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S. HRG. 110–1206 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE FEDERAL SUPERFUND PROGRAM’S ACTIVITIES TO PROTECT 

PUBLIC HEALTH 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 17, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming1

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ANDREW WHEELER, Minority Staff Director 

1Note: During the 110th Congress, Senator Craig Thomas, of Wyoming, 

passed away on June 4, 2007. Senator John Barrasso, of Wyoming, joined 

the committee on July 10, 2007. 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex officio) 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex officio) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

OCTOBER 17, 2007 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New York ........ 1 

Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 3 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 4 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 7 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ............... 10 

Craig, Hon. Larry, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .............................. 41 

Cardin, Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the Stata of Maryland ......................... 102 

WITNESSES 

Bodine, Susan Parker, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ........................ 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 19 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 25 

Steinzor, Rena, Jacob A. France Research Professor of Law, University of 

Maryland School of Law; Scholar, Center for Progressive Reform .................. 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Response to an additional question from Senator Boxer .............................. 50 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 50 

Porter, J. Winston, President, Waste Policy Center ............................................. 50 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 57 

Campbell, Bradley M., Principal, Bradley M. Campbell, LLC ............................. 58 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

Steinberg, Michael, W., Senior Counsel, Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP, 

and Outside Counsel, Superfund Settlements Project ...................................... 67 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 74 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 76 

Siegel, Lenny, Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight ................. 82 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 91 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 92 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 

Report; The Toll of Superfund Neglect, Toxic Waste Dumps & Communities 

at Risk: Rena Steinzor and Margaret Clune ..................................................... 104 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE FEDERAL 

SUPERFUND PROGRAM’S ACTIVITIES TO 

PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUPERFUND AND

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Clinton, Inhofe, Lautenberg, Craig, Boxer, 

Barrasso 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Senator CLINTON. The hearing will come to order. 

I want to start by welcoming our newest member, Senator 

Barrasso, to the Subcommittee. We are delighted to have him. He 

is already a Ranking Member. That is a rapid ascent in the Senate. 

I want to thank Chairman Boxer and our full Committee’s Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe, for their support of this Subcommittee 

hearing. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. 

We will begin with 5 minute opening statements, and then we 

will hear testimony from EPA Assistant Administrator Bodine. The 

Superfund Program is such an important part of our environmental 

protection system in our Country, and I think this is a very significant opportunity to discuss what it is doing and what more it could 

do. 

Superfund has its roots in New York. Stemming from the discovery in 1978 by Niagara Falls resident Lois Gibbs that her neighborhood, known as Love Canal, had been built on a massive chemical dump. The effects of that chemical dump had been seen, but 

not understood for years. The impact on the people who lived there 

was tragic. 

Love Canal became a national story and helped spur Congress to 

enact the Superfund law, which was signed by President Carter in 

December 1980. The Love Canal site was finally taken off of the 

Superfund’s national priorities list in 2004, but 1,246 sites across 

the Country remain on the Superfund list today, including 86 in 

New York alone. 
2 

So as we approach this 30 year anniversary of Love Canal, the 

Superfund site remains vitally important because it reminds us of 

why we went down this path. The importance is underscored by a 

report issued last year by the Center for American Progress and 

the Center for Progressive Reform. That report profiled 50 of the 

most dangerous sites still on the Superfund list scattered across 10 

States. We will hear more about that report later in the hearing, 

but I want to highlight a couple of its findings. 

First, most of the 50 sites are locate in heavily populated areas. 

Second, many have been on the list for decades. Third, they contain 

a range of highly toxic chemicals such as PCBs, creosote, lead, arsenic, mercury and TCE. Sixty percent were located in neighborhoods where households reported median incomes in the range of 

$40,000, and some 26 percent were in the midst of populations 

comprised of 40 percent or more of racial or ethnic minorities. 

So this is both an environmental health issue and an environmental justice issue. That is why I am dismayed by the Bush administration’s handling of this program. The number of cleanups 

has fallen dramatically from an average of about 75 sites per year 

from 1993 to 2000, to an average of fewer than 40 sites per year 

under this Administration. In Fiscal Year 2007, only 24 cleanups 

were completed. 

When we have asked the Administration to explain this sharp 

drop in cleanups, they claim it is due to greater complexity of the 

sites left to be cleaned. I don’t accept that point. But even if you 

take it at face value, it raises another important question. Why 

won’t the Administration, therefore, ask for more money to get the 

program back on track to deal with the allegedly more complex 

sites? When asked that question, the Administration has tied itself 

into knots defending the absurd position that more money wouldn’t 

help all that much. 

They have been extremely secretive about the program, keeping 

information from the public and stonewalling this Committee. 

Chairman Boxer submitted a series of questions, and I am delighted that she is here, because she submitted those questions to 

the EPA about Superfund 5 months ago. On Monday, 2 days before 

this oversight hearing, she received a stack of documents in response. All but three of the documents were marked privileged. 

That is just simply unacceptable. What does the Administration 

have to hide? I thought we were all in this together. 

I hope we can get beyond this pattern today. For the Administration to keep repeating mission accomplished about the Superfund 

Program doesn’t square with reality. There are 11 Superfund sites 

where human exposure to dangerous levels of toxic chemicals is not 

under control. There are 111 of those sites, because seven of them 

are in New York alone. 

In addition, EPA data indicates there are 160 other sites where 

EPA has insufficient information to determine whether human exposure to these toxic chemicals is under control. I will be pressing 

EPA today to explain their plans to get these sites under control 

and to explore the reasons for the slowdown in cleanups. 

I think it is clear this program needs additional funding. I think 

reinstating the polluter pays fee is a step we must take, both to 

provide additional funds for the cleanups and to make the program 
3 

fairer. Ordinary taxpayers should not pay for cleanups, and that is 

what has been happening at orphan sites for the last 4 years. 

So we have a lot of ground to cover today. I want to turn now 

to Ranking Member, Senator Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you very much for that very kind welcome to the Subcommittee. I look forward to working with all of the members and 

I appreciate you holding this hearing today. I appreciate the witnesses who are here to testify. 

I think that it is important that we engage in constructive dialog 

to find solutions to the tough problems that we need to answer. We 

have excellent witnesses. I look forward to what all of them have 

to say. 

There have been successes in the history of the Superfund, but 

like any Government-run program, there is always room for improvement. I am from Casper, Wyoming. It is known as the oil city, 

and I will tell you two short stories today. One is about Casper. In 

1913, a refinery opened there. It was actually the first paved road 

in that community. The Amoco refinery at its height had 750 workers. It was on the bank of the Platte River on 340 acres. In 1991, 

when it closed, there were smokestacks, storage tanks, pipes, concrete, aging equipment and it was too expensive to be in compliance and they merely closed the refinery. It left behind a mess. 

There were about 10 million gallons of oil that went into the 

groundwater beneath the refinery, and that is about the same 

amount that was leaked in the Exxon Valdez. The oil was seeping 

into the Platte River and there was oil sheen on the riverbank. But 

together, local leaders, community leaders, government and an oil 

conglomerate all worked together. They came up with a plan. They 

put a 40 foot high steel wall that was then sunk into the bedrock 

along the riverbank. Groundwater was pumped through a series of 

filters and a filtering wetland at the rate of 700 gallons a minute. 

From this, they were able to get out a lot of the oil that was left 

under this abandoned refinery, 4,000 gallons of oil a month. They 

now have a world class golf course. We do in Casper, Wyoming. 

Robert Trent Jones, Jr., designed it, the same designer where they 

played the President’s Cup 2 years ago in Manassas, VA. There is 

a restaurant. There are pathways. There are trees, picnic areas. 

There are ducks and deer, a few businesses that are there in offices. 

So what the folks have done working together, they have turned 

a rust-enclosed polluting eyesore into an economic development 

center that is giving us a clean environment. It is going to take a 

while to get all of this cleaned up, but as it continues, this is now 

useful and economic development and a tremendous asset for our 

community. This has become a model for closed refineries now all 

around the world. 

The second story is about red tape and government bureaucracy, 

how it at times prevents innovation from occurring. I think we 

need to encourage innovative solutions and provide a legal framework for that to happen. I think we have to get away from the phi-
4 

losophy that only the Federal Government can fix the problem. In 

Casper, with the refinery, it was much more than that. It was a 

cooperative effort. 

But sometimes, government programs have unintended consequences. To that, I want to tell you about my friend Russ Zimmer. Russ lives in Torrington, WY. He and Ila are still there today. 

For many years, he ran the local feed store. He was a good neighbor, helped out, and volunteered in the community, always lending 

a helping hand. Neighbors actually encouraged him to run for the 

legislature. He got into the Wyoming State Senate, and because he 

was such a good friend and a neighbor, he became President of the 

State Senate. But he ran the feed store. 

One day, to help out a lady in the feed store who was buying 

some dog food and some feed, she had a check that she got from 

turning in her battery to a battery disposal place, and he didn’t 

want her to have to go to the bank and cash the check. So he took 

it as a third party check, signed the check, and kept it. He forgot 

about it for many years. 

Well, it turns out that the company that the check was written 

from ran this battery disposal company, and that company went 

bankrupt and there was some pollution that occurred as a result 

of the cleanup of the battery business. When folks went through 

the records of the defunct company looking for someone to be held 

liable for the damage at the site of the battery disposal business, 

they found this check that Russ Zimmer had cashed for the company. 

Russ Zimmer, good neighbor, innocent bystander, was named a 

potentially responsible party, they call the PRP. Well, for the common sense people of Wyoming, this was laughable. But yet, it cost 

Russ Zimmer nearly $10,000 to deal with his legal problems. People all around the State of Wyoming are aware of it because he was 

the President of the State Senate, and said, is this the way government should work, this government that can do all of this to some 

person who is just trying to be a good neighbor and helpful? But 

under joint and several liability, a person who contributed even a 

very little can be held responsible for the entire cost of the cleanup. 

We need some common sense in this. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator. We certainly 

agree with that. We need common sense everywhere we can find 

it. It is not always apparent. 

I want to now turn to our Chair of the full Committee, who is 

doing a wonderful job, Senator Boxer. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. I am very 

proud of this Committee, members on both sides of the aisle. You 

have taken your responsibilities very seriously, and as a result I 

think we are making progress. I do say to our Ranking Member of 

the Subcommittee, welcome. 

So I thank Senator Clinton for holding this hearing on the EPA’s 

management of the Superfund toxic waste cleanup program. We all 

know Superfund is a critically important program. It protects the 
5 

health and safety of our families. Here is the point. One in four 

people in America lives within four miles of a Superfund site. Let 

me say that again because people forget. One in four people in 

America lives within four miles of a Superfund site, including 10 

million children. Every politician says our children are our future. 

Well, if you mean it, then you have to protect them so they grow 

up healthy. 

Superfund sites are the most contaminated toxic waste sites in 

our Country. They are polluted with dangerous toxic substances including lead, arsenic, mercury, which are known to cause cancer, 

birth defects and harm the nervous system. Superfund was created 

to address these threats. It is a landmark environmental bipartisan 

law. 

We made great strides in protecting communities by cleaning up 

sites in the 1990’s. Unfortunately, in the past several years, the 

pace of listing toxic waste sites and of actually cleaning them up 

has slowed to a crawl. As we have heard from Senator Clinton, 

cleanups have dropped by at least 50 percent, from 80 sites down 

to 40. And this year, EPA couldn’t even meet its own goal of cleaning up 40 toxic waste sites. Instead, EPA now says it expects to 

clean up 24 sites. That is a drop from 80 cleanups a year to 24, 

and it is unacceptable not only to members of this Committee, but 

it should be unacceptable to the American people. 

Based upon EPA’s own documents and studies by outside experts, EPA is likely failing to list many toxic waste sites for cleanup that are posing health and environmental risks. The agency has 

failed also to quickly address sites at which human exposure is not 

under control. There are at least 111 of these sites, according to 

data from earlier this year. 

In addition, EPA hasn’t even collected enough information to determine whether human exposure is under control at 160 other 

Superfund sites. These figures are alarming and they are telling. 

Senator Clinton, that is why this hearing is so important. We will 

get out this message. EPA hasn’t even collected enough information 

to determine whether human exposure is under control at 160 

other Superfund sites and they admit that 111 of these sites 

human exposure is not under control. More must be done. 

In an effort to determine if EPA could do more work with more 

money, earlier this year I asked a series of questions about EPA’s 

management of the program. In the last few days, EPA delivered 

a response, a large volume of paper. Could we just show the volume of paper that we received just in the last two nights? The vast 

majority, as Senator Clinton has pointed out, has been marked 

privileged. 

I again went over the laws that rule whether a document is in 

fact privileged and can be kept from the public. The good news for 

our Committee is that we can release all this information. It is up 

to us. It is at our discretion. Unless there is a trade secret issue 

involved in there, or some national security problem involved, and 

as far as we know at this point, none of that is the reason these 

documents are marked privileged. 

I just want you to know what I intend to do, because I am not 

going to do it today because we are going through these documents. 

I am going to share these documents with my colleagues from both 
6 

sides of the aisle, and then I intend to make these documents public in accordance with the laws of the Country and the rules of this 

Committee. 

I have to ask rhetorically, since when does EPA have the right 

to withhold important information about toxic waste sites and 

cleanup from families whose health may be at risk from living near 

those sites? Who is the boss, the people or the EPA? I say the people. That is what this Country is about. They deserve to have the 

truth. 

Superfund is one of our landmark environmental laws. It has resulted in cleanup and it helped to protect the health of millions of 

Americans who live near these sites. I will not stand by, and I 

know members of this Committee on both sides of the aisle will not 

stand by while this crucial environmental law is undermined and 

information is kept secret from the public. 

I will work with Senator Clinton to follow up on this hearing. We 

will carefully review the large volume of these so-called privileged 

information documents that the agency has provided. I find it appalling that I would get those at the eleventh hour. If we have to 

have another hearing, I say to you, Madam Chair, I am sure you 

will be available, so we can let the people know what the truth is. 

We will get to the bottom of these issues. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I would like to thank Senator Clinton for holding this hearing on the Environmental Protection Agency’s management of the Superfund toxic waste cleanup program. Superfund is critically important to protecting the health of children and families who live in communities across our country. 

One in four people in America lives within four miles of a Superfund site, including 10 million children. Superfund sites are among the most contaminated toxic 

waste sites in the country. 

They are polluted with dangerous, toxic substances, including lead, arsenic, and 

mercury, which are known to cause cancer, birth defects, and harm the nervous system. 

Superfund was created to address these threats. We made great strides in protecting communities by cleaning up sites in the 1990’s. Unfortunately, in the past 

several years the pace of listing toxic waste sites for cleanup, and of actually cleaning up these sites, has slowed to nearly a crawl. 

As we have heard from Senator Clinton, cleanups have dropped by at least fifty 

percent, from 80 waste sites cleaned up per year down to 40. And, this year, EPA 

couldn’t even meet its own goal of cleaning up 40 toxic waste sites. 

Instead, EPA now says it expects to clean up only 24 sites—that’s a drop from 

80 cleanups a year down to 24. This is simply unacceptable. 

EPA has also listed far fewer sites for long-term cleanups under the program. The 

number of sites listed has dropped from 30 per year to 17 per year—a 56 percent 

decline. 

Based upon EPA’s own documents, and studies by outside experts, EPA is likely 

failing to list many toxic waste sites for cleanup that are posing health and environmental risks. 

The agency has also failed to quickly address sites at which human exposure is 

not under control. There are at least 111 of these sites, according data from earlier 

this year. 

In addition, EPA hasn’t even collected enough information to determine whether 

human exposure is under control at 160 other Superfund sites. These figures are 

alarming and telling. 

More must be done. 

In an effort to determine if EPA could do more work with more money, earlier 

this year I asked a series of questions about EPA’s management of the program. 
7 

In the last few days EPA delivered a response, a large volume of paper—the vast 

majority of which is stamped ‘‘privileged.’’ 

This is unacceptable. I have to ask: since when does EPA have the right to withhold important information about toxic waste sites and cleanup from families whose 

health may be at risk from living near those sites? 

Superfund in one of our landmark environmental laws. It has resulted in the 

cleanup and helped to protect the health of millions of Americans who live near 

toxic waste sites. It is the best and clearest example we have of ensuring that polluters pay for the messes they make, and that the public has a right to know about 

the toxic risks they face. 

I will not stand by while this crucial environmental law is undermined. I will 

work with Senator Clinton to follow up on this hearing, and will carefully review 

the large volume of so-called privileged information the agency has provided. I anticipate that we will have to hold additional hearings to get to the bottom of these 

issues. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. 

Senator Inhofe, thank you for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I appreciate having this hearing today. 

The Superfund program was enacted over 25 years ago to deal 

with sites that were endangering the health of citizens and of the 

environment. 

I also want to say before starting, Administrator Bodine, you are 

doing a great job and I appreciate your being here today. 

I am happy to say that for the most part, this program has been 

a success. A great number of these sites have been cleaned up and 

we have established additional provisions in the law to guard 

against the creation of new sites and hold those accountable for 

any pollution to our environment. 

I anticipate discussion today regarding the pace of cleanups and 

the addition of new sites to the national priorities list. It is important to note that the cleanup rates from the previous Administration reflected completions of the simpler, the smaller Superfund 

sites, or the low-hanging fruit, as you might say. What we have left 

today are highly complicated sites. I know that in Oklahoma I have 

been concerned with the progress at Tar Creek Superfund site. 

It is very important to understand that, and it happened in my 

State of Oklahoma, we have the most devastating Superfund site 

anywhere in America. I think there was some competition for that 

title, but not anymore. So we are making progress there. 

I have been concerned about the progress at the site, but over 

the last few years we have been pleased to see new collaboration 

among the Federal and State agencies involved in this site. Although I know there is still a lot left to be done, I appreciate your 

work and the work of the Regional Administrator Greene down in 

Dallas-Fort Worth and Region VI Superfund Director Sam Coleman. Both of them have spent a lot of quality time personally at 

this site. 

I might add also there is a very simple way of getting this off 

of high center. When I was chairing this Committee, we actually 

got people from DOJ and DOI and the EPA and the Corps of Engineers all in one room together. That is unheard of, but when they 

did, it is awfully hard to pass the buck from one to another. So we 

have made a lot of progress there. 
8 

Within Superfund, we have to prioritize, and the protection of 

human health first. Once this is done, some sensible analysis 

should go into the cleanups of these sites. Cost considerations 

should be balanced with future intent of the land use and the risk 

of exposure. There needs to be modable cleanup alternatives considered for each site and this important decision should be made 

by high-level EPA officials, someone who can be held accountable, 

as opposed to someone who cannot be held accountable. 

In fact, it has been a focus of mine while I was Chairman, and 

I will continue to press for accountability of the EPA regions. All 

too often, the regions disregard their agency’s own guidance and directives, making decisions that incur significant long-term costs for 

the agency without any type of review. For example, I have been 

most troubled to learn of the Federal creosote site in Manville, New 

Jersey. 

In this case, the EPA has acted contrary to its own guidance and 

excavated some 450,000 tons of dirt and shipped a significant portion of it to Canada for incineration. Amazingly, the decision was 

made by someone at the EPA to dig up a shopping mall parking 

lot and excavate 125,000 tons of dirt, only to be recovered by another parking lot. For this 50 acre site, the price tag was around 

$300 million for the American taxpayers. This type of gold-plated 

cleanup makes no sense. 

Now, we hear from some that the Superfund tax should be reinstated because EPA lacks funding for cleanups. First of all, it is 

simply not true. But how can this assertion even be made when we 

hear such outrageous spending of money, as in the example that 

I just talked about. It only takes away the valuable resources from 

other sites. That is why I am working with Majority Leader Harry 

Reid on this issue, and the two of us will be requesting the GAO 

to investigate just how the Federal creosote site literally grew into 

a money pit for the American taxpayers. 

Some of my colleagues would like to see the Superfund corporate 

tax reinstated. I am strongly opposed to this tax. In fact, the Chairman made the statement that ordinary taxpayers should not have 

to pay for something for which they are not responsible. That is exactly what this is, this type of a tax. 

I have opposed this for quite some time. The tax does not distinguish the polluter from a company that is an environmental steward. In fact, when applied, this tax unfairly targeted the oil and 

chemical industries, penalizing companies who had no contact with 

any Superfund sites. The tax goes where the money is, not where 

the responsibility lies. This is not a targeted tax on polluters. This 

is an indiscriminate tax on business. 

So the supporters of this tax simply imply that if we do not reinState the tax, we will not have enough money to clean up sites. 

This isn’t true. There has never been a correlation between the 

amount of money raised by the tax and the dollars spent on cleanup. 

For example, in 1966, the tax fund was at its highest level, yet 

the amount spent by that Administration, the Clinton administration, for Superfund cleanup was at a 10 year low. While in 2004, 

the money spent by the Bush administration was at a 10 year high, 

while the fund was at a low point. 
9 

So I look forward to discussing these critical items during the 

course of this hearing. I appreciate your holding this hearing, 

Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Today this Subcommittee will be addressing an important issue for Americans 

and that is the cleanup of toxic waste sites. The Superfund program was enacted 

over 25 years ago to deal with sites that were endangering the health of our citizens 

and the environment. I am happy to say that for the most part, this program has 

been quite a success. A great number of these sites have been cleaned up and we 

have established additional provisions in the law to guard against the creation of 

new sites and hold those accountable for any pollution to our environment. 

I anticipate discussion today regarding the pace of cleanups and the addition of 

new sites to the National Priorities List. It is important to note that cleanup rates 

from the Clinton administration reflect completions of simpler and smaller Superfund sites—the low hanging fruit. What are left today are highly complicated sites. 

I know that in Oklahoma, I have been concerned with the progress at the Tar Creek 

Superfund site. Over the last few years, I have been pleased to see a new collaboration among the Federal and State agencies involved in this site, and although I 

know there is still much left to do, I appreciate your work and the work of Regional 

Administrator Greene and the Region 6 Superfund director Sam Coleman. 

Within Superfund, we must prioritize the protection of human health first. Once 

this is done, some sensible analysis should go into the cleanups of these sites. Cost 

considerations should be balanced with future intent of the land use and risk of exposure. There needs to be multiple cleanup alternatives considered for each site and 

this important decision should be made by high level EPA officials—someone that 

can be held accountable rather than EPA bureaucrats. 

In fact, it has been a focus of mine while I was Chairman, and I will continue 

to press for accountability of the EPA regions. All too often the regions disregard 

their agency’s own guidance and directives, making decisions that incur significant 

long term costs for the agency without any type of review. For example, I have been 

most troubled to learn of the Federal Creosote Site in Manville, New Jersey. In this 

case, the EPA has acted contrary to its own guidance and excavated 450,000 tons 

of dirt and shipped a significant portion of it to Canada for incineration. Amazingly, 

the decision was made by someone at the EPA to dig up a shopping mall parking 

lot and excavate 125,000 tons of dirt only to be recovered by another parking lot. 

And for this 50 acre site, the price tag is around $300 million dollars for the American tax payers. This type of ‘‘gold plated’’ cleanup makes no sense. 

We hear from some that the Superfund tax should be reinstated because EPA 

lacks funding for cleanups. First of all, this simply is not true. But how can this 

assertion even be made, when we hear of such outrageous spending with the money 

that they do have. Irresponsible spending at one site, like what I just described, 

only takes away valuable resources from other sites. That is why I am working with 

the Majority Leader Harry Reid on this issue and the two of us will be requesting 

the GAO to investigate just how the Federal Creosote Site literally grew into a 

money pit for the American taxpayers. 

Some of my colleagues would like to see the Superfund corporate tax reinstated. 

I am strongly opposed to this tax as it is patently unfair. This tax does not distinguish a polluter from a company that is an environmental steward. In fact, when 

applied, this tax unfairly targeted the oil and chemical industries penalizing companies who had no contact with any Superfund site. The tax goes where the money 

is, NOT where the responsibility lies. This is not a targeted tax on polluters. This 

is an indiscriminate tax on business. 

Supporters of this tax imply that if we do not reinState the tax we will not have 

enough money to clean up sites. This is not true. There has NEVER been a correlation between the amount of money raised by the tax and the dollars spent on cleanup. For example, in 1996 the tax fund was at its highest level, yet the amount spent 

by the Clinton administration for Superfund cleanup was at a 10 year low. While 

in 2004, the money spent by the Bush administration was at a 10 year high, while 

the fund was at a low point. 

I look forward to today’s hearing and hope that we discuss reasonable and fair 

reforms to the Superfund program. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 
10 

Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, 

for bringing this to the public discourse, because it is pretty obvious, as I think we look at the records of what has happened with 

Superfund, and we see it being criticized here for an action her or 

an action there. My work with Superfund began in 1983 because 

New Jersey had the most Superfund sites of any State in the Nation. 

I believe in a pretty basic principle. If you dirty it, you clean it 

up. Polluters, those responsible, not everyday taxpayers, ought to 

pay for the cleanup. Based on their actions, it appears that the 

Bush administration doesn’t share this logical view. 

I listen very carefully to my friends from the other side. They 

talk about low-hanging fruit. Well, low-hanging fruit got to be very 

expensive because in my hometown of Montclair, N.J., we had over 

$100 million spent on a single site. That doesn’t sound like very 

available little fruit when it cost over $100 million. 

Now, this is the first Administration to oppose reinstating the 

Superfund tax on the oil and chemical industries. Yes, it is a broadbased tax, but those are the people who created these sites in the 

first place. Because of their opposition, taxpayers are paying to 

clean up the Nation’s worst waste sites, rather than the industries 

that created these messes. 

When we look at who is paying for it now, we heard objections 

to imposing taxes on those who create the mess. But now it is John 

Doe taxpayer who is paying this. In Fiscal Year 2005, it cost $1.24 

billion. In Fiscal Year 2006, it was the same thing and in Fiscal 

Year 2007, $1.260 billion. So it goes on. 

So the taxpayers are paying a heck of a price for the problems 

that others created, not to be that way. Cleanups under this Administration have plummeted from approximately 80 per year to 

40. Now, EPA estimates it will only cleanup 24 sites in 2007 and 

30 in 2008. 

It is unacceptable. Some witnesses on today’s second panel will 

detail how the Administration’s failure on Superfund has allowed 

cleanups in my State to languish. There are at least 15 toxic waste 

sites in New Jersey where people face uncontrolled exposure to contamination. Many of these sites pollute the ground and surface 

water that we rely on for drinking, swimming and fishing. I am 

pleased that this Subcommittee is now conducting real oversight of 

the way EPA runs the Superfund program to make sure that it 

puts public health, not polluter profits, first. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses, in addition to 

Ms. Bodine, particularly our witnesses with ties to my home State 

of New Jersey. Bradley Campbell is former Commissioner of New 

Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection, and Rena 

Steinzor is former Staff Counsel to New Jersey Representative and 

later Governor Jim Florio. Jim Florio was one of the authors of the 

Superfund program in 1980. It was done in a lame duck session 

and it was the best thing that came out of that session. At least 
11 

we understand the problems we have. Now, what we have to do is 

figure out a way to make them work more efficiently. 

So I thank all of the witnesses for being here, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Madam Chairman, thank you for holding today’s oversight hearing on the Superfund program—which the current Administration continues to neglect. 

My work to improve the Superfund program began in 1982. I got involved because 

New Jersey had the most Superfund sites of any State in the Nation. 

I believe in a pretty basic principle: Polluters—not everyday taxpayers—should 

pay for cleanups. 

But based on their actions, it appears that the Bush administration doesn’t share 

this priority. 

This is the first Administration to oppose reinstating the Superfund tax on the 

oil and chemical industries. 

Because of their opposition, taxpayers are paying to clean up the nation’s worst 

waste sites, rather than the industries that created these messes. 

Cleanups under this Administration have plummeted from approximately 80 per 

year to 40. Now EPA estimates it will only cleanup 24 sites in 2007—and 30 in 

2008. 

That’s unacceptable. 

Some witnesses on today’s second panel will detail how the Administration’s failure on Superfund has allowed cleanups in New Jersey to languish. 

There are at least 15 toxic waste sites in New Jersey where people face uncontrolled exposure to contamination. 

Many of these sites pollute the ground and surface water we rely on for drinking, 

swimming and fishing. 

I am pleased that this Subcommittee is now conducting real oversight of the way 

EPA runs the Superfund program, to make sure it puts public health—not polluter 

profits—first. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses—particularly our witnesses with 

ties to my home State of New Jersey: 

• Bradley Campbell, former Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of Environmental Protection; and 

• Rena Steinzor, a former staff counsel for New Jersey Representative and Governor Jim Florio. 

Thank you both for being here. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg. 

Now, we will turn to our first witness, Assistant Administrator, 

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of the EPA, Susan 

Bodine. 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Ms. BODINE. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members of the 

Subcommittee. I am Susan Parker Bodine, the Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk 

about EPA’s Superfund program and our efforts to protect human 

health and the environment from risks posed by toxic waste sites. 

I am going to briefly summarize the progress we are making, and 

I ask that my entire written statement be placed in the record. 

Senator CLINTON. Without objection. 

In December, the Superfund program will be 27 years old. During these 27 years, there has often been lively debate over how the 

program should be managed. But there has always been agreement 

on the goal of the program, to protect human health and the envi-
12 

ronment. I strongly believe in this goal and I know that achieving 

this goal is the deeply held mission of the more than 3,200 men 

and women who work in the Superfund program. 

I am extremely proud of what they have accomplished. To date, 

two-thirds of the sites listed on the national priority list have had 

cleanup construction completed. That is 1,030 sites, and 95 percent 

of the sites have had cleanup work performed. Our Superfund removal program has conducted more than 9,400 removal actions at 

more than 6,900 sites across the Country to address immediate 

risks to human health and the environment. 

And just this year, EPA employees made an additional 64 sites 

ready for reuse by making sure that the cleanup goals applicable 

to use of the land are met, and making sure that institutional controls that are needed are in place so members of the community 

don’t have to worry that their child’s day care center may have 

been a thermometer plant or their loft apartment may have been 

a former light bulb factory. 

We take our responsibility to the communities very seriously. 

The Superfund program has over 100 community involvement coordinators that work at each site with the local communities to provide information and help empower residents to become active participants in our Superfund cleanup decisions. Because we have 

learned from experience that involving the community improves 

the efficiency and the effectiveness of our cleanup remedies, particularly when we are getting information about choices with respect to future land use and with respect to institutional controls. 

We have also learned that by working with the community, we 

can design a cleanup that will create neighborhood assets. For example, at the Pacific Sound Resources site in Washington State, 

EPA worked with the local community, the State, the Port of Seattle, and the site owners to develop a cleanup remedy that not 

only protected human health and the environment, but also provided the Port of Seattle with the opportunity to expand their terminal facility, and it provided the community with property for a 

new waterfront park. 

Ironically, some of the most spirited criticism of the Superfund 

program is a result of over 20 years of progress. The current managers of the Superfund program are being criticized for no longer 

completing the construction of as many sites as in the 1990’s, but 

that has nothing to do with the management of the program and 

everything to do with the fact that over 1,200 sites were listed on 

the NPL before 1991. Of course, a large number of these sites completed remedy construction by 2000. In fact, the sites listed before 

1991 represent over 900 or 90 percent of our completed sites. 

What we are dealing with today are 284 sites that were listed 

before 1991 that did not get finished in the 1990’s. That is not because of any mismanagement on the part of the managers of the 

Superfund program at that time. It is because these are difficult 

sites. Generally, the sites that have been listed more recently, and 

this trend began in the 1990’s, they no longer include the small 

easy sites. Instead, EPA lists sites that the States can’t address 

under their State programs, and these tend to be more complex 

sites, sites with recalcitrant parties, or orphan sites. 
13 

Again, this is a shift that began under my predecessors, particularly Tim Fields, a good cooperative relationship with States, and 

that changes the profile of the sites that we are dealing with today 

because, of course, the Superfund process isn’t a 1-year or 2 year 

process. It goes through a series of stages. 

Now, the sites that are not complete have about 4.3 separate 

projects per site. While the sites that have been completed had on 

average about 1.8 separate projects per site. Again, if you look at 

the remaining sites, a large number of Federal facilities, and a 

large number are mega-sites, which are sites that we estimate to 

cost more than $50 million. In fact, those two categories together 

constitute about 40 percent of our remaining workload. 

In addition, we are continuing to do work at the 1,030 sites that 

are construction complete. We have to make sure that institutional 

controls are in place at those sites, and a lot of them have longterm response actions, particularly groundwater pump and treat 

actions that have to be managed. 

Now, one of the other criticisms we have heard is failure to list 

as many sites on the NPL. I can verify, yes, we no longer list as 

many sites as we used to. I already said that EPA listed more than 

1,200 sites before 1991. At the beginning of the program, we were 

dealing with 150 years of industrialization. Since then, the Congress has enacted the Resource Conservation Recovery Act to deal 

with hazardous waste management, preventing creation of new 

NPL sites. 

In addition, States have developed their own cleanup programs 

which can deal with the, again, the easier sites, the ones that are 

less contaminated. So the fact that we are not listing more sites on 

the NPL is not a sign of failure. It is a sign of success. 

I realize I have gone over, so I ask that my complete statement 

be in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bodine follows:] 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID

WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Good morning Madame Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Susan 

Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Thank you for the opportunity 

to appear today to discuss the Superfund program: the significant progress that has 

been made, the challenges that remain, and what EPA is doing to address those 

challenges. 

THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM SUPERFUND PROGRESS

The Superfund program was established under the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), which Congress passed in December 1980 to respond to concerns over Love Canal and other 

hazardous waste sites. 

As it approaches its 27th anniversary, the Superfund program has evolved into 

a program that is very successful in protecting human health and the environment. 

Through fiscal year 7, remedy construction was complete at 1,030 sites. In other 

words, two-thirds of all sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) have had 

cleanup construction completed and of the remaining sites not yet completed, the 

majority of sites have cleanup work underway. In addition, EPA has conducted more 

than 9,400 removals 

at more than 6,900 sites to address immediate threats to human health and the 

environment. Further, EPA’s long-term site management and post-construction efforts in fiscal year resulted in an additional 64 sites being made ready for anticipated use. My testimony will discuss both the process by which the Superfund pro-
14 

gram protects human health and the environment, as well as how the Superfund 

program has evolved over the years. 

Site Discovery, Screening, and Assessment 

The Superfund cleanup process begins with site discovery or notification to EPA 

of possible releases of hazardous substances. Sites are discovered by various parties, 

including citizens, but the majority of sites are referred to EPA by State agencies. 

Once discovered, sites are pre-screened. A majority of sites are screened out at this 

point because they pose little or no potential threat to human health or the environment. The remaining sites are entered into the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System (CERCLIS). Following preliminary assessment by EPA or its State, Tribal or other Federal partners, more 

sites are screened out. After the site assessment process, only approximately 2 percent of sites remain to be considered for potential listing on the NPL. Through fiscal 

year 7, more than 47,000 sites have been assessed (both removal and remedial program assessments), including final remedial assessment decisions at 39,766 sites 

(395 in 2007, exceeding our goal of 350). In addition to site assessment conducted 

under the Superfund program, more than 1000 sites are assessed each year under 

EPA’s Brownfields program. EPA assessed 2,139 sites under the Brownfields program in 2006, the most recent year for which data are 

available. 

Selection of Cleanup Program 

At its inception, the Superfund program was often the only program available to 

clean up a toxic waste site. That is no longer true. Accordingly, following site assessment, EPA and its State and Tribal partners identify the most appropriate program 

to address sites that require cleanup. This may be a State voluntary or enforcement 

program; it may be the RCRA corrective action program; it may be the Superfund 

removal program; it may be the Superfund remedial program either as a Superfund 

Alternative Site, or by listing on the NPL. Moreover, sites that meet certain statutory criteria are eligible for Federal Brownfields assistance. 

At sites that are addressed under the Superfund remedial program, the data developed from site assessment are used to evaluate a site under the Hazard Ranking 

System (HRS). Sites that score above 28.5 under this system are eligible for listing 

on the NPL. If listed on the NPL, a site becomes eligible for remedial funding. To 

date, EPA has listed 1,569 sites on the NPL. The vast majority of NPL sites (1,211) 

were listed before 1991. Fewer sites are considered by EPA for listing on the NPL 

than in the early days of the program. However, that result is not surprising given 

the development in the 1990’s of other programs, particularly State programs, to address site cleanup and shows the success of environmental programs nationwide. 

Currently, EPA proposes and finalizes sites on the NPL twice a year, generally 

in March and in September. In 2007, EPA finalized 12 sites on the NPL and proposed 17 sites. 

Remedy Selection at NPL Sites 

After listing, EPA or responsible parties (including other Federal agencies) usually need to conduct further investigation to determine the most appropriate remedy 

for the site (called the remedial investigation/feasibility study). Once a remedy has 

been selected, EPA or responsible parties with EPA oversight then design the remedial action. 

Remedy selection also has evolved over the years. In 1995, EPA issued a policy 

on how the Agency considers reasonably anticipated uses of the land when selecting 

a remedy. In implementing this policy, EPA works with the community, property 

owners, and local governments to identify what the reasonably anticipated use of 

the property may be. EPA also may provide funds for community involvement in 

the remedy selection process through Technical Assistance Grants. 

EPA’s community involvement programs help make the community valuable participants in the remedy selection process. By listening to the community’s needs and 

concerns, EPA often is able to tailor remedies to address them. For example, at the 

MacAlloy Superfund site in North Charleston, South Carolina, a residential community was located next to the industrial facilities that were being remediated. A developer was interested in redeveloping the site. To help preserve the community, 

EPA worked with the responsible party and the developer on an additional parcel 

of property that was not adjacent to the community, relocating industry away from 

an existing neighborhood. 
15 

Involvement in the remedy selection process also helps the community understand 

the tradeoffs associated with different remedy options and the basis for remedy decisions. For example, at the Department of Energy’s Feed Materials Production Center in Fernald, OH, the community was originally reluctant to support any remedy 

that allowed waste to be left in place. However, by creating a Fernald Citizens Advisory Board that was fully engaged in the remedy decision process, the community 

came to accept and strongly support the selected remedy, which pursued a ‘‘balanced 

approach,’’ allowing low-concentration materials to be contained in an onsite disposal facility, thereby reducing both the time and cost of cleanup. 

To ensure that remedies are cost-effective and are employing the most recent 

technologies, in 1996, EPA assembled a group of experts from both Headquarters 

and Regional offices to review the technical merits of high cost remedies. Currently, 

the Remedy Review Board reviews all remedies expected to have costs above $25 

million. This review normally takes place before a remedy is proposed. After a remedy is proposed and public comment is solicited, the remedy is documented in a 

Record of Decision (ROD). 

EPA has learned a great deal about how to clean up contaminated sites over the 

last 27 years. Beginning in 1996, EPA established a policy to improve cleanup effectiveness by reviewing earlier remedies. Through 2006, EPA has updated more than 

700 remedies, improving both remedy effectiveness and reducing cost. 

In particular, EPA has learned a great deal about how to address groundwater 

contamination. Originally, EPA installed groundwater pumping and treatment operations at nearly every groundwater contamination site. However, over time, the 

Agency learned that pumping and treating was not always needed and that monitored natural attenuation also could achieve groundwater restoration goals. EPA 

clarified its policy on monitored natural attenuation in 1999. This policy clarification 

resolved remedy issues at a number of sites and allowed 42 sites to be considered 

construction complete between 1999 and 2000. EPA also realized that already installed groundwater pumping and treating operations were not always operating as 

expected. Beginning in 2000, EPA began focusing on optimizing groundwater remedies. In some cases, optimization involves adding or moving extraction wells to 

more effectively capture the contaminated plume. In other cases, optimization involves turning off a pumping and treatment operation because the contamination 

is naturally attenuating. EPA has optimized more than 50 Superfund-financed 

groundwater remedies and anticipates optimizing at least four more in 2008. 

Remedy Construction 

Once a remedy design is complete, EPA or the responsible parties with EPA oversight construct the remedy. In 1993, to measure interim progress of the Superfund 

program, EPA began tracking the number of sites where all remedy construction 

was complete. Currently, remedy construction has been completed at 1030 sites (66 

percent of the NPL), and is underway at an additional 318 sites (20 percent of the 

NPL). A site generally is considered construction complete when all the remedies 

at the site are operational and functional. 

At some sites, remedy construction has been underway for a great deal of time. 

In fact, of the 535 sites on the NPL where remedy construction is not complete (an 

additional four sites were differed to other programs), 284 have been on the NPL 

since before 1991. This does not mean that EPA had been neglecting these sites. 

It simply means that some sites present a greater cleanup challenge than others, 

often due to the size or complexity of the sites. 

In 1999, as part of a Resources for the Future study of the Superfund program, 

EPA characterized non-Federal facility Superfund sites as either ‘‘mega-sites’’ or 

nonmega-sites. A mega-site is a site that is expected to cost over $50 million to remediate. EPA has added this term to its Superfund data base, to help track the 

number of mega-sites. To date, 154 non-Federal facility sites have been identified 

as actual or potential non-Federal facility ‘‘mega-sites.’’ Of these, 26 achieved construction completion in the 1990’s, 30 have achieved construction completion since 

2000. 

Sites owned by the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy also frequently present significant cleanup challenges. To date, there are 172 Federal Facility sites on the NPL. Of these, 22 achieved construction completion in the 1990’s 

and 37 achieved construction completion since 2000. 

Given the challenges posed by ‘‘mega-sites’’ and Federal facilities, it is not surprising that remedy construction work remains at many of these sites. To date, of 

the sites that have all remedy construction completed, only 11 percent were ‘‘megasites’’ or Federal facilities. However, of the 535 NPL sites with construction work 

remaining, 39 percent are either ‘‘mega-sites’’ or Federal Facilities. 
16 

Addressing Immediate Risks 

Although completing remedy construction at large, complex, sites may take many 

years, the first step at each site is to address immediate risks. This is done through 

the EPA Removal program. For example, EPA has provided alternative water supplies to more than 2 million people so they are not drinking or using contaminated 

water. To date, the Removal program has conducted more than 9,400 removals at 

more than 6,900 sites (including 413 removals in fiscal year 7). Of these, more than 

2,400 have occurred at NPL sites. In fact, EPA has carried out removal actions at 

56 percent of the sites on the NPL, including 142 removals at NPL sites not yet 

in the long-term construction phase. This means that 95 percent of NPL sites have 

had either removal or remedial cleanup work. For example, EPA did not wait to list 

the Omaha Lead site in Nebraska on the NPL before taking action to reduce the 

risk posed to residential communities. EPA started cleanup work in 1999 using 

Superfund Removal authorities. The site was listed on the NPL in 2003, and using 

an expedited interim remedy process, EPA has completed cleanups of more than 

3,500 residential yards through the end of fiscal year 7. Similarly, in 1999, EPA 

began removal actions in Libby, Montana. The Libby site was listed in 2002, and 

a final remedy has not yet been selected. However, EPA has been and continues to 

be actively working in Libby to reduce asbestos exposure. To date, EPA has carried 

out removal activities at 951 properties in and around Libby and has removed more 

than 500,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil. 

Post-Construction Completion Strategy 

With so many sites now at the construction completion stage, the Superfund program also must focus attention and resources to address post-construction activities 

to ensure that remedies remain protective over the long term and sites can be returned to productive use. 

In October 2005, EPA published its Post Construction Completion Strategy. The 

strategy was developed to improve site operations and maintenance, remedy performance tracking, institutional control (IC) implementation and tracking, and reducing barriers to beneficial site reuse. Under this strategy, EPA is ensuring that 

5-year reviews are completed and any discrepancies identified in the reviews are 

acted upon. EPA also is developing an Institutional Control Tracking System to document and make public the institutional controls that are needed to ensure longterm protectiveness. Site-specific information on ICs will be available on the EPA 

web site, including contacts to obtain additional information and a link to the IC 

instrument. 

In fiscal year 7, the Superfund program adopted a new measure to capture site 

progress beyond the construction completion milestone: Site-Wide Ready for Anticipated Use. This measure tracks the number of NPL sites where the remedy is constructed (construction complete), cleanup goals for anticipated uses of the land have 

been met, and any necessary institutional controls are in place. EPA exceeded its 

fiscal year goal of making 30 Superfund sites ready for anticipated use by achieving 

this milestone at 64 sites. 

Enforcement 

EPA also has been very successful in leveraging Federal dollars to secure private 

party cleanups. EPA conducts searches for responsible parties throughout the response process and takes action to ensure cleanup work is conducted or paid for by 

those responsible parties, rather than by EPA using appropriated dollars. Potentially responsible parties (PRPs) have performed work at approximately 70 percent 

of Superfund site cleanups. 

Since 2001, EPA secured commitments (through fiscal year 6) from responsible 

parties to carry out cleanups and reimburse EPA for past costs worth nearly $6 billion. The cumulative value of private party cleanup commitments and cost recovery 

settlements (through fiscal year 6) is more than $25 billion. EPA’s enforcement efforts have allowed the Agency to focus the Agency’s appropriated funds on sites 

where responsible parties cannot be identified or are unable to pay for or conduct 

the cleanup. 

Superfund enforcement also has evolved over the years. In the early years of the 

program, most cleanup work was carried out by EPA, using appropriated funding 

and then seeking cost recovery. To leverage Federal funding and increase the number of sites being cleaned up, EPA adopted an ‘‘enforcement first’’ policy in 1991 to 

require PRPs to perform cleanups. As a result, more work is being done with responsible party resources up front, and EPA therefore needs to recover a smaller 
17 

proportion of cleanup costs. PRP resources represent a greater proportion of cleanup 

than in the early years of the program. This includes work carried out by EPA using 

responsible party dollars, as well as work carried out by responsible parties themselves. 

In the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, Congress added a provision which allows 

EPA to retain and use funds received in settlement with responsible parties in sitespecific accounts. The principal and any interest earned by these ‘‘special accounts’’ 

may be used to fund response actions at the site where the settlement dollars were 

received. 

When the Agency uses funds from a special account it allows the Agency to use 

its appropriated funding for cleanup at other sites were there are no viable or liable 

parties. To date, EPA has spent more than $1 billion from special accounts to fund 

cleanup actions and anticipates spending millions more to clean up sites where responsible parties have deposited funds for site-specific cleanups. 

EPA’s enforcement tools also have evolved into significant tools to advance revitalization of Superfund sites, including encouraging private sector cleanup and development. At the Many Diversified Interests (‘‘MDI’’) site, a 36 acre former foundry 

facility listed on the NPL, EPA, working with the site’s Bankruptcy Trustee, developed a proposed administrative settlement document which the Trustee published 

along with a request for bids to purchase the property. The effort to solicit bids for 

acquisition was successful, with the understanding that the winning bidder would 

undertake the cleanup remedy selected in EPA’s Record of Decision (ROD), and, in 

return receive covenants not to sue for existing contamination. The site was purchased by a developer who agreed to perform the selected remedy. Today, the site 

is being cleaned up and its ultimate use will be development of a town house community. 

Financial Management 

EPA is undertaking a number of actions to ensure that Superfund resources are 

not expended on unnecessary activities and are available to carry out site cleanup 

work. For example, EPA has: 

• Initiated a workforce analysis to determine if staff resources should be reallocated; • Started benchmarking studies of EPA performance; • Shared best practices among the EPA regions; • Aggressively deobligated funds from old contracts, grants, cooperative agree- ments and interagency agreements, resulting in approximately $740 million in additional resources for the program through fiscal year 6; • Utilized special account resources from PRP settlement agreements. 

These efforts are, in part, a result of several studies, including an internal review 

of the Superfund program, known as the 120-Day Study, which identified opportunities for the Agency to put its resources to better use. 

In addition, to help EPA manage its funding decisions in a risk-based manner, 

sites that are ready to begin construction and will be paid for using EPA’s resources 

are subject to a rigorous prioritization process. EPA’s National Risk-Based Priority 

Panel reviews new cleanup construction projects as they become ready for EPA 

funding. The panel prioritizes the projects based on three factors: protection of 

human health, protection from significant environmental threats, and potential 

threats based upon site conditions at the time of review. A number of factors are 

then used to weigh funding priorities among the sites including: human exposure 

risk, contaminant characteristics and stability, significant environmental risk, and 

program management considerations. The panel is composed of national EPA Superfund program experts from both regional and Headquarters offices. In fiscal year 7, 

EPA funded all new cleanup construction projects that were ready for construction 

funding. 

Public Information 

Over the last several years, EPA has greatly expanded the amount of information 

available to the general public regarding Superfund sites. For example, beginning 

in 2002, to more accurately reflect the environmental outcomes of the Superfund 

program, EPA began tracking the sites where a complete human exposure pathway 

to contaminants above levels of concern has been eliminated, as well as sites where 

migration of groundwater contamination has been controlled. 

The list of sites where human exposure is not under control is dynamic. Over 

time, sites are removed and new sites are added, depending on changed site conditions or new information. The Superfund program has made it a priority to improve 
18 

the quality of the data supporting this environmental indicator so that it can be 

used to prioritize and manage the program. EPA has posted a description of the exposure scenario on the Superfund Site Profiles web site, along with actions that are 

planned or underway to address the situation. This has been done to ensure that 

the public has access to current information regarding the human exposure status 

at each Superfund site that is listed as human exposure not under control. For each 

site where the Agency is still gathering data to make a human exposure decision 

(i.e., insufficient information to make a human exposure determination), EPA has 

posted on that site the reasons for the insufficient data determination, along with 

the actions planned or underway to gather the necessary data. 

In addition to the exposure information described above, EPA has enhanced the 

availability of information regarding Superfund sites in the following ways: 

• Extensive information about all Superfund sites is available in site profiles 

which are typically updated each month on EPA’s web site; 

• EPA’s community involvement coordinators regularly communicate site information to community members who live near Superfund sites through public meetings, mailings, and published notices; 

• On its Superfund web site, EPA posts Records of Decision (RODs) and other key 

decision documents [ROD Amendments, Explanation of Significant Differences 

(ESD)] for NPL sites. More than 3,300 Superfund program documents are currently 

available on the web site; 

• EPA has added information from its Institutional Control Tracking System to 

Superfund site profiles. This information provides the public with the status of a 

site’s institutional controls (IC), including whether an IC is needed and what (legal) 

mechanism(s) will be used to implement the IC; 

• To reach an even broader audience, EPA has been working with data providers 

such as Microsoft, Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), and Google to 

develop the necessary links to allow these companies to access EPA site information 

and overlay it on maps and other geospatial displays (such as Google Earth). 

LAND REVITALIZATION

The land revitalization initiative, launched in April 2003, includes all of EPA’s 

cleanup programs as well as partners at all levels of government and in the private 

and non-profit sectors. The goal of land revitalization is to restore our nation’s contaminated land resources and enable America’s communities to safely return these 

properties tobeneficial economic, ecological, and societal uses. EPA is ensuring that 

cleanup programs protect public health, welfare, and the environment and also that 

the anticipated future uses of these lands are fully considered in cleanup decisions. 

EPA helps facilitate opportunities for integrating cleanup and reuse. Promoting 

community-driven site reuse planning and reuse is another way EPA can help to 

ensure protective and sustainable cleanups. EPA has supported privatization efforts 

recently undertaken at two Federal facilities on the NPL. At Department of Defense 

(DoD) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) sites, EPA recognizes that the privatization of the cleanup, where a developer or other organization rather than the military conducts the cleanup, can present an opportunity to integrate redevelopment 

planning with cleanup. The first such privatization occurred on August 27, 2007 at 

the McClellan Air Force Base, California. The second is expected to occur later this 

fall at Ft. Ord, CA. Privatizing cleanups at closing military Superfund sites provides 

another option to Federal and State agencies and local communities to help maximize cleanup and redevelopment resources to help move properties back into productive reuse more quickly. 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

EPA’s emergency response activities are another facet of the Superfund program. 

The Emergency Response program provides national leadership to prevent, prepare 

for, and respond to human health and environmental emergencies, including terrorist events. Through FEMA funding, EPA’s Emergency Response program was actively involved in the response to the events of 9/11 and in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Although EPA was not involved in incidents of that magnitude this year, EPA’s 

Emergency Response program was actively involved in responses and cleanups 

throughout the country, such as the tornado disaster in Greensburg, KS, and the 

Synthron Chemical plant explosion and fire in Morganton, N.C. 
19 

CONCLUSION

The Bush administration is fully committed to Superfund’s mission, protecting 

human health and the environment by cleaning up our Nation’s worst toxic waste 

sites. The Superfund program has produced significant accomplishments and EPA 

is continuing its efforts to manage the program efficiently and effectively in order 

to protect human health and the environment, and provide opportunities for reuse 

and redevelopment to communities across the country. 

RESPONSES BY SUSAN PARKER BODINE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. EPA has slowed or not conducted cleanups due to funding considerations for several years. Looking at the past 5 fiscal years, how did EPA determine 

which contaminated sites to slow down or not cleanup due to funding issues? 

Response. I want to assure you of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA’s) continuing commitment to clean up sites that pose risks to human health 

and the environment. The appropriated funding levels for the Superfund program 

have remained steady over the past five fiscal years, between $1.2 and $1.3 billion 

dollars. Moreover, EPA supplements its annual appropriated funding with resources 

deobligated from prior fiscal year contracts, settlements with responsible parties, 

and State cost share contributions. There has not been a significant decrease in 

Superfund cleanup work. Superfund construction work has remained relatively 

steady over the years; however, work is now concentrated on more costly, complex 

sites. While there have been years in the past five fiscal years that EPA did not 

fund all of the new site construction projects ready for construction, we are pleased 

to report that in fiscal year 2007, EPA funded all new construction projects that 

were ready for funding, therefore, there is no backlog of unfunded Superfund site 

construction projects. 

EPA prioritizes funding for Superfund construction projects in the following manner: the highest priority is given to funding emergencies which pose immediate 

threats to human health or the environment. The next priority is for ongoing construction actions that have already begun and require additional resources. Ongoing 

actions receive a high priority for funding for several reasons: Once an action is 

started, the best management practice is to complete it so contamination is not left 

exposed or allowed to re-contaminate an areas; and, significant additional costs 

could be incurred if these projects were to be shut down in the middle of cleanup 

construction. 

After emergencies and ongoing construction actions are funded, EPA looks to fund 

new construction projects. New construction projects are ranked according to the 

risk-based criteria established through EPA’s National Risk-Based Priority Panel 

evaluation process (http://epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrbpp/index.htm). In addition, 

EPA considers the timing of when a project is ready to begin as well as EPA’s goals 

under the Government Performance and Results Act. 

Question 2. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2007 released an investigation of EPA’s public notification efforts at sites that received asbestos-contaminated material from Libby, Montana. GAO concluded, ‘‘The extent and effectiveness of EPA’s [public] notification efforts varied across the 13 states for which EPA 

had lead responsibility to conduct cleanups. . . At 8 of the sites, EPA regional offices did not implement key public-notification provisions of the NCP. . . [Although 

EPA’s public-notification guidance strongly emphasizes that meeting NCP provisions 

is often insufficient to meet community needs for public notification, EPA officials 

did not conduct notification activities beyond those provisions at 4 sites in EPA region 9.’’ Two of these four sites are located in California, in the towns of Glendale 

and Newark. 

Describe why EPA failed to conduct any recommended notification activities at 

sites in California, including Glendale and Honolulu, Hawaii, and Phoenix, Arizona. 

Response. EPA did not fail to conduct notification activities. EPA relies on the discretion afforded in the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to make case-by-case decisions on whether to exceed required public notification and outreach activities. The 

referenced sites in Glendale CA, Honolulu HA, and Phoenix AZ, are discussed 

below. 

The sites in California, Hawaii, and Arizona were all conducted as time critical 

Responsible Party (RP) lead removals under an Administrative Order on Consent. 

The removal actions were small in scope and in each case the RP was willing to 

conduct the response action. The EPA OnScene Coordinator (OSC) provided Federal 

oversight and was the designated spokesperson for the site. The OSC interacted 
20 

with the industrial site occupants and owners. A repository for local information 

was established at local libraries. An Administrative Record was established and updated up onsite completion. Public notice was made at the start of the removal per 

the NCP when the Administrative Record was received by the repositories (Region 

9 Superfund Records Center and local Library). Also, public notices were made in 

the local press (Glendale NewsPress, The Argus, Honolulu Advertiser and Arizona 

Business Gazette). A public comment period was held for 30 days and for each of 

these sites no public comments were received. The State Health Departments were 

all notified at the time of the site assessments. 

EPA is committed to its mission of protecting human health and the environment 

and recognizes that it is important to communicate with the community and State 

and local government officials regarding cleanups in their areas. EPA always strives 

to inform the public on human health and environmental impacts associated with 

an EPA cleanup activity. EPA is reviewing carefully the findings of the GAO report 

and considering the lessons learned from the responses of State and local government officials and community focus groups. 

Question 3. Explain the reason that EPA rejected each of the recommended actions at the ten other sites located in Dearborn, Michigan, Denver, Colorado, Great 

Falls, Montana, Hamilton Township, New Jersey, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Minot, 

North Dakota, Salt Lake City, Utah (Intermountain Insulation and Vermiculite 

Intermountain), and Wilder, Kentucky. 

Response. EPA does not believe it rejected actions recommended in the GAO report. EPA continually strives to provide the public with early and meaningful opportunities for involvement in cleanup decisions. In doing so, we comply with the public 

outreach requirements under the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 

EPA understands that it is important to communicate with the community and 

State and local Government officials regarding cleanups in their areas. Sections of 

the National Contingency Plan (NCP) are specifically designed to allow rapid action 

by EPA responders when there is an urgent threat to human health and the environment. Included in the NCP are requirements for public notification and outreach. 

The ten sites referenced in your question varied greatly in scope of cleanup which 

can have a significant impact on the type and extent of public outreach efforts. For 

example, the Great Falls, MT site in Region 8 was a single residence where a former 

worker at an exfoliation plant had taken asbestos wastes and placed them in the 

driveway. For this site, EPA chose to meet with State and local officials and with 

neighbors in the near vicinity rather than distributing fact sheets and holding public meetings. 

Conversely, the Region 5 site in Minneapolis, MN involved hundreds of residences 

where residents had taken home contaminated ‘‘free crushed rock’’ from the exfoliation plant. Region 5 provided extensive outreach in identifying those contaminated 

properties and communicating with hundreds of potentially affected homeowners. 

The Dearborn, MI site in Region 5 which involved sampling of hundreds of homes 

also resulted in extensive community outreach. The Hamilton Township Site in EPA 

Region 2 is an example where, due to growing public interest, community outreach 

was increased after Phase I activities at the site. The Region prepared and distributed fact sheets and provided information to residents, businesses, local and State 

officials, interested stakeholders and the press to keep them fully informed of all 

sampling activities. In addition, the EPA On-Scene-Coordinators (OSCs) visited 

many residents to talk about the ‘‘Off—Site Sampling’’ and local businesses to discuss the Phase II removal action. 

Question 4. Describe what steps EPA has taken since the GAO report was issued 

to improve its public notification activities at the sites listed above? 

Response. Work at the sites listed above had been completed prior to the issuance 

of the GAO report. It should be noted that these cleanups were all conducted as 

‘‘time-critical removal actions,’’ where the threat to public health was determined to 

be urgent and cleanups were initiated and completed quickly. EPA OSCs and, in 

some cases, Community Involvement Coordinators remain available to the public to 

answer questions onsite actions. EPA may conduct additional public notification and 

outreach activities should there be a need for follow—up site activities. 

Question 5. Describe what analysis EPA has done of the public notification activities at other sites that may have received asbestos-contaminated material from 

Libby, Montana. Please describe the site, type of analysis, and EPA’s conclusion regarding the adequacy of notification. 

Response. In response to the multi-phase GAO review leading to the issuance of 

the report, ‘‘EPA May Need to Reassess Sites Receiving Asbestos-Contaminated Ore 

from Libby, Montana and Should Improve Its Public Notification Process’’ (GAO— 

08—71), EPA headquarters and regional offices reviewed available site-specific in-
21 

formation on the GAO list of271 vermiculite sites. Based on best available information, EPA reviewed GAO data (or provided data) on facility location, type of facility, 

tonnages of venniculite received and EPA actions. The review was helpful in establishing a current baseline of site activities including activities at sites not specifically addressed by the GAO report. For instance, Region 2 visited 24 sites and developed reference fact sheets documenting EPA activities for each of these sites. Of 

these Region 2 sites, only the Hamilton Township, NJ site investigation resulted in 

the need for a time critical removal action. Public notification and outreach activities at the Hamilton Township, NJ site are well—documented in the GAO report 

and supporting regional submissions. EPA complies with the public notification and 

outreach requirements under the National Contingency Plan (NCP). Should any 

new sites be identified that require cleanups, EPA will be diligent to follow all NCP 

requirements for public notification. 

Question 6. Has EPA conducted additional sampling and testing using modern 

methodologies at other sites to determine if the agency should take additional cleanup actions now, rather than to wait until after 2010 when the agency is scheduled 

to complete studies on asbestos’ risk? If so, please list the sites, the results of the 

sampling, and any additional cleanup or notification actions planned by EPA. 

Response. Due to the concern for public health risk associated with asbestos exposure, EPA is not waiting for more definitive tests on asbestos toxicity to be completed in 2010. Rather, since empirical data strongly relates asbestos exposure to 

increased risk of cancer and plural disease, EPA is aggressively proceeding with site 

investigations using appropriate and best available techniques and science. Further, 

EPA is gathering data that, although not currently used in risk evaluation per the 

Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), may be useful for the updated risk 

model. Specifically, EPA is enumerating the full body of asbestos structure size fractions. Doing so should allow for improved risk calculations. 

The Asbestos Committee of the EPA led Technical Review Workgroup supports 

and promotes consistent application of the best science in the field of risk assessment for asbestos at contaminated sites nationwide. The asbestos committee provides site consultation in support of regional requests and develops technical guidance. It has developed a draft guidance document, ‘‘Framework for Investigating Asbestos-Contaminated Superfund Sites’’ currently in draft and undergoing external 

peer review. The draft document provides (l) a recommended flexible framework for 

investigating and evaluating asbestos contamination that can be used for removal 

and remedial actions within the Superfund program, and (2) detailed recommended 

standard operating procedures (SOPs) for collecting data on the nature and extent 

of asbestos contamination at Superfund sites. The draft Framework discusses specific strategies and methods that are based on the best available science for characterizing exposure and risk from asbestos. Activities at the below mentioned sites 

helped inform development of the draft Framework. 

The following are examples of sites where best available sampling and testing 

techniques (e.g., activity-based-sampling) have been applied or are planned: 

• N-Forcer (Dearborn, MI): Asbestos was detected at levels of concern. In 2005 

contaminated soil was removed to a depth of 18 inches, an impermeable barrier was 

installed, and the site was backfilled to prevent exposure. No additional cleanup or 

notification actions are planned. 

• Vermiculite NW Inc (Spokane, WA): In 2000 and 2001, EPA determined that 

there was asbestos contamination in the soil and that it could become airborne if 

disturbed. In 2004, EPA turned the site over to the State of Washington for oversight of the cleanup activities under the Model Toxics Control Act Voluntary Cleanup Program. No further actions are planned by EPA. 

• Intermountain Insulation (Salt Lake City, UT): EPA sampling results showed 

unacceptable levels of asbestos in the air. EPA completed a removal action at the 

site in 2004. No additional actions are planned by EPA. 

• Vermiculite NW, Inc (Portland, OR): EPA testing showed unacceptable levels of 

asbestos in soil and in the former processing building. The responsible party cleaned 

the soil and the building with EPA oversight. No further action is planned. 

• Big Tex Grain (formerly Texas Vermiculite/WR Grace) San Antonio, TX: EPA 

testing indicated unacceptable levels of asbestos in the soil, in the processing building, and in the air monitoring onsite. Activity based sampling has started. Pending 

the results of the sampling a removal may be done on the property. 

• EPA is planning a site assessment at the Zonolite Co/WR Grace in New Orleans, LA. This site is located at 4729 River Road and the assessment is planned for 

the summer of 2008. 

Question 7. Does EPA have any plan to conduct additional sampling and testing 

at other sites to determine if the agency should take additional cleanup actions not, 
22 

rather than waiting until after 2010 when the agency is scheduled to complete studies’ on asbestos’ risks? If so, please describe the plan, including specific actions, 

timeline, and anticipated funding needs. 

Response. EPA is not waiting until the results of further studies to conduct additional sampling and testing, including possible cleanup activities at sites where asbestos-contaminated Libby vermiculite may be present. EPA is committed to protecting communities from hazards associated with asbestos contamination. EPA 

agrees that, more sensitive-risk-based sampling methods have been developed and 

we have experience using these methods. We have developed procedures for conducting activity-based sampling, which allow us to better measure human exposure. 

These procedures and a decision making framework for assessing asbestos—contaminated sites are described in a draft report titled, ‘‘Framework for Investigating 

Asbestos—Contaminated Superfund Sites’’. 

We agree it would be prudent to take another look at the completed site assessments to determine whether some of the previously assessed sites may benefit from 

a reassessment. EPA is currently developing a strategy (in Fiscal Year 2008) to reassess, as necessary, and prioritize these sites. 

In addition to the planned activities described in our answer to question 3A and 

with regard to sampling and testing at specific sites—EPA has approved an Action 

Memorandum to conduct a time critical removal at a site in Ellwood City, PA. EPA 

Region III does not plan to conduct any additional sampling or testing using activity-based sampling at the site given that cleanup actions are scheduled to begin in 

May, 2008. 

Question 8. Describe the number of workers potentially exposed to dangerous levels of asbestos at the 271 sites described in the 2007 GAO report. 

Response. See combined answer for questions 9 and 10 below. 

Question 9. Describe the number of people, including the number of children, who 

may have been exposed to dangerous levels of asbestos at the 271 sites described 

in the 2007 GAO report. 

Response. EPA does not currently have information on numbers of people who 

may have been exposed at the 271 sites described in the GAO report. However, 

there is an ongoing project of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

(ATSDR) whic1:l is producing this kind of information for selected sites. ATSDR is 

working with other Federal, state, and local environmental and public health agencies to evaluate public health impacts at 28 sites that processed Libby vermiculite. 

The evaluations focus on the processing sites and on human health effects that 

might be associated with possible past or current exposures. For each site evaluated, 

ATSDR is issuing a report, known as a health consultation. These reports generally 

include a description of the numbers of workers and other populations that may 

have been exposed to asbestos at these sites. 

ATSDR posted the health consultation reports for the 28 sites on the Internet at 

http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/sites/national—map/. ATSDR is evaluating the 

sites that processed Libby vermiculite by (1) identifying ways that people could have 

been exposed to asbestos in the past or ways that people could be exposed now, and 

(2) determining whether the exposures represent a public health hazard. ATSDR 

will use the information gained from the site-specific investigations to recommend 

further public health actions as needed. 

EPA encourages local, state, and Federal public health agencies to launch outreach efforts to locate and assist former workers and other highly exposed individuals. 

Question 10. Describe the number of people who live within one mile of the 19 

sites that the 2007 GAO report discusses. 

Using facility site address information, Census data, GIS tools and information 

in the draft ATSDR Summary Report mentioned above, EPA developed the table 

below describing the number of people estimated to live within one mile of the 19 

sites discussed in the GAO report. 
23 

EPA FacUity Facifity Name P6pUlation 

~on Location dUri .. u! V~l'mieulittl within 1 mite 

ProcessiDg radius-

, ~&~,C~~ 

1 ~th~, ZQ$lit\tCoJWRG 2,312 

MA. 

2 H~n Zonolife Co.JWRG . 8,200 

Towmbip,NJ 

3 New Castle, P A WRGrace 2070 

4 Wilder,KY Z~/Co.IWW 9~22 

5 Dearbom,MI ~~Ii~ ~JWltG 31,138 . 5 Minneapolis, MN Western Minerals 21,125 

Products Co, 

8 Denver, CO Western Mineral 15,374 

Pt~ctsCo, 

8 Great Fitlls, MT NlA (private 5,459 

residence) 

8 Mioot,ND Robinson Insulation 6,481 

Co, 

8 $alt Lake Cit)', Infe~0l'Intain 11,4% 

'lIT htsu:latlon 

8 SaIt take:City, . Venniculite 12;238 

UT Intermountain 

9 Glendale,AZ Ari·~'OOOl'ite Co, 18,'7'6S 

9 Phoenix, AZ WRG 18,411 

9 Glendale, CA . California 28,011 

_. ZonoliteIWRG 

9 Newark,CA \V"RG 8,972 

9 Honolulu. HI Verrniculite of 15,883 

Hawaii 

10 Portland, OR Vermiculite NW, 11,189 

Im:./WRG , 10 Pl'Iii1and, OR ~lteC'o. 652 

10 Spokane, "tvA Ve . 1te NW, 15,604 

f-- !nc./WRG 

Total: 242,505 
24 

Question 11. Describe the date that EPA first learned that substances containing 

less than 1 percent asbestos, including areas that received asbestos-contaminated 

material from Libby, Montana and products made of such material, could present 

a threat to human health. Please provide all relevant records that demonstrate EPA 

had such information. 

Response. Asbestos-related risk and human health effects are measured in terms 

of airborne fibers, that is, the number of fibers released into the air that could be 

contained in the breathing zone. Measurements of fibers are made using electron 

microscopy. Bulk measurement, such as the 1 percent (1 percent) threshold, is not 

a health based measurement. Rather, it measures the amount of asbestos contained 

in materials in a bulk state. 

The 1 percent asbestos threshold is a Clean Air Act regulatory criterion used for 

asbestos-containing material (ACM) as defined in Subpart M of the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). EPA issued a Superfund 

program memorandum on August 10,2004 that indicated the 1 percent threshold 

may not be reliable for assessing potential human health risk from asbestos contaminated soils at hazardous waste sites and that a risk-based, site specific, action 

level was more appropriate when evaluating response actions for asbestos. 

With respect to the tremolite asbestos contamination of vermiculite, EPA first 

learned in 2001 that W.R. Grace, owner and operator of the Libby Montana 

vermiculite mining operations, had tested its vermiculite attic insulation in the late 

1970’s and found that it released six times the OSHA permitted level at the time. 

Subsequent to these findings, discussions during the EPA conference, ‘‘EPA’s Asbestos Site Evaluation, Communication, and Cleanup Workshop, Keystone, Colorado’’ 

held September 23—26, 2003 helped to drive the decision to issue the August 

10,2004 memorandum ‘‘Clarifying Cleanup Goals and Identification ofNew Assessment Tools for Evaluating Asbestos at Superfund Cleanups’’ (OSWER Directive 

9345.4-see attached). This 2004 memorandum directed that Regions should, ‘‘develop risk-based, site-specific action levels to determine if response actions should 

be taken when materials containing less than 1 percent asbestos. . . are found on 

a site.’’ 

Question 12. Describe the actions, other than those discussed in the 2007 GAO 

report, which EPA took to alert the public about the potential health threats in 

areas that received asbestos-contaminated material from Libby, MT. 

Response. In its report, GAO was asked to determine the extent and effectiveness 

ofEPA public notification efforts about cleanups at sites that received Libby ore. The 

focus of the GAO review on public notification efforts covered the 13 sites where 

EPA conducted removal actions. GAO research was extensive in documenting its assessment of EPA’s public notification and outreach efforts. However, there were 

many actions taken by EPA that were not specifically discussed in the GAO report. 

EPA Headquarters and regional offices maintain web sites with updated information on asbestos, potential health threats and the status of activities in Libby, MT 

and other asbestos-contaminated vermiculite sites. Also, many of the detailed 

records of EPA interaction with the public, State and local officials onsite assessments and activities by EPA at vermiculite sites are available at Regional Superfund Records Centers. 

For example, the On-Scene-Coordinators for the Western Minerals (including 

Gluek Park) site in Minneapolis, MN, and the N-forcer site in Dearborn, MI established websites on EPAOSC.net for public viewing that include site cleanup details/ 

progress, public meeting information, site fact sheets, flyers, news releases, sampling plans, sampling results, maps, and health consultation reports. 

More recently, several public meetings have been conducted in San Antonio, Texas 

for the Big Tex Grain Site. The last meeting was held in January 2008. The public 

was notified of this meeting via a mailed flyer. The results of sampling studies were 

discussed, as well as, the plans for further sampling and potential cleanup actions. 

EPA Region 3 is conducting public notification activities at the Ellwood City, 

Pennsylvania site consistent with the requirements of the NCP including the designation of a spokesperson, establishment ofAdministrative Record, notification of 

the Administrative Record with a public comment period, as well as a fact sheet to 

be delivered to the surrounding community. 

Question 13. Describe the actions that EPA has taken or plans to take to alert 

the public to the potential health threats posed by products made from asbestos-contaminated materials from Libby, Montana. Please provide all relevant records that 

demonstrate EPA actually took such actions or plans to take such action. For any 

future activity, provide a timeline describing the steps that EPA plans to take. 

Response. In May 2003, EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 

Registry (ATSDR) co-authored the consumer outreach brochure, Current Best Prac-
25 

tices for Vermiculite Attic Insulation. In addition, EPA worked cooperatively with 

home improvement centers (Lowes, Home Depot, and Sears) to assist in our effort 

to educate consumers about concerns relating to vermiculite attic insulation. EPA’s 

website provides information largely taken from the outreach brochure, including information about asbestos and how it may affect health; products and areas in the 

home where asbestos may be found; how to identify materials that may contain asbestos; how to manage and address asbestos; do’s and don’ts for homeowners; how 

to find and work with an asbestos professional; and references to additional information. Please see: www.epa.gov/asbestos. 

On May 21, 2003, EPA and ATSDR held a press briefing announcing the EPAATSDR public awareness campaign on vermiculite attic insulation which may contain asbestos. An EPA press release was also issued that day. Additionally, the 

EPA’s Regional offices helped inform State agencies about the issue and provided 

extensive information. Most, if not all states have vermiculite information on their 

appropriate State agency websites. 

In addition to posting information regarding asbestos and vermiculite attic insulation (VAI) on the EPA website, the Agency conducted an extensive outreach effort 

to the major home improvement stores including, Sears, Home Depot and Lowes. 

Beginning in 2003, Sears displayed the VAI brochure in the information kiosks of 

most Sears stores nationwide. However, Sears later went through a major reorganization in their stores where all of the information kiosks were removed, along 

with our brochures. Home Depot decided not to display the brochure in their stores 

due to stocking issues and display placement issues, but did agree to link their 

website to the EPA’s VAl website. Lowes made a similar decision and agreed to 

work with their partner, the Home Safety Council, to display EPA’s information on 

their website. http://www.homesafetycouncil.org/safety guide/sg poison w003.aspx. 

EPA also conducted an extensive mailing to various associations and organizations, including home building and repair magazines, newsletters, and a number of 

home and garden television shows, to share information about VAL The Agency sent 

approximately 60 letters as part of its outreach efforts to provide information on asbestos and vermiculite attic insulation. 

RESPONSES BY SUSAN PARKER BODINE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Do you agree with the conclusions of the report authored by Professor 

Steinzor ‘‘The Toll of Superfund Neglect?’’ 

Response. EPA does not agree with Professor Steinzor’s conclusions that the 

Superfund program no longer cleans up hazardous waste sites because of funding 

shortages and neglect. The report ignores the extensive cleanup construction and 

risk reduction measures taken at the sites identified as not being cleaned up. 

The appropriated funding levels for the Superfund program have remained steady 

over the past five fiscal years, between $1.2 and $1.3 billion dollars. Moreover, EPA 

supplements its annual appropriated funding with resources deobligated from prior 

fiscal year contracts, settlements with responsible parties, and State cost share contributions. The report fails to account for these resources. There has not been a significant decrease in Superfund cleanup work. Superfund construction work has remained relatively steady over the years; however, work is now concentrated on more 

costly, complex sites. We are pleased to report that in fiscal year 2007, EPA funded 

all new construction projects that were ready for funding, therefore, there is no 

backlog of unfunded Superfund site construction projects. 

Far from neglecting Superfund site cleanup, through fiscal year 2007, 1,030 

Superfund sites had cleanup construction completed, that represents 66 percent of 

the sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). Moreover, through fiscal year 

2007,95 percent of NPL sites have had remedial or removal cleanup construction 

work performed. 

Significant work has occurred at the 50 sites identified in Professor Steinzor’s report. Construction has been completed at 2 of the sites; UGI Columbia Gas Plant 

and ALCOA Lavaca Bay. However, ‘‘Construction Complete’’ is an interim measure 

of site cleanup progress and much work occurs at a site before this milestone is 

achieved. At 22 of the 50 sites in the report, construction work is underway. At another 6 sites, engineering design work is underway in preparation for construction. 

At 17 other sites, important studies are in progress to determine how the sites 

should be cleaned up. In addition, at 3 of the 50 sites, although studies have not 

yet begun, early response actions have been taken. 

Although completing remedy construction at large, complex, sites may take many 

years, EPA often addresses immediate risks at sites through its Removal program. 
26 

For example, EPA has provided alternative water supplies to more than 2 million 

people so they are not drinking or using contaminated water. Through fiscal year 

2007, the Removal program conducted more than 9,400 removals at more than 6,900 

sites. Of these, more than 2,400 have occurred at NPL sites. 

In fact, EPA has carried out removal actions at 56 percent of the sites on the 

NPL, including 142 removals at NPL sites not yet in the long-term construction 

phase. 

Ten of the 50 sites in Professor Steinzor’s report are known as mega sites—NPL 

sites where the final cleanup remedy is expected to cost more than $50 million. 

Mega-sites typically take a longer time to clean up because they are more complex 

than the average NPL site. Of 535 sites that are not construction complete (as of 

end of fiscal year 2007), nearly 40 percent are either Federal facility sites or are 

mega-sites, where cleanup costs are expected to exceed $50 million. This compares 

to 1,030 sites that are construction complete (through fiscal year 2007) of which only 

11 percent are Federal facility or mega-sites. Today the remaining number of sites 

to be completed is much smaller, but a greater percentage of those remaining sites 

are the larger, more complicated, mega-sites which take more time to complete. 

The Iron Mountain Mine Superfund site, one of the fifty sites in Professor 

Steinzor’s report, is a good example sofa mega-site where a significant amount of 

cleanup work has been achieved. Iron Mountain Mine covered 4,400 acres in northern California and operated from 1860 to 1962. Annual rains and surface waters 

washed through the abandoned, exposed mine and created acid mine drainage 

(AMD) that flowed into the Sacramento River—making it the largest discharger of 

heavy metals to surface waters in the United States. After being added to the NPL 

in 1983, EPA has studied the source of the AMD and carried out several emergency 

response (removal actions) and long-term cleanup actions (remedial actions) to reduce the AMD discharging from the mine to the Sacramento River by 95 percent. 

The report also mischaracterizes the purpose of the Superfund Hazard Ranking 

System (HRS). The HRS has never been an indicator of relative risk among sites. 

A site need only score above 28.5 to be eligible for listing on the National Priorities 

List. It is not necessary to score beyond this, and inappropriate to use the scores 

as indicators of relative risk. In setting cleanup priorities, the Superfund program 

focuses attention and resources on the sites that present the greatest imminent risk. 

Question 2. Do you agree with the characterization of the Superfund program 

found in Bradley Campbell’s hearing testimony? 

Response. EPA does not agree with Bradley Campbell’s conclusions that Superfund program completions have dropped because of funding shortages and lack of 

enforcement. These assertions are simply untrue. The appropriated funding levels 

for the Superfund program have remained steady over the past five fiscal years, between $1.2 and $1.3 billion dollars. Moreover, EPA supplements its annual appropriated funding with resources deobligated from prior fiscal year contacts, settlements with responsible parties, and State cost share contributions. 

Superfund program work has remained relatively steady. Through fiscal year 

2007, 1,030 Superfund sites had cleanup construction completed, that represents 66 

percent of the sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). Moreover, through 

fiscal year 2007,95 percent ofNPL sites have had remedial or removal cleanup construction work performed. Annual site completions have been affected by the composition of sites that have not yet reached construction completion. These sites are 

generally more complex than the sites we have completed in the past. Of 535 sites 

that are not construction complete (as of end of fiscal year 2007), nearly 40 percent 

are either Federal facility sites or are mega-sites, where cleanup costs are expected 

to exceed $50 million. This compares to 1,030 sites that are construction complete 

(through fiscal year 2007) of which only 11 percent are Federal facility or megasites. 

In addition, EPA continues its vigorous Superfund enforcement efforts. Through 

aggressive enforcement, EPA has been able get responsible parties to conduct cleanups, and has collected settlement dollars to clean up sites. Since the beginning of 

the program, the value of Superfund settlements has exceeded $25 billion. In fiscal 

year 2007 alone, EPA secured more than $1 billion in settlements for cleanup or 

cost recovery. EPA currently has more than $1 billion in site specific special accounts that can be used to clean up sites, and since 2002, more than $535 million 

has been used for cleanup work. 

Question 3. Would reinstating the lapsed Superfund taxes provide additional funding for the Superfund program? 

Response. The lapsed Superfund taxes did not dictate the annual level of congressional appropriations for the Superfund program. Neither taxes nor the balance in 

the Superfund Trust fund governed annual levels of congressional funding. EPA 
27 

never had direct? access to tax revenues or to Trust Fund balances. The Superfund 

program has always relied on appropriated funding to fund Superfund program activities. 

Question 4. Mr. Michael Steinberg suggested in his testimony at the Committee 

hearing on October 17, 2007 that there historically has not been coordination between senior EPA headquarters policymakers and the regional staff on major cleanup and funding decisions. What input did EPA headquarters have into the Manville 

Site decisions and what process did EPA follow to ensure that the cleanup decisions 

were effective but also reasonable? 

Response. To ensure that the cleanup decisions were effective and reasonable, 

EPA followed the statutory requirements for CERCLA remedies and the process established in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 

(NCP) for meeting these requirements. 

EPA headquarters was kept informed and involved during the remedy selection 

process for the Federal Creosote site. In March 1999, comments on the Operable 

Unit 1 (OU1) proposed plan were solicited and received from EPA Headquarters/the 

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER). Comments received from 

OSWER were incorporated into the proposed plan. Also in March of 1999, the proposed remedial action for the Federal Creosote Site was presented before the National Remedy Review Board (NRRB), which is chaired by OSWER. The NRRB reviews proposed Superfund cleanup decisions projected to cost greater than $30 million at this time to assure that they are consistent with Superfund regulations and 

guidance, and to verify that remedy selection is cost effective. The NRRB focused 

on the nature and complexity of the site, health and environmental risk, cost, the 

range of alternatives that addressed site risks and other relevant factors. The recommendations that NRRB provided were followed by the Region. EPA Headquarters 

provided additional solicited input on the draft Record of Decision (ROD) for OU1, 

which were incorporated into the final OU1 ROD. In addition, EPA headquarters 

was engaged and provided input on proposed plans and the draft RODs for the two 

subsequent operable units at the site. 

EPA Headquarters was kept informed and provided support during the implementation of the remedy. Remedial action funding was prioritized through the National 

Risk-Based Priority Panel process and all funding requests were developed in conjunction with Headquarters throughout the entire period of the remedial action at 

the site. 

Question 5. It has historically been EPA’s policy to identify and pursue as many 

potentially responsible parties (PRPs) as possible to contribute to site clean-up costs. 

To date EPA has focused on only one PRP at the Manville Site. Is EPA going to 

investigate fully and pursue other PRPs? 

Response. EPA’s enforcement efforts at this site have been substantial. EPA evaluated the liability of and sent notice letters to two parties, who were the owners/ 

operators of the facility at the time of disposal. EPA has also sent numerous 104(e) 

Information Request letters to parties to assess potential liability that those parties 

may have for the transactions that their companies had at the site. To date, EPA 

has received no information that has justified issuance of notice letters to these parties. Although EPA’s PRP investigation is in its last stages, EPA is in the process 

of evaluating information from two additional parties. 

Question 6. EPA has not ranked the Federal Creosote site high on its ranking list 

of priority sites. In addition, the Federal Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) and New Jersey health officials concluded that there were no significant health risks at this site, unless long-buried materials were dug up. Do you believe that spending close to $300 million (approximately 25 percent of EPA’s average 

annual Superfund appropriation) to respond to one site that apparently posed no 

significant public health risk is a wise use of limited taxpayer dollars? 

Response. By definition, a site on the National Priorities List is a priority. The 

Federal Creosote site was placed on the NPL in 1999. Prior to listing, the Site was 

operated as a coal tar wood treatment facility from 1911 to 1956. After operations 

ceased and the wood treatment facility was dismantled, the property was purchased 

by a developer. In the 1960’s, 137 single family homes were built on 35 acres of the 

Site. This residential area became known as the Claremont Development. The remaining 15 acres of the site was developed into the Rustic Mall which consists of 

commercial and retail establishments. 

A review of historical information revealed that, during its operation, the facility 

treated railroad ties with creosote. Wood treatment activities at the Site resulted 

in the production ofcreosote—contaminated sludge, sediments, process residuals, 

preservative drippings, and spent process liquid. The most prominent features of the 

wood treatment operations included two unlined canals that conveyed creosote 
28 

waste to two unlined lagoons that were used to hold concentrated creosote waste 

sludge. 

Investigations by EPA revealed that creosoting materials and contaminated soils 

associated with the wood treating facility were not removed prior to construction of 

the Claremont Development and Rustic Mall. The former lagoons are located from 

2—5 feet below ground surface; the waste from one lagoon extends approximately 

25 feet below ground surface while the other extends over 35 feet to bedrock. At 

several properties, the former lagoons and associated sludge were found to abut and/ 

or underlie existing residences. The material in the lagoons was concentrated creosote sludge; on at least one occasion, creosote sludge seeped into a residential basement sump, was pumped onto the residential street, and flowed into the storm 

sewer system. The creosote waste in the canals is shallower—extending approximately 14 feet below ground surface. The material found in the buried canals range 

from a dry, crusty creosote/soil mixture to flowable creosote waste sludge. 

EPA conducted extensive surface soil sampling in the spring of 1998 to determine 

whether there was any immediate threat to current residents. This sampling revealed that surface soil at approximately 11 homes with the highest overall levels 

of carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (material associated with wood 

treating chemicals) posed an unacceptable risk over the long-term and EPA took immediate action at those properties. The lagoon sludge and canal waste is highly contaminated source material which poses a risk to current and future residents. The 

primary routes of exposure included dermal contact with contaminated sludge and 

soil (present and future risk). Source material contaminated groundwater which 

could result in a future risk associated with ingestion of contaminated groundwater. 

EPA concluded, based on its investigations, that the site did pose a significant 

public health risk. Following the Remedial InvestigationlFeasibility Study, the proposed remedial activities were reviewed by the National Remedy-Review Board and 

later, the National Risk—based Priority Panel for funding. The site work was considered as the highest prioritized new construction project in 1999 and was allocated 

funding that fiscal year. 

ATSDR did not conclude that there was no significant public health risk at this 

site. At the time of its review, ATSDR concluded that ‘‘past and present exposures 

to surface soil represent no apparent public health hazard.’’ ATSDR followed up this 

conclusion by stating: ‘‘However, this conclusion does not rule out the need to continue remedial activities’’. Furthermore, based on their conclusions, ATSDR made 

the following recommendation in the Public Health Assessment for the Federal Creosote site: ‘‘The NJDHSS (New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services) 

and ATSDR recommend that the USEPA continue its remedial plans to remove 

source material from the site.’’ ATSDR was fully supportive ofEPA’s selected remedies for the site. 

The decision to take remedial action at the Federal Creosote Site is consistent 

with the risk-based approach as mandated by the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 

As stated in the NCP, the acceptable risk range for site-related exposures is 10– 

4 and 10–6 . EPA conducted a Baseline Human Health Risk Assessment (BHHRA) 

to estimate the potential risks associated with the Federal Creosote site. The 

BHHRA demonstrated that the site-related exposures exceeded EPA’s acceptable 

risk range which triggered EPA’s response action. 

Question 7. EPA removed more than 450,000 tons of soil from the Federal Creosote site-almost 300,000 tons more than EPA originally estimated. If the scope and 

cost of a selected cleanup changes as fundamentally as this did during the cleanup, 

shouldn’t EPA re-evaluate the choices it has made for the site? Was that done in 

this instance? 

Response. While the increase in quantity from EPA’s original estimate was significant, the quantities provided in the statement above are incorrect. EPA’s original 

quantity estimate was approximately 250,000 tons at the ROD stage not 150,000 as 

indicated above. 

EPA re-evaluated its remedial decisions at several points during the remedial 

process; however, site constraints limited the available remedial choices, and EPA 

concluded that the increase in volume did not justify a change in remedy. After the 

OUI ROD, additional investigations led to an increase in the estimated quantity of 

OUI waste. This increase in quantity and resulting cost was evaluated in the remedy selection process and was documented in the OU2 ROD. 

The remedial action differed significantly from the remedy selected in the OUl, 

OU2 and OU3 RODs with respect to cost. In accordance with the NCP, EPA consulted with the New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection and published 

an Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD). The ESD made an explanation of 

these significant cost differences and supporting information available to the public 

in the administrative record established for the site and published a public notice 
29 

that summarized the ESD, including the reasons for such differences, in a local 

newspaper. 

Question 8. EPA’s ‘‘presumptive remedy’ guidelines direct EPA’s regional offices 

to use bioremediation or low temperature treatment on former wood-treating sites. 

EPA’s guidance also advises against selecting a remedy that would incinerate large 

volumes of soil because ‘‘incineration of large volumes of contaminated media may 

be prohibitively costly.’’ Do you believe an EPA decision to ship more than 150,000 

tons of soil from the Federal Creosote site to Canada to be incinerated is consistent 

with EPA’s own policy and guidelines in this area? 

Response. EPA implemented the remedy in accordance with its policy and guidelines, considering site-specific conditions such as space constraints and the residential nature of the site. 

The presumptive remedy guidance document is intended to assist EPA in determining appropriate cleanup technologies. The guidance document states that ‘‘EPA 

officials may decide to follow the guidance provided in this document or to act at 

variance with the guidance, based on an analysis of specific site circumstances.’’ 

Recognizing that there is no such thing as a ‘‘one—size fits all’’ remedy for sites, 

the NCP requires the agency to formulate different remedial alternatives ‘‘taking 

into account the scope, characteristics, and complexity of the site problem that is 

being addressed’’ 40 C.F.R. § 300.430.(e)(2). 

EPA’s presumptive remedy guidance considered three technologies effective in 

treating creosote wastes that contain organic contaminants: bioremediation; thermal 

desorption; and incineration. 

On-site and offsite applications of these technologies as well as additional technologies were given consideration during the remedy selection process for the Federal Creosote site. 

The site-specific evaluation of treatment alternatives required by the NCP resulted in EPA’s determination that site conditions were such that onsite treatment 

using either bioremediation, thermal desorption, or incineration was not appropriate. In additional to the practical concerns regarding the operation of a hazardous waste treatment facility in the town center and within a housing development, there were technical concerns regarding the ability of bioremediation and a 

thermal desorption system to treat the high concentration of contaminants present 

in the soil and address the types of material encountered at the site. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you so much, Administrator Bodine. It 

certainly will be, without objection. 

I have some specific questions, but I want to make just a general 

comment. As I said in my opening remarks, you know, the glass 

is half full, the glass is half empty. People look in, see the same 

set of facts and draw different conclusions. 

I think what we are interested in on this Subcommittee is what 

we can do together to help make progress in dealing with a lot of 

these complex sites in a more expeditious way. My ears perked up 

when Senator Inhofe talked about targeted funding sources. What 

targeted funding sources would be acceptable to the Administration 

to begin to get more money into the process? Because certainly if 

we are dealing with more complex sites that certainly does for me 

argue that there is a higher level of technical skills required; it is 

more painstaking. And yet the amount of money requested has not 

increased to reflect the complexity of those cleanups. 

So I hope that the EPA will work with this Committee to come 

up with some solutions for these complex sites. 

I want to specifically draw your attention to a site called Lawrence Aviation Industries. It is a 160 acre site in Suffolk County 

which is on Long Island in New York where huge quantities of 

TCE and acid sludge were dumped into two large lagoons. The site 

is located on a hill and the waste has leached toward wells and the 

Long Island Sound. 

Now, this is a case where we do have a responsible party, and 

yet the site has a status of human exposure uncontrolled, more 

than 7 years after it was listed in 2000. I would like to ask why 
30 

the EPA has not controlled human exposure to pollution at this site 

and when can we expect the EPA to get it under control? 

Ms. BODINE. Thank you. 

Actually, I am glad that you brought up this site because it illustrates a broader point. We are dealing with sites and determining 

whether the human exposure is under control or whether we have 

sufficient data to make that determination. That is a determination 

that can change as our information about the site changes over 

time. So a site can be under control, and then we can learn about 

a new exposure pathway and it could be not under control or insufficient data until we have learned what is going on. 

So at Lawrence Aviation, it is one of many sites around the 

Country where we have become aware of a pathway related to 

TCE, which is vapor intrusion. By no means is that the only site. 

There are a lot of sites around the Country where we have recognized that there is this new exposure pathway, vapor intrusion, 

that wasn’t thought of. In the 1990’s, we were dealing with these 

sites, and we thought if we dealt with the groundwater, we were 

done. We have discovered, no, there is another pathway. We have 

to go back and check because we need to protect human exposure. 

So that is why a large number of sites either are not under control, or particularly a large number of sites are insufficient data because we are going back. We think there may be a vapor intrusion 

problem. We don’t know yet. We will collect the data. 

Specifically at Lawrence Aviation, we did do the sampling, and 

to date we have not found a vapor intrusion problem, but we need 

to go back and verify that. Again, the groundwater problem was 

taken care of at the site a long time ago. The local residents were 

hooked up to a public water supply system, and on the vapor intrusion site we have conducted the sampling and I will have to get 

back to you on the record on what the results are. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, Ms. Bodine, I would like for a full status 

report on all the 111 sites where there is a finding of human exposure to dangerous levels of toxic chemicals. Obviously, I would like 

to know the status of that. I understand the vapor intrusion problem. We have that unfortunately at a number of sites in New York. 

But I would appreciate your submitting that to the Committee. 

I also want to just clarify something. In your written testimony, 

you talk about how the potentially responsible parties have performed work at 70 percent of the sites. I have a letter from Chairman Dingell in the House to Administrator Johnson asking whether 50 percent is a more accurate figure. The EPA responded, ‘‘We 

cannot accurately predict what the percentage will be in the future. 

However, some believe that there will be more orphan sites where 

there are no viable PRPs in the future, and thus the percentage of 

PRP participation may decrease.’’ 

May I ask you, what do you think the future holds? Is it likely 

that the PRP share will increase or decrease? 

Ms. BODINE. Well, you are looking just at NPL sites. 

Senator CLINTON. Right. 

Ms. BODINE. We are not listing as a proportion of the sites as 

many sites that are PRP-lead, because oftentimes there will be a 

highly qualified State program that can manage and oversee the 

responsible parties action. So those sites don’t necessarily get list-
31 

ed. So again, the sites that are being listed have the recalcitrant 

PRPs, the complex sites, or the orphan sites. 

So yes, going forward, the proportions of the cleanup actions that 

are orphan are larger than they had been in the past, because we 

don’t list every responsible party. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, but then of course that raises the question that we now think there are nearly 400 orphan sites. Since the 

Superfund trust expired 4 years ago, that does mean, as Senator 

Lautenberg pointed out, that totally innocent parties, namely 

American taxpayers, are paying for all of these cleanups, and they 

are in a sense carried as unfunded liabilities on the Superfund program. 

So I would like also in writing what you think the liability is; 

how much the total cleanup costs at these so-called orphan sites 

currently on the NPL will be. I think it is an important question 

for us to try to get to the bottom of together because it will help 

inform the debate about what to do with respect to reinstating the 

Superfund fees or trying to get some targeted funding to help us 

cleanup. 

So if I could, Administrator Bodine, I would appreciate that. And 

then I would ask unanimous consent to submit the letters and the 

backup to my questions for the record. 

Let me now turn to Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and 

thank you for being here today. I appreciate your time. 

Senator Boxer referred to some privileged documents. I think we 

saw a big pile in the possession of the Committee. Is this information that needs to be privileged because EPA is bound by laws to 

do that? Could you just help clarify that a little bit for me? 

Ms. BODINE. We generally claim a privilege for our deliberative 

processes, as have all Administrations before us, as well as other 

agencies, because you need to be able to preserve the candor in the 

communication within an agency as we are dealing with whatever 

complex situations that is under our authorities. 

So of course, you are our oversight Committee. We are sharing 

documents with the oversight Committee, but when it involves, 

again, privileged internal debate discussion draft deliberative material, we ask that this not be made public because if it were, it 

would then chill the ability to have those kinds of discussions with 

our staff within the Administration about how to deal with situations. 

Senator BARRASSO. I have read through the testimony of the second panel as well, and if I could just refer to one of those and visit 

with you about it, because you are testifying now and they are 

later. Mr. Steinberg says that there is a need for the EPA to manage its annual appropriations differently, that some of the money 

that is going into what people might think is Superfund activities 

is actually being used for other administrative and other purposes. 

What would you think about that? 

Ms. BODINE. The Superfund program is a large program. As I 

talked about, we have over 3,200 Federal employees, men and 

women who are working every day on the program. So yes, we are 

paying their salaries. We do manage a large construction budget 
32 

for sites where we are overseeing the cleanup directly. So we do 

have to have staff that deal with management of contracts. 

So there is, as there is in the private sector, you have your base 

core program costs and then you do have administrative overhead 

costs that are associated with that, but those costs are necessary 

to get the work done. 

Senator BARRASSO. And then the final question, we talked a little 

bit about the Amoco refinery and a partnership, and I know you 

talked a little bit about the local communities and what they are 

doing. So I think it shouldn’t be a surprise that there are maybe 

fewer things going on the list because of the efforts that are being 

done at a local level and private-Government partnerships. 

Ms. BODINE. Absolutely. EPA and the Superfund program is not 

the only game in town at all. Where local communities can manage 

their problems, where the State can deal with the situation that is 

good news. That is success. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. Bodine, you said that we have always had a lively debate on 

how the program should be managed. I would respectfully disagree 

that this is what the debate is about. You can always have a disagreement on management. I think the debate is much more fundamental. It is about the priority that is given to the Superfund 

program and the lack of priority that is given to it under this Administration, and the seeming lack of concern for the people who 

are impacted. 

With that in mind, I would call to your attention a 2004 EPA report where there is an acknowledgment that, ‘‘current resources appropriated to the Superfund program may be insufficient to fully 

implement the program.’’ Do you disagree with these statements? 

Ms. BODINE. I would have to look at the report that you are referring to. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Grant? This is your own agency, cleaning up 

the Nation’s Waste Sites, 2004 edition, and this is where that comment is made. We will send it over. Could you send that over to 

the Administrator? 

Do you agree or disagree whether or not you see it there? Do you believe that there is in fact a shortfall coming of $100 million to 

$200 million over a 10 year period? 

Ms. BODINE. I know that in 2004 there were some analyses that 

were looking forward in terms of what we may be expecting for 

sites that were coming and what we were expecting for funding. I 

don’t know exactly what you are referring to, but I do know that 

our out-year estimates of costs are not particularly reliable, so 

whatever numbers there would be a degree of uncertainty associated with those. 

Senator BOXER. Forget the uncertainty. Do you feel comfortable 

with the funding as far as the Superfund site and what we need? 

Do you feel comfortable that you have the resources that you need 

now and into the future for your people who are coming after you, 

assuming we just kept the same funding stream? 
33 

Ms. BODINE. We are continuing to make progress in cleaning up 

sites, and we have funding to continue to make that progress. We 

are part of the whole unified budget. 

Senator BOXER. I know you are part of the unified budget, and 

I am not asking about the unified budget. I don’t have a lot of time 

here, so the point is you are answering me not yes or no, but you 

are giving me a story. The story is just very confusing to people, 

because either you have it or you don’t. EPA in 2004 said you don’t 

have it. You seem happy, and you seem to think the debate we are 

having is about management, when a lot of us believe it is much 

more than management. It is about a fundamental decision made 

by this Administration to short the program. 

Now, you are familiar with Region VI, correct, which is Oklahoma, Texas, are you not? 

Ms. BODINE. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I am going to ask you something here. You 

in your opening statement were very positive about working with 

the community. You mentioned it several times, working with the 

community, working with the State, working with our tribal partners. Are you aware that in Region VI that part of your budget has 

been decimated in order to take money out of those so you can have 

money for other matters? Are you aware of that? 

Ms. BODINE. No, ma’am, I am not. 

Senator BOXER. Well, you should be aware of it because it is a 

document I got, and it is a document that says it is for oversight. 

So I am talking to you about this. Do you know how much was cut 

from technical assistance in order to have money for the NPL site 

in this region? 

Ms. BODINE. I don’t. 

Senator BOXER. Well, it was 64 percent in 2003. And then community involvement, you know how much that was cut? About 56 

percent, State, tribal management assistance was cut 32 percent. 

State, tribal grants were cut 100 percent. EPA site assessment was 

cut 48 percent. State, tribal core grants were cut 88 percent. Contracts, program management were cut 66 percent. Other support 

assistance was cut 25 percent. And the statement is made, and 

there are no names on this document. This is nothing to do with 

confidentiality here. This is the taxpayers’ money, how it is being 

spent or not spent. And it says by reducing these categories, Region 

VI was able to keep its NPL site work progressing. 

So this Administration is destroying this program just to keep 

the facade of the last dollar you can eke out to keep things moving. 

So I would just simply say to you, and my time is running out, 

the debate is a lot more than the way you are portraying it. It is 

very serious. In my State, EPA failed to use health-based standards when assessing risks. At 271 sites that received asbestos-contaminated material from Libby, Montana, and 36 of those sites are 

in my region, including my State. How are you responding to that? 

I know Senator Baucus has a great deal of concern about this. Do 

you agree with the GAO study of October, 2007 that said you failed 

to use health-based standards when assessing the risks; you failed 

to follow your own regulations and guidance in notifying the public 

about potential dangers? Do you agree? 
34 

Ms. BODINE. We know more about asbestos than we did when we 

were going out and looking at the sites where Libby material was 

sent. Since then, we have developed better methodologies. Again, 

it was since that work was done. We have improved our technologies and improved our methodologies. And so, yes, we understand that we need to go back and look at sites where—— 

Senator BOXER. So you agree with the criticism of the GAO study 

of 2007? 

Ms. BODINE. I don’t agree with the conclusion that we failed to 

follow regulations with respect to informing the public. Those actions were under removal actions and under the national contingency plan, under our regulations the degree of public involvement, 

whether you would need a public hearing, for example, is scaled to 

the level of effort, to the size of the cleanup. So in some cases, you 

could have had a single home that we were addressing and you 

wouldn’t have a large-scale public meeting for a situation like that. 

In other cases, we did have public meetings. 

So again, it was scaled to the relative degree of—— 

Senator BOXER. So do you agree or disagree with this report? 

Ms. BODINE. I agree we need to go back and evaluate the sites 

using our better methodology, as well as when we complete the toxicity assessment of the Libby amphibole, look at the data, and 

evaluate against that. That is all new methodologies and new information that we are developing, that we didn’t have when we did 

the work originally. 

Senator BOXER. So you agree with this report? 

Ms. BODINE. There are two parts. I agree with the recommendation we need to go and look further, and I disagree with the conclusion that we failed to follow our regulations with respect to it. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, the GAO said you agreed with the 

whole report. So I don’t know whether you told them that or not, 

but I will send this over. It said GAO expressed general agreement 

on the notification. Are you planning to go out and notify my people as far as what they have been exposed to? Do you have plans 

to remediate the problem? 

Ms. BODINE. Again, we will go back and evaluate and notify the 

public as we go back and as we do the work, as we find out more. 

Senator BOXER. Madam Chair, I find this response very unsatisfactory because it is halting. It is not clear. Whenever we raise anything to do with Libby and asbestos, this is what we get. I would 

hope if we could through the Subcommittee and the full Committee, get a response from you to the GAO investigation, and how 

you are going to go back to my people and people all over this 

Country, tell them what they were exposed to, and what precautions they ought to take about this exposure. 

Thank you. Sorry I went over. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. 

Administrator Bodine, we will submit very specific questions 

along the lines of Senator Boxer’s concerns to try to get very specific answers, because clearly this is important to all of us that 

have these sites in our States and are trying to figure out how to 

protect the people that we represent. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
35 

Administrator Bodine, you heard my opening statement. I referred to the fact that Senator Reid and I are actively looking into 

the Federal creosote site in New Jersey and we will be requesting 

a GAO investigation into the site, particularly the cleanup methods 

used leading to over $300 million for a 50 acre site. 

I think this is a good thing to talk about because all the fingerpointing that is here and which Administration did what, first of 

all, you weren’t here when that happened so you are off the hook. 

This is something that started in 1999, so both Administrations 

were involved in it. 

Now, at the Federal creosote site, EPA dug up 450,000 tons of 

dirt and shipped more than 150,000 tons to Canada to be incinerated, raising the cleanup costs of this site dramatically. This was 

done when there were other remedies available. The EPA’s own 

guidance, which says that incinerating anything over 5,000 would 

be cost-prohibitive. 

Now, you weren’t here, but do you have any insight into why the 

EPA used such a costly remedy as they did at this site? 

Ms. BODINE. Sorry, Senator Inhofe. I don’t have any insight into 

that. I can go back. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I would like to have you do that for the 

record because specifically they say that you should not use this 

methodology if it is over 5,000. This was way over, and so something got into that decision, and I would kind of like to know what 

it is. 

Now, up until I became Chairman of the EPW Committee, and 

that was four and a half years ago, the Federal Government spent 

$130 million on Tar Creek. This is over about a 20 year period. Tar 

Creek is the site I referred to in the State of Oklahoma. And the 

results weren’t good. Once we got all the Federal agencies to work 

together and to work on this with the State agencies in a new cooperative manner, we found that sound solutions for the site addressing the environment, the residents, and the cost. Is there some way 

that you could have used this model of cooperation for the Federal 

creosote site or for some of the other Superfund sites? 

Now, what we did was something that is unheard of in government. We got everybody in one room—DOJ, DOI, EPA, the Corps 

of Engineers, the State agencies. And we ended up doing this in a 

cooperative way with Oklahoma University, the State of Oklahoma, 

and I must say with a lot of cooperation from our Democrat Governor out there. We worked on this thing, but we worked with all 

the Federal agencies and we got it done. 

Now, I would ask you, if you are familiar with this and if this 

is a model that could be used for other sites? 

Ms. BODINE. Yes, I am familiar with the collaborative work 

among the agencies at Tar Creek. And yes, in situations where you 

have other Federal agencies involved, then I think in fact you need 

to follow that model. You need to get all the Federal agencies at 

the table. 

Senator Craig is not here, but there is a site in Idaho that is 

phosphate mining where they brought—— 

Senator INHOFE. He and I have argued in the past over which 

is the most devastating site, and I have won that argument, clearly. 
36 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CLINTON. Why am I not surprised? 

Ms. BODINE. No debate. Thank you. 

It is not Bunker Hill that I was talking about, but there is a 

phosphate mining site which has a lot of the land management 

agencies involved in addition to EPA, in addition to the State, and 

exactly the kind of model that you described for Tar Creek is very 

helpful at that site as well, where you bring folks together. You 

have different jurisdictions and different responsibilities, but to 

make progress you all have to work together. 

Senator INHOFE. And there is a propensity that seems to be inherent in Government not to do that. It is a turf thing. Anyway, 

you have probably not noticed that in your years. 

We have been referring to that site in New Jersey. That is a site 

that health officials concluded there weren’t any significant health 

risks. I would like to know, if that is the case, then why did that 

have such a high priority? Why were we spending so much on it? 

Ms. BODINE. Well, I know that we are nearly done with this site, 

so I wouldn’t be surprised that it no longer has health risks because we have addressed them. Now, how it was at the beginning, 

I would have to go back and find out. But that site is nearly complete. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. You said something, and I unfortunately 

didn’t read your written testimony. I normally try to do that, but 

I believe you said that there were 1,200 sites prior to 1991. 

Ms. BODINE. That were listed. 

Senator INHOFE. That were listed at that time. 

Ms. BODINE. Right. The vast majority of sites on the NPL were 

listed before 1991. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. Now, those that were listed before 1991, of 

those, how many would you say are still not treated? I think you 

said 284. Is that correct? 

Ms. BODINE. I think it was about 284. Yes. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. Yes, it is 284. All right, what characteristics are in those 284 that were in the other 1,000 sites? 

Ms. BODINE. Some of them, if you look at the sites that we are 

still working on, they are really the famous sites. What I would 

like to do is provide you with that list for the record, but they are 

sites that have either had contentious litigation or they are just 

very large complex sites. 

Senator INHOFE. I think that would be a good idea, because the 

argument we keep hearing, and I know it is sincerely posed, is that 

there is not a great difference in the ones that were done during 

the 1990’s as opposed to during this Administration. 

Ms. BODINE. Right. You have to look at the ones that aren’t done. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. One last thing, very occasionally Senator 

Lautenberg and I agree on some things. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator INHOFE. And one statement that he made that I agree 

with, he said, and it is very simple, and he has a way of putting 

in terms that even I understand. He said, if you pollute it, you 

should clean it up. And I agree with that. Frankly, I think we all 

agree with that. But I think the whole concept that if you are in 

a particular industry, should you be taxed, even though you don’t 
37 

have any relationship or any responsibility, have never operated in 

an area where there is a Superfund site, why should you and the 

stockholders of that company be responsible for something that you 

had nothing to do with? 

Now, in so far as policies that you take, I would like to have you 

keep that in mind. Look for areas, yes, if you can find the polluter 

that polluter should clean it up. We all agree with that, so this 

should not be a contentious issue. 

Ms. BODINE. We have a very strong enforcement program for cleanup work or commitments to clean up work of over $25 billion, 

with the work done by people who actually caused the problem. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Good for you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

I enjoy my opportunities to be with Senator Inhofe. He always 

makes me think of a response, but I will forego that pleasure. 

Ms. Bodine, you seem to take some delight in the fact that we 

have a bunch of sites that are left, and you excuse them by saying 

they are a greater cleanup challenges than others. Does that mean 

that they are not dangerous in any way? 

Ms. BODINE. No, I didn’t say that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, you said it in your remarks. I will 

remind you: ‘‘This does not mean that EPA has been neglecting 

these sites. It simply means that some sites present a greater 

cleanup challenge than others.’’ 

Does a greater cleanup challenge mean that these sites might be 

dangerous to the people in the area? 

Ms. BODINE. If there is an immediate risk, we go out, do a removal action, and address any—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But you used the word complicated, and 

that suggests that there is something big and terrible in there. 

Ms. BODINE. At a site, you can have addressed substantial engagement associated with the site and still have a complicated remedy that is technically complicated where the work needs to obviously continue and will take a long period of time. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You remind me of a doctor who was visiting with a patient and says I have good news for you. Your heart 

is fine, but your cancer is overtaking your body. So here is the good 

news for you, that one part of you is terrific and the other part of 

you is terrible. You are taking some high degree of satisfaction out 

of the fact that we don’t have money with which to pursue the 

cleanup of these sites. Do you approve of the fact that the taxpayers are paying $1.25 

billion to clean up these sites? 

Ms. BODINE. We would like to have the responsible parties pay 

for the entire cleanup. There are some sites where the responsible 

parties are not there. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, but that is why we had the Superfund 

reserve at some three some billion dollars in 1996. Now it is zero. 

There are many sites that need attention, but Senator Boxer was 

interested in some of the materials, some of the text that was withheld from the public at large. Now, our former Commissioner Brad-
38 

ley Campbell is going to testify on the second panel. I will give you 

that notice, that he inadvertently receives e-mails in which EPA directed its technical staff to make up excuses why a cleanup could 

not take place to cover for the real reason, which was lack of sufficient funds. Are you aware of that incident? 

Ms. BODINE. No, I am not. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Is there a practice at EPA that says whatever you do, don’t admit that things have slowed up because we 

have insufficient funds; we don’t have the resources; we don’t have 

the staff? 

Ms. BODINE. I am not aware of that practice, no. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You are not? So you have sufficient staff 

to do all these cleanups and all the tools that you need to do them 

with? 

Ms. BODINE. We manage our program and we manage it tightly. 

We scrutinize the sites. We require all of our projects to go through 

value engineering. We require the projects to be ranked by a national risk-based priority panel before we fund them. So we are 

closely managing this program, and indeed we are also managing 

the funds so that we are not putting too much money on a project, 

because in fact we have been able—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are you short at all? Do you find any 

shortages of direct resources, personnel, equipment, or anything 

like that as a result of not having enough money? You have plenty 

of dough? 

Ms. BODINE. We have been able to de-obligate. In other words, 

we put money on a project. It wasn’t needed. We have been able 

to de-obligate $740 million since 2001 from sites. So we are managing our resources more closely now. Before, we had a tendency 

to over-obligate. We put too much money on a project. That gave 

us the opportunity when the project is done to take the unused 

money and go and use it at other sites. 

We are managing our projects more closely now so that we are 

not over-obligating. We are not putting too much money on a 

project. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Even though they might need it to get it 

cleaned up. My good friend, Senator Inhofe, talked about, or others 

talked about the low-hanging fruit and how the early sites were 

easy cleanups. That creosote site cost $300 million by your own 

statements. So how low was that fruit hanging? 

Senator INHOFE. Would the Senator yield for a comment? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Sure. It is not my time. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I would only comment, and that is my 

point, that so much was spent in a way that violated the normal 

rules of what you should spend in terms of the incineration, particularly when it was a site that apparently posed no health risk. 

That is the point I was making. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I assume the record will be held open and we can expect prompt 

returns from EPA on any questions that we submit in writing. 

Senator CLINTON. I am sure that is the case. We will leave the 

record open and we will look for those prompt responses. 

I just have one final question, and that concerns the TCE standard. Last year, the National Academy of Sciences Board on Envi-
39 

ronmental Studies and Toxicology returned its review of TCE to 

EPA, and recommended that you act expeditiously to release a new 

TCE health risk assessment that includes vapor intrusion and indoor air standards. 

As we were talking earlier, this vapor intrusion problem from 

TCE is a serious one that we have to address. We have 10 Superfund sites in New York alone with TCE contamination that is already in the groundwater. We have evidence of vapor intrusion. 

Has EPA set that standard yet, Administrator Bodine? 

Ms. BODINE. What you are referring to is a new IRIS, integrated 

risk information system, standard that the Office of Research and 

Development is working on. What the NAS said was that the Office 

of Research and Development could take not the data that they 

had used before to set a draft standard, which was based on mouse 

livers or mouse kidneys, but could take data based on rats and set 

a standard expeditiously. If the agency did that, then the conclusion would be that TCE is far less potent a risk than folks would 

have assumed based on data derived from mice as opposed to rats. 

So the Office of Research and Development is carefully looking 

at all of these issues with respect to what data set they are looking 

at. So an expeditious setting of a standard and doing perhaps what 

was issued by the NAS could result in a standard that says, no, 

you can be exposed to much more TCE. So obviously, that Office 

of Research and Development is being very careful before they 

draw any conclusions. 

Senator CLINTON. Well, Administrator Bodine, I would very 

much appreciate the chance to have our experts sit down with the 

EPA staff tasked on this because the NAS found that the evidence 

on carcinogenic risk and other health hazards from exposure to 

TCE has strengthened since 2001. Hundreds of waste sites are contaminated. It is well documented that individuals in many communities are exposed to the chemical with associated health risks. 

It is very clear in the report that was issued that the Federal 

agencies were urged to finalize their risk assessment with currently available data so risk management decisions can be made 

expeditiously. I am now hearing that this is not how the EPA is 

viewing the data that is available, and I wish to have a thorough 

briefing on this, and have our experts meet with the requisite staff 

at the EPA to try to understand what happened between the NAS 

recommendation and where we are today based on your testimony. 

Is that appropriate? 

Ms. BODINE. That is very appropriate, because the fact that there 

is a stronger relationship or stronger showing that it is a carcinogen doesn’t mean that it is more potent. There is a difference. 

Senator CLINTON. I understand that. 

Ms. BODINE. And that is why we will get those folks together. 

Senator CLINTON. We need to get them together because the National Academies, which I believe have a full understanding of the 

difference that you are referring to, urged expeditious action. So I 

think that it is time that we got expeditious about this, because I 

have a lot of people in my State who are suffering from and worried about the vapor intrusion. 

Any other questions? 

Senator BOXER. 
40 

Senator BOXER. Yes, I do, if no one else does. 

Again, I want to get back to the budget. You sort of make a 

dismissive nod. Our budget is important to the people of the United 

States of America, and the budget of the Superfund program is 

very important to the 10 million that live within four miles of a 

Superfund site, and who are suffering, getting sick, dying early, 

getting cancer and all of that. And that is why I ask a lot about 

the budget. 

Do you ask division directors to recommend cuts in the Superfund program? 

Ms. BODINE. No. We ask them to manage their sites and manage 

their resources carefully. 

Senator BOXER. You don’t ask them to come up with cuts? 

Ms. BODINE. We ask them to carefully review what their projects 

are and how much money they need and at what point in time. 

Senator BOXER. Well, Madam Chair, I have a document here 

given to me by the EPA which shows that in fact the division directors were called to a meeting in 2006. They were asked to recommend cuts. Now, you mentioned State grants as you gave your 

very optimistic opening statement. Are you aware that they are 

continuing to cut the State grants so that they can come up with 

more money for remedial actions? 

Ms. BODINE. I am aware that we fund State programs through cooperative grants. We also fund State programs through the $50 

million that comes out of Brownfields, and that a lot preliminary 

work onsites can be done using either source. 

Senator BOXER. Are you aware that people were called together 

for a fly in meeting and asked how they could cut their budget? 

You said you were not aware. How could you not be aware? Aren’t 

you in charge of the Superfund program? 

Ms. BODINE. I am not micro-managing the Superfund program. 

Senator BOXER. Oh, OK. So cuts coming from your division directors would not be of concern to the person at the top? Is that right? 

Is that what I am hearing? 

Ms. BODINE. That is not. 

Senator BOXER. So you don’t know. It doesn’t sound like you 

know what is happening, because your own documents that you 

made available to me show possible disinvestments, asking people 

how they could cut. They said, well, in order to continue cleanups, 

we have to cut, slow down the remedial investigations, remedial designs, State programs, the C program, which as I understand it 

brings in retired people to help with these matters, and across the 

board cuts. 

Madam Chair, this program is not in good shape right now. We 

have someone here who doesn’t even know that the district directors are asked how to cut funds. That says to me, this isn’t about 

micro-managing. These are district directors. These are the people 

who are close to the problem. I would just suggest to you, we are 

all Senators here. We have to go back to our States. One of the 

things we are very aware of is not to lose touch with people. Don’t 

lose touch with your district directors or you cannot do your job. 

Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Madam Chairman. 

Senator CLINTON. Senator Inhofe. 
41 

Senator INHOFE. Well, first of all, you may not be aware of that, 

but if you would pass on to whomever made the decision to ask the 

district directors to find places to cut their budgets, that I applaud 

them for doing that. I think all government should be doing that, 

so I think they are doing a good job. 

I would say, Madam Chairman, that we have been joined by the 

Senator from Idaho. Before he is recognized for his questions, I 

would say to him that we had a discussion between the Superfund 

sites in Idaho and Oklahoma, and the one in Oklahoma was much 

more devastating than the one in Idaho. I am sure you will have 

a chance to ask some questions. 

Senator CLINTON. Welcome, Senator Craig. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY CRAIG, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chairman, thank you very much. 

Susan, it is great to have you with us today. 

Almost from the time I began my service in the U.S. Congress, 

a great mining district of Idaho went from being highly profitable 

and productive to slumping into a depressed metals market that 

spun it ultimately into a Superfund site. So Madam Chairman, literally for 22 years, I have worked with one of the largest Superfund sites in the Nation, and the EPA our of Region X in Seattle, 

so thorough and so competently that they even brought people out 

to establish permanent residency in Idaho to work specifically on 

that site. 

We have had our troubles. It has not all gone well. There were 

major human factors involved, Madam Chairman, because it was 

an old smelter site and there was heavy lead in the environment. 

Over the years and with the frustration involved, I went so far as 

to ask the National Institute of Health to come in and review. The 

National Academy of Sciences has been in to review. 

I must tell you that EPA in almost every way met the standards. 

They didn’t meet them in the time we would have liked, largely because it was not their fault. It was the fault of the litigation and 

the law that made it so complicated and so cumbersome that it was 

in many instances because we were always trying to find the bad 

buy because of legacy environments, that we spent more time in 

litigation and in court than we did in cleanup for a time. If we 

hadn’t been looking for bad guys and our purpose was to go out and 

clean it up and bring everybody in to participate, my guess is the 

great Silver Valley of Idaho and the Coeur d’Alene mining basin 

would have been cleaned up years ago. 

Having said that, Ms. Bodine, I am very pleased with the 

progress that EPA is making, and very pleased with the relationship that EPA has with the State of Idaho now. We have established some landmark environments out there, some cooperative relationships that really ought to be a template on how you solve 

problems, in my opinion. I know that Tony Hardison has worked 

very hard on this issue. We have what is called the Basin Environmental Improvement Project Commission, State and Federal cooperatively working together. 

This is not just a Federal responsibility. We have shown that 

there is a State responsibility. There is a cooperative effort that 
42 

can in fact streamline and make things very productive. So I want 

to thank you for that. 

Talk to me, if you would, and the Committee for a few moments 

about how you view the relationship between EPA and the Basin 

Environmental Improvement Project Commission, because in my 

opinion, that is where a lot of our approaches toward resolution of 

these Superfund sites ought to move, not just in Idaho, but nationwide. 

Ms. BODINE. Thank you, Senator. It is a very good relationship. 

In fact, it is critical. When you look at the Coeur d’Alene site, in 

size it is absolutely enormous. It deals with multiple watersheds, 

multiple basins. When you are addressing a situation like that, it 

is not just the mine tailings and the environmental impacts. It is 

the ecological impacts, the human health impacts. It is the entire 

community involved there. Therefore, you have to have the State 

as a partner to deal with and to engage, as well as the local community. That is the only way you can address one of these watershed-wide issues. So yes, it is not only a good relationship. It is an 

absolutely critical relationship. 

Senator CRAIG. Madam Chair, let me address one other issue if 

I may, and I think, Susan, before I got here, touched on it. Clear 

across the State and over in the toe, in the top of the boot of Idaho, 

is another major mining area. 

Ms. BODINE. Yes. 

Senator CRAIG. It is one of the last major phosphate mining 

areas in the United States. There are a lot of interests out there 

trying to shut it down, plain and simple. I have been blunt about 

it, and said, fine, if you want all of your phosphate fertilizers to 

grow America’s food crops imported from China, so be it. That is 

what will happen if we can’t get this right. 

EPA, the U.S. Forest Service, because it is Federal land, permitted for the purpose of phosphate mining, with three major mining companies in there, providing a huge supply of America’s phosphate fertilizers. And EPA has worked with them. 

The downside, Madam Chairman, is one of the minerals that 

comes from the process is selenium. Selenium in concentrate is poisonous. It has caused some problems. There are tremendous plans, 

tremendous efforts to bring all of that together with multiple agencies and to keep a phosphate mining industry in the United States. 

Can you speak to us about how that cooperative and coordinated 

effort has gone on? 

Ms. BODINE. Again, having that cooperation is critical, particularly as you pointed out, the land is Federal land. Our mission is 

protection of human health and the environment. We also have to 

work cooperatively with the Federal land managers. When it is 

their land, they in fact have the lead with respect to that property. 

So again, dealing with this phosphate mine situation, all of the 

agencies and the State agencies as well, have to work cooperatively 

together, and that is the case in the phosphate mine cleanups. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Susan, thank you. 

What I find in Idaho that is an active agriculture State, mining 

State, now a new technology State, is that we have a cooperative 

and coordinated relationship with EPA that has at times been 
43 

rocky, but in most instances highly successful. In all instances 

where we have come together cooperatively, we have improved the 

environment and the condition of human health and life quality 

substantially from what it was originally. 

So I am extremely pleased to date. I would like to redo the 

Superfund law. I think it is a complicated, cumbersome system 

that is reflective of the past, and not the current environment. We 

all ought to be oriented toward cleanups, instead of finding bad 

guys and sometimes legacies exist that you can’t find the bad guy 

anymore. He or she or they simply don’t exist. Our mission ought 

to be to clean, instead of to litigate. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BODINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator Craig. 

We will keep the record open. 

Administrator Bodine, I at least will have additional questions 

for the record. Thank you very much for being here. 

We are moving now to our second panel. Obviously, we are 

pleased to have such a broad cross section of panelists here for this 

important issue. We are going to move immediately into the statements from the panelists. We would appreciate you keeping to the 

5-minute rule. We have your written testimony, and of course it 

will be in the record. So if you could summarize the high points of 

what you wish the Committee to hear, that would be extremely 

helpful. 

We will go in the following order. We will start with Rena 

Steinzor, then Dr. Porter, then Bradley Campbell, then Michael 

Steinberg, then Lenny Siegel. So as soon as people are settled in, 

we will begin with Rena Steinzor, the Jacob A. France Research 

Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, and a 

scholar at the Center for Progressive Reform. 

Thank you very much, Professor Steinzor, for being here. 

STATEMENT OF RENA STEINZOR, JACOB A. FRANCE RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

SCHOOL OF LAW; SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 

Ms. STEINZOR. Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me. 

Superfund badly needs your attention, and I congratulate the 

Committee for reviving the constitutional check and balance of rigorous oversight. I request that our report, The Toll of Superfund 

Neglect, be included in the hearing record. 

Senior EPA political appointees and industry representatives 

may or may not understand how Superfund is supposed to work. 

They should understand how it does work. Unfortunately, they are 

not sharing either explanation with you. 

The truth is that Congress intended the program to be a threelegged stool: one, identification of the worst sites; two, a multi-billion dollar fund to prime the pump for cleanup and pay costs at orphan sites; and three, strict joint and several liability to give parties compelling incentives to initiate cleanups. 

Over the last several years, EPA’s political leadership has sawed 

the first leg in half, dumping many Superfund sites into the laps 
44 

of underfinanced States; removed the second leg of public funding; 

and left the third leg, enforcement, to rot to its core. No wonder 

the program is in trouble. 

To obscure this dismal reality, EPA officials and industry representatives have created five legends about Superfund. The first 

legend is that long-neglected Superfund sites are not harming anybody and can safely be neglected. These assertions are ludicrous. 

Indeed, if the people who advance them truly believe they are true, 

we would have a more honest debate if the question was whether 

we should abolish Superfund. No one wants to go there, and for 

good reason. 

Thousands of uncontrolled Federal and State Superfund sites 

plague communities across the Nation. Most sites are located in or 

near heavily populated urban or suburban neighborhoods. Many 

have languished on the Superfund national priorities list for two 

decades. Often, no more than holes in the ground, they are filled 

with a noxious mix of chemicals leading into the air, soil or water. 

The sites sit stop aquifers used for drinking water, spill into rivers 

and streams used for swimming and recreation, and contaminate 

soil where children play. Millions of people live close to the sites, 

including hundreds of thousands of children. Many of these communities are low income and comprised of people of color. 

The second legend, contending that cleanup has slowed because 

EPA did the easy sites first, is half true. It is difficult to complete 

cleanup at the biggest sites, but up until a few years ago our government rolled up its sleeves and deployed with fervor when confronted with a difficult job. Agencies did not come to Congress urging you to decrease their funding. 

This bizarre development brings us to the third legend, that EPA 

has all the money it needs. The broad-based industry taxes that 

support the program expired in 1995. President Clinton asked Congress to extend them every year he was in office. The Bush administration not only opposed extension of the tax, it has addressed 

chronic shortfalls by drawing on general taxpayer revenue and 

steadily lowering annual appropriations. In constant dollars, 

Superfund appropriations are 40 percent lower than the amount 

specified in the last reauthorization. 

Glossing over the implication of these missing resources, EPA 

and industry representatives argue that Superfund taxes are not 

only unnecessary, but onerous. The truth is that before the taxes 

expired, they raised revenues that amount to 1.79 percent of the 

2006 profits of just six of the Nation’s largest oil and petrochemical 

companies. 

As for the last legend, that responsible parties are already shouldering the Superfund burden, we confront another half-truth. At 

sites where orders were issued before today’s enforcement doldrums, responsible parties are moving cleanup along. But at countless other sites, the Nation’s most prominent and richest corporations have ignored or stonewalled their obligations. For the sake of 

those living near these sites across the Country, I urge you to support the reinstatement of Superfund taxes and continue your rigorous oversight of EPA implementation. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Steinzor follows:] 
45 

1Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 

U.S.C. § § 9601 et seq., 2I appreciate the assistance of Margaret Clune, CPR policy analyst, in preparing the original 

report and my research assistants, Michael Wright and Xochitl Strohbehn, students at the University of Maryland Law School, who helped me prepare this testimony. 3The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) is an organization of 45 academics who specialize 

in the legal, economic, and scientific issues that surround Federal regulation to protect public 

health, natural resources, and worker safety. One component of the Center’s mission is to circulate academic papers, studies, and other analyses that promote public policy based on the 

multiple social values that motivated the enactment of our nation’s health, safety and environmental laws. We seek to inform the public about scholarship that envisions government as an 

arena where members of society choose and preserve their collective values. We reject the idea 

that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of private markets. For 

more information, please see http://progressivereform.org. 4The Center for American Progress is a progressive think-tank dedicated to improving the 

lives of Americans through ideas and action. It is committed to creating a long-term, progressive 

vision for America—a vision that policymakers, thought-leaders and activists can use to shape 

the national debate and pass laws that make a difference. For more information, please see 

http://www.americanprogress.org. 5The report selected the 50 sites on the basis of the severity of contamination, their proximity 

to people, whether construction has been completed at the facility, and other criteria. See pages 

157–162 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a full description of our selection methodology. 

In the year since the report was issued, construction has been completed at two sites on the 

list: the ALCOA (Point Comfort)/Lavaca Bay in Texas and the UGI Columbia Gas Plant in 

Pennsylvania. 6As the Subcommittee is aware, completing construction does not mean that a site is finished, 

and does not pose a risk to the public. Especially where remedies are temporary, long-term monitoring, operation and maintenance are essential to ensure that risks remain contained. 7An EPA chart submitted to the subcommittee shows 47 ‘‘construction complete’’ sites in 2001, 

42 in 2002, 40 annually in 2003–2005, and 24 in 2007. These numbers are substantially less 

than annual figures for the preceding 6 years which were 68 (1993), 61 (1994), 68 (1995), 64 

(1996), 88 (1997), 87 (1998), 85 (1999), and 87 (2000). 

STATEMENT OF RENA STEINZOR, JACOB A. FRANCIS RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW; SCHOLAR, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE

REFORM

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me 

to testify today. Superfund badly needs your attention, and I congratulate the Committee for reviving the constitutional check and balance of rigorous oversight. 

I have worked on Superfund for 25 years. I was subcommittee counsel for Representative James J. Florio, widely perceived as the ‘‘father’’ of Superfund, when 

Congress last reauthorized the program. I served as a senior staff person on the National Commission on Superfund, which included the CEOs of all major stakeholders 

and negotiated a consensus reauthorization of the Superfund statute,1 only to have 

its work washed away by the Contract with America. I have represented clients liable at Superfund sites and counseled clients who wanted to avoid that fate. I teach 

Superfund law to students and have written five scholarly articles on the subject, 

as well as a report entitled The Toll of Superfund Neglect, which is the focus of my 

testimony today.2 The report was released by the Center for Progressive Reform3

and the Center for American Progress4 and is available at http:// 

www.progressivereform.org/articles/Superfund—061506.pdf. The report analyzes the 

environmental conditions and demographics of 50 of the worst sites in the nation’s 

ten most populous states.5 A list of the sites we studied is attached as Appendix 

A to my testimony. I respectfully request that the report and its attachments be included in the record for this hearing. 

LEGENDS

Senior EPA political appointees and industry representatives may or may not understand how Superfund is supposed to work. They should understand how it does 

work. Unfortunately, they are not sharing either explanation with you. Instead, they 

have created five Superfund legends that have little relationship to history or reality: 

1. Few if any sites endanger public health. 

2. Because EPA has only recently gotten down to the worst, most complex sites, 

cleanup has slowed, with the construction phase of remedial action6 completed at 

only 24 sites in 2007, as compared to 87 sites in 2000.7

3. EPA has enough money without renewal of the Superfund tax. 

4. Superfund taxes are onerous. 

5. Companies that created the sites are paying to clean them up. 
46 

8See page 71 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Normandy Park Apartments site in Hillsborough County, FL. 9Census tracks are small geographic areas averaging 4,000 people. See https://ask.census.gov. 

10See page 38 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Operating Industries 

site. 11See page 60 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Lawrence Aviationsite. 

TRUTH

The truth is that Superfund’s creators intended it to be a three-legged stool: 

1. systematic identification and prioritization of abandoned toxic waste sites all 

over the country that require cleanup; 

2. creation of a multi-billion dollar fund supported by industry taxes to both prime 

the pump for cleanup and pay for so-called ‘‘orphan’’ sites; and 

3. strict, joint, and several liability that gives responsible parties that created the 

sites compelling incentives to clean them up and allows Government to recover most 

of the money spent upfront. 

Over the last several years, EPA’s political leadership has sawed the first leg in 

half, removed the second leg, and left the third leg to rot to its core. No wonder 

the program is in trouble. 

The assertion that long-neglected Superfund sites are not harming anybody and 

can safely be neglected is ludicrous. Indeed, if the people who advance this legend 

believe it to be true, we would have a more honest debate if we discussed whether 

we could safely wind down Superfund, ending the program within some fixed 

timeline. No one wants to go there, and for good reason. 

Thousands of uncontrolled Federal and State Superfund sites plague communities 

across the Nation. Our report offers a snapshot of these conditions. Most of the 50 

sites we studied are located in heavily populated urban or suburban neighborhoods. 

Many have languished on the Superfund National Priorities List for two decades. 

Often no more than holes in the ground, they leak toxic soups comprised of hundreds of chemicals into the air, soil, or water, including PCBs, creosote, lead, 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, chromium, copper, zinc, cadmium, arsenic, mercury, and trichloroethylene. The sites sit atop aquifers used for drinking water, leak 

toxic chemicals into rivers and streams used for swimming and recreation, contaminate soil where children play with hazardous wastes, and in one particularly tragic 

and egregious case, provide the foundation for an apartment building that is still 

occupied.8

Millions of people live in the census tracts9 where the sites are located, including 

hundreds of thousands of children. Many of these communities are low income and 

comprised of people of color. Of the 50 sites we studied, 60 percent were located in 

neighborhoods where households reported median incomes in the range of $40,000 

and some 26 percent were in the midst of populations comprised of 40 percent or 

more racial or ethnic minorities. 

The second legend, contending that cleanup has slowed because EPA did the easy 

sites first, is half true. It is difficult to complete cleanup at the biggest, most contaminated sites, such as (1) the Operating Industries site, a 190-acre municipal 

landfill in the Los Angeles suburbs where millions of gallons of liquid hazardous 

waste was poured over densely packed household garbage, producing leachate that 

contains vinyl chloride, benzene tetrachoroethylene, and heavy metals10 or (2) the 

160-acre Lawrence Aviation Industries site in Suffolk County, New York, where the 

owner poured unknown quantities of TCE and acid sludges onto the ground and into 

two unlined lagoons.11

But up until a few years ago, our Government rolled up its sleeves and deployed 

the complicated technology and significant resources that are required to get difficult jobs done. Agencies in charge of such efforts did not come to Congress demanding fewer resources as these challenges became more daunting, as EPA now 

does. 

This bizarre development brings us to the third legend: EPA has all the money 

it needs to complete cleanup. The broad-based industry taxes that support the program expired in 1995. President Clinton asked Congress to extend them every year 

he was in office, and every year, the Congress refused the request. The Bush administration opposes extension of the tax and has made up chronic shortfalls by drawing on general taxpayer revenues and steadily lowering annual appropriations. In 

fiscal year 3, EPA ran through all the money left over from the years when the program was supported by industry taxes and the program has been exclusively supported by general revenues ever since. 

Not only are the wrong people paying to support a program that is starved for 

resources, crucial tasks are increasingly left undone. In constant dollars, revenues 
47 

12See page 3 of the testimony of Katherine N. Probst, Senior Fellow and Director, Risk, Resource, and Environmental Management, Resources for the Future, before this Committee at a 

Superfund oversight hearing held on June 15, 2006, available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/ 

heating—statements.cfm?id=257181. 13For information on State funding shortfalls, see EPA, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation Report No. 2004-P—00027, Some States Cannot Address Assessment Needs and Face 

Limitations in Meeting Future Superfund Cleanup Requirements (September 1, 2004), available 

at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/2004—01—2004-P—00027.pdf. 

appropriated for the Superfund program now stand at levels 40 percent lower than 

the amounts Congress specified when it last reauthorized the program in 1986.12

As any businessperson knows, it takes money to make money. Not only are there 

hundreds of sites at the Federal level that need investigation so cleanup plans can 

be made, thousands of additional sites have ended up in the states’ laps. Even if 

they wanted to, EPA and the states cannot go to court to demand responsible party 

cleanups without first completing these investigations and writing cleanup plans 

and, without more money, they have little hope of cleaning up orphan sites where 

no responsible party is available. Yet EPA has precipitously cut the funding for 

states to do the technical analysis necessary to determine what should be done 

about these hazards.13 The result is that the sites are swept out of sight, getting 

worse and worse as their public health and environmental implications are buried 

in a sea of mind-numbing, ‘‘don’t-worry-be-happy’’ EPA statistics. 

Let me give you another example. I teach at the University of Maryland School 

of Law in Baltimore. This past spring, Dr. Joshua Sharfstein, the City’s Public 

Health Commissioner, closed a popular baseball field called Swann Park after old 

documents came to light revealing that in the late 1970’s, arsenic from a nearby Allied Signal pesticide plant had blown onto the park, insinuating itself into the soil 

at toxic levels. The Maryland Department of the Environment managed to overcome 

the funding gap that has paralyzed its State Superfund efforts, and ordered that 

the park be remediated. Undoubtedly, the saga of Swann Park is but the dusting 

of snow on top of the iceberg, as we will learn over the next decades unless we resuscitate both the Federal and State Superfund programs. 

The fourth legend is that Superfund taxes are too onerous and corporate responsible parties are already paying their fair share through cleanups ordered by past 

consent decrees. Glossing over the implications of these missing resources, EPA and 

industry representatives argue that the Superfund tax would amount to double dipping against these responsible parties. 

The truth is that before they expired in 1995, Superfund taxes raised revenues 

of approximately $1.5 billion annually, or $4 million daily, from taxes on crude oil 

and chemical feedstocks and through a broad-based corporate tax. As the following 

chart shows, annual Superfund tax revenues amount to 1.79 percent of the 2006 

profits of just six of the nation’s largest oil and petrochemical companies. The CEO 

salaries of these six companies alone would cover almost 6 weeks of missing revenues. 

As for the assertion that responsible parties are shouldering the large majority 

of the burden for cleaning up Superfund sites, we confront yet another half-truth. 

At sites where cleanup orders were issued well before today’s enforcement doldrums, 

responsible parties are moving cleanup along, often at a clip faster than government-funded cleanups. But at countless other sites, some of the nation’s most prominent corporations have backed off their obligations, apparently waiting for Federal 

and State enforcement officials to come compel them to address their responsibilities. 
48 

14See Center for Public Integrity, Wasting Away, Superfund’s Toxic Legacy (2007), a series 

of reports, all of which are available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/Superfund/. 15Universal Oil Products, New Jersey, EPA ID# NJD002005106, available at http:// 

www.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/0200101c.pdf. 

An analysis by the Center for Public Integrity completed in 2007 relied on confidential EPA enforcement material to compile a list of the 100 large companies that 

have the most Superfund sites, breaking down this data to show the numbers of 

sites on the list that remain unaddressed years and even decades after listing.14

For example, the 75-acre Universal Oil Products site in East Rutherford, New Jersey was first listed in 1983 and is heavily contaminated with 4.5 million gallons of 

waste solvents and solid chemical wastes. Honeywell, the only responsible party at 

the site, is leading cleanup efforts, which have crawled along for a quarter century. 

According to the most recent EPA site description posted on the web this past February, an investigation into contamination of onsite wetlands and creek areas did 

not begin until 2005 and still are not completed.15

CONCLUSION

More than any other environmental program, Superfund is a victim of compassion 

fatigue and political doublespeak. The Federal Government and responsible parties 

have dragged their feet on cleanup for so long that it has been impossible for the 

public at large to maintain the level of outrage that propelled the birth of the program in 1980 and Congress’ decision to increase Superfund resources sixfold in 

1986. In many locations, cosmetic changes have been made ? rusting barrels have 

been removed from the surface and vegetation has reemerged on what were 

moonscapes 20 years ago. Beneath the surface, though, little has really changed. 

The toxic stews continue to circulate, moldering and spreading, adding chemicals to 

aquifers, rising to the surface of the soil as the land freezes and thaws, and releasing methane and other volatile gases. 

For the sake of those living in the census tracts containing the 50 sites detailed 

in this report, as well as the untold other people living near hazardous waste sites 

across the country, CPR urges this Committee to support the reinstatement of 

Superfund taxes and continue its rigorous oversight of the implementation of this 

vital program. 

Thank you again for inviting me. 
49 

APPENDIX A-50 PROFILED SITES 

STATE SITE NAME HRS DATE ADDED 

SCORE TOTHENPL 

California Aerojet General Corp. 54.63 Sept. 8, 1983 

Iron Mountain Mine 56.16 Sept. 8, 1983 

McCormick & Baxter Creosoting 74.86 Oct. 14, 1992 

Operating Industries Landfill 57.22 June 10, 1986 

Strin2.fellow 61.4 Sept. 8, 1983 

Texas ALCOA (Point Comfort)lLavaca Bay 50 Feb. 23, 1994 

Gulfco Marine Maintenance 50 April 30, 2003 

Jasper Creosoting Company Inc. 50 July 28, 1998 

R&H Oilffropicana 50 Proposed on June 14,2001 

Star Lake Canal 50 July 27, 2000 

New York Computer Circuits 50 May 10, 1999 

Consolidated Iron & Metal 50 June 14,2001 

Lawrenee Aviation Industries, Inc. lO Feb. 4, 2000 

Liberty Industrial Finishing 50.65 June 10, 1986 

Old Roosevelt Field Contaminated GW Area 50 May I I, 2000 

Florida American Creosote Works (Pensacola Pit) 58.41 Sept. 8, 1983 

Escambia Wood - Pensacola 50 Dec. 16, 1994 

Normandy Park Apartments 49.98 Proposed on Feb. 13, 1995 

Reeves Southeast Galvanizing Corp. 58.75 Sept. 8, 1983 

Stauffer Chemical Corp. (Tarpon Springs) 50 May 31,1994 

Illinois Circle Smelting Corp. 70.71 Proposed on June 17, 1996 

DePuelNew Jersey ZincIMobii Chern Corp. 70.71 May 10, 1999 

Indian Refinery - Texaco Lawrenceville 56.67 Dec. 1,2000 

Parsons Casket Hardware Co. 55.58 July 22,1987 

Sauget Area I 61.85 Proposed on Sept. 13,2001 

Pennsylvania East Tenth Street 67.68 Proposed on Jan. 18, 1994 

Lower Darby Creek Area 50 June 14, 2001 

Sharon Steel (Farrell Works Disp. Area) 50 July 28, 1998 

VOl Columbia Gas Plant 50.78 May 31,1994 

Watson Johnson Landfill 71 Sept. 13 2001 

Ohio Annco, Inc., Hamilton Plant 69.34 Proposed on April 30, 2003 Diamond Shamrock Corp. (Painesville Wks) 50 Proposed on May 10, 1993 

Dover Chemical Corp. 50 Proposed on May 10, 1993 Nease Chemical 47.19 Sept. 8, 1983 

North SanitarY Landfill 50 May 31.1994 

Michigan Barrels, Inc. 42.24 Oct. 4, 1989 

Bay City Middlegrounds 50 Proposed on Feb. 13, 1995 BofOJ5 Nobel, Inc. 53.42 March 31, 1989 Rockwell International Corp. 52.15 July 22, 1987 

State Disposal Landfill. Inc. 42.24 Feb. 21, 1990 

New Jersey Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc. 50.27 July 28, 1998 

CPSlMadison Industries 69.73 Sept. 8, 1983 

Universal Oil Producl5 (Chemical Division) 54.63 Sept. 8, 1983 VentronlVelsicol 5t.J8 Sepl. 21, 1984 Vineland Chemical Co., Inc. 59.16 Sept. 21. 1984 Georgia Brunswick Wood Preserving 54.49 April 1, 1997 Camilla Wood Preserving Company 50 July 28, 1998 

LCP Chemicals Georgia 60.14 June 17, 1996 

Terry Creek Drdge Spoil Areas/Herc. Outfall 50.18 Proposed on April I, 1997 

Woolfolk Chemical Works, Inc. 42.24 Aug. 30. 1990 
50 

RESPONSE BY RENA STEINZOR TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question. Your 2006 report found that some si1es with potentially responsible 

parties have waited the longest for cleanup. In your opinion, what accounts for this, 

since EPA knows who should be responsible for cleaning up these sites? 

Response. Our report concludes, and I continue to believe, that EPA lacks the political will and the resources to mount an effective enforcement effort, undermining 

the liability track of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) and congressional intent that the polluter 

should pay for cleanup. EPA lacks the political will in the sense that too many career staff believe that they do not the support of political appointees to demand that 

responsible parties undertake the financial and operational responsibility for cleanup and to go to court if those parties refuse to sign enforceable agreements. The 

Agency lacks the resources because Superfund taxes expired in 1995, and EPA too 

often Jacks the funds to assemble the technical in formation to support its case in 

court. 

RESPONSES BY RENA STEINZOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. One Thousand two hundred and eleven of the 1,569 sites on the NPL 

were listed prior to 1991. The Superfund program has been successful at cleaning 

up many of these sites. Isn’t it a result of the program and the addition of State 

programs that the number of new sites listed in declining? 

Response. I believe that EPA and the states have consciously decided not to list 

additional sites because they do not want to increase their Superfund responsibilities. These decisions are made not on the basis of environmental conditions, but 

rather on the basis of bureaucratic convenience. The program has achieved notable 

success. The trend toward lower numbers of listings do not provide reliable evidence 

that the need for a robust program to continue is waning. 

Question 2. In your testimony you comment of the argument (sic) that 10 reinstate 

the Superfund taxes on the oil and chemical industries would be ‘‘double dipping. 

‘‘ To rebut this you point to the salaries of the CEOs as justification. Do you believe 

because these companies pay their CEOs high salaries, they should be subject to 

unfair taxes? 

My testimony observes that requiring specific companies to pay to clean up sites, 

and also asking some of those same companies to pay taxes to support the program, 

is exactly the scheme that Congress in tended and does not constitute ‘‘double dipping’’ as some industry representatives have argued. Congress decided that it was 

fair to impose costs on industry. especially the oil and chemical industries, because 

they played a large role in creating the sites initially and avoided the costs of safer 

waste disposal. Congress rejected the idea that these costs should be borne primarily by the general taxpayer. Oil companies are enjoying a period of enormous, 

windfall profits, and pay their CEOs very large salaries. The large size of those profits and salaries shows that they can easily afford reinstatement of Superfund taxes. 

Question 3. In your testimony, you refer to a ‘‘bunch of mind numbing ’don’tworry-be-happy’ EPA statistics’’ that EPA allegedly uses to conceal risks to human 

health. Can you give some specific examples of this? 

Response. Ample examples of this phenomenon can be found in fiscal year Superfund Annual Report, Building on Success: Protecting human Health and the Environment, available at http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/accomp/pdfs/sf annual 

report 2007.pdf 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Professor. 

We move now to Dr. J. Winston Porter, President of the Waste 

Policy Center. 

STATEMENT OF J. WINSTON PORTER, PRESIDENT, 

WASTE POLICY CENTER 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is a real pleasure to be here today. I used to run this program, 

as some of you know, a number of years ago, including Senator 

Lautenberg certainly. I want to talk a little bit about what I see 

needs to be done to improve the program. 
51 

Certainly, ever since my day, there has been an issue of the pace 

of the program. I would say in general sites take too long and cost 

too much to get cleaned up. My background is project management 

engineering and things of that nature, so I want to come at it from 

that angle in terms of my remarks. 

Superfund is not an exact science and a lot of engineering judgment is required to clean up the sites. So I am going to talk about 

three phases, very briefly: the study phase of Superfund; the selection of remedy phase; and the construction phase. 

Now, at two thirds of the sites, construction is complete, so we 

have done something right because two thirds of the sites have 

been actually completed. On the study phase, the most important 

thing is to set deadlines. Amazingly, on a program of this type, we 

don’t seem to have firm deadlines for cleaning up the site. I think 

that is fundamental. I grew up in the engineering world, and I 

think we should share with the world, and I tried to do it in my 

way, is to put in memo form for everyone to see what is my deadline for site X, Y, and Z. I have a lot of respect for Susan, and I 

think I would like to see them do more of that. 

It is very important to identify alternatives. There are only three 

or four alternatives in a Superfund site, or maybe five or six. There 

are not thousands. It is important early in the game to identify the 

alternatives and for the responsible parties and others to get together and set deadlines to deal with the work. 

Let me give you a couple of quick examples of catching somebody 

doing something right, as they used to say. The Rocky Flats site 

near Denver is a large Federal facility site. It was scheduled to finish in something like 2040 or 2030, and cost billions and billions 

and billions of dollars. The engineering firm got together with the 

Department of Energy and the State and others and they agreed 

to finish in 2005. So from 1995 to 2005, they worked toward a specific deadline. They made it. Everyone was happy and they saved 

billions of dollars. So it can be done. 

I would like to see us actually work harder at identifying where 

things have gone right. Some things have gone right. So that is a 

good example. 

We need to have much more sense of urgency. The PRPs, responsible parties, should do the work. I would like to make a little bit 

of a sad commentary on the industrial people. That is, I would like 

to see more senior management involved with these companies. 

When I go to these sites, I see a lot of scientists and a few engineers and lots of lawyers, and that is all fine. We need all those 

people, but I think those sites would move much more quickly if 

the senior management of those companies was more involved in 

the cleanup. The theme I am trying to weave here is responsibility 

put on real individuals. That is the way you finish projects. 

I believe the removal program, as Susan said, is very important 

because it has in fact worked. Nine thousand removals have been 

done. That means going out and dealing with obvious problems. 

There is often an obvious problem at these sites, leaking barrels or 

things of that nature. 

As far as selection of remedy, I would like to also make another 

suggestion in terms of responsibility. Since my day and others’ 

days, the decisionmaking power has been delegated down further 
52 

and further into the EPA regions. I would like to see the regional 

administrators, the political appointees by the President, be it Clinton or Bush or whomever, to have a person who is their agent to 

get that site cleaned up and to deal with that site. I think we need 

to go back to that. That person should have a broad overview. That 

person may not be able to deal with all the technical factors, the 

micro-management, but the Superfund law requires things like 

community acceptance, like cost-effectiveness, State impacts, et 

cetera. They can talk about the role of land use. 

Another quick example is the Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver that I worked at quite a few years ago. The Army decided they 

were going to make that huge arsenal into a wildlife refuge, as opposed to putting houses there. That immediately made the site 

much more quickly cleaned up. If you go out to Denver nowadays, 

you will find a very nice wildlife refuge at that site. It would probably not be finished until now if we had tried to put houses there. 

The construction phase let me close with that. The $1.2 billion 

which was mentioned this morning has been around for a while, 

and Rena is certainly right. In constant dollars, it is not as great 

as it used to be, but we have also cleaned up two thirds of the sites. 

This program doesn’t need to have a flat budget in perpetuity. We 

need to put more and more focus on finishing the sites. 

I would like to be sure that Susan and others are really doing 

it, and I am a big fan of hers, but really doing a good job of being 

sure that the money is going toward cleanups. There are 3,000 staff 

members at EPA working on Superfund. That is one out of every 

four or five EPA employees working on Superfund. I am not sure 

it is one fourth of the problems in this Country environmentally 

speaking, so that caught my attention a little bit. 

Congress might want to consider supplemental appropriations for 

specific projects if they need it, but I don’t think a wholesale more 

money is needed. If anything, Superfund has had a lot of money 

over the years. I used to get $2 billion year in and year out for that 

and other hazardous waste programs. What I think we have done 

is frankly created a fairly large bureaucracy in the program and we 

need to be much more focused on the job at hand. 

In summary, I want to offer results over process. Speeding the 

pace has many benefits. The public is much happier. Hundreds of 

times I have heard in my official capacity and my consulting practice how upset the public is. Why does it take so long, in California 

or New York or wherever? I think they will be much happier if we 

look like we are really focusing on finishing. The costs to industry 

and taxpayers are less. Time is money. Sites that take 10 or 15 or 

20 years obviously cost more than a site that is completed in three 

or four or 5 years. 

And finally, the benefits. If these sites are so bad, and some of 

them are, why do we take forever to clean them up? It seems to 

me kind of counter-intuitive. If a site is bad enough to get on the 

NPL, the national priorities list, we should try to move in a matter 

of years, not decades, to get it cleaned up. 

So that is my testimony, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Porter follows:] 
53 

STATEMENT OF J. WINSTON PORTER, PRESIDENT, WASTE POLICY CENTER

Madame Chairman, my name is J. Winston Porter, and I am president of the 

Waste Policy Center in Leesburg, VA. The WPC is a private research and consulting 

organization which deals with management, policy, and technical issues in the areas 

of solid and hazardous waste management, as well as other environmental matters. 

From 1985 to 1989, I was the EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Solid Wastes and 

Emergency Response. 

It is a pleasure to be here today to provide testimony on the pace of the cleanup 

of Federal Superfund sites. I will make a number of recommendations to improve 

this pace. 

In my testimony I will draw on over 20 years of Superfund experience, including 

management of the EPA program as well as consulting activities with various Federal agencies and states and numerous private parties. My professional background 

also includes the fields of chemical engineering and project management. I will start 

with a brief background statement, followed by my recommendations related to Superfund’s study, remedy selection, and remedy construction phases in relation to improving the pace of the cleanup program. 

BACKGROUND

Briefly, the current status of EPA’s Superfund program is that about two-thirds 

of the 1,550 national priority list sites have reached the construction completed 

(remedy installed) phase, about 400 sites are in the remedy design or construction 

phases, and approximately 150 sites are in the study phase. 

In addition, many thousands of ‘‘emergency removals’’ have been conducted at 

Superfund sites in order to directly and cost effectively deal with obvious problem 

areas. This program has been perhaps Superfund’s biggest success story. 

It is also important to note that the EPA has a significant number of Superfund 

sites in the remedy construction phase for which both potentially responsible party 

(PRP) and Federal funds are limited. 

In addition to the EPA, both the Departments of Energy and Defense have major 

Superfund-related programs underway. The DOE work primarily involves a few 

dozen very large facilities, most of which have been components of the nuclear 

weapons program. The DOD sites are much more numerous, although usually less 

complex, and include both Superfund and base closure activities. 

So, a large amount of work is underway or has been completed by dedicated Federal and State personnel as well as PRPs and various private contractors. Much has 

been achieved under the Superfund program, but much remains to be done. For this 

remaining work it is important to improve program efficiency in order to ensure 

timely and technically sound cleanups in a more cost-effective manner. 

As we strive to improve the Superfund program, let me first make several general 

observations which will serve as the bases for my later recommendations. 

First, Superfund is not an ‘‘exact science.’’ Science and technology are very important in addressing Superfund waste sites, but selecting a sound remedial action at 

a site requires a good dose of common sense and ‘‘engineering judgment’’ since no 

two sites are the same. The Superfund regulations themselves require decisionmakers to consider such elements as cost effectiveness, implementability, and State 

and community acceptance in selecting a remedy. These are not primarily technical 

issues. 

Second, while much has been accomplished by Superfund, site study and remedial 

activities generally take too long and cost too much. 

Third, the trend in recent years to use the Superfund program for only the most 

complex and hazardous sites is sound. Most waste sites in the country can now be 

managed under other EPA or State programs, brownfields activities, and various 

voluntary cleanup processes. The voluntary cleanup programs should, in particular, 

be emphasized. 

Most of the following recommendations will be directed at the EPA Superfund 

program, but will also have important implications for other Federal agencies. My 

comments will be divided into study, remedy selection, and construction phases. 

THE STUDY PHASE

While the study projects related to Superfund sites are a decreasing part of the 

overall program, such activities are still very important to overall program success. 

Superfund projects usually begin with a ‘‘remedial investigation/feasibility study’’ 

(RI/FS). This complex study process is described in some detail in Superfund’s primary regulation ? the National Contingency Plan. 
54 

Very briefly, the RI portion calls for characterization of the site in terms of its 

natural features, as well as the amount and location of contamination and likely 

risks of such contamination to both public health and the environment. The FS part 

involves identification of alternative remedial actions, and then comparison of such 

alternatives against a set of nine remedy selection criteria. 

Based on the RI/FS process, as well as substantial stakeholder input, EPA then 

selects a remedy for the site through a ‘‘record of decision’’ (ROD) process. 

In general, the RI/FS process has become steadily more complex and lengthy over 

the years, for almost all types of sites. My recommendations for conducting faster, 

less costly, and more technically sound RI/FSs are as follows: 

1. Most importantly, timeframes for completing the study phase 

should be agreed to by the EPA and other key participants, 

such as PRPs. 

Unfortunately, at many sites the study work simply meanders around for many 

years without much focus or mid-course corrections, leading to wasted time and 

money, and ,in some cases, an unimaginative or non-cost-effective remedy selection. 

Frankly, part of this lengthy process has to do somewhat with the fact that Superfund has become something of a ‘‘jobs program’’ for various consultants, lawyers, 

and governmental agencies. All of these specialists are needed, but their work needs 

to be more directed toward results rather than complex processes. 

Stated differently, there is often little sense of urgency in completing the study 

phase due, in part, to the lack of a senior ‘‘champion(s)’’ to complete the work. This 

is, or course, very frustrating to the communities involved. I would like to see such 

‘‘completion champions’’ developed in both the governmental and private sectors at 

Superfund sites. 

Some very complex Federal and private sites will require longer study periods, 

but for most sites about 2–3 years should be adequate to produce a sound RI/FS. 

To improve matters, early in the RI/FS process the EPA, PRPs, and other relevant 

organizations, should work together to set a clear goal to complete the study activities. This end date can be modified if necessary, but it is important for all to understand that, like almost every other type of engineering project, schedule (and budget) are key factors and should be adhered to. 

There are a number of examples of the success of target setting in Superfund, but 

perhaps the most dramatic has been the DOE Rocky Flats Closure Project, near 

Denver. For this site the ‘‘completion contractor,’’ Kaiser-Hill, and the DOE agreed 

upon a 2005 target date for all study and remedy implementation work to be completed. If successful, the contractor was to receive a completion bonus. Not only was 

the project completed on time, but billions of dollars and many decades of time were 

saved. This work, of course, required good cooperation among the DOE, EPA, the 

State of Colorado, local stakeholders, and the contractor. The firm completion target 

date greatly focused this cooperation. 

Finally, this project illustrates the importance, for both study and construction 

work, of the site personnel developing what I have referred to as a ‘‘culture of completion.’’ 

2. When the RI/FS process begins one of the first orders of business 

should be to use experienced staff and key stakeholders to 

quickly identify about 4–7 major remedial action alternatives. 

During this phase use should be made of EPA’s list of ‘‘presumptive remedies’’ for 

many types of problems, as well as experience gained at similar Superfund sites. 

The selected set of alternatives can always be modified during the study phase, 

but the current process which often involves ‘‘taking data’’ for many years before 

detailed focus on remedial options often leads to overly costly information, much of 

which may not be needed. Also, since the data collection is often not focused on comparing alternative remedies, the key information to compare such alternatives is 

sometimes missing. 

An iterative approach should be used where information collection and analysis 

of remedial alternatives work cooperatively in order to achieve sound comparisons 

of options, leading to a good remedy selection. 

Even more importantly, the identification of key options early in the study process 

allows the decisionmakers and stakeholders to begin their dialog on the non-technical factors which are contained in the remedy selection criteria. These include 

such items as cost-effectiveness, implementability, and State and community accept-
55 

ance. Many times these types of factors are at least as important as the strictly 

technical matters, such as precise levels of contamination for dozens of substances. 

3. Significantly streamline the process for developing the myriad of 

deliverables at Superfund sites. 

While certain documents are clearly needed to guide the RI/FS activities, the long, 

tedious process of developing complex draft and final work plans, for example, 

should be expedited. This is also true of dozens of other ‘‘deliverables’’ which take 

so much time at Superfund sites, many of which should be quite standard by now. 

It might be helpful to revisit the need, or at least the complexity, of such 

deliverables. 

To increase the pace of Superfund site cleanups, we need to develop a ‘‘culture 

of completion,’’ as opposed to a ‘‘culture of deliverables.’’ It might even make sense 

to develop incentives of some type to encourage such completions. 

There are several perverse effects which have led to such lengthy periods for document development and review. One has to do with the fact that Superfund is about 

the only Federal environmental program where responsible parties have to pay for 

additional oversight beyond that which salaried regulators normally provide. Thus, 

if a group of PRPs are forced to give EPA, say, $5 million for oversight, then EPA 

can retain contractors to provide hundreds of pages of ‘‘comments’’ on such items 

as the aforementioned work plans. So, we now have dueling contractors battling 

over many pages of detailed text, before work can even begin. 

One near term answer would be for review periods and oversight dollars to be reduced substantially, so participants can focus more on results than elaborate processes. 

4. The PRPs should be encouraged to conduct the RI/FSs themselves with their own contractors and under EPA’s overall supervision. 

While this concept has been largely accepted and successfully promoted by the 

EPA, more could be done to encourage PRPs to do the study work, particularly 

where PRPs would commit to more reasonable timeframes than EPA often takes for 

its own studies. 

A key aspect of PRP-conducted studies has to do with selection of appropriate consulting firms to conduct the necessary RI/FS activities. Such contractors have a difficult role in that they need to be responsive to their client, the PRPs, but must also 

provide the objective and professional work needed by EPA to allow selection of a 

sound and cost-effective remedy for the site in question. 

The key is for the EPA, the relevant state, and the PRPs and their consultants 

to develop a cooperative and results-oriented relationship for the site work. 

THE SELECTION OF REMEDY PHASE

The RI/FS process discussed above presents the decisionmaker with detailed comparisons of alternative remedial actions, from which this person must select a remedy, present it to the public for comment and make a final determination. The selection of protective, cost-effective remedies is, of course, a key to the overall success 

of the Superfund program. My suggestions in this area are as follows: 

1. The decisionmaker should be a very senior EPA official who can oversee all of 

the considerations which go into remedy selection. As noted earlier, technical factors 

are very important in this process, but non-technical factors are also key. For example, if there is very strong community opposition to a particular remedial action, or 

if a remedial option is not cost-effective, such factors must be considered by the decisionmaker. 

During my tenure as an EPA assistant administrator I made a number of ROD 

decisions, mainly at ‘‘nationally significant sites.’’ Most decisions I delegated to the 

ten EPA regional administrators (RAs). However, over the years the ROD decision 

responsibility has, in most cases, been delegated further down the line in the EPA 

regions. 

My own view is that the RA should usually be the decisionmaker in this important process since he or she is the one who can speak for the region and has the 

position and stature to consider all aspects of the problem, while ‘‘pushing’’ the staff 

to provide the necessary information to complete remedy selection expeditiously. 
56 

2. The role of expected land use should be an important factor in 

selecting a remedy. 

While all remedies should be protective, it does not make much sense to demand 

that a cleanup be sufficient for, say, a children’s daycare center, when the site is 

slated for use as a golf course, or a factory, or a wildlife preserve. All of these uses 

have their own requirements, so we do not need a one-size-fits-all approach to waste 

sites. The goal should be for a site to always be protective, so the remedial action 

may need to be modified at a later date if the site use changes dramatically. 

During Superfund’s history one of the better examples of the role of land use in 

remedy selection has to do with the DOD’s Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. 

For this site, the DOD decided ultimately that the land use would be for a wildlife 

refuge, not residential housing. Once this decision was made the DOD, Shell Oil, 

EPA, and the State and local stakeholders worked together to select the remedy and 

move quickly into the implementation phase, and a important wildlife refuge is the 

result. 

Another DOD example may also be instructive with respect to the land use issue. 

This has to do with the DOD’s Superfund-related remediationsites versus those conducted under the base closure program. Simply stated, the base closure cleanups, 

including the selection of remedy, seem to proceed much faster than those related 

to Superfund. One of the reasons, I believe, has to do with the fact that local communities and others are usually highly motivated to finish base closure cleanups in 

order to bring the affected land into productive use. The same time pressure often 

does not exist with Superfund remedial activities. 

THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE

As noted earlier, the major activity these days has to do with the construction 

phase at Superfund sites. About 400 sites are in the phase where the selected remedy is being either designed or constructed. Currently, this is also the most controversial phase in that EPA apparently does not have sufficient funds to expeditiously complete all of the construction work now planned. 

This is particularly true for so-called fund-financed sites where EPA must install 

the remedy itself as there are insufficient willing and able PRPs to conduct this 

work at some sites. This issue is further compounded by the views of some that at 

a significant number of sites the community may not be fully protected since construction funds are not readily available. 

The following are my recommendations on these construction-phase issues: 

1. The roughly $1.2 billion dollars which is annually appropriated to EPA by Congress should be looked at very carefully by EPA senior management to ensure that 

the highest priority is given to protecting human health and the environment by ensuring that Superfund sites are completed. 

2. If Congress is satisfied that EPA has done all it can do to squeeze out funding 

for as many construction sites as possible, then it might consider a supplemental 

appropriation to EPA to focus on additional construction activities. 

3. The EPA might selectively revisit the ROD decisions made at selected sites to 

see if some savings can be made based on new information or technology. 

4. Although I suspect that this is already being done, that portion of the site 

which may provide actual, near term risk to the community should receive very high 

priority for funding. 

5. While aiming at the highest risks is always the most important priority, I personally believe that where sites can be finished for modest sums of money, such 

funding should be considered, as there are usually site ‘‘carrying charges’’ which can 

then be reduced. 

6. The EPA and others should be creative in finding non-Federal funds for completing sites. In some cases, local developers or others may be so interested in having access to a completed site that they may be interested in helping financially. 

This type of financial driver has, of course, been instrumental in dealing with 

brownfields sites, which can often be very valuable when cleanup measures are completed. 

7. Other creative measures should be pursued in the future to minimize costs and 

to develop more creative financing. A good example is the joint EPA and Army 

Corps of Engineers eight pilot programs referred to as the ‘‘urban rivers restoration 

initiative.’’ In this program the EPA and the Corps, along with State and other 

agencies, work together to achieve a better and more cost-effective restoration program than by using Superfund alone. 
57 

8. Finally, it was mentioned earlier in this testimony that the emergency removal 

program has been one of Superfund’s major successes. This program can deal with 

obvious contamination problems anytime during the Superfund process, with much 

less process costs than the remediation program. Given, this program’s success, Congress might consider allowing EPA to spend more than the current limit on individual removal actions. 

Implicit in all the above is the fact that I don’t believe that the chemical and petroleum feedstock taxes should be renewed on Superfund. These taxes are unfair in 

that they target only two industries, which together account for much less than half 

of Superfund’s contamination problems. Also, Superfund sites are a broad societal 

problem which has been created by many types of industries; local, state, and Federal agencies; and even individuals. 

Therefore, I believe the current process of requiring directly responsible parties 

at a site to fund the necessary work at that site is the best approach. For those 

sites, where responsible parties are not available, willing, or able financially to conduct the work general revenues are the most equitable approach, given the widely 

varied causes of contamination at such sites. EPA also has strong legal authorities 

to seek reimbursement from known responsible parties who are able, but not willing, to do the work in question. 

Madame Chairman, I hope my remarks will be helpful to Congress in dealing 

with this important program, and I will be happy to answer any questions which 

you might have. 

RESPONSES BY J. WINSTON PORTER, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Do you believe there are certain decisions related to Superfund sites 

that shouldbe made by high level EPA officials rather than career staff in the regions?Why? 

Response. Yes, I do believe that certain decisions related to Superfund should be 

made by highlevel EPA officials, usually the Assistant Administrator or Regional 

Administrators.These officials have much more authority to set priorities than the 

career staff and abetter overview of the situation. Having said that, the input of the 

career staff is veryimportant and should be listened to carefully by the senior officials. 

Question 2. Why do you think the pace of cleanups was apparently faster during 

the ClintonAdministration? 

Response. The pace of the cleanups was somewhat faster during the Clinton Administration for two primary reasons: (a) The Assistant Administrator during much 

of the Clinton Administration was Tim Fields who made it clear that his major priority was completing construction at Superfund sites. Tim, who formerly reported 

to me when I was the AA during the Reagan Administration, is very knowledgeable 

about Superfund and pushed hard with the staff to complete sites and (b) the push 

to complete sites during the Clinton days did lead to concentration on ′′easier′′ sites 

to finish. Many of the current sites are more complex ones. 

Question 3. Would more money for EPA be a significant factor in speeding up 

cleanups? 

Response. I don’t think more money would make much difference in the pace of 

Superfund cleanups. It is more important in my opinion to place more emphasis on 

completing sites and to be sure significant funding is not spent on non-site, administrative activities, which are usually large in the Superfund program. Also, the number of remaining sites in Superfund are getting smaller and $1.2 billion, or so, annually is still a lot of money. I am somewhat afraid that more money will yield more 

bureaucracy, not faster cleanups. 

Question 4. What are the one or two items which you think would be the most 

helpful inincreasing the pace of Superfund cleanups? 

Response. The two items which would be most helpful in increasing the pace of 

Superfundcleanups are: (a) setting visible deadlines for completing sites, and (b) 

having senior EPAofficials directly involved in pushing the pace of cleanup, and held 

accountable for theresults. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Porter. 

Next, Bradley Campbell. Mr. Campbell was very active at the 

EPA and the Council of Environmental Quality in the 1990’s. We 

appreciate your being here. 
58 

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL, PRINCIPAL, 

BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL, LLC 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator CLINTON. And the Commissioner of New Jersey. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the 

Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here, and I am grateful that 

this Subcommittee is focused on what I view as a vital program for 

protecting public health in our communities. 

As the Chairman suggested, my background includes more than 

18 years of work on this program in various roles as regional administrator and White House lead counsel for the Clinton administration Superfund reforms, and as a State commissioner having to 

work cooperatively with EPA to get sites cleaned up. 

I think from those perspectives, I can say with some certainty 

that the flaws that the members of this Committee have identified 

in this hearing are very clearly the flaws of the program today. It 

is badly managed, it is underfunded, and enforcement is on the 

wane in the last 6 years of this Administration. 

With all due respect to Administrator Bodine and certain members of the Committee in terms of the pace of cleanup, the composition of the national priorities list and the list of sites and actions 

that are in the funding queue didn’t change overnight in 2000. 

However, the management of the program did and the pace of 

cleanup did, going in half from more than 85 site completions over 

the 4-years immediately preceding, to 42 or less ever since. That 

is an enormous change. The list didn’t change, but the management did. 

Second, on funding, it is obviously very difficult to decipher 

sometimes the language of Superfund. You have to know the code. 

There are numerous times when sites are ready to fund, simple excavations are ready to fund, but you will see on an EPA site that 

is in engineering or in design. Frankly, in New Jersey at some of 

the sites I will discuss, there are simple excavation remedies that 

have been in design for the length of time it would take a high 

school senior to get an engineering degree. 

I think in those cases, it is fair for members of this Committee 

in their oversight, and as Senator Lautenberg knows well, to infer 

that something else is going on, and that something else is typically a funding shortfall obscured by the bureaucratic language 

suggesting that there is still work to be done before it is ready to 

fund. 

Of course, these are reinforced by failures of enforcement, which 

has occurred at numerous sites in New Jersey, which I discuss in 

my testimony. 

Each of these factors—the failures of enforcement, the failures of 

funding, the failure to manage, to complete protection of the community at these sites—is mutually reinforcing. If management isn’t 

sending the message from the top that these sites have to be completed, there is little institutional incentive to take needed enforcement action. There is little need for funding because essentially 

management is not sending the signals. Those failures have very 

real impacts for public health and the environment. 

I highlight in my testimony a number of sites where cleanup actions are ready to fund, but the communities are still waiting after 
59 

years and years for cleanup to begin. The Imperial Oil facility, 

which I mention in my testimony, repeatedly EPA representations 

that a simple excavation remedy, removing contaminated soils that 

are adjacent to densely populated communities, are still being designed; in that case, 8 years to design a simple remedy. It is simply 

not credible. 

In the case of the Cornell-Dubilier site, with open dumps of capacitors containing PCBs in the midst of an area where there are 

hundreds of families. I have a chart that just gives you some sense 

of the levels of contamination. These are onsite soils. The offsite 

soils are relatively similar. This is the State standard to protect 

public health. These are the levels at the site, and yet there are 

numerous actions at the site that are waiting to be done and are 

unfunded. 

At the Roebling Steel site, literally a site that has been in hiatus 

for years, very simple remedy, not a complex complicated remedy 

that takes years to decide, but one where the cleanup actions have 

been decided and have been decided for years. And yet for 4 years, 

the cleanup actions that were ready to go simply were in the funding queue and the public was told that they were awaiting design, 

even more devastating, in those sites that affect low-income and 

minority communities. I applaud the Chair for her bill linking the 

environmental justice issues to the Superfund cleanup issues. 

In the Ringwood site, which Senator Lautenberg has visited numerous times, a Native American community waited and waited for 

EPA to respond to its calls to remove contamination from in and 

around their homes. When EPA failed to enforce, I took action and 

in 3 days we removed more material under State law from around 

the homes than EPA had been able to remove in 30 years. And 

even now, as the community has asked for more actions by the 

Ford Motor Company, EPA, to my chagrin, continually sides with 

the company over the community and over my successor, Commissioner Jackson, in terms of the studies that are needed; in terms 

of the needed actions to protect human health. 

An even sadder story on the Passaic River. We have levels of 

dioxin that are creating enormous risks for low-income, mostly nonEnglish speaking communities along the Passaic River. And yet 

year after year, EPA’s decision is to do more studies. Only after the 

State took action under its enforcement authorities, funded its own 

remedy, did EPA begin to move away from a schedule that contemplated a decision no earlier than 2011, with remedies coming 

in 2013. 

Each of these circumstances I think highlights those three flaws 

of this program. They are not a function of more complex sites. 

They are not a function of the changed nature of the NPL. They 

are functions of bad management and a failure to commit to the 

funding that is needed and the enforcement that is needed to protect public health in our communities. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:] 

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL, PRINCIPAL, BRADLEY M. CAMPBELL, LLC 

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you this morning to testify on the Superfund program’s capacity to protect public heath. I am Bradley M. Campbell, currently an environmental attorney and consultant and president of Bradley M. Campbell LLC and Minotaur Consulting LLC. 
60 

My testimony today is informed by more than 18 years of work with the Superfund program spanning the administrations of three Presidents. As an attorney with 

the United States Department of Justice from 1990 to 1995, I tried or participated 

in many of the seminal liability cases under statute, and also served as the Department’s lead attorney for Superfund reauthorization and reform during the 103d 

Congress. As Associate Director of the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), I helped coordinate the Clinton administration’s positions on Superfund 

and brownfield legislation during the 104th Congress. While at CEQ, I also worked 

directly with the Environmental Protection Agency to develop and implement the 

Clinton administration’s Superfund reform and brownfields initiatives. 

In 1999, President William Jefferson Clinton appointed me Regional Administrator of EPA’s Region 3, where I was responsible for oversight and implementation 

of the Superfund program in Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. I served as regional administrator until the 

change of administration in 2001. 

In 2002, I was nominated by the Governor of New Jersey and confirmed by the 

New Jersey Senate as Commissioner of New Jersey’s Department of Environmental 

Protection, a position in which I served for 4 years ending in January 2006. In this 

role, I was responsible for protection of human health and the environment in a 

State that has more sites in Superfund’s National Priority List (NPL) than any 

other. 

Currently, I am in private practice as an attorney and consultant, where I continue to interact with the program on behalf of municipalities, responsible parties, 

and environmental and community organizations. 

In these varied roles, I have seen firsthand how important the Superfund program 

can be in protecting communities from toxic threats, in returning contaminated sites 

to productive use, and in renewing the economy and fabric of communities. I also 

have understood, through the work of Members of this Committee and the testimony of those who live near Superfund sites, many distinct failures of the program 

throughout its history. 

SUPERFUND TODAY: THREE AGENCY FAILINGS

1. Overview 

There has been a common thread in both Superfund’s successes and its failures. 

Simply put, this is a program that is highly sensitive to EPA’s agency leadership 

on cleanup pace, to levels of funding, and to the program’s enforcement emphasis. 

In the first years of the Superfund program, Congress responded directly to program failures of leadership, funding, and enforcement in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Four years later, Administrator William K. 

Reilly initiated the ‘‘90-day review,’’ which resulted in additional reforms and the 

start of an ‘‘enforcement first’’ policy that accounted for the first significant increase 

in the pace of remedial work under the program. 

When the 103d Congress failed to enact President Clinton’s broadly supported 

proposals for Superfund reauthorization and reform legislation, Administrator Carol 

Browner implemented a sweeping set of management and policy reforms to address 

the broad range of challenges identified during the legislative process. This second 

wave of reform included, among other achievements, EPA’s highly successful 

Brownfields Program. 

While the number and scope of these reforms are beyond the scope of this testimony, they can be fairly described in the mantra that all of us working on those 

reforms heard and repeated often: Superfund cleanups had to be faster, cheaper, 

and fairer. The success of the effort was easy to document, however, in the sustained increase in the pace of Superfund cleanups that resulted unfortunately, over 

the last six and a half years, the program has suffered from the current administration’s approach to management, funding, and enforcement. 

• Pace of Cleanup: EPA has effectively abandoned any management focus on 

maintaining a reasonable pace of cleanup completion. By EPA’s own statistics, the 

pace of cleanup progress has been cut roughly in half as measured by construction 

completions. While the use of this program measure has had its critics, the agency’s 

failure to manage the program to maintain the pace of cleanup is documented by 

other measures as well. 

• Funding: Closely linked to the pace of cleanup is the level of funding. Over the 

past 6 years, shortfalls in funding at sites where remedial work is ready to start 

have been more numerous and more pronounced. As a consequence, bureaucratic 

delay in the cleanup process has been encouraged, or has been used as a veil to obscure funding shortfalls. 
61 

1Source: EPA 2007. See also Katherine N. Probst and Diane Sherman, Success for Superfund: 

A New Approach for Keeping Score (Resources for the Future, 2004)(Probst & Sherman) at 2 

(‘‘the number fo new construction complete sites has decreased quite dramatically in the new 

millennium’’). 2See Jophn Pendergrass and Katherine N. Probst, Estimating the Cost of Engineering Controls (Environmental Law Insitute and Resources for the Future 2005). 3Probst & Sherman 6—9. 

• Loss of enforcement ethic: In the absence of clear and transparent goals for 

cleanup completion, and in the absence of funding for the agency to assume the lead 

for cleanups when responsible site polluters are uncooperative, EPA has been far 

less willing to use the powerful enforcement tools the statute confers on the agency, 

and less willing to compel responsible polluters to perform more thorough or more 

comprehensive cleanups. 

2. Pace of Cleanup 

Through a combination of Administrator Browner’s program reforms, imposition 

of clear management goals, and the full funding of the Superfund through the 

Superfund tax, EPA achieved a remarkable pace of 85 or more construction completions each year in the 4 years ending in fiscal year 2000. In the preceding 4 years, 

as a consequence of Administrator Reilly’s ‘‘enforcement first’’ program and Administrator Browner’s early leadership, the annual number of construction completions 

averaged more than 65. 

By contrast, in the 4 years ending in 2006, the current administration has 

achieved construction completion at 41 or fewer sites each year.1

This decline in program efficacy was as sudden as it has been stunning in magnitude. In response, EPA leaders and others have suggested that the decline in construction completions is attributable to the fact that remedial remaining NPL sites 

cleanups are larger and more complex than those in preceding years. 

This explanation is deficient for a number of reasons. First, the composition of the 

NPL did not change overnight in 2000, but the pace of cleanup and the agency leadership clearly did. 

Second, some of EPA’s most ambitious and complex site cleanups, such as the 

Hooker Chemical or Love Canal site, were among the sites at which the agency 

achieved construction completion and, in the case of Love Canal, deletion from the 

NPL. 

Third, any change in the complexity or scale of cleanup challenges at sites where 

communities still await construction completion is offset by EPA’s increasing reliance on institutional or engineering controls in lieu of permanent remedies, compared to earlier phases of the program. Institutional controls typically reduce both 

the cost and time required for major cleanups to achieve construction completion. 

While EPA’s dependence on institutional controls gives rise to serious concerns 

about the reliability of Superfund remedies and long-term protection for affected 

communities,2 it is beyond dispute that the expanded use of institutional controls 

enables EPA to maintain the pace of cleanup even if, as current agency leaders assert, remaining cleanup challenges are more complex or larger in scale. 

Fourth, as some of the examples in the second half of my testimony help illustrate, many of the cleanups that await completion are utterly commonplace in nature, presenting no unusual challenges of complexity or scale. 

I acknowledge that ‘‘construction complete’’ is an imperfect measure of program 

success in protecting public health, as some of the programs most trenchant analysts have noted.3 Yet whatever the limitations of ‘‘construction complete’’ as a program measure, it is the only readily available and transparent indicator of program 

success. It remains the measure that the current administration itself holds out as 

an appropriate measure of success, and so it should remain among the standards 

by which the performance of the agency leadership is judged. 

Moreover, other significant indicators of program efficacy reinforce this measure. 

In New Jersey, for example, more than half of the sites that lack construction completion have uncontrolled human exposure pathways or uncontrolled groundwater 

migration, risks that are almost always eliminated by construction completion. 

While there is no longitudinal data to determine how this figure has changed over 

time, it tends to reinforce the virtue of using ‘‘construction complete’’ as a milestone 

of program efficacy. 

These broad observations about the changed pace of the program are borne out 

by the very different approaches to the program that I experienced first as an EPA 

Regional Administrator in 1999—2001 and that I experienced later as DEP Commis-
62 

sioner from 2002–2006 in New Jersey, the State with more Superfund NPL sites 

(140) than any other. 

During my tenure as an EPA regional administrator, EPA’s national Superfund 

program goals were clearly communicated by the agency’s national leadership and 

incorporated in regional and site-specific management of the program. These goals 

also were reflected in our cooperative work with our State counterparts. As a consequence, everyone at EPA from headquarters to the field learned to focus on resolving impediments to clean up and, where consistent with public health protection, 

to accelerate the pace of cleanup. 

When I became DEP commissioner in 2002, it was apparent in working with the 

Superfund program that EPA had little or no agency initiative or senior management emphasis on maintaining or improving the pace of cleanup. New Jersey’s requests for EPA to step up the pace at particular sites were generally unproductive. 

Conversely, EPA rarely requested State action to hasten cleanup progress or accelerate construction completion, requests I made often during my own tenure at EPA. 

3. Funding Shortfalls 

The pace of cleanup is closely tied to the availability of funding. There has been 

long recognition due to EPA’s success in the late 1990’s at achieving a construction 

completion rate of 85 or better that the Superfund would have to be replenished and 

funding expanded. This was reflected both in President Clinton’s repeated calls to 

reinState Superfund taxes, and in budget proposals that included significant expansion of program funding to meet the accelerated pace of cleanup. 

During my tenure as a Regional Administrator, I never had to delay or defer 

cleanup actions because funding was unavailable. During my later tenure as DEP 

Commissioner, EPA repeatedly told me that cleanup would be delayed because of 

funding shortfalls. In addition, there were numerous occasions in which proposed 

remedies were rejected for trivial or pretextual reasons because funding was not 

available to proceed with cleanup. In one case, EPA staff shared with me internal 

emails in which they were directed to find a technical basis to reject a remedy because funding was not available. In other cases, the message was less explicit but 

no less clear, as some of the examples in the second half of my testimony illustrate. 

4. Diminished Enforcement 

Even with clear management goals for cleanup pace and adequate funding, the 

pace of the Superfund program depends vitally on strong enforcement. 

This principle was embedded in EPA policy as ‘‘enforcement first’’ during the tenure of Administrator Reilly, and this policy shift transformed the program from one 

in which approximately two-thirds of cleanups were led by EPA using Superfund resources, to one in which responsible polluters took the lead in funding and performing cleanup at two thirds of NPL sites. 

With responsible parties in the lead at the majority of NPL sites, use of enforcement tools is essential to maintaining the pace and quality of cleanup. EPA must 

be willing to use its unilateral order authority to compel responsible polluters to 

perform protective and expeditious cleanups, and must be prepared to use the 

threat of treble damages if EPA must assume control of the cleanup in place of the 

responsible party. 

EPA’s willingness to use its enforcement tools is critical not merely for completing 

cleanups, but also to compelling interim measures to control hazardous substances 

and to cutoff pathways to human exposure. My experience in dealing with EPA as 

New Jersey’s DEP Commissioner was that EPA’s willingness to use the enforcement 

tools Congress has given the agency has waned significantly over the past 6 years. 

At several New Jersey NPL sites, I had to threaten enforcement action under State 

law in order to prompt responsible parties to enter a consent order with EPA to implement interim measures to stop ongoing pollution to ground and surface waters. 

Of course, the agency’s enforcement posture in the cleanup context is difficult to 

quantify and generally opaque to the public. My experience, both as New Jersey 

DEP Commissioner and subsequently as a private attorney, as the examples in the 

second part of my testimony suggest, has been that the current EPA leadership is 

rarely willing to order responsible parties to perform remedial activities at an accelerated pace or to order remedies that are more protective than those that the responsible polluters are willing to perform. 

Of course, these three failings of the current program are closely related. In the 

absence of clear management oversight to maintain or accelerate the pace of cleanup, there is little institutional incentive at EPA to take aggressive enforcement action. When funding is short, the resources to support potential enforcement litiga-
63 

tion are more limited, the ability to resolve enforcement disputes through the use 

of mixed public and private funding is eliminated, and the credibility of EPA’s most 

potent threat, that of taking over the disputed cleanup and asserting treble damage 

liability against the responsible polluter, is greatly diminished. 

SUPERFUND TODAY: THE EXPERIENCE ON THE GROUND

The combination of management failure, funding shortfalls, and diminished enforcement now manifest in EPA’s administration of the Superfund program are not 

abstract failures to meet bureaucratic program measures. Rather, they are failures 

that have direct and grave implications for public health in our communities, for 

economic growth and renewal in communities saddled with contaminated sites, and 

for the quality of life in communities that already have waited far too long for Superfund’s promise of protective cleanups. 

Moreover, there is a ‘‘downstream’’ effect of these failures on hundreds of sites beyond those on the NPL. For years, State agencies like New Jersey had enormous 

leverage to compel prompt cleanup at NPL-caliber sites because responsible polluters sought to avoid the greater cost, public attention, and stigma associated with 

NPL listing and remediation under Federal requirements of the National Contingency Plan (NCP). As the Federal program has become less focused on cleanup completion, hampered by funding shortfalls, and less willing to use enforcement tools, 

the potential for listing on the NPL is no longer a strong driver for responsible polluters to complete protective cleanups under State law. 

The following examples, drawn from my experience over he past 6 years, should 

highlight how the broad program trends outlined in the first part of my testimony 

directly and adversely impact New Jersey’s communities. 

1. Passaic River Dioxin (Diamond Alkali) 

Nearly 27 years after the passage of Superfund, and more than 23 years after site 

listing on the NPL, dioxin deliberately and unlawfully dumped in the Passaic River 

from the Diamond Alkali site in Newark, New Jersey continues to spread down the 

river and throughout the Newark Bay estuary. With each tide, the dioxin spreads 

further throughout the system. With each tide, and with each year of sediment, the 

cleanup challenge becomes more difficult and more expensive. To date, EPA has proposed no interim or final action to address the dioxin contamination in the river. 

The toxic threat presented by this site has not been cured by fish advisories, even 

though DEP took the lead in posting more effective warning signs, and in funding 

extensive outreach to communities to make them aware of dioxin risks. Scores of 

New Jerseyans, predominantly in non-English-speaking communities, continue to 

take the crabs as subsistence, failing either to understand or to heed warnings in 

multiple languages. On the New York side of the estuary, no warnings or take prohibitions are posted at all. Levels of dioxin in blue claw crabs are such that one 

could only safely eat one crab in 20 years. In a risk estimate developed at DEP and 

reviewed by EPA, cancer risks for those taking the crabs for consumption were estimated to exceed one hundred percent, meaning the exposed populations were at risk 

of multiple cancers over their lifetime. Prior to my start at DEP, neither EPA nor 

DEP made any significant effort to publicize these risks or to compel the responsible 

companies to address the dioxin contamination. 

For decades, EPA’s pattern had been to do years of studies, take years to review 

the studies, and then order additional rounds of studies on the basis that newer 

data was needed, never asking more than the responsible polluter was willing to 

do early in my tenure as Commissioner of DEP, I joined with EPA and other Federal agencies in a ‘‘Passaic River Restoration Initiative’’ or PRRI, authorized by Congress with the stated intention of accelerating remedial work on the river. In the 

context of that initiative, New Jersey repeatedly urged EPA to accelerate the development of remedial options, to no avail. EPA consistently interposed the need for 

more study, and cited the failure to fund the legislative initiative as an additional 

cause of delay. 

I then personally met with the leading regional scientists who had studied the 

contamination. They presented a clear and strong consensus that the data needed 

for a remedial decision was available and delay for further study would only allow 

the extent of contamination to expand. When I renewed my press for early action 

to address the contamination, EPA circulated a revised draft schedule promising a 

remedial decision in 2013 and remedial action in 2015. 

New Jersey then made clear to EPA that we intended to issue our own order 

under State authority requiring the principal responsible party to develop, design 

and engineer an appropriate remedial measure to reduce dioxin loadings within a 
64 

4I must note my disagreement with the recent conclusion, by EPA’s Inspector General, that 

the past failures had nothing to do with minority and low-income composition of the community. 

year, making clear that our decided preference was for EPA to act or for EPA and 

the State to develop an order together. Again, EPA refused, even as they asserted 

that their own intention was to develop remedial options within a year. 

Throughout the process, EPA cited the lack of funding available to proceed with 

the process if a major dispute were to arise with the responsible parties, and exhibited a steadfast unwillingness to use its enforcement tools to compel the responsible 

parties to design remedial measures within a reasonable timeframe. 

Only after New Jersey issued its independent order, retained outside counsel to 

enforce the order, and committed its own funds to the design of a remedy, did EPA 

finally begin to pursue a reasonable schedule for the cleanup they had neglected for 

nearly thirty years. Happily, Governor Jon Corzine took office and expanded the 

funding for this effort under my able successor, Commissioner Lisa Jackson. 

But the pattern of delay has not ended. Just recently, EPA once again postponed 

long-overdue remedial action on the river by deferring, until next spring, a review 

of its remedial options by the agency’s remedy review board. The dioxin will spread 

further, remedial options will be made more expensive by another year of sedimentation, the day when fish and shellfish will be healthy to eat will recede further 

into the future. And, most tragically, the health of scores of New Jerseyans will remain at great risk for years to come. 

2. Ringwood Mines 

For years, the Ford Motor Company dumped paint sludge from its manufacturing 

operations in old mine shafts and uncontrolled dump sites in Ringwood, New Jersey, 

leaving waste bearing lead and other toxins over more than 500 acres in the small 

Borough of Ringwood. The population of Ringwood numbers 13,000, and still 

fewer—less than a hundred ? live in the immediate vicinity of the waste, but runoff 

from the sites migrates to the Wanaque Reservoir, which serves more than 2 million 

New Jersey residents. 

Ringwood and the predominantly low-income families living near the waste had 

long complained about the adequacy of Ford’s cleanup effort, but EPA and DEP ignored these complaints for years.4 As a result of effective advocacy by the Borough 

and local residents, and a superb investigative series by the Bergen Record newspaper, the community called my attention to the failures of the cleanup at the site. 

New Jersey DEP undertook a renewed investigation, and found enormous volumes 

of paint waste left in plain sight, adjacent to and inside the yards of local families, 

where toxic exposure has been a fact of life for these residents for decades. 

The regulatory failure at both the Federal and State levels that allowed this site 

to be de-listed from the NPL is a tragedy of terrible proportions, and one not attributable to the current program. I credit EPA and its Regional Administrator, Alan 

Steinberg, for responding to our calls to visit the site, for promptly recognizing that 

this site should be re-listed on the NPL, and for requiring Ford to initiate a new 

and more comprehensive cleanup. 

Yet even in the aftermath of extraordinary agency failure, and EPA’s recognition 

of the programmatic failure that left a distressed community at risk for years after 

the site was deleted from the NPL, the cleanup process at Ringwood is hampered 

in this second cleanup by funding shortfalls and lax enforcement. 

Despite the earlier failure to give the community an adequate voice in the cleanup, EPA from the outset refused our request for technical assistance grants that 

would enable to community effectively to participate in the cleanup. Despite Ford’s 

clear responsibility for the site and its earlier failures to perform an adequate cleanup, EPA has repeatedly sided with Ford and against the citizens and the Borough 

in the cleanup process. 

For example, both the community and current DEP Commissioner Lisa Jackson 

have asked for seismic studies to determine the impact of the waste and the cleanup 

process on local ground stability, because local residences have been plagued with 

sinkholes in the area of the contamination. Rather than compel Ford to perform this 

needed work, EPA sided with Ford and against DEP and the community in deeming 

the work unnecessary. 

When Ford responded to the re-listing of the site by asserting liability against the 

tiny Borough that had helped bring the egregious failures by Ford and EPA to light, 

EPA again sided with Ford, and to this day has failed to enter a settlement that 

would appropriately limit the Borough’s exposure to hostile litigation by Ford. 

Here as elsewhere, EPA has demonstrated little willingness to compel more cleanup work than the responsible polluter is willing to offer its taxpayers, has been un-
65 

willing to use its enforcement tools to ensure complete cleanup or to protect the Borough, and has not provided or required Ford to provide the funding needed for the 

community to participate fully in the cleanup. 

The long-suffering Borough of Ringwood and its residents, it appears, will suffer 

still longer. 

3. Imperial Oil 

The Imperial Oil/Champion Chemical site encompasses 15 acres surrounded by 

residential neighborhoods in Monmouth County, New Jersey. Past operations at the 

site included waste oil reprocessing and agricultural chemical production, and the 

legacy of those operations include waste oil, PCBs, and arsenic contamination. This 

contamination has extended offsite and into a nearby creek. While there has been 

some removal of contaminated soils from areas outside the fenced-in boundary of the 

site, the remediation of the onsite contamination at the site of the former Imperial 

Oil facility has been continually postponed due to lack of funding. EPA has relied 

primarily on a fence to protect the local community and curious children from onsite 

contamination at the facility. 

The impact of funding shortfalls in the Superfund program has been especially 

apparent in EPA’s management of the third phase or ‘‘operable unit’’ of the cleanup 

(Operable Unit 3 (OU3). The Record of Decision (ROD) for OU3, which finally determines the cleanup plan, was signed in 1999. New Jersey DEP assumed the lead for 

the design and engineering of OU3, and this work was substantially completed in 

2001. 

From 2002 onward, EPA continually rejected completed design work for OU3 on 

trivial or pretextual grounds, while making clear the funding was unavailable for 

the site even if EPA were to approve the designs. EPA staff inadvertently forwarded 

to DEP staff internal correspondence in which EPA technical staff were directed to 

find a technical basis to reject DEP’s OU3 design, because funding would not be 

available for some time. Over time, New Jersey’s complaint over this impasse and 

the funding shortfall became more vocal, joined by members of New Jersey’s congressional delegation. 

In 2006, EPA simply took over the lead for the site. Notably, but not credibly, the 

agency reports on its website that it is still ‘‘designing’’ the relatively straightforward excavation remedy provided by OU3. 

This is a site that is entirely dependent on adequate funding by the Superfund 

program, the responsible parties being largely insolvent or defunct. While EPA’s 

public descriptions of the site suggest that it has taken the last 8 years for two different agencies to design and agree to a remedy for a simple soil excavation, the 

reality is that the cleanup delays are attributable to inadequate funding and failure 

to manage for construction completion. 

4. Roebling Steel 

Another site where cleanup depends entirely on program funding and has been 

delayed repeatedly is the sprawling Roebling Steel site, encompassing five hundred 

acres along the Delaware River in Florence Township, New Jersey. All of the funding available from the responsible party was recovered in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 

proceeding in 1992. 

The site is at the heart of the Township’s plans for economic redevelopment, a 

fact highlighted by EPA’s award of a $100,000 planning grant for reuse of the site 

and its stated willingness to enter a prospective purchaser agreement (PPA) with 

potential redevelopers. But neither the modest planning grant nor a PPA can overcome the principal obstacle to redevelopment of the site: protracted delays in EPA’s 

cleanup of the site. 

Despite repeated requests by DEP and the Mayor of Florence to EPA to fully fund 

cleanup at the site, remedial activity at the site went into an extended hiatus 

throughout my 4 years as commissioner. EPA staff privately attributed the hiatus 

to funding shortfalls, whereas EPA’s public summaries of cleanup progress suggest 

that delays are due to design of the relatively straightforward remedial action selected for the site. Here again the remedy ‘‘design’’ process serves as a veil to obscure the agency’s current failures of management and funding. Here again, the 

remedy still-to-be funded is a simple excavation, presenting no unusual complexity. 

As at Imperial Oil and Cornell-Dubilier (discussed below), the relatively uncomplicated nature of the remedial work that remains to be funded belies EPA’s claims 

that construction completions have slowed due to the nature of the remedy rather 

than management failure or funding shortfalls. 
66 

EPA’s own portrayal of the site on its web pages illustrates starkly the extent of 

delay. The third remedial action selected for the sight was completed in 1994. EPA 

currently projects that design, not construction, of the fourth remedial action will 

be completed in the fall of 2007 ? 13 years later. While other work, including a revetment along the river, has been completed in the interim, little or no work occurred for more than 5 years. 

Given this pattern of funding shortfalls and cleanup delays over the past 6 years, 

the Township of Florence can have no optimism as to whether and when the site 

will be available for redevelopment and returned to productive use. Prospective purchasers have little or no reason to choose redevelopment of this site over available 

greenfield sites. And the site continues to be a source of toxic loadings to the adjacent Delaware River. 

5. Berry’s Creek/Universal Oil Products 

As the Passaic River example illustrates, the failures of management, funding, 

and enforcement that mark the current Superfund program appear especially pronounced at contaminated sediment sites, even where (as on the Passaic) the contamination at issue is primarily attributable to a single polluter. Current program 

failures at these sites adversely affect not only surrounding human and natural 

communities, but also hamper the good-faith efforts of responsible companies to 

complete their cleanup work and resolve their liability. 

The Berry’s Creek Superfund provides a New Jersey example of this problem. At 

this site, remedial actions for the land portion of the site progressed, but the cleanup process for the mercury contamination of marsh and river sediments has languished for years. At this site, one of the responsible parties repeatedly sought to 

accelerate the pace of remedial investigation and feasibility studies, but found that 

after many years EPA had done little more than have the responsible party fund 

a literature search. 

In response, the responsible party took the unusual step of asking New Jersey 

DEP to assume the lead for the cleanup and undertake an accelerated remedial effort. While New Jersey DEP’s own program for hazardous site cleanup already was 

overburdened, the good faith of the company in making this overture persuaded me 

to make the request of EPA, either to have the State take over the lead or to jointly 

develop an accelerated approach with EPA. EPA flatly rejected this request, but the 

fact of the request demonstrates the level of frustration with the current program 

pace even among responsible parties. 

EPA did finally begin remedial investigation of the marsh and creek in 2005, but 

there is little prospect of a remedial decision in this decade if current program approaches continue. 

5. Cornell-Dubilier 

The severity of Superfund funding shortfalls is further illustrated by the fact that 

even sites with ongoing human and ecological suffer long delays in the queue for 

funding. 

Located in South Plainfield New Jersey, the Cornell-Dubilier Electronics site has 

more than 540 residents living within one quarter of a mile of the site, and the site 

includes direct surface water connections to ecologically sensitive tributaries of the 

Bound Brook. 

EPA has undertaken numerous emergency response and remedial actions at the 

site, but funding shortfalls have delayed a number of major remedial actions called 

for by the record of decision signed in 2004. In particular, there is an open and uncontrolled dump of capacitors that comprises, by EPA’s own description, the most 

contaminated portion of the site. 

This phase of the cleanup should have proceeded no later than 2005, but due to 

funding constraints and the cleanup of the capacitor disposal area is not projected 

by EPA to take place until later this year. In addition, expanded cleanup of commercial and residential areas has progressed at an unduly slow pace ? by all accounts 

because of inadequate funding. 

In the interim, both the public and sensitive natural resources are being exposed 

to PCBs, heavy metals, and toxic organic compounds. 

CONCLUSION

Both broad statistics and the experience of states on the ground are consistent: 

the Superfund program has lost its focus on completing cleanup work, is hamstrung 
67 

by funding shortfalls, and is unwilling to make full use of the enforcement tools 

Congress as given the agency. 

The consequences for public health and the economy of affected communities in 

New Jersey are profound. So too, are the consequences for New Jersey DEP, already 

managing far more hazardous sites than its resources permit. 

I am grateful to the subcommittee for focusing its attention on this vital public 

health and environmental challenge. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Campbell. 

Next, Michael Steinberg, Senior Counsel of Morgan, Lewis and 

Bockius, and Outside Counsel to the Superfund Settlements 

Project. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. STEINBERG, SENIOR COUNSEL, 

MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP, AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL, SUPERFUND SETTLEMENTS PROJECT 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members of 

the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here this morning on behalf of the Superfund Settlements Project. 

Superfund is far from perfect, but I believe it functions more effectively today than it has during most of its life. Today, responsible parties are cleaning up most of the sites on the NPL and they 

are paying the full cost of those cleanups. It hasn’t always been 

that way. At the orphan sites, where there are no responsible parties, EPA uses the so-called trust fund to pay for cleanups. 

This morning, I would like to address three issues: health risks, 

financial management, and listing sites on the NPL. 

First, Superfund is doing a better job than you might think in 

reducing risks to public health. In fact, most NPL sites no longer 

pose current health risks. How do we know this? Because Superfund has already eliminated human exposure to unsafe levels of 

contamination at those sites. Without exposure, there is no risk. 

Now, that is a pretty basic point, but it sometimes gets overlooked. For example, the report issued last year by Professor 

Steinzor looked at 50 NPL sites and said that they all posed major 

health risks. In fact, that report looked at proximity, not exposure. 

Again, proximity alone is not the same as exposure. Half of those 

50 sites are listed by EPA as having human exposure under control. That means EPA found no exposure to unsafe levels of contamination at those sites—not in the air, not in the soil, and not 

in the groundwater or the surface water or the sediment. Again, 

without exposure, there is no risk. 

Of course, no one is suggesting that we walk away from those 

sites. They still need to be cleaned up. But when we look at the 

competing needs of other Federal programs that protect public 

health and we try to establish priorities for getting things done, we 

need to remember that most NPL sites no longer pose current 

health risks. 

Second, if we look at how EPA runs the Superfund program, I 

would echo some of the comments made earlier that there is a 

pressing need for stronger financial management. My written 

statement offers a few recommendations that would conserve EPA’s 

appropriation for use at sites where there are no responsible parties. I would like to focus this morning on just one of those recommendations. 
68 

A big chunk of EPA’s Superfund appropriation each year is consumed by support offices that are not involved in cleanup. I am not 

talking about administrative overhead. I am talking about things 

like the Office of Inspector General, and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. These offices provide what are basically shared 

services to all of EPA’s programs. Superfund alone has its appropriation raided to pay for those services, and these raids add up to 

some $200 million each year, again some 15 percent of EPA’s budget for Superfund, going to offices that are not involved in cleanups. 

We would urge that this spending be sharply reduced beginning 

in Fiscal Year 2008. This is the most direct and logical way to free 

up more money for the program’s core mission of working on NPL 

sites that lack responsible parties. 

Third and last, let’s look at the NPL. Listing a site on the NPL 

creates a long-term financial obligation for Superfund. So before a 

site is listed, we should ask whether other approaches might work 

just as well or even better. For example, the State’s voluntary 

cleanup program might encourage responsible parties to move forward with a faster and more efficient cleanup. EPA agrees in concept, and that is why they call the NPL the tool of last resort. But 

it is difficult to tell whether EPA is looking at those other approaches before it lists a site. 

If you open the Federal Register and you look at a proposed listing, you will notice that EPA never says why it wants to list the 

site. It doesn’t say whether it has looked at other approaches. This 

means that communities and interested parties can’t submit meaningful comments on proposals to add sites to the list. 

Whatever EPA’s reasons for listing sites, the real need here is for 

transparency. Every proposed listing should say why EPA wants to 

list the site and whether it looked at other approaches besides the 

NPL. This way we will ensure that EPA is considering alternatives 

and we will avoid using Superfund resources for sites that can be 

addressed effectively through other programs. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:] 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. STEINBERG, SENIOR COUNSEL, MORGAN, LEWIS AND

BOCKIUS LLP, AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL, SUPERFUND SETTLEMENTS PROJECT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Superfund today is a mature program that has addressed most of its original 

workload. Construction of the remedy has been completed at most of the sites on 

the National Priorities List, and even more NPL sites have human exposure under 

control. 

Today, private parties are cleaning up most of the sites on the NPL, and they are 

paying the full cost of those cleanups. The Trust Fund is used to pay for the ‘‘orphan 

sites’’ where no responsible parties can be found to perform the work. 

Despite Superfund’s many accomplishments, there is still room for improvement. 

By strengthening its financial management controls, EPA can and should do more 

with its annual Superfund appropriation. 

Specifically, EPA should conserve more of its annual appropriation for the core 

mission of the Superfund program—completing long-term cleanup at NPL ‘‘orphan 

sites.’’ Among the key steps EPA should take are these: 

• spend less money on support services from EPA offices that are not involved 

in actual site cleanups; 

• provide all stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to comment on proposed additions to the NPL; 
69 

1EPA considers ‘‘cost-effectiveness’’ only to a limited extent. 40 C.F.R. 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(D) 

(2006). EPA does not consider the more fundamental questions as to the relative costs and benefits of alternative remedial actions. See generally State of Ohio v. United States EPA, 997 F.2d 

1520, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (‘‘there is nothing in section 121 [of CERCLA] to suggest that selecting permanent remedies is more important than selecting cost-effective remedies’’). 2This includes ‘‘orphan sites’’ where the responsible party is insolvent, or has been exempted 

from liability by Congress. The Trust Fund is also paying for general informational and outreach 

programs such as technical assistance to community groups, research and development, remedial and brownfields policy development, and public participation. 3The Superfund budget is about 50 percent bigger than the budget for the Food Safety and 

Inspection Service, which protects the nation’s meat, poultry, and egg products. 

• exercise centralized management control over remedy selection decisions that 

shape Superfund’s long-term financial obligations; 

• spend less money on oversight of work performed by experienced private parties; and. 

• spend less money on non-emergency removal actions. 

INTRODUCTION

The Superfund Settlements Project (‘‘the Project’’) appreciates the opportunity to 

share with the Subcommittee some industry perspectives on the Superfund program 

as it operates today. The Project is a not-for-profit association of major companies 

from various sectors of American industry. It was organized in 1987 in order to help 

improve the effectiveness of the Superfund program by encouraging settlements, 

streamlining the settlement process, and reducing transaction costs for all concerned. 

The members of the Project share an extraordinary degree of practical, hands-on 

experience with the Superfund program. They have been involved at literally hundreds of Superfund sites across the country over the last 25 years. Representatives 

of the Project have testified before Congress on many occasions regarding various 

aspects of the Superfund program. The Project has also played an active leadership 

role in the national policy debate over many Superfund issues, and has been a 

strong supporter of EPA’s Superfund Administrative Reforms since they were announced in 1995. 

Collectively, the Project’s members have spent well over six billion dollars onsite 

cleanups and site studies since 1980. That spending covered not only the companies’ 

own shares of liability, but also sizable shares attributable to other parties that 

were defunct, insolvent, or otherwise unable to pay their fair shares. On top of that, 

these companies also paid out hundreds of millions of dollars more in Federal 

Superfund taxes during the first 15 years of the program’s life. All told, these companies have paid far more than any fair or equitable measure of their actual responsibility for the contamination at these sites. 

OVERVIEW

Superfund is a mature program that has largely accomplished its goals, albeit at 

a cost that was not always justified by the risks being addressed.1 The gaps in environmental regulatory programs that led to the creation of many Superfund sites 

have been filled by the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery 

Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act. Given the substantial deterrent effect 

of those statutes, Congress has a right to expect that fewer sites are being created 

that will require remediation in the future, and this is consistent with our experience. 

Today, private parties are cleaning up most of the sites on the National Priorities 

List (‘‘NPL’’), and paying the full cost of those cleanups. The Superfund Trust Fund 

is paying for cleanups at the ‘‘orphan sites’’ where no responsible party exists.2

Superfund has also largely addressed its original workload. Significantly, construction of the remedy has already been completed at most of the sites on the NPL. 

Today, Superfund is working on the remaining NPL sites, which include some of the 

largest, most complex, and most challenging sites. 

In this statement, we first describe the evolving partnership between EPA and industry that has enabled the Superfund program to achieve notable successes, particularly since EPA’s announcement of major administrative reforms in October of 

95. Then we turn to some of the pressing challenges currently facing Superfund. 

The central theme that connects all of these challenges is the need for EPA to 

manage its annual appropriation more effectively than it does today.3 Currently, 

EPA: 
70 

• transfers a significant fraction of its appropriation each year to EPA support offices that are not involved in actual cleanup work; 

• assumes new long-term financial obligations each year with little transparency 

and limited review by senior management; and 

• spends money each year on projects that are not high priorities and activities 

that are not essential. 

In sum, EPA is not yet managing its Superfund ‘‘income’’ or ‘‘expenses’’ as well 

as it can. In the spirit of constructive criticism, we offer today a series of recommendations aimed at helping EPA address these challenges. In particular, EPA 

should: 

• conserve more of its annual Superfund appropriation for long-term cleanup 

work at NPL sites that have non-performing PRPs; 

• provide greater transparency for its new NPL listings; 

• exert greater management control over the key cleanup decisions that increase 

Superfund’s long-term financial obligations; and 

• reduce unnecessary spending on oversight and non-emergency removal actions. 

I. SUPERFUND TODAY REFLECTS A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP

BETWEEN EPA AND INDUSTRY. 

Although the Superfund program has generated extraordinary levels of controversy and criticism, EPA has, over time, developed institutional capability and 

expertise, solved problems, improved relationships, and ultimately established a program that performs a critical function in society. To be more specific: 

• tens of thousands of contaminated sites have been evaluated; 

• short-term removal actions have been taken at several thousand of those sites; 

• longer-term remedial actions have been completed at most of the non-Federal 

sites on the NPL; 

• construction is underway at most of the remaining NPL sites; and 

• human exposure is under control at most NPL sites. 

Superfund—once a topic of intense public concern, dominated by controversy and 

emotion—has fundamentally achieved its objectives and accordingly has receded in 

the public focus. Today a general public recognition exists that at most sites, the 

actions that should be taken are being taken. 

In the process and in recent years, EPA has also worked to improve relationships 

with Potentially Responsible Parties (‘‘PRPs’’) and has minimized its previously 

confrontational approach to private parties. For the most part, there now exists an 

atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect. EPA should be commended for its 

accomplishments in this field. 

It should also be recognized that industry has made major contributions to the 

success of this program. At site after site across the country, companies rose to the 

challenge. They organized PRP groups, established committees within those groups, 

investigated the conditions of contamination, and developed action proposals. Once 

EPA selected the remedies, those companies carried out remedial actions, and today 

they are managing long-term operation and maintenance at most sites. They provided the leadership, the technical resources, and the funding to perform required 

work at an ever-increasing percentage of contaminated sites. That percentage is now 

greater than 70 percent of NPL sites. 

Welcoming the more cooperative spirit that EPA has demonstrated since adoption 

of the administrative reforms in 1995, those companies have themselves taken pride 

in the results of this program. They have earned the right to be regarded as constructive partners in the achievement of success under Superfund. They will continue to be constructive partners in addressing other sites through other cleanup 

programs. 

Despite Superfund’s notable successes, however, the program still has considerable room for improvement. In particular, EPA can and should be more efficient 

with the money it receives each year from Congress. Accordingly, in the spirit of 

constructive criticism, we describe below several ways in which EPA can direct more 

of its annual Superfund appropriation to the core mission of completing long-term 

cleanup at NPL ‘‘orphan sites.’’ Importantly, all of the measures that we recommend 

here are steps that EPA can take without the need for legislative action or rulemaking. 
71 

II. EPA SHOULD CONSERVE MORE OF ITS SUPERFUND APPROPRIATION

FOR CLEANING UP NPL ‘‘ORPHAN SITES.’’ 

Currently, some $200 MM/yr of EPA’s annual Superfund appropriation is directed 

not to the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (‘‘OSWER’’), but to other 

EPA offices that provide varying degrees of indirect support to the Superfund program. These other offices include: 

• Office of Research and Development (‘‘ORD’’); 

• Office of Administration and Resource Management (‘‘OARM’’); 

• Office of the Chief Financial Officer (‘‘OCFO’’); 

• Office of Inspector General (‘‘OIG’’); 

• Office of Policy and Environmental Information; and 

• Office of General Counsel (‘‘OGC’’). 

The net effect of these transfers is that nearly one-fifth of the total Superfund appropriation is diverted to other EPA offices that are not actually involved in cleaning up any Superfund sites. Congress should find this unacceptable, for several reasons. 

First, $200 million is a lot of money, particularly in comparison to the total 

amount that EPA actually spends on cleanup work. For example, the amount transferred to other offices in fiscal year was about the same as the total amount that 

EPA spent that year on Remedial Design and Remedial Action at NPL sites—the 

core mission of the Superfund program. In essence, Superfund has been spending 

about as much on indirect support in non-Superfund offices as it has been spending 

on actual cleanup of NPL sites. 

Second, the dollar amounts of these annual transfers to other offices were established years ago. These amounts apparently have not been revisited in light of the 

current level of program support that is actually needed from these other offices. 

Thus, it is not clear that these allocations reflect Superfund’s current needs, or that 

they reflect sound management decisions about the wisest use of public funds. 

Third, we know of no sound policy reason why the Superfund program should pay 

for the support of OARM, OCFO, and OIG, among others. These support offices provide shared services to EPA’s many programs, which is why these offices are directly funded by Congress as part of EPA’s annual appropriation. The current practice of having the Superfund program pay for these shared services is a glaring departure from the normal practice, both at EPA and throughout the Federal Government. 

Finally, apart from the magnitude of these transfers to other offices, the transfers 

are open-ended, in the sense that any funds not actually used by the offices receiving the transfer apparently remain available for their use in subsequent fiscal years. 

Any funds not actually used in a given year should be returned to OSWER at the 

end of that year, so that they may be used on cleanups. 

For all of these reasons, we recommend that EPA scrutinize its use of the annual 

Superfund appropriation and conserve more of that money for the core mission of 

the Superfund program. 

III. EPA SHOULD MAKE ITS NPL LISTINGS FOCUSED AND TRANSPARENT. 

Each new site listed on the NPL imposes long-term financial obligations on the 

Superfund budget for many years to come. We believe that new sites should be listed on the NPL only after (1) a specific finding that they require Federal intervention 

because no other options will work (‘‘the tool of last resort’’), and (2) a transparent 

process that allows the public to comment fully on the listing. We address these two 

points in turn. 

A. NPL LISTING SHOULD REMAIN THE ‘‘TOOL OF LAST RESORT.’’ 

In thinking about the purpose and scope of the NPL, it is helpful to bear in mind 

the lessons learned during the past 25 years in three main areas: 

• the universe of contaminated sites; 

• the alternatives available for addressing those sites; and 

• the strengths and weaknesses of the Superfund NPL program. 

We briefly address each of these points below, before explaining why the NPL is, 

and should remain, the ‘‘tool of last resort.’’ 

First, experience has dramatically changed our knowledge about the number and 

character of contaminated sites throughout the country, as well as the risks associ-
72 

4See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Protection ? Meeting Public Expectations With Limited Resources 17—18 (1991) (GAO/RCED—91—97) (health risks from contaminated sites ranked relatively low by EPA scientists, but relatively high by the public). 5This same approach should also govern NPL delistings or deletions. It makes little sense to 

keep a site in the NPL universe once it no longer meets the listing criteria. 6Similarly, EPA should discontinue its ‘‘Superfund Alternative Approach,’’ which brings sites 

into a parallel program where they compete with NPL sites for resources. 

ated with them. Rather than facing a few hundred sites, each of which was initially 

believed to pose severe threats to public health, it now is clear that we have a great 

many sites, most of which pose relatively small, if any, risks. For example, one EPA 

count of potential Brownfield sites indicated over 600,000 sites perceived to be affected by contamination, the great majority of which either are being addressed 

through State programs or pose no severe or immediate risk to human health or 

to the environment. These factors mean that instead of ‘‘making a Federal case’’ out 

of each site, the framework for response should emphasize state, local, and private 

efforts, rather than ‘‘making a Federal case’’ out of each site. 

Second, there are now more ways to address contaminated sites than when Superfund was enacted in 1980. Virtually all states have developed their own ‘‘miniSuperfund’’ programs and voluntary cleanup programs that have achieved success. 

In addition, at the Federal level, EPA’s RCRA corrective action program governs 

thousands of operating facilities, and another program covers underground storage 

tanks. 

Third, Superfund has attached a lasting stigma to some sites and the communities that surround them. In many cases, Superfund has also imposed excessive 

operational, legal, and financial restrictions on these sites that will interfere with 

their future reuse or redevelopment. Moreover, the cost at which Superfund has 

achieved results ? some $35 billion in EPA appropriations alone since 1980, and at 

least that much more in private sector spending—is widely viewed as far higher 

than necessary or justified in light of the risks being addressed. 

In hindsight, it seems clear that many sites addressed under Superfund did not 

present major risks to human health or the environment.4 Instead, sites were listed 

on the NPL based on fairly crude assessments of their potential risks. Once a site 

is listed on the NPL, however, the focus shifts from risk reduction to ‘‘cleanup,’’ 

where progress is much slower and completion is maddeningly elusive. Ironically, 

this focus on ‘‘cleanup’’ often delays or limits the risk reduction that should be Superfund’s focus. 

In light of this experience, it is clear that the NPL should be the tool of last resort—a tool that because of its unique nature should only be used in those situations that require such a high-cost, inefficient mechanism. EPA adopted this term— 

‘‘the tool of last resort’’—some years ago as its unofficial policy, but then failed to 

communicate this policy clearly in its actual NPL listings. As we show below, the 

resulting lack of transparency makes it difficult for local communities or other interested parties to understand why some sites are listed and others are not. 

The circumstances warranting use of the Superfund NPL as ‘‘the tool of last resort’’ include sites that: 

• are severely contaminated; and 

• pose immediate or severe risks; and 

• have no near-term prospect of cleanup by viable PRPs. 

Apart from the sites that meet the above criteria for NPL listing, nearly all other 

sites should be managed under other programs, including the RCRA corrective action program and the full range of State cleanup programs. If those other programs 

are viewed as deficient in some respects, then those programs should be improved, 

rather than shifting sites to Superfund and thereby removing the incentive to remedy the perceived shortcomings of those other Federal and State programs.5

Importantly, it is fully expected that PRPs—private companies, as well as governmental departments and agencies—will continue to perform and fund cleanups at 

sites they have contaminated. The point here is simply that Superfund is not the 

appropriate mechanism to address most of these sites.6

We now turn to the process that EPA uses to list sites on the NPL, with a focus 

on the need for transparency regarding the reasons why sites are being listed at 

all. 
73 

7EPA’s Federal Register notices give the names and locations of the sites EPA proposes to 

list on the NPL, but they never explain what EPA hopes to accomplish by listing the sites. See, 

e,g., 72 Fed. Reg. 53,5—(September 19, 2007) (proposing to list 12 new sites on the NPL without 

giving any reasons for doing so). 

B. EPA SHOULD GIVE ALL STAKEHOLDERS A MEANINGFUL 

OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON LISTINGS THAT ARE 

TRANSPARENT. 

When it comes to transparency in government, more is better. Yet considering the 

importance of NPL listings, EPA’s approach is relatively opaque—EPA never explains why it lists sites on the NPL. 

EPA adds sites to the NPL each year. Yet EPA does so without offering any explanation of what it seeks to accomplish by listing the new sites, what other option(s) 

it considered for addressing those sites, or why it believes the other option(s) were 

inadequate.7 Because EPA refuses to reveal its thinking, local communities and 

other interested parties have no opportunity to submit meaningful comments on 

proposed NPL listings. 

To address this deficiency, EPA should include in each proposed NPL listing a 

statement that describes the other approaches that EPA considered for addressing 

the site (e.g., State voluntary cleanup program). EPA should also explain why it believes NPL listing is the best approach for each site. 

Based on that statement, the public could then submit comments that address the 

full range of possible approaches to a site. Such comments might point out the availability of other approaches to getting the site cleaned up. EPA would then consider 

those comments before making a final decision on whether or not to list the site. 

The net result would be a huge increase in transparency, without any added cost 

or delay. 

In sum, strong centralized management of the NPL listing process will help insure that the NPL remains ‘‘the tool of last resort,’’ so the Superfund will be conserved for orphan sites. Second, greater transparency in the listing process will help 

ensure that EPA has considered all viable options for addressing a site. 

IV. SENIOR MANAGERS AT EPA HEADQUARTERS SHOULD BE ACTIVELY

INVOLVED IN KEY DECISIONS ABOUT SITE CLEANUPS. 

After NPL listings, the next most important decisions in the Superfund program 

are the selection of final cleanup plans for NPL sites. Each year, EPA issues new 

Records of Decision (‘‘RODs’’) that select remedies for NPL sites around the country. 

As a practical matter, each new ROD imposes financial obligations on the Superfund budget for years to come. If a site has no viable PRPs, or if the PRPs fail to 

step forward, then EPA eventually ends up paying for the cleanup. In this way, each 

new ROD effectively controls some of Superfund’s future spending. Given the high 

cost of some cleanups, these ‘‘commitments’’ can amount to tens of millions of dollars. 

Because the RODs are so important in shaping Superfund’s long-term financial 

needs, the senior program officials at EPA Headquarters should review them closely 

before the final decisions are made. But that is not the norm today. Instead, EPA’s 

Regional Offices usually have the final say on these cleanup decisions. 

Specifically, under an EPA delegation of authority dating back to 1994, most new 

RODs are signed by Division Directors in the 10 Regional Offices. Review by senior 

program management at EPA Headquarters is typically quite limited. For all practical purposes, EPA Headquarters does not actively manage the rate at which the 

Superfund program takes on new financial obligations each year. 

We recommend that EPA take several actions to address this problem: 

• revise its delegation of authority so that senior managers at EPA Headquarters 

review new RODs before they are signed; 

• expand its National Remedy Review Board so the Board can review more sites 

and help insure that future remedy decisions are consistent with decisions at similar sites, technically sound, and, as required by section 121(a) of CERCLA, cost-effective; and 

• revisit and expand its use of the Fund-balancing ARAR waiver, the ‘‘inconsistent applications of State standard’’ ARAR waiver, and the Technical Impracticability ARAR waiver to facilitate the selection and prompt implementation of costeffective remedies. 
74 

8See Using RCRA’s ‘‘Results-Based Approaches and Tailored Oversight Guidance’’ When Performing Superfund PRP Oversight (December 22, 2006). Having belatedly embraced the policy 

of ‘‘tailored oversight,’’ EPA now needs to develop training and communications tools to ensure 

that this new policy takes hold in the 10 Regional offices. This will be made more difficult by 

the bureaucratic reality noted earlier: the EPA Regions are accustomed to a highly decentralized 

system where Headquarters has delegated most of the key decisionmaking authority. 9K. Probst, et al., Superfund’s Future—What Will It Cost? at 25, Table 2—4 (2001). 

V. EPA SHOULD SPEND LESS ON OVERSIGHT OF WORK PERFORMED BY

EXPERIENCED PRIVATE PARTIES. 

A decade ago, then-EPA Administrator Carol Browner recognized that EPA devotes excessive contractor dollars and excessive full-time equivalent personnel to duplicative technical work and to monitoring the studies and cleanup work performed 

by private parties (‘‘oversight’’). In a 1995 Administrative Reform, and again in guidance a year later, Administrator Browner pledged a 25 percent reduction in oversight at sites with capable and cooperative PRPs. 

Despite that 1995 proclamation, however, EPA has yet to implement the necessary across-the-board reduction in oversight spending, or even institute a tracking 

system for its own oversight spending. In fact, EPA only recently embraced the general policy of tailoring oversight levels to reflect the experience of the private party 

and its contractor, the complexity of the site, the nature and strength of any public 

concern, etc.8 In our experience, EPA typically performs the same amount of oversight of PRPs that have successfully performed numerous cleanups at other sites as 

it did many years ago when those PRPs were just beginning to work on Superfund 

sites. Clearly EPA could free up additional resources for remedial construction at 

NPL sites by fulfilling its 10-year old pledge to reduce substantially its oversight 

of work performed by experienced private parties. 

VI. EPA SHOULD REFOCUS THE REMOVAL PROGRAM ON ITS ORIGINAL

PURPOSE OF ADDRESSING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. 

The Superfund removal action program was designed primarily to address emergency situations that required an immediate response. Yet today, relatively few removal actions involve emergencies. 

In fact, most removal actions now consist of so-called ‘‘time-critical’’ actions, where 

EPA believes that work should be commenced within 6 months, and ‘‘non-time-critical’’ actions, where there is even less urgency involved. Of the 2,440 removal actions that EPA selected during the period from fiscal year through fiscal year 9, a 

total of 1,892 (77.5 percent) were either ‘‘time-critical’’ or ‘‘non-time-critical’’ actions.9

Thus, less than one-fourth of all removal actions involved emergency situations. 

Given the availability of other Federal and State cleanup programs, it appears that spending some $250 MM/yr to perform primarily non-emergency actions is not 

a wise use of the Superfund budget. Superfund removal actions should focus on 

those sites, orphan or otherwise, that need immediate action to address actual emergencies. 

The point here is not to launch a debate over the precise contours of the term 

‘‘emergency.’’ Rather, the idea is to limit the removal program to sites that present 

an emergency under some reasonable definition of that term. Most Superfund removal actions today, by EPA’s own definitions, do not involve emergencies in any 

sense of the term. Accordingly, the removal program should be refocused on its 

original purpose. 

RESPONSE BY MICHAEL W. STEINBERG TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. The Superfund statute gives EPA the role of helping to protect the 

public interest by ensuring that cleanups are done right, so that families can safely 

raise their children and communities can safely use their land. In your testimony, 

you call for reducing such oversight. How would inadequate cleanups be addressed 

if reduced oversight results in problems with cleanup? 

Virtually all potentially responsible parties (‘‘PRPs’’) recognize and agree that appropriate oversight of investigative and cleanup work performed by PRPs constitutes an essential safeguard toward assuring proper performance of the work and 

enhancing public confidence. That said, however, the manner in which oversight has 

been performed under Superfund has long been a source of friction between EPA 

and PRPs. 
75 

EPA’s Superfund program grants to the Remedial Project Managers in the Regions extremely broad discretion to tailor their level of oversight activities based on 

a host of site-specific variables, including the complexity of the site, the particular 

phase of the Remedial Investigation of Feasibility Study (‘‘RlfFS’’) or Remedial Design of Remedial Action (‘‘RDfRA’’) work involved, and the caliber of the PRP technical team that is performing the work. Despite this inherent flexibility, however, 

EPA oversight spending has frequently reached excessive levels in relation to the 

scope and cost of the work being performed. Of particular concern are direct contract expenditures to pay for the services of EPA’s oversight contractors. 

In general-and recognizing that major differences exist from Region to Region and 

from site to site—EPA project managers have failed to maintain effective control 

over the outside contractors who actually perform the vast majority of oversight activities. Those contractors often determine how much oversight, and what kind of 

oversight, is performed—even though the contractors have a direct financial interest 

in maximizing such oversight. 

EPA PLEDGES TO REDUCE OVERSIGHT

The clamor for oversight reform was one of the reasons that EPA’s 1995 Superfund Administrative Reforms featured a reform entitled ‘‘Reduce Oversight for Cooperative Parties.’’ Specifically, Administrator Carol M. Browner declared that EPA 

would ‘‘reward [cooperative] parties by significantly reducing or tiering oversight 

while continuing to exercise sufficient oversight to ensure that the work is performed properly and in a timely manner.’’ 

In explaining this reform, EPA stated: 

As the Superfund program has matured, parties have developed a considerable 

body of experience in conducting response activities at sites. Some not only have 

used this experience to perform high quality work but have acted cooperatively with 

EPA throughout the cleanup and enforcement processes. In recognition of this development, and to promote further cooperativeness, EPA will reward such parties by 

significantly reducing or tiering oversight while continuing to exercise sufficient 

oversight to ensure that the work is performed properly and in a timely manner. 

Reduction of such oversight will result in decreased transaction costs for EPA and 

cooperating parties. 

On July 31, 1996, EPA’s two lead Superfund offices jointly issued guidance on the 

implementation of this new reform. The guidance contained several key directives. 

First, it established a specific numerical goal for reducing oversight. According to 

the oversight activities.’’ Moreover, ‘‘EPA’s overall goal is for a nationwide 25 percent reduction in oversight costs over the next year at these 100 sites.’’ 

Second, the 1996 gUidance also called for expanding the reform beyond the initial 

100 sites. It directed the Regions to evaluate ‘‘every site where the PRP is performing the RifFS, the RD/RA, or the [EE/CA] and response action for non-time-critical removals’’ to determine whether ‘‘the level of oversight can be reduced without 

reducing the level of protection at a site.’’ Where such reductions could be achieved, 

the guidance specifically directed that ‘‘[reductions in oversight costs should be implemented as soon as possible.’’ 

Third, the 1996 guidance directed that ‘‘[a]t the time of annual billing, Regions 

should provide PRPs with an estimate of the oversight costs for the next year.’’ 

In May of 1997, the General Accounting Office (‘‘GAO’’) reported to Congress on 

EPA’s implementation of the 1995 administrative reforms. With respect to the ‘‘Reduced Oversight’’ reform, GAO stated: 

According to EPA’s annual report on administrative reforms and other agency documents, EPA has reduced or plans to reduce its oversight of potentially responsible 

parties at over 100 sites. Although EPA stated that such reduced oversight lowers 

litigation costs for EPA and cooperating parties, EPA officials could provide us with 

no data to demonstrate such results to date. 

At about the same time that GAO issued its report, Dr. J. Winston Porter, former 

Assistant Administrator of the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

(‘‘OSWER’’), issued a proposal for ‘‘Simplifying Superfund.’’ Dr. Porter described the 

oversight problem (and the solution) as follows: 

Another prime reason why site studies take so long is that regulators, particularly 

EPA and their contractors, conduct overly tedious and lengthy reviews of every aspect of work by PRPs or others. These reviews include such repetitive ‘‘process’’ 

items as work plans, sampling plans, and quality assurance plans. 

It is first recommended that the amount of money allocated to regulatory oversight be reduced in order to truncate the process. 
76 

Second, EPA should sharply curtail the number of documents requiring EPA or 

other regulatory review. 

That was more than a decade ago. Today, EPA still does not track how much it 

spends on oversight. As a result, it is impossible to determine whether oversight has 

actually been reduced, as Administrator Browner pledged in 1995. 

TAILORED OVERSIGHT

To its credit, EPA did issue Superfund guidance last year that incorporated a 

‘‘Tailored Oversight’’ guidance document previously issued by the RCRA corrective 

action program. Conceptually, tailoring oversight to the needs of particular sites ensures that cleanups are done right, while freeing some of EPA’s limited resources 

for other important tasks. 

It remains to be seen what impact this recent Headquarters guidance document 

will have in a program as heavily decentralized as Superfund. It would be important 

to know, for example, whether program managers at EPA Headquarters have undertaken any concrete initiatives to encourage the Regions to apply the Tailored 

Oversight approach, or to monitor and track future Regional decisions regarding 

oversight. 

RELATIONSHIP TO CLEANUPS

With this background, it must be emphasized that the possibility of an ‘‘inadequate cleanup’’ being performed at a site is not a sound reason to maintain the 

current regime of virtually unlimited oversight. First, most PRPs already have every 

incentive to develop and perform sound cleanups. They seek to be responsible corporate citizens and community members. PRPs also know full well that their legal 

liability does not end when they finish the cleanup. 

Second, if a cleanup is ‘‘inadequate,’’ it is apt to be because new information has 

come to light that was previously unknown to both EPA and the PRPs. Perhaps 

some contamination was not detected, or perhaps new scientific information is released about a particular compound that was detected. This sort of thing happens 

occasionally, but infrequently. The key point is that it cannot be prevented by piling 

on oversight resources on the front end. 

Third, if a cleanup is found to be ‘‘inadequate,’’ the PRPs typically remain legally 

responsible for any additional work that is needed. Section 122(f) of CERCLA severely limits the terms of cleanup. 

RESPONSE BY MICHAEL W. STEINBERG TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Many think that when the Superfund tax was in effect it was some 

kind of ‘‘polluter pays’’ tax. Is this how the Superfund tax worked and if reinstated 

today how would it work? 

Response. In answering this question, we first address the rationale for the Superfund taxes, and then explain why Superfund today is a ‘‘polluter pays’’ program 

even though the taxes expired over a decade ago. 

THE RATIONALE FOR THE SUPERFUND TAXES

When Congress enacted Superfund in 1980, it was generally expected that EPA 

would perform most of the cleanups, using public funds to pay for them. A typical 

Superfund site was expected to be an abandoned dumpsite. 

In that context, the Superfund taxes seemed a natural mechanism to shift financial responsibility for the cleanups to the sectors of society that were perceived to 

have largely caused the problem. In the early 1980’s, EPA in fact did most of the 

investigations and cleanups. For many companies, their tax payments in those years 

far exceeded their payments for work at sites, and EPA used its Superfund budget 

to clean up many sites that had been contaminated mainly by industry. 

During the 1980’s, however, EPA began to successfully use the law’s Draconian 

liability provisions both to recover its costs from PRPs and, more importantly, to require PRPs to perform cleanup work themselves. This evolution in EPA’s enforcement approach led to a better understanding of the problems that gave rise to 

Superfund sites in the first place. 

As EPA began to identify and confront the responsible parties at sites, it became 

evident that the original assumption that Superfund sites were created by oil, chemical, and large manufacturing and service companies was clearly in error. In fact, 
77 

the responsible parties include many medium and small businesses and many industrial sectors not subject to substantial—or any—Superfund taxation, as well as 

local and State governments, defunct and unidentifiable parties, and, in a surprising 

number of cases, the Federal Government itself. 

In 1989, a Senate committee report urged EPA simply to find a few deep-pocket 

PRPs at each site and force them to do the work, using the strong-arm liability 

power of Superfund. At about that same time, EPA issued its ‘‘Enforcement First’’ 

policy, which was intended to put the responsibility for investigation and cleanup 

on the PRPs at every site where viable PRPs could be found, thereby saving the 

Superfund budget for sites without viable PRPs. 

EPA’s dramatic change in practice is documented in the table below, which is reprinted from page 43 of Superfund’s Future: What Will it Cost?, published in 2000 

by Resources for the Future (‘‘RFF’’). From 1980 to 1986, PRPs performed the key 

RifFS studies at only 24 percent of the sites, and they performed the cleanup remedy at only 33 percent of the sites. But from 1991 through 1999, when EPA’s ‘‘Enforcement First’’ policy was in effect, these figures roughly doubled. PRPs performed 

46 percent of the RIfFSs, and 73 percent of the actual cleanups. EPA understood 

that this trend allowed it to leverage its Superfund budget far more effectively, and 

so EPA has worked hard to have PRPs do the work at every site where liable parties can be found. 

As a result of ‘‘Enforcement First,’’ PRPs perform the cleanups and reimburse 

EPA for its response costs at most sites. For a smaller number of sites that have 

viable PRPs, EPA has done the work and the PRPs have reimbursed EPA for its 

expenditures, including its oversight costs and its indirect costs. 

Today, virtually the only NPL cleanups that EPA actually pays for are those 

where no viable PRPs exist—the so-called ‘‘orphan’’ sites. These sites generally were 

not contaminated by the companies formerly targeted by the three Superfund taxes. 

Instead, these sites were contaminated by companies that are defunct or insolvent, 

or by other types of generators, such as municipalities. EPA’s narrowly limited role 

in paying for cleanups is a fundamental change from the original expectations. It 

has resulted from the tenacious and successful efforts of EPA to implement its ‘‘Enforcement First’’ policy. And it has eroded the basic rationale for imposing the 

Superfund taxes in the first place. 

COMPANIES RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTAMINATION ARE PAYING FOR

CLEANUP, SITE BY SITE

For more than a decade, companies whose wastes contaminated sites have been 

held directly responsible for cleanup costs, one site at a time. Through payments 

to investigate and remediate sites at which they are PRPs, such companies are paying their fair share to address the national problem. In fact, at many sites they are 

paying far more than their fair share, due to the joint and several liability feature 

of Superfund. 

At most sites, it is impossible to identify the origin of much of the waste, so the 

PRPs that are identified must divide up the total costs among themselves. This 

means that each viable PRP typically pays far more than its proportionate, fair 

share of the costs to investigate and remediate the site. 

Another factor that increases each PRP’s liability is that the allocations of responsibility usually take place 30 to 50 years after the waste disposal occurred and a 

number of the identified PRPs no longer exist. The wastes generated by such 

defunct parties are referred to as the ‘‘orphan’’ share. Under joint and several liability, the viable companies have to pay that share. 
78 

In 1995, EPA partially recognized the inequity of that result and agreed to absorb 

part of the orphan share, subject to severe limitations. EPA now absorbs part of the 

orphan share in certain settlement agreements, but only up to 25 percent of the cost 

of the work to be performed under the settlements, and only if that amount can be 

written off against EPA’s claim for past costs at the same site. The Agency recognized that these constraints meant that responsible parties would still be asked to 

pay excessive shares. EPA, ‘‘Interim Guidance on Orphan Share Compensation for 

Settlors of Remedial Design/Remedial Action and Non-Time-Critical Removals’’ 

(June, 1996). 

At the same time, EPA also committed to join parties in an equitable manner 

rather than focus on a few deep-pocket PRPs. But in our experience, EPA enforcement efforts continue to focus mainly on the larger private sector parties alleged to 

be involved at sites. 

In a nutshell, existing large corporations responsible for past disposal of hazardous waste are typically required to pay the full costs of cleaning up the sites 

where their wastes were sent—including the ‘‘orphan’’ share. Under this approach, 

their obligations are discharged in full and then some. Indeed, at least some of these 

companies have paid three times—once as PRPs to remediate their sites, again as 

the larger viable parties forced to absorb the orphan shares, and yet again as corporate taxpayers to support the general Superfund program. They have more than 

paid their fair share. 

THE SUPERFUND TAXES ARE NOT NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ‘‘POLLUTER

PAYS’’ 

Because viable PRPs are already paying for cleanups, the Superfund taxes are not 

needed to maintain the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle. Superfund is already overwhelmingly a ‘‘polluter pays’’ program. It is typically only at ‘‘orphan’’ sites, where no responsible parties exist, that EPA performs cleanups using general revenues. This is 

entirely fair, because the companies formerly targeted by the Superfund taxes did 

not create those ‘‘orphan’’ sites. 

It must also be recognized that there are other important respects in which the 

‘‘polluter pays’’ principle has been departed from under Superfund. That is because 

EPA and Congress have elected to release certain groups of responsible parties from 

their full liability as PRPs, either by providing preferential settlements (as in the 

case of municipalities or very small private parties) or by granting full exemptions 

(as in the case of scrap dealers, certain small businesses, and lenders). In many instances the shares of liability that would have fallen on these parties have been imposed on the remaining PRPs. These dynamics have distorted any pure application 

of the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle. They have instead substituted a ‘‘Deep Pocket-Easy 

Target’’ policy. Government should not further compound this distortion of ‘‘polluter 

pays’’ by reimposing the taxes on a group that has paid, and is paying, more than 

its fair share. 

2. When the Superfund tax was in effect, did it correlate to the 

amount of money that EPA spent on cleanups? 

The short answer is ‘‘no.’’ This fact was documented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which in 2005 reported that ‘‘total funding for the Superfund 

and 

Brownfields programs and the Superfund-related programs of the ATSDR and 

NIEHS, in current year dollars, remained relatively constant from fiscal year 1993 

to fiscal year 2005.’’ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Hazardous Waste Programs: Information on Appropriations and Expenditures for Superfund, Brown 

fields, and Related Programs 2 (June 30,2005) (GAO–05–746R) (emphasis supplied). 

In other words, Congress appropriated roughly the same amount for Superfund in 

each of those 13 consecutive fiscal years, from fiscal year to fiscal year 5. For example, Congress appropriated almost the same amount (in current year dollars) in fiscal year 5, the last year that the three Superfund taxes were still in effect, as it 

did in fiscal year 6, a decade after those taxes had expired. 

3. Why do you think there is a decline in the number of cleanups 

from the 1990’s? 

There has certainly been a decline in the average number of sites listed by EPA 

each year as being ‘‘Construction Complete,’’ i.e., physical construction of the remedy 

has occurred. This decline is widely misunderstood. 
79 

First, the enactment and implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and other environmental statutes that 

impose liability for releases of hazardous substances has already achieved the desired end result: fewer sites that require remediation are being created. To presume 

that the number of sites requiring cleanup under CERCLA should remain constant, 

or even increase, is to ignore the positive effects of these other environmental statutes. 

Second, investigating and cleaning up a site on the National Priorities List 

(‘‘NPL’’) typically takes about a decade and, for complex sites, several decades. That 

process is sometimes referred to as the ‘‘remedial pipeline.’’ EPA has calculated that 

the average duration of this process from start to finish (not counting post-construction operation and maintenance) is 8.1 years. RFF, on the other hand, found that 

a more accurate average duration is over 11 years. And even when ‘‘Construction 

Complete’’ is achieved, long years of operation and maintenance still lie ahead. 

Thus, the number of sites that reach ‘‘Construction Complete’’ in any given year 

is only one measure of progress, and frequently not the most useful one. An exclusive focus on that factor can obscure an accurate evaluation of total progress being 

made, including the full range of intermediate and ultimate milestones being 

reached, at all of the Superfund sites where work is underway. 

Superfund in fact has made great progress in cleaning up the sites on the NPL. 

After many years of tedious efforts to move sites through the initial stages of the 

remedial pipeline, EPA has achieved ‘‘Construction Complete’’ at more than 1,000 

NPL sites. With over two-thirds of the NPL sites now having accomplished this objective, it should come as no surprise that at some point there would be a reduced 

number of sites crossing that particular checkpoint each year. This in no way suggests that there has been a decline in the overall level or pace of cleanup activity. 

Another factor, perhaps less obvious, helps to explain the reduced numbers of 

‘‘Construction Completes’’ in recent years. EPA made a deliberate policy choice in 

the early 1990’s to focus first on those NPL sites that could be completed relatively 

quickly—the ‘‘low-hanging fruit’’ of the Superfund program—and to defer work on 

many of the larger, more complex NPL sites. 

The payoff from this policy choice was record high numbers of ‘‘Construction Completes’’ throughout the 1990’s. But in a way, EPA was robbing Peter to pay Paul. 

EPA now faces a smaller portfolio that is dominated by larger and more complex 

NPL sites—and a public that has grown accustomed to those atypically high completion rates. 

The numbers can be looked at in many ways. In the first 20 years of the program, 

757 sites reached the point of ‘‘Construction Complete,’’ 411 of them in the 5 years 

from 1996 through 2000. Those statistics yield an average of 82 completions per 

year for those 5 years, but an average of 38 completions per year for the 20-year 

period as a whole. Neither ‘‘average’’ is very meaningful, however, because at any 

given point in time, so much work is being done at so many sites that simply is 

not reflected in the number of sites that happen to reach any single milestone in 

any particular year. 

4. What are some ways that EPA could better manage their current 

budget of $1.24 billion dollars? 

The Superfund program today faces a range of financial management challenges. 

The central theme that connects them is the pressing need for Superfund to live 

within its means. Currently, the Superfund program: 

• loses a large part of its annual appropriation each year to other EPA offices 

that do not perform cleanups; 

• takes on new long-term financial obligations each year without strong management review, as new NPL sites are listed, new Superfund Alternative (‘‘SA’’) sites 

are designated, and new Records of Decision are signed; 

• spends money each year on projects that are not high priorities and activities 

that are not essential; and 

• fails to maximize the use of private sector funds by failing to offer incentives 

for private companies to perform cleanups. 

Taken together, these weaknesses mean that the Superfund program is not yet 

effectively managing either its ‘‘income’’ or its spending to the extent necessary for 

the program to live within its means. The following recommendations fall into categories that match up closely with these weaknesses. 

Specifically, EPA should: 
80 

1. CONSERVE FUNDS FOR OSWER

Currently, some $220 MM/yr of EPA’s annual Superfund appropriation is transferred to other EPA offices that provide varying degrees of support for the Superfund program. 

These include: 

• Office of Research and Development (‘‘ORO’’); 

• Office of Administration and Resource Management (‘‘OARM’’); 

• Office of the Chief Financial Officer (‘‘OCFO’’); 

• Office of Inspector General (‘‘OIG’’); 

• Office of Policy and Environmental Information; and 

• Office of General Counsel. 

The net effect of these transfers is that nearly one-fifth of the total Superfund appropriation is redirected ‘‘off the top’’ to other EPA offices that are not involved in 

cleaning up sites. This is deeply troubling, for several reasons. 

First, the amount of money involved here is very large, particularly in comparison 

to the total amount that EPA actually spends to clean up sites. For example, the 

amount transferred to other offices in fiscal year is about the same as the total 

amount that EPA spent on RD/RA at NPL sites, the most important elements of 

the Superfund cleanup program. To put it another way, Superfund is spending as 

much on administration and indirect support—most of it provided by offices outside 

of OSWER—as is spent on actual cleanups of NPL sites. 

Second, the dollar amounts of these transfers were established years ago, and 

have not been revisited in light of the level of program support currently provided 

by these other offices. Thus, there is no basis to believe that the allocations reflect 

current program needs. 

Third, and last, there is no sound policy reason for the Superfund program to pay 

for the support services of OARM, OCFO, and OIG, among others. These support 

offices provide shared services to EPA’s many programs, and so they are directly 

funded by Congress as part of EPA’s annual appropriation. The practice of having 

the Superfund program pay for these services is a glaring departure from the normal practice, both at EPA and throughout the Federal Government. 

Finally, apart from the magnitude of these transfers to other offices, the transfers 

are currently open—ended, in the sense that funds not actually used by the offices 

receiving the transfer remain available for their use subsequent fiscal years. Any 

unused funds should be returned to OSWER at the end of each fiscal year so they 

can be used for cleanups. 

2. LIMIT GROWTH OF SUPERFUND DOCKET TO SITES THAT CANNOT BE

ADDRESSED THROUGH OTHER PROGRAMS

Each new site listed on the NPL—and each new site designated as a SA site pursuant to EPA guidance—effectively imposes long-term financial obligations on the 

Superfund budget for years to come. New sites should not be listed or designated 

absent a clear showing that no viable PRPs are willing to perform or fund the work; 

the sites require Federal intervention; and no other alternative programs will work 

(‘‘the tool of last resort’’). 

Currently, EPA lists sites on the NPL (and designates sites as SA sites) without 

making these findings. Sites are added to the Superfund docket even though viable 

PRPs exist. Sites are added based upon very limited data. Sites are added without 

attempting to quantify the actual risks they may pose. 

Moreover, EPA’s current NPL listing process is not very transparent. As a result, 

some 20–30 sites are typically added to the NPL each year with little explanation 

of what other options were considered or why those options were judged inadequate. 

(EPA recently began including in the docket a brief statement about the ‘‘Need for 

NPL Listing,’’ but this alone does not permit stakeholders to evaluate, or comment 

on, EPA’s decision—making.) Similarly, the SA designations are made pursuant to 

poorly defined criteria and are shielded from public review and scrutiny. 

Greater EPA Headquarters management control over the NPL listing process and 

the SA designation process is mandatory in order to control the growth of the Superfund docket, which is an essential element of managing Superfund’s total ‘‘debt’’ 

load into the future. Greater transparency in both processes is also critically needed. 
81 

3. REDUCE UNNECESSARY SPENDING

The total amount actually available for cleanup each year is further limited by 

the fact that EPA spends more money than is necessary on remedial actions and 

on oversight. This situation could be improved in several ways. 

A. Remedial Actions 

Each new Record of Decision (‘‘ROD’’) selects a remedy for a Superfund site, effectively imposing long—term financial obligation on the Superfund budget for years 

to come. Yet dozens of new RODs are issued each year, and they are signed by 

EPA’s Regional Offices (pursuant to delegations of authority), with little involvement by the Superfund program management at EPA Headquarters. In practical 

terms, then, program management is not managing the rate at which the program 

takes on new financial obligations each year. 

EPA should take several actions to address this problem: 

• EPA Headquarters should review most new RODs before they are signed; • the National Remedy Review Board should be given more authority to ensure 

that future remedy decisions are both technically sound and, as required by section 

121 (a) of CERCLA, cost-effective; • EPA should expand its use of the Fund-balancing Applicable or Relevant and 

Appropriate Requirement (‘‘ARAR’’) waiver, the ‘‘inconsistent applications of State 

standard’’ ARAR waiver, and the Technical Impracticability ARAR waiver to facilitate the selection and prompt implementation of cost-effective remedies; • Superfund’s approach to risk assessment should emphasize current land uses, 

realistic exposure scenarios, and sound science. 

B. Oversight of Cleanups Performed by Private Parties 

As discussed above at pages 1–4, EPA could quickly free up additional resources 

for remedial construction by fulfilling its 12-year old pledge to reduce its oversight 

of work performed by PRPs. 

4. FOCUS ON PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS

CERCLA authorizes the President to take actions to protect public health and the 

environment. Section 104( a)( 1) of CERCLA, however, directs the President to ‘‘give 

primary attention to those releases . . . [that] may present a public health threat.’’ 

Despite this statutory directive, the Superfund program continues to devote some 

of its scarce dollars to projects that present no ‘‘public health threat,’’ and indeed 

may pose no significant risks to human health at all, but instead pose purely ecological risks. EPA should prioritize its spending so that all of the NPL sites with 

significant human health risks are addressed before any resources are directed toward sites that present only ecological risks. 

5. MAXIMIZE USE OF PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDS

Finally, the success of the Superfund program is heavily dependent upon 

leveraging the resources of PRPs so that most cleanups are performed by PRPs 

rather than by EPA. Although EPA has made progress in this regard, it has yet 

to maximize the use of PRP resources. Indeed, given recent court decisions that restrict the ability of private PRPs to file contribution claims against other liable parties, EPA needs to do far more than it has done in the past simply to maintain the 

current level of PRP-Iead cleanups. 

To maximize the number of PRP-Iead cleanups, EPA should provide PRPs with 

greater incentives to reach settlements. Among the many potential incentives are 

the following: 

• meaningful orphan share funding, where EPA agrees to either pay part of the 

costs, or to waive some or all of its claim for past costs, in order to account for orphan shares; • expanded access to special site accounts, which typically contain money collected from small parties that should be disbursed to the performing parties at the 

site; • ‘‘carve-outs’’ whereby EPA pursues non-settlers for portions of site work and/or 

EPA past costs; and • consent decree language that is more flexible and balanced than the provisions 

of the Model RD/RA Consent Decree. 

In closing, it was a pleasure to be able to testify before the Subcommittee at the 

October 17, 2007 hearing. If you or your colleagues have any questions about this 

letter, or require any additional information, I would be pleased to be of assistance. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Steinberg. 
82 

Our final witness is Lenny Siegel, Director of the Center for Public Environmental Oversight. 

STATEMENT OF LENNY SIEGEL, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator Clinton, members of the Subcommittee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to relate 

what I have learned about Superfund from communities throughout the United States. 

Last week, when I contacted grassroots activists from the communities that I am featuring in my testimony, they responded 

promptly, and were in fact excited that their stories might be told 

in the Nation’s Capital. 

Over the past quarter century, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly 

known as Superfund, has been an important instrument for protecting public health and the environment in the United States. 

Today, with the Superfund account depleted, seriously contaminated sites suffer from inadequate cleanup, inefficiencies, and inequities. 

I highlight four sites in my community plus three others, which 

I have visited within the past year, to illustrate what the shortage 

of fund money means to the people who live, work or attend school 

on or near some of the Nation’s most contaminated properties. 

These include sites on the Superfund national priorities list, as 

well as many that should be. My focus today is onsites that are dependent upon the Superfund itself. 

At the Orion Park Military Housing Area in Mountain View, 

California, the shortage of resources has severely handicapped U.S. 

EPA’s ability to address offsite sources, preventing it from requiring the Navy to conduct onsite cleanup, and forcing NASA’s adjacent Ames Research Center to expend its own resources on contamination migrating from the site. 

Contamination prevented the development of new military housing on the site, and the military personnel at the planned Armed 

Forces Reserve Training Complex will be a long-term risk from 

vapor intrusion and the migration of subsurface contamination into 

buildings. 

I might add there are no current exposures there. They evicted 

all the residents. A local paper wrote, ‘‘the Army’s plan to build a 

huge training center at Moffett Field on a site it knows is contaminated with carcinogenic gas should be halted at least until warnings from local environmentalists are acknowledged and the dangers are mitigated.’’ 

In Victor, NY, trichloroethylene from apparent illegal dumping 

has poisoned private wells and released toxic vapors into homes. A 

fund-led cleanup could protect the impacted families, but the 

Superfund does not have enough money for it to make much sense 

even to add the site to the NPL. Earlier this month, Jackie Barry, 

whose family home has been directly impacted, recently sent a 

message to ‘‘anyone who cares’’ on the Internet: ‘‘it has been 6 

months since news broke of the contamination. It has been 17 

years that it existed. Why would we think that anything could be 

accomplished? I sit here in my home with my family and pray 
83 

every day that someone will listen. For God’s sake, there has been 

death and illness and who knows what else is here.’’ 

In Ambler, PA, EPA successfully capped two asbestos waste piles 

14 years ago, but exposed piles not on the National Priorities Listed are slated for redevelopment, with neighbors fearing that the 

current exposures will be increased with the release of development-associated asbestos dust, and would like EPA to list the site 

and fund the response. But as long as the fund is depleted, this appears unlikely. In my written testimony, I have a picture of what 

they call a removal action at that site. It says ‘‘don’t create dust.’’ 

It is a sign. 

Sharon McCormick, who lives within breathing distance of the 

piles, asked: ‘‘If you can make your presentation to the Senate, now 

would be a good time because we are desperate down here. Development on asbestos waste of this magnitude has never been done 

before. Please help me.’’ 

There is consensus support for the dredging of polychlorinated 

biphenyls from New Bedford Harbor, Massachusetts, a Superfund 

mega-site. This is a place where I have been in a room where all 

the agencies do get together. However, inadequate funding has 

forced an inefficient start-and—stop cleanup that is currently slated to stretch out a quarter century. Henry Bousquet, who grew up 

near the harbor, explained: ‘‘My little girls, Phoebe and Payton, are 

very young, 3 years and 11 months respectively. At the current 

rate of $15 million a year for the Acushnet River Superfund remediation, Phoebe will be 29 years old, just 3 years younger than I 

am now, before it is clean enough for parents to feel safe about it.’’ 

Today, both sites are already dependent upon EPA funding, and 

those that should be added to the National Priorities List, cleanup 

is slow and inefficient, and expenses are often borne by third parties. Replenishing the fund would be a giant step forward in recognizing, investigating and remediating the most contaminated sites 

in America. 

I think it is important to go beyond the statistics, go out and 

visit these communities, see what it means to people’s homes, to 

their families, to their property, the fact that we are not acting 

quickly enough to remediate these sites. We aren’t even putting 

them into the pipeline because there is not enough money. Go out 

and talk to them and then come back and decide whether we need 

money in the Fund or not. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Siegel follows:] 

STATEMENT OF LENNY SIEGEL, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PUBLIC

ENVIRONMENTAL OVERSIGHT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past quarter century, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, has been 

an important instrument for protecting public health and the environment in the 

United States. Its tools—addressing response, compensation, and liability—are like 

the proverbial three-legged stool. At many sites, CERCLA collapses when one of 

those tools is missing. Across the country, since the Superfund account was depleted, seriously contaminated sites have suffered from inadequate cleanup, inefficiencies, and inequities. 
84 

I highlight four sites, all of which I have visited within the past year, to illustrate 

what the shortage of Fund money means to the people who live, work, or attend 

school on or near the some of the nation’s most contaminated properties. 

• At the Orion Park Military Housing Area, Mountain View, California, the shortage of Fund resources has severely handicapped U.S. EPA’s ability to address offsite 

sources, preventing it from requiring the Navy to conduct onsite cleanup and forcing 

NASA to expend its own resources on contamination from the site. Contamination 

prevented the development of new military housing on the site, and military personnel at the planned Armed Forces Reserve training complex will be at long-term 

risk from vapor intrusion, the migration of subsurface contamination into buildings. 

• In Victor, New York trichloroethylene (TCE) from apparent illegal dumping has 

poisoned private wells and released toxic vapors into homes. A Fund-led cleanup 

could protect the impacted families, but the Superfund does not have enough money 

for it to make much sense even to add the site to the National Priorities List (NPL). 

• In Ambler, Pennsylvania, EPA successfully capped two asbestos waste pile sites 

14 years ago, but remaining piles, not on the NPL, are slated for redevelopment. 

Neighbors, fearing that current exposures will be increased with the release of development-associated asbestos dust, would like EPA to list the site and fund the response, but as long as the Fund is depleted, this appears unlikely. 

• There is consensus support for the dredging of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 

from New Bedford Harbor, Massachusetts, a Superfund ‘‘mega-site.’’ However, inadequate funding has forced an inefficient start-and-stop cleanup that is currently 

slated to stretch out a quarter century. 

Today, both at sites already dependent upon EPA funding and those that should 

be added to the National Priorities List, cleanup is slow and inefficient, and expenses are often borne by third parties. Replenishing the fund would be a giant step 

forward in recognizing, investigating, and remediating the most contaminated sites 

in America. 

CERCLA: A THREE-LEGGED STOOL

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 

commonly known as Superfund, is imperfect, but over the past quarter century it 

has been an important tool for protecting public health and the environment in the 

United States. It provides tools for determining environmental cleanup strategies 

and technologies, assessing and assigning responsibility, and providing the resources to remove, treat, and prevent contact with hazardous substances. 

All three tools—addressing response, compensation, and liability—are necessary. 

Like the proverbial three-legged stool, CERCLA collapses when one of its legs is 

missing. Across the country, since the Superfund account was depleted, seriously 

contaminated sites have suffered from inadequate cleanup, inefficiencies, and inequities. 

From my recent visits to communities with seriously contaminated sites, I have 

selected four examples. In each of these cases, community members have strong reason to believe that public health and the environment are at risk, and—whether or 

not the site is currently on the NPL—that the insufficiency of the Superfund is a 

major factor. I believe that these four case studies each represents many more sites 

in the NPL universe. 

This site, in my own community of Mountain View, California, is particularly complicated. Originally part of the Moffett Naval Air Station, its 72 acres sit between 

NASA Ames Research Center and Stevens Creek. It was transferred to the Air 

Force as a result of the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round and retransferred to the Army after BRAC 1995. Despite the earlier discovery of other 

local groundwater plumes of (VOCs), the Orion Park plume escaped detection until 

1999, when NASA detected trichloroethylene under its adjacent, downgradient property. Subsequent sampling found widespread TCE readings in the hundreds of parts 

per billion range, in the top two aquifers. 
85 

Though the Navy argued that the contamination did not pose a risk to the hundreds of military families who lived above the plume, U.S. EPA conducted its own 

sampling, demonstrating that vapors from the groundwater plume were rising into 

an unknown percentage of the homes. This probably contributed to the Army’s decision to replace the housing in partnership with a private builder, under the Residential Communities Initiative. However its private partner decided not to build 

homes at Orion Park, because of the contamination. 

As an alternative, the Army proposed—and the 2005 BRAC Commission agreed— 

to construct an Armed Force Reserve Center training complex—on thirty acres at 

Orion Park. 413 full-time employees will staff the facilities, which will also sup port 

a total of 1,500 Soldiers for weekend classroom and administrative training. To resist the intrusion of toxic vapors, the Army plans to build engineering controls into 

all of its new buildings, but there is no cleanup planned for the site. In fact, no complete investigation is planned. Meanwhile, NASA is planning a major treatment system, an air—sparging barrier to intercept the toxic chemicals as they flow onto 

Ames Research Center property y. This will cost over $1 million, plus long-term operation and maintenance expenses. 

Why has the Orion Park response stalled? After all, within a few miles of my 

house there are at least a dozen National Priorities List sites, including Moffett 

Field. At those sites, the regulators, responsible parties, and the community have 

worked together successfully to address the contamination. But Orion Park is an exception. 

For one, the Navy does not accept EPA’s determination that Orion Park is part 

of the Moffett NPL site. More important, it argues that all of the contamination 

originates offsite, south of Bayshore Freeway (U.S. 101), probably from abandoned 

businesses. Most of the other stakeholders, including NASA, EPA, and community 

activists, have concluded from site sampling that TCE and other poisons were released both at Orion Park and south of 101. Before EPA considers trying to force 

the Navy to follow CERCLA at the site, it believes the offsite area needs to be thoroughly assessed. The Navy says it cannot legally conduct upgradient groundwater 

sampling, so the task has fallen to EPA. 
86 

And that’s where the Superfund comes into play. EPA must pay for any sampling 

it conducts from the Fund. But there isn’t enough money to pay for the required 

investigation. And for sure, there is not enough money to prevent additional contamination from migrating under the freeway to Orion Park. EPA cannot insist that 

the already recalcitrant Navy—or the current owner, the Army—undertake cleanup 

until it addresses the offsite source. 

Thus, the long-term protection of Army personnel who will work above a shallow 

groundwater plume on an NPL site is handicapped because the Superfund cupboard 

is bare. Furthermore, NASA’s Ames Research Center continues to spend its own 

Federal money to address contamination that should have been captured and treated by other Federal agencies. 

Earlier this year, the Rochester, New York Democrat and Chronicle headlined 

that private wells in Victor, New York were still contaminated by TCE. Furthermore, as at Orion Park and many other sites across New York State and across the 

country, contamination was also volatilizing into local homes. The contamination, 

apparently caused by illegal dumping at the Syracusa Sand & Gravel mine, was 

first detected and confirmed in 1999! 

This year New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation (NY DEC) 

began to pay more attention to the site. But progress has been handicapped by the 

absence of a viable responsible party, to pay for required investigation and cleanup. 

That is, DEC has finally interrupted the most egregious pathways, but actual cleanup is a long way off. 
87 

In March, therefore, the area’s Congressman called upon EPA to step in and ‘‘take 

the lead.’’ EPA, according to the newspaper, said that it was ‘‘poised to help if the 

situation warranted it.’’ An impacted resident reported: ‘‘We recall a meeting that 

I held at my home with our State Senator. In this meeting he described his experience in several environmental litigation cases as a lawyer (prior to being an elected 

official) and his knowledge of the EPA, National Priorities List and the Federal 

Superfund. He wondered why the site hadn’t been put on the NPL and then went 

on to suggest that even if we had, that right now it was best to have the DEC doing 

the work because of minimal resources in the Federal Superfund.’’ 

In Victor and many other sites in the U.S., people are exposed in their own homes 

to serious levels of harmful substances released by polluters, in many cases decades 

ago. We have a program for dealing with that: CERCLA. But today impacted communities are told time and time again: Joining that program won’t help because 

Superfund has no money. 

Ambler, Pennsylvania, 15 miles northwest of Philadelphia, is the birthplace of the 

American asbestos industry. Ambler itself grew up as a company town for the 

Keasby and Mattison Company (K&M), one of the nation’s leading manufacturers 

of asbestos products such as electrical insulation, brake linings, piping, roofing shingles, and cement siding. K&M operated in Ambler from 1897 to 1962. K&M disposed 

of defective products and manufacturing wastes at several locations within the community. In 1986 EPA placed the piles on Locust Street and at the K& M main plant 

on the NPL—listed aptly as the Ambler Asbestos Piles—and it completed the response, primarily cap ping, in 1993. 
88 

However, no action was taken at the similar 38-acre BoRit site, three parcels 

along the eastern bank of Wissahickon Creek, less than a mile from the piles on 

the NPL. A developer owns a six-acre parcel just across a small creek, Tannery Run, 

from three commercial buildings: Sons of Italy, an auto repair shop, and McDonalds. 

The second parcel is a reservoir currently owned by the Wissahickon Watershed Authority. The Wissahickon Valley Watershed Association hopes to acquire the reservoir and improve it as a waterfowl preserve. To the northwest of the reservoir is 

the former Wissahickon Whitpain Park, owned by the adjacent township of Whit 

pain. This triangular park was closed more than twenty y years ago because of asbestos releases. 
89 

Over the past year or so, EPA’s Environmental Response Team and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection have been investigating the site. 

Residents have told me that the entire site is proposed for redevelopment, and that 

the environmental response would take place under the brownfields model. Frequently passing signs warning not to create dust, they are concerned that any earth 

movement would release hazardous chrysotile asbestos into their neighborhood as 

well as the creeks, which feed into Philadelphia’s water supply. They favor capping, 

as at the nearby NPL site. But there is no plan to place the piles on the NPL, apparently because EPA doesn’t have the money to contain the risk. A local activist 

explained, ‘‘I was told both by my Congresswoman and by my EPA region that listing BoRit on the Superfund list wouldn’t help, because Superfund has no money.’’ 

EPA did its job at the nearby NPL site, but it doesn’t have the resources to do 

it here. Inadequate Superfund funding is forcing a brownfields-type response, placing the public at risk. 

One of the nation’s Superfund ‘‘mega-sites,’’ the 18,000-acre New Bedford Harbor’s 

sediment contains high concentrations of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in several areas. Over 100,000 people live within three miles of the site. Though there 

were many sources, the largest appears to have been Aerovox, a manufacturer of 

electrical capacitors and transformers, which operated on the harbor’s edge from 
90 

about 1940 to 1977. There are supposed to be signs along the waterfront warning 

people not to eat fish, but they often disappear and must be replaced. 

Each summer sediment is dredged, de-sanded, de-watered, and shipped to a licensed PCB-landfill in Michigan. The Army Corps of Engineers, under contract to 

U.S. EPA, started dredging harbor hotspots as early as 1994. The Corps is just finishing its fourth year of full-scale dredging, with only about 40 days in the field each 

year. Based upon the numbers I was given when I visited, this year the Corps removed 25,000 cubic yards of contaminated sediment, treated 20-million gallons of 

water, and shipped 16,000 tons of residue by train to Michigan. 

There is consensus support for the remedy, but this is far from a success story. 

Community members express serious concern at the anticipated duration of the 

project. At the current rate, dredging will continue for an estimated 25 years. The 

problem isn’t capacity or weather, but money. 

Over the life of the project, EPA has spent over $235 million for ‘‘planning, engineering, and construction’’ at New Bedford Harbor. Reportedly, over $100 million 

has come from private responsible parties. However, the remaining funding—nearly 

$300 million more—will have to come from EPA’s depleted Superfund. At $15 million per year, the project proceeds slowly and suffers significant inefficiencies from 

the imposed start-and-stop response. 

Activists are concerned about continuing public exposures to PCBs through water, 

air, and food chain pathways. Even though the entire inner harbor and thousands 

of acres of the outer harbor have been closed to shellfish harvesting and fishing 

since 1979, residents are known to harvest and eat fish, lobster and shellfish from 

the harbor, exposing themselves to potential risks from PCB ingestion. Local residents would like subsistence fishing to resume safely. And they point out that as 

long as the harbor is contaminated, the once valuable lobster fishery and hard shell 

clam industry—which brought in some five million dollars to the regional economy— 

will remain sidelined and the comprehensive redevelopment of otherwise attractive 

shoreline brownfields properties will be difficult in New Bedford and other communities on the harbor. 
91 

While U.S. EPA‘s CERCLA program has always had significant room for improvement, it has protected public health and improved the natural environment in hundreds of communities across the United States. Today, however, both at sites already dependent upon EPA funding and those that should be added to the National 

Priorities List, cleanup is slow and inefficient, and expenses are often borne by third 

parties. Many vapor intrusionsites—with completed pathways but without responsible parties—are not getting the attention they deserve. Replenishing the fund 

would be a giant step forward in recognizing, investigating, and remediating the 

most contaminated sites in America. 

RESPONSES BY LENNY SIEGEL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. Please describe your experience in working with EPA and State cleanup programs on the need to address vapor intrusion at toxic waste sites? 

Response. The practice of the various states, and even EPA regions, vary significantly. For example, New York State and EPA Region Nine activity evaluate hazardous waste sites—even sites with remedies in place—to determine whether a full 

vapor intrusion study is necessary. Other states, such as Texas and Michigan, seem 

unwilling to consider vapor intrusion even when preliminary data suggest a need 

to investigate. 

There seem to be two primary reasons for the foot—dragging in certain jurisdictions: 

First, in the absence of detailed policies in most states, the only pertinent guidance is U.S. EPA’s 2002 Draft Vapor Intrusion Guidance. Some agencies are unwilling to rely upon that because it was never finalized. For example, at a state—led 

Superfund site in Arizona, the State Department of Environmental Quality reportedly told community members that a proposed vapor intrusion investigation could 

not move forward because EPA’s 2002 guidance remained in draft form. I have 

heard that EPA has decided not to finalize that guidance, despite its important as 

policy and the ongoing technical work that agency staff have carried out in support 

of that goal. 

Second, the most common contaminant at sties that appear to pose the greatest 

vapor intrusion risk is trichloroethylene (TCE). EPA has not only failed to complete 

its 2001 draft Human Health Risk Assessment, but it provides no national interim 

guidance for screening levels for TCE in indoor air. This allows some states to use 

enormously unprotective standards, and it creates confusion at many other sites. 

The absence of standards based upon current science is more than a theoretical 

problem. People are being exposed to TCE at levels that I consider unsafe, in their 

homes, schools, and workplaces. 

For years I have been attending workshops and conferences about vapor intrusion. Usually I’m the only community representative there, among scores or even 

hundreds of consultants, regulators, and others, I have therefore urged EPA to organize forums for public stakeholders, in which members of impacted communities 

would learn about the state—of—the—science in vapor intrusion and offer grounded—in—reality feedback to the experts. EPA recently agreed, inviting five representatives of impacted neighborhoods to the first National Stakeholders’ Forum on 

Vapor Intrusion in San Diego in March 2008. The event was a success, but most 

of those present were the ‘‘usual suspects’’ from consulting firms, Government agencies, and universities. I am working with other at EPA to organize a larger conference, hopefully to be held in Fall 2008. However, thus far we have not identified 

a source for essential funding for travel scholarships. 
92 

Question 2. Do you believe that EPA has lived up to the National Academy of 

Sciences’ recommendation in 2006 ‘‘that Federal agencies finalize their risk assessment with currently available data so that risk management decisions can be make 

expeditiously’’? 

Response. Clearly EPA has not moved forward expeditiously. The public has seen 

nothing substantive from EPA since the Academy recommendation. Part of the problem is that since 2003 the risk assessment mission has been moved from EPA to 

an Ineragency Working Group, which is made up of representatives from the White 

House, EPA the three Federal polluting agencies: NASA, the Defense Department, 

and the Energy Department. This working group sponsored the Academy study; in 

fact, the Academy’s recommendation, cited in the question, mistakenly ascribes 

EPA’s statutory responsibility to ‘‘Federal Agencies,’’ presumably NASA, DOD, and 

Energy, all of which have a conflict of interest. EPA should stop meeting privately 

with the other agencies, and it should develop interim screening and action levels 

for TCE in indoor air while it accelerates the timeline of studies required to issue 

a final risk assessment. 

RESPONSES BY LENNY SIEGEL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. It is actually a misrepresentation to call the Superfund a ‘‘trust fund’’ 

since the money collected from it went directly into the general treasury and then 

EPA received funding through the appropriations process. If reinstated what assurances do we have that the money would go directly to Superfund cleanup? 

Response. It’s my understanding the EPA has spent more on the Superfund program than it collected in Superfund taxes. I have no reason to believe that would 

change after reinstatement. If the point of the question is whether the money will 

go directly to site remediation, I believe that the program expenditures on research, 

technology transfer, technical assistance, and cooperation with State and tribal Governments, as well as other entities, are a wise use of funds. Were it not for such 

expenditures, EPA would be throwing money at the cleanup program without the 

benefit of all the technological and policy developments that have occurred since enactment of CERCLA. 

Question 2. Historically, can you point to a correlation between the money received from the Superfund tax and the money spent on cleaning up Superfund 

[sites]? 

Response. I have not done a statistical analysis, but I know that a large share 

of money spent at National Priorities List (NPL) sites comes from both Federal and 

non-Federal responsible parties, EPA-funding activity—sometimes recovered after 

the fact—makes such efforts possible. I know anecdotally that since the Fund was 

depleted that cleanup has been slowed—creating financial inefficiencies at sites 

such as the New Bedford Harbor, Masschussetts—and there has been significant 

pressures to keep Superfund-caliber sites off the NPL because there isn’t enough 

money to address them properly. 

Question 3. Do you agree that the sites left today are larger and more complicated, requiring more time and attention to ensure community acceptance of the 

remedies and proper cleanup? 

Response. Most of the large, complex sites that have been on the NPL for some 

time have a long way to go before completion. At some of these sites, interim measures have provided temporary protection of public health and the environment, but 

significant contamination remains. In particular, sites with contaminated groundwater can be made safe for surface use, especially if vapor intrusions is investigated 

and mitigated, but full groundwater cleanup is technically challenging and lengthy 

in most geologic settings. However, there are other, smaller or simpler sites that 

have been added to the NPL relatively recently, either because the level of contamination was recently discovered or remediation under other programs has not been 

adequate. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Siegel. You raise a 

very important additional aspect of this. I ask unanimous consent 

that we submit all the written testimonies of the panelists for the 

record. 

Senator CLINTON. I would like to ask several of the witnesses to 

respond to what they have heard, both from Administrator Bodine 

and from the other panelists. It would be helpful if it were possible 

to give us your top three recommendations about what you think 
93 

needs to be done with respect to Superfund. It may be hard to fit 

all of that in, but having heard what you have heard, I think it is 

important that the Committee get guidance as to what you believe 

we should be focusing on. 

Professor Steinzor, would you start please? 

Ms. STEINZOR. That is a great question. First and foremost, reinState the tax; second, prioritize enforcement. There are too many 

sites where potentially responsible parties who have ample resources are not working to clean the sites up. And third, change 

the attitude toward Superfund, because that is actually the root of 

its problems. This program is the one that everybody loves to hate. 

It has no respect and no credibility, and yet everybody should acknowledge that the problems it addresses are real and profound. 

This change in attitude needs to start at the top, because the 

States are struggling with the sites that have been dumped in their 

laps and the ones they have found. The EPA needs to changes its 

fundamental perspective. 

Senator CLINTON. I would ask unanimous consent to submit Professor Steinzor’s report, along with Margaret Clune, entitled, The 

Toll of Superfund Neglect, for the record. 

[The referenced document can be found on pages 102-258.] 

Senator CLINTON. Professor Steinzor, when you refer to reinstating the Superfund polluter pay tax, would you do it exactly the 

same way as it was done before? Or do you have a specific set of 

suggestions as to how it could be better targeted or better structured? 

Ms. STEINZOR. I think the rate may need to be raised. It is a very 

broadly based tax. It focuses on the oil and chemical industries, 

which are the two industries most involved at Superfund sites. 

There also is a broad-based corporate tax that spreads the burden 

across many firms. 

I have real questions in my mind whether more money is needed 

than was committed in the last reauthorization. As I said in my 

testimony, in constant dollars that amount is 40 percent lower than 

what Congress said. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Dr. PORTER. Dr. PORTER. Yes, Madam Chairman. I would say my big three 

would be, No. 1, set deadlines, whether they are studies or completion, but very visible deadlines. Projects tend to get done when 

there are deadlines, or at least people know what is the reason it 

is not being done. 

I would like to coin a term this morning. I would like to see these 

sites as kind of a subset of the first point. I would like to see more 

of a culture of completion at sites. What we have now is a culture 

of deliverables. There are 15 or 18 reports due at every site, and 

those are all important documents, but it has gotten to be a very 

legalistic process-oriented situation where it is a culture of 

deliverables. It is like, you can’t blame me because I got the work 

plan done on time, or you can’t blame me because I did something 

else on time. 

No, we can blame you because you were supposed to get the 

whole project done in 3 years or whatever. So the first one is set 

deadlines. 
94 

The second is fix responsibility a little more clearly. It thinks the 

regional administrator is the primary person. Susan obviously is in 

a key role. In fact, she may need to make some of those decisions 

herself. In my day, I made the Love Canal decisions, because I felt 

that was a nationally significant job. I made the Times Beach decision personally because I felt like that was nationally significant, 

and a few others. 

And then finally, I would say more dollars for cleanup, not necessarily what Rena is saying that we need more dollars, period, but 

within the budget, try mightily within the budget we now have, 

which in the PRP work I would try to get more dollars directly related to clean up. I am a little taken aback by this 3,000 people 

at EPA working on Superfund. I know you have to go one by one 

through and decide if everybody is doing something useful, because 

I am sure they are all doing something useful, but I do think that 

we need to be sure that money is going to clean up. 

As kind of a subset of that is have the PRPs take more responsibility for their own sites and setting their own goals. They should 

be, it seems to me, time is money and I would like to see the responsible parties step up themselves, the CEO or someone says we 

are going to get that site cleaned up and let’s do it in 3 years or 

4 years or whatever. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. 

My recommendations would track very closely those of the previous speakers, but let me give you a level of detail. First in terms 

of fully funding the program, I think that is essential. I think it 

requires reinstating the tax, as members have recognized. 

I also think it means recognizing the other agency roles in this 

process, not just EPA’s budget, but for example there is currently 

a statutory prohibition on using the fund to do ecological risk assessments by Fish and Wildlife Service and the like. I think expanding that funding to ensure cleanups are fully funded is essential. 

Second, in terms of the efficiency of the program, is really making sure EPA is more transparent about the status of these cleanups. They are simply not forthright in terms of saying that the 

cleanups that remain are too complex and that funding is adequate 

currently. When it is fully funded, you will see that there are 

many, many actions in the cleanup queue that are ready to start. 

And third, to make sure that this funding extends to enforcement. In the current climate, there has been too little enforcement 

and too often EPA or the Department of Justice asserts that it is 

because the funding isn’t there. I think fully funding the enforcement program is going to be a critical key. 

And the other critical key I think is one of leadership. You need 

different leadership in this program that is going to set completion 

of protective cleanups as a foremost goal, as it was during President Clinton’s Administration, as it was under Administrator Reilly 

before that. 

Senator CLINTON. I am over my time. I want to ask both Mr. 

Steinberg and Mr. Siegel to submit your top three priorities in 

writing for the record, if you would. 
95 

Senator BARRASSO. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

So I am wondering, this is a fascinating thing, saying, give me 

your best three. And even though it takes too long, I think that is 

a great way to approach that stuff, so I would go to Mr. Steinberg 

and Mr. Siegel for those top three. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Thank you, Senator. 

The theme that connects my top three is financial management. 

First: is direct more of the current appropriation to clean up. A 

very large amount of the current appropriation does not go to clean 

up or to things that are related to clean up. I mentioned the $200 

million that goes to support offices. Again, that is an easy place to 

look for money to redirect. 

There is also duplicative spending on technical studies that are 

being done by PRPs at the sites. EPA does shadow studies that 

don’t need to be done in many cases. There is oversight that is excessive. There are lots of dollars spent from the appropriation that 

could be better spent. So doing more with what we have would be 

step one. 

Second, I think there is a disconnect between the senior management of the program here in Washington and the fundamental decisions that are made at sites around the country about what kind 

of cleanup plan is appropriate and how much money we are going 

to commit to be spent. Whether it is fund spending or PRP spending, those are important decisions that shape the long-term financial picture for Superfund. They are being made today in the regions, not here in Washington. There is no political accountability 

in Washington for those decisions. So I would echo Dr. Porter’s recommendation that we restore centralized management over remedy 

selection decisions. 

Third and last, as I mention in my testimony, listing a site on 

the NPL should be the last resort. We should be looking aggressively at other options, not simply moving sites that are problematic or awkward onto the NPL, because that again bogs down the 

program in long-term financial obligations. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you. 

First, obviously I think the fund should be replenished. It is not 

just at the remediation phase where funds are important, but in 

the whole idea that sites aren’t even being ranked because there 

is no money to clean them up even if we investigate them. 

Second, Senator Clinton you mentioned trichloroethylene, there 

is a problem where standards are being set under this Administration in consultation with the world’s largest polluters, the Departments of Defense and Energy. I think they are entitled to come to 

the table like I am, but they have a conflict of interest. The Interagency Working Group should be dropped so that trichloroethylene 

and other chemicals can be regulated in a normal way. 

Third, and this is what I work on, is community involvement, 

technical assistance. On Monday, I visited the Information Technology High School in Long Island City in Queens. This is a school 

that was built on a toxic site. It is not on the NPL right now, but 

the community was given these tables showing what the indoor air 
96 

sampling showed for the trichloroethylene and perchloroethylene in 

the building. They had no idea what it meant. They were scared. 

I came and I tried to interpret it for them, pro bono, but the fact 

is if communities are going to intelligently and constructively take 

part in the process, as they have in my community where we have 

more expertise, where we have EPA technical assistance grants, 

they are going to need that kind of support. You can’t only fund 

the actual cleanup. You have to fund the communities. Otherwise, 

they are just going to sit in the audience and throw tomatoes at 

EPA and whatever responsible parties are there. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Steinberg, people, I think, believes that 

it is really a polluter pay system, but I am not convinced that the 

tax actually worked that way. Could you explain to me how the tax 

worked and if the Superfund tax was in effect, when it was in effect, did it really correlate to how the money was spent on EPA and 

on cleanups? 

Mr. STEINBERG. The taxes that were in place correlated poorly 

with the industry sectors involved at Superfund sites. In particular, 

the corporate excise tax surcharge aspect is keyed to how profitable 

and how structured a company is, not even to what industry sector 

it is in. So companies that paid a high corporate excise tax automatically paid more into Superfund, whether they ever had any 

connection to waste generation or waste dumping at all. 

The point was made earlier that the balance in the trust fund 

in any given year had no connection to the amount of the appropriation, which has stayed relatively level in constant dollars over 

much of the life of this program. So the notion that there would 

be more money spent on Superfund if the taxes were reinstated I 

think is essentially illogical. 

Senator BARRASSO. Mr. Porter, following up on your firm deadlines in getting things accomplished, would more money for the 

EPA really be a significant factor in speeding this up? 

Mr. PORTER. I don’t think so, Senator. I really believe they have 

a fair amount of money. They have a lot of people working on the 

program. Certainly, there may be selected areas where they need 

more money, but I am just a little afraid if you throw too much 

more money at it, you just get more bureaucracy. I think right now 

with two thirds of the sites cleaned up, we need to focus like a 

laser on those that aren’t cleaned up. Most of them, as Mike as indicated, are begun by private parties. They have the money to pay 

for it. 

So I am not a big fan of just sending money. They need some targeted money. I certainly agree with several of my colleagues here 

that I would like to see the money more directed toward cleanup 

within the money you are giving them. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I am going now to turn to Senator Lautenberg. He will continue 

to chair the hearing. I thank the panelists very much for being 

here. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. [Presiding] Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

having done the good job that you did during your question periods. 
97 

We seem to be running, and I won’t need this. They are an orderly group. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks. 

The conflicting views of whether or not more money is going to 

be useful, there is kind of a trite expression used around here, well, 

look at all the waste. And that is the way you cover up things that 

you can’t explain in direct language, just look at all the waste. 

Winston Porter, it is nice to see you again. I didn’t realize how 

much we disagreed. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PORTER. Not on everything, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You are a good person to have on the 

team, I can say. And all of you had testimony that triggered 

thoughts and, in many cases, I think conflict of views. 

Mr. Steinberg, you point to the fact that a lot of the money that 

is available is not used on cleanup directly. You say it is used on 

other areas. You identify some of the areas where funds are used. 

Would you abolish those functions? 

Mr. STEINBERG. No, Senator. I think that the support services 

that benefit Superfund as well as other EPA programs should be 

funded independently. Other EPA programs don’t contribute a 

share of their budget to fund, for example, the Office of Inspector 

General. Congress funds the IG directly. The same should be true 

with the IG employees who work on Superfund. There is no reason 

that money should come from the Superfund appropriation. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I think it gets us down to the basics 

that we have heard from several of your table mates, and that is 

that the program needs more money. No matter how it is disguised 

and how it is identified, the fact is that there has not been enough 

money to conduct the programs that are required. 

Mr. Steinberg also, you made a fairly bold statement. You said 

there are no health risks at any of the Superfund sites. Am I correct? 

Mr. STEINBERG. No. What I said was that most of the NPL sites 

do not pose current health risks. That is based on the fact that 

EPA has listed some 85 percent of them as meeting the indicator 

called human exposure under control, meaning no exposure to unacceptable levels in any environmental medium. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I thought I heard you be more specific than saying most. I thought you were using a much broader 

term than that. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, it is a very high percentage, but it is not 

all. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But those that do pose health risks, should 

these things be approached on the kind of a basis that we alert fire 

alarms, alarms for other threatening conditions? Shouldn’t there be 

some haste associated with these things? I have been to Ringwood, 

as Brad Campbell says. That is I think the only site that was delisted and now is re-listed. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Correct. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The site is awful. You walk through there 

and you have these paint slugs all over the place, and a lot of cancer. People are frightened for their children, but they can’t afford 
98 

to go other places. This was largely a Native American community. 

One of the things that happened is, in my conversations with a 

couple of people there, is that they said they couldn’t even fish in 

the reservoir anymore because it was so contaminated, but also security was keeping them out of there. It was a source of nutrition 

for them and their families. 

So there are broader effects on those who are even some distance 

from the Superfund site, and affect public health in a very significant way. 

Mr. STEINBERG. And even at that site, Senator, we know that the 

Inspector General spent $500,000 after the fact to issue a report 

criticizing the cleanup. So that comes out of Superfund’s appropriation—criticism. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, we can’t restructure EPA at this moment. But the fact of the matter is that shouldn’t there be someone 

looking over—we have people in IG jobs who look over people’s 

shoulders as their function. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Certainly, but the other programs that the IG 

looks at don’t pay for the IG’s work force. And the IG has a very 

large work force now devoted to Superfund, and the question is 

why are we using Superfund dollars to fund that large work force? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, I don’t want to get hung up on technicalities. 

Professor Steinzor. 

Ms. STEINZOR. I would just point out that I am not sure that we 

can have much confidence in EPA’s declaration that the sites don’t 

pose a health risk, when it is very clear that the same people that 

are making that declaration are very committed to tamping the 

program down, making do with less money, explaining that really 

they don’t need any more resources. So I would question that statistic. I think that it would be better if the agency had more credibility and was really making an honest effort to assess what the 

problems were. 

One of the subjects that came up is State funding. The States 

don’t even know themselves what the status is. I asked the people 

in Maryland to help me by telling me what their funding levels had 

been. They could tell me Maryland’s level, but they couldn’t tell me 

what had been going on around the Country. 

In the absence of EPA funding for the States to do site assessments, we have no idea if the sites are being addressed at all under 

other authorities, much less under Superfund. We found increasing 

numbers of abandoned properties that have reemerged, just like 

that site was re-listed, the one that you mentioned. 

So I would just urge us to have some caution about these don’t 

worry, be happy statistics. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. They can’t make me happy. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Brad, you were with Jim Florio, I think, 

at the time. He authored much of the Superfund law and that was 

1980. Again, it was a lame duck session I think in which this was 

passed, and a very important contribution to America’s well-being. 

Brad, your experience with EPA regarding public notification and 

communication with the State about the asbestos contamination at 

the Hamilton Township, New Jersey site, how would you assess 
99 

EPA’s communications with State and public notification at other 

Superfund sites in the State of New Jersey? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would give it a very poor ranking in terms of 

the level of communication. I think there is often a link between 

that issue and funding. They are much less willing to recognize a 

problem if it looks like it may be an expensive problem, or if it may 

require, as in the case you know at Ringwood, funding the community with a technical assistance grant to give them a voice in the 

cleanup. 

One of the concerns I have, Senator, and here I think there is 

some common ground among the panelists. Many of my panelists 

have talked about efficiency, while Professor Steinzor and Mr. 

Siegel and I have talked about cleanup. Well, there is nothing more 

inefficient than a stop and start cleanup. At the Roebling site or 

Imperial Oil or Cornell-Dubilier, which thanks to your leadership 

was highlighted recently. You have the agency mobilizing to do one 

bit of cleanup, demobilizing, and then waiting to re-mobilize. That 

is enormously inefficient and it shows that this under-funding and 

management failure that has occurred over the last 6 years is only 

making these problems worse and making the cleanups more inefficient because they are stop and start. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is very difficult to understand how Ms. 

Bodine was so content with the funding level, and refused to give 

any credence to my question about were more funds necessary. I 

think that pervades the agency. They are there to protect themselves from public scorn or question. 

So, the people who are largely voiceless, powerless, who live in 

these communities because many of them, as we have discussed 

here, are low-income minority communities. I have lived in a couple 

of them. The Passaic River was our river. My mother swam in that 

river in her younger days. Now, you can just about walk on it. 

Mr. Campbell, I want to ask you a question. In response to the 

claims that the Superfund tax was inefficient, that had little purpose in its being, and Professor Steinzor or Mr. Siegel also, any of 

you who would like to comment on that assertion about the fact 

that this tax really wasn’t appropriate as a source. Is it inappropriate? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would like to comment. I think it is very appropriate. Let me explain, and certainly others know the legislative 

history as well or better than I do, but when Superfund was crafted, the polluter pays principle essentially had two components: the 

liability scheme, strict joint and several; and the tax. They weren’t 

created in isolation. There were a lot of cross-connections between 

the two. I will give you one. 

One is that the oil and petrochemical industry bear a large portion of the tax when it was in place. On the other side of the ledger, they got the petroleum exclusion in the liability scheme. Now, 

they are off the hook both on the liability scheme and in the tax 

structure. 

There are many ways you can design a tax, as you know. There 

may not be one that achieves all virtues. But to suggest that the 

polluter pays principle is only in the liability scheme and the tax 

is unrelated to that really flies in the face of the legislative history 

and the way the burden of these cleanups has been distributed. 
100 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Siegel. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes. Senator, I pay local taxes that go to my fire department, and yet the fire department has never been out to my 

house. Is that inequitable? It is not a fee for a service. It is a tax, 

so you never know exactly which taxpayer is going to benefit from 

the funding. Nevertheless, that is the way we have to fund services 

when you don’t know over a period of time that is actually going 

to need it. 

Mr. STEINBERG. May I respond to Mr. Siegel briefly? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I want to endorse his comment that this is a tax 

and not a fee, and we should be straightforward and call it a tax, 

because that is what it is. 

I also think it is important to realize that when we are looking 

at sites that have no responsible parties, that there is no basis on 

which to say that a particular industry or a particular segment of 

industry was responsible for the creation of that site. In many 

cases, there is little information about where the waste originally 

came from. In many cases, these were open dumps that were used 

widely by people in a community, and for that to be treated as a 

shared societal cost seems to me to be totally equitable. So no polluters are off the hook. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I can respond just briefly to Mr. Steinberg? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, please do, before I do. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Senator Inhofe earlier identified a site in New 

Jersey that had extensive oil and petrochemical contamination in 

soils, and the reason those soils were removed was to avoid vapor 

intrusion in the homes of innocent residents who lived nearby. I 

don’t think there is any doubt from which industry sector the oil 

and petrochemicals came from. There is doubt because of the liability exemption that you can recover from those parties. The legislative bargain that was created at the time was that the petroleum 

exclusion was justified because we had the tax on the other side 

of the ledger. The tax has now fallen out and it is the public, including the residents immediately threatened by that pollution that 

are picking up the tab. 

Mr. STEINBERG. The exemption that my colleague is referring to 

was an exemption intended to cover crude oil and petroleum product. It does not exempt all—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. What would you suggest, Mr. Steinberg, as 

a funding source to clean up these sites? Or shouldn’t there be any? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I would say that if you believe that more money 

is needed, and that is not a belief that I am prepared to endorse 

at this time, but if you believe more money is needed—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. How about the flat world? Do you go for 

that? 

Mr. STEINBERG. I believe that within the current $1.24 billion appropriation, there is money available to be redirected toward more 

important goals than it’s currently being used for. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Is it enough? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, I heard numbers like $100 million and 

$200 million a year mentioned earlier. There certainly is that much 

money within the current appropriation. 
101 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, there is lots of disagreement. The fund was at one point $3.8 billion, and it was used to accelerate 

the pace of cleanup and became a very effective program. It took 

a long time to train the people to the assignments they had. It was 

new venture for us. If you remember when there was a threat that 

Superfund was going to close down and people took off and found 

themselves other jobs so that they could take care of their families. 

It was hard to get ramped up again. 

Professor Steinzor. 

Ms. STEINZOR. Yes, I would just like to point out a couple of 

things. First of all, from a historical perspective, the design of the 

tax was advocated by industry. It was ARCO that invented the 

broad-based corporate tax. 

Second, the alternative that nobody is saying is that the people 

that will pay for the orphaned sites are the general taxpayers, so 

we are being told the paradoxical statement that on the one hand 

we shouldn’t be asking industries that were not involved to pay, 

and on the other hand it is OK to ask the general taxpayer to pay. 

And the third thing I would just like to say is, as our report tried 

to point out, this tax is so small in comparison to the profits, particularly in the oil sector. The broad-based tax is so small that its 

portrayal as a burden is really illogical. 

Mr. PORTER. Senator, could I just add one point here? As somebody who has followed this program a long time, if you look at all 

the Superfund sites in the Country, individuals have caused Superfund sites. We have thrown people in jail in various States who all 

by themselves caused a Superfund site, a very bad one. Cities have 

caused Superfund sites. States have caused Superfund sites. Federal facilities have caused sites. 

So as Mike Steinberg is saying, I would largely want to associate 

myself with, and that is I want the polluter to pay, but what we 

are saying with respect to the chemical industry is the polluter 

must pay twice. You pay for your own site and you pay for the 

automobile industry site down the street, or the city site. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We can find, in my view, isolated examples 

of where there is not a direct cost for the activity of a company or 

individuals, but it is good for the general population. It is for the 

health of the Country. And you can’t always isolate these things as 

being responsible for health problems. If you look at global warming right now, you see that we are going to have to spend a heck 

of a lot more money than we ever thought we would in order to get 

rid of greenhouse gases. Everybody is going to pay, the average citizen, the companies, the building owners, et cetera. 

So life changes. As a consequence, and I was naive, I am not a 

lawyer, and I didn’t understand how since there was no law about 

companies that were polluting the environment, how they could be 

taken to task. I found out that under common law that there is, 

and it was upheld in the courts. So there is no question about their 

sharing liability for spoiling their neighbors’ lake. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Senator, yesterday I visited the Hopewell Precision 

Superfund site in Hopewell Junction New York. There is a company there. It is still in business. It is the polluter. EPA is not re-
102 

covering money from that company because they say the company 

can’t afford it. What do you do? 

Well, the idea is to go after the company that sold the trichloroethylene through the tax to that company, because that trichloroethylene is ending up in the home of my friend. I think under the 

circumstances, you not only have to look at what is equitable, but 

where you can get the money. You can’t squeeze it out of these 

companies, the polluters that don’t have money, so you have to go 

after the ones that do. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. That is why we have the orphan fund. 

Mr. SIEGEL. The company is still there, but EPA says, OK, I 

don’t want to put them out of business. That is fair, but you have 

to get the money from someplace, rather than from the health and 

safety of the people down the gradient. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. They pay for their poor health if they 

have any money, and they pay much more serious price than 

money. 

Mr. Steinberg, and I want to close with this because while we are 

all having such a good time here, we have other things that we 

have to do, how many Superfund sites, Mr. Steinberg, are members 

of the Superfund Settlements Project and directly responsible for 

the pollution and for their contribution to the Superfund condition? 

Mr. STEINBERG. If I understood the question, how many sites are 

on the dockets of the members of the Project? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. STEINBERG. It is hundreds and hundreds. I don’t have a precise number. That would include Federal NPL sites, Federal removal sites, State sites, voluntary cleanup sites, brownfield sites, 

and underground storage tank sites. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We are going to call this hearing to a 

close. The questions for the record will be submitted, and we would 

ask your response as quickly as you can be. I thank each of you 

for your testimony, even if it is obvious that I don’t agree with everything you say. 

The hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Madame Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. 

The Superfund Program is important to the health and safety of the American 

public. Superfund sites are scattered across the nation’s landscape. The old industrial backbone of our country, though, was centered in the Northeast and Midwest. 

These parts of America have a disproportionately large number of Superfund sites 

as part of that legacy. 

In Maryland, for example, we have 17 sites on the Superfund National Priorities 

List and dozens of additional sites where removal actions have taken place. The majority of these sites are located in close proximity to some my state’s biggest population centers. 

For the health and safety of Maryland’s 5.6 million residents, we need a Superfund program that is well funded and well managed. I fear that we don’t have that 

today. 

Madame Chairman, I am concerned: 

• that the Superfund program is being starved for cash, 

• that the pace of cleanups is declining rapidly, and 

• the health of our citizens continues to be at risk. 

EPA’s mid-Atlantic region encompasses five states, including Maryland. In this region, total funding for Superfund: 
103 

• response programs, 

• enforcement programs, and 

• management is at a 17 year low. 

The peak funding was $360 million annually in 1992. Funding for Region III leveled off at $350 million annually through the 1990’s. Since 2000—under the current 

administration—that figure fell to $319 million in 2007. 

Human exposure to potentially dangerous chemicals and others substances is not 

yet under control at 111 Superfund sites in 33 states. 

Maryland has 2 such sites: Ordnance Products in Cecil County and Aberdeen 

Proving Ground—Edgewood in Harford County. 

This hearing is a timely one, Madame Chairman: 

• We need a Superfund program that is protecting our citizens’ health. 

• We need a program that is restoring our environment. 

• And we need a program that is actively returning old Superfund sites back to 

productive economic use. 

In short, Madame Chairman, America needs—and Maryland needs—a Superfund 

Program that is healthy. 

I am anxious to hear from EPA about the current pace of cleanups. 

I also want to hear from our other witnesses about how that rate can be accelerated and how we can put this program put back onto firm footing. And then I hope 

we will move quickly to put those recommendations into action. 

Thank you, Madame Chairman. 
104 
105 

THE TOLL OF SUPERRJND NEGLECT 

TOXIC WAfIfE DUMPS & COMMUNITIES AT RISK 

RENA STEINZOR ANO MARGARET CLUNE 
106 

CoNTENTS 

Executive Summary 

50 Reminders Why We Still Need Superfund 

Polluters Pay No More 

Superfund Opponents Spin 

Conclusion 

50 Sites in 10 States: 

The Human & Environmental Costs of Superfund Neglect 

California 

Texas 

New York 

Florida 

Illinois 

Pennsylvania 

Ohio 

Michigan 

New Jersey 

Georgia 

Appendix A - Populations at Risk from 50 Sites 

Appendix B - Methodology 

7 

17 

23 

27 

29 

31 

43 

55 

67 

79 

91 

103 

115 

127 

139 

151 

157 
107 

Twenty-six years ago, just as President Ronald Reagan took office, Congress 

created the "Superfund," a multi-billion dollar environmental program designed to 

inventory and clean up the nation's worst abandoned toxic waste sites, beginning 

with the infamous Love Canal. Today, the Superfund National Priorities List 

(NPL) includes 1,244 sites awaiting cleanup. Many have languished on the 

list for well over a decade and some have awaited cleanup for almost a quarter 

century, as lack ofresourees, industry opposition, technical challenges and 

mismanagement plagued the program. 

Superfund's plight threatens public health across the country. One in four 

Americans live within three miles ofa Superfund site,' and approximately 

three to four million children, who face developmental risks from exposure to 

environmental contaminants,live within one mile.2 

Over the last decade, cleanups have slowed to a crawl because the program lost 

its stable "polluter pays" funding base in 1995. A series of Republican-controlled 

Congresses allowed the industry taxes that support the program to expire and 

ignored yearly requests by the Clinton administration to reinstate them. 

When President George W. Bush took office, the principle that polluters need not 

pay went from de facto to official public policy. The largest beneficiaries of this 

policy are oil and petrochemical companies whose record profits and outsized 

CEO compensation packages are front-page news nationwide (see Figure 4 on 

page 19). In addition to the "pain at the pump" caused by high gas prices, the 

American people are hurting from tax policy that places the interests of wealthy 

corporations over public health. 

In the absence of political commitment and resources, the number of completed 

Superfund cleanups fell abruptly in 2001 to 50 percent of previous annual totals. 

Cleanups were completed at just 40 sites in each of the last three years, as 

shown in Figure 1. 

I U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SuperjUnd's 25,h Anniversary: Capturing the Past, Charting the 

Future, available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundl25anniversary/ (last visited March 23, 2006) 

[hereinafter, EPA, SuperjUnd's 25111 Anniversary]. 

2 Martina E. Cartwright, SuperjUnd: It's No Longer Super and It Isn ~ Much of a Fund, 18 TuL. 

ENVTL. L. 1. 299, 318 (2005) (citing Philip Landrigan et al., Chemical Wastes, Children's Health, 

and the SuperjUnd Basic Research Program, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 423, 423 (\999». 
108 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Rgura 1: Annual Superfund Claanupsl 

Construction Completions by Fiscal Year, 1992-2005 

l00r---------------------------------------------------------, 

oo~8=8~------------------~~~~-

80 

70 

" 61 

~ 60 

os 50 

1: 

~ 40 

30 

20 

10 

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 

Fiscal Year 

To explain the human and environmental implications of this Superfund neglect, 

this report spotlights five of the worst NPL sites in each of the 10 most populous 

states: California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, 

Michigan, New Jersey and Georgia.4 As of April 2006, none of these sites had 

completed the cleanup process.s Detailed information on the 50 sites, the types 

of communities where they are located and the people who live near them is 

presented in the second portion of this report, starting on page 29. Looking across 

these examples produces the following observations: 

3 Data for Figure I obtained from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Number ofNPL Site Actions and 

Milestones by Fiscal Year, available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsiteslquery/queryhtm.nplfy. 

htm (last visited March 28, 2006) [hereinafter, EPA, NPL Milestones by FY]. 

• UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Census 2000 PHC-T-2. Ranking Tables for States: 1990 and 

2000: Table 1. States Ranked by Population: 2000, available at: http://www.census.gov/populationlcen2000/phc-t2ItabO I.pdf (last visited April II, 2006) [hereinafter, CENSUS, Ranking Tables). 

, Construction complete status last verified April 13, 2006. For more detailed information on the 

significance of the "construction complete" designation, see infra notes 20-21 and accompanying 

text 
109 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

• People of color were disproportionately represented around a 

significant number of sites. Thirteen of the profiled sites are located in 

census tracts where the popUlation ~ at least 40 percent racial or ethnic 

minority, including four sites where the percentage is greater than 70. 

These findings are not the product of a statistically valid examination 

of Superfund sites on the whole, and the 50 sites profiled in this report 

make clear that Superfund sites endanger communities of all types. 

However, on a site-specific basis, these findings echo concerns long 

expressed by scholars and other commentators that hazardous waste sites 

disproportionately affect minority and low-income populations. 

• These sites have awaited cleanup for many years. The 50 profiled sites 

were used by manufacturers to dispose of liquid and solid toxic wastes 

for many decades. Some sites date back as far as the tum of the last 

century. They have been included on the NPL for long periods of time, 

with the oldest having been listed on the very first NPL in 1983,8 and 

the most recent listed in 2001, at the same time that annual construction 

completions dropped by half. 

• A number of sites remain in Superfund limbo. Some of the sites, 

although proposed to the NPL between five and 13 years ago, remain 

in "proposed" status, meaning they are ineligible for long-tenn federal 

"remedial action" funding and are not a priority for enforcement actions 

that would compel responsible parties to clean them Up.9 

8 EPA published the first NPL, containing 406 sites, on Sept. 8, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 40658 (Sept. 

8,1983). Eight of the SO sites profiled in this report were on that first NPL: Aerojet General (CA); 

Iron Mountain Mine (CA); Stringfellow (CA); American Creosote Works (pensacola Pit) (FL); 

Reeves Southeast Galvanizing Corp. (FL); Nease Chemical (OH); CPSlMadison Industries (NJ); 

and Universal Oil Products (Chemical Division). 

9 EPA classifies some of the proposed NPL sites profiled in this report (specifically, Normandy 

Park Apartments (FL), Circle Smelting Corp. (IL), Dover Chemical Corp. (OR) and Teny Creek 

Dredge/Spoil AreasIHercules Outfall (GA» as ''NPL-equivalent sites." Katherine N. Probst, et al., 

Appendix B FY 2000 Status 0/52 Sites Proposed 10 theNPL as o/the End o/FY 1999 in SUPERFUND'S 

FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT COST? A REPORT 10 CoNGRESS, 165·167 (2001) (data provided to RFF by EPA) 

[hereinafter, Probst, et al., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE]. EPA defines NPL-equivalent sites as those at which 

responsible parties perform cleanup under EPA enforcement authority and with EPA oversight, but 

without being listed as finaJ on the NPL. Id. at 40. For more information on how EPA classified the 

sites that were proposed to (but not made "final" on) the NPL prior to RFF's 2001 analysis, see id. at 

165-167. Additional information concerning the status of the proposed NPL sites may be available 

in the site descriptions maintained by their respective EPA regional offices, available at http://www. 

epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/npl.htm (click on state of interest, then follow site name hyperlinks). 
110 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

• The SO profiled sites are among the most hazardous in the nation. The 

substances disposed at these sites can cause eVerything from cancer to birth 

defects to brain damage. EPA calculates a hazard score, on a scale of 0 to 

100, to determine whether to add a site to the NPL. To qualify for an NPL 

listing, a site must have a score of 28.5 or higher. The 50 sites profiled in 

this report were assigned scores ranging from 42.24 to 74.86, placing them 

among the most dangerous sites to human health and the environment. 

• These sites contain an array of hazardous substances. The 10 most 

common contaminants at the 50 sites include polychlorinated biphenyls 

(PCBs), lead, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, chromium, copper, zinc, 

cadmium, arsenic, mercury and trichloroethylene. Some sites contain 

extraordinarily toxic chemicals, some of which (e.g., creosote and lead) 

are now banned for most purposes. Most often, these chemicals are 

invisible, tasteless and odorless, giving little warning when they are 

present in drinking water, the air or soil. 

• Large numbers of people, including chlldren and the elderly, live 

near these sites. Most of the 50 profiled sites are located in heavily 

populated urban or suburban neighborhoods. According to EPA, 

between 205,349 and 803,100 people live within one mile of these sites.6 

As of 2000, some 235,000 people lived in the census tracts where they 

are located, including 34,127 children aged nine and younger and 14,068 

persons aged 75 and older. 

• Lower-income Americans disproportionately reside around these sites. 

In stark contrast to the wealthy corporate beneficiaries of the Superfund 

tax windfall detailed in this report, residents of30 of the 50 census tracts 

reported a median household income for 1999 (the most recent tabulation of 

data available at the tract level, for Census 2000) below that of the nation as 

a whole, that is, below $41,994.7 Nonetheless, a significant number of sites 

are surrounded by middle income or even wealthy populations, testifying to 

the fact that Superfund sites endanger a wide variety of communities. 

6 EPA's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Infonnation 

System (CERCLIS) provides ranges for the number of people living within 1 mile ofNPL sites. 

Infonnation for specific sites can be accessed through CERCLIS online, (11Iailable at http://cfpub. 

epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/srchsites.cfm. 

1 UNl11ID STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, (11Iailable at 

http://factfinder.census.gov/servletlSAFFFacts? _submenuld=factsheet_l &_sse=on (last visited 

April 28, 2006) [hereinafter, CENSUS, 2000 Highlights]. 
111 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

, 

• Some of the sites that have waited longest for cleanup are owned 

by viable, profitable companies. Sites sometimes lack a "responsible 

party"; for example, the company responsible for contamination may be 

out of business. These sites are to be cleaned up using Superfund dollars. 

Where there is a responsible party, the company is supposed to pay for 

cleanup. Yet in a number of cases, sites have languished on the NPL even 

though a responsible party has been identified. This includes, for example, 

a New Jersey site owned by Honeywell, which in 2005 ranked number 75 

on the Fortune 500, with profits topping $1.2 billion. This site was among 

the first Superfund sites listed in 1983, but still has not been cleaned up. 

At many Superfund sites, cosmetic changes have been made - rusting barrels 

have been removed from the surface, and vegetation has reemerged on what were 

moonscapes 20 years ago. Beneath the surface, though, the toxic stews continue 

to circulate, moldering and spreading, adding chemicals to aquifers, rising to 

the surface of the soil as the land freezes and thaws, and releasing methane and 

other volatile gases. The senior federal officials now responsible for the program 

provide political spin instead of solutions. They tell us that Superfund does not 

need the tax money it was intended to have, and that the popular "polluter pays" 

principle still applies even though the tax on oil and chemical companies has 

expired. There is no better way to illustrate the bankruptcy of such claims than to 

get back to basics and look at the nation's worst sites, the dangers they pose and 

the paralyzed cleanup response. 
112 

50 REMINDERS WHY WE Snu. NEED S ..... D 

Vulnerable Populations 

The arguments over facts and figures related to financing Superfund reverberate 

outside Washington and throughout the country, where NFL sites stagnate and 

pose continuing risks to human health and the environment.lO In observing the 

251h anniversary of the Superfund law in December 2005, EPA reminded the 

public that, "even today, 1 in 4 Americans live within 3 miles of a Superfund 

site. "11 Approximately three to four million children live within one mile of a 

Superfund site, and due to their unique physical susceptibilities, are at greater risk 

to the effects of exposure from environmental contaminants.12 

Among those at risk from the NFL sites around the country that still await cleanup 

are the people living near the 50 sites profiled in this report. Specifically, the 

report highlights five sites in each of the top 10 most populous states: California, 

Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey 

and Georgia (ranked by size ofpopulation).13 

As of the 2000 Census (the most recent tabulation of data available at the 

census tract level), 234,524 people lived in the census tracts containing one of 

the 50 profiled sites. Of those, 34,127 are children aged nine and younger. An 

additional 14,068 are persons aged 75 and older. In 30 of the 50 census tracts 

(60 percent of tracts), the median household income for 1999 (again, the most 

recent tabulation of data available at the census tract level) was below that for 

the nation, that is, below $41,994.'4 

This report also provides the percentage of "minority" (that is, the percentage not 

classified as "one race, white") and "Hispanic" popUlations around each of the 50 

sites. The Census Bureau considered race and Hispanic origin to be "two separate 

and distinct concepts" for the 2000 census (as explained further in Appendix B). 

Thirteen of the profiled sites are located in census tracts where the population 

is at least 40 percent racial minority or Hispanic, including four sites where the 

percentage is greater than 70. 

10 Cartwright, supra note 2, at 318 (explaining that, "EPA's existing backlog, combined with the 

emergence of additional sites, prolongs the health risks currently borne by communities adjacent 

to Superfund sites"). 

II EPA, SuperfUnd's 25'h Anniversary, supra note 1. 

12 Cartwright, supra note 2 (citing Philip Landrigan el al., Chemical Wastes, Children's Health, 

and the SuperfUnd Basic Research Program, 107 ENVfL. HEALTIf PERsPECTIVES 423,423 (1999)). 

13 CENSUS. Ranking Tables, supra note 4. 

14 CENSUS, 2000 Highlights, supra note 7. 
113 

TNE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Rgura 2: Profiled SiIeI 

STATE 

California 

SITE NAME 

• Aerojet General orp. Iron Mountein Mine 

McCormick & Baxter Creosoting 

Industries Landfill 

Int ComfortllLavaca Bay Gulfco Marine Maintenance 

Texas • Jasper CrlOsoting Company Inc. 

New York 

Floride 

Illinois 

Pennsylvania 

Ohio 

Michigen 

New Jersey 

Georgia 

R&H Oil/Tropicena 

Brunswick Wood Preserving 

Camilla Woad Preserving Company LCP Chemicals Georgia • Terry Creek Drdga Spoil Areas/Herc. Outfall 

• Woolfolk Chemical Works Inc. 

HRS 

SCORE 

54.63 

58.16 

74.66 

57.22 

DATE ADDED 

TO THE NPL 

Sept ,1 

SeptB,l983 

Oct 14, 1992 

June 10, 1986 

Sept8,1983 

Dec. 16, 1994 

Proposed on Feb. 13, 1995 

Sept 8, 1983 

Ma 31 1994 

Proposed on June 17, 1996 

Mey 10, 1999 

Dec. I, 2000 

July 22. 1987 

These findings are not the product of a statistically valid examination of 

Superfund sites on the whole, and the 50 sites profiled in this report make clear 

that Superfund sites endanger communities of all types. However, on a sitespecific basis, these findings echo concerns long expressed by scholars and other 

commentators that hazardous waste sites disproportionately affect minority and 

low-income populations. 

Detailed information on the 50 sites and the people who live near them is 

presented in the state-specific sections set forth in the next part of this report, 

beginning on page 29. 
114 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Health Risks 

To qualify for listing on the NFL, a site must have a Hazard Ranking System 

(HRS) score of28.5 or higher. As shown in Figure 2, the 50 sites profiled in this 

report were assigned scores ranging from 42.24 to 74.86, placing them among the 

worst of the worst, yet most have nonetheless languished on the NFL for many 

years. HRS scores depend on a variety of factors that reflect the dangers posed by 

the sites, including: 

• quantity of toxic chemicals dumped at the site; 

• toxicity of the chemicals with respect to both human and animal exposures; 

• people potentially exposed to these hazards; 

• environmental loss caused by the site (e.g., loss of underground drinking water 

supplies, destruction of fishing beds or other fragile ecosystems); and 

• pathways by which people and the environment are directly exposed (e.g., 

contamination of water, land, or air).I! 

The disposal practices utilized at the 50 sites profiled in this report resulted in toxic 

mixtures of hazardous substances that individually cause everything from cancer to 

birth defects to brain damage when they seep into drinking water, are emitted into 

the air, or lace the soil on the sites and in surrounding communities. The 10 most 

common contaminants at the 50 sites profiled in this report include polychlorinated 

biphenyls (PCBs), lead, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, chromium, copper, zinc, 

cadmium, arsenic, mercury and trichloroethylene. Most often, these chemicals 

are invisible, tasteless and odorless, giving little warning when they are present in 

amounts far above what is safe, for people and for wildlife. Details on the health 

risks posed by these contaminants are set forth in Figure 3. 16 

As bad as exposure to individual chemicals can be, their effects when they interact 

with each other have yet to be documented. Equally troubling, Superfund sites 

represent just one of the many sources of environmental contaminants present 

in surrounding communities. Once again, our understanding of the cumulative 

effects of such exposures is preliminary at best. 

U For more infonnation on the HRS, see ENVTL. PROT. AOENCY,ApPENDlXA TO PART 300--THB 

HAZARD RANKING SYSTEM, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. A. 

16 Infonnation concerning health effects of exposure is drawn (and additional infonnation may 

be obtained) from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry's (ATSDR) Frequently 

Asked Questions about Contaminants Found at Hazardous Waste Sites (ToxFAQs). As noted by 

ATSDR in the preface to each of its ToxFAQs summaries, "[t]he effects of exposure to any hazardous substance depend on the dose, the duration, how you are exposed, personal traits and habits, 

and whether other chemicals are present." UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, Frequently Asked Questions About Contaminants Found at Hazardous Waste Sites, 

available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov!toxfaq.html (infonnation on individual contaminants may be 

located by searching by initial letter in name). 
115 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

Figura 3: Five ContImlnlnll Found Most Frequently at the 50 Profiled Sitaa 

Contaminent Profiled sites where found Hea~h effects of exposure 

· Stringfellow (CAl 

· Star Lake Cenal (TXI 

· Consolidated Iron 5. Metal (NY) 

· Sauget Area 1 (Ill 

· Watson Johnlon lendfill (PA) 

· East lD"Street(PA) 

· lower Darby Creak (PAl 

· Skin conditions such as ecne end Polychlorinated · Sharon Steel (Farrell Wks Disp Area) (PA) rashes Biphenyls (PCBsl · Armco, Inc., Hamilton Plant (OHI 

· North Sanitery Landfill (OH) · Uverdamage 

· Rockwellintarnational (Mil 

· Bay City Middlegrounds (Mil 

· Barrels, Inc. (Mil 

· Univarsal 011 Products (Chemical Division) (NJI 

· Cornall Dubitier Elaclronics (NJ) 

· lCP Chemicals Georgia (GAl 

· Aeroiet General (CA) 

· Stsuffar Chemical (Tarpon Springs) (FLI 

· Normandy Park Apartments (Fl) · Decreased function of nervous 

· DePue/New Jersey Zinc (Ill system 

· Circle Smelting (Ill · Increases in blood pressure 

lead · Sauget Area 1 (Ill · Anemia 

· North Sanitary landfill (OHI · Brain and/or kidney damage 

· Barrels, Inc. (Mil · In pregnant women, can cause 

· Stata Disposal Landfill, Inc. (Mil miscarriages 

· Universal Oil Products (Chamical Division) (NJI 

· CPS/Madilon Industries (NJI 

· McCormick 5. BalIIer Creosoting (CAl 

· AlCOA (Point Comfortlltavaca Bay (lX) 

· Jasper Creosoting (lX1 

· Star Lake Canal (lXI · Animal slUdies indicate potential 

Polycyclic Aromatic · Amarican Creosote Works (Pensacola Pit) (FLI for reproductive difficulties end 

Hydrocarbons · Stauffer Chamlcal (Tarpon Springs' (FL) birth defects; "it is not known 

(PAHsl · Sauget Araa 1 (Ill whether these effects occur in 

· Indian Raflnery- Texaco lewrenceville (Ill people" 

· UGI Columbia Gas Plant (PA) 

· Sharon Staal (Farrell Wks Disp Aree) {PAl 

· Camilla Wood Preserving (GAl 

· Stringfellow (CA) 

· Breathing lerge amounts of 

· Iron Mountain Mine (CA) 

· Aerojat Ilenaral (CAl chromium (VI) cen ceuse irritetion 

· Star Lake Canal (TX) to the nose 

· Uberty Industrial finishing (NY) · Ingesting lerge amounts of 

Chromium · Stauffer Chamical (Tarpon Springs) {fU chromium (VII can cause stomach 

· Armco, Inc., Hamilton Plant (OH) upsats, ulcers, convulsions, kidney 

· Diamond Shamrock Corp (Painesville Works) (DHI end liver demege end even death 

· State Disposa' Landfill,lnc. (Mil · Skin contact with chromium (VII 

· Brunswick Wood Presarving (GA compounds can causa skin ulcers 

· Iron Mountain Mine (CAl 

· Aerolet General(CAI 

· Breathing high levels can cause 

· Star Lake'Canat (lX) 

· Stsuffer Chemical Co. (Tarpon Springs) (Fl) nose and throat irritation 

· Circle Smaltlng (Ill · Ingesting high levels can cause Copper · Ssuget Araa 1 (Ill nausae, vomiting and diarrhea 

· Parsons Casket Hardware (IL) · Very high doses can cause liver 

· Stala Disposal Landfill, Inc. (Mil and kidnay damage and can even 

· CPS/Madlson Industries (NJ) cause death 

· Brunswick Wood Preserving (GAl 
116 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Lagging Cleanups 

Once a site requires no additional cleanup activities, it may be deleted from the 

NPLY Of the 1,553 sites that had been added to the NPL as of April 2006, only 

309, or 20 percent, had been deleted. IS According to EPA, however, measuring 

success by simply looking at the ratio of deleted NPL sites to total sites on the 

NPL fails to "recognize the substantial construction and reduction of risk to 

human health and the environment that has occurred at NPL sites not yet eligible 

for deletion."'9 So, in 1990, to "communicate more clearly to the public the 

status of cleanup progress" among NPL sites, EPA established the new category 

of "construction complete" as its main indicator of program success.20 Sites are 

considered "construction complete" when any necessary physical construction 

and engineering work is complete, even if final cleanup goals have not been 

achieved.11 In addition to the sites deleted from the NPL, another 600 or so have 

achieved the "construction complete" designation.21 

As of April 2006, none of the 50 sites profiled in this report had progressed far 

enough in the cleanup process to be deSignated "construction complete."23 Some 

of the sites, although proposed to the NPL between five and 13 years ago, have 

never even been made "final" NPL sites.24 "Final" sites have been added to the 

National Priorities List through the issuance ofa final rule in the Federal Register 

and are the only sites at which EPA can use Trust Fund monies to pay for longtenn remedial actions.2S In contrast, proposed NPL sites are not eligible for 

17 Katherine N. Probst & Diane Sherman, Successfor Superfimd: A New Approach for Keeping 

Score, at 1 (April 2004), available at http://www.rtf.orglrfflDocumentslRFF-RPT-SuperfundSuccess.pdf (last visited March 28, 2005); 40 C.F.R. § 3oo,425(e). 

18 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NPL Site Totals by Status and Milestone as of April 25, 2006, available 

at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsiteslquery/queryhtmlnpltotal.htm (last visited May I, 2006). 

19 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OSWER DIREc:iwE 9320.2~09A-P, CLOSE Our PROCEDURES FOR 

NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST SITES 3-1 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlresources/ 

closeoutlpdf/guidance.pdf (last visited March 28, 2005) [hereinafter, EPA, CLOSE OuT PROCEDURES 

FOR NPL SITES]. 

20 Probst & Sherman, supra note 17, at 1; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Final Rule on National Oil 

and HazardQUs Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8699 (March 8, 1990). 

21 EPA, CLOSE OUT PROCEDURES FOR NPL SITES, supra note 19 at 3-1. Sites also qualify as construction complete when "EPA has determined that the response action should be limited to measures that do not involve construction," or when the site qualifies for deletion from the NPL. Id. 

II Katherine N. Probst, Whither Superfund? Is Superfund Withering?, ENVTL. FORUM, July/Aug. 

2005 at 21 [hereinafter, Probst, Whither Superfund?]. 

23 Construction complete status last verified April 13, 2006. For more detailed information on 

the significance of the "construction complete" designation, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 

24 See supra note 9. 

2S See, e.g., Probst, et al., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 39,271; 40 C.F.R. 
117 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

long-term federal ''remedial action" funding, nor do EPA or the states typically 

make them a priority for enforcement actions. Most of the 50 sites categorized 

as "proposed" have been in that status for a decade or longer. In some instances, 

EPA claims that the states in which they are located are ''taking the lead" on 

pursuing them or it says that because responsible parties are being "cooperative," 

it has deferred a decision to finalize the listing.26 Neither rationale explains why 

the sites have languished for so long. 

Rather, funding shortages appear to be largely responsible for the lagging 

cleanup of these and other NPL sites. In 2002, EPA's Office of Inspector General 

reported that the agency granted funds 23 percent below what its regional offices 

requested for remedial construction activities at NPL sitesP Five sites received 

less funding than the regional office administering the site requested, and seven 

sites received no funding at all.28 Among the sites that received no funding was 

Jasper Creosoting in Texas, one of the 50 sites featured in this report. Region 6 

officials stated that the lack of funding at this site presents "long-term risks to 

human health and the environment," noting that without funding to implement 

a permanent remedy, the contaminated groundwater plume migrating from the 

site will eventually reach the water well for the City of Jasper, Texas.29 Three 

years later, in its FY 2004 Superfund Annual Report, EPA reiterated that "[t]he 

Superfund program faces a backlog of new cleanup projects ready to begin 

construction."30 And, for FY 2005, EPA reported that it did not have enough 

resources to fund new projects that were ready for construction at nine sites.31 

§ 300.425(b)(I). 

26 See supra note 9. 

27 See Letter from Nikki L. Tinsley. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Office of the Inspector Gen., to 

James Jeffords, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works 1 (Oct. 25, 2002) available at http://www.epa.gov/oiglreportsl2002/boxer.pdf(last visited April 4, 2006). 

28 [d. at 3. The sites (and states in which they lie) for which actual funding fell short ofrequests 

were: Atlas Tack Corp. (MA). Elizabeth Mine (VT), Jennison-Wright Corporation (IL), Continental Steel Corp. (IN), Central Wood Preserving Co. (LA), Hart Creosoting Company (TX), Jasper 

Creosoting Company (TX), Basin Mining Area (MT), Upper Tenmile Creek Mining Area (MT), 

Gilt Edge Mine (SD), and Lorentz Barrel & Drum Co. (CA). [d. at Enclosures 1 and 2. Gilt Edge 

Mine received less funding than requested for both remedial action construction activities (Enclosure 1) and long-term response actions (Enclosure 2). [d. 

29 [d. at 3-4. 

30 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AOENCY, EPA-540-R-05-00 I, FY 2004 SUPERFUND ANNuAL REPORT 20 (2005), 

available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlactionlprocess/pdfs/fy2004/fy2004.pdf (last visited 

April 4, 2006). 

1I U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AOENCY, Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2005 as 

a/November 22,2005, http://www.epa.gov/superfundiactioniprocessinumbers05.htm(lastvisited 

April 7, 2006). For a list of the nine sites that did not receive new construction funding in fiscal 

year 2005, please see http://www.epagov/superfundiaccomp/factsheets05.htm#not_funded (last 

visited April 7, 2006). 
118 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

These developments have taken a drastic toll on Superfund cleanups. As shown in 

Figure I, the number of construction completions dropped precipitously beginning 

in 200 1.32 One explanation for the decline is that during the I 990s, EPA's regional 

offices focused on cleaning up less complex sites first, in order to achieve high 

targets for construction completions.33 Accordingly, "EPA is now left with many of 

the sites that require more complex, lengthy, and expensive cleanups, which take 

more work overall and a longer amount of time to reach construction complete 

status."34 Nonetheless, funding shortfalls - including those which prevent some 

cleanup projects from even being started - undoubtedly playa significant role in 

EPA's recent lackluster record in moving sites to "construction complete."35 

Site Examples 

Superfund sites come in many guises. Most ofthe 50 sites are located in 

heavily populated urban or suburban neighborhoods and contain a toxic soup 

of harmful chemicals with direct routes of exposure - e.g., contaminated 

water, soil or air - for the people who live in surrounding communities. The 

sites were used by manufacturers to dispose ofliquid and solid toxic wastes 

for many decades. Some sites date back as far as the turn of the last century. 

They have been included on the NPL for long periods of time, with the oldest 

having been listed on the very first NPL in 198336 and the most recent listed in 

2001, at the same time that annual construction completions dropped by half. 

Inexplicably, some of the sites that have waited the longest for cleanup are owned 

by companies that remain viable, even profitable. For example: 

• Universal on Products (Chemical Division), a 75-acre site in Bergen 

County, New Jersey, was added to the NPL in 1983 and was used to 

manufacture a variety of toxic chemicals from 1932-79. Approximately 

4.5 million gallons ofliquid waste heavily laced with such volatile organic 

compounds as vinyl chloride, benzene and trichloroethylene were dumped 

in unlined lagoons, resulting in contamination of soil, surface water and 

groundwater. The runoff of waste polluted the nearby Hackensack River 

Basin, which is used by local residents for recreation. Allied Signal, now 

32 EPA, NPL Milestones by FY, supra note 3. 

JJ Probst & Shennan, supra note 17, at 3. 

34 Id. 

35 Id., note 7 (noting that "there may be other reasons as well for the decrease in the number of 

construction complete sites, including funding shortfalls."). 

36 EPA published the first NPL, containing 406 sites, on Sept. 8, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 40658 (Sept. 

8, 1983). Eight of the 50 sites profiled in this report were on that first NPL: Aerojet General (CA); 

hon Mountain Mine (CA); Stringfellow (CA); American Creosote Works (pensacola Pit) (FL); 

Reeves Southeast Galvanizing Corp. (FL); Nease Chemical (OR); CPSlMadison Industries (NJ); 

and Universal Oil Products (Chemical Division). 
119 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

Honeywell, has been identified as a responsible party at the site and has 

been conducting cleanup activities. In 2005, Honeywell was ranked 

number 75 on the Fortune 500, with profits topping $1.2 billion.37 

• The 85-acre Bofon-Nobel site in Muskegon County, Michigan, was 

first listed in 1988, and responsible parties include American Cyanamid, 

Akzo-Nobel, Bissell Corporation, DuPont, Eli Lilly, General Electric, 

IBM and Union Carbide, most of which either are or were listed on 

the Fortune 500. Unlined lagoons were used for disposal of the wastes 

generated by the production of alcohol-based detergents, saccharin, 

pesticides, herbicides and dye intermediaries. Final cleanup plans were 

completed in the early 1990s, but negotiations with the companies listed 

above, among others, slowed implementation until the late 1990s, and 

even then, federal funding was used to construct groundwater treatment 

facilities. The census tract in which the site is located has a median 

household income of about $38,000. 

Several of the 50 sites were owned by companies that used extraordinarily toxic 

chemicals, some of which (e.g., creosote and lead) are now banned for most 

purposes. Over decades, excess chemicals and metals spilled or dropped onto 

the bare ground, where they seeped into underground aquifers or were washed by 

rain into adjacent storm sewers, rivers, or creeks. For example: 

• The American Creosote Works (Pensacola Pit) site in Escambia 

County, Florida, was used from 1902-1981 for wood preserving. 

Creosote was used until 1950, when pentachlorophenol became the 

chemical of choice. Ponds set up to '~rco1ate" these highly toxic liquids 

overflowed, spilling into Bayou Chico and the Pensacola Bay. The 

census tract encompassing the site is 48 percent minority, with a median 

household income of$23,000. 

• The Lawrence Aviation Industries site in Suffolk County, New 

York,covers 160 acres and was used to manufacture titanium sheeting 

for the aeronautics industry. In 1980, the site owner crushed over 1,600 

drums of trichloroethylene, acid sludges and other toxics, spilling their 

contents onto the unprotected soil. It also poured wastes into surface 

waters and two unlined lagoons. 

37 Fortune 500, 1955-2005, CNNMoney.com, available at http://money.cnn.comlmagazineslfortuneffortune500 _ archivefsnapshotsl2005f634.hbn1 (last visited May 8, 2006). 
120 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

• The DePuelNew Jersey ZincIMobil Chemical Company in Bureau 

County, Iilinois,was used by a series of companies to smelt zinc for close 

to a century, creating waste piles, lagoons and cooling ponds filled with 

toxic wastes that now threaten a community with a median household 

income of $37,000, as well as the nearby DePue Lake, which houses a 

fishery, state wildlife refuge and numerous wetlands. 

Other sites served as dumping grounds for multiple companies, many of which have 

changed their names, metamorphosing into other businesses or simply disappearing. 

• One of the oldest and most notorious sites on the NPL, the 17 -acre 

Stringfellow site, is located in a canyon near the southern CaUfornia 

town of Glen Avon. It served as a hazardous waste disposal facility 

from 1956-1972, accepting over 34 million gallons of waste from metal 

refinishing, electroplating and pesticide manufacturing companies. This 

waste was dumped into surface evaporation ponds. Rainfall caused the 

ponds to overflow, sending streams of heavily polluted water into nearby 

neighborhoods. The population of the census tract around the site is 52 

percent minority and has a median household income of $43,000. 

• Similarly, the Lower Darby Creek Area in Delaware County, 

Pennsylvania, consists of two separate dumps, the Clearview Landfill 

and the Folcroft Landfill and Annex, where a combination of hospital 

waste, demolition debris and municipal waste were disposed of by 

several companies and local governments. Clearview was covered and 

re-vegetated in 1976, and the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority 

constructed hundreds of homes on its eastern and southern borders. Years 

later, EPA discovered that the covers were eroding and contaminated 

runoff was seeping into nearby Darby Creek. 

• The 550-acre LCP Chemicals site in Glynn County, Georgia,was used 

for seven decades as an oil refinery, paint manufacturing plant, power 

plant and chlor-alkali factory. Five major companies have been identified 

as responsible parties at the site: ARCO, Georgia Power Company, 

Dixie Paints and Varnish Company (currently O'Brien Company), Allied 

Chemicals, Inc. (now Allied Signal, or Honeywell) and the Hanlin Group, 

a subsidiary ofLCP Chemicals-Georgia, Inc. EPA estimates that more 

than 380,000 pounds of highly toxic mercury was "lost" in the area 

between 1955-1979 and, as a result, commercial fishing has been banned 

in the area. The census tract in which the site is located is 63 percent 

minority, with a median household income of $24,000. 
121 

THE TOLL OF SUP£RFUND NEGLECT 

At several of the 50 sites profiled in this report, hundreds of acres of ordinary 

household garbage served as the foundation for disposal of millions of gallons of 

liquid industrial waste. At the time, engineers theorized that the garbage would 

serve as a sponge, soaking 1ij) the corrosive liquid and holding it in place. But the 

sponge became saturated and began leaking into the ground. Far from solving the 

problem of what to dq with these heavily contaminated liquids, the garbage, which 

covered dozens - even hundreds - of acres, just spread it around. For example: 

• In Montgomery County, Ohio, the 102-acre North Sanitary Landfill 

sits atop an aquifer used for drinking water, which is composed of highly 

transmissive sands and gravel. Portions of the site have caught fire 

several times. It is located in a census tract with a median household 

income of $25,000. 

• Another glaring c;xample is the 190-acre Operating Industries site in 

Monterey Park, CaUfornia, located in the heart of the densely populated 

Los Angeles metropolitan area where millions of gallons of liquid industrial 

waste were poured over huge landfills containing ordinary household 

garbage. Leachate ti:9m the site includes vinyl chloride, benzene, 

tetrachloroethyiene and various heavy metals. The surrounding census tract 

is 61 percent minority, with a median household income of$47,000. 

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, some of the 50 sites were proposed for the NFL, but 

have never been converted to final status, meaning that they are ineligible for 

long-term federal remedial funding. For example: 

• The Dover Chemical Corp. site in Tuscarawas County, Ohio, was 

proposed for listing in May 1993, but has not been added to the final 

NFL. Dover Chemical has operated a manufacturing facility at the site 

since 1950, which produces products that are used to manufacture extreme 

pressure lubricants, plasticizers and flame retardants for vinyl products. 

• The Normandy Pal'k Apartments site in Hillsborough County, Florida, 

was proposed for listing in February 1995, but has never been finalized. 

The site is the former home of a recycling operation that involved 

crushing batteries and smelting lead. The company, Gulf Coast Recycling, 

ultimately leveled the buildings used for these purposes and constructed 

apartment homes on the site, which remain occupied. 
122 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

POWITEIlS PAY No MORE: 

CoRPoRATE TAX WINOfiW.S a THE FATE OF THE SUPERFUND PRoaRAM 

The 'Polluter Pays' Framework 

In the late 1970s, the nation came to know the town of Love Canal, New York. 

Built on top of a massive toxic waste dump, town residents suffered from severe 

illness and birth defects caused by chemical exposures. Ultimately, 1,000 families 

were relocated and homes along the "Canal" were demolished.38 

After the revelations about Love Canal and similar sites won widespread media 

attention, the need for a comprehensive program to address the country's toxic 

waste crisis was clear. However, there remained the question of who would pay. 

Environmentalists argued that because companies profited from cheap waste 

disposal methods, it was they who should pay to clean up the resulting mess.39 

The chemical industry retorted that society as a whole had benefited from the 

disposal methods in the form of less expensive products, so society as a whole 

should pay for the c1eanup.40 

The law that was ultimately enacted (officially titled the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)) took a 

two-pronged approach that affirmed, and then reaffirmed, the "polluter pays" 

principle.4! The choice of which prong to pursue was left up to EPA, both in 

general and on a site-specific basis. First,it created a liability scheme to get 

"responsible parties" to pay for the cleanup of contaminated sites themselves -

known colloquially as "lawyers first, shovels later."42 Responsible parties who did 

not honor the government's request that they clean up "voluntarily" were subject 

to "treble damages" - three times ultimate cleanup costs - as punishment for 

their recalcitrance.43 

38 A. Theodore Steegrnann, Jr., History of Love Canal and SUNY Buffalo s Response: History, the 

University Role, and Health Research, 8 BUFF. ENVIL. L. I. 173, 175 (200 1); See also ROBERT V. 

PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENvntONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND Poucy, 263 (3n1 ed. 2000). 

39 Cartwright, supra note 2, at 303 (citing CONGo Q., INC., Congress Clears 'SupeTjUnd'Legislation, 36 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 584, 587 (1980» . 

... /d. (citing CONGo Q., INC., Congress Clears 'SupeTjUnd'Legislation, 36 CONGo Q. ALMANAC 584, 

587 (1980». 

41 President Carter signed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 

Liability Act into law on Dec. 11, 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-510 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 9601-9675). 

42 Katherine N. Probst, SupeTjUnd at 25: What Remains to Be Done, RESOURCES, Fall 2005, at 20 

(2005) [hereinafter, Probst, SupeTjUnd at 25]; 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), CERCLA § 106(a) (authorizing 

EPA to issue an administrative order or secure a court order to force responsible parties to undertake cleanup measures necessary to abate contamination posing an "imminent and substantial 

endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment"). 

431d. 
123 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Second, the statute created a multi-billion dollar trust fund (known generally as 

the "Superfund," but to avoid confusion with the program itself, referred to here as 

the "Trust Fund" or the "Fund") that the federal government could use to pay for 

site cleanups where responsible parties "could not, or would not, foot the bill.''44 

The law further provided that the government could recover those costs from 

any responsible parties it could later find, leading to the colloquial label "shovels 

first, lawyers later."4s To finance the Trust Fund, Congress levied taxes on those 

industrial sectors most likely to have contributed to the hazardous waste sites. 

The two tracks were integrally related to one another - without the resources 

provided by the Trust Fund, the government could not investigate sites, 

prosecute responsible parties, or use government-funded cleanup to abate 

threats to public health. Conversely, enforcement actions replenished the Trust 

Fund. Although Congress never anticipated that the Trust Fund would become 

self-supporting given the costs of administering the program and the likelihood 

that some sites would prove to be "orphans" with no responsible parties around, 

the two tracks ensured that thousands of identifiable polluters would end up 

either paying now, or paying later. 

Transition to 'Let the People Pay' 

Superfund taxes generated $1.5 billion a year, or $4 million per day.46 These funds 

were significant - and vital to the health of the program - but they accounted 

for only a small fraction of oil, chemical and other industry profits. Indeed, this 

amount represents 2 percent of the 2005 profits earned by just six of the nation:SO top 

petroleum and petrochemical producing companies - which paid the largest share 

of Superfund taxes - and the compensation paid to the six companies' CEOs would 

cover over a month:SO worth of lost tax revenue (see Figure 4). 

44 Probst, Superfund at 25, supra note 42, at 20. 

45 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D), CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(A)-(D) (authorizing recovery of 

cleanup costs from responsible parties). 

46 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES: A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT 

SUPERFUND PROGRAM, at 6, available at http://www.epa.gov!superfundlwhatissfi'sfjact4.pdf(last 

visited March 27, 2006); see also Mark Reisch, Superfund Reauthorization Issues in the 105th 

Congress, Congo Research Servo Issue Brief No. 97025 (1998), available at http://ncseoniine. 

orgINLElCRSreportslwastelwaste-17.cfm (last visited March 29, 2006). 
124 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Rgure 4: Petroleum Profits 

Company Name FortJJne 500 Rank f~':;:==l CEO Name 2\JU5 CtU 

Exxon Mobil 1 $38138 lee R. Ravmond $25173000 

Chevron 4 $14099 Oavid J. O'Reilly $11,171).000 

ConoeoPltlllillS . 6 $135211 James J. Mulva $16789000 

Valero Energy 15 $3,590 William E. Greehev $44.81&.000 

Marathon Oil 23 $3,032 Clarence P. Cazelo~ Jr. $4,839.000 

Sunoeo 66 $974 John G. Orosdick $33436000 

Totel: Total: 

$71,354 $133.1162.000 

Nonetheless, industry lobbied fiercely against the Superfund tax, and following 

the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995, the tax was allowed to expire.47 At 

the time, the Fund still had an unobligated balance of nearly $4 billion, as well as 

continual deposits from interest payments, cost recoveries, fines and penalties.48 

As a result, the lapse in taxing authority had little initial effect on the ability to 

fund the program.49 . 

Although EPA had enough money to keep up a reasonable pace for cleanup 

initially, the Clinton administration re~ognized that the long-term stability of the 

program required that the fund be repll:nished continually, and Presid~t Clinton 

faithfully recommended reinstatement of the Superfund taxes in his annual 

budget submissions.so 

Year after year, however, Republican-cllotrolled Congresses resisted these 

requests, and, as EPA received appropriations without any revenue from taxes 

replenishing these amounts, the Trust Fund's balance continued to erode .. In 1998, 

Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO, subsequently renamed 

the Government Accountability Office) for reassurance that there was no legal 

prohibition on shifting the entire burden onto general taxpayers. Answering 

narrowly, GAO replied that such an approach was legaJ.Sl Nonetheless, the 

47 [d. 

4B James E. McCarthy. Superfund Taxes or General Revenues: Future Funding Options for the 

Superfund Program, Congo Research Servo Report No. RL31410 (2005) at at 2-3, available at 

http://ncseonline.orglnlelcrsreportsl05marIRL3141O.pdf(last visited March 29, 2006). 

49 [d. at 3. 

l1J See id. 

SI U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED·98-152R, SUPERFUND: STA11JS OF THE SUPERFUND 

TRUST FUND 1·2,4 (1998), available at http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2l160233.pdf(last visited 

March 30, 2006). The GAO discussed the issue with officials from the Congressional Budget Of· 

fice, EPA and the Office of Management and Budget and none "identified any provisions ofJaw or 

the congressional budget resolution that would preclude funding the Superfund program entirely 

from general revenues"). [d. at 4. 
125 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

shift was a profound break with the statute's underlying premise that polluting 

industries, not citizens, should support this burden. 

As shown in Figure 5, from FY 1993-1999, the share of the Superfund program 

funded by general taxpayers remained constant at $250 million, less than 20 

percent of the overall appropriation.52 In 1999, that amount increased to $325 

million, and from FY 2000-2003, rose to more than $600 million per year 

- around 50 percent of the total appropriations.53 By 2004, general revenues 

accounted for 100 percent of appropriations to EPA for the Superfund program 

because by the end ofFY 2003, the Trust Fund's balance was zero.54 

Rgura 5: Ratio of Pollutlr Ind Individual Taxpayer Cantrlbutionl1D Trust Fund5s 

Private Versus Public SlIaras of Superfund Resources 

FY 1993-2004 

1983 19941995 1996 1987 1 sse 1899 2000 2001 '1002 2003 

'2 U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINO OFFICE, GAO-04-787R, SUPERFUND PROGRAM: BRI!AKDOWN OF APPROPRIATIONS DATA 3 (2004), available at http://www.gao.govlnew.itemsld04787r.pdf(last visited March 

31,2006) [hereinafter, GAO, BRI!AKDOWN OF SUPERFtIND APPROPRIATIONS]. 

" [d . 

.. [d.; McCarthy, supra note 48, at 4-5 (citing Budget of the United States Government, Appendix, 

Fiscal Years 1996-2005). 

" Data set forth in Sources and Amounts of Appropriations to the Supeifimd Program, Fiscal 

Years 1993 through 2004 in GAO, BREAKDOWN OF SUPERFUND APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 52, at 3. 
126 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Funding Shortages 

The process of cleaning up heavily contaminated hazardous waste sites is complex, 

resource-intensive and time consuming. Specifically, "major Superfund cleanups 

can cost millions or even hundreds of millions of dollars" and "can involve 

complex remedies such as excavation and treatment oflarge amounts of soil, 

lengthy treatment of polluted underground water, or even dredging and removal of 

contaminants from underwater sites."56 

Coinciding with the decline of the Trust Fund balance, yearly appropriations for 

Superfund have fallen well below program needs. During the spring and summer 

of 1999, staff on the relevant Congressional committees "tried unsuccessfully to 

determine how much money the Superfund program would need over the next 

few years and when a decrease in needed appropriations was likely to occur."S7 

Recognizing that more detailed analysis was needed, Congress requested that 

Resources for the Future (RFF) conduct an independent study.58 After analyzing all 

major elements of the program, the report's authors presented their best estimate as 

to future funding requirements, along with alternative low and high case scenarios 

to reflect uncertainties about factors used in their model.59 The authors concluded 

that the program would not be in a position to "ramp down" in the next decade.60 

Congress did not heed this warning, cutting actual appropriations to a point far short 

ofRFF's estimates.61 A comparison of enacted appropriations and RFF's base and 

low case estimates appears in Figure 6. Specifically, cumulative appropriations for 

FY 2000-2005 fell short ofRFF's base case estimate of costs for the same period by 

$1.75 biIIion.62 Compared against RFF's low case estimate, actual appropriations 

still fell $1.3 billion short.63 

S6 Meredith Preston, With Trust Fund Depleting. Battle Brews Over Whether to Reinstate Industry 

Taxes, 33 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1078 (May 10,2002) [hereinafter, Preston, Trust Fund Depleting]. 

57 Probst, et al., SUPERFUND'S F'uTuRE, supra note 9, at 3 (2001). 

~ Id. at 33 (citing Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 

Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000, Conference Report 106-379). 

59 Id. at 121. 

60 Id. at 157; see also Probst, Whither Superfund?, supra note 22. 

61 See notes 62-63, infra, and accompanying text; see also Preston, Trust Fund Depleting. supra 

note 56 (quoting Kate Probst, co-author of the RFF report: "[i]fyou look at our numbers, they've 

(EPA) been underfunded since FY 2000"). 

62 Data for enacted appropriations to the Superfund program for fiscal years 2000 - 2004 were 

obtained from GAO, BREAKDOWN OF SUPERFUND APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 52, at 3. For fiscal year 

2005, the enacted appropriation figure was obtained from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Superfund 

Appropriation History, available at http://www.epa.gov!superfundiactioniprocesslbudgethistory.htm 

(last visited April 4, 2006) [hereinafter, EPA, Superfund Appropriation History]. RFF's base case estimates appear in Table 7-4, Estimated Total Annual Cost to EPA of Superfund Program: Base Case 

FY2000-2009 (Millions of 1999$) in Probst, et al., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 158. 

63 Data for enacted appropriations to the Superfund program for fiscal years 2000 - 2004 were ob-
127 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Figure 8: Superfund's RlIOurca Gap64 

Comparison of Estimatad Costs and Enacted Apportions to Superfund 

FY 2000·2005 

1~r--------------------------------~-----------------------' 

1.400 1~00t===~::~~~~~~~~~::::::~:::--::--:;;:;:~==::--~===J _ 

~ 1.200 +------==::::!:====:!:====:!:====±=======~-_l .S! 

~1.DOO+------------------------------~ 

~ ~ ~---------------------------------------------; t! 

c ~ 600 ~ +- ~----------------------------------------------; _____________________________________________ ~ 

~ ~--------------------------------------------------~ 

o 

2000 ~1 ~2 2003 

Fiscal Year 

..... Enacted Appropriations to Superfund Program 

...... RFF Estimated Cost of Superfund Program: Base Case 

... RFF Estimated Cost of Superfund Program: Low Case 

2004 2005 

When measured in nominal dollars, funding for the Superfund program has 

remained relatively constant over the last few years. However, when adjusted 

for inflation, funding for the program has been steadily declining.65 This trend 

appears to be continuing. The President's FY 2007 Budget Request for Superfund 

is $1.259 billion -- $20 million less than the FY 2006 request -- all of which will 

come from general revenues.66 

tained from GAO, BREAKDOWN OF SUPERFUND APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 52, at 3. For fiscal year 

2005, the enacted appropriation figure was obtained from EPA, Superfund Appropriation History, 

supra note 62. RFF's low case estimates appear in Table H-8, Estimated Total Annual Costs to 

EPA o/Superfund Program: Three Scenarios, FY2000-2009 ($1999) in Probst, et al., SUPEIlFUND'S 

FUTUIlE, supra note 9, at 264. 

04 Data for enacted appropriations to the Superfund program for fiscal years 2000 - 2004 were obtained from GAO, BIlEAKDOWN OF SUPERFUND APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 52, at 3. For fiscal year 

2005, the enacted appropriation figure was obtained from EPA, Superfund Appropriation History, 

supra note 62. The estimates presented are RFF's totals, which appear in Tables 7-4, Estimated 

Total Annual Cost to EPA 0/ Superfund Program: Base Case FY2000-2009 (Millions 0/1999$) 

(base case estimates); and H-8, Estimated Total Annual Costs to EPA o/Superfund Program: Three 

Scenarios, FY2000·2009 ($1999) (low case estimates), in Probst, et al., SUPEIlFUND'S FUTUIlE, 

supra note 9, at 158, 264. 

6' For a comparison of Superfund appropriations in nominal dol1ars and constant 1987 dol1ars, see 

Probst, Superfund at 25. supra note 42, at 22. 

66 Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House Committee on Transportation and In· 

frastructure, Hearing on Agency Budgets and Priorities for FY 2007, available at http://www.house. 

gov/transportationlwater/03·08-06/03·08-06memo.hm1 (follow "Background" hyperlink.). 
128 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Superfund Opponents Spin 

Despite these precipitous drops in the Trust Fund's balance, efforts to reinstate 

the Superfund taxes have failed repeatedly, largely as a result of unrelenting 

opposition by the petroleum and chemical industries and their allies in the Bush 

administration.67 Instead of seeking additional resources, the administration has 

opted for a slowdown in cleanups. Indeed, in response to Superfund's financial 

troubles, one high-ranking EPA official even suggested that the agency could 

stop adding new sites to the NPL until work on current projects is completed.68 

Conveniently, this approach would not only prevent sites from becoming eligible 

for federal cleanup monies - and in effect bury information about sites that 

threaten public health and the environment69 - but would gradually create the 

impression that the entire program could be abolished. 

Superfund's opponents make two deceptive claims against reinstatement of the 

corporate tax. First, they argue that the "polluter pays" principle is already at 

work due to the statute's liability scheme and the contributions of responsible 

parties for site cleanup. And second, they claim the Trust Fund bears no 

relationship to program funding for Superfund. 

67 See e.g., Preston, Trust Fund Depleting, supra note 56 (noting measures to reinstate Superfund 

taxes planned by Sen. Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.) and proposed by Rep. Frank Pallone (D-N.J.»; 

Linda Roeder, InsUfficient Funds for Cleanup Operations, Supreme Court Decision Lead EPA 

Concerns, 36 ENV'T REp. (BNA) S-14 (Jan. 14,2005) (reporting that bills to reintroduce the tax 

in the 108" Congress failed to win approval and that Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CaIif.) and Rep. 

Frank Pallone (D-N.J.) planned to reintroduce measures reinstating Superfund taxes) [hereinafter, 

Roeder, Insufficient Funds]; Linda Roeder, Legislation Introduced in House to Reinstate Corporate Income Tax to Finance Trust Fund, 36 EJoIV'T REP. (BNA) 2293 (Nov. 11,2005) (examining 

legislation introduced in November 2005 by Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-N.Y.) to reinstate the 

corporate environmental income tax) [hereinafter, Roeder, Legislation Introduced]; Linda Roeder, 

EPA Cites Challenge o/Cleaning Up Sites While Contending With Limits on Funding, 37 ENV'T 

REp. (BNA) S-17 (Jan. 20, 2006) (describing bill introduced by Reps. Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) 

and Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) that would restore both the excise taxes on the petroleum and 

chemical industries as well as the corporate environmental income tax). 

68 Thomas Dunne, Remarks; Supelji.md Seminar; Charlottesville, Virginia 9 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at: http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docS/2004_1202_dunne_sf_speech.pdf(last visited April 7, 

2006) (posing the question, "would Superfund benefit, and would the public approve, if EPA stopped 

listing new sites, or didn't begin cleanup at any newly eligible orphan sites, until current work in the 

pipeline was completed?'') [hereinafter, Dunne, Remarks]; see also Linda Roeder, Insufficient Funds, 

supra note 67 (quoting Thomas Dunne, then EPA Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response); Meredith Preston, Agency Seeking Ways to Control Costs, Manage Available Finances, Official Says, 36 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 861 (April 29, 2005) (quoting Samuel Coleman, 

Director of the Superfund Division, EPA Region 6 as stating that EPA is considering not adding any 

more sites to the NPL "unless they pose a significant risk to human health"). 

69 Roeder, Insufficient Funds, supra note 67 (noting opposition by environmental organizations 

and Congressional Democrats). 
129 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

Superfund Spin, Part 1: 'Polluters Already Pay' 

The Bush administration has endorsed the view long promoted by the oil and 

chemical industries that the Superfund tax is unfair because polluters already pay 

for cleanups. Administration officials point out that 70 percent of cleanups are 

paid for by responsible companies, not the Trust Fund.70 

Yet as explained above, when Congress enacted the Superfund law, it intended 

not only that specific polluters pay to clean up wastes at the individual sites they 

contaminated, but also that those industries most likely to have profited from cheap 

disposal pmctices shoulder the financial burden of cleaning up "orphan" sites.71 

In the absence of the Superfund corpomte tax, tax revenues from avemge citizens 

are now being used to replenish the Trust Fund - just as the Fund is expected to 

finance an increasing share of cleanups. Indeed, EPA regional managers predict 

cleanups financed by the Trust Fund will increase from 28 percent to 43 percent72 

in coming years because, according to Resources for the Future, "states are now . 

addressing the majority of single-party sites and sites with cooperative responsible 

parties ... leaving EPA the orphan sites and sites with recalcitrant PRPs - that is, 

the sites more likely to have Fund-lead actions."73 

The Trust Fund also helps ensure that responsible parties pay. The 70 percent 

statistic derives from EPA's evaluation of the success of its "Enforcement First" 

policy, which it adopted following the agency's publication of its 1989 "90-Day 

Study."74 In the early years of Superfund, EPA frequently performed cleanups using 

Fund money and then sued responsible parties to recover costs - in FY 1987, only 

30 percent of remedial actions were conducted by responsible parties.7S In 1989, 

however, EPA committed to using a "lawyers first, shovels later" approach.76 Under 

70 See. e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Cleaner Lantis, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/clean-Iands.html (last visited May 22, 2006). 

71 See McCarthy, supra note 48, at 2. 

71 Probst, el al., SUPERFUND'S FUTURE, supra note 9, at 103. Estimates by the regional managers 

applied to the "next five years," based on planning data for remedial action starts as well as projections through FY 2005. /d. 

73 ld. at 103-04. 

74 U.S. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, OSWER 9201.101A, 90-DAY STUDY: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE 

SUPERFUND PROGRAM (Jan. I, 1989). The study focused on a variety of common concerns associated with Superfund, such as enforcement, cleanup response time, and community participation. 

U.S. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, Superfund Reforms; Round 1, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/ 

reforms/roundslroundl.htm (last visited April 7, 2006) [hereinafter, EPA, Superfund Reforms: 

Round 1]. 

" ld. 

7' U.S. ENy'T PROT. AOENCY, OSWER 9201.101A, 90-DAY STUDY: A MANAOEMENT REVIEW OF THE 

SUPERFUND PROGRAM (Jan. I, 1989). The study focused on a variety of common concerns associated with Superfund, such as enforcement, cleanup response time, and community participation. 
130 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

this approach, EPA pursued financial settlements with responsible parties before 

using Trust Fund money to begin cleanups.'17 As a result, by FY 1992, the share of 

remedial actions conducted by responsible parties haeJ jumped to 70 percent. 78 

Today, however, the incentive for responsible parties to settle with EPA - and pay 

for cleanups - is substantially weakened. Because the money available in the 

Fund has dwindled, EPA now lacks sufficient funding to credibly pursue responsible 

parties. Iffunding is not restored, it inevitably will become easier for sites to ''hide 

in the weeds," in the lexicon of the program, and avoid cleanup obligations.79 

To ensure that EPA is able to both handle the anticipated increase in Fundfinanced cleanups and achieve settlements with responsible parties, it needs not 

only sustained but increased levels of program funding - funding that ought to 

come from a reinstated industry tax. 

Superfund Spin, Part 2: 'The Trust Fund Bears No Relationship to Program 

Funding' 

Every penny raised by Superfund corporate taxes, before they expired, went 

directly into the Trust Fund. The law does not authorize either Congress 

or the executive branch to spend this money for any other purpose. Nor is 

EPA allowed to withdraw these revenues directly; instead, it must wait for a 

Congressional appropriation. In sum, unless and until Congress appropriates 

money from the Fund, tax revenues remain in the bank, accruing interest but 

sequestered from any other uses. 

Bush administration officials frequently distort these fundamental realities in 

defending their opposition to the Superfund tax.so Because Congress must 

U.S. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, Superfund Reforms; Round 1, bttp:/Iwww.epa.gov/superfundlprogramsl 

reformslroundslroundl.btm (last visited April 7, 2006) [hereinafter, EPA, Superfund Reforms: 

Round 1]. 

71 See Memorandum from John Suarez, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance & 

Marianne Horinko, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to Regional Administrators 1 

(Sept. 20,2002), available at: http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resourceslpolicieslcleanup/superfundlenffirst-mem.pdf(last visited April 7, 2006). 

78 EPA, Superfund Reforms; Round 1, supra note 76. 

79 Lack offunding also affects enforcement litigation - without funding adequate to conduct site 

investigations, EPA loses its ability to issue cleanup orders under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), 

CERCLA § I 06(a); see also Lois J. Schiffer, How Litigation Shaped Superfund, ENVTL. FORUM, 

July/Aug. 200S at 24 (noting that the funding problem affects enforcement litigation in several ways, 

including that "EPA bas less money to investigate sites so that it can move the process forward"). 

80 Another argument is that a better alternative to reinstating the taxes is to increase efficiency within 

EPA's Superfund program. See Linda Roeder, Legislation Introduced, supra note 67 (quoting EPA 

Administrator Stephen L. Johnson). Velma Smith, Senior Policy Analyst at the National Environ-
131 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEBlEtT 

appropriate money from the Trust Fund, the administration argues that the 

Fund's balance is irrelevant to the amount of funding available for the Superfund 

program8l - even though the Trust Fund is permanently reserved to support 

the program. Marianne LamOIit Horinko, who headed the Superfund program 

before briefly serving as acting EPA administrator after Christine Todd Whitman 

resigned, explained this argument in a 2004 speechB2: 

The link between the Superfund Tax and EPA's cleanup budget 

is one of those urban myths, like giant alligators in the sewer 

system. There are no alligators, and there is no link. EPA's 

Superfund budget is appropriated each year by Congress. Over 

the past 10 years the amount appropriated to EPA for Superfund 

has remained remarkably consistent, roughly between $1.1 and 

$1.4 billion per year. But it's unrelated to the Superfund tax and 

Trust Fund balance. The Superfund budget is subject to the same 

kind of funding pressures as all other federal programs. In 1996, 

for example, the Trust Fund balance was $3.8 billion, while our 

appropriation was only $1.4 billion. I expect appropriations 

for Superfund cleanups will continue steady into the future, no 

matter what the balance in the Trust Fund. Even if the Superfund 

taxes were reimposed tomorrow, money collected would not 

flow directly to EPA. It would be subject to Congressional 

appropriations, and our Superfund budget would not necessarily 

increase. That budget is controlled by Congress, pure and simple.s3 

mental Trust, has commented that lOOking for efficiencies in the operation of the Superfund program 

in order to address the funding shortfalls is like "taking the couch pillows out and scrounging around 

for change in order to pay this month's mortgage." Velma Smith, Remarks at the Panel Discussion, 

"Superfund Enforcement at 2S: Learning from the Past and Looking to the Future," at the International Trade Center, Ronald Reagan Building Amphitheater, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13,2005). 

'1 Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Omtinues to Oppose Reinstatement of Corporate Taxes to Replenish TnlSt 

Fund, 27 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 498 (March 10,2006). As the president of the American Petroleum 

Industry explained to Congress in 1999, because Superfund is a discretionary domestic program subject to the budget rules that apply to all discretionary spending, it is "the discretionary spending caps, 

rather than the Trust Fund balance, [that] control the Superfund program's spending level." The 

SupeifUnd Completion Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Pu~ 

lie Worb, 106111 Congo (1999) (statement of Red Cavaney, President, American Petroleum Institute), 

available at: http://epw.senate.gov!107th/cav_5·2S.htm (last visited April 7, 2006) . 

• 2 Remarks by Marianne Lamont Horinko, Baker Botts Annual Environmental Seminar (Feb. 

5, 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov!superfundlactionlcongresS/02-05·04.htm (last visited 

April 7, 2006) . 

• 3 Id. See also Dunne, Remarks, supra note 68, at 2-3 (arguing that amounts appropriated to the 

Superfund program "bear little or no relationship to the balance in the Trust Fund. If the tax were 

reimposed tomorrow, our budget would not necessarily go up one dime"). 
132 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Yet as anyone familiar with the program realizes, Congress has had $1.45 billion 

per year less to allocate among budget priorities since Superfund taxes expired.84 

If the taxes were reinstated, the overall appropriations "pie" would increase, and 

Superfund would have a better chance of getting the bigger "slice" it so greatly 

needs. At the very least, even if Congress were to keep funding levels constant, 

it would likely revert to drawing about 80 percent of the Superfund program's 

appropriation from the Fund's corporate tax revenues. 8S Such an arrangement 

would not only free up an equivalent amount of general revenues for other 

programs, but also restore the "polluter pays" principle to Superfund. 

CoNClUSION 

Efforts to reauthorize CERCLA have, in the past, exhausted those involved in the 

process, and "few have the stomach" to face another attempt at reauthorization.86 

For the sake of those living near the 50 sites detailed in this report, as well as the 

millions of others living near hazardous waste sites across the country, Congress 

must take a collective deep breath and resolve to once again tackle reauthorization 

of CERCLA. At a minimum, Congress must dig beneath the administration's pat 

arguments against reinstating the Superfund taxes and reclaim the critical revenue 

they generate. Next, it must follow through and ensure that increased amounts 

of money in the Trust Fund result in increased appropriations to the Superfund 

program. Adequate funding may not, on its own, solve all the problems plaguing 

the Superfund program, but it is unquestionably a critical component to ensuring 

the cleanup of the nation's toxic waste sites. 

84 See McCarthy, supra note 48, at 3. 

8S Money in the Fund may only be used for purposes related to the Superfund program as spelled 

out in CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9611, CERCLA § Ill. Accordingly, if Congress wants to include any 

of the money in the Fund in its annual budget, it must appropriate it for Superfund. History demonstrates that Congress indeed uses the money in the Fund. FromFY 1993-1999, about 80 percent of 

program funding was drawn from the Fund. See supra, note 52, accompanying text, and Figure 5. 

86 Probst, Whither Superfund?, supra note 22. 
133 

50 SITES IN 10 STATES 

THE HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

To bring the threat to public health and natural resources to life, this report 

examines the status of the five worst National Priorities List (NPL) sites in each 

of the country's 10 most populous states. A complete list of these sites, along 

with demographic data and chemicals present, can be found in Appendix A. An 

explanation of the methodology used to select and analyze these sites can be 

found in Appendix B. 
134 

CALIFORNIA 

Source: us Census Bureeu (Stete. & Countie.l, us EPA (NPl Sties) 

As of the 2000 Census, 22,453 Californians lived in the census tracts containing 

the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,228 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additional 1,227 were persons aged 75 and older. In two of the five census 

tracts, the median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
135 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

AEROJET GENERAL CORP. 

Sacramento County, California 

HRS Score: 54.63 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0087.01 

Total Population: 4,751 

Median Age: 42.5 

Children 9 and under: 582 

Persons 75 and older: 339 

Percent Minority: 22.6 

Percent Hispanic: 4.4 

Median Household Income in 1999: $84,740 
136 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site DescriptionS? 

Added to the NPL on September 8, 1983, Aerojet General Corp. is a 5,900-acre 

site near Rancho Cordova, 15 miles east of Sacramento and a half-mile from the 

American River. Since 1953, Aerojet and its subsidiaries manufactured liquid 

and solid propellant rocket engines and formulated various other agricultural, 

pharmaceutical and industrial chemicals. A second chemical manufacturing 

complex operated on the site from 1974-1979. The companies disposed of 

unknown quantities of hazardous waste using surface impoundments, landfills, 

deep injection wells, leachate fields and open burning. These practices released 

various chemicals and processing wastes into groundwater and surface water. In 

1979, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were found off-site in private wells 

and in the American River in 1983. Perchlorate, a component of rocket fuel, was 

found in drinking water wells off-site in 1997. Soils were also contaminated with 

metals including arsenic, cadmium and lead. 

Throughout the area, groundwater is used extensively to supply municipal, 

domestic, industrial and irrigation water. Nearby Lake Natoma and Alder 

Creek are used for recreational activities. The American River is used for 

public water supplies. Communities potentially affected by this site are Rancho 

Cordova, population 55,000; Carmichael, population 49,000; and Sacramento, 

population 407,000. The closest residence is about 500 feet away from the site. 

Contaminated public and private drinking water supply wells ltavebeen closed. 

Contaminants Present 

Ground and surface water: 

• volatile organic compounds (VOCs), including 

Trichloroethylene (TCE) and Perchloroethylene (PCE) 

• I, I-Dichloroethylene 

• I, I-Dichloroethane 

• 1,2-Dichloroethylene 

• 1,2-Dichloroethane 

• 1, 1,2-Trichloroethane 

• Carbon Tetrachloride 

• Vmyl Chloride 

• Chloroform 

• Freon-1l3 

• Other rocket propulsion waste products or components, 

such as Perchlorate and N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NOMA) 

87 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundisiteslnpl!ca.htm(follow .. listofallNPLSitesinCalifornia.by 

County" hyperlink, then follow "Aerojet General Corp." hyperlink) (updated Nov. 8,2005). 
137 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Soil: 

• VOCs 

• Perchlorate 

• Metals including arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, 

cobalt, copper, lead, nickel and zinc 

IRON MOUNTAIN MINE 

Shasta County, California 

HRS Score: 56.16 
138 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Demogmphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0124 

Total Population: 3,863 

Median Age: 43.8 

Children 9 and under: 387 

Persons 75 and older: 204 

Percent Minority: 8.4 

Percent Hispanic: 3.6 

Median Household Income in 1999: $41,607 

Site Description88 

Added to the NPL on September 8, 1983, Iron Mountain Mine (IMM) is a 4,400-

acre site that was mined for iron, silver, gold, copper, zinc and pyrite from the 

1860s until 1963 • Currently, underground mine workings, waste rock dumps, piles 

of mine tailings and an open mine pit remain at the site. Historic mining activity 

has fractured the mountain, exposing minerals to surface water, rain and oxygen. 

As a result, sulfuric acid formed and runs through the mountain, leaching copper, 

cadmium, zinc and other heavy metals into surface water. These contaminants 

are then channeled into Spring Creek Reservoir and are released into Keswick 

Reservoir periodically to coincide with diluting releases from Shasta Dam. 

About 70,000 people use surface water within three miles ofIMM as a source of 

drinking water. Upon listing in 1983, California estimated that a daily average 

of2,350 pounds of zinc, 300 pounds of copper and 50 pounds of cadmium 

were carried into Keswick Reservoir from the IMM site. Uncontrolled spills 

from Spring Creek Reservoir release harmful quantities ofheavy metals into 

the Sacramento River. Since 1940, numerous fish kills have occurred in the 

Sacramento River from IMM metals. In 1994, the Winter Run Chinook Salmon 

was listed as an endangered species and its critical habitat includes the affected 

waterways. Potential health risks include ingestion of or direct contact with mine 

drainage and contaminant accumulation in local fish. 

Contaminants Present 

Suiface water: 

• sulfuric acid 

• copper, zinc and cadmium 

88 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov!superfundlsites!npllca.htm(follow .. listofalINPLSitesinCalifornia.by 

County" hyperlink, then follow "Iron Mountain Mine" hyperlink) (updated Sept. 27, 2005). 
139 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

MCCORMICK & BAXTER CREOSOTING CO. 

San Joaquin County, California 

HRS Score: 74.86 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0008 

Total Population: 1,525 

Median Age: 27.1 

Children 9 and under: 306 

Persons 75 and older: 58 

Percent Minority: 71.7 

Percent Hispanic: 68.3 

Median Household Income in 1999: $22,348 
140 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Pescription89 

Added to the NFL on October 14, 1992, the McCormick & Baxter Creosoting 

Co. site is a 29-acre former wood-preserving facility near the Port of Stockton. It 

is bordered on the north by Old Mormon Slough, a tributary to the San Joaquin 

River. People currently fish in both the Slough and San Joaquin River. Between 

1942 and 1990, McCormick & Baxter treated utility poles and railroad ties with 

creosote, pentachlorophenol (PCP) and compounds of arsenic, chromium and 

copper. Wood-treating chemicals were stored in tanks and treatment waste was 

deposited in unlined ponds and concrete tanks. 

In 1978, following a fish kill from PCB-contaminated storm water runoff traced 

to the site, McCormick & Baxter installed two storm water collection ponds and 

a perimeter dike around the site. In 1983 and 1984, soil on the site was found to 

be contaminated with arsenic, chromium, copper, PCP and polycyclic aromatic 

hydrocarbons (PAHs). The soil contamination extended to 40 feet below ground 

surface ("bgs"). In addition, a shallow aquifer beneath the site is contaminated to 

175 feet bgs. This aquifer connects to a deeper aquifer within four miles ofthe 

site, which provides drinking water to about 97,000 people. In 1989, arsenic and 

PCP air particulates were detected on the site. 

Approximately 105,000 people live and work within four miles of the site. 

Contaminants have been found in locally caught fish, which may be consumed by 

fishermen and their families. The contaminants also pose a threat to local aquatic 

organisms. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil and groundwater: 

• Pentachlorophenol (PCP) 

• dioxin 

• polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PARs) (constituents of creosote, arsenic, 

chromium and copper) 

• non-aqueous phase liquids (NAPLs) are widespread beneath the site 

89 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available 

at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsiteslnpVca.htm (follow "list of all NPL Sites in California, 

by County" hyperlink, then follow "McConnick & Baxter Creosoting Co." byperlink) (updated 

Jan. 27, 2006). 
141 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBLECT 

OPERATING INDUSTRIES 

Los Angeles County, California 

HRS Score: 57.22 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 4828 

Total Population: 4,309 

Median Age: 39.1 

Children 9 and under: 462 

Persons 75 and older: 364 

Percent Minority: 61.1 

Percent Hispanic: 46.4 

Median Household Income in 1999: $46,708 
142 

Center for American Progress , Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description90 

Added to the NPL on June 10, 1986, the Operating Industries site is a residential, 

commercial, liquid and hazardous waste landfill on 190 acres in Monterey Park, 

California, about 10 miles east of downtown Los Angeles. Pomona Freeway 

bisects the site into a northern 4S-acre portion and a southern 14S-acre portion. 

The landfill's leachate (liquid that percolates through the waste) contains 

several contaminants, including vinyl chloride, benzene-type compounds, 

tetrachloroethylene and heavy metals. 

The Operating Industries site is adjacent to a large residential area. About 

23,000 people live and use wells within three miles of the site as a source of 

drinking water, and 2,100 people live within 1,000 feet of the landfill. Potential 

health threats include gas inhalation and direct contact or accidental ingestion 

of contaminated groundwater, soils or leachate. There is also the potential for 

explosion or fire. 

Contaminants Present 

Air, groundwater, soil & leachate: 

• various organic and inorganic compounds 

Air: 

• various organic compounds 

90 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available 

at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsitesinpllca.htm(follow .. listofalINPLSitesinCalifornia.by 

County" hyperlink, then follow "Operating Industries, Inc." hyperiink) (updated Jan. 27, 2006); 

and NPL Site Narrative, available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsitesinpllnar932.htm. 
143 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

STRINGFELLOW 

Riverside County, California 

HRS Score: 61.4 

Demographic Profile 

CenSus Tract No.: 0401 

Total Population: 8005 

Median Age: 28.7 

Children 9 and under: 1,491 

Persons 75 and older: 262 

Percent Minority: 52.5 

Percent Hispanic: 58.4 

Median Household Income in 1999: $43,132 
144 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description91 

Added to the NPL on September 8, 1983, the 17-acre Stringfellow site is located 

in a canyon near the Southern California town of Glen Avon and served as a 

hazardous waste disposal facility from 1956 until 1972. During this period, 

over 34 million gallons of waste, mostly from metal finishing, electroplating and 

pesticide production, were deposited in surface evaporation ponds. To decrease 

the volume of wastes in the ponds, spray evaporation procedures were used. In 

1969 and again in 1978 excessive rainfall caused the disposal ponds to overflow. 

As a result, the soil was contaminated with pesticides, spent acid, PCBs, sulfates 

and heavy metals. Over the years, heavy rains caused overflow and contamination 

of nearby water bodies with VOCs and several heavy metals, including cadmium, 

nickel, chromium and manganese. This contaminated groundwater plume 

potentially affected private drinking water wells for approximately 10,000 nearby 

residents, but since 1989, the community has received water from public utilities 

and no longer relies on groundwater. The original disposal area was covered by a 

clay cap, fenced and guarded by security services. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• cadmium 

• nickel 

• chromium 

• manganese 

Soil: 

• pesticides 

• polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 

• sulfates 

• heavy metals 

91 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundisiteslnpVca.htm(follow .. listofallNPLSitesinCalifornia.by 

County" hyperlink, then follow "Stringfellow" hyperlink) (updated Oct. 26, 2005). 
145 

TEXAS 

As of the 2000 Census, 21,009 Texans lived in the census tracts containing the 

five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,420 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additionall,092 were persons aged 75 and older. In all five census tracts, the 

median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
146 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

ALCOA/POINT COMFORT/LAVACA BAY 

Calhoun County, Texas 

HRS Score: 50 

& SellCIId NPI. SftII 

CaunIIeI 

CtnIuI'll'act ConbIInintl StllCIId NPI. SftII 

2IlOO CentuI'll'acll 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9903 

Total Population: 1,515 

Median Age: 38.1 

Children 9 and under: 220 

Persons 75 and older: 86 

Percent Minority: 7.39 

Percent Hispanic: 14.59 

o a.& 7 14 ... 

Source: US Cen.us Bure.u (Counties & Trl.ts), US EPA (NPl Sties) 

Median Household Income in 1999: $40,300 
147 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Descrjption92 

Added to the NPL on February 23,1994, theALCOAILavaca Bay site is located 

in Southeast Texas along the Gulf of Mexico. It consists of the ALCOA PCO 

Plant, an associated dredge-spoil island, and portions of Lavaca Bay and western 

Matagorda Bay. The plant, located on the shore of Lavaca Bay, covers about 

3,500 acres in an industrial area 1.5 miles from Point Comfort and four miles 

from Port Lavaca; About 1,100 people live in Point Comfort and 10,000 people 

live in Port Lavaca. The dredge-spoil island covers about 420 acres. The island 

contains a 91-acre gypsum lagoon and five lagoons in a 50-acre dredge-spoil area. 

In 1965, ALCOA opened a plant that produced chlorine gas and sodium hydroxide 

through a process that utilized mercury cathodes. During the plant's operation, 

wastewater containing mercury was discharged into Lavaca Bay through outfalls 

on the gypsum lagoon. Dredge spoils ~ontaminated with mercury were disposed 

of in several areas on the site. EPA foun¢high concentrations of mercury in 

sediment samples from Lavaca Bay in 1992. 

The bay was used for both commercial and recreational fishing and serves 

as a habitat for a number of endangered aquatic and bird species. There are 

prohibitions on taking finfish and crabs from a part of Lavaca Bay due to the 

levels of mercury in the fish tissue. 

Contaminants Present 

Lavaca Bay sediments: 

• mercury 

• PARs 

!12 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/earthlr6/6sf/pdffiles/06017S2.pdf(updated Feb. 15, 2006). 
148 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

GULFCO MARINE MAINTENANCE 

Brazoria County, Texas 

HRS Score: 50 

SeIeCIId NPL Sb 

CcIunIIea 

c.n-lhIctCanlalnIna SIIICIId NPL SIll 

... Ce111U11hICII 

Demowmhic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 6642 

Total Population: 2,307 

Median Age: 39.3 

Children 9 and under: 286 

Persons 75 and older: 65 

Percent Minority: 10.62 

Percent Hispanic: 10.92 

o 35 7 

I 14'" I 

Soureo: US Consus Buroau ICoun60' & Traeta). US EPA INPl Sti •• 1 

Median Household Income in 1999: $38,542 
149 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description93 

Added to the NPL on April 30, 2003, the 40-acre Gulfco Marine Maintenance site 

served as a barge cleaning, sand blasting and repair facility from 1971 until 1998. 

As part of site operations, residual product recovered from the barges was stored 

in tanks and sold. Wash waters from barge cleaning were stored in three surface 

impoundments in the north area until they closed in 1982. Wastewater was 

then stored in a floating barge or storage tanks at the site, which contain VOCs 

including benzene and chloroform. 

Other contaminants present include PAHs, pesticides, chlorinated hydrocarbons 

and metals. Direct contact with these chemicals or contaminated soils poses 

potential health risks. The contaminants also pose environmental risks to the 

adjacent wetlands via surface runoff or contaminated groundwater migration. 

Approximately 78 people live within one square-mile of the site and 3,392 people 

live within 50 square miles. 

Contaminants Present 

Surface storage tanks; 

• benzene, 

• chloroform, 

• dichloroethane, 

• trichloroethylene 

Elsewhere: 

• PAHs 

• Pesticides 

• chlorinated hydrocarbons 

• metals 

93 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/earthlr6/6sfi'pdffilesl0602027.pdf(updated Feb. 2006). 
150 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

JASPER CREOSOTING CO. 

Jasper County, Texas 

HRS Score: SO 

StItcIId NPI. SltII 

Counti .. 

CInauI '!tIet Call1lllnlq Selected NPI. SIll 

2000 CIIIIIII '!tIelI 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9502 

Total Population: 3,685 

Median Age: 37.3 

Children 9 and under: 543 

Persons 75 and older: 261 

Percent Minority: 44.48 

Percent Hispanic: 7.06 

o 7 14M ... 

Sourc.: US Census Bur.au ICounti., & Tracts). US EPA INPl Sti.s) 

Median Household Income in 1999: $27,926 
151 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description94 

Added to the NPL on July 28,1998, Jasper Creosoting is a fonner wood treatment 

facility that utilized coal-tar creosote and PCP. Wood treatment operations 

contaminated the soil, surface water and sediment on the site (including a wetland 

area) with PAHs, PCP and dioxins/timms. The site occupies 11 acres of a 2 I-acre 

tract and is surrounded by suburban and rural land uses. 

The population of the City of Jasper is about 8,247 people and approximately 

1,100 people live within a one-mile radius of the site. The site is located on the 

outcrop of the Jasper Aquifer, a 1,200-foot deep aquifer that serves as the primary 

source of drinking water for residential users. There are 27 drinking water wells 

located within four miles of the site. 

Contaminants Present 

• creosote 

• semi-volatile organic compounds (SVOCs) 

• PARs 

• PCP 

• dioxinslfurans 

.. Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/earthlr6/6sflpdffilesl0601735.pdf(updated Feb. 2006). 
152 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

R&H Oll./TROPICANA 

Bexar County, Texas 

HRS Score: 50 

SeIICI8d NPL SIIa 

CounIIu 

CanIut hat ContaIning SeIIctIIII NPL SIIa 

_ CenIua hell 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 1609 

Total Population: 8,292 

Median Age: 27.6 

Children 9 and under: 1,602 

Persons 75 and older: 362 

Percent Minority: 39.58 

Percent Hispanic: 93.96 

o 7 14Mh1 

Source: US Census Bur •• u ICounties & Tr.cts), US EPA INPL Sties) 

Median Household Income in 1999: $24,200 
153 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description95 

Proposed to the NPL on June 14,2001, this seven-acre site has not yet been added 

to the final NPL. The site contains an inactive petroleum refinery and a gasoline 

blending facility in a densely populated area of San Antonio, Texas. Several spills 

and other releases of petroleum-related waste have contaminated groundwater and 

threatened nearby municipal drinking water wells. 

Petroleum refining operations occurred at the site from 1938 to 1978. The 

refinery produced petroleum products including gasoline, fuel oils and ink oil. 

The site was briefly used to blend gasoline in 1988 and 1989. During this time, 

ethanol and various gasoline components were blended for sale. At the time the 

site was proposed to the NPL, structures remaining on the site included 40 above 

ground storage tanks, piping, dozens of drums, a machine used to separate oil 

and water, an earthen sump and several areas of contaminated soil. Sludge and 

tar were present around the tanks and separator. Drums contained combustible 

or flammable liquids, acid, oil mixtures and chlorinated solvents. An EPAfunded removal action to address these items was completed as of March, 2002.96 

Remedial action has not yet commenced.97 

A plume of contaminated groundwater floats in an aquifer beneath the site. 

The plume includes benzene, toluene, arsenic, barium and zinc. Although the 

contaminated aquifer is not currently used as a water supply, it is underlain by 

the Edwards aquifer, which is one of the most permeable and productive Karst 

aquifers in the United States. The Edwards aquifer has been designated as a 

sole-source water supply for San Antonio. Karst aquifers are susceptible to the 

natural creation of underground cavities and channels and, as such, are extremely 

vulnerable to contaminant migration. 

9l Site description and contaminant information obtained from the pre-cleanup NPL site narrative, 

available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsiteslnplltx.htm (follow "list of all NPL Sites in Texas, 

by County" hyperlink, then follow CERCLIS ID (numeric) hyperlink for "R&H OillTropicana") 

(updated March 2, 2006). 

96 Information on cleanup progress and funding obtained from EPA's List 9 - Active CERCUS 

Sites, Region 6 at 392-93 (December 2005). List 9 and other Superfund products may be obtained 

in CD format without cost by submitting orders online, at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsitesi 

phonefaxlproducts.htm. 

97Id. 
154 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEILECT 

Contaminants Present 

Ground water: 

Benzene 

Toluene 

Ethylbenzene 

2-Methyl Naphthalene 

Naphthalene 

Xylenes 

arseruc 

barium 

• zinc 
155 

STAR LAKE CANAL 

Jefferson County, Texas 

HRS Score: SO 

Demogra,phic Profile 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Census Tract No.: 0108 

Total Population: 5,210 

MedianAge: 35.2 

Children 9 and under: 769 

Persons 75 and older: 318 

Percent Minority: 4.32 

Percent Hispanic: 5.68 

Median Household Income in 1999: $41,890 
156 

Site Description98 

Added to the NPL on July 27,2000, this site consists of the lengths of two 

industrial canals - Star Lake Canal and Jefferson Canal- that were constructed 

in the late 1940s as industrial wastewater and stonn water outfalls. The canals are 

currently utilized for industrial and stonn water purposes by local chemical and 

other manufacturing facilities. 

Hazardous substances, including chromium, copper, PAHs and PCBs have 

migrated or could potentially migrate to Molasses Bayou, Star Lake Canal, 

Neches River, Sabine Lake and their associated wetlands. Contaminated surface 

water sediments have been found in the Molasses Bayou wetlands, which are 

known as habitat for the white-faced ibis, a state-designated threatened species. 

Toxaphene and PCP have also been found in the sediments of the Jefferson Canal. 

Moreover, surface water flows from the canals down Neches River to Sabine 

Lake, which is used as a fishery. In 1996, Sabine Lake produced over one million 

pounds offish and shellfish. 

Contaminants Present: 

Canal Sediments: 

• chromium 

• copper 

• PARs 

• PCBs 

Molasses Bayou Wetlands: 

• copper 

• PARs 

• pesticides 

98 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/earthlr6/6sf/pdffiles/060S043.pdf(updated Feb. 2006). 
157 

NEW YORK 

As of the 2000 Census, 22,790 New Yorkers lived in the census tracts containing 

the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,767 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additional I , 170 were persons aged 75 and older. Median household income 

in 1999 was below that of the nation in one of the five census tracts. 
158 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

COMPUTER CIRCUITS 

Suffolk County, New York 

HRS Score: 50 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 1352.06 

Total Population: 1,844 

Median Age: 40.7 

Children 9 and under: 212 

Persons 75 and older: 61 

Percent Minority: 7.86 

Percent Hispanic: 4.12 

Median Household Income in 1999: $78,725 
159 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description99 

Added to the NPL on May 10, 1999, the Computer Circuits site consists of a 

one-story building (about 0.4 acres) on a 1.7-acre lot in a mixed industrial and 

commercial area. Computer Circuits occupied the building between 1969 and 

1977, where it manufactured printed circuit boards for military and commercial 

applications. Waste liquids from this process were discharged into six cesspools 

near the building. 

Sampling of the cesspools found copper IIl1(ilead in quantities above permit 

levels. The cesspools were excavated and backfilled in 1976 and 1977. A 1976 

inspection revealed that the site was littered with broken barrels, spilled piles of 

chemicals and blue and green sludges. Groundwater samples from monitoring 

wells had significant levels of copper and VOCs. 

The site overlies the Upper Glacial/Magothy aquifer system. All nearby residents 

obtain drinking water from public-supply wells, 60 of which are located within four 

miles of the site. Exposure to contaminated groundwater through direct contact, 

ingestion or inhalation may pose a health threat. No private wells are allowed. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• TCE 

• inorganics 

99 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02lsuperfundlnpV0202636c.pdf. 
160 

T HE TOLl OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

CONSOLIDATED IRON & METAL 

Orange County, New York 

HRS Score: SO 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0004 

Total Population: 5,587 

Median Age: 25.8 

Children 9 and under: 1,278 

Persons 75 and older: 173 

Percent Minority: 74.15 

Percent Hispanic: 23.27 

Median Household Income in 1999: $25,016 
161 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site DescriptionlOO 

Added to the NFL on June 14,2001, Consolidated Iron and Metal is a seven-acre 

inactive car and scrap metal junkyard bordering the Hudson River in a mixed 

industrial, commercial and residential area. Scrap metal processing and storage 

took place at the site for about 40 years, during which time various scrap metals 

were received, including whole automobiles, automobile engines, transmissions 

and batteries, keypunch machines, computer parts, appliances and transformers. 

A smelter operated on the site between 1975 and 1995 and melted aluminum and 

other materials, resulting in ash/slag byproduct that is contaminated with lead. 

Oil and other wastes on facility soils and in storm water were discharged into the 

Hudson River without testing or permits. 

Prior to an EPA clearing operation in 2003, the site contained: a tire pile; a 

staging area and smelter; a compactor and metal shear; office space and garages; 

and various scrap metal piles. Although the removal action eliminated the 

immediate risks to nearby residents (such as dispersal of windblown contaminants 

or propagation of West Nile virus), surface and subsurface soils on the site are 

contaminated, as is the Hudson River adjacent to the site. 

Contaminants Present 

Surface and subsurface soils: 

• VOCs and SVOCs 

• pesticides 

• PCBs 

• metals 

Hudson River: 

• PCBs 

• metals 

100 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02lsuperfundlnpll0204175c.pdf. 
162 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

LAWRENCE AVIATION INDUSTRIES 

Suffolk County, New York 

HRS Score: 50 

DemQmphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 1582.02 

Total Population: 7527 

MedianAge: 35.9 

Children 9 and under: 1,111 

Persons 75 and older: 359 

Percent Minority: 11.58 

Percent Hispanic: 9.10 

Median Household Income in 1999: $57,330 
163 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site DescriptionlOl 

Added to the NPL on February 4, 2000, this 160-acre site was used to manufacture 

titanium sheeting for the aeronautics industry. It sits on a topographic high point 

such that groundwater flows toward Port Jefferson Harbor, an outlet to Long Island 

Sound. Groundwater from the underlying Upper GlaciaL'Magothy aquifer is the 

only source of drinking water in the vicinity. Forty-seven public supply wells serve 

an estimated 120,500 people within four miles of the site. 

Past disposal pmctices and releases from leaking drums resulted in contamination 

of soil and groundwater. For example, in 1980 the company crushed over 1,600 

drums containing TCE, PCE, acid sludges, salt wastes, oils and others wastes and 

allowed the liquid contents to spill onto unprotected soil. Numerous discharges 

to the ground surface and two unlined lagoons also occurred. Monitoring wells 

on the site's perimeter and nearby residential wells have shown that TCE, PCE, 

nitmtes and fluoride contaminate the groundwater. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• TCE 

• PCE 

• nitrates 

• fluoride 

101 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfundlnpll020133Sc.pdf. 
164 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBLEtT 

LIBERTY INDUSTRIAL FINISHING 

Nassau County, New York 

HRS Score: 50.65 

DemolWlphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 5205.01 

Total Population: 3,728 

Median Age: 38.2 

Children 9 and under: 517 

Persons 75 and older: 226 

Percent Minority: 7.56 

Percent Hispanic: 6.12 

Median Household Income in 1999: $69,482 
165 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Descriptionl02 

Added to the NFL on June 10, 1986, this 30-acre site is located in the Village of 

Farmingdale, Town of Oyster Creek. During World War II and the Korean War, 

the site was used for airplane parts manufacturing and associated metal finishing 

activities. In the 1950s, it was converted to an industrial park. Thereafter, a 

variety of industrial operations were conducted, including metal plating and 

fiberglass product manufacturing. 

Since the 1980s, the site has been used for light manufacturing and warehousing. A 

groundwater plume contaminated with organic and inorganic substances underlies 

the fonner industrial area and extends approximately one mile to the south. 

Portions of the Massapequa Nature Preserve, located about one-halfmile away, are 

also contaminated. A separate plume of organic contamination originates to the 

north of the site and eventually commingles with the other plume. 

There are no private drinking wells in the site vicinity. People living nearby 

obtain their drinking water from local water utilities, which routinely test their 

supplies to ensure compliance with state and federal drinking water standards. 

In 1998, under EPA oversight, the PRPs installed "sentinel" wells between the 

Liberty site and drinking water wells of the local water districts. The "sentinel" 

wells serve as an early warning system should any plume of contamination 

migrate close to the well fields. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater and soils: 

• cadmium 

• chromium 

• VOCs (including dichloroethene, trichloroethene and tetrachloroethene) 

• PCBs 

102 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov!region02lsuperfimdlnpl10201184c.pdf. 
166 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBLECT 

OLD ROOSEVELT FIELD CONTAMINATED GW AREA 

Nassau County, New York 

HRS Score: 50 

DemoWlphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 4066 

Total Population: 4,104 

Median Age: 41.5 

Children 9 and under: 649 

Persons 75 and older: 351 

Percent Minority: 5.85 

Percent Hispanic: 2.63 

Median Household Income in 1999: $102,525 
167 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description103 

Added to the NPL on May 11, 2000, Old Roosevelt Field Contaminated Ground 

Water Area is a contaminated groundwater plume located on part of Roosevelt 

Field, which was used for aviation activities from 1911 to 1951. Part of the field 

was sold for use as a racetrack. The other part reverted to use as a commercial 

airport until it closed in 1951. 

Today the Roosevelt Field Shopping Mall and Garden City Plaza occupy the fonner 

airport area. 1\vo public supply wells were installed in 1952 and put into use in 

1953. The population served by each well is about 3,400 people. Since they were 

first sampled in the late 1970s and early 80s, both wells have shown the presence 

oftetrachloroethene (PCE) and trichloroethene (TCE), and concentrations of these 

chemicals have increased since then. In 1987, a treatment system was installed to 

remove VOCs from raw water being pumped from the wells. 

Contaminants Present 

• PCE 

• TeE 

103 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfundinpIl0204234c.pdf. 
168 

FLORIDA 

As of the 2000 Census, 21,517 Floridians lived in the census tracts containing the 

five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 2,626 were children aged nine and younger. An 

additional 978 were persons aged 75 and older. In three of the five census tracts, the 

median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
169 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

AMERICAN CREOSOTE WORKS (PENSACOLA PIT) 

Escambia County, Florida 

HRS Score: 58.41 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0003 

Total Population: 3,131 

Median Age: 38.3 

Children 9 and under: 392 

Persons 75 and older: 308 

Percent Minority: 48.07 

Percent Hispanic: 1.95 

Median Household Income in 1999: $23,164 
170 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description104 

Added to the NPL on September 8, 1983, American Creosote Works, Inc. is 

an l8-acre site one-quarter mile north of where Pensacola Bay converges with 

Bayou Chico. From 1902 to 1981, it was operated as a wood-treating facility. 

Prior to 1970, the company discharged liquid process wastes into two unlined 

80,000-gallon percolation ponds. Creosote was the primary preservative chemical 

until 1950, when pentachlorophenol (PCP) became the preferred chemical. The 

percolation ponds were allowed to overllow through a spillway and follow a 

drainage course into the nearby Bayou and Bay. Later, workers periodically drew 

wastewaters off the ponds and discharged them into designated "spillage areas" 

on the site. Additional discharges occurred when heavy rains flooded the ponds, 

causing them to overflow. 

Currently, the site is surrounded by a predominantly residential area that is served 

by municipal water supplies, but numerous residents and businesses operate private 

irrigation wells. The soil, sediment and groundwater are contaminated mostly with 

VQCs, PARs, PCP and dioxin from the fonner wood-treating processes. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil, sediment and groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PARs) 

• PCP 

• dioxin 

104 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npllnplflnlacwpenfl.htm. 
171 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

ESCAMBIA WOOD - PENSACOLA 

Escambia County, Florida 

HRS Score: 50 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0014.01 

Total Population: 5,481 

Median Age: 20.4 

Children 9 and under: 410 

Persons 75 and older: 69 

Percent Minority: 17.48 

Percent Hispanic: 1.77 

Median Household Income in 1999: $22,150 
172 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description1os 

Added to the NPL on December 16, 1994, the Escambia Treating Company site 

is a 26-acre abandoned wood preserving facility that treated wood products with 

creosote and PCP from 1942 until it closed in 1982. After it closed, three open 

surface impoundments remained on the facility, along with a backfilled surface 

impoundment. 

The site is located in a mixed industrial and residential area. Groundwater and 

soil on-site are contaminated with wood treating chemicals such as creosote and 

pentachlorophenol. The primary source of groundwater in Escambia County, the 

Sand-and-Gravel aquifer, lies beneath the facility. As of 1994, this aquifer served 

about 129,330 people. Approximately 20 public water supply wells and numerous 

private wells are located within four miles of the site. The nearest public supply 

well is one mile northeast of the site. 

In 1992, EPA completed a removal action, which entailed excavation of 225,000 

cubic yards of contaminated material, currently stockpiled under a secure cover 

on-site. In 1995, the site became part of a National Relocation Evaluation Pilot 

to help EPA determine when relocation should be used in addressing the health 

threats posed by Superfund sites. By January 2002, the government had acquired 

or obtained agreements to acquire all of the 170 properties in Rosewood Terrace, 

Oak Park and Goulding subdivisions, including 158 single family homes, a 

200-unit apartment complex and 11 vacant residential lots. Over 500 persons 

have been relocated to comparable replacement housing in the Pensacola and 

surrounding areas. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• PCP 

• numerous other creosote constituents detected at elevated concentrations 

Surface soil, subsurface soil: 

• PCP 

• several other organic and inorganic anaJytes detected 

lOS Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/wastelnplfnplflnlescwodft.htm; and NPL Site Narrative, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsiteslnplfnar1435.htm. 
173 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NE8L£eT 

NORMANDY PARK APARTMENTS 

Hillsborough County, Florida 

HRS Score: 49.98 

Demogrnphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0107.01 

Total PopUlation: 6,149 

Median Age: 36.5 

Children 9 and under: 851 

Persons 75 and older: 264 

Percent Minority: 22.23 

Percent Hispanic: 12.72 

Median Household Income in 1999: $58,607 
174 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site DescriptionlO6 

Proposed to the NPL on February 13, 1~95, the Normandy Park Apartments site 

has never been finalized on the NPL. From the early 1950s through 1963, Gulf 

Coast Recycling, Inc. operated a battery breaking and lead smelting facility at 

the site location. In 1963, Gulf Coast ceased operations and demolished on-site 

buildings. The property was used as an open dump until approximately 1968, 

when Gulf Coast built the Normandy Park Apartments. 

The Apartments occupy 8.25 acres, with a northern adult section and a larger 

southern family section. Overall, 12 residential buildings house about 283 

residents. Other amenities include tennis courts, a playground, swimming 

pools and an office building. Gulf Coast's sampling in 1992 revealed high 

concentrations of lead at and below the soil surface, as well as elevated 

concentrations of lead in groundwater. 

In June 1992, Gulf Coast entered into an agreement with EPA to investigate the 

site and address immediate threats to the residents. With EPA oversight, Gulf 

Coast placed two concrete caps over contaminated soil in the northern complex 

and constructed a wooden deck over contaminated soil in the southern courtyard. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil and groundwater: 

• lead 

106 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://wWw.epa.gov/region4/waste/npllnplfls/normanfi.htm. 
175 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

REEVES SOUTHEAST GALVANIZING 

Hillsborough County, Florida 

HRS Score: 58.75 

DemolUaphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0121.03 

Total Population: 3,760 

Median Age: 31.1 

Children 9 and under: 617 

Persons 75 and older: 110 

Percent Minority: 11.30 

Percent Hispanic: 9.04 

Median Household Income in 1999: $33,044 
176 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description107 

Added to the NPL on September 8, 1983, this 28-acre site includes two areas: 

the Reeves Southeastern Galvanizing (SEG) facility (l7-acres) and the Reeves 

Southeastern Wire (SEW) facility (ll-acres). Beginning in the 1960s, the SEW 

and SEG facilities generated caustic, rinse, acid process and perhaps plating 

wastes. These wastes were neutralized and then discharged into storage ponds, 

contaminating both ground and surface waters. 

About 56,000 people live within three miles of this site, with public water 

supply wells located about one mile upland. The area also includes residential 

neighborhoods, light manufacturing facilities, warehouses and a refuse-to-energy 

plant. Groundwater was contaminated with heavy metals such as zinc. Prior 

to EPA involvement, soil, sediment and surface water were also contaminated 

with heavy metals such as zinc and lead. Hillsborough County issued a notice 

of violation in 1974 and the company responded by upgrading its wastewater 

treatment facility. This system neutralized acid and removed 90 percent of the 

heavy metals. Sampling has shown municipal and private wells not contaminated, 

but people who come into contact with or accidentally ingest contaminated 

surface water or soils may be at risk. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• heavy metals such as zinc 

Surface water and soils: 

• heavy metals, primarily zinc 

101 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet. available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npllnpIftnlreevesfl.htm. 
177 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND N£6L£CT 

STAUFFER CHEMICAL CO. (TARPON SPRINGS) 

Pinellas County, Florida 

HRS Score: SO 

DemolWlphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0273.08 

Total Population: 2,996 

Median Age: 42.7 

Children 9 and under: 356 

Persons 75 and older: 227 

Percent Minority: 9.15 

Percent Hispanic: 4.37 

Median Household Income in 1999: $46,855 
178 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Pescrjption108 

Added to the NFL on May 31, 1994, the 160-acre Tarpon Springs plant produced 

elemental phosphorous using phosphate ore mined from deposits in Florida. 

Victor Chemical Company constructed the plant and began production in 

1947. Stauffer Chemical Company obtained the plant in 1960 and continued 

to manufacture elemental phosphorous until closing in 1981. Over 500,000 

tons of chemical process wastes were disposed of on the site between 1950 and 

1979. Stauffer removed 33,000 gallons of elemental phosphorous contained 

in above-ground tanks in 1997-98. However, on-site monitoring wells remain 

contaminated. 

Currently land use surrounding the site is a combination of light industrial, 

residential, recreational and commercial. About 8,500 people in the Tarpon 

Springs area receive drinking water from 23 public wells and three private wells 

located within four miles of the site. Because of the depths of the aquifers, all 

drinking water wells within four miles of the site are potential targets. 

Contaminants Present 

On-site soils, on-site waste ponds and ground water: 

• heavy metals (barium, chromium, lead, vanadium, zinc, copper and arsenic) 

• radio nuclides 

• PARs 

• elemental phosphorous 

lOS Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/wastelnpLlnplflnlstautSfI.htm. 
179 

ILLINOIS 

As of the 2000 Census, 28,931 Illinoisans lived in the census tracts containing the 

five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 4,729 were children aged nine and younger. An 

additional 2,031 were persons aged 75 and older. In four of the five census tracts, 

the median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
180 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

CIRCLE SMELTING CORP. 

Clinton County, Illinois 

HRS Score: 70.71 

DemQgraphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9003 

Total Population: 6,427 

Median Age: 35.4 

Children 9 and under: 973 

Persons 75 and older: 453 

Percent Minority: 1.24 

Percent Hispanic: 1.10 

Median Household Income in 1999: $46,859 
181 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description109 

Proposed to the NPL on June 17, 1996, the Circle Smelting Corp. site has not 

been finalized on the NPL. In 1904, the Circle Smelting Corp. facility was 

constructed as a zinc smelter and began recovering zinc from scrap metals. 

Three separate sources have been identified at the site: two large areas of 

contaminated soil and a 17 -acre slag pile that has high concentrations of zinc, 

nickel, lead, cadmium and copper. There are also piles of residual metals and 

coal cinders. Surface waters were contaminated when the hazardous substances 

migrated to Beaver Creek. Smelting operations also generated air emissions that 

included metal oxides. 

At the time of proposal to the NPL, an estimated 460 people lived near the site 

and 21 people still worked at the Circle Smelting facility. About 230 children 

attended a public elementary school located in the contaminated area. 

Contaminants Present 

• zinc 

• nickel 

• lead 

• cadmium 

• copper 

109 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL Site Narrative, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsites/npllnar1475.htm. 
182 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

DEPUE/NEW JERSEY ZINC/MoBIL CHEM CORP. 

Bureau County, lllinois 

HRS Score: 70.71 

DemQlWlphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9650 

Total Population: 4,168 

Median Age: 36.6 

Children 9 and under: 598 

Persons 75 and older: 347 

Percent Minority: 10.27 

Percent Hispanic: 24.33 

Median Household Income in 1999: $37,181 
183 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site DescriptionliO 

Added to the NPL on May 10, 1999, the DePue site was a zinc smelting facility 

that began operations in 1903 and expanded into several facilities consisting of 

over 860 acres. The original plant produced slab zinc, zinc dust and sulfuric acid 

for the automobile and appliances industries. New Jersey Zinc constructed a diammonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizer plant on the site in 1966. Mobil Chemical 

Corp. purchased a portion of the property in 1975 and took over ownership of the 

plants in 1985. The site had several sources of contamination, including waste 

piles, lagoons and cooling ponds. The plants were demolished in 1992. 

Soil, surface water and groundwater are contaminated with chemicals from 

the plants. Elevated levels of cadmium, lead and other metals were found in 

residential soil samples, posing long-term health effects. DePue Lake, with its 

fishery, state wildlife refuge and wetlands, is also contaminated by surface water 

and groundwater discharges from the plants. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil (including nearby residential areas): 

• cadmium 

• lead 

Site Source Areas: 

• zinc • lead 

• arsenic 

• cadmium 

• chromium 

• copper 

110 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIRSSuper/npllillinoisIILD062340641.htm. 
184 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

INDIAN REFINERY - TEXACO LAWRENCEVILLE 

Lawrence County, lllinois 

HRS Score: 56.67 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9811 

Total Population: 3,459 

Median Age: 45.3 

Children 9 and under: 354 

Persons 75 and older: 591 

Percent Minority: 1.88 

Percent Hispanic: 1.16 

Median Household Income in 1999: $30,714 
185 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Descriptiontll 

Added to the NPL on December 1,2000, this 990-acre site was operated as a 

refinery from the early 1900s until 1995. An ongoing oil release and associated 

contaminated area on the southern part of the refinery property was discovered 

in 1997. Subsurface oil product, floating on groundwater, was escaping through 

several discharge points into wetlands that are hydraulically connected to the 

Embarras River. As a result, most of the vegetation in the wetlands area had been 

killed. Residential, commercial, agricultural and natural areas surround the site. 

Approximately 4,900 people are supplied with drinking water from municipal wells 

serving the city of Lawrenceville. People living in the Kirkwood Subdivision and 

in scattered housing near the site use private wells for drinking water. Sampling 

in 1996 and 1999 revealed that hazardous substances that were disposed of at the 

Indian Acres area have migrated oifsite into the adjacent residential area. The 

waste in the residential area contained elevated levels ofPAHs and metals. During 

demolition of the site in early 1999, wastes containing phenol and cresols were 

hauled from the site to the city of Lawrenceville's wastewater treatment plant. The 

resulting fumes and odors caused respiratory problems in nearby residents and 

caused sewers to back up into the residents' homes. 

Contaminants Present 

Waste in residential area: 

• low pH (characteristic oflube oil acid sludge and lube oil filter cake) 

• PAHs 

• metals 

Oil releases into wetlands: 

• benzene 

• toluene 

• xylene 

• methyl napthalene 

• napthalene 

• trimethylbenene 1,3,5 

• total petroleum hydrocarbons 

III Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIR5Super/npllillinoisIILD042671248.htm. 
186 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND HESLEeT 

PARSONS CASKET HARDWARE CO. 

Boone County, I1Iinois 

HRS Score: 55.58 

CWt!ti1!$ 

CIIl!$I!s "htt CMllIillinll S.1ltm! lIll'!. Sill! 

Demogrnphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0101 

Total Population: 7,725 

MedianAge: 29.4 

Children 9 and under: 1,453 

Persons 75 and older: 358 

Percent Minority: 20.47 

Percent Hispanic: 26.64 

Median Household Income in 1999: $39,041 
187 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description1l2 

Added to the NFL on July 22, 1987, this six-acre site was used as an electroplating 

facility from the 1920s until the owner filed for bankruptcy in 1982 and is now 

bordered by residential and industrial land uses. Wastes from the electroplating 

operations were stored in drums, aboveground and underground storage tanks and 

an unlined surface impoundment. Wastes included electroplating sludge, cyanide, 

bronze, nickel, brass sludge and associated solvents. 

In 1982, the state ofIllinois found that about 120 drums of various sizes were 

stored inside and outside the manufacturing building, many dented, corroded, 

leaking or uncovered. The storage tanks contained about 4,800 gallons of waste, 

while the unlined lagoon contained 166,500 gallons of liquid waste and 1,230 

cubic yards ofsludge. The state removed these wastes in 1985. 

Despite this effort, sampling in 1987 indicated that groundwater was contaminated 

with VOCs. This groundwater is the sole source of drinking water for the 15,200 

residents of the city of Belvidere, approximately 6,000 of which live within a onemile radius of the site. The closest residence is less than one-tenth ofa mile away, 

and a municipal water supply well is about 1,500 feet from the site. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs. 

Soils: 

• VOCs 

• cyanide 

• heavy metals including arsenic, copper and nickel 

U2 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

bttp:l/www.epa.govIR5Super/npl/iIlinoisIILDO05252432.htm. 
188 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NE6LECT 

SAUGET AREA 1 

St. Clair County, Illinois 

HRS Score: 61.85 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 5023 

Total Population: 7,152 

Median Age: 29.9 

Children 9 and under: 1,351 

Persons 75 and older: 282 

Percent Minority: 40.21 

Percent Hispanic: 2.45 

Median Household Income in 1999: $30,958 
189 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionll3 

Sauget Area 1 site consists of 12 contaminated sources that include over 3.5 miles 

of Dead Creek (sites A through F) and adjacent sites (G, H, I, L, M and N). Dead 

Creek is an intermittent creek, sometimes impounded, that was used around the 

1930s for waste disposal. Sites G, H and I are inactive landfills or former disposal 

areas adjacent to the creek. Site G operated between 1950 and 1973; H and I were 

active from 1931 to 1957. Site L is a former surface impoundment used by waste 

haulers to dispose of wash water from 1971 to 1979. Sites M and N are former 

sand pits that were excavated in the 1940s. 

Protected endangered species, such as the black-crowned night heron, are located 

in Segment F of Dead Creek and downstream in Old Prairie Dupont Creek, the 

Cahokia Chute of the Mississippi River and the main channel of the Mississippi 

River. These water bodies, also used for recreation and commercial fishing, may 

be affected by the migration of hazardous substances from the Sauget site. About 

6,000 feet of wetland frontage has been impacted by releases from these sources, 

and over II miles of wetland frontage is subject to potential contamination. 

Approximately 143,000 people live within a four-mile radius of the site. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil and sediment in landfills and creek: 

• chlorobenzenes 

• chlorophenols 

• chloroanilines 

• nitroanilines 

• dioxins 

• PCBs 

Surface waters: 

• chlorinated solvents 

• chlorobenzenes 

• PCBs 

• PARs 

• chlorophenols 

• nitroaniline 

• heavy me!8ls (including cadmium, copper, cobalt, lead, mercury, nickel and 

zinc) 

113 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIR5Super/npVillinoisilLD980792006.htm. 
190 

PENNSYLVANIA 

As of the 2000 Census, 15,188 Pennsylvanians lived in the census tracts containing 

the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 2,277 were children aged nine and younger 

and an additiona1987 were aged 75 and older. In three of the five census tracts, the 

median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
191 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

EAST TENTH STREET 

Delaware County, Pennsylvania 

HRS Score: 67.68 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 4066 

Total Population: 2,314 

Median Age: 34.5 

Children 9 and under: 355 

Persons 75 and older: 111 

Percent Minority: 8.56 

Percent Hispanic: 1.77 

Median Household Income in 1999: $28,219 
192 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refotm 

Site Descriptionll4 

The East Tenth Street site was proposed to the NPL on January 18, 1994, but has 

never been finalized on the NPL. In 1910, American Viscose Co. purchased the 

36-acre property to manufacture rayon and then, beginning in 1958, cellophane. 

In 1988, an environmental assessment by the Pennsylvania Department of 

Environmental Resources found that employees were excavating an underground 

solvent storage tank fann and dumping the contents of the tanks on the ground. 

Another assessment in 1990 revealed tanks, leaking transformers and asbestos 

within and outside of site buildings. Asbestos, PCBs and other hazardous 

substances had been mishandled during past demolition activities, and there was a 

sludge-filled tunnel located on one of the lots. 

The sediments in Marcus Hook Creek, which runs next to the site and is classified 

as a state-designated area for the protection of aquatic life, are contaminated 

with PCBs. Removal actions - including the abatement of asbestos in several 

buildings, the removal of antiquated transformers, the construction of fences 

around contaminated lots and the removal of PCB-contaminated cements - have 

made the site safe. However, touching or ingesting contaminated groundwater, 

soils, surface water or sediments continues to pose a health risk. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs 

Soil: 

• PCBs 

• asbestos 

• heavy metals 

• organic compounds 

Sludge-filled tunnel: 

• chlorofonn 

• cadmium 

• mercury 

Sediments in Marcus Hook Creek: 

• PCBs 

114 Site description and contaminant infotmation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://epa.gov/reg3hwmdlnpIlPAD987323458.htm. 
193 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

LOWER DARBY CREEK AREA 

Delaware County, Pennsylvania 

HRS Score: 50 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 4034.02 

Total Population: 3,864 

Median Age: 35.9 

Children 9 and under: 566 

Persons 75 and older: 178 

Percent Minority: 2.07 

Percent Hispanic: 0.78 

Median Household Income in 1999: $45,353 
194 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site DescriptionllS 

This site, which was added to the NPL on June 14,2001, consists of two landfills, 

the Clearview Landfill and the Folcroft Landfill and Annex. Clearview Landfill 

is on the east side of Darby Creek. About two miles downstream. the Folcroft 

Landfill/Annex is on the west side of Darby Creek. Folcroft is part of the John 

Heinz National Wildlife Refuge and is managed by the United States Fish and 

Wildlife Service. 

The two landfills operated from the 1950s to the 1970s. They disposed of a 

variety of wastes, including municipal, demolition and hospital waste. Landfill 

waste was placed along the edges of the creek. After Clearview was covered and 

seeded in 1976, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority constructed hundreds 

of residences around its eastern and southern borders. 

Years after the landfills closed in the mid-1970s, EPA discovered that the covers 

were eroding and contaminated runoff was seeping into Darby Creek. Samples 

and reports showed that Clearview soils and seeps contained metals, PCBs and 

petroleum byproducts. Groundwater at Folcroft wells contained metals and 

solvents. 

Contaminants Present 

Clearview Landfill soils and seeps: 

• metals 

• PCBs 

• petroleum byproducts 

Folcroft Landfill/Annex groundwater wells: 

• metals 

• solvents 

IU Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://epa.gov/reg3hwmd/npIlPASFN0305521.htm. 
195 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

SHARON STEEL (FARRELL WKS OISP AREA) 

Mercer County, Pennsylvania 

HRS Score: 50 

DemQwwhjc Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0311 

Total Population: 1,871 

Median Age: 41.4 

Children 9 and under: 255 

Persons 75 and older: 275 

Percent Minority: 14.38 

Percent Hispanic: 0.43 

Median Household Income in 1999: $27,604 
196 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionll6 

Added to the NPL on July 28, 1998, the Sharon Steel site encompasses a 400-

acre area in western Pennsylvania, within a few hundred feet of the Ohio line. 

Beginning about 1900, the Sharon Steel Cotporation used the area to dispose of 

blast furnace slag, electric arc furnace slag, basic oxygen furnace slag and sludge. 

From 1949 to 1981, millions ofgallons of spent pickle liquor acid were dumped 

over the slag, under the theory that the acid would be neutralized by carbonites 

in the slag. In actuality, groundwater and soils were contaminated with metals, 

PARs, PCBs and pesticides. 

The site is located in the flood plain of the Shenango River and there are several 

wetland areas on-site. Studies show that the groundwater flow is transporting the 

contamination away from residents so residential wells have not been affected. 

However, metals have been detected in all biota samples. 

Contaminants Present 

Soils and groundwater: 

• metals 

• PAHs 

• PCBs 

• pesticides 

116 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

bttp:llepa.gov!reg3bwmdlnpIlPADOO 193317S.btm. 
197 

T HE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

UG I COLUMBIA GAS PLANT 

Lancaster County, Pennsylvania 

HRS Score: 50.78 

De1llQgraphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0112 

Total Population: 1,913 

Median Age: 31.0 

Children 9 and under: 341 

Persons 75 and older: 68 

Percent Minority: 13.17 

Percent Hispanic: 8.21 

Median Household Income in 1999: $30,789 
198 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionll7 

Added to the NPL on May 31, 1994, this 1.5-acre site is located in a light 

industrial and residential area 400 feet from the Susquehanna River. From 1851 

to 1949, Columbia Gas used the site for gas manufacturing. Eventually, the 

property was transferred to UGI Corp., which owned it until 1979. Thereafter, the 

property was used as a boat dealership until 1994. 

During the years of active gas manufacturing operations, overflows from an 

on-site tar separator were directed to an open ditch that led to the Susquehanna 

River. Records reveal complaints by local fishermen that their boats were being 

covered in tar. Samples of soil, sediment, sludge and tar revealed VOCs, PAHs, 

heavy metals and cyanide contamination. Groundwater flowing through the 

contaminated subsurface soil and bedrock has become contaminated with VOCs. 

Additionally, in 1987, EPA determined that approximately 800 cubic yards of 

sediment in the Susquehanna River were contaminated with tar from the site. 

Withiu 15 miles downstream ofthe site, about 90 people use the Susquehanna 

River as a source of drinking water, and 1,000 people use groundwater wells 

within four miles of the site for drinking water. People or animals that touch or 

swallow contaminated materials may be at risk. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil, sediment, sludge, tar and groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• PARs • heavy metals 

• cyanide 

117 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://epa.gov/reg3hwmdlnp1lPAD980539126.htm. 
199 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

WATSON JOHNSON LANDFILL 

Bucks County, Pennsylvania 

HRS Score: 71 

Pemosraphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 1030.02 

Total Population: 5,226 

Median Age: 36.9 

Children 9 and under: 760 

Persons 75 and older: 355 

Percent Minority: 2.99 

Percent Hispanic: 1.21 

Median Household Income in 1999: $47,269 
200 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionll8 

The Watson Johnson Landfill was added to the NPL on September 13, 200 I. About 

32 acres of the 56-acre site was a former landfill that accepted both municipal and 

industrial waste. The landfill was active from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. 

After concerned citizens contacted EPA in 1998, sampling revealed a variety of 

contaminants. Hazardous substances detected in the soils include VOCs, PCBs 

and metals. An on-site monitoring well and a Quakertown Borough municipal 

well were contaminated with PCE and TCE. Metals and PCBs were detected in 

sediment samples collected from an adjacent wetland and an elevated level of 

mercury was detected downstream of the site in Tohickon Creek. Residential well 

sampling indicated elevated levels of arsenic in some home wells. 

In July 1999, a front-end loader unearthed and accidentally punctured a drum, 

spilling two gallons of material on the ground that was found to contain PCE and 

lead. EPA removed the drum and surrounding contaminated soil in March 2000. 

Drinking water from the municipal well is currently being treated to remove 

the TCE contamination, and public water main service is being extended to 35 

residences currently using private wells. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil: 

• VOCs 

• SVOCs 

• PCBs 

• metals 

Monitoring well and municipal well: 

• PCE 

• TCE 

Sediments in adjacent wetlands: 

• metals 

• PCBs 

Tohickon Creek: 

• mercury 

Residential wells: 

• arsenic 

• TCE 

118 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://epa.gov/reg3hwmdlnpIlPAD980706824.htm. 
201 

As of the 2000 Census, 23,068 Ohioans lived in the census tracts containing the 

five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,270 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additional 1,581 were persons aged 75 and older. In three ofthe five census 

tracts, the median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
202 

THE TOLL DF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

ARMCO, INC., HAMILTON PLANT 

Butler County, Ohio 

HRS Score: 69.34 

Demowmhic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0105 

Total Population: 2,543 

MedianAge: 33.8 

Children 9 and under: 369 

Persons 75 and older: 102 

Percent Minority: 6.80 

Percent Hispanic: 0.63 

Median Household Income in 1999: $34,630 
203 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description1l9 

Proposed to the NPL on April 30, 2003, the Armco Inc., Hamilton Plant site is a 

120-acre inactive industrial facility bordered by the Great Miami River and the 

B&O Railroad. Augspurger Road divides the site into two portions. The 27-

acre northern parcel was formerly used as a rail yard, a temporary storage area 

for scrubber sludge waste and a 4.5-acre landfill. The southern parcel consists 

of92 fenced areas and was used for manufacturing operations, including a coke 

production facility and blast furnaces. 

The facility operated as a steel mill, producing both coke and molten iron under 

various owners since the 1900s. Coke production stopped in 1982 and iron 

production ended in 1991. The facility was then used intermittently until it was 

completely closed in 1994. Coal tar sludge was periodically drained and disposed 

of in the landfill portion of the property from the early 1960s through the landfill's 

closure in 1980. The blast furnace operation generated wastewater that was 

discharged into two settling ponds. Excess water from the ponds was originally 

discharged to the Great Miami River under a permit. Settled pollutants in the 

water such as ammonia, cyanide, phenol, lead and zinc were periodically dredged 

from the ponds and stored in piles in the northern parcel. 

Past disposal practices resulted in the contamination of site soil and Great 

Miami River sediments. The river is a recreational fishery for species such as 

bluegill and small mouth bass, and nearby land serves as habitat for a federally 

designated endangered species, the Indiana Bat. Moreover, the site is less than 

one-half mile from the City of Hamilton's North Plant wellfield, which serves 

approximately 35,763 people. The Village of New Miami Wellfield is located 

within one mile of the site and serves about 3,045 people. A total population of 

60,605 is served by wells within four miles of the site. Although groundwater 

contamination had not yet been detected, the aquifer is only 40 feet below 

ground surface in the vicinity of the site. 

Contaminants Presept 

Settling pond sediments: 

• SVOCs 

• PCBs 

119 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL Site Narrative, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar1670.htm. 
204 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

Soil: 

• SVOCs 

PCBs 

metals 

Great Miami River sediments: 

SVOCs, including 4-methylphenol (o-cresol), fluoroanthene, 

henzo(k)flouranthene, and henzo{f,b,i)perylene 

metals, including chromium and zinc 
205 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP (PAINESVILLE WORKS) 

Lake County, Ohio 

HRS Score: 50 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 2048 

Total Population: 3,337 

Median Age: 38.7 

Children 9 and under: 400 

Persons 75 and older: 182 

Percent Minority: 1.80 

Percent Hispanic: 0.72 

Median Household Income in 1999: $48,125 
206 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Site Description 120 

Proposed to the NPL on May 10, 1993, the Diamond Shamrock Corp. (Painesville 

Works) site has not yet been added to the NPL. The site occupies about 500 acres 

between Lake Erie and the Grand River and is bordered by a tire manufacturing 

company on the east and an industrial area on the west. 

In 1912, the Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company began operations at the 

plant, producing mainly caustic soda, chromate compounds, chlorine, chlorinated 

paraffins and coke. The company also accepted and disposed of spent pickle 

liquor from nearby steel industries until it closed in 1972. Eight sources are 

associated with the site: .75 million tons of chromate waste materials, three waste 

lakes, a wastewater retention basin, a hazardous waste landfill, chromate effluent 

treatment lagoons and contaminated soils in the main production area. PCBs were 

discovered in the transformer oils. 

The site poses a threat to drinking water intakes along Lake Erie and to the 

fisheries, wetlands and sensitive environments in the lake and nearby Grand River. 

Headlands Beach State Park, located nearby, is a significant recreation area. Sport 

fishing occurs in both the river and the lake; commercial fishing also occurs in 

the lake. Nearby wetlands provide habitat for the River Otter, a state endangered 

species, as well as the Indiana Bat, a federally designated endangered species. 

Contaminants Present 

Surface water and sediments: 

• hexavalent chromium 

• mercury 

• cyanide 

• ethylbenzene 

• xylene 

• napthalene 

110 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL Site Narrative, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundisites/npVnarI376.htm. 
207 

DOVER CHEMICAL CORP. 

Tuscawaras County, Ohio 

HRS Score: 50 

Demo!WlPhic Profile 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Census Tract No.: 0206 

Total Population: 5,206 

Median Age: 42.6 

Children 9 and under: 572 

Persons 75 and older: 586 

Percent Minority: 1.63 

Percent Hispanic: 0.61 

Median Household Income in 1999: $43,830 
208 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Site Descriptionl21 

The Dover Chemical Corp. site was proposed to the NPL on May 10, 1993, but 

has not been added to the final NPL. This site consists of three parcels that total 

approximately 60 acres: a chemical manufacturing facility on the 20-acre main 

parcel; an undeveloped property in a residential area to east of the facility; and an 

undeveloped property between 1-77 and Sugar Creek. The latter parcel contains 

an eight-acre pond up to 28 feet deep that was formerly a borrow pit during 

construction ofI-77. 

Since 1950, Dover Chemical has manufactured products used to make extreme 

pressure lubricants, plasticizers and flame retardants for vinyl products. Soil and 

groundwater were contaminated by site activities from the 1950s through the early 

1970s, including ground storage and unintentional spills and leaks. Until 1987, 

wastewater was discharged into a ditch that ultimately discharged into Sugar 

Creek. Following a removal action that same year, contaminants previously 

found in the lagoon surface water and adjacent shallow groundwater are no longer 

present. Although a variety ofVOCs and other constituents have been found on 

the site, dioxin contamination poses the greatest risk. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil and groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• carbon tetrachloride 

• 1,4-dicholorobenzene 

• hexachlorobenzene 

• tetrachloroethene 

• dibenzofurans (furans) 

• polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxin) 

121 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIR5Super/nplJohio/0HD004210563.htm. 
209 

NEASE CHEMICAL 

Columbiana County, Ohio 

HRS Score: 47.19 

Demographic Profile 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Census Tract No.: 2048 

Total Population: 5,491 

Median Age: 37.0 

Children 9 and under: 728 

Persons 75 and older: 338 

Percent Minority: 1.91 

Percent Hispanic: 0.53 

Median Household Income in 1999: $35,038 
210 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NE6LECT 

Site Descriptionl22 

Added to the NPL on September 8,1983, this 44-acre site is surrounded by lightly 

developed land on three sides, an industrial plant to the northeast and 124 homes 

within one mile. Between 1961 and 1973, Nease Chemical produced various 

chemical compounds, including household cleaners, fire retardants and pesticides 

(most notably, mirex, a probable human carcinogen). During the facility's 

operation, hazardous substances were released into soils and groundwater through 

five unlined ponds used to treat manufacturing waste. Contaminants were also 

released to the Middle Fork of Little Beaver Creek (MFLBC) through surface 

water runoff from the ponds into creek tributaries. 

Soils, sediments, surface water, groundwater and fish along a 3D-mile reach 

ofMFLBC are contaminated despite Nease Chemical's voluntary removal of 

115 drums and 5,700 cubic yards of solI from contaminated areas in 1975. The 

MFLBC and associated wetlands are an important natural resource with certain 

stretches designated as wild and scenic. Dairy herds on two nearby farms were 

exposed to mirex through creek and floodplain contamination. In 1989, the Ohio 

Department of Public Health (ODH) detected mirex in the bloodstream of some 

local residents and workers, prompting ODH to issue a health advisory against 

fishing and swimming along portions of the MFLBC. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater, soil and sediments: • VOCs 

• SVOCs 

122 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIRSSuper/npl/ohio/OHD980610018.htm. 
211 

NORTH SANITARY LANDFILL 

MontgomeJY County, Ohio 

HRS Score: 50 

Demowmhic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0018 

Total Population: 6,491 

Median Age: 32.0 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Children 9 and under: 1,201 

Persons 75 and older: 373 

Percent Minority: 14.90 

Percent Hispanic: 1.96 

Median Household Income in 1999: $24,875 
212 

Site Description123 

The North Sanitary Landfill was added to the NPL on May 31, 1994. More than 

half of the 102-acre site was used for landfilling industrial and municipal wastes 

into unlined gravel pits, which intersected the water table. The site sits atop and 

within a federally designated sole-source aquifer composed of highly transmissive 

sands and gravels. It is in close proximity to the City of Dayton's two major 

municipal well fields, which supply over 430,000 people with drinking water. 

Several private residential wells have become contaminated with organic 

substances believed to be related to the site. Wastes disposed of at the site include 

used oils, solvents, paint, electrical transformers, brake grindings containing 

asbestos and sewage. Thousands of drums buried on the site are contaminated 

with TCE and other VOCs. Numerous fires have occurred at the site, the most 

recent in 1996. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater and soils: 

• VOCs, such as TCE, tetrachlorethene, 1, l-dichloroethene, vinyl chloride and 

methylene chloride 

• semi-VOCs such as Phenol and bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate 

• heavy metals such as lead, mercury, cadmium and cyanide 

• PCBs 

123 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

hnp:/lwww.epa.govIR5Super/npl/ohio/OHD98061 1 875.htm. 
213 

MICHIGAN 

As of the 2000 Census, 20,915 Michiganders lived in the census tracts containing 

the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,189 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additional 1,161 were persons aged 75 and older. In four of the five census 

tracts, the median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
214 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

BARRELS, INC. 

Ingham County, Michigan 

HRS Score: 42.24 

Demowaphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0002 

Total Population: 1,467 

Median Age: 28.7 

Children 9 and under: 319 

Persons 75 and older: 40 

Percent Minority: 41.58 

Percent Hispanic: 24.81 

Median Household Income in 1999: $28,681 
215 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Descrjption124 

Added to the NFL on October 4,1989, Barrels, Inc. is a two-acre site in an 

industrialized portion of Lansing, Michigan. From 1964 to 1981, Barrels, Inc., 

received metal barrels from industrial facilities for cleaning and repainting. 

Waste residues were allegedly dumped directly onto the ground as the first step in 

recycling the drums. Paint sludges were also deposited at the site. 

In 1983, the state detected lead and zinc in the shallow groundwater. Soils 

on-site were heavily contaminated with heavy metals, volatile hydrocarbons, 

PCBs, oil, grease and many inorganic substances. Air quality reports indicated 

elevated levels for benzene and methylene chloride at the site boundary when 

barrels were on the site. 

Approximately 9,000 people live within one mile of the site, and three schools 

are within one-half mile. A Lansing municipal well is located in close proximity 

to the site, and the Grand River flows within one-half mile of the site. In 1986, 

the state removed 1,000 drums, 1,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil and nine 

underground storage tanks. The area is fenced, which EPA says has resolved the 

risk of direct contact. 

Contaminants Present 

Shallow groundwater: 

• lead 

• zinc 

Soils: 

• heavy metals 

• volatile hydrocarbons 

• PCBs 

• oil 

• grease 

• inorganic substances 

124 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIRSSuper/npl/michiganlMID017188673.htm. 
216 

Til( TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBLECT 

BAY CITY MIDDLEGRDUNDS 

Bay County, Michigan 

HRS Score: 50 

pemolWlphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 2810 

Total Population: 4,363 

Median Age: 35.2 

Children 9 and under: 632 

Persons 75 and older: 384 

Percent Minority: 3.71 

Percent Hispanic: 4.54 

Median Household Income in 1999: $30,264 
217 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionl2S 

Proposed to the NPL on February 13, 1995, the Bay City Middlegrounds site has 

not been added to the final NPL. The site occupies 40 acres on Middlegrounds 

Island in the Saginaw River. It is an inactive landfill and dredged sediment 

disposal area owned by Bay City, Michigan. The landfill accepted construction 

and demolition debris, municipal and household wastes, and solid and liquid 

industrial waste. The sediment disposal area consists of piles of sediments 

dredged from the Saginaw River and Bay by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

Approximately 58,900 people live within a four-mile radius of the site. The 

sediments in some areas of the river and bay have been contaminated with many 

hazardous substances, including pesticides and PCBs. Soils and groundwater 

associated with the landfill also contain a variety of contaminates. The highest 

threat is to surface water. Contaminated groundwater and surface runoff 

discharge to the Saginaw River and have contaminated fishing areas as well as 

a small river wetland. A drinking water intake for the Bay municipal system, 

which serves approximately 94,426 people in Bay City and the surrounding area, 

could potentially be affected by site contamination. Also potentially affected are 

fisheries in the river and bay, wetlands, threatened and endangered species, and a 

state-designated wildlife area. 

Contaminants Present 

Soils and groundwater associated with landfill: 

• PCBs 

• solvents 

• benzene 

• toluene 

• ethylbenzene 

• xylenes 

• polynucleic aromatics 

• phthalates 

• pesticides 

• a variety of other contaminants 

Sediment piles: 

• polynucleic aromatics 

• phthalates 

• PCBs 

• pesticides 

• heavy metals 

12' Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL Site Narrative, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfundlsites/npllnar1450.htm. 
218 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

BOFORS NOBEL, INC. 

Muskegon County, Michigan 

HRS Score: 53.42 

DeIDQ!p1lphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0031 

Total Population: 4,191 

MedianAge: 33.3 

Children 9 and under: 673 

Persons 75 and older: 160 

Percent Minority: 5.61 

Percent Hispanic: 3.82 

Median Household Income in 1999: $37,663 
219 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description126 

Added to the NPL on March 31, 1989, Bofors Nobel is an 85-acre site six 

miles east of Muskegon with an operating chemical production facility and 10 

abandoned sludge lagoons. Big Black Creek, which bounds the site on the south, 

receives groundwater discharge from the site. 

Starting around 1960, operations at the site produced alcohol-based detergents, 

saccharin, pesticides, herbicides and dye intermediates. Unlined lagoons were 

used for wastewater and sludge disposal until 1976. In the 1970s, the state 

of Michigan discovered contaminants in site groundwater that had severely 

affected the creek ecosystem. Twelve extraction wells were installed to capture 

contaminated groundwater before it reaches the creek. 

About 1,800 people live within a 1.25-mile radius of the site. Groundwater 

treatment plant and barrier walls have been installed to treat the contamination. 

Contaminants Present 

Lagoon sludge: 

• 27 different organic compounds 

Groundwater: 

• methylene chloride 

• benzene 

• 3,3-dichlorobenzidine 

• aniline 

• azobenzene 

• benzidine 

• toluene 

Soils and lagoon sludge: 

• methylene chloride 

• benzene 

• 3,3-dichlorobenzidine 

• aniline 

• azobenzene 

• benzidine 

126 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

hnp:/lwww.epa.govIRSSuper/npllmichiganlMIDOO6030373.htm. 
220 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUNO NEGLECT 

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. (ALLEGAN) 

Allegan County, Michigan 

HRS Score: 52.15 

Demogrnphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0312 

Total Population: 4,838 

MedianAge: 35.2 

Children 9 and under: 697 

Persons 75 and older: 402 

Percent Minority: 8.56 

Percent Hispanic: 2.85 

Median Household Income in 1999: $39,539 
221 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description127 

The Rockwell International Corp. (Allegan) site was added to the NPL on July 

22, 1987. From the 1920s until 1991, Rockwell manufactured parts for trucks 

and construction equipment on this 30-acre site. During this period, wastewater 

and oils were discharged into a wetland area behind the plant, a series of 

lagoons and the Kalamazoo River. Prior to 1970, the wetland and lagoons were 

filled in and built over. 

Surface and subsurface soils, groundwater and sediments in the lagoons and the 

Kalamazoo River are contaminated with VOCs, semi-VOCs, pesticides, PCBs 

and metals. The areas of waste disposal may also overlap with portions ofa 

landfill adjacent to the site. Oils containing semi-VOCs and PCBs are present 

in the waste disposal areas. During the 1970s, Rockwell built a wastewater 

treatment plant at the site and discharged treated wastes under a National Pollutant 

Elimination Discharge System permit. 

Approximately 8,150 people live within three miles of the site. The area is served 

by a public water supply system. Three municipal wells are located one-half mile 

up gradient of the site, and at least 15 private wells are known to be within a mile 

of the site. The groundwater discharges into the Kalamazoo River. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil, groundwater, lagoon sediment, Kalamazoo River: 

• VOCs 

• SVOCs 

• pesticides 

• PCBs 

• metals 

Landfill area: 

• VOCs 

• SVOCs 

• pesticides 

• PCBs 

• metals 

• oil containing SVOCs and PCBs 

m Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIRSSuper/npVmichigan/MID006028062.htm. 
222 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

STATE DISPOSAL LANDFILL, INC. 

Kent County, Michigan 

HRS Score: 42.24 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0118.01 

Total Population: 6,056 

Median Age: 36.5 

Children 9 and under: 868 

Persons 75 and older: 175 

Percent Minority: 3.98 

Percent Hispanic: 1.04 

Median Household Income in 1999: $66,458 
223 

Center for American Progress 1 Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionl28 

Added to the NPL on February 21,1990, this 37.6-acre fonner landfill is located 

in Plainfield Township in Kent County. It was a licensed waste disposal facility 

from 1966 to 1976. The landfill accepted residential, commercial and other 

wastes, and unconfirmed reports indicate that it may have also accepted liquid 

hazardous wastes. 

The area under study encompasses 800 acres of wooded, agricultural and 

residential properties. Affected residential wells were provided with alternative 

water supplies from 1985 to 1991 and some were connected to the municipal 

water supply. The landfill has been capped and fenced. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater and landfill area: 

• lead 

• copper 

• cyanide 

• chromium 

• VOCs (including tetrachloroethane, trichloroethane, 1,2-dichloroethane, 

dichloroethane, 1, l-dichloroethane, chloroethane. vinyl chloride, 1,1,1. 

trichloroethane, chloroflourocarbons as well as benzene, toluene and xylene 

compounds) 

128 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.govIRSSuper/npllmichiganlMID980609341.htm. 
224 

NEW JERSEY 

As of the 2000 Census, 28,155 New Jerseyans lived in the census tracts 

containing the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 3,392 were children aged nine 

and younger. An additional 1,977 were persons aged 75 and older. The median 

household income for 1999 in all five tracts was above that for the nation. 
225 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUNO NEGLECT 

CORNELL DUBILIER ELECTRONICS, INC. 

Middlesex County, New Jersey 

HRS Score: 50.27 

C __ 'Il'$Ilt~nIlStl*_NI'I..Sil& 

_~$'Il'$$ 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0010.02 

Total Population: 5,950 

Median Age: 36.2 

Children 9 and under: 818 

Persons 75 and older: 395 

Percent Minority: 35.61 

Percent Hispanic: 9.78 

Median Household Income in 1999: $65,942 
226 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionl29 

The Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc., site was added to the NPL on July 28, 1998. 

From 1936-1962, the company manufactured electronic parts and components at the 

site, during which time it allegedly dumped PCB-contaminated materials and other 

hazardous substances directly onto the soil. Now known as the Hamilton Industrial 

Park, the site is occupied by an estimated 15 commercial businesses. 

Approximately 540 people live within a quarter-mile of the site, and the nearest 

residential homes are less than 200 feet away. A total of about 8,700 people live 

within one mile of the site. An unnamed tributary to Bound Brook traverses the 

southeast comer of the property. Water bodies that join this tributary allow for the 

maintenance, migration and propagation of various plants and organisms. Fish 

collected from Bound Brook were found to contain PCBs at levels higher than the 

amount allowed by the FDA, so a fish-consumption advisory is in effect. 

A study conducted between 1988 and 1991 found significant groundwater 

contamination, consisting mainly oftrichloroethene and tetrachloroethene. Due to 

widespread contamination, all residential wells in the area were reportedly closed 

and residences were hooked up to another water main. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil: 

• VOCs 

• SVOCs 

• PCBs • inorganic constituents 

Groundwater: 

• ttichloroethene 

• tetrachloroethene 

SUrface water: 

• PCBs 

Building interiors: 

• elevated levels of PCBs and metals 

129 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NFL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfundlnpV0201112c.pdf. 
227 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

CPS/MADISON INDUSTRIES 

Middlesex County, New Jersey 

HRS Score: 69.73 

Demoaraphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0078.01 

Total Population: 3,032 

Median Age: 38.6 

Children 9 and under: 334 

Persons 75 and older: 176 

Percent Minority: 24.11 

Percent Hispanic: 7.12 

Median Household Income in 1999: $52,284 
228 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description130 

Added to the NPL on September 8,1983, this site contains two adjacent 

manufacturing facilities on a 35-acre tract ofland. CPS, which is no longer in 

operation, processed, treated and stored organic chemicals used in the production 

of water treatment agents, lubricants, oil field chemicals and anti-corrosive agents. 

The company generated spent halogenated solvents that were shipped off-site for 

disposal. Hazardous wastes were stored in tanks or containers. Madison Industries 

is still in operation and continues to handle hazardous materials at the site. Madison 

produces zinc compounds for fertilizers, pharmaceuticals and food additives. 

Since 1967, the two companies have repeatedly dumped and discharged chemicals 

into the public sewer system as well as onto their respective properties. To date, 

32 municipal wells have closed due to contamination. Approximately 1,000 

people live within a half mile of the site. Prickett's Brook and Pond have also 

been contaminated. These waters are not used for recreation or as water supplies, 

but children who play nearby may suffer adverse health effects if they come in 

contact with or ingest the water or sediments. The Perth Amboy well field is 

down gradient of the site and may be impacted further if the recovery well system 

is not properly monitored and maintained. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs 

• heavy metals including zinc, cadmium, copper, lead 

Sediments and surface water of Prickett s Pond: 

• zinc 

• VOCs 

130 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfundlnpV0200109c.pdf. 
229 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NE8LEeT 

UNIVERSAL OIL PRODUCTS (CHEMICAL DIVISION) 

Bergen County, New Jersey 

HRS Score: 54.63 

DemQgrnphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0120 

Total Population: 8,716 

Median Age: 37.9 

Children 9 and under: 938 

Persons 75 and older: 616 

Percent Minority: 20.32 

Percent Hispanic: 10.65 

Median Household Income in 1999: $50,163 
230 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionl3l 

The Universal Oil Products (Chemical Division) site was added to the NPL 

on September 8, 1983. Various chemicals were manufactured on this 75-acre 

site from 1932 to 1979, when Universal Oil Products ceased operations and 

dismantled the plant. From 1960 to 1979, the company also recovered solvents 

and waste chemicals. 

Approximately 4.5 million gallons of these wastes were dumped into unlined 

lagoons. This resulted in contamination of the soil, surface water and 

groundwater. Approximately 36,500 people within three miles of the site depend 

on groundwater as their drinking water source. The site is in a coastal wetland 

management area of the Hackensack River Basin. Ackerman's Creek, a tributary 

to Berry's Creek, flows through the site. These and other area surface waters are 

used by local residents for recreation. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• VOCs, including benzenes and TCE 

• vinyl chloride 

• toluene 

• PCBs 

• lead 

Sediments: 

• PCBs 

Soils: 

• VOCs 

• PCBs 

• PAHs 

• lead 

Surface water: 

• VOCs 

III Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available of 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfundlnpV020010 1 c.pdf. 
231 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

VENTRONNELSICOL 

Bergen County, New Jersey 

HRS Score: 51.38 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0600 

Total Population: 7,708 

Median Age: 40.3 

Children 9 and under: 948 

Persons 75 and older: 616 

Percent Minority: 9.08 

Percent Hispanic: 7.30 

Median Household Income in 1999: $60,859 
232 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site DescriptionU2 

Added to the NFL on September 21, 1984, this 40-acre site is a former chemical 

processing plant that operated from 1929 to 1974. Approximately 160 tons of 

process waste is believed to have been buried on-site. Ventron buildings were 

abandoned and demolished in 1974, and two new buildings now stand on the site 

where the old mercury processing plant stood. One is a food distribution center 

and the other is used for warehousing activities. 

The site is located in a densely populated industrialized area, but access is 

restricted. Contaminants still remain on the site and could potentially migrate 

by groundwater and air. Discharges from the facility have contaminated Berry's 

Creek and neighboring wetlands with mercury and other chemicals. Mercury 

levels in the sediment adjacent to the property are among the highest known in 

freshwater ecosystems nationwide. 

Exposure to site-related contaminants could occur by drinking or direct contact 

with the water or sediments in the creek. On-site workers may be exposed to 

contaminants located in the soils and sediments. Humans and wildlife could also 

be exposed to mercury via consumption of organisms in Berry's Creek. 

Contaminants Present 

Soil, sediments, groundwater: 

• mercury and other contaminants 

III Site description and contaminant infonnation obtaine9 from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02lsuperfundlnpl10200674c.pdf. 
233 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBlEeT 

VINELAND CHEMICAL CD., INC. 

Cumberland County, New Jersey 

HRS Score: 59.16 

DemoiUaphjc Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0409.01 

Total Population: 2,749 

Median Age: 37.1 

Children 9 and under: 354 

Persons 75 and older: 174 

Percent Minority: 33.14 

Percent Hispanic: 24.01 

Median Household Income in 1999: $44,962 

II 
234 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Descriptionl3l 

Added to the NFL on September 21, 1984, this 54-acre site served as a location 

for Vineland Chemical's production of arsenic-based herbicides from 1950-1994. 

The site is mostly covered with vegetation and included manufacturing and 

storage buildings, a laboratory, lagoons and former chicken coops. Prior to 1977, 

the company stored byproduct arsenic salts in open piles and in the chicken coops. 

As the result of water contacting the exposed piles, arsenic has contaminated the 

subsurface soils, groundwater and the nearby Maurice River and Union Lake. The 

lower Maurice River system extends 26 miles from the lake to the Delaware Bay. 

Approximately 57,000 people depend on the groundwater system in the area, either 

through private or municipal wells, for drinking water. Residential areas surround 

the site and numerous towns and villages are close to the Maurice River. 

A health screening study showed that some company employees had elevated 

concentrations of arsenic in their blood and urine. Accidental ingestion, direct 

contact or inhalation of the contaminants may subject workers or trespassers 

to carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic risks. Downstream residents who use 

well water also may be subject to health risks. In 1982, the company began 

operating a wastewater treatment system to remove arsenic, but the system cannot 

accommodate all the contaminated water leaving the site each day. 

Contaminants Present 

Groundwater: 

• inorganic and organic arsenic 

• metals 

Surface soil: 

• arsenic 

• small amounts of other metals 

Subsurface soil, Sediments and Surface Waters of Union Lake and Maurice 

River: 

• arsenic 

!l3 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfutidlnpll0200209c.pdf. 
235 

GEORGIA 

As of the 2000 Census, 30,498 Georgians lived in the census tracts containing 

the five profiled NPL sites. Of those, 4,229 were children aged nine and younger. 

An additional 1,864 were persons aged 75 and older. In all five census tracts, the 

median household income for 1999 was below that for the nation. 
236 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGlECT 

BRUNSWICK WOOD PRESERVING 

Glynn County. Georgia 

HRS Score: 54.49 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0004.01 

Total Population: 6,115 

Median Age: 35.7 

Children 9 and under: 921 

Persons 75 and older: 198 

Percent Minority: 12.02 

Percent Hispanic: 1.42 

Median Household Income in 1999: $39,612 
237 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Description134 

This 84-acre site in Brunswick, Georgia, was used to treat wood from 1958 

to 1991. The wood was treated using pentachlorophenol, creosote and CCA 

(chromium, copper, arsenic). These chemicals were stored in drums and 

eventually contaminated the soil. In February 1991, the company declared 

bankruptcy and the following month EPA responded to a fire at the facility. 

There are six municipal wells within a four-mile mdius of the site, which serve 

over 6,000 people. All the municipal wells and most, if not all, of the private 

wells dmw water from a deeper aquifer. Private wells in the area have been 

sampled extensively since 1991 but have n~ been impacted by the site. In 

addition, the site is adjacent to the tidally influenced Burnett Creek. 

Contaminants Present 

• PCP 

• creosote 

• CCA (chromium, copper, arsenic) 

134 Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available ar 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/nplJnplgalbrunwpgahtm. 
238 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

CAMilLA WOOD PRESERVING COMPANY 

Mitchell County. Georgia 

HRS Score: 50 

Pemogrnphic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 9804 

Total Population: 7,431 

Median Age: 34.2 

Children 9 and under: 910 

Persons 75 and older: 403 

Percent Minority: 53.29 

Percent Hispanic: 2.64 

Median Household Income in 1999: $30,625 
239 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptionll5 

Added to the NPL on July 28, 1998, this former wood preserving facility used 

creosote to treat railroad ties and poles from 1947 through the 1980s. In the 

1970s, pentachlorophenol (PCP) was introduced as a preservative for pole 

treatment and was the exclusive preservative for poles by the 1980s. The plant 

ceased manufacture of railroad ties in the late 1980s and stopped wood treating 

operations in 1991. 

That year, EPA conducted an emergency response action because soil and ground 

water were contaminated with wood preserving materials. EPA's actions included 

placement ofa fence along the perimeter of the facility. Sampling indicated that 

35,000 cubic yards of soils were contaminated. There were also vast quantities 

of wastewater containing PCP and creosote, which were shipped off-site to a 

Chemwaste facility in Texas. 

Contaminants Present 

Soils and groundwater: 

• wood preserving materials (PCP, creosote) 

• PAHs 

l3S Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4Iwaste/npVnpiga/camiiaga.htm. 
240 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

LCP CHEMICALS GEORGIA 

Glynn County, Georgia 

HRS Score: 60.14 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0007 

Total Population: 7,224 

Median Age: 33.8 

Children 9 and under: 1,198 

Persons 75 and older: 467 

Percent Minority: 63.10 

Percent Hispanic: 2.03 

Median Household Income in 1999: $23,801 
241 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Site Description136 

Added to the NPL on June 17, 1996, this 550-acre site is the top priority site in 

Georgia. Over the last 70 years, an oil refinery, paint manufacturing company, 

power plant and chlor-alkali plant have all operated at the site, the majority of 

which is a tidal marsh. Since 1919, the site has been occupied by at least five 

major companies: ARCO, Georgia Power Company, Dixie Paints and Varnish 

Company (currently O'Brien Company), Allied Chemicals, Inc., (currently Allied 

Signal) and the Hanlin Group subsidiary, LCP Chemicals-Georgia, Inc. 

Plant soil, groundwater and marsh biota are substantially contaminated with 

mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), metals and semi-volatile compounds. 

EPA estimates that more than 380,000 pounds of mercury was "lost" in the area 

between 1955 and 1979. Mercury and PCBs have been detected in aquatic life at 

levels sufficient to produce a ban on commercial fishing in the area. There is also 

a seafood consumption advisory for part of nearby Turtle River and all of Purvis 

Creek. Upon the plant closing in 1994, Georgia asked EPA to take immediate action 

at the site to address chlorine gas releases and the flow of contamination into an 

adjacent saltwater tidal marsh, which provides habitat for endangered species. To 

date, EPA has recovered over 400,000 pounds of mercury. Approximately 13 acres 

of marsh and marsh channels adjacent to the site have been excavated. 

Contaminants Present 

Plant site soils, groundwater, and marsh biota: 

• mercury 

• PCBs • semi-volatile contamination 

il6 Site description and contaminant information obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npVnplga!1cpincga.htm. 
242 

TKE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

TERRY CREEK DREDGE SPOIL AREAS/HERCULES OUTFALL 

Glynn County, Georgia 

HRS Score: 50.18 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0005.01 

Total Population: 3,928 

Median Age: 42.9 

Children 9 and under: 479 

Persons 75 and older: 573 

Percent Minority: 50.53 

Percent Hispanic: 1.25 

Median Household Income in 1999: $27,768 
243 

Center' for American Progress I Center for Progressive RefoIm 

Site Description137 

Proposed to the NPL on April 1, 1997, the Terry Creek Dredge Spoil Areas/ 

Hercules Outfall site has not been finalized on the NPL. This site was an outfall 

area for a former pesticide manufacturer in Brunswick, Georgia. Toxaphene, 

a chlorinated pesticide, was produced at the Hercules plant between 1948 and 

1980. During that period, toxaphene was discharged through an outfall ditch into 

Dupree Creek, which flows into Terry Creek. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers periodically dredged portions of Dupree Creek 

and Terry Creek. Dredge material was placed in several areas near the confluence 

of the two creeks, as well as other nearby locations. The dredged material 

contained highly contaminated sediments. Seafood monitoring has demonstrated 

a significant reduction in total toxaphene concentrations since a 2001 cleanup 

action. However, fish consumption advisories still exist in parts of both creeks. 

Contaminants Present 

Outfall ditch sediments, creek sediments and dredge disposal areas: • toxaphene 

137 Site description and contaminant infoImation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npl!nplgaltercrkpr.htm. 
244 

THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEBLEtT 

WOOLFOLK CHEMICAL WORKS, INC. 

Peach County, Georgia 

HRS Score: 42.24 

Demographic Profile 

Census Tract No.: 0404 

Total Population: 5,800 

Median Age: 23.9 

Children 9 and under: 721 

Persons 75 and older: 223 

Percent Minority: 95.29 

Percent Hispanic: 0.71 

Median Household Income in 1999: $21,094 
245 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Site Descriptiont38 

Woolfolk Chemical Works, Inc. was added to the NPL on August 30, 1990. 

Contamination on this 31-acre site resulted from the production, formulation and 

packaging of pesticides, herbicides and insecticides, which took place on the site 

since 1910. In the early 1980s, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division 

investigated the site based on citizen complaints and found that the company was 

discharging waste products to a drainage corridor heading away from the site. The 

property was later transferred to another company, and a cleanup action, which had 

been agreed to as part of the transfer, revealed more extensive contamination. 

There are 48 contaminants of potential concern at the site and the majority of 

the risk stems from arsenic contamination. In 1990, contamination was found to 

have spread to surrounding residential properties. Contamination was eventually 

removed from 26 residential properties, including 22,900 tons of soil and debris. 

A PRP associated with the site also purchased about 17 properties and converted 

them to commercial use. However, EPA reports continuing problems with PRP 

compliance with orders pertaining to cleanup of one of the site's operable units. 

Contaminants Present 

• 48 contaminants, primarily arsenic 

IlS Site description and contaminant infonnation obtained from NPL site fact sheet, available at 

http://www.epa.gov/region4/waste/npVnplgaiwolfokga.htm. 

247 
248 

Center for Am~rican Progress i Center for Progressive Reform 
1)J!)1·5,OOO 3.337 400 182 $4S,125 I 1.8 0.72 

512 585 I S43.1J31J I 1,63 0.61 

72& 338 1.91 0.53 

14.S 

MlchlQnD Barreis, Inc, (Ingham Oct 4, 1989 repainting; waste residues vvere 1,467 318 $28,631 41.58 2A,BJ Cuunty) 

on 632 334 530.264 

573 160 i37,o63 5.61 
250 

for American Progress : for Pr():~re.ssive Refonn 
Apr. 1.001·5,000 5,115 921 198 $39,612 12.02 

wood preserving facility; 

used creosote to treat railroad 

JuL 28,1998 50 ties and poles from 1,001·5,000 7,431 910 403 $30,525 53.29 

County) 1980s; in ' 

LCP Chemicals Georgia 1995 60.14 1,001·5,000 ),224 1,198 467 $23,801 63.1 

lGlynn Countyl 

eok Dredge Spoil 

50.18 1,001·5.000 3,928 573 $27,168 50.53 

31-acre site contaminated as 

Woolfolk Chemic,,1 

Works, Inc, (Peach Aug. 30,1990 5,001-10,000 5,800 721 223 $21,094 95.29 

County) 

insecticides. 

all those who classified themselves as "Spanish/HispBnicfLatino'" for Census 2000. These pf:Jop!e mayor may not have been also classified minorities. $Qe the 

B for more. 
252 

APPENDIX B - METHODOLOGY 

Site Selection 

The top 10 most populous states are host to a total of 796 National Priorities List 

(NPL) sites:1J9 

1. 631 are ''final'' NPL sites but are still awaiting cleanup. Many were first 

placed on the NPL as long as two decades ago. 

2. 28 are "proposed" NPL sites, meaning that EPA is still considering public 

comment on whether they should be placed on the NPL in final status. 

3. 137 have been deleted from the NPL. 

Because sites have typically been listed for long periods of time, and are often 

very large complicated properties with multiple sources that contributed hundreds 

of contaminants, it is impossible to detail their tortured histories in anything less 

than thousands of pages. For readers interested in investigating their status in 

more depth, we recommend the following Internet accessible resources: 

1. the NPL site fact sheets maintained by the EPA regional offices, available 

online by selecting the state and then site of interest at www.epa.gov/ 

superfundlsites/npl/npl.htm; and 

2. EPA's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 

Liability Information System (CERCLIS) at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ 

supercpadlcursiteslsrchsites.cfm. 

More detailed information, including site-specific information about responsible 

parties, cleanup actions and funding, is available by ordering the desired 

information in CD format (without cost) from EPA. Visit www.epa.gov/ 

superfundlsiteslphonefaxlproducts.htm to learn more and place orders. 

The criteria we used were designed to capture the risks posed by NPL sites to 

people who live nearby or to the environment. The steps described below were 

repeated for each of the 10 states in order to select the five profiled NPL sites in 

each state. 

139 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, National Priorities Lisl Sites in the United Slates, http://www. 

epa.gov!superfundisiteslnpVnpl.htm (last visited Feb. 14,2006). By clicking on individual states, 

visitors to the site may obtain basic infonnation on each NPL site in the state, as well as links to 

NPL Site Narratives and current Site Descriptions. 
253 

THE TOll OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT 

Site Status 

From each state's complete list ofNPL sites, we eliminated from consideration 

those sites that have already been deleted or partially deleted from the NPL, along 

with sites designated "construction complete." Therefore, all of the 50 profiled sites 

are in the status where construction, for one reason or another, is not complete.'4() 

In accordance with the report's focus on appropriations to EPA, we eliminated 

federal facilities from consideration, since, as explained above, they are funded 

through mechanisms specific to the agencies responsible for those sites. Because 

the report focuses on the implications of Superfund's deterioration since 1995, 

when taxes expired, we imposed one further screen: eliminating sites that were 

added to the NPL only recently, with one important caveat. Where sites that had 

been added to the NPL presented a significantly higher risk than older sites, as 

measured by the Hazard Ranking System scores for that site, we included them 

in our study.'41 Additionally, some of the sites with high HRS scores that had 

been proposed to - but not yet finalized on - the NPL were selected due to the 

relatively higher risks posed by such sites to the surrounding communities.142 We 

ask readers to keep in mind that the threats posed by sites that we excluded are 

not necessarily resolved, and it may take many years of follow-up monitoring and 

remedial repair until these threats are eliminated. 

140 Construction complete status last verified April 13, 2006. 

141 The HRS is a comp1elt, multi-factor formula that EPA uses to decide which sites are placed 

on the NPL. See Board o/Regents o/the Univ. o/Washington v. EPA, 86 F.3d 1214, 1217 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). The HRS methodology is set forth as Appendilt A to the National Contingency Plan, 

40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. A, and was revised in 1990. See Hazard Ranking System. Final Rule, 

55 Fed. Reg. 51532 (Dec. 14, 1990). The mathematical model serves as a screening device for 

evaluating relative risks to health or the environment posed by releases of hazardous substances. 

See supra note IS, and accompanying ten; see also, e.g.,RSR Corp. v. EPA, 102 F.3d 1266, 1268 

(D.C. Cit. 1997). HRS site scores range from 0 to 100. 40 C.F.R Pt. 300, App. A, § 2.1.1. EPA 

proposes sites receiving a score of 28.5 or higher to the NPL. See Tet TIn Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 

1321,1322 (D.C. Cit. 1991). The majority ofHRS scores for the sites profiled in this report were 

obtained from Scorecard.org, available at http://www.scorecard.orglenv-releasesllandlrank-sites. 

tcl. For sites recently proposed to the NPL, HRS scores were obtained from the HRS Documentation Records themselves, available through EPA's electronic docket system, now incorporated into 

the government-wide Regulations.gov. 

142 "Because cleanup activity is often at an early stage at proposed sites, there generally is considerable work still to be done." Probst, et al., SUPERFUNO'S FuwRE, supra note 9, at 37. 
254 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Reform 

Ordering Individual Sites by HRS Score 

Once we had identified sites where construction was not complete, we ranked 

them in descending order according to their HRS scores, which provide a measure 

of the site's pre-cleanup risk to human health and the environment. 

Identifying the Greatest Risks 

These steps yielded non-federal proposed or final NPL sites that had not yet been 

designated construction complete, have relatively high HRS scores and have, in 

most cases, been on the NPL for a number of years. From this pool, the challenge 

was to identify the sites that pose the greatest risk. Two factors entered into 

this decision: the number of people living near the site and progress on cleanup. 

The former was an objective piece of readily available information - EPA's 

CERCLIS database provides ranges for the population living within one mile 

of any NPL site.143 The latter - progress on cleanup - was a different matter 

entirely. In a recent report commissioned by EPA to analyze ways of improving 

performance measures for the Superfund program ("Success for Superfund: A 

New Approach for Keeping Score"),l44 Resources for the Future concluded that 

although EPA provides a great amount of information concerning specific NPL 

sites in its various databases, "The lack of overall standardization in format, of 

consistency in the information available, and of regular updates makes it very 

difficult to get a complete picture of individual sites on the NPL or to compare 

progress or attributes among sites."145 

Initially, we used performance measures provided as part of Superfund's 

Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) reporting, principally for 

EPA's assessment of "current human exposure under control" and "contaminated 

water migration under control."l46 The final selection of sites was based on a 

qualitative balancing of the status of the sites as measured by these indicators, 

the population density surrounding the site and the descriptions of site conditions 

provided in the NPL site fact sheets, which are prepared and maintained by the 

relevant EPA regional offices. As Resources for the Future noted in its "Success 

for Superfund" report, however, although the NPL site fact sheets seem to be the 

'4' Information for specific sites can be accessed through CERCLIS online, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpadlcursitesisrchsites.cfm. 

'44 Probst & Sherman, supra note 17, at 4. 

,., ld. at 7-8. 

,% ld. at 3, note 10 (noting that the current human exposure under control and contaminated 

groundwater migration under control had originally been developed for the RCRA program, which 

regulates the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes). Information on the status 

of specific sites as measured by these two indicators can be accessed through CERCLIS online, 

available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpadlcursites/srchsites.cfm. 
255 

THE TOLl OF SUPERFUND NEBlEtT 

most complete source of information for NPL sites, ''there is little standardization 

among the formats used or the information provided."147 Information provided in 

this report concerning the profiled NPL sites is drawn from each site's fact sheet. 

Taken together, these selection criteria resulted in an informed selection offive 

of the non-federal proposed or final NPL sites in each state that pose the greatest 

continuing risk to surrounding populations. Detailed descriptions of the sites 

appear in the state-specific sections of this report, many of which reveal past 

waste disposal practices and pre-cleanup conditions not dissimilar from that most 

infamous of Superfund sites, Love Canal. 

Demographic Analysis 

Locating NPL Sites 

Next, to obtain a picture of those populations that the 50 profiled sites potentially 

affect, coordinates for each site were obtained from EPA's CERCLIS database. l48 

Using geographic information systems (GIS) software and boundary files from the 

2000 Census, the census tract containing each site was identified. 149 

Census tracts are subdivisions of counties that generally have between 1,500 

and 8,000 people, with an optimum size of 4,000 people each. ISO Population 

density affects the geographic area of census tracts!S! - that is, there will be 

more (geographically smaller) census tracts in densely populated areas and less 

(geographically larger) census tracts in sparsely populated areas. Because we 

chose our 50 sites in part on the basis of the number of people they affect, more are 

located in relatively small, densely populated census tracts than might otherwise be 

true of Superfund as a whole. These people also live in closer geographic proximity 

to the sites than people living in larger, more sparsely populated tracts. 

147 See Probst & Sherman, supra note 17. at 7. As RFF further noted, site fact sheets vary in how 

recently they have been updated, as does the schedule for updating the information among EPA 

regional offices. Id. NPL site fact sheets for specific sites can be obtained by accessing http://www. 

epa.gov/superfundlsiteslnpJlnpl.htm, then navigating to the state and site of interest and clicking on 

the site name hyperlink. 

148 Precise latitude and longitude coordinates for NPL sites were obtained from the December 

2005 version of EPA's List 9 - Active CERCLIS Sites, which contains information concerning active 

CERCLIS sites, including, for NPL sites, latitude and longitude data. List 9 and other Superfund 

products may be obtained in CD format without cost by submitting orders online, at http://www.epa. 

gov/superfundlsiteslphonefax/products.htm. The ability to provide an accurate demographic analysis 

was limited by the fact that the coordinates given by EPA yield a single point for a site location. In 

reality, sites consist of polygons containing, in some cases, hundreds of acres ofland. 

149 Cartographic boundary files available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/coblbdy_files.html. 

1'0 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Census Tracts: Cartographic Boundary Files and Metadata, 

available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/tr_metadata.html (last visited May 3, 2006). 

151 Id. (explaining that "[t]he spatial size of census tracts varies widely depending on the density 

of settlement. "). 
256 

Center for American Progress I Center for Progressive Refonn 

Census Tract Maps 

This phenomenon can be seen by comparing census tract maps within each state. 

Within each state, all five maps are drawn at the same scale. Accordingly, where 

one map shows the outlines of many census tracts, while another (drawn at the 

same scale) shows the outlines of fewer tracts, the former (with many census 

tracts) is the more heavily populated area. 

2000 Census Data 

Finally, demographic data from the 2000 Census were obtained for each census 

tract from the U.S. Census Bureau's American FactFinder, a user-friendly 

Internet accessible database. U2 Current demographic conditions in the census 

tracts may differ from the data collected for Census 2000. To address the fact 

that demographic shifts do occur between decennial censuses, the United States 

Census Bureau collects and produces demographic data on a yearly basis in 

its American Community Survey, based on an annual survey of three million 

households. Is3 Although the Census Bureau plans to increase the local coverage 

of its American Community Survey data over the next several years, currently 

the only tabulation of data on the tract level are those collected during the last 

decennial census (Census 2000). Detailed information on the people that live in 

the census tracts containing the 50 profiled NPL sites is presented in the statespecific sections of this report. Two final pieces of demographic information are 

included for each of our 50 sites: the percentage of "minority" and "Hispanic" 

populations. For Census 2000, the Census Bureau asked every individual living 

in the United States both: I) whether they classify themselves as "Spanish! 

Hispanic/Latino"; and 2) what race they considered themselves to be, because 

''the federal government considers race and Hispanic origin to be two separate and 

1>2 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FACTFlNDER, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/ 

homeisafElmain.htrnl? Jang=en. Data for specific census tracts may be obtained by accessing http:// 

factfinder.census.gov/servletl AdvGeoSearcbByListServlet? Jang=en& _ command=getPlacenames 

and choosing the appropriate year, and geography, then selecting the state, county and tract of 

interest. The following categories of infonnation are provided for each census tract: Total Population, Median Age, Children 9 and under, Persons 75 and older, Percent Minority, Percent Hispanic, 

and Median Household Income in 1999. For each tract, Median Household Income was obtained 

from Table DP-3, Profile of Selected Economic Characteristics: 2000 (from Summary File 3 (SF-3) 

Sample Data), while all the other figures were obtained from (and, for percentages or aggregations of 

age groups, calculated from data provided in) Table DP-l, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000 (from Summary File 1 (SF-I) 100-Percent Data), 

m UNllED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, American Community Survey, available at http://factfinder. 

census.gov/jsp/safIlSAFFlnfo.jsp? Jlageld=sp 1_ acs& _ submenuId= (last visited May 2, 2006). 
257 

distinct concepts."I54 The "minority" classification in this report includes all those 

residents who classified their race as anything other than "one race, white." The 

"Hispanic" classification in this report includes all those residents who classified 

themselves as "Spanish/Hispanic/Latino." Because the classifications measure 

two different attributes, there may be overlap between the two categories. For 

example, an individual could have classified herself as "American Indian" and 

"Spanish/Hispanic/Latino." Thus, the classifications are not mutually exclusive 

but measure two separate and distinct concepts, as defined by Census 2000. 155 

Readers will note that several sites are located in areas that are heavily populated 

by Americans that identified themselves as a race other than white and/or as 

Spanish/Hispanic/Latino. Scholars and other commentators have long debated 

whether Superfund and other hazardous waste programs address problems that 

disproportionately affect people of color, and those concerns are validated by 

aspects of this report on an individual site basis. However, our sample size 

and the focus of our analysis are not sufficiently refined to support any further 

speculation as to whether Superfund sites as a whole affect such populations in a 

discriminatory manner. 

t54 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Census 2000 Brief: Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin 

I (March 200 I), available at http://www.census.gov/prodl200 I pubs/c2kbrO I-I.pdf (last visited 

May 2, 2006). 

m Census 2000, in tum, adhered to "the federal standards for collecting and presenting data on 

race and Hispanic origin as established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in OctoberI997." Id.at2. 
258 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 

Rena Steinzor is the Jacob A. France Research Professor at the University of 

Maryland School of Law and a board member of the Center for Progressive 

Reform. From 1983-88, she served as staff counsel for the Subcommittee 

on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the Energy and Commerce 

Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (James J. Florio, Chairman). She was 

the primary staff person responsible for legislation that became the "Superfund 

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986" (Public Law 99-499). While in 

private practice at the Washington, D.C., law firm Spiegel & McDiarmid between 

1988 and 1994, she represented local governments involved in Superfund cases 

both before EPA and on Capitol Hill. Professor Steinzor served as senior staff 

to the only municipal representative on the National Superfund Commission. 

Margaret Clune, J.D., M.C.P., is a policy analyst with the Center for Progressive 

Reform. The authors thank Corianne Iacovelli and Amy Roth for their excellent 

research assistance. 

The Center for American Progress commissioned this report. Reece Rushing, 

associate director for regulatory policy at the Center for American Progress, 

served as project manager and editor for this report. 
259 

Center for American Progress .--. b .1 

AaoIlT lHE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PR08RESS 

The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and ed)iC$lional 

institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures 

opportunity for all. We relieve that Americans are bound togeth~r" awnunon 

commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our ~ational policies· 

reflect these values. We work to find progressive and pragmatic sollltiORS.to 

significant domestic and international problems and develop polifY ~sals that 

foster a government that is "of the people, by the people, and for thepe<>ple." 

PRO.R 

CPR!!~! ••• IY •••• OR. 

AaollT lHE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REOFRM 

The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) is a nonprofit research8l}d educational 

organization dedicated to protecting health, safety and the environment through 

analysis and commentary. CPR believes sensible safeguards in these areas serve 

important shared values, including doing the rest we can to prevent harm to 

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and protecting the earth for future generations. Visit CPR on the web at www. 

progressiverform.org. 
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