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ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, AND 

DUPLICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 8, 2012 

Serial No. 112–75 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

WITNESSES

Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Former Governor of Virginia, Former Chairman, 

Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 

For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 35 

Mr. Scott Lilly, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 41 

(1) 

ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, AND 

DUPLICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:09 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, and Keating. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. I recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Today we continue our examination of the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to adequately manage its own people, its resources, and billions of taxpayer dollars, and ultimately its ability 

to carry out its core mission of protecting the American people. 

Investigations recently completed by both the Government Accountability Office and the DHS inspector general call into question 

the Department’s ability to operate effectively and without susceptibility to waste, fraud, and abuse of authority. For example, last 

year more than 150 Department of Homeland Security employees 

were arrested for offenses that hindered carrying out the Department’s core mission to protect the homeland. There were thefts by 

airport screeners. You can see the slides. Between October 2009 

and September 2010, at Newark Liberty Airport, TSA screeners 

stole as much as $30,000 from unsuspecting passengers who were 

trying to get through security to board their plane. In Orlando, passengers had laptop computers stolen from their luggage. There 

were immigration officers accepting bribes; even Customs and Border Protection officers conspiring with transnational drug traffickers. As a former Federal prosecutor in the Department of Justice Public Integrity Section, I find that to be extremely offensive. 

The DHS inspector general received in fiscal year 2011 approximately 5,800 complaints against Customs and Border Patrol employees, and of these complaints, the IG converted approximately 

730 of those complaints into active investigations. Presently the inspector general has approximately 1,200 CBP-related cases open 

for investigation. 

Then there is wasted taxpayer money. After squandering close to 

$1 billion on the failed SBInet, DHS is attempting yet another bor-
2 

der security project. Once again, the lack of coordination, communication, and integration at the administrative level has produced 

similar results. The Department is unable to justify the rationale 

for specific technologies, how much is needed, or even where to put 

it along the Arizona border. 

Further findings expose duplicative functions within the Department that unnecessarily spend money and consume scarce resources. 

These findings call into question whether the Department of 

Homeland Security, given the challenges it faces from within, is capable of securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws, and 

protecting the American people from terrorist attacks. 

Last month the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, testified before our committee the administration’s fiscal year 

2013 budget reflects a commitment to protect the homeland and 

the American people through effective and efficient uses of resources. She said the Department of Homeland Security has implemented initiatives to cut costs, share resources across its agencies, 

and consolidate and streamline operations. This includes redirecting over $850 million from administrative and mission support areas to front-line priorities, as well as saving over $3 billion 

through various efforts since 2009, which has allowed DHS to redeploy funds to mission-critical initiatives. 

These are all positive initiatives, and I commend the Secretary, 

but the fact is the Government Accountability Office states the Department can do a better job saving taxpayer dollars by eliminating 

duplication and finding additional cost savings. 

For example, last week the GAO issued a key report related to 

duplication and cost-saving opportunities across the Federal Government. The report identified 16 homeland security areas where 

offices, programs, or initiatives have similar or overlapping objectives. The GAO report also identified inefficiencies within DHS 

that are causing other Federal agencies that contract with DHS to 

spend more money than necessary. 

Last year DHS collected about $230 million in fees from other 

agencies to pay for 2,500 facility risk assessments. However, DHS’s 

Federal Protective Service completed only four of those assessments. The agencies that paid for the service got nothing in return 

for their risk assessments. 

In addition to GAO’s work, the DHS inspector general found 

hundreds of millions of dollars in questionable costs in 2011. During the past year, the IG made recommendations to improve acquisition controls, to reduce duplication, develop more efficient fraudprevention efforts for FEMA, strengthen information sharing between the Government and private industry on cyberthreats, and 

improve TSA’s oversight of airport badging procedures, among 

other important findings. 

Just as American families have had to make difficult choices concerning their finances, so should the Department. DHS has a responsibility to not only protect and secure the homeland, but also 

ensure that it is a good steward of the taxpayer dollars. 

In February, our subcommittee began a series of hearings examining the challenges faced by DHS. These hearings seek to answer 

three basic questions: What challenges does DHS face? More blunt-
3 

ly, what is wrong with the Department? Why is it taking so long 

to become ‘‘One DHS’’, as Secretary Napolitano often talks about? 

Do the DHS shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core mission of securing the homeland? 

Today we continue that discussion. Stealing from airline passengers, conspiring with drug traffickers, blindly throwing resources onto the border, and unnecessarily duplicating efforts contributing to the waste, fraud, and abuse of authority that fleeces 

the American taxpayer and breaches their trust. We need to assess 

to what extent internal control weaknesses exist that, if corrected, 

could prevent incidences like these in the future. 

Given the fiscal challenges facing our Nation and the possibility 

for continued waste within DHS, it is important to assess how Congress could help make DHS a stronger organization. So I look forward to hearing more about these cost-saving areas from the GAO 

and DHS inspector general and the witnesses here. 

We are honored to have Governor Gilmore here as well. I appreciate you being here, Governor. 

With that I recognize the Ranking Member. 

[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

MARCH 8, 2012 

Today we continue our examination of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

ability to adequately manage its people, its resources, billions of taxpayer dollars 

and, ultimately, its ability to carry out its core mission of protecting the American 

people. 

Investigations recently completed by both the Government Accountability Office 

and the DHS Inspector General call into question the Department’s ability to operate effectively, and without susceptibility to waste, fraud, and abuse of authority. 

For example, last year more than 150 Department of Homeland Security employees were arrested for offenses that hindered carrying out the Department’s core mission to protect the homeland. 

There were thefts by airport screeners. Between October 2009 and September 

2010 at Newark Liberty Airport, TSA screeners stole as much as $30,000 from 

unsuspecting passengers who were trying to get through security to board their 

plane. In Orlando, passengers had laptop computers stolen from their luggage. 

There were Immigration officers accepting bribes. Even Customs and Border Protection officers conspiring with transnational drug traffickers. The DHS Inspector 

General received in fiscal year 2011 approximately 5,800 complaints against Customs and Border Protection employees. Of these complaints, the Inspector General 

converted approximately 730 into investigations. Presently, the Inspector General 

has approximately 1,200 CBP-related cases open for investigation. 

Then there’s wasted taxpayer money. After squandering close to $1 billion on the 

failed SBINet, DHS is attempting yet another border security project. Once again, 

the lack of coordination, communication, and integration at the administrative level 

has produced similar results. The Department is unable to justify the rationale for 

specific technologies, how much is needed, or even where to put it along the Arizona 

border. 

Further findings expose duplication of functions within the Department that unnecessarily spend money and consume scarce resources. 

These findings call into question whether the Department of Homeland Security, 

given the challenges it faces from within, is capable of securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws and protecting the American people from terrorist attacks. 

Last month, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, testified before our committee the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a commitment to protect the homeland and American people through effective and efficient 

use of resources. 

She said the Department of Homeland Security has implemented initiatives to cut 

costs, share resources across its agencies, and consolidate and streamline operations. This includes redirecting over $850 million from administrative and mission 
4 

support areas to front-line priorities, as well as saving over $3 billion through various efforts since 2009, which has allowed DHS to redeploy funds to mission-critical 

initiatives. 

These are all positive initiatives. But the Government Accountability Office states 

the Department can do an even better job of saving taxpayer dollars by eliminating 

duplication and finding additional cost savings. 

For example, last week the GAO issued a key report related to duplication and 

cost savings opportunities, across the Federal Government. The report identified 16 

homeland security areas where offices, programs, or initiatives have similar or overlapping objectives. 

The GAO report also identifies inefficiencies within DHS that are causing other 

Federal agencies that contract with DHS to spend more money than necessary. 

Last year, DHS collected about $230 million in fees from other agencies to pay 

for 2,500 facility risk assessments. However, DHS’s Federal Protective Service completed only four of those assessments. The agencies that paid for the service but got 

nothing in return ended up conducting their own risk assessments. 

In addition to GAO’s work, the DHS Inspector General found hundreds of millions 

of dollars in questionable costs in 2011. During the past year, the Inspector General 

made recommendations to improve acquisition controls to reduce duplication, develop more efficient fraud prevention efforts for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, strengthen information sharing between the Government and private 

industry on cyber threats, and improve TSA’s oversight of airport badging procedures, among other important findings. 

Just as American families have to make difficult choices concerning their finances, 

so should the Department. DHS has a responsibility to not only protect and secure 

the homeland but also ensure that it is a good steward of taxpayer dollars. 

In February, our subcommittee began a series of hearings examining the challenges faced by DHS. These hearings seek to answer three basic questions: 

• What challenges does DHS face and put bluntly, what is wrong with DHS? 

• Why is it taking so long to become ‘‘One DHS’’? as Secretary Napolitano so often 

mentions, and 

• Do DHS shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core mission of securing 

the homeland? 

Today, we continue that discussion. Stealing from airline passengers, conspiring 

with drug traffickers, blindly throwing resources onto the border and unnecessarily 

duplicating efforts contribute to the waste, fraud, and abuse of authority that fleeces 

the American taxpayer and breaches their trust. We need to assess to what extent 

internal control weaknesses exist that, if corrected, could prevent incidents like 

these in the future. 

Given the fiscal challenges facing our Nation and the possibility for continued 

waste within DHS, it is important to assess how Congress can help make DHS a 

stronger organization. We look forward to hearing more about these cost savings 

areas from GAO and the DHS Inspector General. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 

this hearing, which I think is a timely examination of the ways to 

ensure that our scarce Homeland Security funds are being utilized 

properly. 

I do agree with you in terms of the Arizona border surveillance 

technology plan. I agree with you, as a former district attorney myself, there is no place for criminal acts, you know, with the people 

that are there to protect us in the law enforcement field in our 

country. But I do think it is important to note as well that DHS 

itself has been vigilant in rooting out this kind of behavior, and 

they are to be commended in that respect. 

The current economic climate does have all people tightening 

their belts across the country. The same is true for our Federal 

Government. Congress has the responsibility of safeguarding taxpayer funds by eliminating instances of duplication and wasteful 

spending. Yet streamlining operations can at times be distinguished from reducing the resources of Federal employees so drastically that they can’t perform their jobs effectively and provide 

needed Government services. 

I mentioned at our last hearing both the necessity of looking at 

these issues from a broader perspective; that shortsighted plans 

that eliminate job-creating programs and compromise our safety for 

the sake of short-term savings are not always the answer. For this 

reason, I am pleased to see the GAO has taken a bird’s-eye view 

of Federal Government programs and provided with us a roadmap 

for actual savings prospects. The report identifies 51 areas that re-
10 

quire greater efforts at efficiency, as well as suggestions for providing more effective Government services. It also identifies Government duplication, overlap, fragmentation to help Congress discover more cost savings and revenue-enhancement opportunities. 

Although the report contains a Government-wide assessment, it 

highlights several broad areas where duplication, overlap, and fragmentation exist within DHS. Accordingly, this subcommittee received testimony from DHS Under Secretary Rafael Borras last 

week on efforts the Department is making to integrate its management system. 

Pursuant to his testimony, the Department is making positive 

strides in this regard and is having clear plans in place to reduce 

duplicated efforts in the management area. In fact, the Department’s Efficiency Review Initiative, which was highlighted by Vice 

President Biden as a model for all Federal agencies, has resulted 

in more than $1 billion in DHS cost avoidances, including $180 million saved by consolidating duplicative software-licensing agreements. 

Moreover, the Department serves as one of the leading Federal 

agencies in the administration’s Shared First Initiative, which requires Federal agencies to eliminate duplicative IT systems. Due to 

this program, there aren’t any duplicative IT efforts at DHS, even 

in the face of at least $1.2 billion in duplicative IT investments at 

the Departments of Energy and Defense. So according to the GAO 

head, Comptroller Gene Dodaro, again, DHS is to be commended 

for moving in this direction. 

These are the good stories. I am pleased to see that Secretary 

Napolitano has advanced internal measures aimed at eliminating 

waste, fraud, and duplication. Unfortunately, this does not change 

the fact that DHS is still made up of 22 legacy agencies, and a 

number of its activities are still shared by other Federal agencies. 

It is within these instances where GAO identifies numerous instances of undefined roles, responsibilities, and duplicative efforts 

that ultimately result in spending taxpayer money that could have 

been better utilized. 

For example, when it comes to personnel background investigations, cybersecurity training, and the identification of fraudulent 

travel documents, the lines between multiple agencies are blurred. 

Furthermore, despite its management strides, the Department has 

yet to fully address efficiencies in component operations that result 

in wasted funds. 

The Department’s Federal Protective Service has received over 

$230 million from Federal agencies for risk assessment and security services, yet these agencies have not found the FPS’s services 

adequate or satisfactory, so they perform their own assessments as 

well. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that a much more sound strategy to eliminate and streamline bureaucratic programs that haven’t been 

working for years over preventing new programs and technologies 

with potential for taking effective due cost concerns in place is a 

sound strategy. I look forward to receiving testimony from our witnesses on these and other issues in the relevance of today’s hearing. With that, I yield back my time. 

[The statement of Mr. Keating follows:] 
11 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER WILLIAM R. KEATING

Thank you, Chairman McCaul for holding this important hearing, which is a 

timely examination of ways to ensure that scarce homeland security funds are being 

utilized properly. 

The current economic climate has people all across America tightening their belts 

and cutting back on spending. 

The same is true of our Federal Government. 

Congress has the responsibility of safeguarding taxpayer funds by eliminating instances of duplication and wasteful spending. 

Yet, streamlining operations is not one and the same with reducing the resources 

of Federal employees so drastically that they cannot perform their jobs effectively 

and provide needed Government services. 

I have said this time and again, both on and off the committee, shortsighted plans 

that eliminate job-creating programs and compromise our safety for the sake of immediate savings are not always the answer. 

For this reason, I am pleased to see that the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) has taken a bird’s-eye view of Federal Government programs and provided 

with us a road map for actual savings prospects. 

The report identifies 51 areas that require greater efforts at efficiency as well as 

suggestions for providing more effective Government services. 

It also identifies Government duplication, overlap, fragmentation to help Congress 

discover more cost savings and revenue-enhancement opportunities. 

Although the report contains a Government-wide assessment, it highlights several 

broad areas where duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exist within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Accordingly, this subcommittee received testimony from DHS Under Secretary of 

Management Rafael Borras last week on the efforts the Department is making to 

integrate its management system. 

Pursuant to his testimony, the Department is making very positive strides in regard to having clear plans in place to reduce duplicative efforts in the management 

arena. In fact, the Department’s Efficiency Review Initiative, which was highlighted by 

Vice President Biden as a model for all Federal agencies, has resulted in more than 

$1 billion in DHS cost avoidances, including $180 million saved by consolidating duplicative software-licensing agreements. 

Moreover, the Department serves as one of the leading Federal agencies in the 

administration’s Shared First Initiative, which requires Federal agencies to eliminate duplicative IT systems. 

Due to this program, there aren’t any duplicative IT efforts at DHS, even in the face of at least $1.2 billion in duplicative IT investments at the Departments of Energy and Defense, according to GAO head, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro. 

These are the good stories. And I am pleased to see that Secretary Napolitano has 

advanced internal measures aimed at eliminating waste, fraud, and duplication. 

Unfortunately, this does not change the fact that DHS is still made up of 22 legacy agencies and a number of its activities are still shared by other Federal agencies. 

It is within these instances where GAO identifies numerous instances of undefined roles and responsibilities and duplicative efforts that ultimately result in 

spending taxpayer money that could have been better utilized. 

For example, when it comes to personnel background investigations, cybersecurity 

trainings, and the identification of fraudulent travel documents, the lines between 

multiple agencies are blurred. 

Furthermore, despite its management strides, the Department has yet to fully address deficiencies in component operations that result in wasted funds. 

The Department’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) has received over $230 million 

from Federal agencies for risk assessments and security services. 

Yet, these agencies have not found the FPS’s services adequate or satisfactory, so 

they perform their own assessments, as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I think that it is much more sound strategy to eliminate or 

streamline bureaucratic programs that haven’t been working for years over preventing new programs and technologies with potential from taking effect due to cost 

concerns. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member and his bipartisanship. Other Members are reminded that they may submit statements for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
12 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 8, 2012 

Thank you, Chairman McCaul for holding this hearing. 

These are very difficult financial times and every aspect of the Government—Federal, State, and local—must do its part to eliminate wasteful spending, weed out unnecessary duplication, and cut costs where possible. 

Reducing Government spending by eliminating overlapping and duplicative programs is a common-sense approach to saving scarce Federal funds and enhancing 

revenue. This approach, however, should be achieved with a careful examination of what 

works, what does not work, what should be consolidated, and what should be left 

alone. 

For example, it has been proposed that the Department of Homeland Security reduce 16 individually-authorized preparedness grant programs into a single pool of 

money. 

This proposal causes me grave concern. 

Although I recognize it is prudent to re-evaluate and streamline programs to promote efficiency and reduce costs in the wake of the current fiscal climate, I am concerned that the end result will be hamstrung first responders facing unprecedented 

natural disasters. 

As required by law, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted 

an examination of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across Federal Government programs and has recommended actions for improvement. 

The result of this examination is a 426-page report, the size of which, is an indication that extensive work is required. 

In the report, GAO identifies 51 areas where programs may be able to achieve 

greater efficiencies or become more effective in providing Government services and 

32 areas with evidence of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation. 

Due to its size, mission, and inherent overlapping authority, the Department of 

Homeland Security is named in more areas of overlap than any other agency. 

The report also contained 176 actions that either the Executive Branch or Congress should take to improve this country’s fiscal outlook. 

While it is convenient for my colleagues to point the finger at the Executive 

Branch, in this instance, the numbers indicate that the Executive Branch is ahead 

of the game while Congress, with a Republican controlled House, lags behind. 

In fact, in a follow-up status report on the 176 recommended actions, GAO determined that nearly 80 percent of the issues identified that required Executive Branch 

action have been addressed. 

On the other hand, this Congress has addressed less than 40 percent of the GAO 

recommendations that required Congressional action. 

Many of the recommended Congressional actions could have been achieved by 

now, if the Majority would stop putting politics first and bring common-sense, costsavings bills—even if introduced by Democrats—to the House floor. 

As the Ranking Member of a committee that shares its oversight jurisdiction with 

over 100 Congressional committees and subcommittees, watching my colleagues put 

politics first comes as no surprise. 

To illustrate this point, the Homeland Security Authorization Act that this committee ordered reported last October has yet to be considered by the House because, 

in part, the report has been held up due to jurisdictional challenges. 

Of relevance to this hearing, that measure contains a section that would require 

the Department to ‘‘identify redundant, wasteful, or unnecessary capabilities and capacities where resources can be redirected.’’ 

Unless we get our house in order and reduce duplicative homeland security jurisdiction, good-intentioned provisions like this one that would result in efficiencies at 

the Department of Homeland Security, are unlikely to ever be enacted into law. 

With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You, having served as a district attorney, and I as 

a Federal prosecutor, I think we make a pretty good team. I think 

our goal is not gotcha politics here, it is about how we can better 

improve the Department, which is so important to protect the lives 

of the American people. 

So with that, I want to introduce our distinguished panel of witnesses. First, the Honorable James Gilmore. He is a former Governor of Virginia. When I lived in Virginia, at DOJ, he was my 
13 

Governor. He is Chairman of the Congressional Advisory Panel to 

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Prior to serving as Governor, he was 

Virginia’s attorney general. He also served in the U.S. Army as a 

counterintelligence agent. In 2009, he became president and CEO 

of the Free Congress Foundation. He is also president of USA Secure. 

Next we have Ms. Cathleen Berrick, the Managing Director of 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office. In this position she oversees GAO’s reviews of the 

Department of Homeland Security and Justice programs. Prior to 

being named Managing Director by Comptroller Gene Dodaro, she 

oversaw GAO’s reviews of aviation and surface transportation security matters, as well as Department of Homeland Security management issues. 

We also have next Mr. Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector 

General of the Department of Homeland Security. He assumed this 

position in February 2011. Previously, Mr. Edwards served as the 

Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. 

He has served over 20 years in the Federal Government, and has 

held leadership positions at several Federal agencies, including 

TSA, United States Postal Service Office of Inspector General, and 

the U.S. Postal Service. I have two extra reporters from two of my 

new counties in my new district that may want to talk to you about 

the Postal Service after this hearing. 

Mr. Scott Lilly is the senior fellow at the Center for American 

Progress. He writes and researches on areas including governance, 

Federal budgeting, National security, and the economy. He joined 

the center in 2004 after 31 years of service within the United 

States Congress. He served as a clerk and staff director on the 

House Appropriations Committee, minority staff director of that 

committee; executive director of the House Democrat Study Group; 

executive director of the Joint Economic Committee; and chief of 

staff in the office of Congressman David Obey from Wisconsin. 

It is good to have you here. You have a pretty extensive background in this institution. It is good to have you. 

So with that, I now recognize our first witness, the former Governor Gilmore, for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES S. GILMORE, III, FORMER GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA, FORMER CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL 

ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION 

Mr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I thank you 

for the invitation, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, Members of the subcommittee. My thanks also to Chairman Peter King for this invitation as well. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that the oral remarks that 

I make today be extended in the record, with the permission of the 

subcommittee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, I am here today, I think, to give 

you some sense of historical perspective of how we ended up where 

we are today, which may give some insight as to where we are real-
14 

ly trying to go. I was approached in 1999—1998, really—by the 

Congress through its representative the Department of Defense, 

was delegated with the authority of setting up the official Commission of the United States Congress on Terrorism and Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, and asked to chair that Commission. 

I want the Members to know about your Commission. This was 

not a Commission of insiders. This was not a witch hunt. This was 

not an effort to try to find blame. This was an effort, instead, at 

a very early date, to investigate the state of preparedness of the 

United States. It was not a Washington- or Federal-centric Commission. The Congress, in its wisdom, put onto the membership 

people—police, fire, rescue, emergency services, people from across 

the States, as well as some specialists in intelligence and other 

areas. 

Jim Clapper, I asked him to serve as the Vice Chairman of our 

Commission, which he did for many years until he left to go back 

into the Government. As everyone is aware, General Clapper is 

now the Director of National Intelligence of the United States. 

Ray Downey was our fire representative. He died in the World 

Trade Center on 9/11. Paul Bremer was on the Commission. But 

frankly, the work was aided a great deal by our representatives 

from around the States in the various fields that were important 

to homeland security. 

We issued our first report in 1999. We issued our second report 

in 2000. I brought a copy of that along with me here today just to 

display to you. All the Congresspeople received all five of our reports. We just did three reports before the 9/11 attack and two 

afterwards. The Congress extended the Commission, the 3-year 

Commission, for 2 years afterwards. 

This second report was issued December 15 in the year 2000, 

fully a year before the attack. In the opening cover letter we reported, ‘‘We are impelled by the stark realization that a terrorist 

attack on some level inside our borders is inevitable, and the 

United States must be ready.’’ This was not the first warning, either by other people or even by our Commission, as to the nature 

of things, but it was widely ignored. 

The second report, however, did address the issue of the Department of Homeland Security, and we did not endorse the Department. We investigated for a year the question of how you address 

this issue. We believed that to create a Department of Homeland 

Security would require at least 10 years to put together, to 

straighten it all out, to figure out who was in and who was out, 

what the chain of command would be, how the management pieces 

would be put into place. We just didn’t think we had 10 years. So 

our recommendation, which is extensively discussed in our reports, 

was a White House coordinating body. 

Now, we did—in May 2010, General Clapper and I did brief the 

new administration. We sat with Vice President Cheney at length. 

We believed that the Bush administration was, in fact, beginning 

to set up the internal White House committee in order to coordinate all the different elements of the United States Government 

that would deal with homeland security issues. But sadly enough, 

we didn’t have a year after the issuance of this report. The 9/11 

attack, of course, occurred before that time. 
15 

After the 9/11 attack, there was enormous political pressure in 

both the Congress and the administration to take decisive action. 

It didn’t, I think, seem like the coordinating recommendations we 

made looked decisive enough after the 9/11 attack. The Congress 

decided that they were going to move on their own and set up a 

Department of Homeland Security and toss these various agencies 

into one overarching department. 

It seemed apparent that that was going to happen, and I believe 

the Bush administration could fairly be said to be resisting it. But 

after a while, they concluded that Congress was going to act, and 

they wanted to be a part of shaping it, and they, in fact, submitted 

their own bill. 

Our position of the Gilmore Commission, even after all these 

years, would be, and still is today, that while we did not recommend this structure, nonetheless we wished them all success, 

because after 10 years, that is what we got. So we really ought to 

be going to work with these distinguished colleagues to my left in 

order to polish this up and find ways to eliminate duplication, and 

to work in order to make it a great success, as indeed we believed 

that it can be. 

Our review would indicate that of the initial reports that have 

come out, we are concerned about the original report of DHS of 

Homeland Security grants, fraudulent travel documents, passenger 

aviation fees, and domestic disaster assistance. We believe these 

areas are areas where duplication is realistic and could be addressed. 

We think much work has to be done. We believe that we still 

haven’t completely answered the question of who is in charge in 

any particular area. The FBI is not in the Department. The CIA 

is not in the Department. Locals and States are not in the Department. Locals will always be the first responders, just as they were 

at the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon. They are not in 

the DHS structure, although there is some communication. 

We believe there has been woefully inadequate public communication to the people of the United States as to what the dangers 

are. We believe that there has been insufficient attention and seriousness paid to the risk of the use of the military in the homeland, 

one of our principal areas. The most recent National Defense Authorization Act, for example, has reckless language that authorizes, 

by construction, the detention of American citizens indefinitely and 

without trial. There is language in there that the Congress, I think, 

sought to correct that, and I think they failed to correct it. 

These are serious challenges as we see right now. We believe 

there is no training of the military to play a law enforcement role, 

nor should they play a law enforcement role. We believe that the 

locals and the States are not being sufficiently cut in, nor financed, 

in order to prepare for the inevitable additional attacks. 

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in closing, that I am now president and CEO of the Free Congress Foundation. We have several 

topics that we address. One of our topics that we are about to do 

is to begin now the Center for National Security at the Free Congress Foundation for the purpose of beginning to follow up on this 

work, which has not been followed up on, in our view, sufficiently. 

We would like to make a contribution to the community and to the 
16 

Congress, and we will do it through the raising of private funds 

and through the use of a private nonprofit. Hopefully we can make 

a contribution to your work, Mr. Chairman, and that of your subcommittee, and that of the full committee. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES S. GILMORE, III 

MARCH 8, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman it is honor to be here today. I commend you and House Homeland 

Security Chairman Peter King for holding these forward-thinking hearings on reviewing American Homeland Security policy as an institution for the 21st Century. 

Communicating with the American public about the realities of terrorism and how 

our country is prepared is essential to keeping our liberty. 

I have singled out a few items to consider as objectives to save taxpayer dollars. 

I note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) isn’t the only agency with 

duplication problems. This is a Government-wide problem—but four Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) report items stand out. 

Homeland Security Grants.—The Department of Homeland Security needs better 

project information and coordination among four overlapping grant programs (current reform is underway with grant consolidation). 

Information Technology Investment Management.—The Office of Management and 

Budget, and the Departments of Defense and Energy need to address potentially duplicative information technology investments to avoid investing in unnecessary systems. 

Passenger Aviation Security Fees.—Options for adjusting the passenger aviation 

security fee could further offset billions of dollars in civil aviation security costs. 

Domestic Disaster Assistance.—The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

could reduce the costs to the Federal Government related to major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal indicator on which disaster funding decisions are based and better measuring a State’s capacity to respond without 

Federal assistance. 

HISTORY OF GILMORE COMMISSION BEFORE & AFTER 9/11

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Americans and most of the civilized world looked 

ahead to the future with little fear—especially of global war. A transcript of a Jan. 

26, 1996 Bill Clinton Presidential radio address delivered on a Saturday morning 

following his recently delivered state of the union address sums up where he and 

most of Americans were focused—Domestic Policy: 

‘‘These are the seven challenges I set forth Tuesday night—to strengthen our families, to renew our schools, and expand educational opportunity, to help every American who’s willing to work for it achieve economic security, to take our streets back 

from crime, to protect our environment, to reinvent our government so that it serves 

better and costs less, and to keep America the leading force for peace and freedom 

throughout the world. We will meet these challenges, not through big government. 

The era of big government is over, but we can’t go back to a time when our citizens 

were just left to fend for themselves.’’ 

Little did we know then that by 2003 a Republican President would sign a bipartisan bill creating another Government cabinet agency called the ‘‘Department of 

Homeland Security.’’ 

As a new Republican majority emerged in the mid-1990s in the House and Senate—there was much talk of reinventing Government and President Clinton and the 

Congress did balance the Federal budget for the first time in three decades in 1998. 

However, Congress and the Clinton administration were uneasy about the growing threat to the West which came in two major events—the August 7, 1998 U.S. 

Embassy bombings in Africa and the October 12, 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. 

We worked tirelessly to deliver our first report to the Congress on Dec. 15, 1999. 

The Gilmore Commission was up and running by the time of the USS Cole incident—and probably did our best work in the second report—which was delivered to 

the Congress on Dec. 15, 2000. We kept our focus and delivered our final report to 

Congress and President Bush a week before September 11, 2001. 

The Commission was extended another 2 years after 9/11. 
17 

From 1999 to 2003, I was proud to serve as Chairman of the Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic Response to Terrorism Involving 

Weapons of Mass Destruction—the shortened name became known as ‘‘The Gilmore 

Commission.’’ To sum up what we did in those 5 years prior and after 9/11 is this: 

Our Commission was focused on local responders. One Gilmore Commission member, Ray Downey, served as a representative from the New York City Fire Department. Ray, unfortunately, died serving the people of his city and Nation while responding and saving lives on September 11, 2001. Of our five reports—we delivered 

164 recommendations. One hundred forty-six have now been adopted by the Congress and the Executive Branch. 

Prior to the horrendous attacks on 9/11 our Commission (myself and Gen. James 

Clapper) briefed former Vice President Dick Cheney at the White House in May 

2001 to address the growing terrorist threat to this country and to begin to develop 

our counterterrorism office inside the White House. This would become the Office 

of Homeland Security which was announced by President Bush on September 20, 

2001. 

CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE FOR THE GILMORE COMMISSION

The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105–261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks. 

It said: The panel shall—— 

1. Assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness for incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction; 

2. Assess the progress of Federal training programs for local emergency responses 

to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; 

3. Assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents involving weapons of 

mass destruction, including a review of unfunded communications, equipment, and 

planning requirements, and the needs of maritime regions; 

4. Recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts, and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction incidents; and 

5. Assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in funding effective 

local response capabilities. 

That Act required the Advisory Panel to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction to the President 

and the Congress three times during the course of the Advisory Panel’s deliberations—on December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Advisory Panel’s tenure was 

extended for 2 years in accordance with Section 1514 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1358, Public Law 107–107, 107th Congress, 

First Session), which was signed into law by the President on December 28, 2001. 

By virtue of that legislation, the panel was required to submit two additional reports—one on December 15, 2002, and one on December 15, 2003. 

ADVISORY PANEL COMPOSITION (A UNIQUE MEMBERSHIP FOCUSED ON FIRST

RESPONDERS)

Mister Chairman, please allow me to pay special tribute to the men and women 

who serve on our panel. This Advisory Panel is unique in one very important way. 

It is not the typical National ‘‘blue ribbon’’ panel, which in most cases historically 

have been composed almost exclusively of what I will refer to as ‘‘Washington Insiders’’—people who have spent most of their professional careers inside the Beltway. 

This panel has a sprinkling of that kind of experience—a former Member of Congress and Secretary of the Army, a former State Department Ambassador-at-Large 

for Counterterrorism, a former senior executive from the CIA and the FBI, a former 

senior member of the intelligence community, the former head of a National academy on public health, two retired flag-rank military officers, a former senior executive in a non-governmental charitable organization, and the head of a National law 

enforcement foundation. But what truly makes this panel special and, therefore, 

causes its pronouncement to carry significantly more weight, is the contribution 

from the members of the panel from the rest of the country: 

• Three directors of State emergency management agencies, from California, 

Iowa, and Indiana, two of whom now also serve their Governors as Homeland 

Security Advisors; 

• The deputy director of a State homeland security agency; 

• A State epidemiologist and director of a State public health agency; 
18 

• A former city manager of a mid-size city; • The chief of police of a suburban city in a major metropolitan area; • Senior professional and volunteer fire fighters; • A senior emergency medical services officer of a major metropolitan area; • And, of course—in the person of your witness—a former State governor. 

These are representatives of the true ‘‘first responders’’—those heroic men and 

women who put their lives on the line every day for the public health and safety 

of all Americans. Moreover, so many of these panel members are also National leaders in their professions: Our EMS member is a past president of the national association of emergency medical technicians; one of our emergency managers is the 

past president of her national association; our law officer now is president of the 

international association of chiefs of police; our epidemiologist is past president of 

her professional organization; one of our local firefighters is chair of the terrorism 

committee of the international association of fire chiefs; the other is chair of the 

prestigious national Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability. 

Those attacks continue to carry much poignancy for us, because of the direct loss 

to the panel. Ray Downey, Department Deputy Chief and chief-in-charge of Special 

Operations Command, Fire Department of the City of New York, perished in the 

collapse of the second tower in the September 11 attack on the New York World 

Trade Center. 

PANEL REPORTS

In the history of the Panel, we produced five advisory reports to the Congress and 

to the President of the United State. The first report in 1999 assessed threat. The 

second report in 2000 developed the fundamentals of a National strategy for combating terrorism. 

The third report, dedicated to Ray Downey who lost his life in the World Trade 

Center, filled out a National strategy in five key subject areas: State and local response capabilities, health and medical capabilities, immigration and border control, 

cybersecurity, and use of the military. Our fourth report in 2002, issued in the year 

following the 9/11 attacks, further made recommendations on how to marshal the 

National effort towards a National strategy. It paid special attention to the needs 

of intelligence sharing and the proper structure for counterterrorism activities inside 

the United States. Our last report was issued on December 15, 2003. That final report sought to express some end-vision and direction for the United States as it develops its National strategy and makes the country safer. 

FIFTH REPORT (2003)—FORGING AMERICA’S NEW NORMALCY: SECURING OUR HOMELAND, 

PRESERVING OUR LIBERTY

Mister Chairman, the Advisory Panel released its fifth and final report on December 15, 2003. In that report, the strategic vision, themes, and recommendations 

were motivated by the unanimous view of the panel that its final report should attempt to define a future state of security against terrorism—one that the panel has 

chosen to call ‘‘America’s New Normalcy.’’ 

That strategic vision offered by the panel reflects the guiding principles that the 

panel has consistently enumerated throughout its reports: 

• It must be truly National in scope, not just Federal. 

• It should build on the existing emergency response system within an all-hazards framework. 

• It should be fully resourced with priorities based on risk. 

• It should be based on measurable performance. 

• It should be truly comprehensive, encompassing the full spectrum of awareness, 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery against domestic and international threats against our physical, economic, and societal well-being. 

• It should include psychological preparedness. 

• It should be institutionalized and sustained. 

• It should be responsive to requirements from and fully coordinated with State 

and local officials and the private sector as partners throughout the development, implementation, and sustainment process. 

• It should include a clear process for strategic communications and community 

involvement. 

• It must preserve civil liberties. 

In developing the report, panel members all agreed at the outset that it could not 

postulate, as part of its vision, a return to a pre-September 11 ‘‘normal.’’ The threats 

from terrorism are now recognized to be a condition must face far into the future. 

It was the panel’s firm intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects 
19 

terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats from other sources that the American people face every day—from natural diseases and other illnesses to crime and 

traffic and other accidents, to mention a few. The panel firmly believes that terrorism must be put in the context of the other risks we face, and that resources 

should be prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks in logical fashion. 

In 2004 our panel proffered a view of the future—5 years hence—that it believes 

offers a reasonable, measurable, and attainable benchmark. It believes that, in the 

current absence of longer-term measurable goals, this benchmark can provide Government at all levels, the private sector, and our citizens a set of objectives for readiness and preparedness. The panel did not claim that the objectives presented in 

this future view are all-encompassing. Neither do they necessarily reflect the full 

continuum of advances that America may accomplish or the successes that its enemies may realize in the next 5 years. The view is a snapshot in time for the purpose of guiding the actions of today and a roadmap for the future. 

The panel said that America’s new normalcy by January 2009 should reflect: 

• Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual freedoms in the 

context of measurable advances that secure the homeland. 

• Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability of all levels of government, the private sector, and our citizens to prevent terrorist attacks and, 

if warranted, to respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats faced 

by the Nation. 

• A standardized and effective process for sharing information and intelligence 

among all stakeholders—one built on moving actionable information to the 

broadest possible audience rapidly, and allowing for heightened security with 

minimal undesirable economic and societal consequences. 

• Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local government and the 

private sector with corresponding processes that provide an enterprise-wide National capacity to plan, equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards. 

• Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and acceptable uses of the military domestically—that strengthens the role of the National Guard and Federal 

Reserve Components for any domestic mission and ensures that America’s leaders will never be confronted with competing choices of using the military to respond to a domestic emergency versus the need to project our strength globally 

to defeat those who would seek to do us harm. 

• Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels of government, and 

others in rapidly developing and implementing research, development, and 

standards across technology, public policy, and other areas needed to secure the 

homeland—a process that focuses efforts on real versus perceived needs. Wellunderstood and shared process, plans, and incentives for protecting the Nation’s 

critical infrastructures of Government and in the private sector—a unified approach to managing our risks. 

The panel’s Future Vision back in 2009 included specifics details involving: 

• State, Local, and Private Sector Empowerment; 

• Intelligence; 

• Information Sharing; 

• Training, Exercising, Equipping, and Related Standards; 

• Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection; 

• Research and Development, and Related Standards; 

• Role of the Military. 

The GAO and DHS have prepared lengthy reports to enhance homeland security 

of our Nation and the Congress is doing its due diligence. Hearings like we are having today move forward the idea of making progress happen, but we must always 

consider the role of the military as we decide on our future homeland policy. 

IN CONCLUSION

Civil liberties are the foundation of the Gilmore Commission. The panel addressed 

the on-going debate in the United States about the tradeoffs between security and 

civil liberties. It concluded that history teaches, however, that the debate about finding the right ‘‘balance’’ between security and civil liberties is misleading, that the 

traditional debate implies that security and liberty are competing values and are 

mutually exclusive. It assumes that our liberties make us vulnerable and if we will 

give up some of these liberties, at least temporarily, we will be more secure. 

It concluded that civil liberties and security are mutually reinforcing. The panel 

said that we must, therefore, evaluate each initiative along with the combined effect 

of all initiatives to combat terrorism in terms of how well they preserve all of the 

‘‘unalienable rights’’ that the founders believed were essential to the strength and 

security of our Nation—rights that have become so imbedded in our society and in-
20 

grained in our psyche that we must take special precautions, take extra steps, to 

ensure that we do not cross the line. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you, Governor. It is a real honor to 

have somebody of your experience and magnitude appear before 

this committee. Thank you for being here. 

The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Berrick for her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Keating, the Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here 

to discuss GAO’s work assessing overlap, potential duplication, and 

cost-saving opportunities at DHS, as well as challenges that have 

affected the Department’s implementation efforts. 

As you know, DHS is now the third-largest department in the 

Federal Government. Given the significance of its mission, and in 

a time of building fiscal pressures, it is critical that its programs 

are operating effectively and efficiently, are sustainable, and continue to mature to address pressing security needs. 

Last week, as you mentioned, GAO issued its second annual report identifying areas across the Federal Government, including 

DHS, that have duplicating goals or activities, as well as opportunities to reduce costs or enhance revenue. Our report identified 15 

such areas across the Department. 

For example, we found that the Department lacked oversight to 

prevent unnecessary duplication, and four overlapping grant programs which together constitute over $20 billion in grant funding 

since 2002. As a result, DHS could not be assured that it wasn’t 

awarding multiple grants to the same recipients for the same or 

similar purposes. 

We also found that Federal agencies are paying for their own security assessments, as you mentioned, while also paying FPS within DHS for assessments that it is not conducting. 

In the area of cost savings, we reported that deploying more efficient, in-line baggage screening systems at airports could result in 

about $450 million in savings over the next 5 years because of reduced staffing costs. They would need fewer screeners to man this 

equipment. 

Regarding border security, we found that delaying proposed investments in border-surveillance technology until DHS better defines the measures’ benefits and estimates life-cycle costs could 

help ensure their effective and efficient deployment. 

In another example we found that DHS could reduce the billions 

of Federal dollars spent on major disasters by adjusting the indicator used for assistance awards to better reflect a State’s capability to respond. 

In total, we recommended 40 actions that either DHS or the Congress could take to address these issues and achieve savings. Of 

the 22 actions GAO suggested in our report last year, our first annual report, 2 have been fully implemented, 14 have been partially 

implemented, and 6 have not been addressed. Moving forward, we 

will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts in these areas. 
21 

In a report we issued last year commemorating the 10th anniversary of 9/11, we talked about a lot of the important progress DHS 

has made across its mission since its establishment. However, we 

also reported on work remaining needed to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS’s operations, as well as themes 

that have impacted the Department’s progress. These themes were 

drawn from more than 1,200 reports we have issued studying DHS 

since its creation, and over 1,600 recommendations we have made 

to strengthen their operations. 

For example, we reported that while DHS has enhanced its management functions and has plans for further enhancement, which 

we think are very positive, it has not always effectively executed 

these functions for results. This, as you know, has contributed to 

schedule delays, cost increases, and performance issues in a number of major acquisitions that are aimed at delivering important 

mission capabilities. A number of these programs have had to be 

canceled as a result. 

We also found that while DHS has made important strides in coordinating efforts with its many, many stakeholders, including 

State and local law enforcement, it needs to take additional action 

to forge and leverage these partnerships and share information, 

such as sharing information with private-sector stakeholders on 

threats to critical infrastructure. 

Moving forward, as declining budgets are likely to be a reality, 

it will be important for DHS to address these issues as well as take 

action to proactively identify areas to reduce duplication and enhance cost savings throughout the Department. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK

MARCH 8, 2012 

GAO HIGHLIGHTHS

Highlights of GAO–12–464T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in Government agendas, policies, and structures to confront homeland security threats facing 

the Nation. Most notably, DHS began operations in 2003 with missions that included preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing the Nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing damages from attacks. DHS is now the 

third-largest Federal department, with more than 200,000 employees, and has an 

annual budget of almost $60 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,200 products on DHS’s operations in such areas as transportation security and emergency 

management, among others. Moreover, GAO has reported that overlap and fragmentation among Government programs, including DHS, can cause potential unnecessary duplication, and reducing it could save billions of tax dollars annually and 

help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. As requested, this testimony addresses: (1) Opportunities for DHS to reduce potential unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue, and (2) crosscutting and 

management issues that have affected DHS’s implementation efforts. This testimony 

is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through February 2012. 
22 

What GAO Recommends 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO previously made 

about 1,600 recommendations to DHS. The Department has addressed about half 

of them, has efforts to address others, and has taken action to strengthen its operations. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.—ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE OVERLAP AND

POTENTIAL UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION, ACHIEVE COST SAVINGS, AND STRENGTHEN

MISSION FUNCTIONS

What GAO Found 

In March 2011 and February 2012, GAO reported on 6 areas where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Congress could take action to reduce overlap 

and potential unnecessary duplication, and 9 areas to achieve cost savings. Of the 

22 actions GAO suggested be taken in March 2011 to address such issues, 2 were 

fully implemented, 14 were partially implemented, and 6 have not been addressed. 

GAO’s February 2012 report identified 18 additional actions to address overlap, potential duplication, and costs savings, including the following examples. 

TABLE 1.—EXAMPLES OF OVERLAP, POTENTIAL DUPLICATION, AND COST 

SAVINGS AREAS 

Example 

Homeland security grants .. DHS lack of oversight contributed to the risk of funding unnecessarily duplicative projects among 4 

overlapping programs that in total constituted $20 

billion in grants from fiscal years 2002 through 

2011. 

Immigration inspection fees Air passenger immigration inspection fees should be 

reviewed and adjusted to fully recover the cost of 

inspection activities conducted by U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and CBP. 

Border security technology Delaying proposed border security technology investments until DHS better measures benefits and estimates life-cycle costs could help ensure the most effective use of program funding. 

Domestic disaster assistance.DHS could reduce the billions of Federal dollars spent 

on major disasters by adjusting the indicator used 

for disaster assistance awards and better measuring a State’s capacity to respond. 

Federal facility risk assessments.Agencies are making duplicate payments by funding 

their own assessments, and paying the Federal Protective Service millions for assessments it is not 

performing. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

In September 2011, GAO reported on three key themes that should be addressed 

to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS’s operations. 

Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.—DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts among its stakeholders. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected 

its ability to effectively satisfy its missions, such as sharing information with private-sector stakeholders on cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. 

Implementing and integrating management functions for results.—DHS has enhanced its management functions, and has plans to further strengthen the management of the Department. However, DHS has not always effectively executed or integrated these functions, which has contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and 

performance issues in a number of programs aimed at delivering important mission 

capabilities, such as border security technologies. 

Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts.—While 

progress has been made, limited strategic and program planning and limited assessment to inform approaches and investment decisions have contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs in an efficient manner, such as the lack of riskbased plans for deploying aviation security technologies. 
23 

1GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO–11–318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011); 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and 

Enhance Revenue, GAO–12–342SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012); Follow-up on 2011 Report: 

Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, 

and Enhance Revenue, GAO–12–453SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012). 2GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO–11–881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 

7, 2011). 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on opportunities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, enhance revenue, and address crosscutting and management issues that have affected its mission implementation efforts. Last September, the Nation passed the 10-year anniversary of the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The events of that day led to profound changes in Government agendas, policies, and structures to confront the homeland security threats 

facing the Nation. Given DHS’s significant leadership responsibilities in homeland 

security, it is critical that its programs are operating as efficiently and effectively 

as possible, are sustainable, and continue to mature to address pressing security 

needs. 

DHS began operations in 2003 with key missions that include preventing terrorist 

attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing resulting damages, and helping the Nation recover from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest Federal department, with more 

than 200,000 employees, and has an annual budget of almost $60 billion. We have 

evaluated numerous departmental programs and efforts since DHS began its operations, and issued more than 1,200 reports and Congressional testimonies in areas 

such as border security and immigration, transportation security, and emergency 

management, among others. We have made more than 1,600 recommendations to 

DHS designed to strengthen its operations, such as to improve performance-measurement efforts, strengthen management processes, enhance coordination and information sharing, and increase the use of risk information in planning and resource 

allocation decisions, as well as to address gaps and challenges in its mission operations that have affected DHS’s implementation efforts. As of September 2011, DHS 

had implemented about half of these recommendations, had actions underway to address others, and had taken additional steps to strengthen its operations. However, 

as we have previously reported, the Department has more to do to ensure that it 

conducts its missions efficiently and effectively, while simultaneously preparing to 

address future challenges that face the Department and the Nation. 

In March 2011 and February 2012, we reported on areas across the Federal Government, including DHS, that had duplicative goals or activities to inform Government policymakers as they address the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our 

National Government.1 These reports included more than 100 areas, some of which 

related to homeland security, where agencies, offices, or initiatives had similar or 

overlapping objectives or provided similar services to the same populations; or 

where Government missions were fragmented across multiple agencies or programs. 

We reported that overlap and fragmentation among Government programs or activities that can be harbingers of potential unneccessary duplication and that reducing 

or eliminating potential unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation could 

potentially save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. These reports also included opportunities for Federal departments, including DHS, to consider taking action that could either reduce the 

cost of Government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. 

Moreover, in September 2011, we issued a report summarizing progress made by 

DHS in implementing its homeland security missions 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.2 We reported that DHS had implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals in many areas to create and 

strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. We also reported, however, that as 

DHS continues to mature, more work remains for it to strengthen the efficiency and 

effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. As part of this work, we 

identified three key themes that affected DHS’s implementation efforts. 

My statement today, as requested, is based on these reports and addresses: (1) 

Opportunities for DHS to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication in 

its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected DHS’s program-implementation efforts. 

For these past reports, among other things, we analyzed DHS documents; reviewed and updated our past reports, supplemented by DHS Office of Inspector Gen-
24 

3For the purposes of our reports, we considered ‘‘duplication‘‘ to occur when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to the same 

beneficiaries. We used the term ‘‘overlap’’ when multiple agencies or programs have similar 

goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. 

We used the term ‘‘fragmentation‘‘ to refer to those circumstances in which more than one Federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad 

area of National need. The presence of fragmentation and overlap can suggest the need to look 

closer at the potential for duplication. In certain instances in this statement, we use the term 

‘‘potential duplication‘‘ to include duplication, overlap, or fragmentation. 

eral (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its operations in March 2003; and interviewed DHS officials. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology from our previous work can be found within each specific report. 

DHS COULD TAKE ACTIONS TO REDUCE OVERLAP AND POTENTIAL UNNECESSARY

DUPLICATION AND ACHIEVE COST SAVINGS

Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication at DHS 

Our March 2011 and February 2012 reports identified 6 areas across DHS where 

overlap or potential unnecessary duplication exists, and 17 specific actions that the 

Department or Congress could take to address these areas. In our March 2011 report we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11 actions to address the areas of 

overlap or potential unnecessary duplication that we found. Of these 11 actions, 1 

has been fully addressed, 4 have been partially addressed, and the remaining 6 have 

not been addressed. In many cases, the existence of overlap, potential unnecessary 

duplication, or fragmentation can be difficult to determine with precision due to a 

lack of data on programs and activities. Where information has not been available 

that would provide conclusive evidence of overlap, duplication, or fragmentation, we 

often refer to ‘‘potential unnecessary duplication.’’ In some cases, there is sufficient 

information available to show that if actions are taken to address individual issues, 

significant financial benefits may be realized. In other cases, precise estimates of 

the extent of potential unnecessary duplication, and the cost savings that can be 

achieved by eliminating any such unnecessary duplication, are difficult to specify in 

advance of Congressional and Executive Branch decision making. However, given 

the range of areas we identified at DHS and the magnitude of many of the programs, the cost savings associated with addressing these issues could be significant. 

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the areas of overlap and potential unnecessary duplication that we identified at DHS, the actions we identified for DHS and Congress to 

consider to address those areas, and the status of those actions.3
25 
26 

TABLE 2.—OVERLAP AND POTENTIAL UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION AREAS 

AT DHS INCLUDED IN GAO’S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT 

Areas of Overlap or Potential Unnecessary Duplication Actions To Consider 

FEMA needs better project information and coordination to identify and prevent potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant programs.— 

Of the $37 billion in appropriated homeland security 

preparedness grant programs from fiscal years 2002 

through 2011, FEMA allocated about $20.3 billion to 

grant recipients through four programs intended to 

enhance the capacity of States, localities, and other 

entities to prevent, respond to, and recover from a 

terrorism incident. However, we found that the four 

FEMA grant programs had multiple areas of overlap, including overlap among grant recipients, goals, 

and geographic locations, combined with the limited 

project information FEMA had available regarding 

grant funding levels, grant recipients, and grant 

purposes. Specifically, we found that 140 projects 

constituting about $183 million in grant funding 

lacked sufficient detail to determine whether they 

were unnecessarily duplicative or had involved coordination to prevent any unnecessary duplication. 

Upon gathering additional information from State 

and local grant recipients, however, we determined 

that none of the projects were duplicative. In its 

budget request for fiscal year 2013, DHS proposed 

consolidating most of FEMA’s current preparedness 

grant programs into one comprehensive program.

Action 1: FEMA should 

take steps to ensure that 

it collects project information with the level of 

detail needed to better 

identify any potential 

unnecessary duplication. 

Action 2: FEMA should explore opportunities to 

enhance its internal coordination and administration of the programs. 

Action 3: Congress may 

want to consider requiring DHS to report on the 

results of its efforts to 

identify and prevent unnecessary duplication 

and consider these results in making future 

funding decisions for 

these programs. 

Agencies are making duplicate payments for facility 

risk assessments by completing their own assessments, while also paying the Federal Protective Service (FPS) for assessments that it is not performing.— 

FPS received $236 million from Federal agencies for 

risk assessments and other security services in fiscal 

year 2011, but multiple agencies, including DHS, expend additional resources to assess their own facilities. Moreover, DHS has not taken actions to address this unnecessary duplication. Further, it is not 

clear whether FEMA’s planned risk assessment tool 

that will be used to complete risk assessments will 

help minimize the unnecessary duplication. In our 

February 2012 report, we reiterated two recommendations made in previous reports and suggested additional action to further mitigate duplicative efforts. DHS agreed with our previous two recommendations and has begun action on both, but it 

did not comment on the new suggested action.

Action 1: FPS should develop interim solutions 

for completing risk assessments while addressing the risk assessment tool’s challenges. 

Action 2: FPS should make 

information about the 

estimated costs of key 

activities and the basis 

for these estimates 

available to affected parties. 

Action 3: DHS should 

work with Federal agencies to determine their 

reasons for duplicating 

the activities and identify measures to reduce 

this unnecessary duplication. 

Source: GAO. 

Cost-Saving and Revenue Enhancing Areas 

Our 2011 and 2012 annual reports also identified 9 areas describing other opportunities for DHS or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the 

cost of Government operations or enhance revenue collection for the Treasury. We 

identified 23 specific actions that the Department or Congress could take to address 

these areas. In our March 2011 report, we suggested that DHS or Congress take 

11 actions to either reduce the cost of Government operations or enhance revenue 

collection. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed and 10 have been partially addressed. In some cases, there is sufficient information to estimate potential 

savings or other benefits if actions are taken to address individual issues. In other 

cases, estimates of cost savings or other benefits would depend upon what Congressional and Executive Branch decisions were made, including how certain GAO recommendations are implemented. Additionally, information on program performance, 
27 

the level of funding in agency budgets devoted to overlapping or fragmented programs, and the implementation costs that might be associated with program consolidations or terminations, are factors that could impact actions to be taken as well 

as potential savings. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the cost savings and revenue-enhancing areas that we reported on in March 2011 and February 2012. 
28 

TABLE 4.—NEW COST-SAVINGS AND REVENUE-ENHANCING AREAS AT DHS 

INCLUDED IN GAO’S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT 

Cost Saving or Revenue-Enhancing Areas Actions to Consider 

Options for adjusting the passenger aviation security 

fee could further offset civil aviation security costs.— 

From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, TSA collected 

about $18 billion in passenger and air carrier security fees, compared to the approximately $63 billion 

appropriated for aviation security activities over the 

same time frame; thus, security fees offset about 29 

percent of amounts appropriated. We found that increasing the passenger security fee could help further offset billions of dollars in the Federal budget 

for aviation security programs and activities in outlying fiscal years. We identified options Congress 

may wish to consider using to increase the passenger security fee that could increase fee collections 

from about $2 billion to $10 billion over 5 years. In 

addition, we reported that TSA’s fiscal year 2012 

budget proposal to incrementally increase the passenger security fee by 2014 could reduce total 

enplanements from fiscal years 2012 through 2014 

by 1 percent. This would reduce expected fee collections of $4.4 billion by about $120 million over this 

3-year period. In its budget request for fiscal year 

2013, DHS included a proposal to gradually raise 

the passenger security fee to $7.50 per one-way trip 

by 2018 and devote $18 billion of this fee increase 

for deficit reduction.

Action 1: Congress, working with TSA, may wish 

to consider increasing 

the passenger security 

fee according to one of 

the options we identified. 
29 

TABLE 4.—NEW COST-SAVINGS AND REVENUE-ENHANCING AREAS AT DHS 

INCLUDED IN GAO’S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT—Continued 

Cost Saving or Revenue-Enhancing Areas Actions to Consider 

FEMA could reduce the costs to the Federal Government related to major disasters declared by the President.—From fiscal years 2004 through 2011, the 

President approved 539 major disaster declarations 

at a cost of $78.7 billion. We found that FEMA could 

reduce the costs to the Federal Government related 

to major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal indicator on which disaster 

funding decisions are based and better measuring a 

State’s capacity to respond without Federal assistance. We reported that we expected to reiterate two 

recommendations from August 2001 related to the 

principle indicator and further recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA 

Administrator to implement them. We also expect to 

make a recommendation related to the metrics to assess a State’s disaster preparedness and capabilities, 

so that it can be used to better measure State capacity to respond to disasters. We are currently conducting a review of the disaster declaration process 

and plan to report the results in 2012.

Action 1: FEMA should reexamine the basis for 

the Public Assistance 

per capita indicator and 

determine whether it accurately reflects a 

State’s capacity to respond to and recover 

from a disaster without 

Federal assistance. 

Action 2: FEMA should reexamine the method 

used to update the per 

capita indicator to ensure that the indicator 

accurately reflects annual changes in a 

State’s capacity to respond to and recover 

from a disaster. 

Action 3: FEMA should examine the usefulness of 

supplementing or replacing the per capita damage indicator with the 

metrics required by both 

statute and Presidential 

Policy Directive to assess a State’s disaster 

preparedness and capabilities.1

Delaying proposed investments until DHS better defines and measures benefits and estimates life-cycle 

costs for future acquisitions of border surveillance 

technology could help ensure the most effective use of 

future program funding.—We found that CBP’s Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, the successor of CBP’s nearly $1 billion Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) technology program for securing the border between points of entry, is at an 

increased risk of not cost-effectively accomplishing 

its goal in support of Arizona border security because CBP has not provided support for its business 

case for investing in the plan. We made three recommendations in November 2011 to increase CBP’s 

likelihood of successfully implementing the Arizona 

Border Surveillance Technology Plan, minimize performance risks, help justify program funding, and 

increase the reliability of CBP’s cost estimate. DHS 

concurred with our recommendations and identified 

steps it planned to take to implement them, along 

with estimated dates for their completion, but not 

all actions fully addressed our recommendations. In 

addition, in February 2012, we reported that Congress may wish to consider limiting future program 

funding. The President’s fiscal year 2013 budget requests $91.8 million for Integrated Fixed Towers 

that are part of the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan.

Action 1: CBP should determine the mission benefits to be derived from 

implementation of the 

plan. 

Action 2: CBP should develop and apply key attributes for metrics to 

assess program implementation. 

Action 3: CBP should update its cost estimate for 

the plan using best practices. 

Action 4: Congress may 

wish to consider limiting 

future program funding 

until CBP has more 

fully defined the benefits 

and costs of its new plan 

for Arizona. 
30 

4DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, 

non-Governmental, and private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share a common National interest in the safety and security of the United States 

and the American population. 

TABLE 4.—NEW COST-SAVINGS AND REVENUE-ENHANCING AREAS AT DHS 

INCLUDED IN GAO’S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT—Continued 

Cost Saving or Revenue-Enhancing Areas Actions to Consider 

The air passenger immigration inspection user fee 

should be reviewed and adjusted to fully recover the 

cost of the air passenger immigration inspection activities conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) and CBP.—We estimated that fee 

collections available to ICE and CBP to pay for costs 

incurred in providing inspection services totaled 

about $600 million in fiscal year 2010. However, we 

found that air passenger immigration fee collections 

did not fully cover CBP’s costs in fiscal years 2009 

and 2010. Although ICE does not track air passenger costs separately from sea passenger costs, 

ICE officials stated that its portion of total air and 

sea passenger collections did not cover ICE’s total 

air and sea passenger costs in fiscal year 2007 

through 2009. We reiterated in our February 2012 

report four items for Congressional consideration to 

allow ICE and CBP to better align air passenger immigration inspection fee revenue with the costs of 

providing these services and achieve cost savings by 

reducing the reliance on general fund appropriations.

Action 1: Congress may 

wish to direct DHS to 

require ICE and CBP to 

regularly report total 

cost of air passenger immigration inspections 

and the amount of associated fee collections. 

Action 2: Congress may 

wish to direct DHS to 

adjust the fee as needed 

so that collections are 

aligned with total inspection costs. 

Action 3: Congress may 

wish to require DHS to 

direct ICE to amend its 

cost study methodology. 

Action 4: Congress may 

wish to require DHS to 

direct ICE and CBP to 

establish a regular 

schedule to review and 

coordinate costs of inspection activities. 

Source: GAO. 

1See 6 U.S.C. § 749 and Presidential Policy Directive—8 (PPD–8): National Preparedness, 

March 30, 2011. 

DHS CAN IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS OPERATIONS BY

CONTINUING TO ADDRESS THEMES THAT HAVE IMPACTED ITS PROGRESS

Our work at DHS has identified three key themes—leading and coordinating the 

homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions 

for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts—that have impacted the Department’s progress since it began operations.4 As 

these themes have contributed to challenges in the Department’s management and 

operations, addressing them can result in increased efficiencies and effectiveness. 

For example, DHS can help reduce cost overruns and performance shortfalls by 

strengthening the management of its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and 

costs for homeland security by improving its R&D management. These themes provide insights that can inform DHS’s efforts, moving forward, as it works to implement its missions within a dynamic and evolving homeland security environment. 

DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these areas, but our work found 

that these themes have been at the foundation of DHS’s implementation challenges, 

and need to be addressed from a Department-wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position DHS for the future and enable it to satisfy the expectations set forth 

by the Congress, the administration, and the country. 

Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.—While DHS is one of 

a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically important that 

DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective partnerships with its stakeholders, 

while at the same time addressing DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity of 

the new department’s leadership would be critical to building and sustaining the 

long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland security goals and objec-
31 

5GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO–02–957T (Washington, DC: July 17, 2002). 6GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and 

Management Functions, GAO–07–454 (Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007). 7GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Private and Public Cyber Expectations Need to 

Be Consistently Addressed, GAO–10–628 (Washington, DC: July 15, 2010). 8GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–05–207 (Washington, DC: Jan. 2005). 9GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–11–278, (Washington, DC: Feb. 2011). 

tives.5 We further reported that to secure the Nation, DHS must form effective and 

sustained partnerships between components and also with a range of other entities, 

including Federal agencies, State and local governments, the private and nonprofit 

sectors, and international partners.6

DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts. 

For example, it has improved coordination and clarified roles with State and local 

governments for emergency management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships 

and collaboration with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security 

practices for aviation security. However, DHS needs to take additional action to 

forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions. For example, 

in July 2010, we reported that the expectations of private-sector stakeholders have 

not been met by DHS and its Federal partners in areas related to sharing information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure.7 In 2005, we designated information-sharing for homeland security as high-risk because the Federal Government faced serious challenges in analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a timely, accurate, and useful way.8 Gaps in sharing, such as agencies’ failure to link information about the individual who attempted to conduct the December 

25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from being included on the Federal Government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist, a tool used by DHS to screen for 

persons who pose risks to the country. The Federal Government and DHS have 

made progress, but more work remains for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms and better meet partners’ needs. Moving forward, it will be important that DHS continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and leverage 

the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the important progress that 

it has made thus far. In addressing ever-changing and complex threats, and with 

the vast array of partners with whom DHS must coordinate, continued leadership 

and stewardship will be critical in achieving this end. 

Implementing and integrating management functions for results.—Following its 

establishment, the Department focused its efforts primarily on implementing its 

various missions to meet pressing homeland security needs and threats, and less on 

creating and integrating a fully and effectively functioning department from 22 disparate agencies. This initial focus on mission implementation was understandable 

given the critical homeland security needs facing the Nation after the Department’s 

establishment, and the enormous challenge posed by creating, integrating, and 

transforming a department as large and complex as DHS. As the Department matured, it has put into place management policies and processes and made a range 

of other enhancements to its management functions, which include acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management. However, DHS 

has not always effectively executed or integrated these functions. In 2003, we designated the transformation and integration of DHS as high-risk because DHS had 

to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to effectively address 

DHS’s management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security. Nine years later, DHS remains on our high-risk list.9

DHS has demonstrated strong leadership commitment to address its management 

challenges and has begun to implement a strategy to do so. Further, DHS developed 

various management policies, directives, and governance structures, such as acquisition and information technology management policies and controls, to provide enhanced guidance on investment decision making. DHS also reduced its financial 

management material weaknesses and developed strategies to strengthen human 

capital management. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DHS moved from a Disclaimer of Opinion to a Qualified Audit Opinion on its Balance Sheet and Statement 

of Custodial Activity for the first time since 2003. However, DHS has not been able 

to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its consolidated financial statements (i.e., 

prepare a set of financial statements that are considered fairly presented) though 

its current goal is to receive an unqualified, or clean opinion, on the Departmentwide consolidated financial statement for fiscal year 2013. 

DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and per-
32 

10See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and 

Oversight of Its Prime Contractor, GAO–11–6 (Washington, DC: Oct. 18, 2010); Department of 

Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions, GAO–10–588SP (Washington, 

DC: June 30, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment 

in Key Technology Program, GAO–10–340 (Washington, DC: May 5, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, 

GAO–10–651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010); and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, GAO– 

10–158 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010). 11See 6 U.S.C. § 749. 12GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying 

Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO–10–128 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 7, 2009). 13GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO–11–869T (Washington, DC: July 26, 

2011). 

formance problems in major programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. For example, we reported on numerous cost, schedule, and performance 

risks, and concluded that DHS had not economically justified its investment in the 

Secure Border Initiative Network, DHS’s border security technology program.10

More specifically, DHS did not adequately define requirements, perform testing, or 

oversee contractors, delaying security enhancements on the Southwest Border. After 

initiating a Department-wide assessment of the program, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security froze program funding and, at the completion of the assessment in January 

2011, the Secretary decided to end the Secure Border Initiative Network as originally conceived after investing nearly $1 billion in the program. DHS also has not 

yet fully implemented its roles and responsibilities for developing and implementing 

key homeland security programs and initiatives. For example, FEMA has not yet 

developed a set of target capabilities for disaster preparedness or established 

metrics for assessing those capabilities to provide a framework for evaluating preparedness, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 

2006.11 Moreover, DHS does not yet have enough personnel with required skills to 

carry out activities in various areas, such as acquisition management; and is in the 

process of modernizing its financial management system, impacting its ability to 

have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making. Moving forward, addressing these management challenges will be critical for DHS’s success, 

as will be the integration of these functions across the Department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness. 

Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts.—Forming a 

new department while working to implement statutorily-mandated and Departmentinitiated programs and responding to evolving threats, was, and is, a significant 

challenge facing DHS. Key threats, such as attempted attacks against the aviation 

sector, have impacted and altered DHS’s approaches and investments, such as 

changes DHS made to its processes and technology investments for screening passengers and baggage at airports. It is understandable that these threats had to be 

addressed immediately as they arose. However, limited strategic and program planning by DHS, as well as assessment to inform approaches and investment decisions, 

have contributed to programs not meeting strategic needs or doing so in an efficient 

manner. For example, we previously reported that TSA’s program for research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies was not 

risk-based and did not reflect some of the key risk-management principles, such as 

conducting a risk assessment based on the three elements of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—and including a cost-benefit analysis and performance 

measures.12 As a result, TSA had limited assurance that its strategy targeted the 

most-critical risks and that it was investing in the most cost-effective new technologies or other protective measures. In addition, we reported that DHS coordinated the development of a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture—a multidepartment effort to protect against terrorist attacks using nuclear 

and radiological materials through coordinated activities.13 However, the strategic 

plan for the architecture did not include some key components, such as funding 

needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives, or monitoring mechanisms for determining programmatic progress and identifying needed improvements. 

Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across sectors, but 

it has more work to do in using this information to inform planning and resourceallocation decisions. Risk management has been widely supported by Congress and 

DHS as a management approach for homeland security, enhancing the Department’s ability to make informed decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since 

DHS does not have unlimited resources and cannot protect the Nation from every 
33 

14For a list of GAO reports related to performance assessment, see GAO–11–881. 15GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO–09–896 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2009). 

conceivable threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its homeland security approaches and strategies. 

Moreover, we have reported on the need for enhanced performance assessment, 

that is, evaluating existing programs and operations to determine whether they are 

operating as intended or are in need of change, across DHS’s missions.14 Information on the performance of programs is critical for helping the Department, Congress, and other stakeholders more systematically assess strengths and weaknesses 

and inform decision making. In recent years, DHS has placed an increased emphasis 

on strengthening its mechanisms for assessing the performance and effectiveness of 

its homeland security programs. For example, DHS established new performance 

measures, and modified existing ones, to better assess many of its programs and efforts. However, our work has found that DHS continues to miss opportunities to optimize performance across its missions due to a lack of reliable performance information or assessment of existing information; evaluation among possible alternatives; and, as appropriate, adjustment of programs or operations that are not 

meeting mission needs. For example, we reported that CBP had invested $2.4 billion 

in tactical infrastructure (fencing, roads, and lighting) along the Southwest Border, 

but could not measure the impact of this investment in tactical infrastructure on 

border security.15 As the Department further matures and seeks to optimize its operations, DHS will need to look beyond immediate requirements; assess programs’ 

sustainability across the long term, particularly in light of constrained budgets; and 

evaluate trade-offs within and among programs across the homeland security enterprise. Doing so should better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in 

a sustainable manner as it works to address existing ones. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Given DHS’s significant leadership responsibilities in securing the homeland, it 

is critical that the Department’s programs and activities are operating as efficiently 

and effectively as possible, are sustainable, and that they continue to mature, 

evolve, and adapt to address pressing security needs. Since it began operations in 

2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas. These accomplishments are especially 

noteworthy given that the Department has had to work to transform itself into a 

fully functioning cabinet department while implementing its missions—a difficult 

undertaking for any organization and one that can take years to achieve even under 

less-daunting circumstances. However, our work has shown that DHS can take actions to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication to improve the efficiency of its operations and achieve cost-savings in several areas. Further, while 

DHS has made progress, additional actions are needed to strengthen partnerships 

with stakeholders, improve its management processes and share information, and 

enhance its risk management and performance-measurement efforts to enhance effectiveness and achieve efficiencies throughout the Department. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that Members of the subcommittee may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Ms. Berrick. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Edwards for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss waste, fraud, abuse, and duplication at DHS. 

Since its inception in 2003, the Department has made strides toward establishing, building, and maintaining a cohesive, effective, 

and efficient organization. While the Department is taking positive 

steps, it still faces significant challenges in achieving effective and 

economic operations. 
34 

Today I will discuss the results of recent audits that underscore 

the need for continued improvement in three areas: Acquisition 

management, disaster response, and transportation security. 

Acquisition management, including adequate planning, oversight, 

and controls, is critical to the Department’s effort to prevent fraud, 

waste, and abuse. Our recent review of CBP’s purchase and storage 

of steel for fence construction under the Secure Border Initiative illustrates what can happen without adequate planning and oversight. CBP purchased steel based on needs it estimated before legally acquiring land or meeting treaty obligations. Then it did not 

provide effective contract oversight; for example, not paying invoices on time, and not thoroughly reviewing and documenting selection of the subcontractor. As a result, CBP purchased more steel 

than needed, incurred additional storage costs, paid interest on late 

payments, and approved a high-priced subcontractor, all of which 

led to additional expenditures. We estimate that CBP could have 

avoided about $69 million in costs if it had managed this acquisition more effectively. 

We also conducted an audit that looked into DHS oversight of acquisition programs managed by the components. Although DHS 

generally had management oversight and controls over component 

acquisition programs, it needed to further refine some policies and 

strengthen oversight. Some components were subjecting acquisitions to increased regulatory requirements because the DHS acquisition management directive was not clearly understood. These requirements may have resulted in increased costs. 

Additionally we found the Department could benefit from more 

use of strategic sourcing. Specifically, DHS had eight different procurement officers purchasing detection equipment, was not facilitating strategic sourcing, and was using multiple equipment models to meet similar missions. The Department could decrease acquisition costs by strategically sourcing this equipment. 

We also recently reviewed OneNet, an information technology infrastructure platform designed to consolidate DHS’s component 

networks. The goal of OneNet is to allow DHS’s components to 

share data in support of cross-organizational missions. DHS has 

made some progress, but needs to make a number of improvements 

in order to ensure transition to OneNet. 

As a result of our review, we made recommendations to the Department’s Chief Information Officer that we believe will help ensure this transition. 

FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program, which is used to 

quickly disburse money to disaster survivors, is at risk to fraud, 

waste, and abuse, and therefore requires fiscal responsibility and 

program integrity. We looked at the progress FEMA has made in 

preventing fraudulent losses of Federal funds. The agency still 

needs to increase fraud prevention awareness, and develop, establish, and enhance internal controls, including the checking of the 

validity of data. The process of recouping improper payments, 

which had been halted, has been restarted, and should continue 

until all cases are resolved. 

Another critical mission of DHS is transportation security. As 

part of this mission, TSA must provide sufficient oversight to ensure that individuals working at airport locations are properly 
35 

screened before receiving a badge, giving them unfettered access to 

secure areas. We determined that TSA had limited oversight of the 

badging process. Badges were issued despite inaccurate or omitted 

application data or improper vetting. Airport employees were not 

always trained how to use the available tools to detect fraud. TSA 

did not require airports to conduct recurrent criminal history 

checks. As a result, TSA has no assurance that individuals who 

pose threats could not obtain badges to access secure areas. 

In closing, I would like to note that DHS and its components concurred with the majority of our report recommendations, and in 

most cases have already begun implementing them. I commend the 

Department for continuing to meet and work on these management 

challenges and improve its operations and performance. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I would 

be happy to answer any questions that you or other Members may 

have. 

[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS

MARCH 8, 2012 

Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

Members of the committee: I am Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General of 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on our on-going efforts to identify and eliminate waste, fraud, abuse, and 

duplication in the Department. 

As you know, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established in January 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DHS OIG seeks to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in DHS programs and operations and reports directly to both the DHS Secretary and the Congress. We fulfill our mission primarily by issuing audit, inspection, and investigative reports that include recommendations for corrective action, 

and by referring cases to the United States Attorney General for prosecution. 

I would like to begin by noting the strides DHS has taken toward building a cohesive agency that addresses its key mission objectives to protect our borders, improve 

our response to manmade and natural threats, and implement transportation and 

trade security. DHS, by virtue of the breadth and importance of its mission, the 

scope of its activities, and the number of employees, must overcome some especially 

difficult challenges. 

Each year we publish a report on the most significant management challenges facing the Department including acquisition management, grants management, and 

transportation security. Today, my testimony will highlight important issues in 

those three areas. 

I am pleased to report that not only did DHS and its components concur with majority of our recommendations in these areas; in most cases they are already taking 

steps to implement these recommendations. 

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

The Department continues to streamline its management of acquisitions, but is 

still challenged by their magnitude and complexity. Good acquisition management 

is critical to the Department’s efforts to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, particularly good acquisition planning and adequate oversight and controls, as well as best 

practices such as strategic sourcing of common equipment. I would like to highlight 

four of our 2011 reports focusing on these issues. 

In our report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of the Purchase 

and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative (OIG–12–05), we determined that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not effectively manage 

the purchase and storage of steel in support of the Secure Border Initiative. Since 

2008, CBP spent approximately $1.2 billion to construct physical barriers along the 

Southwest Border as part of this initiative. About $310 million of the cost was to 

purchase and store steel in support of fence construction. CBP purchased steel 

based on an estimate before legally acquiring land or meeting international treaty 
36 

obligations. In addition, it did not provide effective contract oversight during the 

project: It paid invoices late, did not reconcile invoices with receiving documents, 

and did not perform a thorough review of the contractor’s selection of a higherpriced subcontractor or document the reasons for its approval of the subcontractor. 

As a result, CBP purchased more steel than needed, incurred additional storage 

costs, paid interest on late payments, and approved a higher-priced subcontractor, 

with additional expenditures of about $69 million that could have been put to better 

use. CBP did not efficiently plan the purchase and storage of steel for the Supply and 

Supply Chain Management (SSCM) task order. It purchased 27,557 tons of extra 

steel, with a value of about $44 million, which remained in storage at the end of 

the task order. Additionally, CBP did not obtain necessary approval to build all 

planned fence segments before acquiring the steel. In September 2009, CBP purchased 34 tons of steel for $23,000, even though it had significant quantities of the 

same steel already in storage. CBP was not proactive and did not efficiently plan 

for the storage of steel remaining from the task order. Instead of moving the extra 

steel to a cost-efficient location, CBP extended the original contract and awarded a 

supplemental storage contract. CBP’s decision to extend the storage contracts for 2 

years resulted in $9.8 million in avoidable storage costs. 

CBP did not reconcile or promptly pay invoices from the SSCM task order. The 

cost of the task order increased because CBP paid invoices late, which resulted in 

late payment interest charges. Furthermore, CBP could not guarantee the Government received what it paid for under the task order. CBP did not have policies and 

procedures for submitting and reviewing invoices. There was no clear guidance on 

the proper office to route invoices to, no time line for the review process, and no 

notification process to remind offices of invoices coming due. 

CBP did not perform a thorough review of the consent to subcontract documentation and did not document the reasons for its approval of the higher-price subcontractor. Its approval of a subcontractor may have added about $13.5 million to the 

project. The DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer recognized the importance 

of component oversight of subcontractor selection and issued an acquisition alert in 

April 2011 to DHS heads of contracting activities. 

We noted that CBP should ensure it applied lessons learned from this project to 

future projects. To that end, we made five recommendations to improve CBP’s management of future fence construction and contract oversight. CBP concurred with 

four recommendations, and DHS proposed an alternative to the fifth recommendation that met the intent of that recommendation. CBP was acting to implement the 

recommendations. 

In DHS Oversight of Component Acquisition Programs (OIG–11–71), we reported 

that DHS generally had management oversight and controls over components’ acquisition programs, but needed to further refine some policies and strengthen oversight in some areas. 

The Department had made progress in its acquisition oversight processes and controls by implementing a revised Acquisition Management Directive (Directive 102– 

01) and accompanying Acquisition Instruction Guidebook (102–01–001). The directive and guidebook addressed many previously identified oversight and control problems related to acquisition management. However, the guidance needed further refining to provide additional details and improve controls in some areas. 

The Department had not fully defined for its components what constituted an acquisition program, and had not developed consistent guidance for reporting the 

three levels of acquisition programs in its standard reporting system. Components 

were not completing and reporting all key information into the next Generation 

Periodic Reporting System (nPRS), and were thus distorting the acquisition portfolio 

position through inconsistent reporting of programs. In July 2010, data from nPRS 

showed progress in entering level 3 acquisition program components, but the system 

still only reflected half the total number of level 3 programs that components were 

reporting outside nPRS. By mandating use of nPRS for all acquisition programs, the 

Department would have visibility into components’ acquisition programs and could 

provide better oversight of its acquisition portfolio. 

The Department did not ensure that components were using all available acquisition tools, including nPRS and the Strategic Sourcing Program Office (SSPO). Component personnel had developed or were developing their own data tracking systems 

because the Department had not consistently mandated use of nPRS or its tools. 

The Department also did not ensure that components were using the SSPO to manage acquisition programs, which would have created transparency and efficiency in 

their acquisition programs. As a result, components may have awarded contracts 

without considering the SSPO, and the Department may have incurred increased 

costs for procurements. In addition, components may have conducted duplicative 
37 

market research for procurements that had already been done by the SSPO. The 

Department should ensure components were at least considering the use of the 

SSPO before awarding contracts. 

DHS did not ensure that all components had developed adequate policies and procedures to manage and oversee acquisition programs. The Department’s Acquisition 

Management Directive 102–01 states that components are authorized to establish 

internal acquisition processes and procedures consistent with the Directive. However, not all components had created such processes and procedures. Others had created program management offices to manage simple procurements, were not properly reporting programs into the standard system, or were not applying strategic 

sourcing strategies to support program development. The Department had not ensured the adequacy of the processes and procedures that components developed. As 

a result, some components unnecessarily created acquisition programs, which potentially increased administrative costs without adding value to the programs. In addition, the Department did not always know what is in its acquisition portfolio. 

We made four recommendations to the Chief Procurement Officer to strengthen 

the Department’s management oversight and controls over component acquisition 

programs, including requiring reporting of acquisitions in nPRS, implementing a 

plan of action or deadline to finalize acquisition management policies and procedures, and requiring components to consider using the SSPO and other resources 

in planning acquisitions. The Chief Procurement Officer agreed with our recommendations, and DHS initiated corrective actions. 

The report, DHS Continues to Face Challenges in the Implementation of Its 

OneNet Project (OIG–11–116), presented the results of our audit of DHS’ efforts to 

consolidate its components’ networks into a single wide-area network, OneNet. In 

2005, DHS began to consolidate and transform existing individual component networks into a single, world-class information technology (IT) infrastructure. As part 

of an IT Infrastructure Transformation Program, OneNet’s goal was to provide a reliable, cost-effective IT platform for data sharing among components in support of 

cross-organizational missions. 

DHS had made some progress toward consolidating the existing components’ IT 

infrastructures into OneNet. The Department had established a centralized Network Operations Center/Security Operations Center to manage and oversee OneNet 

and to monitor, detect, and respond to IT security incidents. All but three components were signing memorandums of agreement with CBP to obtain network and 

security services; as the OneNet steward, CBP had elected not to prepare an agreement. All components had converted their sites to Multiple Protocol Label Switching 

architecture to read and access audit trails captured on firewall and intrusion detection devices. The Department had also established a redundant trusted internet connection (RTIC) to provide a redundant network infrastructure and essential OneNet 

services (e.g., internet, extranet, and application hosting) to all DHS components. 

At the time of our review, the Department needed to improve its implementation 

of OneNet. DHS needed to establish component connections (peering) to OneNet and 

ensure that all components transitioned to the RTIC. At the time of our audit, only 

two components had peered all their sites to OneNet; the remaining seven components identified the lack of Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), which support controlled cross-communication among component Trust Zones, as the primary reason 

for their delayed transition to OneNet. DHS components had established different 

and unique levels of IT security policies, as well as different PEPs, to enforce these 

policies. Not all DHS components had completely transitioned to the RTIC. As of 

February 2011, two components had completed their transition. Three of the remaining seven components had signed waivers with extension dates until 2012 to 

defer their transition to the RTIC. Finally, DHS had not completed required OneNet 

management documents, such as the Concept of Operations, which describes how 

to use desired capabilities to carry out operations. Three components did not have 

required interconnection security agreements, and three other such agreements had 

expired. 

We recommended that the DHS Chief Information Officer complete the transition 

and connection (peering) of components and develop and implement key planning 

documents, network service agreements, and interconnection security agreements 

for OneNet. DHS generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. 

In DHS Department-wide Management of Detection Equipment (OIG 11–47), we 

found the Department could better manage acquisition of detection equipment by 

developing processes to standardize equipment purchases and identifying common 

mission requirements among components. DHS had eight different procurement offices purchasing detection equipment and did not have a process to facilitate strategic sourcing. The Department was using multiple models to meet similar missions, 

and thus, was incurring higher administrative, logistical support, and maintenance 
38 

costs. We identified about $170 million worth of small X-ray machines, metal detectors, and personal and hand-held radiation detectors that DHS could acquire 

through strategic sourcing strategies. To strategically source, DHS would need to 

standardize purchases of explosive, metal, and radiation detection equipment; and 

identify common mission requirements among components. Limiting the models and 

types of equipment would increase procurement, maintenance, and personnel efficiencies. 

Components were also maintaining separate inventories, and the inventory systems were not based on standard inventory data elements and standard nomenclature for similar detection equipment. Without a dictionary of common data elements and nomenclature, the Department did not have timely visibility over onhand balances of equipment and could not be sure inventory data was complete and 

accurate. 

We made two recommendations to the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. 

First, we recommended that DHS establish a standard data dictionary, consolidate 

data descriptions, and make sure components use consistent inventory terms; second, we recommended that DHS re-establish a Joint Requirements Council to identify cross-cutting opportunities and common requirements. DHS concurred with both 

recommendations and reported it was developing standard data elements to manage 

its inventory accounts and was planning to revive the Joint Requirements Council. 

DISASTER ASSISTANCE FRAUD

The report, Assessment of FEMA’s Fraud Prevention Efforts (OIG–11–84), included 

results of our review of FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP), 

through which the agency quickly disburses billions of dollars to disaster survivors. 

The program’s vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse requires FEMA to implement procedures designed to ensure assistance is provided in proper amounts and 

only to eligible recipients. While FEMA had made progress in preventing fraudulent 

losses of Federal funds, challenges remained in reporting and identifying fraud; increasing fraud prevention awareness; developing and maintaining proper internal 

controls; and recouping improper disaster assistance payments. 

The report highlighted the fact that FEMA had not established an environment 

in which employees understand that fraud prevention is integral to the agency’s 

mission. This is partially caused by FEMA not training disaster assistance employees how to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. Rather, FEMA offered nonmandatory ad hoc training to those employees who wanted to take the training. 

FEMA’s leaders must continually demonstrate the importance of fiscal responsibility 

and program integrity. Mandating fraud prevention training for all employees would 

increase the agency’s attention to fraud prevention and deterrence. 

The agency had improved its internal controls since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

However, OIG and Government Accountability Office reviews, as well as agency assessments, continued to identify needed improvements in internal controls over its 

assistance programs. For example, in September 2009, we reported that FEMA substantially improved internal control weaknesses that existed during Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. While these changes resulted in fewer instances of payments 

made to registrations with duplicate and invalid key data, FEMA does not always 

use all of its validity checks for key registration data. Consequently, FEMA continued to make improper disaster assistance payments that should have been avoided. 

FEMA needs to consistently apply its existing business rules, and monitor payment 

activities to update its internal controls when it indentifies new vulnerabilities. 

The goal of the Fraud Prevention and Investigation Branch (FPIB) is to assist in 

identifying, mitigating, and preventing fraud in FEMA programs through fraud 

awareness training and, in partnership with DHS, recoupment of losses. FEMA 

should issue a management directive establishing FPIB as an agency-wide entity 

with authority to review all FEMA-funded programs and recommend improvements 

to internal controls to deter and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA needs also 

to provide additional staffing to enable the FPIB to achieve that goal and adopt 

measures used by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, such as the 

fraud-mapping tool, to foster accountability and transparency of FEMA programs 

and improve internal controls. Finally, FPIB’s visibility would be enhanced if it reported directly to the FEMA Office of the Administrator, or one of his direct reports. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Transportation security is one of the critical missions for which DHS was created. 

Since its inception, the Department has invested considerable resources to establish 

a secure transportation environment, particularly at our Nation’s airports. We have 

audited many of the layers of security established or overseen by TSA. One of our 
39 

recent reports, TSA’s Oversight of the Airport Badging Process Needs Improvement, 

examined TSA’s controls over the issuance of airport badges to individuals. 

Individuals who pose threats may obtain airport badges and gain access to secured airport areas, endangering the safety of airport workers, passengers, and aircraft. We identified badges issued to individuals with one or more omissions or inaccuracies in key applicant data used for vetting. For example, badges were issued to 

individuals without a complete security threat assessment (STA). Individuals were 

not always properly vetted, and badges were issued without the required information such as STA status, birthdate, and birthplace. Airport operators and local TSA 

officials were not fully aware of the details of the complex vetting process and the 

ramifications of entering inaccurate biographical data. 

TSA had designed and implemented only limited oversight of the badge application process. Specifically, the agency did not ensure that airport operators had quality assurance procedures to safeguard the completeness and accuracy of the data 

used for vetting. Despite its reliance on designated airport operator employees, TSA 

did not always ensure that airports were properly training these employees. Only 

one airport had a formalized training program focused on airport operator employees’ duties and responsibilities. TSA also did not ensure that airport operator employees were using available tools to perform their assigned duties. 

In addition, TSA did not require its inspectors to verify airport data during interviews. TSA inspectors reviewed the airport badging process during inspections; however, this limited coverage did not ensure that vetting information was complete and 

accurate. Inspectors did not always have direct access to the Transportation Security Clearinghouse database and were not required to compare or cross-reference 

records. Therefore, inspections of badging office records may have been insufficient 

to determine the airports’ level of compliance with vetting process requirements. Direct access to clearinghouse data would enable inspectors to verify records for approved STAs in a timely manner and take immediate corrective action if necessary. 

TSA did not require airports to conduct recurrent Criminal History Records 

Checks (CHRC) to ensure that badge holders maintained their reputable status. According to airport and TSA officials, these checks should be conducted on a recurrent basis. These officials also indicated the self-reporting policy was ineffective because most employees would not report themselves for fear of losing their job. Some 

airports were proactive in mitigating risk in the CHRC process. According to TSA 

officials, the agency recognized the need for more frequent criminal checks. The 

Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing office, in cooperation with the 

agency’s Office of Chief Council, was exploring implementation of a requirement to 

conduct recurrent CHRCs. 

Some sites we visited had best practices that could be implemented at other airports to ensure authenticity of documentation and data accuracy. In addition, in response to our preliminary findings, the Airports Council International—North 

America established a task force of its member airports to identify and evaluate best 

practices for airport identification badging. Some practices included conducting 

badging application audits to identify common errors to incorporate into training 

classes, providing advanced training on fraudulent document identification and document handling procedures, establishing checks to prevent duplicate records, and 

establishing a quality control process to review applicant information before it is 

submitted for an STA. 

We presented our findings to the airport operators, local TSA officials, and inspectors. Our analysis generated 101 updates, which airport operators sent to the Transportation Security Clearinghouse. We made recommendations to establish and implement quality assurance procedures for the badging process, ensure that airport 

operator employees receive proper training and tools to perform their assigned duties, require independent verification of approved applications, provide real-time reports on active badge holders, and conduct recurrent CHRCs. TSA concurred with 

all but one recommendation—on real-time reporting—with which it partially concurred. 

In closing, I would like to commend the Department for acting quickly on our recommendations in an effort to improve its operations and performance. The Office 

of Inspector General remains committed to performing audits and inspections, identifying issues, and making recommendations to assist DHS in carrying out its mission effectively and efficiently. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome any questions from you or Members of the committee. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Edwards. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lilly for his testimony. 
40 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT LILLY, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR 

AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. LILLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate this subcommittee. I have felt that over the past decade 

we have seen a general degradation in the capability of the Federal 

Government to do the things it needs to do, and I think one reason 

for that is a decline in effective oversight by the Congress. The 

Congress has the capability of breaking down walls within bureaucracies, forcing the bureaucracy to share information with itself, as 

well as help the American people understand what the people who 

are paid with their tax dollars are doing. I think this hearing is 

a very good step in the right direction. 

Of all the departments in the Federal Government that I think 

need oversight, the Department of Homeland Security is the most, 

and that is for a number of reasons. I would say, first of all, I 

would like to very strongly agree with Governor Gilmore with respect to the mistake that I believe the Congress and the President 

made in creating this Department. There is a very good reason that 

the United States did not combine the Departments of Navy and 

War before World War II, but did so afterwards. I think after 

9/11 was the worst time we could have tried to combine 20 disparate agencies with little background. 

There is an important lesson to be learned here, and that is politicians very often want to do the easiest and most visible thing 

when there is a problem, and that is to rearrange the boxes. But 

in fact, rearranging the boxes is almost always the wrong thing to 

do. If you had looked at the entire Federal Government and tried 

to identify the most troubled agencies, certainly the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice would 

have been among them on September 11, 2001. Those problems 

should have been dealt with directly within the Justice Department 

at that time rather than trying to deal with the failings of that 

agency after combining it into a large and largely out-of-control Department. So I think that gives us some context as to why we have 

the problems we have. 

I think we also had serious leadership problems in the early days 

of the Department. I think a lot of less effective staff from other 

agencies were transferred to the Department, which compounded 

those problems. I think the Department developed a culture of excluding one another and the Congress from information that has to 

be shared within departments in order to make the Department 

work better. 

Of all the things that we could look at to try to improve the Department, I am not sure that duplication would be at the top of my 

list. We certainly need to be mindful of duplication. 

With respect to the local grants, it is a program that is declining 

in budget already. I think largely local governments don’t want to 

spend even Federal money to solve the same problem twice. 

I am concerned about duplication, and we should look for opportunities—we should always be mindful of it and check for it, but 

I am much more concerned about the general lack of managerial 

talent within the Department, and within the Government generally, to make the large-type procurements that we are talking 

about with the Arizona border. This is obviously a project that 
41 

takes a huge amount of skill. It has never been done. We need the 

best management the country has, and you can’t always hire those 

on contract. If you don’t have some of them working for the Government, you are going to have a problem. 

I want to say one other thing that I think this committee should 

look at. It is not directly in your jurisdiction, but I think it is an 

enormous problem. We talked about weapons of mass destruction. 

I think there is one area where we are failing pretty dramatically 

in that regard, and that is with respect to biological weapons. 

The threshold for nuclear weapons is quite high, as the efforts 

that Iran is making today show. The efforts for biological weapons 

are much lower. The ability to track them and the expertise necessary to produce them is far more difficult. The efforts that we are 

making in terms of producing antidotes or helping defend the 

American people or first responders I think have fallen completely 

flat. 

So with that I will conclude my testimony and am happy to take 

questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Lilly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT LILLY

I want to congratulate the committee on their work in overseeing the operations 

of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department was created during my 

tenure as Minority Staff Director of the House Appropriations Committee and I 

have watched it struggle for more than 8 years now. I must say that I have never 

witnessed greater chaos in Government than in the early years of this Department. 

There was an extended period in which they could not produce a directory of the 

names and phone numbers of their key employees. I did a report in 2005 detailing 

the data from an Office of Personnel Management study which showed that DHS 

employees ranked the performance of their Department dramatically lower than employees of other Federal agencies. During that period we had Departmental IG reports indicating that leaders of the deeply troubled Transportation Security Administration had awarded themselves $1.5 million in year-end bonuses—amounts onethird higher than handed out by any other Federal agency. TSA also spent $462,000 

on an awards ceremony including nearly $2,000 for seven sheet cakes. 

In 2006, that same IG told ABC News that he had not been reappointed because 

the Secretary of the Department had labeled him a ‘‘traitor and a turn coat’’ for his 

effort. 

We are finally seeing some improvement but DHS continues to need all of the 

oversight that the Congress can give it and it needs the support and understanding 

of Congress in mutual efforts to solve some of its most intractable and enduring 

problems. 

Having said that, I do not see the first issue raised by the General Accountability 

Office in their February 28 report, the potential for duplicative projects resulting in 

DHS local grants, as a particularly something that merits a lot of time and attention. We should be mindful of the possibility of duplication and agencies have a responsibility to get sufficient information about projects for which Federal funds are 

being requested to know whether they are likely to duplicate efforts in the same 

or neighboring jurisdictions. 

On the other hand, one would have to expect that local governments, having far 

greater planning resources to address local needs than the Federal Government, 

would also be concerned about using their Federal funds wisely and in a way that 

does not provide two solutions to the same problem. Frankly, I would be more concerned about local governments using funds requested under the banner of counterterrorism and security as a means of solving other problems not associated with 

that purpose. Ultimately GAO did not find duplication but simply a lack of optimal 

reporting. 

Federal Facilities Risk Assessment by the Federal Protective Service is different 

problem and a more troubling one. FPS is currently expected to make these assessments for about 2,300 facilities a year. They charge agencies occupying these facilities for the cost of the assessments at a rate that appears to be somewhere between 

$80,000 and $100,000 per facility. One problem is that at least some agencies seem 
42 

to lack confidence in FPS to competently perform this work. In addition, there appears to be a problem with FPS being able to simply execute these assessments at 

all. Finally, the question has been raised as to whether FPS is charging an unreasonable price for such services. 

The committee should get to the bottom of these problems. There are at least two 

sides to every problem. It would strike me as entirely plausible that FPS simply 

lacks the expertise and management capabilities to effectively perform this function. 

It is also plausible that other agencies are unwilling to give up turf to a central provider of services even thought that would be a more logical and less costly approach. 

It is also plausible that both of those scenarios are accurate. The amount of money 

involved is not small but the importance of protecting Federal facilities is even bigger. The committee should insure that the facilities are protected and at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer. It may take a lot of time and patience but that is what 

good oversight is all about. 

Finally, I noticed that an issue not in the latest GAO report was mentioned in 

the Chairman’s comments about this hearing on the committee website. Those comments involved the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan which is simply 

the latest iteration of efforts that now date back 15 years and previously known as 

Secure Border Initiative Network. Over time we have spent close to a billion dollars 

on these efforts and they have yet to demonstrate anything like the capability we 

had all hoped for. 

It is tempting in a political season to assign blame for such failure. I could point 

out that this particular contract was crafted in 2005 and signed in 2006. But I don’t 

think that accomplishes much if we want to solve the problem. Good oversight is 

not about who does the best job of playing ‘‘gotcha’’ but finding out why bureaucracies fail to perform. Is this problem simply lacking the managerial competence in 

DHS to organize a task of this dimension? Is it that smart people were sold on technologies that were still not mature enough to work in the real world? Is poor contract performance to blame? Is this a problem that will simply take a lot of time, 

money, and patience to solve? Is it some portion of all of these? 

The answers to these questions are important and this committee can play a vital 

role in forcing out the truth—but only if it truly seeks the truth and unfortunately 

that is sometimes not the real objective of oversight investigation. 

Again, I congratulate you on holding this hearing and would be happy to answer 

any questions the subcommittee may choose to ask. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Lilly. We appreciate your remarks 

about oversight. You of all people know how important it is for the 

Congress to provide oversight. You know, we legislate, we pass 

laws, but through oversight we can make the Executive Branch 

more effective. I think a lot of times we introduce bills that go nowhere, and particularly in this Congress we see a lot of gridlock. 

I think oversight, and what we are doing here today, we can make 

changes for the better. As you mentioned, this Department probably needs more oversight than any other. So thank you for your 

testimony. 

My first question has to do with—you know, when I got the information from the IG report and GAO, I was very alarmed by the 

corruption within the Border Patrol, Customs and Border Patrol, 

particularly the case involving the agent who 19, 20 different times 

facilitated cartels with drug transactions, bringing cash and weapons into the airports, getting past screening with a badge, and taking those cash and weapons out of this country to groups I consider 

to be terrorists. Then I saw there were over 200 active investigations, cases. 

I guess, Mr. Edwards and Ms. Berrick, I mean, how extensive is 

this problem? How can we stop it? Because as a former public corruption prosecutor, I see nothing more offensive than somebody 

that has sworn an oath to our country and our Constitution then 

betraying our country and our Constitution by these acts. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, preventing employee corruption is 

a difficult task, especially the value a corrupt employee brings to 
43 

the criminal enterprise, mainly involving the drug trade. The Department uses pre-employment screening, CBP uses polygraphs, 

and they also do a periodic background investigation to help address the corrupt employees and to identify infiltrators. But that 

alone is not enough. 

We, along with the components, do integrity briefing and training to alert employees on signs of corruption and the consequences 

of corruption, and also invite employees to come to us and let us 

know if they see corruption that exists. We also work with law enforcement entities and components to detect and to arrest corrupt 

employees. Besides civil rights violations, this is our highest domestic priority. Last year, in fiscal year 2011, we arrested 403 employees. 

But to answer your question, we need to have effective, strong 

internal controls, which is critical to detecting, deterring, and preventing these type of incidents. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, over 400 arrests? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Four hundred and three, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Border Patrol agents? 

Mr. EDWARDS. All arrests per fiscal year 2011. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I mean, this is sort of like an enemy within that 

we need to pay attention to. I was not aware of the extensive nature of this corruption within the Department, and thank you for 

calling that to our attention. 

Ms. Berrick, do you have anything to add to that? 

Ms. BERRICK. Mr. Chairman, while the IG does criminal investigations of these cases, GAO’s role is more to look at what controls 

the agencies have in place to detect and prevent this prior to some 

criminal act happening. We actually have some on-going work now 

looking into these issues. There is more Congressional interest in 

this. 

For example, we are looking at the integrity of border agents and 

what controls DHS has in place to ensure that. We are going to be 

reporting out this summer. We have some similar work at TSA as 

well. We would be happy to brief you and your staff when that 

work is completed. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I am also concerned about some of these employees 

that work in fast-food restaurants in the airport, and they have 

these badges to get in without screening. You often wonder what 

kind of background checks are done on these individuals as well. 

When I was working counterterrorism, we initially did a sweep 

of all the airports of illegals who were working within the airports 

who had these badges because they can be compromised. 

So the other issue that is so important to me being from Texas 

is the border, and what are we doing to better secure the border? 

In the technology piece, you know, we have done a lot with the 

fencing and all that, and added more agents, but the technology 

piece is the piece that has not been completed. When I hear the 

Secretary say it is going to be another 10 years before that can be 

done, you know, a lot of my constituents get very frustrated about 

that. 

So SBInet in the Arizona Tucson sector was a colossal failure to 

the tune of almost $1 billion. What is the Department doing now? 

I know, Ms. Berrick, you have called into question the technology 
44 

piece in the Tucson sector today in terms of they are not doing it 

the right way. 

Ms. BERRICK. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With respect to SBInet deployed along 53 miles of the highestrisk area within Arizona, we found that Border Patrol generally 

thinks it is providing value. They are happy with the increased 

support it is providing. However, the Army Test and Evaluation 

Command did a study that actually found SBInet is only providing 

a marginal improvement in interdiction capability when you compare it to what was already on the ground, ground sensors and 

other things. 

So we actually recommended that DHS do a post-implementation 

review, because they are spending money maintaining that system, 

as you mentioned, along the 53 miles, to really see is it worth the 

investment that we are paying for this? 

The second piece to this is DHS’s new strategy for securing the 

Southwest Border, starting in Arizona. They are calling it the Arizona Technology Plan. There is a lot of similar technologies that 

they are planning on using that they were going to be using for the 

failed SBInet. We have called into question the need for CBP to do 

better planning, to make sure that they can justify the specific 

technologies, the locations, the numbers that they are going to pursue so that Congress can make informed decisions about those and 

also have better life-cycle cost estimates. We found that the estimates were a very rough order of magnitude. We think there is a 

potential for significant more funds being needed to roll this out as 

DHS has envisioned it. So we think they need more rigor in how 

they go about pursuing this part two of securing the border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In this time of budgetary constraints as well, Congressman Cuellar and I—he is from Laredo, and I am from Austin—we talked a lot about leveraging existing technologies within 

the Federal Government. I mean, too often we are stovepiped. So 

the DOD has some great sensor surveillance technology that already exists, and the private sector has a lot of this already. We 

don’t need to start from scratch. As we draw down our operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think that we ought to be reallocating 

those technologies to the Southwest Border. In fact, on a recent trip 

to Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq, we talked to the generals 

about that. I think that would be an effective use of the Federal 

Government’s resources. 

The final question, because my time—well, I am about 2, almost 

3 minutes over, but, Governor, I just wanted to, with all of your 

vast experience in this issue—to some extent I agree with you, you 

know, merging 22 agencies. I mean, what a difficult task. I don’t 

envy any Secretary of this Department. It is a monumental task 

they have. What, in your opinion—just a very general question: 

What do we need to do to fix this Department? 

Mr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, I think that this is a good time, 10 

years on after the 9/11 attack, to simply do a management assessment of whether or not the structure of the Department of Homeland Security is the best way to carry out the mission of protecting 

the Nation. There are other alternatives that we offered and that 

other people have offered. 
45 

We do not wish this Department any ill. We wish it success, particularly because the security of the Nation depends on it. But an 

overall management assessment, particularly the work that is 

being done by the GAO and the inspector general, we think are 

productive. But I would be cautious about only looking at the 

granular issues that have been addressed here this morning, this 

person or that person, or the badge is not right, or you can’t get 

into the fast food areas. I think an overall management look at the 

Department and the mission that needs to be carried out 10 years 

on would be a very healthy thing. The Congress, of course, could 

lead in that way and make that happen. 

Mr. Chairman, if I might add one more thought about this, we 

believe at Free Congress that there are several serious threats to 

the Nation. We think that the lack of growth and the economic 

downturn is the greatest challenge to our National security that exists. But also the threat to the Southern Border is very serious, in 

our view. I don’t think that any consistent policy has been articulated yet as to what we are trying to do down there other than 

build fences and perhaps capture people in the desert. 

At the end of the day, people are corrupt because of money, because of the great deal of money that can be offered to people, 

which means that I believe that a public statement from the Congress would be very healthy to say that it isn’t just a matter of taking money and being publicly corrupt in violation of the criminal 

laws. I myself was a prosecutor. The public statement really ought 

to be that people who take money from drug people in order to 

smuggle and set up abilities to be corrupt are actually betraying 

their country. 

In fact, the people who are using these products that are being 

offered in the United States of America, when they use them, they 

aren’t just breaking the criminal law, they are betraying their 

country, because they are setting up an opportunity here for insecurity. These corruptions and methodologies that are going on 

along the Southern Border, you wait until we get into another 

major conflict in this country and people want to strike inside this 

country. The vehicles and methods and routes to do damage to this 

country exist on that Southern Border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. I couldn’t agree with you more. I have 

been talking a lot, this is my fourth term, 8 years, about that border and the threat that is posed from the Southern Border. You 

know, just recently with what is going on in Iran, with Israel, the 

Iranian operative thinking he is contracting with Los Zetas, the 

drug cartels, to take out the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, 

they are becoming more operational. We know that the Qods Forces 

and Hezbollah have a presence now in this hemisphere. That 

Southern Border, I think, poses a serious threat. Thank you for 

identifying that. 

I am well over my time. With that, I recognize Ranking Member 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank Mr. Lilly for recognizing that Congress has a role in 

viewing this, but I have got to tell you I think we are going to be 

here time and time again—it is like shining a sneaker—trying to 
46 

see what DHS can do. Until we address the fundamental issues, 

there is going to be inherent waste and duplication. 

I think there is an estimate, Mr. Lilly, that Homeland Security 

is subject to one of the most fractured jurisdictions in terms of responsibility. It is estimated it reports to over 100 Congressional 

committees and subcommittees. How has this disjointed jurisdiction affected this duplication? Until we can start to—how can Congress approach this if things are so fractured? What do we have to 

do ourselves on these jurisdictional issues? Because I will tell you, 

we are going to be here long after I am gone talking about the 

same thing until we do some fundamental restructuring. 

Mr. LILLY. Well, I think Congress plays a role in this. I really 

prepared my remarks with respect to the Executive Branch issues. 

But a number of agencies, or a number of departments have multiple jurisdictions in the Congress. But I don’t think there is any 

example that is as divided as this is. Even where there is multiple 

jurisdictions, for instance—well, the jurisdictions split pretty cleanly within the organization of the executive department, so it is 

clear which agency or which committee of the Congress has jurisdiction over what. You normally end up with one authorizing committee that plays the lead role and one appropriations subcommittee, and I think that can work quite effectively. 

I think that there needs to be more coordination between the authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committee, because I 

think you can dig into things a lot more deeply than the Appropriations Committee can. But certainly if the Congress would clean up 

its act and try to streamline jurisdictions, that would be a big assistance to oversight. 

Mr. KEATING. I don’t think I can do my job with the current situation as effectively as I can. I don’t think DHS can do their job 

with the current situation. 

Mr. LILLY. I will give you an example of an issue that I don’t 

think is being addressed right now, and that is the flood insurance 

under FEMA, which is not under the control of this committee, but 

the banking committee. We are paying insurance companies about 

8 percent in order to basically do the paperwork on this. They have 

no risk at all. I think the price that we are paying is way out of 

line. Somebody needs to be looking at that. As far as I can tell, the 

banking committee isn’t. 

Mr. KEATING. Most of us were in Philadelphia just a few days 

ago. You know, there is a perimeter breach that was there. Yet 

when we had our hearing at Logan Airport in Boston earlier this 

year, we found out that that is just a local responsibility. There is 

no Federal responsibility at all on those issues the way it is set up. 

Governor Gilmore, I mean, we could be here forever dealing with 

this, but those jurisdictional lines have to be combined. We are asking an agency that has day-to-day responsibility with our safety on 

one hand to be over here, and there is just a myriad of different 

agencies they have to deal with. No one could do their job as efficiently as they could unless we get that resolved. 

Mr. GILMORE. Congressman Keating, I think you are right, and 

I appreciate your leadership on that. You will find that our Commission reports, all five of them, are replete with recommendations 

to the Congress that they simplify their oversight capabilities by 
47 

reducing the number of committees that the Department and that 

the Homeland Security authorities have to respond to. That has 

not been done. Why not? Because territorial—because the 

Congresspeople want to protect their territory, and their authority, 

and so on. So in order to protect that territory inside the Congress, 

they are sacrificing the National security of the United States. It 

is a simple trade-off. In fact, this report right here on page 16 

starting on that is an admonition to the Congress to simplify their 

oversight capabilities by reducing the number of committees. Actually, this committee and this subcommittee exist today because of 

those reforms, but they didn’t undo all the other oversight as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Ms. Berrick, would you like to comment on that? 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Representative Keating. 

I can certainly see it causing challenges for the Department day 

in and day out working with them, with reporting to multiple committees. GAO is sometimes asked this question directly since, of 

course, we work for the Congress. 

I think that the key issue is how well the committees work together and coordinate. Frankly, we are not doing any more investigations at DHS; we are not being asked by Congress to do any 

more than we are doing for similar-sized organizations. Our experience has been that the committees generally have worked together 

well, usually have multiple requesters on engagements that GAO 

is asked to do. 

So I think the key, again, is how well those committees work together, but certainly can sympathize with DHS on the multiple reporting requirements and oversight. 

Mr. KEATING. I will just close and say that we are looking at duplication, we should look at ourselves first right here in Congress. 

Thank you. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I associate myself with the Ranking Member’s remarks. We talked about how the Federal Government is stovepiped 

and doesn’t work well together, and yet on this very issue—and it 

was a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission—was that the Congress consolidate under one committee oversight and authorizing of 

the Department, and yet you have got so many other committees 

that have that responsibility as well. It should be consolidated. 

With that, I recognize the gentleman from Missouri, former auctioneer, Mr. Long. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gilmore, in February, the DHS Under Secretary of Management told the subcommittee that some of the existing contracting 

offices within DHS and its components may be duplicative and unnecessary, which, from your testimony, I am sure you agree with. 

How might DHS restructure its contracting offices to maximize the 

efficiency and then eliminate duplication? 

Mr. GILMORE. Congressman, the way I would approach it would 

be to ask: What is the mission? What are we trying to accomplish? 

The various components need to harmonize and work together in 

order to complete the mission. Procurement within those different 

agencies needs to be directed towards the accomplishment of the 

overarching mission. There is no reason why you couldn’t simply 

have the ability to combine much of the procurement into one place 

with one’s ability to oversee the procurement so that instead of a 
48 

mission for each individual agency, as disparate as they may be, 

they could be combined to carry out the overarching Homeland Security mission. So in other words, there could be a combination of 

this in a consolidation. 

Mr. LONG. Is the turf battles why you see so much duplication, 

you think? 

Mr. GILMORE. No. Well, as I have said, I think there is a turf 

battle in Congress. I don’t know whether there is a turf battle—— 

Mr. LONG. I am talking about within the—— 

Mr. GILMORE. I do know that. I think that within the Department itself, the Secretary would have a feel for whether or not she 

is obstructed by turf battles within the different agencies. I think 

it is more likely that each of the agencies came in, 10 years ago, 

into the Department with disparate missions and different structures and different ideas about how to carry things out, and they 

are trying to do all of that. Now the question is whether that combines into the overall mission of the Department of Homeland Security. That will be a good study, I think, for GAO. 

Mr. LONG. Thank you. 

Mr. Lilly, you have said that you are not as concerned about duplication, or at least duplication would not be No. 1 on your priority 

list. If you are just going to name three things that we should be 

the most concerned with, what would be your top three priorities? 

Mr. LILLY. Well, I think the first thing is just attracting the caliber of management to the Department, to the Federal Government. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. You have mentioned that a couple of times. 

Where are we falling short on that? What caused the current morass? 

Mr. LILLY. Well, I think there are a number of things that have 

happened. One is I think we had a pretty talented generation of 

managers that came into the Government in the 1960s and 1970s, 

and they came in in a bunch, and they are leaving in a bunch. So 

you have got kind of a vacuum as a result of that. 

Also, I know there are people up here that are wanting to talk 

about how much Federal employees are overpaid, and there may be 

some levels where that is true. The recent CBO study showed that 

for employees with less than a college degree, the Federal Government pays more. But at the very top end, when you are talking 

about program managers and contract officers, we don’t pay enough 

to hold them. 

You can go to any department, and you can see our best people 

in Government are being hired by the contractors that work for the 

Government and paid $20,000, $30,000, $50,000 more than they 

are making working for the Government. So we just have a continuous system of dumbing down our best talent because we are not 

competitive at that level. 

If you wanted a project officer that is going to be able to figure 

out how to use information technology to protect the border, you 

are talking about a very high-priced piece of talent, and if you are 

not willing to pay for it, you won’t get it. I don’t think we do have 

it. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. 
49 

Ms. Berrick, why does DHS maintain three separate informationsharing mechanisms for the public transit agencies? 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you. This was an issue we reported on last 

year. I think the reason is in DHS’s early years, they were very focused on getting out as much security information as possible to 

stakeholders, so they used many different methods to do that, 

which is understandable wanting to get that information out. They 

paid less attention to are these systems duplicating each other and 

also, frankly, how useful the information is to the recipients. 

Now that DHS is maturing, we have been looking at this issue 

and have made a number of recommendations that DHS streamline 

these information-sharing mechanisms, and also solicit feedback 

from the recipients of this information to make sure it is, in fact, 

what they need, because what we have heard in a number of 

cases—one example is in the transportation security area—is 

stakeholders, you know, rail operators are getting information from 

so many different sources that they tend to stop looking at it because they are getting overwhelmed. 

Mr. LONG. Right. 

Ms. BERRICK. So I think that is the reason. Again, DHS is moving in the right direction, I think. They have already taken action 

to consolidate some of these information-sharing networks for transit operators, for example. But I still think that there is more that 

can be done. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Thank you. 

I thank you all for your testimony. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I ask any questions, I want to talk about a comment that 

was just made about turf battles, and related to a hearing we had 

on border and maritime security this week dealing with these 

overstays. During the testimony and questioning, it was brought up 

that the agencies involved, whether it is CBP or ICE and even the 

Department of State, aren’t communicating. I hear the word ‘‘turf 

battles,’’ and I think about the 9/11 Commission report and the fact 

that they revealed that these agencies that were charged with protecting our great land—the FBI, and the CIA, and NCIS, and all 

these others—weren’t communicating; that there were walls often 

put up between agencies. 

It alarms me, Governor Gilmore, that we are talking about turf 

battles. We shouldn’t have turf battles. The battle that we are 

fighting is for American turf and American liberty here in this 

country. The 9/11 Commission report clearly indicated that agencies needed to communicate in order to keep this country safe. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we have an oversight hearing on 

this particular issue, of agencies communicating, because I think 

we are charged with—in this whole committee and subcommittee— 

with doing that. So I appeal to you. 

A question I have is a question that I brought up with Secretary 

Napolitano, and it is an area of duplication. One area of possible 

duplication seems to be the International Affairs Division. The 

President’s fiscal year 2013 request seeks to realign the DHS Office 

of International Affairs as an independent office responsible di-
50 

rectly only to the Secretary. In addition to the DHS’ office, the components, such as CBP, ICE, and TSA, all run their own international affairs offices. So I guess for Ms. Berrick, has GAO investigated whether there is duplication and overlap in this area? If so, 

what did you find? 

Ms. BERRICK. We haven’t looked at the specific issue of the nine 

offices within DHS, our international affairs offices. However, in 

our report that we issued last week, we did look at duplication 

among different agencies’ internal affairs offices and delivering 

training to foreign posts in other countries and found that just 

among the internal affairs offices among multiple agencies, there 

was a lack of coordination on what this training should be. So as 

a result, these foreign posts, the CBP officers and others, were getting similar training from multiple sources. So I think there is certainly a potential there, since we found that on a broader scale, but 

we haven’t specifically looked at that within DHS. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I think at a time when we need to streamline Government, and that is what I think this Congress is trying to do— 

I understand Customs and Border Patrol is basically looking at 

protecting folks coming into our borders and our ports; and TSA, 

transportation, making sure that the terrorists aren’t flying into 

this country with weapons of mass destruction. Then ICE, if we do 

have an immigration or customs issue, they are going to enforce 

that. Hopefully they are going to remove that element and enforce 

the laws on the books. 

So I get that they are all different missions. I guess what I am 

looking at is an international office under the DHS necessary to 

streamline that, or is there true duplication? 

So I will ask Mr. Lilly there if he wants to answer. 

Mr. LILLY. I would just say I think what you are talking about 

there is—the goal would be to consolidate all of this so there is one 

voice for the Department of Homeland Security. But I think you 

have to recognize that you still have these different cultures operating within the Department. The immigration people are competent to deal with their counterparts overseas, and that is very 

important because we have a lot of expectations with foreign governments in terms of the way they deal with this. 

But the sharing of information is something that is a process 

that takes time. So your goal is to get to one DHS office in an embassy in Rome, or wherever, but right now you may have to sacrifice that in order to make sure that you are communicating agency by agency with your foreign counterparts. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I guess I am looking at—the NCTC was created after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was created 

after 9/11, and with the intent purpose of making sure that all of 

our agencies charged with security are communicating and are 

doing the mission to defend this great country. I think we have 

grown Government so much that we are actually—it seems to me 

we are working counter to that original 9/11 Commission report 

that charged us and created this agency. 

So I am alarmed that information sharing isn’t happening, and 

that we are so large that maybe we are cumbersome and not able 

to fulfill the mission. Sometimes simple and smaller is more efficient and better. 
51 

So I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate the gentleman’s comments. I think, 

you know, when each of the 22 have their own procurement officer, 

acquisition, Mr. Lilly, One DHS really is the goal, and I think that 

hopefully we will get to that point. I think the gentleman from 

South Carolina is correct. We have created so many different organizations—now the DNI, for instance—I mean, it just, I think, complicated things. 

I just want to close by saying on the public corruption issue, to 

me, it is appalling that we have Federal officers, Federal agents facilitating working with drug cartels or terrorists. That, to me, is 

unacceptable. That is no different than Hanssen within the FBI or 

Aldrich Ames in the CIA betraying their countries, as Governor 

Gilmore stated. 

So with that, I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

This has been an outstanding hearing. With that, this hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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