Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1769 | December 26, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James Brandon Dillon

The Dillon Law Firm, LLC

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tiras D. Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 26, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1769

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable David A. Happe, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C04-1709-F2-2231

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1769 | December 26, 2019 Page 2 of 9

Statement of the Case

[1] Tiras D. Johnson appeals his convictions for dealing in cocaine, as a Level 2 

felony; dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 2 felony; and maintaining a 

common nuisance, as a Level 6 felony, following a jury trial. Johnson raises 

two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied Johnson’s motion to continue his jury trial, which 

motion Johnson made one day before his trial was 

scheduled to commence.

2. Whether the State violated his constitutional rights when it 

searched his residence without a warrant but pursuant to 

the terms of Johnson’s conditions of release on community 

corrections.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2017, the Madison County Drug Task Force engaged in controlled drug buys 

from Eric Troutman. In August, Drug Task Force and Anderson Police 

Department Officer Chad Boynton learned from Troutman that Johnson was 

involved in drug activity. Officer Boynton then learned that Johnson had been 

placed in local community corrections and had signed an agreement with the 

Madison County Community Justice Center pursuant to his placement. 

[4] Johnson’s agreement to be placed in community corrections included the 

following waivers:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1769 | December 26, 2019 Page 3 of 9

11. I agree and specifically waive any and all rights as to 

search and seizure under the laws and constitutions of both the 

United States and the State of Indiana.

12. I have been advised of my rights and understand that any 

community corrections staff, law enforcement officer or 

probation officer may enter my residence at any time without 

prior notice to search. I agree and consent to these terms, and 

understand that, upon request, I must facilitate the entry to my 

vehicle, residence, other location where my property may be 

located, or electronic devices, by providing keys, combinations or 

passwords. My refusal to do so would be a violation which could 

cause my sentence to be revoked.

Ex. Vol. at 8.1

 In a supplemental document attached to the agreement and 

titled “[d]isclosure to individuals residing with a participant on electronic 

monitoring,” the following language appears:

This disclosure is provided to make you aware that as a 

participant of the electronic monitoring/Home Detention 

Program [Johnson] has signed a contract that states:

I agree to allow the Madison County Community Justice 

Center Staff to enter my residence at any time, without 

prior notice, and to make reasonable inquiry into my 

activities and the activities of others in the home. I agree 

to waive my right against search and seizure, and permit 

Madison County Community Justice Center or any law 

enforcement officer acting on behalf of Madison County 

Community Justice Center to search my person, residence, 

1

 Our pagination of the Exhibits Volume is based on the .pdf pagination.
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motor vehicle or any other location where my personal 

property may be found . . . .

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

[5] Officer Boynton approached officials at the Community Justice Center and 

informed them that Troutman had identified Johnson as a participant in drug 

activity. Those officials then “requested . . . that [the Anderson Police 

Department] make contact at the residence and proceed with a search . . . to 

verify whether the information was accurate.” Tr. Vol. III at 9. Officer 

Boynton and other officers then went to Johnson’s residence, went inside, and 

immediately smelled the “odor of burnt . . . marijuana.” Id. at 37. The officers 

then searched the residence and seized 679.97 grams of cocaine; 367.60 grams 

of methamphetamine; firearms; manufacturing equipment; and $6,944.02 in 

cash. Officers also found Johnson’s driver’s license under the cushions of a 

couch. 

[6] On September 1, the State charged Johnson with dealing in cocaine, as a Level 

2 felony; dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 2 felony; and maintaining a 

common nuisance, as a Level 6 felony. The court later set Johnson’s jury trial 

date for June 5, 2019. On June 4, Johnson moved to continue the trial, among 

other reasons, so that he could locate and depose an additional witness. 

According to Johnson, the additional witness would have “testif[ied] that [there 

was a] person[] in the house other than Mr. Johnson.” Tr. Vol. II at 119. But 

Johnson gave no explanation to the court as to why that witness had yet to be 

deposed or the efforts he had previously made to locate that witness, and the 
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court responded to Johnson’s motion by stating that “[t]his is a case which is 

over eighteen . . . months old now” and “at some point the court has to hold 

parties accountable for timely preparation of a case.” Id. at 120. The court then 

denied the motion to continue.

[7] At Johnson’s ensuing trial, he objected to the evidence seized from his 

residence on the ground that it had been seized in violation of his state and 

federal constitutional rights. The trial court overruled that objection. The jury 

then found Johnson guilty as charged, which the trial court reduced to 

judgment. The court then sentenced Johnson, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Motion to Continue

[8] On appeal, Johnson first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion to continue. We review the trial court’s decision to grant or 

deny a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. Maxey v. State, 730 

N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ind. 2000). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court. E.g., Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 

2019). “A motion to postpone the trial on account of the absence of evidence 

can be made only upon affidavit,[2] showing the materiality of the evidence 

2

 The record does not show that Johnson’s June 4 motion to continue was in writing and verified. 

Nonetheless, we prefer to resolve appeals on their merits, and the State does not assert that the fact that 

Johnson only made his motion orally should be the basis for our decision.
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expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it . . . .” 

Ind. Trial Rule 53.5.

[9] According to Johnson, the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

continue because, in doing so, the court denied him the right to present a 

defense by effectively prohibiting him from locating and deposing the additional 

witness. Johnson further asserts that his case is analogous to the facts of Barber 

v. State, in which we held that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied the defendant’s motion to continue to depose an additional, recently 

discovered witness. 911 N.E.2d 641, 646-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. 

In particular, in Barber we stated as follows:

there is no evidence that defense counsel acted in bad faith in 

asking for a continuance on the morning of Barber’s December 

15, 2008, bench trial and filing her updated witness list that 

morning as well. Defense counsel had just located the witnesses 

that weekend and needed time to secure their presence for trial. 

Barber was arrested on October 15, 2008. Barber’s first 

continuance came only five days after her arrest and before her 

defense counsel had been appointed. Barber’s second 

continuance was filed on November 17, 2008, about one month 

after her arrest. It provided, “On the evening on November 14, 

2008, an investigator located one of the many potential witnesses 

that would be essential to the Defendant’s case, however through 

that investigation, it has been learned that there may be several other 

witnesses left to be identified.” Appellant’s App. p. 19 (emphasis 

added). As a result, defense counsel alleged that she could not 

provide an effective defense for Barber. The trial court granted 

the continuance and scheduled the trial for December 15, 2008. 

In the meantime, defense counsel and the Public Defender’s 

Agency Investigators continued to look for additional witnesses. 

On Saturday, December 13, 2008, two days before trial, defense 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1769 | December 26, 2019 Page 7 of 9

counsel finally contacted two additional witnesses, Mathis and 

Collier, who could support Barber’s defense of involuntary 

intoxication. Accordingly, on the morning of trial, defense 

counsel filed a Verified Emergency Motion to Continue seeking a 

motion to continue the trial or, in the alternative, a motion to 

bifurcate the trial allowing the State to present its witnesses that 

day and giving the defense an opportunity to present its 

newfound witnesses on a later date. Defense counsel then 

provided an offer of proof. The only prejudice the State alleged it 

would suffer was that had it known earlier, it could have called 

off its witnesses (two civilians and two officers), who showed up 

for trial that morning. However, defense counsel located Mathis 

and Collier over the weekend and filed the motion to continue on 

Monday morning, the day of the bench trial. As such, the State 

would not have known whether the trial was still on until the trial 

court ruled on the motion. The prejudice to the State is minimal.

Barber’s defense was involuntary intoxication. Under Indiana 

law, “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in the 

prohibited conduct did so while he was intoxicated, only if the 

intoxication resulted from the introduction of a substance into his 

body: (1) without his consent; or (2) when he did not know that 

the substance might cause intoxication.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-5. 

There is obvious prejudice to Barber from not being able to 

present the testimony of Collier and Mathis. Although Barber 

testified that she believed she was drugged, Collier would have 

testified that she believed the same thing happened to her on the 

evening of October 15, 2008, at the same American Legion. And 

according to defense counsel, Mathis would have supported both 

Barber’s and Collier’s testimony. 

Id.

[10] Here, as in Barber, there is no evidence that defense counsel acted in bad faith 

when he requested a continuance. Nonetheless, we cannot agree with Johnson 
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that his facts are analogous to the detailed showing in Barber or that the trial 

court here abused its discretion. Johnson asserts that the additional witness 

would have testified that there was another person at the residence with 

Johnson at the time of the search and seizure. Be that as it may, unlike in 

Barber, Johnson does not explain the materiality, if any, such testimony would 

have had to Johnson’s defense. Also, unlike the two-month timeframe in 

Barber, Johnson had approximately eighteen months to locate and depose his 

additional witness. And further unlike in Barber, Johnson makes no attempt to

show the due diligence he may have used to locate and depose that witness 

within that timeframe. Thus Barber is inapposite here, and we cannot say that 

the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Johnson’s motion to 

continue.

Issue Two: Warrantless Search and Seizure

[11] Johnson next asserts that the State violated his state and federal constitutional 

rights against unreasonable searches and seizures when it entered his home 

without a warrant. “We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on the 

constitutionality of a search and seizure.” Belvedere v. State, 889 N.E.2d 286, 

287 (Ind. 2008).

[12] Johnson asserts that he only waived his rights with respect to searches and 

seizures for those officers “acting on behalf of” the Madison County 

Community Justice Center. Appellant’s Br. at 17-18. But Johnson does not 

discuss his agreement with the Community Justice Center in his argument on 
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appeal. Instead, Johnson’s argument relies on the language of the disclosure to 

third parties that was attached to the agreement.

[13] We reject Johnson’s argument. The actual agreement he signed to participate 

in community corrections unambiguously waived his rights with respect to 

searches and seizures by law enforcement officers, whether those officers were 

acting on behalf of the Community Justice Center or not. And we reject 

Johnson’s bald assertion that Officer Boynton’s coordination with the 

Community Justice Center prior to searching Johnson’s residence was 

pretextual. The record supports the conclusion that the Community Justice 

Center asked Officer Boynton to act on the its behalf. In any event, again, as a 

condition of his placement in community corrections Johnson validly waived 

his right to complain about searches and seizures at his residence. Accordingly,

we affirm the trial court’s admission of the evidence seized from Johnson’s 

residence.

Conclusion

[14] In sum, we affirm Johnson’s convictions.

[15] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.