[Cite as Cleveland v. Adams, 2012-Ohio-1063.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97523 

CITY OF CLEVELAND 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

CLARENCE ADAMS

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case No. 2011 CRB 032040 

BEFORE: Jones, P.J., Cooney, J., and S. Gallagher, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 15, 2012 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Paul Mancino, Jr. 

75 Public Square 

Suite 1016 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Barbara A. Langhenry 

Interim Law Director 

BY: Victor R. Perez 

Chief City Prosecutor 

Jaclyn R. Shultz 

Assistant City Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Clarence Adams, appeals the October 4, 2011 judgment 

entry rendered by the Cleveland Municipal Court. We reverse and remand. 

 I. Procedural History and Facts 

{¶2} In September 2011, a complaint was filed in the municipal court charging 

Adams with one count each of endangering children, domestic violence, criminal 

damaging, and two counts of assault. 

{¶3} Adams pled no contest to one count of assault and domestic violence, both 

misdemeanors of the first degree. He was sentenced to the maximum term of six 

months for each count, to be served consecutively. Adams was also fined $1,000 for 

each count and ordered to have no contact with any of the victims. Adams now raises 

several assignments of error relative to his plea and sentence. The first assignment of 

error, which is dispositive, provides: 

I. Defendant was denied due process of law when the court failed to 

explain the effect of a no-contest plea. 

 II. Law and Analysis 

{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Adams contends that his plea was 

unconstitutionally entered and must be vacated because the trial court failed to inform 

him of the effect of a no contest plea. We agree. 

{¶5} A trial court’s obligations in accepting a plea depends on the level of the 

offense to which the defendant is pleading. N. Royalton v. Semenchuk, 8th Dist. No. 
95357, 2010-Ohio-6197, ¶ 7, citing State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12, 2003-Ohio-2419, 

788 N.E.2d 635, ¶ 25. 

{¶6} Crim.R. 2(D) defines a “petty offense” as “a misdemeanor other than a 

serious offense.” Crim.R. 2(C) defines a “serious offense” as “any felony, and any 

misdemeanor for which the penalty prescribed by law includes confinement for more than 

six months.” Adams pled no contest to one count of assault and domestic violence, both 

misdemeanors of the first degree, punishable by maximum sentences of six months. 

R.C. 2929.24(A)(1). Thus, the crimes constituted petty offenses. 

{¶7} Under Crim.R. 11(E), “[i]n misdemeanor cases involving petty offenses the 

court * * * shall not accept [a plea] without first informing the defendant of the effect 

of the plea of guilty, no contest, [or] not guilty.” Crim.R. 11(B)(2) provides that a “plea of 

no contest is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the 

facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall 

not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” 

 

{¶8} A review of the transcript from the plea hearing reveals that the trial court did 

not advise Adams of the effect of the no contest pleas. The city contends that all that 

was required was substantial compliance, and the trial court met that obligation. We 

disagree. The trial court failed to comply, either strictly or substantially, with the 

requirement that Adams be informed that his plea was not an admission of his guilt, but 

an admission of the truth of the facts as alleged in the complaint. Further, Adams was 

not informed, either literally or substantially, that the plea would not be used against him. 

 

{¶9} We are also not persuaded by the city’s contention that Adams failed to 

demonstrate that he was prejudiced. This court has previously held that when a trial 
court completely fails to comply with a rule in accepting a plea, a demonstration of 

prejudice is unnecessary. Semenchuk, 2010-Ohio-6197, at ¶ 13-14, citing State v. Clark, 

119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462. 

{¶10} In light of the above, the trial court violated Adams’s due process rights by 

accepting his no contest plea without informing him of the effect of the plea. The first 

assignment of error is therefore sustained. Because our resolution on the first 

assignment of error is dispositive, the remaining assignments of error are moot, and we do 

not address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(C). 

{¶11} Judgment reversed; case remanded. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cleveland 

Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., and 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR