SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE

Evaluations Needed to 

Determine 

Effectiveness of U.S. 

Aid to Lebanon’s 

Security Forces

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on the Middle East and North Africa, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 

Representatives

March 2013

GAO-13-289

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-289, a report to the

Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives

March 2013

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Evaluations Needed to Determine Effectiveness of

U.S. Aid to Lebanon’s Security Forces

Why GAO Did This Study

Following Syria’s withdrawal from 

Lebanon in 2005 and war between 

Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, U.S.

agencies increased their allocations of

security assistance for Lebanon from 

$3 million in 2005 to about $28 million 

in 2006. This assistance included 

training and equipment funded and 

implemented by State or DOD for the 

Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal 

Security Forces of Lebanon. However, 

questions remain regarding the 

effectiveness of security assistance as 

a tool of U.S. policy in Lebanon, 

including concerns about the influence 

of foreign actors, primarily Syria and 

Iran, and extremist militant groups 

operating in Lebanon. 

GAO was asked to review U.S. 

security assistance to Lebanon. GAO’s

review, covering fiscal years 2007 

through 2012, assessed the extent to 

which the U.S. government (1) 

adjusted its strategic goals and 

security assistance programs in 

Lebanon, (2) funded assistance

programs for Lebanese security forces, 

and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of 

security assistance programs in 

Lebanon. GAO reviewed budgetary 

data and planning documents and 

interviewed U.S. and Lebanese 

government officials in Washington, 

D.C.; Tampa, Florida; and Beirut, 

Lebanon.

What GAO Recommends

State and DOD should complete plans 

with milestone dates to evaluate 

security assistance programs in 

Lebanon and develop better 

performance indicators to facilitate 

evaluation. State and DOD concurred.

What GAO Found

The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 2007 and 

adjusted security assistance in response to political and security conditions. 

Since 2007, U.S. strategic goals for Lebanon have been to support the nation as 

a stable, secure, and independent democracy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. 

policy priorities include supporting the Government of Lebanon in establishing 

stability and security against internal threats from militant extremists and the 

influence of Iran and Syria. U.S. programs to help achieve these priorities include 

Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Antiterrorism 

Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, Export Control and Related Border 

Security, and Section 1206 and 1207 authorities. While strategic goals have not 

changed, program implementation has changed to meet conditions on the 

ground, according to U.S. officials. For example, the Department of State (State) 

delayed committing Foreign Military Financing funds to Lebanon for 3 months in 

2010, following an exchange of fire between the Lebanese Armed Forces and 

Israeli forces. 

U.S. agencies allocated over $925 million for security assistance programs for 

Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012; State has disbursed and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has committed the majority of the funds.

Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012

To date, State has evaluated only one of its security assistance programs for 

Lebanon, the INCLE program; neither State nor DOD has completed plans or 

established time frames to evaluate the other programs. State’s evaluation policy 

requires that certain programs be evaluated periodically. Without such 

evaluations, State and DOD have little objective evidence to show that the 

programs have been effective or what the proper mix of programs should be. 

Evaluations can be facilitated through appropriate performance measurement. 

However, GAO and other agencies have previously reported deficiencies in how 

agencies measure program performance. For example, GAO found in 2011 that 

the IMET program evaluation efforts had few of the elements commonly 

accepted as appropriate for measuring performance. State and DOD are 

undertaking efforts to develop better performance indicators. 

View GAO-13-289. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at 

(202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Letter 1 

Background 2

The United States Has Kept Strategic Goals for Lebanon Constant 

Since 2007 and Adjusted Security Assistance in Response to 

Political and Security Conditions 6

U.S. Agencies Allocated Over $925 Million in Security Assistance 

for Lebanon during Fiscal Years 2007-2012 and Have Disbursed 

or Committed Most of the Funds 9

U.S. Agencies Have Done Little Evaluation of Security Assistance 

Programs in Lebanon 12

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 25

Appendix II Status of Funds for U.S. Security Assistance Programs for 

Lebanon 27

Appendix III Selected Security Equipment and Services Provided to 

Lebanon by the U.S. Government and Other Governments 34

Appendix IV Comments from the U.S. Department of State 36

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 39

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41

Tables 

Table 1: Selected U.S. Security Assistance Programs 5

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Table 2: International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012 31

Table 3: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR): Antiterrorism Assistance Program, 

Fiscal Years 2007-2012 31

Table 4: NADR: Counterterrorism Financing Program, Fiscal Years 

2007-2012 32

Table 5: NADR: Export Control and Related Border Security 

(EXBS) Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012 32

Table 6: Section 1207 Train and Equip Authority, Fiscal Years 2007-

2012 33

Table 7: Selected Security Equipment or Service Provided by the 

United States to Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012 34

Table 8: Selected Security Equipment or Funding Provided by 

Other Countries to Lebanon 35

Figures

Figure 1: Map of Lebanon and Its Neighbors 3

Figure 2: Timeline of Selected Political Events in Lebanon 4

Figure 3: Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, 

Fiscal Years 2007-2012 10

Figure 4: Total U.S. Security Assistance for Lebanon by Program 

for Fiscal Years 2007-2012 11

Figure 5: Status of Foreign Military Financing Funds for Lebanon, 

Fiscal Years 2007-2012 28

Figure 6: Status of INCLE Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-

2012 29

Figure 7: Status of Section 1206 Authority Funds for Lebanon, 

Fiscal Years 2007-2012 30
Page iii GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Abbreviations

DFAS Defense Financing and Accounting Service

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security 

IMET International Military Education and Training

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

ISF Internal Security Forces

LAF Lebanese Armed Forces

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

 programs 

State Department of State

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Page 1 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 19, 2013

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Chairman

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Dear Madam Chairman:

Lebanon is a religiously diverse country transitioning toward 

independence and democratic consolidation after a 15-year civil war and 

subsequent occupation by Syrian and Israeli forces. Lebanon is home to 

the militant group Hezbollah, which is also a member of the Lebanese 

government. Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the 

war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the United 

States significantly increased assistance for Lebanon, for the Lebanese 

Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). In 2005, U.S. 

agencies allocated about $3 million in U.S. security assistance for 

Lebanon but the next year allocated almost $28 million in security 

assistance.1 In 2010, the LAF fired on Israeli Defense Forces along 

Lebanon’s and Israel’s shared border. A member of Congress raised 

concerns about U.S. assistance to Lebanon in the wake of this clash.

In response to your request that we review U.S. security assistance to 

Lebanon, we assessed the extent to which the U.S. government, from 

fiscal years 2007 through 2012, (1) adjusted its strategic goals and 

security assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance 

programs for Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the 

effectiveness of security assistance programs in Lebanon. To address 

these objectives, we analyzed Department of State (State) and 

Department of Defense (DOD) documents, such as the Mission Strategic 

 

1

According to State and DOD officials, there is no consensus about whether some funding 

accounts that support security cooperation or security sector reform should be labeled 

“assistance.” For the purposes of this report, however, we consider those accounts that 

funded overt security-related activities in Lebanon to be security assistance. Specifically, 

these funding accounts include Foreign Military Financing; International Military Education 

and Training; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, 

Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Section 1206 authority; and Section 1207 

authority. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

and Resource Plans for Lebanon, program plans and guidance, 

congressional budget justifications, and other relevant documents. We 

obtained funding data from State and DOD on programs that provide 

security assistance to Lebanon. We also interviewed State and DOD 

officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, Lebanon, and DOD officials in 

Tampa, Florida. Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of our scope 

and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Lebanon is a small, religiously diverse country on the Mediterranean Sea 

that borders Israel and Syria. (See fig. 1.) Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Figure 1: Map of Lebanon and Its Neighbors

Religious tensions among Lebanon’s Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, 

and Shiite Muslims, among others, along with an influx of Palestinian 

refugees into Lebanon, have fueled Lebanon’s internal strife and conflicts 

with its neighbors. During the civil war between 1975 and 1990, both 

Syrian and Israeli forces occupied the country. In the midst of the civil war 

and Israel’s continued occupation of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah 

emerged in Lebanon as a powerful Islamic militant group. Throughout the 

1990s, Hezbollah, funded by Iran and designated by the United States 

and Israel as a terrorist organization, pursued its military campaign 

against Israeli forces occupying Lebanon while also participating in 

Lebanon’s political system. In 2000, Israeli forces withdrew from southern 

Lebanon. In 2005, with pressure from the international community, Syrian 

forces withdrew from Lebanon following the assassination of Lebanon’s 

prime minister. The subsequent parliamentary elections that year resulted 

in a member of Hezbollah holding a cabinet position for the first time. In 

the summer of 2006, Hezbollah and Israel entered into a month-long 

conflict that ended with the adoption of United Nations Security Council 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Resolution 1701 by both the Israeli and Lebanese governments.2 The 

resolution called for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in parallel 

with the deployment of Lebanese and United Nations forces and the 

disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, among other things. Since 

2011, instability in neighboring Syria may have exacerbated sectarian 

conflict within Lebanon. See figure 2 for a timeline of selected political 

events in Lebanon.

Figure 2: Timeline of Selected Political Events in Lebanon

The United States has provided Lebanon with assistance, such as 

emergency humanitarian aid during the civil war and training for military 

forces under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

program. The United States and Lebanon have historically enjoyed a 

good relationship in part because of cultural and religious ties, a large 

Lebanese-American community in the United States, and the proWestern orientation of Lebanon, particularly during the Cold War. 

Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah 

war, the United States increased its security assistance to Lebanon. The 

United States provided assistance to the LAF, which is generally 

responsible for providing border security, counterterrorism, and national 

defense, and to the ISF, or police force, which is generally responsible for 

maintaining law and order in Lebanon. The fiscal year 2006 

appropriations marked the first time since 1984 that U.S. agencies 

allocated Foreign Military Financing grants to help modernize and equip 

the LAF. Since then, the United States has provided security assistance 

to Lebanon through the Foreign Military Financing program; IMET; 

 

2

S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1701 (2006). 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program; 

the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) 

programs; and Section 1206 and Section 1207 authorities for training and 

equipping foreign militaries and security forces and for reconstruction, 

stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries, respectively. The 

NADR security assistance for Lebanon has been provided through three 

programs: Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, and 

Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS). Table 1 describes 

these security assistance programs. In addition, to these security 

assistance programs, U.S. Special Forces units have provided 

specialized training to LAF Special Forces units, according to agency 

officials.

Table 1: Selected U.S. Security Assistance Programs

Program Description Implementing agency

Foreign Military Financing Provides grants and loans to foreign governments for the 

acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.

a DOD

International Military Education and 

Training

(IMET) 

Provides training, such as technical and professional military 

education, on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly 

nations.

DOD

International Narcotics Control and 

Law Enforcement 

(INCLE)

Supports country and global programs critical to combating 

transnational crime and illicit threats, including efforts against 

terrorist networks in the illegal drug trade and illicit enterprises.

State

NADR - Antiterrorism Assistance Trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly 

governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism.

State

NADR - Counterterrorism Financing Provides training for law enforcement officials, prosecutors and 

judges, among others, in specific elements of money laundering 

and terrorist financing crimes.

State

NADR - Export Control and Related 

Border Security (EXBS)

Assesses countries’ export control systems and provides a variety 

of assistance to help countries develop and improve their strategic 

trade and related border control systems.

State

Section 1206 authority Trains and equips foreign military and nonmilitary maritime forces 

to conduct counterterrorist operations or support military and 

stability operations in which the U.S. armed services are a 

participant.

DOD and State

Section 1207 authorityb Provides for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in 

foreign countries.

 State

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD information.

a

Foreign Military Financing can fund the transfer of services or equipment through either Direct 

Commercial Sales or Foreign Military Sales.

b

Section 1207 authority expired on September 30, 2010.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

The United States has kept strategic goals for Lebanon constant since 

2007. These goals include supporting the Government of Lebanon in 

establishing stability and security against internal threats from militant 

extremists and countering destabilizing influences. U.S. agencies have 

adjusted security assistance in response to Lebanon’s political and 

security conditions. For example, State and DOD have delayed releasing 

funds and limited the types of equipment provided. Both agencies have 

also implemented additional assistance programs since fiscal year 2007.

Since 2007, U.S strategic goals for Lebanon have been to support the 

nation as a stable, secure, and independent democracy. According to 

DOD and State officials, the overarching priorities for Lebanon remain 

focused on supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability and countering 

the influence of Syria and Iran. Security-related goals for Lebanon focus 

on counterterrorism and regional stability or internal security.3 Programs 

activities seek to support development of the LAF and the ISF as the only 

legitimate providers of Lebanon’s security. The goals and objectives of 

the individual security assistance programs are intended to support the 

U.S. strategic goals and overarching priorities, as the following examples 

illustrate:

• Goals for the Foreign Military Financing, IMET, and 1206 programs in 

Lebanon since the departure of Syrian forces are to bolster the 

capability of the LAF, nurture the bilateral military relationship 

between the United States and the LAF, and continue encouraging 

establishment of a stable, legal, and pro-U.S. civil government.

• Goals for the INCLE police training program are (1) to build Lebanon’s 

operational capacity to combat crime, and prevent and respond to 

terror attacks; and (2) to assist Lebanon in developing the ISF into a 

 

3

According to State, U.S. goals support the implementation of United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1701. The resolution, adopted on August 11, 2006, includes a 

statement emphasizing the importance of the extension of the control of the Government 

of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. According to State, full implementation of the 

resolution is a key priority for the United States.

The United States Has 

Kept Strategic Goals 

for Lebanon Constant 

Since 2007 and 

Adjusted Security 

Assistance in 

Response to Political 

and Security 

Conditions 

U.S. Strategic Goals Are to 

Support a Stable, Secure, 

and Independent Lebanese 

Government
 

Page 7 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

competent, professional, and democratic police force with the 

necessary training, equipment, and institutional capacity to enforce 

the rule of law in Lebanon, cement sovereign Lebanese government 

control over its territory, and protect the Lebanese people.

• Goals for the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Lebanon are to 

develop and build the Lebanese government’s capacities in border 

security, mid- and senior-level leadership development, and 

counterterrorism investigations.

• Goals for the Counterterrorism Financing Program are to deny 

terrorists access to money, resources, and support.

• Goals for EXBS in Lebanon focus on strengthening the capability of

Lebanese enforcement agencies to effectively control cross-border 

trade in strategic goods.

• Goals for the 1207 program were to strengthen Lebanon’s internal 

security forces after armed conflicts in 2006 and 2007.

The goals and objectives of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon have 

continued to focus on supporting Lebanese sovereignty and stability and 

countering the influences of Syria and Iran. However, according to State 

and DOD officials, the agencies have changed how they implement 

programs based on changes in the political and security situation, for 

example, by delaying the release of funds or limiting the types of 

equipment provided. In one instance, State delayed committing fiscal year 

2010 Foreign Military Financing funds as a result of an incident on August 

3, 2010, in which the LAF opened fire on an Israeli Defense Force unit 

engaged in routine maintenance along the Blue Line,4 alleging that it had 

crossed into Lebanese territory. Two Lebanese soldiers, a journalist, and 

an Israeli officer were killed. According to State, in response to concerns 

raised by a member of Congress, State delayed committing $100 million 

of fiscal year 2010 Foreign Military Financing funds for Lebanon, citing 

the need to determine whether equipment that the United States provided 

to the LAF was used against Israel. According to a State official, State 

committed the funds in November 2010 after consulting with the member 

of Congress.

In addition, according to State officials, State and DOD decided to place a 

temporary hold on lethal assistance to the LAF in January 2011, after the 

 

4

The Blue Line is the line of Israeli withdrawal recognized by the United Nations in 2000 

and is not the Israeli-Lebanese border.

State and DOD Have 

Adjusted Implementation 

of Security Assistance 

Programs to Meet 

Conditions on the Ground
 

Page 8 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

collapse of Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s government. In March 2012, the 

agencies decided to lift the hold on lethal assistance based on the Mikati 

government’s adherence to key international obligations to the Special 

Tribunal for Lebanon5 and United Nations Security Council Resolution.

The U.S. government has also implemented new security assistance 

programs in Lebanon since fiscal year 2007 in response to changing 

security assistance needs, according to State officials. For example, State 

began implementing the EXBS program in Lebanon in fiscal year 2009—

after State performed an assessment to identify deficiencies in the 

country’s ability to detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction and 

advanced conventional weapons, according to officials of State’s Bureau 

of International Security and Nonproliferation. State determined that 

Lebanon did not have a comprehensive system to regulate trade in 

strategic goods and technologies for the purpose of preventing the 

proliferation of such weapons, and lacked the necessary legal and 

institutional elements to manage strategic trade consistent with 

international standards. In addition, in fiscal year 2010, State’s Bureau of 

Counterterrorism began implementing its Counterterrorism Financing 

program in Lebanon. According to bureau officials, the goals of the 

program are to build the foreign capacity of the Government of Lebanon 

to develop laws and regulations to deny terrorists access to funds.

State has also changed the focus of some of the security assistance 

programs. For example, the INCLE police training program is no longer 

providing basic training to cadets, according to the Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The bureau turned the basic 

training over to the ISF as of July 2012 and is providing leadership and 

management training. The bureau is working with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration to develop 

specialized training to increase the ISF’s investigatory skills, according to 

U.S. embassy officials. The bureau is also expanding its community 

policing program, according to bureau officials. In addition, State’s Bureau 

for Counterterrorism has changed the focus of its antiterrorism training, 

according to officials of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security whom we 

interviewed in Lebanon. They explained that when the program began in 

 

5

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is an independent judicial organization composed of 

Lebanese and international judges. Its primary mandate is to hold trials for the people 

accused of carrying out the attack on February 14, 2005, which killed 23 people, including 

the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and injured many others.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

2007, it focused on training Lebanese security details to protect national 

leaders. The trained protection details have demonstrated a mastery of 

the skills for which they were trained. As a result, the Bureau for 

Counterterrorism and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security consider the 

protection mission to be complete and since 2010 has shifted its focus to 

border security, management and leadership, and counterterrorism 

investigations, according to the Diplomatic Security officials. Finally, while 

there have been no major changes to the EXBS program in Lebanon, 

U.S. embassy officials stated that the United States has increased the 

program’s emphasis on convincing the government to change its export 

control laws.

U.S. agencies have allocated over $925 million in security assistance for 

Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, with funds varying by year 

and program. The majority of funds—69 percent—was from the Foreign 

Military Financing program, though State and DOD also utilized seven 

other programs. State has disbursed the majority of funds it allocated for 

each fiscal year, while DOD has committed the majority of funds for 

Foreign Military Financing.

In order to help achieve U.S. strategic goals, State and DOD have 

allocated more than $925 million in security assistance for Lebanon’s LAF 

and ISF from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. This funding peaked in 

fiscal year 2007 at about $323 million, declined in fiscal year 2008 to 

about $32 million, and has fluctuated from fiscal years 2009 through 

2012. (See fig. 3.)

U.S. Agencies 

Allocated Over $925 

Million in Security 

Assistance for 

Lebanon during Fiscal 

Years 2007-2012 and 

Have Disbursed or 

Committed Most of 

the Funds

Security Assistance 

Allocated for Lebanon 

Varied by Year
 

Page 10 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Figure 3: Total U.S. Security Assistance Allocated for Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-

2012

In fiscal year 2007, the $325 million allocated for security assistance for 

Lebanon followed the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel and 

assisted Lebanon in fulfilling its obligations under the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 1701. This funding level represented a 

significant increase over fiscal year 2006, when U.S. security assistance 

for Lebanon totaled only about $28 million.6 See appendix II for 

information on allocation, obligation, and disbursement or commitment of 

security assistance for Lebanon by program and year.

 

6

Of the $325 million in security assistance allocated in fiscal year 2007, roughly $280 

million was allocated from supplemental appropriations. Fiscal year 2009 security 

assistance allocations also included funding allocated from supplemental appropriations. 

Appropriations for subsequent fiscal years support the continuation of these efforts, albeit 

at lower levels.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

U.S. agencies allocated the majority (approximately 69 percent, or $641 

million) of security assistance for Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 

2012 through the Foreign Military Financing program, which provides 

grants and loans to the Lebanese Armed Forces to purchase U.S. 

equipment, services, and training. Figure 4 shows the distribution of U.S. 

security assistance allocated for Lebanon by program.

Figure 4: Total U.S. Security Assistance for Lebanon by Program for Fiscal Years 

2007-2012

Note: The “all other programs” grouping includes IMET, Antiterrorism Assistance, Counterterrorism 

Financing, EXBS, and Section 1207.

The Foreign Military Financing program funded the purchase of various 

equipment and services. For example, Lebanon received trucks, truck 

tractors, trailers, ambulances, cargo-troop carriers, and armament 

vehicles through the Foreign Military Financing program. Other equipment 

purchased through the Foreign Military Financing program included 

helicopters, ships, radios, and spare parts. Appendix III presents selected 

equipment and services provided to Lebanon by the U.S. government and 

by other governments from fiscal years 2007 through 2012.

U.S. Agencies Allocated 

the Majority of Security 

Assistance through the 

Foreign Military Financing 

Program and Used Seven 

Other Programs
 

Page 12 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Generally, State disbursed the majority of funds allocated during the 

same fiscal year for security assistance programs providing funds for 

Lebanon, and DOD committed the majority of Foreign Military Financing 

funds for Lebanon.7 See appendix II for additional information on 

allocation, obligation, and disbursement or commitment of security 

assistance for Lebanon by program and year. Specifically, State 

disbursed about 78 percent of total allocations from fiscal years 2007 

through 2012 for the IMET, INCLE, Antiterrorism Assistance, 

Counterterrorism Financing, and EXBS programs and the Section 1206 

and 1207 authorities. Although State has disbursed the majority of these 

allocated funds, State has not disbursed some funds allocated for the 

INCLE and Antiterrorism Assistance programs for fiscal years 2007 

through 2011. According to State officials, some obligated funds are 

waiting to be disbursed and all of the unobligated funds are no longer 

available for obligation. DOD has committed 87 percent of Foreign 

Military Financing funds for Lebanon for fiscal years 2007 through 2012.

As of February 2013, U.S. agencies had evaluated only the INCLE police 

training program for Lebanon and did not have firm plans to evaluate the 

other six ongoing security assistance programs.8 State’s evaluation policy 

requires periodic evaluations of certain programs, consistent with 

standards established in U.S. law. Evaluations can be facilitated by 

collecting data on appropriate performance indicators. However, we and 

other audit agencies have previously reported deficiencies in how State 

and DOD measure program performance. For example, we found in 2011 

that the IMET program evaluation efforts had few of the elements 

commonly accepted as appropriate for measuring progress and did not 

 

7

Foreign Military Financing funds are budgeted and tracked in a different way than the 

other foreign assistance accounts in this report. The Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) and the Defense Financing and Accounting Service (DFAS) are 

responsible for the financial systems that account for Foreign Military Financing funds, as 

well as for tracking the implementation and expenditure of those funds. Furthermore, 

DSCA’s system can only track Foreign Military Financing uncommitted and committed 

amounts, not unliquidated obligations or disbursements. DFAS tracks disbursements 

using the Defense Integrated Finance System; however, there is no direct link between 

the DSCA and DFAS systems. As a result, DSCA was not able to provide data on 

unliquidated obligations or disbursements but did provide us with data on Foreign Military 

Financing allocations and commitments for Lebanon. 

8

The six other ongoing programs are the Foreign Military Financing, IMET, Antiterrorism 

Assistance, Counterterrorism Financing, EXBS program, and 1206 programs. Section 

1207 authority expired on September 31, 2010. 

U.S. Agencies Disbursed or 

Committed the Majority of 

Funds 

U.S. Agencies Have 

Done Little 

Evaluation of Security 

Assistance Programs 

in Lebanon
 

Page 13 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

objectively measure how IMET contributes to long-term desired 

outcomes.9 We have also reported deficiencies in how DOD defined 

performance measures for the 1206 program.10 In response to those 

reports, State and DOD concurred with our recommendations and 

described agency efforts to develop better performance measures.

State’s evaluation policy, which is partly based on the Government 

Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010,11 requires that all 

large programs, projects, and activities be evaluated at least once in their 

lifetime or every 5 years, whichever is less.12 According to State, the 2010 

act strengthened the mandate to evaluate programs, requiring agencies

to include a discussion of evaluations in their strategic plans and 

performance reports. State established its evaluation policy in February 

2012 in part to comply with the requirements of this act. In addition, 

according to State, the policy supports State’s goal of connecting 

evaluation to its investments in diplomacy and development to ensure 

that they align with the agency’s overarching strategic goals and 

objectives. State’s evaluation guidance requires each bureau to evaluate 

two to four projects, programs, or activities over a 24-month period 

beginning with fiscal year 2012, depending on the size, scope, and 

complexity of the programs being evaluated and the availability of 

funding. State’s evaluation policy also requires all bureaus to complete a 

bureau evaluation plan and to update it annually. State requires the 

bureaus’ plans to align with evaluation policy guidance and to assist each 

bureau in assessing the extent to which its efforts contribute to achieving 

its intermediate objectives and, by extension, its longer-term goals.

 

9

GAO, International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human 

Rights Training and Improve Evaluations, GAO-12-123 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2011).

10GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and 

Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010).

11The act requires agencies to develop objective, quantifiable, and measurable goals and 

report progress against those goals. Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866. 

12State defines the “lifetime” of a large program, project, or activity as the implementation 

period of that program, project, or activity, and defines “large” in terms of dollar value or 

the size of staff resources devoted to the effort. Under this policy, individual bureaus may 

use other criteria as well and are responsible for determining the selection, timing, 

process, and manner of evaluation for specific programs, projects, and activities.

State Policy Requires 

Periodic Evaluations of 

Certain Programs
 

Page 14 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Program evaluations are individual systematic studies conducted 

periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a program is 

working. As a key component of effective program management, 

evaluations assess how well a program is working and help managers 

make informed decisions about current and future programming.13 An 

evaluation provides an overall assessment of whether a program works 

and identifies adjustments that may improve its results. Depending on 

their focus, evaluations may examine aspects of program operations 

(such as in a process evaluation) or factors in the program environment 

that may impede or contribute to its success. Program evaluations may 

systematically compare the effectiveness of alternative programs aimed 

at the same objective. Types of evaluation include process (or 

implementation), outcome, and impact evaluations, as well as cost-benefit 

and cost-effectiveness analyses.

Performance measurement, by contrast, is the ongoing monitoring and 

reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward preestablished goals. Performance measurement is typically conducted by 

program or agency officials and focuses on whether a program has 

achieved its objectives, expressed as measurable performance 

indicators. As indicators of progress toward goals, performance measures 

can inform overall program evaluations. Program evaluations typically 

examine a broader range of information on program performance and its 

context than is feasible to monitor on an ongoing basis.14 Both forms of 

assessment—program evaluation and performance measurement—aim 

to support resource allocation and other policy decisions to improve 

service delivery and program effectiveness. But performance 

measurement, because of its ongoing nature, can serve as an early 

warning system to management and as a vehicle for improving 

accountability to the public.

As of February 2013, U.S. agencies had evaluated only one of their 

security assistance programs in Lebanon. The Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs contracted with an external 

 

13GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

14GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, 

GAO-11-646SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2011). 

Program Evaluations Can 

Be Facilitated by 

Performance Measures

State Has Evaluated One 

Security Assistance 

Program in Lebanon
 

Page 15 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

organization to conduct an evaluation of the INCLE police training 

program for the ISF. The evaluation was conducted between November 

2010 and May 2011. The bureau commissioned the evaluation to 

establish the relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of the 

program from 2008 through 2010. The evaluation covered five training 

courses, and the evaluation team collected data by means of focus 

groups, semistructured interviews, structured observation, learning tests, 

field cluster research, and document review.

The INCLE police training evaluation demonstrated the importance of 

conducting a program evaluation. According to the evaluation, the training 

was effective, with clear evidence that the ISF trainees had both learned 

and been able to retain the core knowledge taught in all five courses. The 

program also succeeded in reaching ISF personnel from throughout the 

country. The evaluation further determined that the training program 

made a relevant contribution to international donor assistance to the ISF. 

However, the evaluation concluded that the program did not reach its 

principal stated objective in the program period. The evaluation found no 

evidence to suggest that the performance of the ISF had systematically 

improved as a result of the training program. The evaluation also 

concluded that, although trainees learned and retained knowledge 

successfully, they were generally not able to apply the skills taught by the 

program in their daily duties. The evaluation identified the failure to apply 

skills as the key impediment to program effectiveness and attributed the 

failure to a flaw in the program design, which failed to sufficiently engage 

the ISF in the inception stage to clarify objectives and secure broad 

consensus on program goals. Moreover, the design of the training was 

not informed by a systematic assessment of the ISF’s training needs.

The final evaluation report included five recommendations to the Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, including a joint 

recommendation with the ISF, and two additional recommendations for 

the ISF. The recommendations included a number of subcomponents. 

The report recommended that the bureau take the following actions:

• continue the training based on renewed program consensus;

• closely coordinate program transition with ISF on the operational 

level;

• expand senior leadership training;

• strengthen internal capacity for program design and management; 

and

• in addition to quantitative performance measures, design meaningful 

qualitative performance indicators in cooperation with the ISF to 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

provide relevant and timely progress information throughout the 

program period.

The evaluation report also outlined steps to transition the training program 

to full ISF control. Bureau officials stated that the bureau has adopted 

many of the report’s recommendations, including the transition of one 

course to full ISF control in July 2012, the creation of a training 

coordination process for INL and other donors to maximize synergies and 

avoid duplication of effort, and the creation of a strategic planning cell 

within the ISF to coordinate directly with the bureau and other donors.

Although the Section 1206 program in Lebanon has not been evaluated, 

DOD—under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy— 

is implementing a new assessment process for the Section 1206 

program. The objectives of the assessment process are to

• measure implementation of Section 1206 programs to build partner 

capacity,

• assess quality and timeliness of program implementation,

• measure the impact of programs, and

• estimate return on investment.

DOD is implementing this new process in part to respond to our 2010 

recommendation that DOD develop and implement specific plans to 

monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on Section 1206 project outcomes 

and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives.15 DOD conducted a pilot test 

of its assessment process of counterterrorism-oriented Section 1206 

programs in the Philippines and stability operations-oriented Section 1206 

programs in Georgia in 2012. DOD also assessed Section 1206 programs 

in Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland from March through June 2012. DOD 

officials stated in December 2012 that they were not able to assess the 

program in Lebanon because of the security situation, but they plan to 

include Lebanon as soon as the security situation permits.

Although DOD has not evaluated the effectiveness of the 1206 program 

or any other security assistance programs in Lebanon in which it 

participates, it conducts various types of assessments of the LAF. For 

example, since 2010, the U.S. Central Command and the LAF have 

 

15GAO-10-431. 

DOD Has Not Evaluated 

the Effectiveness of the 

Section 1206 Program in 

Lebanon 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

participated in reviews—known as joint capabilities reviews—to assess 

the progress of the LAF based on eight broad critical capabilities. The 

critical capabilities—for example, Land and Border Defense and 

Security—are linked to the broad strategic goals described in State’s 

Mission Strategic and Resource Plans for Lebanon (now Mission 

Resource Requests), according to DOD Central Command officials.16 The 

joint capabilities reviews include milestone dates from 2013 through 2015. 

The U.S. Central Command also conducts annual assessments linked to 

the Theater Campaign Plan for Lebanon.17 These assessments grade the 

LAF on desired outcomes and make recommendations for course 

corrections. According to the DOD Central Command officials, the 

assessments are organized by lines of effort, such as defeating violent 

extremist organizations and building partner capacity. These lines of effort 

are not linked to specific security assistance programs, however.

Although bureau evaluation plans were due in May 2012, State bureaus 

responsible for security assistance programs were at varying stages of 

implementing State’s evaluation policy at the time of this report. For 

example, State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which is responsible 

for the Foreign Military Financing and IMET programs, created an 

evaluation plan for fiscal year 2013 which does not include an evaluation 

of the programs in Lebanon, according to a bureau official.

State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, which manages the Counterterrorism 

Financing program and—along with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security—is 

responsible for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, created an 

evaluation plan for fiscal year 2013, according to a Bureau of 

Counterterrorism official. This plan does not include an evaluation of the 

 

16These mission-level plans document the overarching foreign policy basis for U.S. 

embassy and consulate activities for the budget year and beyond.

17The Theater Campaign Plans are intended to organize and align operations, activities, 

events, and investments in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic effect rather 

than operational effect. 

State Has Not Completed 

Plans or Established Time 

Frames to Evaluate the 

Effectiveness of the 

Remaining Security 

Assistance Programs in 

Lebanon 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

programs18 in Lebanon. The Bureau of Counterterrorism will evaluate the 

Antiterrorism Assistance programs for two other partner nations, 

Bangladesh and Morocco. According to a Bureau of Counterterrorism 

official, the bureau will consider the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in 

Lebanon for the next tranche of evaluations beginning in fiscal year 2014.

State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which 

implements the EXBS program, submitted its bureau evaluation plan on 

April 10, 2012. The plan, which covers fiscal years 2012 through 2015, 

does not include an evaluation of the EXBS program. The bureau does 

periodically assess the legal, regulatory, and institutional components of a 

country’s strategic trade control systems using a 419-point assessment 

methodology. The bureau conducted such an assessment for Lebanon in 

2010, according to bureau officials. However, according to the bureau’s 

evaluation plan, the assessments do not assess enforcement capacity to 

the extent preferred and may not fully satisfy the intent of State’s 

evaluation policy. The bureau is working with the Office of U.S. Foreign 

Assistance Resources to determine how to integrate the assessment 

methodology into program evaluations that would meet State’s evaluation 

policy. The bureau may evaluate EXBS within the fiscal years 2013 to 

2016 time frame.

Although State bureaus are at varying stages of developing their 

evaluation plans, State has developed department-wide guidance for 

standardizing the way it measures the effectiveness of its programs and 

has entered into contracts with five contractors for monitoring and 

evaluation services, according to State officials. State bureaus can use 

these contracts to evaluate their programs.

 

18The training provided by the Counterterrorism Financing program is expected to be 

completed prior to September 30, 2015, according to State officials. End-of-course 

evaluations completed by students will be submitted to State after completion of the 

training. The Bureau of Counterterrorism also reviews assessments conducted by the U.S. 

Embassy in Beirut and by other organizations for information to help develop programs, 

integrate them with efforts by other countries, and provide indicators of Lebanon’s 

progress. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

We have reported previous deficiencies in performance measurement of 

State’s and DOD’s security assistance programs, and these deficiencies 

may inhibit agencies’ ability to conduct program evaluations. As we have 

previously reported, performance measurement of State and DOD 

security assistance programs exhibited several deficiencies, including a 

lack of specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented performance 

indicators.

• In 2008, we reported that State did not systematically assess the

outcomes of the Antiterrorism Assistance program and, as a result, 

could not determine the effectiveness of this program.19 More 

recently, a 2012 State Office of Inspector General assessment of the 

antiterrorism programs in certain countries reported that the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance could not 

determine the Antiterrorism Assistance program’s effectiveness in part 

because they had not developed specific, measurable, and outcomeoriented program objectives.20

• In 2011, we reported that State’s and DOD’s ability to assess IMET’s 

effectiveness was limited by several weaknesses in program 

monitoring and evaluation, including the lack of a performance plan 

for IMET that explained how the program was expected to achieve its 

goals and how progress could be assessed through performance 

measures and targets.21

• In 2010, we reported that DOD and State had incorporated little 

monitoring and evaluation into the Section 1206 program and had not 

consistently defined performance measures for Section 1206 

projects.22

 

19GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department’s Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved 

Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

20Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of the Antiterrorism 

Assistance Program for Countries under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South 

and Central Asian Affairs, AUD/MERO-12-29 (Washington, D.C.: April 2012).

21GAO-12-123. 

22GAO-10-431. 

Past Deficiencies Reported 

in Agencies’ Performance 

Measurement May Inhibit 

Program Evaluation
 

Page 20 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

According to State and DOD officials, assessing the impacts of security 

assistance programs is challenging, but they continue to seek 

improvements in performance measurement. For example, officials of the 

Bureaus of Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Security stated that it is an 

enormous task to come up with concrete, meaningful performance 

indicators for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, which addresses 

aviation security, investigations, and response techniques. In addition, 

officials at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut stated that State and DOD are 

struggling to develop specific, measurable performance indicators and 

still have a long way to go. DOD officials stated that developing metrics to 

measure the results of security assistance programs in Lebanon is 

difficult. The officials stated that some indicators may be subjective and 

difficult to quantify—for example, U.S. influence in building relationships 

or the willingness of the LAF to fight. Furthermore, they said that it is 

difficult to quantify what would have happened in the absence of U.S. 

assistance.

Because the agencies do not have specific, measurable, and outcomeoriented performance indicators, U.S. officials have cited anecdotal 

evidence that they believe demonstrates the effectiveness of U.S. 

security assistance programs in Lebanon. For example, some officials 

have cited the LAF’s success in taking control of a Palestinian refugee 

camp from Al-Qaeda-inspired militants as an indication of the impact of 

the assistance. The United States provided ammunition and other 

supplies to assist the LAF during the 3-month engagement. As other 

indications of effectiveness, U.S. officials also mentioned the LAF’s 

actions in arresting members of a Shiite clan involved in kidnappings, the 

professionalism demonstrated by LAF Special Forces units in training 

exercises, and increases in drug seizures. However, the use of only 

positive anecdotal evidence does not provide sufficient context and scope 

to help officials judge the effectiveness of these programs.

State and DOD officials described agency efforts to improve performance 

measurement. For example, the Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs is shifting from reporting output measures, such 

as numbers of students trained, to outcome measures, according to 

bureau officials. The bureau plans to collect more accurate performance 

metrics that focus on measuring the impact of the INCLE police training 

program in Lebanon. The bureau also plans to consider such factors as 

the quality of the officers and the extent to which women are integrated 

into the ISF, according to bureau officials. Moreover, the Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is working with the 

ISF to improve the performance indicators in the ISF’s strategic plan, 

Although Facing 

Challenges, State and DOD 

Are Continuing Efforts to 

Improve Performance 

Measurement
 

Page 21 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

according to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The current plan 

includes some output measures, such as number of traffic stops made by 

police. Embassy officials also stated that they are working with the LAF to 

develop a military cooperation plan that will include performance 

measures. In addition, according to DOD Central Command officials, 

efforts are under way to develop a new framework for its annual 

assessments of the LAF that will include improved performance 

measures. The new framework will examine the effects of DOD efforts in 

Lebanon.

Since 2007, U.S. agencies have allocated almost $1 billion in security 

assistance for Lebanon, supporting its efforts to build a stable, secure, 

and independent democracy following the withdrawal of Syrian forces and 

the Israeli-Hezbollah war. U.S. security assistance for Lebanon has 

presented certain risks because of the influence wielded by the militant 

group Hezbollah, which is now a member of the Lebanese government. 

Ensuring that U.S. security assistance for Lebanon is effective in 

achieving U.S. strategic goals is now more important than ever—to help 

Lebanon resist the influence of Iran, which funds Hezbollah, and to 

withstand the potential spillover of conflict in Syria.

Program evaluation and performance measurement are key management 

tools to ensure that U.S. security assistance is effective in achieving U.S. 

strategic goals. However, the U.S government has evaluated the 

effectiveness of only one security assistance program in Lebanon, a 

program to which it allocated about 14 percent of the nearly $1 billion in 

security assistance allocations since 2007. Neither State nor DOD has 

completed plans or time frames to evaluate the remaining six ongoing 

U.S. security assistance programs in Lebanon. Without evaluations of all 

of its security assistance programs in Lebanon, the U.S. government 

cannot show that the programs have been effective in achieving their 

specific objectives or that they constitute the best mix of security 

assistance for Lebanon to support U.S. strategic goals for the country. 

Moreover, because State and DOD currently measure program 

effectiveness using performance indicators that are not specific, 

measurable, and outcome-oriented, program measurement cannot 

facilitate evaluations. While State and DOD officials described general 

agency efforts to develop better performance indicators, they have not yet 

produced plans with specific time frames for completing their efforts.

Conclusions 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

To enhance the U.S. government’s ability to determine if security 

assistance programs in Lebanon have been effective in achieving their 

specific objectives and that they constitute the best mix of security 

assistance to support U.S. strategic goals for the country, and to help 

State and DOD track progress toward established goals for Lebanon, we 

recommend that

1. the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 

complete plans to evaluate the effectiveness of security assistance 

programs in Lebanon, including milestone dates for implementing the 

plans;

2. the Secretary of State develop performance indicators for State’s 

security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, 

measurable, and outcome-oriented; and

3. the Secretary of Defense develop performance indicators for DOD’s 

security assistance programs for Lebanon that are specific, 

measurable, and outcome-oriented.

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOD for comment. State 

and DOD provided written comments which are reprinted in appendixes 

IV and V, respectively. State also provided technical comments, which 

we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In their comments, 

State and DOD generally concurred with the report’s findings and 

recommendations.

In its written comments, State said that it recognized that a robust, 

coordinated, and targeted evaluation function is essential to its ability to 

measure and monitor program performance; make decisions for 

programmatic adjustments and changes; document program impact; 

identify best practices and lessons learned; help assess return on 

investment; provide inputs for policy, planning, and budget decisions; and 

assure accountability to the American people. State said that Lebanon is 

a good example of a security assistance program that involves complex 

program goals and therefore requires a carefully designed evaluation 

framework. State noted, however, that the qualitative versus quantitative 

nature of security assistance makes formal evaluation of such programs a 

unique challenge. State said that, short of formal program evaluation 

relative to Lebanon, it relies on feedback from other sources, such as 

periodic Joint Capabilities Reviews involving the LAF and the U.S. 

government; Mission Resource Requests from the U.S. Embassy in 

Beirut; and capability assessments from the U.S. Central Command. We 

agree that these reviews may provide useful input but are limited because 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 23 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

they are not linked to specific security assistance programs and do not 

substitute for formal evaluations, which State agreed would improve its 

ability to determine the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance.

In its written comments, DOD stated that it would coordinate with State to 

evaluate the effectiveness of Lebanon’s security forces with clear metrics 

that can be evaluated and communicated back to Congress. DOD also 

agreed to improve assessment and evaluation metrics established to 

measure the results of assistance provided under Section 1206 and 

Section 1207 authority. DOD commented that the draft report did not 

consider current DOD evaluating programs that utilize key baseline 

documents, such as the Joint Capabilities Review. The draft report, 

however, acknowledged that DOD assesses the capabilities of the LAF in 

other types of assessments but stated that, while these are useful, they 

do not provide the program-specific evaluation that is needed to ensure 

that U.S. security assistance is effective in achieving U.S. strategic goals. 

DOD's 2012 implementation guidance for assessing Section 1206 

programs also recognizes this limitation of other types of assessments. 

This guidance states that DOD must be able to demonstrate the return on 

investment that Section 1206 training and equipment provide to DOD and 

to the U.S. government, and that the assessments are a means for DOD 

leadership to determine which types of programs are more successful 

and which partner nations make demonstrable progress toward the 

objectives of the Section 1206 programs.

DOD also stated that, in the future, it requests that GAO extend it the 

courtesy of a formal out brief prior to releasing the draft report to the 

Congress. We acknowledge the importance of holding exit meetings with 

agency officials. As such, our protocol is to offer an exit meeting with 

agency officials after our data collection and analysis are complete. We 

requested an exit with DOD on January 28, 2013. However, due to the 

limited availability of the designated DOD policy official with oversight of 

U.S. efforts in Lebanon and a subsequent change in the designated 

official, we were not able to hold the exit meeting until February 15, 2013. 

DOD was provided a draft of the report in advance of the exit meeting. 

DOD’s technical comments provided at this meeting were incorporated in 

the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretaries of State and Defense. In addition, the 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VI. 

Sincerely yours,

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 25 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

We assessed the extent to which the U.S. government, from fiscal years 

2007 through 2012, (1) adjusted its strategic goals and security 

assistance programs in Lebanon, (2) funded assistance programs for 

Lebanese security forces, and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of security 

assistance programs in Lebanon.

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has adjusted its 

strategic goals and security assistance programs in Lebanon, we 

reviewed documents from the Department of State (State) and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) for fiscal years 2007 through 2012, 

including Mission Strategic and Resource Plans for Lebanon, 

congressional budget justifications, country plans, and other relevant 

documents. We also interviewed knowledgeable officials from State and 

DOD. At State headquarters in Washington, D.C., we spoke with officials 

from the Bureaus of Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Security and 

Nonproliferation, and Political-Military Affairs, and from the Office of U.S. 

Foreign Assistance Resources. Within DOD, we met with officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency in the Washington, D.C., area, as well as officials of 

the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command in 

Tampa, Florida. In addition, we met with U.S. officials and officials of the 

Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese Internal Security Forces at 

the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government funded security 

assistance programs for Lebanon Armed Forces and Lebanese Internal 

Security Forces from fiscal years 2007 through 2012, we analyzed budget 

and funding data from State and DOD. Recognizing that different 

agencies and bureaus may use slightly different accounting terms, we 

provided State with the definitions from GAO’s A Glossary of Terms Used 

in the Federal Budget Process (GAO-05-734SP) and requested that it 

provide the relevant data according to those definitions. State provided 

data on the status of allocations, obligations, unobligated balances, and 

disbursements as of September 30, 2012, for funding accounts that 

supported security assistance in Lebanon: International Narcotics Control 

and Law Enforcement; International Military Education and Training; 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; and the 

Section 1206 and Section 1207 authorities. State collected the data 

directly from each bureau if it was a State-implemented account. 

However, because Foreign Military Financing funds are budgeted and 

tracked in a different way than other foreign assistance accounts, DOD 

provided us with data on allocations and commitments. All data pertain to 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

overt activities and are nominal numbers that have not been adjusted for 

inflation. We also discussed the types and amounts of assistance 

provided with various officials of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the 

Lebanese Internal Security Forces. To assess the reliability of the data 

provided, we requested and reviewed information from officials from each 

agency regarding the agency’s underlying financial data system or 

systems and the checks, controls, and reviews used to ensure the 

accuracy and reliability of the data provided. We determined that the data 

provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has evaluated the 

effectiveness of its security assistance programs in Lebanon, we 

reviewed relevant State and DOD documents, including an independent 

evaluation of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs’ police training program in Lebanon, DOD’s Section 1206 

Assessment Handbook, and various State and DOD program and country 

assessments. We also examined State evaluation guidelines, Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs evaluation guidance, 

various bureau evaluation plans, and other documents. Furthermore, we 

reviewed relevant GAO reports, including those that discussed how 

agencies measure program performance. We also reviewed special GAO 

publications on performance measurement and evaluation. In addition, 

we interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C., and at 

the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and DOD officials at the U.S. 

Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, 

Florida.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Status of Funds for U.S. Security 

Assistance Programs for Lebanon

Page 27 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

This appendix provides additional information on Department of State 

(State) and Department of Defense (DOD) programs used to provide 

security assistance to Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. 

State and DOD utilized eight programs to provide more than $925 million 

in security assistance to Lebanon from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. 

The majority of security assistance (95 percent) was provided through 

three programs: Foreign Military Financing, International Narcotics 

Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and the Section 1206 authority. 

Specifically, this appendix provides additional information on the Foreign 

Military Financing, INCLE, and the Section 1206 authority such as 

selected equipment and training provided and the status of funds 

including allocation, obligation, and commitment or disbursement of funds 

for the other five programs.

Appendix II: Status of Funds for U.S. Security 

Assistance Programs for Lebanon
Appendix II

From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, State allocated a total of about $641 

million in Foreign Military Financing for Lebanon. DOD reported that for fiscal 

years 2007 through 2012, the majority of allocated funds had been committed

(see fig. 5). For Lebanon, Foreign Military Financing has provided basic 

equipment such as tactical radios, ammunition, rifles, helmets, body armor, 

and trucks. Lebanon has also received night vision goggles, missiles, and 

helicopters. 

Figure 5: Status of Foreign Military Financing Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal 

Years 2007-2012

Note: We are not able to present data on Foreign Military Financing for Lebanon in the

same way as the other programs because its funds are budgeted and tracked in a different 

way than the other program funds and the system that is used does not track information 

consistent with the way we are presenting the data for the other programs. For the 

purposes of this report, “uncommitted” amounts represent Foreign Military Financing

obligations not yet committed for expenditure and “committed” amounts include funding 

that has been committed but not yet disbursed, as well as Foreign Military Financing 

funding that has been disbursed to a case.

______

1

Annual appropriations for Foreign Military Financing generally have contained language 

stating that Foreign Military Financing funds shall be obligated upon apportionment. For 

the most recent appropriations containing this language, see the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, December 23, 2011.

2

Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications.

Foreign Military Financing 

Background

State administers Foreign Military 

Financing funding, with significant 

input from embassies, DOD, and 

the regional military commands. 

DOD’s Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency executes the 

program. Foreign Military Financing 

provides grants and loans to 

foreign governments and 

international organizations for the 

acquisition of U.S. defense 

equipment, services, and training.

This funding is available for 

obligation for 1 year and is 

considered obligated upon

apportionment based on annual 

appropriations bill language.1 Once 

the period of availability for new 

obligations expires, the funds are 

available for an additional 5 years

to liquidate obligations.

2 The funds 

remain entirely within the U.S. 

government until the point at which 

payments are made to defense 

companies for goods and services 

rendered. 

Foreign Military Financing

Page 28 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix II

From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, State allocated a total of $130 million in 

INCLE funds for Lebanon. While most of the allocated funds have been 

obligated, about 40 percent of total allocated funds from fiscal years 2007 

through 2012 have been disbursed (see fig. 6). According to State, fiscal year 

2007 marked the first allocation of INCLE funds for Lebanon. In Lebanon, the 

INCLE program has funded the construction of a police station building and 

the purchase of riot helmets and batons, pistols, and police vehicles, among 

other equipment. In addition, the INCLE program has funded training and 

technical assistance to the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, including, for 

example, courses in community policing.

Figure 6: Status of INCLE Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012

Note: According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal years 2007, 2009, and 2011 are 

no longer available for obligation. ______

3

Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications.

4

Pursuant to authority generally provided in the annual Department of State, Foreign 

Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, certain funds that have been 

deobligated remain available for obligation for an additional 4 years from the date on which 

the availability of such funds would otherwise expire if the funds were initially obligated 

before they would have expired. 

INCLE Background

State administers the INCLE 

program and uses it to assist the 

Government of Lebanon in 

developing its law enforcement and 

judicial capacity. These funds are

generally available for obligation for 

2 years. Once the period of 

availability for new obligations 

expires, the funds are available for 

an additional 5 years to liquidate 

the obligations.3 The period of 

availability for obligations of INCLE 

funds may be extended for an 

additional 4 years in certain cases.

4

 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

Page 29 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix II

From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, DOD allocated a total of $111 million 

through the Section 1206 program for Lebanon (see fig. 7). State reported 

that all allocated funds from fiscal years 2007 through 2012 have been 

obligated and disbursed. 

For Lebanon, Section 1206 funding has provided vehicle spare parts, 

ammunition, and other basic supplies to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). 

In particular, equipment provided under Section 1206 was used to restock the 

LAF arsenal with basic ammunition after the 2007 siege at Nahr al-Bared

Palestinian refugee camp and to begin to build the LAF’s first secure 

communications system.

Figure 7: Status of Section 1206 Authority Funds for Lebanon, Fiscal 

Years 2007-2012

______

5

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1206. 

6

Expired funds may also be used for certain contract modifications. 

Section 1206 Background

The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006, as amended, established the 

authority for Section 1206 

programs to train and equip foreign

national military and nonmilitary 

maritime forces, such as coast 

guards, to conduct counterterrorist 

operations or to support military 

and stability operations in which 

the U.S. armed forces are a 

participant.5 

State and DOD jointly administer 

Section 1206 assistance. Funded 

from the DOD operations and 

maintenance accounts, Section 

1206 funds remain available for 1 

year for obligation. Once the period 

of availability for new obligations 

expires, the funds are available for 

an additional 5 years to liquidate 

the obligations.6 

Section 1206 Authority

Page 30 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix II

Table 2: International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, Fiscal Years 

2007-2012

Dollars (in thousands) 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Allocated 872 1,408 2,137 2,406 2,497 2,364

Unobligated

balance

0 0 0 0 0 0 

Unliquidated 

obligations

0 56 160 219 437 1901

Disbursed 872 1,352 1,977 2,187 2,060 463

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Note: State’s Bureau for Political-Military Affairs manages the IMET budget with input from 

DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which implements the program. IMET funds 

are generally available for obligation for 1 year and are available for expenditure for an 

additional 5 years after the end of their period of availability for obligation. 

Table 3: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR): 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012

Dollars (in thousands) 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Allocated 6,500 3,646 3,714 4,604 2,000 2,000

Unobligated

balance

90 66 16 24 140 802

Unliquidated 

obligations

562 417 758 628 584 1,186

Disbursed 5,848 3,162 2,940 3,953 1,276 12

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Notes: NADR funding supports the Antiterrorism Assistance program, which is managed 

and implemented by State with some implementation by a broader set of agencies.

Antiterrorism Assistance funds are generally available for obligation for 2 years. All NADR 

obligations continue to be available for expenditure for an additional 5 years after the end 

of their period of availability for obligation. 

According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 

are no longer available for obligation. 

Background

In addition to the Foreign Military 

Financing, INCLE, and Section 

1206 programs, State and DOD 

provided security assistance to 

Lebanon through five other 

programs: Antiterrorism 

Assistance, International Military 

Education and Training, Section 

1207 Train and Equip, Export 

Control and Related Border 

Security, and Counterterrorism 

Financing. See tables 2 through 6 

for details on allocation, 

obligation, and disbursement of 

funds by these programs for 

security assistance for Lebanon 

from fiscal years 2007 through 

2012. 

Additional Programs Providing Security 

Assistance to Lebanon 

Page 31 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix II 

Table 4: NADR: Counterterrorism Financing Program, Fiscal Years 2007-2012

Dollars (in thousands)

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Allocated 0 0 0 0 166 0

Unobligated

balance

0 0 0 0 0 0 

Unliquidated 

obligations

0 0 0 0 166 0

Disbursed 0 0 0 0 0 0

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Note: NADR funding supports the Counterterrorism Financing program, which is managed 

and implemented by State with some implementation by a broader set of agencies.

Counterterrorism Financing funds are generally available for obligation for 2 years. All 

NADR obligations continue to be available for expenditure for an additional 5 years after 

the end of their period of availability for obligation. 

Table 5: NADR: Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, Fiscal 

Years 2007-2012

Dollars in thousands

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Allocated 0 0 400 800 800 1,050

Unobligated

balance

0 0 0 0 2 583

Unliquidated 

obligations

0 0 0 2 395 94

Disbursed 0 0 400 798 403 373

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Notes: NADR funding supports the EXBS program, which is managed and implemented by 

State with some implementation by a broader set of agencies. EXBS funds are generally 

available for obligation for 2 years. All NADR obligations continue to be available for 

expenditure for an additional 5 years after the end of their period of availability of 

availability. 

According to State, unobligated balances in fiscal year 2011 are not available for 

obligation. 

Additional Programs Providing Security 

Assistance to Lebanon (continued)

Page 32 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix II endix II

Table 6: Section 1207 Train and Equip Authority, Fiscal Years 2007-2012

Dollars (in thousands) 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Allocated 0 4,850 508 0 0 0

Unobligated

balance

0 1,120 508 0 0 0

Unliquidated 

obligations

0 147 0 0 0 0

Disbursed 0 3,583 0 0 0 0 

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

Notes: While funded through DOD, Section 1207 funds were transferred to State for 

management.

The authority for Section 1207 expired at the end of fiscal year 2010. When Section 1207 

funds were transferred to State, they became "no year" money and will remain available 

until expended. 

Additional Programs Providing Security 

Assistance to Lebanon (continued)

Page 33 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix III: Selected Security Equipment and 

Services Provided to Lebanon by the U.S. 

Government and Other Governments

Page 34 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Table 7 presents selected security equipment and services provided by 

the United States to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) through the 

Foreign Military Financing and Section 1206 programs from fiscal years 

2007 through 2012. According to data provided by the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, 78 cases1 were approved for Lebanon during this 

time frame and ranged in value from $18,000 to $38.2 million. The 

defense articles or services are listed in descending order based on the 

total estimated case value as reported by the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency. Table 8 presents selected security equipment or 

funding provided by countries other than the United States to the LAF, as 

reported by the LAF. Countries are listed in descending order based on 

the estimated value of security assistance provided.

Table 7: Selected Security Equipment or Service Provided by the United States to Lebanon, Fiscal Years 2007-2012 

Defense article or service

in selected cases Description

Total estimated

value (in millions)

High-mobility multi-purpose wheeled 

vehicles 

Provision includes trucks, ambulances, cargo troop carriers, 

armament vehicles, trailers, and tractors

$38.2

Coastal security crafts Provision of ships to monitor and patrol territorial waters $36.6

Signal equipment Communications equipment including radios and training $31.7

Trunked radio system Handheld and fixed radio installations and training $30.9

Caravan aircraft One Caravan aircraft, including missiles $27.8

Spare parts and follow-on support Spare parts and follow-on support for tactical vehicle and 

communications equipment 

$23.5

Ammunition Ammunition cartridges, components, and publications $20.6

Training Security Assistance Team Training $18.6

Helicopter spare parts Spare parts for UH-1H helicopters, including communication 

equipment support

$16.2

Ammunition Ammunition cartridges, publications $15.2

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Security Cooperation Agency data.

 

1

Cases can include more than one item or service; case value refers to the total value for 

all items and services listed with a unique case identifier. 

Appendix III: Selected Security Equipment 

and Services Provided to Lebanon by the U.S. 

Government and Other Governments
Appendix III: Selected Security Equipment and 

Services Provided to Lebanon by the U.S. 

Government and Other Governments

Page 35 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Table 8: Selected Security Equipment or Funding Provided by Other Countries to Lebanon

Donor country Defense article or funding

Estimated value

(in millions)

United Arab Emirates • Puma and Gazelle Helicopters

• M60-A3 tanks

• Trucks, vehicles and boats

• Body armor

• Tactical radios

$150 

Saudi Arabia • Cash

• Civilian vehicles

• Ammunition

$65 (cash)

$2.3 (equipment)

Qatar • Helicopters

• Vehicles

• Spare parts

$38.3

Eight other countries or entities, 

combined

• Logistics support and equipment a

•

$21

Poland • Small arms

• Ammunition

$20.9

Germany • Naval radars and equipment

• Patrol boats

• Vehicle and thermal cameras

$12

France • Body armor

• Sniper rifles and ammunition

$10.8

Italy • Excess defense articles such as vehicles, spare parts $3

United Kingdom • Anti-riot equipment

• Explosive ordnance disposal system

$2.7

Source: GAO analysis of LAF information.

a

The other countries or entities include China, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Greece, 

Holland, Kuwait, Malaysia, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 36 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 37 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 38 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 39 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 41 GAO-13-289 Security Assistance to Lebanon

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director); 

Jenna Beveridge; Teakoe S. Coleman; David Dayton; and La Verne 

Tharpes made key contributions to this report. Martin de Alteriis, Grace 

Lui, and Jeremy Sebest provided additional technical assistance.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320918)
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