The NCO, Adam Glenday, 1990 
David W. Hogan, Jr.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Robert K. Wright, Jr.

General Editors

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2007
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, Chief of Military History

Chief Historian Jeffrey J. Clarke

Chief, Histories Division Richard W. Stewart

Editor in Chief John W. Elsberg

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The story of the noncommissioned officer corps : the backbone of the Army / David W. 

Hogan, Jr., Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Robert K. Wright, Jr., general editors.—Rev. ed.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. United States. Army—Non-commissioned officers—History. I. Hogan, David W., 

1958– II. Fisch, Arnold G. III. Wright, Robert K., 1946–

 UB408.5.S76 2003

 355.3’38—dc21

 2003043520

Revised Edition—CMH Pub 70–38
Foreword

This volume originally appeared in 1989 as part of the U.S. Army’s commemoration 

of The Year of the NCO. The purpose was to capture the history of the noncommissioned 

officer—a rich history that continues to evolve. Today’s generation of NCOs and 

Soldiers is the Next Greatest Generation. With the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 

1989, the Cold War came to an end because of the model democratic government the 

Greatest Generation helped stand up after World War II in Germany. That model 

democratic society contributed to lowering the Iron Curtain and served as an example 

to countries that have since become democracies and members of the European Union. 

Fast forward to what our Next Greatest Generation is doing today in the Middle East, 

where they are cultivating democratic societies that in turn will serve as role models 

for their neighbors. Our Soldiers are answering the call to duty, giving freedom and 

stability to our world, just as the Greatest Generation did after World War II. Although 

our Army today is, in many respects, a very different force than the Army of 1989 or 

1945, many things stay the same. Our Soldiers still serve the people of the United 

States and live the Army values. They embody the Soldier’s creed and our warrior 

ethos, which states, “I will always place the mission first, I will never accept defeat, I 

will never quit, and I will never leave a fallen comrade.” 

Army NCOs trace their roots to the beginnings of American military history. 

They helped Washington preserve the Continental Army at Valley Forge, stood with 

Winfield Scott at Chippewa, and directed Zachary Taylor’s guns at Palo Alto. They 

carried the nation’s colors at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, fought yellow fever in Cuba 

with Walter Reed, and led Pershing’s and Eisenhower’s legions into Germany. Whether 

helping local populations build a village in Southeast Asia or teaching young Iraqi 

soldiers to conduct operations, American NCOs are leading from the front and are 

some of our nation’s best ambassadors. Over time, through various changes in tactics 

and technology, Army NCOs have emerged as the Army’s small-unit leaders, trainers, 

and guardians of standards. 

Our NCO Corps is unrivaled by any Army in the world, envied by our allies, and 

feared by our enemies. Throughout the Army’s history, the NCO has been a pivotal 

figure, but never more so than today with our spectrum of operations: full combat, 

tank-on-tank fighting, as during the invasion of Iraq; the guerilla/insurgency war 

ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan; peacekeeping operations in Kosovo; and humanitarian support for survivors of the tsunami in Asia, hurricanes in the southeast, and fires 

in the southwest. Our Army must be ready for this broad range of operations in the 

years ahead. As NCOs embrace their ever-growing responsibilities in the twenty-first 

century, this volume will help them remember how they came to be the “backbone 

of our Army.”

Washington, D.C. KENNETH O. PRESTON

1 July 2005 Sergeant Major of the Army

v
Preface

Fourteen years have passed since Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft first published and 

prefaced The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps in commemoration of the Year 

of the NCO. Since that time the book has proved extraordinarily popular as a source 

of inspiration and anecdote, as a repository of history and heritage, and as a compendium of documents, paintings, and photographs relevant to the contributions and 

experiences of our Noncommissioned Officer Corps. Indeed, it consistently numbers 

among the Center of Military History’s “best sellers.” This popularity and continuing 

utility make it even more appropriate that the Center of Military History update and 

republish The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, an updated and expanded 

edition that we are proud to release on the Army Birthday, 2003.

This new edition of The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps preserves the 

format, attention to anecdote, and mixture of art and text that made the original so 

popular. We have added chapters on Desert Storm, the Army during the 1990s, the 

Army in Afghanistan, and a new Epilogue to carry the story forward. We have also 

added a chapter on the critical role of NCOs to the success of the famous Lewis and 

Clark Expedition, an event whose Bicentennial Commemoration coincides with a 2003 

publication date. We also have worked with text and supporting materials throughout 

the manuscript to assure its continuing correspondence to contemporary scholarship. 

We believe the new version will prove even more popular than the old.

The American noncommissioned officer is a timeless icon, representing the 

strength and resolution of the American people. With ample reason, we affectionately 

refer to them as “the backbone of the Army.” We truly hope that you will enjoy and 

profit from this updated version of their inspiring story.

Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN

1 April 2003 Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Chief of Military History

vi
Preface to the

First Edition

The publication of The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps culminates the 

Center of Military History’s contribution to the Year of the NCO. The Secretary of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff directed this year-long consideration of the special responsibilities and accomplishments of the noncommissioned officer so that members of 

our Army might come to appreciate better the vital role they have played and continue 

to play in the defense of the nation.

For its part in this commemoration, the Center used its Army Artist Program to 

commission three enlisted artists to prepare eighteen paintings that depict American 

noncommissioned officers exercising their historic responsibilities in peace and war. 

These paintings, with detailed captions that explain the historical significance of the 

NCO’s traditional roles as small unit leader, trainer, and guardian of Army standards, 

were recently published as a print set and are available through the Army’s Publication 

Center.

The Center also published Time-Honored Professionals, a booklet describing the work 

of today’s NCOs as part of a long tradition of military service. Aimed specifically at recent 

graduates of the Primary Leader Development Course, this illustrated essay describes the 

evolution of the NCO’s duties through two hundred years of our nation’s history.

Expanding on these preliminary efforts, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer 

Corps attempts to place the corps in its wider historical context. The emergence of 

NCOs as recognized professionals, a development whose importance is being commemorated this year throughout the Army, is a stirring story of accomplishment, 

perseverance, and dedication to the highest military standards. As General Vuono says 

elsewhere in this volume, “The noncommissioned officer is the standard bearer of our 

Army.” I believe that the aptness of his statement is amply demonstrated in the pages 

that follow.

We in the military history community are acutely aware of the need for a detailed, 

scholarly study of the American noncommissioned officer and look forward to seeing such a project launched in the near future. Meanwhile, I recommend these three 

projects to the members of the Total Army, especially to its company grade officers 

and noncommissioned officers, those most intimately involved in leading and training the men and women of the Army. Our goal, as expressed in these publications, is 

to foster a better understanding of the difficult tasks routinely assumed by the NCO 

and of the continuing need for excellent small unit leaders, trainers, and guardians of 

our Army’s standards.

Washington, D.C. WILLIAM A. STOFFT

13 June 1989 Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Chief of Military History

vii
Acknowledgments

Although only three names appear on the title page, this volume was very much a 

collaborative effort. Thirteen contributing historians wrote this book. Three Army specialists created the series of paintings that were the original basis for the essays in Part 

Two: Anita Y. Sonnie, Theresa L. Unger, and Manuel B. Ablaza; and one of CMH’s own 

NCOs, Sfc. Marshall T. Williams, designed and drew the NCO insignia that enhance 

this volume as Appendix A.

We also wish to acknowledge the important contributions made by John W. 

Elsberg, Editor in Chief, who designed and directed the production of both versions 

of this book; Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Acting Chief Historian at the time of the first 

edition; Albert E. Cowdrey, Acting Chief of the Histories Division at the time of the 

first edition, Richard W. Stewart, Chief of the Histories Division during the preparation 

of this revised edition, and Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief Historian at the time of the revised 

edition, who served as exacting readers; Arthur S. Hardyman, Chief, Graphics Branch, 

who directed the selection and placement of the illustrations for the first edition; Beth 

F. MacKenzie, who as acting Chief of the Graphics Branch directed the selection and 

placement of the many additional illustrations for this edition; Linda M. Cajka, who 

designed the photographic essays and prepared the final layout for the first edition; 

Howell C. Brewer, Jr., who did the original photographic research; Teresa K. Jameson, 

who digitized the NCO insignia and designed and prepared the final layout for this 

edition; Julia Simon, Roger Wright, and Gene Snyder, who prepared the artwork for the 

revised edition; Bianka J. Adams and Erik B. Villard, who assisted with the preparation 

of the appendixes in the revised edition; Walter H. Bradford and David C. Cole, who 

helped with the revision of the section on grade insignia and the section on Army values; Catherine A. Heerin, Chief, Editorial Branch, who worked on both manuscripts; 

Barbara H. Gilbert, who edited the original manuscript into final shape; Diane M. 

Donovan, who edited this edition; James B. Knight and Mary L. Haynes, who provided 

stellar support in the CMH Library; and Shelby Stanton, Peter Harrington of the Anne 

K. Brown Collection, Marie Yates of the Defense Audiovisual Agency, M. Sgt. David 

N. Schad of the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army, Leslie D. Jensen of the West 

Point Museum, the staff of Soldiers magazine, and the staff of the Special Collections 

Branch at the National Defense University Library, all of whom assisted in the search 

for pictures. Maj. Les A. Melnyk of the National Guard Bureau History Office and 

Edwin Larkin, Director of Public Affairs, General Services Administration, provided 

photos for the Leadership section.

Special thanks to Robert Bouilly, historian at the Sergeants Major Academy; 

Larry Arms, director of the Army Museum of the Noncommissioned Officer; Judy 

Bellafaire and Britta Granrud of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial 

Foundation; and Amy Hill of the U.S. Army Women’s Museum for their input. The 

draft of this work was read and critiqued by Col. Robert A. Doughty, Head, Department 

of History, USMA; Roger A. Beaumont, Texas A&M University; and Maj. Christopher 

G. Clark, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. We would also like to thank William 

viii
M. Hammond and Terrence J. Gough of the Histories Division, Terry Van Meter of the 

Museum Division, and Graham A. Cosmas of the Joint History Office for their support during the preparation of the revised edition; Sfc. Al Sanchez, PERSCOM, who 

reviewed the section on NCOES for the first edition, and Joanne M. Brignolo, Joycelyn 

M. Canery, Rae T. Panella, M. Dixon Robin, LaJuan R. Watson, and Wyvetra B. Yeldell, 

who provided careful assistance during the first edition’s production process.

A list of those historians who contributed to the writing of this volume follows 

below. Each contributor assumes full responsibility for his part of this study, to include 

any errors of commission or omission.

Charles R. Anderson (M.A., Western Michigan University), a CMH historian, is 

the author of two personal accounts of the Vietnam War: The Grunts and Vietnam: 

The Other War. He wrote eight essays for this volume: “Ready for Patrol,” “Ambulance 

Corps Proficiency,” “Sustaining the Offensive,” “A Hidden Resource,” “Keeping the 

System Moving,” “From Information to Intelligence,” “War in a Maze,” and “Training 

the Trainers.”

Larry A. Ballard is a historian with the Center of Military History and the author 

of numerous articles on U.S. Army history, as well as Battle of Ball’s Bluff. He served as 

an NCO with the Army in Vietnam and as a historian with the 116th Military History 

Detachment, Virginia Army National Guard. He contributed the essays “Guardians of 

Standards,” “Laying the Gun,” and “Dress on the Colors.” He also compiled “Selected 

Documents” and the appendix on NCO sleeve insignia.

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown (Ph.D., Indiana University) has been the Chief of 

Military History, U.S. Army, since 1998. A graduate of West Point, he has commanded 

an armor unit at every company and field grade level, including an armored battalion 

during the Gulf War. He also authored Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in 

World War II. For this volume, he wrote the essays “Hell Night on Objective Norfolk” 

and “Expeditionary Operations.”

Maj. Christopher G. Clark (M.A., Kearney State College) was a military historian 

serving as the chief of the Course Development Division at the U.S. Army Sergeants 

Major Academy. He contributed the appendix on Suggestions for Further Reading for 

the original edition.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. (Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University) authored Military 

Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950 and The Department of the Army. He coauthored the essay “Teamwork, Firepower, Responsibility.” He also prepared the original 

versions of “The Evolution and Development of the NCO Corps Since 1775” and the 

appendix “A Gallery of Noncommissioned Officer Heroes.”

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr. (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) is the author of, among other 

works, Cassino to the Alps, in the U.S. Army in World War II series. He wrote the initial 

versions of “The Evolution of and Development of the NCO Corps Since 1775” and 

the appendix “A Gallery of Noncommissioned Officer Heroes.”

David W. Hogan, Jr. (Ph.D., Duke University) is a historian at the Center of 

Military History. He authored 225 Years of Service: The U.S. Army, 1775–2000 and 

several books and articles. He updated “The Evolution and Development of the NCO 

Corps Since 1775,” coauthored “Ambulance Corps Proficiency” and “Teamwork, 

Firepower, Responsibility,” and served as the general editor for the rest of the updated 

volume.

Robert S. Rush (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is a retired command sergeant major 

and author of Hell in the Huertgen Forest: The Ordeal of an American Combat Regiment, as 

well as The NCO Guide and The Enlisted Man’s Guide. Now a historian at the Center of 

ix
Military History, he wrote the essays “War Against Terror in the Mountains” and “The 

Future” and prepared the photograph section “Deployment.”

Mark D. Sherry (Ph.D., Georgetown University) is assigned to the Center of 

Military History’s Histories Division. His special area of interest is post–World War II 

national strategy. He contributed the essay “Give Me Ten.”

Lt. Col. Adrian G. Traas, U.S. Army, Retired (M.A., Texas A&M University) served 

with Corps of Engineers units in Korea, Vietnam, Italy, and Virginia. He is currently 

preparing a volume on engineer operations for the U.S. Army in Vietnam series 

and has published From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army Topographical 

Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846–1848. He wrote the essay “Into the Provinces.”

Charles E. White (Ph.D., Duke University) is currently the historian for the Lewis 

and Clark Commemorative Office at the Center of Military History. He previously 

served as infantry branch historian and as command historian for the 21st Theater 

Army Area Command. He is the author of The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the 

Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805 and wrote the essay “Along the Frontier” 

for this volume.

Lt. Col. Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, U.S. Army, Retired (Ph.D., Pennsylvania State 

University) is the author of several books and articles and Associate Professor of 

History at Lord Fairfax College in Virginia. He contributed the essay “Checking 

Cartridge Boxes.”

Robert K. Wright, Jr. (Ph.D., College of William and Mary), who served as a noncommissioned officer in Vietnam, authored The Continental Army and coauthored 

Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution. He developed the format for the “Portraits of 

NCOs in Action” section of the book and wrote the essays “To Range the Woods” and 

“An Ordered and Disciplined Camp.”

Washington, D.C. DAVID W. HOGAN, JR.

1 April 2003 ARNOLD G. FISCH, JR.

ROBERT K. WRIGHT, JR.

x
Contents

 Page

Part One: The Evolution and Development of the NCO Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Birth of an Army, 1775–1860 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Civil War and Its Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

American Expansion Overseas, 1898–1902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

NCOs Enter the Modern Era: World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

World War II and Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Vietnam and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

The Triumph of Professionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Desert Storm, Peacekeeping, and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Part Two: Portraits of NCOs in Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

To Range the Woods: New York, 1760 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

An Ordered and Disciplined Camp: Virginia, 1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Along the Frontier: Louisiana Territory, 1804 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Checking Cartridge Boxes: Canada, 1814 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Guardians of Standards: Missouri, 1820s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Laying the Gun: Mexico, 1847 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Dress on the Colors: Virginia, 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Ready for Patrol: New Mexico, 1870s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Ambulance Corps Proficiency: Cuba, 1898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Sustaining the Offensive: France, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

A Hidden Resource: Philippines, 1920s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Teamwork, Firepower, Responsibility: Italy, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Keeping the System Moving: Southwest Pacific, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

From Information to Intelligence: Korea, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Give Me Ten: Georgia, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Into the Provinces: Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

War in a Maze: Vietnam, 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Training the Trainers: CONUS, 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Ready To Respond: Germany, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

“Hell Night” on Objective Norfolk: Kuwait, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Expeditionary Operations: An APOD in CONUS, 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

War Against Terror in the Mountains: Afghanistan, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

The Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

xi
Page

Part Three: Selected Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Extract from Frederick von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline 

 of the Troops of the United States, Part I, 1789 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

 Extract from An Act Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government 

 of the Armies of the United States; with the Regulations of the War 

 Department, 1812 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

 Extract from William Duane, A Hand Book for Infantry, 9th ed., 1814 . . . . . . . . . 261

 Extract from General Regulations for the Army of the United States; 

 also, The Rules and Articles of War, and Extracts from Laws Relating 

 to Them, 1835 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

 Extract from General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1847 . . . . . 263

 Extract from Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the 

 Exercise and Maneuvers of the United States Infantry, 1854 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

 Extract from Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1904 . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

 Extract from Army Regulation 245–5, 2 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

 Extract from Army Regulation 600–20, 31 January 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

 Extract from Army Regulation 350–17, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

 Extract from Army Regulation 600–20, 13 May 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Professional Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

 Extract from General Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1841 . . . . . 275

 General Orders No. 37, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General’s 

 Office, 21 October 1852 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

 Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1888 . . . . . . . . . 277

 Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1889 . . . . . . . . . 277

 Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1891 . . . . . . . . . 278

 Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1892 . . . . . . . . . 281

 Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1893 . . . . . . . . . 282

 Extract from Circular No. 30, War Department, 1 May 1924 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

 Extract from Army Regulation 350–90, 25 June 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

 Extract from Army Circular No. 35–52, 20 May 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

 Extract from Army Regulation 600–200, 24 March 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

 Extract from Army Circular No. 351–42, 23 June 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

 General Orders No. 98, HQ, U.S. Continental Army Command, 18 July 1972 . 292

 Extract from Army Regulation 350–17, 1 December 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Specialist Rank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

 Extract from Army Circular No. 204, 24 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

 Extract from Army Circular No. 202, 7 July 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

 Extract from Army Regulation 615–15, 2 July 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

 Extract from Message, 28 May 1985, Subject: Elimination of Specialist Ranks . . 299

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

A. Evolution of NCO Insignia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

B. A Gallery of Noncommissioned Officer Heroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

C. Suggestions for Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

Map

Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1803–1806 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

xii
Page

Illustrations

The NCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . frontispiece

The March to Valley Forge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A Drill Sergeant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Powder Horn of Levi Gasset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Arnold’s March to Quebec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Guilford Court House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Those Are Regulars, By God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Convent of Churubusco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Skirmish in the Wilderness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Attack at Dawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

We Leave the Trenches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Last Stand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Men in Rest Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

On the Gas Alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Machine Gunner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Kajon-ni, Korea, December 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Border Patrol in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

American Advisers in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Base Camp, An Khe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Departure from Vietnam on a “Freedom Bird” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

End-of-Month Inspection at Fort Riley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Field Training in 1922 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

10-inch Coast Defense Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The NCO Academy at Sonthofen, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Students (inset) at the Sergeants Major Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Tank Doctors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

SMA Jack L. Tilley in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

To Range the Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

The Battle of Rogers’ Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Rangers Arrive on a Littlebird . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

An Ordered and Disciplined Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Supply Depot in 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Red Ball Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

The Journal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

American Soldiers with Local Afghan Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Pursuit of the Sioux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Checking Cartridge Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Battle of North Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Guardians of Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Stand-to Inspection, 1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Stand-to Inspection, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

The Battle of Molina del Rey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Moving up to the Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Multiple Launch Rocket System in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Union Standard Bearer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

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The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker’s Hill, 17 June 1775 . . . . . . . . . . 96

Drill Sergeant at Attention in Front of the Colors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Noncommissioned Officer’s Sash Used in 1840–1872 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Nineteenth-Century Shoulder Scales for Noncommissioned Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Civil War Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Ready for Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

A Cavalryman’s Breakfast on the Plains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Bradley Fighting Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Field Hospital Back of the Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Pre–World War I Medical Training Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Medicine Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Noncommissioned Officer’s Belt, 1851–1902 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Insignia for Regimental Noncommissioned Staff, Pattern 1896 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Insignia of a Commissary Sergeant, Pattern 1896 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

On the Trail of the Hun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Transportation Problems in Italy, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Saudi Arabia, January 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

A Hidden Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

French Children and Friend, 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Soldier Developing Relationships with Locals in Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Field Artillery Manual, 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Noncommissioned Officer’s Small Implements Pouch, World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Nineteenth-Century Company Whistle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Rome, Italy, June 4, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Maneuver Exercises at Manassas, Virginia, 1904 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Infantry Troops Surrounding an Abrams Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Combat Leader’s Stripe on a Wool Field Jacket, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Keeping the System Moving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Clerks of the Union Army at Petersburg, 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Administrative NCO, c. 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

From Information to Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Apache Scouts of the Post–Civil War Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Trailblazer Signals Intelligence Intercept System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Give Me Ten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Practice Jump at Fort Benning, 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

The 82d Airborne Division Departing for Grenada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Moment of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Into the Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Civil War Ponton Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Ribbon Bridge across the Sava River, Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Swamp Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Road to Fallen Timbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Troops Awaiting Helicopter Transport in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Training the Trainers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Wireless Operator’s School, c. 1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Conducting the After Action Review (Hotwash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Mighty, Mighty Fine Slingload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

1908 Wright Military Flyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Attack on the Comandancia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

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Night Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

The Tanks at Seicheprey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

The Final Push through the Rumayiah Oil Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Sherman Tanks Passing Streams of German Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

A Sergeant Climbs aboard an M1 Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Waiting To Go to War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Embarking for Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Load ’Em Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Troops Deployed to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Yorktown, 14 October 1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Light Infantry Troops in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Preparing To Dig In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

The Pentagon after September 11 Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Land Warrior Helmet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Newburgh, New York, 3 May 1783 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

The Escape of Sergeant Champe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

Alexander M. Kenaday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

William H. Carney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

Adna R. Chaffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

Christian A. Fleetwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

William McKinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Charles E. Morse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

William McBryar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

Calvin Pearl Titus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

Michael B. Ellis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

James B. Lepley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Patrick Walsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Samuel Woodfill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Alvin C. York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

Jose Calugas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

Edward A. Carter, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Macario Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Jose M. Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

Roy H. Matsumoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

Audie L. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

Nicholas Oresko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

Joseph E. Shaefer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

Harrison Summers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

Hulon B. Whittington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Cornelius H. Charlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

Gilbert G. Collier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Jerry K. Crump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

John Essebagger, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

Charles L. Gilliland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

Carolyn H. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

Benito Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Corporal Hiroshi H. Miyamura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

Webster Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

Roy P. Benavidez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340

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Glenn H. English, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340

Mildred C. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

Paul R. Lambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

Clarence E. Sasser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

Fred W. Zabitosky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

Gary I. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

Randall D. Shughart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

Christine Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

Christopher D. Braman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

The following illustrations appear between pages 233 and 253:

Leadership

The Skirmish Line

Storming of a British Redoubt

Soldiers on a Troopship

A First-Class Fighting Man

Full Study of Corporal, 15th New York Infantry

Antiaircraft Artillery Position along the Siegfried Line

A Patrol Returns to Fire Support Base in Vietnam

A Squad Deploys From an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

An Instructor Demonstrating Counseling Skills

Drill Sergeant Giving Sign of Encouragement

Trainees under the Watchful Eye of Their Drill Sergeant

Medic Completing a Twelve-Mile Road March in Bosnia

Training

The First Muster, Salem, Massachusetts, 1637

Bayonet Drill at Fort Huachuca

Hands-on Instruction with the M60 Machine Gun

Hand-to-Hand Combat Training

The Jump Tower at Fort Benning

Steuben at Valley Forge

Give Me Ten!

A Tank Crew Training at Grafenwöhr, Germany

Scaling the Wall with a Little Help

Technical

Pathology Lab at Dewitt Army Hospital, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

A Women’s Army Corps NCO Operating a Printing Press

Medic Stowing Equipment for a Training Mission

Harper’s Sketch of a Civil War Regimental Aid Station

Signal Corps Radio Tractor and Crew in 1915

Refitting a Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle

Microwave Repair Specialist

Rearming an AH–1G Cobra

Standards

Basic Trainees and Drill Sergeant Marching to the Mess Hall

A First Lesson in the Art of War

The 9th Cavalry Stands for Inspection

Drill Sergeant Teaching Recruits How To Fold the National Colors

Sentinels From the Old Guard at the Tomb of the Unknowns

Three Breaks to the Ground, Ready, Go!

xvi
Entries to the 27th Annual U.S. Army Culinary Arts Competition

Fife and Drum Corps Rehearsal

Staff Sergeant Guiding a Forklift Operator in Afghanistan

Waiting To Phone Home (Deployment)

A Soldier Leaving His Family for Service in World War I

A Corporal Bidding His Family Goodbye as He Departs for Korea

A Mother Weeps as Her Husband Deploys for Desert Storm

Soldiers on a Train during World War II

Soldiers Traveling by Rail during the Spanish-American War

Troops Boarding an Airplane for the Flight to Saudi Arabia

Unloading HMMWVs from a C–130 in Sarajevo

Loading a Cannon on a Ship during the Spanish-American War

A HMMWV Drives onto the Tarmac in Somalia

Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division Preparing To Board Aircraft in Haiti

Happy Veterans Returning from World War II

Family and Friends Greet Soldiers Returning from Desert Storm

The following illustrations appear between pages 304 and 319:

NCO Insignia, 1775–1821

NCO Insignia, 1821–1851

NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1851–1902

NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1873–1902

NCO Insignia, 1902–1920

NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1902–1920

NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1920–1958

NCO Insignia, 1948–1951

NCO Insignia, since 1958

Specialist Insignia, since 1959

Illustrations courtesy of the following: Frontispiece, p. 2, Valley Forge Historical Society; pp. 2, 5 (bottom), 6, 9, 13, 

17, 21, 22, 26, 35, 36, 42, 50, 53, 70, 78, 86, 102, 110, 113, 121, 126, 136, 144, 152, 160, 166, 168, 176, 178, 184, 187, 

192, 195, 200, 203, 206, 212, 214, 216, 222, 240 (bottom), 247 (bottom), 249, 320, 324 (bottom), 338 (bottom), Army 

Art Collection; pp. 4 (top), 38, 62, 147, 171, 236, 237, 242 (left), 243 (top), 244 (bottom left), 248, Soldiers magazine; 

pp. 4 (bottom), 98, 102, 114, 130, 131, 140, National Museum of the United States Army; p. 5 (top), 

private collection; p. 10, New Britain Museum of Art; p. 11, Gilcrease Museum, Tulsa; pp. 

14, 31, 234 (bottom right), 243 (bottom), 246 (middle), 322, Anne S. K. Brown Military 

Collection, Brown University Library; pp. 19, 118, 202, 323, 325 (bottom), Smithsonian Institution; p. 29, Fort Riley 

Regimental Museum; p. 34, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy; p. 44, Continental Insurance Company; p. 45, 

Jane’s; pp. 52, 138, Library of Congress; p. 58, 67, Michael Haynes; pp. 72, 94, 238 (top), Painting by Don Troiani, 

www.historicalartprints.com; pp. 74, 240 (middle), 246 (top), Shelby Stanton; p. 80, Virginia National Guard; pp. 88, 

234 (top left), 235 (top left), West Point Museum, U.S. Military Academy; p. 96, Yale University Art Gallery, Trumbull 

Collection; p. 104, Amon Carter Museum; p. 112, National Infantry Museum; p. 128, Rock Island Arsenal Museum; 

p. 129, DOD Joint Combat Camera Center; pp. 139, 155, Federation of American Scientists; p. 194, U.S. Army 

Transportation Museum; p. 220, Reuters/Jim Hollander; pp. 233, 250 (bottom), 252 (top, middle right, bottom), 253 

(bottom), 340 (top), 345, Defense Visual Information Center; p. 234 (top right), The Library of Virginia; p. 239 (bottom), Pennsylvania Capitol Preservation Committee; pp. 242 (right), 341 (top), Army Women’s Museum; p. 247 

(top), Fort George G. Meade Museum; pp. 250 (top left, right), 251 (top left, right), 252 (middle left), 253 (top), 328, 

329 (top, bottom), 330, 333 (bottom), 334 (top), 335 (top), 336, 337, National Archives; pp. 324 (top), 325 (top), 327, 

335 (bottom), Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University; p. 326, Freedom Foundation at Valley Forge; 

p. 329 (middle), Mary Tordorevich; pp. 331 (bottom), 332 (top), Hall of Heroes (www.homeofheroes.com); p. 333 (top), 

Audie Murphy Research Foundation; p. 334 (bottom), Richard Summers; p. 338 (top), Congressional Medal of Honor 

Society; p. 340 (bottom), S. Sgt. David Bata; p. 344 (bottom), Camp Bondsteel Public Affairs Office. All other illustrations are from the Department of the Army.

xvii

“The backbone of the Army is the noncommissioned [officer.]”

—Rudyard Kipling, The ‘Eathen, 1896

“We are the finest Army in the world today. Let’s keep it that way. We got 

here because we have the finest noncommissioned officers. And we have never 

satisfied ourselves with being just a little bit better than the next guy. Every day, 

insist on being the best and on getting better. Every day, train your soldiers and 

grow them into leaders. Every day, strengthen the ties that bind us together as 

warriors, officer and noncommissioned officer.”

—General Eric K. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, 2000
The March to Valley Forge, December 19, 1777, by William B. T. Trego
The

Evolution

and

Development

of the

NCO Corps

Colonial America adapted continental European and English 

traditions and practices to fit local circumstances. The colonists took the same approach when they formed military 

forces, including noncommissioned officers. 

In continental Europe, noncommissioned officers appeared 

with the emergence of standing armies. Over time, European NCOs 

became administrative managers, drillmasters, and enforcers of 

camp discipline—the only authority figures in constant contact with 

the troops. A huge social distance existed between the aristocratic 

officer corps and the men—both NCOs and private soldiers. This 

social gap, combined with Old World military tactics, placed very 

strict limitations on the lives of noncommissioned officers. Even the 

battlefield allowed them little independence of action. NCOs merely browbeat the soldiers to stand fast in the line of battle despite 

horrific casualties.

In contrast to the standing armies of the European powers, the 

British settlers in colonial America brought with them a militia 

tradition dating back to the Anglo-Saxons. Every free, able-bodied adult male was expected to own arms and to be a part of the 

militia company of his local community. This local company 

quickly divided into squads, each with its own NCO, to share the 

burden of rotating guard duty. The militia of Jamestown, Virginia, 

for example, organized by squads as early as 1609. Such small 

units were well suited to counter Indian hit-and-run tactics and 

to operate in the heavily wooded country around the settlements, 

where larger units had no chance of chasing and catching raiders. 

Colonial NCOs thus enjoyed many more opportunities to exercise 

initiative. Militia units, led by qualified NCOs, combined into larg-
er formations for a specific campaign, helping 

British forces to defeat the French in Canada 

and to meet threats from the Spanish along 

the borders of South Carolina and Georgia.

Birth of an Army, 1775–1860

Militia units paved the way for the formation of the Continental Army. Immediately 

after the skirmishing at Lexington and Concord 

in April 1775, the New England colonies raised 

separate armies. In June 1775 the Continental 

Congress assumed responsibility for these 

troops, as well as others raised by New York, 

and formed a national force of ten (later thirteen) companies of “expert riflemen.” Over the 

next two years the Continental Army expanded 

to include 110 regiments from all thirteen colonies and Canada.

Although tables of organization reflected 

patriot knowledge of British and European 

armies, variations in details showed local innovation. By 1776 a typical infantry regiment had 

a regimental staff and eight companies. Along 

with three field officers and six staff officers, 

the regimental staff included four staff NCOs: 

a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant, 

and two lead musicians (a drum major and a fife major). The two 

lead musicians trained the company fifers and drummers and were 

responsible for signal functions on the battlefield. In practice, these 

numbers varied considerably due to shortages of personnel, especially experienced NCOs.

Colonial companies, with their NCOs, also varied somewhat in 

size during the War of Independence. When at full strength a typical 

infantry company included four sergeants, four corporals, and two 

musicians (a fifer and drummer) among its ninety members. The four 

22

A drill sergeant works with his 

basic training platoon at Fort 

Jackson, S.C., 2001. Throughout our Army’s history, NCOs 

have performed vital tasks as 

small-unit leaders, trainers, 

technical experts, and guardians of Army standards.

Powder Horn Powder horns were 

used to store powder for priming and 

charging firearms. They were used by 

local militia at the beginning of the 

Revolutionary War but were quickly 

replaced by cartridge boxes with the 

standardization of military uniforms 

and accoutrements. Powder horns 

continued to be used by NCOs into the 

first quarter of the nineteenth century 

to re-prime muskets in the event of a 

misfire. This powder horn belonged to 

Levi Gasset and was used at the Battle 

of Dorchester Heights during the siege 

of Boston, 1775. 
corporals and seventysix privates constituted 

the “rank and file,” 

those men who stood in 

the line of battle (ranks 

parallel to the line, files 

perpendicular) carrying 

muskets. The fifer and 

drummer, whom the 

Continental Army classified as NCOs, handled 

battlefield communications. For administrative 

purposes, each infantry 

company divided into 

four squads, consisting 

of a sergeant, a corporal, 

and nineteen privates. 

These men formed into 

two ranks of ten files 

each, with the corporal 

serving as the file closer 

in the rear of the formation and the sergeant performing the same 

function on the flank.

Artillery and light dragoon (cavalry) regimental organizations 

were similar to the infantry regiment but made provision for spe23

Detail from Arnold’s March 

to Quebec, N. C. Wyeth. In 

September 1775 Col. Benedict 

Arnold and about 1,100 

American soldiers began their 

march toward Quebec. Only 

about half of them survived the 

350-mile, six-week journey.

Guilford Court House, H. 

Charles McBarron, c. 1975. 

During the Revolutionary War, 

the Continental Army relied on 

competent NCOs to match the 

British in actions like this one.
cialized ratings such as gunners, bombardiers, saddlers, and blacksmiths. As specialists, these skilled individuals drew higher pay than 

privates. They did not, however, have the command responsibility of 

noncommissioned officers.

As with the European armies, the Continental NCO possessed a 

status little better than the privates he was supervising. Initially, sergeants received 48 shillings per month and corporals and musicians 

44, compared to a private’s pay of 40. From this amount, the Army 

deducted a portion for clothing; the soldier was expected to obtain 

his own arms and blankets. Over time, General George Washington 

was able to secure from Congress an additional dollar per month for 

sergeants major, quartermaster sergeants, and drum and fife majors. 

He also made provision for short swords as NCO side arms and for NCO 

quarters separate from those of privates. 

In 1778 a Prussian volunteer, Baron Frederick Wilhelm von Steuben, 

arrived at Washington’s camp at Valley Forge. Many historians have 

doubted Steuben’s claim to the title “Baron” and to the aristocratic “von” 

in his name, but he did possess considerable military skills. Published 

at Washington’s direction, Steuben’s Regulations for the Order and 

Discipline of the Troops of the United States (1779), popularly known 

as the “Blue Book” because of the color of the first edition, established 

the principle that the noncommissioned officer was selected by and 

responsible to the company commander, subject to the battalion or 

regimental commander’s approval. Unfortunately, this close connection 

with the parent unit became one of the factors hindering NCO professional development. Unlike commissioned officers, until World War II 

the noncommissioned officer was locked for his entire career into the 

one regiment that had accepted his enlistment. No NCO could transfer 

in grade from one regiment to another without the permission of the 

general-in-chief of the Army, a permission seldom sought or granted. 

24

Those Are Regulars, By God,

H. Charles McBarron, 1957. 

This painting of the American 

charge at Chippewa depicts 

one of the Army’s highlights, 

a War of 1812 triumph that 

solidified the NCO’s role as 

small-unit leader. 
However, Steuben’s Regulations did aid the NCO’s evolving role 

as caretaker of soldiers. The Blue Book covered all aspects of infantry 

service and stressed NCO responsibilities for the care, discipline, and 

training of the men, both in garrison and in the field, areas that Steuben 

had found weak in the Continental Army. The regimental sergeant 

major served as the assistant to the regimental adjutant, maintaining 

rosters and handling issues concerning the interior management and 

discipline of the regiment. The quartermaster sergeant likewise assisted 

the regimental quartermaster and supervised the loading and transport 

of the regiment’s baggage on the march. The first or senior sergeants 

of the companies enforced discipline, maintained the duty roster, and 

delivered the morning report to the company commander. They also 

kept company descriptive books that listed the name, age, height, 

place of birth, and prior occupation of every enlisted man in the unit. 

The Army maintained similar books into the first years of the twentieth 

century, when they were finally replaced by other documents describ-

ing the individual soldiers. 

Steuben’s Regulations also introduced a new emphasis on the 

noncommissioned officer’s battlefield role, enhancing his status and 

further distinguishing him from his British counterpart. The NCO’s 

traditional importance as a file closer was already well established in 

America. Because both the American and European armies generally 

fought standing in lines facing the enemy (linear tactics), the noncom-

missioned officers kept the long ranks steady to maintain volley-fire 

discipline. But the Americans’ French-made muskets were more accu-

rate than the British weapons. American NCOs consequently became 

responsible for aimed volley fire, while the British volleys remained 

untargeted. Other nations had light formations, such as rangers and 

jaegers, who used aimed fire, but this emphasis on aiming by the whole 

force, rather than merely pointing the musket in the general direction 

of the enemy, made Americans unique among the infantrymen of the 

day. To enable Americans to engage the British redcoats with cold steel, 

Steuben emphasized training in the use of the bayonet. The continen-

tals also learned precision high-speed maneuvering and flexibility on 

the battlefield. 

As in eighteenth-century continental Europe, training was the 

responsibility of officers, not NCOs, but Steuben’s system did provide 

for training noncommissioned officers in leadership skills. Staff NCOs 

supported staff officers, and line NCOs backed up—and could take over 

for—line officers in combat. On the battlefield, the “covering sergeant” 

stood in the second rank immediately behind the company officer and 

was responsible for protecting him. The covering sergeant kept his 

bayonet fixed and carried his musket at shoulder arm. He did not fire 

in volleys, but reserved his fire until needed to defend his captain or 

lieutenant. One of the corporals assumed a similar guard function in 

protecting the junior officer (the ensign) who carried the colors, until 

the color sergeant later assumed that position with an expanded guard 

of corporals. NCOs thus became essential figures in the linear tactics 

that survived until after the Civil War, and their influence grew as the 

Army refined its tactics.

Although pay, education, and status of the NCO improved some-

what during the years between the Revolution and the Civil War, the 

25
changes were largely incremental. The Regular NCO was part of a small, 

frontier constabulary, isolated physically and mentally from a people 

who viewed the professional military as dregs too lazy to grasp the 

opportunities in civilian life. In volunteer units, the fact that soldiers 

elected their officers and NCOs often led to major problems with dis-

cipline. After years of living with a pay scale barely higher than that 

of common soldiers, the NCO experienced a jump in pay during the 

War of 1812, only to see it decline again with the war’s end. For the 

average NCO, the amount of pay probably mattered less than the fact 

that, if he were stationed on a frontier outpost, it might be four to six 

months before he saw it. Professional education for NCOs was practi-

cally unknown beyond rudimentary on-the-job instruction by company 

commanders. Occasionally, NCOs in the artillery, engineers, medical 

department, and signal corps received more specialized training. From 

time to time, Army leaders like Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne and Secretary 

of War Jefferson Davis took steps to raise the status of NCOs, making 

sure that they were treated with consideration and not berated in front 

of their men; Davis supported the commissioning of officers from those 

NCOs who could pass an exam. For selected line sergeants with eight 

years of service, the Army did, in 1832, create the rank of ordnance ser-

geant, a position that paid a sergeant an extra $5 per month to receive 

and preserve ordnance, arms, and other military stores of his assigned 

post.

Notwithstanding their comparatively low status, the NCOs played 

critical roles in the Army of the new nation. As the Army explored 

and established posts to protect the fur trade and emigrant routes in 

the lands beyond the Mississippi River, NCOs frequently found them-

selves on independent missions with a fair amount of discretion. They 

became highly proficient in small-unit tactics, the supply of small 

groups, marching and camping in the wilderness, patrols, and road 

and blockhouse construction, developing in the process a good deal 

of self-reliance, resilience, and capacity for improvisation. Farther east, 

NCOs accompanied officers on recruiting details. And when war broke 

out again with Britain in 1812, NCOs once more provided the glue that 

held together the linear formations of Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and 

New Orleans.

In 1815 Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott published his Rules and Regulations 

for the Field Exercise and Maneuvers of Infantry, which replaced 

Steuben’s earlier Regulations. Scott’s book placed particular stress on 

the importance of swift movement from the column of march to lin-

ear formation on the battlefield. In executing this maneuver the color 

guard, led by the color sergeant, played the key role, maintaining the 

proper alignment and cadence that enabled the men to hold their 

ranks. The color sergeant, with his guard of from five to eight corporals, 

therefore became the focal point on which the men dressed, wheeled, 

and advanced into battle. This emergence of the color sergeant, who 

replaced the commissioned ensign in carrying the flag, clearly and sig-

nificantly enhanced the noncommissioned officer’s role in combat.

The brief, inconclusive War of 1812 (1812–1815) was followed by 

thirty years of relative peace. The NCO and the Army accompanied the 

wave of settlers crossing the continent, surveying the land, building 

roads and stockades, and garrisoning posts along the routes the pio-

26
neers followed. Duty was varied and sometimes dangerous, as NCOs 

led their men in missions that included enforcing treaties with the 

Great Plains Indians, protecting trading caravans, and blazing trails on 

the way to Oregon and the Mexican territories of California and Texas. 

But the NCOs were still small-unit leaders and disciplinarians only. The 

engineering and surveying technology of the peacetime Army was 

considered the business of officers who had learned it in the nation’s 

first engineering school, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

The battles of the Mexican War (1846–1848) broadened the Army’s 

experience. The American soldiers who campaigned south of the Rio 

Grande learned how to conduct successful amphibious landings at 

Vera Cruz, experienced street-to-street and house-to-house fighting in 

the battles of Monterrey and Mexico City, won the battle of Contreras 

after a surprise night march in the pouring rain, and demonstrated the 

uses of effective artillery—both siege mortars and “flying artillery”—at 

the battle of Palo Alto and elsewhere. Many NCOs learned skills they 

would soon need in a greater war, as did many of their officers, including Ulysses Grant and Robert E. Lee.

Victory over Mexico ushered in another decade of peace, at 

least with foreign nations. The whole southwestern United States 

had been conquered and annexed, and the immediate task was to 

explore, survey, and map the new regions. The Corps of Topographical 

Engineers took the lead: “Topogs” worked with the Mexican Boundary 

Commission, protected by an infantry and a cavalry company. The Gold 

Rush and the movement of settlers into Indian lands helped to bring 

on new battles with the tribes, and during the decade of the 1850s the 

Army recorded no fewer than twenty-two separate Indian “wars.” But 

even while NCOs led their men across the vast spaces of the West, the 

United States was drifting toward war.

The Civil War and Its Aftermath

Neither the Regular Army nor the militia was prepared for the 

kind of fighting that developed during the Civil War. Some Regular 

27

Convent of Churubusco,

James Walker, c. 1947. During 

the Mexican War, an outnumbered American force gained 

victory by applying the concept 

of combined-arms operations. 

Infantry, artillery, and dragoon 

regiments had mastered the necessary skills of working together.
Army NCOs were veterans of the Mexican War, and others had gained 

experience against nomadic Indian tribes on the Great Plains; but the 

huge, massed battles of the Civil War were completely different. Most 

of the thousands of volunteers on both sides who hurried to enlist had 

no military experience at all. Even members of militia companies who 

had participated in musters had spent more time on ceremonial or 

social duties than on serious training. Once in the field, both Regular 

and volunteer units faced similar challenges and dangers, fighting on 

many battlefields. Over time, these ordeals in combat created a large 

cadre of experienced noncommissioned officers, but only at the cost 

of terrible losses.

With few exceptions, Regular Army noncommissioned officers 

remained loyal to the Union when the Civil War broke out. Many were 

foreign born: some were Canadians and Englishmen, but they included 

mostly Germans and Irish who had arrived in the United States through 

the cities of the eastern seaboard and had settled either in the North or 

the Midwest. They remained loyal to the Union at a time when about a 

third of the commissioned officers joined the Confederacy.

These men had to rely on the training manuals then in print. The 

most important when the war broke out were Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott’s 

Infantry Tactics, first published in 1854, and Col. William J. Hardee’s Rifle 

and Light Infantry Tactics, published in 1855. A third manual, Maj. Gen. 

Silas Casey’s U.S. Army Infantry Tactics for the Instructions, Exercises, 

and Maneuvers of the Soldier, a Company, a Line of Skirmishers, 

Battalion, Brigade, or Corps D’Armée, appeared in 1862 and soon 

superseded the earlier books. (Changes in weaponry outdated Scott’s 

Tactics, and Hardee defected to the Confederacy.) 

All three books prescribed a similar role for the noncommissioned 

officers with some differences. Casey, like Scott, emphasized the color 

sergeant’s role in controlling unit cadence and direction. Unlike Scott, 

however, Casey foresaw the heavy battlefield losses the war would 

bring, and his manual envisioned situations in which senior sergeants 

28

Skirmish in the Wilderness,

Winslow Homer, 1864. NCOs 

took on added leadership 

responsibilities as battlefield 

tactics changed during and 

after the Civil War. 
would have to take command of units on the spot when all the officers 

became casualties. He insisted, therefore, that all NCOs received training in giving commands. 

During the Civil War both Regular and volunteer full-strength 

regiments consisted of ten companies, although the volunteer units 

varied considerably in other respects from state to state. The Regular 

regimental NCO staff consisted of a sergeant major, a quartermaster 

sergeant, a commissary sergeant, a hospital steward, and two musicians. Each company had 4 officers, 5 sergeants, 1 wagoner, and 64 to 

82 corporals and privates.

A fundamental problem in the Civil War was that the linear tactics 

of the day were designed for men carrying smoothbore muskets. With 

soldiers now armed with rifled muskets, which had a much greater 

accuracy, casualties were certain to be horrendous unless tactics 

changed. The increased killing power of even newer weapons introduced late in the war (breech-loading rifles, cavalry carbines, and the 

Gatling gun) underscored the need for more open tactical formations 

than Casey had called for in 1862. Various unit commanders gradually 

introduced such formations to reduce the vulnerability of their men to 

the increased volume and accuracy of enemy fire.

Taking note of those changing realities during the course of the 

war, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton prepared a new manual to supplement Casey’s. His Tactics, adopted as Army doctrine in 1867, placed 

greater emphasis upon simplicity of maneuver. His instructions could 

be taught more easily by NCOs to new troops, shortened training time, 

and increased the soldier’s effective term of service.

The gradual elimination of linear tactics after the Civil War redefined the NCO’s combat leadership role. Throughout the world, a 

technological revolution continued to sweep over all armies, supplying both the infantry and the artillery with weapons of evergrowing lethality. These weapons broke up the use of close-packed 

masses of troops, forcing them into a more open order of battle pre29

Attack at Dawn, Charles 

Schreyvogel, 1904. Small 

patrols, often led by NCOs, 

proved the most effective way to 

patrol the West.
ceded by lines of skirmishes. This change in tactics emphasized and 

expanded the role of small-unit leaders—the noncommissioned offi-

cers—in maintaining order on a more complex battlefield.

The Regular Army of the late nineteenth century was a small, 

tough, close-knit body of men. Except for some coast artillerymen, 

these soldiers had few connections with American society at large. 

Most noncommissioned officers were bachelors. At least one-quarter 

of the enlisted men were foreign born. In addition, elite black regi-

ments (the 24th and 25th Infantry and the 9th and 10th Cavalry) played 

an important military role in frontier campaigning. All the NCOs in 

these units were black, and they enjoyed considerable prestige in black 

communities. Because blacks had few opportunities in civilian society, 

many able men enlisted and proved to be superb Indian fighters (in 

the 9th Cavalry, eleven noncommissioned officers won the Medal of 

Honor during the regiment’s long campaign against the Apaches in 

the Southwest).

In addition to displaying ethnic diversity, the Army of the late nine-

teenth century consisted of enlisted men from a variety of occupational 

and social backgrounds. Company Descriptive Books listed not only 

the usual farm boys, but also craftsmen, scholars, and adventurers. 

Many served for more than one enlistment, creating in the process a 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps of stability as well as variety.

Regardless of personal background, military rank and individual 

worth mattered most in the widely scattered infantry or cavalry gar-

risons of the time. In Spartan barracks, corporals and privates lived 

together in one large room, with sergeants usually occupying a small 

cubicle of their own next to the main sleeping quarters or on the sec-

ond level of two-story barracks. Under such circumstances, it was not 

surprising that isolated company-size units developed close bonds. 

Many company commanders and first sergeants felt a paternal concern 

for the men.

The first sergeant stood at the center of this “family” relationship. 

Enlisted men had to obtain his permission to speak to the company 

commander. The first sergeant kept the Company Descriptive Book—

the family bible of the unit—and was chief adviser to the captain in all 

matters concerning the men. A few notorious sergeants took advantage 

of their special position to bully and brutalize their men, but most non-

commissioned officers exercised their authority with restraint. In either 

case, the classic old Army of the Indian-fighting days did not last even 

until the end of the century. Already the nation was changing, and the 

Army had to change with it.

American Expansion Overseas, 1898–1902

As the Indian Wars came to an end and the nineteenth century 

drew to a close, Army officers began to consider the challenges the 

new century was likely to bring. Reformers, both within and outside 

the Army, agreed that a fundamental need existed for better-trained 

noncommissioned officers, like those found in the older, more 

experienced armies of other countries. In 1878 Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory 

Upton, in his book The Armies of Asia and Europe, had warned of the 

inadequacy of NCO training in the United States. In travels over-

30
seas, he had learned that all European armies accepted the notion 

that “a good noncommissioned officer can no more be improvised 

than an officer.”

But the road to reform was long. Since the early years of the 

nineteenth century the Army had provided some technical training for noncommissioned officers of the artillery at Fort Monroe, 

Virginia. Hospital stewards, the senior NCOs of the Medical Service, 

had received special training since 1857. Since the 1870s Signal 

Corps noncommissioned officers had received instruction, first at 

Fort Whipple, Virginia, and later at Fort Riley, Kansas. Similarly, 

engineer NCOs received training at Fort Totten, New York. For 

a time, an Infantry School of Application at Jefferson Barracks, 

Missouri, and a Cavalry School of Application at Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, trained noncommissioned officers in those branches. 

But such schools were not ready to meet the technological challenges the twentieth century would bring to NCO education. Their 

tradition-bound curriculums simply did not keep up with progress 

in the various skill fields.

At first, most company-grade officers opposed the establishment of more and better schools for noncommissioned officers. 

They argued, with some justification, that the company commander 

knew his men’s capabilities and limitations best and therefore was 

in a position to provide them on-the-job training (OJT). A minority of officers expressed doubt whether OJT for combat-arms NCOs 

was adequate. They wanted more post schools, where instruction 

could be given in elementary mathematics, science, mechanical 

drawing, surveying, and engineering. But at first they could make 

little progress. Major improvements in NCO training and education 

would have to wait for World War I. 

During the latter years of the nineteenth century, the United 

States began to emerge as a new world power. An increasing num31

We Leave the Trenches,

Charles Johnson Post, 1898. 

Although short in duration, the 

Spanish-American War tested 

the ability of both Regular and 

National Guard NCOs to make 

a swift transition from peace to 

combat.
ber of Americans were prepared to support imperialistic ventures 

overseas. Some were motivated by high ideals, others by a more 

basic quest for profit. Whatever the inspiration that drew Americans 

beyond the continental limits of the United States, it was only a 

matter of time before the nation’s leadership called on the Army 

and the Navy to protect the nation’s new overseas interests.

The United States now spanned from coast to coast and had 

even bought Alaska from the Russians. Now it focused on the 

Pacific and the Caribbean, as commercial and naval interests began 

to acquire coaling and repair stations for the nation’s growing fleet 

of steam-powered cargo ships and warships. In the Caribbean, 

American economic interests blended with humanitarian concerns 

for the people of Cuba, who in 1895 rebelled against a repressive 

Spanish colonial regime. When the battleship Maine mysteriously blew up and sank in Havana harbor in 1898, war broke out. 

Secretary of State John Hay once referred to the war with Spain as 

America’s “splendid little war.” True, it was a short war (less than six 

months of actual fighting) that ended in unqualified victory for the 

United States, but for the average soldier and NCO there was very 

little that was agreeable—much less splendid—about the conflict.

The Regular Army was almost totally unprepared to fight an 

overseas war. Its 26,000 officers and men were scattered around 

America in obscure posts and in company- and battalion-size 

units. For several years the Army had not been able to hold training for more than a regiment. The individual NCOs and privates 

were tough and experienced, but the Army lacked a mobilization 

plan. Moreover, it lacked experience in carrying out the joint operations with the Navy necessary to 

invade Cuba and the Spanish-held 

Philippines.

One problem the Army did not 

have was finding enough men. The 

sinking of the Maine caused a great 

surge of patriotic fervor. Congress 

expanded the Regular Army to nearly 

29,000 and called for an additional 

125,000 volunteers, mostly National 

Guardsmen. By the end of the war 

these numbers had grown into a total 

force of 275,000.

Mobilizing and supplying all 

these soldiers severely strained the 

ill-prepared War Department. The 

men assembled at fifteen campsites, 

mostly in the South, to be equipped, 

trained, and transported to Cuba. In 

the camps, the soldiers ate substandard food and lived in unsanitary 

conditions during the heat of the 

summer. Typhoid fever broke out, 

destroying thousands of lives in the 

camps. Once the men arrived in 

32

The Last Stand, Frederic 

Remington, 1900. As the United 

States entered the twentieth 

century as a new world power, 

NCOs faced duty on foreign 

shores in conflicts ranging from 

the Philippine Insurrection 

(shown here) to China’s Boxer 

Rebellion.
Cuba after a delayed, uncomfortable trip on crowded transports, far 

more men died from a combination of typhoid, yellow fever, and 

malaria than in combat.

During the actual fighting in Cuba, the three American divi-

sions (two infantry and one dismounted cavalry) were arrayed for 

battle for the first time in post–Civil War open tactical formations. 

Individual NCOs showed they could lead their men successfully 

in this new way of fighting. Most of the American troops were 

regulars, but some volunteer units were outstanding—including 

the famous “Rough Riders.” The Spanish forces, isolated by the U.S. 

Navy, which had destroyed or bottled up their fleet, surrendered 

within a matter of days.

The Army learned a number of lessons from the operations in 

the Caribbean, including some valuable lessons on joint opera-

tions with the Navy. The painful experiences with tropical disease 

in Cuba led to a Medical Department investigation of the cause of 

yellow fever and the transmission of typhoid. Enlisted volunteers 

played a heroic part in the yellow-fever experiments, some win-

ning stripes for their courage. A healthier Army was the result, with 

tighter sanitation rules that NCOs enforced in camp and field. 

Never again did the Army as a whole suffer such losses from dis-

ease. Significantly, during a war marked by poor food, the NCO 

Corps added a new specialist. Each company, for the first time, got 

a designated, permanent cook with NCO status.

In Asia, the Army learned other lessons. The Spanish forces in 

the Philippines were quickly pinned down by the American fleet, by 

the American VIII Corps (fresh from San Francisco), and by Filipino 

insurgents who were eager to win independence. The Spanish in 

Manila surrendered after a token resistance that cost the Americans 

only seventeen dead. But the U.S. forces soon found they had a 

new fight on their hands. The insurgents were no more willing to 

see their country run by Americans than by Spaniards. After a few 

months of uneasy collaboration, the Filipinos launched an armed 

insurrection against their new colonial rulers.

The Philippine Insurrection lasted over three and one-half 

years, with most of the fighting taking place in the mountains and 

jungles. The insurgents were excellent guerrilla fighters, and the 

Army had to rely on all of its experience gained in fighting the Great 

Plains Indians and the Seminoles to campaign successfully against 

them. The Americans suppressed the uprising, but casualties were 

heavy.

The fight against the Filipino insurgents was a soldier’s war, 

with individual determination and warfighting skill counting for 

much more than strategy. Cpl. Leland S. Smith, serving with a 

Signal Corps photographic detachment attached to an infantry 

company, kept a diary that captured the flavor of the campaign. In 

October 1899 the company was pursuing the guerrillas and was in 

march column as it approached a bamboo jungle in which insur-

gents possibly were hiding. The inexperienced lieutenant ordered 

the men to form a company front and fix bayonets, intending to 

personally lead a bayonet charge crashing through the bamboo. 

The grizzled old first sergeant, after giving the lieutenant a pained 

33
look, suggested that the men might instead remove their bayonets 

and move cautiously through the dense growth. In the end, the lieu-

tenant and the company followed the sergeant’s lead.

The fighting in the Philippines was the longest and the hardest the 

Army experienced in Asia up to that time, but it was not the only crisis 

American soldiers faced there. American interest in China was an old 

story, and behind it was the usual mix of commercial and humanitar-

ian reasons. China, then a weak nation riddled with corruption, had 

granted favorable trading concessions to a number of powers. But 

the exploitation of their country by both European and American 

traders caused some young Chinese nationalists to form a secret soci-

ety that westerners called the Boxers. By early 1900 the Boxers had 

brought China to the verge of revolution with a campaign to get rid 

of all foreigners and non-Chinese influences. They murdered Chinese 

Christians and western missionaries and in June 1900 assassinated 

the German ambassador. Fearing for their lives, the remaining for-

eigners in Peking (Beijing) fled to the embassies. When a large force 

of Boxers and Chinese imperial troops laid siege to the legations, the 

United States joined Britain, France, Japan, Russia, Germany, Austria, 

and Italy in creating an allied relief force to move on the Chinese 

capital and rescue the foreign nationals trapped there.

Despite much sensational publicity, the hard fighting in China 

lasted only about a month. The Chinese nationalists were defeated, 

and the Manchu dynasty was forced to grant to the western powers 

concessions that were even more humiliating than before. But out-

standing instances of bravery by individual soldiers, including Cpl. 

Calvin Titus of the U.S. Army, imparted some genuine heroism to this 

brief, spectacular episode (see Appendix B).

Perhaps the most important fact about the Boxer Rebellion for the 

United States was that it represented the first time since the American 

Revolution that the country had participated with other nations in 

an allied military operation. Like the war with Spain, the operation 

taught valuable lessons to an American Army inexperienced in fight-

ing beyond the limits of the continental United States and in concert 

with other powers. But in other ways the events of 1898–1904 were 

misleading. Fighting the dispirited battalions of the fading Spanish 

Empire, the Filipino guerrillas, and the Chinese nationalists gave the 

Army, and its NCOs, no hint of the dangers they would face in a great 

modern war.

NCOs Enter the Modern Era: World War I

The decade and a half between the end of the Philippine 

Insurrection and the United States’ entry into World War I were 

years of change for the Army. American institutions and policies 

adjusted to the country’s new status as a world power. Although the 

United States did not become involved in any major conflicts, the 

armed services played a key role in administering the new overseas 

territories and in protecting American interests abroad. Along the 

Mexican border, U.S. forces pursued the bandit chieftain Francisco 

(“Pancho”) Villa in what turned out to be a useful, though uninten-

tional, training exercise.

34
The Army, remembering the 

problems that had emerged during the Spanish-American War 

and aware of the rapid technological changes taking place in 

warfare, began to modernize its 

weapons and equipment. The 

rod bayonet had proved too weak 

during the war with Spain and was 

replaced by a one-pound knife 

bayonet. The standard Army rifle, 

adopted in 1892, had already 

been made obsolete by clip-loading rifles with a higher sustained 

rate of fire. In 1903, therefore, the 

Army introduced the magazinefed improved Springfield that 

served until World War II.

Though important, these 

advances in hand-held weapons paled in comparison with 

the impact on the Army and the 

NCO of two new inventions: 

the automatic machine gun and 

the internal combustion engine. 

The Army had used the manually 

operated Gatling gun since 1866. 

But by World War I several different versions of the fully automatic machine gun—a weapon that would revolutionize tactics during 

the war—had appeared in America. For both immediate and longrange impacts on warfare, even these weapons were less important 

than the gasoline-fueled motor that made possible trucks, tanks, 

and airplanes. As early as the Mexican border expedition in 1916, a 

few Army trucks had begun to replace the traditional mules. In time, 

mechanization would generate a whole new range of NCO specialist 

functions and have an immense influence on Army strategy, tactics, 

and organization.

Change resulted not only from technology. Starting in 1899 

with the appointment of Elihu Root as secretary of war, the Army 

began a series of sweeping organizational and institutional reforms. 

Root’s goal was to create a modern U.S. Army, with the commanding 

general replaced by a chief of staff and with a General Staff much 

like those found in European armies of the time. Congress approved 

these changes, but the new General Staff did relatively little genuine 

war planning and policy making at first, instead filling its days with 

administrative detail. In 1910, however, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood 

became chief of staff and immediately began to eliminate many of 

the staff’s time-consuming procedures so it could devote its energies to planning. Taken together, the Root reforms and the dynamic 

leadership of General Wood helped prepare the Army, and in turn 

the NCOs, for the age of modern warfare. 

35

Men in Rest Area, J. Andre 

Smith, c. 1917. Sergeants and 

corporals deployed to France 

as part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).
Realizing that the new Army would need the highest-qual

-

ity NCOs, the Army’s leaders took steps to improve the status of 

the NCO Corps. High on the list of reforms was pay. It had been 

a problem for generations, not only because it was low, but also 

because it differed very little from the pay of privates. Periodically 

throughout the nineteenth century—and especially after the Civil 

War—many officers warned that poor NCO pay was a continu-

ing danger to morale. However, their voices were not heard in 

Washington. When Congress finally enacted a relatively compre-

hensive military pay bill in 1870, it did not address this particular 

problem. As a result, soldiers sometimes avoided the chance to 

obtain NCO stripes. Others, already promoted to NCO status, 

requested reduction in grade. Both were responding to the simple 

fact that a private could make more money than his sergeant by 

earning extra-duty pay for special details. NCOs were not eligible 

for such “overtime.”

After the patriotic frenzy of the Spanish-American War had 

passed, the question of enlisted pay surfaced again as enlistments 

declined and desertions increased. By 1900 practically every 

unit of the Regular Army was understrength. For the rank and 

file, this meant more fatigue details and less time for training. 

Noncommissioned officers, instead of being experienced veterans, 

frequently had to be appointed from among men in their first 

term of enlistment. By 1907 the situation was so disturbing that 

Secretary of War William Howard Taft addressed it in his annual 

report to the president.

Taft argued that to recruit and hold skilled workmen such as 

foremen, mechanics, and clerks—men who could become NCOs—

the Army had to compete successfully with industry. If a business-

man expected to hire and keep foremen who could train unskilled 

laborers and make them work effectively together, he had to pay 

them far more than the unskilled workers. This fact held true for 

the Army as well.

Taft’s strong plea for higher Army enlisted pay, especially for 

noncommissioned officers, finally moved Congress in May 1908 

to pass the first Army-wide pay bill since 1870. The long-overdue 

legislation was a major step toward solving the problem that had 

for so long demoralized senior NCOs. It increased NCO pay, both 

in absolute terms and relative to privates’ pay. Under its provisions, 

an artillery, cavalry, or infantry sergeant received $30 a month; 

corporals in these branches, $21; and privates first class, $18. The 

pay reform of 1908 was the Army’s way of recognizing both the 

importance of the NCO Corps and the need to compete with the 

private sector for qualified people, an important step as the nation 

moved toward involvement in the First World War.

World War I provided many opportunities for noncommis-

sioned officers to prove their skills both as technicians and as 

leaders on the modern battlefield. As casualties mounted on the 

Western Front, the Army, as it had in previous wars, commissioned 

outstanding NCOs to meet the need for company-level officers. 

But as the war dragged on, it also discovered that the problem of 

heavy losses among junior officers could be met by able noncom-

36
missioned officers’ stepping in to 

replace the fallen. At the same 

time, technical units proliferated, 

and more NCOs demonstrated 

their skills as specialists.

The casualties of trench warfare 

also created shortages among noncommissioned officers. To meet the 

need for additional NCOs, the Army 

Staff recalled to active duty 648 

retired men who, because of their 

age, mainly became recruit trainers 

instead of replacements in combat 

units. Most combat replacements 

came from draftees who trained 

for NCO positions in Army camps 

throughout the United States.

This infusion of recent civilians 

probably contributed to the criticism that soon developed among 

the allies. In their early contacts with the American Expeditionary 

Forces, Allied NCOs viewed American noncommissioned officers as 

half-trained and unsophisticated. When the first American divisions 

arrived in France, some French and British officers noted with distaste 

that American noncommissioned officers seemed to exercise little 

authority over their men. Part of the reason, the French concluded, 

was the American practice of throwing all the ranks together in garrison. The British and French had long set their noncommissioned 

officers apart, giving them special prestige and authority. From such 

comments, many Americans came to recognize the relatively low status of U.S. NCOs compared to those in other armies. And the NCOs 

themselves—regular and draftee—soon realized that trench warfare 

placed greater leadership demands upon them than their training 

had prepared them for.

As a result, General John J. (“Black Jack”) Pershing, commander 

of the American Expeditionary Forces, recommended in April 1918 

that NCO training in leadership skills be upgraded at once. The 

Army implemented his recommendations the next month. But when 

General Pershing recommended that special schools for sergeants be 

established immediately to improve leadership skills, schooling was 

provided, but only for noncommissioned officers in the American 

Expeditionary Forces—it was not institutionalized Army wide. 

Pershing’s wartime expedient did not survive demobilization.

Nevertheless, during the last months of the war the strong performance of hundreds of noncommissioned officers showed the value 

of those reforms that Pershing had managed to institute. General 

Pershing summed up his views on the importance of NCOs as smallunit leaders in a message to Maj. Gen. G. B. Duncan, commanding 

general of the 82d Division: NCOs, Pershing wrote, “must love initiative and must hold what ground they gained to the utmost. It often 

happens that a sergeant or even a corporal may decide a battle by the 

boldness with which he seizes a bit of ground and holds it.”

37

On the Gas Alert, Harry Everett 

Townsend, c. 1920. NCO roles 

in the Western Front trenches 

of World War I spanned the 

widest array of technical and 

tactical specialties.
Indeed, the most important tactical lesson to emerge from 

the battles of the Western Front was the significance of small-unit 

actions. The European armies had learned the lesson slowly. The 

battle of the Somme and the horror of Verdun—a battle that cost 

hundreds of thousands of lives—taught the survivors on both sides 

to avoid mass formations. Usually led by a noncommissioned 

officer, small fire teams of infantrymen learned to take advantage 

of mist along river banks and every fold of ground, while provid-

ing covering fire for other groups nearby. At Pershing’s insistence, 

Americans learned the lesson too. As weapons and tactics contin-

ued to evolve in twentieth-century warfare, the role of the NCO 

would continue to grow.

World War II and Korea

During the 1920s and 1930s, antiwar sentiments and isolation-

ism swept America. The whole Army suffered, in particular the 

NCO Corps, whose numbers and pay were cut. Once again, the gap 

between a private’s and a sergeant’s pay narrowed. Despite the efforts 

of the War Department and the chiefs of staff to preserve a corps of 

experienced, professional soldiers and their special place within 

the Army, the Army could not build on General Pershing’s wartime 

efforts to encourage the professional spirit of the NCO Corps. The 

Great Depression in particular brought further cuts in congressional 

funds for the Army and more hardships for those trying to make a 

living as career soldiers. Yet many civilians were going hungry, and 

the Army offered a career of relative security. Many competed for the 

few vacancies available.

World War II made more demands upon the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps and had a greater impact upon the NCO’s role and sta-

tus than any previous conflict in American history. The war engaged 

a huge proportion of the nation’s manpower: 25 percent, compared 

to 13.6 percent in World War I. This great mobilization not only 

increased the numbers of noncommissioned officers but also led 

to inflation in grade structure. As the eight-man infantry squad 

increased to twelve men, the squad leader became a sergeant. The 

corporal, once leader of the squad, became second-in-command 

and a fire-team leader. By the end of the war, 23,328 infantry squads 

in 288 active infantry regiments had two NCOs instead of one. More 

than 70 separate battalions, including armored infantry and rangers, 

raised the total number of such squads to over 25,000.

Along with the need for more small-unit leaders, the Army 

required thousands of new technical specialists to handle the more 

sophisticated weaponry of World War II. To identify and keep track 

of the numerous, complex skills appearing in the enlisted ranks, the 

Army introduced an important new managerial tool: the military 

occupational specialty (MOS) system. In World War I, personnel 

classification had included only initial identification of inductees’ 

civilian work experiences. The MOS system went a step farther, using 

three-digit numbers to identify specific skills the Army needed, and 

it proved vital in handling the complexities of wartime personnel 

classification and assignment.

38
Yet the MOS system had its defects. It could identify specialties far better than it could identify men or women whose personal qualities would make them good noncommissioned officers. 

Furthermore, it soon became overspecialized, degenerating into a 

confusing maze of unrelated numbers, as each branch of the service 

developed its own series of special job skill requirements.

But the main problem was the proliferation of technicians/specialists, which became so great that it overwhelmed most units. Because 

these specialists received NCO status, a typical rifle company soon had 

only one private first class and seventeen privates—everyone else was 

a noncommissioned officer. This situation placed the burden for work 

details and guard duty on a shrinking number of soldiers. In late 1943 

the Army leadership decided that technicians/specialists appointed 

after 1 December 1943 would share the duties of privates, while wearing the letter T under their NCO chevrons and drawing the pay of 

enlisted grades 3, 4, and 5. Thus the “techs” came into existence, the 

target of some joking at the time but an absolutely essential element 

in the winning of the war.

The large numbers of new NCOs were even more important. 

Drafted, trained, and promoted during the hectic months of 1942 and 

1943, these citizen-soldiers carried out their duties as noncommissioned officers superbly in countless engagements on every front during World War II, but especially those where small-unit leadership was 

at a premium, such as the jungle warfare of New Guinea in the Pacific 

and the Hürtgen Forest battle in Europe.

When World War II ended, the great numbers of NCOs and techs 

presented a problem, for they were more likely to remain in the ser39

Machine Gunner, Jes W.

Schlaikier, 1943. From the steamy 

tropics of the South Pacific to 

the intense cold of the Ardennes 

Forest, NCO squad leaders coped 

with a wide variety of conditions 

during World War II.
vice than were privates and PFCs. While rapid demobilization reduced 

enlisted strength by 90 percent, NCO ranks were bursting at the seams. 

Numbers, however, were not the whole story. The World War II mobilization had permanently changed the character of the professional 

noncommissioned officer. No longer bachelors whose whole lives 

revolved around their units, many of the noncommissioned officers 

now were married men who lived in their own homes rather than sharing the barracks with their subordinates.

In the postwar era, the Army took some steps to improve NCO training and education. During World War II it had not revived Pershing’s 

special schools for NCOs, although it had integrated some leadership training into the unit-training cycle before deployment. Decisive 

change came only after the war, as the Army took up its occupation 

duties in Germany and Japan and prepared to face the challenges of 

the Cold War. The Army Staff decided to develop service-wide standards for NCO training in peacetime. Although well-trained noncommissioned officers were still needed, few possessed the skills required 

for postwar duties.

The Army’s answer was the NCO academy system. Beginning 

in 1947 and continuing throughout the 1950s, a small number of 

noncommissioned officer academies emerged, the first being the 

Constabulary Academy founded at Sonthofen, Germany. Probably 

the best known was the Seventh Army Noncommissioned Officers 

Academy in Munich. Although promising, the new schools had shortcomings: weak guidance from above resulted in a lack of uniformity in 

selection procedures, subject matter, quality of instruction, and length 

of courses. Moreover, most noncommissioned officers never attended 

an academy; for them, instruction continued to mean traditional onthe-job training.

For many NCOs, unfortunately, Army life in the late 1940s became 

merely a job like any other. Occupation duty in conquered Germany 

40

Kajon-ni, Korea, December 

1952, Don Spaulding, 1952. The 

1950–1953 “police action” in 

Korea sent NCOs into combat as 

part of a United Nations force as 

the Cold War turned hot.
and Japan was soft, with the American dollar strong and food and 

recreation easy to obtain. During the late 1940s practical training was 

often neglected. Yet the onset of the Cold War in 1947–1948 ought to 

have warned all soldiers—in fact, all Americans—that the price of freedom was as high as ever.

The price had to be paid in 1950, when war broke out in Korea. 

During the first few months of desperate fighting, instances of poor 

combat leadership and discipline often led to panic. Yet during the 

shock of battle and the confusion of retreat, some NCOs, those veterans of World War II who had not forgotten what they had learned 

in combat, stood out. As survivors toughened up and as the Army 

brought in rigorous training once again, NCOs began to demonstrate 

a renewed spirit, and their leadership skills, never more important, 

began to reemerge.

Because of the irregular and compartmented nature of the Korean 

terrain (eroded hills, narrow valleys, and deep gorges), much of the 

fighting took the form of small-unit actions. As in earlier wars, capable 

NCOs took command when their officers became casualties. Combat 

studies of the Korean conflict show that noncommissioned officers 

participated significantly in every outstanding performance by an 

infantry company. During the Korean War NCOs became recognized 

as leaders in battle even more than in World War II. Their record, historian S. L. A. Marshall wrote, showed that “strengthening the prestige 

of the upper bracket of noncommissioned officers within the combat 

arms contributed more directly than all else to an uplift of the fighting 

power of the army.”

After the war ended in stalemate in 1953, the readiness of the Army 

again declined. Congress cut military budgets, and the Army used the 

41

Border patrol in Germany. 

The Cold War placed different 

demands on the NCO Corps than 

did conventional combat. Constant 

vigilance became a watchword for 

NCOs assigned to patrol the Iron 

Curtain in Germany.
NCO Corps as a holding area for officers who could no longer keep their 

commissions and who were awarded six stripes instead. But things 

never returned to the climate of the late 1940s. The nation had heard 

the warning, and it maintained the draft and at least the minimum 

forces it needed to meet a continuing Communist threat throughout 

the world.

Legislation gradually transformed the status of noncommissioned 

officers. One of the most significant acts was the Military Pay Bill of 

1958, which created two additional pay grades, E–8 and E–9. This 

action emphasized the increasingly important role of senior NCOs in 

the post–Korean War Army and was one way of rewarding experienced 

E–7s who had performed in an outstanding manner.

The Korean War had shown the urgent need for more and bettertrained small-unit leaders. The Army Staff began to see the deficiencies 

in a system that relied on ad hoc courses and on-the-job training to 

produce NCOs prepared for leadership in a nuclear age. This realization 

led to a belated attempt in 1957 (AR 350–90) to standardize the courses 

of instruction at the various academies.

The Army leadership wanted the curriculum to stress the increased 

responsibility that the new concept of the nuclear battlefield placed on 

the NCOs, since it expected scattered units and fire teams to operate in 

isolation from one another. This emphasis was especially necessary after 

the introduction of the so-called Pentomic division in 1957, a formation 

whose five battle groups required more NCOs as small-unit leaders than 

had the World War II division.

All phases of instruction now emphasized how to teach oth-

ers, underscoring the NCO’s role as instructor, trainer, and example. 

Methods of instruction were the largest block in the curriculum, with 

map reading—a chronic deficiency among inexperienced (and even 

experienced) troops—the second largest. The course of instruction 

was set at a minimum of four weeks.

Minimum standards proved harder to establish than a curriculum. 

For many reasons, the goal was never achieved. Various academies 

depended upon the budgetary fortunes of their parent commands, 

and the quality of both instructors and students varied from class to 

class and from academy to academy. Most combat-unit command-

ers were reluctant to release key senior noncommissioned officers 

to attend the academies, especially during maneuver periods. But 

perhaps the biggest weakness of the academies was that even as late 

as the Vietnam War period, they remained outside the Army’s formal 

school system, and relatively few members of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps ever attended.

Vietnam and Beyond

When war broke out again it was in another poor and divided 

nation of the Third World. Although the nature of the Vietnam conflict 

differed considerably from the fighting in Korea during the previous 

decade, the NCO again was called upon to fill the traditional roles of 

skilled trainer and small-unit leader.

The first American soldiers arrived in the Republic of Vietnam 

not as fighting forces, but as military advisers to a non-Communist 

42
government under siege by both domestic insurgents and infiltrators 

from North Vietnam across the so-called Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ. 

Working directly with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in a 

variety of hands-on situations, Army NCOs proved their worth as trainers, teachers, and advisers, just as they had in earlier, similar assignments in the Philippines, Korea, and elsewhere. American sergeants 

and corporals helped the ARVN develop abilities ranging from how to 

operate bulldozers and other heavy equipment to how to use helicopters and sophisticated weapons supplied by the United States.

NCOs tackled this traditional role in a new land with skill and determination, and the effort quickly proved to be effective, both among the 

ARVN soldiers and the Hmong tribesmen of the Central Highlands. The 

people of Vietnam were willing to learn and to take a role in their own 

defense, and the American advisory effort—at least at the practical 

level where the noncommissioned officer operated—was a success.

Beginning in 1965, the American commitment in Southeast Asia 

began to change. The advisory effort, always supported by a small 

number of combat units for security, dwindled in proportion as the 

deployment of U.S. ground forces expanded dramatically. Thousands 

of additional American soldiers, along with allied forces from Korea, 

Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand, joined the ARVN 

in fighting the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

As American soldiers took on a major combat role, the character of the war became apparent: more so than in any other military 

involvement in American history, battlefield success in Vietnam 

depended on effective small-unit leadership. In this sense, Vietnam 

was the war of the platoon sergeant—of the squad, patrol, and fireteam NCO. The Korean War had provided many examples of such 

leadership, but the NCO role in Vietnam was much more pervasive, 

reflecting the enemy’s own increasing emphasis on small-unit tactics and the diversity of the terrain. Now NCOs had to demonstrate 

their competence, judgment, and fighting skills in isolated actions 

in areas ranging from rice paddies and deep jungles to the Central 

Highlands of Vietnam. Their success in a succession of often-for43

American Advisers in Vietnam. 

Beginning in the early 1960s 

with small-scale deployments of 

advisers to help the Army of 

the Republic of Vietnam, the 

American presence grew to over 

a half-million soldiers.
gotten day-to-day engagements was critical to the total American 

military effort. At the same time, their advisory role continued as 

they taught ARVN units to conduct their own search-and-destroy 

missions and large sweeps to clear areas of enemy forces.

U.S. Army commanders in Vietnam knew that a favorite Communist tactic was to infiltrate troops into a particular area until 

they outnumbered the ARVN defenders. The insurgents would then 

strike, overwhelming the government forces before reinforcements 

could arrive, and then fade back into the peasant population. 

Using this tactic, the Communists were able to muster a numerical superiority at almost any given point in Vietnam, even if they 

were outnumbered in the country as a whole. The Americans hoped 

to counter this tactic by making the maximum use of airmobility—moving troops quickly by helicopter. If there was one item 

of military equipment that symbolized American warfighting in 

Vietnam, it was the helicopter. Choppers enabled small combat 

units to move quickly throughout the Vietnamese countryside. The 

U.S. Army’s extensive use of airmobility made the role of the NCO 

small-unit leader not only more effective, but also of greater tactical 

importance.

But if NCOs played a critical role in the Southeast Asia conflict, 

they did not find it an easy assignment. Operations in unfamiliar 

terrain, increasing and determined challenges from the enemy, and 

deteriorating morale on the home front—all these factors combined to place tremendous strain upon the Army’s leaders, from 

generals to sergeants. But the sergeants had special problems.

For thousands of noncommissioned officers, the Vietnam War 

brought an identity crisis. Because of a chronic shortage of experienced NCOs, caused in part by rotation policies and the one-year 

tour of duty, many company-grade officers dealt directly with the 

44

Base Camp, An Khe, John O. 

Wehrle, 1966. During the Vietnam War, American forces took 

advantage of the helicopter to 

conduct multibattalion operations.
men. Available NCOs were often bypassed, and their proper role 

as small-unit leaders eroded. The morale of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps thus declined at the very time when, because of the 

nature of the tactics employed in Vietnam, the small-unit leader was 

more important than ever.

Combat operations were often intense and resulted in large 

numbers of killed and wounded. These casualties, along with noncombat losses and the one-year rotation system, soon stretched 

the Army in Vietnam thin among the younger commissioned and 

mid-level noncommissioned officer grades. Promotions to captain 

and major, or to staff sergeant and platoon sergeant, came more 

rapidly than normal. To meet a critical shortage, the Army turned 

out thousands of so-called “shake and bake” NCOs. Often their 

personal qualities of bravery and talent overcame their lack of experience and training, but individual achievement could not conceal 

the fact that the Army had come to depend in great part on a hasty 

wartime expedient.

As the buildup in Vietnam continued, ill will within the American 

enlisted ranks also became a growing problem. During World War 

II, enlisted men usually directed their animosity toward officers’ 

privileges. Even before Vietnam, however, the focus of enlisted 

hostility shifted toward the career NCOs, or “lifers.” The problem 

was a growing polarization between the younger, junior enlisted 

men (E–1s through E–5s) and the older, professional noncommissioned officers (E–6s through E–9s). Junior company-grade officers, 

reflecting the national generation gap, also often found it difficult 

to identify with the older NCOs. The latter found themselves either 

completely isolated or siding with the attitudes of senior officers in 

their own age group. Unit discipline was the ultimate casualty.

45

Departure from Vietnam on 

a “Freedom Bird.” The heavy 

requirement for small-unit 

tactical leaders, technical specialists, and trainers strained 

the available pool of NCOs. In 

addition, the typical 365-day 

tour of duty disrupted the customary ability of the corps to 

provide continuity and experience in the field.
Incidents of insubordination and violence toward senior non

-

commissioned officers and, in some cases, company commanders 

became more common as the Vietnam War continued. This is not to 

say that the Army was overwhelmed by insubordination or that non-

commissioned officers overall lost control of their men. But incidents 

were frequent enough to contribute to an atmosphere of frustration 

and self-doubt among many experienced NCOs. The crisis of the 

corps was a part of the more general crisis of the Army itself and of 

the nation at large, a product of deep divisions that had developed 

over the war.

As the United States combat forces withdrew from Vietnam, 

the Army chief of staff recognized that raising the status of the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps was the first, crucial step toward 

rebuilding the Army. In 1973 the president and Congress decided to 

end the draft (Selective Service). Instead of a mainly conscript Army, 

the nation would now have a truly professional, Modern Volunteer 

Army. As the term “modern” suggested, the intent was not to return 

to the lean, struggling “old Army” of the 1920s and 1930s—much less 

to the frontier and the Indian-fighting days—but rather to build an 

Army upon the most modern principles of personnel management, 

leadership, motivation, and training. After two hundred years of NCO 

evolution and development as trainers, technical specialists, and 

small-unit leaders, the Army was at last fully prepared to recognize, 

encourage, and reward NCO professionalism. No less was needed if 

the Army was to continue to serve the nation that depended upon it.

The Triumph of Professionalism

The Army’s increased emphasis on NCO professionalism meant 

that the Noncommissioned Officer Corps’ potential at last would be 

fully developed. From the days of George Washington’s Army, non-

commissioned officers had usually thought of themselves as profes-

sionals, for they did skilled work that was not easy to learn and they 

shared a sense of identity as leaders and teachers of the enlisted ranks. 

But the Army leadership had been slow to recognize and encourage 

NCO professionalism. Vietnam and the Volunteer Army compelled a 

recognition of the changes that advances in science, technology, and 

tactics had brought. The dark hours of Vietnam thus led in the end 

to a greater appreciation of the noncommissioned officer’s proper 

role. The change that resulted affected the critical areas of NCO pay, 

training and education, and personnel management. Through funda-

mental changes in these areas, the Army gradually recognized NCOs 

as a distinct and essential group, separate from those they led, and 

provided them a career ladder to climb and the knowledge and train-

ing they needed to climb it.

Long a concern, NCO pay received close attention in the postVietnam era. The laws creating the Modern Volunteer Army after 

Vietnam ensured that noncommissioned officers would be paid 

salaries that reflected their professional status in the Army and in 

American society. Today, the Regular Army fully recognizes the profes-

sionalization of the NCO Corps in its pay scales, as it does in other 

crucial ways.

46
NCO training and education had also long been the focus of Army 

reform debate. All professional groups formally educate and certify 

their members. Doctors attend medical schools; attorneys, law schools; 

and commissioned officers, military academies and service schools. But 

for much of their history the Army’s noncommissioned officers, other 

than technical specialists, did not receive professional educational 

opportunities. Instead, the Army’s leadership considered on-the-job 

training adequate. Before 1971 a formal, standardized educational program for the Noncommissioned Officer Corps did not exist within the 

Army school system. For the great majority of enlisted men, regardless 

of rank, “training” meant nothing more than hands-on experience.

Vietnam brought NCO education and training to the point of crisis. 

Tactical operations depended upon small-unit leaders—on platoon 

sergeants and squad and fire-team leaders—even more than in Korea. 

As the American role grew, combat losses, the limitations of the 12-

month tour in Vietnam, and the 25-month stabilized tour in the rotation base, plus normal separations and retirements, led to a severe NCO 

shortage.

In June 1967 Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson had 

created the Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course (NCOCC) 

to train NCOs where the need was greatest—for the combat arms. 

The Infantry School at Fort Benning offered the first of these courses, 

followed shortly by courses at the Armor School at Fort Knox and the 

Artillery School at Fort Still.

To some extent the NCOCC paralleled the Officers Candidate 

School (OCS) that had served the Army well during and after World War 

II. Students in both programs were volunteers who were promoted to 

47

End-of-Month Inspection, Fort 

Riley, Kansas, c. 1900. The 

tradition of the formal endof-the-month inspection and 

payday formation was central 

to NCO life for many years.
corporal upon assignment. Following a 22-week course, the officer candidate received a commission as a second lieutenant upon graduation. 

The NCOCC student, after an intensive 10-week course, was promoted 

to sergeant (E–5), with the top 5 percent (honor graduates) promoted 

to staff sergeant (E–6).

All new NCOCC graduates received an additional ten weeks of 

practical training in grade as assistant instructors and tactical NCOs 

in a basic training center. After a total of twenty weeks of training, 

they were sent to units in Vietnam. The first reported for duty in the 

spring of 1968. Despite the fact that there is no substitute for experience, and despite some initial resentment from older, middle-grade 

noncommissioned officers, these “shake and bake” NCOs generally 

performed well. The Army leadership concluded, therefore, that the 

NCOCC was a good wartime expedient, but not a sound foundation 

upon which to base long-term NCO training.

The Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course was important, not only because it met an immediate need in Vietnam, but also 

because its success stimulated fresh thinking about NCO education 

and training as a whole. Outside the academies, on-the-job training 

was still the norm in 1968. Unlike the system for officer candidates, no 

Army-wide standards or systematic procedures existed for developing 

noncommissioned leaders. The NCOCC led the Army in the right direction—toward permanent upgrading and reform.

The result was the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System 

(NCOES), implemented in 1971. NCOES began as a three-level (later 

four- and now five-level) education system for enlisted careerists. The 

program had four specific objectives: to increase the professional quality of the NCO Corps; to provide enlisted personnel with opportunities 

48

Hands-on Instruction in the 

Field, 1922. Except for short 

periods of national emergency, the Army normally has 

had to operate with limited 

funds. Training continued during such lean periods because 

NCOs knew how to improvise.
for progressive, continuing professional development; to enhance 

career attractiveness; and to provide the Army with trained and dedicated NCOs to fill permanent positions of increased responsibility.

The framework for achieving these objectives was a three-tier 

course of instruction designed to guide the NCO through a progressive series of skill levels in his or her primary and secondary military 

occupational specialties (MOSs). Each course included course work, 

on-the-job training, and periodic testing. NCOES courses attempted 

to present the proper balance of instruction in leadership, management, and technical skill. The basic course, which began in fiscal year 

1971, provided E–4s and E–5s with training in all career management 

fields through forty-one service school courses. A year later, forty-three 

advanced courses opened, preparing over 4,000 E–6s and E–7s for E–8 

and E–9 responsibilities in their MOS.

The capstone of the Noncommissioned Officer Educational System 

was the senior-level course, begun during fiscal year 1973 at the 

Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. Designed to prepare 

selected E–8s for duty as sergeants major and command sergeants 

major throughout the Army, the senior-level course at Fort Bliss, unlike 

the basic and advanced courses, was branch immaterial—dedicated 

to the broader professional perspective command sergeants major 

needed.

49

10-inch Coast Defense Gun,

Thure de Thulstrup, 1900. 

Sergeants taught their men 

to master new weapons produced by the industrial and 

technical revolution at the turn 

of the nineteenth century.
With the maturing of the NCOES, the Army for the first time had put 

into place a formal, standardized system that educated enlisted men 

and women in step with grade progression. The senior-level course at 

the Sergeants Major Academy provided career enhancement for senior 

NCOs similar to that provided for officers by the senior service colleges. 

With NCOES, the professionalization of noncommissioned officer training was at last becoming a reality.

A professional NCO personnel management system, however, 

emerged very slowly. Like a juggler trying to keep several objects in the 

air at the same time, the Army Staff faced several manpower challenges 

in the mid-1960s. While operations in Vietnam required increasing quantities both of men and materiel, large field armies in western Europe and 

Korea also placed heavy demands on training and maintenance facilities. 

These burdens seriously challenged the Army’s junior leaders, especially 

its NCOs. The Army tried a series of personnel management programs to 

sustain the professional capabilities and the morale of these leaders. But 

it was a scattergun approach.

As the 1970s began, the reduction of the Army from Vietnam’s peak 

of 1.5 million men and women to about 775,000 and the emergence 

of the all-volunteer force caused the Army Staff to reconsider its piecemeal personnel management programs. Policies governing promotion, 

MOS classification, and testing and evaluation all affected a soldier’s 

career pattern, morale, and likelihood of staying in the Army. Because 

the various programs were separate and sometimes contradictory in 

their effect, a soldier might well become confused and disheartened 

by the lack of clear direction in his or her career. Chief of Staff General 

Creighton W. Abrams directed a review to address the problem. In 1973 

the Military Personnel Center and the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) took the lead in initiating far-ranging studies.

The result was the Enlisted Personnel Management System 

(EPMS), implemented on 1 October 1975. It was designed to provide clear patterns of career development and promotion potential, 

whether a soldier served three years or thirty. Each career management field was grouped into a number of related MOSs and redesigned to provide a logical and visible road map to guide careermotivated soldiers along the most direct route from E–1 to E–9. The 

50

The 7th U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 

Sonthofen, Germany. Although 

formal instruction for officers 

began with the establishment 

of West Point, comparable 

leadership programs for NCOs 

began only after World War II. 
staff intended the new system to eliminate promotion bottlenecks 

and to provide a fair opportunity for advancement to all by central-

izing promotions.

The EPMS had varied and powerful impacts. For one thing, deadend military occupational specialties—those in which a soldier could 

progress only to sergeant or staff sergeant—were eliminated. Instead, 

the grouping of related responsibilities into career management 

fields enabled a soldier to merge one specialty into a related MOS at 

a certain grade. For example, a soldier with a Radio Operator MOS 

formerly peaked at the grade of sergeant and had to change jobs 

entirely to seek further promotion. Under the EPMS, the same soldier 

could merge into a related specialty (e.g., Tactical Communications 

System Operator/Mechanic) and continue along the same career 

path.

NCO education was also affected. The Noncommissioned Officer 

Educational System was one of the earliest programs to be taken over, 

integrated, and expanded. MOS skill levels were restructured for each 

enlisted grade, with a total of five levels. The branch schools devel-

oped training plans for each military occupational specialty, outlin-

ing specific tasks, the conditions under which tasks were to be per-

formed, and the standards to be met for each skill level. Periodically, 

NCOs would verify through Skill Qualification Testing their ability 

to perform tasks at their required skill level. By achieving even higher 

qualifications scores in common-task testing, the MOS written test, 

and the hands-on evaluation, a soldier could attain the next higher 

skill level and thereby be considered for promotion.

In many ways the EPMS was like the Officers’ Personnel 

Management System. Once the EPMS was adopted, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps had the kind of formal, service-wide system 

of professional career development that commissioned officers had 

long taken for granted.

But the EPMS was not the last word in noncommissioned 

officer career management. In 1980 the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations outlined the Noncommissioned Officer Development 

Plan (NCOPD). The creators of the plan emphasized the need for 

commanders at all levels to conduct formal NCO leadership train-

ing. At the same time, the plan made the Sergeant Major of the Army 

responsible for overseeing noncommissioned officer professional 

development throughout the Army’s major commands, the National 

Guard, and the Army Reserve.

Significantly, the NCODP complemented but did not displace 

the Enlisted Personnel Management System. The Noncommissioned 

Officer Development Plan enabled the NCO to put into practi-

cal application within his or her own unit the training and skills 

acquired through the EPMS and the NCOES. Instead of mere testing, 

this “doing” phase of training enabled soldiers to demonstrate their 

readiness to become truly professional NCOs.

Taken together, the Noncommissioned Officer Educational 

System, the Enlisted Personnel Management System, and the 

Noncommissioned Officer Development Plan meant that the Army 

had the doctrinal, institutional, and structural blueprint necessary 

to produce the professional noncommissioned officers needed for 

51
a contemporary Army. Today NCOs in the U.S. Army enjoy the 

recognition as professionals they have earned. They receive respectable pay for a day’s work; they can advance in rank through a career 

educational system; and they enjoy the benefits of centralized 

career management. NCOs now sit on promotion boards chaired 

by general officers and stand (symbolically at least) at the right 

hand of every commanding officer from platoon leader to the 

Chief of Staff. The way has been long, but a better Army has been 

the result.

Desert Storm, Peacekeeping, and Beyond

The 1970s was a period that most veteran NCOs would like to 

forget. While Americans watched a quarter century of involvement 

in Vietnam come to an end with the fall of Saigon in April 1975, 

the Army struggled to maintain its effectiveness despite serious 

problems common to society as well. Illegal drugs flourished in 

many parts of the Army; 40 percent of the Army in Europe confessed to drug use. In some units, conditions approached mutiny 

as gangs used extortion and brutality to impose their will. Racial 

violence affected Army units around the world. Soldiers abused 

their officers and noncommissioned officers. Between 1969 and 

1971 the Army recorded 800 instances of attacks involving hand 

grenades, resulting in the deaths of forty-five officers and NCOs. 

The low prestige of the Army in society at large forced the Army to 

accept recruits of inferior quality, when it could find them at all. 

By 1974 Army manpower levels were 20,000 below authorization, 

and only four of the thirteen active component divisions were 

52

Aerial View of the U.S. Army 

Sergeants Major Academy, c. 

2001. A soldier’s progression 

through the NCOES culminates in the Sergeants Major 

Academy. Inset: Students of 

the Command Sergeants Major 

Course. Standardized classroom 

instruction is the hallmark of the 

current NCOES. 
combat ready. NCOs found themselves caught between undisciplined soldiers and efforts to build an all-volunteer force. 

Through the efforts of leaders from the chief of staff to the 

NCOs in the field, the Army slowly regained its efficiency and 

esprit. Supported by superiors, NCOs attacked the problems in 

their units. The Army cracked down on drug dealers and gang leaders; in four months in 1973, the Army in Europe discharged over 

1,300 undesirables. Racial awareness programs created a dialogue 

between blacks and whites that restored a degree of trust. The 

“enlisted men’s councils” that had bypassed NCOs in the chain of 

command gradually disappeared. Savvy recruitment campaigns and 

long-overdue pay raises in the early 1980s helped draw more qualified soldiers. New combat training centers, notably the National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, ensured that these soldiers 

would be better trained under conditions more realistic than ever 

before. New policies carried out by NCOs provided increased support for families of servicemen. And NCOs were in the vanguard as 

the Army rebuilt its doctrine and equipment for the future. A new 

AirLand Battle doctrine placed more emphasis on maneuver and 

leadership at lower levels on the battlefield. NCOs worked hard to 

incorporate the “Big Five” weapons systems that would execute this 

new doctrine: the UH–60 Black Hawk helicopter, the M1 Abrams 

tank, the AH–64 Apache helicopter, the Patriot air defense system, 

and the M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicle. New light divisions and 

special operations forces provided the Army with new capabilities 

at the lower ends of the conflict spectrum. The capabilities of the 

new Army were graphically demonstrated in the quick success of 

Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, in 1989.

One year after Just Cause, the NCOs and the rest of the Army 

received the chance to show how far they had come in seventeen 

years. Within days of Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in 

53

Desert Storm, Frank Thomas, 

1991. During the hundredhour ground war in Southwest 

Asia, NCOs served proudly and 

capably as an integral part of 

the multinational force.
August 1990, NCOs deployed to Saudi Arabia with the rest of the 

82d Airborne Division. For the next five months, NCOs were in 

the thick of Operation Desert Shield, the deployment of 297,000 

American troops with their food, equipment, vehicles, and big guns 

from the United States and Europe to the Persian Gulf region. When 

a United Nations resolution failed to induce Saddam to withdraw 

from Kuwait, the coalition launched Operation Desert Storm on 17 

January. From the tank gunners firing their Abrams guns with deadly 

accuracy to the engineer squad leaders supervising road construction 

in some cases ahead of their own combat forces, from the Special 

Forces sergeants training and performing liaison duties with Saudi 

and Kuwaiti troops to the grizzled command sergeants major providing veteran leadership for the young soldiers, the Army’s NCOs 

covered themselves with glory during the hundred-hour ground 

war. With the conclusion of Desert Storm, one of the most lopsided 

victories in American military annals, the Vietnam veterans among 

the NCOs could view with special pride the new Army that they had 

done so much to create.

The NCOs enjoyed little opportunity to rest on their laurels 

after the victory of Desert Storm. With the collapse of the Soviet 

empire and end of the Cold War, the Army entered an era of downsizing. In fiscal year 1992 alone, the Army lost about 100,000 soldiers and inactivated such proud units as the VII Corps and the 3d 

Armored Division that had distinguished themselves in the Gulf. 

From 710,000 at the start of Fiscal Year 1992, the active Army had 

decreased to 529,000 by the end of FY 1994. To ease the strain of 

54

Tank Doctors, Robert Teachout, 

1988. In the 1980s new equipment, new tactics, and new 

training centers kept the NCOs 

prepared for action.
force reductions, the Army instituted a number of support pro

-

grams—including payments, job searches, and counseling—for 

those leaving the Army. Still, the rapid reduction of force structure 

to 1950s levels created an immense challenge for NCOs as they 

struggled to maintain morale among soldiers uncertain about their 

futures with the Army.

As the Army shrank, it also was deploying more frequently to 

trouble spots around the world. The end of the Cold War brought 

into the open national rivalries and ethnic tensions that had been 

subsumed for years by the East-West contest. Within two years of Desert Storm, the Army was deploying troops to Somalia to aid nongovernmental organizations in the task of ending the famine and 

restoring order to a society that had collapsed. In September 1994 

the Army spearheaded an international force of 25,000 troops that 

landed in Haiti to restore President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power 

and to maintain order. In December 1995 American troops partici-

pated in a 60,000-man force that deployed to Bosnia to implement 

the Dayton Peace Agreements between the Serbs and the Bosnian 

Muslims. And, in May 1999, Task Force Hawk moved to Albania to 

support Operation AlliedForce against Serb occupation of Kosovo. 

In between these deployments, American soldiers were deploying to 

other trouble spots from the Sinai to Macedonia. At the same time 

Army troops retained a forward presence in Germany, Korea, Kuwait, 

and Saudi Arabia. 

Nor were American troops, including NCOs, going overseas 

merely to conduct peacekeeping missions or nation building. 

To an unprecedented degree, they found themselves conducting 

humanitarian missions, both foreign and domestic, and helping to 

interdict the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In south-

eastern Turkey, Rwanda, Peru, Ecuador, and Honduras, NCOs aided 

those left homeless by warfare or natural disasters. At home, NCOs 

gave out relief supplies to victims of Hurricane Andrew in south-

ern Florida, helped fight floods in the Midwest and Georgia, and 

assisted those affected by earthquakes in California. NCOs trained 

foreign and domestic law enforcement and helped with detection 

equipment in the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the 

United States. The pace of activity, with many soldiers deploying 

overseas multiple times in a given period, increased the challenge 

for NCOs in maintaining morale, particularly given the growing 

number of enlisted men with families. It is largely due to the efforts 

of competent, confident NCOs that retention rates remained as high 

as they did. 

In the rising number of overseas deployments, NCOs of the 

reserve component played a full share. The Army’s force-structure 

reforms of the early 1970s had placed an ever larger share of com-

bat support and combat service support functions in the hands of 

National Guard and Army Reserve units, to the point that it was hard 

to envision an overseas mission of any scale without the participa-

tion of such units. Reserve NCOs possessed a number of skills in such 

areas as medicine, military police, and civil affairs—skills that were 

valuable to the nation-building, peacekeeping, and humanitarian 

tasks that were becoming such a steady staple of the Army’s activities 

55
in the 1990s. A policeman from a Virginia town might find himself 

an NCO with a civil affairs unit in Bosnia, or a medical technician 

from Texas might find herself a medic NCO in Central America in 

response to a massive natural disaster. Never did the phrase Total 

Army have more resonance than in the active-reserve integration of 

the last years of the twentieth century. 

With the beginning of the twenty-first century, NCOs joined the 

rest of the Army in bracing themselves for the changes wrought by 

the “revolution in military affairs.” Through a sweeping “transformation,” the Army sought to adjust to the information revolution and 

other major changes wrought by anticipated technological breakthroughs. The Army hoped that these breakthroughs would make 

possible an Objective Force that was more lethal, mobile, deployable, 

agile, survivable, and supportable than any force before it. These 

changes promised to make the intelligent, self-reliant noncommissioned officer more important than ever before to the Army of the 

future. NCOs were at the forefront of testing of the Stryker vehicle 

and other new systems of the Interim Combat Brigade Team at Fort 

Lewis, Washington. Just as they had contributed enormously to the 

Army that won the Gulf War, so they sought to build the Army of the 

new century.

On a September morning in 2001, however, the world of the 

NCO changed with the terrorist destruction of the twin towers of the 

World Trade Center and one of the outer walls of the Pentagon. In 

the halls of the Pentagon, NCOs performed heroically to rescue those 

at the mercy of the flames. Within weeks, Special Forces NCOs were 

making contact with allies in Afghanistan, cultivating the seeds for 

the upheaval that would eventually sweep al Qaeda terrorists and 

their Taliban allies from power. They helped train the fighters of the 

Northern Alliance and provided the air liaison parties that made possible the devastating aerial bombardments on Taliban positions. In 

56

SMA Jack L. Tilley with 101st 

Airborne Troops in Afghanistan, 

2002. Today’s NCO safeguards 

standards and traditions, trains 

subordinates, and is both 

technically and tactically proficient—the backbone of the 

Army.
Operation 

Anaconda, NCOs of the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne 

Divisions led their troops through the rugged elevations and frigid 

weather of the Shahi Kowt (Shah-e-Kot) range in eastern Afghanistan 

to root out al Qaeda cells from their caves. In this war against terror-

ism, perhaps even more so than in previous American conflicts, NCOs 

figured to take a predominant role.

Never have the challenges for the Army’s NCOs been more daunt-

ing, but never have the capabilities of those NCOs been greater. 

The NCO of the twenty-first century has come a long way from the 

file-closer of the Revolutionary War era. Today’s NCO must deal with 

a more diverse body of soldiers than faced any of his predecessors. 

He finds himself in much more complex situations, at different times 

serving as ambassador, teacher, doctor, and technician, as well as 

disciplinarian. He deals with technology infinitely more complicated 

than the flintlock muskets and brass cannon of Washington’s Army. 

But today’s NCO has more training and education and more profes-

sional status than any of his predecessors. Furthermore, the most 

important factors, the intricacies of leadership and human relations, 

have not changed that much in 200 years.

57

“When someone pinned those stripes on your collar, you made a 

promise. You promised to take care of soldiers and teach them how 

to stay alive. You either did it consciously by reciting the NCO Creed 

or some other way during a ceremony....Look at your soldiers. Look 

at what’s going on around you. Check, check, and correct. You should 

leave Sergeants Tracks behind you everywhere you go. They are the 

mark of a true professional.”

 —M. Sgt. Christopher J. Zimmer

NCO Journal, 2002
To Range the Woods, Manuel B. Ablaza, 1988
To

Range

the

Woods

New York, 1760

Entering the fort made the ranger sergeant feel uneasy—too 

much saluting, too many people scurrying around acting 

important. Ever since this latest struggle against the French 

and their Indian allies had started in earnest, things had been this 

way. For the first time in anyone’s memory British regulars had been 

sent across the ocean in large numbers, bringing a whole array of 

notions that had turned fighting upside down. Suddenly, officers 

everywhere were making an infernal racket and worrying about 

how you looked, not how well you could shoot. They even dressed 

wrong. Their red coats and shiny buttons stood out clearly in the 

bright summer sun, but that was hardly something that you wanted 

when you were trying to sneak up on an enemy outpost!

Although the scene at the fort always reminded him of an anthill after someone had kicked it over, he sighed and motioned to 

the private with him to proceed. They had a mission to carry out. 

Major Rogers had told him to deliver a message personally to the 

general, and it was best not to dawdle. Pausing only to ask directions 

to headquarters from the British sergeant (he was easy to spot—the 

one with the axe on a stick, called a halberd) at the gate, the two 

New Englanders set about their task. Although the private was 

young enough to be impressed by the fort, the sergeant had been in 

action for four years, and he wasn’t about to let anyone forget that 

he wore the elite green uniform of a ranger.

The pride that he felt in his unit went hand in hand with the 

efficient arrangement of his weapons, uniform, and equipment. 

From his clean and well-maintained musket and hatchet to his leggings and moccasins, the sergeant projected an image of someone 

completely at home in the virgin forests that covered the frontiers 

of the North American colonies. Moving silently through the woods 

around Lake Champlain was second nature to this man—a fact that 

Major Rogers had noticed and rewarded, first by hand-picking him 
44

The Battle of Rogers’ Rock, J. 

L. G. Ferris. The fundamental 

American belief that soldiers are 

also citizens has always prompted 

those in authority to lead through 

example rather than through 

fear. Since Rogers’ Rangers in 

the French and Indian War 

(depicted here), NCOs have 

used this personal approach to 

maintain discipline. 

and then by promoting him. Leading a small patrol and acting as the 

army’s eyes and ears carried a high degree of risk and the burden of 

making split-second decisions that could mean life or death for the 

soldiers serving under him, but that was what the sergeant wanted to 

do, and it was what he did best.

Background

From the late seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century, Britain 

and France were engaged in a prolonged struggle for world dominance. Known loosely as the second Hundred Years’ War, it pitted 

land and sea forces against each other around the globe. Colonists 

of both powers in North America and their Indian allies became 

embroiled in the conflict as well, establishing fundamental traditions in both the American and Canadian armed forces.

The term French and Indian War (1754–1763) refers to the portion of the contest between the two giants fought in the New World. 

To people of the time, North America formed a relatively minor 

theater compared with Europe, Africa, India, or even the Caribbean. 

But to Virginians or New Englanders or French Canadians the issue 

was far more immediate—survival. Earlier conflicts had involved 

relatively tiny contingents’ raiding each other’s outposts as the 

colonies expanded from their initial toeholds along the coastline 

and major rivers. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, 

colonial growth had brought imperial interests fully into play. At 

stake was control over the rich resources of the continent, including 

the fur trade.

In 1754 the governor of Virginia raised a small contingent of 

full-time soldiers, known as Provincials to distinguish them from 

Royal regulars. He sent them under a former militia officer, George 
45

Rangers from the 2d Battalion, 

75th Rangers, arrive by 

MH–6 Littlebird during

training exercises at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, April 2002. 

Leading by example is especially important among Rangers, 

who have served with distinction 

since colonial times.

Washington, to evict the French from the area that would later 

become Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The defeat of this Virginia force 

marked the opening round of the war. This initial disaster prompted 

the London government to send over two regular regiments of 

Redcoats the following year, while France dispatched similar forces 

to strengthen Canada. Although the outnumbered French and 

Canadians held the line for several years, the British marshaled 

increasing numbers of Provincials and Redcoats and prepared to 

bring the issue to conclusion.

Canada’s security rested upon a network of defensive frontier 

fortifications that stretched from Louisbourg on the Atlantic, across 

the Great Lakes, and down the Ohio Valley. It also depended on the 

use of Indian allies in raids against the British colonies. For decades 

that combination had kept enemies at bay, but the British finally 

found a way to bring their superior resources into play. Columns of 

regulars and Provincials assembled annually on the disputed frontiers for campaigns targeting key forts. The first of these French forts 

fell in 1758. A year later the capture of Niagara cut the French off 

from the support of western tribes, while major British forces took 

Quebec City and finally punched through the Lake Champlain fortifications. The remaining French troops, now isolated, surrendered 

Canada in 1760.

Colonial military institutions took form during the period 

between the first landings by English settlers at Jamestown and 

Plymouth and that final victory over the French one hundred and 

fifty years later. Starting with Old World concepts, the settlers gradually modified their inherited traditions to fit the realities of the New 

World—a natural process as colonial society matured and grew. 

Whether political, legal, or military, all of America’s institutions 

grew from English roots. Militarily, they traced their origins to the 

militia establishment created by the Anglo-Saxons over a millennium earlier. The militia tradition obligated each man who benefited 
46

from society to protect it and, with certain exclusions, organized the 

able-bodied into part-time units on a local basis.

Colonists in North America created a defensive system to deal 

with two very different dangers: Indians and other Europeans. 

Contrary to popular myth, colonial military institutions did not 

evolve only with a view to the dangers of the forests; they also 

reflected the possibility of enemies’ striking from the sea. The 

Indians posed a day-to-day problem only for frontiersmen; the 

Europeans, especially Frenchmen in the north and Spaniards in the 

south, formed a more significant long-term threat. America began 

as a maritime society and remained so until the Civil War. Because 

the art of war underwent dramatic change in Europe during the sev-

enteenth century, as cannon and matchlock firearms improved and 

permanent professional armies emerged, the colonists had to adjust 

accordingly.

Conditions prevented early New World settlements from main-

taining large standing armies, although they attempted to obtain the 

most modern weapons possible. Economic necessity required that 

everyone contribute to the production of food or essential products. 

The colonies could not afford to maintain idle manpower waiting for 

a possible war. At the same time, with little or no warning any colony 

or community could find itself under local attack from Indians or 

European raiders. The natural solution to this problem was to take 

the militia organization of England and infuse it with a new sense 

of urgency. Except for Pennsylvania, where a strong Quaker element 

objected to war on religious grounds, every English-speaking colony 

required free, able-bodied adult males to join their local military 

company and to provide their own weapons, ammunition, and basic 

field equipment. Regular unpaid training meetings—where training 

might be tough or casual, depending upon the current danger—pro-

vided basic skills, including an innovative emphasis on individual 

marksmanship. When it came to firing a musket, not every American 

was a Daniel Boone, but by the eighteenth century familiarity with 

and possession of firearms was more widespread in the English colo-

nies than in almost any other place on earth.

In contrast to Europe, where the standing national army became 

all-important and local forces withered away, the American mili-

tia system remained vigorous. Although rarely mobilized in full 

strength, the network of local companies became a training agency 

and manpower pool from which full-time Provincial forces were 

raised. These Provincials enlisted for specific campaigns or provided 

garrisons in time of crisis for a network of small forts to protect key 

ports or frontier settlements.

A special category of Provincials represented colonial America’s 

other original contribution to military science—the rangers. First 

appearing about 1675 as a type of scout to provide early warning of 

impending Indian attack by “ranging” or patrolling between forts, 

they (and their French-Canadian counterparts, the coureurs du bois) 

became masters of camouflage and woodcraft. Later their mission 

expanded when Capt. Benjamin Church of Massachusetts organized 

a mixed force of rangers and friendly Indians to conduct long-range 

raids during an Indian uprising called King Philip’s War.
47

During the French and Indian War, the rangers reached a new 

level of importance. Robert Rogers of New Hampshire ultimately 

organized a force of about a dozen companies that accompanied the 

various British columns in the conquest of Canada. Their most dar-

ing achievement came in mid-September 1759 after General Jeffrey 

Amherst had captured Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga). Rogers person-

ally led a strike force of about two hundred rangers on a deep raid 

designed to break the will of the last remaining pro-French Indians. 

Moving mostly at night, the column slipped through enemy lines 

and destroyed the village of St. Francis on the St. Lawrence River 

a hundred miles west of Quebec. The men then broke into small 

teams, often led by NCOs, and conducted a remarkable overland 

withdrawal to the New Hampshire frontier.

With such experiences behind him, the American soldier became 

markedly different from his European counterpart. His full-time ser-

vice in any campaign became a matter of individual choice. Lacking 

the brutal discipline of continental Europe, Provincial leaders had 

to persuade militiamen to enlist and then they had to keep their 

confidence. Officers responsible for enforcing training and weap-

ons-owning requirements knew they would meet their troops again 

as neighbors, as would their NCOs, who were responsible for the 

immediate supervision of the privates.

NCOs in Action

In the Old World, the noncommissioned officer emerged simul-

taneously with the concept of a permanent, or standing, army. With 

an officer corps drawn from the ranks of the aristocracy and privates 

from the lower classes, an intermediary group was required to bridge 

the social gap. Poorly paid, often unwilling troops needed constant 

supervision, and the new group of NCOs became the enforcers of 

discipline. Those duties carried greater weight in camp or garrison 

because actual combat remained relatively rare—few nations could 

afford the appalling casualty rates. Although no level of organiza-

tion officially existed below the company, common practice divided 

the enlisted men into “messes” consisting of an NCO and eight or 

ten privates who ate and slept together—the origin of the modern 

squad.

Weapons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 

crude by modern standards. Poorly made and woefully inaccurate, 

the early matchlock and the later flintlock musket were effective 

only when fired at close range by large masses of troops standing 

shoulder to shoulder. Most nations raised their armies by contract-

ing with captains and colonels to organize separate companies and 

regiments, uniform and equip them to a rough standard, and then 

recruit necessary replacements. When preparing for combat, the 

units would be grouped into brigades, battalions, and platoons, a 

process that often left the privates in a situation where they had to 

take orders from officers who were relative strangers. Under these 

conditions, sergeants and corporals exercised little independent 

authority. Their primary responsibility was to keep the men in line 

and force them to obey orders.
This use of the NCO in continental Europe peaked in the 

eighteenth century in the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great. 

During the Seven Years War in particular, relatively small Prussia 

held off the combined arms of three great powers—Russia, 

Austria, and France. Although he lost several battles, Frederick 

was a military genius, which accounted in part for his success. 

But contemporaries were quick to point to his NCO Corps as a 

secret weapon. Frederick knew that he would normally have to 

fight against superior numbers, but he realized that quality and 

determination frequently can triumph over quantity. He there-

fore set about training his regiments to a higher standard than 

did his neighbors, using sergeants and corporals to ensure abso-

lute obedience. Frederick made no bones about it—he demanded 

that his privates fear their own NCOs more than the enemy. 

American colonists, looking more to English practices, quick-

ly made noncommissioned officers responsible for most of the 

training provided to new soldiers. But training was not based on 

large-scale units. Militia regiments existed as early as 1636, but 

they seldom could assemble in a single location for training. 

Instead, a town or village normally formed a single company, 

subdivided into squads patterned after the European messes. 

Although the fact that neighbors composed a squad helped to 

narrow the gap between NCO and private, the NCO had more 

immediate responsibility, and more opportunity than in Europe, 

for independent action in training and administration. Those 

enhanced powers inevitably translated into more responsibility 

on the battlefield, a trend reinforced by the need to adjust to the 

heavy woods and the hit-and-run tactics of Indians. Since large 

formations simply stood no chance of chasing and catching raid-

ers, small units became the American norm. The result during the 

French and Indian War was the formation of ranger companies 

by Major Rogers.

A combination of factors, including the relative lack of rigid 

class lines in the New World, affected the evolution of a new kind 

of military organization in the colonies. Freed from the need to 

maintain large standing forces, with more economic and social 

freedom at a local level than in Europe, Americans quickly aban-

doned blind obedience as a foundation for their militia system. 

Instead, they created a new blend in which talent and compe-

tence mattered most. Leadership became a positive influence, not 

something enforced through brutal discipline.

From the very beginning, the notion that every citizen was 

expected to serve in the military if needed helped keep the armed 

forces clearly subordinate to civilian authorities. At the practical 

level, the local orientation of unit organization allowed the mili-

tary to grow from the bottom up, guaranteeing that noncommis-

sioned officers would form the backbone of any force. In fact, the 

practice begun during the colonial days of picking natural leaders 

to serve as NCOs still has an influence on how we train profes-

48
49

sional soldiers. And the passage of centuries has only confirmed 

the importance of the noncommissioned officer as small-unit 

leader, from the frozen wilderness of Lake Champlain in Rogers’ day 

to the mountains of Afghanistan in our own.
An Ordered and Disciplined Camp, Anita Y. Sonnie, 1988 
An

Ordered

and

Disciplined Camp

Virginia, 1781

The quartermaster sergeant was caught up in the hustle 

and bustle of packing up his regiment’s camp and loading 

the gear into wagons. To an outsider, the scene appeared 

one of total confusion, but not to the experienced eyes of veteran 

Continental Army noncommissioned officers. They knew that each 

man followed a careful script, so that no incomplete task would create problems down the road. Precision came from the routine itself, 

from a drill that defined specific tasks, allocated responsibilities, 

provided supervisors to correct any mistakes instantly, and, most 

important, took place each and every time the Army moved.

While uniforms might appear worse for wear, the regiments’ 

weapons and equipment were immaculate—a fundamental change 

since the opening days of the Revolution. Thanks to training begun 

at Valley Forge by George Washington and his Inspector General, 

Baron Frederick von Steuben, officers and NCOs had standardized 

instructions and a sense of how each man fitted into the smooth 

functioning of the whole. One example of the improvement came 

from the “camp color men.” Every day a dozen or so privates reported to the regimental quartermaster and his assistant, the quartermaster sergeant. In camp, this detail performed duties ranging from 

digging latrines to collecting firewood; on the march, they packed 

and unpacked the baggage wagons. Their nickname came from the 

small pennants, camp colors, used to mark both the wagons and 

the outlines of the camp. This systematic approach ensured that 

essential housekeeping functions were performed routinely without 

interfering with other important duties.

This morning General Washington broke camp shortly after 

dawn, pushing hard to cover as many miles as possible. For over a 

week, several American divisions and a French expeditionary force 

had been marching south from New York. Rumor had it that the 
units were on their way to a place called Yorktown in far-off Virginia. 

While the quartermaster rode ahead to mark out a new site, the sergeant supervised the detail and the baggage wagons. He knew that 

doing his job professionally would never lead to glory, but also that 

without his efforts the regiment would never reach its destination 

in shape to fight, a point he kept trying to make to the privates. The 

beautiful Indian summer weather and a compliment from Baron 

von Steuben himself made this particular morning special—and 

raised hopes that perhaps the campaign would end with a victory.

Background

The War of Independence began on 19 April 1775 at Lexington, 

Massachusetts, in a fight that the British had hoped to avoid. The 

British had sent a large garrison to Massachusetts after the Boston 

Tea Party to enforce the authority of the Royal governor. The angry 

citizens had countered by increasing militia training and gathering 

military supplies. The British column of regular light infantry that 

entered Lexington was on its way to destroy one such stockpile in 

nearby Concord. The Redcoats were met by the local militia company, commanded by a veteran of Rogers’ Rangers, drawn up on 

the Common—a grassy open space. When the British attempted to 

disperse the citizen-soldiers, shots rang out, starting what proved to 

be the second longest war in American history.

By evening the British had been 

mauled and driven back into Boston, 

besieged by nearly 20,000 colonists. 

All four New England colonial governments reacted by replacing their 

militia and Minutemen with armies 

recruited to serve until the end of the 

year. At almost the same time, the 

Second Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia and quietly 

began creating a nation. On 14 June 

1775, it assumed control of the existing military forces and established 

the regular Continental Army. To 

symbolize unity among all colonies, 

north and south, Congress promptly set about recruiting ten (later thirteen) companies of riflemen from 

the middle colonies and named a 

Virginian, George Washington, as 

commander in chief.

Over the next two years the growing Continental Army would experience both triumphs and defeats. 

Although it came to include regiments drawn from all thirteen colonies and Canada, it was plagued 

early in the war by instability, caused 

52

Supply Depot, City Point, 

Virginia, 1864. Although combat operations attract public 

attention, it is the movement 

of troops and supplies, directed 

by technically competent NCOs, 

which ultimately has meant victory in a host of campaigns. 

During the Civil War, such 

activities revolved around horses, 

mules, and wagon trains.
by relying on units recruited for 

only a single year at a time. 

That practice had been adequate during the French and 

Indian War, when the enemy 

remained on distant frontiers. 

It was also consistent with 

the colonists’ deep-seated fear 

that professional, or standing, 

armies of the European kind 

posed a greater danger to civil 

liberties than any foreign invasion. Many Americans believed 

that militia units serving for 

limited periods would be sufficient to win independence, 

since militiamen could easily be mobilized to reinforce 

Washington and his generals 

whenever a crisis threatened. 

But Washington wanted a regular force as well. In the end 

both the militia and the regular Continental Army proved 

vital to victory.

The Revolutionary forces 

quickly gained control over the 

countryside, dispersing attempts 

by those Americans still loyal to 

the King to assert themselves. 

Washington’s units also succeeded in driving the British 

from Boston. Unfortunately, an American invasion of Canada ended 

in disaster, and in the summer and fall of 1776 a massive Royal fleet 

and army inflicted a string of humiliating defeats on Washington in 

New York. The largest expedition dispatched across a major ocean 

before the twentieth century, the British army mauled the continentals and militia attempting to defend Manhattan and Long Island. 

On Christmas Day 1776 the Revolution seemed to be on its last legs. 

The British and their Hessian auxiliaries had settled down in snug 

winter quarters to lay plans for the final conquest. Washington’s 

remaining troops were huddled in rude camps, suffering the bitter 

cold.

But at dawn on 26 December the tide of the war turned back in the 

Americans’ favor. The continentals suddenly struck across the Delaware 

River at a Hessian brigade in garrison at Trenton, New Jersey, destroying it as a fighting force while suffering only four casualties. Buoyed by 

that success the same troops, reinforced by Pennsylvania militiamen, 

slipped around the enraged British a week later and smashed a second 

brigade at Princeton, forcing the British to pull back.

Those twin victories, small though they were, along with the 

heartening words of Thomas Paine’s pamphlet Common Sense, 

53

Red Ball Express, H. Charles 

McBarron, 1978. During World 

War II, trucks like those of 

the famous “Red Ball Express” 

carried out the essential supply 

functions formerly conducted by 

wagon trains. 
54

restored morale and enabled the Continental Congress to carry 

out a major recruiting effort. In a bold departure from earlier prac-

tices, the nation’s leaders decided to match the British regulars with 

trained regulars of their own. They approved enlistments for the 

duration of the war, rather than for a fixed term. They also increased 

the Continental Army to a balanced force of over one hundred regi-

ments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, backed by technical special-

ists in military police, ordnance, and quartermaster units and by a 

sophisticated command and staff organization.

The Army did not achieve immediate success when it took 

to the field for the 1777 campaign. The new recruits lacked time 

for anything more than rudimentary training before operations 

began. Moreover, their weapons, imported from Europe, had to be 

routed to them through a complicated series of distribution points. 

In Pennsylvania, Washington fought hard against a British army 

brought by sea from New York to attack Philadelphia, but he could 

not prevent the loss of that city, then the nation’s capital. In northern 

New York State, other Continental units, reinforced by large militia 

contingents, took advantage of favorable terrain in early fall and 

inflicted a serious setback on British invasion plans by capturing 

General “Gentleman Johnny” Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga. In each 

case, some regiments performed well while others failed the test of 

battle.

Most of the Continental Army massed at Valley Forge, 

Pennsylvania, for the winter of 1777–1778, far enough from 

Philadelphia for safety, yet close enough to prevent the British from 

venturing into the countryside. Washington used the pause in active 

operations caused by the cold weather to institute a major reform 

of the Continentals. For the first time in the war he had time to 

standardize training programs. Taking advantage of European vol-

unteers, especially Steuben, who had learned his trade in Frederick 

the Great’s Prussia, the Americans crafted a coherent tactical doctrine 

that blended the ideas from the Old World with tried-and-true colo-

nial experience.

Steuben, despite his German origins, agreed with Washington 

and the other leaders that the Army should follow the new French 

emphasis on flexibility and initiative and add to them the traditional 

American reliance on marksmanship. As Inspector General, he set 

about developing a comprehensive system to teach that doctrine to 

the troops assembled in snowbound huts at Valley Forge. Since the 

flintlock musket of the era lacked rifling and a rear sight, it was ineffective at ranges beyond one hundred yards. It also had a practical rate 

of fire of no more than three or four rounds per minute. To employ it 

efficiently, men had to be meticulously trained to stand in lines and 

load and fire in unison. Then they had to learn how to maneuver on 

the battlefield in those lines without losing their cohesion.

The system of instruction crafted by Steuben at Valley Forge was 

published in early 1779 under the title Regulations for the Order and 

Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part I (better known to the 

troops as the Blue Book because of the color of its cover). It broke 

down the elements needed for combat success into individual tasks, 

each of which built upon mastery of preceding tasks. One of the sim-
55

plest systems devised anywhere in the world, it was quickly absorbed 

by the soldiers. To speed that process along, Steuben displayed a 

genius at practical psychology. He assembled a “company of instruc-

tion” built around Washington’s bodyguard and personally drilled 

it, encouraging all off-duty personnel to watch. Punctuated by a 

colorful array of epithets and jokes in several languages, his method 

of teaching made training enjoyable and challenged each soldier 

to excel. Members of the company then returned to their original 

units where, under the watchful eye of a select group of officers, they 

extended the system to the rest of the Army.

Beginning at the battle of Monmouth in June 1778, Steubentrained continentals demonstrated a new battlefield competence. 

His system relied on skilled marksmanship (in fact, the Blue Book 

became the first drill manual in the world to use the command 

to take aim rather than simply instructing the private to point his 

weapon in the general direction of the enemy). It also called for 

new skills. Thanks to his instruction, Americans quickly mastered 

the techniques of bayonet fighting and learned to use cadenced 

marching and column formations to maneuver quickly under fire. 

Whenever possible, they practiced these skills on the same kind of 

broken terrain they would encounter on the battlefield, not on the 

kind of manicured parade grounds preferred by European armies.

By the late summer of 1781 the process set in motion at 

Valley Forge had achieved a measure of success on the battlefield. 

Moreover, Britain no longer faced rebellious Americans fighting 

alone, for France had declared war on England in 1778, followed 

in due course by Spain and the Netherlands. As the conflict spread 

around the globe, resources available to the British to carry on 

military operations in North America shrank. Commanders based in 

New York City, admitting that they could no longer risk challenging 

Washington on ground of his own choosing, shifted to a new strat-

egy. All troops that could be spared from the British garrison in New 

York sailed south in an attempt to conquer the lower colonies one at 

a time. Despite a series of battlefield victories, the British could not 

crush the resistance there either. When the unanticipated arrival of 

a large French fleet from the West Indies created a decisive opening, 

Washington rapidly shifted his focus to Virginia, pinned General 

Charles Cornwallis against the water at Yorktown, and, in a textbook 

example of formal European siege warfare, forced Cornwallis to sur-

render.

NCOs in Action

Initial Continental Army tables of organization drew upon 

European ideas that had been modified by American experience, 

especially during the French and Indian War. They created an infan-

try regiment composed of eight companies and a small headquar-

ters. At full strength, an ideal seldom reached, the basic 90-man 

company of musketmen had 4 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 

musicians, and 76 privates. The privates and corporals formed the 

“rank and file,” the men who shouldered muskets in linear combat 

and fired in volleys. The fifer and a drummer drew the same pay 
56

as corporals and counted as NCOs. Despite their musician title, 

they actually functioned as the company’s signal section, relay-

ing commands through their instruments in the same manner as 

buglers in a later era.

If the basic company arrangement required by formal 

European-style combat formations appeared to minimize the 

importance of the NCO, administrative organization was quite 

a different matter. Camp routines revolved around four squads, 

each consisting of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and up to 19 privates. 

Soldiers ate and slept with their squad, sharing the burden of 

transporting unit equipment, such as cooking pots or axes, and 

occasionally splitting into two sections, each headed by an NCO. 

Appointment of sergeants and corporals remained the exclusive 

prerogative of the regimental commander, normally acting on 

the advice of the company commander, but great attention was 

paid to selecting men of demonstrated maturity and leadership. 

Subsequent changes in company organization preserved these 

same basic arrangements. In 1778 the company shrank to 3 

officers, 2 musicians, and 3 squads with a total of 3 sergeants, 

3 corporals, and 53 privates. In 1781 the fourth squad returned 

when the number of privates grew to 64. That final change did 

not alter the number of officers or musicians, but increased the 

sergeants to 5 and the corporals to 4. One of each continued to 

provide leadership for each squad. The extra sergeant, created by 

freeing the first sergeant from direct supervision, helped to aug-

ment the officers’ command and control abilities.

As a product of the Old World, Steuben emphasized the 

importance of officer involvement in training and in tactical 

leadership. As an American, he integrated the noncommissioned 

officer into that system. A fundamental Continental Army con-

cept after Valley Forge called for each NCO to be trained so that 

when emergencies arose in the heat of battle he could step for-

ward and assume the duties of his immediate superior. That mes-

sage was emphasized through the final chapter in the Blue Book 

that set out the duties and responsibilities of each individual in 

a regiment, from colonel to private.

Within an infantry regiment in the Steuben era, each staff 

function had two individuals assigned, one officer and one NCO. 

The quartermaster watching over transportation and logistics 

was backed up by his quartermaster sergeant, just as the sergeant 

major assisted the adjutant, while two senior musicians (called 

the fife and drum majors) provided technical supervision over 

their company-level counterparts. Similar relationships emerged 

within the line companies. When deployed for combat, a regi-

ment’s men stood two deep to take maximum advantage of the 

firepower of their muskets. Company-grade officers assumed 

positions in the front row to exercise command and control. 

A “covering sergeant” stood immediately behind each officer 

with the dual mission of protecting him or stepping forward in 

the event that he fell. The covering sergeant kept his musket at 

shoulder arms with bayonet fixed and did not shoot when the 

other troops did, but reserved fire as his last resort. Other NCOs 
57

provided a guard for the junior officers carrying the regimental 

colors or occupied positions behind the line as file closers.

Although no one realized it at the time, Yorktown was the 

decisive battle of the War of American Independence. News of the 

defeat broke Britain’s political will to wage war, forcing the King to 

appoint a new government, which was committed to negotiating 

peace. While war dragged on for almost two more years as diplo-

mats worked out complex arrangements acceptable to all of the 

parties involved, the Continental Army used the time to continue 

improving its training in the Steuben system. It even conducted 

maneuvers on the Hudson River in the summer of 1782 as a dress 

rehearsal for a planned invasion of Manhattan Island. An armistice 

went into effect on 19 April 1783, eight years to the day after the 

first shots at Lexington. The final peace treaty was signed in Paris 

the following September.

Demobilization began almost at once, introducing a pattern that 

would become typical of America’s response to the end of any war. 

By the end of the year, Washington had returned his commission 

to Congress and had joined most of his former troops in civilian 

life. The last contingent of the Continental Army, a regiment in size, 

disbanded on 20 June 1784 at West Point, New York, proving that 

Washington had created not a standing army but, rather, a wartime 

emergency force. A lone company of artillerists provided a measure 

of continuity by transferring directly into the new, single-regiment 

Regular Army created by Congress that same month.

Over time that nucleus would expand and contract, as would 

the militia, whose citizen-soldiers provided an emergency reserve 

force under the Constitution. Each contingent preserved the Steuben 

system of doctrine and training relatively intact through the War 

of 1812. The practice of dispersing the regulars in coastal forts and 

small garrisons along the frontier and the militiamen in companysize units in individual towns, together with changes in weapons 

and equipment, eventually watered down the immediate battle-

field practicality of the Blue Book. Ironically, these very same trends 

increased the Army’s reliance on both the technical knowledge and 

small-unit leadership of the NCO Corps.
The Journal, Michael Haynes, c. 2002 
Along

the

Frontier

Louisiana Territory, 1804

The sergeant sat down at the end of a long day to write in his 

journal. As the senior noncommissioned officer of the expedition under “Captains” Lewis and Clark, he acted as the first 

sergeant, issuing the daily provisions after the company bivouacked 

in the evening and appointing guard and other details. When the 

two captains were absent, he commanded the expedition.

Under candlelight, the sergeant described the daily routine of 

the Corps of Discovery. The expedition usually “set off early” in the 

morning after breaking camp and loading its equipment aboard 

the boats. A corporal commanded the detachment that rode in the 

white canoe, while the civilian boatmen took the red canoe. On the 

keelboat, three sergeants rotated duties. One always manned the 

helm, another supervised the crew at amidships, and the third kept 

lookout at the bow.

Hard physical labor characterized each day, as the men navigated 

their “ungainly craft” up the powerful Missouri River. If the river was 

deep enough, the men rowed. If the current was too swift for rowing, 

the men fastened a 40-foot cable to the mast of the keelboat, came 

ashore, and pulled the boat upriver. If the wind failed and the river was 

shallow enough, the men walked to the bow of the keelboat, placed 

their iron-pointed setting poles into the river’s bottom, and started 

walking to the stern of the boat, pushing it slowly upriver. They then 

returned to the bow and repeated this process. In every case, the men 

needed a total physical commitment to make every mile.

At the end of the day, while some kept watch and others danced 

to the fiddle, the sergeant faithfully described the events of the day in 

his journal. He noted that as the expedition traveled north, the men 

conquered every navigational hazard the Missouri River offered. The 

men also overcame a variety of physical ills: boils, blisters, bunions, 

sunstroke, dysentery, fatigue, injuries, colds, fevers, snakebites, ticks, 

gnats, toothaches, headaches, sore throats, and mosquitoes. At the 

same time the Corps of Discovery became the first Euro-Americans to 
Fort Clatsop

(Winter Camp 1805–06)

Blackfeet Fight

Great Falls Portage

Shoshone Villages

Mandan Village

Pompey's Pillar

Nez Percé Villages

OREGON COUNTRY

S P 

G R E A 

S P A I N

L O U I 

1803–1806

LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION

Preparation

Pittsburgh to Camp River Dubois (1803)

Camp River Dubois to Pacific Ocean and 

 Return (1804–06)

1806 Return Route Variations

Clark

Lewis

Lewis and Clark

International and State Boundaries (Present Day)

0 500

Miles
St. Louis

Camp River Dubois

 (Winter Camp 1803–04)

Confrontation with Teton Sioux

Fort Mandan

(Winter Camp 1804–05) 

Pittsburgh

Cincinnati

Louisville

A I N

T B R I T A I N

S P A I N

S I A N A P U R C H A S E

1 8 0 3

MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY

TERRITORY SOUTH

OF OHIO RIVER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1803

I N D I A N A

T E R R I T O RY

DISPUTED TERRITORY WITH SPAIN

Pittsburgh

Monticello

Washington

Harpers Ferry

Lancaster

Philadelphia
62

see some remarkable species of animal life: the mule deer, prairie dog, 

and antelope. As the sergeant told his parents in a letter from Camp 

River Dubois at the start of the journey, “I am So [sic] happy as to be 

one of them pick’d [sic] Men [sic] from the armey [sic].”

Background

The Treaty of Paris, signed on 20 September 1783, formally ended 

the War of Independence and brought peace with Great Britain. With 

the end of hostilities, most Americans believed the United States had 

no immediate need for a standing army; indeed, most thought that 

the Congress had created the Continental Army only to fight the war. 

Even George Washington acknowledged that the new nation did not 

need nor could it afford a large standing army in time of peace. On 

the other hand, Washington noted that a few regular troops were “not 

only safe, but indispensably necessary” to support the rule of federal 

law. From the end of the American Revolution to the beginning of the 

War of 1812, the United States struggled to find the kind of army it 

needed “to provide for the common defense.”

As most soldiers returned home from the Revolution, the 

Continental Congress considered the type of army the confedera-

tion of states required. In his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” 

(1783), Washington recommended a small regular army to gar-

rison West Point and posts along the frontier. These soldiers would 

be “Continental Troops” who looked to Congress, not to the states, 

“for their Orders, their pay, and supplies of every kind.” Washington 

envisioned four regiments of infantry and one of artillery, along 

with “artificers,” a total of 2,631 officers, noncommissioned offi-

cers, and men. Each regiment of infantry would contain 26 non-

commissioned officers, while the regiment of artillery would have 

264 noncommissioned officers, including bombardiers and gun-

ners. To supplement the regular army, Washington called for a wellorganized, well-trained, and disciplined militia in which all male 

citizens from eighteen to fifty were required to serve.

Congress took no action on Washington’s plan. Fearing that a 

standing army was “inconsistent” with representative government 

and “dangerous to the liberties of a free people,” lawmakers on 

2 June 1784 ordered Henry Knox, who had taken command of 

the army with Washington’s return to civilian life, to discharge all 

remaining soldiers, except for twenty-five men at Fort Pitt (now 

Pittsburgh) and fifty-five at West Point. No officers above the rank 

of captain were to remain in the army, nor were there to be any 

noncommissioned officers. On 18 October 1784, Congress officially 

disbanded the Continental Army.

Meanwhile, events along the western frontier convinced the 

Continental Congress that the states required a military presence to 

protect their borders. Great Britain continued to garrison several forts 

in the Northwest in defiance of the Treaty of Paris. The British were 

also encouraging the Indians to resist the movement of Americans 

into the territory Great Britain had ceded to the Confederation. The 

problem of defending the nation’s borders prompted Congress to 

authorize a peacetime regular army—the First American Regiment. 
On 3 June 1784, Congress asked Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 

and Pennsylvania collectively to furnish 700 officers, noncommissioned officers, and men from their militias for this new formation. The First American Regiment was divided into eight infantry 

companies and two artillery batteries. Only Pennsylvania met her 

recruitment goal, and thus she chose the regimental commander, Lt. 

Col. Josiah Harmar. By the spring of 1785, Harmar had dispersed his 

small force among the tiny outposts along the Ohio River Valley to 

keep the peace between Americans and Indians.

While few Americans were affected by events along the frontier, 

many nevertheless felt that the Articles of Confederation did not 

vest enough authority in the central government. Border problems, 

an unfavorable balance of trade, the national debt, the specter of 

inflation, and Shay’s Rebellion (1786) convinced most Americans 

that the states needed to form a more perfect union. From May to 

September 1787, fifty-five men met in Philadelphia and drafted the 

Constitution of the United States. 

During the next two years, as the states ratified the new 

Constitution, Secretary of War Henry Knox directed the First 

American Regiment to restrain whites from settling Indian land. 

Unfortunately, by the end of the decade the Indians were feeling 

the press of white civilization as nearly 50,000 squatters entered 

their country. Although Harmar’s men had taken steps to stop the 

encroachment of whites on Indian land, against so many lawless 

settlers the First American Regiment could do little to maintain 

the peace. Irritated by the intrusion of whites into their land, and 

encouraged by the British, the Indians became increasingly hostile. 

By the fall of 1789 a crisis in the Northwest was rapidly approaching. In response to the looming danger, Congress on 30 April 1790 

voted to increase the number of enlisted men in the army to 1,216. 

63

American soldiers greet local 

Afghan workers within the 

military compound, Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, May 2002. The 

NCO has often been one of the 

nation’s most effective ambassadors, working with members 

of many nationalities and ethnic 

groups to get the job done. 
64

The infantry regiment was subsequently reorganized into three bat-

talions of four companies each. Each company would contain four 

sergeants and four corporals.

Seeking to settle the Indian problem, Arthur St. Clair, governor of 

the Northwest Territory, directed Harmar to launch a punitive attack 

against the Miami tribal towns near what is now Cincinnati. Harmar’s 

1,453 troops were largely untrained recruits and militia, with a small 

core of only 320 veterans. Nevertheless, on 30 September 1790, 

Harmar moved his ill-trained force into the wilderness. By midOctober the Americans had destroyed the deserted Indian towns along 

the Maumee River and were on their way back to Fort Washington. 

But on 19 and 21 October Harmar’s force suffered two successive 

defeats. During both actions, most of the militia panicked and fled, 

leaving the regulars unsupported. After a month of campaigning, 

Harmar returned to Fort Washington having lost a third of his pack 

train killed or stolen, nearly all of the militia (largely through deser-

tion), and a quarter of his regulars. The first major military operation 

of the United States Army had ended in disaster. 

The consequences of Harmar’s defeat were immediately evident 

along the frontier. Angered by Harmar’s attack and encouraged by 

their success, the Indians stepped up their raids. Determined to end 

these attacks, Congress authorized Governor St. Clair, old and in fail-

ing health, to raise and command a volunteer force of about 2,200 

men. His mission was “to establish a just and liberal peace” with the 

Indians.

St. Clair had no more success than Harmar. Assembling his men 

and supplies at Fort Washington, He led his untrained and bickering 

force against the Indians on 7 August 1791. After three months of 

marches and the construction of two forts, the Americans encamped 

amid snow, ice, and rain near the eastern bank of the upper Wabash, 

about fifty miles from what is now Fort Wayne, Indiana. Although 

patrols had informed the command that Indians were nearby in 

great strength and were approaching the camp, security was surpris-

ingly nonexistent. A half-hour before sunrise on 4 November 1791, 

approximately 1,000 Indians rushed from the forest and attacked 

the ill-prepared camp. The militia received the first impact of the 

attack and fled in panic, leaving the regulars and civilians accompa-

nying the expedition to be slaughtered by the triumphant Indians.

After three hours of fighting, St. Clair decided to abandon his camp 

rather than risk annihilation. Fortunately for the Americans, the 

Indians did not conduct a vigorous pursuit. Instead, they celebrated 

“the most one-sided, overwhelming victory” Indians have ever won 

over an American or European army. According to contemporary 

accounts, St. Clair had left nearly 650 soldiers and up to 200 civil-

ians, including women and children, on the battlefield.

President George Washington was furious. What more proof did 

the Congress need in order to act on his “Sentiments on a Peace 

Establishment,” written nearly ten years earlier? Now the president 

took steps to get Congress to act. He initiated, and Congress passed, 

laws to strengthen the militia and institute a legionary system for 

the regular army. The Militia Act of 8 May 1792 established in law 

the principle of universal military obligation, while the Congress 
65

on 27 December 1792 agreed to reorganize the regular army as a 

legion. Drawing parallels from the Roman Republic, the Legion 

of the United States consisted of four miniature armies called sub 

legions of 1,280 men each. Roughly analogous to modern battalion 

task forces, these sub legions were tactically flexible, self-sufficient 

combined-arms forces of infantry, light infantry, dragoons, and artil-

lery. Regiments disappeared, as did the rank of colonel. Majors com-

manded the sub legions.

To train and lead the legion, Washington called upon Anthony 

Wayne, one of his ablest commanders during the Revolution. 

Washington knew Wayne possessed “a dominating desire to meet and annihilate the enemy.” He was also “able, smart, and organized.” 

For nearly two years, General Wayne recruited, trained, and disciplined 

the legion. Wayne placed a copy of Steuben’s 1779 Blue Book in 

the hands of every company commander and saw that they used 

it. Noncommissioned officers drilled the men daily, teaching them 

to maneuver together in formation, to work as a team, and to react 

instinctively on the battlefield. Sergeants taught their men to handle 

their muskets, to use their bayonets, and to shoot accurately. Discipline 

was unrelenting and swift. Wayne’s goal was to forge the Legion of the 

United States “into a strong, well disciplined striking force with one 

objective—to fight Indians in the wilderness and win.” In 1794 the 

confrontation came.

At Fallen Timbers (near present-day Toledo, Ohio), on 20 August 

1794, the Legion of the United States broke the power of the Indians 

in the eastern region of the Northwest, convinced the British to evac-

uate their garrisons below the Great Lakes, and gave the infant U.S. 

Army its first model of excellence. That Anthony Wayne had greater 

success against the Indians than did Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. 

Clair can be attributed to a number of factors. The Legion was twice 

as large as the forces Harmar and St. Clair marched against the 

Indians. Wayne’s troops were also better paid and equipped. Most 

important, the Legion had nearly two years to prepare, due primarily 

to the fact that the government wished to exhaust all efforts for peace 

before giving Wayne permission to take military action.

The battlefield at Fallen Timbers was a mass of tangled thickets 

amid fallen and uprooted trees left by a tornado that had swept over 

the Maumee River Valley years earlier. Marching in combat forma-

tion, the Legion drove straight into the Indian lines. Expecting to 

launch their own assault against disoriented troops, the Indians 

suddenly faced a thundering volley of “close and well directed fire” 

from the American infantrymen, then a fierce bayonet charge, and 

finally, hard-riding Kentucky mounted riflemen slashing from the 

flanks. This was more than the Indian force could stand. In forty-five 

minutes the battle was over. The United States again had a victori-

ous army. A year later, on 3 August 1795, the Indians agreed to cede 

most of Ohio and part of Indiana to the United States in the Treaty 

of Greenville.

Relative quiet reigned along the frontier for the next fifteen years. 

On 30 May 1796, Congress abolished the Legion of the United States 

and reduced the army to a corps of artillerists and engineers, two 

companies of light dragoons, and four infantry regiments of eight 
66

companies each. America’s conventionally organized and reduced 

army now began dispersing to garrison not only the forts along the 

northern border that Great Britain finally relinquished in accor-

dance with Jay’s Treaty (signed in London on 19 November 1794), 

but also those outposts in the south that the Spanish surrendered 

according to the terms of the Treaty of San Lorenzo, signed with 

Spain on 27 October 1795.

With the election of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency in 

1800, the Army received close attention. Contrary to popular opin-

ion, Jefferson increased the size of the army, expanded its role in 

building the new nation, reformed its leadership, established the 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York (1802), and paid 

particular attention to military affairs along the frontier. Jefferson 

was both determined to maintain peace with the Indians and fas-

cinated with western exploration. 

After the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory on 

30 April 1803, Jefferson chose the Army to explore this region. 

It was no accident that the new nation and its president turned 

to the Army for this most important mission. Soldiers possessed 

the toughness, teamwork, discipline, and training appropriate to 

the rigors they would face. The Army also had a nationwide orga-

nization even in 1803 and thus the potential to provide requisite 

operational and logistical support. Perhaps most important, the 

Army was already developing leaders of character and vision: 

officers such as Meriwether Lewis and William Clark and the out-

standing noncommissioned officers—John Ordway, Charles Floyd, 

Nathaniel Pryor, Patrick Gass, and Richard Warfington—who 

served with them.

NCOs in Action

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Army during the 

Jefferson administration was the famous Lewis and Clark 

Expedition, officially “the Corps of Volunteers for North Western 

Discovery.” Covering nearly eight thousand miles in two years, 

four months, and ten days, the expedition has become famous 

over the past two hundred years as an epic of human achievement. 

Although the Corps of Discovery did not locate an uninterrupted, 

direct route to the Pacific Ocean as Jefferson had hoped, it strength-

ened the nation’s claim to the Pacific Northwest and paved the way 

for future Army expeditions, which helped to open the American 

West to commerce and settlement. The two captains and some of 

their men kept detailed journals and brought back invaluable geo-

graphic, hydrologic, and scientific data, including 178 new plants 

and 122 previously unknown species and subspecies of animals. 

The expedition also made friends with several Indian tribes and 

gave the nation a foothold in the region’s fur trade. All things con-

sidered, it was a magnificent example of America’s potential for 

progress and creative good.

Noncommissioned officers made a singular contribution to the 

success of the Lewis and Clark Expedition. Throughout the winter 

of 1803–1804, John Ordway, an experienced noncommissioned 
67

officer from the First Infantry Regiment, assisted Clark in establishing Camp River Dubois. During the five months of the encampment, Clark and Ordway received, selected, trained, and disciplined 

personnel for the expedition. On several occasions Ordway commanded the camp in the absence of the two captains. He was the 

“top sergeant” of the expedition, expected to maintain order and 

discipline and to see that daily operations ran smoothly.

Both captains dealt firmly with any form of insubordination or misbehavior, especially when it was directed against a noncommissioned 

officer. The first time this occurred, Captain Lewis admonished the 

recruits and pointed out the importance of noncommissioned officers in 

the chain of command. He informed the men that he and Captain Clark 

would be derelict in their own duties if they were “to communicate our 

orders in person” to every member of the expedition. On two occasions, 

Captain Clark appointed Sergeants Ordway and Nathaniel Pryor as presiding officers of court-martial boards convened to try infractions of military law. These measures proved effective, as the Corps of Discovery 

Pursuit of the Sioux, February 16, 1805, Michael Haynes.

On February 14, 1805 four men, George Drouillard and privates Robert Frazer, Silas Goodrich and John 

Newman were on a detail from Ft. Mandan to collect and bring back meat. About 25 miles downstream from 

the fort they were stopped and robbed by a party of hostile Sioux, estimated by William Clark to number 106. 

After making their way back to the fort with this bad news, a force of twenty volunteers was quickly assembled 

and at dawn on the 15th, under the leadership of Captain Lewis, set off in pursuit. The next morning the 

near-frozen men saw a column of smoke rising into the frigid air. The Sioux, after overnighting in the earth 

lodges of an abandoned Mandan village, set fire to them as they left. Not finding the Sioux, the men then 

hunted to replenish their fresh meat supply.
68

recorded only five infractions during its two-and-a-half-year trek, a 

record unmatched by any other Army unit of the time. 

On the return trip, Lewis and Clark split the Expedition into 

four groups and called upon the noncommissioned officers to 

lead separate detachments. According to the plan developed at 

Fort Clatsop during the winter of 1805–1806, once the Expedition 

crossed back over the Rockies, Lewis, Sergeant Gass, George 

Drouillard, and seven privates would head northeast to the Marias 

River. At the portage camp near the Great Falls, Lewis would leave 

Gass and two men to recover the cache left there. He, Drouillard, 

and the remaining privates would travel up the Marias to seek 

the Blackfeet Indians and establish friendly relations with them. 

Meanwhile, Clark would take the remainder of the expedition 

southeast across the Continental Divide to the Three Forks of the 

Missouri River. From there, Sergeant Ordway, nine privates, and 

the cache recovered from Camp Fortunate would proceed down 

the Missouri to link up with Lewis and Gass at the mouth of the 

Marias. Clark, five privates, the Charbonneau family, and York 

would then descend the Yellowstone River to its juncture with 

the Missouri River. As Clark and his party were descending the 

Yellowstone, Sergeant Pryor and three privates would take the 

horses overland to the Mandan villages and deliver a confidential 

message from Lewis to Agent Hugh Heney of the British North 

West Company. Lewis hoped to entice the North West Company 

into an American trading system he sought to establish. All 

detachments would unite at the juncture of the Missouri and 

Yellowstone Rivers in August 1806.

The willingness of Lewis and Clark to divide their command 

in such rugged, uncertain, and potentially dangerous country 

shows the high degree of confidence they had in themselves, 

their noncommissioned officers, and their troops. In addition 

to the physical challenges the expedition would certainly meet, 

war parties of Crow, Blackfeet, Hidatsa, and other tribes regularly 

roamed the countryside and threatened to destroy the expedition 

piecemeal. By dividing their command in the face of uncertainty, 

Lewis and Clark took a bold but acceptable risk to accomplish 

their mission.

Separated for forty days, the Corps of Discovery proceeded to 

accomplish nearly all its objectives. Lewis and his party success-

fully reached the Marias River without incident. While Gass and 

five men were recovering the cache at the portage camp, Lewis, 

Drouillard, and two privates traveled up the Marias, where they 

clashed with the Blackfeet on 27 July. As Lewis and his men 

hastily made their way across country to the Missouri River after 

their bloody encounter with the Blackfeet, Ordway’s group had 

recovered the cache at Camp Fortunate, proceeded down the 

Missouri River, and linked up with Gass, whose team had already 

recovered the cache at the portage camp at the Great Falls and 

was awaiting Lewis and Ordway. Meanwhile, as Clark and his 

party set off in canoes down the Yellowstone River, Pryor’s party 

took the horses overland to the Mandan villages. On the second 

night, a Crow raiding party stole all the horses. Demonstrating 
69

their ingenuity, self-sufficiency, and mastery of life in the wilderness, Pryor and his men kept their poise, walked to Pompey’s 

Pillar (named in honor of Sacagawea’s infant son, whom Clark 

nicknamed “Pomp”), killed a buffalo for food and its hide, made 

two circular Mandan-type bullboats (all four rode in one, while 

the second was a reserve in case the first sank), and floated down 

river to link up with Clark on the morning of 8 August. Four days 

later Lewis and his group found Clark and his group along the 

banks of the Missouri. The Expedition then proceeded down the 

Missouri, arriving at St. Louis on the morning of 23 September 

1806.

The Lewis and Clark Expedition was one of the most daring 

and dramatic episodes in American history. The Army furnished the 

organization and most of the manpower, equipment, and supplies. 

Military leadership, discipline, and training proved crucial, both to 

winning over potentially hostile tribes and to overcoming the huge 

natural obstacles to crossing the continent. Noncommissioned officer 

leadership was pivotal to the success of the expedition. The versatility 

and flexibility of the noncommissioned officers enabled the Corps of 

Discovery to chart a course for later Army colleagues to follow.

Throughout the nineteenth century the Army was instrumental 

in exploring the West. Perhaps no other organization contributed as 

much to the development of the American West as did the U.S. Army. 

This is especially true of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers, 

which mapped the West, laid out boundaries, constructed roads, 

improved rivers, and assembled vast amounts of scientific information about the interior of North America. These Army explorers were 

not amateurs, mountain men, or entrepreneurs. They were soldiers 

led by professional officers and noncommissioned officers. Indeed, 

the Lewis and Clark Expedition demonstrated, as today’s noncommissioned officer continues to, that the noncommissioned officer 

has many roles and serves the Army in many ways.
Checking Cartridge Boxes, Theresa L. Unger, 1988
Checking

Cartridge Boxes

Canada, 1814

The 22d Infantry noncommissioned officers were tired when 

they reached the bivouac areas north of Buffalo on a warm 

Tuesday. Unlike other units of the division, which had begun 

arriving in mid-April, Capt. Sampson King’s three companies of the 

22d had left western Pennsylvania late. The NCOs could not pause 

to appreciate the beauty of the season. As soon as the companies 

linked up with Maj. Henry Leavenworth’s 9th Infantry, they learned 

that they had to prepare their men for combat in a matter of hours, 

not months.

While the officers went off to receive their briefings, the regimental sergeant major of the 9th quickly outlined what had been done 

so far and told the 22d Infantry’s sergeants and corporals what he 

expected them to do. The NCOs returned to their companies and 

began to settle the men into the camp’s routine. The edge in each 

corporal’s voice during the endless round of squad inspections and 

drills communicated to the recruits a sense of urgency and seriousness.

Background

The Army entered the War of 1812 with fewer than 12,000 men. 

Few of the soldiers had any previous combat experience, and only 

the most senior officers, veterans of the War of Independence, had 

fought a trained enemy. In small, isolated garrisons on the frontier, 

where the Army had conducted some major campaigns against 

sizable Indian forces, the ability to make do with field expedients, 

not any sophisticated understanding of military science, had been 

essential. When Congress declared war on Great Britain, the Army 

had to shift gears and attempt to relearn the hard lessons of the 

Revolution.

Mobilization in that era called for existing regiments to pull 

their scattered companies together, absorb new recruits, and deploy 

to meet the threat. Other regiments, added by congressional legislation, were raised from scratch. The Army had not yet discovered 

the value of promoting experienced junior NCOs to provide trained 

cadres for new organizations. Hence, regiments created in wartime 
72

Battle of North Point, Don 

Troiani, 1983. Each NCO owes 

it to his soldiers to ensure that 

they are equipped, trained, and 

motivated before they face the 

test of battle. During the War 

of 1812, Maj. Gen. Samuel 

Smith’s defenders of Baltimore 

depended upon such careful 

preparations.

trained sergeants and corporals in their duties and responsibilities 

at the same time that raw privates were learning rudimentary skills 

from the company officers.

The weapons and tactics of 1812 were unchanged from those of 

the Revolution. This was the age of linear warfare. To succeed, infantry units had to be highly disciplined and superbly drilled. Up to a 

thousand men had to move as one to get into proper position and 

then fire their smoothbore muskets in controlled volleys to inflict 

maximum casualties on the enemy. Each man, in essence, was a part 

of a lead-throwing machine whose strength and success depended 

on a rigorous form of teamwork. In this system, NCOs took positions as file closers on the flanks and in the rear of their units, where 

they could watch the men’s performance and plug gaps appearing 

in the line.

The work of the NCOs in preparing the men for campaigning 

in the field had an equally important impact on battlefield success. 

The Army had clearly defined this role since Steuben first set the 

standards at Valley Forge in 1778. The regimental sergeant major 

was responsible for the performance of the NCOs below him. He 

monitored their conduct, made sure they were technically proficient, 

and instructed them when they were not. He was the enlisted expert 

on matters of drill. The sergeant major also inspected the books and 
73

records maintained by the company first sergeants, showed them 

how to solve problems, and gave a consolidated report to the regi-

mental adjutant each month. The first sergeant knew every man in 

his company, watched their progress in camp, arranged duty details 

such as guard, and served himself as a file closer in the field.

Armies employing linear tactics, whether in the Old World or 

the New, found that a company’s sergeants and corporals formed 

the backbone of any unit. Although officers were in charge of con-

ducting training, the NCOs, in their constant supervision of the 

privates, had to see to it that the instruction became internalized, so 

the men would respond instinctively in any crisis. Picked because of 

their superior performance in the ranks, company NCOs served as 

examples to the men they were expected to lead. For day-to-day life, 

a company formed messes, or squads, each under a single NCO, who 

became responsible for the squad’s well-being on and off the battle-

field. His knowledge of camp life, equipment care, and drill deter-

mined the quality and performance of his unit. Each recruit learned 

his manual of arms, wearing of the uniform, and basic drill from his 

squad leader. If the squad leader did not measure up, neither could 

the company or the regiment.

The critical role of NCOs in preparing for combat during this era 

was highlighted in the third year of conflict. When the war began, 

few British troops could be spared from the crucial struggle against 

Napoleon in continental Europe to fight the Americans. Public opin-

ion in the United States understood this fact and expected a swift 

victory to be won by an invasion of Canada. The task turned out to 

be far more difficult than anticipated. In 1814, after several incon-

clusive American victories and defeats, Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown’s 

division drew the assignment to strike at southern Ontario as soon 

as the weather improved enough to allow operations. Learning from 

the failures of other commanders who had been repulsed, he refused 

to launch his invasion prematurely. That spring, as the bulk of the 

troops marched westward from Sacketts Harbor, New York, Brown 

concentrated on logistics and turned training over to Brig. Gen. 

Winfield Scott. The result was an intense program that produced the 

best force fielded by the United States during the War of 1812—an 

outnumbered contingent that crossed the Niagara, fought two bat-

tles, and later withstood a siege in Fort Erie.

In 1814 Scott’s problems were compounded by the absence of 

standards for unit or recruit training. Part of the problem lay in a lack 

of initiative in many commanders, part in an absence of agreement 

on which drill manual should be used. Some commanders favored 

Steuben’s original 1779 Regulations, still nominally the official doc-

trine; others leaned toward a variety of privately published books. 

Scott preferred the current French system, available in translation 

as Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercises of the French Infantry

(1803). Like Steuben at Valley Forge, he trained his officers and 

NCOs first and then had them train the men.

Knowing that his men might face some British elite regiments, he 

initiated a vigorous program as soon as the troops settled into camp 

in the Flint Hill area north of Buffalo. Reveille came at sunrise, at 

which time the troops were expected to turn out under arms. Except 
74

Paratroopers of the 82d Airborne 

Division prepare for deployment 

during the 1960s. Since the 

Army’s early years, soldiers’ lives 

have depended in large part on 

how carefully their leaders have 

enforced attention to detail during training and preparation for 

combat. 

for a brief breakfast break, squad and company drill lasted until 

noon, followed by four hours of battalion drill in the afternoon. The 

only free time was between supper at seven and lights out at nine 

o’clock. Each Sunday he conducted a full field inspection of the entire 

force. Daily battalion and company drills, some personally conducted by the general, gradually expanded to fill the entire duty day. 

Officers and NCOs alike emphasized mass movements and instinctively developed the pace and cadence so important to maneuvering 

linear formations. Scott applied his routine equally to regulars and 

to volunteer militia units, rarely approving exemption from drill for 

reasons of bad weather or for special duties or commitments.

The tempo and sophistication of training picked up in June as 

the men mastered the basics. Scott then began to emphasize proficiency in the tricky technique of firing muskets while formed in 

three ranks instead of the Revolutionary War’s two. He also instituted, like Steuben a generation earlier, the practice of forming a 

composite unit at full strength. The various officers and NCOs whose 

men were included then took turns running the unit through the 

different maneuvers. This exercise not only allowed the leaders to 

gain additional experience, it helped build confidence at all ranks. 

Throughout the training, General Scott and his fellow brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Eleazer W. Ripley, tried hard to impress upon the 
75

officers and NCOs the importance of enforcing division policies. 

The former were told to lead through example, by being prompt 

and attentive at each formation. The latter, in directly supervising 

the privates, became the key enforcers of regulations, which touched 

on almost all aspects of the soldier’s life. For example, believing that 

good health and sanitation went together, Scott required the men to 

bathe three times a week, “in the lake, not in the creek.”

Scott also stressed that each soldier was to learn to keep his 

weapons, equipment, and uniforms in the best condition possible. 

When he initially faced major shortages, especially in clothing, he 

encouraged units to make up in drill and discipline what they lacked 

in appearance. When supplies eventually caught up, Scott made the 

NCOs responsible for ensuring that the entire division marked and 

numbered clothing and unit equipment according to a single scheme 

and began prohibiting deviations from standards that had been 

justified as “field expedients.” Division inspectors checked each indi-

vidual knapsack to ensure that it contained 1 shirt, 1 pair of summer 

pantaloons, 1 pair of shoes, 1 pair of socks or stockings, 1 fatigue 

frock, 1 pair of trousers, and 1 blanket. A hairbrush and handkerchief 

were the only optional items authorized. Every man also carried a 

haversack with three days’ bread and meat. Any deficiencies were 

reported to the quartermaster and requisitioned by the units.

The last missing element in the division’s preparation for the 

campaign arrived on 23 June—the long-expected shipment of uni-

forms. Because of shortages, however, it did not include the standard 

blue coat. Instead, the troops received a newly designed summer 

fatigue uniform consisting of a gray woolen “round-about” (a short 

jacket with long sleeves) and gray-white overalls. Companies that 

had already obtained new uniform coats were told to box them 

up and turn them back in, each marked with the owner’s name, as 

soon as the round-abouts were available. All other clothing items 

not authorized were to be similarly boxed and stored. Sergeants and 

corporals supervised this process and made one final inspection of 

their men’s muskets, gun slings, and cleaning tools before the divi-

sion took to the field.

NCOs in Action

On 3 July 1814, Brown’s force crossed the Niagara River and 

captured Fort Erie opposite Buffalo. Two days later it collided at 

Chippewa with a British force that had confidently left Fort George 

to “restore” the border. The enemy commander took one look at the 

gray uniforms and concluded that he was facing only local militia. 

As the outnumbered but well-trained Americans swung into action 

and executed complex movements under fire with precision, he 

recognized his error and exclaimed, “Those are Regulars, by God!” 

That discovery came too late to prevent a British defeat. The weeks 

of relentless practice imposed on the soldiers by Scott and his NCOs 

paid off in this hard-fought battle.

The division did not rest on its laurels, but resumed Scott’s pro-

gram of drills and inspections. Each afternoon at four o’clock all 

men not on an operational mission underwent a full check of equip-
76

ment. NCOs and officers closely monitored shaves and haircuts. 

Scott insisted that unit leaders enforce his standards of cleanliness 

and appearance or face disciplinary charges themselves for failure 

to exercise proper supervision. Later, during the Mexican War, that 

attitude would lead a younger generation of troops to nickname him 

“Old Fuss and Feathers.”

The painstaking attention to detail paid off. Following a period 

of indecisive maneuver, Brown’s forces collided again with the rein-

forced British at Lundy’s Lane on 25 July. Fought mostly in the dark, 

the battle turned into a test of small-unit leadership and of the skill, 

discipline, and devotion of the soldiers on both sides. Once again, 

the American soldier gave as good as he got, fighting his red-coated 

foe to a standstill, although heavy casualties forced the U.S. troops 

to withdraw to Fort Erie after the battle. Both sides considered the 

battle a victory.

For over a month Brown’s outnumbered division clung tena-

ciously to the fort as the British attempted a conventional siege—one 

in which the enemy attempted to approach and undermine forti-

fications by advancing a series of trenches. Fortunately, Scott had 

anticipated this possibility and had created a provisional combat 

engineer element by pulling one hand-picked private from each 

infantry company and one corporal from each regiment. These “pio-

neers” received special training, drew proper tools—saws, spades, 

and axes carried in special leather shoulder slings—and wore a linen 

apron that extended from neck to knee. During regimental drills the 

corporals positioned themselves with the regimental staff while the 

privates stood in the center rear of their companies. During the siege 

the pioneers, led by a handful of officers, supervised infantry work 

parties in maintaining and extending the fortifications. Finally, a 

brilliant sortie on 17 September forced the British to withdraw and 

along with the approach of winter ended the campaign.

Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie, like the victories at Fort 

McHenry and New Orleans on other fronts—and some losses else-

where—reminded the Army of an important point lost during long 

years in isolated garrisons: training and dedicated, competent NCOs 

were essential to military success. It was a lesson that the Army 

would long remember in the aftermath of Winfield Scott’s vivid 

demonstration.

The Army underwent a drastic demobilization at the end of the 

War of 1812, and its surviving units returned to service along the 

frontier and in coastal defense fortifications. Most of the special-

ized units and duty positions were eliminated, leaving the bulk of 

the soldiers in infantry and artillery regiments. Senior leadership 

positions passed to a new generation of officers who had matured 

during the conflict. These men retained an important sense of the 

value of a quality NCO Corps to the Army’s mission in the field. 

The new civilian leadership that worked with generals like Scott and 

Andrew Jackson also recognized the role of sergeants and corporals. 

Thereafter, when faced with political pressures to trim the regular 
77

establishment, they fought hard to preserve as many NCO positions 

as possible, knowing that a trained cadre could absorb raw recruits 

quickly. Formal educational programs comparable to the officer 

corps’ Military Academy at West Point, New York, still lay far in the 

future, but by insisting upon literacy as well as technical competence 

for anyone selected to serve as a sergeant or corporal, they took the 

first step toward a professional corps as well. Similar changes began 

to appear within the ranks of the volunteer militia, as some units 

gradually transformed themselves into a true reserve component.

Elements of the daily duties of a corporal in Scott’s 22d Infantry 

will sound familiar to any squad leader or team chief today. Like his 

or her predecessor, the modern NCO is the ultimate first-line super-

visor. Every detail of the private’s equipment, uniform, and personal 

hygiene still must be checked on a regular basis. Regardless of branch 

of service, all NCOs still learn the fundamentals of marksmanship, 

drill, and tactics and pass them on to new soldiers who serve under 

their immediate watch. That legacy is of far greater and more endur-

ing importance to the nation than most people realize. Historians 

often dwell on Scott’s later military career or point out facts such 

as his responsibility for the gray dress uniforms worn by the cadets 

at West Point and the country’s other military academies. In a real 

sense, however, his most important legacy, going back to the War of 

1812, is preserved within the NCO Corps.
Guardians of Standards, Manuel B. Ablaza, 1988 
Guardians

of

Standards

Missouri, 1820s

The sergeant major and the first sergeant surveyed the dimly 

lit barracks. It was Saturday afternoon, and the soldiers 

had spent all day cleaning their quarters and equipment. 

Wooden floors had been mopped or sanded. Heavy wooden bunks 

had been dismantled, scrubbed, and reassembled. Mattresses were 

stuffed with clean straw. Polished and oiled muskets were placed 

in racks on the whitewashed wall. Each soldier had brushed clean 

his dress uniform, blanket, and pack and neatly placed them on his 

bunk, topped with the leather dress cap (called a shako) and canvas 

cover. While the barracks was empty, the senior NCOs began their 

weekly inspection.

They first inspected the room for cleanliness. Bedding was 

studied next to ensure the infamous “Army bugs” had been, at 

least temporarily, banished. Next, the soldier’s clothing and equipment came under review. Because each man’s kit was neatly placed 

according to regulation, it was more quickly and easily checked 

for accountability and serviceability. Shirts, socks, and underwear 

received the bug test. Buttons and insignia were checked to see that 

they were clean, polished, and serviceable. Missing and damaged 

items were noted. The flintlock muskets were examined to ensure 

that they were in working order. Flints and mainsprings came 

under close scrutiny. Weapons that failed inspection were noted, 

to be turned in to the armorer for repair or replacement. When the 

inspection had been completed, the NCOs returned to their quarters to prepare reports. Housecleaning was over for the company, at 

least until next Saturday.

Background

The American soldier of the early nineteenth century spent his 

career largely isolated from civilian influences. Assigned mostly to 

far-flung outposts on the frontier, the soldier led a harsh, uninspiring life, felt unappreciated, and too often could not recognize the 
80

Stand-to Inspection, Virginia, 

1914. Each noncommissioned 

officer placed in charge of a section, squad, or shift has the duty 

to enforce standards in soldiers’ 

daily lives. 

importance of his activities to the country. Attitudes within the 

civilian community contributed to his sense of estrangement. Many 

taxpayers and voters still clung to the notion that a soldier’s usefulness ended with the close of a war. For much of the early nineteenth 

century, the nation turned its back on the Army and frequently 

sought to keep military strength at a minimum. Sustaining morale 

and combat readiness posed the greatest challenge to the Army’s 

leaders in those years.

The Army had demobilized at the conclusion of the War of 

1812 and returned to its traditional missions of policing the frontiers and manning fortifications along the coastline and borders. 

A new secretary of war, John C. Calhoun, took office in 1816 and 

immediately began studying the lessons of the preceding conflict to 

determine how the Army could better meet its obligations under the 

Constitution. He and the senior officers quickly concluded that the 

military’s primary peacetime function was deterring future conflict 

by being able to mobilize rapidly and efficiently. Greater professionalism was the essential precondition to accomplishing that task.

Leaders, however, had to operate within a broader national context. A severe economic depression racked the country, forcing the 

president and Congress to make major cuts in the armed forces. In 

late 1820 Secretary Calhoun responded to the challenge, submitting 

a plan to Congress that would minimize the impact of the budget 

on the Army’s ability to mobilize in the event of another war. To 

avoid the damage done by the traditional method of disbanding 

entire regiments, Calhoun proposed an “expansible army” concept. 

Under that scheme the Army would make cuts only in the number 

of privates in each company, not in the number of regiments or companies on the books, nor in the officer and NCO Corps. In wartime 

it could quickly add new recruits to the existing units, restore basic 

combat capabilities, and buy time for the formation of new regiments and the mobilization of the militia.
81

Stand-to Inspection, Basic Training, 1985. Just as in the 1820s 

and 1914, regular inspections 

help to ensure that equipment 

will be in the best possible condition when the unit faces combat.

Congress rejected Calhoun’s concept and in 1821 reduced 

the Regular Army from 10,000 to 6,000 men, comprising seven 

regiments of infantry and four of artillery. The third arm, mounted 

troops, disappeared from the force until 1832. Although nominally 

separate and distinct branches, most artillery companies served in 

permanent fortifications or frontier posts and really trained as foot 

soldiers; only a handful had the opportunity during the nineteenth 

century to function as mobile gunners.

Although Congress rejected expansibility, Calhoun still sought 

to instill professionalism into the small contingent of officers and 

NCOs. He knew that leaders trained to high standards could quickly 

adjust to greater responsibilities if mobilization came. That philosophy received a boost from the reality of life during an era of austere 

budgets. The limited numbers of officers quickly became overextended, creating a shortage at company levels and forcing senior 

NCOs to take up the slack. The Army started transferring functions 

from the commissioned to the Noncommissioned Officer Corps 

out of necessity, but as the NCOs demonstrated their abilities that 

process tended to accelerate. Some sergeants even found themselves 

temporarily commanding companies.

One distinctive feature of the United States’ approach to military 

service set the Army apart from its European counterparts throughout its early history. Emphasis on the citizen-soldier concept even 

for the regulars mandated a much shorter term of enlistment than 

the lifetime service typical of Old World armies. Most signed up for 

single hitches of three to five years. Turnover placed a heavy burden 

on the career officers and NCOs, since they had to devote large 

amounts of time to training and teaching new men the basic skills 

of military life.

Ensuring a steady flow of high-quality replacements required 

effort even at the low strength ceilings set by Congress. For greater 
82

efficiency, the Army replaced the earlier practice of regimental 

recruiters with a centralized system of depots in major cities. The 

General Recruiting Service enlisted men into the Army at large, 

rather than into specific units. The Army sought to attract single men 

between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five. A married man wish-

ing to enlist had to obtain permission from the War Department. 

Although the Army actively sought white, English-speaking U.S. citi-

zens, recruiters could and did accept immigrants. During the 1820s 

roughly one-fourth of the Army fell into that category, primarily Irish 

and Germans, but by the 1850s the immigrant ratio had grown to 

two-thirds. Although black Americans had fought well during the 

War of Independence, none were allowed to serve in the Army until 

the middle of the Civil War.

It was hard to persuade highly qualified individuals to join 

up or enlist—conditions were severe and pay rates low. An act of 

December 1812 set monthly enlisted pay at $12 for sergeants major 

and quartermaster sergeants, $11 for sergeants and senior musicians, 

$10 for corporals, and $8 for privates. Military base pay was generally 

less than that of civilians. Common farm hands at the low end of the 

economic spectrum made between $8 and $12 a month, and indi-

viduals with skills comparable to many Army jobs earned $1 to $2 a 

day. A small increase in pay scales finally cleared Congress in 1833 

but failed to match rising civilian incomes. To compound the prob-

lem, soldiers often had difficulty in collecting their pay. Although 

troops were supposed to be paid every two months, a paymaster 

might take six months or more to make the rounds of the frontier 

outposts to actually hand out the money.

Despite its reduced strength the Army pushed westward, explor-

ing, surveying, and building roads and military posts. It was during 

Calhoun’s tenure as Secretary of War that the line of garrisons on the 

frontier was extended west of the Mississippi River. Policy called for 

the Army to form a buffer zone between the leading edge of settle-

ment and the areas occupied by Indians and to prevent either group 

from harassing the other. Skirmishes and long expeditions to “show 

the flag” to distant tribes sometimes broke the monotony of frontier 

duty, but the average soldier spent most of his time doing construc-

tion work or, even more important in an era of limited budgets, 

raising livestock and growing vegetables for subsistence. So much 

time was taken by these chores—common in European forces, but 

unusual in the American Army—that one officer complained, “The 

axe, pick, saw, and trowel have become more the equipment of the 

American soldier than the cannon, musket, and sword.”

The frontier outposts usually amounted to a handful of simple, 

even primitive, log or adobe structures. Since the skills and imagina-

tion of the troops themselves determined how the buildings were 

constructed, quality varied greatly from post to post. In fact, the 

Army did not issue comprehensive instructions on the construction 

of military barracks until 1838. Twelve men occupied each hut or 

room, sleeping in bunk beds. Two shared the lower level and two 

the upper, an arrangement that was most comfortable during the 

cold frontier winters. (Soldiers did not receive individual beds until 

the 1840s.)
83

Little activity that was soldierly broke the monotony of work 

and sleep. Because construction (even when new posts were not 

under construction, the old ones needed constant repair) and other 

chores consumed so much of the soldier’s day, regular training suffered. When time was available, NCOs marched and drilled troops 

in impromptu sessions. Calhoun realized the need for a more formal 

approach to training and played a key role in the establishment of 

the Artillery School of Practice at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the Army’s 

first service school. Unlike today’s individual instruction the artil-

lery school trained entire units. Companies rotated to Fort Monroe 

for the year-long program and then moved to a new duty station. In 

1827 Calhoun’s successor established an Infantry School of Practice 

at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, but the Army eventually discontinued 

both operations for budgetary reasons.

NCOs in Action

The Army regulations of 1821 were the first to establish a 

systematic method of selecting noncommissioned officers. Each 

regimental commander appointed the NCOs on his staff and chose 

company NCOs based upon the recommendation of the respective 

company commanders. The grade of lance corporal, long recognized 

in practice though not in law, also acquired legal status under these 

regulations. When there were too few NCOs in a company, selected 

privates were given that title and appointed as substitutes. Privates 

desiring the additional responsibility could either be appointed by 

a commissioned officer or could appear before a monthly board to 

represent themselves. Those selected received no extra pay and were 

not exempt from privates’ duties, but they commanded squads and 

detachments consisting of other privates. The lance corporal rank 

existed off and on until the beginning of World War I in the Army 

and still persists in the Marine Corps.

Calhoun’s emphasis on standardizing NCO selection and 

appointment resulted directly from his desire to strengthen the 

corps’ professionalism. Similar motives lay behind changes in the 

way uniforms indicated rank. After several years of experimentation 

with various types of insignia the Army adopted chevrons in 1821. 

The regulations of the time prescribed that they be in distinctive 

branch colors (white for infantry, yellow for artillery) and be worn 

on the sleeve with points up. Sergeants major and quartermaster ser-

geants wore their chevrons above the elbow, corporals below. Except 

for one brief use of epaulets, chevrons have remained the NCO’s 

distinctive mark ever since. Different systems changed the direction 

of the points from time to time until finally a 1902 general order 

prescribed the current points-up practice.

NCO duties during the decades between the War of 1812 and 

the Civil War were set forth in Scott’s Infantry Drill Regulations, named 

for the general officer (Winfield Scott) who chaired the board that 

drafted them. These regulations placed the ultimate responsibility 

for the training, well-being, and readiness of a company’s enlisted 

men in the hands of its noncommissioned officers. The appearance 

and condition of barracks and the neat and soldierly look of the 
84

men who lived in them became “sergeants’ business.” As a first-line 

supervisor the NCO also became accountable for the status and ser-

viceability of the troops’ uniforms and equipment. This duty turned 

the NCO into the Army’s “guardian of the standards.”

The Army had a very specific reason for using sergeants and cor-

porals to monitor closely the living conditions of the soldiers. Status 

of weapons and equipment related directly to survival in combat, 

but disease killed four or five men for every one lost on the battle-

field. The causes of typhoid, cholera, yellow fever, and other illnesses 

remained a mystery until the late 1800s, but observant commanders 

dating back to biblical times had recognized that rates of sickness 

went down when troops kept clean. Army doctors were too few to 

serve the many scattered posts, especially those isolated on the fron-

tier, sometimes leaving line officers and NCOs to enforce preventive 

measures that were the only way to fight disease. Scott’s regulations, 

for example, required NCOs to ensure that their men washed their 

hands and faces daily, brushed or combed their hair, and changed 

underwear regularly (three times a week during the summer, twice 

a week the rest of the year). Scrubbing barracks and clothing on a 

weekly basis supposedly rid them of bedbugs, lice, and ticks or, at the 

very least, kept their numbers down.

The Army noncommissioned officer of the 1820s also had to 

consider his own welfare. NCO opportunities were limited. No 

sergeant or corporal could be transferred in grade from one regi-

ment to another without the permission of the War Department in 

Washington and endorsements at every layer in the chain of com-

mand—a lengthy process rarely attempted. Consequently, to protect 

their grades, senior NCOs had little choice but to remain with the 

same unit throughout their military careers. These men often became 

almost legendary figures in their respective regiments, as generations 

of officers came and went while they stayed as seemingly indestruc-

tible fixtures held in awe by both officers and enlisted men.

Today, as always, the readiness and efficiency of the Army depend 

upon the readiness and efficiency of the individual soldier and his 

equipment. Whether troops occupy shacks with simple chimneys, as 

in the last century, or modern high-rise billets complete with sophis-

ticated central heating and air-conditioning systems, the fundamen-

tals of military daily life do not change. Standards of performance 

for cleanliness, accountability, and serviceability are as relevant to 

battle dress uniforms (BDUs) and M16s as they were to leather sha-

kos and flintlock muskets.

The responsibility of the NCO inspecting enlisted billets in the 

current decade is basically no different from that of the sergeant 

major and first sergeant who went through a log hut in the 1820s. 

A section or squad leader is still accountable for ensuring that all 

personnel under his or her command present a neat and soldierly 

appearance and that they maintain their living quarters and work 

areas. Of course, the complexity and tempo of modern war has 

changed. In contrast to earlier eras, today’s soldier is issued far more 
85

gear under applicable Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs), 

Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs), and Common Tables 

of Allowances (CTAs). His or her efficiency and survivability depend 

in large part on the serviceability of that equipment, as does the 

unit’s ability to deploy quickly during an emergency. The NCO plays 

the central role in ensuring that the individual soldier remains in 

a constant state of readiness, able to function to his or her highest 

ability.

For two centuries NCOs have been dedicating their energies and 

resources to the task of sustaining the Army’s most potent individual 

weapon, the soldier. Today’s NCO carries on that long tradition of 

being the guardian of the standards.
The Battle of Molina del Rey, James Walker, c. 1847
Laying

the

Gun

Mexico, 1847

The sergeant had drilled his gun crew incessantly since 

arriving in Mexico. He took great pride in his position as 

“Chief of the Piece,” knowing that the Army had entrusted 

him with a great deal of responsibility. The captain expected him 

to guarantee that both his men and the brass gun, a smoothbore 

muzzle-loader that fired six-pound shot, were ready for action. 

When the sounds of battle grew louder, the sergeant and his assistant, a corporal, checked and rechecked the weapon, implements, 

and horses. The two NCOs were veterans, educated in a hard 

school—fighting Indians on the western plains and in Florida’s 

swamps. Their calmness and quiet competence quickly steadied the 

junior enlisted men.

Soon the order came to go forward, and the team started toward 

the enemy at full gallop. The wheels of the gun, its accompanying 

caisson, and their limbers kicked up dust as they traversed the plateau to reach a new position. Once there, they placed the gun in battery, the horses and vehicles shifted to a more protected spot farther 

back, and the men took up their carefully rehearsed positions. The 

sergeant and gunner (corporal) stood near the rear of the gun, the 

rest of the crew where they could use the implements. “Load!” and 

powder and ball were brought up and rammed home. The gunner 

coordinated the aiming of the piece. “Fire!” and a solid iron ball 

streaked toward the enemy.

With each shot, the sergeant visually marked the range, calling 

out corrections. Sweating cannoneers sponged out the hot barrel 

between rounds to extinguish any sparks that might set off the powder charges prematurely. As the enemy approached, the crew shifted 

first from a single iron ball to grapeshot and then, at closer range, to 

canister, converting the piece into a giant shotgun, firing dozens of 

deadly pieces of metal. After the attack was repulsed, the horses were 

brought forward to limber up, the crew remounted, and the “flying 

artillery” raced to another part of the field.
88

Moving up to the Battle, James 

Walker, c. 1847. Historically, 

the Chief of the Piece has been 

responsible for transforming a 

weapons system, such as the 

artillery of the Mexican War, 

into a lethal instrument.

Background

After the War of 1812 the United States entered an era known as 

the “Thirty Years’ Peace.” No foreign enemy threatened the security 

of the nation. The Army kept busy policing the borders and engaging in sporadic conflicts with Indians. During the 1830s and 1840s 

the only sources of combat experience for the NCO Corps were the 

Seminole Wars in Florida, a bitter struggle against the skillful Chief 

Black Hawk across the Mississippi River, and occasional campaigns 

as the line of settlement started to push out onto the Great Plains. 

Because so much of this service was performed by company- and battalion-size elements drawn from scattered posts, junior officers and 

NCOs became involved in a much wider array of planning and execution than they would have in a conventional conflict. Fortunately, 

this training prepared them for leadership responsibilities when war 

broke out with Mexico in 1846.

In 1842, at the conclusion of the Second Seminole War, Congress 

cut the strength of the Army from 12,500 men to 8,600. This reduction differed from earlier ones in that the legislators finally decided 

to follow Secretary of War Calhoun’s 1820 recommendation for an 

expansible military. Only the number of privates in each company 

was reduced. No regiments or companies were disbanded, and no 

noncommissioned officers were released. The new policy nurtured 

an experienced NCO Corps, which in turn set and maintained standards of training that would not have been possible otherwise. 
89

Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(MLRS) Deployed during Desert

Storm, 1990–1991. The NCOs 

of today are responsible for the 

greatly intensified lethality of 

artillery on the battlefield, which 

is now able to blanket a square 

kilometer in less than a minute.

The wisdom of this policy was soon apparent. Three years 

later the independent Republic of Texas became part of the United 

States, increasing the territorial area that the Army had to protect. 

The annexation also caused sharp tensions with Mexico, which still 

considered much of eastern Texas part of its own territory; and war, 

with its need for an expanded Army and a well-equipped and trained 

artillery arm, became a real possibility.

While most of the regular infantrymen and dragoons served in 

remote posts and camps isolated from the mainstream of American 

life, many artillerymen enjoyed a better lot. Although the Army had 

originally established the branch with a mobile battlefield mission, 

since 1794 it had become the primary element of the Army charged 

with protecting the nation’s coastline from European attack. Busy 

port cities were the most important points along the Atlantic and 

Gulf shores and therefore became the sites of the forts built by Army 

engineers and manned by gunners. Artillery companies assigned to 

those locations were spared physical isolation, but most of their 

days were monotonous, as they divided training time between 

infantry drills and practice with the heavy guns emplaced in the 

brick fortifications.

Artillerymen in Europe had enjoyed special status throughout 

history. No other arm required enlisted men to master such special 

skills and techniques. Cannoneers sang their own songs and spoke 

their own jargon, a remnant of the early days of their craft when 

artillerymen were civilians on contract to the military. They even had 

a patron saint, Barbara, protectress from sudden death. (Legend has 

it that the choice of St. Barbara directly reflected the nasty habit of 

early cannon to burst when fired.) These traditions passed into the 

U.S. military during the American Revolution, when Continental 

Army artillerists quickly demonstrated expertise on battlefields from 

Boston and Trenton to Yorktown, winning grudging praise from the 

British.

The heavy weapons of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were smoothbore muzzle-loaders, cast in iron or brass. Limited 

in range and highly inaccurate, most fired solid iron balls on a flat 

trajectory. Explosive shells existed, but they lacked reliable fuses, 

and they were restricted to high-angle fire by mortars and howitzers. 
90

Barrels and carriages were so heavy that it took a crew of up to fifteen to manhandle and service a single large gun in combat, severely 

limiting both tactical mobility and the rate of fire. For the early guns, 

achieving even limited success depended directly on the extent to 

which the crew worked as a well-trained team, under the supervision 

of an officer in command of each gun.

In 1818 the Army had divided artillery weapons into three 

categories according to intended use—field, seacoast, and siege or 

garrison—with a variety of calibers and types within each category. 

Mobility was a factor only in the case of the first. A system of mobile 

field artillery, adopted in 1839, introduced interchangeable parts 

and carriages with a single wooden trail. It remained substantially in 

place, with the addition of rifled cannon, throughout the Civil War.

Each of the Regular Army’s four artillery regiments in 1846 con-

tained ten companies, although one company functioned as light 

artillery, armed with four to six guns. The rest served as infantry 

when not garrisoning fortifications. When war broke out, expansion 

brought the regulars back up to full company strength as Calhoun 

had advocated.

The basic enlisted artilleryman’s uniform in this era was the same 

as the infantry’s—a light blue jacket and trousers. Distinctive branch 

markings included red trim on the dark blue cap and red stripes 

down each leg. Privates and corporals wore one stripe, sergeants 

and officers two. Regulations prescribed chevrons to be worn on the 

sleeve of the uniform, points up, as a means of designating enlisted 

rank—three for sergeant, two for corporal, and none for privates. 

Chevrons for artillery and cavalry were yellow, while infantry wore 

white.

During the Mexican War, the artillery tested two important 

changes, one involving organization and the other training. In 

the fall of 1838 Congress had authorized light artillery units to 

receive horses. The first to be selected was Capt. Samuel Ringgold’s 

Company C, 3d Artillery. It served as a model for the units that were 

to follow, going into action with crew members sitting on ammuni-

tion chests carried on the caissons and limbers or riding some of the 

harnessed horses. Building on that precedent, select units switched 

to a “flying” configuration by taking cannoneers from the pre-

carious chests and mounting them on saddle horses. The changes 

allowed commanders to shift the guns rapidly from one point on 

the battlefield to another and to employ them offensively as well as 

defensively.

The other innovation came in the standardized precision drill, 

which permitted the men to unlimber, load, fire, and limber up 

quickly to take advantage of the improved weapons and organiza-

tion. Practice was the key, and the NCOs saw to it that their soldiers 

were cross-trained in all functions so that a few casualties would not 

knock the gun out of action. Rehearsals enabled each piece to fire 

two aimed rounds every minute for a sustained period. During the 

Revolution and the War of 1812 each gun had been commanded 

by a company officer; by the time of the conflict with Mexico that 

function had passed to a sergeant, designated as Chief of the Piece. 

Immediate command of each crew and the sighting of the gun were 
91

charged to the gunner, a corporal. Seven additional enlisted men 

completed the crew.

The tactical improvements made possible by the advances in 

weapons, organization, and training paid enormous dividends dur-

ing the Mexican War. At the battle of Palo Alto, when Mexican can-

non attempted to fire on American infantry, Brevet Major Ringgold’s 

battery galloped to their defense. As the Mexicans were setting up 

their battery, the “flying artillery” unlimbered, loaded, and fired 

point-blank into the enemy guns, annihilating their crews. When 

the enemy broke through the American left flank at the battle of 

Buena Vista, Bragg’s and Sherman’s batteries quickly moved from 

point to point, mounting and dismounting, limbering and unlim-

bering, firing shot and canister at the enemy ranks. These batteries 

and the handful of others available to Maj. Gens. Zachary Taylor 

and Winfield Scott proved to be decisive, enabling American troops, 

although usually outnumbered, to stage two successful invasions 

and eventually force the Mexicans to sue for peace.

NCOs in Action

Although junior enlisted strength rose and fell, artillery tables of 

organization remained fairly consistent in allocating noncommis-

sioned officers during the 1830s and 1840s. Whether there were four 

or six guns, each company contained 2 sergeants with special staff 

responsibilities, 4 to 6 sergeants (Chiefs of Piece), 8 to 12 corporals 

(the gunners and an ammunition NCO to support each piece), and 

2 buglers. The latter ranked with and were paid as NCOs.

In this generally lean era, the NCO was treated far better than the 

private soldier, reflecting his close relationship with the commander 

who had picked him for promotion. For example, NCOs were rarely 

deprived of their whiskey ration as a disciplinary measure, a com-

mon punishment for the private soldier. Neglect of duty and conduct 

unbecoming a soldier—often due to drunkenness—were the most 

frequent charges NCOs faced. Reduction to the ranks for varying 

periods of time was the most common punishment.

Then, as now, a key role of the NCO in all branches was that of 

trainer. Because NCOs supervised daily drill, they worked with offi-

cers to master the “school of the soldier,” as basic training subjects 

were called in earlier times. They then passed on that knowledge to 

the privates. To carry out training, a typical company in peacetime 

garrison organized enlisted men into four squads, each under the 

charge of an NCO. In these squads soldiers learned various drills, 

practiced maneuvers at the company level, and gained skill and 

confidence in handling artillery. The success these sergeants and 

corporals had in quickly training the large influx of recruits during 

the Mexican War confirmed the wisdom of the reforms advocated 

by Secretary Calhoun. Thereafter, policy makers never abandoned 

the notion that a relatively small number of qualified professionals 

could meet the requirements of mobilization.

By the mid-1800s the Army had moved so far down the road of 

transferring basic leadership responsibilities, especially in the area of 

training, that the NCO Corps began to earn the nickname “backbone 
of the Army.” This process was accompanied by an effort to enhance 

the individual noncommissioned officer’s prestige and authority. 

Every NCO received a certificate, or warrant, to document his status 

in a manner similar to the commission of an officer, and for the first 

time the sergeants and corporals were allowed to form their own 

mess separate from the private soldiers. To recognize special service, 

an act of 1847 authorized the president to award a brevet as second 

lieutenant to any NCO who distinguished himself, with the pay and 

benefits of the higher grade. The individual NCO had the option of 

accepting or declining the appointment, since it entailed transferring 

to a new unit.

NCOs also began to draw new assignments with less direct 

supervision by officers. This increase in responsibilities reflected 

both a trend within the Army toward greater technical specializa-

tion and the growth of professional attitudes among NCOs. Some 

of these changes came within the regimental staffs, while others 

gave sergeants the chance to work outside unit confines. A handful 

began to replace officers as recruiters in civilian population centers. 

Another important change during the 1830s allowed the ordnance 

sergeant to supplant an officer known as a conductor of artillery, 

who had performed important duties ensuring that weapons and 

other materiel were properly cared and accounted for. Choice assign-

ments like these became the goal of many career NCOs.

Since Yorktown, the artillery service has had to keep pace with 

constant growth in the complexity of modern warfare. Technological 

requirements set the cannoneers apart from their fellows in the 

Continental Army. The pace of change accelerated so rapidly during 

the nineteenth century that by 1903 the branch had to be split in 

two. Those “redlegs” charged with manning weapons in fortifica-

tions became the Coast Artillery, and later the Air Defense Artillery 

when long-range bombers replaced battleships as the primary strate-

gic threat to national security. The successors of Ringgold and Bragg 

became the Field Artillery and concentrated on improving their 

ability to provide support on the battlefield. The mobility of “flying 

artillery” is now seen in self-propelled howitzers and the Multiple 

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and in the use of helicopters and 

parachutes instead of horses to move weapons into firing position.

The versatility and flexibility necessary for artillerymen in modern 

combat demand technical skills that the Mexican War soldier could 

scarcely imagine. At the same time, the sergeant in command of an 

MLRS on today’s sophisticated battlefield still has the same basic 

responsibilities as a six-pounder’s Chief of Piece under Captain Bragg 

at Buena Vista. That continuity is most apparent in the training of 

individual soldiers. In the artillery, as throughout the Army, the NCO 

of today is still the key link in transmitting skills and motivating 

junior soldiers to maintain the highest possible state of readiness.

Training in this sense is really the most fundamental form of 

leadership. Over the centuries the Army noncommissioned officer 

92
93

has been the person with the most direct influence over the soldier 

on a daily basis. The fact that missions are accomplished and work 

performed according to high standards reflects how effective ser-

geants and corporals have been in instilling a sense of professional-

ism and technical and tactical competence in the men and women 

they command.
Union Standard Bearer, Don Troiani, 1983 
Dress

on the

Colors

Virginia, 1864

The wind-tossed Stars and Stripes wrapped around the color 

sergeant as he took up his position and planted its staff in 

front of his blue-clad regiment. Several hundred yards ahead 

stood the enemy breastworks. The battlefield was pandemonium. 

Clouds of drifting smoke and dust, the thud of artillery, the crackle 

of thousands of muskets, shouted commands, cries of the wounded—all combined to rattle even veteran soldiers. Still, the men could 

see the flag. It was more than a patriotic symbol. It was a fixed point, 

and like the calmness of its bearer, it steadied the men. Responding 

to orders, the blue line behind the color sergeant advanced with 

heads lowered, as if walking into the heart of a storm, advancing 

around comrades who had dropped as the Confederates began to 

find the range. When the men reached the colors, they halted to 

regain their alignment.

The regiments of the brigade approached the enemy field works 

through a series of such advances. Each time Old Glory led the way, 

allowing the line to maintain its formation. At a hundred yards, the 

men exchanged volleys with hardly visible opponents in butternut 

and gray. But as often happened during the Civil War, the advantage 

lay with defenders under cover. Canister and Minie balls ripped gaps 

in the ranks until finally the command “Fall back!” rang out. The 

impulse to run for safety was strong, but once again the color sergeant served as a steadying guide. The sight of the unit flag moving 

through the swirling battle imposed order on the chaos. Recovering 

the precision mastered on the parade ground, the battered unit 

withdrew from the field, surviving to fight another day.

Background

After the Mexican War, Congress reduced the Army to a small 

force of regulars with traditional peacetime roles. Initially set at 

slightly less than 10,000 officers and men, the size of the Army had 
96

The Death of General Warren 

at the Battle of Bunker’s Hill, 

17 June 1775, John Trumbull, 

1786. Beginning with the defense of Bunker Hill, the Army 

used flags as rallying points that 

stood above the smoke of battle.

grown to about 16,000 effectives by 1860, reflecting the need to secure 

the large territorial gains in the Southwest. Most of these troops were 

employed west of the Mississippi River; the rest were garrisoned at 

eastern coastal fortifications. Spread thinly in 130 garrisons, posts, and 

camps scattered over 3 million square miles, the regulars relied mainly 

on noncommissioned officers for junior leadership.

The military’s most significant tasks after the war with Mexico lay 

in the West. The Army was involved in exploration, railway surveys, 

and mapping. In addition, troops assisted civil authorities during 

the 1850s in efforts to enforce federal law in Utah and to halt the 

fighting between pro- and anti-slavery forces in “Bleeding Kansas.” 

The discovery of gold in California and the opening of the Oregon 

Territory’s rich farmlands not only dramatically increased the westward movement, but also added to the Army’s responsibilities. 

Wagon trains and routes had to be guarded by troops who protected 

the settlers from Indians and the Indians from the settlers. Combat 

experience gained during those missions came in the form of isolated small-unit actions.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 brought a very different 

challenge. Congress promptly raised the strength of the Regular 

Army to over 22,000 men. Infantry regiments increased from 10 to 

19, cavalry from 5 to 6, and artillery from 4 to 5, leading to immediate promotions to NCO rank for hundreds of soldiers. These events 

proved that Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had been right in the 

1820s in urging Congress to organize the Army in peacetime on an 

“expansible” basis, but the regulars were never expected to deal with 
97

Drill Sergeant at Attention in 

Front of the Colors, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1998. Army 

units now use flags only on ceremonial occasions; but in tribute 

to the NCO’s historic role as 

color bearer in battle, today’s 

color guards consist of noncommissioned officers.

the crisis of secession by themselves. The Civil War would be fought 

by volunteers on both sides.

In 1861 President Abraham Lincoln, like the Confederacy’s 

Jefferson Davis, issued a call for volunteers to be raised by the states 

and organized into regiments. Each side used various terms of 

enlistment; most men signed up either for a three-year stint or “for 

the duration.” In either case, the obligation was different than the 

Regular Army’s five-year hitch. So great was the response that by mid1861 each army had formed several hundred infantry regiments and 

almost 500,000 volunteers had entered the federal service. Volunteer 

units, especially those raised early in the war, often depended upon 

existing militia formations for their cadres. They carried designations 

that included a number (each state employed its own numbering 

system), state of origin, and, in the North, the term “volunteer,” all 

of which were emblazoned on the unit’s colors. Common usage 

simply referred to the infantry regiments as the 2d Massachusetts or 

the 5th Virginia.

On paper, a Civil War infantry regiment consisted of a small 

headquarters element and ten companies. Each company included 

a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, 4 

other sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 musicians, 1 wagoner, and between 
98

Noncommissioned Officer’s Sash

The Army has used the sash to denote 

rank from early times. From 1840 

until 1872, line sergeants and members of the noncommissioned staff 

were authorized to wear a sash of 

worsted wool as pictured.

Shoulder Scales for Noncommissioned Staff In the mid-nineteenth 

century brass shoulder scales protected 

soldiers from saber blows. Beginning 

about 1854, three patterns of shoulder scales came into use, one pattern 

of scales for noncommissioned staff 

as pictured, another for sergeants, 

and a third for corporals and privates. 

Scales of this type continued in use 

until 1872. 

Civil War Drum Regimental Drum 

of the Civil War Period, 1861–1865. 

Drums, fifes, trumpets, and bugles 

conveyed the commander’s orders in 

the noise and confusion of the battlefield in the eighteenth and nineteenth 

centuries. Drummers and field musicians not only needed the skill and 

talent to play but also had to maintain 

their composure under fire. Positions 

such as this would lead to the introduction of specialist grades at the 

beginning of the twentieth century.

64 and 82 privates. The minimum strength of a regiment was supposed to be slightly more than 850 officers and men, the maximum 

strength about 1,050. Actual numbers in the field were much lower, 

especially as units incurred losses from combat and disease. On the 

Union side, present and fit-for-duty strengths often fell into the 150- 

to 500-man range. Attrition took a heavier toll on Regular units than 

on volunteers because longer enlistments and lower benefits attracted few replacement recruits. The 2d Infantry, for example, consisted 

in 1864 of only seven officers and thirty-eight enlisted men, assigned 

mainly to guard duty.

One of the most honored and sought-after NCO positions in the 

regiment was that of color bearer. These men carried the national 

and regimental colors at the head of the unit in battle, a responsibility entrusted only to the most respected and courageous individuals. 

Regulations authorized each Union regiment of infantry two silk 

flags: the U.S. national color and an organizational color. Usually 

only the former went into combat at the head of the regiment, 

with the organizational color remaining with the trains for safety. 

Regulations also allowed a unit to inscribe on the colors the names 

of battles in which it had participated. Confederate regiments followed similar practices.

The true importance of the colors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not come from ceremonial use. They played a 

critical tactical role in this era of linear warfare, providing immediate 

visibility at the center of the unit. Vital as a key element in the command-and-control system, they also served as a rallying point during 

close combat. These functions related directly to the weapons of the 
99

day. During the Revolution and War of 1812, smoothbore flintlock 

muskets required units to deploy in long lines two or three ranks 

deep to achieve maximum efficiency in the use of their cumbersome 

short-range firearms. The volleys were controlled in part through 

the use of the flags, which were then carried by junior officers called 

ensigns.

By the time of the Civil War, technological advances in weaponry 

had led to an accurate, dependable, muzzle-loading percussion rifle 

for general use. In 1855 the highly effective .58-caliber “rifled mus-

ket” had been adopted by the Regular Army. The new weapon was 

accurate to 600 yards, 500 more than the range of the old smooth-

bore. The new rifle underwent minor modifications during the war, 

but it would remain the standard infantry weapon until a breech-

loader was adopted in 1873.

Although improved weapons allowed more emphasis on indi-

vidual marksmanship and initiative, tactical manuals lagged in tak-

ing full advantage of the Minie ball’s potential. Napoleonic concepts 

still dominated. Doctrine still called for infantry to stand shoul-

der-to-shoulder in two ranks. Loading, firing, and bayonet charges 

were all performed on command in drills involving many separate 

motions under rigid discipline. Decisive action continued to depend 

on platoon, company, battalion, and even regiment and brigade 

volleys. These were designed to bring the greatest mass of firepower 

possible to bear on a specific part of the enemy’s line, softening it 

up for a charge. The goal of training became the “perfect volley,” in 

which every soldier pulled his trigger at the same instant.

Under linear tactical systems, effectiveness depended heavily on 

the smooth and rapid alignment of a unit. Without proper control, 

maneuvers such as forming lines of battle from the march, wheel-

ing, oblique firings, and bayonet charges simply degenerated into 

a mob of armed men, each acting on impulse. When the newly 

raised Civil War regiments received their baptism of fire and began 

to experience the far heavier casualties inflicted by rifled muskets, 

subtle adjustments began to appear. Given half a chance, units 

opened the distance between individual ranks and, if on the defen-

sive, dug in or took ready cover to minimize losses. Those changes 

increased the burden on officers and NCOs and the importance of 

the colors.

By 1861 the ensign had disappeared from the U.S. Army. All 

company-grade officers were fully occupied with other duties. 

Responsibility for carrying the two flags devolved upon NCOs, and 

the Army added two color sergeants to the regimental headquarters 

to perform this special duty. To protect them in combat, a distinct 

color guard was also created, consisting of five to eight color cor-

porals, depending upon the number of colors carried. Regulations 

stated that members of the color guard would carry their muskets 

with bayonets always fixed. Often, for added protection, a specially 

selected color company of varying size would accompany the color 

guard.

Through this natural evolution, the colors became a key factor in 

esprit de corps. The flags represented the honor and integrity of the 

unit. They symbolized the glories of the past, stood guard over the 
100

present, and provided inspiration for the future. Both officers and 

men fully understood that their colors could not be surrendered. 

To return from battle without them was the ultimate disgrace. For 

example, General Orders of the Army of the Potomac denied any 

unit that lost its colors in action the right to carry others without 

the authority of the commanding general. Permission would not be 

given in cases where a unit had lost its colors through misconduct, 

“until such troops shall, by their bravery on other fields, have fully 

retrieved their tarnished honor.” Because of their tactical and psycho-

logical importance, and because of their visibility even in the smoke 

of battle, the colors often became the focal point of enemy fire and 

charges. Casualties among color bearers were high.

NCOs in Action

Of the more than 2 million men who served in the Union Army, 

over 1,925,000 were volunteers. Since about one in ten eventually 

became a noncommissioned officer, the wartime NCO Corps was 

also essentially a volunteer group. Like their Regular counterparts, 

volunteer NCOs held their rank through the action of the regimen-

tal colonel, who made selections based upon recommendations by 

the company captains. All appointments had to be announced in 

regimental orders. Once an NCO was appointed, he could not be 

removed from office except by sentence of court-martial or by the 

order of the regimental commander.

Pay increases made the NCO’s life marginally more tolerable. 

During the early part of the war, when base pay for Union infantry 

sergeants was $17 per month, soldiers were considered well paid. 

However, wartime inflation cut into the buying power of military 

pay, as did the Army’s decision to issue the troops paper currency that 

depreciated rapidly. In 1864, when the greenback dollar was worth 

only 39 cents in coin, Congress voted an increase in military pay, add-

ing $3 a month to the income of a line sergeant. This still left him 

far behind civilians in terms of buying power, but his inadequate pay 

was partially offset by enlistment and reenlistment bounties. In 1864, 

when the three-year enlistments were about to expire, all members 

of veteran regiments, regardless of rank, received a $400 bonus to 

remain in service. Some states offered additional sums, so that by the 

end of the war some soldiers received up to $1,000 to reenlist. Foreign 

observers, accustomed to the low pay of European armies, were struck 

by America’s generosity toward its soldiers.

Yet the sums of money involved, accentuated by the relatively 

small difference between the pay of a private and a sergeant, belied 

the important roles carried out by NCOs during the war. The tactics 

of the time called for officers up to the rank of brigadier general to 

lead their men in person, and in consequence officer casualties were 

high. As a battle went on, sergeants and corporals often found them-

selves assuming command of companies. In extreme cases, such as 

the charge of Pickett’s Virginia division at Gettysburg in 1863, whole 

regiments lost all their commissioned officers. The demonstrated 

ability of the NCOs to handle the burden of leadership in such cases 

permanently affected the corps’ future status.
The exposed position of a unit’s colors and their tactical sig

-

nificance led to particularly high casualties among the sergeants and 

corporals carrying them—often wiping out the entire color guard. 

During the 1862 battle of Fredericksburg, for example, the 155th 

Pennsylvania was ordered to cross an exposed area and assault 

enemy-held heights that dominated the field of battle. When the 

color sergeant was killed, a corporal seized the flag. He soon fell, as 

did three successors. A fifth corporal grasped the banner and kept 

it aloft, an act for which he was promoted to color sergeant. In the 

battle of Antietam, the 62d New York lost sixteen color bearers in 

quick succession. Two years later at Spotsylvania, Sgt. Nathaniel 

Barker, 11th New Hampshire Infantry, took up the national and regi-

mental colors after six predecessors had been killed and carried both 

throughout the remainder of the battle. Sergeant Barker’s heroism 

led to the award of the newly authorized Medal of Honor, a recogni-

tion extended to many individuals who either protected their own 

colors or captured those of an enemy unit.

The accurate rifle fire of the Civil War changed infantry tactics. 

Based on the hard lessons of battle, the Army adopted a new system 

of open-order tactics after the war. Instead of advancing in rigid lin-

ear formations, soldiers now equipped with the new breech-loading 

rifles spent more time in small groups. Given the higher volume of 

fire, the Army achieved a more efficient use of manpower through 

skirmishing and attacking in rushes. That trend would continue 

in the Spanish-American War, which saw the introduction of high 

velocity, low trajectory clip-loading rifles, and would accelerate 

throughout the twentieth century as technology further increased 

the lethality of the battlefield. These advances in firepower, however, 

made it impossible to carry flags into combat, thus leading to the 

abolition of the rank of color sergeant.

At the same time, the utility of the old linear tactics as a tool for 

instilling the fundamentals of unit discipline did not diminish. Like 

colors and color guards, drill and formations have remained a key 

part of Army tradition and training after disappearing from combat. 

Flags and guidons continue to play an important role in the creation 

of unit identity, cohesion, and esprit de corps, with battle streamers 

replacing the old inscriptions. Their continued presence at the center 

of a formation symbolically represents their former position in the 

heat of battle. The retention of a color guard with fixed bayonets 

commemorates the earlier functional role of protecting the colors 

against capture.

The Army values traditions and relies heavily on the NCO Corps 

to preserve them. Drill and ceremony, including parades, reviews, 

retreat, and military funerals, add pageantry to military life but also 

symbolize for each soldier the shared values, courage, and self-dis-

cipline essential to any successful military organization. The high 

honor given to a unit’s senior enlisted member as custodian of its 

flag or guidon and membership in the color guard reflect that conti-

nuity in a very personal way.

101
Ready for Patrol, Theresa L. Unger, 1988 
Ready

for

Patrol

New Mexico, 1870s

The NCOs were stern, the troops anxious; only the horses seemed 

calm. No quick once-over before the daily retreat parade, this was 

the last inspection before going out on a war patrol that might last 

a month or more, depending on how soon the Indians were found and 

whether they chose to talk or fight. The Apaches had been on the attack 

again, raiding settlements from across the Mexican border. Here at Fort 

Union, in the New Mexico Territory, the sergeants and corporals respected 

the Apache as a tough enemy who could find and take advantage of any 

weakness, any detail overlooked in garrison. Spit shine and polish would 

count for little in the coming months, but the tools of campaigning would. 

Experienced eyes ran over carbines, uniforms, boots, bridles, saddles, and 

cartridge belts and looked in every knapsack and saddlebag.

During the hours of preparation for the reconnaissance, as it was 

officially termed, the varied experiences of the men became obvious. The 

newer men were loudest, their excited talk filled with bravado. To them 

it was all high adventure and daring exploits. The veteran cavalrymen, 

some with Civil War experience, quietly continued their cleaning and 

packing for the campaign. They knew that the boasts of green troopers would provide no protection from Indian arrows and bullets. The 

NCOs used the inspection to quash as many youthful misconceptions 

as possible. “Why do you carry so much coffee? Are you going to offer 

the Apaches a cup?...Where are your extra socks? And where’s the bar of 

soap? No, you’re not taking any baths for a while—you soap your feet 

so you don’t get blisters...and cut them fingernails and toenails...pack 

more bullets and salt...make sure your cantle and pommel rolls are balanced...when’s the last time you cleaned this revolver?”

Background

Following the Civil War and a decade of Reconstruction duty in 

the South, a sharply reduced Army returned to its old tasks: enforcing 

treaties and trying to prevent fighting between Indians and settlers 
104

A Cavalryman’s Breakfast on 

the Plains, Frederic Remington, 

c. 1892. Despite profound changes

in the outward appearance of the 

cavalry during the last century, 

the mission to “get there fastest 

with the mostest” remains.

on the frontier. The postwar Army split into small detachments and 

used both cavalry and infantry extensively to cover vast distances in 

pursuit of elusive adversaries. After demobilization, the Army would 

remain for the next thirty years at slightly under 25,000 troops, 

most assigned to twenty-five infantry and ten cavalry regiments. One 

positive result of the Civil War was the enlistment of black soldiers 

in the Regular Army for the first time since the Revolution. Though 

mostly officered by whites, the 24th and 25th Infantries and the 9th 

and 10th Cavalries were black units with a full complement of black 

NCOs.

In 1869 the Army administered its 255 posts through three 

major territorial departments: Atlantic, Pacific, and Missouri. 

Campaigns against the Indians were coordinated by the Department 

of the Missouri, headquartered at Jefferson Barracks near St. Louis. 

Although they sent soldiers into 943 engagements with the Indians 

in a thirty-year period, many of the Army’s senior leaders remained 

largely unconcerned with the operations they directed. Interested in 

large-scale campaigns like those waged by Napoleon, Grant, Lee, and 

Jackson, they found few lessons of value in the Plains campaigns. 

The junior officers, NCOs, and troopers coping with the daily reality 

of the frontier, on the other hand, had a different viewpoint. They 

cared less about Napoleon and Lee than about Geronimo and Red 

Cloud. Learning in the saddle, they became experts in dealing with 

some of the world’s greatest irregular fighters and in the process 

wrote a new chapter in the history of one of the Army’s most important combat arms—the Cavalry.

The image of cavalrymen as soldiers in resplendent uniforms, 

charging across a plain on magnificent horses, with sabers drawn 

and guidons billowing in the wind has more reality in European 

than in American history. America’s experience with mounted troops 
105

Bradley M2/M3A3 Tracked Armored Fighting Vehicle, 2000. 

From horses on the Great Plains 

to Bradleys in the twenty-first 

century, the essentials of smallunit leadership and, therefore, 

the duties of the NCO have 

remained the same.

has placed much greater importance on the abilities and initiative 

of the noncommissioned officer to ensure that the men put in their 

“forty miles a day on beans and hay,” chasing an elusive enemy over 

barren desert territories.

The use of mounted troops by the U.S. Army dates back to the 

Revolutionary War. Dense forests, stone fences to divide fields, and 

limited roads restricted European-style mounted charges. On the 

other hand, after being defeated in 1776 at the battle of Long Island 

by an undetected British flanking movement, George Washington 

recognized the value of reliable scouts mounted on horseback. 

The following winter Congress added four cavalry regiments to the 

Continental Army. Those regiments, really mounted infantry, originally received the designation light dragoons, a choice of terms that 

established the precedent for the use of troopers throughout the 

Army’s history. Basically, Washington’s cavalrymen performed reconnaissance missions. Their battles usually involved skirmishing, often 

dismounted, rather than charges. Like the colonial rangers, the light 

dragoons tended to spend most of their time in small patrols where 

NCOs played important leadership roles. Even in Nathanael Greene’s 

campaign in the Carolinas in 1781, where the terrain lent itself more 

to European-style charges, the lives of the men serving under William 

Washington or “Light Horse Harry” Lee were filled with routine 

rather than glamour.

The pattern of service in the mounted arm in the decades that followed, like that of the infantry and artillery, built upon Revolutionary 

precedents. In the small Army, the nation maintained to police its 

interior border and to man a handful of coast defense forts, relatively 

few of the expensive horsemen were necessary, and European-style 

heavy cavalry was hardly needed at all. Those troopers that did exist 

spent most of their time caring for their horses and costly equipment 

and nearly all of the rest conducting patrols. NCOs supervised the 

former and provided much of the essential leadership for the latter 

functions. Even when they became involved in combat, the horsemen tended to be employed as mobile infantry who dismounted to 

fight. Only on rare occasions—such as at Resaca de la Palma during 

the Mexican War or at Brandy Station in the Civil War—did American 
106

cavalry conduct true mounted charges. On the other hand, the mas-

sive mobilization for the latter conflict brought more troopers into 

the Army than ever before, and such great cavalrymen as James E. 

B. “Jeb” Stuart, George Armstrong Custer, and Philip H. Sheridan 

emerged among the leaders on both sides of the fighting.

When the Army returned to the Great Plains and the deserts of 

the Southwest in late 1865, it kept a larger proportion of horsemen 

than at any time in its history. The vast distances and small total 

strength of the service mandated a larger share of responsibility for 

the troopers. Scouting, escorting the workers constructing the trans-

continental railroads and telegraph lines, and enforcing treaties with 

various tribes were easier when mounted. Although charismatic offi-

cers like George Armstrong Custer frequently dominated the news-

paper headlines, the quiet professionalism of long-term NCOs held 

units together during years of isolation at each of the dozens of forts 

established during a thirty-year period.

An example of a “hitching-post” garrison was Fort Union in 

the Territory of New Mexico. In the late 1870s responsibility for 

protection of that region fell to elements of the 9th Cavalry, a black 

regiment, and the 15th Infantry. Several companies occupied Fort 

Union, from which patrols set forth to prevent or punish Indian 

attacks on settlers and infringement on treaties by unscrupulous 

whites. A typical patrol would last up to several weeks, with infantry 

participating as escorts for a wagon train carrying reserve supplies, 

hardtack and salt pork for the men, and grain for the animals. As 

each day came to a close, a camp was established and sergeants 

and corporals organized the nighttime guard. Troopers cared for 

their horses and equipment before themselves, a crucial duty often 

enforced by the NCOs.

If the patrol met hostile Indians, the troops could expect frontier 

combat against a fierce and resourceful enemy. For the men of the 

9th Cavalry in New Mexico Territory, the most formidable adversary 

was Victorio, an Apache who had never studied the campaigns of 

Napoleon or Frederick the Great. His relatively small band relied 

heavily on the element of surprise. Plains Indian warfare centered on 

the raid, intended to accomplish a specific purpose with a minimum 

of loss to the tribe. Taking maximum advantage of their intimate 

familiarity with the terrain and ignoring the boundary between the 

United States and Mexico, the Apaches often seemed to materialize 

out of nowhere, inflict considerable damage during a brief fire fight, 

and then disappear before an effective response could be organized. 

With no intertribal coordination and no systematic recruiting to 

replace casualties, Indians traditionally shunned set-piece battles, 

fighting at night or staging true ambushes. Their courage and prefer-

ence for close battle cost them dearly against long-range rifles. 

The Army took years to find a way to employ its advantages of 

firepower and discipline. Constant pressure gradually neutralized 

surprise tactics by wresting the initiative from the Indians, while the 

cumulative impact of casualties, losses of property and livestock, 

and slaughter of the buffalo wore the tribes down. Such warfare 

demanded high proficiency in basic military skills, especially marks-

manship. Massive battles in the Civil War had placed a premium on 
107

artillery and sheer numbers of rounds fired, rather than individual 

accuracy. Out on the plains and deserts of the West, units initially 

found themselves blazing away until their ammunition was nearly 

gone then watching in frustration as most of the enemy escaped. The 

basic marksmanship problem was worsened by the fact that many 

of the recruits joining the Army in the 1870s were recently arrived 

immigrants from Europe, men who lacked experience with firearms. 

Budget restrictions prevented the Army from buying ammunition for 

frequent rifle practice, even had time been available for it, since so 

much of a soldier’s day had to be spent on growing food, maintaining 

the buildings of his post, and caring for animals and equipment.

In the aftermath of Custer’s stunning 1876 disaster at the Little Big 

Horn, changes were instituted. New regulations mandated that each 

soldier fire twenty rounds per month at targets set up at ranges of from 

100 to 1,000 yards. Cavalrymen fired the carbine from a stationary 

position and the revolver while mounted, first at a walk, then a trot, 

and finally at the gallop. Officers and troops alike came to take pride 

in their new skills and soon formed teams for competitions between 

posts. The American soldier’s international reputation for outstand-

ing marksmanship dates from this period. More importantly for the 

men involved, the increased attention to training began to pay off in 

improved combat effectiveness against hostile tribes.

NCOs in Action

Noncommissioned officers on the frontier assumed positions 

of responsibility that went beyond the important roles that they 

had long filled. In addition to the familiar company-level positions 

and regimental-level NCO staff, a new category of assignments 

appeared. Post staff NCOs—the ordnance and quartermaster corps 

sergeants—emerged. Assignment to such a position was not part of 

a normal career pattern. An NCO interested in becoming a post ord-

nance sergeant had to have served at least eight years in the Army, 

four as an NCO; those interested in the post quartermaster sergeant 

duty had to have already completed at least four years in uniform. 

Applications, which had to be handwritten as a proof of literacy, 

were passed up the chain of command to The Adjutant General, who 

made the assignments.

The main purpose in appointing post NCOs was to ensure prop-

erty accountability in a widely scattered Army. Secondary purposes 

were to reward long and faithful service among the NCO Corps 

and to encourage junior enlisted men to remain with the colors by 

holding out the chance for advancement beyond the company level. 

Charged with responsibility for government property at his post, 

each ordnance sergeant quickly became one of its most respected 

soldiers. He had to be honest as well as experienced, for the oppor-

tunity to make an illegal profit at government expense was always 

present.

His responsibility extended beyond the weaponry and ammuni-

tion implied by his title. He also had to keep each unit assigned to 

the post well supplied with all required equipment and clothing, 

assisted by the quartermaster sergeant. When a cavalry unit was pres-
108

ent, the ordnance sergeant added all equipment related to horses 

and riding to his inventory. Post NCOs came to provide continuity 

in an environment made fluid by the mission of the Army in the 

West. Companies and regiments changed stations, but the post 

NCOs stayed. Beyond that, as they developed new skills and quali-

fications in an increasingly complex military system, they became 

forerunners of a whole family of specialists who later contributed 

to the development of the Army.

The rise in the status of NCOs in the West grew directly out of 

the nature of the fighting they encountered. Besides keeping unit 

records, overseeing daily fatigue details, and supervising training, 

sergeants and corporals often served as small-unit leaders with-

out immediate supervision by officers. In the dusty expanses of 

the Plains or southwestern mesas, merely finding a hostile force 

could become a major undertaking, requiring patrols that lasted 

for weeks and covered hundreds of miles. To conduct patrols prop-

erly, infantry and cavalry squads and platoons often had to search 

independently and then reconcentrate promptly. NCOs, of course, 

led these squads and platoons, occasionally accompanied by a lone 

officer. If the reconnaissance confronted a hostile band, they then 

had to become combat leaders. Courage, skill, and brains were all 

requirements of the job. Just giving commands to their men was a 

problem in some units, where up to a quarter of the soldiers spoke 

little or no English. While American general officers thought about 

great battles of future wars, crucial innovations in practice were 

emerging from the warfare on the Plains. Gradually, the increasing 

use of heliostats and the telegraph for signaling and the railroad 

for shifting and concentrating forces made the Plains garrisons less 

isolated.

In the twentieth century, technology dramatically changed the 

cavalry, as it did warfare in general. The Noncommissioned Officer 

Corps coped with the new inventions, just as it had taken other 

developments in stride. The use of machine guns in World War I 

severely limited the combat role of horse cavalry. Small numbers of 

mounted soldiers did perform reconnaissance, liaison, and courier 

service in France, but the large-scale introduction of motor vehicles 

and tanks changed the scale, the pace, and the form of warfare. Army 

leadership in general turned out to be more willing to plan changes 

for the cavalry than Congress was to provide funding, but by 1932 

the branch had its first mechanized cavalry regiment equipped 

with light tanks and armored cars. Large-scale cavalry training con-

tinued well into World War II, although most cavalrymen fought 

as infantry, in reconnaissance squadrons (troops that performed 

vital roles in screening the flanks of corps and divisions), or in the 

armored divisions and separate tank battalions of the combinedarms team. A decade later the introduction of assault and troopcarrying helicopters would extend that cavalry mission to the sky. 

NCOs met this new challenge by becoming the commanders of 

individual tanks and armored cars and mastering the technical 
109

skills to maintain the fleets of new war machines, just as they had 

led patrols and cared for horses and saddles.

It was the Noncommissioned Officer Corps that in many ways 

provided the glue that held the branch together during the wrench-

ing changes from horses to the internal combustion engine. The 

sergeants and corporals found that when technology changes many 

functions continue, whether soldiers are mounted on chargers, 

tanks, or helicopters. Reconnaissance, screening, and raiding can 

be performed by armored vehicles and helicopters, shock action by 

main battle tanks and attack aircraft. In each case the fundamental 

techniques of leading and supervising troops on a day-to-day basis 

do not change.

Whether on horseback or in a turret, the cavalry NCO carries a 

great deal of responsibility. He must make quick decisions about 

deployment of forces on all types of terrain while remaining ready to 

respond quickly to mechanical breakdowns or the actions of hostile 

forces. He remains the immediate link between the officer and the 

private, translating planning into action. The Army on the western 

plains was an Army in transition, an Army preparing for a vastly 

expanded role in the twentieth century, although it did not know 

it at the time. Fittingly, NCOs helped to pioneer and achieve that 

transition.
Field Hospital Back of the Lines, Charles Johnson Post, 1898
Ambulance Corps

Proficiency

Cuba, 1898

The ambulance sergeant had never seen a situation like this. Ever 

since the V Corps had landed at Daiquiri nine days ago, one 

thing after another had gone wrong for the medical personnel. The landing itself had been a nightmare: supplies lost in the surf, 

hospitals unable to get ashore given the demand for the few available 

small boats. Then the shortage of baggage wagons had so hampered the 

march inland that surgeons had often abandoned medical chests along 

the route, hoping to retrieve them later. Now, as fighting raged along 

the slopes of a nearby rise the local natives called San Juan Hill on this 

oppressively hot July day, the few ambulances available had been posted 

near the corps headquarters, so that the corps surgeon could personally 

control their use. The sergeant could only watch the wounded trickle 

back to the field hospital by whatever means they could find, whether 

their own feet or the wagons that could navigate the few roads, which 

were already heavily congested. 

Although the corps commander had believed that muddy roads 

would enable supply wagons to do the same work as ambulances, the 

sergeant was not so sure. Between the poor condition of the roads, the 

unruly behavior of the drivers and mules, and the resulting jars and jolts, 

more than a few patients had died trying to cover the four or five miles 

from the battlefield to the field hospital. There, they would encounter 

such a shortage of tents, cots, and bedding that many could only recline 

on the ground. It was the sergeant’s responsibility to keep up the spirits 

of the young privates as they gawked at the confusion surrounding them. 

He knew that he must control his irritation at a moment like this and 

provide the sort of leadership that would bring order to chaos. Inwardly, 

he could only hope that future Army expeditions would take more care 

to organize their medical preparations than this one had.

Background

Formation of the Ambulance Corps represented another step in 

the accelerating specialization and professionalism of American society in the late nineteenth century. The Army joined this trend in spite 
112

Pre–World War I Medical Training Exercise, Fort Benning, 

Georgia. NCOs involved in the 

care and treatment of battlefield 

casualties have always needed 

to make life-and-death decisions 

under fire. 

of severely limited peacetime budgets. Just as doctors and lawyers 

developed their professional organizations and career training, career 

officers and NCOs in their own ways sought to upgrade their standards and adjust to new ideas and growing technological complexity. 

Engineers and artillerymen, for example, tried to adapt to a stream 

of inventions that changed the way in which the seacoasts were protected, rebuilding fortifications and introducing heavy artillery and 

telegraphic and telephonic communications to create an early centralized fire control system. Driving the change was the realization 

that the United States might one day have to face up-to-date foreign 

armies in the field, as the Army had done in the past.

The requirement for new skills was first reflected in the addition 

of individual specialists to combat units and post garrisons. In time, 

however, the Army created entire units with unique missions. Since 

the time of the Revolution the Army had set up such organizations in 

wartime, but now it considered permanent units necessary to enhance 

its capability to deter foreign aggression. The combination of technical developments and broadening awareness provoked reexamination 

of many long-accepted dogmas. A growing number of Army branches 

began to publish journals, discussing issues and spreading innovations among widely scattered units. Yet budget restrictions prevented 

the Regular Army from pursuing many promising leads. Hence the former state militias—now increasingly known as the National Guard—

took the lead. Using state-appropriated funds and drawing on civilian 

skills, these citizen-soldiers, for example, created the first true Signal 

Corps unit in New York in the 1870s and the earliest permanent division organization in Pennsylvania in 1878. The trend continued in the 

early twentieth century with the creation of the Army Reserve, which 

had as one of its original missions the responsibility of maintaining a 

reservoir of technical specialists.

A field that changed dramatically was the initial care and evacuation of the wounded. Caring for casualties has always been a major 
113

Medicine Man, Henrietta 

Snowden, 2000. Today’s medical NCOs find themselves 

deployed on a wide range of missions, from combat duty in the 

Middle East and Afghanistan 

to humanitarian missions in the 

Balkans and Africa. 

problem in war. In the American Revolution, the recovery of casualties fell to the regimental quartermaster sergeant with a work party 

composed of fifers and drummers. No wounded man could call for 

a medic, for the trained medic and litter bearer did not yet exist. 

In the Civil War, two-thirds of the wounded died. Initial treatment 

came from a regimental surgeon in an often improvised aid station, 

but two men were needed to move each wounded soldier there. As 

a result, many casualties were untended for considerable periods on 

the battlefield. Commanders risked defeat if they diverted too many 

able-bodied fighters from the line to recover the wounded, whose 

chances were slim anyway.

The massive casualty figures of the Civil War highlighted a continuing problem in military medicine: how to move battlefield casualties to 

regimental surgeons without worsening their condition. Under policies 

in effect at the beginning of that war, each regimental surgeon was to be 

assisted by a maximum of 25 enlisted men: 15 bandsmen and no more 

than 10 men detailed from line companies, but no medical specialist. 

Problems quickly became apparent. The quality of personnel was often 

poor, because commanders did not send their best men to act as nurses, 

orderlies, pharmacists, and litter bearers. Those who went often lacked 

motivation as well as training. The detailed “hospital attendants” had to 

split their time between retrieving new battlefield casualties and caring 

for those already at the temporary facility. Ambulances were lacking. 

Although testing began in 1859, the Army had not yet adopted a standard design when the war broke out. Often the rough, springless wagons 
114

Noncommissioned Officer’s Belt The noncommissioned officer’s belt was introduced in 1851 and used 

until 1902. It was authorized for noncommissioned officers of the line and staff who were authorized to carry the 

noncommissioned officer’s sword. After 1872 the use of 

the belt and sword was relegated principally to members 

of regimental noncommissioned staff, including regimental sergeants major, regimental quartermaster sergeants, 

ordnance sergeants, principal musicians, and noncommissioned officers of the various staff departments, 

including the Medical, Subsistence, Quartermaster, and 

Ordnance Departments. 

Insignia for Regimental Noncommissioned Staff Pattern 1896 Insignia for the 

Noncommissioned Staff of the 25th Infantry on Model 1895 Forage Cap. The crossed 

rifles indicate infantry branch, and the regimental number, in this case “25,” denotes 

the unit. The lack of a company letter shows that the wearer served on the regimental 

noncommissioned staff, which should not be confused 

with noncommissioned officers of the various staff 

departments.

Insignia of a Commissary Sergeant Pattern 

1896 Insignia of a Post Commissary Sergeant of the 

Subsistence Department on a Model 1895 Forage 

Cap from the Period of the Spanish-American War. A badge with a wreath is indicative 

of the insignia worn by noncommissioned officers of the various staff departments and 

indicates a specific position rather than a branch association.

pressed into service to fill that gap had civilian teamsters, not soldiers, 

as drivers.

Dr. Jonathan Letterman, an Army surgeon, made the first attempt 

to create a system of treatment and evacuation. When he became 

medical director of the Army of the Potomac in the summer of 1862, 

he centralized a large ambulance force—he used 200 men at the battle 

of Antietam in September—all under the control of officers or NCOs. 

A captain took charge of an army corps’ vehicles, with a first lieutenant 

at the division level, and a sergeant commanding the two ambulances 

assigned to each regiment, each with a driver, plus two men and two 

stretchers. Another Letterman innovation welcomed by surgeons came 

from assigning better men to the ambulance crews, soldiers detailed 

from line regiments who had demonstrated that they were “active and 

efficient.” Once in the new ambulance corps, they stayed with it and 

trained regularly. With the Army able to provide better treatment and 

more efficient evacuation for its wounded, an increasing proportion 

of the wounded were able to return to duty.

The Letterman system remained limited to the Army of the Potomac 

until March 1864. Tested in fierce battles, it finally became the basis for 

a new Army-wide ambulance service. Each regiment had between one 

and three ambulances. Two additional ambulances accompanied each 

corps headquarters, while two Army freight wagons supported each 

division’s ambulance train. Field experience through the rest of the war 

showed that the only major problem with the Letterman ambulance 

corps was the chronic shortage of vehicles.
115

Unfortunately for the future of Army medical care, the Ambulance 

Corps with its now trained NCOs and enlisted men disbanded at 

the end of the Civil War. Low peacetime strength levels (no more 

than 25,000 regulars served at any one time for most of the rest of 

the century) forced the War Department to concentrate on policing 

Indians and settlers in the western territories, not on preparing for 

a major conventional war. Much of what the Army had learned in 

medical treatment and evacuation during the Civil War was forgot-

ten. Critical specialties were eliminated, including nurses, medical 

storekeepers (druggists), and the ambulance men who provided 

initial treatment in the field. The only enlisted medical specialists 

retained were hospital stewards.

A comeback began on 14 May 1885, when the Massachusetts 

legislature created the Ambulance Corps, Massachusetts Volunteer 

Militia. Each of the militia’s two brigades received permission to 

form a unit of 1 officer, 2 sergeants, and 13 privates. The officer in 

charge had to be a trained physician, able to pass the test as a medical 

officer in the Regular Army and to recruit and train his own enlisted 

men. Samuel B. Clarke, M.D., enlisted thirteen medical students 

in time to have his unit participate in its first “summer camp” two 

months later. The second ambulance unit completed organization in 

1887. Wearing infantry uniforms and red crosses, Clarke’s men car-

ried modified cartridge boxes with medical supplies, special knives 

in lieu of weapons, and collapsible stretchers. In camp they not only 

trained but also demonstrated their immediate value to others by 

treating a variety of heat casualties. The Massachusetts Ambulance 

Corps went through a number of changes in the following decades, 

setting an example for other states and the regulars to follow. By 

the eve of World War I it had grown to the size of a battalion with 

4 specialized companies, 2 of which manned ambulances while 2 

provided the enlisted strength for field hospitals.

Action by the War Department came in 1887. Congress, approv-

ing an Army request, created the Hospital Corps within the Medical 

Department. It provided three grades for enlisted medical specialists: 

hospital stewards, acting hospital stewards, and privates. Serving as 

nurses, wardmasters, cooks, and assistants, these men would per-

form all “hospital services in garrison and in the field” and staff the 

wartime ambulance service.

The Hospital Corps marked a new departure in two ways. First, 

prospective enlisted members had to volunteer for the duty and to 

show real aptitude. Second, recruits now had a professional career pat-

tern. Men who volunteered from line units received training in first aid 

and in the duties of a litter bearer for at least four hours a month. After 

working as litter bearers for at least one year, candidates could take an 

examination for selection as Hospital Corps privates. After a year of 

service with the Hospital Corps, privates would be eligible for appoint-

ment as acting hospital stewards. Following one year of service on a 

probationary basis and passage of another examination, they could 

be appointed permanent hospital stewards. In its first year some 600 

privates transferred to the new corps, with 24 passing their examina-

tions and receiving promotions to NCO status as acting hospital stew-

ards. Such planned career development made the establishment of the 
116

Hospital Corps important for the Army as a whole, for it launched the 

continuing development of various new specialties that allowed the 

Army to emerge as a modern, professional force.

Until the Spanish-American War, however, the Hospital Corps 

maintained a strength of only about 750, slightly more than one-quar-

ter of whom held NCO rank. Additional responsibilities without com-

mensurate pay raises, however, prompted many potential NCOs to opt 

for remaining with their line regiments. Others, trained by the Army, 

left at the end of their initial enlistments for better jobs in civilian life. 

When the Army assembled a divisional field hospital at Pine Ridge, 

South Dakota, in 1890, units in surrounding states and territories had 

to be stripped of stewards and corpsmen, leaving them almost without 

medical support for several weeks. Once at the divisional hospital, 

these corpsmen also revealed unacceptable variations in training. Both 

problems were addressed quickly. In 1891 two companies of instruc-

tion were founded (a third was added in 1893) to standardize training. 

With staffs of 3 medical officers, 7 NCOs, and 40 privates each, the 

companies produced competent “sanitary soldiers” by offering a curriculum of infantry drill, first aid, elementary nursing and pharmacology, field hospital setup, field cookery, care of animals, and ambulance 

driving. Beginning in 1892, recruiting rules were altered to allow direct 

enlistment into the corps, a policy aimed at attracting civilian druggists, 

teachers, and cooks, and base pay for a Hospital Corps private was 

raised from $13 to $18 per month.

The Spanish-American War provided a rigorous test for the 

Hospital Corps. Though the quality of corpsmen trained in the com-

panies of instruction was excellent, the quantity was insufficient. 

The Army had no choice but to go back to its old system of detailing 

men from the line and trying to train them quickly. By the end of the 

war, 6,588 corpsmen, of whom 608 were NCOs, had served in the 

combined Regular and volunteer force. 

In the years that followed, additional reforms again sought to 

standardize performance and grade structure. In 1903 the medics 

expanded to a five-rank grade progression, from private to private 

first class, corporal, sergeant, and sergeant first class. Beginning in 

1904, annual maneuvers funded by the federal government brought 

National Guardsmen and regulars together for joint training. The 

Hospital Corps used these occasions to test its ability to perform its 

wartime mission. Each year, however, the companies of instruction 

had to cease normal operations to transform themselves temporar-

ily for field service. Finally, in the spring of 1911, the corps reor-

ganized on a permanent, specialized basis into four field hospital 

companies and four ambulance companies. On maneuvers, these 

companies supported units in the field. In garrison, they trained in 

all medical functions.

NCOs in Action

As hospital steward and assistant hospital steward, the NCO 

appeared in a new role in the late nineteenth century: the techni-

cal specialist. This development certainly was not restricted to the 

Medical Department. Already in the 1870s and 1880s technical 
117

specialists were well established in the artillery and coast artillery as 

fire-direction NCOs and electricians and in the Signal Corps as com-

munications experts and weather observers.

But the Hospital Corps, reflecting advances in medicine as a whole, 

was particularly affected by the trend toward specialization. In its early 

stages, medical specialization meant teaching line soldiers the rudi-

ments of field medicine and emergency first aid. Later, Hospital Corps 

NCOs and privates acquired the skills to perform an increasing num-

ber of complex medical procedures without close supervision.

Training methods also became more specialized, and the respon-

sibilities of medical NCOs as trainers expanded. Before and during 

the Civil War the Army left the training of hospital attendants to 

regimental surgeons, but the need to train subordinates took sur-

geons away from their primary duties, while many of the soldiers 

detailed to medical service brought little or no interest to their infor-

mal apprenticeship. To eliminate these problems, the Army created 

the two companies of instruction in the 1890s to train personnel 

recruited directly for a medical military career. NCOs were a part of 

that process from the very beginning, using their practical field expe-

rience to supplement the technical knowledge of the doctors.

By the eve of World War I, skilled and specialized medical units 

had become an integral part of the Army. During the war each regi-

ment or separate battalion had a sanitary detachment, reinforced by a 

division-level sanitary train capable of providing one field hospital and 

one ambulance company to support each line regiment. Additional 

units existed at corps and army levels. Growth in the overall size of the 

Hospital Corps was stimulated by additional pay increases and by the 

expansion of the grade system from five ranks to seven.

Technological change compelled further development of Army 

medicine as the lethality of the battlefield escalated dramati-

cally. Fortunately, medical science kept pace. New inventions and 

improved knowledge allowed treatment to save lives that hitherto 

would have been lost. Late nineteenth century medical advances 

made possible the successful treatment of a greater range of illnesses 

and injuries. New drugs and antiseptics reduced pain and infection. 

Line commanders welcomed such developments, which held out the 

possibility of increased unit efficiency, higher morale, and less death 

and suffering. If large numbers of the wounded could be returned to 

duty, line units could regain experienced men and maintain man-

power levels needed for continuous campaigning.

More was demanded of the medical enlisted ranks, especially the 

NCOs. They had to recover casualties rapidly, stabilize them, and move 

them safely to aid stations for treatment. During World War II, the Army’s 

Medical Corps introduced the most sophisticated network of facilities 

and hospitals yet seen. Later, in Korea and Vietnam, extensive use of 

helicopters as aerial ambulances dramatically improved evacuation pro-

cedures and survival rates. The seriously wounded could be taken from a 

battlefield to a hospital in as little as twenty minutes. The Army medical 

NCO has come a long way from the Spanish-American War.
On the Trail of the Hun, William James Aylward, c. 1920 
Sustaining

the

Offensive

France, 1918

The two American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) NCOs faced a 

familiar scene as the Meuse-Argonne offensive entered November 

1918: deep mud, miserable weather, a hopelessly unrealistic 

schedule, and enemy harassing fire. Neither had enjoyed the luxury of 

a full night’s sleep lately, and their tempers were short. Such problems 

had faced leaders throughout the history of warfare. But now NCOs had 

to deal with something new: traffic jams, like the one that the military 

police sergeant found himself trying to untangle.

“Before your truck can go,” he told the sergeant from the Chemical 

Corps, “that ammunition convoy for V Corps has got to get through the 

intersection. And they aren’t going anywhere until someone finishes 

changing that flat tire.” Each day hundreds of vehicles tried to use the same 

road at the same time, with everyone claiming the highest priority. To hear 

convoy commanders tell it, General Pershing had personally ordered every 

driver to get to the front as fast as possible no matter what was in the way. 

Once again, the military policeman thought, it was the NCO on the scene 

who had to get things moving again. To be successful, he’d have to take 

full advantage of the authority that the “MP” on his arm and the pistol on 

his hip provided. At least the drivers had stopped yelling—they could see 

it wouldn’t do any good—and the tire was just about changed. NCOs had 

straightened out difficult situations in earlier campaigns, and they were 

equal to the task again. For days and nights on end, they had moved ten 

divisions of troops and thousands of tons of weapons, ammunition, and 

equipment into position for this, the largest American offensive of the war. 

Now that the attack was under way, it was even more important to keep 

the convoys on schedule to sustain momentum and to achieve the victory 

that would let the men return home again.

Background

Soldiers performing specialized duties like military policemen 

and truck drivers are so familiar—and so essential—in today’s Army 

that their presence is taken for granted. Every duty position requires 
120

Transportation Problems in 

Italy, 1944. The application of 

the internal combustion engine 

to warfighting in the twentieth 

century led to a host of new 

technical specialties for NCOs.

specific skills and training beyond that gained in civilian life. This 

fact of life is so fundamental that people tend to forget that it has not 

always been the case. From the Revolution through the Civil War the 

Army was overwhelmingly infantry oriented, focusing on the ability 

to execute a handful of common tasks. Throughout its early history 

the military operated under very limited budgets and could set aside 

only about five percent of its manpower to perform specialized functions. Not even the late nineteenth century’s explosion of new inventions produced a dramatic change. As late as the Spanish-American 

War, the combat arms still accounted for ten out of every eleven 

soldiers. The principle of effectiveness gained by division of labor 

had long been understood in industry, but it was slower in gaining 

recognition in the armed forces.

One important reason for the limited earlier reliance on technical 

specialists grew from the Army’s restricted peacetime mission. During 

the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it had served primarily 

as a constabulary force. Spread along the inland frontier or in small 

coast defense garrisons, it dealt with low-level threats and operated at 

a technological level based on the requirements of local conditions. 

The only constant requirement for experts tended to involve a few 

clerks, cooks, bandsmen, and the people to keep the horses and mules 

moving: farriers, blacksmiths, saddlers, and wagoners.

Within the combat branches, however, a small number of duty 

positions depended upon technical skills even in the days of the 

Continental Army. For example, effective use of artillery required 

experienced NCOs and enlisted men to assist officers in placing and 

aiming the guns. But these early specialists received no formal training in their duties. Instead, they learned on the job, as apprentices 

did, by watching an experienced NCO and carrying out his orders. 

Formal schooling for enlisted personnel appeared about a halfcentury into the Army’s history when, in 1824, the Artillery School 

opened at Fort Monroe. Entire companies rotated assignments to that 

post, to allow both officers and soldiers to get classroom and practical instruction with heavy emphasis on the mathematics needed in 
121

Saudi Arabia, January 1991,

Jim Dietz, 1991. The Army has 

always relied on NCO leadership 

and technical skills to keep the 

convoys rolling. This painting 

depicts refueling operations in 

Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

gunnery. Although its creation was a significant breakthrough, the 

Artillery School suffered many interruptions. Budget problems and 

wartime priorities suspended classes from 1835 to 1858 and again 

during the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. The school 

enjoyed its greatest influence on the Army between 1868 and 1898, 

graduating nineteen classes of NCOs and officers.

Artillerymen had more choice than other enlisted specialists 

about higher-level positions they could hope to achieve. Most could 

aspire to a promotion sequence based on leadership and tactical proficiency that would carry them through the classification of master 

gunner to the rank of first sergeant or regimental sergeant major. If 

they opted to concentrate on the heavy artillery dedicated to coast 

defense, they could also benefit from a technological revolution that 

began in the late 1880s. Developments in the design of long-range 

guns and the use of the telegraph and telephone led to indirect-fire 

control systems and created duty positions for sergeant electricians 

and engineers. The Engineer School of Application at Willet’s Point, 

New York, began informally training engineer NCOs as early as 

1866, although the school was not officially recognized until 1885.

Among other branches in the nineteenth-century Army, the 

small Signal Corps became along with the Corps of Engineers one 

of the most technically oriented. Its small size enabled it to set and 

enforce high standards and to maintain a very high ratio of NCOs 

to privates. Enlisted applicants had to pass rigorous tests in mathematics, English grammar, and the history and geography of the 
122

United States before being allowed to attend the Signal School at Fort 

Whipple (now Fort Myer), Virginia. Most graduates went on to serve 

at weather stations, where they received further on-the-job training in 

the highly technical field of meteorology. After at least one year in the 

field, enlisted men could compete for vacant sergeant-observer slots. 

In 1887 Congress fixed the enlisted force of the Signal Corps at 150 

sergeants, 30 corporals, and 270 privates.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a number of discoveries 

and inventions promised to change the material base of life—and 

warfare—among industrializing nations. During the first decade of 

the twentieth century the Army, now faced with overseas responsibili-

ties as the nation began to emerge as a major world power, reexam-

ined the way it had to organize and fight. The results were dramatic 

increases in technical specialists in both new and old occupations. As 

part of a series of reforms requested by Secretaries of War Russell A. 

Alger and Elihu Root in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, 

Congress authorized additional technical personnel, regrouped them 

by function to make training more efficient, and revised the enlisted 

grade structure to give regular NCO status to many specialists.

No single invention had a greater impact on the Army than the 

internal combustion engine, which promised to free troops from the 

slow pace of horses and mules. In 1906 the Quartermaster Corps 

bought its first six automobiles, and experiments with trucks soon 

followed. Army trucks quickly demonstrated their value following 

the San Francisco earthquake. In 1907 the Army formed an “aero-

nautical division” in the Signal Corps and two years later bought its 

first experimental powered aircraft from the Wright brothers. Both 

applications of the engine received field testing during General John 

(“Black Jack”) Pershing’s expedition into Mexico in 1916. The service 

was hard, as Army units pursued the elusive bandit and Mexican folk 

hero Pancho Villa through forbidding terrain. Despite crashes and 

maintenance problems, cars and trucks proved superior to horses 

and mules, and the eight planes then in service performed recon-

naissance and carried messages. Aviation was definitely now a part of 

the Army, even if the planes did have a tendency to break down with 

some regularity.

Beginning in 1904, with the issue of new Field Service Regulations 

and with the motivating force of the Root reforms, the Army also 

changed to meet the needs of an expanded overseas mission. Basic 

was the planning for a permanent divisional organization. The Army’s 

support functions also underwent extensive reshuffling. In 1912 the 

Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Paymaster Departments merged as 

a single Quartermaster Corps, with its own body of enlisted men to 

perform tasks previously done by civilian contractors or by line sol-

diers on detail. Changes extended to the infantry regiments, which 

created units to sustain their riflemen: sanitary (medical) detach-

ments and headquarters, machine gun, and supply companies. As 

a result, the regimental commander now controlled a wide array of 

technically proficient NCOs and specialists. His headquarters com-

pany still included such traditional noncommissioned staff positions 

as the sergeant major and the color, mess, and stable sergeants, plus 

cooks, bandsmen, and administrative clerks.
123

When America entered the war in Europe in 1917, specializa-

tion increased. Long-established technical functions required more 

personnel, so that the engineers, to take one example, jumped from 

1.6 percent of the Army’s total strength to 10.8 percent by the end of 

the war. New kinds of units grew rapidly. The Medical Service Corps 

was formed in 1917 and the Chemical and the Tank Corps in 1918. 

In addition, the scattered truck companies of 1916 were gathered and 

expanded into the new Motor Transport Corps, and the first air squad-

ron, formed in 1913, became the 185-squadron Air Service in 1918.

The “square” infantry division formed the main American tacti-

cal unit of World War I. Its basic structure demonstrated how deeply 

dependent the Army had become on noncombat specialists. Each 

division deployed tactically in 4 infantry and 3 field artillery regi-

ments, supplemented by 3 machine gun battalions. Supporting them 

were a field signal battalion, an engineer regiment, and a variety of 

headquarters and trains units. The sheer number of personnel and 

vehicles requiring coordination led to the addition to the trains of two 

companies of trained military policemen, a return to a practice first 

conducted during the Revolution, but abandoned thereafter. These 

MPs replaced details of infantry or cavalry performing traffic control 

and headquarters security missions. Tables of organization for the 

standard division required 64 mechanical draftsmen, 64 electricians, 

142 linemen, 10 cable splicers, 156 radio operators, 29 switchboard 

operators, 163 telegraphers, 360 telephone repairmen, 52 leather and 

canvas workers, 118 surveyors and assistants, 62 topographers, 132 

auto mechanics, 128 machinists, 167 mechanics, 67 blacksmiths, 

151 carpenters, 691 auto and truck drivers, 128 tractor operators, 122 

truckmasters, plus men for 68 other trades. These technology-driven 

changes reduced ground combat troops to a minority in the Army for 

the first time in history. Infantry, artillery, and tankers ended the war 

accounting for only 42 percent of the men in Army uniform. In con-

trast, the technical services—engineer, medical, signal, quartermaster, 

ordnance, transport, and chemical—grew to 31.6 percent of the Army’s 

strength.

The increase in new specialty occupations (a jump from 57 to 

704) overwhelmed the prewar rank and pay structure, prompting a 

host of experiments and temporary adjustments. The experience of 

the Tank Corps is typical. When tank battalions were added to the 

AEF, General Pershing simply made up new occupational titles such 

as “tank commander” and “tank driver” and assigned them grades that 

he thought matched their responsibilities—in these cases, sergeants. 

This method met the Army’s needs in the early months of the war, but 

it gradually led to many inconsistencies. Efforts to devise an Index of 

Occupations and accompanying pay tables that would rationalize the 

system of matching grades to jobs ended with the Armistice and did 

not resume until World War II.

These wide-ranging changes in the Army had a profound impact 

on the NCO Corps. From colonial times, American NCOs had filled 

certain well-defined roles as trainers, enforcers of discipline, small-unit 

leaders on the battlefield, and keepers of company-level records. But 

as NCOs became specialists in new technologies as well, a split started 

to emerge between the specialists and traditional troop leaders.
124

The supreme test of the new specialist-oriented Army came dur-

ing the Meuse-Argonne offensive. A major assault on the German 

lines began on 26 September 1918, when nine divisions moved 

out across a 24-mile front, and it lasted until the Armistice on 11 

November. Before the first troops jumped off, over 80 depots and 34 

evacuation hospitals had to be built, hundreds of miles of roads and 

railroads put in operating condition, 40,000 tons of ammunition 

stockpiled, and hundreds of guns and some 800,000 men moved 

into position—all at night, to avoid detection by the enemy’s aircraft. 

Several thousand military policemen alone were needed to handle 

traffic control during fourteen days of frenzied activity.

Once the specialists set the stage, troop-leading NCOs took over 

the initiative as American troops joined the huge Allied offensive 

along the Western Front. The American zone of attack was along the 

Meuse River and through the Argonne Forest in German-occupied 

northeastern France. The aim was to cut the enemy’s strategic rail net-

work supporting most of the Western Front. Difficult terrain and the 

complexity and depth of German defenses promised a long, costly 

fight. Interlocking artillery and machine gun positions arrayed in up 

to five belts covered all approaches to the key heights. Although the 

Germans had failed to detect the buildup, a stalemate developed, 

as the offensive turned into an endless series of firefights between 

squads, platoons, and companies. Bayonets, hand grenades, shot-

guns, rifles, and even entrenching tools served as weapons. NCOs 

leading these desperate assaults might not have been well versed in 

the fine points of staff briefings, but they knew what had to be done. 

With a disregard for their own survival that inspired their country-

men, these NCOs and their troops pressed forward.

When the fighting ended, the Americans could look back on 

an extraordinary achievement. After 47 days of combat, the 21 divi-

sions and 324 tanks of the First and Second Armies had gained over 

30 miles and defeated 47 German divisions. Artillerymen manning 

2,417 guns had fired over 4.2 million rounds, while 821 aircraft, 

employed for the first time in large numbers in a ground attack role, 

had dropped 100 tons of bombs. But the cost of the huge offensive 

was heavy—120,000 American casualties.

NCOs in Action

Contrary to popular opinion, the “doughboys” did not try to 

overwhelm German machine guns with human waves. At Pershing’s 

insistence, they placed reliance on traditional American strengths—

marksmanship and individual initiative—and the employment of 

skirmishing tactics to seek out soft points in the system of trenches 

and to isolate strongpoints to be neutralized later. In this process 

sergeants and corporals found themselves performing as small-unit 

leaders at the squad and platoon levels. As lieutenants fell, NCOs 

had to control much of the actual fighting. Both casualty rates and 

decorations reflected their achievements.

But those infantrymen, cannoneers, and machine gunners 

were not alone in the great effort. Heroism on the battlefield was 

matched by the less-publicized efforts of specialists behind the 
125

lines. Specialists from long-established technical branches such as 

engineers and medical corpsmen joined with military policemen, 

truck drivers, and chemical service personnel to keep the offensive 

moving.

In each case the NCOs, many of whom owed their stripes to civil-

ian skills rather than service longevity, stepped forward to exercise inde-

pendent judgment and supervision over work details, filling a potential 

void. The long-anticipated war of movement taxed support specialists 

to the limit. The artillery alone required twelve to fourteen trainloads 

of ammunition every day. Thousands of replacement troops had to 

be moved toward the front and thousands of casualties back to field 

hospitals. Trucks, locomotives, and rolling stock had to be maintained 

around the clock, roads and tracks had to be repaired, supply dumps 

had to be organized, and convoys had to be directed and controlled. 

In each case myriad decisions had to be made on the spot by NCOs 

tasked with immediate supervision over work details.

The Army’s experiences during the Meuse-Argonne offensive 

marked the culmination of the nation’s first involvement in modern 

mass mobilization. From recruitment through training and move-

ment overseas to combat, the War Department had to make dra-

matic adjustments to the needs of technology. The number of motor 

vehicles in the inventory, for example, jumped from 500 in 1916 to 

over 118,000 by the war’s end. Enormous traffic jams developed on 

shell-cratered roads, and troops sometimes had to push and pull 

disabled vehicles. Thanks in large measure to the important part 

played by technically proficient NCOs, the supplies and equipment 

got through to the frontline troops.

The new specialist-oriented Army proved itself the most effective 

fighting force in American history. A fast-growing number of special-

ists—over 700 separate occupational titles by war’s end—performed 

many jobs that no one in the Army had even been aware of only 

a few years earlier. Outstanding among the specialists were those 

involved in transportation—drivers, dispatchers, and their supervis-

ing NCOs—and the small army of military police, mechanics, and 

fuel handlers who supported them. Their work in pre-positioning 

troops and equipment, and then keeping them supported during the 

fighting, was essential to victory.

Although the Army inevitably cut back its forces after World War I, 

it could not, and did not, turn its back on the lessons it had learned. 

The need for modern technology and for specialists able to use it effec-

tively had continued to be a hallmark of the twentieth-century Army. 

Recognition of the important role played by specialized units culmi-

nated in permanent status for selected branches. On 26 September 

1941, the Military Police Corps reached this plateau, followed a little 

over a year later by the Transportation Corps. In World War I the Army 

clearly left behind the horse-and-wagon pace of the past.
A Hidden Resource, Manuel B. Ablaza, 1988
A

Hidden Resource

Philippines, 1920s

Teaching a class to a group of civilians is not an activity usually associated with the duties of a corporal in the U.S. Army. In the early decades of the twentieth century, however, that 

is exactly what several hundred noncommissioned officers found 

themselves doing in the Philippine Islands. NCOs had not been sent 

across the Pacific to teach. They went overseas to perform a very traditional role: to fight the enemies of their country and to deter potential 

enemies. But Army tasks had been changing as the nation expanded 

beyond the limits of North America and emerged as a world power. In 

the aftermath of the Spanish-American War and World War I, soldiers 

began to perform duties in what would later be called civic action. 

This was a new kind of battle, sometimes as important as skirmishes 

in the jungle—perhaps even more important.

The corporal entering the primitive classroom for the first time 

knew he had to apply his Signal Corps technical training and basic 

leadership skills in new ways. Like NCOs who had drawn similar 

assignments in the 1920s in other villages, his job was to work with 

the local population in a program to build roads and bridges, dig 

wells, set up medical care, improve hygiene, and teach English. The 

goal was to prepare the Filipinos for eventual independence and 

democracy. Now it was up to him to make things happen. He took 

off his campaign hat, looked at the expectant faces sitting in the 

audience, and started to work.

Background

In 1898 the United States fought a war with an overseas power, 

the kingdom of Spain, for the first time in nearly a century. The 

struggle was short, but operations were worldwide, stretching from 

the Caribbean to the western Pacific. Victory left America responsible for a number of new territories, including Puerto Rico and the 

Philippines. Along with increased international prestige came the 

responsibility to protect those possessions. Yet the new international 

standing did not alter an old American tradition: pressure from the 

voters to demobilize after the end of hostilities.

Although American reluctance to maintain a large peacetime 

Army predated independence, this traditional attitude had not 
128

French Children and Friend, 

1918. NCOs serving abroad 

are goodwill ambassadors whose 

activities have an enduring 

impact on the United States’ 

role in the world.

been a significant problem throughout most of the years since the 

Revolution. A small force of regulars, backed by militia, was usually 

ample for protecting selected ports and policing western frontiers. 

The vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean and the capabilities of the 

Navy made it difficult for any European nation to threaten the 

country. Although technological changes in the late nineteenth 

century started to alter the dynamics of these basic conditions, 

most soldiers who fought against Spain in 1898 did not realize 

that the world was becoming a more complex and dangerous place. 

They volunteered for a year and, like their citizen-soldier predecessors in every American war, wanted to go home as soon as the 

fighting ended.

That left the War Department with a dilemma. Anti-Spanish 

Filipino groups sought immediate independence and took up arms 

when the American occupation forces did not depart. Thus began 

an unexpected and unwanted conflict that lasted until mid-1902. 

The Army faced a growing insurgency at a time when demobiliza-
129

Soldiers distributed medical supplies, food, and clothing to the 

people of Cap Haitien, Haiti, in 

Support of Operation Uphold

Democracy in 1994. Relationships formed with local civilian 

populations have proved of lasting value to America’s foreign 

policy.

tion was draining available manpower. In the face of the simple 

fact that not enough troops were available to occupy and administer every town and village, American civilian and military officials 

in Washington and Manila adopted a new approach. The Army 

began to develop a policy designed to win over the Filipino people, 

and this policy introduced the Army to large-scale civic action 

programs.

The new approach tried to address long-standing problems of 

life in the islands: inefficient public administration, unhealthy living 

conditions, and lack of educational, economic, and political opportunity. The Army would use force only against active insurgency. 

Congress and the President told the Army to use three guidelines in 

working out its difficult and delicate assignment: maintain law and 

order, respect local laws and customs, and remember that the United 

States hoped ultimately to extend to the islands the basic ideals of 

self-government expressed in the Declaration of Independence and 

the Constitution.

The commander of American ground forces on the scene, Maj. 

Gen. Wesley Merritt, had taken the first steps in developing a civic 

action policy immediately after the Spanish surrendered Manila in 

August 1898. He directed that all municipal functions except policing the city were to remain in Filipino hands as long as public order 

was preserved and American interests respected. Merritt promised 

protection for churches, schools, and libraries and reopened the 

port to revive the economy. The Army’s direct participation came 
130

Manual for Noncommissioned 

Officers and Privates of Field 

Artillery of the Army of the United 

States, 1917 As the duties and technical requirements for noncommissioned 

officers increased at the beginning of 

the twentieth century, the need for 

education and professional development 

also increased. This manual dates from 

World War I.

in the area of law enforcement. Soldiers policed the streets of 

Manila and the Army set up a military court system—Superior and 

Inferior Provost Courts—to replace the Spanish colonial judiciary.

Public health was a major concern of the Army from the beginning. Manila had undergone a two-month siege before surrendering, leaving its 70,000 inhabitants vulnerable to malnutrition and 

epidemics. The problem was magnified by the fact that local health 

conditions had always been poor. For centuries rivers and the moat 

that surrounded the old city had been used as open sewers. Army 

specialists quickly went to work. Merritt’s chief surgeon instituted 

a policy of inspections, vaccinations, and scientific sanitation procedures. Army engineers cleaned the reservoirs that served the city 

water system, pumped water at increased pressure, and monitored 

contamination levels. Manila residents were urged to change traditional patterns of behavior that threatened public health. New 

sanitary standards were enforced and legal action taken against 

violators.

These early civic action projects largely sought to relieve immediate problems by reducing crime and disease and reviving commerce. But the Army also took action that would have long-lasting 

effects. American soldiers in the Philippines became teachers in 

khaki.

They were surprised at the Filipino hunger for education. 

Whenever an American in uniform began explaining anything, 

even something quite ordinary, crowds of Filipinos quickly gathered on street corners or in tiny villages. Americans discovered they 
131

Noncommissioned Officer’s Small Implements Pouch Throughout the eighteenth and 

nineteenth centuries, junior noncommissioned officers in positions of trust were required to carry and 

maintain tools and implements to maintain the 

weapons and equipment of the squad. The NCO 

small implements pouch M1910 carried by squad 

leaders during World War I represents the last vestige of this responsibility.

Company Whistle The advent of longer-range weapons in 

the mid-nineteenth century resulted in a change to small-unit 

tactics. The introduction of whistles at company, battalion, and 

regimental levels improved the conveyance of movement orders. 

The whistle is symbolic of the changing role of the noncommissioned officer: as the battlefield became larger and more complex, the NCO increasingly took on the role and responsibilities 

of the small-unit leader.

would have to do more than simply revive the Spanish colonial 

system, which had reserved education to a small male elite. The 

Army moved quickly to build a public school system.

General Merritt assigned the chaplain of the 1st California 

Volunteers as administrator of education in Manila. Schools in the 

capital began to reopen in September 1898, only three months 

after the Army arrived in the islands, and by the end of the month 

several were in session. Since Catholicism was no longer the official 

state religion, as it had been under the Spanish, courses in religion 

were eliminated, although Manila’s Catholic teaching orders were 

allowed to supervise secondary and higher education programs as 

long as they did not oppose the new policy of religious pluralism. 

The English language was taught in each school, typically by an 

American soldier. Americans—first soldiers, later civilians—supervised primary and intermediate instruction. Within a few months 

the number of schools increased from seven to thirty-nine with 

over 3,700 students enrolled.

In time, Manila served as the laboratory for a civic action campaign throughout the Philippines. The same four-part policy—law 

enforcement, public health, public works, and education—was 

extended to hundreds of villages. The character of the physical 

environment and the dispersal of the population over thousands 

of islands ensured that civic action could not be the monopoly of 

officers; there were simply too many villages to contact. From the 

outset civic action depended on the participation of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men.
132

Policymakers in faraway Washington were products of their 

times. With the best intentions, they viewed events in the islands 

from a traditional cultural and racial perspective, even describing 

the Army’s new mission in the Philippines as part of the “white 

man’s burden” to carry civilization to “backward” Filipinos. NCOs 

and troops on the scene, however, thought in terms that were much 

more down to earth. To them, civic action projects were not cru-

sades but tasks to be accomplished in the face of obstacles: armed 

opposition, jungle heat, monsoon rains, and shortages of money 

and equipment. In other words, they accepted the new mission as 

part of everyday life, and applied the same leadership and technical 

skills to accomplishing it that they would have used for any task at 

a stateside post.

In supervising civic action projects, NCOs brought to their new 

mission the enthusiastic “can-do” attitude typical of their own train-

ing and of the Progressive Era and got the job done. They took off 

their shirts and got down in the mud, pushing roads through the 

jungle to give isolated villages access to markets. They dug wells, 

built bridges, and deepened harbors. They drained swamps and 

taught hygiene to villagers who had long believed illness the work 

of mysterious fate. They loaned equipment and donated building 

materials to towns and villages, and then ensured that donated 

materials did not become the personal property of town and village 

council members. And, with the realization that civic action reforms 

could not succeed in an insecure environment, NCOs trained local 

police forces.

By 1900 the educational component of the program emerged 

as the most effective tool to defeat the rebels. This command policy 

was reflected at all levels throughout the Philippines. Typically one 

of the first projects undertaken when an American unit moved into 

a town was the organization of a school. NCOs supervised construc-

tion of necessary facilities, while commanders detailed officers and 

enlisted men as principals and teachers. The education program 

grew so rapidly that by the spring of 1900 the headquarters in 

Manila organized a Department of Public Instruction under Capt. 

Albert Todd. He instituted a centralized system employing basic 

American methods: compulsory attendance, free primary and sec-

ondary schools, and specialized schools to prepare industrial work-

ers for jobs and Filipinos for careers in education. To overcome the 

barrier posed by an array of local dialects, all instruction beyond the 

primary grades used English.

The Filipino people were remarkably receptive to their new 

American-style schools. Only five months after the Department of 

Public Instruction began operations, over 100,000 students were 

enrolled in about one thousand schools. In the same brief period, 

the Army distributed over $100,000 worth of school materials, 

including arithmetic, geography, American history, and Englishlanguage texts, as well as ink, workbooks, pens, paper, chalk, blackboards, and slates. Captain Todd and his assistants in the field were 

surprised and delighted that compulsion was virtually unnecessary 

in the new education system. In many areas, adults were willing 

to meet for night classes. Obviously, the Army’s soldier-teachers 
133

were responding to a desire for knowledge long unsatisfied by the 

Spanish.

The image of the Army NCO as a teacher no doubt surprised 

the Filipinos in the early months of the American presence in the 

islands. To them, education had always been a function of the 

church, and teachers had always been priests or nuns. Now teachers 

were appearing in the uniform of a foreign army. Just as surprising, 

the new soldier-teachers were bringing new subjects into classrooms 

and villages: English language, hygiene, and the rudiments of citizen-

ship in a democracy. NCOs overcame their lack of formal prepara-

tion by teaching subjects in which they had excelled during their 

own school years or in which they simply had an off-duty interest. 

Army soldier-teachers were providing needed instruction, and they 

were appreciated for it.

Their successes reflected the fact that civic action called on 

them to perform a familiar role, albeit in a new environment. 

NCOs had always been instructors, the ones responsible for teach-

ing recruits everything from the wearing of a uniform to the opera-

tion of highly technical equipment. In a larger sense, NCOs had 

been instructors for all enlisted personnel, because they translated 

the orders of officers into specific instructions to the troops. In the 

islands their audience was civilian, and they began communicating 

a variety of subjects which, taken together, comprised a primary 

course in what Americans would regard as modern citizenship. 

Army NCOs helped to transform the Filipino people from the 

burdened subjects of a foreign colonial power into the citizens of 

the independent democracy that would emerge in the islands after 

World War II.

Once the basic security and health needs of villagers were 

answered, Americans went on to teach some of their favorite cus-

toms and recreations as well. Filipinos proved receptive to the 

American-style Christmas party, especially when it included a sol-

dier-Santa with gifts for the local children. NCOs also introduced 

American sports to the Filipinos. Baseball and basketball soon 

became—and remain today—enormously popular in the islands. 

Although American soldiers were simply an occupation force in the 

first phase of U.S. involvement, they soon opened up the country to 

knowledge and many other positive characteristics of contemporary 

societies.

NCOs in Action

Competence and adaptability have always been important 

attributes of Army NCOs. Duty in the Philippines highlighted the 

importance of those qualities by placing sergeants and corporals 

in a demanding situation, midway between military and civilian 

status. Fortunately, the Army turned to the NCO Corps just at the 

time when the trend toward technical specialization was expand-

ing the reservoir of skills in its ranks. While many NCOs led smallunit patrols tracking insurgents in the steaming heat of Philippine 

jungles and hills, others played vital roles in civic action programs 
134

that won over large segments of a potentially hostile population. The 

Philippine War cost the lives of over 4,200 soldiers, but the Army’s 

improvised civic action program proved to be one of the most successful efforts of its type in history.

The fact that NCOs could perform and ultimately excel under 

such conditions grew directly not only from their function as 

teachers, but also from their long tradition of on-the-job training. NCOs had always learned how to do their jobs in part from 

more senior noncommissioned officers. The immediacy and 

informality of this process required NCOs to give full play to their 

imaginations and to improvise. In pursuing the American mission 

in the Philippines, they had ample opportunity to exercise these 

abilities.

The end of the Philippine War did not mean that the Army’s civic 

action program was over. A garrison remained in the islands until 

World War II broke out; its NCOs continued teaching the Filipinos 

useful skills even after the Army handed most of the responsibilities 

for public health, public administration, civil engineering, and education to American civilians and eventually to trained Filipinos. That 

experience paid dividends during and after World War II.

Beginning in 1942 America and its Allies began liberating countries occupied by Nazi Germany or imperial Japan. As the principal 

ground force, it fell to the Army to assume initial responsibility 

for bringing order to areas recently cleared of hostile forces. As in 

the case of the Philippines, the Army had the talents and resources 

needed to restore sanitation and fight disease in ruined Naples, to 

clear the war-damaged port facilities of Amsterdam, and to dig wells 

in Okinawa. Nowhere were these skills more important than in 

Manila, virtually destroyed in the battle to liberate it. In each case, 

the Army undertook the mission as a temporary adjunct to its primary combat role and sought to turn responsibility over to civilians 

as soon as possible.

One difference from the Philippine experience was that during 

World War II the Army established staff sections and entire units 

dedicated to civic action programs and other functions of military 

government. These were manned by officers and NCOs selected 

on the basis of civilian backgrounds or because of special skills. 

When the war ended and American troops continued occupation 

duties in Germany and Japan, that expertise remained in place 

in a scaled-down form and played a key role in turning former 

enemies into allies. That same technique would be attempted 

again in Korea and Vietnam when the Army had to compete with 

ideologically motivated enemies for the hearts and minds of civilian populations.

From an extemporized beginning in turn-of-the-century Manila, 

through occupation duties in Japan, Germany, and Korea after World 

War II, to the global deployments of the 1950s and 1960s, the Army 

has built upon the proven concepts of complementing combat skills 
135

with a dedicated program of civic action. Consistently it has made 

the direct involvement of NCOs the cornerstone of its efforts.
Rome, Italy, June 4, 1944, Greg K. Olsen, 1944
Teamwork, 

Firepower, 

Responsibility

Italy, 1944

The infantry sergeant and the staff sergeant commanding the 

M4 Sherman tank were both anxious, yet cautiously optimistic. The Germans had taken cover in some of the picturesque 

streets and buildings of the Italian capital of Rome. As the two veteran sergeants well knew, urban fighting was a hard, methodical, 

dangerous business. But they also believed in the ability of their 

combat team to survive and function—they had the experience, the 

men, and the weapons to work their way through the streets and do 

the job at a minimal cost.

Taken together, the tank crew and the attached infantry squad 

made up a small unit—fewer than twenty men. But between them, 

the two noncommissioned officers commanded a combined-arms 

organization with more firepower than an entire Civil War regiment. 

The Sherman contributed its 75-mm. main gun and three machine 

guns to the team; one of the infantrymen carried a Browning 

Automatic Rifle (BAR), and the rest had the clip-fed Garand semiautomatic rifle. If the sergeants had done their job properly, ensuring 

that each man attained proficiency with his individual weapon and 

that all understood the tactics of employing armor alongside foot 

soldiers, they could handle whatever the Germans threw their way.

When they had distributed the resupply of ammunition and 

C-rations and after the tank commander checked in with higher 

headquarters on his radio, the NCOs decided that the unit was ready 

for its next mission. The squad leader issued the terse command 

“Mount up!” and the Sherman tank started down the outwardly 

deserted street.

Background

Had they faced this same situation a few years earlier, these same 

men might well have lacked the equipment, the combined-arms 

training, and the experienced NCO leadership necessary to fight the 
138

Maneuver Exercises, Manassas, 

Virginia, 1904. Team building 

is an essential goal of training, and as in 1904 the Army 

builds teams through maneuver 

exercises in realistic settings that 

resemble the face of war.

Germans. The armistice of November 1918 that ended the fighting in 

World War I also ushered in the traditional return to low peacetime 

manpower levels that meant hard times for the Army.

The War Department tried to avoid that drawdown. After evaluating wartime performance, especially the problems encountered in the 

first massive mobilization since the Civil War, the Secretary of War 

asked Congress to approve a force of about 600,000 men and universal male military training. Officials argued that this approach, almost 

a return to the colonial militia concept, would help to deter future 

wars. Since most Americans had understood that World War I was the 

“War To End All Wars,” Congress did not accept the argument. After 

all, the defeat of Germany and the exhausted condition of the other 

European powers meant that another large-scale land war was very 

unlikely for many years to come. Beyond that, an isolationist spirit 

prevailed in the United States during the interwar years.

Rapid demobilization from the wartime high of 3,250,000 men 

continued until it finally bottomed out in the early 1920s at 12,000 

officers and 125,000 men, grouped in nine skeleton divisions. In the 

years that followed, Congress rarely appropriated enough money to 

sustain the training needed to prepare even this small force for the 

possibility of combat. The reductions compelled many experienced 

noncommissioned officers to return to civilian life. Yet this was the 

time when the Army needed them the most. As John C. Calhoun had 

recognized after the War of 1812, a small peacetime Army needed a 

professional NCO Corps to preserve the knowledge essential to train 

recruits in any future mobilization.

Tight budget restrictions—which became even tighter when the 

Great Depression arrived in 1929—prevented the Army from doing 

much about new weapons and tactics. In fact, Congress, acting upon 

General John (“Black Jack”) Pershing’s recommendation, deprived the 

Tank Corps, created during World War I, of its status as a separate com-
139

Infantry troops surround an 

M1A1 Abrams main battle 

tank. The precedent of combining arms and blending Regulars 

with reserve components continues today.

bat arm. As late as 1938, while German armor experts were developing 

advanced tanks and Panzer tactics, the major general in charge of the 

Army’s cavalry urged the country not to be misled into believing an 

“untried machine” could replace the “proven and tried horse.”

In 1933 the Nazi dictator, Adolf Hitler, came to power in 

Germany. Within three years, Germany renounced the Treaty of 

Versailles and began to rearm. America responded slowly at first to 

this potential threat. Beginning in 1935 Congress started to increase 

appropriations for the armed forces, giving priority to the Navy and 

the Army Air Corps. Active enlisted strength in the Army crept back 

up toward 165,000 men, and increased funds permitted the resumption of summer maneuvers that involved National Guard units as 

well as regulars.

In the fall of 1939 Hitler invaded Poland, launching a new war 

in Europe. Reluctantly, the United States began to accelerate its military preparations. At the same time, a new leadership team gradually 

took over in the War Department with the appointment of General 

George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff in September 1939 and Henry 

L. Stimson as Secretary of War in July 1940. In September 1940 the 

National Guard entered federal service for a year of intensive training; and in the same year, after bitter debate, Congress voted the 

nation’s first peacetime draft. Other reforms introduced at this time 

were the creation of a general headquarters to coordinate training, 

the establishment of the Armored Force at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and 

the creation of a small airborne force. By the autumn of 1941 the 

Army had grown to 27 infantry, 5 armored, and 2 cavalry divisions, 

plus a host of supporting units. This sudden growth placed a heavy 

burden on the small professional NCO Corps that had endured the 

lean years.

In July 1940 Chief of Staff Marshall selected Brig. Gen. Lesley 

J. McNair as his deputy at general headquarters and later at Army 
140

Combat Leader’s Stripe on a Wool Field 

Jacket, Pattern 1944 A wool field jacket, sometimes referred to as the “Ike Jacket,” of a technical 

sergeant of the Tank Destroyer Force in World War 

II. The green stripe under the chevrons on each 

sleeve indicates that this technical sergeant was not 

only a platoon sergeant, but also a leader within 

a combat organization. After the war the technical sergeant became the sergeant first class, and 

the combat leader’s stripe evolved into the combat 

leader’s tab.

Ground Forces (AGF). McNair pushed hard to improve both weapons and tactics. In particular, he sought to maximize resources by 

designing lean but flexible organizations that balanced mobility 

and firepower. McNair also ardently supported the development of 

armor, favoring mass production of a maneuverable medium tank 

and self-propelled tank destroyers. But above all, General McNair 

was a trainer. He insisted on progressive training, beginning with the 

fundamentals for individual soldiers, then moving on to combinedarms operations, and finally to maneuvers involving whole armies 

and corps.

His capacity for work was prodigious. McNair oversaw the creation of new tables of organization for the entire Army, the formation of thousands of units, the staging of twenty-seven large-scale 

domestic maneuvers, and the preparation of hundreds of thousands 

of soldiers for combat. Under his guidance, AGF also perfected the 

tactical doctrine that these forces would carry overseas. Significantly, 

both training and battlefield doctrine stressed teamwork. McNair 

himself observed that “you cannot use men against Hitler, you must 

use fighting units.” This emphasis on trained teams contributed 

directly to the growth of the NCO’s small-unit leadership function.

For all of McNair’s preparations, however, the battle was still the 

payoff. As Michael Doubler has argued, “The American Army was 
141

successful because it proved itself capable of quickly adapting to 

new and sometimes unexpected circumstances.” In Europe and the 

Mediterranean, the Army faced a tested enemy that often enjoyed 

the advantages of favorable terrain and fortified defensive posi-

tions. Inexperienced compared to their German foes, American sol-

diers also found some of their doctrine, training, equipment, and 

organization to be flawed. But even the Germans were impressed 

with the resourcefulness of the U.S. Army—its ability to adopt new 

tactical techniques, technology, and organization in the midst of a 

campaign. For this resilience in adjusting combined-arms tactics, 

the Army owed much to its NCO Corps.

NCOs in Action

The U.S. Army had much to learn about infantry-armor coor-

dination and street fighting when it joined the war in Europe. 

Very few infantry formations had trained with tank units, and 

Army doctrine said little about combined-arms tactics against 

village strongholds. In the initial actions in the Mediterranean, 

tank-infantry coordination was generally poor. The infantry often 

failed to exploit armored mobility and firepower; many times, 

tankers found themselves on the objective while the infantrymen 

who were supposed to accompany them had bogged down against 

pockets of German resistance. Those infantrymen who did manage 

to keep up with the tanks often were killed or wounded by enemy 

fire directed at the armor. For their part, tankers, concerned about 

antitank obstacles, often showed a reluctance to advance and take 

the burden of pressing the attack from the riflemen. Inadequate 

communications between the two arms further hindered coopera-

tion. The infantry had no way to alert tanks of antitank traps or 

heavy weapons, while the tank crews could not point out enemy 

positions to the infantrymen. 

Fortunately, the flexibility of the Army on doctrinal matters 

enabled small-unit leaders to develop specific techniques to solve 

specific battlefield problems. The Army placed no restriction on 

sources for ideas. Learning and adapting to tactical situations gen-

erally took place at lower levels, with field armies, corps, and divi-

sions primarily collecting “lessons learned” and distributing them 

in the form of bulletins. Rarely did the higher echelons dictate new 

tactics; they focused on providing ideas and information and then 

holding commanders responsible for results. Freed to act on their 

own initiative, NCOs developed tactical solutions on the basis of 

their own experience. These lessons then spread, whether by higher 

level bulletins or demonstrations issued by higher levels or, quite 

frequently, by word of mouth among the NCOs themselves.

Depending on the situation, NCOs either creatively applied 

doctrine or disregarded it entirely while improvising new combat 

formations and tactics. As tanks and infantry trained and fought 

together in the theater, they learned to advance together—the infan-

try clearing antitank obstacles, the tanks providing close fire sup-

port to the infantry assault. Short, quick armored thrusts followed 

closely by infantry proved effective, whether in the advance up the 
142

Italian peninsula, the fighting in the hedgerows of Normandy, or 

the struggle to penetrate the West Wall along the German border.

The process of learning at lower levels is particularly illustrated 

by the Army’s experience with street fighting. Soldiers soon learned 

that the worst place to be in urban combat was along the boulevards, 

swept by enemy fire. They adopted the approach of advancing from 

building to building in succession by blasting holes through adja-

cent structures. Once they had cleared a particular house, soldiers 

would call on engineer teams to place explosives against the wall 

adjacent to the next building. The resulting explosion would clear 

a hole in the wall while generally surprising and incapacitating the 

enemy in the next room, enabling the unit to pour through the hole, 

clear the room, and then clear the building. To carry out these tactics, 

platoons and squads changed their configuration. Under the over-

all leadership of squad leaders, assault parties moved quickly and 

aggressively through the buildings, clearing each floor in succession. 

Covering parties provided fire support, assisted where needed, and 

remained ready for any counterattack. Meanwhile, from the streets, 

tanks, tank destroyers, and self-propelled guns provided heavier fire 

support where necessary.

NCOs also showed their resourcefulness in their improvisa-

tion with technology. In the fierce battles for the hedgerows of 

Normandy, the Army installed phones on the back decks of tanks, 

so that infantry small-unit leaders could communicate with their 

armored counterparts. Sgt. Curtis G. Culin of the 102d Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron developed his famous hedgerow cutter 

that enabled tanks to plow through the embankments of the hedges 

blocking the American advance in Normandy. Soldiers developed 

creative ways to use explosives to blow gaps through hedgerows, 

walls, or buildings. They also used bazookas and bangalore torpe-

does, as well as pole and satchel charges, to blow gaps in the enemy 

positions. Finally, NCOs learned to use tanks, tank destroyers, and 

even antiaircraft guns for heavy-caliber fire at point-blank range. 

Battering strongpoints with direct fire by supporting heavy weapons 

not only soon reduced those fortifications to rubble but also had 

an electrifying effect on the morale of the riflemen attacking the 

defenses. Through such means, the NCOs and their soldiers carried 

out the timeless task of inflicting maximum damage on the enemy 

while minimizing their own losses.

The Army has continued to develop and refine combined-arms 

tactics. Today’s team (except in light divisions) looks very different 

from its 1944 predecessor. No longer must an infantry squad hitch 

a ride, exposed, on the outside of a tank. Now mechanized infantry 

ride inside their own armored M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, 

capable of keeping pace with the M1 Abrams main battle tank. 

Furthermore, the team can call directly for support not only from 

self-propelled artillery pieces but also from specialized antitank 

weapons carriers, helicopter gunships, and Air Force A–10 close-sup-

port strike aircraft. That combination, fighting under AirLand Battle 
143

doctrine, possesses a mix of speed and firepower that would make 

the World War II NCO shake his head in amazement, although he 

would still recognize the basic concepts being used.

No matter how the modern combined-arms team is constructed, 

however, it still must be competently led and properly trained if it is 

to achieve its goals. Highly sophisticated technology has been placed 

in the hands of every soldier. Each junior leader, therefore, must be 

both technically and tactically proficient. Now as never before, the 

role of the trained professional NCO is central to the success of the 

team’s mission.
Keeping the System Moving, Anita Y. Sonnie, 1988 
Keeping

the

System Moving

Southwest Pacific, 1945

For most Americans in 1940 the South Pacific was an exotic 

place. The movie screen and magazines depicted it as a 

romantic realm of palm trees and moonlit beaches. The next 

five years radically changed that image—especially for the troops 

stationed there. For soldiers working in a nondescript G.I. Quonset 

hut near the equator, their little island with the strange-sounding 

name was hot, humid, and buggy. But their sense of purpose helped 

them overcome any immediate discomforts.

To the Tech. 5 and dozens of other troops waiting in line for 

processing, this was simply another stop on a long journey toward 

the front lines of the war against Japan. Already they had endured 

the boredom and discomfort of life on a crowded troopship that 

had spent weeks crossing thousands of miles of ocean. Since leaving 

ports of embarkation in the United States, few of the enlisted men 

had even known exactly where they were going. The ship had been 

full of rumors throughout the voyage, but all the officers would say 

about their destination was that it was “somewhere in the Pacific 

theater of operations.”

To the Women’s Army Corps first sergeant, the island was the 

front lines and the Quonset hut her place to serve in the war effort. 

Her job was to ensure that the Tech. 5 and everyone else in that long 

line went through processing “by the numbers.” She had volunteered to don a uniform and carry out duties that would free men for 

combat. If the Army felt that her talents were best used in keeping 

the paper flowing, then she would see to it that the clerks under her 

supervision efficiently and correctly filled out each form so that the 

replacements would not be held up unnecessarily. The waiting men 

were merely part of a seemingly endless line of troops heading for 

the next island invasion. Moving them along was the first sergeant’s 

job, and the stripes and rockers on her sleeve gave her the authority 

and standing to accomplish that mission. No soldier or NCO would 

ever become careless at that processing point—she saw to it that 

they all realized quickly that the operative word in Women’s Army 
146

Clerks of the Union Army’s 1st 

Division, IX Corps, at Petersburg, Virginia, 1864. Behind 

the lines of every battle in the 

Army’s history, the largely unsung combat service support 

troops have carried out unglamorous but essential functions 

under the supervision of their 

NCOs. 

Corps was Army. Her steady stream of orders coordinated the clerks, 

replacements, and the blizzard of paper work.

Background

The Noncommissioned Officer Corps contributed in many ways 

to defeat the Axis armies in World War II. Many sergeants, corporals, and technicians did not serve on the front lines, but in critical 

behind-the-scenes roles in a host of fields, expanding upon the corps’ 

well-established tradition of furnishing the Army with the expertise to 

keep pace with technological change. NCOs delivered fuel and ammunition to the tankers, cannoneers, and riflemen. They built airfields, 

installed communications networks, operated weather stations, and 

maintained and repaired all kinds of equipment, including items that 

had not even been invented by the time of Pearl Harbor.

This period also saw the emergence of the female NCO. During 

World War II the U.S. Army for the first time officially enrolled 

women other than nurses. In 1942 the War Department established 

a modest force that rapidly grew into a Women’s Army Corps almost 

100,000 strong. The WACs, as they came to be called, filled important roles in all theaters of the war, primarily clerical and administrative. WACs under their own noncommissioned officers quickly 

became a vital cog in the machine that moved millions of troops and 

mountains of supplies and equipment all over the world.

Allied strategy gave primary importance to the defeat of Nazi 

Germany, making it imperative for commanders in the Pacific 

Theater to make the most of their limited resources. General Douglas 

MacArthur, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and Lt. Gen. “Vinegar Joe” 
147

Stilwell coordinated forces in the Southwest Pacific, 

Central Pacific, and China-Burma-India Theaters in a 

drive toward Tokyo. In the process they sent troops, 

including WACs, to some of the most remote locations the Army had ever seen. The MacArthur-Nimitz 

technique of conserving resources by bypassing 

many of the strongest Japanese garrisons came to be 

known as “island-hopping.” That process required 

the Navy to move marines, soldiers, and equipment over vast distances on precise timetables. After 

assault forces fought desperate battles for vital terrain, support elements carved supply dumps, roads, 

and air strips from coral atolls, volcanic lava, and 

jungle valleys. These bases, connected by ships and 

planes, formed a gigantic “pipeline” stretching from training camps 

and manufacturing plants in the continental United States to the 

front lines. Many Army women found employment along these support and supply arteries.

The Army’s use of the WACs was part of the largest mobilization 

in American history. But American women had contributed to the 

Army since the founding of the nation. As early as 1775, General 

George Washington employed female civilians in staff hospitals. In 

so doing, he confronted certain basic issues that would resurface frequently until the mid-twentieth century. One problem was internal: 

placing any group of civilians within a military organization created 

administrative complications. The second problem had more to do 

with society at large than with the Army. Too often civilians belittled 

the women working for the Army as “camp followers,” rather than 

regarding them as patriots. Those same issues plagued each tentative experiment to integrate females into the Army that followed. 

Until the twentieth century, even female nurses were excluded from 

military service except in wartime, both by public opinion and by 

Army doctors. Then came Pearl Harbor. The enormous demands of 

World War II simply overwhelmed the old objections and forced the 

military to find new solutions at a time when America’s British and 

Soviet Allies had vast numbers of women in uniform.

On 15 May 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed a law 

that established a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). Although 

its creation launched a new era in American military history, the 

WAAC took time to develop. In its early days it had a civilian director, 

Oveta Culp Hobby, but no officers, NCOs, or recruits. Nine weeks 

later the first WAAC officer candidate school (OCS) convened at Fort 

Des Moines, Iowa, followed shortly by the first enlisted basic training course. Six months later female OCS graduates began reporting 

for duty, and during 1943 women took over full responsibility for 

training new WAACs. But no schools existed anywhere in the Army 

to create sergeants and corporals. The War Department filled that 

gap by turning to the traditional Army practice of company-based 

promotion, making temporary adjustments to fit the special circumstances of the WAAC.

After finishing a four-week basic training cycle, WAAC recruits 

learned specific skills at one of four schools: Administration, Motor 

An administrative NCO from 

the 254th Base Support Battalion handles a variety of paperwork, c. 2001. A successful 

military operation requires that 

soldiers and equipment arrive 

at a precise location when needed, a task that depends largely 

on administrative and logistics 

NCOs and their soldiers.
148

Transport, Telephone Operator, and Cook and Baker. During this 

phase the training company cadre selected a number of recruits to 

serve as acting NCOs for the remainder of the cycle. Upon comple-

tion of the specialty courses, most WAACs formed all-female com-

panies. The Army filled most leadership positions with officers 

who had finished OCS, NCOs transferred from training staffs, and 

graduating recruits selected for permanent NCO rank. A few gradu-

ates remained with the training cadre as instructors or administrative 

clerks, usually becoming NCOs for later classes. The newly formed 

company then went as a unit to its first duty station.

Initially the WAAC enlisted structure differed radically from the 

rest of the Army. WAACs could attain four ranks: auxiliary, junior 

leader, leader, and first leader. This contrasted with the seven ranks 

found among male NCOs. The lowest WAAC ranks, auxiliary (subdi-

vided into first, second, and third classes) and junior leader, roughly 

translated as private and private first class, respectively. Equivalents 

for the two upper WAAC ranks were less precise. Their responsibili-

ties spanned the spectrum from corporal through master sergeant. 

Despite these differences, WAAC NCOs performed the duties of 

squad and section leaders, platoon sergeants, and company first 

sergeants. Comparisons became easier on 1 April 1943, when the 

WAAC expanded to seven enlisted grades that differed from the rest 

of the Army only in the titles: auxiliary, junior leader, leader, staff 

leader, technical leader, first leader, and chief leader. Holders of the 

top five ranks were considered NCOs.

Organizationally the WAAC became part of the Services of 

Supply in the continental United States. Many of the first units 

(twenty-seven companies by October 1942) drew assignments with 

the Aircraft Warning Service, where they helped to operate a primi-

tive tracking system along the East Coast. WAAC NCOs assigned to 

duty there primarily provided first-line supervision during aroundthe-clock operations. WAAC NCOs also were involved in the full 

range of the corps’ activities outside the Aircraft Warning Service. 

Because nearly two-thirds of the women performed administrative 

and office duties, the majority of their NCOs naturally served in 

clerical fields as well. At the same time, over 13 percent of the WAACs 

were assigned to technical and professional duties, which put NCOs 

in charge of photographers, medical technicians, weather observers, 

and other specialists.

Although the units deploying to assignments provided a valu-

able addition to the Army’s capabilities during the second full year 

of World War II, WAAC NCOs still retained important functions as 

instructors. The final table of organization for a training company at 

the five WAAC centers provided the unit with sixteen NCOs, but only 

five officers. A company contained between 150 and 200 recruits. 

Training needs ensured that several thousand WAAC NCOs would 

remain on training duty during the last three years of the war.

NCOs in Action

Important and varied as these responsibilities were, NCOs per-

forming them labored under a handicap. As originally constituted, 
149

the WAAC was an auxiliary to the Army, not a part of the Army. This 

legal distinction meant that WAAC personnel did not have military 

status; the only real parallels to the Army were the WAAC chain of 

command, pay scale, and uniform. Neither NCOs nor anyone else 

in the Auxiliary enjoyed the array of benefits extended to male sol-

diers—from pensions to burial with military honors. Gender was 

not the issue, for the members of the Army Nurse Corps, part of 

the Medical Department since 1901, did receive benefits. The lack 

of status also affected WAAC legal standing. Since women were not 

subject to court-martial, questions arose about jurisdiction over 

disciplinary infractions. If WAACs had to be confined, they required 

separate facilities and guards.

The resolution of these issues came on 1 September 1943, when 

the War Department granted full military status to the Women’s 

Army Corps (WAC). The name change, dropping “auxiliary,” carried 

more than symbolic meaning. The Army had gained a large group 

of trained and dedicated new soldiers. On its first day, the new WAC 

numbered 51,268, of which 1,811 were serving outside the conti-

nental United States. The corps grew as senior commanders discov-

ered the value of using women in military roles. General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower in Europe became the first major overseas commander 

to specifically request WAC units. After his request was filled in 

January 1943, plans to employ Army women accelerated, and WAC 

NCOs took up supervisory activities in more locations with each 

passing month. WAC strength climbed as fast as volunteers could be 

processed, peaking at 99,288 in April 1945, just before the surrender 

of Germany.

During World War II, WACs and their NCOs served in every 

theater of operations, although most remained at bases within the 

forty-eight states. The Army used them in a large number of jobs, 

but not in slots related to combat, since public opinion held that 

women should not be on the front lines. The bulk of WAC jobs were 

administrative, and most WAC NCOs headed clerical sections, but 

some detachments carried out assignments that ranged from operat-

ing targets for antiaircraft artillery gunners to rigging parachutes for 

airborne units.

At major installations in the United States, WAC headquarters 

companies assumed most of the routine support functions of “post 

overhead.” Sergeants and corporals had traditionally supervised 

such day-to-day activities; WAC NCOs took over from their male 

counterparts without friction. Diversity came from assignments 

to the various technical services; the Signal Corps was the first to 

request WACs, and it employed most of them in communications 

centers or in signal intelligence. Other WAC NCOs worked in the 

Chemical Warfare Service as pharmacologists and toxicologists;

under Corps of Engineers control on the Manhattan Project 

(the highly classified effort to develop the atomic bomb); and at 

the Transportation Corps’ eight ports of embarkation as mechan-

ics, photo technicians, tailors, movie projectionists, and even 

butchers.

So many WACs served with the Army Air Forces—nearly half of 

the total WAC strength—that throughout the war a number of War 
150

Department officials persisted in thinking of the WAC as an organi-

zation established for Air Forces use exclusively. Female NCOs in this 

line of work carried out assignments that included weather observa-

tion, Link trainer instruction, control tower operation, cryptography, 

bombsight maintenance, and sheet-metal work. A lucky few even 

drew flight duty.

One of the most important WAC contributions to the war effort 

came in the Medical Department, which by the end of World War 

II employed one-fifth of the corps. Because medicine by its nature 

requires a high degree of individual competence, WACs in this field 

became something of an elite group. To be eligible for training in 

one of the medical specialties (such as pharmacist, Braille instructor, 

optometrist, bacteriologist, or therapist), women needed superior 

scores on a screening test and a high school diploma. Because prior 

civilian technical training was necessary for many medical duties, 

WAC recruiters had to offer more than junior enlisted status and pay 

to attract women with the requisite talents. WAC psychiatric work-

ers, for example, became staff sergeants upon completion of basic 

training. These special arrangements began to change the character 

of the WAC NCO Corps by creating two types of NCOs: those who 

had come up the rank ladder one rung at a time, and “instant” NCOs 

who possessed critical skills. In both cases, these female leaders 

represented an infusion of new talent and leadership into what had 

long been exclusively a man’s Army.

The Army had established the Women’s Army Corps to free 

men for duty on the battlefield. WACs actually moved far beyond 

that relatively limited objective and became a vital part of the trend 

toward specialization that has marked the twentieth-century Army. 

During the war, women in uniform did so-called feminine jobs, 

such as typing personnel records and operating telephones, but they 

also repaired truck engines and changed tires, functions traditionally 

considered strictly masculine. Despite this steady expansion into tra-

ditional Army roles, however, WAC NCOs in many respects were all 

specialists because of their exclusion from combat, and their NCO 

Corps in many ways retained an identity separate from that of the 

male NCOs.

As a noncombat component, the female corps never developed 

the sharp division between NCO troop leaders and skilled techni-

cians that became so pronounced elsewhere in the Army. In an effort 

to control the negative effects of that division among male soldiers, 

the Army had favored first specialists, then troop leaders, in a series 

of rank and pay adjustments stretching over several decades. The 

need for such adjustments never arose in the WAC, where the closest 

thing to troop leaders was training company NCOs, whose numbers 

steadily declined as more WACs took positions in the field.

The greater homogeneity of the WAC NCOs in many ways 

reflected the nature of the WAC as a whole. Female recruits differed 

from their male counterparts in several notable respects: all were 

volunteers and most were older than the average newly sworn-in 
151

male. As in later years, they were also better educated. Young male 

draftees usually came to the Army with little or no work experi-

ence, whereas many WACs had held a job of some kind between 

high school and enlistment. Most women brought to the Army 

valuable skills, even advanced degrees. Although some officers used 

WACs only reluctantly, many commanders recognized them as an 

asset and sought to place them in positions where their experience 

could be maximized. Women who had been secretaries or hospital 

laboratory technicians in civilian life needed little training to per-

form similar tasks in the WAC. The contribution made by American 

women in World War II was never a mirror image of that made by 

men; the Women’s Army Corps was narrow in purpose but high in 

quality and experience, and its NCO leadership reflected the overall 

characteristics of the corps’ membership.

At the end of World War II, the War Department began demobi-

lizing all components of the wartime Army. The important contribu-

tions to victory made by the WACs and their NCOs were recognized 

by all, but the idea of retaining women in a peacetime Army initially 

met the same objections that had always been raised. Alarm at the 

rapid loss of skilled personnel soon forced a reassessment. When 

Congress granted Regular Army status to the WAC in 1948, female 

NCOs were assured of the Army careers many desired. Although 

the prominence of Army women in administrative positions caused 

most to be identified with the Adjutant General Corps, WAC NCOs 

proved they could perform any noncombat specialty held by male 

NCOs. By the time the WAC was fully integrated into the Army in 

1978, female corporals and sergeants were respected members of 

the Army NCO Corps.
From Information to Intelligence, Anita Y. Sonnie, 1988 
From Information

to

Intelligence

Korea, 1952

The intelligence sergeant from division G–2 waited impatiently in the bunker for word that the reconnaissance platoon was safely back inside the barbed wire. He knew 

the importance of talking to the patrol, and especially the platoon 

leader, while the night’s work was still fresh in everyone’s memory. 

Even though the men might be tired, hungry, and dirty, they had 

to be debriefed immediately. Taking time to wash up or wolf down 

a C-ration might make someone forget a critical detail that experts 

could use to piece together the enemy’s intentions.

Once the infantrymen reported in, the two NCOs settled down 

in front of the maps and began working their way through a systematic question-and-answer process. Did the patrol uncover any 

features not on the map? Did it locate the enemy? Were they North 

Koreans or Chinese? What kinds of equipment did they have? These 

and a host of other questions formed a list carefully constructed by 

senior intelligence analysts to ensure that nothing was overlooked 

and that every point was covered. Fortunately, the corporals and 

sergeants assigned to the reconnaissance element usually brought 

back something of value each time they went beyond the regiment’s 

outpost line. 

Even now, with the Korean War two years old, Communist units 

still conducted operations with a single-minded inflexibility surprising to senior American noncoms who had experienced World War II. 

That predictability gave the intelligence specialists their most valuable tool. It created patterns, patterns which created a framework 

that tied together otherwise isolated facts uncovered by repeated 

patrolling—things like finding fresh tread marks along a dirt road 

or watching a new trench complex being slowly extended. When 

analyzed, that kind of information became intelligence that often 

predicted what the North Korean or Chinese troops across the valley would do next, as well as when and where. Such nuts-and-bolts 

work, rather than the glamorous discovery of a key document or the 

decoding of some message, actually held the greatest satisfaction for 
154

Sgts. William Major and Joe 

Kessay, the Last of the Famous 

Apache Scouts of the Post–Civil 

War Years, Stationed at Fort 

Huachuca, Arizona. Throughout the centuries, NCOs have 

acted as the eyes and ears of their 

commanders by collecting and 

interpreting intelligence data.

most of the senior NCO specialists. When their attention to detail 

allowed regimental, battalion, and company commanders to make 

adjustments that saved lives and brought the chances of peace that 

much closer, they had turned in a good day’s work.

Background

Only five years after the conclusion of World War II, the Cold 

War turned hot. Encouraged by America’s former ally, the Soviet 

Union, Communist North Korea launched a surprise attack on proWestern South Korea in the early hours of 25 June 1950. Its leaders 

hoped to overwhelm the Republic of Korea (ROK), and expected 

no armed reaction from the United States. Instead, Americans acted 

decisively. President Harry S. Truman immediately recognized that 

unless free nations met aggression with force, the pattern would be 

repeated endlessly around the globe. At his orders an emergency 

task force was pieced together from units on occupation duty in 

Japan and rushed across the narrow strait to Korea. Other units, 

unprepared and inadequately armed, arrived in time to join a general retreat southward that halted only when ROK and American 

forces took a final position against the sea in a small pocket behind 

the Naktong River—the so-called Pusan Perimeter.
155

AN/TSQ–138 Trailblazer, a 

Mobile, Ground-based Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence 

Intercept System. As a tactical 

direction-finding and intercept 

system to provide support to the 

tactical commander, it performs 

many of the former functions of 

the Apache Scouts.

In opposing Communist aggression on the Korean 

peninsula, the United States entered a new and different kind of war. This war did not begin with a 

dramatic declaration by Congress and did not have 

as its objective the capture of the enemy’s territory. 

Instead, Washington sought to “contain” communism 

and restore a border along the 38th Parallel. To avoid 

escalation into a possible full-fledged global conflict, 

possibly involving nuclear weapons, President Truman 

opted not to order a general mobilization or to risk 

opening other fronts in Asia, although reinforcements 

were dispatched to Europe as a precaution. One of the 

earliest signals that the struggle would be limited in 

nature came in official references to it as a “conflict” or 

a “police action,” not as a war. After the United Nations 

gave its blessing to the American policy, eighteen U.N. 

member nations sent forces, from platoon to brigade in 

size, to aid in the fight.

During its first year the struggle approximated the 

war of maneuver common in World War II. Within two 

months of being pushed south, U.N. forces, led by the 

U.S. Eighth Army and X Corps, coordinated a daring 

amphibious landing behind enemy lines at Inch’on 

with a simultaneous breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. The North 

Korean People’s Army shattered under the dual blows. U.N. forces 

invaded North Korea, and remnants of Communist forces retreated toward the People’s Republic of China. Alarmed as the allies 

approached its Manchurian border, China intervened, sending massive forces of so-called volunteers into the peninsula. The November 

onslaught defeated the allies and drove them back to positions south 

of the South Korean capital, Seoul.

Stalemate ensued. When truce talks began in the summer of 

1951, the war of movement ended. For the next two years both 

sides traded blows and registered limited gains along a generally 

stable front stretching 150 miles from coast to coast on the Korean 

peninsula. The war now began to look like a replay of World War 

I, with the opposing armies dug into strongpoints and ridgelines. 

Minefields, barbed wire, and artillery duels completed the image of 

a Western Front in the Far East. Deliberately stalling the truce talks, 

the Communist side intensified small-unit actions in an effort to 

improve its bargaining position.

In its first battlefield clash with Communist powers, the Army 

came face to face with strange new conditions. More than at any time 

since the Revolution, Americans fighting in Korea had to be aware of 

the political effects of their actions. The impact of each operation on 

President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the American public 

(and to a lesser extent on other U.N. combatants) became a prime 

consideration behind each enemy move. Because their attempts to 

erode American public support for the war outweighed other factors, 

Communist forces frequently preferred to inflict small setbacks on 

isolated units rather than mount a large-scale campaign aimed at a 

major objective. Americans fought back by withdrawing and coun-
156

terattacking enemy troops, rather than focusing exclusively on the 

capture or retention of terrain, and attempted to avoid heavy losses. 

Unfortunately, while preserving lives, this tactic confused a public 

conditioned by World War II to expect a series of territorial gains 

that added up to victory. On the other hand, the Army’s long expe-

rience with civic action programs gave it a decided edge in winning 

the support of the Korean people.

Within this context, exploiting the potential of military intel-

ligence became extremely important. Although spying is often 

referred to as the second oldest profession, military intelligence as 

a dedicated specialty was a new phenomenon in the Army. Until 

World War II the function involved a handful of detailed personnel, 

mostly officers, operating at the highest levels. Beginning on the eve 

of that conflict, however, advances in technology made it possible 

for experts to gather a massive volume of information, process it 

rapidly, and give it to units in time to influence ongoing operations. 

Taking advantage of the new advances in signal intelligence required 

a dramatic organizational change. In addition to a vastly expanded 

and functionally specialized collection and analysis capability at 

the national and theater levels, the demand for usable intelligence 

required other staff positions at echelons down to the battalion.

Such growth meant more than just adding bodies. As the equip-

ment and techniques of war became more sophisticated, intelli-

gence production became more complex. All personnel assigned 

to the newly formed Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and their 

counterparts in the Signal Corps involved in intercepting com-

munications had to meet high standards of competence and to 

remain constantly in touch with new developments as technology 

advanced. To meet the sudden demand for proficient NCOs, the 

Army turned to an old mobilization technique: recruiting people 

with relevant aptitudes and offering them extra technical training. 

That approach, retained even after World War II ended, produced 

intelligence specialists, especially within the NCO Corps, capable 

of carrying out very complex tasks requiring unusual attention to 

detail with only a minimum of direct supervision.

NCOs in the intelligence field in Korea met the challenges 

posed by new Communist tactics in several ways. CIC detachments 

assigned to each division, usually operating as teams composed of 

one officer and three enlisted men, produced combat intelligence. 

Other NCOs found themselves working in rear areas to counter 

enemy propaganda, sabotage, espionage, and subversion efforts. 

CIC NCOs working with the South Korean Army became especially 

adept at uncovering low-level North Korean agents attempting to 

infiltrate the lines by posing as civilian refugees. Others in the signal 

field maintained the security of friendly radio traffic through the 

use of codes and ciphers. The members of communication recon-

naissance companies operated powerful radio equipment designed 

to intercept or jam enemy communications. The value of intercepts 

often went beyond message content. If at least two units intercepted 

the same transmission, they could pinpoint the location of an 

enemy command post, then inform an artillery or air unit for an 

attack mission.
157

The NCOs working in the field of combat intelligence drew 

less attention but in many ways exceeded even the high standards 

set during World War II. Thanks to American air superiority over 

the entire Korean peninsula, observers could photograph enemy 

activity from above. Film came back to intelligence units, where 

NCOs studied the prints through magnifying lenses. All fea-

tures of military significance—firing bunkers, trenches, weapons 

emplacements—were identified and labeled, and prints distrib-

uted to units operating in the area. Other NCOs specialized in 

producing technical intelligence from weapons, equipment, and 

documents captured by line units or developed tactics to more 

effectively counter enemy strengths. Linguists at the enlisted level 

interrogated refugees, suspected agents, and prisoners and trans-

lated documents to learn enemy operational plans.

Solving the language problem became one of the more endur-

ing intelligence triumphs of the war. Although in the two world 

wars large numbers of Americans had spoken the languages of 

the enemy, Americans fluent in Korean were very rare in 1950. 

At the outbreak of hostilities only two members of General 

MacArthur’s G–2 staff spoke Korean. As a temporary measure he 

turned to the Japanese-Americans who had proved invaluable in 

World War II. Since most Koreans had to learn Japanese during 

the decades before 1945, when their country was occupied by 

Japan, Japanese became the linguistic bridge between Korean and 

English. However, this three-language system caused delays that 

lowered the value of information collected. A crash program of 

language training instituted during the first year of the war even-

tually filled the gap.

Captured enemy soldiers turned out to be one of the most 

valuable intelligence assets in Korea, just as they had been in every 

other war in history. Primary responsibility for exploiting this 

source fell to the intelligence specialists within the NCO Corps. It 

quickly became apparent that a sudden increase in enemy strag-

glers and deserters foreshadowed an offensive, and NCO interro-

gators soon uncovered the reason. Communist doctrine stressed 

building unit cohesion by furnishing troops with very detailed 

information on upcoming tactical plans except the date for the 

attack. Once this practice was discovered, a team of interrogators 

and analysts could easily connect items of information extracted 

from a number of individuals and fill in the missing pieces.

The close relationships established between American and 

South Korean soldiers in the intelligence field were matched else-

where. Very early in the war the Army adopted a policy of pair-

ing officers, NCOs, and other enlisted men of the two national 

armies at all echelons as a way swiftly to improve the Korean 

ground force. At the company level and below, the policy took 

the form of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army 

(KATUSA) program. A number of ROK soldiers were assigned 

to each American line company. Training and fighting within a 

“buddy” system, American troops taught South Korean soldiers 

the use of infantry weapons, small-unit tactics, and basic English 

terms and phrases. In return the KATUSAs became invaluable 
158

assets for squad and platoon NCOs. They were adept at reading 

terrain accurately, detecting signs of enemy activity, and serving as 

translators.

The use of KATUSAs recalls the experience of earlier generations 

of NCOs working with Indian scouts to conduct cavalry operations 

on the western plains. The result in both eras was the same: NCOs 

became more effective small-unit leaders.

NCOs in Action

Throughout World War II and Korea the number and functions 

of intelligence specialists within the Army grew, eventually giving 

rise to the formation of a permanent, distinct military intelligence 

branch. During this process a basic distinction emerged, based on 

rank: enlisted personnel collected and recorded relevant information, while officers analyzed it. In accordance with this tradition, 

NCOs occupied critical middle positions in the chain. They transmitted finished intelligence from division-, corps-, or army-level 

G–2 staffs downward to the regiment-, battalion-, and companylevel units engaged in field operations. And during operations the 

NCOs gathered information and equipment from small-unit actions 

for transmission to higher-echelon intelligence sections to be analyzed. The historical practice in the intelligence field of reserving to 

officers the function of analysis did not bar NCOs from interpreting evidence they handled. On the contrary, NCOs were required 

to look for changes or trends and to bring them to the attention of 

superiors.

But before intelligence NCOs could examine any prisoners, 

equipment, or documents and begin extracting information from 

them, they had to receive evidence from the field. That process 

depended on an even older military skill: reconnaissance. Ever since 

Maj. Robert Rogers’ men ranged the woods in the mid-eighteenth 

century, the observations of such specialists within the combat arms 

had formed the primary source of the raw information on which 

intelligence was based. If modern intelligence specialists owed much 

to the revolution in technology that produced sophisticated photographic and communications intercept equipment, the reconnaissance field remained solidly grounded in time-honed fundamentals. 

Patrols conducted in Korea, like Rogers’ sweeps along the shores of 

Lake Champlain, could succeed only if carried out by hand-picked, 

highly motivated, and well-led soldiers with the training to collect 

relevant information over all types of terrain and through all types 

of weather.

The combination of traditional reconnaissance expertise with a 

highly technical information-processing function made for a very 

effective intelligence-producing operation by the time of the Korean 

War. Information derived from patrols and intercepts became very 

valuable in frustrating new tactics introduced by the Communists. 

As the Army tried to adjust to America’s new role as the leader of the 
159

Free World, it returned again and again to techniques pioneered in 

the Korean War. In succeeding decades, the ground component of 

the military focused increasing attention on the need to operate in 

underdeveloped areas, creating in time a host of special operations 

forces to carry out that mission. Each step along the way reaffirmed 

the importance to ultimate success of competent, professional 

NCOs.

Together, the intelligence specialist and the reconnaissance 

NCO were also a fine example of the twentieth-century cooperation 

between the specialist and the troop leader. The Army created its 

technical specialists largely by giving them special training. The troop 

leader, in the absence of schools for enlisted men, was a product of 

on-the-job training. In combat, however, the two worked together 

to accomplish a single mission, the patrol maintaining close contact 

with the enemy while the intelligence expert used technical tools to 

collate and analyze the reports on enemy units to produce a single 

picture. On both sides of the equation, the NCO was an essential 

member of the team, contributing not only to a more versatile and 

professional corps, but also to a more flexible, modern, and effective 

Army.
Give Me Ten, Theresa L. Unger, 1988
Give

Me Ten

Georgia, 1960

The NCO instructor wore a black hat, spit-shined jump boots, 

and a scowl on his face. Aided by a demonstrator in the 

standard T–10 “chute,” reserve parachute, weapon, and full 

field gear, he had just given a careful explanation of how to hit the 

ground safely even while carrying a great weight. But when the students attempted to practice what they had been taught, one of them 

committed a bad mistake—all the worse because, although he wore 

no rank insignia on his white T-shirt, the offender was a brand new 

lieutenant.

Fortunately, the sergeant was an old hand at this game. He had 

the job of ensuring that trainees’ mistakes were corrected on the 

practice field, before they cost a life. The Army had equipped him 

with a sure-fire method to make his points—physical exertion.

“You!” he bellowed. The offender came to rigid attention. 

“Drop!”

The class was only part way through the first phase of a threeweek course, yet that simple four-letter word already carried a special meaning. The lieutenant understood exactly what was expected. 

He assumed what was commonly known as the “front leaning rest” 

position and began knocking out strenuous four-count pushups.

For him, it was a tough moment in a tough day—in fact, the 

lieutenant found airborne training the most physically demanding 

experience of his life. Up at dawn, he had gone through an hour of 

intense exercise. With his fellow students, he double-timed everywhere he went. At every moment he was subject to close supervision, iron discipline, and immediate on-the-spot corrections by 

tough NCOs. Yet the young officer endured and in time came to 

respect and even admire his taskmaster. He knew that he must learn 

fast in a game where errors could be fatal.

The payoff came later, when he made a series of five jumps from 

transport aircraft over the Fort Benning drop zones. He learned the 

whole experience, from the butterflies in his stomach before each 

jump to the exhilaration that followed a successful landing. He 

made the transition from “leg” to paratrooper and earned the right 

to wear jump wings and the distinctive glider badge. And he, with 
162

Practice Jump at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, 1940. While most soldiers never attend jump school, 

since 1940 the physical fitness 

of the paratrooper has set the 

standard for all soldiers.

his fellow students who did not “wash out,” went on to become 

teachers of others.

Background

The Army got into airborne warfare through a series of limited 

experiments. When World War II erupted in Europe at the end 

of 1939, the United States faced the task of suddenly modernizing and expanding its armed forces after years of low peacetime 

budgets. Army planners had to address a host of new or emerging 

technologies and to uncover ways to exploit them on the battlefield. The task ranged from employing primitive automatic data 

processing equipment to studying recent improvements in tanks 

and airplanes. Fortunately, the Army had time to assess experiments carried out by the European powers, especially by Germany 

and the Soviet Union. Experts also studied the operations of the 

recently concluded Spanish Civil War and the opening campaigns 

of World War II.

Exploring the airborne forces’ potential fell to the chief of infantry and the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Although the 

Germans successfully employed paratroopers while overrunning 

Holland in 1940 and Crete in 1941, questions remained. Did these 

victories warrant the heavy losses? Could transport aircraft parachute enough men and weapons in the right place at the right time 

to accomplish a combat mission? Or was the concept only another 

hoped-for breakthrough in the art of war that in practice would 
163

The 82d Airborne Division 

troops depart for Grenada, 

1983. Drill sergeants and other 

trainers throughout the Army 

have adopted the same physical 

training approach as their airborne counterparts, guaranteeing that no new recruit would 

ever escape the dreaded words 

“Give me ten!” 

prove to be a dead end? The Army needed to find answers quickly, 

before it wasted precious resources required elsewhere.

Initial tests conducted in 1940 by a platoon of volunteers at Fort 

Benning proved that airborne troops had a role to play. But which 

organization would control them? A vigorous turf battle followed, 

pitting the ground forces against the aviators. The Infantry argued 

that paratroopers were basically infantrymen who, although transported to the battlefield by aircraft, would fight as part of a large 

traditional ground combat force. The Army Air Forces, noting that 

most German paratroopers were part of the Luftwaffe, emphasized 

the need for close coordination between parachutists, troop carrier aircraft, and tactical fighters and bombers providing fire support before, during, and immediately after a landing. The Corps of 

Engineers also entered the fray. They envisioned small-scale operations, commando assaults, 

intended to seize or destroy 

specific military targets 

behind enemy lines.

The War Department 

chose the Infantry as proponent in late 1940, setting in 

motion a full-fledged program to develop tactical doctrine and tables of organization. Early in 1942 a special 

command within the Army 

Ground Forces assumed 

centralized control over the 

planning process and the 

training of individuals and 

troop units. Although problems of air-ground coordination persisted throughout the 

war, the first of five airborne 

divisions took its place in 

the Army’s order of battle in 

August. Three (the 17th, 82d, 

and 101st) conducted combat jumps in the European 

Theater of Operations, while 

the 11th saw action in the 

Pacific. Each combined parachute units capable of jumping directly into enemy-held 

areas with more heavily 

armed glider-borne elements 

intended to follow up the 

initial landings and provide 

staying power until armored 

or motorized forces could 

punch through and relieve 

the airhead.
164

In the process of readying these units for battle, a standard train-

ing scheme emerged that was heavily dependent upon NCOs. In July 

1941 the Infantry School institutionalized its airborne training in the 

Parachute School at Fort Benning. The direct predecessor of today’s 

jump school, it remained in service throughout the war. The 82d and 

101st Divisions introduced an alternative form of parachute or glider 

training in August 1942. Conducted as part of a fourteen-week unit 

training cycle, the divisions led each soldier in a sequence of steps 

through to company-level training. Practical work devoted to master-

ing the techniques of jumping was integrated with physical training, 

parachute maintenance, weapons proficiency, and land navigation.

When the Airborne Command (later redesignated the Airborne 

Center) moved to Fort Bragg and nearby Camp Mackall, North Carolina, 

in May 1942, the training functions split. The small Parachute School 

remained at Fort Benning as a component of the Infantry School and 

continued to produce individual replacements. By 1943 it was turning 

out an average of 700 trainees per week to be sent to units elsewhere in 

the United States or to overseas commanders. Meanwhile, the Center, a 

subordinate element of the Army Ground Forces, carried out airborne 

unit training. It constantly revised and upgraded both doctrine and 

curriculum to include lessons learned in combat and took over from 

the Parachute School training in collective skills.

The results of the trainers’ work soon became apparent on the 

battlefield. The Army’s first airborne drops took place in North Africa 

in November 1942. Relatively small operations conducted at night, 

they were marked by mass confusion in the drop zones. Larger efforts 

involving both parachutists and gliders followed in Sicily and at 

Salerno in 1943, and two full American divisions and one British divi-

sion dropped into Normandy during the early hours of D-day, 6 June 

1944. Three months later the newly formed 1st Allied Airborne Army 

employed American, British, and Polish units in the most ambitious 

use of the new striking power during the war—a series of daylight 

landings and drops in the Netherlands intended to seize a series of 

bridges and perhaps avoid a costly battle to cross the Rhine River 

farther south. Other airborne actions took place in southern France, 

western Germany, New Guinea, the Philippines, and Burma.

By the end of the Sicily operation, airborne troops had become an 

acknowledged elite force of highly trained and capable individuals. 

They enhanced their reputation in Normandy and the Netherlands 

and again in the distant Pacific, where—dropping from 300 feet—they 

recaptured from the Japanese the island fortress of Corregidor. In each 

of those drops, innumerable feats of initiative and heroism contrib-

uted to the eventual success of the mission. In airborne warfare, forces 

often scattered widely in drops. The initiative of NCOs in forming 

units and taking the offensive was essential. During the night jump 

on D-Day, for example, some units of both the 82d and 101st landed 

miles from their designated drop zones. Junior leaders had to think on 

their feet, rallying available troops into squad- and platoon-size units 

and moving out to occupy critical bridges, villages, and crossroads 

before the confused Germans could react. In the first hours of airborne 

operations, even more than in traditional combat, NCOs leading the 

way were crucial in hundreds of small actions.
165

Having demonstrated its worth during World War II, the new 

force survived the demobilization that followed, despite deep person-

nel and budget cuts. Gradually, technical improvements—introduc-

tion of a new generation of Air Force transport aircraft such as the 

C–119 “Flying Boxcar” and improvements in the parachute—replaced 

the vulnerable gliders. The split between the two types of airborne 

forces disappeared, and their ability to sustain combat dramatically 

increased. Since the airplane gave an airborne division unparalleled 

mobility, the Army made the 82d, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

its strategic reserve.

When the Korean War broke out, the Army had to fight the 

Communist enemy in Asia while it remained alert to the possibility of 

hostile Russian actions in Europe. Hence, the 82d remained at Bragg 

throughout the war, ready for swift deployment to reinforce Europe, 

while a special force, the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), went 

to Korea. In October 1950 the RCT made two combat jumps behind 

North Korean lines near Pyongyang in an attempt to liberate prison-

ers of war and a third drop on 23 March 1951 at Munsan-ni near the 

Imjin River to disrupt enemy defenses. It also suppressed two riots 

among enemy captives at Koje-do. The rest of the time it provided the 

United Nations Command with an operational reserve of unmatched 

mobility.

Service in both wars confirmed the resourcefulness of the indi-

vidual airborne trooper as well as the superb leadership abilities of his 

NCOs. Just as the prestige of being a member of an elite organization 

attracted soldiers of high quality, so too did the emphasis on initiative 

and judgment, the extra jump pay, and the chance to work with an allvolunteer force. Outstanding corporals and sergeants who intended to 

make careers in the profession of arms were quick to join. In airborne 

units, many of the Army’s best NCOs found the ultimate challenge of 

their careers.

NCOs in Action

The Army changed in many ways in the decades after the chief of 

infantry created the first experimental airborne platoon. The technical 

skills each soldier had to master continued to grow as the military 

became more and more dependent upon sophisticated weapons and 

support systems. While many of these modifications promised to 

improve combat power and the ability of senior commanders to influ-

ence the course of a battle, they did not guarantee that the confusion 

faced by the 82d Airborne Division during the Normandy night drop 

could be prevented. The only true solution to that problem lay in the 

professionalism and competence of individual squad, section, and 

platoon NCOs.

By 1963 the Army’s educational system for enlisted personnel was 

changing and expanding rapidly, as it became clear that NCOs, while 

retaining their traditional leadership role, would also work increasing-

ly as technicians. Soldiers performing an array of jobs needed a host 

of technical skills to sustain and operate everything from rockets and 

missiles to field kitchens and the still-ubiquitous Jeep. Unprecedented 

numbers of men (and more and more women) in both the Regulars 
166

Moment of Truth, Al Sprague, 

1988

and the reserve components attended centralized or unit-level schools 

or participated in increasingly structured on-the-job training.

The expanding array of technical fields led to a reorientation of the 

NCO Corps that actually marked the culmination of a long trend. In 

the late 1950s the Army revised and expanded its system of enlisted 

rank and grade distinctions, attempting to differentiate between the 

large number of individuals who carried responsibility because of their 

mastery of specific tasks and those who filled positions that required 

them to exercise leadership on a constant basis. A new sequence of 

specialist ranks marked by an eagle insignia and a pattern of “rockers” 

emerged to provide the pay and prestige factors necessary to support 

the former group. The much smaller leader category continued to bear 

the “hard stripe” of sergeant or corporal.

Airborne training as it had evolved by 1963 offered a key example 

of how deeply the Army had come to depend on its Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps’ functioning as technical experts, small-unit leaders, and 

instructors. Ironically, just as the Army was distinguishing between 

NCO skills and functions in its insignia, more and more NCOs, 

including airborne instructors, could see that the truly professional 

NCO had to be prepared to carry out all three functions on any given 

day.

In 1961 all basic parachute training in the Army was consolidated 

at Fort Benning. Within two years the course was turning out 24,000 

qualified jumpers annually, sending them through three weeks of 

progressively more difficult instruction. Ground week led into tower 

week and finally to jump week. During each step the NCO instruc-
167

tor, wearing his distinctive black hat, not only imparted the necessary 

information, but also served as a role model. An expert jumper with 

obvious technical knowledge, this handpicked individual carried out 

98 percent of all instruction, whether the trainees were officers or 

enlisted men.

Guardians of a well-deserved reputation, the NCOs ruled the 

Airborne School with an iron hand, ensuring that trainees were 

constantly alert and maintained the proud bearing of elite soldiers. 

Many officer students who attended Airborne School remarked that 

what impressed them most about the training was the unshakable 

professionalism of the black hats. Young lieutenants and privates 

still new to the Army saw airborne sergeant-instructors as what an 

NCO was supposed to be, much as basic trainees during World War 

II had accepted the feared drill sergeant. When new paratroopers left 

Fort Benning and reported to duty assignments around the world in 

a host of military occupational specialties, they extended that ideal 

throughout the Army.

For a decade after the Korean War, national planners were preoc-

cupied with the military implications and dangers of nuclear weap-

ons. Within the Army, tactical considerations placed a premium on 

dispersion and flexibility, implying a series of basic organizational 

changes. Simultaneously, the superpowers shifted their attention to 

underdeveloped countries, and the Cold War became a contest for 

the support and resources of newly emerging nations. These impulses 

created a situation in which the Army and its NCO Corps had to be 

prepared to go anywhere at any time.

Although the entire post–Korean War Army had to be ready to 

meet the kind of challenges reserved primarily for paratroopers in 

World War II, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions now served as 

the heart of an elite mobile reserve (including “leg” divisions)—the 

Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). The painstaking attention to detail 

and to soldierly bearing absorbed by the men who formed those two 

divisions so dominated the corps that the acronym STRAC became 

the slang term identifying any outstanding soldier, unit, or military 

activity. A second element of the Airborne School training regimen 

also spread far beyond the limits of Fort Benning. The physical train-

ing (to the troops, PT) established an Army-wide standard. The push-

up and the school’s distinctive sustained running style (the “airborne 

shuffle”) permeated all echelons.

The pride, self-discipline, and high standards of a paratroop pla-

toon in 1940 set a standard that eventually affected the way in which 

the entire Army, active and reserve, saw itself and sought to accom-

plish the global missions assigned by national leaders. NCOs can and 

should recognize that their skills as trainers and their time-honored 

role as the institutional guardians of standards drove that change.
Into the Provinces, Manuel B. Ablaza, 1988 
Into

the

Provinces

Vietnam, 1965

During the previous twenty-five years the Army had sent 

the master sergeant to many different locations—from 

Fort Belvoir, just down the highway from the Pentagon, to 

Berlin, Ethiopia, and Korea. Along the way, it had issued him many 

different uniforms. Now, as he stood in the muggy Vietnamese heat 

on yet another tour of duty far from his family, he took in stride the 

new boots, bush hat, and jungle fatigues. He prided himself on being 

a dedicated professional. If Uncle Sam wanted him to test some new 

items of equipment before they became general issue, he was happy 

to oblige.

The roar of the road grader’s engine pushed thoughts of clothing 

out of the NCO’s mind. As he was always trying to tell the young 

soldiers assigned to his work details, operating heavy equipment was 

serious business, and failure to concentrate could get people hurt. 

Especially in Vietnam. A war was going on—not like World War 

II, his first experience in combat, nor even like the Korean “police 

action”—but a real war nonetheless. The field manuals said that construction engineers were supposed to do their jobs behind the front 

lines; in Vietnam, no one knew where those lines might be at any 

given time. No American could distinguish Viet Cong guerrillas from 

the local farmers or predict where the enemy would strike next.

The sergeant realized that one of the reasons why “the brass” had 

sent his engineer unit to Southeast Asia to turn an ancient path into 

a road had to do with that very problem—separating the farmers 

from the enemy. How could the poor village people be convinced 

that freedom rather than communism would make their lives easier? 

If the Army could prove to the peasants that Americans were here to 

help them, then the Communists may yet be beaten. The sergeant 

aimed to make that happen.

Background

Army engineers played a key role in supporting American foreign 

policy efforts after World War II. By the mid-1950s the United States 
170

A Civil War Ponton Bridge, c. 

1863. Whether assigned to combat or construction duties, NCOs 

of the Corps of Engineers enable 

the Army to reach its destination and support the troops on 

the way.

and the Soviet Union had emerged as superpowers heading alliances. 

While limited conventional wars such as the Korean conflict still 

took place, the danger of mass destruction posed by thermonuclear 

weapons introduced a new kind of struggle: a Cold War fought with a 

spectrum of methods, including psychological warfare, to determine 

whose social and economic system would prevail. In large measure 

this change took the form of a contest between West and East for 

influence in the so-called Third World of poor, nonindustrialized 

countries.

As European countries, at times reluctantly, granted independence to their former colonial possessions, the United States offered 

assistance to the newly liberated peoples. Successive presidents and 

Congresses tried to improve the quality of life and to secure protection for human rights in the emerging nations as a way to block the 

growth of Soviet influence. In Southeast Asia, this process began in 

earnest after Viet Minh insurgents defeated French troops at Dien Bien 

Phu in 1954. Resulting peace talks split Indochina into Communist 

North Vietnam, pro-Western South Vietnam, and neutral Laos and 

Cambodia.

The Communists never intended that arrangement to be more 

than a temporary pause. When they resumed their advance in 1956, 
171

Armored vehicles move across the 

Sava River on a ribbon bridge 

constructed by a U.S. Army 

bridging unit, Bosnia, 1996. 

Combat engineers routinely overcome obstacles that civilian engineers seldom encounter.

they avoided their mistake in Korea. Instead of launching a conventional invasion, they relied on guerrilla warfare. The United States 

countered by offering the Saigon government diplomatic and economic aid, a policy that met with only limited success. Eventually, 

President John F. Kennedy concluded that the mounting Viet Cong 

threat had to be met by military assistance as well.

The Corps of Engineers is among the oldest branches of the Army 

and one of the first to place reliance on technically competent noncommissioned officers. The roots of NCO technical professionalism 

reach back to the three companies of sappers and miners formed during the Revolution. These early engineers demonstrated their worth at 

the siege of Yorktown, where NCOs took charge of the working parties that dug the trenches, built the batteries, and led the light infantry assault columns in the capture of British-held Redoubt 10. The 

Regular Army’s first permanent combat engineer company came into 

being during the Mexican War, expanding to a battalion during the 

Civil War. By 1917 the engineers had become leaders in technological innovation, forming highly specialized units to meet the needs of 

modern warfare.

Engineers’ work with civic action programs overseas dated back 

to the early years of the twentieth century in the Philippines. There, 

they had refined their special skills while supervising the construction of everything from roads to barracks. They became crucial to 

the success of the Army in working with the local civilian population. Sixty years later, their assignments in South Vietnam continued a well-established tradition. Most experienced engineer NCOs 

served during the early years as members of the Military Assistance 
172

Command, Vietnam (MACV). Their backgrounds in such specialties 

as construction, equipment maintenance, and terrain intelligence 

made them invaluable trainers for the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam (ARVN). Other engineers served with the Special Forces 

that President Kennedy had made the spearhead of his effort to 

win over the Vietnamese people. Among the Green Berets, engineer 

NCOs worked as demolition specialists with “A” detachments in the 

bush or as foremen constructing fortified camps in the most remote 

parts of the country.

The Army also created civic action mobile training teams to 

assist the ARVN’s rural pacification program. Some teams were dis-

patched from Okinawa with engineer sergeants trained in public 

utilities to create public works programs from scratch. Usually an 

officer was teamed with the NCO. While the officer concentrated 

on working with the Vietnamese bureaucracy, the NCO used his 

ingenuity and experience to “scrounge” vital equipment and sup-

plies. From the Montagnard settlements of the Central Highlands 

to the steamy Mekong Delta, just as other NCOs had done in the 

Philippines more than a half-century earlier, these teams provided 

a variety of technical services such as obtaining drinkable water by 

digging or repairing wells.

In 1963 the Army formalized much of the experience it 

had gained through the creation of engineer control and advi-

sory detachments (ECADs). These detachments began to augment 

Special Forces groups all around the world, with the ECAD based 

in Okinawa sending teams throughout the Far East. In Vietnam its 

engineers worked closely with other military and civilian advisers 

and the Green Berets in people-to-people projects. The small but 

talented ECAD included a number of senior engineer NCOs ranging 

in rank from staff sergeant to sergeant major. Contact teams system-

atically eliminated a water supply crisis that had developed in both 

South Vietnam and Thailand, setting up installations and teaching 

military and public works employees how to operate and maintain 

equipment. Later, ECAD personnel also participated in flood relief 

operations to alleviate the suffering caused by a typhoon.

However, initial American support for the South Vietnamese 

government was more than matched by the Communist regimes 

that backed the Viet Cong as North Vietnamese regular regiments 

moved into South Vietnam. In early 1965 President Lyndon Johnson 

and other national leaders reluctantly decided to commit major U.S. 

forces. Engineer units and NCOs became some of the first Army ele-

ments to deploy to Southeast Asia as part of the new commitment. 

Their technical skills, honed through years of on-the-job training, 

were essential ingredients for the massive construction program 

required to create base complexes, port facilities, airfields, and road 

networks needed to support the arriving divisions and brigades. 

Combat engineers, with experienced sergeants occupying leadership 

positions as first-line supervisors, extended the American reach out 

into the countryside, while mobile forces started search-and-destroy 

missions to bring the enemy to bay.

In March the ECAD in Okinawa dispatched reinforcements to 

the small contingent of engineers already in South Vietnam support-
173

ing American advisers. They provided the know-how to supervise 

U.S. and Vietnamese contractors at the first eleven sites selected 

for development. Designs developed at this time for everything 

from tropical billets and mess halls to bunkers and helicopter pads 

became standard for the rest of the war. In June the first major engi-

neer unit—the 864th Engineer Construction Battalion—arrived and 

began the dramatic transformation of Cam Ranh Bay, a sparsely set-

tled natural harbor, into one of the most elaborate logistical bases 

in the world. The battalion commander later credited his senior 

NCOs with getting the program off the ground.

The Engineer Command in Vietnam reached a peak strength 

of 33,000 men in 1969. They served in 2 brigades, 6 groups, 28 

combat and construction battalions, and 40 separate companies. 

Several thousand more engineers served with the engineer battal-

ions assigned to the divisions and other tactical units (brigades and 

armored cavalry regiments) and the logistical command. The com-

mitment of major U.S. forces had paid dividends, forcing the Viet 

Cong remnants and their regular North Vietnamese Army allies to 

abandon conventional operations, withdraw to sanctuaries in Laos 

and Cambodia, and revert to small-unit guerrilla action. At that 

point, under the American government’s policy of Vietnamization, 

U.S. forces began to withdraw, and the ARVN, now trained and 

equipped, gradually took over the main fighting effort. To help pre-

pare for that transition, the engineers embarked on a massive road 

restoration program. In this, as in the preceding phase, engineer 

NCOs at every level played key roles.

NCOs in Action

Bulldozers and their operators literally changed the face of 

South Vietnam. Many engineer NCOs began their Army careers as 

’dozer operators or soon became intimately acquainted with their 

proper use. In Vietnam this experience enabled sergeants to receive 

instructions from officers and translate them into action. It also 

made the NCOs alert to the vital though unglamorous job of main-

taining equipment, a duty that had to be constantly stressed to the 

younger troops and one that taxed the NCOs’ leadership skills.

The addition of a special blade and protective cab turned the 

standard D7 ’dozer into a “Rome Plow,” a vital tactical weapon. 

Escorted by armored cavalry or infantry, Rome Plows—eventu-

ally organized into special land-clearing units—cut swaths through 

selected enemy-held areas of South Vietnam, denying the guerrillas 

the use of formerly secure base areas hidden from aerial observation. 

Operators had to be trained to run and maintain the machines, and 

keeping them on their toes was “sergeants’ business.”

NCO leadership was also at the forefront in the divisional and 

nondivisional combat engineer battalions. These units swept roads 

of mines, carved out temporary patrol and fire support bases in 

remote areas, and, when time allowed, took care of grass-roots civic 

action projects. Such assignments drew the engineers into situa-

tions that stressed the “combat” in their designation. The fire-sup-

port bases turned out to be especially vulnerable, for the enemy 
174

preferred to attack them, rather than larger and more formidable 

installations. Frequently, engineers working in such locations, often 

a small work party under NCOs, had to drop their equipment and 

grab rifles to repel enemy assaults.

Although the most familiar images of engineers in Vietnam 

involve scenes of construction and heavy equipment, their second-

ary role as infantry became more pronounced during the closing 

years of the war. Line units tended to be the first withdrawn from 

Vietnam, while engineers remained behind to work on a massive 

highway-rebuilding program. Engineer soldiers provided their own 

security, as technically expert NCOs led traditional combat squads 

and platoons. Locating and destroying bunker and tunnel complexes 

or setting up ambushes was tough, rugged duty, but it demonstrated 

once again the fundamental versatility of the career sergeants.

Among the engineer NCOs’ last assignments in Vietnam was 

preparing the ARVN for the task of protecting its country without 

outside assistance. For the engineers this task involved establish-

ing and conducting an on-the-job equipment-training program, 

dubbed Project Buddy. As in earlier advisory efforts, the veteran 

engineer NCO emerged as a key player, this time as a teacher.

The technically oriented branches played a critical role during 

the decade-long involvement of the U.S. Army in Southeast Asia. 

Nine of every ten soldiers deployed to that theater served in sup-

porting roles rather than in the basic combat arms. Signalmen, med-

ics, truck drivers, and clerks matched the engineers in contributing 

vital skills required to sustain a modern army and assist an ally in its 

struggle to survive as a nation. They also endured tropical heat and 

humidity and faced tropical diseases such as malaria to carry out 

the civic action program. By and large their activities attracted little 

public attention and gained no glory. Their efforts were not always 

recognized or appreciated by the riflemen, even though many sup-

port troops also did field service and came under attack in a war in 

which there was no front or rear area. Thus, the Vietnam experience 

challenged the NCO Corps’ technical and leadership skills to the 

fullest extent.

Decades of increasing dependence upon technology to win wars 

and to prevent needless loss of life had created a Vietnam-era Army in 

which a professional soldier advanced mainly by adding to his skills 

as a specialist. Engineer promotions came to the noncommissioned 

officer who mastered a specific occupation: erecting buildings and 

bridges, making roads, turning jungles into airfields, surveying, or 

even diving. In paddies and isolated hilltop bases the NCO Corps, 

entangled in a formless, unconventional war, confronted the fact 

that leadership was still a basic part of wearing stripes. From section 

chief or squad leader through platoon sergeant to first sergeant and 

sergeant major, each NCO relearned that essential point.

Today’s Army has been shaped by a conscious effort to examine 

the meaning of Vietnam—of what went right and what went wrong 

there. The renewed emphasis on the NCO Corps is a product of that 
175

reexamination and analysis. In both active and reserve components, 

formal training programs have dramatically expanded to improve 

professionalism, while constantly stressing basic troop-leading 

skills.
Swamp Patrol, Felix R. Sanchez, 1966
War

in a

Maze

Vietnam, 1969

The young NCO waded slowly through the knee-deep, stagnant paddy water. His squad had not taken any fire yet, but the tension seemed to surround him like a fog. There could 

be booby traps buried under the mud among clumps of rice shoots, 

grenades with pins pulled halfway out on those vines just an arm’s 

reach away. There could be a punji pit just ahead, its floor a carpet 

of sharpened bamboo spikes covered with excrement, or an unexploded shell that had been rigged with a pressure detonator in that 

dry patch off to the right, just waiting for a man who wanted to get 

out of the stinking muck for a few minutes. If that wasn’t enough, 

somewhere out there, a sniper might be drawing a bead on the squad 

members.

But the sergeant kept his emotions under control and managed 

to convey a sense of confidence that inspired the patrol’s Spec. 4s and 

PFCs. He wore the stripes and he had the experience. They counted 

on the sergeant to teach each “newbie” how to spot the telltale signs 

of the enemy—the trip wires, the cut bark, the color contrasts in the 

dirt and leaves, and the silhouettes that were so hard to see in the 

green maze of Vietnam’s delta country. More than that, they relied 

on him to keep them on their toes in the ferocious heat—over 100 

degrees already, and it wasn’t even noon—when a weary man could 

easily begin to ignore details. Everyone just wanted to get to the 

objective and clear it. The squad leader had to convince them that 

the constant care and vigilance were worth it, especially when the 

alternative could be a life without legs or arms—or no life at all.

Now he could hear the radio telephone operator (RTO) on the 

horn with the platoon leader. At first the sergeant was angry—the 

squad was already alert, its weapons locked and loaded; he didn’t 

need reminders. Then he realized that the lieutenant was merely 

passing on the word from the company commander. Earlier this 

morning, the men of Alpha Company had been hit by a couple of 

snipers in the tree line. Every other company in the battalion had 

heard it—they were just on the other side of that stand of rubber 
178

Road to Fallen Timbers, H. 

Charles McBarron, 1952. Since 

the early days of the U.S. Army 

it has been the small-unit leader, the sergeant caring for and 

inspiring soldiers in the face of 

the enemy, who represents the 

essence of warfighting.

trees over there, no more than a “click” away. Alpha got both snipers, but only after suffering five wounded themselves. The dust-off 

choppers had come and gone, and now the count was known: one 

had died in the air on the way back to the field hospital; the other 

four would make it, though only two would probably ever return to 

duty in the bush. This was everyday life in the III Corps Tactical Zone, 

South Vietnam, 1969.

Background

No branch of the Army can claim a longer history than the 

Infantry. Through the centuries and across national boundaries its 

experience has an almost timeless quality. Foot soldiers retain their 

central position in the profession of arms. For only the infantryman 

can achieve the ultimate measure of battlefield success—taking and 

holding ground. Other branches facilitate victory, but only the infantrymen can occupy and hold the objective once it is taken.

Infantrymen have always faced the most difficult work of war: 

marching long distances, digging defensive positions, holding the 

line in the face of enemy fire, and tolerating a wide range of adversity, from thirst and hunger to fear and loneliness. American soldiers 

and their NCOs have performed those thankless tasks for over two 

centuries, regardless of how the Army has changed the way it fights 

the nation’s wars. Down in the mud, it hasn’t always been easy for 

the infantryman to appreciate the impact of technology and scientific 

progress on his immediate role on the battlefield. Other branches 

have seen the changes more clearly. Signal Corps specialists and their 

NCOs have watched semaphore flags and torches become microwave 

relay communications equipment; cavalrymen have made the transition from horses to tracked vehicles and then to helicopters. So far-
179

Soldiers await the arrival of 

helicopter transport during the 

Vietnam War. Whether fighting 

the Indians of the old Northwest 

or insurgents in Southeast Asia, 

NCOs ensured the success of 

operations in remote locations against an unconventional enemy.

reaching have been some of these changes that entire new branches 

of the Army have resulted, including the Army Air Forces, which 

achieved separate status in the mid-twentieth century as the U.S. Air 

Force.

Yet the infantry certainly has not been immune to the influence of 

advancing technology. Both weapons and equipment have changed 

considerably over time. Infantrymen of the Revolution and the War of 

1812 struggled to master the primitive smoothbore flintlock musket. 

Over succeeding decades that basic small arm evolved through rifling, 

percussion firing mechanisms, metallic cartridges, and breech-loading, magazine-fed, semiautomatic, and finally automatic capability. 

Other equipment kept pace, as industry and science produced protective helmets, lightweight uniforms, prepackaged individual rations, 

and comfortable, durable boots. By the height of the Vietnam War 

the foot soldier possessed the lightest and fastest-firing rifle ever 

issued to the Army, scientifically designed field gear, and a uniform 

specifically tailored for the tropical climate in which he had to fight. 

As valuable as these improvements were, however, they did not alter 

the fundamentals of how he performed his mission. The Vietnam-era 

infantryman remained what he had always been. He still had to walk 

the hills and valleys, rifle at the ready.

In the 1960s the Army’s infantrymen adapted their traditional 

skills to support a new Army doctrine: counterinsurgency. Supported 

by Communist regimes elsewhere, North and South Vietnamese 

insurgents were well into their second decade of struggle to unify 

the country under Communist leadership. Having defeated French 

colonialists, they now sought to topple the pro-Western Saigon gov-
180

ernment. To accomplish that aim, they followed the example set by 

Mao Ze Dong in China, creating a guerrilla movement that survived 

by melding with the peasant population. Reinforced at first by cadres 

who infiltrated from the North, and later by entire military units, the 

Viet Cong built an infrastructure by drawing rice, recruits, and infor-

mation from the hamlets and villages.

After several years of giving advice and support to Saigon, 

the United States began to commit combat units in 1965 to offset the growing rebel pressure. Striving to buy time for the South 

Vietnamese to build a military force that could stand on its own, 

the U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), moved out of the cities and into 

the countryside to deprive the enemy of support. Counterinsurgency 

exposed the infantrymen of the combat divisions and their NCOs 

to battle in terrain that ranged from delta swamps to harsh, junglecovered mountains. To survive and win, American NCOs had to learn 

skills that could not be taught at stateside bases like Fort Benning or 

picked up during routine overseas tours in Korea or Germany.

With its different character in different places, the war demanded 

different approaches. The 9th Infantry Division, deployed in the 

south along the watershed of the Mekong River, invented special 

riverine tactics to cope with the maze of rice paddies and streams. 

In the country’s Central Highlands, the 4th Infantry Division dealt 

with a population of different ethnic background and language, in 

terrain where temperatures could fall far below the tropical range 

characteristic of the delta. And in the north, in I Corps, troops of 

the 23d (Americal) Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions, operating 

alongside U.S. marines, contended with landscapes that ranged from 

wet lowlands to sharp hill masses. The 1st Cavalry Division, which 

ranged throughout the country, adapted its airmobile capability to 

all situations. The remaining divisions, particularly the 1st and 25th 

Infantry Divisions, occupied positions in what was known as the III 

Corps Tactical Zone. Together with a host of smaller formations and 

key elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), they 

formed a barrier of men and guns between Communist base areas in 

neighboring Cambodia and Saigon, the capital of the fragile, devel-

oping Republic of Vietnam. NCOs of the “Big Red One” and “Tropic 

Lightning” divisions and their men learned to fight in rice paddies, 

rubber plantations, and patches of bamboo and jungle crisscrossed 

by irrigation canals and small streams.

At first, counterinsurgency strategy adapted conventional tech-

niques to the tropical environment. When units embarked at 

American ports, they left behind bulky equipment and some of their 

heaviest weapons, but they added many more helicopters and much 

technical support. After arrival in country and initial orientation, the 

forces fanned out to confront the Viet Cong. In strengths ranging 

from a brigade to several divisions, the Americans attacked enemy 

elements that threatened to cut off inland rice-producing areas from 

the urban centers along the coast. By late 1967 the Viet Cong and 

the North Vietnamese Army had been stopped in their tracks in most 

areas. Then their high command made a desperate gamble to regain 

the initiative during the lunar new year holiday in early 1968. This Tet 

offensive cost them grave losses, but back home in America, antiwar 
181

sentiment accelerated after the bloody fighting of Tet. The fact that 

the Communist forces could still mount such a major attack loomed 

larger in the public mind than the enemy’s defeat.

Convinced that superior American firepower could not be met 

head on, the enemy high command changed tactics. Most large for-

mations withdrew westward to sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos 

to reconstitute their manpower and prepare for an eventual return. 

In the meantime, thousands of small detachments moved back and 

forth across the border, planting caches of weapons and equipment 

for subsequent operations or carrying out hit-and-run attacks on 

American and ARVN bases. By early 1968 the big multidivision oper-

ations of the war were over, at least as far as the Americans were con-

cerned. While brigade-size operations continued, small-unit actions 

on both sides became the norm, giving even more importance to the 

role of the NCO.

Ambushing enemy elements and seeking out the thousands of 

supply points required skilled and courageous small-unit leadership. 

The smallest hamlets and streambeds had to be searched, and virtu-

ally every fold in the landscape had to be examined again and again 

in an effort to uncover every stockpile, cave, and tunnel complex. In 

the process the war became an endless series of search-and-destroy 

missions.

For thousands of NCOs and their infantry squads, sections, and 

platoons, search and destroy came to mean not only patrolling and 

sweeping through areas of suspected enemy strength, but dealing face 

to face with villagers. In supervising the search of individual huts for 

weapons, documents, and hidden supplies, NCOs had to act with 

great tact to accomplish their mission without alienating the rural 

Vietnamese people whose support was fundamental to winning the 

war.

At the village level, counterinsurgency demanded unit reorganiza-

tion. Throughout Vietnam, units as small as battalions activated an 

additional staff section, Civil Affairs (S–5). It continued the Army’s 

earlier programs of civic action and helped to integrate them into the 

flow of combat operations. While a sweep was under way, for exam-

ple, one or two squads would escort medics or engineers into a village 

to provide otherwise unobtainable treatment and assistance. NCOs 

and their men often stood guard as Army materials and expertise were 

employed to construct hospitals, schools, wells, and roads, all in an 

effort to bind the villagers to the central government.

Civic action, of course, was a very old technique for the Army. So 

too were the skills of small unit combat and patrolling. In fact, each 

soldier arriving in Vietnam received a pocket-size card containing 

“Rogers’ Rules of Ranging.” Written during the French and Indian 

War, these rules were still applicable two centuries later.

In Vietnam, American soldiers and their NCO leaders enjoyed 

one key advantage over Major Rogers’ men—the helicopter. The 

“chopper” gave Americans and their allies unprecedented mobility, 

largely neutralizing the Communist tactic of ambush that had helped 

to defeat the French in the early 1950s. Announcing their arrival 

by the sound of rotor blades slicing through the humid air, these 

machines served as transports, gunships, and aerial ambulances, and 
182

successfully demonstrated the tactical value of airmobility. Major 

terrain obstacles were no longer a deterrent. Infantrymen could now 

land at an objective with little warning and be fresh for combat. Once 

a ground commander pinned down an elusive enemy, he could use 

helicopters to “pile on” additional friendly forces, bring direct and 

precise fire to bear, and conduct resupply and “dust-off” operations 

rapidly. On the ground, the infantryman and his NCO squad leader 

were cut from traditional cloth, but supporting them was the most 

advanced technology seen in any war.

NCOs in Action

The Vietnam War and the needs of counterinsurgency doctrine 

gave NCOs a prominent role in Army operations. Terrain, enemy 

methods, and political reality combined to place a premium on 

small-unit leadership. The Vietnamese land surface includes dense 

jungle, with a double or even triple canopy of trees in some areas; 

towering hill masses; and many rivers and streams. These features 

often forced larger units to break up into smaller elements, in close 

but not direct contact—moving along parallel ridges or valleys, for 

example. This pattern was reinforced later in the war when the enemy 

shifted to small-scale forces conducting localized ambushes and 

population-control operations.

The Army carried the battle to the enemy by trying to maintain 

the maximum number of maneuver battalions in the field and by 

breaking them down into companies, platoons, and even squads 

whenever advantageous. This meant that throughout the second half 

of the war, NCOs carried a major share of the leadership burden. 

They ran the squads and fire teams on patrol, constructed listening 

and observation posts, and set ambushes. Thanks to the superiority of 

American firepower, the troops could usually offset any initial enemy 

advantage in numbers once they made contact. The squad leader in 

Vietnam had more firepower under his control than an entire pla-

toon in World War II. At his side was the modern counterpart of the 

color sergeant, the ever-present radio telephone operator (RTO) with 

a PRC–25 radio. Weighed down with a full infantryman’s basic load 

as well, the radioman was the squad’s link to artillery, armed helicop-

ters, and tactical air strikes—as well as to prompt medical attention 

and occasional hot food and clean clothes. The enemy realized that 

fact, regularly targeting the RTO first in any firefight or ambush.

But while some aspects of the war enhanced the status and 

authority of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, others diminished 

them. The Vietnam War was the nation’s longest struggle, lasting 

over eight years, and it became steadily more unpopular the longer it 

lasted, especially among young Americans. Tension soon developed 

between draftees and long-serving NCOs. More ominous to the NCO 

Corps was the lack of experience that began to emerge among its 

younger members. Rotation on a fixed one-year tour sent personnel 

home often just as they acquired useful experience. Many first-term 

enlistees won their stripes rapidly and then rotated out before they 

could become mature, fully rounded NCO leaders.

The cumulative effect produced a crisis among troop-leading 
183

NCOs. As early as October 1967 one brigade noted in its quarterly 

Operational Report—Lessons Learned (ORLL) that it was short over 

300 sergeants and staff sergeants. The Army tried to fill that void 

in Vietnam by changing training cycles. Recruits identified during 

basic training as having leadership potential were used in advanced 

individual training as additional cadre, to cut down on the number 

of experienced NCOs dedicated to daily operations. Others were 

dispatched to a special six-week course after finishing their advanced 

training to receive formal instruction in basic leadership techniques. 

Upon completion of that program, they received immediate promotion to sergeant and were sent to line units. These improvised efforts 

succeeded in large part in meeting the Army’s need for NCO leaders, 

but they also revealed the need for a permanent system of NCO education.

A centralized program was needed to distill the lessons earlier 

generations of NCOs had learned on the job and to transmit this 

knowledge in a systematic way to the Army’s future junior leaders. At 

a time when seven specialists in support and service roles in-country 

backed up every soldier in the combat arms, the growing gap between 

the technical specialist and the troop leader had to be bridged. After 

Vietnam, it was clear to everyone that all troop leaders in the modern, 

high-tech Army had to be technical specialists in order to contribute 

to an effective combined-arms team. At the same time, it was understood that traditional leadership skills remained an essential part of 

any technical specialist’s abilities.
Training the Trainers, Theresa L. Unger, 1988 
Training

the

Trainers

CONUS, 1975

I

f anyone had told the sergeant major when he enlisted that he 

would find himself sitting, like some recruit, in a classroom 

with other senior NCOs as he approached the end of a thirtyyear Army career, he would not have believed it. But today he was 

attending a refresher course in something he had either been doing, 

or supervising, for over ten years: records management. The sergeant 

major had joined the Army during World War II. In a way, the classroom symbolized how much things had changed since then.

One of the most obvious differences was the instructor. For most 

of the sergeant major’s career, he had seen only male officers or 

NCOs carry out that function. The female soldiers of the Women’s 

Army Corps (WAC) with whom he had come in contact had been 

involved mainly in administrative duties. Now WACs and WAC 

NCOs could be seen in the most visible leadership and technical 

positions. The grade insignia on the instructor’s sleeve marked another major change—the introduction in 1954 of specialists (replacing 

the “Techs” of World War II) with their insignia combining an eagle 

and stripes.

Whether in garrison or in the field, the Army had always needed 

NCO instructors, to teach everything from the correct way to wear the 

uniform to the proper employment of weapons. This tradition had 

been strengthened by twentieth-century developments. As the Army 

adopted ever more sophisticated equipment, the need for trained 

personnel to teach young soldiers how to use it, and to supervise its 

use, increased. To keep their expertise current, NCOs in the Army of 

the 1970s now had to return to the classroom several times in their 

careers, either to update knowledge in an established field or to learn 

a new subject.

This new all-volunteer Army had no lack of courses, old or new. 

There were the standard subjects that the Army had long needed 

to support field operations—the Morning Report, Unit Supply 

Procedures, Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services, Range 

Safety Procedures, and Principles of Instruction. But the flood of 
186

Wireless Operator’s School, Camp 

Vail, New Jersey, c. 1920. NCOs,

who for generations had been the 

trainers of combat skills, found 

themselves learning and teaching 

new technical specialties in the 

early twentieth century.

new technology since World War II had led to a parallel stream of 

courses for NCOs in electronics and communications. The coming 

of the computer had added a new list of skills to those considered 

necessary for basic NCO effectiveness. The information explosion 

in the Army affected more than course content. Training itself had 

become a specialty, involving much more than a loud voice and a 

half-dozen posters. NCO instructors now had to be familiar with a 

growing variety of instructional techniques, such as movie projectors, 

closed-circuit television, individually paced skills training, and video 

cassette recorders.

Background

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an accelerating succession of inventions had created a new technology for the 

Army. The most dramatic invention was the internal combustion 

engine, which enabled the Army to move faster in a variety of vehicles 

and aircraft. But others appeared as well: radios and other electrical 

devices, improved metals for lighter and more dependable weapons, 

refrigeration to preserve food, and improved and more effective 

explosives. This new technology dramatically changed the personnel 

structure of the Army. The traditional field army structure—dependent on infantry and artillery, backed by a minuscule service and 

support system—was reversed in less than half a century. At the end 

of the Spanish-American War, only about 8 percent of the Army’s 
187

Conducting the After Action 

Review (Hotwash), Sieger Hartgers, 1995. Increasingly, NCOs 

have had to master and teach 

a host of subjects far removed 

from traditional military skills 

such as marksmanship.

manpower was engaged in service and support specialties. By the end 

of World War I, that proportion had increased to 58 percent, by the 

end of World War II to 67 percent.

Another long-term trend well under way by the 1970s was personnel integration, a term implying more than the elimination of 

racial barriers. Until 1948 the black experience in the Army had been 

restricted to segregated units commanded largely by white officers. 

An executive order issued by the president in that year started the 

forces of change in motion, and within seven years all segregated 

units had disappeared. In succeeding years, large numbers of other 

ethnic groups turned to the military as a way to improve their opportunities in life, and the Army’s overall personnel composition began 

more closely to mirror that of society at large. In addition, World War 

II had seen the creation of the Women’s Army Corps. For the first 

time, the Army directly recruited large numbers of women and gave 

them a variety of duties, several of which had long been considered as 

masculine. Having clearly demonstrated that women could perform 

many tasks in the military, the WAC was continued after the war.

A more recent event shaping the Army in the 1970s was the 

Vietnam War. As the nation’s ground force, the Army bore the brunt 

of the fighting in Southeast Asia. Although the Marine Corps’ loss 

ratio was higher, the casualty totals recorded the heavy price paid by 

the senior service. Of approximately 58,000 Americans who died in 

that war, 38,000 were soldiers. The effects of the war on small-unit 

leadership and personnel policies were pronounced. The one-year 

tour disrupted both small-unit cohesion and leadership in Vietnam 

and training in the United States. Fire-team leaders, squad leaders, 
188

and platoon sergeants in many cases had barely learned their duties 

when they rotated out of the war zone, only to be replaced by less 

experienced men. As the war continued, finally becoming the longest 

in American history, a severe shortage of NCOs developed. In an 

effort to alleviate the situation, the Army assigned fewer experienced 

NCOs to training camps and attempted to cover that deficiency by 

appointing temporary NCOs from among recruits, a policy that inevi-

tably degraded the effectiveness of the training.

Rapid changes in civilian society also affected the Army during the 

Vietnam War. Drug abuse, racial tensions, and resistance to traditional 

authority developed in the streets and on the campuses and inevitably 

spread into the Army as the draft continued. The results were distress-

ing to commanders in and out of the war zone. Discipline and unit 

effectiveness at all levels were threatened. Alarming for the future 

of the Army was the decline of public esteem for all the uniformed 

services, a change of attitude reinforced by continued publicity about 

their internal troubles.

Of all the post-Vietnam developments in American military pol-

icy, the most influential in shaping the Army was the coming of the 

Modern Volunteer Army (VOLAR). The Army faced the most difficult 

transition of all the armed services in attempting to rely on volunteers 

to maintain a large, quality force. In previous eras, an all-volunteer 

Army had meant a small domestic force carrying out limited missions 

during times when the nation’s main defense had been its remoteness 

from the quarrels of Europe and Asia. After World War II, however, the 

Army received international missions that its leaders believed could 

be fulfilled only through continuous reliance on a manpower draft. 

To answer the need, the federal government had extended Selective 

Service into peacetime. Except for a fifteen-month period in 1947–

1948, the draft remained in effect from September 1940 through 

most of the Vietnam War period.

The Modern Volunteer Army of the 1970s was supposed to 

strengthen both the Army and the national defense in several respects. 

For the short term, VOLAR would answer charges that the draft dur-

ing the Vietnam War drew too heavily on the economically disad-

vantaged and on ethnic minorities in the population. For the longer 

term, the Army Staff hoped that VOLAR would make the Army a 

higher quality force. Enlistment standards would be raised; enlisted 

personnel, especially NCOs, would receive more specialized training; 

and the retention rate would increase. At the same time, the train-

ing base and the administration required to handle draftees would 

be reduced. Achieving these goals implied not only improving the 

professional qualifications of personnel already in the Army but also 

altering recruiting methods to enlist young people who possessed 

higher aptitude levels. To attract quality recruits, many traditional 

features of Army life changed dramatically. Pay increased to make 

the Army competitive with entry-level positions in the private sector. 

Once in uniform, soldiers were offered a range of benefits previously 

unheard-of in the military. Soldiers had more military occupational 

specialties (MOSs) from which to choose during initial enlistment 

and, after making their initial choice, a greater opportunity to change. 

Soldiers now found the Army more sensitive to quality-of-life issues 
189

such as privacy in the barracks, grooming standards, and more variety 

in the PX and club systems. To retain quality junior enlisted person-

nel, the Army offered generous reenlistment bonuses and a peacetime 

GI Bill.

The initial reaction of the NCO Corps to the Modern Volunteer 

Army was negative. At first glance the changes from a drafted to a vol-

unteer Army seemed to represent a loss of authority for platoon- and 

company-level NCOs. Rumors abounded that the new Army would 

be manned by long-haired rebels swilling beer in the barracks. Many 

of these fears, however, were quickly dispelled as exaggerations. The 

reforms brought about by the Modern Volunteer Army dramatically 

improved communications up and down the chain of command. 

The Army initiated an extensive counseling effort at the lowest com-

mand levels to ensure that every soldier understood his or her unit’s 

mission and individual role within the unit. At the other end of the 

chain of command, officers, including corps and army commanders, 

became more aware of the attitudes and concerns of subordinates at 

all levels. Local commanders instituted human relations programs 

to speed responses to legitimate grievances not only from soldiers 

but also from their spouses. NCOs came to see that the reforms 

represented not a loss of authority but a different method of apply-

ing their own traditional leadership. The result of the new policy of 

tying discipline to counseling was a better informed and more highly 

motivated Army.

NCOs in Action

Throughout the history of the U.S. Army, instruction has remained 

a fundamental responsibility of NCOs. The subjects of instruction 

have always covered the full range of knowledge required by both 

recruits and experienced soldiers to function in the Army. Since the 

Revolutionary War the newest soldiers at any post have spent their first 

months in the Army following the instructions of their NCOs: learn-

ing how to wear the uniform, how to make a bed, how to prepare for 

inspection, how to use and care for weapons, and how to stand guard 

duty. As the soldier gained experience, he needed more sophisticated 

skills. But the primary instructor was still an NCO who led the soldier 

through squad, platoon, and company tactics and through whatever 

specialty training he needed in artillery, communications, or other 

fields. In time many soldiers became NCOs themselves, learning 

from senior members of the corps. When he or she reached the top 

NCO rank, there were still lessons to be learned, such as preparation 

of the morning report, maintenance of company personnel records, 

and supervision of larger bodies of troops.

As the advance of technology in the twentieth century began 

to affect the way the Army did almost everything, the functions of 

NCOs changed dramatically. In addition to exercising their historic 

role as small-unit leaders in the field and instructors in garrison, 

NCOs became technical specialists. This development set in motion 

permanent changes in the NCO Corps. Trained in essential areas of 

technical expertise—as radio operators, aircraft maintenance special-

ists, tank drivers, ordnance specialists, motor pool sergeants, and so 
190

forth—NCO specialists became as indispensable as traditional troop 

leaders. At the same time, the NCO’s traditional role of instructor 

took on new importance as modern research resulted in an endless 

stream of new technology.

But before new technology can benefit the Army, it has to be 

disseminated down the chain of command to individual soldierspecialists. This continuous upgrading of technical skills throughout 

the enlisted ranks is the responsibility today of every supervising 

NCO. Before they can instruct their troops in the latest technology, 

NCOs must learn it themselves at formal schools where they are 

instructed by other NCOs. The NCOs who begin the process of disseminating new technology are truly “training the trainers.”

Over the course of a twenty- or thirty-year career, NCOs in every 

specialty need periodic refresher training to keep up in their fields. 

Refresher training amounts to a significant investment by the Army in 

the career development of each NCO. The loss of such highly trained 

people would seriously threaten the ability of the Army to carry out its 

varied missions. To preserve the talents of its NCOs, the Army during 

the Vietnam War began to emphasize retention, vigorously backing 

up the campaign with substantial financial benefits and quality-oflife reforms. The “Re-Up!” theme of the 1970s became much more 

than a slogan in the transition from draft to Modern Volunteer Army, 

when there was real concern about the loss of specialist NCOs to private industry. By making service in uniform attractive to all elements 

of the general population, the Army achieved not only the goal of 

retaining talented NCOs but that of integration as well. Women and 

minorities moved into large numbers of NCO billets in the Modern 

Volunteer Army, joining the corps’ leadership and becoming role 

models for others.

In the Army of the 1970s, the teaching function of NCOs became, 

like the courses offered, more technical and complex. NCOs had to 

learn new things and new ways of teaching. Training in all specialties 

was reorganized and presented in the Tasks-Conditions-Standards 

format. After explaining the task within a certain specialty, the NCO 

instructor outlined the conditions under which the task was to be 

performed and the standards by which the performance of the soldier 

was to be judged. The new methodology allowed for individualized 

training on a more extensive scale than ever before. Soldiers and 

NCOs could draw “tech tapes” from their unit libraries to remain 

current in their specialties or to prepare for annual skills and promotion tests.

In addition to the NCOs’ role in introductory and refresher 

instruction, they also began administering a series of individual and 

unit tests. The three phases of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT)—common task testing, written test, and hands-on evaluation—determine 

each soldier’s position in the system of five skill levels. NCOs test units 

under the Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP), which examines each component of a command as well as the entire unit. ARTEP 

foreshadowed the even more sophisticated evaluation methods of the 
191

1980s, such as MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Equipment System) 

and BTMS (Battalion Training Management System).

In all of this, NCO students and instructors alike found an 

increased emphasis on professionalism. When the shortage of 

NCOs developed in the later years of the Vietnam War, tasks that 

normally would have been carried out by experienced NCOs often 

were taken over by company-grade officers. To prepare NCOs to 

resume these tasks, instruction was increased, not only in occupa-

tional specialties but in rank responsibilities as well. Before or during 

promotion to E–5, most young NCOs are enrolled in the Primary 

Leadership Development Course, followed successively by the Basic 

and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses. This professional 

education sequence culminates with attendance at the Sergeants 

Major Academy. The changes set in train by the switch to the Modern 

Volunteer Army have turned out to be extremely important to both 

the NCO Corps and the Army. Every effective NCO leader is a skilled 

trainer, and every skilled trainer is an effective leader.
Mighty, Mighty Fine Slingload, Carl E. “Gene” Snyder, 1996 
Ready

to

Respond

Germany, 1987

“Bravo Two-Niner this is Tango Three-Five. Permission 

to land. Out.” From a camouflaged tent, well hidden 

in a treeline on the north German plain, those cryptic 

words informed the pilots and crew chiefs of two low-flying Army 

helicopters that they could take on the aviation gas that they needed 

to carry out the next phase of a complicated training mission. Each 

year a large contingent of troops came over from the United States 

to test the nation’s ability to react quickly to international crises by 

reinforcing other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO). Once in place, the troops conducted a series of maneuvers alongside Americans permanently stationed in West Germany 

and the Low Countries and allied contingents. In 1987 those exercises, under the names Return of Forces to Germany (Reforger) and 

Certain Strike, gave units from Fort Hood, Texas, the opportunity to 

train with forces from four other countries. The crew chiefs on the 

helicopters and the forward air controller in the tent—all wearing 

NCO stripes—were part of this huge and complex effort.

These NCOs were true professionals. Each had mastered a complicated subject, attended periodic refresher courses to stay abreast 

of changes, and undergone regular tests to demonstrate technical 

proficiency. But none was a specialist only. Each had also learned to 

lead, supervising work parties of soldiers and giving instruction to 

their highly trained subordinates. Each NCO acted as a small-unit 

tactician, a function formerly associated only with combat arms 

squad leaders and platoon sergeants. On the highly lethal battlefields 

of modern war, there are no rear areas; every leader must shoulder 

the dual responsibilities of protecting his or her unit area as well as 

performing an assigned mission. Every NCO must be proficient as 

both technician and leader. The men and women of this Forward 

Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) had to be ready to operate close 

to the enemy, in some cases behind his lines, to sustain in continuous operation a new generation of helicopters. In performing their 
194

A 1908 Wright Military Flyer at 

Fort Myer, Virginia. Airplanes 

have transformed the battlefield 

from a relatively shallow area 

in which opposing forces can 

see and shoot each other into a 

deep zone stretching hundreds 

of miles on either side of the 

forward line. 

jobs they reflected two new realities of the post-Vietnam Army: the 

emergence of a mature NCO Corps and the ever-growing importance 

of Army aviation to battlegrounds of the present and future.

Background

When the Army left Vietnam in the early 1970s, it began one 

of the most sweeping and decisive transitions in its long history. In 

Korea and again in Vietnam, soldiers had fought so-called little wars. 

Tactics in Vietnam had been unconventional, while those in Korea 

had often featured pitched battles like those of the two world wars. 

Throughout both conflicts, however, national leaders had been aware 

that American strategic interest centered on Europe, where the Soviet 

Union and the Warsaw Pact nations had their main forces, and on the 

Middle East, from which America and its allies drew much of their oil. 

The end of the Vietnam War reemphasized these basic strategic facts. 

At the same time, the partial breakdown in morale that resulted from 

Vietnam, and the end of the draft, forced Army planners to do some 

basic thinking about the future.

Drawing upon historical examples, the Army’s leadership reviewed 

the Vietnam experience to identify those things that the Army had 

done well and those that were in need of improvement. Once again, 
195

Attack on the Comandancia,

Al Sprague, 1990. This painting depicts infantrymen deploying from an armored personnel 

carrier. Exploiting the potential inherent to AirLand Battle 

while guarding against an enemy’s ability to do the same has 

required NCOs to master complex systems and equipment.

government policymakers felt considerable social and economic pressure to make dramatic cuts in the military. Many citizens called for 

the nation to withdraw from its role as an active world power and 

to turn its resources to domestic problems. In the media, criticism 

of the armed services was intense and often unfair. The American 

people, accustomed to an unbroken string of clear-cut triumphs in 

war, viewed the stalemate in Vietnam as a defeat, especially when 

the South Vietnamese government collapsed following the U.S. 

withdrawal. Leaders in the Department of Defense recognized the 

great need to return to military fundamentals and at the same time 

to embrace the social changes that were transforming the status of 

women and minorities in the country as a whole.

The result, though not a revolution, was fundamental change. 

Officer and enlisted training programs underwent wholesale revision 

to apply the best aspects of modern educational programs to military 

instruction. The Army reallocated resources between the active and 

reserve components, revised unit tables of organization and equipment wholesale, and reviewed basic doctrine. The Women’s Army 

Corps was abolished, and women were integrated into the total force. 

From a low in the early 1970s, the Modern Volunteer Army expanded 

over the next decade and a half to include twenty-eight divisions 

drawn from the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army 

Reserve. Other combat, combat support, and combat service support 

elements provided a balanced structure capable of sustained operations. Equipped with the latest in technology, officers and NCOs 

began to develop new training programs that were as realistic as pos-
196

sible—a concept as old as Steuben’s efforts at Valley Forge. Nowhere 

did the resurgence of traditional military values emerge more clearly 

than in the Noncommissioned Officer Corps.

One effect of the rapid changes during the 1970s and 1980s was 

the elevation of Army Aviation to branch status. Such recognition had 

been long in coming. Soldiers first took to the skies during the Civil 

War in gas-filled observation balloons often piloted by civilian aero-

nauts. But serious battlefield applications of flying came only after 

the invention of fixed-wing aircraft. Early in the twentieth century a 

detail of Signal Corps personnel received flying instruction from the 

Wright brothers themselves. By the time of World War I Army aces 

were performing reconnaissance missions, dropping bombs, and 

fighting aerial combats with German fliers like the Red Baron. Already 

in those early days of Army Aviation, NCOs were supervising ground 

crews and directing maintenance of planes.

Army Aviation suffered under the same budgetary restrictions as 

other parts of the armed forces during the interwar years. But through-

out Europe and America, military planners knew that air power 

would play a major role in future wars. As the 1930s came to a close, 

the growing power of a rearmed Germany underlined the urgent need 

to develop fighters and bombers, both for tactical support of ground 

operations and for strategic destruction of enemy bases. In 1937 the 

U.S. Army received the first B–17s, the famous Flying Fortresses, on 

which NCOs served as gunners.

During World War II the relatively tiny Army Air Corps blossomed 

into the biggest air organization in the world, the Army Air Forces. 

Dozens of NCOs in ground crews and at maintenance facilities sup-

ported each air crew. But the difference in viewpoint between the 

fliers and those who fought the war at ground level was profound. 

Those who saw the war from the air really did not feel they were part 

of the same team. They agitated for a service of their own and eventu-

ally won a separate Air Force in the National Security Act of 1947.

This law established the basis for Army Aviation as it exists today. 

It allowed the Army to retain some organic aviation, but disputes 

between the two services were quick to develop. Basically, the Air 

Force wanted to limit the Army to a few light observation planes, used 

for liaison and artillery spotting as in World War II. The Army sought 

instead to develop aircraft that it could use for direct support of 

ground troops. Despite strong Air Force resistance, the Army became 

particularly interested in exploring the potential of the helicopter, 

which had just started to enter service in a few limited roles, mainly 

in medical evacuation.

In 1949 Army and Air Force representatives reached a prelimi-

nary agreement that sought to divide responsibilities by restricting 

Army aircraft, whether fixed wing or helicopter, to certain maximum 

weights. The agreement did not resolve the problem of direct support 

for the soldier on the ground, however, and was quickly outdated by 

the battlefield realities of the Korean War. Commanders who cared 

about their troops insisted on taking advantage of aircraft, particularly 

helicopters, to overcome the obstacles posed by Korea’s harsh, hilly 

terrain. Speedy helicopter evacuation of the wounded to hospitals 

attracted the most attention, because it increased a G.I.’s chances of 
197

survival. But the Army also began to move troops and supplies 

throughout the combat zone by air.

The Korean War was still raging in 1951, when Secretary of 

the Army Frank Pace, Jr., and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas 

K. Finletter signed a new memorandum of understanding that 

dropped earlier weight restrictions. Army aviators were allowed 

to support land operations as long as they did not infringe upon 

functions historically assigned to the Air Force, especially assault 

transport and troop carrier airlift missions to deploy paratroop-

ers. Despite this so-called Magna Carta of Army Aviation, time was 

still needed to work out interservice relationships and to clarify 

ambiguities. The Army continued to depend on the Air Force for 

close-air support, reconnaissance, and transport to and from the 

combat zone, while expanding its own aviation capabilities within 

the forward area.

By 1966 experiments and new executive decisions finally pro-

vided a solution to the interservice rivalry. The Army essentially 

gave up its larger fixed-wing planes in exchange for a free hand to 

exploit the capabilities of the helicopter, both as a means of trans-

portation and as a fire support asset. In Vietnam, the decision paid 

dividends that revolutionized warfare. The air ambulance replaced 

ground vehicles as the primary means of battlefield evacuation, 

while the UH–1 Iroquois (better known to the troops as the Huey) 

was so common that it became a symbol of the Army’s Southeast 

Asia war.

On the ground and in the air, NCOs played an ever-stronger 

role in supporting aviation, and soon they were fighting from the 

air as well. First developed at the aviation school at Fort Rucker, 

Alabama, armed helicopters made their debut in combat during 

the 1960s. From jury-rigged machine gun mounts on unarmed 

reconnaissance and evacuation helicopters, the gunship evolved 

into a sophisticated attack platform with the introduction of the 

AH–1 Cobra in 1967.

By this time members of the NCO Corps had pervaded Army 

Aviation. In Vietnam, the crew chief, usually a sergeant or NCOlevel specialist, also became a gunner. Arming the Huey, for 

example, involved mounting two machine guns in the troop com-

partment doorways. The crew chief manned the one on the left 

side of the aircraft while a junior enlisted man handled the one 

on the right. Other NCO duties included supervising maintenance, 

operating the radio, acting as an extra set of eyes for the pilot, and 

ensuring that the aircraft was ready to perform its mission. Army 

airmen went where the action was the hottest and emerged from 

Vietnam as some of the most decorated soldiers in the service.

NCOs in Action

By the mid-1980s all the pieces had come together. Agencies 

such as the Natick Research and Development Center designed 

and fielded a host of new items that took advantage of techno-

logical breakthroughs to meet the practical needs of the soldier on 

the battlefield. Changes appeared in scores of familiar items: the 
198

soldier’s ration; the duty uniform; a new regimental system and 

a training program that emphasized the importance of unit cohe-

sion; lightweight load-bearing equipment; Gortex cold-weather 

clothing; a new armored vest and the Kevlar helmet; an improved 

M16 rifle; the Abrams (M1) main battle tank; the Bradley (M2 and 

M3) infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles; and the Multiple Launch 

Rocket System. 

Army Aviation kept pace with the change. The helicopter’s role 

as a symbol of Vietnam gave many people the impression that 

Army Aviation existed primarily to fight in guerrilla wars under 

the umbrella of Air Force fighters that provided total control of the 

skies. In point of fact, the Army had originally developed the basic 

doctrine of airmobility with a conventional war in mind. When the 

Army shifted its focus back to Europe and the Middle East in the 

1970s, the only doctrinal changes needed involved updating to take 

advantage of a new generation of equipment. In addition to several 

fixed-wing aircraft that provided liaison and intelligence-collec-

tion capabilities, upgraded Cobras, Hueys, CH–47 Chinooks, and 

OH–58 Kiowas were joined by new AH–64 Apaches and UH–60 

Black Hawks. Sustained by maintenance crews trained to the high-

est standards in the world, the Army’s fleet of attack, utility, obser-

vation, and cargo helicopters turned its attention to addressing the 

challenge of high-intensity conventional combat.

Serving the new air fleet was an enlisted force and NCO Corps 

that had been transformed by a new educational system and a new 

emphasis on professionalism. In reality many of the changes in 

hardware and personal equipment reflected changes in outlook 

that had been building through the era of the world wars and after. 

No longer was the volunteer professional soldier to be viewed as 

an outcast, as had all too often been the case in the past. American 

society now demanded that all soldiers be motivated as citizens 

and treated as such, not as a caste apart. In exchange for the sol-

dier’s loyalty to the Constitution, the American people insisted that 

he or she be given the best possible materiel so that his or her life 

or health would not be wasted. By emphasizing these elements in 

recruiting and retention programs, the Army was able during the 

1980s to attract the highest quality of personnel that it had ever 

enjoyed.

Good people, using good equipment, demanded good leader-

ship. Since the leader must understand both the soldiers and the 

machines under his or her control, the old distinction between 

specialist and NCO no longer had much meaning. Recognizing that 

every supervisor had become a leader, the Army abolished the last 

vestiges of the distinction between “hard stripe” sergeants and tech-

nical specialists. It then sent the force to test its enhanced skills in 

realistic, objective, performance-oriented maneuvers to determine 

how well the men and women and the equipment would interact 

to execute a doctrine called AirLand Battle.

This was the underlying significance of the 1987 exercise called 

Reforger. Plans called for the largest single overseas movement of 

U.S. troops since World War II—active and reserve units comprising 

the heart of a corps—and their employment in northern Germany 
199

under allied control as part of a five-nation war game with official 

Soviet observers. The success of the operation was a tribute, above 

all, to the new Army that emerged from the Vietnam experience and 

to the men and women who led it.

No armed service can succeed in modern combat without men 

and women who are capable of understanding and employing items 

of equipment that not long ago were considered science fiction. While 

today’s Army NCO faces challenges similar to those faced by his or 

her predecessors for over the last two hundred years, there is a difference of degree. The stakes today are higher, and both the rate and the 

quality of the technological change are much greater. The Army NCO 

who serves as crew chief on a multimillion-dollar helicopter, acts as 

an air traffic controller to bring it home safely, or provides the forward 

support that keeps it in the air has a tremendous responsibility, both 

for lives and for an expensive and sophisticated weapons system. 

Today’s NCO has to be both leader and technician, for modern war 

demands both current knowledge and the timeless qualities of leadership and courage.
Night Attack, Mario H. Acevedo, 1991 
“Hell Night” 

on

Objective Norfolk

Kuwait, 1991

The M1A1 tank platoon sergeant pressed his head against 

his sight and braced for the recoil as his gunner shouted, 

“On the way!” In an instant the green glow of his thermal 

sight splashed white, first with the heat of the 120-mm. cannon’s 

discharge, then with the thermal signature of an Iraqi T–62 tank 

bursting into flames at 300 meters’ distance. His curt “Target, cease 

fire” barely stopped the gunner from sending another round into the 

already burning target; the loader already had another round in the 

tube. Grasping the tank commander’s override control, the platoon 

sergeant quickly swiveled the turret to the right to affirm that his 

wingman’s tank had destroyed its target as well. Two T–62s had literally popped out of the ground in front of them, backing out of revetments that had hidden them from view. Fortunately, the Iraqis had 

oriented their revetments to the south in the direction of an expected 

American attack up the Wadi al Batin, whereas the American tankers 

actually had approached from the west after a deep left hook. It took 

the Iraqis a few seconds of exposure to reposition their tanks to face 

this attack from an unexpected direction. A few seconds was all it 

took for superbly trained American gunners to find their marks.

That night every soldier in the battalion was grateful that their 

platoon sergeants had been strict with respect to maintenance and 

gunnery. Despite the hundred-plus kilometers of swirling dust and 

intermittent combat through which they had traveled to reach this 

point, every tank in the battalion still rolled purposefully forward 

through the darkness, skimming across the soft desert sands on quick, 

wide tracks, scanning for obstacles, enemy, and even landmines with 

thermal sights and methodically traversing turrets. Drawing on years 

of training and experience, the sergeants had enforced a rigorous routine of maintenance checks and services every day during their preparations for war and at every pause during their inexorable advance. 

Whatever mechanical problems they found were quickly resolved by 

the tank crews themselves or by NCO-led maintenance teams trailing 

them by a few hundred meters. One particularly meticulous process 
202

The Tanks at Seicheprey,

Harvey Dunn, 1918. Armor 

NCOs encountered their first 

challenges maintaining and 

operating tanks in a combat 

zone during World War I, 

when the fledgling Tank Corps 

of the American Expeditionary 

Forces went into action for the 

first time.

was that of sustaining main-gun boresight and zero, the mechanical 

relationship between the gun tube and the sights necessary to assure 

accuracy. This required executing a sixty-plus-step checklist morning 

and evening with continuous updates in between to accommodate 

both the great distances traveled and the extreme differences of temperature between night and day. The results of this attention to detail 

were awesome. The morning would reveal dozens of Iraqi tanks precisely drilled at the turret ring from distances over a mile away.

Although the platoon sergeant did not fully understand it at the 

time, his actions on Objective Norfolk were part of a much-moremassive attack that crushed the elite Iraqi Republican Guard. He could 

get some idea of the scale of operations when he looked through his 

vision blocks to the left and right and saw a vast tableau of advancing American armor eerily illuminated by burning Iraqi vehicles as 

far as the eye could see. The chatter on the radio nets also provided a 

sense of scale. Depending upon the circumstances, either the platoon 

leader or the platoon sergeant would be speaking on the platoon net 

directing the actual employment of its vehicles while the other would 

use the company net to coordinate with and report to the company 

team leadership. Both men could monitor both nets. The radio traffic was a reassuring blend of familiar voices working through chaotic 

circumstances. Here was the flanking platoon sergeant reporting three 

T–62s they had encountered and destroyed; there was the motor sergeant reporting that the recovery NCO had pulled the platoon leader’s 

wingman out of an antitank ditch. A little earlier the first sergeant 

had reassured the company commander that he had direct control of 

the fuel Heavy Expanded Mobile Tactical Trucks (HEMMTs) and was 
203

The Final Push through the 

Rumayiah Oil Field, Mario H. 

Acevedo, 1991. NCOs played a 

key role in the success of the biggest armored corps in American 

military history: the VII Corps 

in Desert Storm.

leading them through the landmines precisely in the tracks of tanks 

that had been through earlier, and a bit after that the NCOIC of the 

medics confirmed he had returned to duty a slightly injured soldier. 

The communications sergeant had already replaced one vehicle’s 

radio and another vehicle’s auxiliary receiver, and the mortar platoon sergeant had dismounted some of his men to serve as infantry 

securing Iraqi prisoners. The fire-support NCO offered the company 

commander yet another illumination round from time to time—not 

necessary for vehicles with thermal sights to see in the dark, but nevertheless a wonderful way to keep the multitude of vehicles oriented 

in the midst of confusion and darkness. All along that fifty-kilometer 

front of vehicles beetling purposefully forward through the wreckage 

of the battlefield, the voice of America was the voice of its NCOs.

Background

The Cold War ended rather suddenly in 1989, when first the 

Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union disintegrated due to domestic 

dissatisfaction with Communist rule. This was certainly not the end 

of threats to world peace, however. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein 

equally unexpectedly seized Kuwait with an armored blitzkrieg 

beginning 2 August 1990. President George H. W. Bush immediately 

asserted that this aggression would not stand and rushed American 
204

forces to reinforce Saudi Arabia against follow-on attacks while orga-

nizing a worldwide coalition to resist and then reverse the Iraqi inva-

sion. After several months of DesertShield, the operation to defend 

Saudi Arabia, it became apparent that this containment coupled with 

diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions would not suffice to force 

Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. President Bush and his coalition of 

allies decided to forcibly liberate Kuwait, and deployed the additional 

forces necessary to do so. On 17 January 1991, DesertStorm, the 

campaign to liberate Kuwait, began with an air campaign to destroy 

enemy air defenses, neutralize strategic targets, incapacitate Iraqi com-

mand and control, and attrit Iraqi combat units. On 24 February the 

ground campaign began with an armored feint up the Wadi al Batin 

and supporting attacks from Marines and Arab allies. Meanwhile, the 

main effort, consisting of the American VII Corps flanked by the XVIII 

Airborne Corps, had driven deep into the desert and swept around 

the Iraqi right flank. The ground war lasted only 100 hours and left 

the Iraqis in Kuwait annihilated or in full retreat. Desert Storm had many of the features of the dramatic cam

-

paigns of liberation during World War II, but it also demonstrated 

the considerable recent change that had occurred in the Army. This 

change included the further evolution of expeditionary combat, the 

affirmation of an American training revolution, the maturation of 

precision-guided munitions, the introduction of battlefield digitiza-

tion, the fluidity between conventional combat and operations other 

than war, and the reinforcement of a concept known at the time as 

the Total Army. Noncommissioned officers were key players in each 

of these accomplishments.

Some critics have argued that the DesertStorm deployment was 

lethargic and that the coalition was successful only because Saddam 

Hussein passively waited six months while the allies mustered their 

forces. Actually, there were two distinct deployments: one to imple-

ment the defensive posture of Operation DesertShield and the other 

that followed the decision to implement DesertStorm. Each deploy-

ment consisted of a heavy corps and lasted about two months. Each 

progressed twice as quickly as previous efforts to deploy heavy forces 

on such a scale, albeit half as fast as the standard now set for the 

Objective Force of 2015. American light forces were alone, except for 

their Saudi allies, on the ground for only a matter of weeks before 

American heavy forces joined them. The early inclusion of such tankkilling assets as Apache helicopters, main battle tanks, and Multiple 

Launch Rocket System (MLRS) artillery was a departure from more 

customary hasty deployments of light forces alone. Evidence suggests 

the Iraqis were surprised by the pace and resolution of the American 

buildup. Within two months they had lost all reasonable prospects 

for invading Saudi Arabia or seriously interfering with the allied 

deployment. Desert Shiel

d and DesertStorm represented a significant advance 

in the evolution of expeditionary combat along a continuum from 

World War II through 2015. The logistics involved were striking; the 

22d Support Command offloaded and moved over 12,447 tracked 

vehicles, 102,697 wheeled vehicles, 1 billion gallons of fuel, and 24 

short tons of mail. Innovations over previous wars included state-
205

of-the-art roll-on, roll-off rapid sealift, modern containerization, 

an efficient single-fuel system for all vehicles, and extensive use of 

computers. A revolution over previous wars was exemplified by the 

technique of shipping vehicles and heavy equipment and then flying 

soldiers into the theater just in time to intercept them at the port of 

debarkation. This allowed troops to arrive physically fit and recently 

trained. When battalions arrived overseas during World War II, their 

soldiers often had not fired a crew-served weapon in five months. 

When battalions arrived in Saudi Arabia from Europe in 1991, they 

were only days removed from having fired a challenging gunnery regi-

men off the tanks of a sister unit at Grafenwöhr, Germany, the most 

sophisticated range complex in the world at the time.

Many have noted the renaissance within the Army following the 

Vietnam War. Much of this renaissance was a return to premises the 

Army had long held: readiness derives from appropriately allocating 

resources for training, logistics, and personnel; state-of-the-art equip-

ment yields battlefield advantages when coupled with doctrine appro-

priate to its use; and leadership must be thoughtfully honed by com-

manders at every level. Ample budgets throughout the 1980s restored 

muscle to an Army declared “hollow” in the 1970s. Development 

and procurement of the then-futuristic M1A1 Abrams tank, M2/M3 

Bradley fighting vehicle, Patriot air defense missile, MLRS, and Black 

Hawk and Apache helicopters—and tightly synchronized AirLand 

Battle doctrine to employ them—gave American heavy forces a deci-

sive edge. The post-Vietnam formation of the Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) breathed new life and energy into the Army 

school system, and the maturation of a Noncommissioned Officer 

Educational System (NCOES) established a parallel ladder for refin-

ing enlisted leadership. One should also mention the extensive 

participation of numerous foreign soldiers in Army educational and 

training programs throughout the Cold War. The Gulf War was an 

enormously successful example of coalition warfare, enabled in part 

by shared appreciation of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

As dramatic as all this technological and educational progress 

was, the advances in training enabled by Multiple Integrated Laser 

Engagement System (MILES) gunnery and computer simulations 

were even greater. Post-Vietnam training developers constructed 

thoughtful and comprehensive “task-condition-standard” programs 

not unlike the comprehensive Mobilization Training Programs of 

World War II. MILES enabled this training to leap beyond subjec-

tive evaluations into realistic engagements wherein opposing forces 

maneuvered against and hit each other as they would in battle. By 

the mid-1980s battalions at the National Training Center fought 

wide-ranging direct-fire battles with realistic consequences under 

the careful scrutiny of pointedly critical observer-controllers. Many 

veterans of DesertStorm characterized fighting against the Iraqis as 

more frightening but otherwise less challenging than at the National 

Training Center. 

Computer simulations broadened such surrogate combat expe-

rience still further. Tank crews in M1A1 tank Unit Conduct of Fire 

Trainers (UCOFTs), for example, experienced a range and number 

of engagements otherwise impossible to duplicate short of the 
206

Sherman Tanks Passing 

Streams of German Prisoners, 

Ogden Pleissner, 1944. Without thousands of skilled armor 

NCOs, the famous St. Lô breakthrough, the race across France, 

and the destruction of the German Seventh Army in World 

War II would have been impossible.

battlefield. Similarly, brigade and division staffs engaging in the computer-driven Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) experienced 

combat decision-making at a pace close to that of actual combat in 

an environment wherein their decisions led to realistic consequences. 

BCTP simulation also allowed for an appreciation of joint warfare 

otherwise impossible to introduce into Army training. The radically 

increased realism and pace rendered feasible by laser gunnery and 

computer simulations amounted to nothing less than a training revolution, a revolution affirmed by Desert Storm.

Lasers and computers were revolutionizing more than training, 

of course. Their contribution to the maturation of precision-guided 

munitions was transforming warfare itself. Much has been written 

concerning the sophistication of cruise missiles and “smart bombs” 

dropped from over 15,000 feet. Army munitions in this category of 

weaponry include the long-range, artillery-delivered Army Tactical 

Missile System (ATACMS) and the “fire-and-forget” televisionguided Hellfire missiles. Similar technological advance is represented 

by the Patriot missile, an air defense weapon so fast and accurate that 

it not only could intercept planes but was on the verge of reliably 

intercepting missiles. Less well appreciated than the precision-guided 

munitions was the ability to deliver “dumb” munitions with evergreater accuracy. One M1A1 tank battalion, for example, routinely 

engaged at ranges greater than 2,000 meters and destroyed over three 

hundred Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles while expending fewer than 

six hundred rounds. Advances in delivering dumb munitions were of 

considerable import when inventories of smart munitions were so 
207

expensive and so readily depleted. DesertStorm’s precision-guided 

munitions and precisely delivered munitions were a dramatic dem-

onstration of an increasing capability, along a continuum extending 

at least as far back as World War II, that seems likely to continue with 

further upgrades well into the twenty-first century. Woe betide the 

army that engages in a pitched battle with an adversary a generation 

or more ahead in these capabilities—as did the Iraqis.

The Gulf War imparted as dramatic an impetus toward battlefield 

digitization—the lightning-fast network-wide sharing of vast data 

files via computers and their accessories—as it did toward the further 

maturation of precision munitions. Glimpses of the possibilities of 

the new technology appeared in the detailed real-time intelligence 

on enemy vehicular movement offered by the Joint Surveillance and 

Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the theaterwide account-

ability of air missions afforded by the Airborne Warning and Control 

System (AWACS). These contrasted sharply with the uncoordinated 

pictures of the battlefield available to DesertStorm ground com-

manders once the attack was rolling. These commanders shared 

information via techniques little different than those of World War II: 

face-to-face discussions over maps, radio conversations, and acetate 

overlays updated by grease pencil. Information lags and the inevi-

table “Murphy’s Law” led to widely differing impressions of what 

was going on, from battalion commanders on Objective Norfolk

convinced they were fighting for their lives to staff officers in Riyadh 

opining that VII Corps should speed up its now risk-free advance. 

A dark aspect of confused battlefield awareness was the harrow-

ing incidence of fratricide. Ultimately, twenty-one of ninety-eight 

American battle deaths were attributed to friendly fire. Virtually 

every brigade that became involved in serious intermingled combat 

experienced engagements wherein friendly troops fired upon other 

friendlies, grim testimonials to weapons that can precisely engage at 

ranges greater than crews can reliably identify targets. In most cases 

the victims were located where the perpetrators anticipated no friend-

ly units. Postwar efforts to redress the horrors of fratricide include 

steadily progressing use of computers to achieve digitized battlefield 

awareness, and the less successful search for vehicular identification 

friend or foe (IFF) devices analogous to those carried on warplanes. 

After defeating Iraq, the Army quickly found itself responsible for 

a host of operations-other-than-war (OOTW) missions: humanitar-

ian relief, refugee control, prisoner of war repatriation, peace enforce-

ment, de-mining, civil administration, reconstruction, and others. 

These missions were not new to the Army, but they had not received 

much attention in a generation—certainly not by the heavy forces 

dominant in DesertStorm. Now these heavy forces found themselves 

spending more time in OOTW than they did in combat—even in 

a theater where they had just fought a conventional conflict. This 

placed extraordinary requirements firmly upon the small-unit leader-

ship, and thus upon NCOs. Desert Shield and Desert

Storm also witnessed a maturation of 

trends integrating the reserve and active components. Although the 

Reserves and National Guard had participated in larger numbers in 

earlier wars, they had never been as thoroughly integrated, as was 
208

the case during DesertStorm. Through the Vietnam War the tradi-

tional view had been that the active component would be the first to 

fight and that the reserve component would add mass with similarly 

structured forces. In the aftermath of Vietnam, service chiefs believed 

that a major factor in plummeting support for the war had been the 

administration’s decision not to activate the reserve component. In 

addition, the proliferation of combat support and combat service 

support required by modern war made it unrealistic to maintain the 

full required panoply of such forces on active service. 

In part by accident and in part by design, the Army—an allvolunteer force since the 1970s—evolved into a force that could not 

sustain major operations without activating the reserve component. 

During DesertStorm the active Army achieved a total force of 871,948, 

of which 60,427 were activated National Guardsmen and 79,118 

activated reservists. Of the 227,800 soldiers deployed to Southwest 

Asia, 37,692 were National Guardsmen and 35,158 reservists. Rather 

than simply adding similar units to a steadily growing force, reserve 

component soldiers often filled complementary roles, in many cases 

bringing transferable civilian skills with them. Subsequent deploy-

ments have demonstrated that the reserve component is ever more 

integral to active component operations, leading Chief of Staff 

General Eric K. Shinseki in 1999 to abandon the term Total Army in 

favor of simply “The Army” when describing a force where active and 

reserve components are working together. 

NCOs in Action

Noncommissioned officers were critical to the success of each of 

the major advances represented by DesertShield and DesertStorm. 

The working mechanics of deployment have always been the busi-

ness of NCOs, and the great strides in expeditionary combat reflected 

their efforts as well. NCOs prepared troops and equipment for over-

seas movement, inspected and supervised deploying contingents, 

designed and inspected load plans, and supervised every facet of 

unit and individual deployment. As technology and strategic circum-

stances dictated an increasingly deployable Army, NCO supervision 

made it possible. 

NCOs made other contributions as well. The revolution that 

harnessed simulations and MILES laser gunnery for increasingly com-

prehensive and realistic training was implemented by NCOs. They, 

for example, were the direct supervisors in the case of UCOFT gun-

nery and they personally directed the installation, maintenance, and 

utilization of the MILES. Precision-guided munitions and precisely 

guided munitions may have represented radical advances in technol-

ogy, but the experts who would prepare and use this equipment were 

NCOs—as had long been the case whenever newly fielded equip-

ment transitioned from experimentation to general use. Similarly, the 

equipment necessary for digitization and the small-unit leadership 

necessary for operations required NCO supervision as well. Capable 

noncommissioned officers were as critical to activated reserve compo-

nent units as they were to their active component brethren. In many 

cases the nature of their specialties scattered reservists and National 
209

A sergeant of the 1st Cavalry 

Division climbs aboard his M1 

during a training exercise. The 

leadership, technical expertise, 

training skills, and standards 

of the armor NCO continue to 

provide the margin between victory and defeat.

Guardsmen in small numbers across the breadth of the battlefield; in 

these cases effective NCO supervision of tiny contingents of soldiers 

proved doubly critical. It is clear that the major improvements in 

Army capabilities manifested during Desert Storm were largely the 

result of the noncommissioned supervision that brought them into 

effect at the soldier’s level.

As significant as their contributions to this makeover of the postVietnam Army were, the most memorable contributions of NCOs 

during Desert Storm fell along more traditional lines. Many NCOs 

performed heroically, leading by example. On one occasion, two Iraqi 

T–55 tanks appeared immediately behind the fuel trucks in the combat trains of an armored task force. These rose in revetments within a 

hundred meters of the task force’s command sergeant major (CSM), 

who had retraced the route of advance with three drivers armed with 

M16s to flush out what they thought was a single sniper. The CSM 

had seen green tracers—American tracers are red—and was concerned 

for the security of the fuel trucks. What followed became a confused 

melee as the tiny contingent was drawn first to one antitank guided 

missile (ATGM) position and then to another. The Iraqis revealed 

themselves by firing ATGMs, and the M16 marksmen cut them down. 

The ATGM positions featured bunkered larders of munitions; these 

the Americans methodically blew up with thermite grenades. At 

one bunker, the CSM met an Iraqi departing as he was entering and 

killed him at the muzzle of his .45-caliber pistol. When the T–55s 

rose up, the CSM clambered aboard the closest and tossed a thermite 

grenade into its hatch. The second T–55 was destroyed by fire from 

an unknown source. For a few moments the most critical action on 

Norfolk was one NCO and three soldiers fighting totally outnumbered in the dark.

Most NCOs fighting on Norfolk demonstrated painstakingly 

developed gunnery skills. Gunnery—preparatory maintenance, boresighting, simulations, drills, and the tank tables themselves—is NCO 

business. Gunners are generally sergeants, and most tank command-
210

ers are senior NCOs. The battalion master gunner, an NCO charged to 

facilitate gunnery training, is a revered figure at the pinnacle of techni-

cal proficiency. All this professional expertise paid off in the extraor-

dinary marksmanship demonstrated on Norfolk. Tank commanders 

made lightning-fast decisions in adverse circumstances. One M3 scout 

platoon sergeant was riding the interval between two task forces when 

a T–55 jerked out of a nearby pit and had him in its sights. Before the 

T–55 made the final lay of its gun, two M829 sabot rounds whistled 

past, one over the platoon sergeant’s front slope and one past his rear 

ramp. The T–55 burst into flames and the sergeant continued his mis-

sion, truly appreciative of precision gunnery.

In one battalion task force, eleven tanks fell into tank ditches or 

through the roofs of Iraqi bunkers. Eight self-recovered under the 

supervision of their NCO tank commanders. The three that did not 

self-recover offer even more striking testimony to NCO expertise. 

One M1A1 crashed through the roof of an Iraqi bunker, collapsing 

into an excavation that almost precisely fit the dimensions of the 

tank. The wingman tried to assist with a tow, but another Iraqi bun-

ker was aligned with the first in such a manner that the wingman 

would have fallen through it in his approach. The M88A1 medium 

recovery vehicle, called forward by the stricken tank commander from 

its position 300 meters behind the leading tanks, soon arrived. That 

vehicle’s commander jockeyed around to create mine-safe footpaths 

with his vehicle tracks and then got out onto the ground to examine 

the “stick.” Out came the M88A1’s main cable, manhandled through 

a half-dozen vehicle lengths of tortured ground and then forced onto 

the M1A1’s tow fixture, which had been hastily exposed by the dig-

ging of the crew. Down went the M88A1’s blade and up went its front 

slope, perching the great drum of its main winch in the most advan-

tageous position. A few quick instructions to the tank commander, 

and a carefully choreographed sequence began: the cable pulled taut; 

the winch inched the rear of the tank toward the lip of the ditch; at 

precisely the right point of purchase, the M1A1 assisted (not too fast, 

or it would have pitched into the second bunker) with its tracks. As 

the M1A1 teetered on the saddle between the bunkers, the winch 

quickly let out the cable, the tank spun into a 90-degree neutral steer 

and then pitched clear of both excavations even as the saddle between 

them collapsed under the violence of its maneuver. This vehicle save 

would have been a credit to the Recovery MOS (military occupation 

specialty) in any circumstances. It was phenomenal when executed 

under fire in the dark.

The catalog of NCO contributions on Norfolk cannot be mea-

sured. Postwar debriefings established that virtually every NCO did 

some amazing thing to keep that great mass of armor moving for-

ward through the inferno. Those with thermal sights guided those 

without them through the minefields. Dozens of hasty maintenance 

saves—some by mechanics and most not—brought every single 

combat vehicle not destroyed by fire through the entire night intact. 

Command, Control, and Communications (C

3) NCOs jumped nets 

and spelled each other to keep the volume of coordination flowing. 

Medical NCOs snatched the wounded from flaming vehicles, while 

combatant counterparts conducted local counterattacks to secure the 
211

area. The advancing tanks talked to each other, covered each other, 

and hosed each other down with machine-gun fire when Iraqi infantry came too close. As sources of fire became apparent, M1A1 commanders talked lighter vehicles into the lee of their tanks, shielding 

them like great pachyderms protecting their young. In the immediate 

wake of the M1A1s and the Bradleys, HEMTTs rolled along with the 

fuel and ammunition upon which all future success depended. In 

each of these miniature serials, crossing the battlefield with no more 

protection than one would have in one’s personal car, the lead driver 

was an NCO. 

It in no way diminishes the contributions of officers and private soldiers to assert that the characteristic that most distinguished 

Americans from their late-twentieth-century adversaries was the 

caliber of their NCOs. No army exceeded and few approximated 

the combination of experience, leadership, and technical knowledge 

represented by pay grades E–5 through E–9. The battlefield is a complex and confusing place. An incredible number of miniature—but 

life-threatening—crises erupt simultaneously. Small clusters of men 

must accomplish extraordinary things with no notice, little help, and 

under adverse circumstances. Bulling across Norfolk was an arduous 

task for all parties involved. America would not have succeeded if the 

only tactical circumstances resolved had been those of which commanders were aware.
Waiting To Go to War [Operation Enduring Freedom], Henrietta M. Snowden, 2000 
Expeditionary

Operations

An APOD in

CONUS, 1990s

The air defense battery first sergeant ambled congenially among 

the numerous soldiers in the Aerial Port of Debarkation 

(APOD) holding area. As was his habit during a deployment, 

he used inevitable waiting periods such as this to good advantage, 

circulating among the troops and quietly talking with first one and 

then another. As he departed, one cluster engaged in animated conversation about last night’s ballgame, he saw his next conversation 

sitting on a helmet. The only one on the floor, the young soldier 

seemed a pensive figure sitting alone in a forest of legs. 

It did not take the first sergeant long to discover that the man 

was a maintenance augmentee from another unit, one of a few from 

his unit deploying, and a stranger to the men around him. The first 

sergeant changed that quickly, introducing the augmentee to a halfdozen soldiers who would be working with him and to the young 

NCO who would be his immediate supervisor. Every private needs 

an NCO, especially in times of uncertainty. It turned out that this 

young soldier’s wife was newly pregnant with their first child, and 

the couple had never been apart for any appreciable period since 

they had first married. She lived off post, far from their parents in 

Minnesota. She had a local job and he was worried that she might 

need help getting to the places and doing the things she might need 

to do. To the first sergeant, this was a variation on a familiar theme, 

and he reassured the private that a robust family-support group 

existed in the battery and that the spouses would do a great job of 

looking out for each other while the soldiers were away. Indeed, the 

battery commander and executive officer were bachelors; the first 

sergeant’s wife had assumed the lead of the family support group 

herself. The first sergeant gave the private a cellular phone and told 

him to call his young wife and tell her that his own spouse would be 

calling in thirty minutes. As he walked away, it was invigorating to 

hear the confidence and hope in the young man’s voice as he began 

his cellular conversation.

As an air defender the first sergeant deployed often. The pace 

began to accelerate with the Gulf War, when his Patriot battery had 
214

Embarking for Cuba, Charles 

Johnson Post, 1898. For NCOs, 

“deployment” means a seemingly endless string of tasks to 

accomplish in a hurry, as NCOs 

of the V Corps found when 

they boarded ships for Cuba in 

1898. 

deployed to protect Tel Aviv from Iraqi Scuds and keep Israel out 

of the war. Since that time he had deployed twice to Saudi Arabia 

to protect that desert kingdom against any residual threat of Iraqi 

aggression. This did not include frequent exercises to demonstrate 

the capability to secure the skies above Turkey, Sicily, and South 

Korea. His brother, a military police platoon sergeant, seemed to be 

deployed almost as often, having logged tours in Somalia, Haiti, and 

Bosnia. Surprisingly his sister, a water purification specialist, seemed 

even more frequently deployed than either of them, if not for as long. 

She numbered among the first assets required for every hurricane, 

natural disaster, desert contingency, and failed regime that required 

U.S. intervention.

Preparation for overseas movement, or POM, has always been the 

business of NCOs. The enormous detail involved in seeing that each 

soldier has all the required immunizations, medical checks, dental 

checks, weapons qualifications, uniform inspections, equipment 

inventories, personnel actions, legal precautionaries, and counseling 

sessions represents an enormous undertaking. In addition, all unit 

vehicles and equipment must be properly serviced, packed, and dispatched and individual and collective training must reach the highest 

possible standard and then remain there. As the Air Force load masters arrived at the APOD holding area to tell the battery commander 

and first sergeant that departure was imminent, both men took con-
215

siderable satisfaction in looking out over a congregation of soldiers 

as well prepared for the upcoming mission as anyone could reason-

ably have hoped. Both men knew they had reached that elevated 

state because each and every noncommissioned officer had done 

his job.

Background

The first sergeant awaiting overseas movement was representa-

tive of America’s changed military responsibilities in the 1990s. As 

the Cold War ended and first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet 

Union itself disintegrated, the world became perhaps less danger-

ous but certainly more volatile. The threat of a massive global war 

or even a nuclear exchange with another superpower receded, but 

involvement in lesser conflicts became ever more likely. Indeed, 

despite a radically downsized Army, Americans averaged 30,000 

soldiers deployed away from home stations into seventy countries 

at any given time during the 1990s—and found themselves under 

fire far more often than had been the case between the end of the 

Vietnam War and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The shape of things to come became apparent in Panama a 

number of months before the Berlin Wall came down. The villain 

was Manuel Noriega, a murderous dictator who had subverted 

democratic process, hijacked the government, ruled by terror, and 

enriched himself from the drug trade. He responded to the United 

States’ criticism and countermoves by bullying American citizens 

in the Canal Zone and ultimately killing an American soldier in an 

unprovoked shooting. This proved to be the last straw; 13,000 heav-

ily armored soldiers from a half-dozen posts in the United States 

flew to Panama, joined the 13,000 soldiers and marines already 

there, and overwhelmed the Panama Defense Force in eight hours 

of fierce fighting. The American soldiers were generally welcomed 

as liberators by the population, and quickly set about the tasks of 

restoring law, order, public utilities, and civil government.

The local unrest, poverty, subversion of legitimate government, 

criminal organization, and drug involvement that complicated cir-

cumstances in Panama illustrated the complexities of the post–Cold 

War era. The Soviets had maintained order, if not necessarily law, in 

their far-flung empire. As the Soviet Union collapsed, historic ethnic 

tensions and local rivalries escalated into armed conflict. This con-

flict was much abetted by the ready availability of surplus Cold War–

vintage arms in international markets. Arms purchases throughout 

the Third World and newly emerging states ballooned, and nations 

like Iraq without arms industries were able to equip themselves 

with formidable panoplies of modern weapons. In much of the 

Third World, population growth outstripped economic develop-

ment, adding to unrest, desperation, and violence. Violence joined 

natural disaster in disrupting food and water supplies and precipi-

tating humanitarian relief crises, sending huge waves of refugees 

across borders in search of sustenance and security. These refugees 

themselves became a source of instability when thrust upon nations 

unprepared to handle them.
216

Load ’Em Up, Marshall 

Williams, 1991. The myriad details and complexities 

involved in deployment have 

only increased for the NCO in 

the century since the SpanishAmerican War.

The diverse threats of the post–Cold War era rarely could be 

resolved by straightforward military solutions, and in many cases 

the military component per se was less consequential than civilian 

efforts they supported and secured. Humanitarian relief efforts had 

long involved an international cast of characters spearheaded by such 

nongovernment organizations (NGOs) as the Red Cross and Doctors 

without Borders. The increasing globalization of the world economy 

was accompanied by globalization of organized crime, with international drug cartels leading the way. International terrorists followed 

suit, carrying their quarrels far beyond the geographical issues that 

had originally defined them. Particularly pernicious in this regard 

were extremist Islamic fundamentalist terrorists who chose to define 

U.S. interests anywhere as hostile to Islamic peoples everywhere.

None of the diverse threats and missions undertaken by the U.S. 

Army in the 1990s was altogether new, but they had increased in 

scale both absolutely and relative to the military means available. 

In the euphoria following the Soviet collapse the United States had 

radically reduced its armed forces and cut funding for them. Similar 

reductions among America’s European allies were even more severe. 

Missions easily handled by robust Cold War–vintage defense establishments suddenly became major undertakings given the diminished 

military resources available. Although easing the weight of defense 
217

expenditures upon the citizens of the Free World was wise, govern-

ments should have devoted more attention to residual threats, pace, 

and balance when doing so. Adversaries decided to try their luck 

against democracies they viewed as weaker, less resolute, and more 

vulnerable. 

After the liberations of Panama and Kuwait, major deployments 

came so frequently they tended to overlap. In 1991, 11,000 soldiers 

and marines deployed to Turkey to assist Kurdish refugees and to 

restore them to their homelands. In 1992, 13,000 American soldiers 

and marines deployed to Somalia to guarantee the distribution of 

food to a starving people plagued by warlords and banditry. During 

their deployment famine decreased and Somali agriculture partially 

recovered, but the contingent ultimately left the country after ugly 

factional fighting left eighteen Americans slain by the very people 

they had come to assist. In 1994, 16,000 soldiers and marines over-

threw a dictatorial military junta in Haiti and restored a democratical-

ly elected regime. In 1995, 20,000 American soldiers joined 40,000 

allied soldiers in enforcing the Dayton accords that ended brutal 

civil strife in Bosnia. In 1999, 7,500 others advanced into Kosovo to 

support the eviction of Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic’s forces 

from a province he was ethnically cleansing of its Albanian majority. 

In 2001, suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
218

led to American intervention in Afghanistan. In addition to these 

major deployments, a host of lesser ones also occurred, as did the 

rotation of sizable contingents through such significant undertakings 

as the air defense of Saudi Arabia, peacekeeping missions in the Sinai 

and Macedonia, counter narcotics efforts in Columbia and Peru, and 

confidence-building maneuvers in Korea and Thailand.

The traditional forward basing of large forces in Germany and 

Korea proved inadequate to support new strategies of expeditionary 

combat. Bases in the continental United States and even in Europe 

became platforms from which the United States could launch forces 

to anywhere in the world. Pre-positioned sets of unit equipment, 

including a panoply of tanks, armored vehicles, support vehicles, 

equipment, and supplies of all types, had long existed in or near 

Germany to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of that country. Now 

the Army distributed brigade sets to the Mediterranean, Kuwait, 

Qatar, and Korea and even pre-positioned sets on ships that could 

move anywhere quickly. The Department of Defense gave consider-

able attention to increasing the numbers, capacity, and efficiency of 

modern sealift and airlift capabilities. Particular advances included 

the dramatically increased use of barcoding and automated informa-

tion systems to facilitate smooth unit movements, accurate visibility 

of assets en route, and the delivery of supplies and equipment “just 

in time” rather than contributing to huge inefficient stockpiles “just 

in case.” Since American forces were both smaller and busier than 

before, cooperative ventures with allies and friends became ever more 

important. All of the major American deployments were into multi-

national settings, and multinational training exercises such as those 

of Partnership for Peace established relationships that later proved 

useful when actual operations were under way. 

The increasingly expeditionary nature of the U.S. Army and the 

multinational nature of its operations evolved through the decade. 

In October 1999 Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki called 

for a radically accelerated pace of adaptation, a “Transformation” that 

would make the Army heavy forces more mobile and the light forces 

more survivable and lethal. He also set the standards of having a bri-

gade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and 

a corps of five divisions in 30 days. These capabilities, wedded to the 

latest in technology and doctrine, promised to adapt the Army to the 

diverse nature and locations of emerging twenty-first-century threats.

NCOs in Action

The new direction taken by the post–Cold War Army necessar-

ily made NCOs even busier. The preparations for and execution of 

overseas movement put extraordinary demands upon junior leaders. 

Troops must be inspected, conditioned, equipped, immunized, pro-

cessed for departure, and trained to high standards in their individual 

and collective skills. The Army must care for families so their con-

cerns will not become a distraction to soldiers already under duress. 

Equipment and supplies demand inspection, service, inventory, 

packing, and shipping. Administrative records of all types—person-

nel, supply, maintenance, transportation, etc.—must be current and 
219

consistently available to the many who need them. All of this has 

traditionally been NCO business, and it proved no different in 

an era wherein expeditionary operations assumed overwhelming 

significance.

Once deployed, NCOs performed all of their traditional combat 

functions but acquired even more responsibility in the small-unit 

environment of operations other than war. Many of the routine secu-

rity, compliance, and reassurance missions took place at the squad 

level or below, and few circumstances demanded elements larger 

than a company at a time. This relative autonomy of small units—and 

thus of NCOs—was particularly significant in multinational settings. 

Responsibilities for direct coordination with allies and potential 

adversaries descended to a lower level than had ever been the case 

before. It was not unusual for small units of Americans to support 

larger allied or multinational contingents for long periods. Relative 

casualty rates can illustrate the focus of the lion’s share of the action 

during the full-spectrum force operations of the 1990s. During World 

War II, Korea, and Vietnam, ground casualties consisted predomi-

nately of junior enlisted men, with officers and NCOs experiencing 

a proportional share. The battle casualties from Somalia, Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and Afghanistan thus far total forty-one, of whom well over 

half were NCOs. It seems clear that the immediately visible American 

leadership was largely noncommissioned.

As modernization progressed the successful fielding of new equip-

ment depended upon the noncommissioned officers who supervised 

its maintenance and use. During this period, the Army made the most 

dramatic progress in the field of digitization, both for automating 

information systems and for increasingly accurate precision-guided 

munitions of several types. The new equipment thus fielded went to 

only a few units at a time, particularly when it was in an experimental 

status. Significant initiatives such as the Louisiana Maneuver (LAM) 

task force, Task Force XXI, and the Interim Brigade Combat Team 

involved the relative few rather than the many. Given the rotation 

of officers into and out of such units, relatively junior NCOs—allied 

with contractors and industrial representatives—often provided the 

continuity that allowed the experimentation and fielding to progress 

on schedule. The role of the NCO as an immediate supervisor of men 

and equipment alike remained unchanged.

During this period of change, successive Sergeants Major of the 

Army redoubled their emphasis on NCO education. The hierarchi-

cal Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) that had 

matured during the 1970s and 1980s became even more instrumen-

tal to a soldier’s career success, with promotion to the next grade gen-

erally denied if relevant courses had not been completed. Given the 

ever-increasing reliance upon the reserve component, the Army made 

every effort to assure that all NCOs were trained to the same stan-

dard regardless of component. Civilian education received increasing 

emphasis as well, with steps taken in reenlistment packages, distance 

learning, and other initiatives to give each NCO the opportunity to 

improve his or her education. As the Army increased in operational 

tempo and technical sophistication, the noncommissioned officers 

who led it kept pace.
101st Airborne Division Troops Deployed to Afghanistan, 2003
War Against Terror

in the

Mountains

Afghanistan, 2002 

The platoon sergeant surveyed his soldiers as they walked 

down the ramp of the CH–47 helicopter. After days of trudging up and down the ridges of Shahi Kowt (Shah-e-Kot) fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda, his soldiers were now relaxed after days 

of pumping adrenaline, and he listened to stories of home and what 

they were going to do first. 

They were light infantrymen who took pride in their craft, their 

buddies, and their organization. There was nothing flashy or fancy 

about them. They were like every other doughboy, dogface, grunt, or 

crunchy who fought with his boots on the ground. Today they were 

bearded, dirty, and tired, but their weapons gleamed. As infantrymen, 

they lived under the stars and got wet when it rained, shivered when 

it was cold, were excited when moving to contact, exhausted when 

moving to daylight, and scared when shot at. The radios and nightvision devices were much better than when the platoon sergeant 

had entered service, and everyone wore the latest in body armor. 

Each man carried more weight than recommended in FM 7–8, the 

infantry platoon manual, but that was normal, as a light fighter had 

no vehicles and carried everything necessary on his back. In the dark, 

everyone looked like a rucksack with legs. 

The platoon sergeant had been a light infantryman since 1987, 

when he had enlisted as part of a cohort battalion at Fort Drum. 

Now, fourteen years and several assignments later, he had deployed 

again, this time with his soldiers to Afghanistan. He had been away 

from home a lot, with deployments to the Sinai, Haiti, Somalia, and 

twice to Bosnia; although he had been shot at before, Shah-e-Kot was 

the first time he and his soldiers had experienced combat. 

His soldiers had trained well and hard. Since 11 September 2001, 

when his platoon was on a rifle range and the word came over the 

radio to check if any soldiers had relatives working at the World 

Trade Center or the Pentagon, they had been preparing for combat. 

Although everyone said this was a new kind of war, at the squad and 

platoon level, it was much the same as any other. 
222

Yorktown, 14 October 1781,

H. Charles McBarron, c. 1976. 

More than most units, light 

infantry demands courage and 

initiative from its NCOs, as 

exemplified by those who led the 

storming party that breached 

the British defensive line at 

Yorktown.

After the attacks, his division responded to the nation’s call with 

some battalions immediately departing overseas to fight terrorism, 

while others, including his, prepared for combat through combat 

drills and combined live-fire exercises. Although he did not know 

the timing, the platoon sergeant knew they would deploy, and he 

worked hard to ensure that his soldiers and subordinate leaders were 

properly trained in their individual tasks, while the platoon leader 

concentrated on the platoon’s collective tasks. No one had any regrets 

about deploying: they wanted to avenge the terror attacks against the 

United States.

He remembered when they left the United States the charter 

aircraft’s circling the devastation of Ground Zero and the quietness of 

the soldiers within the cabin. Like him, they were lost in thought over 

why they were going to fight. 

They began their six months’ deployment guarding an air base. 

The platoon sergeant and other leaders continually stressed that 

although they must observe strict rules of engagement while guarding 

the perimeter, no one should lose sight of the reason they were there 

and of the basic light infantry mission—to close with and destroy the 

enemy. Every day might entail boarding an aircraft or helicopter to go 

into a fight. Many times they received on-order missions and the soldiers would prepare, go through rehearsals and inspections and then 

stand down. These ups and downs wore constantly on each man’s 

psyche, and it was hard to keep focused. Even though they were far 

from any headquarters, the battalion commander continued to stress 

that leaders not compromise standards and not walk by something 

wrong without correcting it. 

At the end of February his company and another, along with the 

battalion headquarters company, boarded Air Force C–130s for the 

flight to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, for high-altitude acclimatization. There, they road-marched with heavy loads and conducted more 

marksmanship, live-fire battle drills, and combat lifesaving. They 
223

Light infantry troops scan the 

ridgeline during Operation 

Anaconda, March 2002. In 

Afghanistan, light infantry has 

shown its ability to operate in 

some of the world’s most forbidding terrain and most severe 

weather conditions.

trained for the worst possible scenario. Because of that hard training, 

the soldiers knew what to do when clearing caves. They were used to 

throwing grenades and firing live rounds. 

The platoon sergeant submitted the daily status report and 

ensured that his soldiers were fed and kept their equipment serviceable. When the packing list for the upcoming operation arrived, he 

directed all the soldiers to repack their rucks, and then he and his 

squad leaders inspected each. It felt like he had done this a million 

times, both as a private laying his gear out and as an NCO inspecting it. The rucksacks were loaded with ammunition, batteries, night 

vision and communications gear for the operation itself, water and 

food, as well as “hawk” gear consisting of Gortex, fleece liners, and 

polypropylene underwear to keep warm when the “big heat tab in the 

sky” went down. Early in his career, the platoon sergeant had carried 

inoperable communications and night-vision equipment because the 

batteries had a shorter life span in the cold; this time he made sure 

his men had enough spares. 

When they boarded the CH–47 for the flight into combat, the 

platoon sergeant checked each man’s name against the manifest as 

they quietly filed by, each lost in his own thoughts and mortality. 

So many things could happen in combat: being killed or wounded 

or seeing one’s comrades die. Everyone had vowed they would stick 

together and allow no one to be captured.

Inside the helicopter, everyone sat on their stuffed rucksacks like 

turtles on rocks. The smell of aviation gasoline and transmission fluid 

hung in the air, and red fluid dripped from fittings. During the long 

flight soldiers dozed to the drone of the engines, heads bouncing 

against their chest, back against the cabin wall, or leaning on another 

soldier’s shoulder. The helicopters skimmed the desert floor until they 

entered the mountains, where they began gaining altitude to traverse 

between the high peaks. Five minutes from the landing zone, the 

signal came to get ready and soldiers passed back the word by yelling 

and splaying their fingers wide. Soldiers shuffled and arranged their 
224

Soldiers from the 10th Mountain 

Division prepare to dig into fighting positions after a day of reacting to enemy fire. Light infantry 

NCOs again met the challenge 

of small-unit leadership and saw 

their skills as trainers pay off 

in rugged conditions against a 

fanatical enemy in Afghanistan. 

equipment. The platoon sergeant made his final check, received the 

thumbs-up from his squad leaders, and passed it on to his platoon 

leader. He could see the stress on the faces around him and hoped 

that his own did not reveal his thoughts before landing. The nose of 

the CH–47 rose abruptly and the crew chief yelled “One minute!” A 

load whine and shock on landing, the ramp drop, and soldiers spilled 

into the whirlwind of gravel and dust kicked up by the rotors. 

They landed in what appeared an onion patch high up on one 

of the ridgelines, so they would not have to fight as far uphill. The 

soldiers moved into traveling overwatch formation for their move to 

the blocking positions they were to secure and began their ascent. 

The rough terrain was more an obstacle than the elevation, although 

breathing was a task. They were above 9,000 feet and it was a real 

effort to hump the rucksack or even just to move around at that 

altitude. The sergeant’s lungs burned and he saw that everyone was 

breathless with any exertion. Everybody did his job, and nobody quit. 

Although they had been warned to expect altitude sickness, none 

occurred in the sergeant’s company, nor did anyone suffer from coldweather injuries. The junior NCOs kept watching their soldiers and 

telling them that “altitude is the enemy, so’s the weather.”

The platoon sergeant observed small stacks of rocks, which intel 

had told them were predetermined al Qaeda aiming points for mortars. Looking down, he could see the ragged shale cliffs that ringed the 

valley below and the deep shadows that hid the many crevices and 

caves their commander had told them about. 

The platoon sergeant controlled the two M240 machine guns 

assigned the platoon. When the enemy bullets and mortar rounds 

began impacting in their vicinity, the soldiers dropped rucks and 

executed Battle Drill 2, React to Ambush. While the platoon sergeant 

directed the fires of the machine guns and one squad against the 

target, the platoon leader and other squads maneuvered forward. No 

one hesitated in moving up to the high ground. Later, many wished 

they had the “hawk” gear they had left behind. 

One day turned into the next, and soon they all seemed to merge. 

When the platoon located enemy positions they called in “fast movers,” gunships, and attack helicopters to suppress and hopefully 

destroy the tunnel. The infantry maneuvered forward to attack. Just as 

in clearing a bunker or trench line, the platoon sergeant focused the 
225

fires of the support element on the tunnel opening, driving any enemy 

deeper into the hole, until the clearing team was near enough to toss 

in a grenade and, once it exploded, to rush inside. Throughout the 

operation, the platoon sergeant kept daily accountability; arranged 

for Medevac of wounded soldiers; kept his men resupplied with 

ammunition, water, and rations; and then ensured that everyone ate. 

On the tenth day he and the other members of his platoon boarded 

helicopters for the return flight to their initial staging area. As the pla-

toon sergeant watched his soldiers move toward their tents at Bagram 

Airfield, he knew they had accomplished their mission. 

War is never easy at the individual level. Although heavily sup-

ported by precision munitions, it will always take infantrymen 

moving forward under fire to clear rough terrain and caves of the 

enemy, and Operation Anaconda was no exception. Infantrymen, in 

a bloody and close-in battle inching up rocky mountainsides, shiver-

ing in the cold, blasting the enemy one-by-one out of caves and rock 

piles, achieved what others could not, victory over a tenacious foe 

long used to fighting in this terrain and climate. 

Background

The war on terror began in earnest on 11 September 2001, when 

commercial aircraft plowed into the twin towers of the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon. Within days, soldiers from every branch 

were deploying overseas to hunt down and destroy those who had 

attacked or harbored plans to attack the United States or its allies. 

This was a different kind of war, a world war, where deployments 

took soldiers from the United States to the mountains of Afghanistan, 

the desert of Saudi Arabia, the jungles of the Philippines, Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and any other locations to which terrorist bases had relo-

cated. Battles could range from the sands of the Iraqi desert, where 

Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles reign supreme, to the 

10,000-foot peaks of Afghanistan, where foot-slogging infantry is 

king and no terrain impassible in the search for a hard-to-pin-down 

terrorist foe. It was to the light infantry that the main fight against 

terrorism would fall.

Throughout U.S. history, light infantry forces have exhibited selfreliance and independence of action. In August 1777 General George 

Washington formed selected soldiers from each of his brigades into 

the Corps of Light Infantry. Specially trained in the use of the bayo-

net, it was with this elite formation that Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne 

conducted the successful night attack against Stony Point in 1779. In 

July 1781 the Corps spearheaded the chief American assaults against 

the British works at Yorktown. 

Later, during World War II, ranger, parachute, and glider infantry 

carried on the light infantry tradition. Although light divisions also 

appeared during World War II, none but the 10th Mountain Division 

saw combat as such. All these units emphasized physical fitness, 

expert weapons proficiency, and hard strenuous training that stressed 

self-reliance and development of junior leaders. With the advent of 

the Cold War, light units lost favor with those heavier organizations 

better able to fight against Soviet armored formations. 
226

Only in the 1980s, after the successful British campaign in the 

Falkland Islands, Israeli operations in Lebanon, and U.S. operations 

in Grenada, did light forces demonstrate utility in “little” wars and 

under certain circumstances, in higher-intensity conflicts. General 

John Wickham stressed both the strategic value and the battlefield 

utility of these “highly deployable, hard hitting combat units” 

capable of demonstrating the United States’ “resolve and capability,” 

particularly in responding to low- to mid-intensity conflict threats 

and where a U.S. presence might well “prevent the outbreak of war.” 

Early doctrine for light infantry units emphasized the need for rapid 

deployment: light infantry divisions would quickly deploy by air into 

operational areas using no more than five hundred C–141 sorties or 

their equivalents. 

As part of the Army buildup of the 1980s, the Army activated 

three divisions (the 6th, 7th, 10th), and reorganized two others (the 

25th and the National Guard 29th) as light divisions. Battalions were 

austere, with only a few vehicles in the headquarters company mortar, 

antitank, and support platoons. The three rifle companies contained 

no vehicles, and their weapons had to be light enough for soldiers to 

carry them over long distances. 

However, the seismic changes occurred not in organization or 

equipment, but in mindset. The spirit and philosophy of the light 

infantry ethic comes through tough, demanding training that devel-

ops small-unit leaders who are capable of taking independent action 

within the overall framework of the commander’s intent. Here, with 

the emphasis on the platoon and squad, good-quality training means 

the difference between life and death and self-reliance becomes sec-

ond nature. 

Comfort and luxury in the field are unknown, and soldiers learn 

to do without the usual amenities: hot rations, a chance to dig into 

duffle bags for clean and dry clothes, or rides to rifle ranges. Rain and 

cold adds to the misery, as rucksacks can only carry so much, with 

priority going to ammunition and other squad or platoon gear. Light 

infantrymen and their leaders learn self-reliance by doing without 

and challenging the limits that they think they can endure, then going 

beyond, with much of the training conducted by platoon- and squadlevel NCOs. Soldiers develop initiative through live-fire exercises at 

squad and platoon level, patrolling, infiltration, and other smallunit tactical exercises day and night, as well as constant rehearsal of 

battle-drills to “what ifs.” Darkness is the light infantryman’s friend, 

and soldiers learn to operate at night as if it were daylight, using the 

darkness to both maneuver and fight. Marksmanship is vital, because 

every round fired is a round carried by the soldier and, not knowing 

when the next resupply will arrive, he husbands his ammunition. 

This austere, demanding training ultimately produces high self-con-

fidence, trust, and cohesion within the units. Leadership by example 

and mutual trust derived from shared experiences of danger and 

deprivation characterizes light infantry. 

Light infantry units have no room for those unfit. A soldier drop-

ping by the wayside on a road march is just as much a casualty as 

one who is wounded in combat. Long marches with heavy rucksacks 

are commonplace, as are exercises involving high-risk live-fires. Long, 
227

The portion of the Pentagon 

that was hit by a hijacked airplane on September 11 was illuminated by artificial light as 

round-the-clock recovery efforts 

continued, 2001.

sleepless days in the field develop endurance, with the ultimate goal 

of soldiers with a dogged, wiry endurance able to persevere regardless 

of their circumstances. Light infantry soldiers often find that combat 

conditions are actually less severe than the conditions they experienced in training.

During the late 1980s and 1990s, light forces—to include elements of the 7th, 10th, and 29th Light Infantry and the 82d and 

101st Airborne Divisions (the latter airmobile) and 75th Ranger 

Regiment—have participated in numerous missions. They have participated in combat in Panama, Kuwait, and now in Afghanistan. 

They have also served as peacekeepers and peace-enforcers in Haiti, 

Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. This ability to perform 

different missions demonstrates the utility of light forces, especially 

considering the type of enemy they will now fight. It underscores the 

importance of boots on the ground and the limits of sterile missile 

strikes from above. 

NCOs in Action

With the ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan, soldiers are 

performing in conditions once considered the operational environment and realm of well-trained special operations forces. The United 

States has never fought at such high altitudes where physical conditions are as unforgiving as the human foe and where the enemy is 

on familiar ground, fighting at a distinct advantage due to weather, 

terrain, and elevation. 

That U.S. conventional light forces are able to operate in such terrain is a tribute to their leadership and training. Mountain terrain is 

harsh, movement slow, and hazards to health and physical well being 

ongoing. Conducting combat and maneuver at high altitudes is mentally and physically taxing, and small-unit leadership is of particular 

importance. The harsh living conditions, ongoing physical deterioration, and psychological depression inherent in mountain combat 

requires leaders, although suffering the same effects as their soldiers, 
228

to be vigilant in ensuring their soldiers not skip meals, drink potable 

water to prevent dehydration, perform basic hygiene, and check for coldweather and high-altitude sickness. The Indian and Pakistani armies are 

probably the most experienced at fighting at high altitudes over long 

periods, yet almost 80 percent of their casualties there resulted from cold 

or high-altitude injuries. Analysts told the U.S. ground-force commander 

during Anaconda to expect 40 percent casualties from altitude sickness 

alone; however, there were fewer than ten casualties, and cold-weather 

casualties were negligible even with his soldiers’ carrying a minimum of 

warm-weather gear. It was all about soldier training and discipline.

Combat is primarily at small-unit level, where squads root from cave 

to cave and the difference in success and failure is what individuals and 

teams learned through hard training. Basic marksmanship skills and M4 

rifles allowed soldiers to consistently hit targets at distances greater than 

300 meters, and the rigorous physical training programs enabled soldiers 

to carry their heavy rucksacks up steep slopes in the thin mountain air. It 

proves that emphasizing basic soldier skills, with specialty skills added as 

missions require, serves the Army well in any situation.

Exceptional units stand out simply because their training allows 

them to do ordinary things well, resulting in self-confident and self-reli-

ant soldiers who believe in their leaders and trust the soldiers they serve 

alongside. The cornerstone of this success revolves around discipline and 

adherence to standards. Both are an NCO’s basic responsibility.

NCOs today do what they have always done, that is, take care of sol-

diers. They check and inspect packing lists and the myriad other details 

that go into preexecution operations. They talk with soldiers, listening to 

their concerns and passing on the good and the bad, in combat leading 

them ably and well. Confident in their leaders, soldiers then take care of 

their comrades on their right and left and accomplish the mission.

All these things found successful during Operation Anaconda—

physical conditioning, marksmanship, and cold-weather-injury pre-

vention—are NCO business. NCOs looked out for their soldiers and 

enforced standards and discipline, this at a time when they were just as 

tired and disoriented by the conditions as everyone else. They did not let 

soldiers die from something that could have been prevented.

The discipline and mastery of an era’s battle drills have served the 

Army well during this nation’s previous wars: whether going in with the 

bayonet at Yorktown, remaining in ranks while facing British cannons at 

Chippewa, leaving perfectly good cover to perform an oblique march so 

they might pour fire into Confederate forces charging the copse of trees 

at Gettysburg, executing battle drills to take out a bunker under heavy 

fire at Normandy, reacting to an ambush in Vietnam, or clearing a wire 

obstacle at night during DesertStorm. The tradition of a firm grounding 

in the basics continued and contributed markedly to the Army’s success 

in Operation Anaconda in the mountains of Afghanistan. 

An NCO’s focus, most especially at platoon and squad levels, is on 

the training that keeps his or her soldiers alive in combat. Fundamental 

training with the basic building blocks applicable to all soldiers (weap-

ons, physical training, first aid, and chemical) as well as those necessary 

for their duty position go far in that regard. Combat wears soldiers down; 

after a short period of rest, training resumes with the added lessons 

learned in combat.
229

Nothing is more important than a solid foundation in leader and 

individual tasks. They are the foundation upon which successful opera-

tions rest. NCOs ensure soldiers meet standards for the individual tasks 

that contribute to mission success. Officers rely on NCOs to put the 

training intent into tangible individual and leader tasks that build the 

collective tasks to support mission accomplishment. When missions fail, 

it is often because leader and individual tasks are not properly accom-

plished. 

Combat proves the rule. In the mountains of Shah-e-Kot, two 

soldiers lay exposed for hours manning their machine gun, keeping 

Taliban soldiers away from a mortar positioned to rain fire on their 

comrades. They did not want to let their comrades down. In another 

place, at another time, a reporter covering the air-assault landing into 

Haiti watched soldiers jump out of their helicopters, run ten paces, and 

then flop down into prone positions behind their rucksacks. He went to 

one young soldier lying on the hot tarmac, his rifle pointed around the 

right side of his rucksack, and asked the young soldier why he was doing 

this when no one was firing at him. The soldier replied, “That’s what my 

sergeant taught me to do.” 

Noncommissioned officers at the cutting edge of combat live by the 

adage “Deeds not Words” in leading their soldiers from the front. Of 

the eleven leaders in an infantry platoon, ten are NCOs ranging in grade 

from sergeant team-leaders to a sergeant first class platoon sergeant. They 

deal daily with soldiers and each other; they represent tens of years of 

experience with numerous assignments and deployments under their 

belts. By personal example, they play a key role in affecting their soldiers’ 

values and behavior so that when the test of combat comes, all are determined to see the mission through to completion. The words “We don’t 

do that in this organization” go far in establishing a unit’s “command 

climate. “ 

Each enlisted leadership position has specific duties, as well as 

practicing the professional Army ethic; enforcing Army standards on 

appearance and conduct; supervising maintenance of equipment, living areas, and work places; and instilling discipline and esprit de corps 

within the organization. Also important are the intangibles of knowing 

each of their soldiers, not only whether they can perform the prescribed 

individual and collective tasks, but also whether they embody Army 

Values. NCOs know the difference between errors of omission, such as 

not knowing how to do something, and errors of commission, such as 

submitting a doctored report or lying to protect oneself. One receives 

little notice outside of additional training and the other results in imme-

diate punishment. 

Current trends suggest that the exercise of independent leadership will become increasingly important to noncommissioned officers 

who lead soldiers in combat. As our Army fights the war on terror and 

becomes more involved in operations other than war, the “battlefield” 

becomes defined in new ways, and many decisions will be made by 

soldiers operating in environments away from their superiors. Training 

junior leaders to take the appropriate action on their own initiative in 

support of the commander’s intent will always be an important part of 

the senior NCO’s duties.
Seen through a night-vision device, a soldier takes up a defensive posture after being engaged by the enemy in the 

Sadamia area of Baghdad, Iraq, July 2004.
The Future

After thirty years, it was over and the sergeant major was standing his last parade, this time as an honoree. How things had changed in what now seemed such a short period! He had experienced service in a draftee army withdrawing from Vietnam, the growing 

pains of the modern Volunteer Army, and the joy of serving in a professional army for his remaining years of service. Most of the uniforms and 

equipment of the seventies were long gone—the fatigues replaced by 

BDUs, the WWII-style “steel pot” by first a Kevlar helmet and now the 

new Land Warrior assault headgear that looked a bit like that worn by 

a bicyclist. The venerable M60 machine gun had been replaced by the 

M240B machine gun and the M16 by the M4 rifle. Moreover, where once 

only the platoon leader had a radio, today radios were standard equipment for squads and teams, and plans for the future envisioned digitally 

linked soldiers.

What he had found more important than equipment and organizational changes were the changes that had occurred within the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps. During the early seventies, while he 

was on detail in the orderly room, he had listened to his first sergeant 

tell stories of army life during the fifties. “Top” administered the “beans 

and bullets,” while the “field first” took care of the company in the field. 

It was not like that now, nor could it be in the future. 

He knew that soldiers today and in the future would expect much 

from their leaders, and the leaders would have to earn their respect 

through performance, confidence, trust, and closeness between leader 

and led. The Army would need NCOs who were innovative, imaginative, 

flexible and tough minded and who had a sincere concern for their soldiers without pandering. Today, when their companies were in the field, 

the first sergeants were there also, attending to beans and bullets and 

assisting the company’s platoons in their individual and small-unit training. In 1993, AR 350–41, Training in Units, was changed to reflect that: 

“Battalion-level and company-level commanders will assign primary 

responsibility for collective training to officers, and primary responsibility for soldier training to NCOs. NCOs will also train most sections, 

squads, teams and crews.” Now accountable for individual training, 

these NCOs of fifteen to twenty-five years of service and the beneficiaries 

of the Army’s Noncommissioned Officer Education System were easily 

the equivalent of the guild masters of the Renaissance, responsible for 

training and upholding the standards of the profession.

The sergeant major had realized early on that for units to progress 

past platoon training with a “Trained” rating, tasks had to be separated. 

When assigning him responsibility for a gunnery range, one of his old 
232

bosses had once told him that the unit would never get to Tank Table 

XII if officers became too involved in Table VIII. Now with the Objective 

Force on the horizon, delineation of tasks was even more important.

Although the sergeant major felt the Army was on the right track for 

the future, possessing superior leadership and the most highly skilled 

soldiers in the world, he knew more would be expected in the future. 

Training leaders was and always would be the most important task for 

the Army, whether in peacetime or war, and the Army’s values-based 

leadership was the foundation upon which all else stood. 

He realized that the Objective Army lay far in the future, and that 

the privates today would be senior sergeants when it became reality. He 

expected that within units of the Objective Force, NCOs would typically 

have wide latitude and more responsibility because of dispersed opera-

tions. He recognized that the “new” NCO would have to be self-aware 

and adaptable, comfortable with ambiguity and change, even more 

so than in the present. He knew that this would require a coherent 

approach to developing leaders through a mix of institutional training, 

unit-level training, Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations, operational 

experiences in both small and large units, education, and a process for 

self-development and mentoring. 

Although the sergeant major loved the light infantry and everything 

associated with it, he knew there were drawbacks. During the early 1990s 

its motto was “Too light to fight, too heavy to run,” and during the early 

days of DesertShield, members of the 82d Airborne Division referred 

to themselves as “speed bumps in the sand.” He had watched soldiers 

riding in the backs of open Humvees conduct the initial operations in 

Kosovo, protected by little more than their Kevlar vests.

The fundamental objective of the Army ground combat mission 

had not changed during his service, and with what he had read about 

the Objective Force, it would not change in the future. Even with new 

technology, all Objective Force operations ultimately focused on tactical 

success in close combat, with one purpose—to close with and destroy 

the enemy. 

Although organized as battalions, companies, platoons, and squads, 

the new Army, in the sergeant major’s opinion, would face a tremendous 

difference in application. His study of the Objective Force operations 

reminded him a bit of the science fiction book, Tactics of Mistake written 

by Gordon Dickson, about small tactical groups that were modular in 

structure and designed for agile, decentralized operations. From the crew 

or squad-like fighting unit through the platoon to an expanded number 

of all-arms maneuver formations, the Objective Force “teams of teams” 

approach depended upon each grouping to focus on a specific set of 

tactical tasks, with each element easily plugging into any Objective Force 

organization. The future appeared challenging, and the sergeant major 

wished that he could begin again as a private as the Army modernized 

toward the Objective Force of the 2020s.
Leadership
Storming of a British Redoubt,

Eugene Lami, c. 1840 

The Skirmish Line (Union Soldiers at Cold Harbor), Gilbert 

Gaul, c. 1890 

Above: Members of the 45th Infantry Division on Board a Troopship 

Bound for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 1943. Right:

A First-Class Fighting Man, Frederic Remington, 1899.
Full Study of Corporal, 15th New York Infantry, Raymond 

Desvarraux, 1918 

An Antiaircraft Artillery Position along the Siegfried Line, December 

1944 

Soldiers return to Fire Support Base Jamie, Vietnam, September 

1970. 

A squad deploys from an M113 armored personnel carrier north of 

Saigon, October 1965. 
An Army Recruiting and Retention School instructor demonstrates the counseling skills that will be needed during 

the course of an NCO’s career, 2001. 

Trainees under the Watchful Eye of Their 

Drill Sergeant 

Above: A drill sergeant gives his troops a sign 

of encouragement during basic combat training, 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 2002. Right: A 

medic out of Camp Comanche with Task Force 

Pegasus 2d Battalion, 224th Aviation, completes 

the twelve-mile road march, the last event of the 

Combat Med Challenge at Eagle Base, Bosnia.
Training
Above: The First Muster, Salem, 

Massachusetts, 1637, Don Troiani, 

1985

A drill sergeant gives hands-on 

weapons instruction during basic 

training, Fort Benning, Georgia, 

1998. 

Right: Soldiers of the 10th U.S. 

Cavalry conduct bayonet drills, Fort 

Huachuca, Arizona, c. 1920.
Steuben at Valley Forge, Edwin Austin Abbey 

Ranger training involves practice in 

hand-to-hand combat. 

A soldier participates in airborne training at “The Tower,” 

Fort Benning, c. 1985.
Give me ten! 

A 24th Infantry Division tank crew 

trains at Grafenwöhr, Germany, c. 

1964. 

Scaling the Wall with a Little Help,

Sieger Hartgers, 1991 
Technical
NCOs slice tissue samples for 

study by a pathologist at Dewitt 

Army Community Hospital, Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia, 2002. 

A Women’s Army Corps NCO 

operates a small printing press 

during World War II. 
A medic stows equipment before his aircraft leaves for a training mission, 2002. 

A Civil War Regimental Aid Station Sketched in Action for Harper’s magazine. 
U.S. Army Signal Corps Radio Tractor and 

its Crew, 1915. Below: Soldiers from Fort 

Lewis, Washington, refit their Stryker Infantry 

Carrier Vehicle after rolling off a C–130 aircraft at Bicycle Lake Army Airfield, Fort Irwin, 

California, 2002. 

Left: A microwave repair specialist stationed in central Europe works on a radio designed to 

NATO-wide specifications, 2001. Above: Troops Rearming an AH–1G Cobra at Mai Loc, 

Vietnam, 1969. 
Standards
Basic trainees and their drill sergeant march to the mess 

hall, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1966. 

A First Lesson in the Art of War, 

Frederic Remington, 1898

Troops of the 9th Cavalry stand at attention by their pup tents, Fort Riley, 1941.
A drill sergeant teaches recruits how to fold the 

national colors.

Sentinels from the Old Guard 

keep 24-hour watch at the Tomb 

of the Unknowns, Arlington 

National Cemetery, c. 1989. 

Three Breaks to the Ground, Ready, 

Go!, Carl E. “Gene” Snyder, 1996 
An NCO surveys the edible creations on 

display at the 27th Annual U.S. Army 

Culinary Arts Competition, Fort Lee, 

Virginia, 2002. 

A staff sergeant guides an enlisted forklift operator, 

Afghanistan, 2002. 

An Old Guard drum major leads the fife and drum corps through a rehearsal, 

2001. 
Deployment
A soldier of 69th Regiment, New York National Guard, leaves 

his family behind for service in World War I, 1917. 

A mother weeps as her husband 

departs for Southwest Asia during 

Operation Desert Storm, 1990.

A corporal bids his family goodbye as he departs for 

Korea, 1950.
Above: Joyful soldiers aboard a train going home. Right: The 17th 

Infantry traveled by rail to the front during the Spanish-American War. 

Troops of the 82d Airborne Division start to board a C–5B for the long flight to Saudi Arabia, 1990.
Unloading HMMWVs from a C–130 in 

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, during 

Operation Joint Endeavor, 1995

An HMMWV of the 10th Mountain Division drives onto the tarmac at 

Mogadishu, Somalia. 

Soldiers load a cannon for transport to Cuba 

during the Spanish-American War.

Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division prepare to board aircraft in Haiti, 1994.
Happy veterans prepare for their return 

home from France at end of World War 

II, 1945.

Family and friends greet members of the 

82d Airborne Division upon their return 

from Operation Desert Storm, 1991. 

“The sardgente...must read and write, be well trained in 

martiall matters, yea and of soe great importance that more 

tolerable it were that all the other officers of the company and 

the captaine himself to be rawe men and of little experience, 

but the Sardgente not soe.”

—A Discourse of Militaire Discipline, 1634

Throughout its history, the Army has 

entrusted those who wore stripes with duties 

and responsibilities that required leadership 

skills and technical proficiency. These duties and 

responsibilities have appeared in official documents ranging from Steuben’s Blue Book to 

Army Regulation (AR) 600–20. It is clear from 

these documents that advances in technology 

and the resulting changes in tactics have made 

the duties of noncommissioned officers more 

complex, but their fundamental responsibilities 

have remained the same.

Extract from Frederick von Steuben, 

Regulations for the Order and Discipline 

of the Troops of the United States, Part I, 

1789.

Instructions for the Serjeant Major

The Serjeant major, being at the head 

of the non-commissioned officers, must 

pay the greatest attention to their conduct 

and behaviour, never conniving at the least 

irregularity committed by them or the soldiers, from both of whom he must exact the 

most implicit obedience. He should be well 

acquainted with the interior management 

and discipline of the regiment, and the manner of keeping rosters and forming details. 

He must always attend the parade, be very 

expert in counting off the battalion, and 

in every other business of the adjutant, to 

whom he is an assistant.

Instructions for the Quarter-Master Serjeant

He is an assistant to the quarter-master 

of the regiment, and in his absence is to 

do his duty, unless an officer be specially 

appointed for that purpose. He should therefore acquaint himself with all the duties of 

the quarter-master before mentioned. When 

the army marches, he must see the tents 

properly packed and loaded, and go with 

the baggage, see that the waggoners commit 

no disorders, and that nothing is lost out of 

the waggons.

Instructions for the First Serjeant 

of a Company

The soldier having acquired that degree of 

confidence of his officers as to be appointed 

first serjeant of the company, should consider 

Selected Documents

As suggested by the author of this 1634 

treatise on the organization of an effective 

military force, the noncommissioned officer has always shared leadership responsibilities with his commissioned superiors. 

In fact, for more than two hundred years 

NCOs have served as leaders in the U.S. 

Army, not only in the barracks and on the 

parade ground but, most importantly, in the 

face of the enemy. In both peace and war 

they are the key to unit morale and esprit 

de corps and the mainstay of discipline and 

efficiency.

Although obvious to us today, the role of 

the NCO was not always clearly defined. Only 

in recent years has the Army become concerned with the professionalism of its noncommissioned officers and set service-wide 

standards for their training. This growing 

recognition of the role and status of the NCO 

has been reflected in official documents and 

publications, as in the extracts that follow.

It should be noted that, beyond minor 

deletions, as indicated, because of space limitations, these documents appear without any 

historical editing on our part.

Responsibilities
the importance of his office; that the discipline 

of the company, the conduct of the men, their 

exactness in obeying orders, and the regularity of their manners, will in a great measure 

depend on his vigilance.

He should be intimately acquainted with 

the character of every soldier of the company, 

and should take great pains to impress upon 

their minds the indispensable necessity of the 

strictest obedience, as the foundation of order 

and regularity.

He will keep the details of the company, 

and never warn a man out of his turn, unless 

particularly ordered so to do.

He must take the daily orders in a book 

kept by him for that purpose, and shew them 

to his officers.

He must every morning make a report 

to the captain of the state of the company, 

in the form prescribed; and at the same time 

acquaint him with any thing material that 

may have happened in the company since the 

preceding report.

He must parade all guards and detachments furnished by his company, examine 

their arms, ammunition, accoutrements and 

dress, before he carries them to the parade; 

and if any man appears unfit, he must supply 

his place with another, and have the defaulter 

punished: For this purpose he must always 

warn a man or two more than ordered, to 

serve as a reserve, who, if not wanted, will 

return to their companies.

He will keep the company book (under 

the inspection of the captain) in which he 

will enter the name and description of every 

non-commissioned officer and soldier; his 

trade and occupation; the place of his birth 

and usual residence where, when and for 

what term he was inlisted; the bounty paid 

him; the arms, ammunition, accoutrements, 

clothing and necessaries delivered him, with 

their marks and numbers, and the times when 

delivered; also copies of all returns, furloughs, 

discharges, and every casualty that happens in 

the company.

When each soldier shall be provided with 

a small book, the first serjeant is to enter 

therein the soldier’s name, a copy of his inlistment, the bounty paid him, the arms, accoutrements, clothing, and necessaries delivered 

him, with their marks and numbers. For this 

purpose he must be present at all distributions 

in his company and as often as arms, clothing, 

etc. are delivered, he must enter them in the 

soldier’s as well as the company’s book.

The first serjeant is not to go on any duty, 

unless with the whole company, but is to be 

always in camp or quarters, to answer any call 

that may be made.

He is never to lead a platoon or section, 

but is always to be a file-closer in the formation of the company, his duty being in the 

company like the adjutant’s in the regiment.

Instructions for the 

Serjeants and Corporals

It being on the non-commissioned officers 

that the discipline and order of a company in 

a great measure depend, they cannot be too 

circumspect in their behaviour towards the 

men, by treating them with mildness, and at 

the same time obliging every one to do his 

duty. By avoiding too great familiarity with 

the men, they will not only gain their love 

and confidence, but be treated with a proper 

respect whereas by a contrary conduct they 

forfeit all regard, and their authority becomes 

despised.

Each serjeant and corporal will be in a 

particular manner answerable for the squad 

committed to his care. He must pay particular 

attention to their conduct in every respect; that 

they keep themselves and their arms always 

clean; that they have their effects always ready, 

and put where they can get them immediately, 

even in the dark, without confusion; and on 

every fine day he must oblige them to air their 

effects.

When a man of his squad is warned for 

duty, he must examine him before he carries 

him to the parade, obliging him to take all his 

effects with him unless when specially ordered 

to the contrary. In teaching the recruits, they 

must exercise all their patience, by no means 

abusing them, but treating them with mildness, and not expect too much precision in 

the first lessons, punishing those only who are 

wilfully negligent.

They must suppress all quarrels and disputes in the company; and where other means 

fail, must use their authority in confining the 

offender.

258
They should teach the soldiers of their 

squads how to dress with a soldier-like air, how 

to clean their arms, accoutrements, etc. and 

how to mount and dismount their firelocks; for 

which purpose each non-commissioned officer 

should always be provided with a turnscrew, 

and suffer no soldier to take his arms to pieces 

without his permission.

On a march the non-commissioned officers 

must preserve order and regularity, and suffer no 

man to leave the ranks without permission of 

the officer commanding the platoon. A corporal 

must teach the sentinels to challenge briskly, 

and every thing else they are to do in their different situation; and when he relieves them, must 

make them deliver the orders distinctly.

When a guard is relieved, the noncommissioned officers take the orders from 

those whom they relieve; when sent to visit 

the sentries, they should instruct them in their 

duty. They should reconnoitre the roads they 

are to patrol in the night, that they may not lose 

themselves. They must make their patrol with 

the greatest silence and attention, and where 

necessary, send a faithful soldier a-head to look 

out. If they meet a detachment of the enemy 

stronger than their own, they must retreat in 

order to their own post. In the night they must 

stop all strangers that approach. They must not 

suffer their men to make the least noise with 

their arms or accoutrements, and every now 

and then stop and listen. On their return from 

patrolling, they must report to the officer what 

they have seen or heard.

When a non-commissioned officer is a 

file-closer, he must take care to keep the ranks 

and files properly closed, and when too much 

crowded, make them incline from the centre. 

When the files of his platoon are disordered by 

the loss of men, he must exert himself to dress 

and complete them afresh, with the utmost 

expedition. He must keep the greatest silence in 

the ranks, see that the men load well and quick, 

and take good aim. He will do all in his power 

to encourage the soldiers, and use the most 

vigorous means to prevent any from leaving the 

ranks, unless wounded.

Extract from An Act Establishing Rules and 

Articles for the Government of the Armies of 

the United States; with the Regulations of the 

War Department, 1812.

Art. 2. It is earnestly recommended to all 

officers and soldiers diligently to attend divine 

service; and all officers who shall behave indecently, or irreverently at any place of divine 

worship, shall,...if noncommissioned officers or soldiers [so behave], every person so 

offending shall, for his first offence, forfeit one 

sixth of a dollar, to be deducted out of his next 

pay; for the second offence, he shall not only 

forfeit a like sum, but be confined twentyfour hours; and for every like offence shall 

suffer and pay in like manner; which money, 

so forfeited, shall be applied by the captain 

or senior officer of the troop or company, to 

the use of the sick soldiers of the company or 

troops to which the offender belongs.

Art. 3. Any non-commissioned officer or 

soldier who shall use any profane oath or 

execration shall incur the penalties expressed 

in the foregoing article....

Art. 5. Any officer or soldier who shall use 

contemptuous or disrespectful words against 

the President of the United States, against the 

Vice-President thereof, against the Congress of 

the United States, or against the chief magistrate or legislature of any of the United States 

in which he may be quartered,...if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, he shall suffer 

such punishment as shall be inflicted on him 

by the sentence of a court martial....

Art. 8. Any officer, non-commissioned 

officer, or soldier, who, being present at any 

mutiny or sedition, does not use his utmost 

endeavor to suppress the same, or coming to 

the knowledge of any intended mutiny, does 

not without delay, give information thereof 

to his commanding officer, shall be punished 

by the sentence of a court martial with death 

or otherwise, according to the nature of his 

offence....

Art. 10. Every non-commissioned officer, 

or soldier, who shall enlist himself in the service of the United States, shall, at the time of 

his so enlisting, or within six days afterwards, 

have the articles for the government of the 

armies of the United States, read to him, and 

shall, by the officer who enlisted him, or by 

the commanding officer of the troop or company into which he was enlisted, be taken 

before the next justice of the peace, or chief 

magistrate of any city or, town corporate, 

not being an officer of the army, or where 

259
recourse cannot be had to the civil magistrate, 

before the judge advocate, and in his presence, 

shall take the following oath or affirmation: 

“I, A.B. do solemnly swear or affirm, (as the 

case may be) that I will bear true allegiance to 

the United States of America; and that I will 

serve them honestly and faithfully against all 

their enemies, or opposers, whatsoever, and 

observe and obey the orders of the President of 

the United States, and the orders of the officers 

appointed over me, according to the rules and 

articles for the government of the armies of the 

United States.”

Art. 11. After a non-commissioned officer 

or soldier, shall have been duly enlisted and 

sworn, he shall not be dismissed the service 

without a discharge in writing; and no discharge granted to him shall be sufficient, which 

is not signed by a field officer of the regiment 

to which he belongs, or commanding officer, 

where no field officer of the regiment is present; and no discharge shall be given to a noncommissioned officer or soldier, before his 

term of service has expired, but by order of the 

President, the Secretary of War, the commanding officer of a department, or the sentence of a 

general court martial....

Art. 12. Every colonel, or other officer commanding a regiment, troop, or company, and 

actually quartered with it, may give furloughs to 

non-commissioned officers or soldiers, in such 

numbers, and for so long a time as he shall 

judge to be most consistent with the good of 

the service...for time not exceeding twenty days 

in six months, but not to more than two persons to be absent at the same time, excepting 

some extraordinary occasion should require it.

Art. 13. At every muster...the commanding officer of every troop, or company, shall 

give certificates, signifying the reasons of the 

absence of the noncommissioned officers and 

private soldiers, which reasons, and time of 

absence, shall be inserted in the muster-rolls 

opposite the name of the respective absent officers and soldiers. The certificates shall, together 

with the muster-rolls, be remitted by the commissary of musters, or other officer mustering, 

to the department of war as speedily as the 

distance of the place will admit....

Art. 21. Any non-commissioned officer or 

soldier, who shall, without leave from his commanding officer, absent himself from his troop, 

company, or detachment, shall, upon being 

convicted thereof, be punished according to 

the nature of his offence, at the discretion of a 

court martial.

Art. 22. No non-commissioned officer or 

soldier, shall enlist himself in any other regiment, troop, or company, without a regular discharge from the regiment, troop, or company, 

in which he last served on the penalty of being 

reputed a deserter, and suffering accordingly....

Art. 26. If any commissioned or non-commissioned officer commanding a guard, shall 

knowingly or willingly suffer any person whatsoever to go forth to fight a duel, he shall be 

punished as a challenger....

Art. 27. All officers, of what condition soever, 

have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays, 

and disorders, though the persons concerned 

should belong to another regiment, troop, 

or company; and either to order officers into 

arrest, or non-commissioned officers or soldiers 

into confinement, until their proper superior 

officer shall be acquainted therewith....

Art. 37. Any non-commissioned officer or 

soldier, who shall be convicted, at a regimental 

court martial, of having sold, or designedly, or 

through neglect, wasted the ammunition delivered out to him, to be employed in the service 

of the United States, shall be punished at the 

discretion of such court.

Art. 38. Every non-commissioned officer 

or soldier, who shall be convicted before a 

court martial, of having sold, lost, or spoiled, 

through neglect, his horse, arms, clothes, or 

accoutrements, shall be put under such weekly 

stoppages (not exceeding the half of his pay) 

as such court martial shall judge sufficient, for 

repairing the loss or damage; and shall suffer 

confinement, or such other corporal punishment as his crime shall deserve....

Art. 39....if any non-commissioned officer 

[shall be convicted before a court martial, of 

having embezzled, or misapplied any money 

with which he may have been entrusted, he] 

shall be reduced to the ranks, be put under 

stoppages until the money be made good, and 

suffer such corporal punishment as such court 

martial shall direct....

Art. 41. All non-commissioned officers and 

soldiers, who shall be found one mile from 

the camp, without leave, in writing, from 

their commanding officer, shall suffer such 

260
punishment as shall be inflicted upon them 

by the sentence of a court martial....

Art. 43. Every non-commissioned officer 

and soldier shall retire to his quarters or tent, 

at the beating of the retreat; in default of 

which he shall be punished according to the 

nature of his offence.

Art. 44. No officer, non-commissioned 

officer or soldier, shall fail in repairing, at the 

time fixed, to the place of parade, of exercise 

or other rendezvous, appointed by his commanding officer, if not prevented by sickness, 

or some other evident necessity, or shall go 

from the said place of rendezvous, without 

leave from his commanding officer, before 

he shall be regularly dismissed or relieved, 

on the penalty of being punished according 

to the nature of his offence by the sentence of 

a court martial.

Art. 45. Any commissioned officer, who 

shall be found drunk on his guard, party, 

or other duty, shall be cashiered. Any noncommissioned officer or soldier so offending, shall suffer such corporal punishment as 

shall be inflicted by the sentence of a court 

martial....

Art. 59. If any commander of any garrison, fortress or post, shall be compelled, by 

the officers and soldiers under his command, 

to give up to the enemy, or to abandon it; the 

commissioned officers, non-commissioned 

officers, or soldiers, who shall be convicted 

of having so offended, shall suffer death, 

or such other punishment as shall be inflicted upon them by the sentence of a court 

martial....

Extract from William Duane, A Hand Book 

for Infantry, 9th ed., 1814.

It is too much practice to commit the 

charge of the elementary drills to noncommissioned officers, by which many great 

evils are produced....By devolving these 

first duties on non-commissioned officers, 

the commissioned officers remain ignorant 

or timid; and the chance of finding noncommissioned officers, who can clearly comprehend and explain the principles of a good 

discipline, is not one in twenty; from which 

cause it is twenty to one that the recruits are 

imperfectly or erroneously taught....

The Serjeant Major

This is a very useful and indispensible 

officer—it would be desirable, and would 

conduce to the perfection of discipline, if there 

were one to every company. The duties are 

very heavy on a single serjeant major to a battalion, and it is not easy to find men every way 

qualified. He is to the serjeants and corporals, 

what the major is to the platoon officers. He 

has charge of the details of serjeants, corporals, privates, and musicians for every service, 

guards, drills, fatigues, etc. and is an indispensible aid to the adjutant.

He should be a complete master of all the 

exercises of the battalion from the first drill 

to the movements in line of battle. A serjeant 

major who feels a pride in his station, and 

whose conduct is exemplary, may expect with 

propriety, military promotion.

Serjeants

The non-commissioned officers should 

be selected from among the most orderly and 

best qualified men—upon them will depend 

very much the order and good conduct of 

the company. They should each have a squad 

composed of an equal distribution of the 

men, who should form messes, over which the 

serjeants and corporals should preside and be 

responsible for the good and orderly conduct 

of the mess, the dressing of provisions, the 

cleaning of their persons, arms, quarters, and 

clothing.

The serjeants in rotation should see the 

parties daily turn out for guards—inspect 

them and their arms—that their clothing be 

clean—arms in good order—flints good and 

well fitted—ammunition sufficient and in 

good condition.

The serjeants make a morning report, one 

copy for the captain, the other for the serjeant 

major, who delivers them to the former.

The serjeants make weekly reports of the 

company, men and arms—reports are delivered to the serjeant major on a stated hour of 

the day every week, but they must be ready 

to make report at any hour required, and the 

corporals aid the serjeants in this duty.

At roll call they should report all who 

were absent—when upon guard arrange the 

sentinels, and never be absent from the head 

261
quarters of the guard. The serjeants perform 

orderly duty, once a week in rotation, of 

which the serjeant major keeps a roster; 

the duty of the orderly serjeant is to attend 

upon and execute such orders as the officer 

to whom he is attached shall order. The serjeants act as guides and pivots in the evolutions of battalions.

Corporals

These are in fact deputy serjeants—they 

have the charge of squads in quarters—there 

is an orderly corporal in quarters always 

dressed, and whose duty it is to execute such 

orders as the orderly serjeant is required to 

have executed. The corporals keep each a 

roll of the company, and they warn the men 

for duty. They teach the recruits the manual 

exercise, instruct them in cleaning arms and 

accoutrements, and see that they perform 

this duty each for himself—they take their 

share of duties in guards, fatigues, the care of 

ammunition and provisions and storage.

The serjeants and corporals call the rolls 

at taptoo time—and are the first on daily 

parade, and are exemplary in the neatness 

of their persons and their sobriety and good 

demeanor.

The corporals plant the sentinels, the 

elder corporal has the choice of the route, 

after an equal distribution.

Extract from General Regulations for the 

Army of the United States; also, The Rules 

and Articles of War, and Extracts from Laws 

relating to them, 1835.

Article IX

Appointment of Adjutants and 

Non-commissioned Officers

12. Each colonel will appoint, from the 

subaltern officers of his own regiment, his 

Adjutant, and report the same to the Adjutant 

General. He will also appoint the non-commissioned staff of his regiment; and on the 

recommendation and nomination of the 

Captains of the companies, he will, should 

he approve thereof, appoint the Sergeants 

and Corporals of their respective companies. 

All these appointments are to be announced 

in regimental orders.

13. The officers and non-commissioned 

officers thus appointed, are not to be removed from their respective places, except by 

the sentence of a court martial, or by order 

of the Colonel or permanent commanding 

officer of the regiment.

14. A non-commissioned officer having 

been duly appointed, cannot, at his pleasure, 

resign his place or relinquish his duties as 

such, and return to the ranks. If he have been 

regraded, in consequence of misconduct, he 

shall not be re-enlisted within a period to 

entitle him to the additional bounty allowed 

to such privates and musicians, as may reenlist under the provisions of the act, section 

3, of the 2d March, 1833.

System of Responsibility

15. Nothing more essentially tends to 

the maintenance of good order, than that 

chain of responsibility, which should extend 

from the highest to the lowest grade. To 

effect this, each company must be divided 

into four squads, each to be put under the 

charge of a non-commissioned officer, who 

will be responsible to the subalterns of the 

company. Should there be a deficiency in 

the number of non-commissioned officers, 

required to assist the subaltern officers in 

the discharge of this duty, Corporals may be 

appointed to act as lance-sergeants, and the 

most approved private soldiers as lance-corporals, who, if they conduct themselves with 

propriety, should be promoted to the first 

vacancies.

18. As far as practical, squads will be kept 

separate, whether in tents or quarters; and 

the men of each will be numbered according to their qualifications, in order that the 

highest in number present, may, as lancecorporal, command the squad in the absence 

of noncommissioned officers and lance-corporals....

42. As an allowance is made by law to 

officers for private waiters, no non-commissioned officer or soldier is to be employed in 

any menial office, or made to perform any 

service not strictly military, for the private 

benefit of any officer or mess of officers.

262
Extract from General Regulations for the 

Army of the United States, 1847.

Article XIII

Non-Commissioned Officers

117. It is of essential importance to the 

service that the station and respectability of 

the non-commissioned officer be upheld. It 

is, therefore, earnestly recommended, and 

enjoined upon all officers, to be cautious 

in reproving non-commissioned officers in 

the presence or hearing of privates, lest 

their authority be weakened in the eyes of 

their inferiors. It is also directed that noncommissioned officers, in no case, be sent 

to the guard-room and mixed with privates, 

during confinement, but be considered as 

placed in arrest, except in aggravated cases, 

where escape may be apprehended.

118. When non-commissioned officers 

are appointed and announced in the manner prescribed by paragraphs 96 and 97, 

they are not to be removed from their 

respective places except by the sentence of a 

court-martial, or by order of the permanent 

commander of the regiment. If reduced to 

the ranks by garrison courts, at posts not the 

head-quarters of the regiment, the company 

commander will immediately forward a 

transcript of the order to the Colonel.

119. A non-commissioned officer having been duly appointed, cannot, at his 

pleasure, resign his place, or relinquish his 

duties as such, and return to the ranks.

120. Every non-commissioned officer 

shall be furnished with a certificate or warrant of his rank, assimilated to the commission of an officer, signed by the Colonel and 

countersigned by the Adjutant. The first, or 

orderly sergeant, when selected by the captain, will be entitled to a separate warrant 

as such, in addition to the appointment he 

may hold as a non-commissioned officer of 

the company.

121. Whenever circumstances may make 

it necessary, lance-sergeants may be appointed from the corporals, and lance-corporals 

from the privates, who, if their conduct be 

good and evince capacity for the discharge 

of such duties, should be promoted to the 

first vacancies. The appointments will be 

made in the same manner as that already 

pointed out for non-commissioned officers.

122. Independent of the particular duties 

required of non-commissioned officers, (sergeants and corporals), when in the ranks, 

according to the systems of tactical instruction, 

it is also their duty, at all times, to observe the 

conduct of the privates, and to report immediately to the proper authority, every breach of 

the general regulations of the service, or of the 

particular orders of the post....

Article XIV

144. Unless under special circumstances, Saturdays will be particularly appropriated to police. The chiefs of squads will cause 

bunks and bedding to be overhauled; floors 

dry rubbed; tables and benches scoured; arms 

cleaned; accoutrements whitened and polished, 

and every thing put in the most exact order.

145. Bathing is promotive both of comfort and health; and where conveniences for 

it are to be had, the men should be made to 

bathe at least once a week. The feet are to be 

washed at least twice a week.

146. It is essential to cleanliness and 

health that the soldiers should change their 

linen at least three times a week in mid-summer, and twice a week during the remainder 

of the year. The hair must be cut close to the 

head, and always be kept short.

147. Non-commissioned officers, in command of squads, will be held more immediately responsible that their men observe what 

is prescribed above; that they wash their 

hands and faces daily—habitually, immediately after the general fatigue; that they, at 

the same time, shave themselves (if necessary) and brush or comb their heads; that 

afterwards, those who are to go on duty, put 

their arms, accoutrements, dress, &c., in the 

best order, and that such as have permission 

to pass the chain of sentinels are in the dress 

that may be ordered....

Extract from Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, 

Infantry Tactics; or, Rules for the Exercise 

and Maneuvers of the United States Infantry, 

1854.

263
Article I

Posts of Company Officers, Sergeants, 

and Corporals

19. The company officers and sergeants 

may (as on a war establishment, with ranks 

filled) be ten in number, as follows: 1. 

Captain. 2. First lieutenant. 3. Second lieutenant. 4. Third lieutenant. 5. Ensign. 6. First 

sergeant. 7. Second sergeant. 8. Third sergeant. 9. Fourth sergeant. 10. Fifth sergeant.

20. If the whole ten be under arms with 

the company, they will be posted as follows:

21. No. 1 in the front rank on the right of 

the company, touching with the left elbow.

22. No. 6 in the rear rank, touching 

with the left elbow, and covering No. 1. In 

the manoeuvres, No. 6 (first sergeant) will 

be denominated covering sergeant, or right 

guide of the company.

23. The remaining officers and sergeants 

will constitute the file closers, and be posted 

in a line two paces in the rear of the rear 

rank, measuring from heels to heels, as follows:

24. No. 2 equidistant between the positions, which will be assigned to Nos. 4 and 

7.

25. No. 3 opposite to the centre of the 

first platoon.

26. No. 4 opposite to the centre of the 

second platoon.

27. No. 5 equidistant between No. 3 and 

the right of the company.

28. No. 7 (with an exception to be immediately made) opposite to the second file 

from the left of the company. No. 7, (second 

sergeant), in every company, will, in the 

manoeuvres, be denominated left guide of 

the company.

29. No. 8 opposite to the second file 

from the left of the first platoon.

30. No. 9 opposite to the second file 

from the right of the second platoon.

31. No. 10 equidistant between Nos. 3 

and 8.

32. No. 7, in the left company, will be 

posted in the front rank, on the left of the 

battalion, touching with the right elbow, 

and be covered by a corporal in the rear 

rank. This sergeant will, in the manoeuvres, 

be sometimes designated as the closing sergeant, and the corporal behind him the covering corporal....

Article II

Instruction of Sergeants and Corporals

72. This will comprehend the Schools of 

the Soldier and Company. The sergeants and 

corporals will be held to know, not only how 

to execute with precision the manual of arms 

as sergeants, but, also, every thing relating to 

the manual of arms, as rank and file, the firings and marchings.

73. The adjutant and sergeant major, 

under the supervision of the field officers, 

will be immediately charged with the instruction of the sergeants and corporals. This will 

commence with the exercises in the School of 

the Soldier, followed by the manual of arms 

as sergeants.

74. When the sergeants and corporals are 

well established in the foregoing, they will 

next be formed into the semblance of a company, and four of the sergeants designated as 

captain, covering sergeant, left guide, and file 

closer, respectively. Every sergeant will, in his 

turn, fill each of those positions, and, if practicable, each corporal also.

75. This instruction having principally 

for object to qualify the sergeant to instruct 

the men, and the corporals to replace sergeants, the adjutant will explain to them 

all the principles of the first two schools, at 

first on the ground, and next in a course of 

theoretic instruction. The two modes will 

comprehend all the various duties of guides 

in the manoeuvres of the battalion.

76. The colonel will frequently cause to be 

exercised, by a field officer, the colour-bearer, 

the colour-guard, and the general guides in 

marching in line. The endeavour will be to 

make them contract the habit of marching in 

a given direction with the most scrupulous 

accuracy, and of preserving, in like manner, 

the length and cadence of the pace....

Colour-guard

50. In each battalion the colour-guard 

will be composed of eight or five corporals, 

according as the battalion may be formed 

264
in three or two ranks, and be posted on the 

left of the right centre company, of which 

company (for the time being) the guard will 

make a part.

51. The corporals will be selected by the 

colonel, who, nevertheless, will take but one 

at a time from the same company, and not one 

from the rifle, unless the rifles have bayonets. 

(In battalions with less than five companies 

present, there will be no colour-guard and 

no display of colours, except it may be at 

reviews.)

52. The front or colour rank of the guard 

will be composed of a sergeant, (to be selected by the colonel), who will be called, for the 

time, the colour-bearer*, with a corporal on 

his right and left; these places will be given in 

preference to the corporals of grenadiers and 

light infantry, respectively, as often as they 

compose a part of the guard.

53. The two other ranks of the guard will 

each consist of three corporals; or, if there 

be but one other rank that will be so composed.

54. When the guard consists of three 

ranks, the centre rank will be composed of 

the three corporals the most distinguished 

for regularity and precision, as well in their 

positions under arms as in their marching. 

The latter advantage, and a just carriage of the 

person, are yet to be more particularly sought 

for in the selection of the colour-bearer.

55. The corporals of the colour-guard 

will carry their muskets within the right arm, 

as will be prescribed at the end of Title III—

bayonets always fixed....

*The colour, in bad or windy weather, except in 

saluting, will be borne furled and cased. The heel of 

ferrule of its lance ought to have for support, a leather 

stirrup or socket, suspended from a belt, the latter buckled around the waist of the colour-bearer.

Extract from Regulations for the Army of 

the United States, 1904.

Article XV

The Post Noncommissioned Staff

93. The post noncommissioned staff consists of master electricians, Artillery Corps, 

ordnance, post commissary, post quartermaster, 

and electrician sergeants. They are appointed by 

the Secretary of War after due examination, as 

follows: Master electricians Artillery Corps from 

the Army or from civil life; ordnance sergeants 

from sergeants of the line who have served at 

least eight years in the Army, including four 

years as noncommissioned officers, and who 

are less than 45 years of age; post commissarysergeants from sergeants of the line who have 

served five years in the Army, including three 

years as noncommissioned officers; post quartermaster-sergeants from sergeants of the line 

who have served four years in the Army; electrician sergeants from the Army or from civil life.

94. An application for appointment must 

be in the handwriting of the applicant, and 

will briefly state the length and nature of his 

military service, and for what time and in 

what organizations he has served as a noncommissioned officer. The company commander will indorse thereon the character 

of the applicant and his opinion as to his 

intelligence and fitness for the position. The 

application so indorsed will be submitted 

to the regimental or artillery district commander, who will forward the same, with his 

remarks as to the merits of the applicant, to 

The Military Secretary of the Army.

95. While the law contemplates in these 

appointments the better preservation of public property at the several posts, there is also 

a further consideration—that of offering a 

reward to faithful and well-tried sergeants, 

thus giving encouragement to deserving soldiers to hope for substantial promotion. 

Commanding officers can not be too particular in investigating and reporting upon the 

character and qualifications of applicants.

96. Regulations for the examination of 

applicants for appointment as post noncommissioned staff officers will be published 

from time to time in orders by the War 

Department.

97. A post noncommissioned staff officer 

will assist the officer of his department, and 

will not be detailed upon any service not 

pertaining to his proper position, unless the 

necessities of the service require such detail, 

in which case the post commander will 

note the fact, with reasons therefor, on the 

sergeant’s personal report.

265
98. A noncommissioned staff officer at an 

ungarrisoned post or station will be responsible for the property of his own department, and for such other property as may be 

intrusted to him for safe-keeping. For all public property committed to his charge he will 

account to the heads of the staff departments 

concerned, and if the means at his disposal 

are insufficient for its preservation he will 

report the facts.

99. The military control of post noncommissioned staff officers serving at posts 

not occupied by troops is vested in the 

commander of the territorial department in 

which they are serving. All matters relating 

to them as soldiers subject to military command, as distinguished from the administrative duties imposed upon them by regulations and orders, will, except in cases of 

reenlistment, be determined at department 

headquarters, where their descriptive lists 

and accounts of pay and clothing will be 

kept. When they are discharged a copy of the 

descriptive list, upon which will be noted 

the fact of discharge, with the date, place, 

and cause, and the character given on the 

discharge certificate, will be forwarded to The 

Military Secretary of the Army.

100. Each post noncommissoned staff 

officer will make such personal reports as 

may be required by the head of the corps or 

department to which he belongs. The officer 

under whose orders these noncommissioned 

officers are serving will indorse on each 

separate report his opinion of the manner 

in which the noncommissioned officer has 

performed his duties, and the commanding 

officer will forward the report direct to the 

chief of the proper bureau or corps.

101. A post noncommissioned staff officer may be reenlisted, provided he shall 

have conducted himself properly and performed his duties in a satisfactory manner. 

If, however, his commanding officer should 

not deem the reenlistment to be for the best 

interest of the service he will communicate 

his reasons to The Military Secretary of the 

Army in time to receive the decision of the 

War Department before the soldier’s discharge. If serving at an ungarrisoned post 

application for reenlistment will be made by 

the soldier to The Military Secretary through 

department headquarters. The reenlistment 

paper will immediately be forwarded direct 

to The Military Secretary, except in the case 

of soldiers stationed at ungarrisoned posts, 

in which case it will be forwarded through 

department headquarters. A post noncommissioned staff officer will be furnished with 

a warrant signed by the chief of the proper 

bureau or corps. The warrant will remain in 

force so long as the soldier is continuously in 

the service, i.e., if he reenlists the day following that of his discharge. Every such reenlistment will be noted on the back of the warrant 

by the officer who reenlists the soldier, as follows: Reenlisted (date); warrant continued.

102. Post noncommissioned staff officers, 

though liable to discharge for inefficiency or 

misconduct, will not be reduced.

Article XVI

Detached Soldiers: Descriptive Lists

103. When an enlisted man is detached 

from his company, a descriptive list will be 

prepared and forwarded to his new commanding officer. On the descriptive list will be 

shown the pay due the soldier, the condition 

of his clothing allowance, and all information 

necessary to the settlement of his accounts 

with the Government. When it can be avoided, the descriptive list will not be intrusted to 

the soldier, but to an officer or noncommissioned officer under whose charge he may 

be, or it may be forwarded by mail. The date 

of the last vaccination of the soldier and its 

result will be noted on the descriptive list. 

Articles of ordnance equipment in possession 

of a detached soldier will be transferred as 

prescribed in paragraph 1564....

Article XXIX

Regiments and Battalions

244. The adjutant, quartermaster, and commissary are, under the regimental commander, 

responsible for the discipline and efficiency of 

the noncommissioned staff and band.

245. The quartermaster will perform the 

duties of quartermaster of the regiment when 

266
in the field, and may be required to perform 

the duties of quartermaster of the post where 

he is stationed. The commissary will perform 

the duties of commissary of the regiment 

when in the field, and may be required to 

perform the duties of commissary of the post 

where he is stationed.

246. A regimental staff officer may be 

assigned to duty with a company or to any 

staff duty which his regimental commander 

may impose. A battalion staff officer is subject 

to any duty which the commanding officer 

may impose.

247. The regimental noncommissioned 

staff officers consist of the sergeant-major, 

the quartermaster-sergeant, commissarysergeant, and two colour-sergeants, and are 

appointed by the regimental commander. 

The battalion noncommissioned staff officers are the battalion sergeants-major, and 

in engineer troops battalion quartermastersergeants. They are appointed by the regimental commander upon the recommendation of 

the battalion commander. When a battalion 

is detached and serving at such a distance 

from regimental headquarters that more than 

fifteen days are required for exchange of correspondence by mail, the battalion noncommissioned staff officers are appointed by the 

battalion commander, who will immediately 

notify the regimental commander. Each noncommissioned staff officer will be furnished 

with a warrant signed by the officer making 

the appointment and countersigned by the 

adjutant. The appointment takes effect on the 

day upon which it is made, and the warrant 

may be continued in force upon discharge 

and reenlistment, if reenlistment be made on 

the day following discharge; each reenlistment 

and continuance will be noted on the warrant 

by the adjutant. Any noncommissioned staff 

officer may be reduced to the ranks by the 

sentence of a court-martial, or by order of the 

commander having authority to appoint such 

noncommissioned officer. Noncommissioned 

staff officers will preferably be selected from 

the noncommissioned officers of the regiment 

most distinguished for efficiency, gallantry, 

and soldierly bearing.

248. The public property pertaining to the 

headquarters of the regiment will be marked 

“H.Q.,” with arm and number of regiment; the 

equipments in possession of the noncommissioned staff and band will be marked “N.C.S.” 

and “Band,” respectively, and with the arm and 

number of the regiment and the number of the 

man to whom the articles are issued.

249. The following-named books and 

papers will be kept in each regiment: An order 

book, a letters-received book, with index, a letters-sent book, with index, a regimental fund 

book, and a descriptive book, furnished by 

The Military Secretary of the Army; all orders, 

circulars, and instructions from higher authority, copies of the monthly returns, muster rolls 

of the field, staff, and band, other regimental 

returns and reports, and all correspondence 

concerning the regiment or affecting its personnel.

Of the books and papers herein referred 

to, the books of letters received and letters 

sent, the muster rolls, the regimental monthly returns and all other returns of the personnel of the regiment, and the general orders 

and circulars of the War Department will be 

permanently preserved. Division and department orders, except extracts of special orders, 

will, when the regiment is relieved from duty 

in the division and department, be disposed 

of under instructions of the division and 

department commanders. The other books 

and papers will be kept for five years, reckoned from the close of the period of their use 

in case of books, and from their dates in case 

of papers, when they will be destroyed under 

direction of the regimental commander.

250. All orders and circulars from the 

War Department, or from the headquarters 

of an army, corps, division, brigade, or territorial division or department in which the 

regiment may be serving, will be filed in 

book form, and general orders and circulars 

indexed as soon as received.

Bands

251. The noncommissioned officers of 

regimental bands will be appointed by the 

regimental commanders, upon the recommendation of regimental adjutants, under 

the same conditions prescribed in paragraph 

247 for the noncommissioned staff of the 

267
regiment. The noncommissioned officers of 

the engineer band will be appointed by the 

commanding officer of the battalion with 

which the band is serving; the noncommissioned officers of the artillery bands will be 

appointed by the artillery district commander, or, if not serving in an artillery district, 

by the senior artillery officer of the post at 

which they are stationed....

Article XXX

Troops, Batteries, and Companies

261. Noncommissioned officers will be 

carefully selected and instructed, and always 

supported by company commanders in the 

proper performance of their duties. They will 

not be detailed for any duty nor permitted to 

engage in any occupation inconsistent with 

their rank and position. Officers will be cautious 

in reproving them in the presence or hearing of 

private soldiers.

262. Company noncommissioned officers 

are appointed by regimental commanders, or 

by battalion commanders under the conditions 

stated in paragraph 247, on the recommendation of their company commanders; but in no 

case will any company organization have an 

excess of noncommissioned officers above that 

allowed by law. The noncommissioned officers 

of artillery companies will, upon the recommendation of the company commanders, be 

appointed by artillery district commanders, or if 

not serving in an artillery district, by the senior 

artillery officer of the command.

263. To test the capacity of privates for the 

duties of noncommissioned officers company 

commanders may appoint lance corporals, who 

will be obeyed and respected as corporals, but 

no company shall have more than one lance 

corporal at a time, unless there are noncommissioned officers absent by authority, during 

which absences there may be one for each 

absentee.

264. The captain will select the first sergeant, 

quartermaster-sergeant, and stable sergeant from 

the sergeants of his company, and may return 

them to the grade of sergeant without reference 

to higher authority.

265. Each noncommissioned officer will 

be furnished with a certificate or warrant of his 

rank, signed by the officer making the appointment, and countersigned by the adjutant; but a 

separate warrant as first sergeant, quartermastersergeant, or stable-sergeant will not be given. A 

warrant issued to a noncommissioned officer 

is his personal property. Warrants need not be 

renewed in cases of reenlistment in the same 

company, if reenlistment is made the day following the day of discharge, but may remain in 

force until vacated by promotion or reduction, 

each reenlistment and continuance to be noted 

on the warrant by the company commander.

266. Appointments of company noncommissioned officers will take effect on 

the day of appointment by the authorized 

commander, and of first sergeants, quartermaster-sergeants, stable-sergeants, cooks, 

artificers, farriers and blacksmiths, mechanics, saddlers, wagoners, musicians, trumpeters, and first-class privates on the day of 

appointment by the company commander; 

but in case of vacancy in a company absent 

from regimental headquarters, a company 

commander may make a temporary appointment of a noncommissioned officer, which, 

if approved by the regimental commander, 

will carry rank and pay from the date of such 

appointment.

267. A noncommissioned officer may 

be reduced to the ranks by sentence of 

a court-martial, or on the recommendation of the company commander, by the 

order of the commander having authority 

to appoint such noncommissioned officer, 

but a noncommissioned officer will not be 

reduced because of absence on account of 

sickness or injury contracted in the line of 

duty. If reduced to the ranks by sentence of 

court-martial at a post not the headquarters 

of his regiment, the company commander 

will forward a transcript of the order to the 

regimental commander. The transfer of a 

noncommissioned officer from one organization to another carries with it reduction to 

the ranks unless otherwise specified in the 

order by authority competent to issue a new 

warrant.

268. When a noncommissioned officer, 

while in arrest or confinement, is reduced by 

sentence of a court-martial, the date of the 

order publishing the sentence is the date of 

reduction. In all other cases reduction takes 

268
effect on the date of receipt of the order at 

the soldier’s station.

The desertion of a noncommissioned 

officer vacates his position from the date 

of his unauthorized absence....

Extract from Army Regulation 245–5, War 

Department, Washington, 2 June 1942.

Companies—General Provisions

b. Noncommissioned officers.—Noncommissioned officers will be carefully 

instructed in their duties as such.

c. Privates with view to appointment as 

noncommissioned officers.—To test the capacity of privates for the duties of noncommissioned officers, company commanders may appoint acting noncommissioned 

officers, who will be instructed, obeyed, 

and respected as such; but no company 

will have more than one acting noncommissioned officer at any time in each 

grade below the third grade unless there 

are noncommissioned officers below the 

third grade absent by authority, during 

which absences there may be one for each 

absentee.

4. Squad leaders.—Squad leaders will 

be held responsible—

a. For the personal cleanliness and 

appearance of their men.

b. That those who are to go on duty 

put their arms, equipment, and clothing in 

the best possible condition previous to the 

time of entering upon duty.

c. That those coming off duty place 

their arms and equipments in the designated places.

d. That the bedding, bunks, and all 

other property issued to or belonging to 

the men of their squads are kept in a clean 

and orderly condition.

e. That all Government property issued 

the members of their squads is properly 

recorded and charged.

f. That all losses or damages to Government property issued the men of their 

squads are promptly reported.

g. That the clothing and other effects of 

deserters, men absent without leave, and 

men sick in hospital are promptly secured 

and turned over to the proper agency.

h. That the names of those desiring 

medical treatment are reported for entry 

on daily sick book.

i. That those desiring to make deposits 

present their deposit books at the proper 

time.

j. That clothing and equipment which 

is no longer serviceable be turned in for 

replacement.

5. Inspections.—a. Company commanders will hold inspections of the 

personnel, equipment, and buildings, to 

include ground contiguous thereto, pertaining to their commands as directed by 

the commanding officer and at such other 

times as deemed necessary.

b. No one will be excused from these 

inspections except the guard, the sick in 

hospital, and those ordered excused by the 

commanding officer.

6. Company mess.—a. Where companies are not joined in a general mess, the 

company commander, assisted by the other 

officers of the company, will supervise the 

cooking and messing of his men.

b. Where all the companies are joined 

in a general mess, he will confine his 

supervision of the mess of his company 

to observation and to notifying the officer 

in charge in writing of anything requiring 

remedy. Should this officer fail to apply 

proper remedy, report will then be made to 

the appropriate commander.

c. Kitchens will be placed under the 

immediate charge of noncommissioned 

officers, who will be held responsible for 

their condition and for the proper use of 

rations.

d. Additional pay for cooks and mess attendants.—See AR 210–50.

8. Miscellaneous.—a. When possible 

the company commander will see that 

every grave of the men of his company who 

die or are killed on the battlefield is carefully marked so that future identification 

can be easily made.

b. Noncommissioned officers will be 

supported by company commanders in the 

performance of their duties. They will not 

be detailed for any duty nor permitted to 

269
engage in any occupation inconsistent with 

their work and position. Officers will be cautious in reproving them in the presence or 

hearing of privates....

By Order of the Secretary of War:

G.C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff.

Changes 

No. 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington25, D.C., 

20 December 1945

AR 245–5, 2 June 1942 is changed as 

follows: 

3. Instruction of personnel. 

b. Noncommissioned officers.

(1) Noncommissioned officers will be 

carefully instructed in their duties as such.

(2) In order that the desired results 

may be attained, special attention will be 

given to the following points:

(a) The careful initial selection of noncommissioned officer material.

(b) The operation of appropriate noncommissioned officer schools.

(c) The prompt removal of noncommissioned officers who fail to attain or 

maintain acceptable standards.

(d) The enhancement of the advantages 

and prestige of the noncommissioned officer grades.

(e) The public recognition through 

new releases, orders, and other appropriate 

means of the accomplishments and importance of the noncommissioned officers.

(f) The delegation to the noncommissioned officers of all authority that 

is rightfully theirs and the creation of 

increased opportunity for the noncommissioned officers to exercise command and 

initiative.

(g) The consultation with appropriate 

noncommissioned officers in planning the 

implementation of directives.

(h) The avoidance of embarrassment of 

noncommissioned officers in the presence 

of their subordinates.

(i) The thorough indoctrination of 

every noncommissioned officer with the 

importance and responsibility of his grade 

and position.

By Order of the Secretary of War:

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 

Chief of Staff

Extract from Army Regulation 600–20, HQ, 

Department of the Army, Washington, 31 

January 1967.

Personnel—General 

Army Command Policy and Procedure

Section IV. Enlisted Aspects of 

Command.

24. General policies. a. Except as specifically indicated, all of the policies of this 

regulation apply equally to all classes of military personnel as listed in paragraph 7. This 

section is devoted to emphasizing policies of 

command that are primarily or exclusively 

related to the enlisted grades. At all echelons 

of command, commanders and their staffs 

are charged specifically with the responsibility of insuring equitable delegation of 

authority and responsibility, as guided by 

this regulation, to noncommissioned officers 

by their superiors, whether officer, warrant 

officer, or other noncommissioned officers.

b. This regulation is applicable to enlisted 

personnel of all components of the Army. 

Per-sonnel retired and members of USAR 

Control Groups prior to 1 July 1955 are 

exempted from this regulation while in that 

status.

25. Noncommissioned officers. The guidance in this paragraph is amplified in AR 

611–201 which describes in detail the command function of all noncommissioned officer MOS.

a. Sergeant major of the Army. This is 

the senior sergeant major grade of rank as 

indicated in paragraph 7. It is also the position title that designates the senior enlisted 

position of the Army. The sergeant major 

occupying this position serves as the senior 

270
enlisted advisor and consultant to the Chief 

of Staff of the Army on problems affecting 

enlisted personnel and their solutions; on 

professional education, growth and advancement of noncommissioned officers; and on 

morale, training, pay, promotions and other 

matters concerning enlisted personnel. He is 

also available to present the enlisted viewpoint on Department of the Army boards 

and committees. Other functions of this 

position include meeting with military and 

civilian organizations to discuss enlisted 

personnel affairs, receiving enlisted personnel who visit Headquarters, Department of 

the Army, and representing all Army enlisted 

personnel at appropriate ceremonies.

b. Sergeant major. This is the position title 

that designates the senior enlisted position 

on the staffs of various commanders. In keeping with the trust, confidence, responsibility, 

and authority bestowed upon this function, 

the sergeant major should be considered as a 

key staff member. As indicated in paragraph 

11, it is from the sergeant major of a major 

unit or installation that the activities of the 

local NCO channel emanate. This channel 

functions orally through the sergeant major’s 

and first sergeant’s call and does not normally involve written directives.

c. First sergeant. This position title is second to the sergeant major in importance, 

responsibility, and prestige. In the sense 

that first sergeants are in direct and daily 

contact with sizeable numbers of other 

enlisted men, this position is one requiring outstanding leadership and professional 

competence. The first sergeant is the senior 

enlisted assistant to commanders of companies, batteries, and troops. It is normal 

for company commanders to use the noncommissioned officer channel (para 11) for 

the conduct of many routine activities, particularly in garrison. Thus, in these activities, 

the first sergeant occupies an intermediary 

position between the other enlisted personnel and the officers of the company. He 

conducts routine company administration 

and company operations as directed by the 

company commander. He drafts company 

orders, reports, and other documents requiring the signature of the company commander. The functions of the first sergeant do not 

include responsibilities which cannot be 

delegated by the company commander or 

which properly belong to the executive officer or platoon leaders.

d. Platoon sergeant. This position title is 

also one of the key ones in the command 

structure of the Army. It is normal for platoon sergeants to become vital members of 

the chain of command under the provisions 

of paragraph 16. When the officer platoon 

leader is present, the platoon sergeant is his 

key assistant and advisor.

e. Section, squad, and team leaders. The 

importance of these positions stems from the 

fact that the responsibilities of these echelons 

of the chain of command (para 11) are habitually exercised by noncommissioned officers. 

Platoon leaders hold their subordinate leaders responsible—(1) For personal appearance 

and cleanliness of their soldiers.

(2) That all Government property issued 

to members of their units is properly maintained and accounted for at all times and that 

discrepancies are reported promptly.

(3) That, while in a duty status, they be 

ready at all times to report the location and 

activity of all individuals of the unit. Thus 

as the basic reporting unit in formations, 

the squad is either present, or individuals 

absent are reported by name and not merely 

accounted for.

(4) That the unit is prepared to function 

in its primary mission role.

f. Acting noncommissioned officers. Company, troop, battery, and separate detachment 

commanders may appoint acting corporals 

and sergeants in accordance with AR 600–200 

for the purpose of filling position vacancies. 

Additionally, AR 600–200 provides for acting corporals, sergeants, and staff sergeants 

for casual groups. While so acting they will 

wear the insignia and have the responsibilities, authority and privileges of the position 

to which appointed, except that they will not 

be entitled to the pay and allowances of such 

higher grades, and such service will not be 

credited as time in a higher grade for appointment or date of rank purposes.

g. Noncommissioned officer disciplinary policies. The purpose of this subparagraph is to 

emphasize the important status of noncommissioned officers in the maintenance of 

271
discipline in the Army. These policies should 

be considered together with the provisions of 

section V and MCM 1951.

(1) NCO authority to apprehend, see 

paragraph 32, this regulation; article 7(c) 

UCMJ; and paragraph 19, MCM 1951.

(2) Noncommissioned officers may be 

authorized by their commanding officers, in 

accordance with article 9(b), UCMJ, to order 

enlisted persons into arrest or confinement. 

Also see paragraph 21a, MCM 1951. This 

authority is frequently confined by commanding officers to first sergeants, charge of 

quarters, or other duty positions.

(3) Noncommissioned officers do not 

have any authority to impose nonjudicial punishment upon other enlisted personnel under 

article 15, UCMJ. However, the recommendations of noncommissioned officers may be 

sought and considered by unit commanders.

(4) As enlisted commanders of troops 

certain noncommissioned officers play an 

extremely important role in furthering the 

efficiency of the company, battery, or troops. 

This function includes the prevention of incidents which, if they occurred, would make it 

necessary to resort to trial by courts-martial 

or imposition of nonjudicial punishment. 

Thus, the NCO is a key assistant to the commander in administering the minor nonpunitive (not to be confused with nonjudicial 

punishment) disciplinary responsibilities 

prescribed in paragraph 33, and in paragraph 

128c, MCM 1951. See also paragraph 35b, 

this regulation.

(5) In taking corrective action with regard 

to subordinates, noncommissioned officers 

will be guided by, and observe, the principles 

set forth in paragraph 34e.

(6) For trials of noncommissioned officers by courts-martial whose membership, as 

provided by article 25(c)(1), UCMJ, includes 

enlisted persons, the following will apply. 

When it can be avoided, no member of the 

court-martial will be junior to the accused 

in rank or grade. Specialists will not, except 

under extraordinary circumstances, sit as 

members of courts-martial of noncommissioned officers. In those cases in which a 

specialist sits on a court-martial of a noncommissioned officer he should be in a higher 

pay grade than the accused.

(7) In the case of noncommissioned 

officers above the fourth enlisted pay grade, 

summary courts-martial may not adjudge 

confinement, hard labor without confinement, or reduction except to the next inferior 

grade.

(8) When nonjudicial punishment (art. 

15, UCMJ) is imposed on a noncommissioned officer it may not include correctional 

custody, confinement on bread and water or 

diminished rations, or any type of extra duty 

involving labor or duties not customarily 

performed by a noncommissioned officer of 

the grade of the person who is to perform the 

extra duty.

h. Miscellaneous NCO responsibilities, prerogatives, and privileges. Noncommissioned 

officers will:

(1) Execute orders on their own initiative 

and judgment within the authority delegated 

to them.

(2) Be employed as training instructors to 

the maximum degree practicable.

(3) Make recommendations relative to 

unit mission accomplishment and troop 

welfare. NCO recommendations have traditionally been of immeasurable assistance to 

their commanding officer on such matters as 

assignment, reassignment, promotion, privileges, discipline, training, unit funds, community affairs, and supply.

(4) Be utilized only in supervisory roles 

on fatigue duty, and only as noncommissioned officers of the guard on guard duty, 

except in temporary situations where other 

grades are critically short.

(5) Be granted such privileges as organization and installation commanders are 

capable of granting and consider proper to 

enhance the prestige of these vital enlisted 

troop commanders.

(6) Be considered for assignment of quarters (noncommissioned officers with bona 

fide dependents) by installation commanders upon the basis of several pertinent factors under the provisions of AR 210–14. 

Determination of the seniority factor of applicants under AR 210–14 will be on the basis of 

date of rank within pay grade for all enlisted 

personnel under consideration.

(7) Be afforded pass privileges in accordance with AR 630–20, which provides that 

272
no pass form will be required for staff sergeants and higher.

(8) Be afforded the privilege of establishing and operating noncommissioned officers’ 

open messes as adjuncts of the Army as covered in AR 230–60.

(9) Be afforded separate rooms in barracks areas to the extent feasible under the 

provisions of AR 210–18.

26. Specialists. a. A specialist is a selected 

enlisted person who has been appointed 

under the provisions of AR 600–200 for the 

purpose of discharging duties that require a 

high degree of special skill. Specialists must 

have acquired proficiency in the technical 

or administrative aspects of their MOS field. 

Specialists, by virtue of their technical skill, 

are often called upon to exercise leadership 

with respect to matters related to their specialty. Normally, their duties do not require the 

exercise of enlisted command of troops. Thus, 

while leadership proficiency is not a primary 

prerequisite for advancement to or within 

the specialist grades, qualities of leadership 

should be encouraged and recognized.

b. Although the duty positions of specialists are not enlisted command positions, and 

do not normally require exercise of leadership 

functions, there are exceptions. In particular, 

the more senior specialists will occasionally 

be called upon to assume command under 

the provisions of paragraphs 16, 17, or 31a of 

this regulation. Additionally, senior specialists are usually soldiers with long service and 

outstanding ability who contribute in considerable degree to maintenance of the high 

appearance and conduct standards of enlisted 

personnel of lesser rank.

c. Specialist Six and Specialist Seven will 

be exempt from guard and fatigue duty, 

except in unusual circumstances when their 

services are required for the proper execution of these duties. In these cases, they will 

be used only in a supervisory role except in 

temporary situations where other grades are 

critically short, but in no case over a noncommissioned officer.

d. Specialist Six and Specialist Seven will 

be granted, in general, the same type privileges as noncommissioned officers in the 

organization and installation. A type of exception that might be applied by organization 

or installation commanders is listed in paragraph 25h(9).

e. Specialist Five and Specialist Four may 

be granted such privileges as the organization and installation commanders consider 

proper.

f. Under no circumstances will a specialist 

be granted any prerogatives or privileges that 

would be detrimental to the prestige of a noncommissioned officer, nor will any specialist 

be placed in such a position that he would be 

required to execute orders over a noncommissioned officer in the Army. In connection with 

joint activities, see paragraph 8d.

g. In the case of Specialists above the 

fourth enlisted pay grade, summary courtsmartial may not adjudge confinement, hard 

labor without confinement, or reduction 

except to the next inferior pay grade.

h. When nonjudicial punishment (art. 15, 

UCMJ) is imposed on a Specialist it may not 

include correctional custody, confinement 

on bread and water or diminished rations, or 

any type of extra duty involving labor duties 

not customarily performed by a Specialist of 

the grade of the person who is to perform the 

extra duty.

i. Specialists who show leadership potential should be encouraged to advance toward 

noncommissioned officer skills in appropriate MOS by undergoing on-the-job training in 

such duty positions. While in this status, the 

commander may appoint the specialist as an 

acting noncommissioned officer.

27. Privates. This class of enlisted men 

is, as indicated in paragraph 7d(3), the basic 

manpower strength and grade of the Army. 

While command functions do not normally 

pertain to privates, they should be indoctrinated in their responsibilities and in their 

potential for enlisted command duties.

Extract from AR 350–17, Noncommissioned Officer Development Program, 

HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, 

1991.

4.g. Commanders of battalions, separate companies, and equivalent organizations will—

(1) Be responsible to develop and implement an effective NCODP.

273
(2) Ensure the program supports the unit 

mission and enhances development of noncommissioned officers. 

(3) Ensure that the program has stated 

objectives with measurable and reachable 

standards. 

4.h. Command sergeant major (CSMs), first 

sergeants, or senior NCOs of battalions, separate 

companies, or equivalent organizations will—

(2) Implement the commander’s directives and guidance on the unit’s NCODP. 

(3) Be responsible for content, pertinence, 

and implementation of the unit’s NCODP. 

5.b. As with all leader training, the 

NCODP is a command responsibility. The 

program reflects command priorities and 

expectations for leader development, jointly 

determined by commanders and their senior 

NCOs.

Extract from AR 600–20, HQ, Department 

of the Army, Washington, 13 May 2002.

Personnel—General Army Command 

Policy and Procedure

Chapter 3. Enlisted Aspects of Command

3–1. Delegation of authority

Commanders and their staffs, at all levels 

of command, are responsible for ensuring 

proper delegation of authority to NCOs by 

their seniors. This policy applies whether the 

senior is an officer, WO, or another NCO.

3–2. Noncommissioned officer support 

channel

a. The NCO support channel (leadership 

chain) parallels and complements the chain 

of command. It is a channel of communication and supervision from the command 

sergeant major to first sergeant and then to 

other NCOs and enlisted personnel of the 

units. Commanders will define responsibilities and authority of their NCOs to their 

staffs and subordinates. This NCO support 

channel will assist the chain of command in 

accomplishing the following—

(1) Transmitting, instilling, and ensuring 

the efficacy of the professional Army ethic. 

(See FM 100–1 for an explanation of the professional Army ethic.)

(2) Planning and conducting the day-today unit operations within prescribed policies 

and directives.

(3) Training of enlisted soldiers in their 

MOS as well as in the basic skills and attributes of a soldier.

(4) Supervising unit physical fitness training and ensuring that unit soldiers comply 

with the weight and appearance standards of 

AR 600–9 and AR 670–1.

(5) Teaching soldiers the history of the 

Army, to include military customs, courtesies, 

and traditions.

(6) Caring for individual soldiers and their 

families both on and off duty.

(7) Teaching soldiers the mission of the 

unit and developing individual training programs to support the mission.

(8) Accounting for and maintaining individual arms and equipment of enlisted soldiers, and unit equipment under their control.

(9) Administering and monitoring the 

NCO professional development program, and 

other unit training programs. 

(10) Achieving and maintaining courage, candor, competence, commitment, and 

compassion.

b. AR 611–201 and TC 22–6 contain specific information concerning the responsibilities, command functions, and scope of NCO 

duties.

(1) Sergeant Major of the Army. This is the 

senior sergeant major grade and designates the 

senior enlisted position of the Army. The sergeant major in this position serves as the senior 

enlisted adviser and consultant to the Chief of 

Staff, Army.

(2) Command Sergeant Major. This position title designates the senior NCO of the command at battalion or higher levels. He or she 

carries out policies and standards, and advises 

the commander on the performance, training, 

appearance, and conduct of enlisted soldiers. 

The command sergeant major administers the 

unit Noncommissioned Officer’s Professional 

Development Program (NCODP).

(3) First Sergeant. The position of first sergeant designates the senior NCO at company 

level. 

The first sergeant of a separate company or equivalent level organization administers the unit NCODP.

274
(4) Platoon Sergeant. The platoon sergeant is the key assistant and adviser to the 

platoon leader. In the absence of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant leads the 

platoon.

(5) Section, squad, and team leaders. 

These direct leaders are the NCOs responsible at this level.

c. NCO disciplinary policies are shown 

below.

(1) NCOs are important to maintaining discipline in the Army. The policies 

prescribed in this subparagraph should be 

considered together with the provisions of 

chapter 4 of this regulation, AR 27–10, and 

the MCM.

(a) NCOs have the authority to apprehend any person subject to trial by courtmartial under the MCM (Article 7, UCMJ, 

and para 302(b), Rules for Courts-Martial 

(RCM)) and chapter 4 of this regulation.

(b) NCOs may be authorized by their 

commanders to order enlisted soldiers of the 

commanding officer’s command or enlisted 

soldiers subject to the authority of that commanding officer into arrest or confinement 

per the MCM (para 304(b), RCM).

(2) NCOs do not have authority to 

impose nonjudicial punishment on other 

enlisted soldiers under the MCM (Article 

15, UCMJ). However, the commander may 

authorize an NCO in the grade of sergeant 

first class or above, provided such person is 

senior to the soldier being notified, to deliver the DA Form 2627 (Record of Proceedings 

under Article 15, UCMJ) and inform the 

soldier of his or her rights. In cases of nonjudicial punishment, the recommendations 

of NCOs should be sought and considered 

by the unit commanders.

(3) As enlisted leaders of soldiers, NCOs 

are essential to furthering the efficiency of 

the company, battery, or troop. This function includes preventing incidents that make 

it necessary to resort to trial by courts-martial or to impose nonjudicial punishment. 

Thus, NCOs are assistants to commanders 

in administering minor nonpunitive corrective actions as found in AR 27–10 and Part 

V, paragraph 1g of the MCM. “ Nonpunitive 

measures” are not “ nonjudicial punishment.”

(4) In taking corrective action with 

regard to subordinates, NCOs will be guided 

by and observe the principles listed in chapter 4.

d. NCO prerogatives and privileges are 

shown below. NCOs will—

(1) Function only in supervisory roles 

on work details and only as NCOs of the 

guard on guard duty, except when temporary personnel shortages require the NCO to 

actively participate in the work detail.

(2) Be granted such privileges as organization and installation commanders are 

capable of granting and consider proper to 

enhance the prestige of their enlisted troop 

leaders.

275

In carrying out their increasingly important responsibilities, NCOs have earned 

their professional standing in the U.S. 

Army. However, broad acceptance of this 

professional status has been a relatively 

recent thing. Only during the last century 

have the Army’s leaders come to realize that, 

for practical reasons as well as to recognize 

an important job well done, the prestige of 

NCOs had to be enhanced. They did this by 

attacking persistent problems in NCO pay, 

rank, and formal professional development.

Extract from General Regulations for the 

Army of the United States, 1841.

Article XIII

Non-commissioned Officers

60. It is of essential importance to the 

service that the station and respectability of 

the non-commissioned officer be upheld. 

It is, therefore, earnestly recommended and 

enjoined upon all officers, to be cautious 

Professional Status
in reproving non-commissioned officers in 

the presence or hearing of privates, lest their 

authority and respectability be weakened 

in the eyes of their inferiors; and admonition should, at all times, be conveyed in 

mild terms, without exposing the individual, whatever be his rank. And it is also 

directed that non-commissioned officers, 

in no case, be sent to the guard-room and 

mixed with privates during confinement, but 

be considered as placed under arrest, except 

in aggravated cases, where escape may be 

anticipated.

61. Non-commissioned officers will be 

appointed in the manner prescribed by paragraph 

45; and when thus appointed and announced, 

they are not to be removed from their respective 

places, except by the sentence of a court-martial, or 

by order of the Colonel, or other permanent commander of the regiment.

62. A non-commissioned officer having been 

duly appointed, cannot, at his pleasure, resign his 

place, or relinquish his duties as such, and return 

to the ranks.

63. Every non-commissioned officer shall be 

furnished with a certificate of his rank, signed by 

the Colonel, and countersigned by the Adjutant.

64. Whenever circumstances may make it necessary, Lance-Sergeants may be appointed from the 

Corporals, and Lance-Corporals from the privates, 

who, if their conduct be good, and evince capacity 

for the discharge of such duties, should be promoted to the first vacancies. The appointments will be 

made in the same manner as that already pointed 

out for non-commissioned officers.

65. Independent of the particular duties 

required of non-commissioned officers, (Sergeants 

and Corporals), when in the ranks, according to 

the systems of tactical instruction, it is also their 

duty, at all times, to observe the conduct of the 

privates, and to report immediately to the proper 

authority every breach of the general regulations 

of the service, or of the particular orders of the 

post....

Article XXII

Non-commissioned Officers’ Mess

94. When the circumstances of the service will permit, it is highly desirable, for the 

maintenance of the respect and authority 

due the non-commissioned officers, that a 

separate mess for this class should be organized. Commanders of companies are therefore enjoined to give their attention to this 

subject.

95. The provisions for the non-commissioned officers will be cooked in the company kitchen, and their meals served at the 

same hours as those of the company....

Article XXIV

Officers’ Waiters or Servants

106. Non-commissioned officers will, in 

no case, be permitted to act as waiters; nor 

are they, or private soldiers, not waiters, to 

be employed in any menial office, or made 

to perform any service, not military, for the 

private benefit of any officer, or mess of 

officers....

General Orders No. 37, Headquarters of 

the Army, Adjutant General’s Office, 

Washington, 21 October 1852.

I. The following forms of Warrant and 

Discharge having been adopted by the War 

Department, are published for the information and government of all concerned:

Form of Warrant for Non-Commissioned 

Officers.

THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE REGIMENT OF 

Arms of U.S. as established by 

Resolution of Congress. June 

20, 1782, and Act of Sept. 15, 

1789, section 3d.

To all who shall see these presents, greeting:

Know ye, That reposing special trust 

and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities of , I do hereby appoint 

him in Company , of the Regiment 

of , in the service of the United States, to 

rank as such from the day of , one thousand eight hundred and . He is therefore 

carefully and diligently to discharge the duty 

276
of by doing and performing all manner of 

things thereunto belonging. And I do strictly 

charge and require all non-commissioned 

officers and soldiers under his command to 

be obedient to his orders as . And he is 

to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as he shall receive 

from me, or the future Commanding Officer 

of the Regiment, or other superior officers 

and noncommissioned officers set over him, 

according to the rules and discipline of War. 

This Warrant to continue in force during the 

pleasure of the Commanding Officer of the 

Regiment for the time being.

Given under my hand at the Head 

Quarters of the Regiment, at , this day 

of , in the year of our Lord one thousand 

eight hundred and

By the Commanding Officer: Commanding 

the Regiment.

Adjutant of the Regiment.

Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary 

of War for the Year 1888.

Non-commissioned Officers

The position of non-commissioned officers is one of ever-increasing importance 

and responsibility. Noncommissioned officers, properly to perform the duties of their 

position, require, and should receive, a special education; they should, moreover, be of 

a higher average class of men, than we have 

heretofore been able to obtain in the regular 

service. I recommend that a school for noncommissioned officers of infantry and cavalry be established at Fort Leavenworth, on a 

plan similar to that now in operation at Fort 

Monroe for the benefit of the artillery. But 

it seems useless to expect much improvement in this respect until the pay attaching 

to these positions is sufficiently increased 

to offer an inducement for a good class of 

men to enlist for the purpose of obtaining 

them. While we have many good noncommissioned officers in the service, it is incontestable that the average of intelligence and 

efficiency is very far below what it should 

be. I therefore most earnestly recommend 

a material increase in the pay of noncommissioned officers, believing that such a 

measure would tend greatly to increase the 

efficiency of the Army.

Pay of Non-commissioned Officers

Fully convinced that the adoption of the 

recommendation I had the honor to make 

in my last report would subserve the best 

interests of the Army, I beg to restate, in brief, 

the reasons why such a measure should be 

adopted and urged upon the consideration 

of Congress.

Much of the efficiency of a company 

depends on its non-commissioned officers. 

The very small increase in the pay of this class, 

totally incommensurate with the responsibility attached to it, is not a sufficient incentive 

to tempt the best and most reliable soldiers 

to accept the position, while it is often to the 

pecuniary advantage of the man to remain in 

the ranks, as a private on extra duty receives 

more pay than the sergeant-major or quartermaster-sergeant of a regiment. That this fact 

is not only wrong but pernicious in its effects, 

needs no argument. The pay of the lowest 

non-commissioned officer should not be less 

than $25, and the pay of the entire class readjusted on the suggested pay for the lowest 

position to $50 or $55 from the highest.

The grade of non-commissioned officer 

is the intermediary between the lowest in the 

Army, that of private, and the highest, the 

commissioned officer. The line of demarkation between these three classes should be 

as strongly accentuated downward as it is 

upward, and this is demanded alike by justice to the non-commissioned officers and 

proper regard for the discipline, efficiency, 

and morale of the Army.

Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary 

of War for the Year 1889.

Non-commissioned Officers

The efficiency of the Army, and the welfare and contentment of the enlisted men, 

depend very largely upon the non-commis277
sioned officers. Hence it is very important 

that the character and dignity of the latter be 

elevated as much as possible. The vacancies 

available for the promotion of enlisted men 

to the grade of second lieutenant are necessarily very few in number, and the most meritorious non-commissioned officers are too old 

to commence a career as commissioned officers. Hence each non-commissioned grade 

should be made a real reward for meritorious 

service. I respectfully recommend that the pay 

of non-commissioned officers of infantry, 

cavalry, and artillery be made the same as that 

now established by law for like grades in the 

engineers.

Pay of Non-commissioned Officers

The importance of efficient non-commissioned officers in the line of the Army 

demands that their pay should bear some 

proportion to the duties and responsibilities 

of their respective grade and that it be sufficient to stimulate a soldierly rivalry among 

the privates to attain even the lowest grade 

in that class. Rank without adequate pay is 

robbed of much of its value and is belittled in 

the eyes of the men whose laudable ambition 

it should be to obtain it. It must be admitted 

that the rapid advance made in the art of war 

requires more study, closer application, and 

greater capacity on the part of non-commissioned officers than in former years.

The first sergeant of a company may 

truly be called the hardest worked noncommissioned officer in the Army. He has 

a direct responsibility for the proper care 

and use of the arms, equipments, and other 

property of the company; he is always on 

duty; must possess tact, sound judgment, 

superior intelligence, and have a thorough 

knowledge of all details, orders, and papers 

pertaining to company administration. A 

good first sergeant is indispensable to the 

making of a good company, for without 

him the best efforts of the captain would 

be rendered abortive. Exercising a certain 

supervision over the duties performed by 

every member of the company, he commands and instructs men in the ranks who 

receive more compensation than is allowed 

him, his pay being $6 less than that of a soldier detailed as a mechanic and $1.50 less 

than is received by the private detailed on 

duty as laborer. Company sergeants, who are 

charged with important duties in the internal economy of the company besides commanding guards, escorts, fatigue parties, etc., 

receive $6.50 less than a soldier teamster in 

the quartermaster’s department; while a private on extra duty receives $8.50 more than 

the pay of a corporal. These facts sufficiently 

evidence what little incentive is offered to 

non-commissioned officers to re-enlist and 

remain in the service.

The class of non-commissioned officers 

in the Army occupies the intermediate grade 

between the private and the commissioned 

officer, and its duties demand men of good 

capacity, strict honesty, untiring energy, and 

possessing high soldierly attributes. Justice 

to company non-commissioned officers 

demands that their pay should assimilate 

to that allowed similar grades in other 

branches of the service. The sergeant major 

and the quartermaster sergeant of engineers 

receive $36 per month; post quartermaster, 

ordnance, and commissary sergeants, $34; 

sergeants of ordnance, engineers, and of the 

Signal Corps, $34; and corporals of those 

three corps, $20 per month.

I have the honor to submit the following 

rates of pay which are deemed justly proportioned to the rank and duties of each grade of 

regimental and company noncommissioned 

officers: Sergeant major, $36; quartermaster 

sergeant, $34; chief trumpeter and the principal musician, $30; saddler sergeant, $26; first 

sergeant, $34; sergeant, $25; and corporal, 

$20.

The adoption of the above schedule of 

pay will undoubtedly greatly promote the 

efficiency of the service, while at the same 

time doing but simple justice to a meritorious and deserving class of soldiers.

Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary 

of War for the Year 1891.

School Teachers

To insure that measure of success to 

the school system in the Army which its 

278
importance demands requires school teachers specially trained and fully competent for 

the duties required of them. In the light of 

past experience it is not believed that this 

can be attained by the detail of enlisted men, 

who, however competent they may be so far 

as education is concerned, lack in the majority of cases the special and rare qualification necessary to instruct others. In order to 

secure, therefore, the best results possible, I 

beg to recommend that legislative authority 

be asked to enlist for each post a fully qualified school teacher, to be designated as “post 

school teacher,” and to receive the pay and 

allowances of a hospital steward. Appointments to be made by the Secretary of War 

after the candidate has passed an examination before a board of officers convened to 

inquire into the character, special capacity, 

and aptitude of applicants for these important positions, for which also enlisted men of 

the Army should be considered eligible. Such 

a law would be a great inducement to the 

well-educated enlisted men, and sufficient 

to insure applications for appointment from 

well-educated young men in civil life competent as instructors.

While the possession of scholastic attainments necessarily increase the value and efficiency of noncommissioned officers, many 

cogent reasons exist why mere proficiency 

in studies should not establish a claim for 

promotion to that class. Noncommissioned 

officers are selected because possessing in a 

high degree courage, honesty, fidelity, force 

of character, and natural tact and ability in 

controlling the men. The whole company is 

often a narrow field for such selections, and 

serious detriment would result from limiting 

company commanders to men possessing a 

certificate of proficiency in studies.

For the benefit of the noncommissioned 

officer class it is recommended that their 

instruction be conducted in a post school 

for noncommissioned officers only, notwithstanding the objection advanced by some 

officers that such a course would interfere 

with the duties of company commanders and 

lessen their authority and responsibilities. 

The selection and appointment of noncommissioned officers would remain, as now, 

with captains of companies, but the establishment of a post school for noncommissioned 

officers would substitute systematic instruction, under an officer selected by reason of 

his special qualifications, to the present necessarily disconnected method of recitations in 

tactics, etc., conducted by the captain of each 

company.

As exemplifying the successful results of 

a properly conducted school of this class, I 

beg to submit the following interesting report 

of the officer charged, for the two past years, 

with the management and conduct of the 

school for noncommissioned officers at Fort 

Myer, Va.:

This school is composed of all the noncommissioned officers at the post, and instruction was given twice a week, on Tuesdays 

and Thursdays, from 10:45 to 11:45 a.m. 

The object of the school was to instruct the 

noncommissioned officers as thoroughly as 

time and opportunity would permit in their 

various duties, and to explain the general 

principles of the drill regulations, minor tactics, especially in hasty sketching and road 

reconnaissance, Blunt’s Small Arms Firing 

Regulations, anatomy of the horse, shoeing, 

together with treatment of local injuries.

Owing to the lack of proper text-books, 

charts, materials, and the shortness of time, 

the instructor often felt hampered, but this 

feeling was offset in a great degree by the close 

attention of the members of the class.

The course may be roughly divided into 

four parts:

1. Drill regulations.

2. Minor tactics.

3. The horse.

4. Small arms firing regulations.

The method pursued in this part of the 

course was to assign lessons of definite length 

and to require recitations in the classroom 

supplemented by the solution of tactical problems at the blackboard. The schools of the 

soldier, platoon, and company were studied, 

likewise the general rules for successive formations in the school of the battalion. Special 

stress was laid on distances, intervals, and 

the posts and duties of guides. The general 

principles of bitting, saddling, and equitation 

were explained in two lectures, and I might 

add I think it a mistake that a fuller explanation of these is not contained in the Drill 

279
Regulations. When the Drill Regulations had 

been finished a written examination covering 

them was given with very satisfactory results, 

the highest percentage being 96.

The lack of proper text-books adapted 

to the use of noncommissioned officers rendered it necessary for the instructor to lecture 

upon the various principles of minor tactics, 

e.g., advance and rear guards, outposts, hasty 

sketching, and road reconnaissance. Hasty 

sketching was exploited at full length and 

detailed instruction given in the use of various topographical signs, use of instruments, 

and plotting of a hasty survey. Then the class 

was divided into parties and sent into the 

field equipped with box and prismatic compasses, and the road in the vicinity of the post 

surveyed and plotted. The various maps were 

then condensed into one large one by two 

members of the class. I append the originals 

turned over to me together with specimens of 

the road reports submitted. The results speak 

for themselves. In examining this work it 

should be borne in mind that the majority of 

the men had never seen a compass, and that 

in the year previous a few of the class had 

had but a very limited experience in work of 

this nature.

In that part of the course pertaining to the 

horse, lectures were given on the anatomy, the 

points to be observed in selection, age, shoeing, treatment of injuries with illustration of 

bandaging, administration of medicines, and 

stable management. This part of the course 

was copiously illustrated by enlargements 

made from the plates in various anatomical 

works on the subject.... 

The modern tendency of individualizing 

the soldier, together with the adoption of 

a looser formation in tactical dispositions, 

have led the French and German authorities 

to require more from their noncommissioned officers than a mere knowledge of 

drill regulations; and I doubt that if the general method of instruction of our noncommissioned officers be looked into, they will 

be found to possess much more than an elementary knowledge of their drill book. The 

unquestioned necessity of a larger scope in 

their instruction being admitted, I can see 

no better way than to unite the noncommissioned officers of each battalion in a class 

under a competent instructor and to follow 

a course prescribed by the War Department. 

This would necessitate the preparation of 

a manual which could be very easily compiled from the ample literature on this subject. Such a compilation would possess the 

advantage of putting the principles before 

the noncommissioned officers in simple 

language without that discussion usually 

found in treatises, and in a way easy of comprehension.

From two years’ experience with the class 

here, I have observed as a result of instruction 

that each noncommissioned officer takes 

a greater interest in his duties as he now 

understands what he is doing; and I think it 

creates that distinction between the noncommissioned officer and the private which is so 

desirable. The mere fact that they know more 

than the men causes them to be looked up to 

and consequently respected....

Pay of Noncommissioned Officers

The absolute importance of efficient noncommissioned officers in the line of the Army 

has been represented in former reports, and 

especial stress laid upon the unfortunate fact 

that the inadequacy of the pay of that class 

not only robs the position of its value, but 

actually deters suitable men in the ranks from 

aspiring to promotion.

A bill embodying the recommendations 

made by this office was introduced in the last 

Congress, but from reasons not affecting its 

merits failed to become a law. It is therefore 

earnestly recommended that the attention of 

the approaching Congress be called to the 

eminent justice of the measure. I reiterate 

the remarks on the subject made in report 

of 1889, and now again recommend that at 

least the pay of the first sergeant and of the 

duty sergeant be increased.

The first sergeant of a company may 

truly be called the hardest worked noncommissioned officer in the Army. He has 

a direct responsibility for the proper care 

and use of the arms, equipments, and other 

property of the company; he is always on 

duty; must possess tact, sound judgment, 

superior intelligence, and have a thorough 

280
knowledge of all details, orders, and papers 

pertaining to company administration. A 

good first sergeant is indispensable to the 

making of a good company, for without 

him the best efforts of the captain would be 

rendered abortive. Exercising a certain supervision over the duties performed by every 

member of the company, he commands 

and instructs men in the ranks who receive 

more compensation than is allowed him, 

his pay being $6 less than that of a soldier 

detailed as a mechanic and $1.50 less than 

is received by the private detailed on duty 

as laborer. Company sergeants, who are 

charged with important duties in the internal economy of the company, besides commanding guards, escorts, fatigue parties, etc., 

receive $6.50 less than a soldier teamster in 

the Quartermaster’s Department; while a private on extra duty receives $8.50 more than 

the pay of a corporal. These facts sufficiently 

evidence what little incentive is offered to 

noncommissioned officers to re-enlist and 

remain in the service.

The class of noncommissioned officers 

in the Army occupies the intermediate grade 

between the private and the commissioned 

officer, and its duties demand men of good 

capacity, strict honesty, untiring energy, and 

possessing high soldierly attributes. Justice to 

company noncommissioned officers demands 

that their pay should assimilate to that allowed 

similar grades in other branches of the service.

I submit that first sergeants and duty 

sergeants of companies, troops, and batteries 

(1,910 in number) should receive the following rates of pay: First sergeants, $34, and 

sergeants $25 per month.

The increase of pay in these grades is $12 

for first sergeants and $8 for duty sergeants, 

and will increase the annual appropriation 

by $201,168.

In connection with the foregoing, I beg 

to say that the highest in rank of the noncommissioned officers of the Army is the 

regimental sergeant major, whose pay is 

now only $23 per month. This should be 

increased to $36, the same pay as is now 

received by the sergeant major of Engineers. 

The duties of a sergeant major are most 

responsible in the correct and safe keeping of 

the regimental records, and he must be the 

highest type of the enlisted soldier to fulfill 

the military duties of his position. In fact he 

is selected as and he should be the ideal soldier and exemplar to the enlisted men of his 

regiment and a valuable aid to the regimental commander and his adjutant, and should 

receive pay commensurate with his rank and 

important duties. I also beg to recommend 

that Congress be asked to authorize the 

appointment of fifty “post sergeant majors,” 

with the same pay as regimental sergeant 

majors, for assignment to important posts at 

which there are no regimental headquarters. 

This grade of noncommissioned officers is 

greatly needed to aid post commanders and 

post adjutants in keeping the post records 

and also in the other duties pertaining to 

their positions, which have now to be performed by men detailed for the purpose, 

and are seldom sufficiently well done, due 

largely to constant changes in troops from 

one post to another and change in details. 

This would not be the case were permanent 

post sergeant majors provided, similar to 

post quartermaster sergeants, and for the 

same reason—for the protection of the best 

interests of the service.

The increase of pay of regimental sergeant 

majors and the appointment of fifty post 

sergeant majors will amount to $27,840 per 

annum.

When the Adjutant-General can state in 

the posters calling for recruits that there are 

2,000 positions of noncommissioned officers in the Army with pay and allowances 

that make them desirable, the disposition 

of good men to enlist will surely be greatly 

stimulated, and it will be economy to secure 

such men even at the cost of $228,000 per 

annum....

Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary 

of War for the Year 1892.

Non-commissioned Officers

With but very few exceptions the intelligence, instruction, character, and efficiency of 

this class of enlisted men are reported satisfactory for the performance of their duties, and 

281
they are required to study and recite in smallarms firing regulations in nearly all infantry 

and cavalry organizations; in the artillery this 

duty is exacted in but twenty-one batteries.

The non-commissioned officers have 

been called the vertebrae of the Army and 

much thought has been given the subject 

of improving them. Inquiry into the matter 

has elicited valuable suggestions from experienced officers, and by far the greater number 

advocate an increase in pay with a corresponding increase in the requirements as the 

most feasible steps to accomplish the object 

desired. Various other suggestions have been 

made, such as care in selecting recruits, regular 

and systematic instruction and drill, separate 

mess and sleeping apartments, competitive 

examination for appointment and promotion, regular schools for non-commissioned 

officers, etc. The lot of the non-commissioned 

officer, with its increased requirements and 

responsibility, which seem out of proportion 

to the small increase in his pay, should be 

made more enviable, and it is an undisputed 

fact that the extra duty man receives more pay 

and has less responsibility than the average 

non-commissioned officer....

Extract from Annual Report of the Secretary 

of War for the Year 1893.

Non-commissioned Officers

Under recent tactical and other changes 

in the army the non-commissioned officer 

has become a more important factor than 

ever before and much depends upon his 

efficiency, which in this class of enlisted men 

is generally very satisfactory, even though 

some organizations may not report them up 

to all the modern requirements. The change 

in requirements has been rather rapid for 

immediate readjustment, and perhaps we 

will not be able to get the best men for these 

positions until their pay is at least equal to 

that of the extra-duty man, or commensurate with the increased responsibilities and 

higher duties demanded. The act of Congress 

approved February 27, 1893, has slightly bettered conditions in this respect by increasing 

the pay of first sergeants to $25 and that of 

sergeants to $18 per month. It should be 

still more; and our sergeant majors and regimental quartermaster-sergeants, who occupy 

the highest positions of all enlisted men and 

receive less pay than first sergeants, deserve 

speedy consideration.

The reports show that 347 non-commissioned officers hold certificates from service and other schools or have graduated 

from colleges, and 116 have belonged to the 

National Guard before they joined the army. 

These figures indicate to some extent the 

qualifications and attainments of this class of 

enlisted men.

In the greater number of organizations 

the rank of corporal is attained only after one 

or more years of service, though there are a 

few in which the average length of service has 

been reported as less. The greatest average 

length is reported from the infantry, the greatest in any organization being 11 years. In the 

cavalry the greatest is 8, and in the artillery 7 

years, and in over half of the regiments the 

average length of service of a private is said to 

be five or more years before he is promoted.

The instruction of our non-commissioned 

officers has generally consisted in recitations in 

Small Arms Firing Regulations, Drill and Army 

Regulations and Manual of Guard Duty; and a 

number of company commanders have also 

instructed them in minor tactics, field service, 

rapid entrenchments, and kindred subjects. 

Recitations in Small Arms Firing Regulations 

have been most active in the infantry and 

cavalry, and less so in the artillery, though the 

number of batteries in which they have been 

held is greater than reported last year, and the 

extent of the regular instruction of artillerymen was never greater than now in our service. 

At a few posts the non-commissioned officers 

have been permitted to attend the lectures 

at the officers’ lyceum, and it is to be hoped 

that this commendable practice will steadily 

extend. Inquiry into the subject of improving 

our non-commissioned officers has elicited 

about the same suggestions as submitted last 

year, the greater number of officers advocating an increase of pay; and this seems to be 

the keynote in our endeavor to secure the best 

possible material. The discipline and instruction of the service demand specially careful 

and continuous attention from the officers 

282
and non-commissioned officers during this 

transition period of armament and drill, when 

so many innovations have been imposed. And 

the non-commissioned officer was never a 

more important and responsible individual 

than now.

Pay of Non-commissioned Officers

Col. P. T. Swaine, Twenty-second Infantry, 

commanding officer, Fort Keogh, Mont., 

reports:

It is urgently recommended that the pay 

of regimental non-commissioned staff officers be apportioned to their rank, as compared with other non-commissioned officers. 

First sergeants, being of an inferior grade, 

actually receive more pay, whereas the higher 

grade should, as in the case of commissioned 

officers, receive the better compensation.

Col. C. H. Carlton, Eighth Cavalry, commanding officer, Fort Meade, S. Dak., reports:

As the regimental sergeant-majors and regimental quartermaster-sergeants are of higher 

rank and are selected from and promoted 

from first sergeants, the regimental sergeantmajors and the regimental quartermastersergeants should receive higher pay than the 

first sergeants; they are now receiving less.

Col. G. S. Poland, Seventeenth Infantry, 

commanding officer, Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo., 

reports:

The pay of regimental sergeant-majors and 

quartermaster-sergeants should be increased 

to at least $60 per month. They do more 

work per day (and are liable to perform field 

service) than many general service clerks and 

civilians in the employ of the Government 

who receive $100 per month and upwards.

The pay of each grade of non-commissioned officers should be increased also.

Maj. A. S. B. Keyes, Third Cavalry, commanding officer, Fort Ringgold, Tex., reports:

Greater inducements should be given for 

re-enlistments, especially to sergeants. First 

sergeants’ pay should be $40 per month, with 

increase for service, and other sergeants in 

proportion.

Col. L. L. Langdon, First Artillery, commanding officer, Fort Hamilton, N.Y., 

reports:

There are many reasons why the pay of 

sergeant-majors and quartermaster-sergeants 

should be larger than that of all other noncommissioned officers; but I can imagine 

none why it should be the reverse, as it is 

now.

Congress has several times increased the 

pay of the other non-commissioned staff 

officers, but the cause, if any, of leaving the 

regimental non-commissioned staff in statu 

quo each time has, to my recollection, never 

been explained.

First. Regimental sergeant-majors and 

quartermaster-sergeants rank all the other 

non-commissioned officers in this army as 

well as in every other army; but in others, the 

English, for instance (if comparisons should 

be considered), pay goes with rank. The question of rank, which the position itself necessitates, alone is a sufficient reason ipso facto 

for superiority of pay.

The rates of pay and the rank of the noncommissioned officers are as follows:

1. Sergeant-major . . . . . . . . . . . . . $23.00

2. Quartermaster-sergeant . . . . . . 23.00

3. Ordnance sergeant . . . . . . . . . . 34.00

4. Commissary sergeant . . . . . . . . 34.00

5. Post quartermaster-sergeant . . 34.00

6. Hospital stewards . . . . . . . . . . . 45.00

7. Acting hospital stewards . . . . . 25.00

8. Sergeants of engineers, 

ordnance, and signal corps . . . 34.00

9. First sergeants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.00

(All with the usual increase for continuous service.) 

Second. The regimental non-commissioned staff is selected from the best material of a whole regiment on account of the 

requirements of the position, which are: 

Good moral character, sobriety, intelligence 

of a high grade, and the strictest integrity. It 

is comparatively an easy matter for a welleducated sergeant of the line, possessing common sense and judgment, to fill the positions 

of ordnance sergeant and first sergeant; but 

283
such a man would have to be qualified by 

nature and education, as well as by special 

course of study, to make a good sergeantmajor.

Third. The duties of sergeant-major comprise the supervision of all the clerical work, 

post and regimental, the preparation of the 

numerous and intricate papers relating to 

regiment and post headquarters, the keeping of all the rosters, the distribution to all 

the officers and organizations of the orders 

intended for them, the entering of all communications passing through the offices, 

the proof-reading from the regimental press, 

the care of the books, accounts, etc., of the 

noncommissioned staff and band—in fact 

all the complicated work, for which the 

adjutant is responsible to his colonel, passes 

through the sergeant-major’s hands, and he 

must have at his finger tips all the orders and 

decisions issued from the army, division, 

and department headquarters. He must be a 

man of discretion and tact. In addition, the 

sergeant-major attends guard mounting every 

day in the year, and all the battalion parades, 

inspections and drills.

The duties required of him are more varied and exacting, the hours longer, and an 

all-day holiday, or even a free Sunday, is an 

unknown pleasure to him, unless he avails 

himself of a pass or furlough, which he very 

seldom does on account of the responsibility 

for the continued and proper performance of 

the work intrusted to him.

Fourth. The regimental quartermastersergeant has as much as to do daily as a 

post quartermaster-sergeant, and performs 

the same duties as the latter if there be none 

at regimental headquarters, which is very 

often the case. If not directly, he is morally 

responsible for a large amount of government 

property intrusted to his care, as much as any 

commissary or post quartermaster-sergeant in 

their departments, who receive larger pay, and 

as he moves with the regiment whenever it 

does, or goes into the field, his work doubles, 

and his responsibility then becomes greater.

Fifth. When a private is on extra duty as 

a clerk or laborer, teamster or mechanic, his 

additional pay for this service is from $10 to 

$15 a month. Thus, a recruit may, and often 

does, draw more pay than a sergeant-major 

or a regimental quartermaster-sergeant. The 

present sergeant-major of my regiment, prior 

to his appointment as such was sergeant and 

school-teacher, and drew $36 a month, but 

on being promoted to the rank of sergeantmajor his pay dropped $8 a month.

Appreciating fully the momentous value 

of any action by you in such matters, I most 

earnestly request your attention to the above, 

with the view of enlisting your interest and 

endeavor toward the introduction of a separate 

bill in Congress for better pay to these hardworked and deserving non-commissioned officers, with the final object to have superiority of 

pay go hand in hand with rank and responsibility of position, and particularly to offset the 

oversight of omitting them altogether in the 

bill passed at the last session of Congress.

A bill increasing the pay of sergeantmajor and regimental quartermaster-sergeant 

to $50 per month, with the usual increase 

for continuous service in each case, would 

accomplish the desired result, of which everyone would acknowledge the fairness and justice and no one could complain.

The increased cost to the taxpayers will be 

slight, as there are only 40 sergeant-majors 

and 40 regimental quartermaster-sergeants in 

the whole Army.

Extract from Circular No. 30, War Department, Washington, 1 May 1924.

III—Issue of old type officers’ uniforms to 

noncommissioned officers of the first, second and 

third grades.—The existing stock of officers’ 

breeches, coats and complete uniforms, old 

type, of the following material:

Serge, 12, 16 and 20/22-ounce,

Melton, 16 and 20-ounce,

Whipcord,

Cotton, olive drab,

Gabardine:

which was manufactured for sale to officers, but which is now obsolete by reason 

of AR 600–35, as changed by Changes No. 

9, AR 600–40, as changed by Changes No. 

10, is authorized for issue to noncommissioned officers of the first, second and third 

grades, until supply is exhausted. The cotton 

garments will be charged to the clothing 

284
allowance at the price of olive drab cotton 

issue coats and breeches and the woolen garments at the price of the olive drab woolen 

issue coats and breeches 20-oz. Braid will 

be removed from the sleeves of the coat by 

enlisted men before wearing. Uniform clothing issued under this authority is specifically 

authorized to be worn at any camp, post or 

station as long as the clothing is serviceable. 

(A.G. 421 (3–3–24).)

By order of the Secretary of War:

JOHN J. PERSHING, 

General of the Armies 

Chief of Staff.

Extract from Army Regulation 350–90, 

HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, 

25 June 1957.

Education and Training 

Noncommissioned Officer Academies

1. General. These regulations establish a 

standard pattern for the Noncommissioned 

Officer Academies in the United States Army. 

The purpose of Noncommissioned Officer 

Academies is to broaden the professional 

knowledge of the noncommissioned officer 

and instill in him the self-confidence and 

sense of responsibility required to make him 

a capable leader of men.

2. Establishment. a. Any of the following commanders is authorized, but not 

required, to establish a Noncommissioned 

Officer Academy:

(1) Commanding general of a division.

(2) The commander of a major installation, subject to approval of the appropriate Army commander, major oversea commander, or chief of a technical service.

b. Where possible, nondivisional troops 

will use the Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy of a nearby division rather than 

establish a separate facility.

c. Each academy will be designated as 

“———(division or installation) Noncommissioned Officer Academy” (e.g., 4th 

Infantry Division Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy).

d. All academies will conform to the 

standard pattern prescribed below.

3. Training. a. The minimum length of 

the course of instruction will be 4 weeks.

b. The number of courses conducted annually will be determined by local 

requirements. Consideration should be 

given to conducting separate courses for 

senior noncommissioned officers and for 

noncommissioned officer candidates. The 

content of the two courses need not vary 

appreciably.

c. Exacting selection procedures should 

be employed to insure the designation of 

outstanding noncommissioned officer instructors who have completed a course of 

instruction at a Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy.

d. Prerequisites for attendance will be 

determined locally by the commander having jurisdiction of the Academy.

4. Curriculum. a. The increased responsibility of noncommissioned officers under 

the new concepts of atomic warfare will be 

stressed in all phases of instruction. In all 

subjects, emphasis will be on how to teach 

the material presented rather than on the 

mere presentation of information.

b. No standardized course of instruction 

is prescribed; however, inclusion of the following subjects is mandatory:

(1) Leadership—minimum of 15 hours.

(2) Drill, Ceremonies and Command—

(Drill, Inspection, Fitting and Wearing of 

the Uniform, Ceremonies, Customs and 

Courtesies, Conduct of Physical Training 

Program, etc.)—minimum of 15 hours.

(3) Methods of Instruction—minimum 

of 30 hours.

(4) Weapons Training—number of hours 

to be determined by division or installation 

commander.

(5) Map Reading—minimum of 20 

hours.

(6) Tactics—number of hours to be 

determined by division or installation 

commander.

(7) Problems of the command and their 

solution—number of hours to be determined 

by division or installation commander.

c. An example of a detailed course of 

instruction which is considered suitable 

for use by a Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy is shown in the appendix.

285
5. Programming, budgeting, and funding. Formal programming is not required. 

Each command will support its academy 

from available resources. Use of training 

aids, furniture, equipment, etc., in support 

of these academies is authorized.

6. Administration. a. In accordance with 

paragraph 34a, AR 640–203, a notation will 

be made in paragraph 26 of DA Form 20, 

Enlisted Qualification Record, for each individual who successfully completes a course 

at a Noncommissioned Officer Academy as 

follows, “——(unit or organization) 

Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 

4 weeks, —— (year).” For example, “1st 

Infantry Division Noncommissioned Officer 

Academy, 4 weeks, 1957.”

b. An individual who has successfully 

completed a course at a Noncommissioned 

Officer Academy which meets the criteria 

established herein will not be permitted to 

attend another such course.

By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary 

of the Army:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,

 General, United States Army,

Chief of Staff.

Extract from Army Circular No. 35–52, HQ, 

Department of the Army, Washington, 20 

May 1958.

Finance and Fiscal Military Pay Act of 1958

1. The Military Pay Act of 1958 has been 

signed by the President and is P. L. 85–422 

dated 20 May 1958. The Act becomes effective on 1 June 1958....

3. The act amends the table “incentive 

pay for hazardous duty” pertaining to commissioned officers, who perform aerial flights 

as crew members in accordance with section 204 of the CCA of 1949, as amended, 

by adding pay grades O–9 and O–10 and 

by establishing the rate of incentive pay for 

those grades in the amount of $165 for all 

categories of years of service. The table for 

enlisted members, concerning this incentive 

pay, is amended by adding pay grades E–8 

and E–9, and by establishing a rate of $105 

for all categories of years of service.

4. The table prescribing special pay for 

sea and foreign duty contained in section 206 

of the CCA of 1949 is amended by adding 

pay grades E–8 and E–9 and by establishing 

monthly rates of $22.50 for each of those 

grades.

5. The act provides that the rates for basic 

allowance for quarters for pay grades O–9 

and O–10 are the same as those prescribed 

for pay grade O–8, i.e., with dependents $171; 

without dependents $136.80. Pay grades E–8 

and E–9 will receive the same as pay grade 

E–7, i.e., members on active duty without 

dependents $51.30; not over two dependents 

$77.10; over two dependents $96.90. The 

requirement that a member with dependents 

in pay grade E–7 have in effect an allotment 

of $80 per month is equally applicable to pay 

grades E–8 and E–9. If such enlisted members are on active duty for training, they will 

receive the same basic allowances for quarters as E–7 on active duty for training. The 

monthly rate of all other pay and allowances 

presently authorized for E–7 are for application to E–8 and E–9....

Extract from Army Regulation 600–200, 

HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, 

24 March 1965.

Personnel—General 

Enlisted Personnel Management System

Chapter 1 

General

1–1. Purpose. a. To prescribe policies, 

responsibilities, and procedures pertaining 

to career management of Army enlisted 

personnel.

b. To provide a basis for further consolidation of all Army regulations on enlisted 

personnel management....

1–3. Applicability. a. This regulation is 

applicable to all enlisted personnel of the—

(1) Active Army.

(2) Army National Guard as indicated:

(a) Soldiers on initial active duty (section 

VI, chapter 7).

(b) Soldiers on active duty training or 

full time training duty for 90 days or more 

(chapter 8).

286
(3) United States Army Reserve on 

extended active duty or Initial Active Duty 

for Training (IADT).

b. The Chief, Army Reserve may issue additional instructions to supplement this regulation.

c. Each chapter in this regulation deals 

with a specific phase of enlisted career management; however, none of these phases will 

be used in isolation since they all deal with a 

system that is totally interrelated.

1–4. Policy. Effective management of 

Army personnel resources is necessary for 

successful accomplishment of the Army mission. Consistent with military necessity, the 

policy of the Department of the Army is to 

utilize personnel in positions commensurate 

with their military qualifications and personal attributes and to foster an atmosphere 

which will motivate all personnel to attain 

their full potential as soldiers.

1–5. Responsibility. Career management of enlisted personnel is a General Staff 

responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Personnel (DCSPER), Headquarters, 

Department of the Army. Classification, 

development, and utilization of soldiers 

within basic policies and procedures prescribed by this regulation are command 

responsibilities.

a. Except as indicated in b and c below, 

the Commander, U.S. Army Military 

Personnel Center is responsible for the 

conduct and supervision of all enlisted 

personnel functions and programs prescribed in this regulation.

b. The Surgeon General is responsible 

for the classification and utilization of 

inducted physicians, dentists, and veterinarians.

c. Unless otherwise prescribed in this 

regulation, correspondence pertaining 

to matters indicated in b above will be 

addressed to MILPERCEN or the Office of 

The Surgeon General.

d. The Cdr, MILPERCEN and The Surgeon 

General are responsible for the preparation and 

publication of changes to this regulation whenever 

changes become necessary in matters for which 

each is the proponent as outlined in b and c above. 

The Surgeon General will coordinate changes with 

the Cdr, MILPERCEN to ensure continuity 

of subject matter and format....

Chapter 3

Personnel Utilization 

Section II. Utilization Controls

3–5. Utilization procedures and priorities. Unit commanders and supervisors will 

utilize soldiers in properly authorized table 

of organization or table of distribution positions consistent with their MOS qualifications 

and grades of rank (para 1–7, AR 600–200). 

Subject to the provisions of section III, the conditions under which soldiers are considered to 

be properly utilized are listed in a or b below. 

It is stressed that every effort must be made by 

the chain of command/supervision to assign 

and utilize soldiers in their PMOS/CPMOS. 

This management action affords the soldier 

necessary professional development protection 

particularly in the area of PMOS Skill 

Qualification Test evaluation and proper onthe-job experience credit. The benefits derived 

impact directly on the individual soldier’s 

career progression in important personnel 

management purposes such as promotion, 

reenlistment, QMP, and schooling.

a. Proper utilization. The proper utilization of soldiers must receive the constant 

personal attention of commanders at all echelons of command. A soldier is considered to 

be properly utilized when used in a position 

under one of the following conditions, in the 

priority listed, or when used in accordance 

with b below.

(1) In the PMOS at the same grade of 

rank or two grades higher (provided there are 

no soldiers available in the proper grade for 

assignment). Consideration should be given 

to utilization in the same or higher skill level. 

Higher skill level will include any other MOS 

to which the soldier should progress in the 

normal line of progression in the MOS Career 

Pattern outlined in AR 611–201. Utilization 

contrary to this provision for soldiers holding a controlled MOS listed in paragraph 

2–18e requires clearance from MILPERCEN, 

DA (appropriate career branch).

(2) In the Career Progression MOS 

(CPMOS) (provided skill level is other than 

“0” (zero)).

(3) In the secondary MOS at the same or 

higher grade of rank (only when no requirement exists in (1) above).

287
(4) In an MOS substitute for the PMOS 

as authorized in AR 611–201 (only when no 

requirement exists in (1) above).

(5) In an additional MOS at the same or 

higher grade of rank (only when no requirement exists in (1) above). Consideration must 

be given to the elapsed time, the change of 

equipment, functions related to the MOS, and 

the changes in the grade that have occurred 

since the soldier last served in the MOS.

(6) In a shortage or balanced MOS, if 

current PMOS is listed as overstrength in DA 

Circular 611 series, or otherwise directed by 

HQDA, in which the soldier is being trained 

for award of a new MOS.

b. Authorized exceptions. Assignments contrary to a above are authorized only when 

made under the following conditions:

(1) The assignment is under actual combat conditions.

(2) The assignment is to—

(a) Meet an urgent military requirement. 

Assignments will not exceed 90 days without approval of the appropriate major commander.

(b) Satisfy an exceptional need for a special temporary duty position. Period is limited 

to 90 days, after which the individual must be 

returned to perform duties in his/her assigned 

position for not less than 120 days or for the 

duration of assignment to the unit.

(3) Major commanders are authorized 

to extend the utilization period up to 12 

months for a soldier on special duty when 

it has been determined that special training 

or skills of the soldier are required for total 

mission accomplishment. This authority may 

be delegated to the installation commander. 

Major commanders will establish a system to 

monitor these specific assignments in excess 

of 90 days (e.g., Quarterly Reports) to ensure 

protection of the interest of the individual 

soldier.

(4) Enlistment Bonus, Selective Reenlistment Bonus, and Variable Reenlistment Bonus 

recipients must serve in the MOS for which 

the bonus was awarded, an MOS within normal career progression pattern, or in an MOS 

designated by HQDA as comparable.

(5) The assignment is for the sole purpose 

of qualifying the individual for award of a 

shortage MOS. (See DA Cir 611 series.) The 

MOS must be at an authorized skill level commensurate with the pay grade.

(6) In support of Reserve summer training.

(7) The assignment is made under special 

instructions from Headquarters, Department of 

the Army.

(8) An NCO may be utilized in a specialist 

position at the same pay grade, provided there 

are no NCO vacancies available in his/her current pay grade and same or higher skill level.

(9) Soldiers surplus in accordance with AR 

614–200, except grade E–9, may be assigned and 

utilized in their primary MOS in a one-grade 

lower position to preclude PCS moves and to 

offset grade or space imbalance between overseas and CONUS. Care will be taken to ensure 

that soldiers directed to serve in a lower grade 

position are not penalized through the Enlisted 

Evaluation System. In instances where the rated 

soldier is assigned to a position authorized a 

lower grade, a statement will be included in the 

narrative portion of the Evaluation Report that 

the assignment to the lower grade position was 

authorized by HQDA. The first priority for utilization of NCO’s under this exception will be in 

a lower grade NCO position. Commanders will 

ensure that soldiers being utilized under this 

provision are counseled as to the specific reason 

for such utilization.

c. Improperly utilized personnel. A soldier who 

is not assigned in accordance with a or b above 

will be considered improperly utilized and will 

be reported to the next higher echelon of command (para 3–4d). Pending reassignment, the 

soldier will be utilized in a position which is 

most commensurate with his/her grade and 

qualifications. A soldier who is assigned in 

accordance with a or b above but who is not 

utilized in his/her assigned position will also be 

considered improperly utilized. Action will be 

taken to ensure that the soldier does in fact perform duties in the assigned position.

d. Other considerations:

(1) A specialist should not be utilized in an 

NCO position below his/her pay grade.

(2) In considering a specialist or private 

for utilization at a higher grade, this sequence 

should be followed:

(a) Specialist position at the next higher pay 

grade.

(b) NCO position at present pay grade.

(c) NCO position at a higher pay grade.

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(3) Individual assignment limitations 

recorded on the soldier’s Personnel Qualification Record must be considered.

Chapter 4 Section V. 

Command Sergeant Major 

Retention Program

4–19. Purpose. The purpose of the CSM 

Retention Program is to provide procedures 

whereby a small number of outstanding CSM 

may be retained beyond 30 years of active 

service. This will provide the Army the benefit 

of their long years of experience, expertise 

and potential for future continued outstanding service.

4–20. Procedures. a. Zone of Consideration. All serving CSM will be considered during their 28th year of active service. Those 

CSMs in the zone not desiring consideration 

may submit a letter of declination in accordance with instructions contained in the 

annual board announcement.

b. Period of Retention. Retention will be 

authorized up to 35 years of active Federal 

service or to age 55 whichever occurs first.

c. Retention. The minimum number of 

CSM to be selected each year will be five. 

More than five may be selected when the 

total CSM on active duty beyond 30 years 

active federal service is less than 25.

d. Selection Proceedings. Selection will be 

accomplished on an annual basis by a DA 

Selection Board consisting of five members, 

one of whom will be the Sergeant Major of 

the Army, presided over by a major general 

president. Selection will be based on outstanding performance, demonstrated initiative and significant potential for valuable 

service in positions of responsibility in accordance with specific guidelines established 

for the board. Retention beyond 30 years is 

not to be a reward for past performance but 

rather based on potential for continued outstanding performance of duty.

e. Board of Recommendations. The board 

will forward their recommendations to 

DCSPER, HQDA for approval.

f. Notification Procedures. Commander, 

MILPERCEN will publish (annually) the LOI 

and approved recommended list. Commander, 

MILPERCEN will personally, through command 

channels, notify those selected and require 

their written acceptance within 30 days of 

receipt. Upon acceptance of retention, authorization for reenlistment will be accomplished by 

MILPERCEN.

Chapter 7

Section VII. Appointment of Acting 

Noncommissioned Officers

7–52. Appointment. a. Units. Company, 

troop, battery, and separate detachment commanders may appoint qualified individuals as 

acting corporals, E–4, and acting sergeants, E–5, 

to serve in position vacancies existing in their 

units at their present or higher grade, including those resulting from temporary absences 

of assigned noncommissioned officers. For 

appointments to acting corporals, E–4, and acting sergeant, E–5, the individual being appointed may not be more than one grade lower than 

the grade to which he/she is being appointed. 

(See para 2–63 for lateral appointments.)

b. Casual groups. Commanders issuing movement orders for casual groups may appoint 

individuals as acting noncommissioned officers 

in grades of corporal, E–4, sergeant, E–5, and 

staff sergeant, E–6, to exercise supervision and 

control during movements. The number of acting noncommissioned officers will not exceed 

the following:

(1) One acting corporal to each 12 casuals.

(2) One acting corporal plus one acting sergeant to each 35 casuals.

(3) One acting staff sergeant when appointing two or more acting sergeants for a group.

c. Insignia. Acting noncommissioned officers may wear either the regular insignia of 

grade permanently affixed to the sleeve or 

acting noncommissioned officers brassards as 

described in AR 670–5. Wearing of regular insignia of grade is encouraged in units where experience indicates the acting noncommissioned 

officer normally will be promoted to the grade 

in which acting. Acting noncommissioned officers of casual groups and training activities, 

where frequent personnel changes make regular 

insignia impracticable, will wear the brassard 

(AR 670–5).

289
d. Pay and benefits. Acting noncommissioned officers are not entitled to pay and 

allowances for such higher grades, and services 

will not be credited as time in a higher grade 

for promotion or date-of-rank purposes.

e. Authority. An acting corporal or sergeant, appointed pursuant to the authority 

contained in this paragraph, has all of the 

authority of a regular appointed noncommissioned officer of the same grade.

7–53. Orders. a. Appointment of acting NCO will be announced in orders 

using Format 304, appendix A, AR 310–10. 

Appointment orders will be filed in accordance with AR 640–10 in the action pending 

portion of MPRJ until such time as termination orders are published.

b. An acting noncommissioned officer’s 

status will be terminated—

(1) At the discretion of the unit commander who made the appointment.

(2) Upon assignment of a regularly promoted noncommissioned officer to the position.

(3) When casual groups reach their 

destination.

(4) Upon reassignment to another unit.

c. Termination for reasons (1) through 

(3) above will be accomplished by orders 

using format 304, appendix A, AR 310–10. 

Termination due to reassignment will be 

accomplished in the additional instructions 

of the order effecting the reassignment (see 

AR 310–10).

Extract from Army Circular No. 351–42, 

HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, 

23 June 1972.

Schools 

Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System (NCOES)

1. General. To provide professional development educational opportunities for the 

Army’s noncommissioned officers and specialists, the Noncommissioned Officer Education 

System (NCOES) was established in 1971. The 

system provides three levels of career development training (Basic, Advanced, and Senior 

Levels) to prepare enlisted personnel for the 

assumption of increasing levels of responsibility. Courses are being implemented at US 

Army service schools as programs of instruction are developed. All courses will be fully 

operational in FY 73.

2. Purpose. The purpose of this circular 

is to provide information concerning the 

policies and procedures established for the 

operation of the Noncommissioned Officer 

Education System (NCOES).

3. Applicability. The NCOES applies to 

all eligible enlisted personnel of all components of the Army.

4. Concept. The NCOES consists of 

three progressive levels of instruction (Basic, 

Advanced, and Senior) designed to prepare 

enlisted personnel to assume increasing 

responsibilities compatible with grade progression. Courses are designed to provide training 

for the full range of noncommissioned officer 

responsibilities in world-wide assignments. 

Basic and Advanced Level courses are Career 

Management Field (CMP) oriented to provide 

this professional development opportunity for 

all enlisted personnel, regardless of Military 

Occupational Specialty (MOS). The Senior 

Level course is CMP immaterial and provides 

broad career enhancement training for senior 

enlisted personnel. NCOES courses are not 

MOS-producing or ASI/SQI-awarding; rather, 

they are career (professional development) 

courses.

5. Objectives. Objectives of NCOES are—

a. To increase the professional quality of the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps.

b. To provide enlisted personnel with opportunities for progressive and continuing development.

c. To enhance career attractiveness by providing a system of formal military education.

d. To provide the Army with highly trained 

and dedicated noncommissioned officers to fill 

positions of increasing responsibility.

6. Course establishment. Courses will 

be established by Commanding General, US 

Continental Army Command, The Surgeon 

General, and Commanding General, United 

States Army Security Agency, to provide this 

educational opportunity to all enlisted personnel in all components of the Army.

7. Course objectives and scope. a. Basic 

Noncommissioned Officer courses.

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(1) Objectives.

(a) To prepare selected enlisted personnel 

in grades E4 and E5 and selected E3’s from 

the replacement stream to perform duties 

appropriate to grades E5, E6, and E7 within 

their CMP.

(b) To provide training in appropriate 

supervisory skills.

(c) To develop a willingness to assume 

responsibilities and the confidence to apply 

technical knowledge.

(d) To instill a feeling of dignity and a 

sense of duty and obligation for service.

(2) Scope of training.

(a) Training is conducted within the 

MOS or CMP context to qualify individuals to lead comparatively small groups of 

enlisted personnel of similar MOS or of the 

same or associated CMP. Training is oriented 

toward the 4 skill level.

(b) Emphasis is placed on basic leadership skills and knowledge of military subjects 

required to effectively lead enlisted personnel 

at the team, squad, section and comparable 

levels.

(c) Practical work is stressed throughout 

the curriculum.

(3) Course lengths. Course lengths vary from 

approximately 8 weeks to 12 weeks depending 

on the requirements of the MOS or CMP.

b. Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 

Courses.

(1) Objectives.

(a) To prepare selected enlisted personnel 

in grades E6 and E7 to perform duties appropriate to grades E8 and E9 within their CMP.

(b) To provide training in appropriate 

supervisory skills.

(c) To increase skills, confidence, and a 

sense of pride and esprit de corps.

(2) Scope of training.

(a) Advanced level training is functional, 

within the MOS and CMP context, and is oriented toward appropriate MOS qualification 

above the 4 skill level.

(b) Emphasis is placed on leadership and 

human relations skills and knowledge of subjects required to effectively perform duty as 

first sergeant, sergeant major, or comparable 

noncommissioned officer at the company, 

battalion, brigade or comparable level of 

homogeneous units.

(c) Training is oriented on the Army, service, or CMP, as appropriate, to produce competent first sergeants, sergeants major, staff 

noncommissioned officers, or comparable 

unit noncommissioned officers.

(d) Emphasis is placed on the philosophy 

underlying Army objectives and Army systems. Training is directed toward providing 

a firm comprehension of the noncommissioned officer’s role in combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

(3) Course lengths. Course lengths vary from 

approximately 8 weeks to 12 weeks depending 

on the requirements of the MOS or CMP.

c. Senior Level Course. The Senior Level 

NCOES course will be conducted at the US 

Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) 

at Fort Bliss, Texas.

(1) Objective. To prepare selected enlisted 

personnel in grade E8 to perform duty as 

command sergeant major with emphasis on 

leadership, human relations, and training.

(2) Scope of training.

(a) Prepare students to assist commanders in the solution of leadership, human relations and training problems.

(b) Instruct students in tactical and 

administrative operations of divisions.

(c) Update students on contemporary 

Army problems.

(d) Orient students on national and international affairs.

(e) Improve communication skills.

(f) Develop intellectual depth and analytical ability.

(3) Course length. Course length will be 

approximately 22 weeks.

8. Prerequisites. Following are prerequisites for selection to attend NCOES courses:

a. Basic Noncommissioned Officer Courses.

(1) Grade E4 or E5 (on a test basis RA E3 

when selected at the completion of AIT).

(2) MOS evaluation score of 100 or more 

as this score appears on the Enlisted Evaluation 

Data Report, in the most recent primary MOS 

evaluation, except for E3 selected from AIT 

who are untested. Waiver of MOS test scores 

is authorized for all personnel who have not 

been tested, and for those tested whose test 

results have not been received at the parent 

unit. Under this waiver authority, it is suggested that a General Technical (GT) score of 

291
100 or higher be used as an alternate discriminator, and that commanders apply the wholeman concept to insure quality selections for 

course attendance.

(3) Maximum service, as follows:

(a) Personnel in grade E4 must not have 

completed more than 8 years’ service as of the 

date of entry into the course.

(b) Personnel in grade E5 must not have 

completed more than 12 years’ service as of 

the date of entry into the course.

(4) Be recommended by unit and/or 

higher commanders as applicable.

(5) Length of service remaining upon 

completion of the course must be in accordance with paragraph 10, DA Pamphlet 350–

10, except E3 must be on at least a 3-year 

(Regular Army) enlistment.

(6) Additional requirements, such as physical examinations and security clearances, that 

pertain to specific courses will also apply.

(7) Waivers of prerequisites will be processed in accordance with paragraph 9, DA 

Pamphlet 350–10, with the exception of the 

grade and service remaining prerequisites 

which are not waiverable.

b. Advanced Noncommissioned Officer 

courses.

(1) Grade E6 or E7.

(2) Not more than 17 years active service 

on scheduled report date for the course (may 

be waived for Reserve component personnel).

(3) MOS evaluation score of 100 or more 

as it appears on the Enlisted Evaluation Data 

Report, in the most recent primary MOS 

evaluation.

(4) Length of service remaining upon 

completion of course must be in accordance 

with paragraph 10, DA Pamphlet 350–10.

(5) Additional requirements, such as 

physical examinations and security clearances, that pertain to specific courses will also 

apply.

c. Senior Noncommissioned Officer course.

(1) Grade of E8.

(2) Not more than 23 years active service 

as of 1 September of the fiscal year of attendance (may be waived for Reserve component personnel).

(3) Available to attend, i.e., must be in 

a CONUS non-stabilized assignment or will 

have completed 5/6 of a CONUS stabilized or 

oversea tour on departure from the command 

to meet school report dates (may be waived 

with concurrence of the losing command).

(4) MOS evaluation score of 100 or more 

as it appears on the Enlisted Evaluation Data 

Report, in the most recent primary MOS 

evaluation.

(5) Length of service remaining upon completion of the course must be in accordance 

with paragraph 10, DA Pamphlet 350–10.

(6) Additional requirements, such as physical examinations and security clearances as 

determined by CG CONARC, will also apply.

General Orders No. 98, HQ, U.S. Continental 

Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 18 July 

1972.

TC 001. Following action directed.

United States Army Sergeants Major 

Academy (5AW3QTAA) Fort Bliss, Texas 

79916

Action: UNIT ORGANIZED

Asgd to: Headquarters, United States 

Continental Army Command (WOGSAAA) 

Fort Monroe, Virginia 23351

Mission: To provide selected noncommissioned officers a broad and varied, 

in-depth educational experience designed to 

qualify them for promotion to Sergeant Major 

and subsequent service in top level noncommissioned officer positions throughout the 

United States Army.

Effective date: 1 July 1972

Authorized Strength: 47 Off: 1 WO: 42 

EM: 90 AGG: 30 CIV

Required Strength: 47 Off: 1 WO: 42 EM: 

90 AGG: 30 CIV

Accounting classification: As appropriate 

in accordance with AR 37–100.

Files/records: AR 340–18 series applies.

Morning reports: Entry will be made in 

record of events section of Morning Report 

prepared for effective date (AR 680–1)

Authority: DA msg DAFD-OTA-CO, 

182811Z Jul 72, VOCG confirmed

Special Instructions:

a. TDA 5AW3QTAAOO

b. TPSN 66113

c. Priority Status 20832

292
d. Equipment section of TDA will be forwarded to DA at a later date.

e. Personnel authorization will be provided from Instructor/School overhead resources. The course will operate as a separate 

element within the CONARC school system 

with education and training matters under 

the jurisdiction of Commanding General, 

CONARC. Attendance will be by PCS for 

approximately 22 weeks. The student input 

of initial class will consist of 160 students 

and subsequently after DLISW phases out, 

200 students per class. Administration and 

logistical support will be provided by United 

States Army Air Defense Center and Fort 

Bliss, Fort Bliss, Texas 79916.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DONN R. PEPKE 

Major General, GS 

Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: 

E. THOMAS 

Colonel, AGC 

Adjutant General

Extract from Army Regulation 350–17, HQ, 

Department of the Army, Washington, 1 

December 1980.

Noncommissioned Officer Development 

Program (NCODP)

1. Purpose. This regulation prescribes policy, 

responsibilities, and procedures for the establishment, Army-wide, of the Non-commissioned 

Officer Development Program (NCODP).

2. Applicability. This regulation applies 

to the Active Army, Army National Guard 

(ARNG), and US Army Reserve (USAR).

3. Objectives. a. The objectives of NCODP 

are the following:

(1) Strengthen and enhance leadership 

development of the first line NCO supervisor.

(2) Assist and provide guidance in the 

continuing development of noncommissioned 

officers.

(3) Increase the confidence of the NCO as 

a leader.

(4) Realize the full potential of the NCO 

support channel for the chain of command.

(5) Improve unit effectiveness.

b. NCODP builds upon the contributions 

of the Army’s Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). 

These two systems provide a valuable foundation for the development of noncommissioned officers; however, it is through the 

practical application of skills in the individual unit that soldiers achieve their goal of 

becoming a truly professional noncommissioned officer.

4. Policies. a. The NCODP is a command 

responsibility.

b. NCODP is a leadership tool to be 

used at the battalion or equivalent level. It is 

equally applicable to TDA and TOE structures 

(see app A).

c. NCO professional development training will be scheduled and reflected on unit/

organization master training programs and 

schedules. Such training will be appropriately 

structured to the needs of the unit and noncommissioned officer as assessed by the commander. (Suggested topics for NCO professional development programs are at app B.)

d. All soldiers who demonstrate the 

potential for, or are performing duty in, a 

leadership position or are designated as an 

acting noncommissioned officer will participate in NCODP.

e. Separate classes may be conducted for 

SFC through CSMs.

5. Responsibilities. a. The Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) 

exercises general staff supervision over policies, 

regulations, initiatives, and programs relating to 

NCODP.

b. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

(DCSPER) coordinates all personnel management initiatives and policies which relate to 

NCODP with the DCSOPS.

c. Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)—

(1) Acts as the focal point for required DA 

NCODP actions which do not otherwise define 

themselves by functional staff responsibility.

(2) Is the focal point for all HQDA agencies 

and their field operating agencies (FOAs) on 

decisions which impact on noncommissioned 

officer development and NCODP policies.

(3) Renders an annual report to the Chief 

of Staff, US Army (CSA), on the state of the 

293
Army’s Noncommissioned Officer Corps. This 

includes an assessment of the implementation of NCODP in major Army Commands 

(MACOMs), the ARNG, and the USAR.

d. Chief, National Guard Bureau 

(CNGB)—

(1) Integrates the NCODP into pertinent directives and programs unique to the 

ARNG.

(2) Provides advice and assistance to the 

DCSOPS. 

e. Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)—

(1) Integrates the NCODP into pertinent 

directives and programs unique to the USAR.

(2) Provides advice and assistance to the 

DCSOPS and the Commanding General, US 

Army Reserve Component Personnel and 

Administration Center in the development of 

NCODP supporting programs for the USAR.

f. The Inspector General (TIG)—

(1) Inquires into the effectiveness of 

NCODP during scheduled inspections and 

staff visits.

(2) Provides appropriate feedback to the 

Army Staff. 

g. The Adjutant General (TAG)—

(1) Coordinates with DCSOPS the Quality 

of Life (QOL) initiatives which impact upon 

NCODP.

(2) Insures that educational policies, 

which impact upon noncommissioned officer development, support NCODP.

h. Major Army commands (MACOMs)—

(1) Provide the support and means to 

promote effective NCODPs in units, organizations, and activities.

(2) Insure that intermediate headquarters assist in supporting battalions and equivalent commands to develop formal NCODPs.

(3) In addition to the above, the 

Commanding General, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will provide NCODP 

guidance and assistance to the ARNG and the 

USAR.

i. The Commanders of battalions and 

equivalent organizations—

(1) Are responsible for developing 

NCODPs which are responsive to the needs 

of their unit and the aspirations and development of their junior leaders.

(2) Insure time and resources are provided 

for the conduct of unit professional development training. This includes formal periods of 

instruction and timely counseling of NCOs as 

an integral part of professional development.

(3) Insure that there is, throughout their 

units, a clear identification of those tasks that 

are noncommissioned officer business.

(4) Insure that a clear and distinct noncommissioned officer support channel is 

established. This support channel will not 

replace the normal supervisory chain of command, but will complement that system.

6. Implementing guidance. a. Professional noncommissioned officer training 

should be programed as integral portions of 

formal and informal periods of instruction. 

It should be implemented at the lowest level 

feasible. This may be company, troop, battery, or separate detachment. (Battalion or 

equivalent level for more formal type training 

is appropriate.)

b. Unit programs will complement formal training presented at military and civilian institutions such as that offered by the 

NCOES and civilian schooling.

c. NCODP professional development 

training will include instructions applicable 

to soldiers of all career management fields; 

it will include familiarization of those tasks 

common to all career fields. FM 22–600–20 

lists specific NCO responsibilities—the broad 

skeletal structure of a noncommissioned officer’s performance. They are as follows:

(1) Train soldiers.

(2) Care for their professional needs.

(3) Account for their status.

(4) Maintain fitness and appearance.

(5) Be concerned about the soldier and 

his or her family.

(6) Supervise, counsel, motivate, and 

discipline.

(7) Be loyal.

(8) Plan ahead.

(9) Set the example.

(10) Maintain the unit’s equipment and 

facilities.

d. Portions of the NCODP may be formalized 

into periods of noncommissioned officer development training which should be institutionalized 

in all commands. The topics selected should be 

attuned to the geography, mission, and shortfalls 

of the unit. They should supplement professional 

training gained from daily, routine operations.

294
Although the specialists of the two world wars 

were not combat leaders, and therefore did not receive 

training in leadership skills, the more senior specialists were often called upon to assume command 

responsibilities. The distinction between the NCO 

small-unit leader and specialist became blurred in 

the post–World War II period as the Army’s needs 

for men and women who combined both technical 

and leadership skills increased. Today, in the era 

of the complete, professional soldier, the position of 

specialist has all but been eliminated from the rank 

structure. Only the Specialist (formally, Specialist 

4th Class) remains.

Extract from Army Circular No. 204, War 

Department, Washington, 24 June 1942.

IV—Conversion of specialist ratings to technician grades.—1. Section I, Circular No. 264, 

War Department, 1941, is rescinded.

2. The following enlisted grades are authorized and in appropriate cases will be included in allotments of grades and strengths and 

in Tables of Organization:

Technician, third, fourth, and fifth 

grades.

3. a. Technicians are noncommissioned 

officers. They will receive the pay and allowances of the pay grade indicated by their titles. 

Technicians, third, fourth, and fifth grades 

will rank among themselves, according to the 

dates of their warrants, below staff sergeants, 

sergeants, and corporals, respectively.

b. Technicians are appointed for specific 

duties of a technical or administrative nature. 

Warrants should indicate the specialty for 

which appointed. All appointments during 

the present war will be temporary and warrants issued will so indicate, except that noncommissioned officers holding permanent 

warrants who are reappointed as technicians 

as a result of the action prescribed by paragraph 8 will be issued permanent warrants 

as technicians.

c. All regulations and orders relating to 

command authority apply to technicians in 

the same manner as to other noncommissioned officers.

d. The appointment and reduction of 

technicians is governed by the same regulations applicable to other noncommissioned 

officers of corresponding grades, except 

that technicians, fourth and fifth grades, 

may be reduced upon termination of their 

assignment to the duties for which they 

were appointed to the technician grade. The 

authority to appoint and reduce technicians, 

fourth and fifth grades, subject to the foregoing provisions, may be delegated by commanders authorized to appoint technicians 

to company and detachment commanders.

4. a. Effective June 1, 1942, all specialist 

ratings, except air mechanics, are abolished 

and all enlisted men holding specialist ratings are disrated and reappointed to techni- cian grades as follows:

Old grade and rating New technician grade

Private, first class, 

specialist first class Technician, fourth 

grade.

Private, specialist first class Do.

Private, first class, 

specialist second class Do.

Private, 

specialist, second class Do.

Private, first class, 

specialist third class Do.

Private, specialist third class Technician, fifth grade.

295

e. NCO communication links at battalion 

levels and higher should be established. Their 

purpose is to consider, but not be limited 

to, problems and recommendations related to 

improvements in the development and QOL of 

all NCOs and enlisted personnel. They also serve 

to provide recommendations to commanders 

on topics which affect enlisted personnel.

f. A matrix of NCODP supporting programs 

and policies is provided at appendix A.

g. A selected list of noncommissioned officer 

development training subjects is at appendix B.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

E. C. Meyer

 General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Specialist Rank
Private, first class, 

specialist fourth class Do.

Private, 

specialist fourth class Do.

b. Specialists, fifth and sixth class, are disrated and will be paid according to their rank 

as privates, first class, and privates.

5. Pending publication of revised Tables 

of Organization or revised allotments under 

the technician grade system, grades and ratings now authorized are changed as follows:

a. Substitute technicians, fourth grade, for 

specialists ratings, first and second classes, and 

for one-half the number of specialists, third 

class.

b. Substitute technicians, fifth grade, for 

one-half of the number of specialists, third 

class, and for all specialists, fourth class.

c. Eliminate allotments of specialists, fifth 

and sixth classes.

d. Allotments of privates and privates, 

first class, will be computed as follows: 

Subtract from the total number of privates 

and privates, first class, now shown in Tables 

of Organization or published allotments, 

the number of basics (if any) and the total 

number of technicians determined under the 

above instructions. One-half of the remainder is the number of privates, first class. The 

number of privates is the remainder less the 

number of privates, first class, plus the number of basics authorized.

Extract from Army Circular No. 202, 

Department of the Army, Washington, 7 

July 1948.

II. GRADE STRUCTURE.—4. Enlisted 

Grade Structure.—Effective 1 August 1948—

a. The grade structure for enlisted personnel will consist of seven pay grades with the 

new titles indicated:

Grade New titles Present titles

First Master sergeant Master sergeant 

First sergeant

Second Sergeant, first class Technical sergeant

Third Sergeant Staff sergeant

Fourth Corporal Sergeant

Fifth Private, first class Corporal

Sixth Private Private, first class

Seventh Recruit Private

b. The new pay grade titles will replace 

titles presently in use. Enlisted personnel will 

be converted to new pay grade titles appropriate to their actual pay grade in accordance 

with a above.

c. The Noncommissioned Officer Corps 

will consist of the first four pay grades only.

5. Conversion of enlisted titles of 

grade.—a. New warrants (WD AGO Form 

58) will be issued for all personnel in grades 

2, 3, and 4 in consonance with the pay grade 

titles above. Warrants will not be issued for 

personnel below the fourth pay grade....

6. Technician titles.—Effective 1 August 

1948, technician grade titles prescribed 

by paragraph 8, AR 615–5, are abolished. 

Enlisted men who on that date hold appointments as technician fifth grade, technician 

fourth grade, or technician third grade will 

be converted to a new pay grade title appropriate to their current pay grade. Appropriate 

warrants, WD AGO Form 58, indicating new 

pay grade titles will be issued for personnel 

in the fourth and third pay grade.

7. a. First sergeant title.—The title of first 

sergeant is not a pay grade title. It remains an 

occupational title appropriate to a first grade 

position of such special importance in the 

Noncommissioned Officer Corps that distinctive insignia of grade is provided.

b. Sergeant major title.—The occupational 

title of sergeant major will continue to apply 

to appropriate individuals at regimental and 

battalion level.

8. New enlisted insignia of grade.—a. 

Effective 1 August 1948 two types of enlisted 

insignia of grade are established, as follows:

(1) Combat insignia worn by combat 

personnel which will be gold color background with dark blue color chevrons, arcs, 

and lozenge.

(2) Noncombat insignia worn by noncombat personnel which will be dark blue 

color background with gold color chevrons, 

arcs, and lozenge.

b. Both types of grade insignia will be on an 

embroidered background 2 inches in width forming 1/8-inch edging around the entire insignia and 

between each chevron and arm.

c. Except for color, combat insignia will be the 

same as noncombat insignia for the same grade.

296
d. Listed below are the appropriate insignia for each grade (see fig. 1):

First grade.—Three chevrons above three 

arcs.

Second grade.—Three chevrons above two 

arcs.

Third grade.—Three chevrons above one arc.

Fourth grade.—Two chevrons.

Fifth grade.—One chevron.

Sixth grade.—No chevrons.

Seventh grade.—No chevrons.

e. First sergeants will wear the grade insignia of the first grade with the addition of a 

lozenge between the chevrons and the arcs.

9. Definition of combat personnel.—a. 

Combat personnel are defined, for the purpose of determining entitlement to combat 

insignia of grade, as all personnel assigned to 

the designated combat units listed below:

(1) Infantry, armored, and airborne divisions (including 1st Cavalry Division) and 

component units thereof.

(2) Infantry and armored-cavalry units.

(3) Artillery 75-mm How; 105-mm How 

or 155-mm How battalions; 8-inch guns, 8-

inch How, 155-mm gun, 240-mm gun, and 

240-mm How battalions; field artillery observation battalions.

(4) Engineer special brigades and component units thereof.

(5) Engineer combat battalions.

(6) Chemical mortar battalions.

(7) Constabulary brigades, regiments and 

squadrons, and component units thereof.

b. Action may be initiated by commanders of major commands, to recommend the 

designation of additional type units other 

than those defined in a above as combat 

units. Such action will be forwarded through 

channels to the Department of the Army for 

approval.

Extract from Army Regulation 615–15, HQ, 

Department of the Army, Washington, 2 

July 1954.

Separation of Noncommissioned Officers 

from Specialists

Section I

General

1. Purpose.—These regulations set forth 

procedures designed to increase the prestige 

of the noncommissioned officer in the Army 

by identifying him as an enlisted commander 

of troops. In order to do so, it is necessary 

to distinguish the noncommissioned officer 

from the enlisted technical or administrative 

specialist. These regulations effect the necessary distinction, and at the same time give full 

recognition to the importance of the noncommissioned officer and the specialist. While it 

is the desire of the Department of the Army 

to restore the noncommissioned officer to his 

traditional position as the backbone of the 

Army, it is also of fundamental importance 

that prestige and respect properly due the 

specialist be preserved. To accomplish the 

purpose of these regulations, the following 

objectives are established:

a. Identify the noncommissioned officer 

and specialist as separate categories of enlisted personnel.

b. Prescribe Department of the Army policies and procedures governing the conversion of a portion of each present noncommissioned officer grade to specialist grades.

c. Provide for the enhancement of the 

prestige of the noncommissioned officer.

d. Preserve the respect properly due those 

persons appointed to specialist grades.

2. Applicability.—These regulations are 

applicable to enlisted personnel of all components of the Army, except retired personnel.

3. Effective date.—Effective 1 March 1955 

conversions to grades and titles outlined 

in these regulations are hereby effected for 

enlisted personnel of the Army in accordance 

with the procedures outlined herein.

4. Definitions.—For the purpose of these 

regulations, the following definitions apply:

a. Appointment.—Administrative action which 

effects change from a noncommissioned officer 

grade to a specialist grade.

b. Noncommissioned officer.—An enlisted person who has been appointed a noncommissioned 

officer by competent authority for the purpose of 

exercising leadership over other personnel.

c. Pay grade.—The statutory pay grade established in the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 

as amended.

d. Promotion.—Administrative action which 

effects advancement from a noncommis297
sioned officer grade to a higher noncommissioned officer grade, from a specialist grade 

to a noncommissioned officer grade, from a 

specialist grade to a higher specialist grade, or 

from a private grade to a higher grade.

e. Specialist.—An enlisted person who has 

been appointed or promoted as a specialist by 

competent authority for the purpose of discharging technical or administrative duties not 

requiring the exercise of leadership.

f. Title.—The descriptive name by which 

various categories of enlisted personnel are 

designated.

Section II 

Grade Structure and Titles

5. Scope.—This section establishes the 

grade structure and titles of grades for all 

enlisted personnel of the Army.

6. Enlisted grade structure and titles.—a. 

The grade structure for enlisted personnel consists of seven pay grades with titles as indicated 

below:

Grade Noncommissioned Specialists Privates

 officers

E–7 Master sergeant Master — specialist

E–6 Sergeant 1st class Specialist —

 1st class

E–5 Sergeant Specialist —

 2d class

E–4 Corporal Specialist —

 3d class

E–3 — — Private 

E–2 — — Private E–2.

E–1 — — Private E–1.

b. These titles replace those in use prior 

to the effective date of these regulations. 

Conversions to the new titles will be accomplished in accordance with the procedures 

outlined in paragraphs 10 through 18.

7. Titles of address.—a. Noncommissioned officers will be addressed as “Sergeant” 

or “Corporal” as appropriate.

b. Specialists will be addressed as 

“Specialist.” 

c. Personnel in private grades will be 

addressed as “Private.”

Section III

Rank

8. Scope.—This section establishes the 

order of rank of personnel on and after the 

effective date established in paragraph 3.

9. Order of rank.—a. The noncommissioned officer will rank above all other 

enlisted personnel regardless of pay grade. 

The following are the rank of grades in order 

of precedence:

Order of rank Pay grade Grade title

First E–7 Master sergeant.

Second E–6 Sergeant 1st class.

Third E–5 Sergeant.

Fourth E–4 Corporal.

Fifth E–7 Master specialist.

Sixth E–6 Specialist 1st 

class.

Seventh E–5 Specialist 2d class.

Eighth E–4 Specialist 3d class.

Ninth E–3 Private 1st class.

Tenth E–2 Private, E–2

Eleventh E–1 Private, E–1

b. Determination of order of rank among 

personnel of the same grade will be in accordance with AR 600–15.

Section VI

Responsibility and Authority of the 

Noncommissioned Officer

24. General.—Noncommissioned officers must be capable leaders. In order to 

insure that noncommissioned officers are 

equal to the tasks required of them, commanders of all echelons will give their personal attention to improving the quality 

and prestige of the noncommissioned officer. The proper assignment of noncommissioned officers, based on MOS, grade, and 

leadership ability is of utmost importance in 

the enhancement of the prestige of noncommissioned officers.

25. Enhancement of noncommissioned 

officers.—In order to instill the desire in the 

noncommissioned officer to assume added 

responsibility and to attain the desired 

results of a competent Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps, special attention will be given 

to the following points:

a. Careful selection of noncommissioned 

officers.

298
b. Training of noncommissioned officers 

in their duties and responsibilities.

c. Prompt removal of noncommissioned 

officers who fail to attain or maintain the 

acceptable standards of leadership.

26. Authority of the noncommissioned 

officer.—The position of respect and leadership accorded the noncommissioned officer 

in the chain of command depends directly 

on the degree of authority and responsibility 

that he is allowed to exercise. The delegation 

of all authority and command prerogatives 

proper to the position is essential to the 

development of strong and capable noncommissioned officers. Maximum care must 

be taken to avoid usurping the authority of 

the noncommissioned officer as to do so 

will adversely affect his pride, spirit, ambition, and initiative, and will undermine 

the prestige upon which his effectiveness is 

dependent. Thus, in order to cultivate, establish, and maintain the prestige and authority 

properly due the position of the noncommissioned officer, commissioned officers 

are specifically charged with requiring of 

noncommissioned officers the exercise of 

all responsibility pertaining to their grade. 

To this end—

a. Noncommissioned officers will be 

utilized as appropriate in the dissemination 

of orders to the troops.

b. Noncommissioned officers will be 

encouraged to execute orders on their own 

initiative and judgment.

c. Recommendations of noncommissioned 

officers relative to troop welfare in terms of 

assignment, reassignment, promotion, privileges, discipline, training, and supply should 

be sought in order to emphasize the responsibilities of the noncommissioned officer and 

develop the competency to discharge these 

responsibilities.

d. Noncommissioned officers will be employed 

as training instructors to the maximum practicable 

degree.

e. The correcting and disciplining of noncommissioned officers will be conducted in such a 

manner as to protect them from degrading embarrassment in the presence of their subordinate.

f. Every noncommissioned officer will 

be indoctrinated with the importance and 

responsibility of his rank and position within the command structure of the Army.

g. The successful implementation of this 

policy is dependent on the extent of leadership exercised by commanders at all echelons of command. Therefore, commanders and their staffs are charged specifically 

with the responsibility for the development 

and maintenance of a leadership program 

which will insure an equitable delegation 

of authority and responsibility to the noncommissioned officer by his superiors, both 

officer and enlisted.

Section VII 

Prerogatives and Privileges

27. Prerogatives.—a. Noncommissioned 

officers will be used only in supervisory 

roles on fatigue duty, and only as noncommissioned officers of the guard on guard 

duty.

b. Specialists in grades E–7 and E–6 will 

be exempt from guard and fatigue duty, 

except in unusual circumstances when their 

services are required for the proper execution of these duties. In these cases, specialists in grades E–7 and E–6 will be used only 

in supervisory roles.

28. Privileges.—a. Noncommissioned 

officers will be granted such privileges as the 

organization and installation commanders 

are capable of granting and consider proper 

to enhance the prestige of noncommissioned officers.

b. Specialists in grades E–6 and E–7 will 

be granted the same privileges as the noncommissioned officers in the organization 

and installation.

c. Other enlisted personnel may be 

granted such privileges as the organization and installation commanders consider 

proper commensurate with their grade. [AG 

221 (18 Jun 54) G1]

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

M. B. RIDGWAY,

General, United States Army, 

Chief of Staff.

299
Extract from Message, HQ, Department 

of the Army, Washington, 28 May 1985, 

Subject: Elimination of Specialist Ranks.

1. As a result of MACOM Commanders’ 

review of the issue of whether we should have 

both specialists and noncommissioned officer ranks, the Chief of Staff, Army, has decided 

that specialist five and specialist six ranks will 

be eliminated. The specialist four rank will be 

retained and decisions on whether soldiers in 

grade E4 are specialists or corporals will continue to be made by commanders in the field 

based on standards of grade authorizations 

in AR 611–201. Additionally commanders 

may laterally appoint specialists four who are 

serving in SGT positions to corporal in accordance with para 2–43, AR 600–200.

2. Effective date for elimination of SP5 and 

SP6 is 1 October 1985. In the meantime promotion to E5 and E6 will continue to be made to 

the appropriate ranks indicated in AR 611–201 

as in the past.

3. Implementation instructions for lateral 

appointment of SP5 and SP6 to SGT and SSG 

on 1 October 1985 will be announced at a later 

date in a message to commanders. Affected soldiers will be informed that the cost of changing 

insignia will be borne by the Army.

4. Request widest dissemination of this 

information.

300
APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Evolution of the NCO Insignia

Since 1775 the Army has set apart its 

NCOs from other enlisted soldiers by distinctive insignia of grade. Those insignia 

have evolved over the years, through a variety 

of shapes, styles, and colors, to today’s chevrons. Sometimes changes in uniform style 

and colors dictated changes in the style and 

color of chevrons. The history of these insignia is complex and often confusing. In some 

cases no official records survive to document 

the use of certain insignia. Many times the 

vagueness of official records resulted in conflicting interpretations by individual NCOs, 

leading to a variety of insignia designs for 

the same official rank. In still other cases, 

noncommissioned officers wore unauthorized grade insignia, leaving little if any documentation.

At the beginning of the Revolutionary 

War, the Continental Army did not have 

consistent uniforms, and the problem of distinguishing rank was often difficult. To solve 

this problem, in July 1775 General George 

Washington ordered designations of grade 

for officers and noncommissioned officers. 

All sergeants were to be distinguished by a 

strip of red cloth sewn on the right shoulder; 

corporals, by one of green.

Epaulettes continued to distinguish 

NCOs for years to come. In 1779 Washington 

authorized sergeants to wear two silk epaulettes; corporals would wear one worsted 

epaulette on the right shoulder. White epaulettes designated infantry NCOs; yellow, the 

artillery; and blue, the cavalry. The colors of 

the artillery and infantry epaulettes remained 

the same until 1798 and 1821, respectively. 

But the early Army of the fledgling republic 

changed the type of epaulette worn by the 

various grades of NCOs when it experienced 

its first small augmentation in early 1787. 

The sergeants major, quartermaster sergeants, 

and drum and fife majors wore two silk 

epaulettes; the sergeants, two worsted; and 

the corporals, one worsted epaulette. Those 

of the projected cavalry and rifle units, which 

the Army did not organize until four years 

later, were to be white. During the quasi-war 

with France in 1797, the Army prescribed 

red epaulettes for all NCOs. This break with 

tradition raised a furor, and only the infantry 

wore red until 1808, while the artillery managed to keep yellow epaulettes. With the raising of five new infantry regiments in 1808, all 

infantry NCOs again wore white epaulettes 

as did the newly organized dragoons. A company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners 

(engineer enlisted men) came into existence 

during the War of 1812, and their NCOs wore 

the same yellow epaulettes as the artillery.

When regulations in 1821 directed the 

wearing of uniforms with cloth wings, the 

Army had to find another way to distinguish 

rank. It adopted a stripe, or chevron, for 

officers and NCOs to wear on the arm of the 

uniform, point up. Colors identified the two 

arms: yellow for artillery and white for infantry. When the Army discontinued the use of 

wings in 1832, epaulettes and cuff slashflaps 

replaced chevrons. One year later, however, 

Congress authorized a regiment of dragoons 

with a distinctive uniform. Because the dragoon uniforms used metal shoulder scales to 

protect against saber cuts, the Army authorized yellow chevrons, with points down, to 

distinguish noncommissioned officer rank. 

In 1845 one battery of horse artillery received 

dragoon-type uniforms, with NCOs wearing 

red chevrons. During the Mexican War, the 

Army authorized yellow or white chevrons 

with points up for all branches to wear on 

fatigue uniforms. In 1851 a new uniform 

established a system of branch colors, and 

chevrons reverted to points down. By 1872 
304

eleven grades of NCO existed in the Army, 

seven with distinctive chevrons. 

As the Army became more specialized, 

it established many new ranks. In 1902, 

when the Army retained twenty distinctive 

NCO chevrons, the insignia returned to the 

point-up position. With the authorization 

of new specialist grades, the number of new 

distinctive chevrons increased dramatically. 

During World War I the Army established 

temporary branches of service and authorized new chevrons for each pay grade in 

the new system. Eventually, it instituted over 

a hundred distinctive chevrons, including 

ones for the Tank Corps, Aviation Service, 

and two different transportation services. 

The cost and confusion became too much, 

and in 1920 Congress ended the practice 

of using the chevron to show a specific job 

or position among enlisted men. The Army 

consolidated all enlisted ranks into seven 

pay grades, five of which were for noncommissioned officers. During World War II the 

Army differentiated between technical and 

combat grades, although the three technician grades adopted were dropped by the 

postwar Army.

For a time, the Army reduced the size 

of its chevrons. To save material, the War 

Department introduced a smaller, two-inchwide chevron in 1948. With the smaller size 

came changes in color to distinguish between 

combat (blue on a gold background) and 

noncombat (gold on a blue background) 

insignia. Another major change in 1948 

was the substitution of the staff sergeant’s 

three bars and a rocker for the three-stripe 

chevron worn by sergeants ever since 1833. 

At the beginning of the Korean War the 

Army went back to large chevrons, this 

time olive drab on a dark blue background. 

Once again, it authorized seven pay grades, 

although the rank titles corresponding to 

the pay grades changed. In 1955 the Army 

decided to distinguish between its combat 

leaders and those soldiers with special skills, 

splitting the top four enlisted grades into 

noncommissioned officers and specialists. 

Once again, it authorized specialists to wear 

distinctive insignia.

In June 1958 the Army adopted the basic 

chevron system in use today. The seven pay 

grades expanded to nine. One new chevron 

appeared (the three stripes with three rockers and a star for sergeant major), and one 

chevron returned (the simple three stripes 

denoting sergeant). The addition of the 

three-stripe sergeant bumped each chevron 

up one grade with the result that the ranks 

of sergeant, staff sergeant, and sergeant first 

class wore one rocker less. To prevent a 

morale problem, the Army allowed personnel in those grades to continue to wear their 

old chevrons until promoted or demoted, 

when they would wear the proper chevron. 

This policy continued until 1968, when all 

personnel had to wear the current appropriate chevron for their grade. In 1958 

the Army also adopted larger specialist’s 

chevrons, reserving the smaller versions for 

female personnel. The Army phased out all 

but one of the specialist grades during the 

1970s and early 1980s, leaving the old “Spec 

Four” chevron as the insignia for the rank 

designated “Specialist.”

The following plates are an artist’s rendition of selected NCO and specialist insignia from 1775 to the present. They do not 

include all insignia and also exclude metal 

pin-on insignia, authorized by the Department of the Army in 1967. Dates of individual grade insignia refer to a point in time 

when NCOs used a particular design, not 

necessarily the color schemes shown.
NCO Insignia, 1775–1821

1. Sergeant, 1775, worn on right shoulder only.

2. Corporal, 1775, worn on right shoulder only.

3. Sergeant and Corporal, 1779, a. Infantry; b. Artillery; 

c. Cavalry. Corporal’s insignia worn on right shoulder 

 only.

1

2

3

a.

b.

c.
1

2

3

NCO Insignia, 1821–

1851

1. Sergeant, Infantry, 1825.

2. Corporal, Artillery, worn on 

 right sleeve only, 1821.

3. Sergeant Major, Infantry, 

 1825.

4. Sergeant Major, Infantry, 

 1847.

5. Quartermaster Sergeant, 

 Infantry, 1847.

6. First Sergeant, Artillery, 

 1847. 

7. Sergeant, Horse Artillery, 

 1847.

8. Corporal, Dragoons, 1833.

4

5

6

7

8
NCO and Specia

list 

Insi

gnia, 1851–1902

1. Sergeant Major, Infantry, 

 1851.

2. Regimental Quartermaster 

 Sergeant, Infantry, 1851. 

3. First Sergeant, Infantry, 

 1851.

4. Company Quartermaster 

 Sergeant, Infantry, 1866.

5. Sergeant, Cavalry, 1855.

6. Ordnance Sergeant, 1851.

7. Hospital Steward (left arm 

 insignia shown), 1851.

8. Corporal, Artillery, 1851.

9. Pioneer, 1851. 1

2

3

45

6

7

8

9
NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1873–1902

1. Sergeant First Class of Signal Corps, 1891. 

2. Chief Musician, Cavalry, 1899. 

3. Color Sergeant, Infantry, 1883. 

4. Hospital Steward, 1887. 

5. Electrician, 1899. 

6. Color Sergeant, Infantry, 1901. 

7. Drum Major, Cavalry, 1899.

1 2

3

4

5

6

7
8. Post Commissary Sergeant, 1898.

9. Post Quartermaster Sergeant, 1884.

10. Stable Sergeant, Field Artillery, 1901.

11. Saddler Sergeant, 1873.

12. Cook, Infantry, 1898.

13. Artificer, Infantry, 1899.

14. Ordnance Sergeant, 1901.

8 9

11

14

12

13

10
NCO Insignia, 1902–1920

Note: Rank insignia authorized for 

right arm only from May 1918 to 

March 1921.

1. Sergeant Major, Senior Grade, 

 Coast Artillery, 1902. 

2. Squadron or Battalion Sergeant 

 Major, 1902. 

3. Ordnance Sergeant, 1917. 

4. Ordnance Sergeant, 1918. 

5. Chief Musician, Cavalry, 1902. 

6. Color Sergeant, 1902. 

7. First Sergeant Engineers, 1902.

8. Sergeant First Class, 1918.

1 2 3

4

5

6

7 8
9. Quartermaster Sergeant, 1913.

10. Hospital Steward, 1902.

11. Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant,

 Infantry, 1902.

12. Sergeant, Signal Corps, 1902.

13. Corporal, Infantry, 1902.

14. Lance Corporal, Infantry, 1902.

9

11

14

12

13

10
NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1902–1920

1. Quartermaster Sergeant Senior Grade, 1916. 

2. Master Signal Electrician, 1918. 

3. Master Engineer Junior Grade, 1916. 

4. Master Gunner, 1908. 

5. Engineer, Coast Artillery Corps, 1908. 

6. Master Signal Electrician, Air Service, 1918. 

7. Master Engineer Senior Grade, Tank Corps, 1918.

8. Chief Mechanic, 1907.

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

8
9. Master Engineer Junior Grade, Transportation Corps, 1919.

10. Master Chemical Sergeant, 1918.

11. Farrier, Cavalry, 1902.

12. Farrier, Field Artillery, 1908.

13. Chauffeur, 1918.

14. Bugler First Class, Infantry, 1918.

9

11

14

12

13

10
NCO and Specialist Insignia, 1920–1958

1. Master Sergeant, 1920. 

2. First Sergeant, 1920. 

3. First Sergeant, 1942. 

4. Technical Sergeant, 1920. 

5. Technician 3d Grade, 1942. 

6. Technician 4th Grade, 1942. 

7. Technician 5th Grade, 1942.

8. Master Specialist, 1955.

1 2 3

4

5 6

7

8
9. Staff Sergeant, 1920.

10. Sergeant, 1920.

11. Corporal, 1920.

12. Specialist First Class, 1955.

13. Specialist Second Class, 1955.

14. Specialist Third Class, 1955.

9

11

12 13 14

10
NCO Insignia, 1948–1951

Combat chevrons:

1 First Sergeant.

2. Master Sergeant. 

3. Sergeant First Class. 

4. Sergeant. 

5. Corporal.

1 2

3

4

5
Noncombat chevrons:

6. First Sergeant.

7. Master Sergeant. 

8. Sergeant First Class. 

9. Sergeant. 

10. Corporal.

6 7

8

9

10
1 Sergeant Major of the Army, 2001.

2. Sergeant Major of the Army, 1979.

3. Command Sergeant Major, 1968.

4. Sergeant Major, 1958.

5. First Sergeant, 1958.

6. Master Sergeant, 1958

7. Sergeant First Class, 1958.

8. Staff Sergeant, 1958.

9. Sergeant, subdued, 1966.

NCO Insignia Since 1958

1 2 3

4 5 6

7 8 9
1

2

3

4 5 6

Specialist Insignia Since 1959

1. Specialist Nine, 1959.

2. Specialist Eight, 1959.

3. Specialist Seven, 1959.

4. Specialist Six, 1959.

5. Specialist Five, 1959.

6. Specialist Four, subdued, 1966.

Note: Of the specialist insignia, only no. 6 remains in use today, as the insignia for what 

is now the single grade Specialist.
Newburgh, New York, 3 May 1783, H. Charles McBarron, 1975. William Brown (left) and Elijah Churchill 

Receiving the First Badges of Merit 
The term hero usually refers to individuals who, because of their courage, strength, 

or skill, stand apart from ordinary men and 

women. Occasionally, heroism is grim determination or even a matter of timing. But a 

hero is, most often, an average person who 

reacts to crisis with quiet professionalism. By 

virtue of their leadership training, all noncommissioned officers are prepared for those 

situations from which heroes emerge.

The Army has had its share of heroes, 

many—if not most—of whom have worn 

stripes. Throughout the Army’s history, its 

NCO heroes usually were average human 

beings who responded when circumstances 

called for exceptional personal effort and 

sacrifice.

These heroes exemplify Army values. 

Values are altruistic principles based on moral 

or traditional standards or codes of conduct. 

The values that have characterized the deeds 

of these heroes and the collective personality of the U.S. Army since 1775 include personal courage, loyalty, respect, duty, integrity, 

honor, and selfless service.

Because the number of recognized heroes 

is so large, those whose names, portraits, and 

deeds appear below represent only a tiny 

fraction of the hundreds upon hundreds who 

deserve mention. In fact, little information 

survives on individual heroes from America’s 

early wars. Their portraits and citations were 

never recorded. Before the Civil War and 

the widespread use of photography, men of 

modest incomes—and that included most 

soldiers—rarely had their portraits painted. 

For them and countless others through the 

Army’s long history, the record is fragmentary 

at best. Little is known about them beyond 

the terse words of their citations for valor.

The American Revolution

William Brown, Sergeant, 5th Connecticut 

Regiment

On 14 October 1781, during the siege of 

Yorktown, Sgt. William Brown led the advance 

party, known in those days as a “forlorn hope,” 

against Redoubt Number 10 in the British 

defenses. Sergeant Brown declined to wait 

for sappers to clear the abatis and picket-like 

fraise that ringed the objective and blocked 

the way up the slope to the British position. 

Instead, he led his men over and through 

these obstructions to enter the redoubt in a 

surprise assault. Using only their bayonets, 

the Americans captured the position within 

ten minutes. Sergeant Brown was among the 

casualties, with a bayonet wound in the hand. 

For his bravery during this decisive battle, 

he received the Badge of Military Merit, the 

nation’s original military decoration, on 3 

May 1783 during the same ceremony that recognized Sgt. Elijah Churchill (see below).

John Champe, Sergeant Major, 2d Partisan 

Corps

Born in Loudoun County, Virginia, 

Champe entered the Continental Army in 

Appendix B

A Gallery of Noncommissioned

Officer Heroes

“The sergeants should be brave and prudent...” 

—E. Hoyt, A Treatise on the Military Art, 1798
322

Detail from The Escape of 

Sergeant Champe, a Lithograph by Currier and Ives, 

1876 

1776 and rose to the rank of sergeant major by 1780. When General 

Washington sought a volunteer to kidnap the traitor, Benedict 

Arnold, and return him to face American justice, Lt. Col. Henry Lee 

selected Champe because of his reputation for daring and patriotism. After a cover story was arranged, the sergeant major “deserted” 

to the British garrison in New York City in October 1780 and joined 

Arnold’s American Legion. He then made plans to capture Arnold 

during the general’s regular evening walk in the garden and, with the 

help of two confederates in the city, to spirit the general across the 

Hudson River to where Colonel Lee would be waiting in Hoboken, 

New Jersey. Unfortunately, the night before the planned abduction, 

Arnold and the American Legion began a deployment to Virginia, 

and Champe could only accompany them. Near Petersburg, he 

finally managed to desert to the American forces, but without 

capturing Arnold. Washington, realizing that Champe, if captured, 

could be hanged as a British deserter, arranged for his honorable 

discharge. Washington later sought to make Champe a captain in 

the Army created during the undeclared war with France in 1798, 

but Champe died before being commissioned. He left future NCOs 

a singular example of patriotism and selfless dedication to duty.

Elijah Churchill, Sergeant, 2d Legionary Corps

Sergeant Churchill received the Badge of Military Merit for two 

daring raids in 1781 against Fort St. George and Fort Slongo on Long 

Island, New York. The first raid took place during a severe November 

storm and included a hazardous twenty-mile crossing from Fairfield, 

Connecticut, to Fort St. George in small, open boats over the choppy 

waters of Long Island Sound. Thrown off course by the gale, the raiding party reached shore and marched several miles behind enemy 

lines to its objective. Under cover of darkness, Sergeant Churchill 

led his men in an attack that caught the British by surprise and 
323

Alexander M. Kenaday’s heroism in the battle of Churubusco 

formed the centerpiece of this 

painting by an unknown artist. 

overwhelmed them. The Americans succeeded in burning a supply 

schooner anchored off shore and in destroying vast stores of enemy 

supplies. In this action, as in a later raid against Fort Slongo, Sergeant 

Churchill did not lose a single man. General George Washington 

awarded the Badge of Military Merit to Churchill at Continental Army 

headquarters, Newburgh, New York, on 3 May 1783.

The War of 1812

Thomas Bangs, Sergeant, 22d Infantry

In the winter of 1814 Sergeant Bangs and the other Americans 

at Fort Niagara faced hostile British forces across the Niagara River 

in Canada. The weather was bitter cold on 13 February, when five 

British soldiers, under a flag of truce, attempted to cross the icy 

river in a small boat with three prisoners of war and three ladies. 

Frozen and exhausted by their efforts, the British could not reach the 

American shore before daylight faded. Their boat was quickly swept 

by the current into Lake Ontario. Sergeant Bangs and two seamen 

were ordered to the rescue in a small boat. After safely returning to 

the American shore, Sergeant Bangs and his two companions braved 

the elements once again to carry the five weary British soldiers back 

across the Niagara River. They successfully made the trip by moonlight, returning two days later with a letter of thanks from the British 

commanding officer of Fort George for saving the lives of his men.

The Mexican War

Alexander M. Kenaday, Sergeant, Company G, 3d Dragoons

Alexander Kenaday was living in New Orleans at the outbreak of 

the Mexican War. With other volunteers, he flocked to the colors for 
324

Adna R. Chaffee, Cedric 

Baldwin Egeli, 1973. Chaffee 

later became the second chief 

of staff of the Army. 

a ninety-day enlistment and joined Col. Sam Mark’s regiment near 

Matamoros, Mexico. In August 1846, when his first regiment disbanded, Sergeant Kenaday reenlisted, this time in Company G of the 

3d Dragoons. He commanded the detail assigned to guard the headquarters during the battle of Churubusco on 20 August 1847. When 

a burning ammunition wagon blocked the advancing American 

troops, Sergeant Kenaday risked his life to climb aboard the wagon 

and throw the ammunition into a ditch alongside the road. For this 

valorous action, he was commended by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott. 

Kenaday later helped to organize a national veterans association in 

Washington, D.C.

The Civil War

William H. Carney, Sergeant, Company C, 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry

Born in Virginia, William Carney 

lived for many years in New Bedford, 

Massachusetts, before joining one of 

the first black volunteer regiments 

raised by the Union. He won the 

Medal of Honor for heroism on 18 

July 1863, when his regiment assaulted Fort Wagner, South Carolina. Seeing 

the color sergeant felled by enemy fire, 

Sergeant Carney seized the national 

flag before it hit the ground. He then carried the Stars and Stripes to 

the parapet of the fort, where he was wounded in both legs, the chest, 

and the right arm. Despite the seriousness of his injuries, Carney 

insisted on carrying the colors as his unit retreated from the fort. 

With the aid of some of his comrades, Sergeant Carney reached the 

field hospital, where, still clutching the American flag, he collapsed, 

saying “The old flag never touched the ground, boys.”

Adna R. Chaffee, First Sergeant, 

Troop K, 6th Cavalry

A native of Ohio, Adna Chaffee 

enlisted in the Regular Army’s 6th 

Cavalry in July 1861 and remained 

with the unit for twenty-seven years. 

He became first sergeant of Troop K in 

September 1862, just in time to participate in the bloody battle of Antietam, 

where he won official recognition for 

his bravery and leadership skills. Later 

commissioned a second lieutenant, 

Chaffee served with the 6th Cavalry 

during the Indian Wars in the Southwest. Chaffee commanded a brigade in the Santiago campaign during the Spanish-American War. As 
major general, he served tours in China and the Philippines before 

becoming Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1904.

Ben Falls, Sergeant, 19th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry

By 1864 Ben Falls could claim three years of service in the 

Civil War. His regiment had fought in all the major battles of the 

Eastern Theater, and Falls had won the Medal of Honor for capturing a Confederate flag at Gettysburg. He and his comrades had every 

reason to expect to go home at the end of a three-year enlistment. 

However, the new draftees arriving as replacements clearly did not 

have the determination of the veterans. Many deserted as soon as 

they arrived. Sergeant Falls said, “If new men won’t finish this job, 

old men must, and as long as Uncle Sam wants a man, here is Ben 

Falls.” Only thirteen strong, he and his company reenlisted for the 

duration, knowing that many would never go home. A month later, 

Sergeant Falls was killed at Spotsylvania Court House. His devotion 

to duty and country was typical of those who carried the proud distinction, “Veteran Volunteers.” 

Christian A. Fleetwood, Sergeant 

Major, 4th United States Colored 

Troops

Born and raised in Baltimore, 

Christian Fleetwood enlisted in the 

Union Army in July 1863 and quickly 

advanced to the rank of sergeant major. 

He participated in the 1864 campaign 

around Richmond, including the battles at Fort Harrison, Chapin’s Farm, 

and New Market Heights. When two 

color sergeants of his regiment fell at 

Chapin’s Farm, Fleetwood seized the 

national colors and bore them throughout the engagement. For this 

courageous act he received the Medal of Honor in April 1865. After 

leaving the Army in May 1866, he joined the District of Columbia 

Militia (later National Guard), in which he eventually rose to the rank 

of major.

William McKinley, Commissary Sergeant, 23d Ohio Volunteer Infantry

William McKinley enlisted in Col. 

(later President) Rutherford B. Hayes’ 

23d Ohio Infantry Regiment in June 

1861. During the battle of Antietam, 

Commissary Sergeant McKinley was 

in the rear in charge of his unit’s supplies. The men had eaten only a scanty 

breakfast, and McKinley knew that, 

as the day wore on, they were growing hungry. Gathering some stragglers, 

McKinley led two mule teams with 

325

William McKinley, August 

Penziger, 1897 (Depicted as 

President of the United States) 
326

wagons of rations and hot coffee into the thick of battle. Working his 

way over rough ground, under fire, McKinley ignored repeated warnings to retreat. He lost one team of mules to enemy fire, but did not 

return to the rear of the brigade until his fellow soldiers had been 

properly fed under the most adverse combat conditions. McKinley 

received a direct commission as a second lieutenant that same month 

(September 1862), rose to the rank of major by the end of the war, 

and eventually became President of the United States.

Charles E. Morse, Sergeant, Company I, 62d New York Volunteer 

Infantry

During the battle of the Wilderness in Virginia on 5 May 1864, 

Sergeant Morse saw his unit’s color 

sergeant fall mortally wounded. In 

the close, often confused fighting, 

Sergeant Morse rushed to his fallen 

comrade and, though surrounded 

by the enemy, raised the colors and 

rallied the men. Soon wounded himself, Sergeant Morse continued to 

carry the colors for the remainder 

of the engagement. He subsequently 

received the Medal of Honor.

The Indian Wars

William C. Bryan, Hospital Steward

Born and raised in Zanesville, Ohio, Bryan enlisted in the Army 

in St. Louis, Missouri, and became an early member of the medical 

specialist corps. In March 1876 he was attached to a task force from 

the 2d and 3d Cavalry engaged in winter operations against hostile 

Sioux under Chief Crazy Horse. On 17 March the force found the 

Indian encampment along the Powder River and attacked. During 

the fierce fighting that followed, Bryan’s horse was shot out from 

under him. Despite heavy fire, he continued to carry out his medical duties on foot and brought two wounded comrades to safety. 

For his heroism, he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Richard P. Hanley, Sergeant, Company C, 7th Cavalry

Sergeant Hanley was part of a detail escorting pack mules during the battle of the Little Bighorn on 25 June 1876. During the 

fighting, one of the mules, loaded with ammunition, stampeded 

into the Indian lines. Single-handed, Hanley chased the mule, 

grabbed its bridle, and brought it back to friendly lines. The feat 

took nearly twenty minutes, during which he was under heavy fire 

from the Indians and in full view of most of the combatants from 

both sides. For his courageous act, Sergeant Hanley won the Medal 

of Honor.
Patrick Leonard, Corporal, Company A, 23d Infantry

Many of the soldiers in the frontier Army were born overseas 

and immigrated to the United States. Leonard was from Ireland. He 

was a special soldier, even among Medal of Honor winners, for he 

won two such medals during the Indian Wars. As a private in the 2d 

Cavalry, Leonard received his first citation in the summer of 1870 for 

gallantry in action against hostile Cheyenne. In April 1876 Corporal 

Leonard, then serving with the 23d Infantry in Nebraska, took part 

in a skirmish against Sioux warriors in which his sergeant was killed. 

Because the young lieutenant in charge of the troop was fresh from 

the East Coast and totally inexperienced in the ways of Indian fighting, it fell to Corporal Leonard and one other corporal to provide 

leadership in routing the determined enemy.

William McBryar, Sergeant, Company K, 10th Cavalry

Sergeant McBryar, a member of 

the all-black 10th Cavalry, was one 

of the last of the celebrated “Buffalo 

Soldiers” to win a Medal of Honor 

in the frontier campaigns against the 

Indians. Sergeant McBryar was cited 

for bravery and good marksmanship 

in action against Apache Indians at 

Salt River, Arizona, in March 1890. 

Sergeant McBryar’s service extended 

to the Spanish-American War, during 

which he distinguished himself in Cuba with Company H, 25th 

Infantry. At the siege of Santiago, he guided the construction of earthworks around the port city, working under fire from the Spanish artillery. He was later commissioned and served as a first lieutenant with 

the 49th Volunteer Infantry until June 1901. When it became clear that 

the United States would enter the World War, this devoted old soldier 

once again volunteered, but was turned down because of his age.

Hampton M. Roach, Corporal, Company F, 5th Cavalry

Corporal Roach received the Medal of Honor for his heroism during an engagement against hostile Indians at Milk River, 

Colorado, in October 1879. Under fire from a heavily armed foe, 

Corporal Roach erected breastworks. Over successive nights, he managed to keep his unit supplied with water despite close-range fire 

from Indians in ambush positions. He was later commissioned as a 

second lieutenant.

The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars

Anthony J. Carson, Corporal, Company H, 43d Infantry

Anthony Carson was born in Boston and entered the Army from 

Maiden, Massachusetts. In April 1900 Carson’s company deployed 

327
to Catubig, Samar, in the Philippine Islands. Attacked by a vastly 

superior force of insurgents, Corporal Carson’s detachment became 

separated from the rest of the company. Under Carson’s leadership, 

the Americans prepared a defensive position and waited for help 

to arrive. For more than two days, Corporal Carson demonstrated 

sound judgment and confidence as he directed his detachment’s 

fire during repeated attacks by the well-armed enemy force. For his 

exceptional leadership and professionalism under fire, Carson was 

awarded the Medal of Honor.

Warren J. Shepherd, Corporal, Company D, 17th Infantry

In heavy action against the enemy at El Caney, Cuba, in July 1898, 

Corporal Shepherd gallantly assisted in the rescue of his wounded colleagues from the front lines. He received the Medal of Honor.

The Boxer Rebellion

Calvin Pearl Titus, Corporal (Musician), Company E, 14th Infantry

During an outbreak of violence 

against foreigners in China during the 

summer of 1900, American troops 

joined soldiers from seven other nations 

to rescue their besieged embassies in 

the walled city of Beijing. During the 

assault on 14 August, when his commander asked for a volunteer to scale 

the east wall of the city without the 

aid of ropes or ladders, Corporal Titus 

replied, “I’ll try, sir.” Under enemy fire 

Titus successfully climbed the thirty-foot wall by way of jagged holes 

in its surface. His company followed his lead up the wall, hauling up 

their rifles and ammunition belts by a rope made with rifle slings. For 

his daring example, Corporal Titus received an appointment to the 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he received the Medal of 

Honor during a review of the Corps of Cadets.

World War I

Michael B. Ellis, Sergeant, Company 

C, 28th Infantry, 1st Division; War 

Department General Orders (WD 

GO) 74, 1919

Sergeant Ellis won a Medal of 

Honor during an engagement near 

Exermont, France, on 5 October 1918. 

Ellis volunteered to go far in advance 

of his company’s attacking wave, 

single-handedly reducing enemy 

machine-gun nests. Flanking one posi328

Calvin Pearl Titus Receiving the 

Medal of Honor at the U.S. 

Military Academy 
tion, Sergeant Ellis killed two of the enemy and captured seventeen 

others. Once he handed off his prisoners to his company, he again 

advanced alone under heavy fire, capturing ten other machine guns, 

along with their crews.

James B. Lepley, Sergeant, Company 

M, 168th Infantry, 42d Division; 

WD GO 99, 1918

Sergeant Lepley won the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in 

July 1918 in Sergy, France. Leading his 

platoon against a strong enemy position, he personally captured several 

machine guns and prisoners from a 

Prussian Guards regiment. Later, near 

the village of Souain, Sergeant Lepley 

dashed from his trench under cover 

of darkness to a nearby woods and, in 

spite of heavy rifle fire, shrapnel bursts, and lingering poison gas, guided two of his missing men back to safety. His actions demonstrated the 

best in the tradition of the NCO’s looking out for his men.

Patrick Walsh, Sergeant, Company I, 

18th Infantry, 1st Division; WD GO 

126, 1918

When the United States entered 

World War I in 1917, Sergeant Walsh 

already had served for thirty-one years 

and was eligible to retire. Instead, he 

elected to remain with his division when 

it left for France. On 1 March 1918, near 

Seicheprey, Walsh followed his company 

commander through a severe barrage to 

the first line of trenches in preparation 

for an attack. When his captain was killed, Sergeant Walsh assumed 

command and initiated an assault that resulted in heavy enemy losses. 

He was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for his demonstration 

of leadership.

Samuel Woodfill, First Sergeant, 60th 

Infantry, 5th Division; WD GO 16, 

1919

A model Regular Army NCO, 

Sergeant Woodfill was, in the words of 

General John J. Pershing, “the greatest 

American soldier of the World War.” His 

more than thirty-three years of service 

included tours in the Philippines and 

Alaska, along the Mexican border, and in 

the Meuse-Argonne sector of France. In 

France, Woodfill won both the Medal of 

329
Honor and the French Legion of Honor for service under enemy fire 

and received a battlefield promotion to lieutenant. Discharged from 

the Army in late October 1919, he reenlisted the following month 

as a sergeant. Along with Sergeant York, Sergeant Woodfill was one 

of the pallbearers selected by General Pershing for the burial of the 

Unknown Soldier in 1921.

Alvin C. York, Sergeant, Company 

G, 328th Infantry, 82d Division; WD 

GO 59, 1919

Despite his application to be a 

conscientious objector, Alvin York 

went to France with the American 

Expeditionary Forces and became one 

of the best known and most decorated heroes of World War I. When 

his platoon suffered heavy casualties, including three other NCOs, near 

Chatel-Chehery, France, on 8 October 

1918, Sergeant (then Corporal) York 

assumed command of the seven survivors. Fearlessly, he charged a 

machine-gun position that was pouring deadly fire on his men. He 

showed his markmanship with his rifle by killing between 15 and 

25 of the enemy (reports differ). The remainder of the now dispirited German unit, consisting of 4 enemy officers and 128 enlisted 

men with several machine guns, surrendered. Sergeant York won the 

Medal of Honor for his dramatic action under fire. In 1935, in recognition of his service during the war, the Army placed York on the 

retired list as a major. 

World War II

Jose Calugas, Sergeant, Battery 

B, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine 

Scouts; WD GO 10, 24 February 

1942

Born in the Philippines, Jose 

Calugas entered the Army at Fort 

Stotsenberg in Luzon and later joined 

the Regular Army’s Philippine Scouts. 

When the Japanese besieged General 

Douglas MacArthur’s American forces 

in the Bataan Peninsula in early 1942, 

Calugas was a mess sergeant in Battery 

B, 88th Field Artillery. On 16 January 

the Japanese bombed and shelled an American gun position near 

Culis, knocking out the gun and killing or wounding the entire crew. 

From his nearby battery, Sergeant Calugas voluntarily raced 1,000 

yards across the shell-swept terrain to the position, where he organized a volunteer squad to get the gun back into effective action. For 

his devotion to duty, Sergeant Calugas received the Medal of Honor.

330
Edward A. Carter, Jr., Staff Sergeant, 

Seventh Army Infantry Company 1 

(Provisional), 56th Armored Infantry 

Battalion, 12th Armored Division; 

WD GO 3, 12 January 1945

Staff Sergeant Carter received the 

Medal of Honor posthumously in 

1997 for his extraordinary heroism in 

action on 23 March 1945, near Speyer, 

Germany. His provisional company 

consisted of black support troops who 

had volunteered as replacements for 

the heavy losses the Army sustained 

in the Battle of the Bulge. When the 

tank on which he was riding received heavy bazooka and small-arms 

fire, Sergeant Carter voluntarily attempted to lead a three-man group 

across an open field. Within a short time, two of his men were killed 

and the third seriously wounded. Continuing alone, he was wounded 

five times and finally had to take cover. When eight enemy riflemen 

attempted to capture him, Sergeant Carter killed six and captured the 

remaining two. He then crossed the field using his two prisoners as a 

shield. From the prisoners, he obtained valuable information concern-

ing the disposition of enemy troops. 

Marcario Garcia, Staff Sergeant, U.S. 

Army, Company B, 22d Infantry, 4th 

Infantry Division; WD GO 74, 1 

September 1945

On 27 November 1944, near 

Grosshau, Germany, Company B, 

22d Infantry, encountered intense 

machine-gun fire and a concentrat-

ed artillery and mortar barrage while 

attacking prepared positions on a 

wooded hill with only meager cover 

on its approaches. The acting squad 

leader, Mexican-born immigrant 

Private First Class Garcia, single-hand-

edly assaulted two enemy machine-gun emplacements. Although 

he sustained painful wounds, he refused evacuation. On his own 

initiative, he crawled forward alone until he reached a position near 

an enemy emplacement. Hurling grenades, he boldly assaulted the 

position, destroyed the gun, and with his rifle killed three enemy 

soldiers who attempted to escape. A short time later when another 

German machine gun started firing, he single-handedly attacked that 

position, destroying the gun, killing three German soldiers, captur-

ing four others, and helping to save his company. He fought on with 

his unit until it took the objective. Only then did he permit himself 

to be removed for medical care. Staff Sergeant Garcia received his 

Medal of Honor for his conspicuous heroism, his inspiring, coura-

geous conduct, and his complete disregard for his personal safety. 

331
Jose M. Lopez, Sergeant, U.S. Army, 

23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division; 

WD GO 47, 18 June 1945

On 17 December 1944, near 

Krinkelt, Belgium, the 23d Infantry 

came under heavy attack from advanc-

ing German infantry supported by 

tanks. When the enemy threatened 

to overrun Company K’s left flank, 

Sergeant Lopez brought over his heavy 

machine gun from the opposite flank. 

From a shallow hole that offered no 

protection above his waist, he cut down 

thirty-five Germans trying to outflank his position. To his right, he saw 

a large number of infantry attacking from the front. Although dazed 

and shaken from enemy shell bursts only a few yards away, he realized 

that the enemy would soon turn his position. Alone, he carried his 

machine gun to the right rear of the sector, where he immediately reset 

his gun and continued his fire. Single-handed, he held off the German 

advance until he was satisfied his company had withdrawn. Again he 

loaded his gun on his back and in a hail of small-arms fire ran to a 

point where some of his comrades were trying to form another line 

against the onrushing enemy. He fired from this position until he had 

exhausted his ammunition. Still carrying his gun, he fell back with 

his small group to Krinkelt. For his gallantry and intrepidity, Sergeant 

Lopez received the Medal of Honor. 

Roy H. Matsumoto, Master Sergeant, 

5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), 

later known as Merrill’s Marauders

A native of Los Angeles, California, 

Roy Matsumoto graduated from middle 

school in Japan before returning home. 

From one of the internment centers that 

the federal government established for 

Japanese Americans, he volunteered to 

serve in the Military Intelligence Service 

Language School and later joined the 

5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), 

the famous Merrill’s Marauders. When the Marauder 2d Battalion 

was trapped at Nhpum Ga, Burma, under cover of darkness, 

Master Sergeant Matsumoto crawled close to the Japanese lines to 

secure vital information. One night he returned with word that the 

Japanese would attempt to cut off a part of the perimeter. After help-

ing to set up an ambush, Sergeant Matsumoto waited with the rest of 

the Marauders for the attack to start. When the first attack came, the 

Marauders sprang the trap, mowing down the first wave of attack-

ers. As the second wave stalled in confusion, Sergeant Matsumoto 

yelled “Charge” in Japanese, causing the second wave to meet the 

same fate as the first. For his actions at Nhpum Ga, he received the 

Legion of Merit; on 19 July 1993, he was inducted into the Ranger 

332
Hall of Fame, Fort Benning, Georgia, “for extraordinary courage and 

service...with Merrill’s Marauders.” 

Audie L. Murphy, Second Lieutenant, 

(then Staff Sergeant), Company B, 

15th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division; 

WD GO 65, 9 August 1945

From private, Audie Murphy rose 

to staff sergeant and later received a 

battlefield commission as a second 

lieutenant. He was wounded three 

times, fought in nine major campaigns across the European Theater, 

and earned thirty-three medals, 

including the Medal of Honor and 

every decoration for valor that his country had to offer, some of them 

more than once. Credited with killing over 240 enemy troops while 

wounding and capturing many others, he became a legend within the 

3d Infantry Division. On 22 September 1944, Staff Sergeant Murphy 

received the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism in 

action. At 0800 on 15 August he landed near Ramatuelle, France, with 

the first wave of the assault infantry. Intense machine-gun and smallarms fire from a boulder-covered hill to his front halted the advance. 

Leaving his men in a covered position, he dashed forty yards through 

withering fire to a draw. Using this route, he went back toward the 

beaches, found a light machine-gun squad and, returning up the 

rocky hill, placed the machine gun in position seventy-five yards in 

advance of his platoon. In the duel that ensued, Murphy silenced the 

enemy weapon, killed two of the crew, and wounded a third. As he 

proceeded farther up the draw, two Germans advanced toward him. 

Quickly killing both of them, he dashed up the draw alone toward 

the enemy strongpoint. Closing in, he wounded two Germans with 

carbine fire, killed two more in a fierce, brief firefight, and forced the 

remaining five to surrender. His extraordinary heroism resulted in the 

capture of a fiercely contested enemy-held hill and the annihilation 

or capture of the entire enemy garrison. 

Nicholas Oresko, Master Sergeant, 

Company C, 302d Infantry, 94th 

Infantry Division; WD GO 95, 1945

While still a technical sergeant, 

Oresko was a platoon leader in an 

attack against strong enemy positions near Tettingen, Germany, on 23 

January 1945. Deadly, accurate automatic-weapons fire pinned down his 

unit shortly after it began its advance. 

Realizing that a nearby machine gun 

had to be eliminated, Oresko moved 

forward alone amid heavy fire until he was close enough to throw a 

grenade into the German position. He then rushed the bunker and 

333
killed the surviving Germans, only to be seriously wounded in the 

hip at the same time. Although weak from loss of blood, he refused 

evacuation until assured that his men had taken their objective. 

While wounded, and in the face of bitter resistance, Sergeant Oresko 

had killed twelve of the enemy, prevented a delay in the American 

assault, and enabled Company C to complete its mission with a 

minimum of casualties. He received the Medal of Honor for his 

example of heroic personal sacrifice.

Joseph E. Schaefer, Staff Sergeant, 

Company I, 18th Infantry, 1st 

Infantry Division; WD GO 71, 1945

On 24 September 1944, Sergeant 

Schaefer was a squad leader in the sec-

ond platoon of Company I, holding 

an important crossroads near Stolberg, 

Germany. In the early morning hours 

two enemy companies, supported by 

machine guns, attacked the key posi-

tion. The withdrawal of one American 

squad and the capture of another left 

Sergeant Schaefer’s squad to defend 

the crossroads alone. Under fire, Schaefer crawled from man to man 

and ordered a withdrawal to a nearby house for better cover. Sergeant 

Schaefer’s squad successfully repulsed at least three separate assaults, 

inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Once the rest of Company I 

began a counterattack, Sergeant Schaefer and his men took the lead in 

regaining their position. Alternately crawling and running in the face 

of enemy fire, Schaefer overtook the retreating Germans and liber-

ated the squad captured earlier. Single-handed and armed only with 

his rifle, Sergeant Schaefer killed between fifteen and twenty of the 

attackers, wounded at least as many more, and took ten prisoners. His 

courage and determination to hold his position at all costs stopped an 

enemy breakthrough and won him the Medal of Honor.

Harrison Summers, Staff Sergeant, 

Company B, 502d Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division; 1st 

Army GO 31, 1944

Sergeant Summers won the 

Distinguished Service Cross for his 

courage during the parachute drops 

on D-day, 6 June 1944. Because of 

the widely scattered pattern of the air-

borne landings, Summers found him-

self leading only twelve men, none of 

them from his own unit, in an attack 

on a concentration of buildings—an 

objective originally assigned to an 

entire battalion. As the Americans began to advance, heavy fire drove 

all but Sergeant Summers to cover. He successfully circled behind 

334
the first house, kicked open the door, and killed the enemy soldiers 

in their firing positions. When a captain from the 82d Airborne 

Division tried to join Summers, enemy fire brought him down. A 

lieutenant then attempted to assist Summers, only to meet the same 

fate. Undaunted, Sergeant Summers worked his way to the back of 

each building in turn and successfully neutralized the entire German 

position with his submachine gun.

Hulon B. Whittington, Sergeant, 

Company I, 41st Armored Infantry, 2d 

Armored Division; WD GO 32, 1945

On the night of 29 July 1944, 

near Grimesnil, France, Squad Leader 

Whittington assumed command of his 

platoon when the platoon leader and 

platoon sergeant disappeared during an 

enemy armored attack. Whittington reorganized the defense and crawled, under 

fire, between gun positions to organize 

and rally the men. When an advancing 

Panzer unit attempted to break through 

a roadblock, he climbed aboard a tank and directed it into position 

to fire point-blank at the leading German tank. Its wreckage blocked 

the entire enemy column of over one hundred vehicles and enabled 

the American troops to counterattack with hand grenades, bazookas, 

and tanks. Sergeant Whittington then led a bayonet charge that killed 

large numbers of the disorganized enemy. When his platoon’s medic 

was hit, Whittington administered first aid to the wounded men. He 

received the Medal of Honor for his bravery and initiative.

Korean War

Cornelius H. Charlton, Sergeant, 

Company C, 24th Infantry, 25th 

Infantry Division; Department of 

the Army (DA) GO 30, 1952

On 2 June 1951, Charlton’s platoon attacked heavily fortified enemy 

positions on a ridge near Chipo-ri. 

After the wounding and evacuation of 

his platoon leader, Sergeant Charlton 

assumed command, rallied his soldiers, and pressed toward the enemy 

emplacements on the commanding ground. Eliminating two enemy 

positions, he continued up the slope until enemy fire pinned down 

his unit. Regrouping the men, he resumed his advance only to be 

stopped by enemy grenades. The sergeant was severely wounded, but 

he refused medical aid and led a third charge, taking the crest of the 

ridge. Attacking the last enemy position and routing the defenders, he 

was mortally wounded by another grenade. His gallantry and determination earned him the Medal of Honor posthumously.

335
Gilbert G. Collier, Corporal, Company 

F, 223d Infantry, 40th Infantry Division; 

DA GO 3, 1955

Corporal Collier was point man of a 

combat patrol seeking contact with the 

enemy near Tutayon, Korea, on the night 

of 19–20 July 1953. In the darkness, 

Collier and his patrol leader slipped 

and fell from a steep, sixty-foot cliff. 

Incapacitated by a badly sprained ankle, 

the officer ordered the patrol to return 

to the American lines. Although he had 

suffered a painful back injury, Corporal Collier elected to remain with 

his leader. As they made their way toward the American lines under 

the cover of darkness, they ran into an ambush. In the ensuing fire-

fight, Collier killed two enemy soldiers but was seriously wounded 

and became separated from his officer. His ammunition gone, Collier 

met four more attackers with his bayonet, killing or wounding them. 

With his last bit of strength, Collier made an effort to reach and help 

his leader, but fell victim to his many wounds. His courage earned 

him the nation’s highest award, the Medal of Honor.

Jerry K. Crump, Corporal, Company L, 

7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division; DA GO 

68, 1952

During the night of 6–7 September 

1951, a numerically superior enemy force 

launched an assault against Corporal 

Crump’s platoon on Hill 284, near 

Ch’orwon, Korea. Crump repeatedly exposed himself to danger in order to deliver 

effective fire into the enemy ranks. He 

inflicted numerous casualties among the 

Communist attackers. Seeing two enemy soldiers about to capture an 

American machine gun, Corporal Crump charged, killing both with 

his bayonet and recovering the gun. As he returned to his foxhole, 

now occupied by four wounded members of his squad, a grenade 

landed among them. Crump instantly threw himself upon it, absorb-

ing the blast with his body. His selfless disregard for his own safety 

earned a Medal of Honor.

John Essebagger, Jr., Corporal, Company 

A, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division; DA 

GO 61, 1952

Corporal Essebagger was part of a twosquad force protecting the right flank of 

an American withdrawal near Popsu-dong, 

Korea, on 25 April 1951. Essebagger’s unit 

repulsed several attacks by an enemy far 

superior in numbers. When his cover-

ing force itself had to retreat, Corporal 

336
Essebagger chose to remain in position to cover the withdrawal. He 

killed or wounded several of the foe, but in enabling the American 

squads to reach safety, he was mortally wounded. He earned a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Charles L. Gilliland, Corporal, 

Company I, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry 

Division; DA GO 2, 1955

On 25 April 1951, near Tongmangni, Korea, a numerically superior enemy 

force launched a determined attack 

against the defensive perimeter of 

Gilliland’s company. The enemy forces 

pushed up a defile, killing many of the 

American soldiers around him. Gilliland 

poured a steady stream of fire into the 

attackers and held his position, despite 

a serious head wound. When the position became indefensible, his unit received orders to fall back to 

new defensive positions. Corporal Gilliland volunteered to remain 

behind to cover the withdrawal. He lost his life making certain that 

his comrades made good their escape. He received the Medal of 

Honor posthumously for demonstrating that leadership not only 

means “follow me,” but sometimes demands the ultimate sacrifice.

Carolyn H. James, Master Sergeant, 

Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters, Seoul, 

Korea, 1952

When Carolyn James enlisted in 1945, 

women represented a distinct minority 

of the Army, and indeed the status of 

the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) in the 

postwar forces was in doubt. But General 

Eisenhower, like General Marshall, recognized the value of capable women in 

freeing men from administrative jobs so 

that they could be available for combat. James was one of the first two 

WACs to serve in the theater during the Korean War, when she worked 

as a stenographer at Eighth Army headquarters in Seoul. While serving with the U.S. Army Air Defense Command in 1960, she became 

the Army’s first female sergeant major.

Benito Martinez, Corporal, Company A, 27th Infantry, 25th 

Infantry Division; DA GO 96, 29 December 1953

Corporal Benito Martinez, a machine gunner with Company 

A, 27th Infantry, distinguished himself on 6 September 1952, in 

Satae-ri, Korea. While manning a listening post forward of the main 

line of resistance, his position was attacked by a hostile force of 

reinforced company strength. In the bitter fighting that ensued, the 

enemy infiltrated the defense perimeter. Corporal Martinez realized that encirclement was imminent and elected to remain at his 

337
post to stem the onslaught. He 

raked the attacking troops with 

crippling fire, inflicting numerous casualties, and refused any 

attempts to rescue him because 

of the danger involved. Soon 

thereafter, the hostile forces 

rushed the emplacement, forcing him to withdraw with only 

an automatic rifle and pistol to 

defend himself. After a courageous six-hour stand, he called 

in for the last time, stating that 

the enemy was advancing on 

his position. His magnificent 

stand enabled friendly elements 

to reorganize, attack, and regain 

key terrain. Corporal Martinez received the Medal of Honor for his 

conspicuous gallantry and outstanding courage above and beyond 

the call of duty. 

Hiroshi H. Miyamura, Corporal, Company H, 7th Infantry, 3d 

Infantry Division; DA GO 85, 4 November 1953

Corporal Miyamura received the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty 

in action against the enemy. On the night of 24 April 1951, near 

Taejon-ni, Korea, an enemy attack threatened to overrun Company 

H’s position. Corporal Miyamura, a machine-gun squad leader, 

was aware of the imminent danger to his men and unhesitatingly 

engaged the enemy with a bayonet, killing approximately ten in 

close hand-to-hand combat. Returning to his position, he administered first aid to the wounded and directed their evacuation. As 

another savage assault hit the line, he manned his machine gun 

and delivered withering fire until he was out of ammunition. He 

ordered the squad to withdraw 

while he stayed behind to render the gun inoperative. Then 

he bayoneted his way through 

infiltrated enemy soldiers to a 

second gun emplacement and 

assisted in its operation. When 

the intensity of the attack necessitated the withdrawal of the 

company, Corporal Miyamura 

ordered his men to fall back 

while he remained to cover their 

movement. He killed more than 

fifty of the enemy before his 

ammunition ran out and he was 

severely wounded. He maintained his magnificent stand 

338

Detail of Benito Martinez from 

Sandbag Castle, Matt Hall, 

c. 2001 

Corporal Hiroshi H. Miyamura, George Akimoto, 1977 
despite his painful wounds, continuing to repel the attack until the 

enemy overran his position. When last seen he was fighting ferociously against an overwhelming number of enemy soldiers.

Mitchell Red Cloud, Jr., Corporal, Company E, 19th Infantry, 24th 

Infantry Division; DA GO 26, 25 April 1951

On 5 November 1950, Corporal Red Cloud was in position on 

the point of a ridge near Ch’onghyon, Korea, immediately in front 

of the company command post. He gave the alarm as Chinese 

Communist troops charged from a brush-covered area less than a 

hundred feet from him. Springing to his feet, he delivered devastating point-blank automatic rifle fire into the advancing enemy. His 

accurate and intense fire checked this assault and gained time for 

the company to consolidate its defense. With utter fearlessness he 

maintained his firing position until severely wounded by enemy 

fire. Refusing assistance, he pulled himself to his feet, wrapped his 

arm around a tree, and continued his deadly fire again, until he 

was fatally wounded. His heroic act stopped the enemy from overrunning his company’s position and gained time for reorganization and evacuation of the wounded. Corporal Red Cloud’s mother 

received his posthumous Medal of Honor on 4 April 1951 from the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley.

Vietnam Era

Webster Anderson, Sergeant First 

Class, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th 

Artillery, 101st Airborne Division; DA 

GO 80, 1969

Webster Anderson, then a staff sergeant, was serving as Chief of Section 

in Battery A near Tam Ky on 15 October 

1967. During the early morning hours a 

determined North Vietnamese infantry 

unit, supported by heavy mortar, recoilless rifle, rocket-propelled grenade, and 

automatic-weapons fire, attacked his battery. When the initial enemy assault breached the defensive perimeter, Anderson climbed the exposed parapet to lead the defense. 

He directed effective howitzer fire against the attackers and personally killed a number attempting to overrun his position. During the 

action Sergeant Anderson was severely wounded by grenades. Unable 

to stand, he propped himself against the parapet and continued to 

direct fire and to encourage his men. When an enemy grenade landed 

within the gun pit near a wounded member of his crew, Anderson, 

heedless of his own safety, crawled to the grenade and tried to throw 

it. It exploded in midair, grievously wounding him. Although now 

only partially conscious, he refused medical attention and continued 

to rally his men in the defense of their position. Sergeant Anderson’s 

actions earned him the Medal of Honor.

339
Roy P. Benavidez, Staff Sergeant, Detachment B–56, 5th Special Forces Group 

(Airborne), 1st Special Forces; DA GO 8, 

1981

A Texas native of Mexican–Yaqui Indian 

descent, Staff Sergeant Benavidez received 

word on 2 May 1968 that a twelve-man inser-

tion team was in trouble west of Loch Ninh, 

near the Cambodian border. Three helicopters 

had already attempted to extract the men but 

could not penetrate heavy enemy fire. Benavidez volunteered to join 

a second rescue attempt. When his helicopter arrived at the scene, 

he jumped out alone and ran seventy-five meters under intense fire 

to reach the location of the surviving team members. Wounded 

several times, he nevertheless managed to organize survivors and 

direct defensive fire while the rescue helicopter landed in the perim-

eter. Through a withering hail of bullets, he dragged several team 

members to the aircraft. He then ran back to the dead team leader’s 

body to recover top secret documents before they fell into enemy 

hands, only to be wounded again, this time in the abdomen and 

back. Moments later, the rescue helicopter, riddled by enemy bullets, 

shuddered and crashed to the ground. Although critically wounded 

himself, Benavidez made his way to the crashed helicopter, pulled 

out the survivors, and organized a new defensive perimeter. He kept 

up the spirits of his wounded comrades, distributing water and first 

aid while running back and forth under intense fire. After a second 

helicopter arrived, he dragged several men to the aircraft; when a 

Communist soldier broke into the perimeter Benavidez killed the 

man in hand-to-hand combat. After one final trip to the perimeter, 

making sure that all classified materials were accounted for, he 

returned to the helicopter and collapsed on the deck. For his heroic 

efforts Staff Sergeant Benavidez received a Distinguished Service 

Cross, which the Army upgraded to a Medal of Honor in 1981.

Glenn H. English, Jr., Staff Sergeant, 

Company E, 3d Battalion, 3d Infantry, 

173d Airborne Brigade; DA GO 39, 1974

On 7 September 1970, in Phu My 

District, Vietnam, Staff Sergeant English 

was riding in the lead armored person-

nel carrier in a four-vehicle column when 

an enemy mine exploded in front of his 

vehicle. As the vehicle swerved, a concealed 

enemy force opened fire with automatic 

weapons and antitank grenades, striking 

the vehicle several times and setting it on 

fire. English escaped the disabled vehicle 

and then led his unit in a vigorous assault on the entrenched enemy 

position. This prompt and courageous action routed the enemy and 

saved his unit from destruction. After the assault, he heard the cries 

of three men still trapped inside the vehicle. Paying no heed to warn-

340
ings that the ammunition and fuel in the burning personnel carrier 

might explode at any time, English raced to the vehicle and climbed 

inside to rescue his wounded comrades. As he was lifting one of the 

men to safety, the vehicle exploded, mortally wounding him and the 

man he was attempting to save. Staff Sergeant English’s conspicuous 

gallantry and intrepidity in action at the cost of his life were an inspi-

ration to his comrades. He received a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Mildred C. Kelly, Command Sergeant 

Major, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland, 1974

Mildred C. Kelly, a former high 

school teacher from Tennessee, enlisted 

in the Women’s Army Corps in 1950 at 

a time when black women could find 

few opportunities in American society. 

Having completed her basic and advanced training at Fort Lee, Virginia, she 

served tours of duty as a personnel administrator at Fort Knox, Fort Benjamin 

Harrison, Fort McClellan, Fort Hood, and the U.S. Army Ordnance 

Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, as well as a two-year deployment 

to Japan. In 1971 she and five male first sergeants advised Army Chief 

of Staff William C. Westmoreland on proposed guidelines for non-

commissioned officers in the emerging all-volunteer Army. When she 

became command sergeant major at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in 

June 1974, she became the first woman to hold the highest-ranking 

enlisted job at any major Army installation with a predominantly male 

population. She also became the first black woman to earn the rank of 

command sergeant major. During her distinguished career, she earned 

the Army’s Meritorious Service Medal, two Army Commendation 

Medals, the National Defense Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, and 

the Good Conduct Medal with eight awards.

Paul Ronald Lambers, Sergeant, 

Company A, 2d Battalion, 27th 

Infantry, 25th Infantry Division; DA 

GO 79, 1969

Sergeant Lambers’ unit, 3d Platoon, 

Company A, had just established a 

night defensive position astride a sus-

pected enemy infiltration route on 

20 August 1968, when it came under 

attack by a battalion of Viet Cong. 

When his platoon leader fell seri-

ously wounded, Lambers assumed 

command and, disregarding intense 

enemy fire, abandoned the safety of his position to secure a radio 

and direct the defense. Running through a hail of bullets, he reached 

the 90-mm. recoilless rifle crew whose weapon was malfunctioning. 

He assisted in its repair and then directed canister fire at point-blank 

341
range against enemy troops who had breached the defensive wire. 

When the enemy charged the position, knocking out the recoilless 

rifle, Lambers single-handedly drove them off with Claymore mines 

and grenades. He then moved from position to position, providing 

assistance where the pressure was heaviest and inspiring the men to 

do their utmost. During the operation he continued to direct artillery and helicopter gunship fire, sometimes to within five meters of 

his own position. For his brave leadership, Sergeant Lambers was 

awarded the Medal of Honor.

Clarence Eugene Sasser, Specialist 

Fifth Class, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry 

Division; DA GO 26, 1969

Sasser, then a private first class, won 

the Medal of Honor for his actions in 

Dinh Tuong Province, Vietnam, on 

10 January 1968. An aidman serving 

with Company A, Sasser participated 

in an airmobile assault that came 

under heavy fire from fortified enemy 

positions on three sides of the landing zone. Over thirty men became casualties within a few minutes 

of landing. Sasser repeatedly ran across an open paddy through a 

hail of fire to locate and assist the wounded. Despite wounds to one 

shoulder and both legs, he refused medical attention for himself and 

continued to search for additional casualties. In all, Sasser spent five 

hours wounded in the mud, actively caring for his fellow soldiers 

before they were finally evacuated.

Fred William Zabitosky, Staff Sergeant, 5th 

Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special 

Forces; DA GO 27, 1969

On 19 February 1968, Sergeant Zabitosky was 

an assistant team leader on a nine-man Special 

Forces long-range reconnaissance patrol deep in 

enemy-controlled territory in South Vietnam. 

Suddenly, a numerically superior force of North 

Vietnamese soldiers attacked his patrol. Exposing 

himself to a hail of enemy bullets, Zabitosky organized his team 

into a perimeter and directed their defensive fire. Realizing the gravity of the situation, he ordered his patrol to move to a landing zone 

for helicopter extraction while he covered their withdrawal with 

rifle fire and grenades. Rejoining the patrol, he then supervised the 

positioning of each man to meet the increasing enemy pressure. 

Heartened by his leadership, the team held the enemy at bay until 

the arrival of tactical air support and a helicopter extraction team. 

As his comrades began to board the helicopters, Zabitosky remained 

behind to adjust helicopter gunship strikes. After boarding one of 

the rescue helicopters, he positioned himself in the door, delivering 

342
fire on the enemy as the ship took off. Engulfed in a hail of bullets, 

the helicopter spun out of control and crashed, knocking Zabitosky 

unconscious. Recovering consciousness, he ignored his extremely 

painful injuries and, heedless of the danger of exploding ordnance 

and fuel, pulled the severely wounded pilot from the blazing wreck-

age. He made repeated attempts to rescue his patrol members but 

was driven back by the intense heat. Despite his serious burns and 

crushed ribs, he carried and dragged the unconscious pilot through a 

curtain of enemy fire to within ten feet of a hovering rescue helicopter 

before collapsing. For his courage and devotion to duty Staff Sergeant 

Zabitosky received the Medal of Honor.

Somalia

Gary I. Gordon, Master Sergeant, 

U.S. Army Special Operations Command; DA GO 14, 1994

On 3 October 1993, Master 

Sergeant Gordon was serving as 

Sniper Team leader, U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command with Task Force 

Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. His 

sniper team provided precision fires 

from the lead helicopter during an 

assault and at two helicopter crash 

sites, despite intense enemy automatic 

weapons and rocket-propelled grenade 

fires. When Master Sergeant Gordon learned that ground forces were 

not immediately available to secure the second crash site, he and 

another sniper unhesitatingly volunteered for insertion to protect 

four critically wounded personnel there, despite being well aware that 

large numbers of enemy were converging on the site. After his third 

request for insertion, Gordon received permission to perform this 

volunteer mission. Forced to land one hundred meters south of the 

crash site, Gordon and his fellow sniper, armed only with sniper rifles 

and pistols, fought their way through a dense maze of shanties and 

shacks to reach the critically injured crew. After pulling the wounded 

men from the wreckage, Gordon and his team member established 

a perimeter around the downed aircraft. Gordon then used his longrange rifle and sidearm to kill an undetermined number of attackers 

until he depleted his ammunition. Gordon recovered more ammu-

nition from the downed helicopter and, after giving some of it to 

the dazed pilot, returned to the perimeter to fend off the approach-

ing enemy personnel. After his team member was fatally wounded 

and his own rifle ammunition exhausted, Master Sergeant Gordon 

returned to the wreckage, recovered a rifle with the last five rounds of 

ammunition, and gave it to the pilot with the words, “Good luck.” 

Then, armed only with a pistol, Gordon continued to fight until he 

was fatally wounded. His extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty 

saved the pilot’s life. For his remarkable display of courage Gordon 

posthumously received the Medal of Honor. 

343
Randall D. Shughart, Sergeant 

First Class, U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command; DA GO 

14, 1994

On 3 October 1993, while serving as a Sniper Team member of 

the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command with Task Force Ranger

in Mogadishu, Somalia, Sergeant 

First Class Shughart joined Master 

Sergeant Gordon in providing precision fires from the lead helicopter 

during an assault and at two helicopter crash sites despite intense 

automatic-weapons and rocketpropelled grenade fire. While providing suppressive fires at the second crash site, Shughart and his 

team leader learned that ground forces were not immediately available to secure the site. They unhesitatingly volunteered for insertion 

to protect the four critically wounded personnel despite the growing 

number of enemy personnel closing in on the site. After their third 

request, Shughart and his team leader received permission. Forced 

to land one hundred meters south of the crash site, Shughart and 

his team leader, armed only with sniper rifles and pistols, fought 

their way through a dense maze of shanties and shacks to reach the 

critically injured crew. After pulling the pilot and the other wounded 

men from the wreckage, Shughart and his fellow sniper established 

a perimeter around the downed aircraft. Shughart then used his 

long-range rifle and sidearm to kill an undetermined number of 

attackers. Sergeant First Class Shughart continued his protective fire 

until he depleted his ammunition and was fatally wounded. His 

extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty saved the pilot’s life. 

For his remarkable display of courage Sergeant First Class Shughart 

posthumously received the Medal of Honor.

Kosovo

Christine Roberts, Sergeant, 50th 

Medical Company, Task Force Falcon, 

2001

Sergeant Roberts, a flight medic, 

was stationed with Task Force Falcon 

in Kosovo when she received word on 

28 June 2001 that a pair of American 

soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Brigade 

Reconnaissance Troop had triggered 

a land mine while on patrol. From 

a UH–60 helicopter, Roberts used a 

jungle penetrator to lower herself 200 

feet through thick trees to reach the 

344

Flight medic Christine Roberts 

demonstrates the use of the 

“jungle penetrator.”
two men on a steep mountain slope. Carrying 100 pounds of emergency medical equipment and weapons, she made her way through 

the undergrowth, using a stick to probe for mines as she walked. 

Upon reaching the two, she discovered that one soldier, Sergeant 

Richard P. Casini, had stepped on an antipersonnel mine and had 

lost most of his right foot. Despite having rigged a tourniquet to 

stanch the bleeding, Casini was only minutes from going into shock. 

Roberts improved the tourniquet and then helped Casini limp to 

the harness on the jungle penetrator, which then lifted the wounded 

man to safety. Careful not to detonate any mines, Roberts extracted 

the second soldier and then herself. The UH–60 raced for home, and 

minutes later Sergeant Casini was undergoing treatment in the Camp 

Bondsteel hospital. Surgeons were unable to save his foot, but due 

to the extraordinary effort of Sergeant Roberts he did not lose his 

life. For her bravery and coolness in a demanding situation, Roberts 

received the Soldier’s Medal, the highest peacetime decoration a soldier can receive. 

Pentagon

Christopher D. Braman, Staff 

Sergeant, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the 

Army, 2001

Braman received the Soldier’s 

Medal for heroism above and beyond 

the call of duty on 11 September 2001, 

when terrorists used a hijacked airliner, with over thirty thousand pounds 

of jet fuel to attack the Pentagon. 

Upon impact a thunderous explosion and a horrific fire killed scores 

of military and civilian personnel, injured hundreds of others, and 

left others in a state of shock. Staff Sergeant Braman rushed toward 

the hole in the building caused by the plane’s impact with a fire 

extinguisher and called out for survivors. He entered the impact area 

and without regard for his personal safety helped rescue numerous 

people from the smoke and fire. In one instance, through fire and 

smoke that almost completely blocked visibility, he heard a woman 

calling for help. Risking death by smoke inhalation, he continued 

forward, finally found the woman, and ensured that she reached 

safety. His unyielding devotion to his fellow soldiers and civilians 

undoubtedly saved lives and showed America’s resolve to overcome 

acts of terrorism. 

The examples above extol two kinds of heroism. The solitary 

NCO, acting in the frenzy of the moment, reveals a rash courage that 

sometimes defies logic, inspires awe, and often serves as the catalyst 

that carries a stalled attack to success even at the cost of his own life. 

345
346

Equally celebrated, however, is the brave small-unit leader who, with 

cool determination, directs his men through deadly fire in the heat 

of battle to gain the objective against all odds and with a minimum 

of casualties. The first is the act of a brave individual soldier; the second, no less brave, demonstrates the NCO’s sense of unit cohesion 

and teamwork, the aim of professional training. The Army and the 

nation have been well served by both kinds of heroes.
Appendix C

Suggestions for Further Reading

Military history is essential for the serving 

professional, whether for recreation or serious 

study. In either case, such reading enhances 

professional development by providing a 

greater understanding of the development of 

the Army’s roles, traditions, and capabilities. 

Even for the casual reader, these accounts of 

NCO experiences in peace and war offer valuable practical lessons. The editors of this volume highly recommend the following books, 

including two works of fiction. Not only do 

they provide an accurate account of NCO life 

throughout the history of the Army, but they 

are well written, accessible, and interesting. 

Many other titles could be added, but these 

offer a good starting point.

Ambrose, Stephen E. Band of Brothers: E 

Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from 

Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest. New York: 

Simon and Schuster, 1992. Famous account 

by the well-known World War II historian of 

one company’s experience during that war.

Armstrong, William H. Major McKinley: 

William McKinley and the Civil War. Kent, 

Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000. Civil 

War experiences of a quartermaster sergeant 

who became President of the United States.

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story 

of the Persian Gulf War. Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin, 1993. Comprehensive account, covering political as well as military perspective.

Bainbridge, William G. Top Sergeant: The 

Life and Times of Sergeant Major of the Army 

William G. Bainbridge. New York: Fawcett 

Columbine, 1995. Autobiography of the fifth 

Sergeant Major of the Army, covering his 

experiences in World War II, role in restructuring NCOES, and service as SMA.

Beaudot, William J. K., and Lance J. 

Herdegen. An Irishman in the Iron Brigade: 

The Civil War Memoirs of James P. Sullivan, Sergt., 

Company K, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers. New York: 

Fordham University Press, 1993. Previously serialized in 1880s; covers entire war.

Benavidez, Roy P. The Three Wars of Roy 

Benavidez. San Antonio, Tex.: Corona Publishing 

Co., 1986. Memoir by the Medal of Honor winner.

Bill, Alfred H. Valley Forge: The Making of an 

Army. New York: Harper, 1952. An account of 

daily life at Valley Forge during the winter of 

1777–1778.

Bolton, Charles K. The Private Soldier Under 

Washington. Williamstown, Mass.: Corner House, 

1976. A discussion of life in the ranks during the 

American Revolution.

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of 

Modern War. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 

1999. The battle in Mogadishu from the soldier’s 

perspective; based on numerous interviews and 

now the subject of a major motion picture.

Cash, John A., John N. Albright, and Allan 

W. Sandstrum. Seven Firefights in Vietnam. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1970. A classic account of small-unit actions in 

the Vietnam War.

Charlton, John B., and Robert G. Carter. The 

Old Sergeant’s Story: Fighting Indians & Bad Men in 

Texas in 1870 to 1876. Mattituck, N.Y: J. M. Carroll & 

Co., 1982. A personal narrative of a cavalry sergeant 

during the period of the Indian wars.

Coffman, Edward M. The Old Army: A 

Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 

1784–1898. New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1986. The U.S. Army during its first 

century, including recruitment, composition, 

training, and other aspects.

Cornish, Dudley T. The Sable Arm: Negro 

Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865. New 

York: Norton & Co., 1966. The role of the 

black soldier in the Civil War.
348

Crane, Stephen. The Red Badge of Courage. 

New York: Penguin, 1995. The classic novel 

of an infantryman in Civil War combat. 

Crane himself did not serve, but he talked 

to many who did, giving his account an 

uncommon realism for a Civil War battle 

piece.

Dobak, William A., and Thomas D. 

Phillips. The Black Regulars, 1866–1898.

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 

2001. Covers daily details of Army existence, 

reasons for enlisting, previous service, relations among troops and civilians, reasons 

for getting out, and post-Army lives.

Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War: A 

Study in Unpreparedness. Washington, D.C.: 

Center of Military History, 1990. One man’s 

impassioned view of the consequences of 

unpreparedness during the Korean War; 

written from small-unit perspective and 

regarded by many as best study of the 

conflict.

Fisher, Ernest F., Jr. Guardians of the 

Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned 

Officer Corps of the U.S. Army. New York: 

Ballantine Books, 1994. Chronicles the rise 

of the NCO Corps from colonial times to 

the present; especially good on personnel 

policies.

Gillespie, Mark F., et al. The Sergeants 

Major of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Center 

of Military History, 1995. A new edition will 

appear shortly.

Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in 

Korea. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1970. A series of vignettes 

focusing on the role of platoon- and company-level fighting in Korea.

Hogan, David W., Jr. 225 Years of Service: 

The U.S. Army, 1775–2000. Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, 2000. Brief 

history of the contributions the Army has 

made to the nation throughout its history. 

Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military: 

An Unfinished Revolution, rev. ed. San Rafael, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. History and role 

of women in armed forces. Latest edition 

goes through Persian Gulf War.

Infantry in Battle. Washington, D.C.: 

Infantry Journal, Inc., 1934. A series of 

vignettes concerning infantry actions during 

World War I.

Jones, James. The Thin Red Line. New 

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962. Another 

classic novel of combat in the jungles of 

Guadalcanal during World War II by a former 

NCO.

Keegan, John. The Face of Battle. New 

York: Vintage Books, 1977. Classic account 

of combat at the enlisted-soldier level in 

the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the 

Somme.

Lee, David D. Sergeant York: An American 

Hero. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

1985. Biography of a hero of World War I.

Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: 

The Experience of Combat in the American 

Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987. Uses 

personal accounts to show centrality and 

meaning of courage in the ethos of the Civil 

War soldier.

Lowe, Percival G. Five Years a Dragoon 

(’49 to ’54) and Other Adventures on the Great 

Plains. Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1965. A personal narrative by an NCO 

in the period after the Mexican War.

MacDonald, Charles B., and Sidney T. 

Mathews. Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, 

and Schmidt. U.S. Army in World War II. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1952. A classic study of small-unit 

actions in Germany and Italy during 1944.

Mauldin, Bill. Up Front. New York: Henry 

Holt, 1945. An insightful look at the average 

soldier in World War II.

Moore, Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. 

We Were Soldiers Once, and Young... New York: 

Random House, 1992. Detailed, personal 

view of a unit going into combat in Vietnam 

for the first time; subject of a popular motion 

picture.

Moskos, Charles C., Jr. The American 

Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s 

Military. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 

1970. The classic examination of the social, 

economic, and educational changes in 

American enlisted personnel in the post–

World War II era.

Murphy, Audie. To Hell and Back. New 

York: Henry Holt, 1949. The memoir of the 

most decorated soldier of World War II.

Nalty, Bernard. Strength for the Fight: A 

History of Black Americans in the Military. 

New York: The Free Press, 1986. An authori-
349

tative survey of race relations in the U.S. armed 

forces since the Revolution.

Rickey, Don, Jr. Forty Miles a Day on 

Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting 

the Indian Wars. Norman: University of Oklahoma 

Press, 1963. The classic story of the enlisted man 

in the Indian wars.

Smith, George W., and Charles Judah, eds. 

Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the 

Mexican War, 1846–1848: Accounts of Eyewitnesses 

and Combatants. Albuquerque: University of 

New Mexico Press, 1968. The Mexican War as 

described by soldiers who fought it.

Stallings, Lawrence. The Doughboys: The Story 

of the AEF, 1917–1918. New York: Harper, 1963. 

Traces the enlisted man of World War I from 

training camp to battlefield.

Terry, Wallace, ed. Bloods: An Oral History of the 

Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 1984. 

Personal, down-to-earth accounts by twenty black 

soldiers who served during the Vietnam War.

Westover, John G. Combat Support in Korea.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1986. A series of vignettes on the role of combat 

support and combat service support soldiers in 

Korea.

Wiley, Bell I. The Life of Billy Yank: The Common 

Soldier of the Union. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill, 1952. The classic description of the common soldier in the Civil War armies based on letters, diaries, and private journals. 

———. The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common 

Soldier of the Confederacy. Indianapolis, Ind.: BobbsMerrill, 1943.
PIN : 066325–000