In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2314 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

EURAL BLACK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:05-cr-00070-4 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 4, 2021 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Eural Black is serving 

a forty-year sentence in federal prison for firearm, robbery, 

and drug offenses that he committed as a Chicago police officer. He moved the district court for compassionate release 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A) based on his prostate cancer 

and the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court denied 

Black’s motion. It concluded that Black had not shown “ex-
2 No. 20-2314 

traordinary and compelling reasons,” as defined by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, to modify his sentence. The court also said that even if Black had made that 

showing, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

weighed against release because Black had served only onethird of his lengthy sentence for such serious crimes.

After the district court denied Black’s motion, we decided 

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020), which 

held that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” issue 

was, in the wake of the First Step Act of 2018, no longer governed by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements that 

the district court had relied upon here. The district court’s alternative rationale—that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against 

release—is not a persuasive basis for treating the legal error 

as harmless. Two unusual features of this case persuade us 

that the district court needs to take a fresh look at how those 

factors apply to Black. We vacate the denial and remand for 

reassessment of both steps of the compassionate-release decision. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant Eural Black was a corrupt Chicago police officer. He took part in a scheme to take the drugs and weapons 

that he found during police work, to have known dealers sell 

them, and to share in the profits. In 2007, a jury convicted 

Black of conspiracies to engage in racketeering, drug distribution, and robbery, as well as two counts of using and carrying 

a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c) (2006). The district court sentenced Black to a total of 

forty years in prison. The court imposed concurrent ten-year 

terms in prison on the conspiracy convictions and consecutive 

terms totaling thirty more years for the gun charges—the 
No. 20-2314 3

mandatory minimum for two such convictions at the time. 

Years later, in 2018 Congress passed the First Step Act, which 

lowered significantly the mandatory minimums for convictions under § 924(c). If he were sentenced today for the same 

convictions, Black’s mandatory minimum sentence would be 

ten years. 

In 2020, Black moved for compassionate release under 18 

U.S.C. § 3852(c)(1)(A), which was also amended in the First 

Step Act to allow federal prisoners to seek release from a district court without the endorsement of the Bureau of Prisons, 

a requirement that had limited compassionate release cases to 

just a few dozen per year nationwide.

Black argued that his cancer and chemotherapy meant he 

faced an increased risk of severe illness and death from 

COVID-19. At the time of his motion, Black was being held at 

one of the federal correctional facilities in Butner, North Carolina, where the complex had nearly 650 active cases of the 

virus, and where one staff member and nineteen inmates had 

died. Black also contended that the sentencing factors under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported his release: He had no prior 

criminal history; specific deterrence was unnecessary because 

he was no longer a police officer and could not commit the 

same crimes again; and although he had served only onethird of his forty-year sentence, thirty years of that term were 

based on mandatory minimums that Congress had since reduced substantially. 

The government opposed Black’s motion. It agreed that 

his health presented an extraordinary and compelling reason 

that could legally support early release. The government argued, however, that the sentencing factors—the seriousness 

of Black’s crimes and the need for just punishment given that 
4 No. 20-2314 

he had served only one-third of his sentence—weighed 

against it. 

The district court denied the motion for two reasons. First, 

it disagreed with the parties that Black had established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Applying the 

Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in Sentencing 

Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Appl. Note 1, the court explained 

that Black had not shown that his cancer was terminal or 

chronic or that he was at risk of contracting COVID-19 and 

thus unable to care for himself in prison. The COVID data 

cited by the parties, the court noted, reflected the infection 

and death rates for the entire Butner facility, not at the Butner 

Federal Medical Center where Black was housed and which 

had few infections and no deaths. Second, even if Black had 

established a compelling reason for release, the district court 

said it would not modify his sentence because the § 3553(a) 

factors weighed against doing so. The court emphasized that 

Black had served only one-third of his forty-year sentence, so 

that compassionate release now would not promote respect 

for the law or provide just punishment. The court also noted 

that Black’s crimes were “very serious” and that he was receiving medical care in prison.

II. Analysis

After Black appealed, he was transferred from the federal 

prison in North Carolina to a federal prison in West Virginia. 

That transfer did not render his motion moot. Black seeks release from any federal prison based on the risk of contracting 

COVID-19 because social distancing is impossible in prison. 

Even at a different federal prison, his case remains live, 

though changing circumstances may make it more or less persuasive. See Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871–72 (7th Cir. 
No. 20-2314 5

2004) (prisoner’s transfer to different facility did not render 

moot his request for injunctive relief against a system-wide 

policy). 

On the merits, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), after considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, a district court may 

grant a defendant’s request to reduce his prison term if the 

reduction is supported by “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and consistent with any applicable Sentencing Commission’s policy statement. We review denials of such motions for abuse of discretion, see Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180, but a 

decision based on a mistake of law will be deemed an abuse 

of discretion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); 

United States v. Guerrero, 946 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Black first contends that the district court erred by deciding that his cancer and susceptibility to COVID-19 did not 

amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Because prostate cancer and the treatment he receives 

for it are listed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as risk factors for COVID-19, and because the government conceded that he had shown extraordinary circumstances, Black argues, the court should not have relied on 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and its Application Note 1 to find otherwise.

Because of a peculiar circumstance stemming from the 

Sentencing Commission’s years-long lack of a quorum, we 

agree with Black that the district court made a legal error. Before the First Step Act took effect in 2018, § 3582(c) required 

an incarcerated person seeking compassionate release to obtain the endorsement of the Bureau of Prisons before seeking 

relief from a court. The statute also required that relief be 

“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission.” See Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1179–80. 
6 No. 20-2314 

Since enactment of the First Step Act, however, the Sentencing 

Commission has been unable to update its applicable policy 

statements because it has lacked a quorum. See, e.g., United 

States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 834–37 (10th Cir. 2021) (explaining this background in more detail).

In Gunn, we decided that under the First Step Act, the 

Commission’s earlier and still unchanged policy statements, 

which were written to fit a quite different statute, are no 

longer “applicable” and no longer limit the availability of 

compassionate release. The pre-First Step Act language in 

§ 1B1.13 and its Application Note 1 describe “extraordinary 

and compelling reasons” for granting motions for release in 

quite stringent terms. Those provisions apply to motions filed 

by the Bureau of Prisons, and they are not “applicable,” to use 

the statutory term, to a motion filed by the inmate as permitted under the First Step Act. See Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180. The 

district court was not bound by the parties’ agreement that 

Black had shown extraordinary and compelling reasons, but 

the court had broader discretion than it realized to decide 

whether Black’s condition was extraordinary and compelling. 

See id. (noting that district court’s discretion may be guided, 

but is not curtailed, by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). 

To be clear, the district court did not make a legal error by

merely quoting and analyzing § 1B1.13. But there is quite understandably no indication in the court’s order in this case 

that it recognized before our decision in Gunn that it had discretion to go beyond § 1B1.13 in deciding Black’s motion. See 

United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287& n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(noting that all seven circuits to have reached the question, 

including this circuit, have given same answer).
No. 20-2314 7

That much is now settled law in this circuit. The district 

court offered an alternative ground for denial, that the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh against Black’s release. That alternative ground could well be a sufficient basis for denying 

relief. E.g., United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th 

Cir. 2021). In this case, however, we believe that the district 

court needs to take a fresh look at this alternative ground. Its 

explanation was terse and did not signal that it took into account other statutory changes that do not mandate relief here 

but may well be relevant and could reasonably be deemed to 

alter the weight of those factors. 

In evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, the district court relied 

principally on the fact that Black had served only thirteen 

years of his forty-year sentence. In most cases we would have 

little trouble accepting that sensible and legally permissible 

rationale. It supports a discretionary conclusion that just punishment and respect for the law require continued incarceration. In this case, however, it is clear that if Black were being 

sentenced for these same crimes today, his sentence could be

substantially shorter. 

The First Step Act, in addition to changing the compassionate release law, included § 403, which amended sentences 

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Congress lowered the mandatory 

sentences for Black’s firearm-related crimes if they were committed today. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) (mandating 

five-year minimum for first firearm offense under the statute 

and twenty-five-year minimum for the second) with id. (2018) 

(mandating five-year minimums for the first and second offense). If Black were sentenced today, he would face a mandatory minimum of ten years, not thirty years, for his firearm

offenses. If, for the non-firearm charges, he received (as he 
8 No. 20-2314 

originally did) concurrent ten-year prison terms running consecutive to the firearm sentences, his total prison time might 

now be twenty years. Any such calculations involve speculation about how the court might have sentenced him (and even 

how he might have been charged) under a quite different set 

of sentencing provisions. But it is at least plausible that Black 

would have served closer to two-thirds or even more of his 

total sentence under those circumstances.

The government points out correctly that Congress did not 

make § 403 of the First Step Act retroactive. See United States 

v. Sparkman, 973 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that 

§ 403 applies retroactively only in limited circumstances 

where firearm conviction occurred before the Act but sentence was imposed after the Act took effect). That feature of 

the First Step Act shows that the district court was not required

to reduce Black’s sentence based on these changes. Congress’s 

policy choice not to make the changes to § 924(c) categorically 

retroactive does not imply that district courts may not consider those legislative changes when deciding individual motions for compassionate release like this one. To the contrary, 

the purpose of compassionate release under § 3582 is to allow 

for sentencing reductions when there is no statute affording 

such a reduction but where extraordinary and compelling 

reasons justify that relief. See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837 (affirming grant of compassionate release for defendant originally 

sentenced to fifty-five years with stacked convictions under 

§ 924(c) where district court considered § 3553(a) factors); id. 

at 838 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (noting importance of 

discretionary, case-by-case consideration). As the Fourth Circuit explained in a similar case: “Not all defendants convicted 

under § 924(c) should receive new sentences, but courts 

should be empowered to relieve some defendants of those 
No. 20-2314 9

sentences on a case by case basis.” United States v. McCoy, 981 

F.3d 271, 287 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming compassionate releases 

for several defendants originally sentenced with “stacked” 

§ 924(c) convictions). Other circuits have agreed. See United 

States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755, 760–63 (6th Cir. 2021); United 

States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d at 288–89 & n.5 (5th Cir.); see also 

United States v. Rollins, No. 99-CR-771-1, 2021 WL 1020998 

(N.D. Ill. 2021) (after remand, exercising discretion to modify 

extraordinarily long sentence that had been based on lateramended consecutive sentences under § 924(c)). We agree 

that such discretion is inherent in the compassionate release 

statute and process.

Because the district court did not consider this statutory 

change, which reflects a substantially different view by Congress about how to punish violations of § 924(c), we are not 

convinced the district court recognized the full extent of its 

discretion when it decided Black’s motion, particularly when 

this rationale was offered as an alternative ground after the 

court had erroneously held that Black was not even legally eligible for relief under § 3582(c). In discussing the § 3553(a) factors, the court mentioned only two factors. First, it called 

Black’s crimes “very serious.” We agree that they were. Upon 

remand, the district court might well decide that the sentences 

should not be reduced. Denial would not be required, though. 

The court also mentioned that Black was receiving medical 

care in prison. That factor is of course relevant in deciding 

how pressing the medical reasons for release might be, but it 

does not independently support continued confinement. 

Black’s treatment—chemotherapy for his prostate cancer—

was precisely what made him more vulnerable to COVID-19 

and thus was the basis of his request for relief. 

VACATED AND REMANDED. 
10 No. 20-2314 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Eural Black was a dirty 

cop and part of a drug-dealing enterprise: “The drug dealers 

in the enterprise provided the corrupt Chicago cops with information about the location of narcotics and money held by 

other drug dealers. The corrupt officers used that information 

to conduct traffic stops and home invasions and seize drugs 

and money they found. The cops then sold the drugs with the 

help of the drug dealers, and the coconspirators divided the 

proceeds.” United States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 692–93 (7th 

Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 353 F. App’x 58 (7th Cir. 2009). 

I agree with the district court and the majority: “very serious” 

crimes. Black was sentenced to 40 years in prison. He is 56 

years old, and his expected release date is May 29, 2041. He 

seeks a nearly 20-year reduction of his sentence. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce a prisoner’s sentence if extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances warrant a reduced sentence and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors favor early release. If the district court finds 

that either requirement weighs against a reduction in sentence, the court may deny relief without addressing the other 

requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 

1078 (7th Cir. 2021). The burden is on the prisoner to demonstrate that a reduction in sentence is warranted. See United 

States v. Melgarejo, 830 F. App’x 776, 778 (7th Cir. 2020). Because I would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the § 3553(a) factors do not favor 

early release, I respectfully dissent.

The district court’s analysis under § 3553(a), though brief, 

was reasonable. See United States v. Burnley, 834 F. App’x 270, 

272 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding under the abuse of discretion 

standard, the district court’s “reasoning process” must be 
No. 20-2314 11 

“reasonable”). We recently emphasized that a district court 

need not include “a detailed, written explanation analyzing 

every § 3553(a) factor;” rather, all that we require is “some 

statement of reasons” to allow for meaningful review. United 

States v. Sanders, 992 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation 

omitted). That is what the district court provided here. The 

court concluded, among other things, that Black had “served 

only about one-third of his forty-year sentence,” that his 

crimes were “very serious,” that a sentence reduction would 

not “promote respect for the law, afford adequate deterrence, 

or provide just punishment for his offenses [which included 

several 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violations],” that “[c]ontinued incarceration is appropriate and necessary,” and that Black was receiving “substantial [medical] care” in prison. R. 730 at 3. The 

court thus considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1)); the 

need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, 

to provide just punishment for Black’s offenses, and to afford 

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (§ 3553(a)(2)(A) & 

(B));1 and the adequacy of Black’s medical care in prison 

(§ 3553(a)(2)(D)). The majority neither identifies a § 3553(a) 

factor that should have been considered but was not, nor finds 

error in the district court’s reasoning concerning the factors 

that it addressed. I would affirm. 

The majority faults the district court for failing to consider

Black’s sentencing disparity argument—that if he were 

1 The district court was correct to ignore Black’s frivolous specific deterrence argument that he could no longer commit the same crime because 

he was no longer a police officer. Black was a drug dealer. Maybe he 

would not have the same manner and means to commit his crimes if he 

was released early, but hardly would any other criminal. 
12 No. 20-2314 

sentenced today, his § 924(c) convictions would carry lower 

mandatory minimum sentences due to § 403 of the First Step 

Act, possibly leading to a lower sentence.2 The majority 

acknowledges that the First Step Act’s § 924(c) sentencing reforms do not apply retroactively to Black, who was sentenced 

before the law was passed. Nonetheless, the majority holds 

that § 3582 and the compassionate release process afford district courts the discretion to relieve defendants, like Black, of 

legally imposed § 924(c) sentences based on the disparity created by the First Step Act.3 

Undoubtedly, the First Step Act’s reforms create sentencing disparities between defendants like Black who were sentenced under the old § 924(c) mandatory minimums and defendants sentenced under the new § 924(c) mandatory minimums. But “applying new penalties to defendants not yet 

sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants 

2 Black’s argument before the district court, in full, was as follows: “The 

lengthy 40-year sentence he is serving rests on two convictions under 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c), one for five years and another for 25 years, both consecutive to each other and consecutive to the 10-year sentence he received on 

the other counts. After the amendment of section 924(c), found in another 

section of the First Step Act, the firearms convictions, if he were sentenced 

today, would yield as little as 10 consecutive years, not 30 consecutive 

years. His current sentence does not represent a judgment that he is a dangerous person; it merely reflects a mandatory disposition, a harsh result 

that Congress realizes was excessive.” R. 720 at 12.

3 The majority’s holding is not limited to defendants who first show an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction and then 

ask the district court to consider the non-retroactive First Step Act amendments to § 924(c) in balancing the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether 

a sentence reduction is warranted. See United States v. Jarvis, — F.3d —, 

2021 WL 2253235, at *3 (6th Cir. June 3, 2021).
No. 20-2314 13 

already sentenced” has been described by the Supreme Court 

as “ordinary practice.” United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755, 

764–65 (6th Cir. 2021) (Thapar, J., dissenting) (alteration omitted) (quoting Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012)). 

This ordinary practice—that naturally results in creating sentencing disparities—“cannot also be an extraordinary and 

compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. Id. at 765 (quotation omitted). In my view, “[a] sentencing disparity resulting from the First Step Act’s reforms is not—as a matter of 

law—an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction 

in sentence.” Id. at 764 (citing United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 

500, 505 (6th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Wills, 991 F.3d 720, 

724 (6th Cir. 2021)); see also United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 

821, 838 (10th Cir. 2021) (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (“Indeed, the imposition of a sentence that was not only permissible but statutorily required at the time is neither an extraordinary nor a compelling reason to reduce that same sentence.”). To allow otherwise permits district courts to use the 

discretion afforded by “§ 3582(c)(1)(A) as an end run around 

Congress’s careful effort to limit the retroactivity of the First 

Step Act’s reforms.” Tomes, 990 F.3d at 505; see United States v. 

Jarvis, — F.3d —, 2021 WL 2253235, at *2 (6th Cir. June 3, 2021)

(“If every defendant who received a longer sentence than the 

one he would receive today became eligible for compassionate release, the balance Congress struck would have come to 

naught.”). But “a court does not have discretion ... to circumvent a contrary statutory command.” See Owens, 996 F.3d at 

764 (Thapar, J., dissenting). Affording the district court such 

discretion undermines Congress’s express intent that the First 

Step Act reforms do not apply to defendants like Black. In 

short, Congress has rejected Black’s argument that the 
14 No. 20-2314 

sentencing disparity created by the First Step Act is an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.

Furthermore, the majority’s holding is unnecessary in this 

case because the district court did account for Black’s § 924(c) 

argument and rejected it.4 The district court explicitly 

acknowledged the argument the majority contends it did not 

consider—that Black’s “lengthy sentence reflects in large part 

a mandatory disposition that Congress now ‘realizes was excessive.’” R. 730 at 2 (quoting and citing Def.’s Mot. at 12).

Several aspects of the district court’s analysis imply that it 

considered but was not swayed by Black’s argument. After 

acknowledging Black’s argument, the district court focused 

its analysis on the nature and circumstances of Black’s offenses, 

which included § 924(c) convictions. We have upheld a similar implicit rejection of a prisoner’s argument in an analogous 

context. See United States v. Carter, 830 F. App’x 783, 785 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (finding a district court’s analysis reasonable when 

it “acknowledged” prisoner’s prior crimes “no longer qualified as career-offender predicates” but “nevertheless exercised his discretion by treating them as serious offenses that 

factored into” its analysis). Moreover, the most natural inference drawn from the district court explicitly acknowledging 

the length of Black’s sentence after acknowledging Black’s 

§ 924(c) argument is that the district court rejected the 

4 The majority assumes that because the district court did not explicitly 

reject Black’s § 924(c) argument, it did not consider the argument. But we 

have never mandated that a district court must explicitly reject an argument when exercising its considerable discretion under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Doing so in this case adds a new requirement that is inconsistent with 

what we otherwise expect of district courts in evaluating compassionate 

release motions.
No. 20-2314 15 

hypothetical sentences that Black proposed and that the majority speculates on here. Although the district court could 

have said more (while not required to do so under the law), it 

said enough to make clear its consideration and rejection of 

Black’s § 924(c) argument. 

Finally, the majority’s analysis of our decision in United 

States v. Gunn portends trouble in future cases. 980 F.3d 1178 

(7th Cir. 2020). Beginning with a point of agreement, Gunn

held that § 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines is not “applicable” to a prisoner’s compassionate release motion under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, § 1B1.13 cannot “curtail” a district judge’s discretion when analyzing whether a prisoner’s 

compassionate release motion presents extraordinary and 

compelling circumstances. Id. at 1180. Even so, the “substantive aspects” of § 1B1.13 and its Application Notes still “provide a working definition” of extraordinary and compelling

circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and can continue to inform the district court’s discretion. Id.; see United States v. Curtis, 846 F. App’x 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2021). The majority elides 

this distinction. It begins by announcing that the district court 

was “applying” § 1B1.13’s Application Note 1 to Black’s compassionate release motion before summarily concluding that 

the district court did not “realize” it “had broader discretion.”

This mode of analysis risks giving district courts the wrong 

impression, namely that mere mention of § 1B1.13 is legal error under Gunn. It is not. See, e.g., Carter, 830 F. App’x at 784–

85. District courts can be guided by § 1B1.13 when considering the evidence, so long as they do not limit themselves 

based on it. See United States v. Lilly, 846 F. App’x 417, 419 (7th 

Cir. 2021). Moreover, the majority does not analyze whether 

the district court’s exercise of discretion was “constrained” or 

“guided by” § 1B1.13, instead shifting our focus on review 
16 No. 20-2314 

from what the district court did to what the district court 

thought (or did not think) it could do. 

Because the district court accounted for each of Black’s arguments, I would find that § 1B1.13 guided rather than constrained its analysis. While the district court’s analysis of 

Black’s medical condition tracks the language of § 1B1.13’s 

Application Note 1(A), its analysis under the catchall provision was far broader than the specific circumstances identified under the Application Notes. The district court noted that 

neither party disputed Black’s medical condition was a risk 

factor for COVID-19, but found that two other considerations—the conditions at Black’s prison facility when the petition was filed, and the BOP’s efforts to manage COVID-19 response in prisons—weighed against finding extraordinary 

and compelling circumstances in Black’s case. Those two considerations are nowhere found in § 1B1.13 or its Application 

Notes. Cf. Carter, 830 F. App’x at 785 (holding district court 

did not abuse its discretion when it “adequately addressed 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, acknowledging [prisoner’s] significant 

medical conditions” but finding those offset by a number of 

other factors including prisoner’ age, prison’s success “controlling the COVID-19 outbreak,” and that prisoner’s wife 

was cared for).

I respectfully dissent.