INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY 

DHS Needs to Enhance 

Management of Major 

Investments 

Statement of David A. Powner Director, Information 

Technology Management Issues

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Management 

Efficiency 

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

For release on delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

GAO-13-478T
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-478T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Management Efficiency, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of Representatives

March 19, 2013

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

DHS Needs to Enhance Management of Major 

Investments

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS has responsibility for the 

development and operation of the IT 

systems for the agencies and offices 

under its jurisdiction that are key to, 

among other things, securing the 

nation’s borders and enforcing 

immigration laws. DHS reported having 

363 such IT investments. Of these 

investments, 68—with budgeted 

annual costs of about $4 billion—were

under development and classified by 

DHS as a “major” investment requiring

special management attention because 

of its mission importance. 

GAO was asked to testify on the 

progress DHS has made and 

challenges it faces in meeting cost and 

schedule commitments for its major IT 

investments, including those for 

Customs and Border Protection, 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services. Specifically, 

GAO was asked to focus on its 

September 2012 report that 

determined (1) the extent to which 

DHS investments are meeting their 

cost and schedule commitments, (2) 

the primary causes of any commitment 

shortfalls, and (3) the adequacy of 

DHS’s efforts to address these 

shortfalls and their associated causes. 

What GAO Recommended

In its report, GAO recommended that 

the Secretary of Homeland Security 

direct the appropriate officials to 

address guidance shortcomings and 

develop corrective actions for all major 

IT investment projects having cost and 

schedule shortfalls. In commenting on 

a draft of the report, DHS concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

Approximately two-thirds of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) major 

IT investments were meeting their cost and schedule commitments. Specifically, 

out of 68 major IT investments in development, 47 were meeting cost and 

schedule commitments. The remaining 21—which DHS had estimated to cost

about $1 billion—had one or more subsidiary projects that were not meeting cost 

and/or schedule commitments (i.e., they exceeded their goals by at least 10 

percent, which is the level at which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

considers projects to be at increased risk of not being able to deliver planned 

capabilities on time and within budget.)

The primary causes for the cost and schedule shortfalls were (in descending 

order of frequency):

• inaccurate preliminary cost and schedule estimates,

• technical issues in the development phase,

• changes in agency priorities,

• lack of understanding of user requirements, and

• dependencies on other investments that had schedule shortfalls.

Eight of the investments had inaccurate cost and schedule estimates. For 

example, DHS’s Critical Infrastructure Technology investment had a project 

where actual costs were about 16 percent over the estimated cost, due in part to 

project staff not fully validating cost estimates before proceeding with the project. 

In addition, six investments had technical issues in the development phase that 

caused cost or schedule slippages. For example, DHS’s Land Border Integration 

investment had problems with wireless interference at certain sites during 

deployment of handheld devices used for scanning license plates, which caused 

a project to be more than 2 months’ late. 

DHS often did not adequately address cost and schedule shortfalls and their 

causes. GAO’s investment management framework calls for agencies to develop 

and document corrective efforts to address underperforming investments and

DHS policy requires documented corrective efforts when investments experience 

cost or schedule variances. Although 12 of the 21 investments with shortfalls had 

defined and documented corrective efforts, the remaining 9 had not. Officials 

responsible for 3 of the 9 investments said they took corrective efforts but were 

unable to provide plans or any other related documentation showing such action 

had been taken. Officials for the other 6 investments cited criteria in DHS’s policy 

that excluded their investments from the requirement to document corrective 

efforts. This practice is inconsistent with the direction of OMB guidance and 

related best practices that stress developing and documenting corrective efforts 

to address problems in such circumstances. Until DHS addresses its guidance 

shortcomings and ensures each of these underperforming investments has 

defined and documented corrective efforts, these investments are at risk of 

continued cost and schedule shortfalls.

View GAO-13-478T. For more information, 

contact David A.Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov.
Page 1 

March 19, 2013

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the Subcommittee,

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and challenges in acquiring, 

developing, and managing the information technology investments and systems 

used by its agencies and offices, including those used by U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Since its creation in 2002, DHS 

has spent billions of dollars on IT infrastructure used to fulfill its mission to ensure 

a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other 

hazards. We recently reported1 that, during fiscal year 2012, DHS planned to 

spend about $5.6 billion on approximately 363 ongoing IT investments. Of these 

363 investments, 68 were under development and were classified by DHS as a 

‘major’ investment2

This statement is based on our report of September 2012. In that report, we 

discussed how each of the 68 major investments was performing against its cost 

and schedule commitments as reported by the department to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). We also reviewed project plans and related 

documentation and interviewed responsible DHS officials to identify the primary 

causes for the shortfalls and whether any corrective efforts had been developed 

and documented to address the shortfalls. We conducted the performance audit 

from October 2011 to September 2012 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

that required special management attention because of its 

importance to the department’s mission. My testimony today focuses on the key 

findings of that work, including (1) the extent to which DHS investments are 

meeting their cost and schedule commitments, (2) the primary causes of any 

commitment shortfalls, and (3) the adequacy of DHS’s efforts to address these 

shortfalls and their associated causes.

 

1 GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Enhance Management of Cost and 

Schedule for Major Investments, GAO-12-904 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2012).

2 DHS defines a major IT investment as one with a cost of $50 million or more and is 

complex and/or mission critical.
Page 2 

Background 

DHS spends billions of dollars each year on IT investments to perform both 

mission-critical and support functions that frequently must be coordinated among 

components and external entities. Of the $5.6 billion that DHS planned to spend 

on 363 IT-related investments in fiscal year 2012, $4.4 billion was planned for the 

83 the agency considers to be a major investment; namely, costly, complex, 

and/or mission critical.

Of these 83 major IT investments, 68 are under development and were estimated 

to cost approximately $4 billion for fiscal year 2012. Examples of major 

investments under development that are being undertaken by DHS and its 

components include:

• CBP—The Automated Commercial Environment/International Trade Data 

System is to incrementally replace existing cargo processing technology 

systems with a single system for land, air, rail, and sea cargo and serve as 

the central data collection system for federal agencies needing access to 

international trade data in a secure, paper-free, web-enabled environment.

• ICE and CBP—TECS Modernization is to replace the legacy mainframe 

system developed by the U.S. Customs Service in the 1980s to support its 

inspections and investigations. Following the creation of DHS, those activities 

were assigned to CBP and ICE, respectively. CBP and ICE are now working 

to modernize their respective portions of the system in a coordinated effort 

with separate funding and schedules. For example, ICE’s portion of the 

investment will include modernizing the investigative case management and 

related support modules of the legacy system.

We have previously reported on the cost and schedule challenges associated 

with major DHS IT investments, such as those with CBP’s Secure Border 

Network (SBInet) and NPPD’s United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology (US-VISIT).3

 

3 See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to 

Better Support Oversight and Accountability, 

In these reports, we made recommendations 

to address these challenges and keep these investments on schedule and within 

cost.

GAO-07-309 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 

2007); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key 

Technology Program, GAO-10-340 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010); and Homeland 

Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and 

Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2009).
Page 3 

DHS Met Cost and Schedule Commitments for Most Major IT 

Investments 

The success of major IT investments are judged by, among other things, the 

extent to which they deliver promised system capabilities and mission benefits on 

time and within cost. Our research in best practices and extensive experience 

working with federal agencies and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

guidance stress the importance of federal IT investments meeting cost and 

schedule milestones.

Approximately two-thirds of DHS’s IT investments met their cost and schedule 

commitments; the remaining one-third had at least one subsidiary project that 

was not meeting its commitments. Specifically, out of the 68 major investments 

under development, 47 were meeting their cost and schedule commitments. 

The remaining 21 investments—which totaled about $1 billion as of March 

2012—had one or more subsidiary projects that were not meeting cost and/or 

schedule commitments (i.e., they had exceeded their goals by at least 10 

percent, which is the level at which OMB considers projects to be at an increased 

risk of not being able to deliver planned capabilities on time and within budget.) 

Table 1 lists the major investments with a cost and/or schedule shortfall. 

Specifically, of the 21 investments with a shortfall, 5 had one or more subsidiary 

project with a cost shortfall, 18 had one or more project with a schedule shortfall, 

and 2 had a project with both a cost and schedule shortfall. These shortfalls 

place these investments at increased risk of not delivering promised capabilities 

on time and within budget, which, in turn, pose a risk to DHS’s ability to fully meet 

its mission of securing the homeland.
Page 4 

Table 1: DHS Major IT Investments with Cost and Schedule Shortfalls (dollars in millions)

Component Investment

One or more 

projects with 

a cost 

shortfall 

One or more 

projects with a 

schedule 

shortfall 

One or more 

projects with a 

cost and 

schedule 

shortfall 

Total 

planned 

project 

costa

CBP

Automated Commercial 

Environment/International Trade Data 

System

 $124.26

Land Border Integration  20.9

Non-intrusive Inspection Systems Program  332.3

Northern Border, Remote Video 

Surveillance System

 8.2

TECS Modernization  43.03

DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer 

Human Resources IT  8.52

FEMA

Disaster Assistance Improvement Plan    50.5

ICE

Detention and Removal Operations 

Modernization

 8.62

NPPD 

Critical Infrastructure Technology and 

Architecture 

 20.55

Infrastructure Security ComplianceChemical Security Assessment Tool 72.76

National Cybersecurity Protection System  262.6

Next Generation Networks Priority Services  63.06

US-VISIT: Arrival and Departure 

Information System

 7.18

US-VISIT: Automated Biometric 

Identification System

 33.24

TSA

Air Cargo Security    4.09

Federal Air Marshal Service Mission 

Scheduling and Notification System

 5.43

Hazmat Threat Assessment Program  4.09

Security Technology Integrated Program  27.99

USCG

CG Business Intelligence  .86
Page 5 

Component Investment

One or more 

projects with 

a cost 

shortfall 

One or more 

projects with a 

schedule 

shortfall 

One or more 

projects with a 

cost and 

schedule 

shortfall 

Total 

planned 

project 

costa

USCIS

Naturalization: CLAIMS 4  2.36

USSS 

Information Integration and Technology 

Transformation

 43.61

TOTAL 21 5 18 2 $1,144.14b

Source: GAO analysis of OMB’s federal IT Dashboard data.

a These are the total planned costs of all investment projects in development as of March 8, 2012.

b Differences in total are rounded off.

Causes of Investment Cost and Schedule Shortfalls Varied 

The primary causes of the shortfalls in cost and schedule associated with DHS’s 

21 major IT investments were (in descending order of frequency): inaccurate 

preliminary cost and schedule estimates, technical issues in the development 

phase, changes in agency priorities, lack of understanding of user requirements, 

and dependencies on other investments that had schedule shortfalls. A summary 

of these causes by investment and component are shown in table 2. 
Page 6 

Table 2: Primary Causes of Shortfalls Experienced by Major DHS IT Investments (in descending order of frequency) 

Causes Inaccurate 

preliminary 

cost/schedule 

estimates

Technical 

issues in 

development 

phase

Changes 

in agency 

priorities

Lack of 

understanding 

of user 

requirements

Dependencies 

on other 

investments

Other 

causes

Component Investment 

CBP Automated Commercial 

Environment / 

International Trade Data 

System 



Land Border Integration 

Non-Intrusive Inspection 

Systems Program



Northern Border, Remote 

Video Surveillance 

System



TECS Modernization 

DHS Office 

of the Chief 

Information

Officer

Human Resources IT 

FEMA Disaster Assistance 

Improvement Plan

  

ICE Detention and Removal 

Operations Modernization

 

NPPD Critical Infrastructure 

Technology and 

Architecture 



Infrastructure Security 

Compliance: Chemical 

Security Assessment Tool



National Cybersecurity 

Protection System 



Next Generation 

Networks Priority Services 

 

US-VISIT: Arrival and 

Departure Information 

System 



US-VISIT: Automated 

Biometric Identification 

System



TSA Air Cargo Security  
Page 7 

Federal Air Marshal 

Service Mission 

Scheduling and 

Notification System



Hazmat Threat 

Assessment Program



Security Technology 

Integrated Program



USCG CG Business Intelligence 

USCIS Naturalization-CLAIMS 4 

USSS Information Integration 

and Technology 

Transformation



Totals 9 6 3 3 3 2 

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

In our past work on DHS’s investments and related IT management processes, 

we have identified some of these same causes and made recommendations to 

strengthen management in these areas. For example, with regard to cost

estimating, we reported that forming a reliable estimate of costs provides a sound 

basis for measuring against actual cost performance and that the lack of such a 

basis contributes to variances. 4 To help agencies establish such a capability, we 

issued a guide in March 20095 that was based on the practices of leading 

organizations. In a July 2012 report6

We have also reported

examining how well DHS is implementing 

these practices, we reported that the department had weaknesses in cost 

estimating. Accordingly, we made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its 

cost estimating capabilities, and the department has plans and efforts under way 

to implement our recommendations.

7

 

4 GAO, Information Technology Cost Estimation: Agencies Need to Address Significant 

Weaknesses in Policies and Practices, 

that developing sufficient requirements is key to 

effectively delivering systems on time and within budget and that DHS has 

experienced project delays and cost overruns resulting from initial requirements 

not being defined properly. To address this challenge, DHS had begun, as part of 

defining and implementing a new IT governance process, to establish Centers of 

GAO-12-629 (Washington, D.C.: July 2012).

5 GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).

6 GAO-12-629. 

7 GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 2010).
Page 8 

Excellence to provide investment officials with expert assistance in requirements 

development and other essential IT management disciplines.8

About Half of DHS’s Projects with Shortfalls Did Not Have WellDeveloped Corrective Efforts

A variety of best practices exist to guide the successful acquisition of IT 

investments, including how to develop and document corrective actions for 

projects experiencing cost and schedule shortfalls. In particular, GAO’s 

Information Technology Investment Management framework9

DHS developed and documented corrective efforts for 12 of the 21 major 

investments with a shortfall, but the remaining 9 did not have corrective efforts

documented. Table 3 depicts the investments with shortfalls and whether 

corrective efforts had been developed and documented.

calls for agencies 

to develop and document corrective efforts for underperforming projects. It also 

states that agencies are to ensure that, as projects develop and costs rise, the 

project continues to meet mission needs at the expected levels of cost and risk; if 

projects are not meeting expectations or if problems have arisen, agencies are to 

quickly take steps to address the deficiencies. 

 

8 GAO-12-818. 

9 GAO, Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing and 

Improving Process Maturity (version 1.1), GAO-04-394G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
Page 9 

Table 3: Extent to Which DHS Had Developed and Documented Corrective Efforts for Investment Shortfalls

Adequately developed and 

documented corrective efforts?

Yes No

Component Investment 

CBP Automated Commercial Environment / International Trade Data System 

Land Border Integration 

Non-Intrusive Inspection Systems Program 

Northern Border, Remote Video Surveillance System 

TECS Modernization 

DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer, Human Resources IT 

FEMA Disaster Assistance Improvement Plan 

ICE Detention and Removal Operations Modernization 

NPPD Critical Infrastructure Technology and Architecture 

Infrastructure Security Compliance: Chemical Security Assessment Tool 

National Cybersecurity Protection System 

Next Generation Networks Priority Services 

US-VISIT: Arrival and Departure Information System 

US-VISIT: Automated Biometric Identification System 

TSA Air Cargo Security 

Federal Air Marshal Service Mission Scheduling and Notification System 

Hazmat Threat Assessment Program 

Security Technology Integrated Program 

USCG Coast Guard Business Intelligence 

USCIS Naturalization-CLAIMS 4 

USSS Information Integration and Technology Transformation 

Total 12 9

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.

With regard to the investments with shortfalls, three were unable to provide us 

with documentation, even though project officials stated that they had developed 

some corrective efforts, and six did not engage in corrective efforts to address 

shortfalls. Of the three investments, officials from TSA’s Federal Air Marshal 

Service Mission Scheduling and Notification System investment, for example, 

reported that they had addressed the project’s schedule shortfall—which was 

due, in part, to a support contractor not having adequate staffing—by performing 

the work within the agency instead of relying on the contractor. Further, 

according to TSA officials, the cost and schedule shortfalls on the Air Cargo 

Security investment, which were due to technical complications and 

dependencies on other investments, were addressed by establishing a new cost 
Page 10

T

and schedule baseline. Nonetheless, this lack of documentation is inconsistent 

with the direction of DHS’s guidance and related best practices, and it shows a 

lack of process discipline and attention to key details, which raises concerns 

about the thoroughness of corrective efforts.

Of the six investments without any corrective efforts, officials from these 

investments (namely, the Office of the Chief Information Officer’s Human 

Resources IT investment, NPPD’s US-VISIT Automated Biometric Identification 

System and Arrival and Departure Information System investments, USCG’s 

Business Intelligence investment, NPPD’s National Cybersecurity Protection 

System, and USCIS’s Claims 4 investment), stated that they did not develop and 

document corrective efforts because they believed DHS’s guidance does not call 

for it in their circumstances. Specifically, the officials said that although DHS’s 

guidance10

The impact of this approach is that multiple projects can continue to experience 

shortfalls—which increases the risk that investments will experience serious life 

cycle cost and schedule variances—without having to develop and document 

corrective actions to alert top management about potential problems and 

associated risks. This is inconsistent with the direction of OMB, which requires 

agencies to report (via the IT Dashboard) on the cost and schedule performance 

of their projects and considers those projects with a 10 percent or greater 

variance to be at an increased level of risk of not being able to deliver promised 

capabilities on time and within budget, and thus they require special attention 

from management. It is also inconsistent with our best practices research and 

experience at federal agencies, which stresses that agencies report to 

management when projects are not meeting expectations or when problems 

arise and quickly develop and document corrective efforts to address the 

problems. Further, our research and work at agencies has shown that waiting to 

act until significant life cycle variances occur can sometimes be risky and costly, 

as life cycle schedules are typically for multiyear periods, allowing the potential 

for underperforming projects to continue to vary from their cost and schedule 

goals for an extended amount of time without any requirement for corrective 

efforts. Consequently, until these guidance shortcomings have been addressed 

and each underperforming project has defined and documented corrective 

calls for corrective actions to be developed and documented when an 

investment experiences a life cycle cost or schedule variance, the variances on 

their project activities thus far were not large enough to constitute such a 

variance.

 

10 Department of Homeland Security, Acquisition Management Directive 102-01and 

Capital Planning and Investment Control Guide, version 7.2.
Page 11

actions, the department’s major investments these projects support will be at an 

increased risk of cost and schedule shortfalls.

DHS Needs to Address Guidance and Cost and Schedule Shortfalls

To help ensure that DHS investments meet their cost and schedule 

commitments, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 

the appropriate officials to (1) establish guidance that provides for developing 

corrective efforts for major IT investment projects that are experiencing cost and 

schedule shortfalls of 10 percent or greater, similar to those identified in our 

report and (2) ensure that such major projects have defined and documented 

corrective efforts.

DHS concurred with our recommendations and estimated that they would 

implement the first recommendation by September 30, 2013, and the second one 

immediately. We are currently in the process of following up with DHS to assess 

the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented. 

In summary, most of the projects comprising DHS’s 68 major IT investments 

were meeting their cost and schedule commitments, but 21 major investments—

integral to DHS’s mission and costing approximately $1 billion—had projects 

experiencing significant cost and schedule shortfalls. These shortfalls place 

these investments at increased risk of not delivering promised capabilities on 

time and within budget, which, in turn, pose a risk to DHS’s ability to fully meet its 

mission of securing the homeland. DHS guidance does not require projects 

experiencing significant cost and schedule shortfalls to develop and document 

corrective efforts until they cause a life-cycle cost and schedule variance. This 

increases risk and is contrary to effective IT investment practices. Given that 

DHS is currently establishing and implementing new IT governance processes, 

the department is positioned to address the guidance shortfalls.

Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Barber and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at 

(202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Gary Mountjoy (assistant director), Scott 

Borre, Camille Chaires, and Nancy Glover.
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