CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ANNUAL REPORT 

2010 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

OCTOBER 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

2010 ANNUAL REPORT 

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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ANNUAL REPORT 

2010 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

OCTOBER 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Senate House 

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

GEORGE LeMIEUX, Florida 

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Department of State, To Be Appointed 

Department of Labor, To Be Appointed 

Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed 

At-Large, To Be Appointed 

At-Large, To Be Appointed 

CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, Staff Director 

DOUGLAS GROB, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member 

(II) 

(III) 

CO N T E N T S 

Page 

Preface ...................................................................................................................... 1

General Overview .................................................................................................... 2 

I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................. 11 

Findings and Recommendations ...................................................................... 11 

Political Prisoner Database ............................................................................. 53 

II. Human Rights ..................................................................................................... 57 

Freedom of Expression ..................................................................................... 57 

Worker Rights ................................................................................................... 71 

Criminal Justice ............................................................................................... 86 

Freedom of Religion .......................................................................................... 99 

Ethnic Minority Rights .................................................................................... 113 

Population Planning ......................................................................................... 116 

Freedom of Residence and Movement ............................................................ 123 

Status of Women .............................................................................................. 129 

Human Trafficking ........................................................................................... 135 

North Korean Refugees in China .................................................................... 140 

Public Health .................................................................................................... 144 

Climate Change and the Environment ........................................................... 150 

III. Development of the Rule of Law ...................................................................... 160 

Civil Society ...................................................................................................... 160 

Institutions of Democratic Governance .......................................................... 166 

Commercial Rule of Law .................................................................................. 178 

Access to Justice ............................................................................................... 190 

IV. Xinjiang .............................................................................................................. 200 

V. Tibet ..................................................................................................................... 215 

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau ........................................................ 231 

VII. Endnotes ........................................................................................................... 239 

(1) 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

2010 ANNUAL REPORT 

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, established by 

the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 as China prepared to enter the 

World Trade Organization, is mandated by law to monitor human 

rights, including worker rights, and the development of the rule of 

law in China. The Commission by mandate also maintains a database of information on political prisoners in China—individuals 

who have been imprisoned by the Chinese government for exercising 

their civil and political rights under China’s Constitution and laws 

or under China’s international human rights obligations. All of the 

Commission’s reporting and its Political Prisoner Database are 

available to the public online via the Commission’s Web site, 

www.cecc.gov. 

Preface 

The findings of this Annual Report make clear that human rights 

conditions in China over the last year have deteriorated. This has 

occurred against the backdrop of China’s accession to the World 

Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the Chinese government’s 

years of preparation for accession, which provided the impetus for 

many changes to Chinese law. Those changes, some of which have 

been significant, have yet to produce legal institutions in China 

that are consistently and reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. This has had far-reaching implications for the protection 

of human rights and the development of the rule of law in China. 

The Chinese people have achieved success on many fronts, for example in health, education, and in improved living standards for 

large segments of the population, and they are justifiably proud of 

their many successes. But the Chinese government now must lead 

in protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights, including 

the rights of workers, and in defending the integrity of China’s 

legal institutions with no less skill and commitment than it displayed in implementing economic reforms that allowed the industriousness of the Chinese people to lift millions out of poverty. 

Most importantly, the Chinese government must free its political 

prisoners, who include some of the country’s most capable and socially committed citizens—scholar and writer Liu Xiaobo, HIV/ 

AIDS advocate Hu Jia, prominent attorney Gao Zhisheng, journalist Gheyret Niyaz, Tibetan environmentalist Karma Samdrub, 

and many others named in this Annual Report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. By engaging rather than repressing human rights advocates, the Chinese government would 

unleash constructive forces in Chinese society that are poised to 

address the very social problems with which the government and 

Party now find themselves overburdened: corruption, poor working 

2 

conditions, occupational safety and health, environmental degradation, and police abuse among them. 

Stability in China is in the national interest of the United States. 

The Chinese government’s full and firm commitment to openness, 

transparency, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights, 

including worker rights, marks a stability-preserving path forward 

for China. Anything less than the government’s full and firm commitment to protect and enforce these rights undermines stability in 

China. 

Overview 

Over the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, across the areas the 

Commission monitors, the following general themes emerged: 

1. New trends in political imprisonment include an increasingly harsh crackdown on lawyers and those who have a track 

record of human rights advocacy, particularly those who make use 

of the Internet and those from areas of the country the government 

deems to be politically sensitive (e.g., Tibetan areas and Xinjiang). 

2. Nexus between human rights and commercial rule of 

law, has become more evident particularly in connection with laws 

on state secrets, the Internet, and worker rights. 

3. Communist Party’s intolerance of independent sources 

of influence extends broadly across Chinese civil society, including with respect to organized labor. 

4. Chinese government’s new rhetoric on compliance with 

international human rights norms creates new challenges for 

U.S.-China dialogue and exchange. 

5. Global economic conditions have prompted the Chinese 

government to expand state economic and social control in 

a manner that impedes the development of the rule of law. 

6. Misapplication of law as a means of control has become 

more evident as the Communist Party has expanded and strengthened the capacity of law and regulation to serve as a means for the 

Party to control an increasing number of facets of daily life. 

7. Prospects for human rights and the rule of law in 

China depend on decisions taken at the highest levels of the Communist Party. 

New Trends in Political Imprisonment 

The Chinese government appears to be engaged in an increasingly harsh crackdown on lawyers and human rights defenders. 

The tightening of control over criminal lawyers, human rights lawyers, and the legal profession more generally has led some of China’s leading legal experts to state that the rule of law is in ‘‘full 

retreat’’ in China. Over the last two years, several lawyers involved 

in human rights advocacy work—including in legal cases involving 

house church members, public health advocates, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and others deemed by the government to 

threaten ‘‘social stability’’—have been harassed and abused by the 

government based on who their clients are and the causes those clients represent. 

The Internet appears to have given rise to a new category of 

political prisoners in China. Many citizens who criticize the governVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
3 

ment on blogs and comment boards face no severe repercussions— 

at most their comments may be deleted. But individuals who have 

a track record of human rights advocacy, political activism, grassroots organizing, or opposition to the Communist Party, and some 

from areas of the country the government deems to be politically 

sensitive (e.g., Tibetan areas and Xinjiang), have been targeted systematically. Among the most common charges against these citizens are the crimes of ‘‘subverting state power’’ or ‘‘splittism,’’ 

which carry a sentence of up to life imprisonment, and inciting subversion or ‘‘splittism,’’ which carry a sentence of up to 15 years. Individuals, including lawyers, writers, scholars, and businesspeople, 

have been imprisoned on these charges for posting online essays 

critical of the government, for exposing corruption or environmental problems, or for trying to organize political opposition online, without advocating violence. 

In the past year, government officials moved more aggressively 

to diminish or end the public influence of Tibetan civic and intellectual leaders, writers, and artists. Officials imprisoned such Tibetans in past years, but the frequency of using courts and the 

misapplication of criminal charges to remove such figures from society has increased. As of early September 2010, the Commission’s 

Political Prisoner Database had recorded more than 840 cases of 

political detention of Tibetans on or after March 10, 2008, when Tibetan protests began in Lhasa and then swept across the Tibetan 

plateau. The true number of political detentions during the period 

is certain to be far higher. 

In the year since the government suppression of a demonstration 

by Uyghurs and multi-ethnic riots in Xinjiang starting July 5, 

2009, human rights conditions in this far western region of China 

have worsened, and cases of political imprisonment remain of critical concern. At the same time that authorities have punished people 

for violent crimes committed in July 2009, they also have continued 

to conflate the right to demonstrate peacefully or to express criticism over government policy with criminal activity. In the past 

year, authorities imprisoned Uyghur Webmasters and a Uyghur 

journalist in connection with articles critical of conditions in 

Xinjiang and in connection with Internet postings calling for the 

July 2009 demonstrations. In the aftermath of the July 2009 

events, authorities also carried out broad security sweeps resulting 

in mass detentions of Uyghur men and boys, some of whom appear 

to have had no connection to events in July 2009. The whereabouts 

of many people detained since July 2009 remain unknown. 

Nexus Between Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law 

Developments over the past year have shown how business disputes and commercial issues can have real human rights implications when the Communist Party perceives its interests to be 

threatened. Under Chinese law, information relating to ‘‘national 

economic development’’ may be deemed a ‘‘state secret.’’ Furthermore, officials sometimes deem information a state secret ex post 

facto, that is, after an alleged ‘‘crime’’ of unauthorized disclosure, 

trafficking, or possession of a ‘‘state secret’’ has occurred. Many 

Chinese companies dealing with foreign businesses are state-owned 

enterprises (SOEs) with close links to the government, heightening 

4 

the possibility that such SOEs will press the government to classify 

commercial information as a state secret or that the government 

will use the charge of violating laws on state secrets to advantage 

Chinese commercial interests. 

The crime of supplying a state secret to a foreign ‘‘organization’’ 

(a category that includes corporations) is punishable by up to life 

in prison. While it remains unclear whether this risk to foreign 

businesses has increased, high-profile cases in the last year illustrate that the risk remains real. Among such cases is that of Xue 

Feng, a geologist and U.S. citizen who helped his employer, an 

American firm, purchase commercially available information on oil 

wells and prospecting sites in China. The information was classified as a state secret after the purchase took place. A Chinese court 

then sentenced the geologist to eight years in prison. The case 

shows that the risk of being charged with violating laws on state 

secrets complicates the normal, legitimate gathering of commercial 

information. The imposition of such a risk whenever state ownership of industry is involved is contrary to standard international 

business practice and undermines the rule of law. 

The controversy between the Chinese government and Google, 

Inc., over the last year highlighted the potential for Chinese censorship practices to interfere with the free flow of information 

among Chinese citizens and businesses, and between people and 

organizations in China and the rest of the world. The government 

appeared to single out Google in June 2009 during an anti-pornography campaign, saying Google was not doing enough to filter 

banned content (much of which is politically sensitive, not ‘‘pornographic’’). In January 2010, Google announced that it had ‘‘detected 

a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China’’ that it said had ‘‘resulted in the 

theft of intellectual property from Google.’’ Google also said it had 

‘‘evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.’’ 

Google said that ‘‘[t]hese attacks and the surveillance they have 

uncovered—combined with attempts over the past year to further 

limit free speech on the web’’ led the company ‘‘to conclude that we 

should review the feasibility of our business operations in China.’’ 

The Google controversy underscored what some business leaders 

have noted as the Chinese government’s long-growing impatience 

with private companies that it perceives to have grown too large 

or become too successful, or whose branding attracts too much loyalty outside of government-approved parameters. 

The nexus between human rights and commercial rule of law 

also has been evident in the area of worker rights. High-profile 

worker actions during this reporting year included strikes calling 

for better wages and formal channels to submit grievances. In a 

number of strikes at prominent foreign manufacturing facilities in 

China, workers called for existing All-China Federation of Trade 

Unions (ACFTU)-affiliated unions to behave more independently 

within the confines of Chinese law. Striking workers’ demands for 

higher wages revealed that they may have been emboldened not 

only by protections for workers codified in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but also by a tighter labor market. However, they 

stopped short of calling for the formation of independent trade 

5 

unions. The limited demands of workers reflected in part the political constraints imposed on the labor movement in China. Workers 

in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, full 

worker rights in accordance with international standards, including 

the right to organize into independent unions. The ACFTU, the official union under the direction of the Party, is the only legal trade 

union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU and must align with its overarching political 

concerns of maintaining ‘‘social stability’’ and economic growth. 

Communist Party’s Intolerance of Independent Sources of 

Influence 

The Communist Party’s determination to rein in independent 

sources of influence remained evident across Chinese society during 

this reporting year. For example, the Chinese government denies 

workers the right to organize into independent unions in part because the Party continues to regard organized labor as it does citizen activism in other spheres of public concern: as a threat to the 

Party’s hold on power and a potentially powerful competitor for allegiance. While legislative developments over the last three years 

now make collective bargaining a legal possibility in China, and efforts to develop collective labor contracting in some locales have 

progressed in limited respects (e.g., in Guangzhou and Shanghai), 

China’s leaders have made clear they will not tolerate an independent trade union movement. They do not see such a development as potentially helping to relieve the government of the burden of social pressures. 

Chinese citizens who sought to establish and operate civil society 

organizations that focused on other issues deemed by officials to be 

‘‘sensitive,’’ including public health advocacy, housing rights advocacy, and advocacy on behalf of petitioners, ethnic minorities, or 

adherents of religious and spiritual groups, faced intimidation, harassment, and punishment. The government continued to tighten its 

control over civil society groups through selective enforcement of 

regulations and through new regulations that make it difficult for 

some civil society organizations to accept tax deductible contributions or contributions from overseas donors. 

The government also punished citizens who waged independent 

campaigns seeking greater government accountability. Activists 

who criticized the government for not doing enough to investigate 

the causes of school collapses in the May 2008 earthquake in 

Sichuan have been imprisoned. Tibetans engaged in environmental 

protection activities with Party and government encouragement 

found themselves facing imprisonment when their popularity 

soared and they criticized local officials for breaking laws that protect endangered animal species. Petitioners in many areas of China 

were mistreated, harassed, and detained for their involvement in 

advocating for housing rights and for organizing to protest forced 

evictions and relocations in which the government failed to meet its 

obligations to compensate residents fairly and in accordance with 

the law. Mistreatment of those advocating on behalf of individuals 

who suffered abuse at the hands of population planning officials 

continued. 

6 

Authorities also sought to tighten control over the Internet, the 

influence of which continues to grow, with more than 420 million 

users in China. Officials stepped up monitoring and control of 

blogging, news, video, and social networking sites; issued legal 

measures that could increase pressure on Internet companies to 

censor political content; and sought to impose greater legal requirements on those wishing to post or host content on the Internet that 

could lead to self-censorship of political content for fear of government retribution. The government also continued to quash 

attempts by Chinese media to test the boundaries of media independence, as illustrated, for example, when an editorial calling for 

reform of China’s household registration system jointly published 

in 13 newspapers was removed from the Internet, and one of its 

co-authors was forced to resign his position as editor of one of the 

papers. 

A further example of the Chinese leadership’s determination to 

rein in independent sources of influence is the continuing ban on 

Falun Gong. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement established in 

China in the early 1990s based on Chinese meditative exercises 

called qigong. By 1999, the Falun Gong movement reportedly had 

grown to include an estimated 70 to 100 million followers (also 

called ‘‘practitioners’’). The group flourished during the decade following the suppression of the Tiananmen democracy movement in 

June 1989, which many viewed as a hopeful development, showing 

that it was possible, even in the wake of the events of June 1989, 

to build a non-state-affiliated popular organization in China on a 

massive scale without state support. In 1999, however, the Party 

announced a total ban on Falun Gong, the implementation of which 

has resulted in the harassment, detention, and mental and physical abuse of large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners in official 

custody, and in some cases torture and death. The ban remains in 

force today, and authorities regularly intensify crackdowns on the 

Falun Gong movement around events the government deems to be 

sensitive, such as the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. 

Chinese Government’s New Rhetoric on Compliance With 

International Human Rights Norms 

Chinese officials appear to have adopted a new rhetorical strategy with respect to China’s compliance with international norms. 

In the past, Chinese officials often argued that it was necessary to 

carve out exceptions and waivers to the application of international 

norms to China. While stating their embrace of international 

norms in the abstract, for example, on free expression and the environment, they sought to make the case that, in practice, China deserved to be treated as an exception, due, for instance, to its status 

as a developing country. Now, however, official statements increasingly tend to declare the Chinese government’s compliance with 

international norms, even in the face of documented noncompliance. 

For example, in June 2010, the State Council Information Office released a white paper presenting ‘‘the true situation of the development and regulation of the Internet in China’’ to Chinese citizens 

and the international community. The white paper claims the government ‘‘guarantees citizens’ freedom of speech on the Internet’’ 

and that its model for regulating the Internet is ‘‘consistent with 

7 

international practices.’’ One implication of this new rhetorical tactic is that it seemingly relieves Chinese officials of the burden of 

arguing from the outset for exceptions and waivers to the application of international norms to China. Simply declaring compliance 

shifts the burden of persuasion to those who point out the Chinese 

government’s noncompliance, placing them in the position of critics 

of China, subject to accusations by Chinese officials of ‘‘fingerpointing,’’ ‘‘China bashing,’’ and ‘‘poisoning the atmosphere’’ for 

good relations with China. By adopting this new rhetorical approach, Chinese officials make respectful, open, and frank dialogue 

with China more difficult, and the approach itself underscores how 

important it is that Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials not uncritically accept Chinese officials’ declarations of 

compliance. 

Chinese officials in the last year also increasingly have sought to 

portray the ‘‘Chinese model’’ (zhongguo moshi) as consistent with 

international human rights standards. In an April 2010 speech before the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, for example, State Council Information Office Director Wang Chen said the 

government is campaigning to gain global acceptance for its model 

of Internet control, having ‘‘engaged in dialogue and exchanges 

with more than 70 countries and international organizations,’’ 

‘‘countered Western enemy forces’ smears against us, and enhanced 

the international community’s acceptance and understanding of our 

model of managing the Internet.’’ This new approach seeks to redefine the substance of international human rights standards in a 

manner that legitimizes the Chinese government’s noncompliance. 

This new approach appears to be connected with debates going on 

now within China over whether China should sign on to, or try to 

change, the rules of the international system. 

Global Economic Conditions and the Expansion of State 

Control 

The Communist Party is motivated to deliver employment and 

prosperity to inland and rural areas, and not just to coastal regions 

that already have benefited disproportionately from economic development, in part in order to demonstrate the Party’s ability to 

govern. The global economic downturn has dampened demand for 

Chinese exports, and that has made the delivery of employment 

and prosperity to inland and rural areas more challenging for the 

Party. In these areas, grievances over lax enforcement of health 

and safety standards and of environmental and worker rights protections have fueled discontent. The corruption and collusion 

between local businesses and local regulatory authorities that are 

associated with lax enforcement have undermined the reputation of 

the Party in these areas. In response, the leadership has resorted 

to expanded state economic and social control. 

In the economic sphere, state-owned companies acquired private 

companies at a faster clip in the past year than previously. Flush 

with capital from an economic stimulus program of unprecedented 

magnitude and favored in the awarding of infrastructure projects, 

China’s state-owned enterprises have expanded easily and 

squeezed out private firms in some sectors. The need to address 

corruption and collusion between private firms and local regulatory 

8 

officials, however, has allowed officials to cast expansion of state 

control as a method for improving accountability and the rule of 

law. In part because corruption and lax enforcement of health and 

safety standards and environmental and worker rights protections 

are the problems that fuel local discontent, Chinese citizens have 

not widely contested the Party’s justification of expanded state control in these terms. 

At the same time, many Chinese firms, especially state-owned 

enterprises, continue to benefit from the Chinese government’s industrial policies that provide government subsidies, preferences, 

and other benefits. The government also has promoted ‘‘indigenous 

innovation,’’ a massive government campaign to decrease reliance 

on foreign technology through industrial policies and to enhance 

China’s economy and national security, with the stated purpose of 

enabling China to become a global leader in technology by mid-century. Such policies have further facilitated the expansion of state 

control of the economy. 

In the social sphere, China’s leaders over the last year sought to 

expand control by establishing or strengthening existing Party 

‘‘branches’’ in non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and residential communities. Local governments, charged 

with ‘‘maintaining social stability,’’ established or strengthened existing ‘‘stability preservation offices’’ and established new ‘‘stability 

preservation funds’’ (weiwen jijin) from which they make payments 

to people with grievances in order to preempt their escalating disputes. Large numbers of petitioners availing themselves of China’s 

xinfang (‘‘letters and visits’’) system for filing grievances against 

the government were harassed, abused, detained illegally, and 

involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals or sent to ‘‘reeducation through labor’’ facilities. Officials continued to use license 

suspension and disbarment as methods to control human rights 

lawyers who sought to represent clients in cases deemed by authorities to be politically sensitive. 

Misapplication of Law as a Means of Control 

The Communist Party and Chinese government are expanding 

and strengthening the capacity of law and regulation to serve as 

a means to control an increasing number of facets of life in China. 

Officials this past year sought to increase monitoring of communication technologies—the Internet and cell phones—that play a 

significant role in the daily lives of large numbers of Chinese citizens. Officials sought to make it easier for the government to identify the source of online content, by barring anonymous 

commenting, for example, and passed legal measures that add 

pressure on Internet companies to police the Internet for state secrets and for content that authorities allege may ‘‘infringe on the 

rights of others.’’ While such moves may be aimed partly at legitimate targets of concern, including spam and defamatory content, in 

the Chinese context they also provide opportunities and incentives 

for officials and private companies to censor politically sensitive 

content. 

Authorities increasingly have used the Law on the Control of the 

Exit and Entry of Citizens to manage dissent. Article 8 of the law 

allows the government to ban ‘‘persons whose exit from the counVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
9 

try, in the opinion of the competent department . . . [would] be 

harmful to state security or cause a major loss to national interest.’’ During this reporting year, authorities increasingly cited this 

provision to prevent rights defenders and advocates who are critical 

of the government from leaving China. 

The Party and government also continued to use law to entrench 

a policy framework of state control over religion, as well as to exclude some religious communities from the limited but important 

protections afforded to state-sanctioned religious groups. In the 

past year, authorities made use of laws concerning property and financial assets to restrict the religious freedom of unregistered religious groups. President Hu Jintao used the powerful Fifth Tibet 

Work Forum platform to emphasize the Party’s role in controlling 

Tibetan Buddhism and the important role of law as a tool to enforce what the Party deems to be the ‘‘normal order’’ for the religion. The government and Party created increasing restraints on 

the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists by 

strengthening the push to use policy and legal measures to shape 

and control the ‘‘normal order’’ for Tibetan Buddhism. 

During this reporting year, China’s security and judicial institutions’ use of laws on ‘‘endangering state security’’—a category of 

crimes that includes ‘‘subversion,’’ ‘‘splittism,’’ ‘‘leaking state 

secrets,’’ and ‘‘inciting’’ subversion or splittism—infringed upon 

Chinese citizens’ constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religious belief, association, and assembly. For example, the government has used the law on splittism to punish Tibetans who criticized or peacefully protested government policies and then used the 

law on ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ to punish Tibetans who attempted to 

share with other Tibetans information about incidents of repression 

and punishment. Authorities also issued regulations in the past 

year in Xinjiang to impose state-defined notions of ‘‘ethnic unity’’ 

and to tighten controls over online speech. The imprisonment of 

Uyghur Webmasters and a Uyghur journalist on charges of endangering state security, in connection with online postings and articles critical of conditions in Xinjiang, underscored authorities’ use 

of the Criminal Law to quell free expression. The imprisonment of 

Liu Xiaobo and other activists on inciting subversion and leaking 

state secrets charges after they peacefully criticized officials and 

the Party further underscored authorities’ use of the Criminal Law 

to quell free expression. 

Prospects for the Rule of Law in China 

Prospects for human rights and the rule of law in China depend 

not only on decisions taken by officials responsible for implementing law and protecting rights at the grassroots, but also on decisions taken at the highest levels of the Communist Party. The 

Party, with over 75 million members (roughly 5.7 percent of China’s total population), strives to maintain unchallenged rule over a 

country of more than 1.3 billion people. The Party stakes the legitimacy of its claim to rule China on its ability to provide both 

stability and prosperity to the Chinese people, and to ‘‘unify the 

country’’ (tongyi guojia). The Party leadership regards developments that could adversely affect China’s one-party system as potential threats to stability, prosperity, or unity. The rule of law, if 

10 

implemented faithfully and fairly, should benefit not just those the 

Party favors. Some of China’s leaders, therefore, regard implementation of the rule of law as potentially diminishing the capacity of 

the Party to maintain control. 

Three decades ago, the challenge that reformers within the Party 

faced was to find a way to advance market-oriented reforms while 

ensuring that economic development still bore the imprimatur of 

the Party. They succeeded. The economy boomed, and the Party received enough of the credit to enable it to maintain its hold on 

power. The challenge that reformers within the Party perceive 

today is in finding a way to advance the rule of law in a manner 

that results in the law still bearing the imprimatur of the Party. 

Over the last year, senior leaders have reiterated positions emphasizing the leading role of the Party, the need to adhere to the Party’s formulation of ‘‘socialist democracy,’’ and the impossibility of 

implementing ‘‘Western-style’’ legal and political institutions. 

Motivated by China’s dependence on foreign investment, China’s 

leaders have appeared to be more nimble in the commercial context 

to accept concepts and practices associated with so-called Westernstyle rule of law. Whether a decrease in China’s reliance on foreign 

investment ultimately will be associated with change or continuity 

in this regard remains to be seen. The findings of this Annual 

Report suggest, however, as the Commission reported in its last 

Annual Report, that the Party still ‘‘rejects the notion that the imperative to uphold the rule of law should preempt the Party’s role 

in guiding the functions of the state.’’ Chinese leaders’ actions over 

the coming months will shed light on whether their stated commitment to the rule of law is real. The Commission and those who pay 

close attention to these issues in China will watch developments 

carefully. 

In 2009, the Chinese government issued the 2009–2010 National 

Human Rights Action Plan that uses the language of human rights 

to cast an ambitious program for promoting the rights of Chinese 

citizens. The Action Plan has been described by some human rights 

advocates as signifying ‘‘remarkable progress’’ because in it the 

Chinese government articulates a clearly defined time period 

(2009–2010) for implementing a number of commitments to civil 

and political rights. The findings of this Annual Report document 

how the Party thus far has prioritized strengthening its grip on society over the implementation of the commitments to human rights 

and the rule of law set forth in the Chinese government’s own Action Plan. The Commission urges Members of the U.S. Congress 

and Administration officials to continue to inquire about the Chinese government’s progress in translating words into action and in 

securing for its citizens the improvements it has set forth in its Action Plan. To that end, this Annual Report and the information 

available on the Commission’s Web site may serve as useful resources. 

11 

I. Executive Summary 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of specific findings follows below for each section of 

this Annual Report, covering each area that the Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues 

that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with 

the Commission’s legislative mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or 

executive action. 

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Findings 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to maintain a wide range of restrictions 

that deny Chinese citizens their right to freedom of speech as 

guaranteed under China’s Constitution. Chinese officials continued to justify such restrictions on grounds such as protecting state security, minors, or public order. They also 

asserted that freedom of expression is protected in China, and 

that restrictions on free expression imposed by the Chinese 

government meet international standards. In practice, however, authorities continued to misuse vague criminal laws intended to protect state security to instead target peaceful 

speech critical of the Communist Party or Chinese government. 

In December 2009, a Beijing court sentenced prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for ‘‘inciting subversion 

of state power,’’ the longest known sentence for this crime. 

Liu’s offenses were to publish essays online critical of the Communist Party and to help draft and circulate Charter 08, a 

treatise advocating political reform and human rights circulated online for signatures. Following demonstrations and 

riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 

in 2009, authorities this past year used state security crimes 

to imprison a journalist and Web site administrators for expressing or failing to censor views critical of government policies in the region. 

• While Chinese citizens now have unprecedented opportunities 

to express themselves through the Internet and other communication technologies, Chinese officials and private companies, 

as required by law, continued arbitrarily to remove or block political and religious content. They did so nontransparently and 

without clearly articulated standards. During the reporting 

year, Internet users and foreign media in China frequently 

found that politically sensitive news articles and discussions, 

including a domestic editorial cartoon that referred to the 1989 

Tiananmen protests, had been removed or blocked from the 

Internet. Despite its noncompliance with international human 

rights standards, the Chinese government is waging a campaign to gain global acceptance for its model of Internet control. 

12 

• This past year, the controversy between the Chinese government and the U.S. company Google highlighted the potential 

for China’s censorship requirements to serve as a trade barrier 

and to cause companies to stop providing services to Chinese 

citizens, further limiting the free flow of information. 

• In the XUAR, China’s maintenance of broad restrictions on 

the Internet, text messages, and international phone calls, put 

in place following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in 

Urumqi and only gradually lifted starting in December 2009, 

illustrated the overbroad scope of China’s restrictions on free 

expression. 

• The Communist Party continued to view the news media as 

a tool to serve the Party’s interests, in practice denying citizens 

their right to freedom of the press as guaranteed under China’s 

Constitution. Throughout the reporting year, the Commission 

observed numerous instances of officials reportedly prohibiting 

news media from publishing certain stories, such as a local 

media interview with U.S. President Barack Obama during his 

November 2009 trip to China, or punishing news media for 

publishing certain stories, such as a Chinese domestic joint 

media editorial criticizing and calling for reform of China’s 

household registration system. 

• The government further strengthened its system of ‘‘prior restraints,’’ by which the government may deny a person or 

group the use of a forum for expression in advance of the actual expression. Under this system, any person or group who 

wishes to publish a newspaper, host a Web site, or work as a 

journalist must receive permission from the government in the 

form of license or registration, and may also be required to 

meet other conditions, including political loyalty or financial 

requirements. In March 2010, an official announced the government would be tightening entry requirements for journalists by requiring them to pass a qualification exam for which 

knowledge of ‘‘Chinese Communist Party journalism’’ and 

‘‘Marxist views’’ of news will be required. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Raise concerns over the Chinese government’s efforts to gain 

global acceptance for its model of Internet control and the Chinese government’s blanket defense of restrictions on freedom of 

expression as being in line with international practice, without 

differentiating between restrictions for legitimate purposes, 

such as to protect minors, and restrictions for impermissible 

purposes, such as to silence dissent. Emphasize that such arguments undermine international human rights standards for 

free expression, particularly those contained in Article 19 of 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

Æ Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese officials on 

the question of how governments can best ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are not abused and do not exVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
13 

ceed the scope necessary to protect state security, minors, and 

public order. Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such as public participation in formulation of restrictions 

on free expression, transparency regarding implementation of 

such restrictions, and independent judicial review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese officials’ own calls for greater 

transparency and public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may be part of a broader discussion on how both the 

U.S. and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the 

protection of common interests, including protecting minors, 

computer security, and privacy with regard to the Internet. 

Æ Support the research and development of technologies that 

enable Chinese citizens to access and share political and religious content that they are entitled to access and share under 

international human rights standards but that is blocked by 

Chinese officials. Support tools and practices that enable Chinese citizens to access and share such content in a way that 

ensures their security and privacy. 

Æ Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other political prisoners imprisoned on charges of endangering state security and 

other crimes but whose only offenses were to peacefully express support for political reform or criticism of government 

policies, including: Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February 2010 to 

five years in prison after using the Internet to organize an 

independent investigation into school collapses in an earthquake) and Huang Qi (sentenced in November 2009 to three 

years in prison for using his human rights Web site to advocate for parents of earthquake victims). 

WORKER RIGHTS

Findings 

• Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or 

in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international 

standards, including the right to organize into independent 

unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 

the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, 

is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower 

level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU and must align 

with its overarching political concerns of maintaining ‘‘social 

stability’’ and economic growth. 

• Labor disputes and officials’ concern with maintaining ‘‘social stability’’ intensified over this reporting year as layoffs, 

wage arrears, and poor and unsafe working conditions persisted. Growing concern on the part of local governments to 

maintain economic growth and employment continued to 

prompt some localities to respond to labor laws that took effect 

in 2008 (the Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, 

and Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) with local 

opinions and regulations of their own that weakened some employee-friendly aspects of these laws. Interpretation of these 

laws across localities has not been consistent, leading to their 

‘‘regionalization’’ and ‘‘loopholization.’’ 

14 

• During the spring and summer of 2010, Chinese and international media and non-governmental organizations reported 

on a spate of worker actions—from a succession of strikes to 

suicides at a factory compound—at various enterprises in 

China, mostly foreign invested, that garnered attention in 

China and around the world. Unofficial reports suggest that 

the striking workers’ primary demand was higher wages. In a 

number of strikes workers called for existing All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)-affiliated unions to behave more 

independently within the confines of Chinese law. Some of the 

strikes and demands for higher wages during 2010 may not be 

a sign of continued weakness on the part of workers vis-a`-vis 

management. Rather, they may reveal that workers in some 

cases have been emboldened not only by worker rights codified 

in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but also by a tighter 

labor market. 

• In response to collective labor action that was organized and 

large-scale, the Chinese government continued to redirect labor 

disputes away from the formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward more ‘‘flexible’’ and ‘‘grassroots-level’’ negotiation 

and mediation. These forms of dispute resolution often relied 

on coordination among levels of local government (e.g., provincial, city, town, etc.), involving local government and Party 

units, the official trade union, and the police and security apparatus. 

• Backlogs in the handling of labor dispute cases continued to 

exceed time limits mandated by law. In addition to large increases in arbitrated cases, labor dispute cases also continued 

to deluge Chinese courts. In some cases, these disputes were 

the result of strong dissatisfaction with arbitration proceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in a court 

if either side is dissatisfied. In other cases, the increase reflected the strong and growing rights consciousness of Chinese 

workers who turned to new protections offered in labor laws 

that took effect in 2008. 

• Migrant workers continued to face discrimination in urban 

areas, and their children still faced difficulties accessing city 

schools. Employment discrimination more generally continued 

to be a serious problem, and plaintiffs brought a growing number of anti-discrimination suits under China’s Employment 

Promotion Law. 

• During the 2010 reporting year, enforcement of China’s 

Labor Contract Law continued to be uneven or selective. Even 

as reported statistics show increases in the number of labor 

contracts signed, formal employment in China continues to 

erode, especially for unskilled urban workers and rural 

migrants. There have been reports of employers concluding 

multiple contracts per worker in order to avoid payment of 

overtime; replacing older workers with younger workers to 

avoid longer-term contracts; using contract expiration as a 

method for laying off formal employees during economic slowdowns; and refusing to hire employees who insist on exercising 

their right to conclude a labor contract. Studies by Chinese researchers suggest that substantial numbers of Chinese workers 

15 

report that their actual work hours are different from the 

hours specified in their labor contracts. 

• The ACFTU during the reporting year has appeared to be 

more willing to address the issue of worker representation. 

One ACFTU official stated that, ‘‘in mitigating labour disputes, 

the fundamental issue is to establish a collective bargaining 

system that would allow labour disputes to be managed and resolved within the enterprise.’’ Following worker strikes at a 

number of foreign-invested manufacturing facilities during this 

reporting year, officials in the southern Chinese province of 

Guangdong accelerated action on draft Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management. In September, the Guangdong 

People’s Congress Standing Committee reportedly delayed further deliberation of the draft. Heavy lobbying by members of 

the Hong Kong industrial community, many of whom own and 

operate factories in Southern China, reportedly played a role 

in the Standing Committee’s decision. However, Guangdong’s 

draft regulations are particularly noteworthy in that they specifically grant workers the right to demand the initiation of collective wage consultations—a right that typically has been reserved for unions. Guangdong and other localities, including 

Beijing, Hainan, and Tianjin, also have issued guidance notices 

and regulations specifying the legal rights of parties involved 

in collective consultations. 

• The Chinese government’s complicated and time-consuming 

work-related injury compensation procedure continued to be a 

major problem for China’s injured workers. The process is further complicated for migrant workers who may already have 

left their jobs and moved to another location by the time clinical symptoms surface. Workers more generally also continued 

to face persistent occupational safety issues. Collusion between 

mine operators and local government officials reportedly remains widespread, leading to lax enforcement of health and 

safety standards. Prohibitions on independent organizing limit 

workers’ ability to promote safer working conditions. 

• China’s new generation of migrant workers, unlike their parents, have higher expectations with regard to wages and labor 

rights. Younger workers, born in the 1980s and 1990s, reportedly were at the forefront of worker strikes that took place this 

past year across China. Together, they make up about 100 million of China’s total pool of migrant workers. In an essay describing the characteristics of the new generation of migrant 

workers, China’s Agricultural Minister Han Changfu pointed 

out that many of these young workers have never laid down 

roots, are better educated, are the only child in the family, and 

are more likely to ‘‘demand, like their urban peers, equal employment, equal access to social services, and even the obtainment of equal political rights.’’ 

• In 2010, the Commission followed several reports alleging 

that Chinese state-owned enterprises utilized prison labor sent 

from China at their overseas worksites. Chinese prisoners reportedly have worked on housing and other infrastructure 

projects such as ports and railroads outside of China. One report indicated that transporting workers from China is standVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
16 

ard practice for some Chinese companies operating outside of 

China and sometimes includes prisoners and those who are on 

parole. China’s Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of 

Citizens states that ‘‘approval to exit from the country shall 

not be granted to . . . convicted persons serving their sentences.’’ 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support projects promoting legal reform intended to ensure 

that labor laws and regulations reflect internationally recognized labor principles. Prioritize projects that do not focus only 

on legislative drafting and regulatory development, but that 

analyze implementation and measure progress in terms of compliance with internationally recognized labor principles at the 

grassroots. 

Æ Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase the experience of collective bargaining in action for both Chinese workers 

and trade union officials; and identify local trade union offices 

found to be more open to collective bargaining and focus pilot 

projects in their locales. Where possible, prioritize programs 

that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bargaining 

pilot projects even in factories that do not have an official 

union presence. Encourage the expansion of exchanges between 

Chinese labor rights advocates in NGOs, the bar, academia, 

and the official trade union, and U.S. collective bargaining 

practitioners. Prioritize exchanges that emphasize face-to-face 

meetings with hands-on practitioners and trainers. 

Æ Encourage research that identifies factors underlying inconsistency in enforcement of labor laws and regulations. This includes projects that prioritize the large-scale compilation and 

analysis of Chinese labor dispute litigation and arbitration 

cases, and guidance documents issued by and to courts at the 

provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the publication and dissemination of Chinese language casebooks that 

may be used as a common reference resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, employers, union officials, and law 

schools in China. 

Æ Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese 

labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the 

rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local levels to 

develop, maintain, and deepen relationships with labor organizations based in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and to invite these 

groups to increase the number of training programs on the 

mainland. Support programs that train workers in ways to 

identify problems at the factory floor level, equipping them 

with skills and problem-solving training so they can relate 

their concerns to employers effectively. 

Æ Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experience and efforts in protecting worker rights—via legal, regulatory, or non-governmental means—with Chinese officials. Facilitate site visits and other exchanges for Chinese officials to 

17 

observe and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, 

the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other regulatory 

agencies at all levels of government that work on labor issues. 

Encourage discussion on the value of constructive interactions 

among labor non-governmental organizations, workers, employers, and government agencies; encourage exchanges that emphasize the importance of government transparency in developing stable labor relations and in ensuring full and fair enforcement of labor laws. Support USDOL’s exchanges with China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 

(MOHRSS) regarding setting and enforcing minimum wage 

standards, strengthening social insurance, improving employment statistics, and promoting social dialogue. Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL started this year 

and plans for further progress in bilateral labor relations. 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Findings 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 

government took steps to limit the prevalence of coerced confessions and illegally obtained evidence within the judicial system. In May 2010, five Chinese law enforcement agencies 

announced two new regulations that intend to limit the use of 

torture by police and prosecutors in criminal, particularly 

death penalty, cases. Over the 2010 reporting year, police torture and coerced confessions continued to be widely reported by 

international and domestic organizations. 

• Citing concerns over social tensions, Chinese authorities 

have promoted local and nationwide anti-crime campaigns to 

stem reported rising crime rates. In June 2010, China 

launched the fourth round of its national ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign in a massive seven-month crackdown on violent crimes 

and escalating social conflicts. ‘‘Strike hard’’ campaigns and 

anti-crime crackdowns have been tied to unusually harsh law 

enforcement tactics, quick trials, and violations of China’s own 

criminal procedure laws and regulations. 

• During this reporting year, Chinese judicial officials contravened provisions in China’s Criminal Procedure Law that 

require courts to provide access to criminal trials for any observer, regardless of citizenship, except where the law specifically prohibits an open trial. 

• Harassment and intimidation of human rights advocates by 

Chinese government officials continued during this reporting 

year. Public security authorities and unofficial personnel unlawfully monitored rights defenders, petitioners, religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family members, and 

subjected them to periodic illegal home confinement. Such mistreatment and abuse was evident particularly in the leadup to 

sensitive dates and events, such as U.S. President Barack 

Obama’s visit in November 2009 and the Shanghai 2010 World 

Expo. 

• Chinese officials continued to use various forms of extralegal 

detention against Chinese citizens, including petitioners, 

18 

peaceful protesters, and other individuals considered to be ‘‘involved in issues deemed sensitive by authorities.’’ Some of 

those arbitrarily detained were held in psychiatric hospitals or 

extralegal detention facilities, such as ‘‘black jails,’’ and subjected to treatment inconsistent with international standards 

and protections found under China’s Constitution and Criminal 

Procedure Law. 

• Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to confront obstacles to practicing law without judicial interference or fear of 

prosecution. In politically sensitive cases throughout China, 

criminal defense attorneys routinely faced harassment and 

abuse. Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were 

not able to have counsel of their own choosing; some were compelled to accept government-appointed defense counsel. Abuses 

of Article 306 of the Criminal Law, which assigns criminal liability to lawyers that force or induce a witness to change his 

or her testimony or falsify evidence, continue to hamper the effectiveness of criminal defense. 

• In August 2010, the National People’s Congress reviewed the 

first draft of the proposed eighth amendment to China’s Criminal Law, which reportedly calls for reducing the current 68 

crimes punishable by death to 55 crimes. The reduction would 

signal the first time the Chinese government has reduced the 

number of crimes punishable by capital punishment since the 

Criminal Law was enacted in 1979. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Press the Chinese government to adopt the recommendation 

of the UN Committee against Torture to investigate and disclose the existence of black jails and other secret detention 

facilities, as a first step toward abolishing such forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese government to extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to 

visit China. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee the rights of 

criminal suspects and defendants in accordance with international human rights standards and provide the international 

community with a specific timetable for its ratification of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 

Chinese government signed in 1998, but has not ratified. Press 

the Chinese government to adhere to protections for criminal 

suspects and defendants asserted in its 2009–2010 National 

Human Rights Action Plan, and encourage the publication and 

broad dissemination of fully detailed reports and updates on 

local government implementation of the Action Plan. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to amend its Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced protections and rights for 

lawyers and detained suspects contained in the 2008 revision 

of the Lawyers Law. Encourage Chinese officials to commit to 

a specific timetable for revision and implementation of the revised Criminal Procedure Law. 

19 

Æ Make clear that the international community regards as 

laudable the commitments to fair trial rights and detainee 

rights the Chinese government made in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan. Request information on the 

formalization of those commitments into laws and regulations 

and on what further steps it will take to ensure their successful implementation, and support bilateral and multilateral cooperation and dialogue to support such efforts. 

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Findings 

• China’s Constitution guarantees ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’ 

but protects only ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ and the government’s restrictive framework toward religion continued in the 

past year to prevent Chinese citizens from exercising their 

right to freedom of religion in line with international human 

rights standards. 

• Some Chinese citizens had space to practice their religion, 

but the Chinese government continued to exert tight control 

over the affairs of state-sanctioned religious communities and 

to repress religious and spiritual activities falling outside the 

scope of Communist Party-sanctioned practice. The government maintained requirements that religious organizations 

register with the government and submit to the leadership of 

‘‘patriotic religious associations’’ created by the Party to lead 

China’s five recognized religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism. 

• Unregistered groups risked harassment, detention, imprisonment, and other abuses, as did members of registered groups 

deemed to deviate from state-sanctioned activities. Variations 

in implementation allowed some unregistered groups to function in China, but such tolerance was arbitrary and did not 

amount to the full protection of these groups’ rights. 

• As leadership in the State Administration for Religious Affairs changed in the past year, authorities continued to affirm 

policies of control over religion. Despite articulating a ‘‘positive 

role’’ for religious communities in China, officials did not then 

use the notion of this ‘‘positive role’’ to promote religious freedom, but rather used the sentiment to bolster support for state 

economic and social goals. 

• The government continued to use law to control religious 

practice rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens. The government continued to pass legal measures that provide some legal protections for registered religious 

communities, but condition many activities on government 

oversight or approval and exclude unregistered groups from 

limited state protections. 

• China’s diverse religious communities faced various state 

controls over their affairs, and in some cases, harassment, detention, and other abuses. Authorities continued to control 

Buddhist institutions and practices and take steps to curb ‘‘unauthorized’’ Buddhist temples. The government and Party 

placed increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of reliVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
20 

gion for Tibetan Buddhists and continued to punish Tibetan 

Buddhists for openly expressing their devotion to the Dalai 

Lama. The government and Party continued to deny members 

of the registered Catholic church the freedom to recognize the 

authority of the Holy See to select Chinese bishops, while authorities continued to harass and hold some unregistered 

priests and bishops under surveillance or in detention. Authorities across the country used the specter of ‘‘extremism’’ to 

bolster state interference in how Muslims interpreted and 

practiced their religion. Conditions for religious freedom for 

Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region continued 

to worsen as authorities integrated controls over Muslims’ religious freedom into far-reaching security crackdowns. Chinese 

authorities continued to impose state-defined interpretations of 

theology on registered Protestant communities and to harass 

and, in some cases, detain and imprison members of unregistered Protestant churches, while also razing church property. 

Authorities maintained controls over Taoist activities and took 

steps to curb ‘‘feudal superstitious activities.’’ 

• During this reporting year, the Chinese government maintained a ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign that it has carried out against 

Falun Gong practitioners for more than a decade, continuing 

its harassment and intimidation of Falun Gong practitioners 

and lawyers who defend Falun Gong clients. Local governments throughout the Shanghai municipal area and surrounding provinces reported mobilizing security forces to target 

Falun Gong practitioners in preparation for the Shanghai 2010 

World Expo, and the 6–10 Office, whose activities continued to 

expand during this reporting year, spearheaded the Shanghai 

Expo crackdown. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all citizens 

freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to remove its framework for recognizing only select religious communities for 

limited state protections. Stress to Chinese authorities that all 

citizens are entitled to enjoy freedom of religion as a fundamental human right, regardless of whether they practice religion in a way deemed to contribute to state economic and social goals. 

Æ Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or 

imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of 

religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist 

nun sentenced in 2009 to 10 years’ imprisonment after she and 

other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan independence 

and the Dalai Lama’s long life and return to Tibet); Su Zhimin 

(an unregistered Catholic bishop who ‘‘disappeared’’ after being 

taken into police custody in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong 

practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful 

21 

protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Yusufjan and 

Memetjan (university students who are members of a Muslim 

religious group and were detained in May 2009 when members 

of the group met on a university campus); Yang Rongli and 

Wang Xiaoguang (house church pastors sentenced to 7 and 3 

years, respectively, in 2009 in connection to their activities 

leading an unregistered congregation), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to end interference in the 

internal affairs of religious communities and stress to the Chinese government that freedom of religion includes: the freedom 

of Buddhists to carry out activities in temples independent of 

state controls over religion, and the freedom of Tibetan Buddhists to express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan 

Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the freedom of 

Catholics to recognize the authority of the Pope to make bishop 

appointments; the freedom of Taoists to interpret their faith 

free from state efforts to ban practices deemed as ‘‘feudal superstitions’’; the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely 

practice Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims to interpret theology free from state interference and not face curbs 

on their internationally protected right to freedom of religion 

in the name of upholding ‘‘stability’’; and the right of Protestants to worship free from state controls over doctrine and to 

worship in unregistered house churches, free from harassment, 

detention, and other abuses. 

Æ Support initiatives to provide technical assistance to the 

Chinese government in drafting legal provisions that protect, 

rather than restrain, freedom of religion for all Chinese citizens. Support training classes for Chinese officials on international human rights standards for the protection of freedom 

of religion. 

Æ Support non-governmental organizations that collect information on conditions for religious freedom in China and that 

inform Chinese citizens of how to defend their right to freedom 

of religion against Chinese government abuses. 

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings 

• Chinese law provides for a system of ‘‘regional ethnic autonomy’’ in designated areas with ethnic minority populations, but 

shortcomings in the substance and implementation of this system have prevented ethnic minorities from enjoying meaningful autonomy in practice. The Chinese government maintained 

policies in the past year that prevented ethnic minorities from 

‘‘administering their internal affairs’’ as guaranteed in Chinese 

law and from enjoying their rights in line with international 

human rights standards. While the Chinese government maintained some protections in law and practice for ethnic minority 

rights, it continued to impose the fundamental terms upon 

which Chinese citizens could express their ethnicity and to prevent ethnic minorities from enjoying their cultures, religions, 

22 

and languages free from state interference, in violation of 

international human rights standards. 

• Among the 55 groups the Chinese government designates as 

minority ethnic groups, state repression was harshest toward 

groups deemed to challenge state authority, especially in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan 

autonomous areas. 

• The Chinese government continued in the past year to assert 

the effectiveness of state laws and policies in upholding the 

rights of ethnic minorities, following domestic protests and 

international criticism of the government’s treatment of ethnic 

minorities. The Chinese government and Communist Party 

strengthened ‘‘ethnic unity’’ campaigns as a vehicle for spreading state policy on ethnic issues throughout Chinese society 

and for imposing state-defined interpretations of the history, 

relations, and current conditions of ethnic groups in China. 

• Chinese leaders pledged to refine and improve conditions for 

ethnic minorities, within the parameters of existing Party policy, issuing some policy documents in the past year which may 

bring mixed results in the protection of ethnic minorities’ 

rights. The Chinese government’s 2009–2010 National Human 

Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009 outlined measures to 

support ethnic minority populations in China. 

• The Chinese government maintained economic development 

policies that prioritize state economic goals over the protection 

of ethnic minorities’ rights. Despite bringing some benefits to 

ethnic minority areas and residents, such policies also have 

conflicted with ethnic minorities’ rights to maintain traditional 

livelihoods, spurred migration to ethnic minority regions, promoted unequal allocation of resources favoring Han Chinese, 

intensified linguistic and assimilation pressures on local communities, and resulted in environmental damage. 

• Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region continued in the past year to restrict independent expressions of 

ethnic identity among Mongols and to interfere with their preservation of traditional livelihoods, while enforcing campaigns 

to promote stability and ethnic unity. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Fund rule-of-law programs and exchange programs that 

raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for 

governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow 

them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in 

line with both domestic Chinese law and international human 

rights standards. Fund programs that promote models for sustainable development that draw on participation from ethnic 

minority communities. 

Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address 

human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China to enable them to continue their research and develop programs to 

23 

help ethnic minorities increase their capacity to protect their 

rights. Encourage such organizations to develop training programs to promote sustainable development among ethnic minorities, programs to protect ethnic minority languages and 

cultures, and programs that research rights abuses in the 

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Encourage broader 

human rights and rule-of-law programs that operate in China 

to develop programs to address issues affecting ethnic minorities in China. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained 

or imprisoned for advocating for the rights of ethnic minority 

citizens, including Mongol rights advocate Hada (serving a 15- 

year sentence after pursuing activities to promote Mongols’ 

rights and democracy) and other prisoners mentioned in this 

report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 

Æ Support organizations that can monitor the Chinese government’s compliance with stated commitments to protect ethnic 

minorities’ rights, including as articulated in the government’s 

2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan and in international law that the Chinese government is bound to uphold. 

Provide support for organizations that can provide assistance 

in implementing programs in a manner that draws on participation from communities involved and ensures the protection 

of their rights. 

POPULATION PLANNING

Findings 

• Chinese authorities continued to implement population planning policies that interfere with and control the reproductive 

lives of women, employing various methods including fines, 

cancellation of state benefits and permits, forced sterilization, 

forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and other abuses. 

• Human rights abuses by officials charged with implementing 

population planning policies continue despite provisions in Chinese law that prohibit such abuses. China’s 2002 Population 

and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states in Article 4 that officials ‘‘shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, 

and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.’’ The PFPL also states in Article 39 that 

‘‘any functionary of a State organ who commits one of the following acts in the work of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal liability in 

accordance with the law; if it does not constitute a crime, he 

shall be given an administrative sanction with law; his unlawful gains, if any, shall be confiscated: (1) infringing on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights 

and interests; (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty, or engaging in malpractices for personal gain . . . .’’ 

• The Commission observed in 2010 a greater number of reports confirming its 2009 finding that some local governments 

are specifically targeting migrant workers for forced abortions. 

24 

• The Commission noted that increased public awareness of 

the demographic and social consequences of the Chinese government’s population planning policy in the 2010 reporting 

year led to public debate among Chinese experts and government officials regarding the need for policy reform. However, 

top Communist Party and government leaders continue to publicly defend the policy and rule out reform in the near term. 

• The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue to exacerbate the country’s highly skewed sex ratio. Reports in the last year, however, emphasized how population 

planning policies exacerbate other demographic challenges as 

well, including a rapidly aging population and a decline in 

working age population. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to vigorously enforce provisions under Chinese law that provide for punishments of officials and other individuals who violate the rights of citizens 

when implementing population planning policies. Urge the 

Chinese government to establish penalties, including specific 

criminal and financial penalties, for officials and individuals 

found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and coercive 

sterilization, which continue in China despite provisions under 

existing laws and regulations intended to prohibit them. 

Æ Urge Chinese officials to cease coercive methods of enforcing 

birth control quotas. Urge the Chinese government to dismantle coercive population controls and provide greater reproductive freedom and privacy for women. 

Æ Call on Chinese officials to permit greater public discussion 

and debate concerning population planning policies and to 

demonstrate greater responsiveness to public concerns. Support 

the development of programs and international cooperation on 

legal aid and training programs that help citizens pursue compensation under China’s newly amended State Compensation 

Law, and other remedies against the state for injury suffered 

as a result of official abuse related to China’s population planning policies. 

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Findings 

• The Chinese government’s household registration (hukou) 

system, first implemented in the 1950s, continues to limit the 

right of Chinese citizens formally to establish their permanent 

place of residence. Implementation and enforcement of some 

hukou measures resulted in discrimination against rural hukou 

holders who migrate to urban areas. Most frequently, hukou is 

used to deny social benefits such as education and subsidized 

healthcare to migrant workers in cities. The discriminatory effects are especially prominent in the area of education. 

25 

• Authorities continued during the Commission’s 2010 reporting period to relax some hukou restrictions consistent with earlier reforms. Guangzhou municipality instituted reforms to 

unify rural and urban hukou into a single residential hukou. 

Chongqing municipality initiated gradual voluntary hukou 

reforms aimed at increasing the percentage of urban hukou 

holders. The effects of these reforms are unclear pending ongoing implementation. 

• The Chinese government and Communist Party exercised 

strict control over public debate on hukou reforms during the 

2010 reporting year. Authorities removed from the Internet a 

joint editorial published by 13 newspapers that decried the 

hukou system as corrupt and in need of speedy reform. A coauthor of the piece was forced to resign his position as deputy 

editor of a major newspaper. 

• The Chinese government continued to impose restrictions on 

Chinese citizens’ right to travel in a manner that is inconsistent with international human rights standards. During the 

Commission’s 2010 reporting year, Chinese government authorities arbitrarily barred rights defenders, advocates, and 

critics from entering and leaving China. Officials refused to 

renew passports to rights advocates and subsequently cited invalid passports as grounds to prevent entry. In some instances, 

no reasons for the travel ban were provided. 

• The Chinese government continued to use coercive measures 

to restrict Chinese advocates’, rights defenders’, and dissidents’ 

liberty of movement within China, especially during politically 

sensitive periods, including the months leading up to the 

Shanghai 2010 World Expo. Authorities used measures such as 

surveillance, police presence outside of one’s home, ‘‘invitations’’ to tea with police, forced trips, detention, removal from 

one’s home, reeducation through labor, and imprisonment. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers that provide legal 

assistance to migrant workers and encourage policy debates on 

the hukou system. 

Æ Encourage U.S. academic and public policy institutions and 

experts to consult with the Commission on avenues for outreach to Chinese academic and public policy figures engaged in 

policy debates on reform of the hukou system. 

Æ Stress to Chinese government officials that the Chinese government’s noncompliance with international standards regarding freedom of movement inside China negatively impacts confidence outside China in the Chinese government’s commitment to international standards more generally. 

Æ Raise specifically Chinese authorities’ restriction on the liberty of movement of rights defenders, advocates, and critics including writer Liao Yiwu, advocate Feng Zhenghu, economist 

26 

Ilham Tohti, professor Cui Weiping, writer Liu Xia (wife of imprisoned intellectual Liu Xiaobo), and democracy advocates 

Ding Zilin, Qi Zhiyong, and Li Hai. 

STATUS OF WOMEN

Findings 

• Chinese officials continued to promote existing laws that aim 

to protect women’s rights, including the amended Law on the 

Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the amended 

Marriage Law; however, inconsistent interpretation, selective 

implementation, and selective enforcement of these laws across 

localities limit progress on concrete protections of women’s 

rights. 

• Recent statistics show increases in women holding positions 

at the central, provincial, and municipal levels of government. 

• Female political representation at the village level remains 

low, due in part to the traditional patriarchal system still in 

play in parts of rural China. Villages typically have a high rate 

of ‘‘self-governance’’ with regard to issues such as land contracts, profit distribution from collectives, and land requisition 

compensation, and with limited decisionmaking power in village committees, women’s interests are less likely to be represented in village rules and regulations, as well as in land 

disputes. 

• The Chinese government is committed under Article 7 of the 

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 

Rights and Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of 

All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to ensuring gender equality in employment. While China’s existing laws such 

as the Labor Law, amended Law on the Protection of Women’s 

Rights and Interests, and Employment Promotion Law prohibit 

gender discrimination, they lack clear definitions and enforcement mechanisms, which weakens their effectiveness. Women 

continue to experience widespread discrimination in areas including recruitment, wages, and retirement. The Shenzhen 

Municipal Women’s Federation announced draft regulations 

during the Commission’s 2010 reporting year to promote gender equality in employment in the Shenzhen Special Economic 

Zone. 

• Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, and victims 

of sexual harassment face several legislative, cultural, and social obstacles in protecting their rights. China’s amended Law 

on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI) 

prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for victims through either administrative punishment 

for offenders or civil action in the people’s court system; however, the LPWRI does not provide a clear definition of sexual 

harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment. 

• Domestic violence remains pervasive, affecting nearly onethird of China’s 270 million families. Advocates continue to call 

for comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly defines 

domestic violence, assigns responsibilities to government and 

27 

civil society organizations to address it, and outlines punishments for offenders. The All-China Women’s Federation proposed draft national legislation this year, but it remains to be 

seen whether this or other such drafts are entered into the legislative agenda. 

• China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio, which some researchers attribute to government-imposed birth limits and a traditional cultural bias for sons, may lead to continued or 

increased forced prostitution, forced marriages, and human 

trafficking. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support programs in China that increase awareness of judicial and law enforcement personnel regarding domestic violence and sexual harassment and increase women’s leadership 

training through U.S.-China exchanges and international conferences. 

Æ Support legal programs that promote women’s land rights, 

especially in rural areas, and urge higher levels of government 

to increase supervision over village committees to ensure that 

village rules and regulations are in accordance with nationallevel laws and policies and to ensure adequate protection of 

women’s rights and interests. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to further revise the Law on 

the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests or enact new 

comprehensive national-level legislation to provide a clear definition of sexual harassment and specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment. Inquire into whether 

officials in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone have placed 

gender equality regulations on the legislative plan, whether 

they intend to make drafts available for public comment, and 

if so, how long the public comment period will be and to whom 

will they make drafts available for comment. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to enact comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly defines domestic violence, 

assigns responsibilities of government and civil society organizations in addressing it, and outlines punishments for offenders. Call for the release of such legislation in draft form for 

public comment. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to establish an enforcement 

mechanism for implementation of provisions in China’s Labor 

Law, amended Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and 

Interests, and Employment Promotion Law that prohibit 

gender discrimination. Urge Chinese officials to specifically address gender discrimination in recruitment, wages, and retirement. 

28 

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Findings 

• The Chinese government voted to accede to the UN Protocol 

to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 

2009, after several years of stating its intent to do so. 

• The legal definition of trafficking under Chinese law does not 

conform to international standards. Article 240 of China’s 

Criminal Law defines the trafficking of persons as ‘‘abducting, 

kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.’’ 

Because this definition is narrower in scope than the definition 

provided in Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol, it imposes limits 

on the Chinese government’s prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and funding of anti-trafficking programs. 

• China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination 

for human trafficking and abductions. The majority of trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. 

• The Chinese government continues to deport North Korean 

refugees under the classification of ‘‘economic migrants,’’ without legal alternatives for victims of trafficking. 

• The Chinese government made some efforts to eliminate 

trafficking and comply with trafficking-related international 

human rights standards during the Commission’s 2010 reporting period. Authorities investigated, prosecuted, and prevented 

some trafficking crimes, especially domestic trafficking cases, 

and those involving the abduction of women for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation. 

• In April 2010, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme 

People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the Opinion on Lawful 

Punishment for the Crime of Abducting and Selling Women 

and Children. The guideline may improve investigation and filing of cases involving the trafficking of women under 18 years 

of age. 

• Officials continued to take steps to increase collaboration 

with other countries, regions, and international organizations 

on victim identification, repatriation, and criminal prosecution. 

For example, some local governments in Yunnan province and 

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region set up liaison offices with 

the governments of bordering countries including Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia to cooperate on anti-trafficking efforts. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to abide by its commitment 

under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, revise the 

government’s definition of trafficking, and enact comprehensive 

29 

anti-trafficking legislation to align with international standards. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide more services for 

trafficking victims, particularly for Chinese citizens trafficked 

for labor exploitation and trafficked abroad. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to abide by its international 

obligations with regard to North Korean trafficking victims 

who are deported without legal alternatives to repatriation. 

Æ Support international and cross-border mechanisms that can 

help enhance the Chinese government’s collaboration with 

other countries, regions, and international organizations on 

victim identification, repatriation, and criminal prosecution. 

Æ Support legal assistance programs that advocate on behalf of 

both foreign and Chinese trafficking victims. 

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Findings 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, central and 

local authorities sustained efforts to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees in China. The 1951 Convention 

and its Protocol obligates the Chinese government to refrain 

from repatriating North Koreans in China who left the DPRK 

for fear of persecution, or who fear persecution upon return to 

the DPRK. 

• North Korean women along the Chinese border continue to 

be trafficked into forced marriage and the sex industry. The 

Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean 

women contravenes the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 

of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), 

as well as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 

and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol). The government’s failure to take 

adequate measures to prevent North Korean women from 

being trafficked contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of 

the UN TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 

(CEDAW). 

• Chinese local authorities near the border with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continued to deny 

household registration (hukou) to the children of North Korean 

women married to Chinese citizens. Without household registration, these children live in a stateless limbo and cannot access education and other social benefits. 

• Famine conditions in the DPRK have worsened since late 

2009, and food shortages during the Commission’s 2010 reporting year have been compared to the food crisis of the 1990s. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Establish a task force to examine and support the efforts of 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to gain unVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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fettered access to North Korean refugees in China, beginning 

with North Korean minors, and to recommend a strategy for 

creating incentives for China to honor its obligations under the 

1951 Convention and its Protocol to immediately cease detaining and repatriating North Koreans in China. 

Æ Urge central and local Chinese government officials to abide 

by their obligations under the UN TIP Protocol (Article 9) to 

prosecute human traffickers in northeastern China and along 

the border with the DPRK. 

Æ Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and related 

social benefits to North Korean women married to Chinese 

citizens and their children. In particular, urge local Chinese officials to allow these children to receive an education in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and the PRC 

Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). 

PUBLIC HEALTH

Findings 

• Authorities are beginning to implement goals outlined in the 

January 2009 10-year medical reform plan—such as initiating 

a pilot public hospital reform project in 16 cities and establishing a basic medicine system with an official list of approved 

pharmaceuticals—however, challenges remain in implementation. 

• Rural areas continue to lack adequate healthcare resources 

with which to serve local residents. 

• Residents of urban areas tend to have greater access to 

healthcare benefits; however, the growing population of migrant workers and their families who live in these areas but 

do not possess an urban hukou (household registration) still 

face difficulties in accessing basic health services. 

• Some children may go without household registration 

(hukou) in China because they are born ‘‘out of plan,’’ that is, 

not in compliance with birth limits imposed by population 

planning policies, and their parents do not pay the required 

fines. Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social 

benefits typically linked to the hukou, including subsidized 

healthcare and public education. 

• Discrimination and social stigma against people living with 

medical conditions such as infectious disease, physical disability, and mental illness remain commonplace. 

• Chinese non-governmental organizations and individual advocates continue to play a significant role in raising awareness 

about health concerns; however, Chinese authorities continue 

to suppress some forms of public health advocacy. 

• The Chinese government has committed to take steps to prevent, treat, and control infectious disease, but reports indicate 

that curtailing the spread of infectious diseases, especially in 

rural areas, has continued to present a significant challenge. 

31 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Urge the Chinese central government to work with local governments to ensure effective implementation of the healthcare 

reform plan. Local government cooperation is critical in achieving the projected goal of healthcare access for the entire population by the year 2020. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to encourage local governments to adopt and enforce measures and regulations that prohibit discrimination against migrant workers and provide 

equal access to social services. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to ease repression of public 

health advocates and provide more support to U.S. organizations that address public health issues in China. 

Æ Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective implementation of China’s Employment Promotion Law and related 

regulations that prohibit discrimination against persons living 

with HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses in hiring 

and in the workplace. 

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Findings 

• Chinese leaders signed the United Nations Copenhagen 

Accord, ‘‘with provisions for international consultations and 

analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that 

national sovereignty is respected,’’ and then in a separate action, they agreed to voluntarily ‘‘endeavor to lower its carbon 

dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45 percent by 2020 

compared to the 2005 level . . .’’ among other actions. China 

emphasized that its ‘‘autonomous domestic mitigation actions 

are voluntary in nature.’’ However, top Chinese leaders explained that they would include related binding targets in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2010–2015). 

• Chinese leaders continued to emphasize China’s reliance on 

domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of its greenhouse gas emissions and reductions; nevertheless, Chinese 

leaders have signaled a willingness to discuss greater transparency. 

• China has made domestic regulatory and institutional efforts, as well as engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperative 

programs to improve the measurement, collection, analysis, 

and reporting of energy and greenhouse gas data. However, the 

reliability and transparency of China’s energy and greenhouse 

gas emission data are still in question. 

• Without adequate procedural protections, implementation of 

climate change mitigation policy may place the rights of vulnerable groups, including the rural poor and ethnic minorities, 

especially resettled citizens, at risk. Hydroelectric dam construction has been accompanied by lack of attention to environmental impact assessment processes mandated by law, and by 

reports of the infringement upon the fundamental rights of 

32 

local populations. Planned rapid acceleration of the pace of development of nuclear and hydroelectric projects heightens these 

concerns going forward. 

• China incorporated language related to climate change and 

the environment in its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), including one overarching principle touching 

upon the broad themes of sustainable development and guaranteeing the ‘‘public’s environmental rights.’’ The HRAP does 

not detail the nature of these rights. In addition, the HRAP 

contains several specific pollution and climate change action 

objectives that are similar to some of the goals stipulated in 

China’s previous national economic development, renewable 

energy, and climate change plans. 

• A report released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in February 2010 on a national pollution source 

census conducted in China, which for the first time included 

data from agricultural and other sources of pollution, revealed 

some discrepancies with past official figures for several pollutants. The census figure for Chemical Oxygen Demand, for example, was nearly double the amount that was previously reported. 

• Limitations on citizen access to information, including pollution and related data, hinder efforts to raise environmental 

awareness, promote public participation, and develop incentives for compliance. Limits on access to remedies for environmental harms and selective or arbitrary enforcement weaken 

environmental compliance efforts. 

• Limited public participation in decisionmaking processes and 

selective suppression of citizen demands for a cleaner environment also weaken compliance efforts and contribute to citizen 

dissatisfaction. In several incidents, authorities harassed, detained, or sentenced citizens for their environmental activism, 

for allegedly organizing antipollution demonstrations, or for ‘‘illegally’’ gathering environmental information. In one notable 

case, officials ordered Jigme Namgyal, a citizen living in the 

Tibet Autonomous Region, to serve one year and nine months’ 

reeducation through labor for ‘‘harming national security’’ by 

illegally gathering information and video material on the local 

environment, by collecting ‘‘propaganda’’ material ‘‘from the 

Dalai Clique,’’ and for allegedly organizing local residents to 

conduct ‘‘irregular petitioning’’ of authorities, among other 

charges. 

• Numerous other factors, including the priority attached to 

economic development, have led to compliance challenges that 

hinder the realization of some of the government’s environmental protection goals. Lack of accountability, corruption, 

local governmental protectionism, and malfeasance impede implementation and enforcement. 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, a quasi-nongovernmental organization overseen by the MEP brought the 

first environmental administrative public interest lawsuit by 

such a group to a special environmental court, opening the 

door to the possibility that other non-governmental groups 

33 

could bring such lawsuits in an effort to improve compliance 

with environmental laws. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support U.S. Government cooperation with the Chinese 

government and other educational programs geared toward 

raising awareness among Chinese officials of how to implement 

climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and environmental protection policies effectively without transgressing 

on fundamental rights. 

Æ Support U.S. Government engagement with relevant ministries in developing China’s capacity to reliably measure, report, publicize, and verify emission reduction strategies and 

techniques. Encourage Chinese officials to make government 

and expert research reports regarding climate change and its 

impacts in China public and easily accessible. 

Æ Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing citizens, such as Jigme Namgyal, Wu Lihong, and Sun Xiaodi, for 

their grassroots environmental activism, or for utilizing official 

and institutionalized channels to voice their environmental 

grievances or to protect their rights. 

Æ Support efforts in China by those working to strengthen environmental complaint and dispute resolution mechanisms and 

support bilateral cooperation in this area. Strengthen cooperation regarding environmental health. Include environmental 

issues in the Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue and expand cooperation on rule of law education with specific focus on issues 

pertaining to the environment. 

Æ Invite U.S. domestic environmental civil society organizations and urge the Chinese government to invite Chinese environmental civil society organizations as participants or observers 

in bilateral climate change and environmental protection 

projects and dialogues. Invite Chinese local-level leaders, including those from counties, townships, and villages, to the 

United States to observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to problem solving. 

Æ Engage local leaders in their efforts to reconcile development 

and environmental protection goals. Call upon U.S. cities with 

sister-city relationships in China to incorporate environmental 

awareness and advocacy, environmental protection, and climate change components into their programs. When making 

arrangements for travel to China, request meetings with officials from central and local levels of the Chinese government 

to discuss environmental governance and best practices. 

Æ Support multilateral exchanges regarding environmental 

enforcement and compliance tools including environmental insurance, market mechanisms, criminal prosecution of serious 

environmental infringements, and public interest litigation 

mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen environmental impact assessment processes and citizen participation 

in those processes. Engage Chinese officials in devising a realVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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istic and fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution. 

Æ Establish a Working Group on Climate Change Policy, the 

Rule of Law and Human Rights in accordance with Section 

II(B) of the Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and Environment between the Government of the United States of America and the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China (the MOU) 

signed during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 

held in July 2009. (Section II(B) of the MOU states that, ‘‘[t]he 

Participants may establish working groups or task forces involving relevant ministries as necessary to support the objectives of the Climate Change Policy Dialogue and Cooperation.’’) 

CIVIL SOCIETY

Findings 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the number of 

civil society organizations (CSOs)—including organizational 

forms that most nearly correspond to the Western concept of 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—participating in legal 

and policymaking activities in areas that are not politically 

sensitive continued to increase gradually. At the same time, organizations and individuals who worked on politically sensitive 

issues continued to face challenges. 

• NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling complicated and 

cumbersome registration requirements. In order to operate legally, an organization is required to obtain sponsorship agreement from a public administration department in a relevant 

‘‘trade, scientific or other professional area’’ at the appropriate 

level of government before registering with the Ministry of 

Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship agreements are sometimes 

difficult to obtain because local sponsors are sometimes reluctant to take on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities. 

NGOs that do not fulfill these ‘‘dual management’’ requirements are not protected under the law and are prohibited from 

receiving outside donations. In part to circumvent the burdens 

of fulfilling dual management requirements, some NGOs opt to 

register as commercial entities, though such actions could also 

subject them to targeted or selective oversight from the government as well as higher tax rates. 

• Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish and operate 

NGOs that focus on issues deemed by officials to be sensitive 

faced intimidation, harassment, and punishment from government authorities. During this reporting year, for example, Chinese officials repeatedly harassed and interfered with the 

operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization that Wan 

Yanhai—a public health researcher and advocate—founded in 

1994. Authorities reportedly canceled the group’s seminar 

marking the International Sex Worker Rights Day, conducted 

an unannounced investigation into the group’s tax records, and 

sent fire department officials to carry out random and unannounced safety inspections. Wan ultimately left China for the 

35 

United States in May 2010, saying that he had concerns for his 

personal safety. 

• During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to tighten its control over ‘‘sensitive’’ civil society groups 

through selective enforcement of regulations. In March 2010, 

China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) put 

into effect a circular concerning ‘‘foreign exchange donated to 

or by domestic institutions,’’ which made it difficult for some 

Chinese organizations, including NGOs, to accept overseas donations. The circular required organizations, when applying to 

receive foreign donations through SAFE, to also submit their 

business licenses, notarized donation agreements, and certificates of registration of the overseas donating organizations. 

One member of the Chinese NGO community explained that 

the problem is not primarily a matter of how social groups actually collect their funding, but rather the authorities’ selective 

enforcement of the rules, depending on what the group does. 

• Despite an overall trend of tighter control, at least one case 

of limited localized reform took place: In Shenzhen, the MCA 

signed an agreement with the local government to explore the 

establishment of a system allowing CSOs to apply and register 

directly with the MCA. The reforms could potentially lead to 

a system where the MCA will supervise and regulate organizations alone, without sponsoring organizations, making it possible for future individuals wishing to form organizations, including NGOs, to have a relatively less complicated one-stop 

shop process rather than the existing ‘‘dual management’’ 

setup. 

• The Chinese government in July 2009 issued ‘‘working 

guidelines’’ for social organizations (shehui tuanti) seeking eligibility to receive tax-deductible donations. Social organizations are one of the three main types of CSOs in China. The 

other two primary types of CSOs in China are foundations 

(jijinhui) and private nonenterprise organizations (minban fei 

qiye danwei). The working guidelines issued last July further 

clarified the standards for determining the eligibility of social 

organizations for tax-deductible donations. At the same time, 

they continued to limit the number of eligible social organizations. The working guidelines also did not alter existing regulations requiring all CSOs to register with the government. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Encourage the Chinese government to broaden the recent 

reforms relating to registration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other aspects of civil affairs in Guangdong 

province and to make them applicable to other parts of the 

country through national legislation and regulatory development. 

Æ Ask the Chinese government to refrain from applying uneven or selective enforcement of regulations to intimidate 

groups that they consider to be handling sensitive work. ReVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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quest the Chinese government revisit the recently issued State 

Administration of Foreign Exchange circular concerning overseas donations to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that 

NGOs are actually a way for citizens to channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn contribute to the maintenance of a stable society. Conversely, stricter controls over civil 

society organizations could remove a potentially useful social 

‘‘safety valve,’’ thereby increasing the sources of instability. 

During discussions with Chinese officials, mention the 

Tsinghua University report that made the same findings: that 

even as the government increased spending on public security 

and tightened its control over civil society, social conflicts are 

happening with greater regularity. 

Æ Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international 

conferences and forums, and support training opportunities in 

the United States to build their leadership capacity in nonprofit management, public policy advocacy, strategic planning, 

and media relations. 

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Findings 

• The Communist Party exercises control over political affairs, 

government, and society through networks of Party committees 

or branches that exist at all administrative levels within governmental, legislative, judicial, and security organizations; 

major social groups (including unions); enterprises (both domestic and foreign-invested); most residential communities; 

and the People’s Liberation Army. During the Commission’s 

2010 reporting year, Chinese leaders emphasized expanding 

and strengthening the Party, focusing in part on establishing 

or strengthening Party branches at the local level and in nongovernment organizations, the military, and academic institutions. 

• During the 2010 reporting year, isolated experiments with 

intraparty democracy took place around the country. In some 

of these experiments, Party officials used the ‘‘open recommendation, direct election’’ method, whereby Party officials 

elicit comments from the public on specific candidates, but only 

Party members, not the general public, cast ballots for the 

Party committee, Party branch, and residents’ committee members and leaders already approved by Party officials at the 

next highest administrative level. Party authorities in various 

locations experimented with election monitoring systems during intraparty elections for residents’ committee members and 

leaders. 

• During this reporting year, Party and central government 

leaders continued activities to strengthen some controls over 

society and to ‘‘safeguard stability.’’ Local governments charged 

with the work of ‘‘maintaining social stability’’ continued to establish specialized institutions including ‘‘stability preservation 

offices’’ and ‘‘comprehensive governance offices.’’ Officials reportedly continued to expand networks of informants to pinVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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point potential ‘‘social instability’’ and to establish ‘‘stability 

preservation funds’’ (weiwen jijin) from which they make payments to people with grievances ostensibly in order to preempt 

their escalating disputes. 

• Chinese leaders made public statements emphasizing the 

leading role of the Party, the need to adhere to China’s unique 

style of ‘‘socialist democracy,’’ and the impossibility of implementing ‘‘Western-style’’ democracy with a separation of powers and competing political parties. Direct elections for local 

people’s congress representatives are held only at the county 

level and direct elections for ‘‘village committees’’ are held only 

at the village level, and leaders emphasized that direct elections would not be held at higher administrative levels. 

• Some citizens and social groups demanded that the Party 

and government undertake democratic reforms and human 

rights protections. Some of these requests were met with official reprisal, including harassment, detention, and, in some 

cases, harsh prison sentences. Chinese authorities continued to 

have no tolerance for, arrested, and imposed sentences on individuals involved in political parties not sanctioned by the Communist Party. For example, a court in Jiangsu province sentenced Guo Quan, formerly a university professor, to 10 years 

in prison for ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ The court found that 

Guo used the Internet to organize an ‘‘illegal’’ political party 

called the ‘‘China New Democracy Party,’’ among other 

charges. 

• The National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee 

conducted two reviews of proposed draft revisions to China’s 

Organic Law on Villagers’ Committees. Proposed amendments 

could potentially resolve the difficulties villagers have in removing village committee members, make it easier to convene 

villager meetings, and strengthen villager oversight of village 

affairs. In addition, they could also strengthen Party control at 

the village level. 

• Local areas continued to experiment with village committee 

election procedures, although implementation problems with 

village elections persisted. During this reporting year, Chinese 

authorities developed plans to improve governance in ‘‘difficult 

villages,’’ which are villages where, among other problems, 

leaders do not support or have delayed holding village committee elections for a long time, where there have been longstanding tensions between leaders and villagers, or where 

citizens have taken their grievances to higher level officials. 

• The Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Wu 

Bangguo, mentioned that the NPC and NPC Standing Committee would increase supervision over governmental affairs 

through ‘‘inquiry and question’’ procedures, which, though in 

the past have been used rarely, focused this year on ‘‘issues of 

broad concern to NPC delegates’’ and the oversight of economic 

policy. The NPC and NPC Standing Committee ‘‘will invite responsible cadres from the State Council and related departments to attend meetings and listen to suggestions, respond to 

inquiries, and answer questions.’’ The NPC Standing Committee passed the revised Electoral Law in March 2010, which 

38 

now awards the same proportion of NPC deputies per population to both rural and urban areas. In the past, urban residents enjoyed greater representation. One county in Sichuan 

province piloted experiments with full-time professional local 

people’s congress deputies. 

• Chinese officials describe China’s political system as a ‘‘socialist democracy’’ with ‘‘multi-party cooperation’’ and ‘‘political 

consultation’’ under the leadership of the Communist Party. 

Consultation reportedly takes place at both the national and 

the local levels. During this reporting year, authorities in 

Guangzhou municipality issued new rules that provide for political consultation between the municipal Party committee and 

members of the local people’s political consultative conference 

and local branches of the eight ‘‘approved’’ political parties regarding laws, regulations, and some policies of broad public interest. 

• During this reporting year, authorities pledged in the 2009– 

2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) to more 

stringently implement anticorruption measures. Central and 

local Party and government entities also issued new or revised 

corruption prevention measures, some focusing on strengthening and expanding the system of reporting officials’ personal 

finances. Chinese authorities have taken additional steps to 

encourage reporting of corruption. Whistleblower protections, 

however, remain inadequate. 

• Citizens and groups are increasingly able to access various 

channels such as public hearings, expert meetings, 

roundtables, and the Internet to express opinions regarding 

proposed policies and regulatory instruments. Authorities reportedly have made 67 administrative legal measures available 

for public comment since 2004. However, citizens still have little direct access to political decisionmaking processes above the 

village level (village elections) and the county level (people’s 

congress representative elections). 

• During this reporting year, at least some cities implemented 

a national directive issued in 2008 stipulating that cities and 

counties expand the scope of public hearings to solicit citizen 

opinions regarding laws, regulations, provisions, and major 

government administrative policies that are relevant to the interests of citizens. Citizens and the media continue to express 

concerns regarding the implementation and impact of public 

hearings. Questions remain regarding the depth and breadth of 

participation, and the processes for compiling, assessing, and 

incorporating public suggestions are still not transparent. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in people’s 

congress and village committee elections, including expansion 

of domestic election monitoring systems and training of domestic election monitors. 

39 

Æ Support exchanges between Members of the U.S. Congress 

and members of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, especially in 

relation to Congressional oversight processes. 

Æ Support projects that seek to work with local governments 

in their efforts to improve transparency and accountability, especially efforts to expand and improve China’s open government information initiatives. Such projects might include joint 

efforts to better publicize the Open Government Information 

(OGI) Regulations at local levels and train citizens and groups 

in how to submit OGI requests. 

Æ Support projects that assist local governments, academics, 

and the nonprofit sector in expanding and making more transparent the use of public hearings and other channels for citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking process. 

Such projects might include an exchange program component, 

whereby Chinese local government officials and non-governmental organization representatives would travel together to 

the United States to attend town hall or public meetings that 

address significant issues. Such projects might also include 

pilot projects in China that make the processes through which 

citizens submit suggestions to authorities about draft laws, 

regulations, or policies more transparent, by making the suggestions submitted to authorities available to the public. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained 

or imprisoned for exercising their right to call for political reform within China, including Liu Xiaobo (signer of Charter 08 

who was sentenced to 11 years in prison in December 2009 for 

‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’), Guo Quan, and other people mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political 

Prisoner Database. 

COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW

Findings 

• The Chinese government has increasingly relied on industrial policies rather than the market to direct economic growth. 

These industrial policies are comprehensive frameworks for development in key sectors of the Chinese economy, providing for 

subsidies and other benefits, plans for restructuring the stateowned companies in the relevant sector, and export goals. Benefits outlined under the policies may discriminate against 

foreign-invested companies to the benefit of China’s stateowned enterprises. In some cases, provisions of the policies 

have been found not to comply with World Trade Organization 

(WTO) requirements, such as provisions in the auto industrial 

plan concerning import of auto parts, which a WTO dispute 

panel found to violate the WTO rules in a case decided in 2008. 

The Chinese government revised the policy, effective September 2009. China’s use of industrial policies has been coupled with increasing protectionism by the Chinese government. 

• The Chinese government has promoted ‘‘indigenous innovation’’ as a massive government campaign utilizing industrial 

policies and government procurement to decrease reliance on 

40 

foreign technology, and to enhance China’s economy and national security, with the stated purpose of enabling China to 

become a global leader in technology by mid-century. In November 2009, three government departments issued the Circular on Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation 

Accreditation Work. Products that satisfy the standards set 

forth in the circular may be entitled to certain preferences in 

government procurement. The initial draft of the circular provided that, in order to qualify for these preferences, products 

(1) must be produced by an enterprise in China that owns the 

intellectual property; (2) must be covered by a trademark that 

was first registered in China by a Chinese company; (3) must 

be innovative and internationally competitive; and (4) must 

meet Chinese technical standards. In April 2010, the Ministry 

of Science and Technology issued a revised version of the 

circular relaxing the requirements for Chinese ownership of 

intellectual property rights, and allowing products based on 

technology and trademarks licensed to a licensee in China to 

qualify. Questions remain concerning the implementation of 

the revised circular, however, including the resolution of conflicts between national- and local-level decisions on indigenous 

innovation. 

• The Chinese government has encouraged indigenous innovation for several years. Indigenous innovation is one of the 

‘‘guiding principles’’ of China’s National Medium- and LongTerm Program for Science and Technology Development (2006– 

2020), and China explicitly called for indigenous innovation in 

government procurement in the 2007 Administrative Measures 

for Government Procurement of Imported Parts, which provide 

that procurement of imported parts should facilitate indigenous innovation by bringing into China technologies that 

China then can assimilate. In some cases, industrial policies 

call for indigenous innovation, such as the 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, which calls for indigenous innovation in the auto 

sector. 

• Chinese government departments in charge of implementing 

China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML), which took effect in August 

2008, have continued to flesh out the regulatory regime. The 

Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) passed two sets of measures 

on mergers, which came into effect in January 2010. In May 

2010, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 

(SAIC) issued for comment three drafts concerning (1) monopoly 

agreements, or uncompetitive agreements, (2) abuse of dominance, and (3) administrative monopoly, or anticompetitive behavior by government authorities. The MOFCOM measures 

cover reporting of proposed concentrations, and investigations. 

The drafts issued by the SAIC expand on provisions of the 

AML and provide guidance on the regulators’ methodology. 

• Although one of the purposes of the AML is to protect fair 

competition in the Chinese market, this may conflict with 

China’s industrial policies encouraging the mergers of large 

state-owned enterprises into larger enterprise groups and the 

protection of state-owned enterprises in general. For example, 

the Auto Industrial Policy calls for the development of large 

41 

auto enterprise groups, and the 2009 Program for the Adjustment and Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry calls for the formation of two to three large auto groups and four to five smaller ones, through a process of takeovers and reorganization. In 

the period since the AML came into effect in August 2008 to 

the end of 2009, MOFCOM has completed 60 merger reviews, 

6 of which MOFCOM approved with conditions, and 1 of which 

MOFCOM blocked. MOFCOM only publishes rulings on mergers that it rejects or approves with conditions, so it is difficult 

to tell whether the parties to unconditionally approved mergers 

are state-owned enterprises or non-Chinese companies. Of the 

published cases, however, six involved mergers between nonChinese parties. 

• During the Commission’s last (2009) reporting year, China 

passed the Food Safety Law and implementing legislation. The 

law called for the creation of a National Food Safety Commission to coordinate the work of government departments with 

responsibility for food safety. During this reporting year, in 

February 2010, the State Council established this commission, 

with Vice Premier Li Keqiang as chairman and high-level 

members of relevant departments as commission members. 

The government also continued to issue regulations on food 

safety, including regulations on food additives and catering. 

China passed a Tort Liability Law in December 2009, which 

came into effect in July 2010. The Tort Liability Law covers 

product liability and product recalls, and, if implemented faithfully and effectively, may provide tools for victims of food safety violations to seek redress. 

• China’s economic development has led to increased need for 

land, and income from land sales has been an important source 

of revenue for local governments. In some cases, these factors 

have been associated with abuse by local governments and 

property developers, including widespread demolitions and 

forced evictions. Forced evictions are contrary to Article 11(1) 

of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which covenant China has ratified. Some property owners who refuse to leave their homes have been beaten, 

harassed, or illegally detained. 

• In some cases, property rights owners receive poor procedural protection and inadequate compensation when their land 

is expropriated. There is evidence of collusion in some cases between property developers and local governments, which may 

receive as much as 60 percent of their revenue from land sales, 

to seize land from its occupants for sale to the developers. Furthermore, though China’s 2007 Property Law and China’s 2004 

Law on Administration of Urban Real Property both provide 

that local governments should only expropriate land in the 

‘‘public interest,’’ this term is not defined in law. Currently, the 

2001 Regulations on Government Housing Demolition in 

Urban Areas, which govern land requisitions, do not include 

any requirement that expropriations of land be in the public 

interest, and lack sufficient procedural protections for property 

rights owners. In December 2009, five Peking University law 

professors sent an open letter to the National People’s ConVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
42 

gress calling for the repeal or amendment of the 2001 regulations, which the professors said violated China’s Constitution 

and Property Law. In January 2010, the State Council Legal 

Affairs Office published for public comment draft Regulations 

for Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings 

on State-Owned Land, which require that, in most cases, 

expropriation must be in the public interest, and offer some 

guidance as to what constitutes ‘‘public interest.’’ The draft 

regulations, which have not yet been finalized, fall short in 

that they allow some expropriations that are not in the public 

interest, and do not offer any protection to rural land dwellers. 

• Rural land is owned by collectives, and farmers legally can 

enter into 30-year contracts with their collectives for use of collectively owned land. However, there is little protection for 

farmers. In some cases, the collectives take back land and ‘‘reallocate’’ it to others. In other cases, village leaders, developers, 

and local governments conspire to take the land and change it 

into what is characterized as ‘‘urban land,’’ which the local government can then sell. Although the farmers are legally entitled to compensation, procedures are not clearly spelled out; in 

some cases, very little of the compensation may reach them 

and they are left destitute. The draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings on StateOwned Land do not cover collectively owned land, and at least 

one of the Peking University professors who called for repeal 

or amendment of the 2001 regulations has warned that this is 

a problem. Nonetheless, Chinese authorities have not proposed 

similar legislation to protect rural land dwellers. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Develop and support a project surveying the role of China’s 

industrial policies in the Chinese economy from the perspective 

of WTO requirements, including how the development of these 

policies and the role they play in directing China’s economy, 

impact the development of transparency and rule of law and 

China’s compliance with its international legal commitments. 

Æ Make a formal request to the Chinese government through 

bilateral meetings such as the Joint Commission on Commerce 

and Trade or the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or through 

the inquiry points of the Chinese government departments responsible for indigenous innovation policy, for details of plans, 

policies, regulations, measures, and other legislation relating to 

indigenous innovation, and explanations as to how these have 

been or will be implemented. This information will facilitate 

understanding of the full impact of China’s indigenous innovation policy on China’s legal system and government procurement practices. 

Æ Request through the Open Government Information office at 

the Ministry of Commerce, or through bilateral dialogues 

between the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 

Commission and their Chinese counterparts, details on merger 

43 

applications reviewed since the Antimonopoly Law came into 

effect, including the number of applications involving non-Chinese companies, the number involving state-owned enterprises, 

and the results of each of the merger reviews. 

Æ Arrange meetings under the auspices of legal exchanges 

such as the U.S. Legal Exchange under the Joint Commission 

on Commerce and Trade, or through the American Bar Association, between U.S. tort lawyers and Chinese lawyers on consumer rights and compensation for victims of substandard food 

products, and the U.S. system of redress through the courts 

and government departments in cases of food quality problems. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government in meetings and correspondence to (1) revise the draft Regulations for Expropriation and 

Compensation of Residential Buildings on State-Owned Land 

to clarify that expropriation is allowed only in the public interest, (2) issue the final version and put it into effect immediately, and (3) ensure that the draft regulations are amended 

to provide comparable protection for rural land dwellers, or 

draft equivalent legislation to protect the rights of rural land 

dwellers. Property owners whose land was expropriated in the 

period between the date the draft was published and the effective date of the regulations and any comparable legislation for 

rural land should be given an opportunity to challenge the expropriation. 

Æ Arrange and support a program of technical assistance for 

Chinese government departments responsible for land management, concerning U.S. procedures and standards for taking 

property by eminent domain. Such assistance would highlight 

the meaning under U.S. law of takings in the ‘‘public interest,’’ 

and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments working with their sister cities in China. 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to put in place comprehensive 

legislation to clarify rural land titles and to provide legal assistance at the grassroots or through pro bono programs at law 

firms, to rural land dwellers to help them protect their rights 

to collectively owned land. Working through organizations such 

as the American Bar Association, encourage the All China 

Lawyers Association to develop a comprehensive and independent legal aid program to address rural land issues. 

Æ Help the Chinese government address issues with rural land 

rights and land transfer by developing and supporting a program under which U.S. local or state governments responsible 

for land titles participate in face-to-face meetings and exchanges with local authorities in China. This training would 

cover title registration, transfer, and dispute settlement. 

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Findings 

• Public security officials and those working under their direction used abductions, physical violence, or threats of physical 

violence to harass and intimidate human rights lawyers during 

the Commission’s 2010 reporting year. Chinese government officials continued to use license suspension and disbarment as 

44 

a means to control and repress human rights lawyers who 

work on politically sensitive issues. 

• Amendments to the State Compensation Law, if implemented faithfully, may expand channels whereby individuals 

who have been subjected to the abuse of administrative authority may obtain compensation. Amendments to the Administrative Supervision Law, if implemented faithfully, may improve 

protections for whistleblowers. Other proposed administrative 

law reforms may, if passed and implemented faithfully, provide 

greater oversight of state agencies, improved protection of citizen interests, and enhanced supervision of government employees. 

• During the 2010 reporting year, large numbers of petitioners, i.e., individuals availing themselves of China’s xinfang 

(‘‘letters and visits’’) system—an alternative to courts whereby 

citizens may seek redress for grievances by submitting petitions to government authorities were harassed, abused, put in 

illegal ‘‘black jails,’’ locked up in psychiatric hospitals, or sent 

to reeducation through labor centers. 

• Chinese officials limited Chinese citizens’ and foreign visitors’ lawful access to justice in sensitive cases. In July 2010, 

a Beijing court sentenced American geologist Xue Feng to eight 

years in prison for helping the American company he worked 

for purchase commercial information on oil wells in China. Although the court claimed the information constituted a state 

secret and endangered national security, officials reportedly 

did not declare the information a state secret until after the 

transaction had occurred. During the more than two-year period of Xue’s detention, Chinese officials attempted to coerce 

him into confessing to the crime by allegedly torturing him and 

committed several violations of China’s Criminal Procedure 

Law. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Object to the continued harassment of human rights lawyers 

and defenders. Call for the release of lawyers, activists, and 

others who are incarcerated, subject to unlawful home confinement, or who have disappeared for their activities to defend 

and promote the rights of Chinese citizens, including Gao 

Zhisheng, Hu Jia, and Zheng Enchong, as well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 

Æ Support the U.S. State Department’s International Visitors 

Leadership Program and other similar bilateral exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, 

and scholars to the United States for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the non-governmental organization 

(NGO) and academic sectors that partner with China’s human 

rights lawyers and nonprofit legal organizations. 

Æ Support research and technical exchange programs designed 

to improve implementation of administrative law reforms, 

45 

prioritizing those that will provide greater oversight of government agencies and grant more protections to Chinese citizens. 

Support NGOs with programming to build capacity among 

petitioners. Support research and exchanges that examine incentive structures that can lead to the punishment of whistleblowers and the stifling of citizen expressions of legitimate 

grievances. 

Æ Communicate concerns about possible official political abuse 

of psychiatric treatment and politically motivated commitment 

of petitioners to psychiatric hospitals in China to the American 

Psychiatric Association, the Geneva Initiative on Psychiatry, 

and the World Medical Association. Urge Chinese officials to 

adopt a national mental health law that will specifically clarify 

the process of involuntary commitment and protect individuals 

from being hospitalized by public security officials. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to release Xue Feng and 

permit him to return to the United States. Call on the Chinese 

government, in the interim, to ensure that U.S. officials are 

permitted to meet with him on a regular basis. 

XINJIANG

Findings 

• Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened during the Commission’s 2010 

reporting year. Following government suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, authorities instituted unprecedented levels of control over the 

free flow of information, denying XUAR residents and the outside world news about conditions in the region and increasing 

the government’s capacity to manipulate information. Amid 

this information blackout, authorities strengthened security 

measures and campaigns to promote ‘‘ethnic unity,’’ using them 

to quell free speech, curb independent religious activity, and 

impose intrusive controls over the lives of XUAR residents. 

• Authorities singled out Uyghurs in particular in security 

campaigns, and the whereabouts of some Uyghurs detained in 

the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots remain unknown. Trials connected to events in July have been 

marked by a lack of transparency and violations of due process. 

Authorities detained, and in some cases, imprisoned, Uyghur 

Web site workers and a journalist in connection to free speech 

about the events and about broader conditions in the XUAR. 

• Central government and Communist Party authorities inaugurated a ‘‘central work forum’’ on the XUAR in May 2010 that 

sets central government and Party objectives for the region’s 

economic and political development, intensifying a trend of topdown initiatives that prioritize state economic and political 

goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and broader 

protections of XUAR residents’ rights. 

• The government enforced other policies and measures that 

also fueled worsening human rights conditions in the region, 

including measures aimed at quelling dissent, promoting assimilation, and repressing independent expressions of ethnic 

46 

and religious identity, especially among the Uyghurs. The 

XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language in XUAR 

schools, in violation of Chinese law. As in past years, some 

population planning policies in the region singled out non-Han 

ethnic groups. The government continued work to transfer 

Uyghur and other non-Han workers to jobs in the interior of 

China, through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by 

coercion and abusive practices. Uyghurs and other groups 

within the XUAR remained subject to hiring practices that 

have allowed widespread discrimination against non-Han 

groups. Ongoing work to ‘‘reconstruct’’ the historic Old City 

section of Kashgar continued to undermine Uyghurs’ right to 

preserve their cultural heritage. Repression of Islam in the 

XUAR worsened. [For more information on conditions for religious freedom in the XUAR, see Findings and Recommendations on Freedom of Religion in this section.] 

• Uyghurs seeking asylum outside China continued to face 

barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and risk of 

refoulement under the sway of China’s influence in neighboring countries and its disregard for international law, as illustrated by the Cambodian government’s deportation of 20 

Uyghur asylum seekers to China in December 2009, following 

Chinese government intervention. 

• Repressive government controls throughout the region, especially those targeting Uyghurs, illustrated the status of the 

XUAR as a government-designated ethnic autonomous region 

that lacks true autonomy, particularly for the group in whose 

name it was established. Despite guarantees in Chinese law 

for measures of autonomy in governance and protections for 

ethnic minority rights, central and local government authorities exert control at a level antithetical to local residents’ 

meaningful control over their own affairs and to the protection 

of their rights. Chinese government actions violate not only 

Chinese law but also international human rights law that the 

Chinese government is bound to uphold. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources 

for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting 

Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human rights. 

Æ Raise concern about human rights conditions in the XUAR 

to Chinese officials and condemn the use of information blackouts and security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on 

the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for their personal connection to rights 

advocates, including Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 

years in prison for allegedly ‘‘inciting racial hatred or discrimination’’ or ‘‘inciting splittism’’ after writing a short story); Alim 

47 

and Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya 

Kadeer, sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, 

respectively, for alleged economic and ‘‘splittist’’ crimes); and 

other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide details about 

each person detained, charged, tried, or sentenced in connection with demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, 

including each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each 

person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., 

procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the name of 

each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned. Encourage people who have been wrongfully detained to file for compensation. Call on the Chinese government to ensure people 

suspected of crimes in connection to events in July 2009 are 

able to hire a lawyer and exercise their right to employ legal 

defense in accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, and to ensure suspects can employ legal 

defense of their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government 

to announce the judgments in all trials connected to events in 

July 2009, as required under Article 163 of China’s Criminal 

Procedure Law. Call on the government to allow independent 

experts to conduct independent examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to allow them access to the trials 

connected to these events. 

Æ Support U.S. government funding for non-governmental organizations that address human rights issues in the XUAR to 

enable them to continue to gather information on conditions in 

the region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase 

their capacity to preserve their rights and protect their culture, 

language, and heritage. Support funding for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the XUAR and gathering news 

from the region to expand their capacity to report on the region 

and provide uncensored information to XUAR residents. 

Æ Call on the Chinese government to support development 

policies in the XUAR that promote the broad protection of 

XUAR residents’ rights and allow the XUAR government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy in making development 

decisions. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that not only promotes economic growth 

but also respects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR 

residents and engages these communities in participatory decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into account the 

particular needs and input of non-Han ethnic groups, who have 

faced unique challenges protecting their rights in the face of 

top-down development policies and who have not been full 

beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. 

Æ Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees with Chinese officials 

and with officials from international refugee agencies and from 

transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on 

Chinese officials and officials from transit or destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee and 

citizenship designations of other countries. Call on transit and 

48 

destination countries to abide by requirements in the 1951 

Convention on the Status of Refugees and the Convention 

against Torture on refoulement. 

TIBET

Findings 

• During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 

government and Communist Party pressed the ‘‘core interest’’ 

policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and 

diminish or end his international influence. The policy is based 

on Chinese assertions that ‘‘Tibet’’ is one of China’s two ‘‘core 

interests’’ (‘‘Taiwan’’ is the other); the Dalai Lama is a separatist; and other governments therefore should not permit the 

Dalai Lama to enter their countries and thereby threaten China’s ‘‘territorial integrity.’’ The policy operates in tandem with 

the Party’s domestic campaign to isolate Tibetans in China 

from the Dalai Lama. The results of such government policies 

could include further increases of human rights abuses of Tibetans concurrent with a decrease in the ability of the international community to detect, document, and respond to such 

abuses. 

• The 25-member Party Political Bureau (Politburo) met in 

January to formulate a ‘‘new general strategy for governing 

Tibet’’ based on the notion of ‘‘four adherences’’ that emphasizes the high degree of subordination imposed on local ethnic 

autonomous governments established under China’s Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. One ‘‘adherence’’ reaffirms the Party’s intention to continue the policy of creating 

a Tibet where the fundamental objectives are Chinese but 

where some ‘‘Tibetan traits’’ will remain. Formulation of a 

‘‘new’’ Tibetan governance strategy by a body made up of the 

highest ranking representatives of central Party and government power, and lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates 

the poor implementation of ‘‘ethnic autonomy’’ in the Tibetan 

autonomous areas of China. 

• The Politburo Standing Committee presided in January over 

the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum), applying the highest imprimatur of political power to achieving sweeping economic, social, and cultural policy objectives for the Tibetan 

areas of China by 2020. The Fifth Forum expanded the Party’s 

Tibet policy purview beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR) to include the Tibetan autonomous areas in Qinghai, 

Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The policy change 

more than doubles the number of Tibetans who live within the 

forum’s contiguous target area, and nearly doubles the area 

subject to central-level policy coordination. Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao outlined goals that 

prioritize changes to rural Tibetan areas, where most Tibetans 

live. Heightened emphasis on the link between rural development and regional stability follows Tibetan farmers’ and herders’ participation in the wave of protests (and some rioting) 

that began in March 2008. 

49 

• The Dalai Lama’s envoys arrived in China for the ninth 

round of formal dialogue with Party officials in January 2010, 

less than one week after the Fifth Forum concluded. The 15- 

month interval between the eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts resumed in 2002. 

Neither side reported substantive progress, both sides reiterated key positions, and the Party added more preconditions on 

the Dalai Lama, but dialogue participants referred to certain 

developments in a positive manner. A senior Party official 

praised the ‘‘better attitude’’ of the Dalai Lama’s Special 

Envoy, and the Special Envoy referred favorably to the Fifth 

Forum decision to consider development issues throughout all 

Tibetan autonomous areas. 

• The Dalai Lama expressed deepening alarm about the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China, saying in March that 

‘‘monasteries function more like museums and are intended to 

deliberately annihilate [Tibetan] Buddhism.’’ A senior TAR official said in March that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the then-fiveyear-old boy who disappeared after the Dalai Lama recognized 

him as the Panchen Lama in 1995, is in the TAR living a ‘‘very 

good life’’ as ‘‘an ordinary citizen’’ with his family, and that he 

and his family are ‘‘reluctant to be disturbed.’’ The Karmapa, 

the spiritual head of the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, 

stated publicly in January that he fled his religious seat in the 

TAR at the end of 1999 and escaped to India because he feared 

the government would have assigned him ‘‘political duties’’ 

when he was older. 

• The government and Party created increasing restraints on 

the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists by 

strengthening the push to use policy and legal measures to 

shape and control what officials refer to as the ‘‘normal order’’ 

for Tibetan Buddhism. At the Fifth Forum, Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao used the Marxist premise of 

‘‘special contradiction’’ to reinforce the Party campaign against 

the Dalai Lama and seek to end his influence among Tibetans 

in China. Legal measures requiring nationwide re-registration 

of ‘‘professional religious personnel,’’ underway during 2010, 

could result in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect 

of holding religious views that the government does not deem 

to be ‘‘legal.’’ Such views include religious devotion toward the 

Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama’s recognition in 

1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama. 

• Government and Party economic development objectives for 

2010 to 2020 principally focus on accelerating and strengthening a development model that subordinates respecting and 

protecting Tibetan culture to Party and government priorities. 

Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao outlined 

Fifth Forum objectives that included building major infrastructure projects, increasing natural resource exploitation, and continuing to push forward the construction of a ‘‘socialist new 

countryside’’ (compulsory settlement of nomadic herders and 

resettlement of farmers). China’s state-run media provided inVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
50 

formation showing that, by the end of 2009, more than 1.33 

million TAR nomadic herders and farmers (a figure equal to 

about half the TAR Tibetan population) will have been settled 

in new housing, and that by 2020 officials plan for the mining 

industry share of TAR GDP to increase from about 3 percent 

currently to between 30 percent and 50 percent. Reports during this reporting year disclosed limited progress on Tibetan 

railway construction. 

• Government security and judicial institutions’ use of laws on 

‘‘splittism’’ and ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ during this reporting 

year infringed upon China’s constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religion, association, and assembly—first by 

using the law on ‘‘splittism’’ to punish Tibetans who criticize 

or peacefully protest against government policies, and then by 

using the law on ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ to punish Tibetans 

who attempt to share with other Tibetans information about 

incidents of repression and punishment. Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during this reporting year 

based on Commission monitoring as of September 2010. The 

apparent decline may suggest that Tibetans generally are not 

risking the consequences of political protest in the presence of 

the ongoing security crackdown. Courts sentenced Tibetans to 

imprisonment for using cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives on protecting 

the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the 

Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous 

prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and 

Yunnan provinces—a geographic area that both sides identify 

as the focus of their Tibet policies. A Chinese government decision to engage in such dialogue can result in a durable and 

mutually beneficial outcome for Chinese and Tibetans, and improve the outlook for local and regional security in coming decades. 

Æ Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of 

refraining from using legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists’ right to the freedom of religion. Such 

measures include: aggressive campaigns of ‘‘patriotic education’’ that compel Tibetans to endorse state antagonism 

toward the Dalai Lama; preventing Tibetan Buddhists from 

identifying and educating religious teachers in a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions; and enacting 

laws and issuing regulations that remold Tibetan Buddhism to 

suit the state. 

Æ Request that the Chinese government follow up on the 

March 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom 

the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an 

51 

‘‘ordinary citizen’’ along with his family. Urge the government 

to invite a representative of an international organization to 

meet with Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that he can express his 

wishes with respect to privacy, photograph the international 

representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together, and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s statement and the photograph. 

Æ Encourage the Chinese government to maximize benefits to 

Tibetans resulting from the Fifth Tibet Work Forum by fully 

taking into account the views and preferences of Tibetans 

when planning infrastructure and natural resource development projects in Tibetan areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to engage appropriate experts in assessing 

the impact of infrastructure and natural resource development 

projects, and in advising the government on the implementation, progress, and impact of such projects. 

Æ Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to 

develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their 

capacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of 

ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable benefits without encouraging an influx of nonTibetans into these areas. 

Æ Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance of honoring reference to the freedoms of speech, religion, 

association, and assembly in China’s Constitution, and refraining from using the security establishment, courts, and law to 

infringe upon and repress Tibetans’ exercise of such rights. 

Continue to convey to the Chinese government the importance 

of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and rioters, and request the Chinese government to provide complete 

details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced with 

protest-related crimes. 

Æ Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence with 

Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are imprisoned as 

punishment for the peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative examples include: former Tibetan monk Jigme 

Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing 

leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai 

Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced 

to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetans as a reincarnated teacher; serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’); and nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced to 8 

years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public 

festival). 

DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU

Findings 

• In November 2009, the Hong Kong government issued a consultation document on election of the Legislative Council 

(Legco) and of the chief executive in Hong Kong’s 2012 elections, and in April 2010, submitted its final proposals on elecVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
52 

tions. The document and proposals increased from 800 to 1200 

the number of members of an election committee that chooses 

the chief executive, and increased the number of Legco members from 60 to 70, but otherwise did not increase the proportion of Legco seats returned by direct election. A 2007 decision 

of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 

which prohibited the people of Hong Kong from directly electing both the chief executive and all members of the Legislative 

Council by universal suffrage in the 2012 elections, had limited 

the scope and form of the Hong Kong government’s proposal. 

• In July 2009, the election committee in Macau selected a 

new chief executive in an uncontested election, and 29 members of the Legislative Assembly, with 12 selected by direct 

election. 

Recommendations 

Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 

encouraged to: 

Æ Make every effort to visit Hong Kong when traveling to 

mainland China. Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials should meet with their counterparts in the 

Hong Kong Legislative Council, and with members of the Hong 

Kong government administration. Such meetings would show 

U.S. support for a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong 

under the system of ‘‘one country, two systems.’’ 

Æ Urge Chinese government officials to allow the people of 

Hong Kong to make their own determination as to constitutional reform, without interference from the central government either through decisions of the National People’s 

Congress or informally, and to allow the introduction of universal suffrage with one person, one vote, if this is the wish of 

the people of Hong Kong. 

The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 17 to 0 with one 

abstention.† 

53 

POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

Recommendations 

When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, 

Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged 

to: 

• Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http:// 

ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner 

or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for 

more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including 

his or her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials 

have violated, stage in the legal process, and location of detention or imprisonment, if known. 

• Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to 

present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious 

prisoners compiled from database records. 

• Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China 

to explore the database, and to advocate for the release of political and religious prisoners in China. 

A MORE POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY

The Commission’s 2010 Annual Report provides information 

about Chinese political and religious prisoners1 in the context of 

specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses 

result from the Communist Party’s and government’s application of 

policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner 

Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained 

by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses 

the database to prepare summaries of information about political 

and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. 

On July 29, 2010, the Commission announced the availability of 

a PPD upgrade that doubles the number of types of information 

available to the public and enables faster and easier methods of 

finding and downloading information about political and religious 

prisoners. The Commission invites the public to read about issuespecific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual 

Report, and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at 

http://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.) 

The PPD received approximately 34,400 online requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period ending August 31, 

2010. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning in late 

2004, approximately 29 percent of the requests for information 

have originated from U.S. Government (.gov) Internet domains, 15 

percent from commercial (.com) domains, 15 percent from network 

(.net) domains, 12 percent from international (e.g., .fr, .de, .ca) domains, 3 percent from nonprofit organization (.org) domains, 2 percent from education (.edu) domains, 2 percent from Arpanet (.arpa) 

domains, and 1 percent from international treaty organization (.int) 

54 

domains. Approximately 19 percent of the requests have been from 

numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information about 

the name of the registrant or the type of domain. 

POLITICAL PRISONERS

The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that 

is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work to 

maintain and update political prisoner records based on their areas 

of expertise. The staff seeks to provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends 

that drive political and religious imprisonment in China. 

As of September 3, 2010, the PPD contained information on 

5,608 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 

those, 1,426 are cases of political and religious prisoners currently 

known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 4,182 are 

cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released 

or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after release, or 

who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably 

more than 1,426 cases of current political and religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing basis 

to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the PPD. 

The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 

former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 

extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners 

in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The 

Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies 

on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 

other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources 

of information. 

MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 

unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and individuals who research political and religious imprisonment in 

China or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 

PPD upgrade significantly leverages the capacity of the Commission’s information and technology resources to support such research, 

reporting, and advocacy. [See New Political Prisoner Database Features in this section.] 

The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to 

cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in 

China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. 

Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violation 

by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types 

include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the 

freedom to advocate peaceful social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials. Users may search 

for a prisoner by name, using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese 

characters. The PPD allows users to construct queries that include 

55 

one or more types of information. [For a list of types of information, 

see box titled Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database: Previous and Additional Data Fields in this 

section.] 

The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet 

to query the database and download prisoner data without providing personal information to the Commission, and without the 

PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s computer. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows 

them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require 

a user to provide any personal information to set up such an account. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a 

user’s computer as a result of setting up such an account. Saved 

queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID 

(which can be a nickname) and password are the only information 

required to set up a user account. 

New Political Prisoner Database Features 

Some of the new PPD features that will strengthen reporting on 

political and religious imprisonment in China and advocacy on behalf of Chinese political prisoners are listed below. 

• An easy-to-use Welcome Page search box for a prisoner’s 

name. 

• An increase in the number of types of information (fields) 

from 19 to 40. Several of the additional fields are on the judicial process—for example, court names and dates and articles 

of China’s Criminal Law. All 40 of the PPD fields may be 

queried separately or in any combination. 

• A full-text search that applies to all 40 fields in a PPD 

record. 

• A one-click download of all of the field data for all of the 

records in the PPD as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 

• An Excel spreadsheet download of the data for every PPD 

record that satisfies a query or a full-text search that a user 

creates. 

• Opening a PPD record from another Web site, blog, document, or email by using the PPD record’s Web link. The link 

will open the current state of the database record, not a stored 

Web page. 

• Opening reports, articles, and texts of Chinese laws that are 

available on the Commission’s Web site or on another Web site 

by clicking links in a PPD record’s short summary. (Many PPD 

records contain a short summary of the case that includes 

basic details about the political or religious imprisonment and 

the legal process leading to imprisonment.) 

• Exporting a PPD record to a single-page Adobe PDF document that contains all of the available record data, including 

the short summary. 

56 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA POLITICAL PRISONER

DATABASE: PREVIOUS AND ADDITIONAL DATA FIELDS

PPD Fields Added in the 

July 2010 Upgrade (21) 

PPD Fields Available 

Prior to Upgrade (19) 

Affiliation CECC record number 

Residence (province) Detention status 

Residence (prefecture) Issue category 

Residence (county) Main name 

Formal arrest date Chinese characters (main name) 

Trial date Other (or lay) name 

Trial court Alternate name(s) 

Sentence date Pinyin name (for non-Han) 

Sentence court Ethnic group 

Appeal date Sex 

Appeal court Age at detention 

Appeal ruling date Religion 

Appeal ruling court Occupation 

Sentence ends per PRC Date of detention 

Actual date released Province where imprisoned 

Charge (statute) Current prison 

Sentence length (months) Sentence length (years) 

Sentence length (weeks) Legal process 

Sentence length (days) Short summary 

Prefecture where imprisoned 

County where imprisoned 

57 

II. Human Rights 

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Introduction 

The Chinese government and Communist Party’s system of restrictions on free expression consists of two core components: content prohibitions and prior restraints. Content prohibitions are 

based on vague and broadly worded criminal and administrative 

provisions covering a wide range of media. These provisions prohibit Chinese citizens from expressing or accessing content the 

Party or government deems to ‘‘incite subversion of state power,’’ 

‘‘spread rumors,’’ or ‘‘attack the Chinese Communist Party,’’ among 

other things.1 Such provisions continued to serve as the basis for 

punishing peaceful critics of the Party this past year. The Commission’s 2009 Annual Report noted the arrest of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo as part of a crackdown on citizens who supported 

Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human rights 

circulated online.2 In December 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu 

to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion, the longest known 

sentence for that crime.3 Officials also moved forward with cases 

against Tan Zuoren and Huang Qi, the activists who criticized authorities for not doing enough to investigate school collapses in the 

May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.4 Courts in Sichuan province sentenced Tan to five years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion and 

Huang to three years’ imprisonment for leaking state secrets. 

These cases reflect officials’ heightened concern about the Internet, 

as Liu, Tan, and Huang had peacefully used that medium for 

rights advocacy and political expression. Officials continued to censor political expression across a wide range of media, from the 

Internet to print publications. In March 2010, after 13 Chinese 

newspapers published a joint editorial criticizing and calling for reform of China’s household registration system, officials disciplined 

editors at the Economic Observer and ordered the editorial removed from Web sites.5

The second core component of China’s system of restrictions, 

prior restraints, refers to a system by which the government controls, through a licensing requirement for example, who may use 

a forum for expression. In China, prior restraints are extensive. 

Any person or group wishing to publish a newspaper, magazine, or 

book; 6 host a Web site; 7 or work as a journalist 8 must first obtain 

a license from or register with the government. Reflecting heightened concern over the Internet, the government during the Commission’s 2010 reporting year sought to tighten prior restraints on 

those applying for domain names for Web sites, to curb anonymity 

on the Internet, and to crack down on unlicensed video Web sites. 

In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the government shut 

down Internet, text messaging, and international phone call service 

altogether following demonstrations and riots in July 2009, and 

only gradually began lifting restrictions in December. Officials also 

sought to tighten control over the news industry nationwide, announcing in March 2010 a qualification exam for journalists that 

would require knowledge of ‘‘Chinese Communist Party journalism’’ 

58 

and warning against unlicensed citizen journalists sharing news on 

the Internet. 

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FREE EXPRESSION

The Chinese government’s content restrictions and prior restraints aimed at controlling political and religious content are inconsistent with international human rights standards and also 

with the rights to free speech and the press enumerated in China’s 

Constitution.9 Chinese officials, however, continue to insist that 

these rights are protected.10 Under international human rights 

standards, a restriction on free expression is permitted so long as 

it is (1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of 

others or protecting national security, public order, public health or 

morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) narrowly tailored.11 The vagueness of the Chinese government’s content prohibitions provides Chinese officials with broad discretion to 

apply prohibitions for purposes impermissible under international 

human rights standards, such as to target criticism of the Communist Party.12 The vagueness with which prohibitions are set 

forth in law also leaves citizens with no clear guidance on the 

boundaries of free speech.13 The government’s prior restraints on 

various speech activities also are not narrowly tailored, allowing officials the discretion to suppress unlicensed expression that they 

find politically disagreeable.14 Moreover, officials apply restrictions 

on expression with little transparency 15 and without sufficient judicial oversight.16

Abuse of Vague Criminal Law Provisions 

CRIME OF SUBVERSION

During this reporting year, Chinese officials continued to label 

peacefully expressed criticism of the government or the Party as a 

threat to state security, relying in some cases on Article 105 of China’s Criminal Law. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life 

imprisonment for attempts to subvert state power or up to 15 years 

for inciting such subversion.17 Chinese courts make little assessment of whether the speech in question poses an actual threat to 

state security.18 Chinese lawyers have noted that courts can apply 

Article 105 arbitrarily because no legislative or judicial interpretation defines the specific boundaries between free expression and 

state security.19 In June 2010, Joshua Rosenzweig of the Dui Hua 

Foundation, a human rights organization, said, ‘‘There’s little doubt 

that . . . the intent of the law against inciting subversion is the 

silencing of political speech.’’ 20

This past year, courts continued to punish alleged subversion in 

trials marred by procedural abuses and in which the defendants’ 

online activity figured prominently. The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate 

People’s Court levied what is reportedly the longest known sentence for inciting subversion, 11 years, against the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo in December 2009.21 [See box titled Liu Xiaobo 

below.] In February 2010, a court in Chengdu city sentenced the 

activist Tan Zuoren to five years in prison for inciting subversion.22

The court cited online essays Tan wrote criticizing the government’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Tan’s efforts to 

59 

commemorate the 20th anniversary of the protests, and interviews 

he gave to foreign media in which he criticized the government’s 

response to the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake.23 Tan was detained 

while conducting an investigation into school collapses in the 

quake. During Tan’s trial, the judge refused to allow Tan’s lawyers 

to call witnesses or to show evidence, frequently cut his lawyers off, 

and barred reporters from the courtroom.24 In October 2009, a 

court in Jiangsu province sentenced former professor Guo Quan to 

10 years in prison for subversion for using the Internet to organize 

an ‘‘illegal’’ political party and publishing ‘‘reactionary’’ articles online.25 [See Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.] 

Liu Xiaobo 

On December 25, 2009, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court 

sentenced the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for 

inciting subversion.26 The court cited six essays Liu had written and 

posted on the Internet as well as his work on Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human rights circulated online for signatures.27 The essays, with titles such as ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s 

Dictatorial Patriotism’’ and ‘‘Can It Be That the Chinese People Are 

Only Suited To Accepting ‘Party-Ruled Democracy’? ’’, criticize the Communist Party’s governance of China but do not advocate violence.28 The 

court noted how Liu had taken advantage of the Internet’s ‘‘rapid transmission of information, broad reach, great social influence, and high degree of public attention.’’ 29 Liu’s case was marred by official abuses. 

When police first took Liu into custody in December 2008, they kept him 

under residential surveillance at a secret location instead of his home in 

Beijing and did so beyond the legal six-month limit.30 At trial, the judge 

limited Liu’s defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their 

arguments and prevented Liu from finishing his remarks.31 In February 

2010, the Beijing High People’s Court affirmed the lower court judgment 

and rejected Liu’s argument that his residential surveillance amounted 

to de facto detention and should be counted toward time served.32 In 

March, officials in Shanghai municipality ordered Shanghai petitioner 

Mao Hengfeng to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor for 

shouting slogans outside Liu’s trial in December 2009.33

OTHER CRIMES: SPLITTISM, STATE SECRETS, AND SLANDER

This past year authorities used legal provisions criminalizing 

slander and acts of endangering state security—‘‘splittism’’ (separatism) and possessing or trafficking state secrets—to punish persons 

who criticized officials or who dealt with commercial information. 

• Gheyret Niyaz. In July 2010, a court in Urumqi, Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), sentenced Gheyret Niyaz, 

a Uyghur journalist and Web editor, to 15 years’ imprisonment 

for ‘‘leaking state secrets.’’ Prosecutors cited essays by Gheyret 

Niyaz addressing economic and social problems affecting 

Uyghurs; sources also connected the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign media that criticized aspects of government policy in the XUAR.34 [For information on 

other Uyghur cases, see box titled Free Expression Punished in 

Xinjiang in Section IV—Xinjiang.] 

60 

• Xue Feng. In July 2010, a Beijing court sentenced Xue Feng, 

a naturalized American citizen and geologist, to eight years in 

prison for trafficking state secrets.35 Xue had helped an American company purchase information on oil wells in China.36 Officials reportedly did not declare the information a state secret 

until after the purchase took place and allegedly tortured 

Xue.37 Xue’s lengthy detention and trial violated China’s 

Criminal Procedure Law, while officials violated China’s consular treaty with the United States by delaying notification of 

the case and access to Xue by U.S. officials.38

• Tagyal (Shogdung). In May 2010, authorities in Qinghai 

province arrested the Tibetan writer known as Shogdung, 

whose real name is Tagyal, on the charge of inciting 

splittism.39 The writer had signed an open letter suggesting 

that people avoid sending donations for the April 2010 Yushu 

earthquake in Qinghai through official channels, citing corruption concerns, and had written a book about the March 2008 

Tibetan protests.40 [For information on other Tibetan cases, 

see box titled Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural 

Expression in Section V—Tibet.] 

• Fan Yanqiong, Wu Huaying, and You Jingyou. In April, a 

court in Fujian province sentenced Fan Yanqiong to two years 

in prison and Wu Huaying and You Jingyou each to one year 

in prison for the crime of slander (Article 246 of China’s Criminal Law) after they wrote essays and created a video documenting a mother’s claim that her daughter was gang-raped 

and murdered by people with ties to local police.41 The court 

claimed the allegations were fabricated and had caused a stir 

on the Internet.42 Authorities reportedly suspended the license 

of Wu’s lawyer before the trial.43 The Commission’s 2009 Annual Report noted rising official abuse of Article 246 to retaliate against Internet whistleblowers.44

• Huang Qi. In November 2009, a court in Chengdu city, 

Sichuan province, sentenced the rights activist Huang Qi to 

three years in prison for illegal possession of state secrets.45

Huang’s human rights Web site advocated on behalf of grieving 

parents after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Authorities 

have considerable discretion to declare almost any matter of 

public concern a state secret. [See box titled Open Government 

Information and the Amended State Secrets Law below.] 

Huang’s lawyer said the ‘‘state secrets’’ were rules for government agencies on dealing with citizen petitions.46

[For information on authorities’ use of extralegal tactics and restrictions on freedom of movement to punish free expression, see 

Section II—Criminal Justice—Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression 

of Dissent and Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.] 

61 

Open Government Information and the Amended State Secrets 

Law 

China’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan emphasizes 

citizens’ ‘‘right to be informed’’ and says the ‘‘Chinese government will 

make more efforts to keep the public informed of government affairs, 

and improve relevant laws and regulations, so as to guarantee citizens’ 

right of information.’’ 47 Effective in May 2008, the Regulations on Open 

Government Information require governments to disclose information 

involving the vital interests of citizens and give citizens the right to request information.48 One barrier to transparency, however, is a state secrets framework that gives officials wide latitude to declare almost any 

matter of public concern a state secret, from death penalty statistics to 

the state’s reeducation through labor policy, and to deny requests for information.49 The Commission’s 2009 Annual Report noted that Chinese 

officials were considering proposed changes to the state secrets law in 

effect since 1989,50 and in April 2010, the National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee passed the amended Law on the Protection of State 

Secrets, which took effect on October 1, 2010.51 The definition of ‘‘state 

secrets’’ in the 2010 law, however, remains vague and broad. According 

to Article 9, a state secret may relate to major policy decisions on state 

affairs, national economic and social development, and science and technology, or other matters as determined by officials.52 Like the previous 

law, the amended law does not provide for any judicial review of a state 

agency’s determination that information is a state secret. It remains to 

be seen whether other provisions in the amended law, including one 

that places time limits on state secrets, reduce the number of state secrets.53

Internet and Other Electronic Media 

CHINA’S INTERNET POLICY

As the Commission has documented in recent annual reports,54

the Chinese government continued to encourage the Internet for 

economic development while maintaining political control over the 

medium. According to a white paper on the Internet released by 

the State Council Information Office (SCIO) in June 2010, the government plans to increase the percentage of Internet users from 

28.9 percent of the population to 45 percent in five years.55 According to official statistics, there were 420 million Internet users in 

China as of the end of June 2010, an increase of 82 million over 

the previous year.56 The white paper noted the government’s investments in Internet infrastructure and the role the Internet has 

played in driving China’s economy.57 The white paper also repeated 

the government’s argument that increased access to the Internet, 

as evidenced by the large number of blogs in China and the presence of lively exchanges on China’s Internet, shows that China 

‘‘guarantees citizens’ freedom of speech on the Internet.’’ 58 This 

past year, Chinese citizens continued to use communication technologies to advocate for rights and to criticize government policies. 

In early summer 2010, for example, workers in China used the 

Internet and cell phones to organize and document strikes.59 Such 

phenomena, however, are insufficient evidence that China guaranVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
62 

tees free speech, in light of the continued political censorship documented below. 

While greater Internet access has afforded Chinese citizens unprecedented opportunities for expression, it has not signified Chinese officials’ willingness to loosen political control. In an April 

2010 speech before the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, SCIO Director Wang Chen said the government is using the 

Internet to promote ‘‘positive propaganda’’; ‘‘guide public opinion’’ 

(citing guidance of the Internet following unrest in Tibetan and 

Uyghur areas of China in 2008 and 2009); enhance China’s ‘‘soft 

power’’; and ‘‘balance the hegemony of the Western media.’’ 60 Wang 

also said the government is campaigning to gain global acceptance 

for its model of Internet control: 

Our nation has successively engaged in dialogue and exchanges with more than 70 countries and international organizations. We have explained our Internet management 

policy, introduced the achievements of our Internet construction . . . countered Western enemy forces’ smears 

against us, and enhanced the international community’s 

acceptance and understanding of our model of managing 

the Internet.61

Officials remained concerned about citizens’ use of the Internet to 

network socially and post commentary. In mid-July 2010, Chinese 

and foreign media reported that officials were behind service disruptions at major microblogging sites, the removal of the blogs of 

well-known activists and lawyers, and increased monitoring of journalists’ blogs.62 In April 2010, the New York Times reported that 

the SCIO had established a new bureau to monitor social networking sites, which have grown in popularity in China.63 The Chinese government continued to employ paid agents to issue pro-government comments online.64 In his April speech, Wang said officials would ‘‘strengthen the blocking of harmful information from 

outside [China’s] borders.’’ 65 In December 2009, Minister of Public 

Security Meng Jianzhu published an essay saying the Internet had 

become an important tool for ‘‘anti-China forces’’ and ‘‘a new challenge for public security forces safeguarding state security and social stability.’’ 66

CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL CONTENT

Scope of Censorship 

Censorship of political content on the Internet remained pervasive 

this reporting year. The Chinese government readily acknowledges 

the blocking of some online content, such as content it considers to 

be pornographic,67 but it provides few details about how it determines other content to block, including what political content it 

censors.68 The scope of content the Chinese government requires 

authorities and private actors to censor remains ill-defined, and 

therefore allows officials to target political and religious content arbitrarily.69 OpenNet Initiative, an Internet research organization, 

noted in a 2009 report that censors primarily target Chinese-language content, including content dealing with the 1989 Tiananmen 

protests, Tibetan rights, and Falun Gong, as well as ‘‘human rights, 

political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumvention tools.’’ 70

63 

The following are select examples of censored political content from 

the past year, as reported by Chinese Internet users and foreign 

media in China. 

• News items were removed from Web sites, including an article examining the role of the Internet in mass incidents in 

China; 71 a transcript of U.S. President Barack Obama’s November 2009 town hall meeting in Shanghai, where he called 

for a free Internet; 72 and a Chinese editorial cartoon that appeared to refer to the government suppression of the 1989 

Tiananmen protests.73

• In October 2009, the organizers of an overseas Web site inviting visitors to comment on the fall of the Berlin Wall reported the site was blocked in China.74

• In March 2010, the Chinese government reportedly instructed Web sites to limit online discussion of the controversy 

between the U.S. technology company, Google, and the Chinese 

government.75

• In April 2010, Internet users reportedly were unable to 

search the word ‘‘carrot’’ on the Internet because it shares the 

same Chinese character as ‘‘Hu’’ in President Hu Jintao’s 

name.76

• In May 2010, several popular Uyghur Web sites remained 

shut down after authorities restored Internet access to the 

XUAR.77

China’s Internet Censors and the Rule of Law 

Both Chinese officials and Internet companies in China have a 

responsibility under China’s laws and regulations to censor content. Chinese officials block or filter access to foreign Web sites 

through control of the gateway connection between China and the 

global Internet.78 Chinese authorities continue to block social 

media sites based overseas, such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, 

and Flickr.79 According to Xiao Qiang, an expert on China’s Internet based at the University of California at Berkeley, ‘‘There is an 

Internet monitoring and surveillance unit in every city, wherever 

you have an Internet connection.’’ 80 Chinese Internet regulations 

provide lists of prohibited categories of content including content 

that ‘‘harms the honor or interests of the nation,’’ ‘‘destroys ethnic 

unity,’’ ‘‘spreads rumors,’’ or ‘‘disrupts national policies on religion.’’ 81 These vague and broadly worded categories provide little 

guidance to Internet users or Internet companies in China,82 the 

latter of which are required by Chinese regulations to censor content and to monitor and report customer activity to authorities.83

[See box titled Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China’s Internet Censorship below.] In January 2010, Chinese cell 

phone users complained about unclear standards during a crackdown on text messages containing pornography or ‘‘unhealthy’’ 

information.84 Vague content prohibitions also apply to other electronic media, such as television.85

64 

Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China’s Internet 

Censorship 

The Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, 

issued a rare article in February 2010 on the subject of Internet censorship in China that highlighted a number of problems, including lack of 

transparency and clear standards and the absence of adequate procedural protections.86 According to a professor of Internet politics at 

Nanjing University cited in the article, the 14 regulations dealing with 

online content in China are all vague and lack detailed provisions.87 The 

professor also noted that content bans were becoming increasingly unpredictable and that affected Internet users receive no explanation or 

opportunity to appeal.88 The article noted how these factors led Internet 

users to practice self-censorship and placed pressure on Internet companies, especially those without government connections, who feared being 

closed down for any misstep.89

This past year, the government introduced measures that could 

increase the pressure on Internet companies to censor politically 

sensitive content. In April 2010, the National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee passed an amended state secrets law, effective 

October 1, 2010.90 [For more information, see the box titled Open 

Government Information and the Amended State Secrets Law 

above.] The law retains the vague definition of state secrets that 

allows officials to declare almost any matter of public concern a 

state secret.91 In addition, the amended law adds a new provision, 

Article 28, which requires Internet and other telecommunication 

companies to cooperate with authorities’ investigation of state secret leaks and, upon discovering a leak, to stop transmission of the 

secret, preserve any relevant records, and notify officials.92 This 

provision further codifies in law a requirement that appears in existing administrative regulations.93 Internet companies that violate 

Article 28 will face punishment from police, state security officers, 

or government officials.94 In December 2009, the National People’s 

Congress Standing Committee issued the Tort Liability Law, effective July 1, 2010, which includes a provision (Article 36) exposing 

Internet service providers (ISPs) to liability for failing to remove 

content that infringes upon the rights of others, to the extent the 

ISP is aware of or is informed of such content.95 A state-controlled 

media article noted that the liability provision could pressure ISPs 

to be overzealous in removing content, including politically sensitive content.96 Furthermore, the article said it is unclear to what 

extent the ‘‘aware’’ clause requires ISPs to actively search the 

Internet for prohibited content.97

The pressure to censor politically sensitive content affects foreign 

companies in China in ways that may have an impact on trade and 

may further limit the free flow of information, as the controversy 

between the Chinese government and the U.S. company Google 

this past year clearly illustrated. In January 2010, Google announced that partly because of ‘‘attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web’’ in China, the company was ‘‘no 

longer willing to continue censoring’’ search results on Google.cn, 

its search engine for China.98 In explaining the problems Google 

faced in China, a Google representative told the Commission at a 

65 

March 2010 hearing that Chinese government censorship requests 

put Google in a ‘‘terribly difficult position’’ because ‘‘there’s not very 

much transparency at all about what’s being requested, and whether it’s being requested of everybody.’’ 99 Google’s stated refusal to 

censor the search engine it created for the Chinese market raised 

the possibility that it would be forced to shut down this service. 

Some Chinese citizens supported Google’s position but worried 

about losing access to a source of information that censored less 

than domestic alternatives.100 In February, Nature magazine released a survey of 784 Chinese scientists, 84 percent of whom said 

that blocked access to Google would ‘‘somewhat or significantly’’ 

hinder their research.101 Google announced in March that it would 

automatically redirect mainland users to its less censored Hong 

Kong site, but in June modified this practice out of fear that the 

Chinese government would not renew Google’s Internet content license.102

PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET ACCESS

This past year, officials sought to tighten broad prior restraints 

on citizens’ ability to post content on the Internet. All Web sites 

hosted in China are required either to be licensed by or registered 

with the government, and sites providing news content or audio 

and video services require an additional license or registration.103

In December 2009, the state-run domain name registrar announced 

rules barring individuals from registering for the Chinese domain 

name ‘‘.cn’’ for their Web sites, limiting registrations to only entities with business licenses.104 Although officials and domestic and 

foreign media cited pornography and online fraud concerns with 

‘‘.cn’’ sites, some in China questioned the reasonableness of 

banning all individual registrations.105 In February 2010, the government rescinded the ban, but added a new requirement that applicants must submit a photo and meet in person with the Internet 

service provider assisting people with Web site registration, which 

could have a chilling effect given China’s restrictions on political 

content.106 In its 2009 Annual Report, the Commission also reported that the government had issued a secret directive requiring 

Internet users in China to provide their real name and identification number before posting a comment on major news Web sites.107

This past year, Wang Chen, the State Council Information Office 

Director, confirmed the existence of the requirement and said the 

government was exploring a real name identification system for 

comment services generally.108

The government continued its periodic crackdown on illegal Web 

sites, often couched as anti-pornography campaigns. A February 

2010 report by the government news agency Xinhua indicated, 

however, that only 12 percent of the 136,000 Web sites targeted in 

a government crackdown were shut down for having pornography, 

while most had failed to register.109 Officials continued to target 

sites devoted to posting news or videos. In November 2009, officials 

shut down Yeeyan, a site that published translations of English 

and Chinese articles, for failing to have a license to provide 

news.110 To obtain a license to provide online news in China, an 

applicant must have at least five full-time news editors with at 

least three years of experience in journalism, as well as registered 

66 

capital of no less than 10 million yuan (US$1.48 million).111

Yeeyan reportedly came back online 39 days later, after removing 

all ‘‘political news’’ from the site.112 As the Commission reported in 

its 2008 Annual Report, a 2008 regulation requires audio and video 

Web sites to be wholly state-owned or state-controlled in order to 

obtain a license.113 In December 2009, officials in a crackdown on 

unlicensed audio and video sites shut down BTChina, a popular 

video-sharing site, which they also accused of hosting pornography.114 The owner denied the pornography charge and said that 

government regulations prevented him from obtaining a license.115

A September 2009 government notice stated that beginning in 

March 2010, officials nationwide would need to inspect their jurisdictions for audio and video Web sites operating without a license.116

In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), authorities 

maintained blanket restrictions on the Internet, international 

phone calls, and text messages, put in place following demonstrations and riots in Urumqi starting July 2009, and gradually began 

lifting them only after almost half a year had passed.117 It was not 

until May 2010 that officials restored more complete Internet access.118 Authorities claimed that overseas elements had directed 

the violence 119 and that restrictions were imposed to prevent further violence.120 The actual role the communication devices played 

in violent rioting (as opposed to demonstrations) was unclear,121

however, and the wide-reaching restrictions—affecting all Internet, 

SMS, and international phone content and lasting for months after 

the July 2009 events—exceeded permissible boundaries allowable 

under international human rights standards. [See International 

Standards for Free Expression in this section.] The press freedom 

organization Reporters Without Borders noted in October 2009 that 

the restrictions were overbroad and prevented XUAR residents 

from sharing information about the ensuing government crackdown.122 [For more information, see Section IV—Xinjiang—Controls Over Free Expression.] 

Freedom of the Press 

STATE POLICY

While China’s Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, in 

practice Communist Party and government control and regulation 

of Chinese news media and publishing continued to violate international standards. [See International Standards for Free Expression in this section.] International standards prohibit restrictions 

on free expression for political control, but in China the official policy is that the media is subordinate to the Party’s interests. In a 

November 2009 speech, top Party official Li Changchun marked 

Journalists’ Day in China by telling journalists to ‘‘persist in 

strengthening and improving the Party’s leadership over news 

propaganda work.’’ 123 This policy continued to be reflected in 

media coverage of major events. Following the April 2010 Yushu 

earthquake in Qinghai province, Li said that propaganda reporting 

had been effectively utilized to ‘‘create a good public opinion atmosphere’’ for disaster relief work and told Chinese media to reflect the 

‘‘good(ness)’’ of the Communist Party and ethnic groups ‘‘uniting’’ 

67 

in disaster relief.124 The government also continued with state-led 

expansion of the media industry in order to spread China’s influence globally. In July 2010, the central government’s news agency 

Xinhua launched a global English-language television channel.125

NEWS MEDIA

Censorship and Guidance of News 

This past year, the Commission observed numerous reports of officials continuing to direct media coverage of topics they deemed 

politically sensitive. The Party, primarily through the Central 

Propaganda Department, issues frequent directives to Chinese 

news media informing them about the stories they can and cannot 

cover or how to cover a story, including requiring them to run only 

Xinhua reports.126 The following table indicates some of the publicly known directives over the past year, as well as other instances 

where officials sought to control news coverage: 

Restricted Topic Restriction 

November 2009—Southern Weekend’s interview with U.S. President 

Barack Obama. 

Ban on reprinting of interview and 

posting on the Internet.127

January 2010—Lunar New Year 

Holiday in February. 

CCTV (national television station) 

ordered to avoid negative news.128

March 2010—Dispute between 

Google and Chinese government 

over Internet censorship. 

News Web sites ordered not to report information released by 

Google, to play down Chinese citizens’ displays of support for 

Google, and to publish only stories 

by central government media.129

March 2010—Annual meetings of 

National People’s Congress and 

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.130

Ban on negative news on front 

pages and in headlines.131

April 2010—Coal mine disaster in 

Shanxi province. 

Local officials reportedly ordered 

journalists to leave the area and 

reduce coverage.132

April 2010—Yushu earthquake in 

Qinghai province. 

Officials attempted to ban nonlocal journalists from covering 

quake. Media later ordered to reduce coverage and focus on Shanghai 2010 World Expo.133

April 2010—Shanghai 2010 World 

Expo. 

Officials ordered news media to 

adhere to only central media reports when activities of central officials are concerned.134

68 

Political Loyalty and Prior Restraints 

The Chinese government claims that government licensing and 

supervision of journalists is needed to prevent corruption and protect journalists.135 Journalists continue to be subject, however, to 

political requirements unrelated to corruption or protecting journalists. In March 2010, a high-level official at the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the Chinese government’s 

main regulator of the press, said that journalists in China would 

be required to pass a new qualification exam that will test them 

on their knowledge of ‘‘Chinese Communist Party journalism’’ and 

Marxist views of news.136 In November, the All-China Journalists 

Association issued a revised ethics code that maintains political requirements, including to ‘‘be loyal to the Party,’’ ‘‘persist in correct 

guidance of public opinion . . . giving first place to positive propaganda,’’ and ‘‘abide by the Party’s discipline for news workers.’’ 137

Government warnings against unlicensed journalistic activity also 

appear intended to ensure centralized control over the news. In a 

February 2010 People’s Daily interview, a GAPP official noted that 

commercial Web sites and unlicensed ‘‘Internet journalists’’ are not 

allowed to independently report news on the Internet.138 The official said that the only news Web sites that are allowed to conduct 

their own reporting are ‘‘traditional media’’ already licensed by the 

government, naming as examples People.com.cn (of the Party’s 

flagship newspaper People’s Daily) and Xinhuanet.com (of the central government’s news agency).139 The close ties between some 

media and the state may exacerbate corruption among journalists. 

According to one foreign news organization, ‘‘[w]hen journalists 

from China’s top news agencies approach a bureaucrat or businessmen, they have not only market power behind them but something 

even more formidable, the power of the state.’’ 140

Punishment of Journalists and Newspapers 

Chinese journalists and newspapers continued to face official 

pressure and punishment for reporting on issues authorities 

deemed to be sensitive. In November 2009, General Administration 

of Press and Publication (GAPP) officials ‘‘severely punished’’ four 

newspapers for publishing what they deemed to be ‘‘false’’ reports 

claiming that much of China’s wealth is held by a small percentage 

of the population.141 In May 2010, GAPP officials ordered Business 

Watch to halt publication for one month because it had published 

an article on a major state power company’s alleged monopolistic 

activities.142 The story was published during the annual meetings 

of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference in March 2010 and prompted some delegates to criticize the power company.143 Authorities reportedly 

cited Business Watch for ‘‘violating propaganda discipline’’ and creating a ‘‘negative influence.’’ 144 In early March, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly issued a warning to top editors at 

the Economic Observer, after it and 12 other newspapers jointly 

published an editorial criticizing and calling for reform of China’s 

household registration system.145 Zhang Hong, an editor and co-author of the editorial, reportedly was removed from his position. [For 

more information, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement—Significant Household Registration (Hukou) Policies and 

69 

Regulatory Developments in 2010—The Joint Editorial on Hukou 

Reform]. In May 2010, an editor of the China Economic Times was 

reportedly removed from his position after the paper reported that 

poorly handled vaccinations in Shanxi province led to deaths and 

sickening of children.146 [For more information, see Section II— 

Public Health.] 

Foreign and Hong Kong Journalists 

Credentialed journalists reporting for foreign news organizations 

in China are subject to fewer restrictions than their domestic counterparts but continued to face harassment. As a result of China 

hosting the Olympics in 2008, since January 2007, foreign journalists allowed into China technically may report without additional 

government permission, with the notable exception of permission 

being required to enter restricted areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region.147 At the World Media Summit held in Beijing in October 2009, President Hu Jintao promised that the government 

would ‘‘guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of foreign 

news organizations and reporters, and facilitate coverage and reporting by foreign media in China according to relevant laws and 

regulations.’’ 148 The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, however, reported several cases of harassment this past year when reporters tried to cover sensitive events or geographic areas. In November 2009, police and local foreign affairs officers in Kashgar 

city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), reportedly 

harassed Italian and American journalists after finding out their 

occupation.149 In February 2010, police in Chengdu city, Sichuan 

province, forced nine Hong Kong reporters into a holding room 

under the pretext that they wanted to check the journalists’ credentials.150 The reporters were attempting to cover the trial of activist Tan Zuoren. The police released the reporters only after the 

verdict was announced. The reporters encountered further harassment outside the court as they tried to interview Tan’s lawyer.151

Chinese authorities continued to harass Chinese citizens working 

with foreign journalists and to prevent citizens from speaking to 

foreign journalists. In late April 2010, authorities threatened a 

Chinese employee with loss of work after he helped a German journalist film video of a migrant school slated for demolition in Beijing.152 Police accused the assistant of conducting ‘‘independent’’ 

reporting.153 In June 2010, public security officials in the XUAR reportedly ordered people not to speak to foreign journalists without 

authorization in the wake of the one-year anniversary of the July 

2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi.154

PUBLICATIONS

Prior Restraints and Political Publications Considered Illegal 

The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to 

root out unlicensed publications and publications containing what 

officials deemed to be ‘‘illegal’’ political content. All newspapers and 

publications must be licensed by the government, have a government sponsor, and meet certain financial requirements.155 Chinese 

regulations include vague and sweeping prohibitions on the publication of materials that ‘‘destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
70 

nic customs and habits,’’ ‘‘propagate evil cults or superstition,’’ or 

‘‘harm the honor or interests of the nation.’’ 156 The non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported in 

March 2010 that the government Web site of Jilin city, Jilin province, posted an article on how the city’s local press and publications 

bureau was targeting 38 different kinds of ‘‘illegal political publications,’’ including those ‘‘attacking the Party and the country’s leaders,’’ ‘‘attacking the Party’s policies,’’ and ‘‘inciting ethnic splittism.’’ 

Banned publications included those about China’s present and 

former leaders, Charter 08 (a political reform and human rights 

treatise), the XUAR and Tibetan protests and riots of the last two 

years, and the Dalai Lama.157 In July 2010, the writer Yu Jie said 

police threatened him with imprisonment if he published a book 

critical of China’s Premier Wen Jiabao.158

Officials waged campaigns against ‘‘illegal’’ publications around 

politically sensitive events or areas. Following the April 2010 

Yushu earthquake in Qinghai province, the Qinghai ‘‘Sweep Away 

Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’’ Office issued a 

notice calling on officials to strengthen supervision of the ‘‘cultural 

market’’ to ensure it ‘‘remains stable and orderly.’’ 159 The Ministry 

of Culture, from April to June 2010, waged a campaign against ‘‘illegal’’ political publications and cultural products centered on 

major tourist sites, ethnic minority areas, and Shanghai, host of 

the 2010 World Expo.160 In May, the official newspaper China 

Daily reported that local authorities in Lhasa city, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), passed a rule requiring anyone wishing to 

make photocopies to supply their ID and have their ID numbers 

registered. The article cited a police official’s claim that ‘‘separatists’’ hand out banners and pamphlets with illegal content in the 

TAR.161

71 

WORKER RIGHTS

Introduction 

Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in 

practice, full worker rights in accordance with international standards, including the right to organize into independent unions. The 

All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union 

under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal trade 

union organization in China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU, and must align with its overarching political 

concerns of maintaining ‘‘social stability’’ and economic growth. 

Labor disputes and officials’ concern with maintaining ‘‘social 

stability’’ intensified over this reporting year as layoffs, wage arrears, and poor and unsafe working conditions persisted. Growing 

concern on the part of local governments to maintain economic 

growth and employment continued to prompt some localities to respond to labor laws that took effect in 2008 (the Labor Contract 

Law, Employment Promotion Law, and Labor Dispute Mediation 

and Arbitration Law) with local opinions and regulations of their 

own that weakened some employee-friendly aspects of these laws. 

In response to collective labor action that was organized and large 

scale, the Chinese government continued to redirect labor disputes 

away from the formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward 

more ‘‘flexible’’ and ‘‘grassroots-level’’ negotiation and mediation. 

Strikes and demands for higher wages during 2010 revealed that 

workers, in some cases, have been emboldened not only by protections for workers codified in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but 

also by a tighter labor market. Backlogs in the handling of labor 

dispute cases continued to exceed time limits mandated by law. Migrant workers continued to face discrimination in urban areas, and 

their children still faced difficulties accessing city schools.1 Employment discrimination more generally continued to be a serious problem, and plaintiffs brought a growing number of antidiscrimination 

suits under China’s Employment Promotion Law. 

Labor Dispute Settlement 

China’s Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (LDMAL) 

provides a specific timeframe within which disputes must be resolved, requiring arbitral tribunals to rule on cases ‘‘within 45 days 

of the acceptance of the arbitration application by the labor dispute 

arbitration commission.’’ 2 If an extension is necessary for complex 

cases, it must be approved by the dispute commission and, in any 

case, may not exceed 15 days.3 If no decision is made within the 

timeframe set forth in the LDMAL, then parties may pursue litigation in courts.4 An ACFTU report indicated that, by the first half 

of 2010, some localities saw dramatic increases in the number of 

labor dispute cases.5 The hearing of labor disputes in many cases 

now takes far longer than the stipulated 45- to 60-day legal requirement.6

To adjust to the pressure of a rapidly rising caseload and address 

dissatisfaction with long delays between case filings and hearings, 

some local governments pushed disputes down to lower levels for 

resolution, encouraging, even coercing, disputants to resolve 

72 

disputes through negotiation or grassroots mediation, often led by 

low-level officials.7 This emphasis on mediation and extrajudicial 

resolution has not been limited to local governments, but also has 

been reflected in national- and provincial-level regulations and circulars.8

In addition to large increases in arbitrated cases, labor dispute 

cases also continued to deluge Chinese courts. In some cases, these 

disputes were the result of strong dissatisfaction with arbitration 

proceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in a court if 

either side is dissatisfied.9 In other cases, the increase reflected the 

strong and growing rights consciousness of Chinese workers who 

turned to new protections offered in labor laws that took effect in 

2008. The Supreme People’s Court reported that civil courts 

throughout China accepted 280,000 cases in 2008 (a 94 percent increase from the previous year) and 319,000 in 2009; during the 

first eight months of 2010, the number of cases totaled 207,400.10

As workers turn to strikes and protests, some officials believe that 

the government has an incentive to proactively address disagreements at worksites before they add to the case backlog or threaten 

‘‘social stability.’’ 11 In Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, for example, a new rule allows the government to fine employers up to 

20,000 yuan (US$2,968) if they refuse to conduct collective negotiations with workers to resolve wage arrears issues.12

While employment discrimination continued to be a serious problem during this reporting year, legal scholars noted that there appeared to be a growing number of cases brought by plaintiffs under 

China’s Employment Promotion Law alleging discrimination in hiring. The law, which took effect in 2008, prohibits discrimination 

based on ethnicity, race, sex, religion, residency, infectious disease, 

and disability.13 One study indicated that civil society organizations have contributed to a greater awareness of employment discrimination and have helped bring cases to the courts.14 In some 

widely reported cases, plaintiffs have prevailed, suggesting that 

‘‘courts have taken a favorable view of the law’’ and that the ‘‘longdiscussed implementation deficit of Chinese law is shrinking, 

slightly.’’ 15

China’s Labor Contract Law, which also took effect in 2008, continues to be subject to interpretation at the local level. Interpretations over this reporting year have been inconsistent across some 

localities. For example, Article 14 of the law states that if a ‘‘worker has worked for an uninterrupted term of 10 years for the employer’’ and if the worker ‘‘proposes or agrees to renew or conclude 

a labor contract,’’ then the worker is entitled to an open-ended contract, that is, ‘‘a labor contract without a fixed period.’’ 16 Addressing this provision, the Jiangsu High Court’s Guiding Opinion on 

the Handling of Employment Disputes ruled in December 2009 

that an employee may be entitled to an open-ended contract even 

if the employee’s 10 years include leave from work due to pregnancy or other conditions allowed by the statute.17 A March 2010 

opinion by the Shanghai High People’s Court, however, construes 

the law more strictly, indicating that judges should deny employees’ requests for open-ended contracts in such situations.18 Such 

variance in interpretation across locales potentially lays the 

73 

groundwork for disputes leading ultimately to calls for further national-level clarification of ambiguity in the law’s provisions. 

Recent Worker Actions 

Widespread reports of strikes and demonstrations continued during this reporting year, especially in manufacturing centers in 

southern China. Strikes were often prompted by factory slowdowns, 

closures, and nonpayment of wages or overtime.19 In these cases, 

trade unions often appeared during the period of negotiation and 

settlement of the strike as subordinate to the government.20 During the spring and summer of 2010, Chinese and international 

media and non-governmental organizations reported on a spate of 

worker actions—from a succession of strikes to suicides at a factory 

compound—at various enterprises in China, mostly foreign-owned, 

that garnered attention in China and around the world.21 Unofficial reports suggest that the striking workers’ primary demand was 

higher wages. These reports also indicate that many of the workers 

decided to participate in the strikes after hearing coworkers who 

had worked at other factories recount similar situations at their 

previous places of employment—namely, low wage levels and subsequent successful attempts to force employers to raise wages 

through work stoppages. In other words, the spread of the strikes 

seemed to have resulted from a ‘‘copy-cat chain’’ of events inspired 

by previous successes rather than an organized labor movement.22

Journalists, commentators, and academics in China and abroad 

have also pointed to changing attitudes of a new generation of 

workers, migrant workers’ difficulties in adjusting to urban factory 

life, and the denial of the right to free association as factors contributing to worker actions.23

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 

The Chinese government prevents workers in China from exercising the constitutionally protected freedom of association.24 Trade 

union activity in China is organized under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a quasi-governmental organization 

under the direction of the Communist Party.25 Leading trade union 

officials hold concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The 

ACFTU Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and 

interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the Party 

and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese government.26

The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues in China, such 

as shopfloor organizing and ‘‘formalistic’’ collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently or uniformly advance the rights 

of workers.27

In recent years, the central government has shown support for 

an enlarged trade union role in collective contracting, and in union 

organizing in private firms in China, including multinational companies.28 These changes are less a sign of opening up and liberalization than they are a collection of strategies to improve the 

standing and legitimacy of the ACFTU in workers’ eyes. The government’s strategy appears to be based on its expectation that a 

more vibrant and engaged ACFTU may limit demands for indeVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
74 

pendent union organization and spontaneous collective action by 

aggrieved workers. 

At the shopfloor level, the ACFTU’s unions remain weak and 

marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at lower 

administrative levels sometimes may play an important role in legislative and regulatory development, this role is not matched with 

power at the enterprise level. Generally speaking, firm-level union 

branches are weak, nondemocratic, and subordinate to management.29 Despite an increase in legislation and administrative regulations that gives the ACFTU more power at the firm level to 

resolve disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union 

branches make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker 

advocacy difficult and slow.30

In its last Annual Report, the Commission noted that during 

2009, with the impact of the global economic crisis and increased 

government fear of social instability related to rising unemployment, the trade union’s role focused on assisting the government 

in resolving labor disputes and conflicts. This was reflected in the 

renewed emphasis on mediation and local-level dispute resolution 

contained in local regulations and measures. During 2010 it was no 

longer clear that the global economic crisis still was the main driver of the increase in labor disputes, as it appeared to be during 

2009. The Chinese economy showed some signs of recovery, and the 

migrant labor shortage first reported in 2004 began to reappear.31

Some of the strikes and demands for higher wages during 2010 

may not be a sign of continued weakness on the part of workers 

vis-a-vis management.32 Rather, they may reveal that workers in 

some cases have been emboldened not only by protections for workers codified in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but also by a 

tighter labor market.33

Most workers who participated in recent strikes reportedly were 

not calling for the formation of independent trade unions per se, 

but rather were calling for unions to act more independently and 

democratically within the confines of Chinese law. A June 18, 2010, 

China Daily commentary noted that Chinese workers’ demands for 

genuine union representation was not the same as a push for alternative unions.34 While acknowledging that the government-run 

ACFTU ‘‘has a herculean task ahead if it wants to fulfill its assigned role of representing workers,’’ the article, written by a 

prominent Australia-based expert on Chinese labor, states that 

Chinese workers ‘‘are willing to become members of the ACFTU,’’ 

but that the ACFTU should: 35

Do away with the ‘‘fake unions’’ . . . [the ones] assigned 

by the local governments, whose paramount interest is to 

attract foreign investment . . . . These governments now 

rent out land to companies and appoint a few local unionignorant people to run the trade union offices . . . . The 

local trade union offices should be put under the jurisdiction of the upper-level union instead of local governments. 

The ACFTU should allow workers to elect their representatives to their workplace union committees, too, as has 

happened in a very modest number of firms. Only then can 

the union branches demonstrably represent workers’ interVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
75 

ests rather [than] . . . employers’ or governments’ [interests].36

The lack of genuine labor representation is well documented. A 

representative of the Hong Kong-based labor organization China 

Labour Bulletin told the Toronto Star in a June 8 article that China’s state-run labor unions ‘‘will rarely, if ever, stand four-square 

with workers.’’ 37 In the past reporting year, however, Chinese officials have appeared to be more willing to address the issue of more 

genuine worker representation. As the global economic crisis deepened and the number of labor disputes continued to increase at an 

alarming rate, there has been greater emphasis on encouraging 

mutual cooperation and agreement between employers and workers. A key notion in recent regulatory development was that protection of both workers’ rights and employers’ lawful rights and interests was essential to maintain stable labor relations and to continue with industrial and economic development.38

China’s Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, which 

went into effect in 2008, underlined the requirement first to exhaust all consultation, negotiation, and mediation avenues to 

resolve labor disputes. The law suggests that arbitration and litigation should be used only when the other alternatives failed.39 It 

also indicates the importance of the tripartite system of coordination 

between labor bureaus, trade unions, and enterprise representatives to solve labor dispute cases together.40 Earlier local interpretations echoed and encouraged the use of this structure,41 and in 

some instances, they also suggested major collaboration and involvement from local governments and other relevant departments 

and organizations.42

With the explosion of labor conflict cases in arbitration committees and courts, however, the central government has been trying 

to redirect these labor conflicts to other channels at lower levels, 

and to encourage more mediation in general and negotiation within 

enterprises.43 Local governments are encouraged to strengthen and 

provide better guidance to improve the competence of labor dispute 

mediation organizations,44 and there is emphasis on the communication and exchange of information between the relevant bodies.45 Thus, the government continues to seek inter-organizational 

collaboration, where arbitration committees, courts, mediation committees, trade unions, and enterprises research and work together 

to resolve labor disputes.46 In Jiangsu province, for example, the 

Human Resources and Social Security Office issued a circular calling for the establishment of a ‘‘Five in One’’ mechanism to resolve 

labor disputes, outlining the respective responsibilities of judicial 

administrative departments, the human resources and social security department, the people’s courts, arbitration committees, and 

trade unions to first utilize mediation before proceeding to the arbitration and judicial stages.47 A Chongqing municipality notice also 

highlights the primary responsibilities of mediation committees, 

while delineating the rights of disputants and the procedures for 

all parties to follow in dispute cases.48

The Supreme People’s Court issued a judicial interpretation in 

September 2010—its third since 2008—in an attempt to clarify the 

courts’ responsibilities to ‘‘properly [hear] labor dispute cases,’’ the 

vast majority of which had failed to result in satisfactory outcomes 

76 

during the mediation and arbitration stages.49 The interpretation 

specifies the types of dispute cases deemed to be acceptable by the 

courts, noting that people’s courts shall accept, among others, cases 

concerning disputes arising out of the restructuring of enterprises,50 the failure of employers to pay wages as stipulated in 

labor contracts,51 and when employees are unable to obtain insurance benefits due to their employers’ failure to properly handle the 

required social insurance application procedures.52

COLLECTIVE CONTRACTING

Collective contracts and some process of collective consultation 

and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor relations since the 

1990s when state enterprise reform deepened and labor conflict 

began to increase rapidly, especially in the private sector. The 

ACFTU has championed collective contracts and collective negotiations as important foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In recent years, the collective contract system has 

received more Chinese government and Communist Party support 

as part of an attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor 

relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU, 

and the employer associations.53 Nonetheless, the collective contract and consultation system remains weak and formalistic because enterprise-level trade union leaders are not positioned to 

serve the interests of their workers. Many collective contracts 

merely reflect the basic legal standards in the locality and often are 

the result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the 

enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the result 

of genuine bargaining between management and the enterprise 

trade union.54

In December 2009, Zhang Jianguo, Director of the ACFTU’s Collective Contracts Department, stated that ‘‘in mitigating labour disputes, the fundamental issue is to establish a collective bargaining 

system that would allow labour disputes to be managed and 

resolved within the enterprise. From this point of view, collective 

bargaining is the route we must take in defusing conflict and developing harmonious labour relations.’’ 55 Han Dongfang, a well-known 

Chinese labor activist and founder of the China Labour Bulletin, 

made this point in a more succinct way: 

The long-term trend is clear. The only way the government 

can prevent greater social conflict is by giving more power 

to the workers not less. If workers have the right to negotiate as equals with the boss the chances of disputes turning violent will be greatly reduced. If on the other hand, 

the government ignores workers’ rights and gives the boss 

free rein, the consequences will be very serious.56

In July 2010, Chinese media reports indicated that drafters of 

Guangdong province’s Regulations on the Democratic Management 

of Enterprises (Regulations) began seeking opinions from relevant 

government departments, workers, state-owned and non-stateowned enterprises.57 One labor advocacy group argued that these 

‘‘regulations . . . could, if implemented, finally open the door to 

genuine worker participation in collective bargaining in China.’’ 58

Article 38 of the draft Regulations states that if less than one-third 

77 

of workers request wage consultations with management, they 

must notify the enterprise union, and the union may consult with 

management on the workers’ behalf, and report the results to 

workers.59 However, if one-third or more of workers demand collective consultations, the union must demand collective consultations 

with the enterprise’s management.60

The Guangdong government’s decision to advance and demand 

faster action on the drafting process appeared to be a response to 

the recent worker actions in the spring and summer of 2010.61 The 

original draft of the Regulations initially was submitted to the 

Guangdong Province People’s Congress Standing Committee in 

July 2008. However, with the onset of the global financial crisis in 

the fall of 2008, officials reportedly delayed further action on the 

draft.62 In July 2010, when worker actions revealed a ‘‘sharpened 

concern over [the] problem of representation,’’ officials recognized 

that, given that the ‘‘changes in labor supply and demand’’ have enabled workers to gradually gain more leverage in their relationships with management, the absence of genuine representation can 

easily turn common labor strife into a ‘‘hard landing’’ with ‘‘intensified contradictions.’’ 63 Thus, by focusing on the right of workers to 

carry out collective actions as well as the representativeness and 

trustworthiness of unions, the draft Regulations reportedly reflects 

an attempt to defuse potential collective labor disputes by preemptively bringing workers into formal legal and regulatory channels.64

While some labor activists appeared to be optimistic about the 

draft’s potential impact, an expert on Chinese labor relations at the 

University of Michigan cautioned that ‘‘without significant institutional reforms to the trade union itself, including the system of 

leadership selection, compensation and job security of trade union 

leaders within the enterprise, and better support and training from 

higher level unions, these reforms are unlikely to succeed.’’ 65 Still, 

in recent years at least eight other provincial, city, and autonomous 

regional governments have also enacted or put forth for consideration their own regulations on enterprise democratic management 

and collective consultations, including the provinces of Guizhou,66

Hubei,67 Jiangsu,68 Shanxi,69 and Zhejiang,70 as well as the cities 

of Jinan 71 and Tianjin.72 Shanghai reportedly is advancing similar 

regulations as well.73 However, Guandong’s draft Regulations are 

particularly noteworthy in that they specifically grant workers the 

right to demand the initiation of collective wage consultations—a 

right that typically has been reserved for unions. In addition, some 

localities, including Beijing,74 Guangdong,75 Hainan,76 and 

Tianjin,77 also have issued guidance notices and regulations highlighting collective consultations’ potential in fostering ‘‘harmonious’’ 

labor relations and specifying the legal rights of parties involved in 

collective consultations. In mid-September 2010, however, media 

reports indicated that the Guangdong Province People’s Congress 

Standing Committee delayed further deliberation of Guangdong’s 

draft Regulations. Heavy lobbying by some members of the Hong 

Kong industrial community, many of whom operate factories in 

southern China, reportedly played a role in the Standing Committee’s decision.78

78 

Migrant Workers 

The Chinese government characterizes as migrants rural residents 

who have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in 

Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and sometimes far from 

home. China had more than 229 million migrant workers at the end of 

2009, an increase of almost 2 percent from the year before.79 Official 

Chinese government statistics break down the total number of migrants 

into those who spent less than half the year as migrants, i.e., those who 

spent less than six months during the year away from their place of 

legal residence (85 million in 2009), and those who spent more than half 

the year as migrants (144 million in 2009).80 The Chinese household 

registration (hukou) system places restrictions on migration between 

rural and urban areas in China. Therefore, migrant workers may work 

in a city for many years but remain unable to qualify for city residency. 

Without city residency, authorities may deny them many basic public 

benefits, such as inclusion in social insurance programs, education for 

their children, and healthcare.81 As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often abused or exploited by employers who take advantage of their insecure social position and lower levels of education.82

While the central government has allowed the hukou system to relax 

over time, this system of institutionalized discrimination continues to affect adversely the social, civil, and political rights of migrants.83

During the global economic crisis, wage arrears problems increased 

dramatically as factories shut their doors.84 Moreover, even though 

wages for migrant workers have been on the rise, they continued to 

work longer hours for less pay than local residents.85 Many localities 

have expanded efforts to include migrants in social insurance coverage. 

However, there are still significant problems in terms of participation 

(for both employers and employees), coverage, and portability between 

rural and urban areas and even within urban areas. Migrant workers 

generally are able to withdraw monies only from their individual accounts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid by 

their employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about whether they would return to the same locale to look for new work, and with 

the portability of pension accounts highly restricted, they chose to withdraw their pensions. 

79 

Migrant Workers—Continued 

A Beijing Federation of Trade Unions survey of workers in Beijing reportedly found that the percentage of migrant workers surveyed who 

had signed formal employment contracts with their employers was significantly lower than the percentage of workers with a Beijing urban 

hukou who had done so.86 In February 2010, over 10,000 children of migrant workers reportedly were unable to resume classes after the Chinese New Year’s holiday in some districts within Beijing as dozens of 

schools faced forced demolitions.87 These students have few alternatives—in Beijing, for example, state-run and legal private schools can 

accommodate only half of all admissions demand.88 Adding to the problem, many parents prefer to enroll their children in state-run schools, 

since these institutions are cheaper and safer and have a lower turnover 

of teachers.89 In an attempt to curb rising crime rates, officials in 

Daxing, a Beijing suburb, are planning to carry out a ‘‘sealed management’’ system (fengbi guanli) and build fences around 16 migrant communities, putting migrants behind ‘‘tall metal fences and high walls’’ 

while ‘‘newly-installed closed-circuit cameras sweep the area for suspicious activity.’’ 90

A recent ACFTU study found that China’s new generation of migrant 

workers, unlike their parents, have higher expectations with regard to 

wages and labor rights as they struggle to transition into urban life.91

China’s Minister of Agriculture, Han Changfu, observes the several 

characteristics that set post-1990s workers apart from the previous generations, pointing out that many of them have never put down roots, are 

better educated, are the only child in the family, and are more likely to 

demand equal access to employment and social services—and even equal 

political rights—in the cities.92 Some reports indicate that the so-called 

‘‘post-1980s’’ and ‘‘post-1990s’’ new generation of migrant workers is at 

the forefront of the recent strikes; in all, there are about 100 million 

young workers in China’s total pool of migrant workers.93 As a Chinese 

demographer explained, the young workers have ‘‘the greatest intention 

to become urban residents and their problems can only be solved by 

making them such.’’ 94 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced in March 2010 that it would provide job training to 

about 600,000 migrant workers each year,95 and high-level central government officials have called for reforming the household registration 

system.96 [See also Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.] 

Working Conditions 

There is increasing evidence of deteriorating working conditions 

for many Chinese workers and increasing bifurcation of the workforce as highly skilled workers still are in high demand while lower 

level workers bear the brunt of the global economic downturn. The 

trend of informalization also disadvantages the lower rungs of the 

labor market more severely as employers seek to retain highly 

sought technical workers and managers while reducing the size of 

the less skilled labor force.97 Academic experts define informal employment as employment that is not stable or secure, that lacks a 

written agreement or contract, and that does not provide social insurance or benefits.98 Since the mid-1990s, when China’s economic 

80 

reforms quickened, there has been a ‘‘rapid and unprecedented 

rise’’ in informal employment.99 Economists estimate that 45 percent of urban employment in China is now informal. Of workers in 

the state or collective sectors, 22 percent are employed informally, 

while the percentage rises to 84 percent for workers in the private 

sector. Informal employment is also more likely for women, for the 

very young and the very old, and among less educated workers.100

Workplace abuses also contributed to poor working conditions. 

During the first five months of 2010, 10 workers committed suicide 

at a Shenzhen factory compound owned by the Taipei-based 

Foxconn Technology Group, which manufactures electronic products for several foreign companies. Yang Jianchang, a member of 

the Shenzhen People’s Congress, blamed authorities for failing to 

intervene, saying that ‘‘the union and officials . . . actually understand little about what the youths really want and their 

sufferings.’’ 101 Nine labor advocates embedded themselves in the 

factory as workers and later published a report detailing that 

Foxconn ‘‘uses military style management,’’ that its ‘‘managers always scold workers,’’ and that the company sometimes forces workers to sign contracts against their will.102 In response to the worker 

suicides and criticism from Chinese and foreign media as well as 

non-governmental labor organizations that Foxconn’s factory ‘‘remains a typical sweatshop . . . that overlook[s] the basic needs of 

their workers for the sake of profit,’’ the company in late May 2010 

agreed to double workers’ wages to 2,000 yuan (US$294) per 

month.103

Wages 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, minimum wages 

rose in 11 provincial-level areas across China. Shanghai, 

Guangdong, and Zhejiang have monthly minimum wage levels 

above the 1,000 yuan mark (US$148).104 Reports indicate that 

some cities proceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled to compete for workers.105 A labor non-governmental organization also attributed the rise in wages to the sudden jump in prices 

at the end of 2009, when China’s consumer price index increased 

1.9 percent, year on year, in December.106

China’s 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers 

and requires local governments to set wage standards for each region.107 China’s Labor Contract Law (LCL) improves formal monitoring requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to monitor labor 

practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.108

The law also imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates 

below minimum wage.109 In addition, the law guarantees minimum 

hourly wages for part-time workers.110

Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine minimum 

wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, especially for migrant workers. Subcontracting practices within industry exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When investors and 

developers default on their payments to construction companies, 

workers at the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack the 

means to recover wages from the original defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect their own duties to pay laborers and leave 

workers without any direct avenue to demand their salaries. 

81 

Kang Houming, a delegate representing migrants at the National 

People’s Congress from Chongqing municipality, told a Hong Kong 

magazine that, as of March 2010, there has yet to be a ‘‘fundamental solution to the wage arrears problems.’’ 111 The key concern 

is not only whether governments will raise minimum wages, but 

also whether local governments will enforce new wage levels even 

as enterprises complain that the increased costs make them less 

competitive, and as some local interests take abusive action against 

migrant workers who demand back wages.112 In February 2010, in 

a case reflective of the general problem, a group of migrant workers 

at a power plant in Chongqing municipality’s Wuxi county went to 

the Sinohydro Foundation Engineering Company, which oversaw 

the operations at the Wuxi plant, to demand their back wages after 

their supervisor ‘‘went missing’’ during the Spring Festival.113 The 

workers, who staffed two 12-hour shifts daily without written contracts, reportedly were later beaten by a gang of people wielding 

knives and sticks.114

Working Hours 

China’s Labor Law mandates a maximum 8-hour workday and 

44-hour average workweek.115 Forced overtime and workdays much 

longer than the legally mandated maximum are not uncommon, especially in export sectors, where some employers avoid paying overtime rates by compensating workers on a piece-rate basis with 

quotas high enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime 

wages.116 According to a report, suppliers in China avoid exposing 

themselves to claims of requiring illegal long hours by hiring firms 

that help them set up double booking systems for foreign importers 

who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations. Such firms not 

only help suppliers prepare books to pass audits, but also coach 

managers and employees on how to respond to auditors’ questions.117

Disputes over working hour abuses continued to be a major reason for labor disputes, especially disputes involving overtime or 

wage arrears related to past abuses and to struggling enterprises 

avoiding legal responsibilities to cut costs.118 China’s Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law lengthened the time allowed 

to file a dispute and also put more evidentiary responsibility on the 

employer to demonstrate that overtime abuses had not occurred, 

which also resulted in an increase in the number of workers seeking compensation.119 Many workplaces reduced hours and salaries 

in the wake of the global economic crisis, which led to workers’ 

complaints over minimum wage violations.120

Occupational Safety 

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENTS

China’s Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002, delineates a set of guidelines to prevent ‘‘accidents due to lack of work 

safety’’ and to keep ‘‘their occurrence at a lower level, ensuring the 

safety of people’s lives and property and promoting the development of the economy.’’ 121 Specifically, the law charges principal 

leading members of production and business units to educate workers on safety issues and formulate rules of operation; 122 protects 

82 

workers’ right to speak up and address work safety issues; 123 sets 

forth trade unions’ right to pursue workers’ complaints over safety 

issues; 124 tasks local governments to inspect, examine, and handle 

violations and potential dangers in a timely manner; 125 and lays 

out the consequences for noncompliance.126

In 2009, there were 2,631 reported deaths in Chinese mines, representing a decrease from a high of 6,995 in 2002.127 Workers in 

China, however, continued to face persistent occupational safety 

issues during this reporting year. Miners are limited in their ability to promote safer working conditions in part due to legal obstacles to independent organizing. Collusion between mine operators 

and local government officials reportedly remains widespread. As 

one Hong Kong-based labor advocacy group explained to Time Magazine, ‘‘[T]he people who are tasked with doing the investigations 

[of mine accidents] are the same people who have financial interests in the mines themselves.’’ 128 The China Daily reported that 

even though the ‘‘heaviest fine specified by the national safety laws 

amounts to 2 million yuan (US$294,117) . . . not a single coal 

mine in China has ever incurred such a heavy fine for safety violations,’’ and ‘‘fines of 1 million yuan (US$147,058), which have been 

seen in some areas, are regarded as harsh enough.’’ 129 During this 

reporting year, the Chinese government continued to control media 

coverage of workplace accidents. 

WORKERS COMPENSATION

One major problem facing injured workers or their family members 

pushing to receive timely compensation is China’s ‘‘complicated and 

incredibly time consuming’’ work-related injury compensation procedure; in some instances, cases can last for decades.130 It is difficult to determine the total number of cases in part because many 

cases never are reported due to the convoluted nature of the compensation process.131 Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do not 

routinely recognize some occupational diseases; while traumatic 

work injuries and deaths have been widely recognized and reported, experts on workers compensation litigation in China report 

failures to diagnose diseases like silicosis, and failure to recognize 

that the condition may be caused by exposure at work.132 As a result, the extent of work-related diseases like silicosis remains difficult to measure and report and, therefore, in many cases goes 

largely unrecognized. 

A Chinese worker stricken with an occupational illness or injury 

must undergo a ‘‘diagnosis . . . conducted by medical and health 

institutions approved by the public health administration departments of the people’s governments at or above the provincial 

level.’’ 133 The worker, or a close relative, must then apply to the 

local human resources and social security bureau within one year 

after the issuance of the diagnosis in order to receive an official 

certification of work-related injury/disability.134 This certification, 

the ‘‘key document’’ that enables ‘‘official classification of incapacity,’’ allows the worker to apply for benefits, which is also a 

complicated process.135 If the worker’s application is rejected, he or 

she must appeal to the labor dispute arbitration committee, though 

its rulings are nonbinding. Only if the committee makes a decision 

that is unfavorable can the worker proceed with civil litigation.136

83 

The process becomes even more problematic given the reality 

‘‘faced by migrant workers, most of whom will have already left 

their jobs and moved back home by the time clinical symptoms of 

the disease become apparent.’’ 137

Central government directives encourage local governments to 

pressure bereaved families into signing compensation agreements 

and to condition out-of-court compensation settlements on forfeiture by bereaved families of their rights to seek further compensation through the court system.138 There have been reports of 

local officials preempting class actions by prohibiting contact 

among members of bereaved families in order to forestall coordination.139 In December 2009, Li Liang, a 26-year-old engineer, collapsed on a factory bus and died in Suzhou city ‘‘amid a spate of 

workers falling seriously ill from chemical poisoning.’’ 140 The factory, which produces electronic touch screens for several foreign 

companies, reportedly assigned workers to clean the screens with 

the toxic solvent n-hexane ‘‘in violation of local codes and without 

proper safety equipment.’’ 141 After Li’s death, 2,000 workers went 

on strike to demonstrate their concerns over prolonged exposure to 

the chemical. Officially, management told other employees that Li 

had died of a heart attack. Authorities were never able to determine Li’s cause of death, since management persuaded the victim’s 

father to have the body cremated before the family received medical expenses and humanitarian aid from the company, some of 

which came from Li’s coworkers.142

Child Labor 

Child labor remained a persistent problem during this reporting 

year.143 As a member of the International Labour Organization 

(ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions on the elimination of child labor.144 China’s Labor Law and related legislation 

prohibit the employment of minors under 16 years old,145 and both 

national and local legal provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate 

a series of fines for employing children.146 Under China’s Criminal 

Law, employers and supervisors face prison sentences of up to 

seven years for forcing children to work under conditions of extreme danger.147 Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have 

dulled the effects of these legal measures. The overall extent of 

child labor in China is unclear in part because the government 

classifies data on the matter as ‘‘highly secret.’’ 148

Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors as well 

as small workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe 

manufacturing enterprises.149 Many underage laborers reportedly 

are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the education system and 

labor shortages of adult workers.150 In April 2010, the National 

Labor Committee, a New York-based nonprofit that focuses on U.S. 

companies’ treatment of foreign workers, alleged that two factories 

in Dongguan city, Guangdong province that manufacture products 

for Microsoft recruited ‘‘hundreds—even up to 1,000—‘work study 

students’ 16 and 17 years of age, who work 15-hour shifts, six and 

seven days a week.’’ 151 They were required to produce 2,000 computer mice per shift and are ‘‘prohibited from talking, listening to 

84 

music or using the bathroom during working hours.’’ 152 The report 

also found that: 

These hours and conditions are blatantly illegal. Under 

China’s laws, 14- and 15-year-olds may not work, while 16- 

and 17-year-olds are classified as ‘‘non-adult’’ workers, who 

cannot work more than eight hours a day.153

Investigators working for Dongguan’s Human Resources Bureau 

told the Associated Press that factories are allowed to hire workers 

between 16 and 18 years of age as long as management registers 

them with the authorities.154 However, KYE factories reportedly 

hired 385 such workers, of which 326 were not ‘‘properly registered.’’ 155 A company representative reportedly acknowledged 

management’s failure to register these workers, and reportedly said 

they ‘‘would now fix the problem.’’ 156

The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of child 

labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,157 permits ‘‘work-study’’ programs and activities that in practical terms 

perpetuate the practice of child labor, and are tantamount to official endorsement of it.158 National provisions prohibiting child 

labor provide that ‘‘education practice labor’’ and vocational skills 

training labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do not constitute use of child labor when such 

activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the 

students.159 The Education Law supports schools that establish 

work-study and other programs, provided that the programs do not 

negatively affect normal studies.160 These provisions contravene 

China’s obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting child labor.161 In 2006, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the 

Applications of Conventions and Recommendations ‘‘expresse[d] 

. . . concern at the situation of children under 18 years performing 

forced labor not only in the framework of re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular work programs at 

school.’’ 162

Prison Labor 

During this reporting year, the Commission monitored reports on 

prison labor in China.163 The export of prison products from China 

reportedly continues despite China’s Provisions Reiterating the 

Prohibition on the Export of Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through Labor, which prohibit the export of 

such products.164 Media reports during the reporting year also 

have described the alleged export of prison labor from China to 

worksites in other countries operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Chinese prisoners reportedly have worked on housing 

and other infrastructure projects such as ports and railroads in Sri 

Lanka and the Maldives, among other places.165 China’s Law on 

the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens states that ‘‘approval to 

exit from the country shall not be granted to . . . convicted persons 

serving their sentences.’’ 166 Despite the existing law, however, and 

despite Chinese officials’ encouragement for companies to increase 

the number of local residents that they hire and train in foreign 

countries, one academic who follows the issue wrote that it is the 

operating practice of some Chinese companies on overseas projects 

85 

to ‘‘keep the number of local workers to a bare minimum and to 

bring in much of the work force from China, including convicts 

‘freed’ on parole . . . .’’ 167 A Ministry of Commerce official dismissed such allegations made in media reports, telling People’s 

Daily that, based on China’s own laws and regulations, ‘‘enterprises 

engaged in foreign contracted projects . . . must . . . assign employees who . . . have no misconduct record or criminal record to 

work overseas.’’ 168

China’s International Commitments to Worker Rights 

As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China 

is obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor 

rights for workers, including freedom of association and the ‘‘effective 

recognition’’ of the right to collective bargaining.169 China is also a permanent member of the ILO’s governing body.170 The ILO’s Declaration 

on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) 

commits ILO members ‘‘to respect, to promote and to realize’’ these fundamental rights based on ‘‘the very fact of [ILO] membership.’’ 171

The ILO’s eight core conventions articulate the scope of worker rights 

and principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is 

committed to respect the fundamental right or principle addressed in 

each core convention, even if that member state has not ratified the convention. China has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions, including two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138 and 

No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and occupation 

(No. 100 and No. 111).172 The ILO has reported that the Chinese government is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced labor 

(No. 29 and No. 105).173 On its face, Chinese labor law appears to incorporate some of the basic obligations of the ILO’s eight core conventions, 

but, in practice, many of these obligations remain unfulfilled.174 Importantly, Chinese labor law does not incorporate basic obligations of the 

ILO’s provisions relating to the freedom of association and the right to 

collective bargaining. 

The Chinese government is a state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guarantees the right of workers to strike, the right of workers to organize 

independent unions, the right of trade unions to function freely, the 

right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations, 

and the right of the latter to form or join international trade union organizations.175 In ratifying the ICESCR, the Chinese government made a 

reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which guarantees workers the right to 

form free trade unions. The government asserts that application of the 

article should be consistent with Chinese law, which does not allow for 

the creation of independent trade unions.176

86 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, international and 

Chinese domestic media have documented a range of new as well 

as ongoing problems within China’s justice system, including detention abuses, coerced confessions, and police torture. Closed trial 

proceedings and trial procedures that unfairly disadvantage criminal suspects and defendants continue to contravene protections in 

both Chinese and international law. Public security administrative 

powers remain unchecked despite growing media coverage and public controversy. 

Chinese and international media reported on various criminal 

justice policy developments during this reporting year, including reforms to stem the use of coerced confessions, to limit the number 

of executions, and to address public dissatisfaction with public security authorities.1 While there were some potentially positive 

developments, the Chinese criminal justice system in practice consistently contravened domestic legal protections and continued to 

fall short of upholding international human rights standards. The 

Chinese government adopted legislation and regulations that signal 

new challenges for human rights advocates and reformers within 

the justice system. The National People’s Congress, for instance, 

passed new amendments to tighten controls over communications 

under its state secrets law and increased restrictions on lawyers 

and law firms that work on politically sensitive cases or cases involving mass incidents.2 The rights of criminal suspects and defendants continued to fall far short of the rights guaranteed in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as rights provided for 

under China’s Criminal Procedure Law and Constitution.3 Although China’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 

(HRAP), released in April 2009, signaled the Chinese government’s 

commitment to improving the ‘‘process of law enforcement and judicial work,’’ Chinese authorities have not implemented criminal justice provisions in the HRAP consistently.4

Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent 

Chinese authorities’ targeting of human rights advocates and defenders in the leadup to sensitive dates and events in 2009 continued through the 2010 reporting year. In the period surrounding 

sensitive events, such as the 60th anniversary of the founding of 

the People’s Republic of China in October 2009, U.S. President 

Barack Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, the annual 

meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Two Sessions) in March 

2010, the 21st anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, and 

the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, public security officers and unidentified personnel continued to use detention measures against 

human rights advocates, petitioners, and their families. 

Public security officers continued to engage in extralegal tactics 

such as harassment, assault, kidnappings, and illegal detention in 

order to punish Chinese citizens who expressed dissent or sought 

87 

to defend their rights and the rights of others. Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom 

of peaceful assembly and association contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, as well as China’s Constitution.5 In September 

2009, for example, prominent activist Qi Zhiyong said Chinese authorities placed him under home confinement and told him to leave 

Beijing prior to China’s National Day parade.6 In the leadup to 

President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, Chinese law 

enforcement officials reportedly detained dozens of rights defenders 

and reform advocates.7 On November 13, 2009, public security officers took away Zhao Lianhai, the head of an advocacy group for 

parents of children sickened by melamine-tainted milk, searched 

his house, and confiscated personal property. When Zhao refused to 

comply with the public security officers because the summons did 

not specify a charge, the police officers added ‘‘provoking an incident’’ to the summons.8 In February 2010, before the Two Sessions, 

Beijing and Shanghai police forcefully removed Mao Hengfeng, a 

longtime Shanghai petitioner, from her Beijing hotel room; subsequently, the Shanghai Municipal Reeducation Through Labor Committee ordered her to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor 

for her involvement in a protest that occurred outside a Beijing 

court in December 2009.9 [See box titled Liu Xiaobo in Section II— 

Freedom of Expression.] During the Two Sessions in early March 

2010, the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders reported that public security officers detained more than 

20 petitioners.10 Chinese police similarly acted to limit free speech 

and activism in the period before and during the Shanghai Expo. 

Shanghai public security officers reportedly detained, threatened, 

and placed under surveillance housing petitioners that sought to 

exercise their constitutional right to petition. [For more information 

on the Shanghai Expo, see Section III—Access to Justice—Abuse of 

Petitioners.] In early April 2010, Shanghai police sent human 

rights advocates notices warning them not to go near the Shanghai 

Expo.11 In June 2010, Human Rights in China, a U.S.-based 

non-governmental organization, reported that police authorities detained and abused members of the Guizhou Human Rights Symposium for planning to commemorate the 21st anniversary of the 

Tiananmen protests.12 Later in June 2010, state security officers 

reportedly abducted Beijing-based human rights advocate Liu 

Dejun and took him to the outskirts of Beijing, where he was beaten and threatened before being left on the side of the road.13

Lawyers and rights defenders who took on ‘‘sensitive’’ cases or 

who became involved with ‘‘sensitive’’ issues during the past year 

were harassed, abducted, or beaten by public security officers or 

unidentified personnel working under the direction of, or with the 

knowledge of, the public security bureau. In November 2009, public 

security officers detained Jiang Tianyong, a prominent human 

rights lawyer, for more than 13 hours, after he and other activists 

gathered outside the U.S. Embassy for a possible meeting with 

President Obama.14 In January 2010, Chinese lawyers met with 

imprisoned human rights lawyer Wang Yonghang who defended 

Falun Gong prisoners and verified reports that authorities beat 

Wang on three occasions following his kidnapping by plainclothes 

88 

police officers.15 Prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng resurfaced in late March after ‘‘disappearing’’ into what experts on 

the case describe as official custody for more than a year, but news 

outlets reported that Gao once again ‘‘disappeared’’ in late April.16

[For more information, see Section III—Access to Justice—Human 

Rights Lawyers and Defenders.] 

Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody 

Although China officially claims to have outlawed torture in 1996 

with amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and the Criminal 

Law, torture and abuse by law enforcement officers remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee against Torture 

(UNCAT) stated it ‘‘remains deeply concerned about the continued 

allegations . . . of routine and widespread use of torture and illtreatment of suspects in police custody, especially to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings.’’ 17 While 

the Chinese government objected to the UNCAT report’s findings 

in its November 2009 followup report, over this reporting year, the 

Commission observed cases of alleged torture during pretrial detention and the continued reporting of suspicious deaths in detention 

centers.18

Despite the government’s public efforts to combat the practice of 

torture, international media, domestic news sites, and non-governmental organizations have documented ongoing problems of police 

torture and other forms of police mistreatment. Public security officers have allegedly employed various torture measures, including 

beatings, electric shock, cigarette burnings, and sleep deprivation.19

In December 2009, the Yancheng Evening News reported that 19 

out of 26 suspects in Chongqing municipality’s ‘‘anticrime’’ crackdown alleged that police used torture to extract confessions.20 In 

February 2010, a Dahe Net article (reprinted in the Global Times, 

which operates under the official People’s Daily) reported that the 

Mengzhou Municipal People’s Court sentenced three police officers 

to varying periods of fixed-term imprisonment or to suspended sentences for using torture to extract a confession after the officers 

ruptured a suspect’s bladder with tear gas canisters.21 In May 

2010, environmental activist Wu Lihong described his mistreatment in prison to international reporters: ‘‘They used tree branches 

to whip my head, burned my hands with cigarettes and kicked and 

beat me until my arms and legs were swollen and my head was 

spinning.’’ 22 [For more information, see Section II—Climate 

Change and the Environment.] In a related case, Zhu Mingyong, a 

lawyer for alleged Chongqing criminal syndicate boss Fan Qihang, 

made public secret recordings of his client detailing numerous 

forms of torture in July 2010, after submitting recordings and pictures documenting Fan’s torture to the Supreme People’s Court for 

review.23

During this reporting year, an earlier case of torture emerged, 

sparking national interest in the justice system’s overreliance on 

confessions in criminal trials. In May, the China Daily reported 

that officials in Shangqiu city, Henan province, admitted police officers had tortured criminal suspect Zhao Zuohai into confessing to 

a murder.24 Zhao, who spent 11 years in prison before being released after the supposed victim reappeared in late April, was reVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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portedly beaten and forced ‘‘to stay awake for more than 30 days’’ 

during the interrogation process.25 Days after his release, the 

Henan High People’s Court acquitted Zhao in a retrial, and the 

Shangqiu Intermediate People’s Court awarded Zhao 650,000 yuan 

(US$96,000) in compensation. In June, the Procuratorial Daily reported that the ‘‘wrongful case of Zhao Zuohai’’ had sparked a 

‘‘great amount of public concern,’’ particularly over the causes behind such an injustice.26 A May 2010 China Daily editorial advocated for greater oversight to prevent future abuses, stating, ‘‘The 

police ought to police themselves to rid its [sic] reputation of such 

taints.’’ 27

Chinese print and online media outlets have continued reporting 

on several instances of ‘‘bizarre’’ or ‘‘unnatural’’ detention deaths 

over the year, which, according to the China Daily, have reportedly 

‘‘sparked nationwide discussion about inmates’ human rights and 

the proper management of detention houses.’’ 28 In news reports 

and online forums, the detention deaths received high-profile monikers, following the widely reported ‘‘hide-and-seek’’ death of detainee Li Qiaoming in February 2009.29 During this reporting year, 

the Chinese media reported on unnatural death cases and official 

explanations that reportedly captured public attention, including 

deaths linked to ‘‘taking a shower,’’ ‘‘drinking hot water,’’ ‘‘falling 

in the bathroom,’’ ‘‘hanging by shoelaces,’’ and ‘‘having a nightmare.’’ 30 According to a June Zhejiang Daily report, ‘‘the naming 

convention[s]’’ related to these official explanations that have 

emerged are a ‘‘glib poke at the official line that time and again 

accompanies these tragedies, a line that clumsily obfuscates the 

most commonly suspected cause of the deaths, which is abuse at 

the hands of detention center personnel.’’ The reports of unnatural 

deaths have shaken public confidence in China’s judicial system, 

according to various media reports.31 In March 2010, Minister of 

Public Security Meng Jianzhu addressed the controversy, urging 

reform and stating that the unnatural deaths have ‘‘seriously 

harmed the public’s confidence in law enforcement by police authorities.’’ 32

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities announced new 

measures intended to limit inmate abuse and police torture by improving the criminal justice system. At the end of May, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the 

Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and Justice released 

two evidence guidelines that prohibit the use of illegally obtained 

evidence to convict defendants.33 In May, the Ministries of Public 

Security, Supervision, and Human Resources and Social Security 

jointly issued the first police discipline regulation, which went into 

effect in June 2010 and details punishments for 76 types of misconduct including sanctioning inmates to mistreat suspects.34 The 

amended State Compensation Law, which enters into effect in December 2010, stipulates that when a detainee dies or is incapacitated, the authorities shall be required to provide evidence proving 

they are not responsible.35

90 

Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues 

ACCESS TO COUNSEL

The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a guaranteed 

legal right for all defendants in China, even though China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and Lawyers Law provide guidelines for 

legal representation in criminal trials.36 Many criminal defendants 

reportedly do not have access to legal assistance. This is counter 

to provisions under Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights, which China signed in 1998 but has 

not yet ratified.37

Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process without 

the assistance of an attorney.38 According to a survey reported on 

Qianlong Web, lawyers participated in criminal defense in approximately 30 percent of criminal cases nationally, and in Beijing, the 

rate of legal representation was less than 10 percent.39 In March 

2010, All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) President Yu Ning 

told China Newsweek that criminal defense may be in decline since 

many Chinese lawyers seek more profitable legal fields and hope 

to avoid the risks associated with criminal law.40

Chinese criminal lawyers continue to confront obstacles in handling cases, most notably in managing the ‘‘three difficulties’’ (san 

nan) of criminal defense—gaining access to detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors’ case files, and collecting evidence.41 Although authorities amended the 2008 Lawyers Law to address 

these longstanding issues, ACLA Vice President Wang Junfeng 

said in December 2009 that, based on national ACLA surveys conducted in late 2009, the amended Lawyers Law had not ‘‘fundamentally resolved’’ the ‘‘three difficulties’’ and that some lawyers 

expressed concerns that the amended Lawyers Law posed new difficulties for the legal profession.42 Many lawyers in the survey expressed frustration with justice officials for failing to honor new 

rights under the Lawyers Law, due to incongruence between the 

CPL and the revised Lawyers Law.43 A senior lawyer with the 

ACLA, Li Guifang, told the China Daily in June 2010 that it is ‘‘almost impossible’’ for criminal defense attorneys to meet with their 

clients within the first 48 hours of detention—a period he characterized as ‘‘a crucial time in getting to grips with a case and vital 

for warning a suspect of his legal rights and responsibilities.’’ 44

Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under 

controversial Article 306 of China’s Criminal Law (commonly referred to as the ‘‘lawyer-perjury’’ statute), a legal provision on evidence fabrication that specifically targets defense attorneys.45

Because of the risks presented by Article 306, most defense attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense: they focus on finding 

flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors’ evidence rather than actively conducting their own investigations.46 Human rights groups 

and Chinese legal experts estimate that more than 100 defense attorneys have been charged with evidence fabrication under Article 

306 and suspect the statute has had a ‘‘chilling effect for defense 

lawyers, who may decide to defend clients less forcefully than they 

otherwise would for fear of displeasing the prosecution.’’ 47 According to a March Legal Daily article, Article 306 may be responsible 

for declining rates of criminal representation: ‘‘Because of Article 

91 

306, an increasing number of lawyers are leaning toward noncriminal procedure professions, which has led to an increasing decline in the rate of criminal defense.’’ 48

In late 2009 and early 2010, the case against prominent Beijingbased lawyer Li Zhuang and its handling figured prominently in 

national Chinese news and in ongoing debates over Article 306.49

In early February 2010, the Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate People’s 

Court sentenced Li to a prison term of one year and six months for 

falsifying evidence and inciting others to bear false witness (under 

Article 306) in what reportedly was widely regarded as political 

targeting.50

FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face numerous obstacles in defending the right to a fair trial. Closed trials, political influence, and a lack of transparency in judicial decisionmaking remain commonplace within the justice system. Although 

China has signed and committed to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Chinese officials routinely sentence defendants in trials that fall far short of fair trial 

standards set forth in the ICCPR. 

During this reporting year, the Commission has observed several 

notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities failed to uphold 

defendants’ right to a fair trial in accordance with domestic and 

international law. 

• In November 2009, the Wuhou District People’s Court in 

Chengdu city, Sichuan province, sentenced veteran activist 

Huang Qi, whose human rights Web site advocated on behalf 

of grieving parents after the May 12 Sichuan earthquake, to 

three years’ imprisonment for violating China’s broad and 

vague ‘‘state secrets’’ legal framework.51 Throughout the legal 

process, owing to the broad definition of state secrets, authorities granted Huang’s lawyers, witnesses, and associates limited 

access to evidence.52 [For more information see Section II— 

Freedom of Expression—Abuse of Vague Criminal Law Provisions—Other Crimes: Splittism, State Secrets, and Slander.] 

• On December 25, 2009, a Beijing court sentenced prominent 

intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ for his role in organizing Charter 08, 

a treatise advocating political reform and human rights, and 

publishing six articles online.53 Among various procedural violations, Liu was denied the right to hire the attorney of his 

choice. Liu’s defense attorneys were also denied the right to 

present their opinions, as required by law, to prosecutors before the indictment was issued and were not given adequate 

time to prepare for trial.54 [For more information see box titled 

Liu Xiaobo in Section II—Freedom of Expression.] 

• In June 2010, the Yanqi County People’s Court, located in 

Bayinguoleng (Bayangol) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, sentenced Karma 

Samdrub, a Tibetan environmentalist, to 15 years’ imprisonment for ‘‘illegally excavating and robbing cultural sites or ancient tombs,’’ charges that were initially dropped in 1998.55

Karma Samdrub’s lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, called the trial a ‘‘misVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
92 

carriage of justice’’ due to a number of procedural irregularities: ‘‘evidence was tampered with, inadequate translation was 

provided and the judge refused to look into [Karma Samdrub’s] 

claims of beatings and sleep deprivation while in custody.’’ 56

[For more information see Section V—Tibet—Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression.] 

Arbitrary Detention 

Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues to 

be used widely by Chinese authorities to quell local petitioners, 

government critics, and rights advocates. Arbitrary detention includes various forms of extralegal detention, such as ‘‘black jails’’ 

(hei jianyu); ‘‘soft detention’’ (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home 

confinement; reeducation through labor, an administrative detention of up to four years for minor crimes; and forcible detention in 

psychiatric hospitals for nonmedical reasons. Another form of extralegal detention—shuanggui (often translated as ‘‘double regulation’’ or ‘‘double designation’’)—is used by the Communist Party for 

investigation of Party members, most often officials in cases of suspected corruption. 

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be ‘‘arbitrary’’ if it meets one of the 

following criteria: (1) there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is deprived of his liberty for having 

exercised rights guaranteed under the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights (ICCPR); or (3) there is grave noncompliance with 

fair trial standards set forth in the UDHR and other international 

human rights instruments.57 In addition, many forms of arbitrary 

detention also violate China’s own laws.58

‘‘SOFT DETENTION’’ AND CONTROL

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Commission 

noted various reports of law enforcement authorities using ‘‘soft 

detention’’ and surveillance measures to control and intimidate 

Chinese citizens. The ‘‘soft detention’’ that numerous human rights 

defenders, advocates, and their family members are subjected to 

has no basis in Chinese law and constitutes arbitrary detention 

under international human rights standards. In late April 2010, for 

example, public security officers held housing rights advocates and 

victims of forced evictions under ‘‘soft detention’’ at their homes in 

order to prevent them from drawing attention away from the 

Shanghai 2010 World Expo.59 In June, the South China Morning 

Post reported on New York University Law School Professor Jerome Cohen’s visit with criminal lawyer Zheng Enchong, who has 

remained under ‘‘soft detention’’ since June 2006.60 In Cohen and 

Yu-Jie Chen’s South China Morning Post editorial on the meeting, 

the authors described the circumstances behind Zheng’s house arrest: 

Around the clock, 12 guards, including uniformed police, 

plain-clothes public security officials and their hired 

hands, take turns manning the outer gate, building entrance and hallway outside Zheng’s apartment. StrategiVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
93 

cally posted surveillance cameras ensure that no one in 

the vicinity can escape police eyes. Zheng, who is 60, only 

leaves when summoned by police and has been summoned 

at least 77 times since 2006 for interrogations that are intimidating and occasionally physically abusive. His home 

has been searched 11 times, and five computers have been 

confiscated. He generally has no Internet access, and his 

phone is monitored when not disconnected.61

Petitioners and activists across China continue to face the threat 

of police surveillance and home confinement for criticizing government policies, challenging officials, and advocating for human 

rights. Huang Yuqin, a Shanghai resident whose home was demolished on March 2, 2010, was placed under ‘‘soft detention’’ and prevented from leaving her home on at least one occasion.62 Public 

security officers placed Beijing activists Cha Jianguo and Gao 

Hongming, founders of the China Democracy Party, under ‘‘soft detention’’ in late January 2010. Although police stationed at Cha 

and Gao’s apartment blocks did permit them to leave their homes, 

the police directed Cha and Gao to travel in police vehicles.63 In 

July 2010, authorities placed a number of civil society activists 

under ‘‘soft detention’’ during German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 

visit to Beijing. Those who reportedly faced harassment or restrictions on movement included Yang Jing, Qi Zhiyong, Wang Debang, 

and Xu Yonghai.64

REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR

Public security officers continue to use the reeducation through 

labor (RTL) system to silence critics and to circumvent the criminal 

procedure process. RTL is an administrative measure that allows 

Chinese law enforcement officials to order Chinese citizens, without 

legal proceedings or due process, to serve a period of administrative 

detention of up to three years, with the possibility of up to one-year 

extension.65 While Chinese sources maintain that the RTL system 

has been established ‘‘to maintain public order, to prevent and reduce crime, and to provide compulsory educational reform to minor 

offenders,’’ RTL is used frequently to punish, among others, dissidents, drug addicts, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, and religious practitioners who belong to religious groups not approved by 

the government.66

During this reporting year, the Commission observed numerous 

accounts of RTL orders violating the legal rights of Chinese citizens, specifically their rights to a fair trial and to be protected from 

arbitrary detention.67 In October 2009, the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that the 

Shenyang RTL Committee ordered democracy advocate Sun 

Fuquan to serve one year and nine months of RTL in February 

2009 for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power’’ and ‘‘splittist speech’’ 

by posting information online about the violent suppression of the 

1989 Tiananmen protests.68 In March 2010, the Shanghai RTL 

Committee ordered Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng to serve one 

year and six months of RTL for ‘‘disturbing social order’’ after she 

shouted slogans outside a Beijing court on December 25, 2009. On 

April 13, 2010, the Shanghai RTL Committee ordered Shanghai petitioner Chen Jianfang to serve one year and three months of RTL 

94 

for committing ‘‘acts disruptive to social order,’’ after he participated in a peaceful protest outside of Peking University on April 

17, 2009.69

Human rights advocates and legal experts within China have 

been calling for an end to RTL for decades. In 2008, another public 

call to end RTL came in the treatise Charter 08, which was signed 

initially by 303 Chinese intellectuals, human rights advocates, and 

others. The Charter states: ‘‘All persons should be free from unlawful arrest, detention, summons, interrogation, and punishment. The 

system of reeducation through labor should be abolished.’’ 70 In 

March 2010, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, announced that the Illegal Behavior Correction Law, which in recent years has been discussed 

as possibly replacing the RTL regulations, had been included in the 

2010 legislative agenda.71 In 2010, two prominent Chinese legal 

scholars publicly debated abolishing and reforming the reeducation 

through labor system in a series of public opinion editorials.72

‘‘BLACK JAILS’’: SECRET DETENTION SITES

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to use 

‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu), secret detention sites established by local 

officials, to detain and punish petitioners who travel to Beijing and 

provincial capitals to voice complaints and seek redress for injustices. Inside the black jails, detainees are denied access to legal 

counsel and in most cases, contact with family and friends. A 

November 2009 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report detailed conditions at the black jails: ‘‘Detainees are kept under constant surveillance, and subject to often arbitrary physical and psychological 

abuse including beatings, sexual violence, threats and intimidation.’’ 73

The Chinese government continues to deny the existence of black 

jails. In November 2009, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang 

told reporters: ‘‘I can assure you there are no so-called black jails 

in China. We put people first, and we are an administration for the 

people.’’ 74 Still, the existence of black jails of various forms 

throughout China is well documented by international organizations and, increasingly, domestic media. Black jails arose as a substitute for the dismantled ‘‘custody and repatriation’’ (shourong 

qiansong) centers that had been used to detain petitioners and undocumented migrants until the centers were abolished in 2003.75

Law professor and human rights defender Xu Zhiyong defines black 

jails as: 

places used by provincial governments to illegally imprison 

petitioners; we call them black jails because, first, they are 

just like prisons—established by the government to restrict 

people’s freedom—and, second, they are ‘‘black’’ because 

they have no basis in any laws or regulations and are totally illegal.76

According to the HRW report on black jails, guards at the detention centers ‘‘routinely subject [the] detainees to abuses including 

physical violence, theft, extortion, threats, intimidation, and deprivation of food, sleep, and medical care.’’ 77

95 

During this reporting year, the Commission observed reports by 

international and domestic Chinese media organizations on black 

jails, as well as on the network of personnel that intercept and 

abuse petitioners.78 In one prominent example of domestic reporting, a Southern Weekly article reported in August 2009 on the case 

of 21-year-old Li Ruirui from Anhui province.79 According to the report, a black jail security guard publicly raped Li after she had 

been detained for several days in a black jail in the Juyuan Hotel 

in Beijing. In December, a court in Beijing ordered the guard Xu 

Jian to serve eight years in prison and pay 2,300 yuan (US$337) 

in compensation.80 In late November, China’s Oriental Outlook 

Magazine, published by the official Xinhua news agency, provided 

an investigative report on the network of black jails, stating that 

they ‘‘seriously damage the government’s image.’’ 81 The report 

noted that, at certain times of the year, local governments employ 

over 10,000 black jail ‘‘retrievers’’ to abduct citizens and pay fees 

from 100 to 200 yuan (between US$15 and US$30) per person per 

day of detention. The Oriental Outlook report stated there were at 

least 73 black jails in Beijing alone. Chinese human rights observers stated that this was the first time an official, high-level magazine acknowledged the existence of black jails; however, the article 

did not appear to influence official statements on the existence of 

black jails or prompt official calls to abolish the detention centers.82

SHUANGGUI: EXTRALEGAL INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF PARTY

MEMBERS

During this reporting year, the Chinese media reported on the 

Communist Party’s use of shuanggui (often translated as ‘‘double 

regulation’’ or ‘‘double designation’’), a form of extralegal detention 

that involves summoning Communist Party members under investigation to appear at a designated place at a designated time. 

Shuanggui investigations often precede formal Party disciplinary 

sanctions or the transfer of suspects to law enforcement agencies, 

if there has been a violation of the criminal law. Although those 

under investigation are reportedly held under conditions preferable 

to police detention, in 2006, Professor Jerome Cohen pointed out 

that the suspects are ‘‘generally held incommunicado and denied 

some of the protections to which criminal suspects are entitled at 

least in principle.’’ 83 Shuanggui has no basis in Chinese law and 

violates protections found in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights.84

Communist Party discipline inspection commissions continued to 

use shuanggui during the past year to detain high-ranking officials 

in the Communist Party’s ongoing battle against corruption. In October 2009, for example, Ou Shaoxuan, a former top-level official of 

the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region High People’s Court, was 

put under shuanggui for alleged corruption in a property dispute.85

The China Daily reported in late April 2009 that Chinese authorities had placed six officials from the State Food and Drug Administration, the agency responsible for issuing production licenses for 

biological products and supervising drug safety, under shuanggui 

for allegedly accepting bribes from drug companies.86

96 

‘‘Strike Hard’’ and ‘‘Anticrime’’ Campaigns 

With official sources reporting an increase in violent crime and 

escalating social tensions with high-profile school attacks, Chinese 

officials launched anticrime campaigns across China during the reporting year.87 In June 2010, the Ministry of Public Security announced the launch of the fourth round of its national ‘‘strike hard’’ 

campaign (to take place between July 2010 and February 2011) 

aimed at violent crime.88 In June, the Vice Minister of Public Security Zhang Xinfeng told a national meeting that ‘‘China, during a 

process of social and economic transformation, is facing emerging 

social conflicts and new problems in social security.’’ 89 Traditionally, ‘‘strike hard’’ campaigns have been intense national crackdowns of fixed duration associated with unusually harsh law 

enforcement tactics, quick trials, and violations of criminal procedure. In addition to the national ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign, provincial, municipal, and lower level governments also undertook 

anticrime and anticorruption campaigns. In the most high-profile 

example, the southwestern municipality of Chongqing continued a 

massive, public ‘‘anticrime’’ sweep (known in Chinese as ‘‘striking 

organized crime and uprooting evil’’ [dahei chu’e]) of criminal syndicates and corrupt officials that resulted in thousands of arrests 

and raised various concerns about judicial independence and procedural rights. 

Launched in June 2009, the Chongqing anticrime campaign continued to capture national publicity and lead to numerous high-profile trials and arrests. By April 2010, Chongqing authorities had 

arrested 14 high-ranking officials and more than 3,000 others in 

the crackdown.90 In February 2010, in one of the more publicized 

cases, the Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced 

Li Zhuang, a prominent Beijing lawyer who represented alleged 

Chongqing organized crime figure Gong Gangmo, to one year and 

six months in prison for fabricating evidence and interfering with 

witness testimony. While officials alleged that Li urged his client 

to make false claims of torture by police and directed a lawyer to 

make claims in support of the allegations, various Chinese lawyers 

have asserted ‘‘that the prosecution of Li is a political vendetta because he, unlike most of the other defense lawyers, fought hard for 

his client.’’ 91 In May 2010, the Chongqing High People’s Court 

upheld an April death sentence for former Director of the 

Chongqing Municipal Judicial Bureau Wen Qiang for his role in 

‘‘accepting bribes, shielding criminal gangs, rape, and failing to account for his cash and assets.’’ 92 In his May appeal, Wen confessed 

to ‘‘85 percent’’ of the charges, but maintained that the first trial 

‘‘inaccurately’’ determined certain established crimes, which had 

led to a ‘‘more severe penalty.’’ 93

At the same time, however, Chinese scholars and lawyers have 

expressed concern that efforts to satisfy public resentment and 

meet anticrime targets have led to procedural inconsistencies and 

wrongful convictions. Jiang Ping, former President of the China 

University of Politics and Law, strongly criticized the handling of 

the Li Zhuang case in an essay widely circulated online, stating 

‘‘[n]o matter what you think about it, from the most basic level, 

procedural justice was violated.’’ 94 According to the July 1, 2010, 

97 

Oriental Outlook article, some Chinese legal scholars have criticized the ‘‘strike hard’’ campaigns, whose ‘‘severity and speed’’ have 

led to criminal procedure violations. The article states ‘‘the procedural rights of criminal suspects and defendants to a certain extent 

are deprived—which is not consistent with the spirit of the rule of 

law.’’ 95

Medical Parole 

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities denied medical 

parole and adequate medical treatment to those within the prison 

system, particularly human rights advocates. The U.S. State Department observed in its report on China’s human rights situation 

for 2009 that ‘‘adequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained 

a serious problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have 

the right to prompt medical treatment.’’ 96 Chinese authorities reportedly denied legal advocate and rights defender Chen 

Guangcheng adequate medical treatment while he was imprisoned.97 [For additional discussion on Chen Guangcheng, see box titled Case Update: Chen Guangcheng—Human Rights Defender in 

Section II—Population Planning.] In April 2010, imprisoned activist Hu Jia, who had been sentenced to three years and six months 

in April 2008, was denied early release from prison despite a reportedly rapidly deteriorating medical condition and possible liver 

cancer.98 In June 2010, Chinese authorities released Zhang 

Jianhong, also known by his pen name Li Hong, who had been 

serving a six-year sentence and suffers from advanced-stage 

Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig’s disease. Authorities 

first diagnosed Zhang with advanced-stage muscular dystrophy in 

2007, after determining that he was ‘‘suffering from muscle contractions and spasms of the hands and feet, and gradual weakening 

of his entire body.’’ 99 Despite the 2007 diagnosis, which qualified 

him for medical parole, prison authorities rejected ‘‘requests from 

Zhang’s family and lawyers for medical parole.’’ 100

Capital Punishment 

In March 2010, Supreme People’s Court President Wang 

Shengjun emphasized the state policy of ‘‘strictly controlling and 

carefully applying the death penalty’’ in his annual report to the 

National People’s Congress.101 Despite claims that fewer executions 

occur, however, the Chinese government maintained its policy of 

not releasing details on the thousands reportedly executed annually and continues to keep information on the death penalty a 

‘‘closely guarded state secret,’’ according to a March 2010 Amnesty 

International report.102 In August 2010, the National People’s Congress reviewed the first draft of the proposed eighth amendment to 

the Criminal Law, which reportedly calls for reducing the current 

68 crimes punishable by death to 55 crimes.103 The reduction 

would signal the first time the Chinese government has reduced 

the number of crimes subject to the death penalty since the Criminal Law was enacted in 1979. 

In December 2009, China gained international attention for executing British defendant Akmal Shaikh, the first EU national to be 

executed in China since 1951, after refusing to allow Shaikh to be 

98 

examined by a doctor.104 Despite multiple appeals by the British 

government based on Shaikh’s ‘‘serious mental health problems,’’ 

China executed Shaikh on December 29, 2009.105 According to an 

international media report, Chinese authorities maintained that 

evidence of Shaikh’s mental illness was ‘‘insufficient,’’ and that the 

case was handled according to Chinese law.106 China’s Foreign 

Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu defended the execution, stating, 

‘‘The Chinese judiciary’s right to treat cases according to the rule 

of law should be respected and there’s nobody who has the right 

to make improper comments on China’s judicial sovereignty.’’ 107

International organizations and critics have claimed the execution 

contravened the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights 

of Those Facing the Death Penalty, adopted in 1984 by the UN 

Economic and Social Council, which states that executions shall not 

be carried out on persons who suffer from mental illness.108

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, China moved to 

adopt lethal injection as the primary form of execution. Lethal injection was legalized in China as an alternative to execution by firing squad in the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law. In December 2009, 

Liaoning province became the first province to adopt lethal injections as the sole form of execution.109 In 2010, Beijing municipality 

also moved to implement lethal injections for all executions.110

99 

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Introduction 

China’s Constitution guarantees ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’ but 

protects only ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ and the government’s restrictive framework toward religion continued in the past year to 

prevent Chinese citizens from exercising their right to freedom of 

religion in line with international human rights standards.1 Some 

Chinese citizens had space to practice their religion, but the Chinese government continued to exert tight control over the affairs of 

state-sanctioned religious communities and to repress religious and 

spiritual activities falling outside the scope of Communist Partysanctioned practice. During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, 

the government maintained requirements that religious organizations register with the government and submit to the leadership of 

‘‘patriotic religious associations’’ created by the Party to lead China’s five recognized religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism. Unregistered groups risked harassment, 

detention, imprisonment, and other abuses, as did members of registered groups deemed to deviate from state-sanctioned activities. 

Variations in implementation allowed some unregistered groups to 

function in China,2 but such toleration was arbitrary and did not 

amount to the full protection of these groups’ rights. 

As leadership in the State Administration for Religious Affairs 

(SARA) changed in the past year,3 authorities continued to affirm 

policies of control over religion. Despite articulating a ‘‘positive 

role’’ for religious communities in China, officials did not then use 

the notion of this ‘‘positive role’’ to promote religious freedom, but 

rather used the sentiment to bolster support for state economic and 

social goals.4 According to Wang Zuo’an, the new head of SARA, 

‘‘The starting point and stopping point of work on religion is to 

unite and mobilize, to the greatest degree, the religious masses’ 

zeal, to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.’’ 5

The government continued to use law to control religious practice 

rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese citizens. In 

April 2010, authorities marked the fifth-year anniversary of implementation of the State Council Regulation on Religious Affairs 

(RRA), which codifies the government’s and Party’s restrictive 

framework for religion.6 While the RRA also provides some legal 

protections for registered religious communities, it conditions many 

activities on government oversight or approval.7 The RRA excludes 

unregistered groups from limited state protections, leaving them 

especially vulnerable to official harassment.8 In late 2009, Hubei 

and Hainan provinces each implemented new provincial-level legislation that, compared to older legislation they replace, provides 

more explicit protections for registered religious communities, in 

line with the RRA, but that also articulates more detailed state 

oversight of religious activities. Both include, for example, limits on 

the activities of clergy and other religious workers that were absent 

from the earlier provincial legal measures they replace.9 In January, SARA issued new trial measures on the financial affairs of 

venues for religious activities,10 subjecting the venues to more 

clearly specified state oversight, as well as specifying some protection for their property and income.11 The new measures apply only 

100 

to registered religious venues, leaving unregistered venues both 

outside this system of oversight and outside the limited protections 

afforded by the measures.12 The State Administration of Foreign 

Exchange issued a circular, effective March 1, 2010, concerning foreign exchange donated to or by domestic institutions that imposes 

unique requirements on religious organizations to receive approval 

to accept one-time donations over 1 million yuan (US$147,000).13

[See Section III—Civil Society for more information.] 

Buddhism 

The Chinese government and Communist Party exercise control 

over the doctrine and religious practices of Han Buddhists in nonTibetan areas in much the same manner as they do for other religious communities.14 During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, 

the government and Party continued to control Buddhist doctrine, 

as well as monitor and control unregistered Buddhist groups and 

activities. [For more information on conditions for Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V—Tibet.] 

CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST DOCTRINE

During this reporting year, the government continued to control 

the institutions and religious practices of Buddhists in an effort to 

bring them into conformity with Party goals and policies. The government requires Buddhist groups and religious personnel to register with the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) 15 in order to 

practice their religion and hold religious services legally,16 and authorities tend to allow a wider scope of activities for Buddhist 

groups that work more closely with them.17 During this reporting 

year, authorities continued to emphasize the BAC’s role in promoting the government’s and Party’s goals. For example, Wang 

Zuo’an—Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs 

(SARA)—said in a February 2010 speech that the BAC ‘‘received 

the Party and government’s approval’’ 18 for, among other things, 

‘‘raising high the banner of loving the country and loving religion, 

as well as the banner of solidarity and progress . . ., spurring economic development, social harmony, ethnic solidarity, [and] unification of the motherland . . . .’’ 19

MONITORING AND CONTROL OF UNREGISTERED BUDDHIST GROUPS AND

ACTIVITIES

Local authorities continued to monitor and control unregistered 

Buddhist groups and activities during this reporting year, labeling 

certain groups ‘‘cult organizations’’ and characterizing unapproved 

religious practices as inconsistent with legal measures. For example, the government continued to enforce a ban against at least one 

Buddhist group that it has designated a ‘‘cult organization’’: a Taiwan-based sect known as the Quan Yin Method (Guanyin 

Famen).20 A 2000 circular from the Ministry of Public Security that 

explains the background of the Party’s ban of the Quan Yin Method 

cites criticism of the Party by the sect’s founder, Supreme Master 

Ching Hai.21 In addition, reports from local governments throughout China in late 2009 and early 2010 focused on the construction 

of unregistered Buddhist temples or statues,22 often characterizing 

101 

these practices as ‘‘illegal’’ 23 or ‘‘indiscriminate.’’ 24 Echoing the 

language from these reports, a September 2009 article from the 

People’s Daily cited the ‘‘indiscriminate construction’’ of temples 

and religious statues as a problem.25 Some of these government reports claimed that local authorities stopped a ‘‘resurgence of the indiscriminate construction’’ of temples during this reporting year.26

An October 19, 2009, manual posted on the Web site of the Wuxi 

City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Jiangsu province offered 

four methods of dealing with unauthorized temples: ‘‘transform,’’ 

‘‘demolish,’’ ‘‘change,’’ or ‘‘co-opt’’; demolition and transformation 

are identified as the primary two methods.27

Catholicism 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government continued to interfere in the religious activities of Chinese 

Catholics who did not accept the full authority of the state-controlled church, including members of the state-controlled church 

community and the unregistered, or ‘‘underground,’’ Catholic community. In addition, the government continued to harass or detain 

some members of both communities, which are estimated to equal 

between 4 million and 12 million believers.28 Authorities also 

placed restrictions on pilgrimages to the Sheshan Marian shrine 

during the period surrounding the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. 

RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE AND INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS

ACTIVITIES

Chinese authorities continued to restrict the scope of religious 

activities of some Chinese Catholics, both registered and underground, who did not accept the full authority of China’s statecontrolled church. For example, since the 1950s, the Chinese 

Government has denied members of the Chinese official church the 

freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See to select 

Chinese bishops.29 The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)—a 

state-controlled entity that monitors and controls Catholic doctrine, 

practices, property, and personnel—exercises influence over the ordination of bishops for the registered church in China, including 

through coercion of bishops to officiate ordinations.30 In some 

cases, the CPA has allowed discreet Holy See approval of some 

bishops also approved by the CPA,31 and the CPA continued this 

practice during this reporting year.32 However, the government 

continued to insist that the Chinese Catholic church be independent, and the government interfered in the religious activities 

of Chinese Catholics who did not accept the full authority of the 

state-controlled church. In January 2010, CPA Vice Chair Liu 

Bainian called on Chinese Catholics to ‘‘continue to raise high the 

banner of loving the country and loving religion, [and] insist that 

the independent, autonomous, self-managing church be unwavering. . . .’’ 33 Various local government reports carried similar language,34 while some instructed officials to monitor ‘‘infiltration by’’ 

or ‘‘contact with’’ foreign religious groups with reference to Catholics.35 In April 2010, the CPA insisted that Bishop Du Jiang of the 

Bameng diocese in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 

attend his official installation ceremony together with Ma Yinglin, 

102 

whom the state-controlled church ordained in 2006 without approval from the Holy See.36 Du stated publicly that he was forced 

to attend the ceremony with Ma, and authorities subsequently 

placed Du under home confinement.37 During the January 2010 funeral of underground bishop Yao Liang—an octogenarian released 

from detention less than a year before his death 38—authorities 

prevented displays of official bishop’s insignia, prohibited the publication of obituaries, and only allowed three bishops to attend.39 Authorities had implemented similar restrictions during the October 

2009 funeral of underground bishop Lin Xili.40

HARASSMENT AND DETENTION

During the past year, the government continued to harass and 

detain arbitrarily Catholics who were not registered with the 

Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), as well as those who were 

registered but ran afoul of the Party’s policies. At least 40 unregistered Chinese bishops are in detention, home confinement, or surveillance, are in hiding, or have disappeared under suspicious 

circumstances.41 Some have been missing for years, such as underground bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang, whom public security 

officials took into custody in 1996 and 2001, respectively, and 

whose whereabouts are unknown.42 Authorities targeted other 

underground bishops more recently, as government and Party 

documents from late 2009 and early 2010 called on authorities to 

‘‘educate and transform’’ 43 underground Catholic communities to 

maintain ‘‘stability’’ 44 and stop ‘‘illegal religious activities,’’ 45 as 

well as to ‘‘insist on maintaining secrecy . . . especially with regard to underground Catholic forces . . . .’’ 46 In March 2010, authorities detained underground priests Luo Wen and Liu Maochun 

after they organized youth camps for university students.47 Authorities released Luo on March 18.48 The Commission has observed no reports that Liu has been released. After public security 

officials held underground bishop An Shuxin in custody for 10 

years, he joined the CPA in July 2009.49 He asserted that he made 

the decision ‘‘for the good of the diocese and the urgent need to 

evangelize,’’ 50 despite facing resentment from some members of the 

underground Catholic church.51 Even after An joined the CPA, 

however, public security officials placed him under surveillance.52

Authorities officially installed An on August 7, 2010.53 In July 

2010, authorities in Hebei province released unregistered Catholic 

bishop Jia Zhiguo after detaining him in an unknown location for 

one year and three months.54 Jia’s detention was reportedly linked 

to his cooperation with officially recognized bishop Jiang Taoran; 

local authorities told Jia that the ‘‘unity’’ between Jia and Jiang is 

‘‘bad because it is desired by a foreign power like the Vatican. If 

there must be unity, it must come through the government and the 

[CPA].’’ 55 On June 8, 2010, over 100 public security officials and 

unidentified persons demolished the only Catholic church in Ordos 

municipality, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and detained two 

priests for over 20 hours.56 The church was registered,57 but according to media reports, the local government intended to build a 

new road on the land where the church was located.58

103 

RESTRICTIONS ON PILGRIMAGES TO THE SHESHAN MARIAN SHRINE

Authorities restricted the freedom of Catholics to visit the 

Sheshan Marian shrine, in Shanghai municipality, during the period surrounding the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.59 Large numbers 

of Catholic pilgrims travel to Marian shrines around the world in 

the month of May, and the Sheshan Marian shrine has special significance to Catholics in China.60 A 2007 letter from Pope Benedict 

XVI mentions the shrine specifically: ‘‘[May 24] is dedicated to the 

liturgical memory of Our Lady, Help of Christians, who is venerated with great devotion at the Marian Shrine of Sheshan in 

Shanghai.’’ 61 In 2010, May 24 fell during the Shanghai Expo, and 

local governments in the Shanghai municipal area and other localities ordered security forces to ensure ‘‘stability’’ in anticipation of 

Catholic pilgrims traveling to the shrine.62 According to media reports, the CPA issued directives during this reporting year instructing Catholics not to travel from other localities to visit the 

shrine,63 and some Catholics in China reported being prevented 

from traveling to the shrine during the Shanghai Expo.64

Falun Gong 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Communist 

Party and Chinese government maintained the ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign that they have carried out against Falun Gong practitioners 

for more than a decade.65 Falun Gong is a spiritual movement 

based on the teachings of its founder, Li Hongzhi, and Chinese 

meditative exercises called qigong.66 The Party designated Falun 

Gong an illegal ‘‘cult organization’’ in 1999 following a peaceful 

demonstration held by its practitioners near the Communist Party 

leadership compound in Beijing.67 It is difficult to ascertain the 

number of practitioners in China today because the movement has 

been forced underground, but official Chinese sources and Falun 

Gong sources estimate that tens of millions of Chinese citizens 

practiced Falun Gong in the 1990s.68

The Shanghai 2010 World Expo, held from May to October 2010, 

became the latest in a series of events that the Chinese government has seized upon as justification for ongoing ‘‘security’’ crackdowns that aim to ferret out and punish Falun Gong practitioners. 

In the lead up to and during the Shanghai Expo, authorities conducted propaganda campaigns deriding Falun Gong, carried out 

strict surveillance of practitioners, detained and imprisoned large 

numbers of practitioners, and subjected some who refused to disavow Falun Gong to torture and other abuses in prison and reeducation through labor facilities.69 In May 2010, Falun Gong sources 

based in the United States published information on 127 documented cases of Chinese authorities detaining practitioners in the 

Shanghai area in connection with the pre-Shanghai Expo crackdown; 26 of the 127 are known to be serving sentences in prison 

or reeducation through labor facilities.70

Authorities also continued to arbitrarily imprison Falun Gong 

practitioners in cases unrelated to the Shanghai Expo. In January 

2010, after Zhang Binglan had reportedly given Falun Gong fliers 

to her daughter, the Tancheng County People’s Court in Linyi city, 

Shandong province sentenced Zhang and her husband Sun Dejian 

104 

to eight years and six months in prison and three years in prison, 

respectively, for ‘‘using a cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law.’’ 71 Other Falun Gong political prisoners remain in prison on similar charges, such as artist Xu Na, whom the 

Beijing Chongwen District People’s Court sentenced to three years 

in prison in 2008.72

The government has not ceased its harassment and intimidation 

of lawyers who defend Falun Gong clients in the Chinese judicial 

system, which the Commission first reported in its 2009 report.73

In November 2009, the Shahekou District People’s Court in Dalian 

city, Liaoning province, sentenced human rights lawyer Wang 

Yonghang, who had defended several Falun Gong clients over a 

three-year period, to seven years in prison on the charge that is 

most commonly leveled against Falun Gong practitioners: ‘‘using a 

cult organization to undermine the implementation of the law.’’ 74

In May 2010, the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice permanently 

revoked the licenses of attorneys Tang Jitian and Liu Wei, which 

Tang believed was retaliation for their defense of Yang Ming, a 

Falun Gong practitioner in Sichuan province.75 Chinese security 

forces continue to detain Gao Zhisheng, a prominent human rights 

lawyer whom the government targeted in part because of his work 

on behalf of Falun Gong practitioners.76 Gao was forcibly ‘‘disappeared’’ from February 2009 until late March 2010, at which 

time he briefly reappeared before vanishing again at the end of 

April.77

SHANGHAI 2010 WORLD EXPO

Local governments throughout the Shanghai municipal area reported mobilizing security forces to target Falun Gong practitioners 

in preparation for the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. In January 

2010, residential committees in Shanghai’s Pudong district conducted ‘‘one-by-one inspections of unstable elements’’ in which officials were told to report swiftly Falun Gong ‘‘reactionary posters 

and other activities’’ to higher authorities and warned that they 

‘‘absolutely must not allow Falun Gong to take root, germinate, and 

spread.’’ 78 In February, Xu Lin, the Pudong Party Secretary, 

warned security forces that they must ‘‘adopt necessary management and control measures’’ and ‘‘must absolutely never lose 

control [of Falun Gong].’’ 79 Shanghai Expo-related propaganda 

campaigns in the greater Shanghai area portrayed ‘‘cults’’ like 

Falun Gong as ‘‘dangers’’ to society that ‘‘wreck families’’ and ‘‘poison 

the minds of youth’’ and stressed the need to ‘‘transform’’ practitioners.80 Party authorities made clear that participation in ‘‘anticult’’ propaganda campaigns was mandatory, and insisted that 

local officials utilize these campaigns to organize residents to ‘‘vigorously struggle’’ and ‘‘win the tough battle against cults.’’ 81 At 

least four Shanghai Expo-related government reports stressed the 

importance of ‘‘transformation through reeducation,’’ a coercive 

process carried out during detention that has been used to force 

Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their beliefs.82

The crackdown against Falun Gong carried out in the name of 

providing security for the Shanghai Expo extended well beyond the 

Shanghai municipal area into surrounding provinces hundreds of 

miles away from the Expo site. In April 2010, officials in Fuzhou 

105 

city, the capital of Fujian province, announced a ‘‘large dragnet investigation’’ during the period of the Shanghai Expo that would 

‘‘strengthen monitoring and control of Falun Gong practitioners’’ 

and ‘‘ensure that they do not have contact with people from the 

outside.’’ 83 In March 2010, Shicheng county authorities in Jiangxi 

province—approximately 700 miles from Shanghai—announced 

measures to ‘‘guard against’’ possible ‘‘interference and sabotage’’ of 

the Shanghai Expo by Falun Gong.84

THE 6–10 OFFICE

The 6–10 Office—an extralegal, Party-run security apparatus 

created in June 1999 to implement the ban against Falun Gong— 

spearheaded the Shanghai Expo crackdown against Falun Gong.85

In February 2010, 6–10 Office agents visited village and residential 

committees in Shanghai’s Minhang district to persuade community 

leaders to sign ‘‘special 610 work responsibility agreements.’’ 86 In 

its 2010 work plan for ‘‘comprehensive management of social 

order,’’ a township in Pudong district designated ‘‘perfecting the 

610 prevention and control system’’ as a priority for its security 

services and required specific measures to be taken such as ‘‘24- 

hour monitoring and control’’ of Falun Gong practitioners during 

‘‘sensitive periods’’ to ‘‘ensure that there is no danger of anything 

going wrong.’’ 87

Beyond the Shanghai Expo crackdown, government reports from 

elsewhere in China indicate that the 6–10 Office continues to expand its activities to punish Falun Gong practitioners, whom authorities sometimes describe as ‘‘diehard’’ 88 or ‘‘obsessed,’’ 89 and 

close potential openings for the movement to grow. The Ministry of 

Commerce reported in November 2009 that a county-level commerce bureau in Hunan province had established an internal ‘‘610 

work leading group’’ that feeds intelligence reports to the 6–10 Office and ‘‘stability maintenance office’’ (weiwenban).90 Assessing the 

results of 10 years of the ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign against Falun 

Gong, a December 2009 report from the director of a district-level 

6–10 Office in Beijing listed the decline in ‘‘registered’’ Falun Gong 

practitioners living in the district from a number in the thousands 

(the actual number was removed) in 1999 to a number in the hundreds in 2009 as a factor in the office’s ‘‘significant victory’’ over 

Falun Gong.91

Islam 

Chinese authorities maintained tight controls over Islam in 

China. Authorities across the country used the specter of ‘‘extremism’’ to bolster state interference in how Muslims interpreted and 

practiced their religion. The state-controlled Islamic Association of 

China (IAC) continued to align aspects of Islamic practice with government and Party policy through its work to train religious leaders, 

interpret theology, draft sermons, and lead overseas pilgrimages. 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the IAC published 

its fourth collection of sermons as part of an ongoing project that 

one government official described as putting forth ‘‘authentic interpretations’’ of Islam that placed Muslims on the ‘‘road to adapting 

to socialism’’ and led them to uphold the state-defined goals of ‘‘uniVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
106 

fication of the country, ethnic unity, and social stability.’’ 92 One 

sermon published in the past year called on Muslims to ‘‘unite love 

of country with love of Islam’’ and ‘‘believe in the Communist Party 

and government’’ instead of ‘‘rumors’’ deemed to spark unrest.93

Throughout the year, government officials in some localities reported strengthening oversight of Muslim communities and blocking religious activities, groups, and venues they deemed ‘‘illegal.’’ 

Various government sources described steps to stop religious ‘‘infiltration’’ and ‘‘illegal’’ outreach and preaching activities.94 A report 

from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region also described ‘‘improving and rectifying’’ Arabic schools and scripture classes, as part of 

steps to ‘‘resist religious infiltration.’’ A Communist Party report 

from Wulan county in Qinghai province noted the county had 

strengthened steps to deal with illegal sites of worship in recent 

years and had banned two privately established mosques.95

ISLAM IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued to worsen. XUAR 

authorities increased repressive security campaigns in the region in 

the aftermath of demonstrations and riots in July 2009 and continued to identify ‘‘religious extremism’’ as one source of the unrest, 

as well as an ongoing threat to the region’s stability.96 As in the 

past, authorities singled out aspects of Islam in particular in campaigns targeting ‘‘religious extremism’’ and ‘‘illegal religious activities.’’ They defined such terms to encompass religious practices, 

group affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international 

human rights guarantees for freedom of religion, expression, and 

association that the Chinese government is bound to uphold.97 In 

the aftermath of the demonstrations and riots, XUAR government 

chairperson Nur Bekri called for strengthening management of religion and ‘‘bringing into full play the special role of patriotic religious figures in maintaining ethnic unity.’’ 98 Authorities carried 

out a new cycle of training for religious leaders in the past year, 

calling on them to raise their ‘‘consciousness and firmness’’ in the 

‘‘battle against extremism.’’ 99 The region’s 2009 work report called 

for strengthening management of religion through measures including preventing ‘‘religious forces’’ from ‘‘infiltrating schools,’’ 

punishing underground religious schools, and increasing management of pilgrimages.100

Authorities in the XUAR implemented various campaigns in the 

past year to restrict religious practice, singling out aspects of Islam 

and tightening controls in some cases. The Party-controlled XUAR 

Women’s Federation carried out a wide-scale campaign in 2009 to 

‘‘weaken religious consciousness’’ among women 101 and campaigns 

to dissuade Muslim women from wearing veils.102 One Women’s 

Federation report described veiling as a form of ‘‘extreme religion’’ 

and ‘‘an expression of a type of ignorant and backward way of 

thinking.’’ 103 Following a proposal in early 2009 to draw Muslim 

women religious specialists known as bu ̈wi under government and 

Party management,104 the XUAR Women’s Federation also reported increasing oversight of these women.105 The XUAR government targeted ‘‘illegal religious materials’’ in 2009 censorship 

campaigns and reportedly issued multiple directives singling out 

107 

‘‘illegal’’ religious and political materials.106 In March 2010, state 

media reported confiscating 13 tons of ‘‘illegally printed religious 

books’’ and detaining a Uyghur man who had received the shipment of books from another province.107

Local governments at the prefectural level and below reported 

taking a range of steps to restrict religious freedom. The Aqsu municipal government, Aqsu district, reported in January on strengthening implementation of and refining its ‘‘two systems’’ program of 

maintaining regular government contact with mosques and religious figures. Steps taken include formulating measures to 

preexamine sermons and monitoring conditions at religious venues 

daily.108 The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture government formulated a set of measures to manage Muslim women religious specialists (bu ̈wi).109 A Communist Party office in Kashgar district 

reported it would increase oversight of groups including bu ̈wi, people who have gone on unauthorized pilgrimages, and people dismissed from their posts as religious personnel, as part of work to 

‘‘safeguard stability.’’ 110 In line with XUAR government direction, 

various local authorities pledged to continue curbing unauthorized 

religious pilgrimages.111 Government offices in Turpan district and 

Shule (Qeshqer Yengisheher) county, Kashgar district, posted job 

advertisements that required that candidates ‘‘not believe in a religion’’ or ‘‘participate in religious activities.’’ 112

Government authorities in the XUAR continued to restrict children’s freedom of religion. Authorities adopted a new regulation on 

the protection of minors, effective December 2009, that restricts 

children’s religious activities.113 While the regulation excludes a 

previously codified ban (now void) on parents ‘‘permitting children 

to engage in religious activities,’’ 114 it broadens an earlier provision to prohibit people from ‘‘luring or forcing minors to participate 

in religious activities.’’ 115 The regulation lacks criteria for determining what acts constitute ‘‘luring’’ or ‘‘forcing,’’ leaving wide latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that constrains children’s 

exercise of freedom of religion and parents’ right to impart a religious education. The provisions on children’s religious activities appear to remain the most detailed in China and to lack a clear basis 

in Chinese law.116 Authorities in Nilka county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, launched a campaign in March to spread government policies including the ‘‘six forbiddens’’: forbidding students 

from believing in religion, participating in religious activities, fasting, wearing clothes with a ‘‘religious hue,’’ viewing or listening to 

audio-video products with ‘‘reactionary content,’’ and disseminating 

‘‘separatist thought.’’ 117

Amid government calls to curb ‘‘illegal’’ religious activities, overseas media reported in the past year on cases of Muslims detained 

for practicing their religion. Radio Free Asia reported in May on a 

series of religion-related detentions in July 2009 in one township 

in Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, involving 10 people in two sets of cases. According to sources cited 

in the RFA reports, the people were detained for teaching unauthorized classes on religion and reading certain religious publications.118 Most of those detained reportedly remained in detention, 

with details of charges against them unknown.119 Authorities reportedly detained 32 women in a Quran study group in Bachu 

108 

(Maralbe ́shi) county, Kashgar district, around early June. Authorities said the women were engaged in illegal religious activities and 

formally detained two of them, releasing the others after levying 

fines.120

Protestantism 

The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to restrict the religious activities and doctrine of Chinese Protestants 

who worship in the state-controlled church, a network of at least 

20 million citizens and 50,000 churches.121 In addition, they continued to arbitrarily harass, intimidate, detain, or imprison some of 

the estimated 50 to 70 million Chinese Protestants who worship in 

China’s unregistered congregations (house churches),122 communities that have been growing larger and more conspicuous over 

the past few decades.123 The government made strong efforts to 

interfere with the internal affairs of some unregistered congregations through such means as the arbitrary detention of religious 

leaders, violent raids, destruction of worship sites, attempts to prevent members from gathering, and the labeling of some Protestant 

organizations as ‘‘cults.’’ 

PATRIOTIC RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THEOLOGICAL

RECONSTRUCTION

China’s state-controlled Protestant church continued to dictate 

the terms by which it allowed Protestants to interpret doctrine and 

theology, in an effort to eliminate elements of the Christian faith 

that the Party regards as incompatible with its goals and ideology. 

The government and Party call this process ‘‘theological reconstruction.’’ 124 The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the China 

Christian Council (CCC) are the official organizations that manage 

registered Protestants,125 and government and Party officials continued to emphasize the role of those organizations in promoting 

Party policies. For example, during an early February 2010 meeting with the TSPM and CCC, top Party and government leaders 

commended the two organizations for their ‘‘positive function in 

safeguarding social harmony and stability while maintaining 

smooth, relatively rapid economic development’’; 126 for ‘‘resolutely 

resisting various forms of foreign religious infiltration activities’’; 127 and for ‘‘achieving positive results through continuing to 

promote theological reconstruction, strengthening the building of 

their organizations, and vigorously launching trainings [for pastors].’’ 128 In February 2010, Jia Qinglin, the fourth-highest ranking 

member of the Politburo Standing Committee, called on the patriotic religious organizations to ‘‘diligently train a corps of qualified 

religious personnel who are politically reliable . . . .’’ 129 In line 

with these sentiments, government entities from localities across 

the country stressed the importance of theological reconstruction 

and political training for pastors in various government meetings 

and work reports.130

109 

MAJOR CASES OF HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH

PLACES OF WORSHIP

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, authorities continued to harass and detain arbitrarily members of house churches 

throughout China and interfere with their places of worship.131

Local government reports throughout China called on authorities to 

monitor and control house churches,132 and authorities targeted 

several prominent house church leaders and large house church 

congregations that had already lost their indoor meeting spaces, 

which some reports suggest may have been a result of government 

pressure on their landlords.133 For example, on November 8, 2009, 

authorities prevented pastor Jin Tianming of the Shouwang 

Church in Beijing from leaving his home to attend worship and 

then prevented the congregation from gathering in a park to worship.134 On November 22, 2009, authorities detained four members 

of the clergy and two other members of the Wanbang Church in 

Shanghai 135 as members of the congregation were planning to 

meet outdoors to worship.136 Wanbang pastor Cui Quan said that 

police accused the church of being ‘‘illegal,’’ questioned those detained about its operations, and then released all six later that 

day.137 On May 8, 2010, authorities put pastor Wang Dao—a participant in the 1989 Tiananmen protests and leader of the Liangren 

Church in Guangzhou—under criminal detention and dispersed the 

congregation as they attempted to worship in a park.138 Wang was 

released on bail on June 13 to await his trial.139 On August 13, authorities in Guangzhou summoned him to a police station in Panyu 

district in Guangzhou, attempted to pressure him to join the statecontrolled church, and released him on the same day.140 On June 

13, authorities detained pastor Zhang Mingxuan and his wife in a 

hotel in Zhengzhou city, Henan province for two days. Authorities 

questioned them about their connection with a U.S. citizen who is 

a Christian in Beijing and a church in Yancheng city, Jiangsu province that local authorities had scheduled for demolition.141

In some cases, authorities levied criminal penalties or used violence against members of house churches. In the early morning 

hours of September 13, 2009, over 400 public security officers conducted a violent raid against the Linfen-Fushan Church, an unregistered Protestant church in Fushan county, Linfen municipality, 

Shanxi province.142 Two bulldozers reduced the building to rubble,143 and public security officers wounded at least 100 church 

members,144 striking some with blunt objects such as bricks, iron 

bars, and garden hoes.145 The congregation site was located inside 

a shoe and clothing factory,146 and Linfen municipal officials characterized the raid as an effort to ‘‘ban illegal buildings.’’ 147 Two official reports posted in August 2009 on the Web site of the Linfen 

Municipal People’s Government foreshadowed the crackdown 

against unregistered churches, as the reports featured statements 

from top Communist Party leaders calling for tighter control of religious activities. According to one of the reports, dated August 18, 

Ding Wenlu, the local head of the Party’s United Front Work Department, inspected the municipality’s religious affairs work on 

June 16 and urged officials to recognize the ‘‘high degree of political sensitivity’’ surrounding their work.148 Ding issued a ‘‘clear deVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
110 

mand’’ that officials must ‘‘pay close attention to . . . and promptly 

dispose of . . . illegal religious activities according to the law.’’ 149

At a government meeting on ‘‘safeguarding stability’’ held in Linfen 

on June 25, reported in an August 18 article, Xie Hai, the Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee, emphasized the need to 

‘‘strengthen management of religious and ethnic affairs work,’’ 

which he characterized as ‘‘having extraordinarily important significance for safeguarding the overall stability of the entire 

city.’’ 150 Xie called for officials to ‘‘go a step further to strengthen 

punishment of illegal religious activities and strike hard against 

those who wear the cloak of religion and use religion to conduct 

various divisive sabotage activities.’’ 151

On September 25, 2009, authorities detained Linfen pastors 

Wang Xiaoguang and Yang Rongli, along with three other church 

leaders, as they attempted to petition central government authorities for redress.152 On October 11, public security officials also detained an additional 10 Linfen-Fushan Church members 153 and, on 

November 30, ordered five church members to serve two years of 

reeducation through labor.154 On November 25, the Yaodu District 

People’s Court variously convicted the five church leaders of 

‘‘illegally occupying farm land’’ and ‘‘gathering a crowd to disturb 

transportation order’’ 155 in a trial that was reportedly marked by 

procedural irregularities that restricted the defense counsel’s access 

to evidence.156 Yang received the longest prison sentence: seven 

years.157 Authorities also interfered with the efforts of Chinese 

Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) researcher Fan Yafeng and Beijing lawyer Zhang Kai to provide legal assistance to members of 

the church. In November 2009, after Fan attempted to provide 

legal assistance to the church, the Party Secretary at CASS reportedly told Fan that he would not be permitted to continue working 

at CASS.158 In July 2010, police barred Zhang from entering a 

Linfen court as he attempted to file an administrative lawsuit on 

behalf of the convicted church leaders.159 [See Section III—Access 

to Justice for more information.] 

Alimjan Yimit (Himit)—a Protestant house church leader in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) whom the Kashgar 

Intermediate People’s Court convicted of ‘‘leaking state secrets to 

overseas organizations’’ in October 2009 160—was moved from the 

Kashgar Municipal Detention Center to a prison in Urumqi after 

the XUAR People’s High Court upheld his 15-year sentence on appeal on March 16, 2010.161 According to his lawyer, Li Baiguang, 

the charges against Alimjan Yimit stemmed from his talking with 

visiting Christians from the United States,162 and Li reported that, 

in his view, the court’s decision did not successfully prove that 

Alimjan Yimit supplied state secrets to people overseas.163 Alimjan 

Yimit had previously worked for a foreign-owned company that was 

shut down for ‘‘illegal religious infiltration activities’’ 164 after public security officials accused the company of preaching Christianity 

to Uyghurs in 2007.165

BANNED PROTESTANT GROUPS AND THE DESIGNATION OF GROUPS AS

‘‘CULTS’’ 

The government and Party continued to prohibit categorically 

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111 

inalizing their communities as ‘‘cult organizations.’’ 166 The government has banned at least 18 Protestant groups with adherents in 

multiple provinces, as well as many more congregations and movements that are active in only one province.167 Examples of groups 

that have been banned in previous years include the South China 

Church (SCC); 168 the Local Church, a group that officials refer to 

as the ‘‘Shouters’’; 169 and the Disciples Association.170 Two weeks 

after the September 13, 2009, raid on the Shanxi Linfen-Fushan 

Christian Church,171 officials met to discuss whether or not to classify the Linfen-Fushan Church as a ‘‘cult’’ organization.172 According to a ChinaAid report, the officials decided not to label the 

church a ‘‘cult’’ organization but resolved not to allow what they 

characterized as the ‘‘abuses and legal violations of Pastor Yang 

Rongli and her ‘foolish and misguided followers.’ ’’ 173 In another 

case, after a November 18, 2009, raid on a Protestant house church 

congregation in Shuozhou city, Shanxi province, authorities detained six church members,174 five of whom were formally arrested 

on charges of ‘‘cult’’ involvement.175 On August 2, 2010, the Weidu 

District Court of Xuchang city, Henan province reportedly refused 

to hear an administrative lawsuit filed by Gao Jianli and Liu 

Yunhua, two members of a Henan house church that authorities in 

Shangqiu municipality had deemed a ‘‘cult’’ on the basis of an internal document, thereby effectively upholding an administrative 

punishment of one year of reeducation through labor (RTL) for 

each of the two men.176 The court had previously upheld the RTL 

order in July on the basis of a prior administrative lawsuit that 

Gao and Liu filed against the Shangqiu Municipal Reeducation 

Through Labor Committee.177

Taoism 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to exercise control over 

the scope of Taoist 178 religious activities in much the same way 

that they do for other religious communities in China. The government requires Taoist groups and religious personnel to register 

with the state-controlled Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) in order 

to legally perform ritual services and hold Taoist ceremonies,179

and authorities tend to allow a wider scope of activities for Taoist 

groups that work more closely with them.180 Authorities also continued to exercise control over the scope of religious freedom for 

Taoists by emphasizing the role of the CTA in promoting government and Party policy. For example, the CTA’s official Web site 

described the theme of the June 21, 2010, Eighth National Conference of the CTA in the following way: 

[R]aising high the banner of loving the country and loving 

religion, as well as the banner of solidarity and progress, 

deeply implementing the scientific development concept, 

implementing the Party’s basic policy on religious work, 

vigorously strengthening self-construction, [and] making 

efforts to play a positive role in advancing social harmony 

and economic and social development . . . .181

In addition, various government reports throughout China called 

on local officials to monitor and control the ‘‘indiscriminate’’ conVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
112 

struction of temples and statues,182 as well as ‘‘feudal, superstitious’’ Taoist activities.183 One April 2010 report from the Wuxi 

Municipal Park Administration specifically called on local authorities to strengthen the management of Taoist sites and prevent Taoists from engaging in various forms of fortunetelling and other 

‘‘feudal, superstitious’’ activities during the Shanghai 2010 World 

Expo.184

Other Religious Communities 

The Chinese government maintained its framework for recognizing only select religious communities and did not enlarge this 

framework to recognize additional groups. Legal regulations allowed foreign religious communities, including communities not 

recognized as domestic religions by the government, to hold services 

for expatriates, but forbade Chinese citizens from participating.185

In August, leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 

Saints reported holding meetings with a high-level Chinese official 

and said church leaders ‘‘established a relationship’’ that they ‘‘expect will lead to regularizing the activities of The Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter-day Saints in China.’’ 186 Some local governments 

recognized the Orthodox church within local legislation.187 Chinese 

citizens reportedly were unable to attend Orthodox services in Beijing, however, because the services were set up for foreigners, and 

seminary graduates reportedly have been unable to work as religious leaders.188 The State Administration for Religious Affairs has 

engaged in talks with officials from the Orthodox church in recent 

years and met with Russian Orthodox Church officials in November 2009.189 In recent years, some local governments have issued 

measures to register venues for folk belief activities.190 No national 

legal measures govern folk belief activities in China. 

113 

ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Chinese law provides for a system of ‘‘regional ethnic autonomy’’ 

in designated areas with ethnic minority populations,1 but shortcomings in the substance and implementation of this system have 

prevented these groups from enjoying meaningful autonomy in 

practice. The Chinese government maintained policies during the 

Commission’s 2010 reporting year that prevented ethnic minorities 

from ‘‘administering their internal affairs’’ as guaranteed in Chinese law 2 and from enjoying their rights in line with international 

human rights standards.3 International human rights standards 

stipulate that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities within a 

state ‘‘shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 

members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 

practice their own religion, or to use their own language.’’ 4 While 

the government maintained some protections in law and practice 

for minority rights, it continued to impose the fundamental terms 

upon which Chinese citizens could express their ethnicity and to 

prevent ethnic minorities from enjoying their cultures, religions, 

and languages free from state interference.5 Among the 55 groups 

designated as minority ‘‘nationalities’’ or ‘‘ethnicities’’ (shaoshu 

minzu 6), state repression was harshest toward groups deemed to 

challenge state authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas. 

State Policies and Ethnic Unity Campaigns 

The Chinese government continued in the past year to assert the 

effectiveness of state laws and policies in upholding the rights of 

ethnic minorities, following domestic protests and international 

criticism of the government’s treatment of ethnic minorities. A September 2009 State Council Information Office white paper on the 

topic described state policy as the ‘‘correct’’ approach ‘‘in keeping 

with . . . the common interests of all ethnic groups’’ and guiding 

Chinese citizens to ‘‘[safeguard] national unification, social stability 

and ethnic unity.’’ 7 Authorities defended state policy in the aftermath of demonstrations and riots in Tibetan areas in 2008 and in 

the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2009 that highlighted 

deep tensions in ethnic minority areas and citizen grievances toward government policy. Authorities denied the events had domestic political roots and instead attributed conflict to factors such as 

interference from outside forces and ‘‘contradictions’’ among the 

people.8 Some academics affiliated with state universities or think 

tanks, along with some lower level officials, openly criticized government policy toward ethnic issues in the past year.9 Although 

the ultimate impact of such criticism is unknown, it may signal 

growing room for debate and reconsideration of aspects of government policy in this area. 

The government and Communist Party strengthened ‘‘ethnic 

unity’’ campaigns as a vehicle for spreading state ethnic policy 

throughout Chinese society and for imposing state-defined interpretations of the history, relations, and current conditions of ethnic 

groups in China. The State Council Information Office white paper 

stressed the importance of ethnic unity in meeting state political 

114 

goals such as social stability and development, and described ‘‘ethnic unity education’’ as part of ‘‘the whole process of socialist cultural and ideological construction.’’ 10 Following steps in 2008 and 

2009 to strengthen ethnic unity education,11 central government 

and Party offices issued plans in the past year to expand the reach 

of ethnic unity education.12 Provincial and local governments also 

reported strengthening ethnic unity campaigns.13

2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 

Chinese leaders pledged to refine laws and improve conditions 

for ethnic minorities, within the parameters of existing Party policy, issuing some policy documents in the past year which may 

bring mixed results in the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights. 

The government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 

(HRAP) issued in April 2009 outlined measures to support legislation, governance, education, personnel training and employment, 

language use, and cultural and economic development among ethnic minorities.14 The government’s December 2009 review of the 

HRAP provided limited information on the plan’s progress, noting 

work in the areas of cultural and economic development.15 Following that date, government offices issued an opinion in May and 

a plan in July that state more support for ethnic minority languages and for education among ethnic minorities, respectively, including support in both documents for ‘‘bilingual education.’’ 16 The 

two documents also state support for ethnic minorities’ right to use 

their own languages,17 but ‘‘bilingual education’’ as implemented in 

some parts of China has marginalized the role of ethnic minority 

languages, in contravention of Chinese law.18

Economic Development 

The government maintained economic development policies that 

prioritize state economic goals over the protection of ethnic minorities’ rights. Despite bringing some benefits to ethnic minority areas 

and residents, such policies also have conflicted with ethnic minorities’ rights to maintain traditional livelihoods, spurred migration to 

ethnic minority regions, promoted unequal allocation of resources 

favoring Han Chinese, intensified linguistic and assimilation 

pressures on local communities, and resulted in environmental 

damage.19 In the past year, the government marked the 10th anniversary of the Great Western Development project—which is directed at a number of provinces and regions with large populations 

of non-Han ethnic groups—and announced plans to continue western development in the coming decade.20 Authorities also stressed 

enhancing development work in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region and Tibetan areas of China, where development initiatives 

have been closely tied to central government-led political controls 

and campaigns to ‘‘uphold stability’’ and suppress dissent. [See Section IV—Xinjiang and Section V—Tibet.] 

Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 

Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 

continued in the past year to restrict independent expressions of 

ethnic identity among Mongols and to interfere with traditional 

115 

livelihoods, while enforcing campaigns to promote stability and ethnic unity. In a December 2009 interview, the head of the IMAR 

Public Security Department likened the region’s public security situation to that in the autonomous Tibetan areas of China and 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, stating ‘‘enemy forces’’ from 

Western countries aimed to split the region.21 In September 2009, 

the IMAR Department of Education issued a detailed plan for 

strengthening ethnic unity education in IMAR schools.22 Authorities strengthened ‘‘ecological migration’’ policies that have required 

herders to resettle from pasture land and abandon traditional livelihoods,23 while outside observers and some domestic scholars have 

questioned the effectiveness of these government policies in ameliorating environmental degradation.24 Mongols continued to face the 

risk of repercussions for peacefully defending their rights or aiming 

to preserve their culture. In a case also illustrating China’s influence outside its borders and contravention of protections for asylum 

seekers, on October 3, 2009, Chinese security officials inside the 

country of Mongolia reportedly joined Mongolian security officials 

in detaining Batzangaa, an ethnic Mongol from China. The detention occurred outside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees office in Ulaanbaatar, where Batzangaa had applied for refugee status. Authorities returned him to China and held him in detention. 

Batzangaa ran a traditional Mongolian medicine school in Ordos 

municipality, IMAR, that reportedly had come under official scrutiny for its popularity and activities with Mongols and Tibetans, 

and he was also involved in a land dispute with local authorities.25

On April 18, 2010, officials at the Beijing Capital International Airport detained rights advocate Sodmongol as he was waiting to 

board a flight to the United States to attend the UN Permanent 

Forum on Indigenous Issues. Sodmongol had organized events and 

led two Web sites—now shut down—that promoted the protection 

of Mongols’ rights. His current whereabouts remain unknown.26

116 

POPULATION PLANNING

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, central and local 

authorities continued to interfere with and control the reproductive 

lives of Chinese women through an all-encompassing system of 

population planning regulations. Population planning policies limit 

most women in urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting 

slightly more than half of Chinese women—located in many rural 

areas—to bear a second child if their first child is female.1 The 

Commission notes the emergence of a growing debate in the Chinese media about possible reform of these policies, but has not yet 

seen government action to introduce national reform measures.2

Local officials continue to monitor the reproductive cycles of Chinese women in order to prevent unauthorized births.3 The Chinese 

government requires married couples to obtain a birth permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces them to employ contraceptive methods at other times.4 Although Chinese law prohibits 

officials from infringing upon the rights and interests of citizens 

while promoting compliance with population planning policies,5 reports from recent years indicate that abuses continue. Violators of 

the policy are routinely punished with fines, and in some cases, 

subjected to forced sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and torture.6 In some cases surgical sterilization may be required of Chinese women following the birth of their second child.7

Mandatory abortion, which is often referred to as ‘‘remedial measures’’ (bujiu cuoshi) in government reports, is endorsed explicitly as 

an official policy instrument in the regulations of 18 of China’s 31 

provincial-level jurisdictions.8 In 2010, the Commission found that 

local officials continued to coerce women with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo abortions in both urban and rural areas across 

China’s major regions.9

China’s population planning policies in both their nature and 

implementation violate international human rights standards. 

Although implementation tends to vary across localities, the government’s population planning law and regulations contravene 

international human rights standards by limiting the number of 

children that women may bear and by coercing compliance with 

population targets through heavy fines.10 For example, China’s 

Population and Family Planning Law is not consistent with the 

standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development.11 Controls imposed on Chinese women 

and their families and additional abuses engendered by the system, 

from forced abortion to discriminatory policies against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ 

children, also violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,12 the 

Convention on the Rights of the Child,13 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.14 China is a state 

party to these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms. 

117 

Coercive Abortion and Fines 

China’s 2002 Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states 

in Article 4 that officials ‘‘shall perform their administrative duties 

strictly in accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil 

manner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and 

interests of citizens.’’ 15 The PFPL also states in Article 39 that 

‘‘any functionary of a State organ who commits one of the following 

acts in the work of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, 

shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with the 

law; if it does not constitute a crime, he shall be given an administrative sanction with law; his unlawful gains, if any, shall be confiscated: (1) infringing on a citizen’s personal rights, property 

rights, or other legitimate rights and interests; (2) abusing his 

power, neglecting his duty, or engaging in malpractices for personal 

gain . . . .’’ 16 Despite these provisions, abuses continue. The Commission has reported on a number of cases of violence against 

women in connection with officials’ enforcement of population planning policies.17 During this reporting year, the use of violence to 

coerce compliance with the PFPL was illustrated by family planning officials in Changfeng county, Anhui province. According to 

Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), on July 15, 2010, 

Changfeng family planning officials kidnapped 23-year-old Li 

Hongmei and her three-week-old daughter and took them to a local 

hospital where they reportedly held Li’s baby hostage until she 

signed her consent to undergo sterilization. According to CHRD, Li 

remained hospitalized for at least a month after the procedure due 

to illness.18

In 2010, authorities across a wide range of Chinese localities 

launched population planning enforcement campaigns—often 

dubbed ‘‘spring family planning service activities’’ (chunji jisheng 

fuwu xingdong) 19—that employed coercive measures to terminate 

‘‘out-of-plan’’ pregnancies. In February, the Jiangxi provincial government reported that one such campaign had commenced in Anyi 

county where officials vowed to engage in a ‘‘100-day battle’’ in 

which they would ‘‘insist without wavering on the principle of IUD 

[intrauterine device] insertion after the first child, surgical sterilization after the second child, and abortion of out-of-plan pregnancies.’’ 20 In March 2010, a local official in Ezhou city, Hubei 

province, instructed cadres preparing for a spring campaign to ‘‘immediately adopt remedial measures against those with out-of-plan 

pregnancies, follow procedures to terminate the pregnancy . . . and 

forcefully ensure implementation in order to reduce the birth 

rate.’’ 21 Regulations published in 2009 in Zhanjiang city in 

Guangdong province spell out penalties for violators of the policy 

and explicitly call for officials to ‘‘force’’ (qiangxing) abortion of 

‘‘extra births’’: 

Strictly prohibit out-of-plan second births or multiple 

births; those who have out-of-plan pregnancies must adopt 

abortion measures, force those who exceed birth limits to 

have an abortion. Out-of-plan children will not be allowed 

to enjoy benefits for villagers; for a period of 15 years, parents of out-of-plan children will not be allowed to enjoy 

118 

benefits for villagers, gain employment at a village-run enterprise, or be granted documents.22

In 2010, the Commission analyzed government reports from nine 

provinces that used the phrase ‘‘by all means necessary’’ (qian fang 

bai ji) to signify intensified enforcement measures and less restraint on officials who oversee coerced abortions.23 Between January and March 2010, city and county governments in at least four 

provinces (Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Jiangsu) and at least 

one provincial-level government (Jiangxi) vowed to ‘‘by all means 

necessary, stabilize the low birth level.’’ 24 In March, Panjin municipal authorities in Liaoning province expressed their resolve to 

crack down on population planning violations ‘‘in order to stabilize 

a low birth rate . . . continuously strengthen measures . . . [and] 

by all means necessary, drive population and family planning work 

into the ‘fast lane.’ ’’ 25 In addition to mandating abortion of pregnancies that exceed fertility limits, all pregnancies that occur without an official permit, including first pregnancies, are regarded by 

the government as ‘‘out-of-plan’’ and subject to ‘‘remedial measures.’’ In Jiangxi province, a Xingzi county official highlighted this 

point in responding to an anonymous citizen’s online inquiry in 

March 2010. Noting that there are 10 circumstances in which a 

couple may apply for a permit to have a second child in Jiangxi, 

the official told the citizen that ‘‘even if you conform to some of the 

stipulated conditions, you must first obtain a ‘repeat birth permit,’ 

then you may remove the IUD and become pregnant; otherwise, it 

would be considered an out-of-plan pregnancy.’’ 26 For women who 

give birth to an out-of-plan child before authorities discover the 

pregnancy, the government imposes penalties known as ‘‘social 

compensation fees’’ (shehui fuyang fei). For certain couples, these 

fines pose a dilemma between undergoing an unwanted abortion 

and incurring potentially overwhelming financial costs.27 In some 

cases, authorities not only levy fines against violators, but also 

punish them through job dismissal and other penalties.28 Some 

children may go without household registration (hukou) in China 

because they are born out of plan and their parents do not pay the 

necessary fines.29 Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access 

to social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including subsidized 

healthcare and public education.30 [For additional discussion of 

China’s hukou system, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and 

Movement.] 

The U.S. State Department, reporting on China’s ‘‘high female 

suicide rate’’ in its 2009 Human Rights Report noted that ‘‘(m)any 

observers believed that violence against women and girls, discrimination in education and employment, the traditional preference for 

male children, birth-limitation policies, and other societal factors 

contributed to the high female suicide rate. Women in rural areas, 

where the suicide rate for women was three to four times higher 

than for men, were especially vulnerable.’’ 31

Targeting Migrant Workers 

The Commission observed during its 2010 reporting year a greater number of reports confirming its 2009 finding that some local 

governments are specifically targeting migrant workers for forced 

119 

abortions.32 [For more information on discrimination against migrant workers, see Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement.] In April 2010, the National Population and Family Planning 

Commission released an ‘‘implementation plan’’ for enforcing population planning regulations for migrant workers within a 10-province region called the Bohai Rim.33 This plan calls for governments 

where migrant workers reside to ‘‘persuade and educate’’ those 

with out-of-plan pregnancies to ‘‘promptly adopt remedial measures.’’ If a migrant worker refuses, local authorities are instructed 

to coordinate with the migrant’s home government (place of household registration) to ‘‘launch unified enforcement work.’’ 34

Strengthening family planning enforcement through coordination 

between governments where migrants work and where their households are registered, as described in the Bohai plan, was also the 

chief goal behind a cooperation agreement that 10 district and 

county-level governments in Shanghai and Fuzhou municipalities 

signed in March 2010.35 In the migrant-rich factory city of 

Kunshan on the outskirts of Shanghai, the government launched a 

‘‘special rectification operation’’ for the ‘‘floating population’’ in December 2009 that set ‘‘raising the implementation rate of remedial 

measures for out-of-plan pregnancies’’ as one of its primary objectives.36 Anhui provincial family planning measures for migrant 

workers require officials to ‘‘mobilize pregnant migrant workers 

without a birth permit to adopt remedial measures.’’ 37 Those who 

initially refuse are fined repeatedly until they terminate the pregnancy, or if they fail to abort within a designated period of time, 

officials are required to ‘‘order them to adopt remedial measures on 

the spot.’’ 38

Coercive Sterilization 

When women reach the state-imposed limit on number of births, 

local authorities often mandate surgical sterilization to prevent 

‘‘out-of-plan’’ pregnancies. In February 2010, the Qiaojia county 

government in Yunnan province issued a directive that urged officials to ‘‘by all means necessary, raise the rate of surgical sterilization after the second birth and IUD insertion after the first 

birth.’’ 39 The directive also warns that the government will ‘‘stop 

salary payments without exception’’ for government workers who 

fail to adopt contraception measures within a specified time period.40 In March 2010, the Qianxi county government in Guizhou 

province issued a similar directive authorizing ‘‘special rectification 

activities’’ to sterilize women with two children.41 Qianxi officials 

face a penalty of 1,000 yuan (US$147) for each woman with two 

children that they fail to sterilize, and conversely, they are promised a reward of the same amount for each tubal ligation that they 

see through to completion.42

In some areas, coerced sterilization is accomplished through punitive action taken against the family members of targeted women, 

which can include extended periods of detention. In April 2010, the 

Puning city government in Guangdong province launched a ‘‘special 

operation to sterilize women with two children’’ in which officials 

were authorized to ‘‘adopt measures that exceed conventional practices.’’ 43 The impetus for the operation came from Guangdong provincial authorities who identified Puning as a problematic area 

120 

that ‘‘lagged behind’’ other localities in meeting population planning goals.44 Puning authorities indicated that the operation’s initial sweep, conducted from April 7 to April 26, resulted in 5,601 

surgical sterilizations.45 The government reportedly set 9,559 tubal 

ligations as its target to achieve before the end of April.46 As of 

April 12, Puning authorities had detained 1,377 people—many of 

whom were elderly relatives of unsterilized women—in extralegal 

‘‘study classes’’ in order to force women who had left Puning for 

work purposes to return and undergo sterilization.47 In addition to 

detentions, Puning authorities employed a series of other ‘‘measures that exceed conventional practice’’ such as nullification of 

household registration (hukou) for unsterilized women, refusal to 

grant household registration to their children, and punitive actions 

taken against their relatives such as cancellation of state benefits 

and permits.48 As of April 12, 63 officials who failed to adopt these 

measures were reportedly subjected to disciplinary action, including one township Communist Party secretary who was suspended.49 Puning is not exceptional in its use of coercive ‘‘measures 

that exceed conventional practices,’’ as the Commission analyzed 

official government reports containing the same phrase in provinces such as Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Gansu, and the Guangxi 

Zhuang Autonomous Region.50

Prospects for Policy Reform 

Growing awareness of the demographic and social consequences 

of China’s population planning policy is giving rise to public discussion of the need for policy reform. In 2010, Chinese experts and officials engaged in a relatively open exchange in the state-run media 

about how to address demographic trends that are expected to detrimentally impact China’s future development.51 The Beijing News 

reported in January that the municipal government would soon 

allow all couples to have two children, but within hours, the Beijing Population and Family Planning Commission denied the 

earlier report.52 The central government reportedly commissioned 

feasibility studies in 2009 to assess the possible effects of a change 

in policy.53 Top Party and government leaders, however, continue 

to publicly defend the policy and rule out reform in the near-term.54

Demographic Consequences 

Chinese society is aging at a rapid pace and is expected to undergo a challenging demographic transformation in the next two decades. In 2008, China had 169 million citizens over the age of 60, 

constituting 13 percent of the total population and surpassing the 

UN’s threshold for classification as an ‘‘aging society.’’ 55 By 2030, 

some Western demographers estimate that the number of elderly 

Chinese could soar to as high as 350 million and account for 25 

percent of the population.56 An economist with the Asian Development Bank projects that one in five urban Chinese will be over 65 

years of age by 2025.57

China’s total fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births per 

woman in 1949 to an estimated 1.5 births per woman in 2010.58

Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Li Keqiang called on separate occasions in 2010 for officials to maintain China’s low birth 

121 

rate for the foreseeable future.59 Cai Fang, the Director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy 

of Social Sciences (CASS), characterizes this decline in the working-age population as the ‘‘greatest threat to China’s economic prosperity’’ and predicts labor shortages in China as soon as 2013.60

An imbalanced sex ratio remains one of China’s major demographic challenges and recent data indicate that it is worsening. In 

response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with 

a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese parents often engage 

in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples whose first child 

is a girl.61 In January 2010, CASS published a comprehensive 

study that placed the male-to-female sex ratio for the infant-tofour-year-old age group in China at 123.26 males for every 100 females.62 Some provinces have ratios exceeding 130.63 This is far 

above the global norm of roughly 103 to 105 males for every 100 

females and represents growth of nearly two and a half points from 

the 2000 census ratio.64 CASS estimates that, by 2020, the number 

of Chinese males of marriageable age will exceed the number of 

Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.65 [For additional discussion of China’s imbalanced sex ratio, see Section II— 

Status of Women.] 

Case Update: Chen Guangcheng—Human Rights Defender 

Authorities in Linyi city, Shandong province, released rights defender 

Chen Guangcheng from prison on September 9, 2010, after he completed 

a four-year, three-month sentence for exposing widespread abuses by 

local officials responsible for implementing China’s one-child policy.66

During the period of his imprisonment, authorities reportedly denied 

Chen Guangcheng, who is blind, adequate medical treatment despite his 

reported deteriorating health.67 Authorities also repeatedly denied requests filed by both Chen and his wife, Yuan Weijing, on his behalf for 

his medical parole.68

According to several media and non-governmental organization reports, Chen returned home under police escort on the morning of September 9, 2010, to heightened police surveillance, including a number of 

plainclothes and uniformed guards around Chen’s home and at the entrance to his village,69 disconnection of the family’s telephone and cell 

phone service,70 and newly installed 24-hour closed-circuit surveillance 

cameras by which security agents monitor his and his family’s activities.71

122 

Case Update: Chen Guangcheng—Human Rights Defender— 

Continued 

In 1996, Mr. Chen began defending the rights of disabled peasants 

and providing legal advice as a self-trained legal advocate focusing on 

antidiscrimination.72 Over the next decade, his legal advocacy was recognized in China and internationally.73 In 2005, Mr. Chen’s rights 

defense work drew international news media attention to population 

planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province.74 Local authorities 

placed Chen under house arrest in September 2005 and formally arrested him on June 21, 2006.75 On the eve of his August 18, 2006, trial, 

three of his defense lawyers were taken into custody.76 The Yinan County People’s Court first tried and sentenced Chen on August 24, 2006, to 

four years and three months in prison for ‘‘intentional destruction of 

property’’ and ‘‘organizing a group of people to disturb traffic order.’’ 77

Li Jinsong, lead counsel on Chen’s criminal defense team, filed an appeal in September 2006 arguing that at trial, the court had illegally deprived Chen of the right to be represented by criminal defense lawyers 

of his own choosing.78 On October 31, 2006, the Linyi Intermediate People’s Court vacated the original trial court judgment and remanded the 

case for a retrial.79 The retrial took place on November 27, 2006,80 and 

on December 1, 2006, the Yinan court handed down the same judgment 

as before,81 which the appeals court affirmed on January 12, 2007.82

Chen’s retrial prompted repeated criticism for its criminal procedure violations.83 In June 2007, Chen reportedly informed his wife and brother 

that he had been beaten by fellow inmates.84

In August 2007, Chen received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for ‘‘his 

irrepressible passion for justice in leading ordinary Chinese citizens to 

assert their legitimate rights under the law.’’ 85 His wife, Yuan Weijing, 

attempted to travel to the Philippines to accept the award on behalf of 

Chen, but Chinese authorities intercepted her before leaving the country 

and reportedly forcibly returned her to her village.86 At other times during Chen’s imprisonment, authorities also repeatedly subjected Yuan 

and their two children to harassment, home confinement, surveillance, 

and other abuses,87 including reportedly preventing the children from 

enrolling in school.88 The Commission will continue to monitor and report on the conditions surrounding Chen Guangcheng and his family in 

the coming year. 

123 

FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT

Freedom of Residence 

The Chinese government continued to enforce the household registration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s.1 Hukou 

regulations limit the right of Chinese citizens formally to establish 

their permanent place of residence. Initially used to control migration of the rural population to China’s cities, ‘‘[t]oday it is one of 

the most important mechanisms determining entitlement to public 

welfare, urban services and, more broadly, full citizenship.’’ 2 The 

hukou regulations classify Chinese citizens as either rural or urban 

hukou holders and local governments restrict access to some social 

services based on the classification. The implementation of these 

regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders who migrate 

to urban areas by imposing significant constraints on rural hukou 

holders’ ability to obtain healthcare benefits, education, and other 

social services in urban locations where they reside but lack legal 

residency status. The hukou regulations appear to contradict the 

freedoms guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, which include ‘‘the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.’’ 3

The discriminatory effect is especially prominent in the area of 

education. In many cases, migrant children, who live in urban 

areas but lack urban hukous, cannot attend local public schools. 

The estimated number of migrant children affected by hukou regulations ranges from 14 million to 19 million.4 Chinese law and regulations call for nine years of compulsory education and equal 

treatment of all children.5 In practice, however, many migrant children are systematically excluded from urban public schools, where 

resources are more abundant than in urban private schools or rural 

schools.6 Many resort to substandard, often unlicensed but relatively affordable urban private schools, those with more means 

offer a special ‘‘donation’’ to public schools in order to gain access, 

and some send their children back to their place of rural hukou, relying on relatives to raise their children.7 Some migrant children 

who have gained access to urban public school systems report unequal treatment. According to a 16-year-old middle school graduate, 

migrant and local students ‘‘from the two sides of the school never 

communicate . . . . Class starting time, lunch time and dismissal 

time are different for students of the two parts. The eastern part’s 

[local] students are going to visit the expo site, but the western 

part [migrant students] doesn’t have the chance.’’ 8 Most migrant 

students are ‘‘housed in a separate school building, wear an alternative uniform and have different teachers and textbooks.’’ 9 School 

teachers tell the local children to ‘‘stay clear of the migrant children’’ because they are ‘‘wild, lacking in manners and poor.’’ 10 In 

addition, migrant children cannot attend high school or sit for the 

crucial college entrance exam in the cities where they reside, but 

in which they do not possess a valid hukou.11 Instead, they generally are required to return to their hukou locations where they 

may experience significant alienation or have little knowledge of 

the local academic culture.12

124 

In recent years, local governments have instituted a series of 

policies intended to reform the hukou system. While details vary by 

location, the key provisions of these reforms allow people to transfer hukou from rural to urban status based on certain criteria.13

These criteria usually include income, education, and special skills 

aimed at attracting elite rural hukou holders with wealth and education.14 The vast majority of China’s over 200 million migrant 

workers fall outside the scope of these reforms.15

Because the problems the hukou system creates are complex, any 

large-scale reform likely will carry sweeping implications.16 Hukou 

transfer is managed at the local level, and typically each local government sets its own standard of admission for rural-to-urban 

hukou transfers.17 Furthermore, rural hukou holders confront disparate interests. For example, those with easy access to urban centers may actually prefer rural hukous over urban hukous due to 

benefits tied to land ownership and a higher birth allowance rate.18

In addition, hukou reforms often lack support from the urban 

hukou class as the current status quo tips in its favor.19

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, authorities continued to relax certain hukou restrictions consistent with earlier 

reform efforts.20 Several high-level officials acknowledged and publicized the need for hukou reforms.21 The Development Research 

Center of the State Council published an essay that advocated for 

a more inclusive approach to hukou reform in order to achieve 

‘‘substantive equality of rights.’’ 22 The efficacy of these policies remains unclear.23

The government and the Communist Party exercised strict control over public debate on hukou reforms during this reporting 

year. Authorities retracted a joint editorial published by 13 newspapers that decried the hukou system as corrupt and in need of 

speedy reforms. One of the editorial’s co-authors, a deputy editor 

at one of the newspapers, was forced to resign.24

Significant Household Registration (Hukou) Policies and Regulatory 

Developments in 2010 

GUANGZHOU MUNICIPALITY

In May 2010, the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau in 

Guangdong province directed district- and county-level Party committees and governments to gradually transform its hukou system 

into one that will identify residents as holders of Guangzhou’s residential hukou.25 The impact of the reform remains unclear. One 

key issue associated with the reform is the interpretation of its language. A noted hukou scholar interpreting similar reforms has 

argued that the impact of a unified residential hukou system is 

negligible on migrant workers. This is because the reform can be 

interpreted to include only a small percentage of rural hukou holders who are already eligible for social benefits,26 rendering the reform efforts pro forma at best. According to one source, the 

Guangzhou experiment is likely to have a limited impact on its 

large migrant population.27

125 

CHONGQING MUNICIPALITY

In July 2010, Chongqing municipality initiated gradual voluntary 

hukou reforms aimed at increasing the percentage of urban hukou 

holders in the municipality.28 By 2020, the reform efforts are intended to gradually turn at least 10 million rural hukou holders 

into urban hukou holders, thus potentially allowing them greater 

access to social services in exchange for their land allocations.29 An 

unusual feature of the reform allows rural hukou holders to retain 

their land contracting and use rights (cheng bao), among other provisions, for up to three years after transitioning to urban hukou 

status.30 It is unclear whether rural hukou holders can choose to 

retain their land rights and their rural hukou status at the end of 

the three-year transition period should they wish to do so. If successful, the Chongqing hukou reforms could significantly remedy a 

shortage of urban land for construction and development in the 

municipality.31

THE JOINT EDITORIAL ON HUKOU REFORM

On March 1, 2010, 13 mainland newspapers published a joint 

editorial four days before the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference convened in Beijing.32 The joint editorial demanded a clear 

timetable for hukou reforms, stating that freedom of movement is 

‘‘an inseparable part of human rights and personal freedom.’’ 33

Furthermore, it decried the hukou system as a breeding ground for 

corruption and urged the delegates to abolish the system.34 Just 

one day after its publication, the editorial was removed from many 

Web sites and the deputy editor of one of the newspapers was 

forced to resign.35

Freedom of Movement 

There can be little doubt that there is greater freedom of movement for those Chinese citizens who shun political engagement outside of government-approved parameters. Unlike 30 years ago, 

there are many opportunities for travel. Yet, Chinese rights defenders and advocates who venture beyond government-sanctioned parameters face frequent restrictions on their liberty of movement. 

The Chinese government continues to impose restrictions on Chinese citizens’ liberty of movement that contravene international 

standards.36

CHINESE CITIZENS BARRED FROM ENTERING AND LEAVING MAINLAND

CHINA

Chinese authorities arbitrarily barred rights defenders, advocates, and critics from entering and leaving China. China’s Passport Law delineates the legal framework for regulating travel 

abroad. While providing some procedural safeguards, the law provides no mechanism for redress. Article 2 of the Passport Law requires Chinese citizens to have a valid passport to enter China 

while Article 13 gives officials the discretion to refuse the issuance 

of a passport where ‘‘the competent organs of the State Council believe that [the applicant’s] leaving China will do harm to the state 

security or result in serious losses to the benefits of the state.’’ 37

126 

With respect to entering China, authorities refuse to renew the 

passports of rights advocates and subsequently cite passport expiration as grounds to prevent entry. Such arbitrary practices appear 

to contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.38

There are numerous cases of concern. The following is a representative sample: 

• Between June 7, 2009, and February 12, 2010, on at least 

eight separate occasions, the Chinese government prevented 

Feng Zhenghu, a Shanghai-based human rights advocate and 

Chinese citizen, from returning to China after a temporary 

visit to Japan. He spent at least 90 days at Narita Airport, Tokyo’s main airport, before he was allowed to reenter mainland 

China.39 Since Feng’s return to Shanghai in mid-February, the 

Chinese government has subjected him to an array of control 

measures including surveillance, confiscation of property, detention, and home confinement due to his intended publication 

of 12 instances of injustice to coincide with the Shanghai 2010 

World Expo.40

• During the week of March 22, 2010, Chinese professor Cui 

Weiping was banned from leaving China to travel to the 

United States, where she planned to attend an academic conference hosted by the Association for Asian Studies in Philadelphia and to give lectures at Harvard University and other 

schools.41 Cui’s travel ban is likely related to a series of Twitter messages she posted about Liu Xiaobo’s 11-year prison sentence and to her comments commemorating the 1989 

Tiananmen protests.42

• On at least two separate occasions, Chinese authorities prevented poet, writer, and musician Liao Yiwu from leaving 

China. Liao was imprisoned for four years for reciting his poem 

‘‘Massacre’’ about the Tiananmen protests.43 In October 2009, 

authorities banned Liao from going to the Frankfurt Book Fair, 

where China was the ‘‘honored guest.’’ 44 On March 2, 2010, 

Liao was again banned from attending Germany’s largest literary festival, Lit.Cologne. Authorities removed him from a 

plane en route to Germany and placed him under house confinement.45

• In April 2010, the Chinese government banned Ilham Tohti, 

a prominent Uyghur economist, from traveling to Turkey to attend an academic conference.46 Ilham Tohti is a professor at 

Minzu University of China who also writes an online blog addressing Uyghur social issues.47 Chinese authorities warned 

Ilham Tohti against attending the conference and took him on 

a ‘‘vacation’’ days before the event.48 The ban is one of eight 

instances where Ilham Tohti was prevented from traveling 

abroad since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in 

Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.49 At the time of 

the April travel ban, Ilham Tohti held a valid Chinese passport 

and had already received a Turkish visa to attend the conference.50

• Macau customs officials banned ‘‘Long Hair’’ Leung Kwokhung, a member of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, from 

entering Macau in December 2009.51 ‘‘Long Hair’’ Leung, along 

127 

with other democracy activists, had planned to press President 

Hu Jintao on the issue of universal suffrage in Hong Kong 

while Hu was in Macau to attend commemorative ceremonies 

of Macau’s return to China.52 Macau customs authorities cited 

Macau’s Internal Security Law as grounds for Leung’s ban.53

An outspoken lawmaker, ‘‘Long Hair’’ Leung had been prevented from entering Macau on previous occasions.54

HOME CONFINEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE OF CHINESE CITIZENS

DURING POLITICALLY SENSITIVE PERIODS

The Chinese government continued to detain, harass, and restrict the movement of political dissidents and rights defenders inside China. Restrictions on liberty of movement within China were 

especially prominent during politically sensitive periods. The Commission’s 2010 reporting year coincided with several anniversaries 

and events: the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the 60th anniversary of the founding 

of the People’s Republic of China (National Day), and the 21st anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. 

The Chinese government employs a spectrum of measures to restrict the movement of dissidents, advocates, and rights defenders 

who act outside of approved parameters. During this reporting 

year, authorities used methods including surveillance, police presence outside of one’s home, ‘‘invitation’’ to tea with police, forced 

trips during politically sensitive periods, detention, removal from 

one’s home, reeducation through labor, and imprisonment. 

There are numerous cases of concern. Representative examples 

follow. 

• In connection with October 1, 2009 (National Day), several dozen activists, dissidents, and rights defenders saw 

increased state intrusion in connection with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Examples include the following incidents: 

Æ Li Hai, a former Tiananmen protest student leader, disappeared from Beijing for 22 days in mid-September 2009 

after having been ‘‘invited’’ by the police to go on a trip. 

Li’s whereabouts remained unknown as of October 9, 

2009.55

Æ Domestic security protection personnel forced Qi 

Zhiyong to travel to an area outside of Beijing. Qi is a Beijing activist who is disabled from the 1989 Tiananmen protest.56 He was allowed to return to Beijing to attend to his 

daughter but was placed under residential surveillance 

and denied access to foreign media.57

Æ Ding Zilin, the leader of the Tiananmen Mothers, and 

Liu Xia, wife of imprisoned intellectual Liu Xiaobo, received orders to leave Beijing.58

• In connection with the 21st anniversary of the 1989 

Tiananmen protests in June 2010, activists, dissidents, and 

rights defenders saw heightened official intrusion during this 

period. The following list highlights the extent and methods 

employed: 

128 

Æ On May 28, 2010, Guiyang Public Security Bureau personnel in Guizhou province surveyed, intercepted, and detained a gathering of Guiyang Human Rights members 

discussing the commemoration of the 21st anniversary of 

the Tiananmen protests.59

Æ On May 24, 2010, domestic security protection personnel 

warned Beijing lawyer Li Xiongbing ‘‘not to leave his home 

in the coming days,’’ 60 and stationed police outside of his 

home.61

Æ On May 26 and 28, 2010, in Xi’an city, Shaanxi province, domestic security protection personnel summoned 

rights defenders Yang Hai and Zhang Jiankang to ‘‘tea’’ 

and told them that they would be forced to travel during 

the Tiananmen protest anniversary period.62

Æ Several supporters of Internet writer Chen Yang went 

missing. Their whereabouts remained unknown as of June 

7. In 2009, Chen was ordered to serve reeducation through 

labor for his Twitter messages mobilizing others to commemorate the anniversary of the Tiananmen protests.63

129 

STATUS OF WOMEN

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, Chinese officials 

continued to promote existing laws and policies that aim to protect 

women’s rights in accordance with international human rights 

norms. Inconsistent interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of these laws across localities, however, limit progress on 

concrete protections of women’s rights. Recent statistics on female 

representation in government show increases in women holding positions at the central, provincial, and municipal levels of government; however, female political representation at the village level 

remains low and may contribute to continued violations of women’s 

land rights in rural areas. Domestic violence remained widespread, 

highlighting a need for national-level legislation that provides a 

clear definition of domestic violence and standards for prevention 

and punishment. Like many countries, China lacks national legislation that clearly defines sexual harassment and gives guidance 

on appropriate measures for prevention and punishment of offenses. Sex-selective abortion and infanticide continue, despite Chinese government regulations which aim to deter such practices, 

and have contributed to a severely imbalanced gender ratio, according to a 2010 UN Development Programme report. Gender discrimination with respect to wages, recruitment, and retirement age 

continues; however, authorities promoted women’s employment and 

took concrete steps to eliminate gender discrimination in the workplace. 

Gender Equality 

In its domestic laws and policy initiatives 1 and through its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 2 (CEDAW), the Chinese government 

has committed to ensuring female representation in government on 

equal terms with men. According to a March 2010 Southern Daily 

report, factors including the costs of giving birth, family conflict, 

and even a woman’s clothing and makeup prevent many Chinese 

women from breaking through the ‘‘glass ceiling.’’ 3 Official statistics reported in March 2010 show that female representation in official positions has increased at central, provincial, and municipal 

levels of government,4 but according to the Southern Daily report, 

‘‘compared with women’s political participation internationally, 

China’s progress in this area is very limited.’’ 5 The report notes 

that China’s international ranking with regard to female political 

participation dropped from 12th place in 1994 to 52nd in 2009,6

and that although women now make up 21.3 percent of National 

People’s Congress representatives, this is still far short of the 30 

percent standard set by the UN Commission on the Status of 

Women in 1990.7

Female political representation at the village level also remains 

low and may contribute to continued violations of women’s land 

rights in rural areas. Chen Zhili, Chair of the All-China Women’s 

Federation, reported in March 2010 that women make up over 60 

percent of the rural workforce, but only just over 10 percent of vilVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
130 

lage committee members.8 In most rural areas of China, villages 

have a high rate of ‘‘self-governance’’ with regard to issues such as 

land contracts, profit distribution from collectives, and land requisition compensation.9 With limited decisionmaking power in village 

committees, women’s interests are less likely to be represented in 

village rules and regulations.10 According to a 2008 report by the 

non-governmental organization Women’s Watch-China, ‘‘villages 

deny land rights of women who married . . . in other villages and 

the women’s sons and daughters in a variety of ways. Yet, the 

grassroots government often holds an equivocal attitude towards 

land rights disputes.’’ 11

Gender-Based Employment Discrimination 

Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to issues 

such as wages, recruitment, and retirement age remains widespread in China, despite government efforts to eliminate it and promote women’s employment. The Chinese government is committed 

under Article 7 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social 

and Cultural Rights to ensuring ‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work,’’ including ‘‘equal 

pay for equal work,’’ and ‘‘equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to 

no considerations other than those of seniority and competence.’’ 12

Several domestic laws also prohibit gender discrimination and promote gender equality in the workplace, but lack an enforcement 

mechanism, thus providing limited protection and support for those 

facing discrimination.13 Examples of reports and surveys on gender 

discrimination in employment from the 2010 reporting year include: 

• According to a September 2009 All-China Women’s Federation survey, over 90 percent of the female college students 

interviewed felt they had experienced gender discrimination in 

their job searches.14

• According to a survey cited in a February 2010 Women’s 

Watch-China report, 15 percent of the companies surveyed pay 

higher wages to male employees than to their female counterparts for the same work.15 Another survey released in March 

2010 by an educational consulting firm reportedly revealed 

that, of the students who found jobs, males earned an average 

of 361 yuan (US$53) per month more than females.16

• According to a China University of Political Science and Law 

survey report released in July 2010, employment discrimination occurs at a high frequency in 60.7 percent of state-operated enterprises, 43.44 percent of government agencies, and 

38.61 percent of public institutions.17

• Several job postings mentioned in a May 2010 investigative 

report on employment discrimination in the Shenzhen Special 

Economic Zone revealed trends in the differences between 

recruitment of male and female employees. Job postings specifically recruiting women often were for lower level, administrative, or auxiliary positions, or positions that required ‘‘a 

woman’s meticulous and patient nature’’ (for example a teacher 

or an accountant).18 Meanwhile, job postings recruiting men 

131 

often were for positions at one of two extremes: either low-level 

positions such as security personnel, drivers, or warehouse 

staff, or high-level positions such as managers, engineers, and 

supervisors.19 Some job descriptions listed in the report also 

demonstrated an interest in female applicants’ marital status, 

proof of birth control, and childbearing history.20

• Mandatory retirement ages for women in China continue to 

be five years earlier than those for men.21 In June 2010, the 

Enforcement Investigation Group of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee issued a report on its investigation 

of the implementation of China’s Law on the Protection of 

Women’s Rights and Interests.22 According to a China Youth 

Daily report on the group’s findings, retirement policies for female senior intellectuals and some female cadre have not been 

well executed in certain central and local state organs and institutions, leading women to retire too early, and impacting 

their economic rights and interests as well as their opportunities for promotion and development.23

Shenzhen Women’s Federation Proposes Draft Gender Equality 

Regulations 

In December 2009, the Shenzhen Municipal Women’s Federation announced draft regulations to promote gender equality in the workplace.24 If adopted, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regulations (Shenzhen regulations) would be the first legislation of its kind in China to specifically focus on gender equality.25

According to a January report by the non-governmental organization 

Women’s Watch-China (WWC), Shenzhen authorities have integrated 

the draft into the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress 2010 legislative plan.26 While domestic and international reports revealed some details of the Shenzhen regulations in late January 2010,27 the draft is 

still under review and not yet publicly available.28

Highlights of the draft include: 

• Definition of gender discrimination. Currently, China’s legislative framework for gender equality—namely the Law on the 

Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the Employment 

Promotion Law—does not provide a definition for gender discrimination. According to the WWC report, the Shenzhen regulations would 

clearly define both direct and indirect gender discrimination.29

• Compensation for pension disparity between men and 

women. Chinese law currently requires women to retire at age 55 

and men at 60. Because women retire earlier, they typically have 

smaller pensions than men.30

• Establishment of a gender budgeting system, regular gender audits, and statistical reviews. With these mechanisms in 

place, governments will be able to ensure that public finances are 

allocated more fairly based on gender,31 develop appropriate genderspecific facilities (such as restrooms),32 and analyze the status of 

gender equality in education and employment.33

132 

Shenzhen Women’s Federation Proposes Draft Gender Equality 

Regulations—Continued 

• Establishment of a protection order system. Under the draft 

Shenzhen regulations, an individual would be able to apply for a 

protection order from the court following abuse or the threat of 

abuse. In addition, if an individual reports abuse to the police, police have the right to detain and charge the offender.34

• Paternity leave. The Shenzhen regulations would provide a legislative basis for paternity leave of 30 days ‘‘on-demand’’ for fathers 

of newborns.35 If implemented, this would provide greater protection for males’ rights and interests 36 and could encourage a larger 

male role in the care of the newborn and mother, according to some 

assessments.37

[For more information on legal developments related to workplace 

discrimination, see Section II—Worker Rights.] 

Violence Against Women 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The amended Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI) and the amended Marriage Law prohibit domestic 

violence,38 and individuals charged with the crime of domestic violence are punishable under China’s Criminal Law.39 The problem 

of domestic violence remains widespread, affecting nearly one-third 

of China’s 270 million families, according to a November 2009 People’s Daily report.40 Current national-level legal provisions regarding domestic violence leave many victims unprotected as they do 

not clearly define domestic violence, assign clear and concrete legal 

responsibilities, or outline the roles of government departments 

and social organizations in prevention, punishment, and treatment.41

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, Chinese advocates 

expressed concern regarding the growing problem of domestic violence and called for national legislation on domestic violence that 

clarifies the aforementioned shortcomings.42 The Communist Partycontrolled All-China Women’s Federation announced on November 

25, 2009, that it had drafted proposed legislation on preventing and 

curbing domestic violence.43 The proposal reportedly attempts to 

provide a clear definition of domestic violence, a clear assignment 

of government responsibility in domestic violence prevention and 

treatment, and ‘‘breakthroughs in legal responsibility,’’ among 

other improvements, according to another November 2009 People’s 

Daily report.44 It remains to be seen whether this or other such 

drafts are entered into the legislative agenda. 

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Victims of sexual harassment in China face several legislative, 

cultural, and social obstacles in protecting their rights, despite China’s international commitments and domestic legislation on this 

subject. The Chinese government is committed under Article 11 of 

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 

against Women to taking ‘‘all appropriate measures to eliminate 

133 

discrimination against women in the field of employment,’’ 45 and 

introduced the concept of sexual harassment into legislation with 

the 2005 amendment to the LPWRI.46 The amended LPWRI prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for 

victims through either administrative punishment for offenders or 

civil action in the people’s court system, but it does not provide a 

clear definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention and punishment.47 In addition, public 

awareness regarding sexual harassment in the workplace is generally lacking, and traditional views toward gender roles in society 

continue to limit momentum toward progress.48

Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, and those who 

choose to pursue sexual harassment claims face potential social 

and economic risks. According to a May 2010 survey published by 

the Qian Qian law firm, 17.2 percent of the women surveyed 

reported experiencing sexual harassment from their bosses, 28.7 

percent reported experiencing sexual harassment from their colleagues, and 54.1 percent expressed that they had experienced sexual harassment from people other than their bosses or colleagues, 

such as clients, patients, and others with whom they must interact 

for work purposes.49 According to one expert on women’s rights 

protection in China, ‘‘those who take action against sexual harassment offenders simply risk losing more than they will gain.’’ 50 In 

one such example in March 2009, a woman sued her company and 

the specific employer who sexually harassed her, seeking damages 

of 400,000 yuan (US$58,573) and a written apology. She ‘‘won’’ the 

lawsuit in November (the court granted her 3,000 yuan, or US$439, 

for psychological recovery),51 but the corporation had already dismissed her from her job.52 Observers note that she may face difficulty seeking employment elsewhere due to the significant media 

exposure of her case.53

As reported in the Commission’s 2009 Annual Report, in February 2009 a study group led by three Chinese researchers submitted a draft proposal to the National People’s Congress for a law 

aimed at preventing sexual harassment in the workplace.54 The 

proposed law would hold both the government and employers responsible for the prevention and punishment of sexual harassment 

offenses. The Commission has not found indicators of progress on 

this or similar national-level legislation during the 2010 reporting 

year. 

SEX-SELECTIVE ELIMINATION

Violence and bias against women and girls continues in the form 

of sex-selective abortion,55 as well as infanticide, neglect, and abandonment of female babies and children, despite the government’s 

legislative efforts to deter such practices.56 According to a UN Development Programme report released on International Women’s 

Day 2010, Asia is currently ‘‘missing’’ nearly 100 million women 

due to ‘‘discriminatory treatment in health care, nutrition access or 

pure neglect—or because they were never born in the first place.’’ 57

China’s ‘‘missing’’ women constitute over 40 percent of that figure.58 In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese parents often 

engage in sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples whose 

134 

first child is a girl.59 The government issued national regulations 

in 2003 banning prenatal gender determination and sex-selective 

abortion.60 According to experts cited in an April 2010 Xinhua report, however, ‘‘more effective action’’ may be needed to address 

China’s skewed sex ratio.61 The Chinese Academy of Social 

Sciences (CASS) published a comprehensive study in January 2010 

that placed the male-female sex ratio for the infant-to-four-year-old 

age group in China at 123.26 males for every 100 females.62 Some 

provinces have ratios exceeding 130.63 The 123.26 figure is far 

above the global norm of roughly 103 to 105 males for every 100 

females and represents growth of more than two boys per 100 girls 

from the 2000 census ratio.64 CASS estimates that, by 2020, the 

number of Chinese males of marriageable age will exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.65

According to an April 2009 British Medical Journal study, China’s 

sex ratio has steadily increased since ultrasound technology— 

through which pregnant parents can determine the sex of the 

fetus—became available in the 1980s. The study suggests that sexselective abortion contributes largely to the country’s significantly 

skewed sex ratio.66 A March 2010 SOS Children’s Village report alleged that in addition to sex-selective abortion, ‘‘China suffers high 

rates of female infanticide . . . as well as widespread abandonment 

and human trafficking of the girl-child.’’ 67 Some scholars have expressed concern that the continued devaluation of women and the 

resulting skewed sex ratio may lead to continued or increased 

forced prostitution, forced marriages, and human trafficking.68 [For 

more information regarding China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio, 

see Section II—Population Planning.] 

135 

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Introduction 

The Chinese government took steps to combat human trafficking 

during the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, but longstanding 

challenges remain. Officials in the past year continued to focus on 

the abduction and sale of women and children.1 Other pervasive 

forms of trafficking—including labor trafficking and trafficking for 

commercial sexual exploitation—did not receive as much attention 

from authorities. The trafficking situation in China appears to be 

uniquely affected by the government’s one-child policy, the resulting gender imbalance, the current economic crisis, and migrant mobility, among other factors. After years of stating its intent to do 

so,2 the Chinese government voted to accede to the UN Protocol to 

Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 

Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009,3 but 

has not yet enacted legislation to implement it fully.4 The UN TIP 

Protocol contains the first global definition of trafficking and obligates state parties to criminalize conduct described in the protocol. 

China’s Criminal Law defines the trafficking of persons as ‘‘abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.’’ 5

This definition is narrower than that provided in the UN TIP Protocol in that it does not automatically prohibit forms of trafficking 

such as forced adult and child labor, commercial sex trade of minors over 14 years old, or trafficking of men.6 From 2008 to 2010, 

a number of provincial governments, central government agencies, 

and Communist Party organizations issued regulations, plans, or 

opinions to implement the Chinese government’s National Plan of 

Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008– 

2012).7 In addition, some local governments established liaison 

offices with governments of bordering countries to facilitate cooperation in combating cross-border human trafficking. Individuals 

and organizations not associated with the government have also 

been active in the effort to combat human trafficking, but some 

have reported government pressure in response to their actions. 

Prevalence 

China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for 

the trafficking of men, women, and children.8 The majority of trafficking cases are domestic; 9 however, human traffickers continue to 

traffic Chinese women and children from China to other regions, 

such as Africa, other parts of Asia, Europe, Latin America, the 

Middle East, and North America.10 Women and girls from countries including North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, 

Cambodia, and Burma are also trafficked into China and forced 

into marriages, employment, and sexual exploitation.11 One May 

2010 news article notes that women may currently make up approximately 80 percent of an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 North 

Korean refugees in China, and of these women, an estimated 90 

percent become victims of trafficking.12 As the U.S. State Department 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report (2010 TIP Report) notes, 

however, a lack of reliable statistics makes it difficult to assess how 

136 

many of the North Korean women in China have been trafficked.13

[For more information on North Korean refugees in China, see Section II—North Korean Refugees in China.] Forced labor, especially 

forced child labor, reportedly continues to be a pressing problem.14

[For more information on child labor, see Section II—Worker 

Rights.] According to the UN TIP Protocol, forced labor of any person under 18 years of age constitutes ‘‘trafficking in persons.’’ 15

Factors Driving Trafficking 

Experts link the reported growth 16 of trafficking in China to several political, demographic, economic, and social factors. Against 

the backdrop of the Chinese government’s one-child policy, Chinese 

families’ preference for sons, and the growing gender imbalance, increasing numbers of male children are trafficked for adoption,17

and women and girls are trafficked for forced marriages and commercial sexual exploitation.18 In addition, parents who cannot keep 

their ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children—those children born in violation of population planning policies and requirements—are vulnerable to persuasion or coercion to relinquish or sell them.19 Domestic and 

international observers link the growing trafficking market to the 

economic crisis,20 the lack of awareness and education on trafficking prevention for vulnerable women and parents,21 poverty 

and instability in bordering countries such as North Korea and 

Burma,22 a thriving international adoption market,23 and the growing number of migrant workers whose children experts identify as 

an ‘‘at-risk’’ population for abduction.24 Using the narrower definition of human trafficking under Chinese law, authorities reportedly 

convicted 2,413 defendants in trafficking cases and resolved more 

than 7,000 trafficking cases involving over 7,300 women and 3,400 

children in 2009.25

Representative Human Trafficking and Abduction Cases This 

Year 

• According to the 2010 TIP Report, in November 2009, Macau officials 

convicted a Macanese man of trafficking two local women to Japan in 

2008 and sentenced him to over seven years in prison. This reportedly 

was the Macau government’s first trafficking conviction under its antitrafficking law.26

• Also in November 2009, 12 children were injured and 1 was killed as 

a result of an explosion that occurred while they were making fireworks 

in a workshop in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, according to 

a Southern Metropolitan Daily report. The children ranged in age from 

7 to 15 years old.27 According to a Xinhua report on the same incident, 

the children were all ‘‘left behind children,’’ or children whose parents 

worked as migrant workers away from home.28

137 

Representative Human Trafficking and Abduction Cases This 

Year—Continued 

• According to a January 2010 China Peace Net report, officials exposed 

a trafficking ring in Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, in which one 

suspect was a doctor and the chair of the obstetrics and gynecology department at a local hospital. According to the report, the doctor ‘‘exploited the convenience of her position’’ and worked with her daughter 

and son-in-law to arrange the purchase of a newborn for 10,000 yuan 

(US$1,476) from parents at the hospital. Officials criminally detained 

the three suspects and, as of January 7, were still investigating the 

case.29

• On March 4, 2010, Hong Kong’s Wanchai District Court convicted 30 a 

Filipino club owner and an employee of human trafficking.31 According 

to a report by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, they had forced 

two Filipina women to work as entertainers and prostitutes in their club 

after a relative of the women initially lured them with the promise of 

waitressing positions in Macau.32

• Domestic news sources reported at least two cases this year of parents 

selling their children in order to reap material benefit. In one case, an 

unemployed couple sold their healthy six-day-old infant son for 2,500 

yuan (US$368) and then reportedly used the money to purchase a cell 

phone, among other items.33 In another case, a couple reportedly fond of 

gambling sold their two children for 9,000 yuan (US$1,328) and 25,800 

yuan (US$3,807).34

Anti-Trafficking Efforts 

The Chinese government and civil society continued with efforts 

to combat human trafficking during the Commission’s 2010 reporting 

year. In December 2009, the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee voted to accede to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 

and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.35 The Ministry of Public Security conducted a nine-month 

campaign to combat the abduction and sale of women and children 

beginning in April 2009, using a national DNA database for matching children with parents and a Web site for increased publicity regarding the children’s plight.36 As of September 2010, at least 6 of 

the 60 posted rescued children were successfully matched with 

their parents through these resources.37

In April 2010, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s 

Procuratorate, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Public 

Security jointly issued the Opinion on Lawful Punishment for the 

Crime of Abducting and Selling Women and Children.38 According 

to the China Daily, ‘‘[T]he guideline will speed up the investigation 

and filing of cases involving girls between 14 and 18 [years of 

age],’’ a demographic that has historically fallen through the cracks 

in authorities’ anti-trafficking efforts under current Chinese legislation.39

From 2008 to 2010, a number of provincial governments, central 

government agencies, and Communist Party organizations issued 

regulations, plans, or opinions to implement the Chinese government’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women 

and Children (2008–2012) (National Plan of Action).40 In addition, 

138 

some local governments in Yunnan province and the Guangxi 

Zhuang Autonomous Region set up liaison offices with the governments of bordering countries including Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia to facilitate cooperation in the effort to combat human 

trafficking across borders.41

Local authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, took steps to improve trafficking victim protection services and care, but continued 

to focus such efforts only on women and children identified as victims through the government’s limited definition of trafficking.42

According to the U.S. State Department 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report (2010 TIP Report), China has an estimated 1,400 shelters nationwide, with 5 specifically devoted to assisting ‘‘trafficking 

victims.’’ Shelters nationwide aided 12,000 trafficking victims in 

2009.43 Individuals and organizations not associated with the 

government have also been active in the effort to combat human 

trafficking. While some NGOs have successfully cooperated with officials to raise public awareness and provide training and victim 

assistance,44 several media reports indicate that individuals, especially parents of trafficked children seeking to informally organize 

and raise awareness about trafficking cases, face government pressure including silencing of protests and petitions,45 official threats, 

home confinement,46 and police surveillance.47

Anti-Trafficking Challenges 

Several hurdles remain in the Chinese government’s fight 

against human trafficking. Although the Chinese government voted 

to accede to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009,48 it has not revised current domestic legislation or the National Plan of Action to bring them into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol. Article 240 of China’s Criminal 

Law defines the trafficking of persons as ‘‘abducting, kidnapping, 

buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a woman 

or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.’’ 49 This definition 

does not automatically prohibit forms of trafficking such as forced 

adult and child labor, commercial sex trade of minors over 14 years 

old, or trafficking of men, which are covered under Article 3 of the 

UN TIP Protocol.50 The Chinese government’s narrower definition 

of human trafficking has negative implications for anti-trafficking 

work in China, including imposing limits on the Chinese government’s prosecution efforts, protection of victims, funding of programs, and victim services.51 Officials continue to conflate human 

trafficking with human smuggling and therefore treat some victims 

of trafficking as criminals.52 This is because, as noted in the 2010 

TIP Report, officials consider that a victim’s crossing of the border 

without documentation constitutes involvement in ‘‘human smuggling,’’ which, unlike human trafficking, gives less consideration to 

the role exploitation may have played in the border crossing. As 

the 2010 TIP Report noted, officials continue to fine or criminally 

penalize some victims of trafficking for crossing borders illegally.53

In addition, the Chinese government continues to deport all undocumented North Koreans as illegal ‘‘economic migrants,’’ without 

providing legal alternatives to repatriation for identified victims of 

139 

trafficking.54 The U.S. State Department placed China on its Tier 

2 Watch List for the sixth consecutive year in 2010,55 saying that, 

among other areas needing improvement, the Chinese government 

‘‘did not make significant efforts to investigate and prosecute labor 

trafficking offenses and convict offenders of labor trafficking’’ and 

‘‘did not sufficiently address corruption in trafficking by government officials.’’ 56

140 

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government persisted in repatriating North Korean refugees to the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially in the 

months before October 1, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.1 Beginning in July 2009, the 

Chinese government reportedly increased the presence of public security officials in northeastern China and repatriated more North 

Koreans than it had in the earlier part of 2009.2 The Chinese government’s repatriation of North Korean refugees, or those who 

leave the DPRK for fear of persecution, contravenes its obligations 

under the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 

(1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol).3 The Chinese 

government maintains that North Korean refugees in China are illegal economic migrants and not refugees.4 The North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture of repatriated North Koreans, 

however, renders those North Koreans in China who did not leave 

the DPRK for fear of persecution ‘‘refugees sur place’’ under international law, or those who fear persecution upon return.5 Under 

the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, the Chinese government is 

also obligated to refrain from repatriating refugees sur place.6

Unlawful Repatriation 

In 2009, the Chinese government continued to repatriate North 

Korean refugees to the DPRK and stepped up its repatriation of 

North Korean refugees before October 1, 2009.7 In October 2009, 

one overseas news organization reported that Chinese authorities 

were conducting weekly visits to every house along the ChineseNorth Korean border to locate North Koreans in hiding.8 In July 

2009, Chinese authorities detained a North Korean woman who 

had lived in China for over 10 years while her 10-year-old son 

looked on, according to Radio Free Asia.9 In September 2009, Chinese authorities detained five North Korean defectors attempting 

to travel to Vietnam to seek asylum.10 Their current status remains unknown. In late 2009, 20 women from the same county in 

the DPRK were repatriated and subsequently imprisoned.11 In January 2010, Chinese authorities repatriated one North Korean 

woman two days after she entered China. Upon return to the 

DPRK, North Korean authorities punished her together with more 

than 40 repatriated refugees from the same town.12 In March 2010, 

one overseas media source reported that 50 North Korean defectors 

had taken refuge in South Korean diplomatic missions in China, 

which they were unwilling to leave for fear of being detained and 

repatriated to the DPRK by Chinese authorities. About 30 of the 

refugees had been confined to the diplomatic missions for more 

than one year, as the Chinese government had intentionally delayed negotiations with South Korea for their departure.13 The Chinese government continues to deny the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) access to North Koreans seeking asylum.14

Chinese authorities offer bounties to Chinese citizens who turn 

in North Koreans 15 and fine,16 detain,17 or imprison those who 

141 

provide the refugees with humanitarian assistance. In August 

2009, the Erlianhaote City People’s Court in the Inner Mongolia 

Autonomous Region sentenced Zhang Yonghu and Li Mingshun to 

7 and 10 years’ imprisonment, respectively, for crimes of ‘‘human 

smuggling.’’ Zhang and Li were assisting 61 North Korean refugees 

to cross the Chinese border into Mongolia to seek asylum.18 While 

the Chinese government prosecutes those who assist North Korean 

refugees in seeking asylum, traffickers traffic an estimated 90 percent of the North Korean women in China.19 [See Trafficking and 

Denial of Education in this section.] 

Punishment in North Korea 

North Koreans repatriated by the Chinese government face the 

threat of imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in the 

DPRK.20 Under the DPRK’s Penal Code, border crossers can receive sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment in a labor training center.21 North Korean authorities assign harsher punishment, 

including long sentences and public execution, to repatriated North 

Koreans deemed to have committed ‘‘political’’ crimes, which include attempted defection, conversion to Christianity, and having 

had extensive contact with religious groups, South Koreans, or 

Americans.22 Many repatriated North Koreans are vulnerable to 

severe punishment on one of these ‘‘political’’ grounds. A significant 

number of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian workers assisting North Koreans in China and helping 

them seek asylum are Christians, South Koreans, or Americans.23

In March 2008, the Peterson Institute for International Economics 

(PIIE) published a large-scale survey of North Koreans in China in 

which 99 percent of those interviewed stated that they did not 

want to return to the DPRK, but wanted to permanently resettle 

in another country.24 Also in March 2008, the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom reported that after Chinese authorities repatriated a group of North Koreans to the DPRK, North 

Korean authorities executed all 60 of them for trying to defect to 

South Korea.25 According to the PIIE survey, 67 percent of North 

Koreans in China suffering from severe psychological distress 

named ‘‘arrest’’ as the primary cause of their anxiety.26 Conditions 

in North Korean detention facilities are harsh, and torture, beatings, and inhumane treatment are common.27 NGOs and the 

UNHCR report that North Korean security officials have assaulted 

repatriated women carrying babies of mixed Chinese-Korean ancestry to force them to have abortions.28

Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education 

The Chinese government’s policy of repatriating North Korean 

refugees and denying them legal status increases their vulnerability to trafficking, mistreatment, and exploitation in China. 

North Korean women, in particular, often fall victim to inhumane 

treatment and indentured servitude.29 One February 2009 National 

Geographic report estimates 75 percent of North Koreans in China 

are women.30 According to an NGO, approximately 90 percent of 

these North Korean women are trafficked into China.31 Traffickers, 

many of whom operate in organized networks, use false promises 

142 

to lure North Korean women into China and abduct those entering 

China on their own.32 In many cases, traffickers reportedly sell the 

women into forced ‘‘marriages’’ with Chinese nationals for amounts 

ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 yuan (US$294 to US$2,934).33 There 

is a high demand for ‘‘brides’’ in northeastern China where men 

outnumber women in some areas by as much as 14 to 1,34 and 

where poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty finding wives.35

In other cases, North Korean women are trafficked into the sex industry, where they are forced to work as prostitutes in brothels or 

in Internet sex operations.36 Some women reportedly have been 

sold and resold up to seven or eight times,37 and trafficked North 

Korean women have testified to being beaten, sexually abused, and 

locked up to prevent escape.38 The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, and the Chinese government is obligated 

under Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP 

Protocol) to ‘‘consider adopting legislative or other appropriate 

measures that permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.’’ 39 The Chinese 

government’s failure to prevent trafficking of North Korean women 

and protect them from revictimization also contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 

Women.40 Although the central government has taken some minor 

steps to combat trafficking and protect trafficking victims along its 

borders with Vietnam and Burma 41 [see Section II—Human Trafficking], traffickers continue to traffic an estimated 90 percent of 

the North Korean women living in China,42 and the Chinese government refuses to provide these victims with legal alternatives to 

repatriation.43

Another problem that stems from China’s unlawful repatriation 

policy is the denial of education and other public benefits for the 

children of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. 

There are anywhere from several thousand to several tens of thousands of these stateless children in China,44 and their numbers 

continue to rise.45 China’s Nationality Law guarantees citizenship 

and, by extension, household registration (hukou) to all children 

born in China to at least one parent of Chinese nationality.46 China’s Compulsory Education Law, moreover, provides that all children age six years and older shall receive nine years of free and 

compulsory education, regardless of race or nationality.47 Some 

local governments refuse to register Chinese-North Korean children 

without seeing documentation that the mother is a citizen, has 

been repatriated, or has run away.48 Local authorities contravene 

Chinese law and the Chinese government’s commitments under 

international law when they refuse these children the hukou they 

need to attend school and obtain healthcare.49 Denial of hukou 

forces these children to live in a stateless limbo. Moreover, when 

their North Korean mothers are repatriated, a significant number 

of these children also become orphaned, as the fathers are unwilling or unable to take care of them.50

143 

Reemergence of Famine Conditions 

The Chinese government’s repatriation of North Korean refugees 

continued as famine conditions in the DPRK have worsened since 

late 2009. In April and June 2010, international NGO and overseas 

media reports compared food shortages in the DPRK to the food 

crisis of the 1990s,51 which killed an estimated 1 million North Koreans.52 Existing food shortages in late 2009 were exacerbated by 

a failed DPRK government devaluation of the North Korean currency in November 2009.53 In June 2010, the New York Times 

interviewed eight North Koreans who had left the DPRK not long 

before and reported that half of them planned on defecting to South 

Korea.54 While many North Koreans may enter China in pursuit 

of food and basic necessities for survival,55 the Chinese government 

contravenes its commitments under international law when it 

makes the blanket assertion that North Korean refugees in China 

are illegal economic migrants and not refugees.56 The North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture of repatriated North 

Koreans renders those North Koreans in China who did not leave 

the DPRK for fear of persecution ‘‘refugees sur place’’ under international law, or those who fear persecution upon return.57 Thus, 

whether North Koreans in China left the DPRK for fear of persecution or fear persecution upon return to the DPRK, the 1951 Convention and its Protocol obligate the Chinese government to refrain 

from repatriating them.58 In 2009 and 2010, however, the Chinese 

government continued to repatriate North Korean refugees and reportedly stepped up its efforts to do so before the 60th anniversary 

of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.59

144 

PUBLIC HEALTH

Introduction 

China has committed to ensuring all its citizens the right to ‘‘the 

highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’’ 1 and 

has taken steps toward this goal. The rising cost of healthcare and 

limited access to quality services, however, remain top concerns for 

many living in both urban and rural areas of China.2 Authorities 

at the central 3 and local 4 levels took steps to launch initiatives in 

2009 to address healthcare challenges, but distribution of medical 

services continued to vary widely by location.5 During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued new regulations on foreign funding that have led to 

increased restrictions on the activities of public health non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Authorities also have heightened targeted harassment of certain public health NGOs and individual 

advocates in the past year. Official corruption and lack of transparency continued to hinder the prevention of infectious disease 

outbreaks, posing the potential risk of further spread of infectious 

disease domestically as well as globally. A government circular 

issued in December 2009 improved the outlook for Hepatitis B 

virus carriers to enjoy equal treatment in employment and education, but specific cases this year continued to highlight a need for 

consistent enforcement of existing laws and regulations prohibiting 

health-based discrimination. 

Healthcare Reform 

The Chinese government considers unrestricted access to basic 

healthcare a universal right,6 and in the 2010 reporting year, officials echoed calls for its realization 7 and took steps to implement 

related policies. In an effort to close the wide gap in access to basic 

healthcare as well as deal with issues of corruption within the 

healthcare system, the State Council passed a large-scale medical 

reform plan in January 2009 and a corresponding three-year implementation plan in April 2009.8 Central and local authorities have 

begun to implement some goals outlined in the plan, such as initiating a pilot public hospital reform project in 16 cities,9 establishing a basic medicine system with a national official list of 

approved pharmaceuticals,10 initiating a plan to train 60,000 general practitioners in the next three years and 300,000 by 2020,11

and increasing aid for children suffering from serious illnesses.12

Despite these initial steps toward healthcare reform, health inequities persist between urban and rural regions in China. According to an April 2010 study on urban/rural differences in China’s 

public health sector, ‘‘[p]eople living in urban areas have an advantage in life and health compared with those in rural areas, and 

there is no exception to this pattern in all the 31 provincial-level 

administrative units.’’ 13 While the majority of urban residents tend 

to enjoy greater healthcare benefits, including more widespread 

medical insurance coverage 14 and higher quality of facilities and 

care,15 the growing population of migrant workers and their families who live in urban areas but do not possess an urban hukou 

(household registration) still faces difficulties in accessing basic 

145 

health services.16 In addition, some children may not have a hukou 

in China because they are born ‘‘out of plan,’’ that is, not in compliance with birth limits imposed by population planning policies, and 

their parents do not pay the required fines.17 [For additional discussion of China’s population planning policies, see Section II— 

Population Planning.] Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including subsidized healthcare and public education.18 [For additional discussion of China’s hukou system see, Section II—Freedom of Residence 

and Movement.] 

Rural areas continue to lack the necessary resources to provide 

adequate healthcare to local residents.19 As noted in the Commission’s 2009 Annual Report, access to healthcare in these areas 

remains dependent on local authorities’ interpretation, implementation, and management of healthcare initiatives.20 The Rural Cooperative Medical System—a cooperative medical care program in 

which farmers are reimbursed for their medical expenses from a 

fund to which farmers and local and central government entities 

contribute 21—reportedly expanded in certain areas.22 Nevertheless, 

reports in previous years have pointed to problems with this system, including forced participation in some areas,23 as well as a 

significant fiscal burden on local governments 24 and an insufficient 

number of administrative personnel.25

Infectious Disease 

The Chinese government has committed to taking steps to prevent, treat, and control infectious diseases,26 but curtailing the 

spread of infectious disease remained a challenge this year.27 Infectious diseases highlighted in domestic and international news reports this reporting year included hand-foot-mouth disease,28

syphilis,29 viral hepatitis,30 HIV/AIDS,31 and tuberculosis.32 Resources in many rural areas are insufficient to prevent and control 

the spread of infectious disease effectively,33 and problems with 

government transparency continue to hinder the effectiveness of existing measures.34 For example, in March 2010, China Daily reported that tainted vaccines in Shanxi province led to the deaths 

of four children and sickened dozens more between 2006 and 

2008.35 According to the report, whistleblower Chen Tao’an, who 

had worked for the provincial center for disease control and prevention, attributed the deaths and sickening of children to ‘‘abuse of 

power and corruption by local health authorities.’’ 36 A May 2010 

Human Rights Watch article reported that local health officials did 

not investigate the case but rather denied the story as ‘‘basically 

untrue.’’ 37 Chen Tao’an was also demoted, according to the report.38 According to an October 2009 study in the Lancet, an international medical journal, China’s domestic vulnerability to the 

spread of infectious disease has a significant impact on global public health.39

Mental Health 

In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 

Social and Cultural Rights 40 and in doing so committed itself to 

ensuring ‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest atVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
146 

tainable standard of physical and mental health.’’ 41 Mental illness 

continues to increase in prevalence, however, and the rate of treatment remains low, incubating what one report calls ‘‘a quiet crisis 

in China.’’ 42 The World Health Organization now considers mental 

illness the greatest burden on the country’s healthcare system, over 

heart disease and cancer, according to an April 2010 Telegraph 

report.43 According to a July 2010 study in the Lancet, ‘‘mental illhealth’’ affects more than 100 million people in China, of which ‘‘serious [mental] illnesses’’ affect 16 million.44 Several news articles 

attribute China’s increase in cases of mental illness to recent social 

changes and resulting social problems.45 Against the backdrop of a 

low number of qualified psychiatrists, few hospitals equipped with 

mental health facilities, and widespread stigma regarding mental 

disorders, most individuals have never been treated for their mental disorders, according to the Lancet study.46

Following a series of violent attacks on adults and children in 

spring 2010 by individuals who allegedly suffered from mental illness, which reportedly raised public concerns about those who fall 

through the cracks of the system and their potential harm to society, Chinese officials at the central and local levels took steps to 

address the country’s deficient mental healthcare system.47 News 

media sources inside and outside China reported widely on a sudden wave of violent attacks—mostly targeting school children—that 

took place from March to May 2010.48 The perpetrators in at least 

three of the attacks reportedly suffered from mental illness.49 In 

May 2010, the China Daily reported official plans in Hubei province to initiate a mental health screening program that would include free treatment for those perceived as a potential threat to 

‘‘public safety.’’ 50 According to the same report, authorities in 

Fujian province ordered a similar screening of ‘‘serious patients 

with an inclination to violence.’’ 51 It is unclear what standards are 

used to evaluate patients or what safeguards exist to prevent misuse. In June, Vice Minister of Health Yin Li announced that the 

country would ‘‘increase the rate of treatment for those with serious mental illness and reduce [the occurrence of] disturbances and 

trouble that bring harm on society,’’ and in the next two years renovate and expand 550 mental health facilities.52 As noted in a July 

Lancet report, however, ‘‘such hospitals have been used as a means 

to silence individuals exercising their freedom of expression. 

Protestors and dissenters have been put in institutions against 

their will by local authorities, diagnosed with mental disorders 

they do not have, and given drugs and electroshock treatments 

they do not need.’’ 53

Official news media reported in 2009 that authorities had circulated a draft of China’s first national mental health law for expert review.54 According to one Shenzhen lawyer quoted in the 

report, ‘‘The draft has made some progress after 25 years of construction and amendments but it may still be difficult to get public 

support as several loopholes have been left unfilled.’’ 55 While the 

report indicated that authorities would put the law into effect as 

early as the end of 2009,56 the Commission has not observed reports of further developments on the legislation during this reporting year. 

147 

Public Health Advocacy 

Despite official recognition this year of the valuable role non-governmental actors have played in raising awareness about health 

concerns, combating stigma, and promoting prevention of diseases,57 some involved in public health advocacy continued to face 

government harassment and opposition in the past year.58 The Chinese government continued to exert control over advocates’ right to 

freedom of association through strict registration requirements that 

limit some organizations’ ability to legally function independently 

of the government.59 In addition, in December 2009, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a circular that tightens restrictions on organizations that receive foreign funding.60 Some in 

China’s non-governmental organization (NGO) community have expressed concern that the new circular may be used to specifically 

target NGOs.61 [See Section III—Civil Society for more information 

on the December 2009 circular.] Additional examples of government pressure on public health advocates in the past year include: 

• According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), officials from Xincai county, Henan province, detained HIV/AIDS 

advocate Tian Xi on August 6, 2010, after he had broken office 

supplies the previous day when the director of Xincai County 

No. 1 People’s Hospital refused to hear his request for resolution of his case.62 Officials initially placed Tian under administrative detention, but on August 17, they took him to the 

Xincai County No. 2 People’s Hospital for medical treatment.63

On August 21, officials notified Tian’s family of his transfer 

into criminal detention at the Shangcai County Public Security 

Bureau (PSB) Detention Center, and on August 23 he was formally arrested for ‘‘intentional destruction of property.’’ 64 According to Tian’s father, in 1996, Tian was infected with HIV, 

Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through a blood transfusion he 

received at Xincai County No. 1 People’s Hospital after sustaining a mild concussion. Since learning of his illnesses in 

2004, Tian has persistently petitioned for resolution of his case 

as well as those of others similarly infected.65 Beijing officials 

detained Tian in December 2009 and July 2010 reportedly in 

connection with his petitioning activities. He is currently held 

at the Shangcai County PSB Detention Center and, without access to his regular medications, he is reportedly in poor 

health.66

• HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a three-anda-half year prison sentence for allegedly ‘‘inciting subversion of 

state power.’’ He is expected to be released in June 2011.67 In 

April 2010, authorities denied family members’ requests for his 

medical parole, despite recent indications that Hu’s health has 

deteriorated.68

• Due to ‘‘increasing government harassment,’’ Wan Yanhai, a 

prominent AIDS activist and founder of the NGO Beijing 

Aizhixing Institute, left China for the United States with his 

family in early May 2010.69 Recent restrictions on foreign 

donations as well as recent run-ins with officials—including 

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partment in April—reportedly factored into his decision to 

leave China.70 Beijing tax bureau officials also launched an investigation into Aizhixing’s tax records in March 2010 71 in a 

move that was reminiscent of developments that led to the 

shutdown of the Open Constitution Initiative in July 2009.72

[For more details regarding official pressure on Aizhixing and 

other NGOs, see Section III—Civil Society—Legal Framework 

and Government Controls.] 

• According to a CHRD report, on June 13, the hotel scheduled 

to host a legal training organized by the Beijing Yirenping 

Center (Yirenping)—an NGO that works to raise awareness 

about public health risks and eliminate discrimination against 

those carrying certain diseases—notified the center’s director, 

Lu Jun, that it had cancelled the reservation due to official 

pressure.73 On the same day, the antivirus software on Lu’s 

personal computer revealed attempts by a remote computer to 

make changes to his computer and copy documents from his 

hard drive.74 The attacks followed six previous hotel cancellations of Yirenping’s planned legal training workshops, one of 

which was reportedly due to looting and vandalizing of the 

host hotel.75

Health-Based Discrimination 

Despite provisions in China’s domestic laws and regulations and 

commitments under international conventions that explicitly forbid 

discriminatory practices in employment and education against 

persons with disability or infectious disease,76 regulation and punishment of such discrimination reportedly continue to be a challenge.77 The Chinese government took steps this year to combat 

discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers,78 but at least two reports involving discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers this 

year highlight the need for continued progress. According to a 

March 2010 report by the Hong Kong-based labor rights organization China Labour Bulletin, a university graduate with Hepatitis 

B won a lawsuit in October 2009 against Xiasha Hospital in 

Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, for violating his right to privacy 

when it revealed his test results to a potential employer. Despite 

the success of this suit, many hospitals continue with such practices, according to the report.79 [For additional information on employment discrimination, see Section II—Worker Rights.] According 

to a report by the Beijing Yirenping Center, some kindergartens in 

Haikou city, Hainan province, reportedly continued to refuse enrollment to children with Hepatitis B in March 2010.80 July 2009 draft 

regulations on the management of health practices in nurseries 

and kindergartens contain provisions that prohibit such action.81

On August 30, 2010, the Yingjiang District People’s Court in 

Anqing city, Anhui province, accepted what may be China’s first 

case of employment discrimination based on HIV status.82 University graduate Xiao Wu (alias) brought a lawsuit against the Anqing 

Department of Education (DOE) for refusing to hire him as an 

instructor after he passed the written tests and interviews for the 

position but then tested positive for HIV in a subsequent medical 

examination.83 According to China Labour Bulletin, Xiao is not 

seeking monetary compensation beyond legal expenses but rather 

149 

acknowledgment from the court that the DOE’s refusal to hire him 

constituted an ‘‘illegal act’’ and must be corrected with ‘‘concrete action.’’ 84 Although HIV cannot be spread through daily contact, one 

DOE employee told the China Daily, ‘‘Our decision not to hire 

[Xiao] is to protect the students.’’ 85 According to the report, Xiao 

Wu also expressed concern that the publicity of the case may negatively impact his future.86

150 

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Introduction 

The Chinese government continued to strengthen regulatory 

structures and institutions to address climate change and environmental pollution and degradation. However, major implementation, 

enforcement, and compliance difficulties remain. Despite challenges, data reliability, access to information, and transparency in 

the climate change and environmental protection sectors have improved in some areas. Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of 

China’s greenhouse gas emissions and reductions data, but at the 

same time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss transparency issues with international actors, and are working to improve data reliability. The Ministry of Environmental Protection 

and some local environmental protection bureaus have expanded 

‘‘open government affairs’’ efforts, which, in the Chinese context, 

often refer to open government information systems and E-government, among other initiatives, but implementation has been uneven. Chinese officials remained willing to engage in cooperative 

programs with international actors related to climate change and 

environmental protection. Some policies and projects intended to 

address climate change, especially in relation to hydroelectric dam 

construction and other energy projects, could be linked to infringements upon citizens’ rights. Citizen environmental complaints continued to increase in number as citizens increasingly voiced concerns about potentially polluting projects. However, channels available to citizens to express environmental concerns and grievances 

were not always open, contributing to the rise of antipollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities continued to stifle selectively environmental activism and suppress citizens who were involved in or 

organized collective action to halt perceived environmental harms. 

Climate Change 

CHINA’S COMMITMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ACTIONS

Chinese leaders signed the United Nations Copenhagen Accord 1

in 2010, and took additional steps to address climate change. The 

Chinese government agreed to voluntarily ‘‘endeavor to lower its 

carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 

2020 compared to the 2005 level,’’ among other actions.2 In a communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Chinese authorities emphasized that 

China’s ‘‘autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in 

nature.’’ 3 In November 2009, Xie Zhenhua, the Vice Chairman of 

the National Development and Reform Commission, explained to 

the press that China will incorporate related targets in its next domestic five-year plan that will go into effect in 2011.4 The Chinese 

government has not agreed to carbon emission caps, only to carbon 

intensity reductions. According to Chinese officials, China’s carbon 

emissions are likely to continue to rise for decades, peaking between 2030 and 2040 according to some officials, and prior to 2050 

according to others.5

151 

The Chinese government included climate change-related language in China’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 

(HRAP) and initiated related institutional and regulatory changes; 

in addition, non-governmental actors are taking steps to address 

climate change. The HRAP contains several specific goals 6 connected to energy and climate change that reiterate goals outlined 

in preexisting national climate change, energy, and environmental 

plans.7 Energy reportedly accounts for 85 percent of China’s carbon 

emissions.8 Several Chinese energy-related institutional and regulatory developments have the potential to impact China’s capacity 

to meet its voluntary carbon intensity targets, if adequately managed or implemented, including passage of new amendments to 

China’s revised Renewable Energy Law in December 2009,9 the establishment of the National Energy Commission in January 2010,10

and the ongoing development of climate change programs in provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.11 Citizen groups 

and networks have been active during this reporting year,12 publishing reports,13 issuing a public statement urging more proactive 

steps to address climate change,14 and engaging in activities to 

educate the public about a low carbon economy.15

DATA RELIABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

While challenges remain, the Chinese government has taken 

steps to improve the reliability of its energy data. However, China 

has had less experience collecting and reporting greenhouse gas 

emission data than it has had with energy data.16 The State Council, 

the National Bureau of Statistics, and the National Development 

and Reform Commission are reportedly responsible for collecting 

and verifying China’s energy data.17 The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a revision to China’s Law on Statistics in June 2009, which came into effect on January 1, 2010, 

that imposes penalties on officials who ‘‘intervene in government 

statistical work and manipulate or fabricate data.’’ 18 In previous 

years, China reportedly has acknowledged problems with energy 

figures 19 and the Chinese government states it has taken regulatory and institutional steps to improve the reliability of its energy 

data.20 Current opinions regarding the reliability of China’s energy 

data are mixed.21

Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on domestic 

monitoring, reporting, and verification of China’s greenhouse gas 

emissions and reductions data.22 At the same time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss transparency issues with international actors.23 Chinese leaders signed the Copenhagen Accord 

and accepted an undefined role for the international community in 

‘‘consultations’’ regarding information on the implementation of 

China’s emission reductions.24 Premier Wen Jiabao further signaled the Chinese government’s intent to improve transparency of 

China’s climate change-related data in his speech at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit.25 China already is engaged in cooperative programs with international actors regarding energy and 

carbon emission reduction data, including projects with the International Energy Agency 26 and the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency.27 During U.S. President Barack Obama’s trip to China in 

November 2009, both sides agreed to ‘‘provide for full transparency 

152 

with respect to the implementation of mitigation measures and provision of financial, technology and capacity building support.’’ 28

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES: CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES

To mitigate China’s carbon dioxide emissions, Chinese authorities intend to increase China’s reliance on renewable energy 

sources, especially hydroelectric power.29 Hydroelectric dam construction requires the relocation of citizens from construction 

zones,30 which, without adequate procedural protections, could 

place the rights of relocated citizens at risk. There have been 

numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations 

affected by the Three Gorges Dam hydroelectric project. These reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard compensation, suppression of advocates, and government corruption during 

resettlement processes, as well as the documented threat of severe 

hardships that may be faced by relocated citizens, including homelessness, unemployment, conflicts between resettled citizens and 

existing populations, and poverty among resettled migrants.31 Authorities reportedly intend to address problems relating to early resettlement by implementing a ‘‘post-Three Gorges plan’’ starting in 

2010.32 China Daily reported in January 2010 that China has ‘‘basically’’ completed the first phase of the Three Gorges Dam resettlement, which involved, in part, relocating 1.3 million people and 

1,500 enterprises from Chongqing municipality and Hubei province.33

The Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project is not the only one 

plagued by problems with citizen resettlement schemes. Over the 

years, the construction of the Pubugou Hydropower Station along 

the Dadu River, partially in Hanyuan county, Sichuan province, reportedly has been delayed repeatedly because of disputes over resettlement issues.34 During this reporting year, a dozen families in 

Hanyuan county reportedly resisted officials’ efforts to compel them 

to move to make way for additional construction on the dam.35

Hanyuan county officials reportedly arrested six people in June 

who repeatedly petitioned against alleged unfair resettlement 

terms.36 Lei Keqiao and five other women reportedly travelled to 

the township government to petition in May and police arrested 

them, accusing them of trying to injure a township official.37 In another hydroelectric dam case, one 2010 research paper published by 

the Social Science Research Network, based on survey data, asserts 

that some resettlement practices in three villages affected by the 

construction of the Liuku Dam in the Nu River (Salween River) 

watershed may not be in accordance with national laws, including 

the cost and size of replacement housing, lack of access to agricultural land, lack of long-term economic support programs, and paucity of citizen input into decisionmaking processes.38

In August 2010, public security officials from Linwei district, 

Weinan city, Shaanxi province, and Beijing reportedly detained, 

but did not formally arrest, Xie Chaoping, an author and a journalist with a magazine under the Procuratorate Daily, in Beijing 

on suspicion of ‘‘illegal business activities.’’ 39 Xie’s lawyer reportedly has said the charge is linked to publication of Xie’s documentary book ‘‘The Great Migration,’’ which documents the historical 

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electric dam.40 The migrants residing in Weinan reportedly are the 

primary subjects of the book.41 Spark Magazine published the book 

as a supplement.42 Xie reportedly used his own money to print the 

supplement, and agreed not to include advertisements or to sell 

it.43 Xie reportedly alleges that Weinan authorities detained him 

because his writings provide details about corruption, land disputes, and hardship suffered by migrants associated with the 

Sanmenxia relocation programs.44 Xie’s lawyer and Chinese news 

stories raised questions about the charge against Xie, and noted 

procedural irregularities in the handling of his case.45 On September 17, the Linwei District People’s Procuratorate announced it 

had rejected the public security bureau’s request to arrest Xie on 

the grounds that there was insufficient evidence.46 Linwei public 

security officials released Xie on bail after holding him 29 days; 

however, they did not withdraw the case and will continue to investigate.47 In addition, in mid-September, Linwei public security officers detained Zhao Shun, the manager of the print shop that printed 

‘‘The Great Migration,’’ although they reportedly have not provided 

the reason for the detention.48

During this reporting year, China’s population planning officials 

sought to justify China’s one-child policy by linking it to climate 

change,49 saying the policy was ‘‘among the most cost-effective tools 

to reduce carbon emissions.’’ 50 However, as the findings of this 

report show, China’s population planning policies in both their 

nature and implementation violate international human rights 

standards.51 [For more information, see Section II—Population 

Planning.] 

Environmental Governance 

CHINA’S POLLUTION PROBLEMS UNDERESTIMATED

Pollution remains a serious problem in China, and a report released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in February 2010 on the first national pollution source survey 52 revealed 

that the levels of some pollutants are higher than previously reported. This is largely because authorities incorporated data from 

additional pollution sources in the survey,53 including agricultural 

sources, leachate from waste management facilities, and household 

waste from all ‘‘cities and towns’’ (except city-level county seats).54

The newspaper Caixin reported a high-level environmental protection official, Wang Yuqing, as saying that the MEP would compile 

and release most of the survey data by the end of 2010,55 but as 

of August 17, only an executive summary of the survey report was 

available.56 Beyond the pollution source survey, other research by 

Western and Chinese scholars is beginning to reveal the depth of 

China’s ‘‘cancer village’’ problem.57 ‘‘Cancer villages’’ are, according 

to one study by U.S.-based scholar Lee Liu, farming villages that 

have a cancer cluster, i.e., an area ‘‘where cancer is more prevalent 

as a result of cancer-causing pollutants.’’ 58 During his research, 

Lee found 241 ‘‘officially’’ reported and about as many ‘‘unofficially’’ 

reported ‘‘cancer villages’’ in China.59

154 

ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

China’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) 

includes themes of sustainable development and ‘‘environmental 

rights.’’ 60 The HRAP also states that China will improve enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.61 The HRAP includes 

the stated goal of ‘‘strengthening the rule of law in the sphere of 

environmental protection to safeguard the public’s environmental 

rights and interests,’’ 62 but does not clearly outline the nature of 

these rights. 

Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws 

and regulations, along with noncompliance, remain significant challenges. In October 2009, the National Audit Office released an 

audit report regarding spending for a major project to reduce water 

pollution between 2001 and 2007 in China’s ‘‘three rivers and three 

lakes’’ (which span 13 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities).63 In some locations, auditors found inadequate environmental law enforcement, inaccurate environmental statistical data, 

work units that transmitted automated monitoring systems data on 

an irregular basis, and work units that did not have their monitoring equipment in proper working order.64 Selective official 

enforcement and enterprise noncompliance with China’s environmental impact assessment regulations continue to blunt their effectiveness. For example, in Jiahe county, Hunan province, a site that 

had been plagued by lead poisoning incidents, 309 of 541 enterprises in the county reportedly had not undergone an environmental impact assessment process.65 Compliance problems in less 

developed areas of China are exacerbated because polluting enterprises with prohibited, antiquated equipment have been known to 

move to poorer areas within provinces or across provinces after 

being shut down in more developed areas.66

Official misconduct and corruption continued to be problems in 

the environmental sector during this reporting year. Discipline 

inspection and supervision entities around the country helped to investigate and manage over 10,000 cases involving government departments and Party cadres who violated major laws or regulations 

during the course of their administrative duties between January 

and November 2009.67 In addition, the official National Audit report released in 2010 revealed corruption; a significant amount of 

project funding had been misappropriated or was ‘‘held back,’’ according to China Daily.68

ENVIRONMENTAL OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and some local 

environmental protection bureaus have continued to implement 

‘‘open government affairs’’ policies, but obstacles to accessing environmental information remain. In her remarks at an April 2010 

Commission roundtable, an expert in Chinese energy and environmental issues noted the significant progress environmental protection organs have made in information disclosure in recent years, 

but also highlighted obstacles to better compliance with environmental open government information (OGI) measures, including 

the lack of capacity of local-level environmental bureaus, the 

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155 

cials accountable for failing to comply with the measures.69 During 

this reporting year, Chinese citizens continued to request environmental data and other information from environmental protection 

bureaus and offices. One joint Chinese/Western study of 113 cities 

also noted progress in the growth of the environmental OGI system, highlighting the good performances by some cities. It also 

noted overall low average performance on transparency, a little 

over 30 points out of 100.70

According to the MEP 2009 OGI report, the ministry received 72 

requests for information, up from 68 last year, and had processed 

71 of those requests by the time authorities published the report 

in March 2010.71 The MEP did not grant information in four 

cases.72 The MEP received nine administrative reconsideration requests.73 While the MEP did not reveal the nature of the information it decided not to grant or explain its refusal in the report, it 

acknowledged some of the shortcomings of its implementation of 

the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulations), including an incomplete catalog, nonstandardized procedures, and an insufficiently wide range of information open to the 

public.74

In October 2009, Beijing resident Ren Xinghui filed open government information requests with the Ministry of Finance, the Three 

Gorges Project Construction Committee under the State Council, 

and the China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development Corporation requesting information on the budget and financing of the 

Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project.75 The Ministry of Finance 

refused Ren’s request on November 16 and based the refusal on Article 14 of an official interpretation of the OGI Regulation, saying 

Ren’s request had no direct relationship to his ‘‘production, livelihood, and scientific and technological research.’’ 76 In January 

2010, Ren sued the Ministry of Finance for refusing to fulfill his 

information request.77 On April 19, the court informed Ren that it 

would not accept his case.78 Two days later, Ren filed an appeal 

with the Beijing High People’s Court.79

Media reports on incidents of pollution during the reporting period highlighted the lack of transparency in both the government’s 

and industry’s handling of information related to environmental 

disasters. Associated Press reporters covering a major oil spill after 

the explosion of a pipeline at a Dalian port quoted a Greenpeace 

statement as saying Greenpeace was ‘‘surprised to see that the 

beaches have not been closed to visitors and lack any warning 

signs . . . . [a]s a result, locals and visitors unaware of the extent 

of the oil spill were playing in the water with their kids, risking 

exposure to petroleum.’’ 80 The New York Times reported that an 

American marine conservationist, who said he has seen ‘‘spills all 

over the world,’’ asserted that the magnitude of the spill was ‘‘far 

more extensive than the official figures.’’ 81 Media reports on a July 

3 wastewater pollution incident involving a copper mine in Fujian 

province owned by the Zijin Mining Group that reportedly led to 

the death of at least 2,000 tons of fish, include allegations by local 

residents of collusion between polluting enterprises and local authorities.82 According to a July 12, 2010, article by the Agence 

France-Presse, the Fujian province environmental protection bureau issued a statement saying it first detected the leak on July 

156 

3 and gave the order to begin monitoring it.83 The company, however, did not make a public announcement regarding the acid pollution until nine days after the incident occurred.84 The South 

China Morning Post reported that residents accused local authorities of covering up for the copper mining company after the July 

incident, and also after a similar smaller incident in June 2010.85

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

During this reporting year, several developments occurred that 

are likely to impact decisions about who has standing to bring environmental public interest litigation cases in Chinese courts. For the 

first time, an environmental group initiated environmental administrative public interest lawsuits, and another group initiated an 

environmental administrative reconsideration case. The All-China 

Environment Federation (ACEF), a group that is ‘‘overseen by the 

Ministry of Environmental Protection,’’ brought two cases to China’s special environmental courts, one against a local branch of a 

governmental ministry 86 and the other against a private entity.87

Both ended in negotiated settlements. The cases mark an important development because these are the first instances in which 

courts accepted cases initiated by a group registered as a social organization. In another development, the Chinese citizen environmental organization Chongqing City League of Green Volunteers, 

headed by Wu Dengming, filed an administrative reconsideration 

request because Wu questioned the legality of low fines levied by 

environmental protection authorities against hydroelectric dam 

companies that disregarded a June 2009 order to stop construction 

of two dams along the Jinsha River and because the water below 

the dam site was affected by the construction.88 The group withdrew the request in August 2009 after representatives from the 

Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Chongqing City Environmental Protection Bureau, and the ACEF consulted with Wu.89

SUPPRESSION OF CITIZEN DEMANDS FOR A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT

During this reporting year, citizen environmental complaints increased, highlighting mounting citizen demand for a cleaner environment. Environmental complaints increased in 2009, according to 

a report about MEP Vice Director Zhou Jian’s speech during an 

April national environmental petition work videoconference.90

There was a greater number of ‘‘petitions to higher authorities’’ and 

‘‘a trend of mass petitions’’ in 2009 according to a separate news 

report on the conference.91 The report noted eight focal points for 

2010 petitioning work, including ‘‘further unblocking petitioning 

channels’’ and ‘‘strengthening petitioning mediation work.’’ 92

Major lead poisoning incidents across China during this reporting year led citizens to file petitions and engage in protests. Some 

of these incidents involved citizen detentions and draw attention to 

issues of government accountability. After the series of lead poisoning incidents, central authorities promised to take regulatory 

action to address heavy metal pollution problems on a national 

scale 93 and ‘‘placed importance on petitions about heavy metal pollution.’’ 94 Select lead poisoning incidents in late 2009 and 2010 include: 

157 

• In August 2009, in Wugang city, Hunan province, approximately 1,000 residents clashed with police after as many as 

1,354 children living nearby tested positive for various levels 

of lead poisoning.95 The plant linked to the pollution that 

caused the lead poisoning reportedly did not have approval to 

operate from local environmental authorities. Local officials reportedly briefly detained 15 of the ill children’s parents who 

participated in the protest, accusing them of being Falun Gong 

practitioners and reportedly intimidating and warning other 

parents not to talk to the media about the case.96

• Also in August 2009, lead pollution in Fengxiang county, 

Shaanxi province, led to elevated blood lead levels in 851 children and protests by hundreds of citizens. The case highlighted 

ongoing compliance problems related to environmental laws 

and policies, gaps in government accountability, and insufficient protection for citizens’ rights, including that of access to 

information.97

• In September 2009, in Jiahe county, Hunan province, authorities stopped a bus carrying 53 Jiahe residents who were 

taking their children to obtain blood tests to determine if they 

had lead poisoning and subsequently detained 3 of the residents, accusing them of ‘‘disrupting traffic.’’ They released one 

citizen later because of a medical condition. As of mid-March 

2010, a second citizen remained in detention, while the fate of 

the third citizen was unknown.98

Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly vocal about concerns 

over potentially polluting enterprises prior to their construction. In 

some cases, citizens report they were not given opportunities to utilize institutionalized channels to voice their grievances. In some 

cases, authorities have arrested organizers of subsequent anti-pollution demonstrations. During this reporting year, ‘‘not-in-my-backyard’’ protests broke out against planned landfill facilities in 

Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and in Anhui province, where 

authorities shelved project plans due to public discontent.99 In 

Fuxing village, Guanyang county, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 

Region, village officials reportedly did not consult with the village 

committee, nor did they convene a village representative meeting 

before moving forward with a landfill project. Only the village 

Communist Party committee approved of the construction.100 In 

July, public security officers formally arrested six citizens who 

along with other villagers had repeatedly demonstrated and petitioned against construction of the nearby planned landfill since 

mid-2009.101 Authorities arrested Liu Zhengjiao, Mo Jian, Wang 

Zhaosheng, He Nianfa, Wang Shuangfa, and Wang Qiwen.102 Irregularities in the handling of these cases were apparent.103

Guanyang public security officers detained Liu Zhengjiao on June 

15 but reportedly did not inform his family or charge him until 

July 11, at which time they arrested and charged him on ‘‘suspicion 

of disturbing public order.’’ 104 A China Economic Times report 

noted irregularities with the detention orders or arrest warrants 

for Mo Jian, Wang Qiwen, and Wang Shuangfa.105

Large-scale not-in-my-backyard protests also broke out during 

this reporting year in several areas, including Jiangsu province and 

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158 

cinerators and cogeneration plants. The protests involved detentions of demonstration organizers, but also appeared to impact the 

construction schedule of a plant in at least one area. From October 

21 to 23, 2009, thousands of citizens reportedly protested plans to 

build a cogeneration plant in Pingwang town, Wujiang city, 

Jiangsu province, and police detained 16 people when citizens and 

police clashed.106 Early in 2010, Beijing authorities announced they 

will move forward with plans to build more incinerators in the city 

despite city residents’ protests and community campaigns to look at 

other options.107 Citizens in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality, protested plans to build an incinerator, and on November 

23, 2009, over 1,000 residents held a ‘‘sit-in in the city.’’ 108 Authorities reportedly ordered a media blackout on November 5 109

and detained several people, four on ‘‘suspicion of organizing and 

instigating an illegal gathering.’’ 110 As of July 2010, the fate of 

those detained was unknown. However, also in response to these 

protests, local officials eventually suspended, but did not cancel, 

the incinerator project.111

Citizens also engaged in demonstrations protesting pollution 

problems after the fact, following unsuccessful attempts to utilize 

the petitioning (xinfang) system and other institutionalized channels to resolve their grievances. Specific cases also highlight possible ill-treatment of citizens, the lack of public involvement in 

environmental decisionmaking, and the non-transparency of the 

media. 

• In Tibetan areas in Gansu province, citizens reportedly petitioned, among other things, for tighter controls over air pollutants emitted by a cement plant in Madang township, Xiahe 

(Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, after attempts to resolve the problem through talks 

with the cement company were unsuccessful.112 A crowd of 200 

to 300 people gathered at the cement factory to protest, and 

some were reportedly detained and others injured by police.113

• In May and June, ‘‘thousands’’ of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) protested against mining activities.114

One citizen said that Tibetans had repeatedly appealed for an 

end to the mining activities; authorities brought in armed police to quell dissent.115 [For more information on mining and 

a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease the mining in parts 

of the TAR, see Section V—Tibet.] 

• In July 2010, in Jingxi county, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 

Region, thousands of villagers participated in demonstrations 

over the course of three days beginning on July 11, against a 

long-term water pollution problem reportedly caused by an aluminum plant.116 One article notes that villagers said the local 

media had been barred from reporting on the case.117 Authorities reportedly detained the ‘‘troublemakers,’’ i.e., the people 

who allegedly acted illegally to ‘‘instigate the incident.’’ 118 One 

account noted that authorities had detained 17 people involved 

in leading the demonstrations.119 As of August, more information about those detained was unavailable. 

During this reporting year, there were other cases where authorities detained or harassed citizens for their environmental activism. 

In March 2010, authorities in Guangzhou detained Xiao Qingshan, 

159 

a longtime labor rights advocate, for seven days for ‘‘disturbing 

public order,’’ for standing outside the Nanfang News Group office 

educating people about the alleged linkages between official corruption and environmental pollution.120 In April, Beijing police prevented the ‘‘Environmental Protection and Citizen Responsibility 

Discussion Forum’’ from taking place 121 and raided the home of 

forum participant and rights defender Gu Chuan.122

Authorities also arrested and imprisoned citizens, in part for 

their environmental activism. In August 2009, public security officers in the Tibet Autonomous Region detained brothers Rinchen 

Samdrub and Jigme Namgyal reportedly after a local environmental protection group they founded accused local police of hunting protected wildlife species.123 On July 3, a Changdu (Chamdo) 

prefecture court sentenced Rinchen Samdrub to five years’ imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for three years on the 

charge of ‘‘inciting splittism.’’ The court accused him of posting a 

pro-Dalai Lama article on his Web site.124 On November 13, the 

Changdu Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Committee ordered 

Jigme Namgyal to serve 21 months’ RTL for ‘‘harming national security’’ by illegally gathering information and video material on the 

local environment, collecting propaganda material ‘‘from the Dalai 

Clique,’’ and ‘‘severely interfering with state power organizations’’ 

and ‘‘harming social stability’’ by organizing local residents to conduct ‘‘irregular petitioning’’ of authorities.125

In April 2010, authorities released Wu Lihong, an environmental 

advocate, after he served a three-year prison sentence for alleged 

extortion and fraud. Wu had documented pollution in the Lake Tai 

region, Jiangsu province, for many years.126 Upon his release, Wu 

reported mistreatment by officials while in detention and in prison.127

160 

III. Development of the Rule of Law 

CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government continued to tighten control over what it considered to be 

politically sensitive individuals and organizations through harassment, closing of offices, and new regulations that could make it 

more difficult for groups to receive foreign sources of funding. 

Though localized experiments aimed at simplifying the legal registration process for civil society organizations (CSOs) 1 are currently taking place in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, a 

special economic zone, it is too early to conclude whether such reforms will succeed or be replicated in other parts of China. 

The number of CSOs in China continues to grow, and their impact continues to be evident. Official government statistics indicate 

that the number of registered groups increased from 288,000 in 

2004 to 430,000 in the first quarter of 2010.2 However, unofficial 

estimates for the total number of groups, including unregistered 

grassroots organizations, range from two to eight million.3 CSOs in 

China address a wide array of social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, 

women’s rights, worker rights, religious charity work, and environmental concerns.4 In the aftermath of recent earthquakes in 

Qinghai and Sichuan provinces, for example, CSOs played an instrumental role in organizing a national humanitarian response as 

part of the rescue effort.5 The Beijing Yirenping Center, a public 

health advocacy organization, pressured the government to introduce measures aimed at eliminating discrimination against Hepatitis B virus carriers.6 As severe drought affected southwest China 

in early 2010, Oxfam Hong Kong allocated funds for relief efforts 

and worked with local officials to provide drinking water and other 

supplies for residents.7

Still, many Chinese officials hold conflicting views of civil society 

organizations. While acknowledging that CSOs serve a necessary 

and even helpful function as mediating mechanisms between the 

government and society, Chinese authorities also look upon many 

groups with suspicion, fearing that ‘‘Western countries have used 

non-governmental organizations extensively . . . to intervene in 

the internal affairs of other countries, create turmoil, and even subvert the regimes of the host countries.’’ 8 China, one Chinese scholar warned, ‘‘has to be vigilant about [Western intervention].’’ 9 As 

such, Chinese authorities allowed many CSOs that focus on providing basic social services to operate freely, and forcibly closed 

some that tried to form networks or carry out projects that the government considers to be ‘‘politically sensitive.’’ As a former editor 

of the China Development Brief, an online newsletter dedicated to 

news about non-governmental organizations (NGOs), explained, 

one never knows ‘‘where the line is, and it does shift’’—for it is 

‘‘civil society with Chinese characteristics,’’ where groups are ‘‘light, 

not antagonistic and not pushing the envelope too far.’’ 10

The Chinese government’s actions to harass and tighten its control over CSOs operating in China contravene both Chinese law 

and international conventions. China’s Constitution states that 

161 

‘‘citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech 

. . . of assembly, of association . . . .’’ 11 Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that: 

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 

with others . . . no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by 

law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 

interests of national security or public safety . . . .12

Legal Framework and Government Controls 

The Chinese government imposes strict registration requirements 

for civil society organizations (CSOs). Under the 1998 Regulations 

for Registration and Management of Social Organizations, an individual who wishes to organize an NGO 13 in China must first obtain a sponsorship agreement from a government administrative 

department in a relevant ‘‘trade, scientific or other professional 

area’’ at the appropriate level of government before registering with 

the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).14 In other words, groups that 

wish to operate locally must register with the corresponding local 

government administrative departments and local MCA units; 

those that wish to operate nationally must do so with national departments and the MCA. In their role as sponsoring agencies, the 

local government administrative departments are charged with the 

duty to supervise the NGOs that they register, including ‘‘record 

keeping with respect to establishment, modification, and closure of 

social organizations,’’ completing annual reviews on the organizations, and ‘‘applying disciplinary sanctions to organizations which 

fail to comply’’ with MCA regulations.15

Such a dual management process has presented problems for 

various groups, as permission to organize is difficult to obtain from 

local sponsors who are sometimes reluctant to take on the burdens 

of supervisory responsibilities.16 Groups that fail to obtain permission to organize are not protected under the law and are also 

barred from receiving outside donations.17 Many experts conclude 

that the cumbersome dual management requirement has had a 

chilling effect on Chinese civil society. 

In part to avoid government interference, some groups in China 

register as ‘‘commercial entities’’ rather than as NGOs subject to 

the Chinese government’s targeted oversight, even though registering as ‘‘commercial entities’’ means that these groups are subject to different tax schemes than government-registered NGOs.18

At the same time, because such groups are neither NGOs nor legally recognized commercial enterprises, they risk becoming targets 

for closure. As the Commission reported in 2009, the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI), or Gongmeng, provides one prominent example. Founded in 2003, OCI attracted authorities’ attention by 

challenging China’s ‘‘black jails,’’ campaigning for migrant workers’ 

rights, and helping parents of babies hurt in the tainted milk incident of 2008 to seek legal redress.19 Authorities ultimately fined 

the organization 1.42 million yuan (US$208,823) for allegedly evading 250,000 yuan (US$36,764) in taxes 20 before shutting it down, 

apparently because OCI did not register as an NGO.21 In any case, 

OCI’s experience sent, in the words of a Human Rights Watch reVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
162 

searcher, ‘‘a chilling effect across China’s nascent civil society,’’ 

since ‘‘most NGOs are much more fragile than [OCI].’’ 22

During this reporting year, Chinese officials repeatedly harassed 

and interfered with the operations of the Beijing Aizhixing Institute (Aizhixing), a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization that activist Wan Yanhai founded in 1994. Having already 

been questioned or detained by authorities several times in the 

past 12 years, Wan was familiar with official harassment and interference, as some of his most significant and politically sensitive 

work involved publicizing the spread of HIV resulting from blood 

contamination cases in the 1990s among villagers in Henan province.23 In March 2010, when the annual meetings of the National 

People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference convened in Beijing, authorities ordered Wan to cancel a 

seminar marking International Sex Worker Rights Day.24 On 

March 25, local taxation bureau officials in Beijing went to Wan’s 

offices to conduct an unannounced investigation into his organization’s tax records from the previous year. A month later, fire officials 

showed up for a safety inspection.25 Tax officials had investigated 

Aizhixing before, in September 2008, but they did not find any 

problems with the group’s accounting.26 Wan ultimately left China 

for the United States in May, saying that ‘‘the attacks from the 

government had become very serious for my organization and for 

me personally’’ and that, already ‘‘under a lot of stress,’’ he had 

concerns for his personal safety.27

Peking University released a notice on March 25, 2010, announcing that it was canceling ties with four university-affiliated organizations, including the Center for Women’s Law and Legal Services 

(Center).28 The Center was China’s first NGO dedicated to women’s 

rights issues, and over its 15-year history it had provided free legal 

counseling to more than 70,000 people, handled over 2,000 cases, 

and proposed more than 70 pieces of legislation.29 Although the 

university’s dean of social sciences told the South China Morning 

Post that the cancellations were part of a routine restructuring 

aimed at eliminating ‘‘some institutes that no longer suit the current trend,’’ Guo Jianmei, who founded the Center, confirmed to 

Asia Week that the Ministry of Education had made the cancellation decision, adding that ‘‘higher-up’’ authorities had told university officials that, because the Center accepted overseas funding, 

and because it was creating a public interest lawyer network, the 

political risks were relatively high.30

At least one international NGO, like its domestic counterparts, 

also faced politically motivated harassment from Chinese authorities during this reporting year. On February 4, 2010, the Ministry 

of Education (MOE) issued a notice warning Chinese students to 

‘‘sever all ties’’ with the British relief agency Oxfam, accusing the 

organization of being an ‘‘[NGO] seeking to infiltrate our interior.’’ 31 Although Oxfam’s Hong Kong Director Howard Liu insisted 

that his agency had never challenged the government’s policies or 

laws and was only interested in alleviating poverty, the MOE notice referred to Oxfam Hong Kong Chairman Lo Chi-kin—also a 

member of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party who has spoken in support of direct elections and political reforms in Hong Kong—as a 

‘‘stalwart of the opposition faction.’’ 32

163 

Continued Regulatory Tightening 

A new circular that tightens rules concerning foreign donations 

to domestic organizations provides another example of the Chinese 

government’s further strengthening of its control over civil society. 

On December 25, 2009, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued a circular concerning ‘‘foreign exchange donated to or by domestic institutions,’’ which went into effect on 

March 1.33 Stating that foreign donations shall ‘‘comply with the 

laws and regulations . . . of China and shall not go against social 

morality or damage public interests,’’ 34 the SAFE circular requires 

all NGOs seeking to receive foreign donations to present the following information: 

1. An application stating that the ‘‘donation is not against national prohibitive regulations . . . that the overseas institution 

is a non-profit institution, [and] that the domestic enterprise 

shall strictly follow the agreement in making use of the donation and bear the legal responsibility thus caused.’’ 35

2. A copy of the receiving organization’s business license.36

3. A notarized donation agreement stating the purpose of the 

donation.37

4. The registration certificate of the overseas non-profit organization (with Chinese translation attached).38

One particularly problematic element of the new SAFE circular 

is the requirement that the donation agreement be notarized.39 The 

Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, reported that two months after the rules became effective, ‘‘banks, 

notary service providers and non-profit outfits are in the dark 

about how to get a donation agreement ‘notarized.’ ’’ 40 Moreover, 

some notaries reportedly will also require some donors to be 

present in China for the notarization.41

The new circular will also require all foreign donations to go into 

special foreign exchange bank accounts, allowing SAFE to ‘‘improve 

the administration of donated foreign exchange and facilitate the 

donated foreign exchange receipts and payments.’’ 42 The circular 

also provides the central and provincial governments additional 

control over religious organizations by requiring an additional level 

of approval to accept one-time donations of more than one million 

yuan (US$147,000).43 While it is unclear whether authorities established the SAFE rule to specifically target NGOs, some NGOs fear 

that the rule can be used as such.44 As the organization Asia Catalyst put it succinctly, the new SAFE rule completes the government’s goal to create ‘‘a chill that shuts some NGOs down, allows 

others . . . to survive but limits the overall growth of the sector— 

and without sparking an international outcry . . . .’’ 45

Limited Reform in Shenzhen 

Despite an overall trend of tighter controls, at least one case of 

limited localized reform took place in the past year. In July 2009, 

the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) and the city of Shenzhen signed 

the Cooperation Agreement on Pushing Forward With Integrated 

Reforms to Civil Affairs Undertakings (Agreement), which delineates a deepening of systemic reforms concerning the registration 

and management of social organizations. The Agreement calls for 

164 

Shenzhen to ‘‘take the lead in experimenting with some of the 

MCA’s major reform projects and measures,’’ 46 and to ‘‘explore establishing a system whereby civil society organizations apply and 

register directly with the [MCA].’’ 47 The reforms, if successful, 

could potentially lead to a system, at least in Shenzhen, where the 

MCA will supervise and regulate CSOs alone, without a sponsor organization, making it possible for future individuals wishing to 

form organizations—including NGOs—to have a relatively less 

complicated one-stop shop process.48 The Agreement is also being 

used by certain civil society organizations, such as ones that provide services to the poor and migrant workers, to forgo registrations altogether and to be recognized by local authorities provided 

that organizations file the required papers properly.49

2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 

At the national level, the 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued by the State Council Information Office 

in April 2009, also referenced the need to broaden the channel to 

‘‘support mass organizations to participate in social management 

and public services, so as to protect the people’s legitimate rights 

and interests.’’ 50 The plan pledges to strengthen the ‘‘construction 

and management of social organizations’’ in order to ‘‘enhance their 

functions in serving society’’ and that ‘‘revisions will be made’’ to 

the Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations, Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Non-Commercial Institutions, and Regulations for the 

Management of Foundations ‘‘to ensure social organizations conduct activities in accordance with the law and their respective 

charters.’’ 51 Moreover, as stated in the HRAP, the government encouraged social organizations to ‘‘participate in social management 

and public services’’ and to establish ‘‘private non-enterprise entities in the fields of education, science and technology, culture, 

health care, sports and public welfare.’’ 52 The plan also aims to develop and standardize ‘‘all kinds of foundations to promote programs for the public good.’’ 53

Notwithstanding the goals stated in the HRAP, however, the 

findings in this section suggest otherwise: that the overall trend is 

one in which the government continues to tighten its control over 

civil society, intimidates individuals that it deems threatening to 

‘‘social stability,’’ and shuts down organizations that conduct activities and projects that it considers to be politically sensitive. 

165 

Three Major Regulations That Govern NGO Operations in China 

Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social 

Organizations (1998) 

This set of regulations defines ‘‘social organizations’’ as ‘‘non-profit 

organizations voluntarily created by citizens in order to achieve the collective desires of members, and conduct activities according to their 

charters.’’ 54 It sets forth the administrative, registration, supervision, 

and management requirements that NGOs must follow in order to operate in China.55 It also requires that social organizations not ‘‘harm the 

unification, security, and ethnic unity of the state; damage state interests, the public interests of society, and the lawful rights and interests 

of other organizations and citizens; or violate prevailing social morals.’’ 56

Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of NonCommercial Institutions (1998) 

This set of regulations addresses institutions that ‘‘engage in such activities as education, science and technology, culture, or public health, 

that the state, with an objective of social welfare, runs through state organs or other organizations using state assets.’’ 57

Regulations for the Management of Foundations (2004) 

This set of regulations places ‘‘foundations’’ into two categories: groups 

‘‘aimed at fundraising from the general public . . . and those that are 

not’’ and lays out specific and different rules for both categories of 

groups.58 It sets forth the administrative, registration, supervision, and 

management requirements that Chinese and foreign foundations must 

follow in order to operate in China.59 It requires foundations to have 

charters and boards of directors, and specifies expenditure requirements.60 Under the regulations, local sponsoring agencies are obligated 

to supervise these foundations, and to ensure that they follow all applicable laws and regulations.61

166 

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction 

China’s political system is dominated by the Communist Party, 

with limited participation by non-Party members in decisionmaking that affects China’s political affairs. During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Party and the central government 

continued actions to strengthen controls over society and to ‘‘safeguard stability.’’ Chinese authorities continued to have little tolerance for those involved in political activities not sanctioned by the 

Party. The Party continued to support isolated experiments with 

intraparty democracy and ‘‘democratic management’’ in localities 

around the country, and high-level leaders stated that the National 

People’s Congress (NPC) and the NPC Standing Committee would 

strengthen supervision of governmental affairs and departments. 

While village elections for ‘‘village committees’’ have spread 

throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. Authorities plan to continue to strengthen open government affairs 

and various forms of ‘‘democratic management’’ in so-called ‘‘difficult villages.’’ Corruption remained high and of serious concern to 

citizens. To bolster the legitimacy of the Party, in part in response 

to citizen concerns about corruption and official accountability, 

Party organs and government agencies initiated measures to 

strengthen anticorruption efforts and improve local accountability 

and transparency. Authorities at central and local levels signaled 

that China’s budget processes could become more open to public 

scrutiny. There is variation in the willingness of local government 

agencies to make their budgets public. During this reporting year, 

authorities continued to signal that they would expand public participation in government policymaking on issues of ‘‘vital public interest’’ through a variety of public forums, and would establish a 

public hearing system to gather citizen input on draft regulatory 

instruments. 

China’s One-Party State and Political Control 

Although China voted as a member of the UN General Assembly 

in favor of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights (UDHR) in 1948, China’s political institutions do not comply 

with the standards outlined therein. Article 21 of the UDHR, for 

example, provides that, ‘‘everyone has the right to take part in the 

government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . . [T]he will of the people shall be the basis of the 

authority of government, this will shall be expressed in periodic 

and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 

procedures.’’1 China’s political institutions also do not comply with 

the standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed and 

committed to ratify.2 Article 25 of the ICCPR requires that citizens 

be allowed to ‘‘take part in the conduct of political affairs’’ and ‘‘to 

vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections.’’ Under General 

Comment 25 to the ICCPR, this language requires that: ‘‘Where 

citizens participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely 

167 

chosen representatives, it is implicit in article 25 that those representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and that they 

are accountable through the electoral process for their exercise of 

that power.’’ (para. 7); ‘‘The right to vote at elections and referenda 

must be established by law and may be subject only to reasonable 

restrictions . . . . [P]arty membership should not be a condition of 

eligibility to vote, nor a ground of disqualification.’’ (para. 10); 

‘‘Freedom of expression, assembly and association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of the right to vote and must be 

fully protected.’’ (para. 12); ‘‘The right of persons to stand for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to 

be members of parties or of specific parties.’’ (para. 17); ‘‘An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the 

electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.’’ (para. 20).3

During this reporting year, the Communist Party emphasized 

Party building 4 and increased Party membership. At the end of 

2009, the Party had nearly 78 million members, an increase of approximately 2 million members from the previous year.5 The Party 

has established more than 3.79 million committees and branches 

throughout the country.6 These organizations reach down into and 

influence every sector of society, including villages and urban 

neighborhoods,7 as well as many enterprises,8 public service organizations (hospitals, schools, research institutes, etc.),9 government 

departments, and social organizations 10 (shehui tuanti: foundations, nonprofit enterprises, and non-governmental organizations). 

The Party organizations in urban neighborhoods and residents 

committees (jumin weiyuanhui) 11 play a role in citizens’ political, 

social, and economic lives.12 During this reporting year, top Party 

leaders directed cadres to focus on Party construction at the most 

basic administrative levels,13 in military organizations,14 in academic institutions,15 and in social organizations.16

Social Controls, Maintaining Social Stability 

The Communist Party and the central government continued to 

focus on ‘‘safeguarding social stability’’ and strengthened controls 

over society. A March 2010 Southern Weekend article described the 

‘‘quiet’’ changes to China’s ‘‘system of safeguarding stability,’’ which 

the article argues began to take shape in preparation for the 2008 

Beijing Summer Olympic Games and are now becoming standard 

practice.17 The story quotes an article by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central Committee, in 

which Zhou stated, ‘‘We should apply the successful experience of 

security at Beijing Olympic Games in developing a public order 

prevention and control system, deeply promote socialization, network formation, and informatization in developing the public order 

prevention and control system . . . .’’ 18 In the name of ‘‘maintaining social stability,’’ the Party and the government make extensive 

use of informant networks.19 Informant networks reportedly reach 

down into social institutions, such as schools.20 In December 2009, 

high-level official Yang Huanning reportedly said that collecting information (through informants) was important for ensuring ‘‘social 

168 

stability.’’ He promised ‘‘preemptive attacks’’ against people that 

Party and government officials characterize as threats to social stability.21 In the spring of 2010, the Politics and Law Commission of 

the Party Central Committee reportedly launched a crackdown on 

groups for the protection of military personnel rights, underground 

labor unions, and groups of farmers petitioning higher level officials, labeling them the ‘‘internal three forces’’ and calling them 

‘‘threats to social stability.’’ 22 An April 2010 Tsinghua University 

Social Development Research Group report asserted that ‘‘safeguarding stability’’ has become one of the ‘‘most important duties’’ 

of local officials.23 The report also states that ‘‘maintaining social 

stability’’ has begun to influence the normal work of governments 

in some locations.24 Local officials reportedly have made serious investments in personnel to ‘‘maintain stability’’ and over the years 

increasingly have established specialized institutions, including 

‘‘stability preservation offices’’ (weiwenban) or ‘‘comprehensive governance offices’’ (zongzhiban).25 China’s public security expenditures for 2009 reportedly increased by 16 percent, and the budget 

for such expenditures is expected to increase by another 8.9 percent 

for 2010.26 Authorities at all administrative levels reportedly have 

established ‘‘stability preservation funds’’ from which they try to 

‘‘buy security’’ by making payments to individuals with grievances 

in order to resolve conflicts before they escalate.27 The Tsinghua 

University group report noted several downsides to the use of these 

funds for the development of rule of law in China, including the potential that these funds will be used arbitrarily without any legal 

basis.28

Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates 

During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to 

show little tolerance for select individuals who advocated for greater democracy, who organized political parties, or who expressed political views not sanctioned by the Communist Party; for example: 

• Liu Xianbin. On July 5, 2010, security officials in Suining 

city, Sichuan province, arrested Liu, a 1989 democracy movement participant and member of the banned Chinese Democracy Party, on charges of ‘‘inciting subversion of state 

power.’’ 29 Liu was reportedly arrested because of his support 

for activists and human rights defenders and because articles 

penned by Liu had been posted outside of China.30 As of August 2010, Liu was still awaiting trial. 

• Guo Quan. The Suqian Intermediate People’s Court in 

Jiangsu province sentenced Guo, formerly a university professor, to 10 years in prison on October 16, 2009, for ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ 31 The court found that Guo used the 

Internet to organize an ‘‘illegal’’ political party called the 

‘‘China New Democracy Party,’’ among other charges.32

• Xue Mingkai. The Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court 

sentenced Xue to 18 months in prison on charges of ‘‘subverting state power’’ on February 10, 2010, despite pleas by his 

mother to consider medical records showing that Xue had a 

mental illness.33 Authorities claimed Xue had contacted and 

joined the overseas China Democracy Party (CDP) in 2009 and 

169 

planned to organize a ‘‘China Democratic Workers’ Party’’ online in the summer of 2006.34

• Luo Yongquan. In the summer of 2009, authorities in 

Shaoguan city, Guangdong province, ordered Luo, a member of 

the CDP and a poet, to serve two years of reeducation through 

labor. Authorities said that Luo publicly attacked the Communist Party and Chinese government in his poems.35

Intraparty Democracy 

Isolated experiments with intraparty democracy (also translated 

as ‘‘inner-Party democracy’’) are taking place around the country 

with high-level Communist Party support. Chinese writers on the 

subject maintain that intraparty democracy should come before democracy in society as a whole.36 The notion of intraparty democracy has been a part of the Party’s basic institutional design since 

1956.37 The decision drafted by Party leaders during the Fourth 

Plenary Session of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Central 

Committee meeting in September 2009 called for expanding 

intraparty democracy and called it the ‘‘lifeblood of the Party.’’ 38

During this reporting year, Party authorities in various locations 

experimented with election monitoring systems (xuanju 

guanchayuan zhidu or minyi guanchayuan zhidu) during 

intraparty elections for residents’ committee members and leaders.39 Election monitors typically were retired officials, people’s 

congress and people’s political consultative congress deputies, and 

Party committee members; but in some areas, people from other 

professions took on the role.40

The People’s Congresses and the Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference 

Chinese officials describe China’s political system as a ‘‘socialist 

democracy’’ with ‘‘multi-party cooperation’’ and ‘‘political consultation’’ under the leadership of the Communist Party.41 The 2009– 

2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued by 

Chinese authorities in April 2009, referenced the supervisory roles 

of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 42 and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).43 However, an 

official speech by Wang Chen, the Director of the State Council Information Office, on the comprehensive summary of the mid-term 

evaluation of the HRAP released in December 2009, included scant 

reference to civil and political rights developments related to the 

NPC and the CPPCC,44 except for noting the deliberations regarding the proposed revisions to China’s Electoral Law.45 The NPC 

Standing Committee passed the revised Electoral Law in March 

2010, which now awards the same proportion of NPC deputies per 

population to both rural and urban areas. (In the past, urban residents enjoyed greater representation.46) In summer 2010, Luojiang 

county, Sichuan province, reportedly began an experiment that established the country’s first full-time, professional local people’s 

congress deputies. While China’s Constitution and other relevant 

laws do not prohibit professional deputies, there currently is not a 

specific legal foundation for them.47

170 

ANNUAL MEETINGS: NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND THE CHINESE

PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

At the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) 

and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 

(CPPCC) in March 2010 (Two Sessions), the Chairman of the NPC 

Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, discussed the plan to increase 

NPC and NPC Standing Committee supervision over governmental 

affairs, and NPC delegates expressed displeasure regarding some 

government work. Increasing NPC supervision of governmental affairs is one of the goals outlined in the HRAP.48 Wu said the NPC 

and the NPC Standing Committee would launch special topic ‘‘inquiry and questioning’’ work by inviting cadres from the State 

Council departments to sit in on meetings, listen to suggestions, 

and ‘‘respond to inquiries, and answer questions’’ regarding ‘‘issues 

of broad concern to NPC delegates’’ and the supervision of economic 

work.49 During the Two Sessions, NPC delegates expressed their 

displeasure about some government work: 479 delegates opposed 

the Supreme People’s Court report and 411 delegates opposed the 

report on the work of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.50 The 

2009 Finance and 2010 Budget Report and the Government Work 

Report fared better with 317 and 36 opposing votes, respectively.51

In March, newspapers in two regions of China published editorials 

criticizing authorities for restricting lawmakers and political advisors’ freedom of speech after a city government advisor admitted officials had pressured him during the Two Sessions to be cautious 

about discussing divisive policies.52

LOCAL PEOPLE’S CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCES: POLITICAL

CONSULTATION IN GUANGZHOU

‘‘Multi-party cooperation and political consultation’’ purportedly 

take place among the Party, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and eight ‘‘approved’’ minor political parties.53

During this reporting year, the Guangzhou Municipal Central 

Party Committee issued a notice which provides for political consultation to be brought into the city’s policy processes.54 Specifically, it provides for political consultation between the municipal 

Party committee and each of the eight ‘‘approved’’ political parties 

at the municipal level or between the municipal Party committee 

and the municipal-level people’s political consultative conference 

regarding a variety of documents including important local laws 

and regulations, long-term municipal economic and social plans, 

and leadership choices.55 The notice outlines several consultative 

meeting types at which political consultation purportedly takes 

place.56 A Wei Wen Po article reported that this is the first instance of such an experiment in China, and if the experiment goes 

smoothly, officials reportedly will promote it throughout 

Guangdong province in the second half of 2010.57

Village Autonomy, Elections, and ‘‘Democratic Management’’ 

Authorities have established ‘‘grassroots autonomy’’ or village 

elections for village committees,58 and while village elections have 

spread throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. In a December 2009 interview with the People’s Daily, a 

171 

spokesperson for a department within the Ministry of Civil Affairs 

(MCA) noted that in a small number of villages, there are several 

problems with the operations of village organizations.59 During this 

reporting year, Chinese authorities continued to implement plans 

to put in order open government affairs and ‘‘democratic management’’ in so-called ‘‘difficult villages.’’ Authorities in different regions label villages ‘‘difficult’’ for a variety of reasons. In Guizhou 

province, which reported that 3.13 percent of its villages were ‘‘difficult villages,’’ 60 the category included villages that have not had 

successful village elections, had long-term problems with tensions 

between villagers and leaders, had longstanding issues with citizens taking grievances to higher authorities, or had problems with 

transparency of village affairs, among others.61 At a video conference in February 2009, authorities pointed out that 6 percent of 

the villages across the country are ‘‘difficult villages’’ and that local 

officials had been underreporting their numbers.62 In December 

2009, authorities held a national meeting to share local authorities’ 

experiences regarding open village affairs and ‘‘democratic management’’ in ‘‘difficult villages’’ across the country.63 The conference 

followed a plan issued by the MCA in July 2009 to resolve problems in ‘‘difficult villages’’ between 2009 and 2011 and a joint opinion issued in February 2009 by high-level authorities outlining the 

guiding ideology, principles, goals, responsibilities, and methods 

authorities link to transforming ‘‘difficult villages.’’ 64

The National People’s Congress Standing Committee reviewed 

draft amendments to the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees 

(Organic Law) in January and again in June 65 in part to potentially strengthen Party control over villages and remedy problems 

with village elections and village governance. Proposed changes to 

the law, if passed, reportedly could mandate that villagers establish village affairs supervision mechanisms, make it easier for rural 

residents to remove village committee members, and make it simpler to convene village meetings to decide on village issues.66 In addition, there has been debate regarding a proposed change that 

would strengthen Party leadership over the running of village affairs.67 Authorities collected public comments on the draft law from 

the end of December 2009 to the end of January 2010.68 In February, authorities in Beijing attempted to prevent village leaders, 

who were attending a meeting in Beijing on February 25 to discuss 

the proposed amendments to the Organic Law, from holding a 

press conference. Police threatened one of the eight village leaders 

who planned to speak and prohibited the tea shop where the conference was to be held from opening. Two of the leaders found an 

alternate site and held the press conference there.69

Party and Government Accountability and Transparency 

ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION

Corruption reportedly remains high and continues to be one of 

the top three concerns of Chinese citizens, according to a survey 

conducted since 2006 by the People’s Daily Online.70 Transparency 

International gave China a score of 3.6 (out of a possible 10, which 

signifies ‘‘highly clean’’) on the organization’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index, which is a measurement of the perceived levels of 

172 

public sector corruption.71 During this reporting year, official discipline inspection and supervision entities from around the country 

reported receiving nearly 1.32 million complaints and information 

tips from citizens between January and November 2009, according 

to information from an official joint press conference.72 Prosecution 

entities reportedly investigated 2,687 government officials who 

were allegedly involved in three categories of cases in 2009: infringement of people’s rights, graft, and malfeasance.73 In May 

2010, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Supervision announced 

that 3,058 officials had received punishments ranging up to life imprisonment in cases concluded over a six-month period beginning 

in October 2009 for wrongdoings related to China’s economic stimulus funds or construction projects.74 In addition, the Communist 

Party reportedly punished 5,241 individuals for issues relating to 

corruption involving economic stimulus funds.75 It is unclear how 

many officials were subject to both Party and government punishment. 

MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY

Authorities pledged in the 2009–2010 National Human Rights 

Action Plan to stringently implement corruption prevention measures.76 Central and local Communist Party and Chinese government entities also issued new or revised corruption prevention 

measures related to the disclosure of assets,77 the closure of ‘‘liaison offices’’ in Beijing associated with local government lobbying efforts,78 and a revised ethics code.79

Chinese authorities have taken additional steps to encourage reporting of corruption. Whistleblower protections, however, remain 

insufficiently developed at this time. [For more information on 

whistleblower protections, see Section III—Access to Justice—Administrative Law Developments.] In October 2009, the Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of 

Supervision established a new hotline to accept citizen tips and 

complaints about corruption.80 According to the Legal Daily, 70 

percent or more of the cases of work-related offenses filed with 

procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from a citizen.81 Citizens who make allegations risk retribution. According to material 

from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported by the Legal 

Daily, 70 percent of the people who filed tips with procuratorate offices were subject to various forms of retribution.82 According to 

the South China Morning Post, however, a procuratorate official 

said that fewer than 200 cases of retaliation were reported each 

year.83 The Legal Daily report indicated that some experts believe 

the law inadequately protects whistleblowers and that many forms 

of retribution technically are ‘‘legal’’ or are ‘‘hidden.’’ 84 In one case 

of retribution in March 2010, police in Hubei province held Chen 

Yonggang for seven days of an eight-day detention on suspicion of 

‘‘defamation,’’ after Chen used the Internet to question government 

budget choices that he believed were extravagant.85 Chen said he 

would not make such Internet postings again. County police reportedly will give Chen compensation for detaining him illegally.86 In 

June, Chinese lawmakers discussed a second draft of the revised 

Administrative Supervision Law proposal, which included a draft 

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provision designed to provide legal protection for informants who 

report suspected official corruption.87

Chinese lawmakers and officials are considering institutional 

changes and measures to resolve other ongoing problems with official infringement of citizens’ rights and to improve government accountability. Experts believe that a new round of training for county 

officials signals a continuing restructuring of county-level governance; the former system of ‘‘accountability upwards’’ will be modified to one of ‘‘accountability downward.’’ 88 One official from the 

Party Construction Department of the Party Central Committee 

Party School noted that most mass incidents and frictions occur at 

the county level and stated that ‘‘the capability of the county government to deal with such events is closely related to the stability 

of the whole country.’’ 89 During this reporting year, central officials 

urged local governments to eliminate local policies that could impinge on the rights of citizens. In May 2010, a Supreme People’s 

Court vice president requested that local governments rapidly 

eliminate ‘‘local policies’’ that work to limit acceptance of administrative court suits.90 A May China News article pointed out that 

for years, administrative behavior has been a ‘‘blind spot’’ for judicial supervision, including local administrative policy documents or 

so-called ‘‘red (letter) head documents’’ issued by administrative organs at every level of government.91 The article noted that ‘‘red 

(letter) head documents’’ repeatedly have been found to be illegal, 

giving rise to numerous problems in administrative law; without 

examination for their legality, these documents could ‘‘deprive citizens of their rights.’’ 92 During this reporting year, Guangdong 

province officials released for public comment a draft provision that 

would, if passed, limit the applicability of these ‘‘red (letter) head 

documents’’ to five years and restrict their scope in three areas.93

BUDGET TRANSPARENCY

Chinese authorities at the central level urged local officials to 

share information about official budgets with the public, and citizens put pressure on government agencies to reveal their budgets. 

Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests there is some variation 

in the willingness on the part of local government agencies to make 

their budgets public. In March 2010, the Ministry of Finance made 

public national budget figures for the second time since early 2009, 

and included more budget categories, which increased the length of 

the material issued publicly from 4 to 12 pages.94 Also in March, 

the National People’s Congress (NPC) reportedly requested that all 

budgets approved by the NPC be made public, including the State 

Council’s budget.95 During this reporting year, 45 Beijing municipal government agencies were to make public their budgets, and 

by a May deadline, most of those agencies reportedly did make information available on the Internet.96 Nevertheless, a news report 

suggested some experts and Beijing residents thought that the figures made public were not detailed enough nor presented clearly.97

In October 2009, Li Detao, a Shenzhen resident working with Public Budget Watch, a volunteer group, submitted open government 

information requests to government agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, 

Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Nanjing.98 The Bureau of Finance in Shanghai responded to Li Detao’s requests but refused to 

174 

provide him with the information he requested, declaring it a ‘‘state 

secret.’’ 99 Officials at the Bureau of Finance in Guangzhou, however, called Li and informed him that the 2009 financial budgets 

for 114 agencies would be placed on the Internet.100 The report 

said Li believes that this is among the first times he has seen government agencies in a first-level (provincial-level) city make their 

budgets widely available to the public.101

Open Government Information 

In May 2008, the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI 

Regulations) took effect.102 The OGI Regulations are part of China’s 

anticorruption efforts and are intended to increase public access to information and expand public oversight and participation.103 The OGI Regulations require proactive disclosure of certain types of information by 

government agencies, allow for citizen requests for access to government 

information, and provide legal remedies for violations of the regulations. 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the State Council General 

Office issued an opinion and the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued 

two opinions (one proposed) relating to the OGI Regulations. The State 

Council General Office’s opinion was issued in January 2010. That opinion affirmed guidance found in a 2008 opinion 104 allowing agencies to 

limit who may make an information request. Specifically, agencies may 

deny requests that do not relate to a requester’s ‘‘special needs’’ in their 

‘‘production, livelihood, or scientific and technological research.’’ 105 The 

2010 opinion also encourages agencies to release more information up 

front to reduce requests and to strengthen systems for determining 

whether information should be withheld on the grounds of state secrets 

or national, public, or economic security.106 In November 2009, the SPC 

released for public comment proposed measures concerning the hearing 

of administrative cases involving open government information (OGI).107

Within the month-long consultation period, the court collected 411 comments.108 Internet users and a Chinese professor expressed concern that 

the draft gives courts too much discretion to deny the release of information for reasons such as ‘‘state secrets’’ or so as not to disrupt ‘‘normal 

administrative activities.’’ 109 That same month, the SPC issued an opinion dealing with administration litigation that calls on courts to ‘‘vigorously accept’’ new categories of cases, including OGI cases.110

175 

Open Government Information—Continued 

Chinese citizens reportedly have responded to the OGI Regulations 

with ‘‘dynamism’’ amidst ongoing challenges to their ‘‘right to know.’’ 111

The latest annual work reports on OGI requests in some of China’s larger cities reported numbers of requests received that ranged from thousands to hundreds of thousands.112 The level of detail provided on the 

disposition of requests varied. Shanghai, for example, provided information on why certain requests were denied, disclosing that 152 requests 

were denied because they involved ‘‘state secrets.’’ The efforts of one 

Shenzhen resident, Li Detao, to file OGI requests for budget information 

from the governments in different locales illustrates some lack of uniformity regarding the handling of OGI requests. Shanghai officials denied Li’s request for budget information on state secret grounds while 

Guangzhou officials granted his request.113 Media stories reported that 

officials denied or had yet to respond to notable OGI requests, including 

one Shanghai resident’s request for information about compensation for 

demolished homes,114 one regarding the death toll in and the costs associated with the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake,115 and one regarding 

Shanghai lawyer Yan Yiming’s request on China’s economic stimulus 

spending.116

Chinese and Western researchers have conducted studies assessing 

implementation of the OGI Regulations, with varying results.117 Results 

of at least one Chinese study and one joint Chinese-Western study 

showed variation in the effectiveness of government agencies in implementing the OGI Regulations.118 Studies highlighted the need to 

strengthen OGI mechanisms within government agencies and indicated 

that Chinese citizens’ awareness and use of OGI mechanisms may be 

relatively low in some areas.119

176 

Open Government Information—Continued 

According to the 2009 annual work reports from Beijing, Shanghai, 

Guangzhou, and Chongqing municipalities, the number of OGI lawsuits 

heard by courts in these jurisdictions numbered 147, 199, 3, and 1, respectively.120 Since Shanghai has had a local OGI regulation since 2004, 

there is some comparative data that shows that OGI-related lawsuits increased from 35 cases in 2006 to a high of 258 cases in 2008.121 Details 

regarding the disposition of the OGI court cases also varied.122 One 

Western expert on China’s OGI noted that ‘‘Chinese courts have frequently refused to accept lawsuits over information disclosure or have 

found in favor of the government.’’ 123 Chinese media reported on notable lawsuits. A June 2010 Democracy and Law article reported that 

Shanghai lawyer Li Honghua filed lawsuits against 80 provincial and 

city governments after he was dissatisfied with responses he received to 

his requests for information on government spending of a 4 trillion yuan 

(US$588 billion) stimulus package. Seven courts reportedly agreed to 

hear his case.124 In January 2010, a court in Wuhan concluded the city’s 

first OGI case, ruling that an agency had violated the law by not responding to an information request within the legal time limit.125 In 

May, the Haidian District People’s Court in Beijing ruled against a 

plaintiff who had requested information about the local environmental 

protection bureau’s approval of a nearby medical waste incinerator, on 

the grounds that the plaintiff did not live close enough to the waste facility.126 [For more information on implementation of the OGI initiative 

in the environmental protection sector, see Section II—Climate Change 

and the Environment.] 

Taken together, developments relating to the OGI regulations over the 

past year suggest that officials are seeking to provide greater clarity regarding how the regulations should be implemented, while citizen interest in requesting government information and seeking legal remedies for 

government inaction continues to grow. 

Public Input on Draft Regulatory Instruments, Public Hearings 

Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to political 

decisionmaking processes; however, they are increasingly able to 

utilize various channels to express opinions regarding proposed 

policies and regulatory instruments. During this reporting year, authorities continued to signal they would expand public participation 

in policymaking related to issues involving the public interest. A 

March 2010 Legal Daily article outlined some of the channels 

through which experts and citizens can express their opinions 

about draft regulatory instruments including expert meetings, the 

Internet, and public participation in roundtables, discussion meetings, and public hearings.127 According to the article, authorities 

granted citizens the opportunity to submit suggestions on 67 administrative legal measures over a six-year period beginning in 

2004.128 According to the same article, a spokesperson from the 

State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) said that since 

June 2007, authorities have made all administrative regulations, 

excluding those involving state secrets and national security, available in principle on the Internet and open for public comment.129

The U.S.-China Business Council released in April 2010 its annual 

177 

review of China’s compliance with its policies and its bilateral 

agreements that relate to transparency. The report noted that the 

NPC had complied with regulations stipulating it must allow a 30- 

day comment period on all draft laws at least once during the 

NPC’s three-reading review process.130 It also noted, however, that 

the SCLAO had been inconsistent in publishing ‘‘trade and economic-related administrative regulations and department rules’’ for 

the 30-day public comment period.131 The SCLAO posted on its 

Web site only approximately 25 percent of the regulations and 

rules issued or posted for comment during the Council’s report period, which represents a decline from the previous year.132

Citizens and the media continue to express concern regarding the 

implementation and impact of public hearings. Public hearings in 

China have expanded across the country since 1996 with the promulgation of China’s Law on Administrative Punishment and offer 

limited opportunities for public engagement regarding various policy topics.133 During this reporting year, at least a few cities have 

issued local measures 134 in order to implement a 2008 State Council decision directing cities and counties to expand the scope of public hearings and to establish a hearing system to solicit citizen 

opinions regarding laws, regulations, provisions, and major government administrative policies that are relevant to the interests of 

citizens.135 During this reporting year, several news articles reported that citizens were concerned about the implementation of 

water price hearings because of problems reported in several cases 

around the country.136 In some of these cases, relevant authorities 

tried to prevent critics from attending hearings or excluded certain 

groups of citizens that may be adversely affected by the proposed 

policy, leaving them with no opportunity to speak out, among several other issues.137 A Chinese university professor argued in a December 2009 China Daily commentary that the impact of public 

hearings on policy is limited.138

178 

COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW

Introduction 

As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is 

bound by commitments outlined under both the WTO agreements 

and China’s accession documents.1 During the Commission’s 2010 

reporting year, foreign investors in China have found an increasingly uneven playing field and lack of progress in China’s compliance with WTO principles of transparency and national treatment, 

i.e., treating foreign and domestic companies equally with respect 

to goods, services, and intellectual property rights.2 The Chinese 

government’s implementation of its WTO commitments, including 

those regarding transparency and non-discrimination, is a measure 

of the overall development of rule of law in China and of the Chinese government’s willingness to abide by its international commitments. 

The Chinese government’s record in meeting WTO commitments 

is mixed. When China joined the WTO, the Chinese government 

agreed to adhere to WTO transparency standards, under which all 

laws, regulations, and other measures relating to trade shall be 

published in a timely manner.3 According to China’s two largest 

trading partners, the United States and the European Union, the 

Chinese government’s current record in transparency is poor.4 Further, when joining the WTO in 2001, the Chinese government 

committed to ensuring that all trade-related measures would be administered in a non-discriminatory manner and that, under the 

principle of national treatment, foreign and domestically owned 

companies would be treated the same. However, the government 

has become increasingly protectionist in the period since 2008.5

One June 2010 report quoted the head of the U.S. delegation to the 

WTO as saying, ‘‘China has become much more focused on developing industrial policy initiatives aimed at helping Chinese enterprises move up the value chain in key industries, and China has 

demonstrated a highly selective interest in continuing to open its 

market more fully and fairly to foreign participation.’’ 6

The foreign business community has found increased problems in 

the Chinese government’s regulatory system and its application to 

business operations in China. The AmCham-China 2010 Business 

Climate Survey for the first time found ‘‘inconsistent interpretation 

and implementation of laws’’ to be the top challenge for the 318 

members that responded to the survey.7 The survey also found increased concern over ‘‘obtaining required licenses and national protectionism, coupled with consistent concern about bureaucracy in 

China . . . .’’ 8

The Chinese government has increasingly made use of industrial 

policies, which favor state-owned companies at the expense of foreign-owned companies,9 and in some cases, such as the auto parts 

import provisions of the 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, which are not 

in keeping with WTO requirements on non-discrimination.10 This 

jeopardizes equality before the law and neutral legal enforcement. 

Such use of industrial policies also negatively impacts transparency. 

179 

Industrial Policies and Commercial Law Developments 

The Chinese government’s use of industrial policies to direct economic growth, rather than strictly relying on market-based principles, hinders development of rule of law.11 Industrial policies lay 

out comprehensive frameworks for the government’s direction of 

relevant sectors, providing, for example, details on subsidies and 

other benefits, restructuring of key industrial entities, financing, 

technological development, and export goals. Industrial policies are 

implemented through various measures, including laws and regulations, which in some instances do not comply with WTO requirements, as in the WTO case on the Chinese government’s imposition 

of measures affecting the import of auto parts. In that case, the 

WTO dispute settlement body found in 2008 that certain provisions 

of China’s Policy on Development of the Automotive Industry, together with implementing legislation, violated WTO rules.12 Under 

China’s Protocol of Accession, the government agreed to provide 

comment periods for new legislation when possible.13 However, as 

industrial policies spell out the scope and direction of legislation, 

comments on the legislation may carry less weight, rendering the 

comment period less meaningful. 

Discussions of two industrial policies, cultural industrial policy 

and automotive policy, follow below. 

Industrial Policy—Cultural Industry 

During this reporting year, the Chinese government moved forward with a plan for promoting the so-called cultural industry 

through subsidies and other forms of support and guidance, passing legislation, and arranging financing in the sector. In July 2009, 

China Daily reported that the State Council had adopted a plan for 

the industry’s development in light of the financial crisis,14 and on 

September 26, 2009, the central government published the Plan to 

Vigorously Promote the Cultural Industry (Plan).15 The Plan covers 

filmmaking, publishing, printing and reproduction, advertising, the 

performing arts and entertainment, animation, cultural exhibitions, 

and digitalization,16 and lists a number of policy measures for the 

Chinese government to take to further develop the industry, including, for example, financing, reforming the state-owned cultural entities, preferential land use and tax policies, development of creative industry parks, assistance with exporting, provision of subsidies, and investment.17

The Plan was issued within two months after the panel established by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body reported its findings 

in a case concerning Chinese regulation of importation and distribution of certain foreign cultural products.18 In that case, the 

WTO panel found Chinese regulations restricting the ability of 

foreign companies and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to import or 

distribute reading materials, audiovisual home entertainment products, and sound recordings, or to import films for theatrical performances, violated WTO rules.19

Though an industrial plan lays out the framework for the development of the sector, it is implemented through legislation and 

other similar measures by responsible government departments. 

During the period since the issuance of the Plan, government deVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00185 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
180 

partments have issued a number of implementation measures. In 

September 2009, the Ministry of Culture—the ministry with overall 

supervisory responsibility for the industry—published its Guiding 

Opinion Concerning Speeding Up Development of the Cultural 

Industry (Guiding Opinion).20 The Guiding Opinion was dated September 10, but was not published until after the State Council 

announced the Plan, and sets out additional details on the covered 

industries and on the means to accelerate development of the industry. 

Financing. The Plan to Vigorously Promote the Cultural Industry (Plan) calls for financing of the industry.21 In September 2009, 

a report indicated that the central government would establish a 

fund to invest in the cultural industry and that China Film would 

be recommended for listing on China’s stock exchange.22 The China 

Securities Journal reported on March 30, 2010, six months after 

the issuance of the Plan, that the domestic entertainment and 

media industry would grow 9.5 percent annually but noted that 

cultural enterprises in China still had trouble obtaining financing.23 On April 8, the central bank and nine other government 

departments issued the Guidance on Financial Support To Reinvigorate and Develop the Culture Industry, which related to providing 

financing to support the cultural industry.24

Exports. The Plan calls for expanding trade in Chinese cultural 

products and for Chinese cultural products to have greater influence on international markets.25 In 2010, 6 government departments accredited 211 printing and reproduction companies as 

Major Culture Export Enterprises and 255 printing and reproduction projects as Major Culture Export Projects, which the Ministry 

of Commerce would support to become more competitive on export 

markets.26

Sectoral policies. During this reporting year, government departments in charge of particular cultural sectors issued measures 

implementing the Plan. For example, in January 2010, the General 

Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) issued a guiding 

opinion for the development of printed materials, digital and 

non-paper media, animation and electronic games, and press and 

publications distribution and logistics; 27 the Ministry of Culture 

accredited 100 enterprises as Animation Enterprises, eligible for 

preferential tax policies; 28 and the State Council issued Guiding 

Opinions on Promoting the Development of a Flourishing Movie Industry.29 In March, GAPP worked out a plan for international best 

sellers.30

Regulation of markets. The Chinese government regulates the 

cultural industry strictly, as evidenced by the strict censorship 

prevalent in China.31 In December 2009, the Ministry of Commerce 

issued a notice on special management of the cultural markets during the New Year and the weeklong Spring Festival, including supervising online games and Internet cafes, online music and cell 

phone music, and lip-syncing and unlawful performances.32 [For information on censorship in China, see Section II—Freedom of Expression.] 

181 

Industrial Policy—Automotive 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government revised its 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, and implemented 

its Auto Stimulus Program, which it had issued in March 2009.33

The dramatic development of China’s auto sector has been guided 

by China’s 2004 Auto Industrial Policy.34 The policy sets out comprehensive guidelines for China’s auto industry, including the development and acquisition of technology, structural adjustment of 

the auto sector through the formation of large corporate groups, 

foreign investment in the sector, growth in the domestic auto market, and automobile exports.35

In 2006, the United States, European Union, and Canada challenged certain provisions of China’s auto policy concerning tariff 

rates applicable to the import of auto parts and assemblies, and the 

legislation implementing these provisions, at the WTO.36 The WTO 

dispute panel found that the provisions discriminated against imported auto parts and thus were inconsistent with WTO requirements.37 The Chinese government appealed the panel’s ruling, 

which subsequently was upheld by the WTO Appellate Body. Accordingly, the panel requested that the government bring the auto 

parts import provisions of the policy, as well as its implementing 

legislation, into conformity with WTO obligations by September 1, 

2009.38 The government did so in August 2009, effective September 

1, 2009.39 In the five years from the issuance of the policy till the 

import provisions were revised, foreign automakers with factories 

in China started buying parts produced in China, in part because 

of the discriminatory measures.40

Both the auto policy and the Program for the Adjustment and 

Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry call for development of automotive technology through a combination of imported technology 

and independent research and development, or indigenous innovation.41 Chinese companies’ overseas acquisitions, including stateowned Beijing Automotive’s acquisition of rights to certain Saab 

technology from General Motors in December 2009 42 and Zhejiang 

Geely’s purchase of Volvo from Ford in March 2010 (financed in 

large part by Chinese state-owned banks), have provided access to 

foreign technology.43

Transparency 

The Chinese government’s implementation of its WTO transparency commitments has been uneven. In its Protocol of Accession 

to the WTO, the government committed to publish all laws, regulations, or other measures affecting trade, to allow a reasonable comment period before implementation, and to establish or designate 

an official journal for this purpose.44 The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in a 2010 report notes that while the State Council 

issued regulations in 2001 requiring comment periods and hearings, ‘‘only a small proportion of new or revised laws and regulations have been issued after a period for public comment, and even 

in these cases the amount of time provided for public comment generally has been short.’’ 45 According to the USTR report, a 2006 

State Council notice directed all government authorities to send 

trade-related rules to the Ministry of Commerce for publication in 

182 

its gazette, but compliance with this requirement is ‘‘far from complete.’’ 46 The USTR’s finding is similar to the April 2010 analysis 

conducted by the US-China Business Council on transparency in 

China.47

China’s transparency obligations have been the subject of several 

dialogues between the U.S. and Chinese governments.48 Most recently, at a meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and 

Trade in October 2009, both governments agreed to continue to cooperate and to develop a workplan on transparency for 2009– 

2010.49 [For more information on transparency, see box titled Open 

Government Information in Section III—Institutions of Democratic 

Governance.] 

Government Procurement 

In 2009, Chinese government procurement exceeded 700 billion 

yuan (US$147 billion).50 This is an area of importance to Chinese 

citizens and to non-Chinese companies alike. As noted in a WTO 

overview, ‘‘Procurement systems have a significant impact on the 

efficiency of the use of public funds and, more generally, on public 

confidence in government and on good governance.’’ 51 When China 

joined the WTO, the Chinese government made several commitments related to government procurement, including that it would 

begin negotiations to join the Government Procurement Agreement 

(GPA) under the WTO ‘‘as soon as possible.’’ 52 While there has 

been some minimal progress toward this end, it is still subject to 

negotiation.53

During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to 

develop legislation to improve its procurement system for domestic 

companies. In January 2010, the government issued for comment 

draft Implementation Rules for the 2003 Government Procurement 

Law,54 which clarify certain open issues in the law. According to 

a China Daily report, the draft ‘‘is aimed at specifying the law, including details over domestic goods in government procurement, to 

further fight any corruption in the purchasing process.’’ 55 The draft 

rules specify when the procuring party should withdraw from a 

procurement proceeding because of a relationship to the supplier, 

and provide details on the definition of domestic goods, projects, 

and services. On May 21, 2010, four Chinese government departments issued the Notice on Collecting Public Comments on Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Domestically 

Made Products.56 The draft clarifies that domestic goods and services include products of foreign-invested companies in China.57

Indigenous Innovation 

The Chinese government’s use of industrial policy intersects with 

government procurement in the area of indigenous innovation. China’s industrial policies have called for Chinese domestic development and ownership of technology.58 The government’s policy on 

indigenous innovation is directed toward encouraging technological 

development in certain key sectors of the economy, with final consideration the development of potential exports, as well as substitution of products using Chinese technology for imported products 

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183 

icy only applies to government procurement at the central level, 

there are concerns with the policy’s application at the provincial 

and local levels.59

Although the Chinese government has encouraged indigenous innovation since at least 2007,60 there has been significant regulatory activity during this reporting year, which has led to widespread concern from the international business community and to 

high-level United States and China discussions of indigenous innovation. In November 2009, three Chinese government departments 

issued the Circular on Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation Accreditation Work,61 requiring companies to apply by December 2009 for their products to be ‘‘accredited’’ as qualifying for 

government procurement. The circular, which covers six broad categories of products in high technology, or new energy or energy efficient areas, provided that only products using intellectual property 

initially registered in China would be eligible for accreditation.62 In 

December 2009, four government departments issued the Catalogue Guiding Domestic Innovation in Major Technology Equipment, which listed products that could be certified as indigenous 

innovation products, eligible for certain procurement preferences.63

Although China is not a member of the WTO GPA, the policies potentially raise market access or intellectual property issues under 

the WTO.64

Foreign government response to the December documents was 

negative,65 and perhaps in response, on April 10, 2010, the Chinese 

government issued a draft notice without the requirement that intellectual property first be registered in China.66 Other issues remain, including the resolution of conflicts between national policies 

and local-level government decisions on indigenous innovation,67

and a group of large American, Canadian, and European business 

associations submitted a letter to the Chinese government commenting on the draft, urging China to join the GPA, and urging the 

Chinese government ‘‘not to publish the indigenous innovation 

product list and not to carry forward this program.’’ 68

Intellectual Property Rights 

China’s record on protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) 

remained poor during this reporting year. China is on the U.S. 

Government’s Priority Watch List for 2010, and named in the Special 301 Report of April 30, 2010, which notes, ‘‘China’s IPR enforcement regime remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent.’’ 69

According to the report, ‘‘IPR enforcement at the local level is hampered by poor coordination among Chinese ministries and agencies, 

local protectionism and corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and prosecuting criminal cases, lack of training, and 

inadequate and non-transparent processes.’’ 70

In October 2009, revisions to China’s Patent Law went into effect, and in February 2010, revisions to the Patent Law’s implementing rules went into effect.71 While the revisions provide some 

clarification, the Special 301 Report notes some concerns, ‘‘including 

the effect of disclosure of origin requirements on patent validity, inventor remuneration, and the scope of and procedures relating to 

compulsory licensing, among other matters.’’ 72 The National People’s Congress revised the Copyright Law, effective April 1, 2010, 

184 

to close a loophole on the scope of protection and to add an article 

concerning registration of pledges of copyright.73 To implement the 

law’s language on pledges of copyright, the National Copyright Administration issued for comments a draft Measure for Registration 

of Copyright Pledge on April 26, 2010.74

According to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 2009 Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases, there were 440 IPR cases 

pending before the SPC in 2009, an increase of 33.7 percent over 

2008.75 The SPC concluded 390 IPR cases in 2009, an increase of 

111.96 percent over 2008.76 A Chinese court ruled that Microsoft 

had infringed the rights of Chinese software maker Zhongyi Electronics in November 2009.77 However, in April 2010, Microsoft won 

a major case against a Chinese insurance company, Dazhong Insurance, which was using pirated copies of Microsoft software.78

Dazhong indicated it would appeal the ruling, accusing Microsoft of 

acting monopolistically.79

Antimonopoly Law 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, two of the three 

government departments charged with enforcing China’s 2008 

Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued implementing legislation. To clarify the merger control procedures, the Ministry of Commerce 

(MOFCOM) issued two sets of measures on concentrations of businesses, both of which came into effect on January 1, 2010.80 The 

State Administration for Industry and Commerce on May 25, 2010, 

issued three draft rules for comment, covering monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance, and administrative monopolies.81 If 

promulgated, the draft rules will provide greater clarity on the 

types of conduct forbidden by the AML. 

The AML has the potential to enhance competition in the Chinese economy and to benefit Chinese consumers, but may conflict 

with Chinese industrial policies encouraging the development of 

large domestic companies and protecting state-owned enterprises. 

A comparison of MOFCOM’s merger rulings in cases involving nonChinese companies with MOFCOM’s lack of review of mergers of 

large Chinese state-owned companies highlights this conflict. During this reporting year, MOFCOM has blocked or given conditional 

approvals to a number of deals involving foreign companies, in 

some cases forcing global companies to divest assets outside of 

China.82 In the period since the AML came into effect in August 

2008 to the end of 2009, MOFCOM has completed 60 merger reviews, 6 of which MOFCOM approved with conditions, and 1 of 

which MOFCOM blocked. MOFCOM only publishes rulings on 

mergers that it rejects or approves with conditions, so it is difficult 

to tell whether the parties to unconditionally approved mergers are 

state-owned enterprises or non-Chinese companies. The six that 

were conditionally approved involved mergers between non-Chinese 

parties.83 This has led some multinationals to believe the AML ‘‘is 

being used as a tool to protect domestic rivals from competition and 

suspect that—unlike in the US, EU and Japan—merger reviews 

are open to industrial policy considerations.’’ 84 However, as a matter of industrial policy, the Chinese government intends to create 

large ‘‘national champions,’’ for example, in automobiles and 

steel.85 Indeed, the 2008 merger of two large state-owned enterVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00190 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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prises, China Unicom and China Netcom, was large enough to trigger a merger filing with MOFCOM but, reportedly, none was 

filed.86

Food Safety and Product Quality 

FOOD SAFETY

Following the passage of China’s Food Safety Law in March 2009 

and implementing legislation 87 during this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to develop its food safety regime, 

though problems remain. The Chinese government issued regulations on food additives and on monitoring food safety and a 

rectification plan for the catering industry, and established a highlevel Food Safety Commission headed by Vice Premier Li Keqiang 

to coordinate the work of government departments involved in food 

safety.88 Nonetheless, there still are risks in the food supply, according to a report by Radio Free Asia, as indicated by recent cases 

of poisoned chives and dyed beans.89 The report notes that analysts 

point to several problems, including poor government supervision, 

lack of coordination among departments, and lack of compensation.90 Parents of the children sickened by the contaminated Sanlu 

milk in 2008 continue to seek redress.91 Zhao Lianhai, who organized a group representing the parents and is a parent of a 

sickened child, was tried in March for ‘‘inciting social disorder,’’ according to his lawyer.92 Four parents, unable to obtain redress in 

China, sued in small claims court in Hong Kong in April 2010.93

However, the Hong Kong court refused the case on jurisdictional 

grounds.94

PRODUCT QUALITY

Problems with the quality of Chinese products are well known 

outside China, with recent cases of toxic sofas exported to England, 

reported cadmium in children’s jewelry imported into the United 

States, and toxic drywall imported into the United States.95 The 

General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 

Quarantine has taken some steps, including setting up a blacklist 

system in January 2010 for companies with illegal quality problems, and announced plans to establish a recall system for home 

appliances this year.96

Tort Liability Law 

The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the 

Tort Liability Law in December 2009.97 The law took effect July 1, 

2010, and covers product liability and product recalls.98 The law 

provides for punitive damages where a producer or seller of a defective product has knowledge of the defect, but still produces or sells 

the product, and it causes serious injury or death.99

Exchange Rate Policy and Export Restraints 

The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be the subject of criticism and concern among policymakers and the general public in 

the United States and around the world. Article XV(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides that conVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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tracting parties ‘‘shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent 

of the provisions of [the GATT], nor, by trade action, the intent of 

the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International 

Monetary Fund.’’ 100 The Articles of Agreement of the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) state that ‘‘each member shall . . . avoid 

manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 

in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to 

gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members[.]’’ 101

From July 2008 till June 2010, China maintained a yuan-dollar 

exchange rate of about 6.83 yuan to the dollar.102 According to one 

economist, this has given Chinese manufacturing ‘‘a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading to huge trade surpluses.’’ 103 On 

June 19, 2010, just before a G–20 meeting, Chinese officials made 

statements concerning greater exchange rate flexibility for the 

yuan.104 As of the end of August 2010, however, there has been no 

real change. According to a July 8 Treasury Department report, 

‘‘China’s continued foreign reserve accumulation, the limited appreciation of China’s real effective exchange rate relative to rapid productivity growth in the traded goods sector, and the persistence of 

current account surpluses even during a period when China’s trading partners were in deep recession together suggest that the 

renminbi remains undervalued.’’ 105

During this reporting year, the United States challenged China’s 

restraints on exports of certain key input materials at the World 

Trade Organization (WTO). According to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), these restraints tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese manufacturers by lowering prices of inputs to manufacturers 

in China, giving them a competitive price advantage.106 When it 

joined the WTO, China committed to eliminate export restraints, 

with certain exceptions enumerated in China’s WTO accession documents.107 However, according to a 2010 USTR report on foreign 

trade barriers, ‘‘China has increased the artificial advantages afforded to its downstream producers by making the export quotas 

more restrictive and by imposing or increasing export duties on 

many raw materials at issue.’’ 108 The United States brought a 

WTO challenge against China over export restraints on nine materials used in the manufacture of steel and chemicals, joined by the 

European Union and other third parties.109 In March 2010, the Director-General of the WTO composed a panel to hear the case,110

and in May, the panel made certain preliminary rulings in response to a request by China.111

There are reports that USTR is considering a separate WTO case 

against China concerning its restraints on exports of rare earth 

metals, which are essential for production of certain high technology products,112 and are the found in many products, including, 

for example, ‘‘iPads, BlackBerries, plasma TVs, lasers, wind turbines, hybrid engines, and smart bombs.’’ 113 USTR cited the policies 

on rare earths during China’s 2009 Transitional Review Mechanism.114 In 2009, China supplied about 97 percent of the global demand for rare earths.115 However, China has cut its export quotas, 

decreasing its rare earth shipments for the second half of 2010 by 

72 percent,116 and is planning to consolidate domestic production 

in a few Chinese companies.117 Foreign companies are not allowed 

to engage in rare earth prospecting or mining in China,118 but can 

187 

enter into rare earth smelting or refining joint ventures with Chinese partners.119

Property 

Under China’s Constitution and system of property law, land is 

categorized into ‘‘urban land’’ and rural, or ‘‘collectively-owned 

land.’’ 120 Urban land is owned by the state.121 Urban land cannot 

be sold, but the state can grant the right to use urban land for a 

term of years upon payment of a land grant premium. The period 

of the grant is 70 years for land classified as residential, 50 years 

for industrial, and 40 years for recreational/tourism/commercial.122

While only the state can grant urban land use rights, a grantee can 

transfer such rights. The parties cannot, however, change the type 

of usage, i.e., residential, industrial, or recreational/tourism/commercial. Collectively owned land can be used only for agricultural 

purposes, or for residences or services for farmers, who can enter 

into land use contracts with the collective for a period of 30 

years.123

China’s real property system raises both commercial rule of law 

and human rights issues. During the Commission’s 2010 reporting 

year, there were many cases of expropriation and abuses by local 

governments and property developers, including forced evictions.124

The International Federation for Human Rights notes that there 

are no statistics on the number of evictions in China but states 

that, according to the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, ‘‘at 

least 1,25 million households were demolished and nearly 3,7 million people were evicted’’ in the period from 1997 to 2007.125 Land 

disputes, especially forced evictions, are a major cause of social unrest in China.126 As a commercial matter, the supply of land, including through conversion of collectively owned land into urban 

land for industrial use, is necessary for China’s economic development and the land sales provide revenue for the government.127 According to one ‘‘semiofficial’’ estimate, revenue from land sales 

makes up as much as 60 percent of local government revenue.128

Further, according to at least one expert, the Chinese government 

subsidizes production by its state-owned enterprises in part by providing them with free or undervalued land.129 This brings down 

costs, making Chinese exports more competitive internationally. 

EXPROPRIATION OF URBAN AND RURAL LAND, COMPENSATION, 

AND ABUSES

The dramatic changes in Chinese land law since the country’s 

founding in 1949 have resulted in conflicting regulations, and in 

many cases, unclear title, which coupled with the rapid rise in 

property values, has led to widespread demolitions and evictions.130 In some cases, there is collusion between local officials and 

property developers, for example, through officials’ ownership interests in the property developers, or through family relationships.131

Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights, which the Chinese government has ratified, provides for the right to housing, and General Comment 4, paragraph 

18, adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1991, provides that ‘‘instances of forced evictions 

188 

are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances.’’ 132

Urban Land Expropriation 

Expropriation of urban land for redevelopment is governed by 

China’s Constitution and legislation including the 2007 Property 

Law, the 2004 Law on Administration of Urban Real Property, and 

the 2001 Regulations on Government Housing Demolition in Urban 

Areas (2001 Demolition Regulations).133 The Property Law allows 

expropriation of urban land in the ‘‘public interest,’’ subject to compensation for demolition and resettlement.134 After the Property 

Law came into effect, the Law on Administration of Urban Real 

Property was revised to add a new Article 6, providing that the 

state may expropriate urban land in the ‘‘public interest,’’ subject 

to granting compensation to the rights holder. Neither law defines 

the term ‘‘public interest,’’ which allows abuse of expropriation.135

Article 6 further provides that when an individual’s residence is expropriated, that individual’s living conditions should be protected.136

There has been widespread abuse in the process of expropriation 

of urban land, with forced evictions, lack of adequate compensation, 

and poor procedural protection.137 Owners who refuse to leave their 

homes in some cases have been harassed, beaten, or illegally detained.138 There have been countless cases of forced eviction reported in the press,139 including the case of a Sichuan woman who 

set herself on fire in November 2009 to protest the demolition of 

her home.140 This case triggered a debate among Chinese Internet 

users concerning forced demolitions.141

In December 2009, five law professors from Peking University 

sent an open letter to the National People’s Congress calling for the 

repeal or amendment of the 2001 Demolition Regulations, which 

they said violate the Constitution and the Property Law.142 In January 2010, the government issued for public comment draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings 

on State Owned Land.143 The draft provides that evictions must be 

in the ‘‘public interest’’ and sets out seven categories of public interest, such as national defense installations.144 However, the draft 

allows expropriation other than in the public interest in certain circumstances where the developers get permission from the relevant 

government departments.145 The draft contains procedures for expropriation with greater protection for evicted residents, including 

public comment periods and better terms of compensation payment 

and calculation. At least two of the law professors who had called 

for the amendment considered the draft an improvement, though 

it allows certain demolitions that do not meet the public interest 

requirement and it does not cover expropriation of collectively 

owned land.146 As of July 2010 the draft had not been passed. One 

of the five professors, Jiang Ming’an, told the South China Morning 

Post that, ‘‘if the draft regulation goes into effect, the western provinces would barely be able to attract investment, as real estate developers would find it difficult to acquire land under the new 

rules.’’ Noting the reliance of local governments on income from 

land sales, Jiang said that ‘‘less government revenue could affect 

189 

the implementation of projects that aim to improve people’s livelihoods.’’ 147 The government has issued other documents since the 

publication of the draft in January 2010 to address problems with 

forced evictions, including a State Council directive issued in May 

to stop forced demolition and a Ministry of Land and Resources notice issued in July to local governments concerning compensation 

to homeowners.148 In May, China Daily reported that the State 

Council had ordered localities to put in place land compensation 

standards before July.149

Expropriation of Collectively Owned Land 

The draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of 

Residential Buildings on State Owned Land apply to urban land 

only, leaving rural residents with a lower level of protection than 

that provided by the draft.150 Many of the disputes leading to mass 

protests involve collectively owned land around major cities.151

Though farmers can enter into 30-year contracts with their collectives for use of collectively owned land,152 in some cases, the village 

committee takes the land back to ‘‘reallocate’’ it.153 In other cases, 

the village committee, local government, and developer conspire to 

convert land into urban land, which the local government can then 

sell to the developer.154 Finally, the Property Law mandates payment of compensation for the land, fixtures, and crops; subsidies 

for resettlement; and premiums for the farmers’ social security.155

Often, these amounts are paid to the village committee, and in 

some cases, very little reaches the original inhabitants.156

COOLING AN OVERHEATING PROPERTY MARKET

During the reporting year, the Chinese government took a number of measures at the national and local levels to cool the property 

market and curb speculation, and the Communist Party Central 

Commission for Discipline Inspection issued rules to stop officials 

from ‘‘meddling in the real estate industry,’’ in a nod to corruption 

in the construction sector.157 These efforts were against the backdrop of a surge in property prices of 23.6 percent in 2009.158 In 

January 2010, the State Council issued a notice ordering local governments to curb speculation and provide affordable housing for 

residents.159 In April, the State Council issued the Circular on Determined Suppression of the Exceedingly Rapid Rise of Certain 

Urban Housing Prices.160 The Bank of China announced that, in 

principle, it would stop issuing home loans to purchasers who already owned two or more homes,161 and reportedly the Chinese 

government planned to put a moratorium on real estate firms raising capital.162 The Ministry of Land and Resources issued the 

Circular on Issues Relevant To Strengthening the Supply and Regulation of Land Use for Real Property in March 2010.163 A number 

of localities, including Hainan, Chongqing, Beijing, and Shanghai, 

introduced measures as well.164

190 

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Commission 

observed instances in which Chinese officials failed to meet international and domestic standards in upholding and protecting citizens’ 

access to justice. International human rights standards require effective remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Article 8 of 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: ‘‘Everyone 

has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 

the constitution or by law.’’ 1 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has 

signed but not yet ratified, requires that all parties to the ICCPR 

ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ‘‘have an 

effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’’ 2 China’s Constitution similarly provides protections, under Article 41, for citizens 

seeking to petition or criticize the Chinese government for ‘‘violation of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary.’’ 3

Chinese citizens, particularly disadvantaged groups—such as 

ethnic minorities, religious adherents, and laid-off workers—however, continue to face substantial obstacles in seeking remedies for 

violations of their legal rights by government entities and officials. 

During this reporting year, international media and domestic news 

sources widely reported on a range of systemic obstacles to justice, 

from the official targeting of human rights advocates to the unlawful detention of petitioners. 

The National People’s Congress Standing Committee issued laws 

and regulations—including a revision to the State Compensation 

Law and a new Mediation Law—which, if faithfully and effectively 

enforced, may improve access to justice for Chinese citizens in the 

future. However, the Chinese government’s policy of targeting Chinese human rights defenders and lawyers that handle ‘‘sensitive’’ 

case work continued unabated, jeopardizing the potential of these 

reforms to produce positive results.4 Systemic abuses within China’s xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system continue to 

reflect official unwillingness to protect the legal rights of Chinese 

citizens.5

Administrative Law Developments 

During this reporting year, the Chinese government continued to 

promote administrative law reforms that reportedly aim to provide 

greater oversight of state agencies, protect citizen interests, and enhance supervision of government employees. The administrative 

law system in China, however, remains beset with fundamental institutional challenges. For instance, although the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) gives Chinese citizens the right to file 

lawsuits to challenge ‘‘concrete’’ administrative acts that violate 

their lawful rights and interests, Chinese media sources have 

consistently criticized difficulties within the legal system that undermine the effectiveness of the ALL.6 In November 2009, the SuVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
191 

preme People’s Court (SPC) addressed concerns over administrative 

litigation by issuing an opinion on the protection of administrative 

litigants, which aims to strengthen the system for accepting administrative cases and to resolve ‘‘complainant difficulties.’’ 7 In May 

2010, however, the Legal Daily criticized the ‘‘chronic [justice] problems’’ that exist in administrative lawsuits (commonly referred to 

as ‘‘citizens sue officials’’), due in part to the problem of lower level 

courts creating policies to restrict citizens from exercising administrative litigation rights.8 According to a May 2010 article in the 

Southern Metropolis Daily, the low success rate of administrative 

lawsuits not only reflects the reality of ‘‘citizen-official’’ power dynamics, but also demonstrates the ‘‘awkwardness’’ of the ALL.9 The 

article notes that even when plaintiffs win their cases, the ‘‘difficulty of implementing’’ the decisions remains.10

In addition, in June 2010, Chinese officials announced that revisions to the Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL) would be 

included in the 2010 annual legislative agenda of the State Council.11 The ARL allows Chinese citizens to submit an application to 

State Council departments for administrative review of specific 

government actions that violate the applicant’s legal rights and interests.12 In July, a China University of Politics and Law professor 

said the scope of the ARL should be expanded: ‘‘the scope of administrative reconsideration cases should be broader than the scope of 

administrative litigation—except where otherwise provided by law, 

any administrative influence over the rights of citizens should be 

included within the scope of reconsideration.’’ 13 In July, Gao 

Fengtao, Deputy Director of the State Council’s Legislative Affairs 

Office, told official news media: ‘‘Although administrative reconsideration has made significant progress and achieved significant 

results, the functional role of the administrative reconsideration 

system has yet to be effectively developed.’’ 14

In April 2010, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) adopted the first revision to the 1994 State Compensation Law (SCL) in more than 15 years.15 The amendments to 

the SCL reportedly will expand the scope of state liability and 

grant citizens greater ability to obtain compensation.16 The revised 

SCL, which will go into effect in December 2010, includes amendments that will allow citizens to claim compensation for psychological injury, will enhance detainees’ protections by allowing 

compensation when authorities sanction the mistreatment of criminal suspects in detention centers, and will shift the burden of proof 

to authorities when a detainee dies or is incapacitated, so that officials will now be required to provide evidence demonstrating they 

were not responsible.17 Under the revised SCL, victims will be 

allowed to apply directly for compensation; the current SCL stipulates ‘‘victims should first apply for state compensation at the department which caused the loss, and . . . in some cases, the citizen 

must first obtain written acknowledgement of violation from the 

department before applying for compensation.’’ 18 The April amendments come after years of criticism over the SCL’s effectiveness. 

The law, which had been dubbed the ‘‘Non-Compensation Law’’ by 

many due to its complicated procedures, underwent one draft 

amendment in 2008 and two in 2009.19 In 2009, Chinese courts 

tried a total of 1,531 cases in which citizens applied for state comVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00197 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
192 

pensation.20 Only one-third of the complainants, however, received 

compensation, according to the Southern Metropolis Daily.21 The 

recently revised SCL received some public criticism for not including earlier draft recommendations on prolonged detention, which 

would have allowed for state compensation in cases where criminal 

suspects were detained wrongly within the period stipulated by the 

Criminal Procedure Law (up to a total of 37 days).22

In June 2010, the NPCSC endorsed amendments to the Administrative Supervision Law (ASL), which entered into effect on October 1, 2010.23 The ASL fulfills an important function in China’s 

national legal system, stipulating measures that bolster administrative control, cover government oversight, and boost agency efficiency. The revised ASL aims to expand the scope of supervision 

from administrative agencies to those more broadly involved in 

public management activities. In addition, if properly implemented, 

the ASL will improve the monitoring of agencies by strengthening 

the responsibility to protect whistleblowers and by stipulating that 

individuals who reveal an informant’s personal information may be 

punished according to the law.24 The issue of retaliation against 

whistleblowers has become a serious problem for the law’s implementation—the Supreme People’s Procuratorate revealed in late 

June that ‘‘approximately 70 percent of informants suffered varying 

degrees of retaliation or covert retaliation.’’ 25

Mediation Reform: The People’s Mediation Law 

Over the 2010 reporting year, the Commission observed ongoing 

government efforts to advance and expand China’s system of dispute 

settlement through mediation.26 China’s official state media claim that 

local-level mediation of civil disputes has existed in China for ‘‘thousands of years.’’ 27 In recent years, however, the Chinese government 

has promoted an official ‘‘great mediation’’ (da tiaojie) campaign nationally in part to relieve pressure on courts amid what has been deemed a 

‘‘litigation explosion.’’ 28 According to a Ministry of Justice official, by the 

end of 2009, the country had 4.94 million mediators (renmin tiaojie 

yuan) and 824,000 mediation organizations (renmin tiaojie zuzhi).29 In 

June 2010, Xinhua reported that these organizations handled 7.67 million cases in 2009 and that less than one percent of mediated cases went 

on to litigation.30 In 2009, Sichuan Province mediated 527,000 disputes, 

which the government claimed contributed to a 23.5 percent drop in 

‘‘mass incidents’’ and a 47.3 percent decline in grievances filed through 

the petition (xinfang) system.31 In January, Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang affirmed the Sichuan model on mediation and called on officials to do more to eliminate and resolve disputes 

at the grassroots level.32

193 

Mediation Reform: The People’s Mediation Law—Continued 

During the reporting year, the Chinese government moved to streamline mediation procedures.33 Most notably, on August 28, 2010, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the first People’s 

Mediation Law (PML), which will take effect on January 1, 2011.34 In 

presenting the draft law for approval in June, Minister of Justice Wu 

Aiying told the Standing Committee that ‘‘Mediation should be the first 

line of defence to maintain social stability and promote harmony.’’ 35 The 

PML stipulates the legal basis for establishing mediation committees as 

the organizations charged with resolving disputes.36 The PML stipulates, for instance, procedures on the creation of mediation committees 

within village committees (cunmin weiyuanhui) and neighborhood committees (jumin weiyuanhui).37 The PML also requires local-level governments to provide financial support for mediation work.38 Some observers, 

however, have pointed out possible shortcomings in the new People’s 

Mediation Law. Article 14, for instance, stipulates that mediation committees must select mediators that are ‘‘impartially upright and enthusiastic in carrying out the people’s mediation work.’’ 39 It further states 

that the mediators must possess the ‘‘certain level of education, policy 

and legal knowledge of adult citizens.’’ 40 The PML, however, does not 

specify professional qualifications or procedures for how committees will 

determine impartiality.41 Critics of the PML have expressed concern 

with how the new law will ensure mediation outcomes are enforced.42 In 

July 2010, a Beijing Youth Daily article pointed out that ‘‘the courts are 

strongly pushing mediated settlements, but the rate of voluntary execution for mediated settlements is far less than that for litigated settlements.’’ 43

Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders 

During its 2010 reporting year, the Commission noted ongoing official efforts to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm human 

rights lawyers and defenders who took on issues officials deemed 

‘‘sensitive.’’ In what activists have said is a ‘‘widespread official 

clampdown’’ on human rights defenders, Chinese authorities 

targeted human rights lawyers with extralegal detention, administrative punishments, and harassment. In April 2010, Chinese officials announced even greater restrictive measures on the legal profession.44

The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who gained international attention for representing marginalized citizens and religious practitioners, remain 

unknown. On March 28, 2010, Gao reportedly resurfaced at Wutai 

Mountain, a sacred Buddhist landmark in Shanxi province, after 

‘‘disappearing’’ into the custody of public security officers in February 2009.45 In early April 2010, Gao gave several interviews to 

foreign reporters, claiming he had been ‘‘released’’ months earlier 

and planned to end his human rights campaigning in hopes of reuniting with his family.46 Weeks later, however, Gao ‘‘vanished’’ 

again, after visiting with family in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.47 The disappearance of Gao has raised concerns 

internationally about the Chinese government’s willingness to silence critics. In a May 2010 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Professor 

194 

Jerome Cohen of New York University Law School and Beth 

Schwanke, Legislative Counsel for Freedom Now, stated that ‘‘[i]f 

the government can act with impunity toward a lawyer as prominent as Gao Zhisheng . . . other dissidents will continue to be ‘disappeared,’ as have many protesters unknown to the outside 

world.’’ 48

As noted in the Commission’s 2009 Annual Report, law firms and 

legal advocacy organizations faced similar challenges in advocating 

on behalf of their clients and human rights topics. The Beijing 

Yitong Law Firm, a firm well known for taking on ‘‘matters deemed 

sensitive by the authorities,’’ remained inactive after Chinese authorities shut down the law firm for six months in March 2009.49

In March 2010, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that 

Beijing’s Anhui Law Firm, a human rights law firm that failed its 

annual examination and evaluation in May 2009, was forced to 

move from its Chongwen district offices after Bureau of Justice and 

Public Security Bureau officials pressured the firm’s landlord not 

to renew its lease.50 The Chinese government has also continued 

its crackdown on non-governmental organizations representing disadvantaged groups. In late March, Peking University severed ties 

with its Center for Women’s Law Studies and Legal Services, a 

high-profile women’s rights advocacy group that has been involved 

with sensitive legal work in recent years.51 [For more information, 

see Section III—Civil Society.] In May 2010, prominent Chinese 

AIDS rights advocate Wan Yanhai, founder of the Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, fled China for the United States after 

facing increasing pressure and harassment from government 

sources.52 [For more information, see Section III—Civil Society.] 

The following examples illustrate the mistreatment that Chinese 

human rights lawyers suffered during this reporting year under 

public security measures and government policies. 

• On November 20, 2009, Chinese security officials placed 

‘‘dozens’’ of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders, including prominent human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong, 

‘‘under house arrest or under surveillance’’ during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to China.53 [For more information 

about house arrests and ‘‘soft detention,’’ see Section II—Criminal Justice—Arbitrary Detention.] Chinese authorities held 

Jiang for more than 13 hours at a Beijing police station, without any documentation authorizing the detention, the day after 

Jiang requested to meet with President Obama.54 While public 

security officials detained Jiang in a police car, a public security officer reportedly used excessive force in constraining 

Jiang’s wife in front of his seven-year-old daughter. Public security officials reportedly later questioned the daughter at 

school while he was in custody. During President Obama’s 

visit, Chinese authorities also placed other human rights lawyers, including Li Xiongbing, Li Heping, and Mo Shaoping, 

under police surveillance, with three or four police officers stationed in front of their homes.55

• In December 2009, officials from the Fuzhou Municipal Justice Bureau, in Fujian province, suspended the legal license of 

Fuzhou-based criminal defense lawyer Lin Hongnan for one 

year, and in April 2010, justice officials reportedly notified Lin 

195 

that his law firm would be dissolved for ‘‘holding unlawful statutory conditions of establishment.’’ 56 The 70-year-old criminal 

defense lawyer represented one of three defendants accused of 

posting articles and video on the Internet calling on officials to 

investigate allegations of rape and murder in the death of a 

young woman in a highly publicized slander case.57 The three 

Internet users reportedly repeated claims by the woman’s 

mother that her daughter was gang-raped and murdered by 

people with ties to local police. [For more information on the 

‘‘Case of the Fujian Netizens,’’ see Section II—Freedom of Expression.] 

• In late 2009, the Shahekou District People’s Court, located 

in Dalian city, Liaoning province, sentenced human rights lawyer Wang Yonghang, in a closed court hearing without a lawyer, to seven years’ imprisonment for defending Falun Gong 

practitioners and publishing articles on Internet sites outside 

of China. According to the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Wang met with his lawyers for 

the first time in January 2010, six months after domestic security protection officers kidnapped him on July 4, 2009. During 

the meeting, the lawyers verified reports that he had been ‘‘violently beaten on three occasions, and that he suffered a severe 

ankle injury, which required surgery. . . .’’ 58

• On July 12, 2010, after reportedly receiving orders from 

their superiors,59 police barred Beijing lawyer Zhang Kai from 

entering a court in Linfen municipality, Shanxi province.60 A 

prominent lawyer who has defended Christians in several sensitive cases over the past year,61 Zhang was attempting to file 

an administrative lawsuit on behalf of five Linfen church leaders sentenced to imprisonment in November 2009 following a 

violent raid on the Linfen-Fushan Church in September 

2009.62 One officer reportedly referred to the issue as a matter 

of national security.63 [For more information on the LinfenFushan Church raid, see Section II—Freedom of Religion.] 

• In June 2010, officials from the Beijing Justice Bureau’s 

Lawyer’s Management Office warned prominent human rights 

lawyers Li Heping and Li Xiongbing not to participate in the 

formation of the ‘‘Rights Defense Lawyers’ Association,’’ and indicated that the Association would not be registered. 

In 2010, Chinese authorities continued to pressure human rights 

lawyers who took on sensitive cases by denying annual license renewals. In order to continue practicing law, lawyers in China must 

have their license to practice law renewed annually by passing the 

‘‘assessment and registration’’ process, which is conducted by government-controlled lawyers associations.64 Some rights lawyers 

have stated that this process has become a political tool to silence 

human rights lawyers and intimidate other attorneys from joining 

their ranks.65 In July, the China Human Rights Lawyer Concern 

Group reported it had received information that six human rights 

lawyers—Jiang Tianyong, Wen Haibo, Zhang Lihui, Tong 

Chaoping, Yang Huiwen, and Li Jinsong—failed to pass the ‘‘annual assessment and registration’’ by the extended July 15 deadline.66 Some human rights lawyers passed the assessment only 

after accepting supplementary conditions, such as guaranteeing 

196 

that they will avoid certain sensitive cases or decline interviews.67

After the deadline, prominent human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong 

described the pressures placed on lawyers and law firms: ‘‘They put 

a lot of requirements on law firms, even making lawyers make 

strict promises, and at the same time making them pay guarantee 

deposits. But as soon as they say they are going to do a certain 

case, this insurance money disappears.’’ 68

In April 2010, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau permanently 

revoked the lawyer’s licenses of Tang Jitian and Liu Wei, two Beijing human rights lawyers who represented a Falun Gong practitioner in an April 2009 trial in Sichuan province.69 The justice 

bureau officials accused Tang and Liu of ‘‘disrupting the order of 

the court and interfering with the regular litigation process.’’ According to the organization Human Rights in China, however, the 

two lawyers claimed that authorities illegally videotaped the trial, 

that the trial judge interrupted the proceedings repeatedly, and 

that unidentified men ordered the lawyers out of the courtroom.70

Although lawyers in China are usually permanently disbarred only 

if convicted of a crime, the New York Times quoted a law professor 

at the Chinese University of Hong Kong who stated the permanent 

revocation of Tang and Liu’s practicing licenses could be the first 

of its kind for a ‘‘disruption-of-court’’ charge.71

In early April 2010, Chinese authorities issued two new administrative regulations on the legal profession that Chinese media outlets claimed will ‘‘strengthen the supervision and management of 

lawyers and law firms.’’ 72 The Ministry of Justice publicly stated 

the measures aim to standardize practices nationally, provide consistency across regulations, and ensure conformity with the 2008 

Lawyers Law.73 The organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, however, criticized the regulations, writing: ‘‘it is clear that 

these regulations were designed to protect the interests of the government, rather than lawyers or the law.’’ 74 According to an April 

2010 Associated Press article, lawyers and human rights groups in 

China warned that the new legal measures ‘‘will allow authorities 

to punish lawyers . . . for actions such as talking to the media or 

even causing ‘traffic troubles.’ ’’ 75

Petitioning (Xinfang) 

The xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system exists to 

provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal 

government, court, and Party decisions and present their grievances.76 China’s Constitution and the 2005 National Regulations on 

Letters and Visits provide that Chinese citizens have the right to 

petition without retribution.77 Because of ‘‘institutional weaknesses 

of the Chinese judiciary and government limitations on citizen political participation,’’ citizen petitions are a ‘‘popular channel’’ for 

wronged Chinese citizens seeking accountability.78 Xinfang offices 

are found throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, including offices of 

the Communist Party, police, government, procuratorates, courts, 

and people’s congresses.79 Citizen petitions cover a range of issues, 

from ‘‘minor business disputes’’ to the most egregious alleged 

abuses and accusations of ‘‘murder, torture, and rape inflicted at 

the hands of government and police officials.’’ 80 Despite legal 

rights to petition and prohibitions against retribution, citizens may 

197 

face official reprisals, harassment, violence, or detention in reeducation through labor centers, psychiatric hospitals (ankang), and 

extralegal ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu).81

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, central authorities 

continued to urge officials to handle petitions locally to prevent 

grievances reaching higher administrative offices, as authorities 

have noted increasing xinfang trends and labeled some petitioning 

activities as threats to ‘‘social stability.’’ In March 2010, Zhou 

Yongkang, member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central 

Committee, wrote that ‘‘much of what is reflected behind petitions 

and mass incidents are contradictions among the people that are 

triggered by interest-related complaints . . . [w]ith regard to the 

large number of contradictions and problems which have not yet 

risen to the level of petitions, they should also be resolved as quickly 

as possible in order to keep them from building up and intensifying.’’ 82 Zhou urged improving the mediation system and resolving ‘‘social contradictions at the grassroots level.’’ 83 In November 

2009, a Supreme People’s Court official announced that the people’s 

county system received 8.25 percent more complaints during the 

first six months of 2009 than it received in 2008, and he estimated 

that the number of complaints for the whole year could surpass 12 

million cases.84 In March 2010, the Party’s Central Political-Legal 

Committee for the first time named groups of farmers petitioning 

higher level officials as one of the ‘‘internal three forces’’ that 

threatened ‘‘social stability.’’ 85

With growing concerns over xinfang trends, central and local authorities intensified restrictions on ‘‘abnormal petitioning.’’ 86 In 

November 2009, Shenzhen municipal authorities reportedly issued 

the Circular Regarding the Lawful Handling of Abnormal Petitioning Behavior.87 The Circular identified 14 types of ‘‘abnormal’’ 

petitioning behavior, such as ‘‘shouting slogans’’ and ‘‘wearing 

grievances,’’ that would be subject to administrative disciplinary 

action, including reeducation through labor (RTL).88 Various provinces and cities have passed circulars similar to Shenzhen’s.89 In 

April, Shenzhen authorities announced a new ‘‘policy’’ that would 

restrict those with a history of ‘‘abnormal’’ petitioning behavior 

from obtaining residence permits.90 Some authorities have already 

detained 91 or sent to RTL centers citizens for exhibiting ‘‘abnormal 

petitioning’’ behavior, including repeat petitioners from Guangxi 

province who traveled to Beijing to air their grievances with higher 

level authorities.92

Abuse of Petitioners 

Regulations and evaluation systems dictate that local-level leaders bear responsibility if a large number of petitioners take their 

grievances to higher levels; in some instances, petitions may contribute to poor performance evaluations.93 These responsibility 

systems give local authorities an interest in suppressing group petitions and preventing petitioners from taking their grievances to 

higher administrative levels.94

During the 2010 reporting year, some collective petitioning activities resulted in police abuses. On June 24, 2010, approximately 

200 relatives of children killed in the May 2008 Sichuan earthVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00203 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
198 

quake reportedly stormed the Mianzhu city government, but were 

prevented from entering the building by 300 special police.95 On 

June 21, nearly 80 Dongjiangyan county parents of children killed 

in the Sichuan earthquake petitioned the provincial government in 

Chengdu for compensation, but 40 were detained and 3 appeared 

to still be in detention as of June 25.96 On April 27, 314 teachers 

from Gong’an county, Hubei province, knelt before the county government building and public security bureau to protest being illegally fired. Police administratively detained three of the organizers 

and sought two more associated with the kneeling protest.97 After 

a previous protest in 2009 by teachers in Gong’an county, authorities sent at least one organizer to a reeducation through labor center for one year.98

In 2010, Chinese authorities detained, threatened or placed 

under surveillance petitioners across China to ensure that their 

complaints regarding access to justice would not interfere with the 

Shanghai 2010 World Expo.99 Chinese authorities targeted a number of housing activists, including petitioners from Shanghai that 

sought to exercise their rights to petition against the relocation of 

18,000 households in preparation for the Shanghai Expo site.100

International human rights organizations and media widely reported on official abuses and detentions related to the forced evictions and demolitions.101 In one such instance, Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders reported that Shanghai public security officials 

ordered Cao Yibao to serve one year of reeducation through labor 

in late May for ‘‘disrupting public order,’’ after being detained in 

April during an identification check on the Expo grounds. Cao, who 

is 60 years old and suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure, 

has petitioned for years since her home was demolished in preparation for the Shanghai Expo event.102

PETITIONERS IN ‘‘BLACK JAIL’’ DETENTIONS

Chinese authorities continued to use ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu), secret detention sites established by local officials, to detain and punish petitioners that travel to Beijing and other provincial capitals 

to voice complaints and seek redress for injustices. [For more information, see Section II—Criminal Justice—‘‘Black Jails’’: Secret 

Detention Sites.] During this reporting year, the Commission observed several examples of black jail detentions that violated international and domestic laws.103

• In June 2010, Xu Lingjun, a disabled People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) retiree from Shaanxi province, died in a black jail 

after suffering from starvation in detention. Xu and other petitioners were held after pursuing complaints against local officials. A former inmate from the black jail told Radio Free Asia 

that Xu ‘‘had been detained for 10 months, and his family had 

been placed under very tight surveillance.’’ According to the report, authorities at the black jail, established by the Communist Party’s Politics and Law Committee of Shaanxi’s 

Chenggu county, regularly beat detainees and failed to provide 

sufficient food.104

• On May 7, 2010, black jail authorities released Beijing-based 

human rights advocate Li Jinping after domestic security protection officers abducted him on April 28 in Beijing. The 

199 

guards refused to let Li leave the ‘‘closely guarded room’’ 

throughout the duration of his detention, and individuals beat 

and verbally abused Li. According to Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders, authorities detained Li for seeking to demonstrate 

for ‘‘an official re-evaluation of the legacy of Zhao Ziyang’’ and 

for ‘‘encouraging petitioners to join him to commemorate 

[Zhao,] the former [Communist Party General Secretary] 

known for his sympathy with demonstrators during the 1989 

Tiananmen protests.’’ 105

FORCIBLE DETENTION OF PETITIONERS IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS

During this reporting year, authorities continued to forcibly 

confine Chinese citizens—including petitioners—to psychiatric hospitals, because of outspoken petitioning activities. Chinese and foreign media outlets reported on petitioners committed to mental 

institutions for periods ranging from days (particularly around sensitive dates) to years.106 In late April, a China Youth Daily article 

exposed the case of Xu Lindong, a Henan petitioner held in psychiatric hospitals for more than six years despite his pleas of sanity. Authorities released Xu, a villager from Luohe city, Henan 

province, after he spent six and one-half years in forcible confinement for filing a petition, on behalf of a disabled friend, over a land 

dispute with local officials.107 During his detention, psychiatric officials shackled Xu 48 times, applied electric shocks on 54 occasions, 

and forced Xu to take psychiatric drugs. In late April 2010, China 

Youth Daily reporters, posing as relatives, revealed the wrongful 

detention, sparking widespread criticism of compulsory psychiatric 

commitments. In response to the case, more than 100 lawyers 

around the country reportedly signed a recommendation urging 

China’s procuratorates to end the practice of falsely labeling citizens as ‘‘mentally ill.’’ 108 In February 2010, Radio Free Asia 

reported that one Chinese non-governmental organization had collected the names of over 300 people who had been forcibly committed to psychiatric hospitals, including petitioners and Falun 

Gong practitioners.109

200 

IV. Xinjiang 

Introduction 

Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region (XUAR) worsened during the Commission’s 2010 reporting 

year. Following government suppression of a demonstration by 

Uyghurs and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, authorities instituted 

unprecedented levels of control over the free flow of information, 

denying XUAR residents and the outside world news about conditions in the region and increasing the government’s capacity to manipulate information. Amid this information blackout, authorities 

strengthened security measures and campaigns to promote ‘‘ethnic 

unity,’’ using them to quell free speech, curb independent religious 

activity, and impose intrusive controls over the lives of XUAR residents. Authorities singled out Uyghurs in particular in security 

campaigns, and the whereabouts of some Uyghurs detained in the 

aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots remain unknown. 

Trials connected to events in July 2009 have been marked by a 

lack of transparency and violations of due process. Authorities detained, and in some cases, imprisoned, Uyghur Web site workers 

and a journalist in connection to free speech about the events and 

about broader conditions in the XUAR. Amid these developments, 

central government and Communist Party authorities inaugurated 

a ‘‘central work forum’’ on the topic of the XUAR in May 2010 that 

set central government and Party objectives for the region’s economic and political development, intensifying a trend of top-down 

initiatives that prioritize state economic and political goals over the 

promotion of regional autonomy and broader protections of XUAR 

residents’ rights. 

Against this backdrop, the government enforced other policies 

and measures that also fueled worsening human rights conditions 

in the region, including measures aimed at quelling dissent, promoting assimilation, and repressing independent expressions of 

ethnic and religious identity, especially among the Uyghurs. The 

XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese 

and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language in XUAR schools, 

in violation of Chinese law. As in past years, some population planning policies in the region singled out non-Han ethnic groups. The 

government continued work to transfer Uyghur and other non-Han 

workers to jobs in the interior of China, through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by coercion and abusive practices. 

Uyghurs and other groups within the XUAR remained subject to 

hiring practices that have allowed widespread discrimination 

against non-Han groups. Ongoing work to ‘‘reconstruct’’ the historic 

Old City section of Kashgar continued to undermine Uyghurs’ right 

to preserve their cultural heritage. Repression of Islam in the 

XUAR worsened. [For more information on conditions for religious 

freedom in the XUAR, see Section II—Freedom of Religion—Islam.] 

Uyghurs seeking asylum outside of China continued to face barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and risk of refoulement to 

China under the sway of China’s influence in neighboring countries 

and its disregard for international law, as illustrated by the Cambodian government’s deportation of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers to 

201 

China in December 2009, following Chinese government intervention. 

Repressive government controls throughout the region, especially 

those targeting Uyghurs, illustrated the status of the XUAR as a 

government-designated ethnic autonomous region that lacks true 

autonomy, particularly for the group in whose name it was established. Despite guarantees in Chinese law for measures of autonomy in governance and protections for ethnic minority rights,1 central 

and local government authorities exert control at a level antithetical to local residents’ meaningful control over their own affairs and 

to the protection of their rights. Chinese government actions violate 

not only Chinese law but also international human rights law that 

the Chinese government is bound to uphold.2

Security Measures and Ideological Campaigns 

Top leaders from the central and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region (XUAR) governments and Communist Party pledged 

throughout the year to make ‘‘upholding stability’’ a top priority for 

the region.3 Zhang Chunxian, who replaced Wang Lequan as Party 

Secretary of the XUAR in April 2010,4 reiterated official calls to 

promote the ideology of ‘‘stability above all else’’ and to ‘‘strike hard 

with maximum pressure’’ against the ‘‘three forces’’ of terrorism, 

separatism, and religious extremism.5 Authorities continued to politicize security concerns, targeting peaceful human rights activity, 

political dissent, and free expression as threats to the region’s security.6 The XUAR government took several steps in the past year to 

enhance the region’s security capacity. The XUAR government increased spending for public security by 87.9 percent over the previous year in its 2010 budget, raising the total to 2.89 billion yuan 

(US$423 million).7 In December 2009, the XUAR government made 

revisions to its Regulation for the Comprehensive Management of 

Social Order, effective February 1, 2010, that redefine the region’s 

priorities in maintaining social order, placing new prominence on 

‘‘striking hard’’ against crimes of endangering state security (ESS).8

Authorities in China have used ESS charges to punish political dissent,9 and the new emphasis on such crimes in the XUAR regulation is unseen in most other social order regulations in China.10

The XUAR government also increased the number of ‘‘special 

police’’ in the region, with plans to recruit a total of 5,000 new officers.11 In the XUAR capital of Urumqi, where the July 2009 demonstrations and riots took place, authorities reported they would 

increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city to 

60,000 by the end of 2010.12 Urumqi authorities also described 

plans to hire 10,000 new officers to expand the ranks of ‘‘patrol 

teams’’ to monitor the city.13 Urumqi authorities launched a onemonth stability operation in late June in the lead-up to the oneyear anniversary of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.14

In the aftermath of events in July 2009, the XUAR government 

also increased measures to promote ‘‘ethnic unity’’ in the region, 

using them as a vehicle for promoting longstanding government 

and Party policy and as a tool for restricting free speech. Authorities dispatched ‘‘stability work teams’’ to over 160 neighborhoods in 

Urumqi following events in July, to ‘‘stress the truth about the incident, stress ethnic unity, and stress policy and law.’’ 15 In DecemVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00207 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
202 

ber, the XUAR People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a 

regulation on promoting education on ethnic unity—apparently the 

first of its kind in China 16—that aims to publicize Party policy toward ethnic minorities and that imposes tight controls on freedom 

of expression, with implications in areas such as academic freedom, 

educational curricula, and commercial decisions.17 The regulation 

includes administrative penalties and states the possibility of punishment under China’s Criminal Law for spreading information 

deemed ‘‘not beneficial’’ to ethnic unity.18 In January and February 

2010, XUAR authorities used administrative and criminal measures to punish people for spreading ‘‘harmful’’ information by telephone and text message, including information that ‘‘influenced’’ or 

‘‘destroyed’’ ethnic unity.19 [For additional information, see Controls Over Free Expression in this section.] Authorities also bolstered ethnic unity education in XUAR schools and universities.20

Criminal Law and Access to Justice 

The criminal justice system in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region (XUAR) remained marked by rights abuses, overt 

politicization, and a lack of transparency. In the aftermath of the 

July 2009 demonstrations and riots, government reports provided 

inconsistent statistics on the number of people detained in connection to the events,21 while overseas media cited sources in the 

XUAR that described widespread security sweeps and mass detentions—including mass roundups of Uyghur men—indicating detention numbers that would exceed those reported at different times 

by the Chinese government and media.22 Some of the people reported to have been detained appeared to have no involvement in 

either acts of protest or violent activity in July.23 An October 2009 

report from Human Rights Watch documented 43 cases of enforced 

disappearances after July 2009, while the report estimated that the 

true number of people in such situations was ‘‘likely significantly 

higher than the number of cases documented’’ in the report.24 In 

addition, Chinese authorities have not reported investigating accounts of state abuses committed during the events in July. In July 

2010, the Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report, based 

on interviews with people present in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, that 

described the use of deadly police force against Uyghur protestors 

and Uyghur crowds that day.25

Trials held in connection to alleged crimes committed during the 

July 2009 demonstrations and riots were marred by violations of 

Chinese law and international standards for due process, including 

politicized judge selections and curbs on independent legal defense. 

Rozi Ismail, head of the XUAR High People’s Court, reported in 

July 2009 that the court had selected judges for the trials who 

were ‘‘politically reliable,’’ 26 and he reported in January 2010 that 

the XUAR High People’s Court had issued ‘‘guiding opinions’’ to the 

trial court and strengthened ‘‘supervision and guidance’’ toward the 

court to ‘‘guarantee’’ the trials ‘‘took place in an orderly way in accordance with law.’’ 27 Although defendants reportedly had legal defense at the trials, in advance of the court hearings, authorities in 

Beijing and the XUAR issued orders dictating the terms upon 

which lawyers could be involved in cases.28 Authorities also reportedly warned lawyers active in human rights defense work against 

203 

taking the cases.29 In at least one set of trials, authorities reportedly violated Article 151(5) of China’s Criminal Procedure Law 

(stipulating that courts shall announce trials involving public prosecutions three days in advance) by failing to provide adequate public notice of the hearings.30 Authorities also warned the media 

against independent reporting on the events.31 Trials were also 

marked by a lack of transparency and apparent failure to publicize 

many of the judgments, in violation of Article 163 of the Criminal 

Procedure Law (stipulating that ‘‘[i]n all cases, judgments shall be 

pronounced publicly’’).32 XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri 

said in March that 198 people involved in 97 cases had been sentenced in the XUAR for crimes committed in July 2009, a figure 

that appeared to far exceed the number of cases reported as of 

March 2010 by Chinese media.33 [See table below titled Xinjiang 

Trials for Crimes Committed During the July 2009 Demonstrations 

and Riots for detailed information.] 

XINJIANG TRIALS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE JULY 2009 DEMONSTRATIONS

AND RIOTS: AVAILABLE INFORMATION AS OF NUR BEKRI’S MARCH 2010 ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE SENTENCING OF 198 PEOPLE 34

Trial Date 

Number of 

People/ 

Cases 

Date of 

Alleged 

Crime 

Charges 

Sentencing 

Details 

(Number 

of people) 

Ethnic 

Group 

(Conjectured 

based on 

name of 

defendant) 

Appeals 

October 12, 

2009 

7 people/ 

3 cases 

July 5 Intentional 

homicide; 

arson; 

robbery 

6: death 

(executed) 

1: life in 

prison 

7 Uyghur October 30, 

2009: All 

judgments 

upheld. 

October 14, 

2009 

(sentence 

October 

15) 

14 people/ 

3 cases 

July 5 

and 

July 7 

Intentional 

homicide; 

arson; 

robbery; 

intentional injury; intentional 

destruction of 

property 

3: death 

(executed) 

3: death + 

2-yr reprieve 

3: life in 

prison 

5: 5–18 

yrs 

12 Uyghur 

2 Han 

October 30, 

2009: All 

judgments 

upheld. 

December 

3, 2009 

13 people/ 

5 cases 

July 5 Intentional 

homicide; 

robbery; 

arson; intentional 

injury 

5: death 

2: life in 

prison 

6: 10–20 

yrs 

11 Uyghur, 

of names 

provided 

December 

19, 2009: 

Some 

cases appealed. 

Judgments 

upheld. 

204 

XINJIANG TRIALS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED DURING THE JULY 2009 DEMONSTRATIONS

AND RIOTS: AVAILABLE INFORMATION AS OF NUR BEKRI’S MARCH 2010 ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE SENTENCING OF 198 PEOPLE 34—CONTINUED

Trial Date 

Number of 

People/ 

Cases 

Date of 

Alleged 

Crime 

Charges 

Sentencing 

Details 

(Number 

of people) 

Ethnic 

Group 

(Conjectured 

based on 

name of 

defendant) 

Appeals 

December 

4, 2009 

7 people/5 

cases 

July 5–7 Intentional 

homicide; 

intentional injury; 

arson; 

carrying 

out explosions 

3: death 

1: life in 

prison 

3: 10–18 

yrs 

5 Uyghur 

2 Han 

December 

19, 2009: 

Some 

cases appealed. 

Judgments 

upheld. 

December 

22 and 

23, 2009 

22 people/ 

5 cases 

July 5 Intentional 

homicide; 

robbery 

5: death 

5: death + 

2-yr reprieve 

8: life in 

prison 

4: 12–15 

yrs 

22 Uyghur N/A 

January 

25, 2010 

13 people/ 

5 cases 

N/A N/A 4: death 

1: death + 

2-yr reprieve 

8: prison 

terms 

including life 

in prison 

6 Uyghur, of 

names 

provided 

N/A 

Total 76 people/ 

26 cases 

Where reported: 

Intentional 

homicide; 

arson; 

robbery; 

intentional injury; intentional 

destruction of 

property; 

carrying 

out explosions 

26: death 

9: death + 

2-yr reprieve 

15: life in 

prison 

18: 5–20 

yrs 

8: prison 

terms, 

including life 

in prison 

63 Uyghur 

4 Han, of 

names 

provided 

The number of trials for crimes of endangering state security 

(ESS)—a category of criminal offenses that authorities in China 

have used to punish citizen activism and dissent—surged in the 

XUAR in 2009. Courts in the XUAR completed trials in 437 ESS 

cases in 2009, an increase of 169 cases over the previous year.35

The 2008 figure from the XUAR, 268 cases, appeared in turn to 

represent a sharp increase over previous years.36 As of December 

2009, no trials directly related to events in July 2009 were reported 

205 

to involve ESS crimes,37 suggesting the increase in 2009 may have 

come partly or fully from other sources, though detailed information on the ESS crimes committed in 2009 is not available.38 XUAR 

authorities had previously heightened politicized security campaigns in the region in advance of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and into 2009.39

Controls Over Free Expression 

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government 

and Communist Party imposed widespread controls over the free 

flow of information in 2009 and 2010. Following demonstrations 

and riots in Urumqi starting July 5, 2009, the Urumqi Party Secretary announced on July 7 that authorities had cut Internet access in the city to ‘‘quench the riot quickly and prevent violence 

from spreading to other places.’’ 40 Authorities also instituted Internet restrictions across the XUAR and imposed curbs on text messaging and international phone calls.41 The actual role the communication devices played in the violence (as opposed to demonstrations), however, was unclear,42 and the wide-reaching restrictions— 

affecting all Internet, SMS, and international phone content and 

lasting for months after the July 2009 events—exceeded permissible boundaries for limiting the right to free expression as defined 

in international human rights standards.43 [See Section II—Freedom of Expression for details.] Authorities allowed XUAR residents 

more access to the technologies starting in late December and January 44 but did not restore more complete Internet access until May 

14.45 At the same time, after that date, a number of popular 

Uyghur-language Web sites remained shut down, with some of 

their staff held in detention [see box titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang below], and longstanding curbs throughout China 

over some human rights Web sites remained in place.46 Throughout the past year, and especially in advance of the one-year anniversary of events in July 2009, authorities also maintained restrictions on Internet discussions and reporting about the events and 

reportedly ordered people not to speak to foreign journalists without authorization.47

Authorities in the XUAR bolstered legal measures to repress free 

speech following events in July 2009. The XUAR People’s Congress 

Standing Committee passed a new regulation on information promotion in September 25, 2009, effective December 1, 2009, that 

bans use of the Internet to ‘‘endanger state security,’’ ‘‘incite ethnic 

separatism,’’ ‘‘destroy ethnic unity,’’ or publish ‘‘harmful’’ information, among other acts.48 Though similar in certain respects to 

some Internet regulations elsewhere in China,49 one official described the new prohibitions as addressing the role the Internet 

played in allowing the ‘‘three forces’’ (terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism) to ‘‘spread rumors, incite ethnic separatism, and 

provoke disturbances’’ before events in Urumqi on July 5.50 The 

regulation stipulates the possibility of criminal penalties for acts 

such as ‘‘destroying ethnic unity’’ and ‘‘inciting ethnic separatism’’ 

(splittism).51 An announcement issued by three Kashgar district 

government offices in March 2010 reiterated the possibility of 

criminal punishment and other penalties for using the Internet and 

other communications technology to commit the crime of ‘‘inciting 

206 

separatism.’’ The announcement defined the crime to include using 

technology to carry out, with the aim of splitting the country, acts 

including: spreading materials on separatism, ‘‘inciting’’ people to 

participate in demonstrations, distributing literary works ‘‘with 

separatist content,’’ and ‘‘slandering and assaulting the Party and 

government.’’ 52 Additional regulations implemented or revised in 

the past year in the XUAR further expanded curbs over free expression. In addition to the new regulation on ethnic unity, discussed above,53 which curbs speech deemed ‘‘not beneficial’’ to ethnic 

unity, a regulation on social order, revised on December 29, 2009, 

and effective February 1, 2010, calls for government offices to punish those who create, publish, sell, or distribute materials perceived 

to touch on issues including threats to state security, ‘‘illegal religion,’’ and superstition.54

The XUAR government and Party also continued to enforce widescale censorship campaigns. A XUAR media report said the XUAR 

government and Party have made ‘‘striking hard’’ against ‘‘reactionary’’ materials and other ‘‘illegal’’ political and religious publications distributed by the ‘‘three forces’’ as the focus of the region’s 

censorship campaign since 2009.55 The article also described 

strengthening controls over ‘‘illegal’’ materials especially after 

events in July 2009.56 Authorities initiated a special multi-province 

operation in 2009, headed by a XUAR government and Party 

group, aimed at stopping ‘‘three forces’’ materials.57 Zhou Huilin, 

Deputy Director of the National ‘‘Sweep Away Pornography and 

Strike Down Illegal Publications’’ Office, said that the operation 

held significance in staving off the threats of ‘‘Westernization’’ and 

‘‘division’’ from ‘‘Western countries led by the United States.’’ 58

Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang 

Information emerged throughout this reporting year on people in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) detained for exercising 

their right to freedom of expression. Limited information from XUAR 

government and media sources indicates authorities have detained people of various ethnic groups for speech deemed to ‘‘threaten stability,’’ 

while several indepth reports detail detentions targeting Uyghurs in 

particular for speaking out about the demonstrations and riots in July 

2009 or otherwise deemed to have a connection to the events. 

• Haji Memet and Abdusalam Nasir, two Uyghur men from 

Huocheng (Qorghas) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, 

were detained on September 23, 2009, for their role in sharing information with U.S.-based Radio Free Asia on the death in custody of 

Sho ̈hret Tursun, a man from Huocheng who reportedly had been detained in Urumqi on July 6 and died in police custody under suspicious circumstances.59 Authorities reportedly suspected Haji 

Memet and Abdusalam Nasir of leaking state secrets.60 Authorities 

also reportedly detained several other people in connection to 

Sho ̈hret Tursun’s case, and as of June 2010, reportedly continued to 

hold at least one of them in detention, along with Abdusalam 

Nasir.61

207 

Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang—Continued 

• Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web editor in Urumqi, 

was sentenced by the the Urumqi Intermediate People’s Court on 

July 23, 2010, to 15 years’ imprisonment for ‘‘leaking state secrets.’’ 

Prosecutors in court cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz addressing economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs; sources also connected 

the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign 

media after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that were critical of aspects of government policy in the XUAR.62

• Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli, Web site administrators, 

received prison sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years, respectively, in July 

2010 for ‘‘endangering state security.’’ 63 Sources connected the cases 

to their Web sites not deleting postings about hardships in the 

XUAR and, in one instance, permitting the posting of announcements for the July 2009 demonstration.64 All three are believed to 

have been taken into detention in the aftermath of the July 2009 

events,65 and other people involved with Uyghur Web sites also 

were detained during the same period.66 In July 2009, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri accused some Uyghur Web sites of 

contributing to incitement of the events on July 5.67

• Gulmira (Gulmire) Imin, a Uyghur Web site administrator and 

government employee, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate 

People’s Court on April 1, 2010, to life in prison for ‘‘splittism, leaking state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration.’’ Authorities alleged she was involved in organizing the July 5, 2009, demonstration.68

• Following the partial restoration of text messaging in the XUAR 

in January 2010, the XUAR Public Security Department penalized 

over 100 people in January and February for using text messages 

and telephone calls to ‘‘spread harmful information,’’ including information deemed to ‘‘harm ethnic unity’’ or pertain to ‘‘splitting the 

country.’’ While authorities levied administrative penalties on most 

people, they took at least five people into criminal detention.69 Authorities reported in May on penalizing others for similar acts.70

The penalties and detentions—about which authorities provided 

limited details—come amid a track record of authorities in China 

using overbroad and vague legal provisions to punish peaceful expression. [See Section II—Freedom of Expression for more information.] 

Xinjiang Work Forum 

Central government and Communist Party authorities inaugurated a ‘‘central work forum’’ on the topic of the Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region (XUAR) in May 2010 that set central government and Party objectives for the region’s economic and political 

development, intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that 

prioritize state economic and political goals over the promotion of 

regional autonomy and broader protections of XUAR residents’ 

rights.71 Speaking at the forum, President and Party General 

Secretary Hu Jintao described upholding long-term stability and 

promoting ‘‘fast-track development’’ as the dual priorities for the 

208 

region.72 The forum did not address citizen grievances over longstanding political and religious controls in the XUAR and affirmed 

existing government policy toward ethnic and religious issues.73

Initiatives and goals addressed at the forum—some of which represent a continuation or intensification of older policies—included 

increased infrastructure construction; greater market access in 

some sectors; wider job creation and pension coverage; tax reforms 

aimed at keeping resource revenue in the region (a reform scheduled to be implemented throughout China 74); and renewed programs to promote ‘‘ethnic unity,’’ ‘‘social stability,’’ and security of 

border areas.75 Authorities said development efforts will focus on 

the southern XUAR, an area with a predominantly Uyghur population that has lagged economically behind areas of the XUAR with 

larger Han populations.76 Authorities also will channel development assistance to the Xinjiang Production and Construction 

Corps, areas within the XUAR with a separate administrative 

structure and with predominantly Han residents that have adopted 

agricultural, manufacturing, and security functions.77

Taken as a whole, while some initiatives from the forum may 

bring some economic benefits to the region, the program appears 

to poise the XUAR to undergo greater demographic and cultural 

shifts in coming decades that further undercut the ability of 

Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to protect their culture, language, and livelihoods. Following the forum, XUAR Party Secretary 

Zhang Chunxian detailed development initiatives including plans 

to resettle 100,000 herders, resettle 700,000 urban residents, and 

intensify Mandarin-focused ‘‘bilingual’’ education, a program that 

has marginalized the use of Uyghur and other non-Han languages 

in XUAR schools.78 He also said that work would focus on 

strengthening the promotion of state ideologies, ‘‘ethnic unity’’ campaigns, and ‘‘Party construction,’’ a program to strengthen Party 

discipline, governance, and legitimacy.79

Language Policy and Bilingual Education 

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government 

intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese in XUAR schools 

and to largely phase out instruction in other languages, a development that in the future could permanently marginalize the role of 

the Uyghur language within broad segments of society in the 

XUAR. Authorities announced in May 2010 that by 2015, they 

would aim to universalize ‘‘bilingual education’’—a policy that, 

within the XUAR, has come to promote class instruction almost exclusively in Mandarin 80—with the goal of making all ethnic minority children proficient in Mandarin by 2020.81 The efforts to make 

Mandarin the dominant language of instruction in XUAR schools 

contravene protections for ethnic minority languages in Chinese 

law 82 and underscore state failures to safeguard and promote local 

languages as one component of regional ethnic autonomy. Prior to 

the May announcement, XUAR authorities had already increased 

promotion of ‘‘bilingual education.’’ In 2009, 31.79 percent of the 

total ethnic minority student population in the XUAR—753,300 

ethnic minority preschool, primary, and secondary school students—received ‘‘bilingual education,’’ an increase of over 25 percent from 2008, according to official statistics.83 Another 240,900 

209 

ethnic minority students (minkaohan students) received education 

solely in Mandarin through longstanding programs that track ethnic minority students directly into Mandarin Chinese schooling.84

The central and XUAR governments also continued to promote ‘‘bilingual education’’ at the preschool level. XUAR authorities reported in 2010 that the central and XUAR governments would 

build over 2,200 new ‘‘bilingual’’ kindergartens by 2012 and 

universalize two years of ‘‘bilingual’’ preschool education by that 

time.85

Authorities also continued to bolster plans to train more teachers 

for bilingual programs,86 a policy which has had a detrimental effect on older teachers who do not know Mandarin or teachers who 

do not meet certain political requirements, such as holding appropriate viewpoints toward religion, ethnicity, and the Marxist 

state.87 New developments in the past year also affected the career 

prospects of current students. In the past year, authorities announced plans to recruit 6,000 students each year from 2010 to 

2013 for free teacher training, with a focus on students who have 

received ‘‘bilingual education’’ or education in Mandarin. The program will include students training to teach in bilingual programs.88 In addition, in announcing college recruitment priorities 

for the coming year, XUAR authorities said they would ‘‘readjust’’ 

preferential recruitment policies for ethnic minority students educated in ethnic minority languages and increase the number of students educated in Mandarin, in order to ‘‘adapt to the needs of 

speeding up the promotion of ‘bilingual’ education.’’ 89

In a measure that, depending on effectiveness of implementation, 

could promote the use of Uyghur in some capacity among government officials, a XUAR Communist Party office and a government 

department issued a circular in April to require all candidates for 

state jobs and some current state employees to pass a language 

proficiency test in a second language spoken in the XUAR.90 The 

degree of proficiency required and overall scope of implementation 

remains unclear, although authorities reported in 2010 on carrying 

out a separate language-training program to promote second-language skills for grassroots cadres.91

Population Planning Policies 

In the past reporting year, government authorities continued to 

enforce some population planning measures that target non-Han 

ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 

at the same time it enforced broader population planning measures 

across the region. In October 2009, the National Population and 

Family Planning Commission signed an agreement with the XUAR 

government to launch a series of initiatives in the region to 

strengthen the region’s population control work, including through 

‘‘special rewards’’ (teshu jiangli) for families in 26 poor and border 

counties who have fewer children than permitted.92 Official media 

reported that the new reward policy mainly targets rural ethnic 

minority households that already have two children and have ‘‘been 

certified’’ as voluntarily forgoing a third birth.93 Under Article 15 

of the XUAR’s Regulation on Population and Family Planning, 

rural ethnic minority families are permitted to have a maximum of 

three children.94 In March 2009, a XUAR Party official called on 

210 

ethnic and religious affairs departments to train religious leaders 

to ‘‘bring their relatively greater prestige and influence among the 

religious masses into play [and] actively propagandize the importance of family planning[.]’’ 95 The steps build on earlier measures 

to target population planning in predominantly non-Han areas 

within the XUAR.96

Citizens who expose abuses in official implementation of population planning policies have faced repercussions,97 and information became available in the past reporting year on a Uyghur man 

from the XUAR detained for speaking to media about a case involving official abuses against his daughter. According to October 2009 

reports from Radio Free Asia, authorities in Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, detained 67-year-old 

Tursunjan Hesen on July 2, 2009, and reportedly accused him of 

revealing state secrets and endangering state security. Tursunjan 

Hesen earlier had given interviews to overseas media about a case 

involving his daughter, Arzigul Tursun, whom authorities had 

planned to subject to a forced abortion.98 Prior to his detention, 

Tursunjan Hesen reported that police had interrogated him repeatedly about Arzigul’s case, asking him who had alerted international 

media about the situation.99

Freedom of Residence 

In the aftermath of demonstrations and riots in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in July 2009, authorities increased oversight of migrants. Some of the steps appeared to target 

Uyghur migrants to Urumqi from other parts of the XUAR. Authorities alleged that Uyghur migrants who were involved in 

events in July had stayed in unregulated rental housing.100 According to official media, in August, Urumqi authorities launched a 

‘‘clean-up and reorganize’’ campaign targeting ‘‘disorderly’’ migration and ‘‘chaotic’’ rental managements, after events in July ‘‘exposed bottlenecks’’ in the management of rentals and migrant 

populations.101 As areas of Urumqi implemented directives to regulate rentals, one district in Urumqi reported ‘‘screening out and 

striking hard’’ against ‘‘itinerant society’’ and ‘‘illegal activities such 

as concealing the ‘three forces’ [terrorism, separatism, and religious 

extremism] in rental housing.’’ 102 In April 2010, Urumqi authorities adopted a formal regulation, effective July, that institutes registration and other requirements on rentals,103 a step one official 

connected to the presence of migrants in the city and the use of 

rental housing by the ‘‘three forces.’’ 104 The region’s Regulation for 

the Comprehensive Management of Social Order, revised in December 2009, added new provisions to strengthen controls over migrants and over rental housing.105 In July, authorities demolished 

what they described as a shantytown in the Heijiashan area of 

Urumqi,106 where authorities had already increased oversight of 

migrants earlier in the year.107 An official in charge of the demolition—part of broader stated efforts to eliminate ‘‘shantytowns’’— 

said that migrants in the area ‘‘often disrupted social order’’ and 

because of ‘‘poor management’’ were ‘‘easily incited by rioters’’ during events in July 2009.108

211 

Labor 

DISCRIMINATION

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 

reported taking some steps in the past year to promote employment 

among non-Han ethnic groups, but did not indicate that the government had taken broader measures to eliminate longstanding 

systemic discrimination in job hiring. The XUAR government and 

Party Committee implemented an opinion on employment promotion in October 2009 that calls for enterprises registered in the 

XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit no fewer than 50 

percent of workers from among local XUAR residents.109 The opinion also calls for ‘‘recruiting more ethnic minorities to the extent 

possible.’’ 110 In addition, employers are to pledge a fixed proportion 

of positions for ethnic minorities as part of work to increase recruitment of college graduates and prioritize graduates from the 

XUAR.111 (Within the XUAR, groups designated as ethnic minorities comprise about 60 percent of the population and Han Chinese 

40 percent, according to official Chinese statistics.112) The opinion 

does not appear to clarify if the stipulations apply to government 

agencies.113 Information on adherence to the opinion and steps to 

promote the hiring of non-Han groups remains limited.114 Job hiring practices that discriminated against ethnic minorities continued. 

The Commission has tracked government and other employment 

announcements in recent years, including in the past reporting 

year, that reserved positions for Han, in violation of Chinese 

law.115 The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps reserved 

78 percent of 1,131 open positions for Han during job recruitment 

in the past year.116

LABOR TRANSFERS

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 

continued to send young non-Han men and women to work in factory jobs in the interior of China through programs that, in some 

cases, reportedly have involved coercion and have placed participants in exploitative working conditions.117 XUAR government 

chairperson Nur Bekri has denied that workers are coerced into 

participating in the government-led labor transfer programs— 

versions of which exist elsewhere in China 118—and has described 

the programs as a means for XUAR residents to earn income and 

gain job training.119 Uyghurs demonstrating in Urumqi on July 5, 

2009, were protesting government handling of a reported assault 

on Uyghur laborers sent to a Guangdong factory through the government-sponsored program.120 In the aftermath of the events, 

authorities affirmed that the labor transfer programs would continue.121 The XUAR Labor and Social Security Department reportedly planned to transfer 300,000 rural workers in 2010,122 an 

increase of approximately 60,000 people over the number of workers who went to jobs in the interior of China in 2008.123

Authorities continued to tie the labor transfers to broader efforts 

to promote state political ideology. According to a XUAR Human 

Resources and Social Security Department official,124 labor transfers not only have allowed participants to earn money but, ‘‘more 

significantly,’’ have enabled ethnic minorities in border areas to 

212 

‘‘transform their ideas, liberate themselves from old thinking, and 

experience the huge achievements gained from the state’s reform 

and opening.’’ 125 An article on labor transfers in Qaba (Habahe) 

county in Altay, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported that 

under county government leadership, numerous rural women 

changed ‘‘traditional concepts’’ and ‘‘vigorously threw themselves 

into various kinds of economic construction.’’ 126 Another article reported that authorities in Jiashi (Peyziwat) county, Kashgar district, strengthened services to protect the rights of transferred 

workers, but also carried out work in ‘‘ideology education’’ and ‘‘persuasion for morale.’’ 127

Protection of Cultural Heritage 

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 

reported on continued steps to demolish and ‘‘reconstruct’’ the Old 

City section of Kashgar and relocate residents, a project which has 

drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for undermining cultural 

heritage protection.128 Authorities in Kashgar implemented a 

‘‘zero-tolerance system’’ (lingkongzhi) in the past year to curb citizen petitioning to higher authorities over grievances connected to 

the demolition and resettlement project.129 They incorporated incentives for officials to curb petitioning to higher level authorities 

in official performance evaluations.130 Authorities reported spreading information on the ‘‘necessity, urgency, and significance’’ of the 

demolition project and visiting local households to ‘‘coordinate and 

solve’’ existing problems.131 A Xinhua article reported that a threemonth project was launched in October to survey cultural heritage 

in the Old City, but the article did not explain why the preservation effort began almost a year after beginning demolition work in 

the Old City.132 In the runup to the launch of the demolition 

project in 2009, authorities said that ‘‘few’’ buildings in the Old 

City had real preservation value and that most structures would be 

demolished.133 The statements on the number of buildings with 

preservation value were at odds, however, with outside assessments and earlier official evaluations of the area’s cultural heritage, while subsequent reports indicated that historic buildings had 

been razed.134 Although Chinese authorities stated in the past year 

that an official from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) supported the project,135 the 

UNESCO official said the organization’s statements were taken out 

of context and described the Kashgar project as ‘‘a whole cultural 

heritage that’s being destroyed.’’ 136

Uyghur Refugees and Migrants 

Uyghurs seeking asylum outside of China continued to face barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and risk of refoulement under 

the sway of China’s influence in neighboring countries and its disregard for international protections for asylum seekers. While a 

number of previously reported cases of refoulement and extradition 

involved refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in central and 

south Asian countries near the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),137 a case from the past year illustrated the barriers 

213 

to asylum procedures that a group of Uyghurs faced in a southeast 

Asian country. On December 19, 2009, Cambodian authorities deported a group of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers to China, including 2 

infants,138 in violation of international law.139 Most of the group, 

along with two others, had arrived in the country in November, 

and sought asylum from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) office in Phnom Penh.140 A Chinese Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (MFA) spokesperson alleged the asylum seekers were ‘‘involved in crimes,’’ and the Chinese government sent the Cambodian government a diplomatic note on the case.141 Cambodian 

authorities then deported the 20 people before the UNHCR made 

a determination of their refugee status.142 Two days after the deportation, China’s Vice President Xi Jinping signed an agreement 

to provide a reported US$1.2 billion in aid to Cambodia.143 The 

Chinese MFA spokesperson denied a connection between the two 

events and said that authorities would deal with the Uyghur 

group’s ‘‘illegal criminal activities in accordance with the law.’’ 144

Chinese authorities reported in June that 3 of the 20 people returned to China were terrorist suspects,145 a charge that, even if 

made at the time of extradition, would not have precluded an assessment of the asylum cases by UN officers.146 Earlier in the reporting year, authorities in China also reportedly detained 

Uyghurs in Chinese cities outside the XUAR who had tried to leave 

China or who had helped others attempting to leave.147

214 

V. Tibet 

Introduction 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party continued to press the ‘‘core interest’’ 

policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and diminish or end his international influence. The Fifth Tibet Work 

Forum (Fifth Forum) applied the highest imprimatur of political 

power to achieving sweeping economic, social, and cultural policy 

objectives throughout the Tibetan autonomous areas of China by 

2020—the same year that the government intends to have completed the ‘‘redesign’’ of Lhasa city and the construction of a network of railways crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau.1 The forum 

expanded the Party’s Tibet policy purview beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to include the Tibetan autonomous prefectures 

and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan 

provinces. The forum set out economic development objectives that 

principally focus on accelerating and strengthening a development 

model that subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture 

to Party and government priorities. 

During this reporting year, the dialogue between the Dalai 

Lama’s representatives and Chinese government and Party officials 

resumed as the government increased pressure on Tibetan Buddhism, a principal element of Tibetan culture. The China-Dalai 

Lama dialogue resumed days after the Fifth Forum when the Dalai 

Lama’s envoys arrived in China for the ninth round of formal dialogue since 2002 with Party officials. Neither side reported substantive progress and both sides reiterated key positions, but senior 

figures on both sides referred to certain developments in a positive 

manner. The Chinese government and Party strengthened the push 

to use policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese 

officials refer to as the ‘‘normal order’’ for Tibetan Buddhism. Legal 

measures requiring a nationwide re-registration of ‘‘professional religious personnel,’’ underway in the TAR during 2010, could result 

in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks 

and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding religious views that 

the government does not deem to be ‘‘legal.’’ Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai 

Lama’s recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama. 

Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during 

the Commission’s 2010 reporting year based on Commission monitoring as of early September. The apparent decline may suggest 

that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the consequences of 

political protest in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown 

on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and 

workplaces. Courts sentenced Tibetans to imprisonment for seeking 

to make information and views about the Tibetan protests available to other Tibetans (inside and outside of China) and for using 

cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. 

215 

Internationally, Government Presses ‘‘Core Interest’’ Policy To 

Isolate Dalai Lama 

The Chinese government and Communist Party during the Commission’s 2010 reporting year pressed the ‘‘core interest’’ policy that 

seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and diminish or 

end his international influence.2 The policy is based on Chinese officials’ assertions that ‘‘Tibet’’ is one of China’s two ‘‘core interests’’ 

(‘‘Taiwan’’ is the other); 3 the Dalai Lama is a ‘‘splittist’’; 4 and that 

other governments, therefore, should not permit the Dalai Lama to 

enter their countries and thereby threaten China’s ‘‘territorial integrity.’’ 5

During the period preceding U.S. President Barack Obama’s February 18, 2010, meeting with the Dalai Lama,6 China’s state-run 

media published demands that the United States ‘‘respect China’s 

core interests’’ by not allowing the meeting to occur.7 During the 

period between the October 6, 2009, White House statement 8 confirming that the meeting would take place at a time following the 

President’s November 15 to 18 China visit,9 and the February 11, 

2010, White House announcement that the meeting would take 

place on February 18,10 some Chinese media reports expressed exuberance based on the incorrect conclusion that President Obama’s 

decision to travel to China before meeting with the Dalai Lama signaled that Chinese government pressure had caused him to decide 

to forego meeting the Dalai Lama.11

The ‘‘core interest’’ policy that aims to isolate the Dalai Lama 

internationally operates in tandem with the Party’s domestic campaign to isolate Tibetans in China from the Dalai Lama. [See, e.g., 

Hu Jintao Invokes Marxist Theory To Reinforce Struggle Against 

the Dalai Lama’s Influence in this section.] At the same time, the 

Chinese government seeks to isolate Tibetans in China from the 

international community with respect to issues such as human 

rights by asserting that Tibetan affairs are China’s ‘‘internal affairs’’ and ‘‘brook no interference’’ from other countries.12 The 

results of such Chinese government policies could include further 

increases of human rights abuses of Tibetans concurrent with a decrease in the ability of the international community to detect, document, and respond to such abuses. 

Domestically, Fifth Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010– 

2020 

PRIOR TO FORUM, POLITBURO SETS ‘‘NEW’’ STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING

TIBET

On January 8, 2010, 10 days prior to the Fifth Tibet Work 

Forum (Fifth Forum),13 the Standing Committee of the Political 

Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party met to formulate a 

‘‘new general strategy for governing Tibet.’’ 14 At the meeting, Politburo members planned the Party’s ‘‘work on Tibet’’ for the period 

ahead, namely ‘‘the advancement of work on Tibet’s development 

by leaps and bounds and long-term order and stability in the new 

situation.’’ 15 China’s state-run media reported that the Politburo’s 

‘‘new general strategy’’ for Tibetan governance would be based on 

the notion of ‘‘four adherences’’: 16

216 

• ‘‘Insist on adherence to the [Party’s] leadership’’; • ‘‘Insist on adherence to the socialist system’’; • ‘‘Insist on adherence to the system of regional autonomy for 

minority nationalities’’; and 

• ‘‘Insist on adherence to a development path with Chinese 

characteristics and Tibetan traits.’’ 

The fourth ‘‘adherence’’ reaffirms the Party’s intention to continue the policy of creating a Tibet where the fundamental objectives (the ‘‘development path’’) are Chinese, but where some 

‘‘Tibetan traits’’ will remain.17 As a governing ‘‘strategy,’’ the ‘‘adherences’’ emphasize the high degree of subordination imposed on 

local ethnic autonomous governments established under China’s 

Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.18 None of the 25 

members of the Politburo—the highest ranking bureau within the 

Party’s Central Committee—are Tibetans.19 Formulation of a ‘‘new’’ 

Tibetan governance strategy by a body made up of the highest 

ranking representatives of central Party and government power, 

and lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates the poor implementation of ‘‘ethnic autonomy’’ in the Tibetan autonomous areas 

of China. 

THE FORUM: HIGHEST LEVEL OF PARTY AND STATE SUPPORT

The nine-member Politburo Standing Committee presided at the 

January 18–20 Fifth Forum, signifying the highest level of Party 

and state support for policy objectives across the Tibetan autonomous areas of China.20 Party General Secretary and President of 

China Hu Jintao and Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao delivered key addresses.21 The Fourth Tibet Work Forum took place 

in June 2001.22

Maintaining the Rural Priority: Boost Income, Provide Services, 

Build Infrastructure 

Hu Jintao outlined at the Fifth Forum a series of development 

goals for 2015 and 2020 that prioritize changes to rural Tibetan 

areas—where 87 percent of Tibetans lived in 2000, according to official Chinese census data 23—and that will have the capacity to increase pressure on Tibetan culture in rural areas. The Party and 

government’s heightened emphasis on the link between rural development and regional stability follows Tibetan farmers’ and herders’ 

participation in the wave of protests (and some rioting) that began 

in Lhasa in March 2008 and spread to locations across the Tibetan 

plateau.24 By 2015, the gap between the income level of farmers 

and herders in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the national average 25 must be ‘‘markedly narrowed’’ and by 2020, the 

gap must be nearly closed, Hu told forum attendees.26 The government’s ability to provide basic public services in rural areas must 

be ‘‘markedly increased’’ by 2015 and must be near the national 

level by 2020.27 Hu said that infrastructure construction must 

make ‘‘great progress’’ by 2015, and by 2020 infrastructure must be 

‘‘comprehensively improved.’’ 28

As of September 2010, the Commission had observed few published reports containing details about specific projects that the 

Fifth Forum would promote in the Tibetan autonomous areas of 

China. Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR governVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00222 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
217 

ment as of January 15, 2010,29 said in March that the Fifth Forum 

adopted ‘‘unprecedented new measures’’ and the TAR government 

would ‘‘initiate some major projects,’’ but he named only one: the 

‘‘Qinghai-Tibet direct current transmission line.’’ 30 In terms of potential economic, demographic, environmental, and cultural impact, 

however, the most important infrastructure projects that the central government has announced for completion by 2020 are several 

new railways that will crisscross the Tibetan plateau.31

New Development: Policy Coordination Across an Expanded Tibetan 

Area 

The Fifth Forum for the first time expanded and coordinated the 

Party’s Tibetan policy purview beyond the administrative boundaries of the TAR to include the Tibetan autonomous prefectures 

and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan 

provinces.32 China’s state-run media reported that the Fifth Forum 

‘‘made comprehensive arrangements for speeding up the economic 

and social development’’ of the Tibetan areas of those four provinces at both central and provincial government levels.33 Echoing 

the principal policy declarations of the January Politburo meeting 

[see Prior to Forum, Politburo Sets ‘‘New’’ Strategy for Governing 

Tibet in this section], the Fifth Forum identified four priorities as 

‘‘the main direction of attack’’ for resolving ‘‘the most conspicuous 

and most urgent issues restraining economic and social development’’ (listed in the order reported): 34

• ‘‘Improvement in the people’s livelihood’’; 

• ‘‘Development of social undertakings’’; 

• ‘‘Protection for the ecological environment’’; and 

• ‘‘Construction of the infrastructure.’’ 

The policy change more than doubles the number of Tibetans 

who live within the Fifth Forum’s contiguous target area and nearly doubles the area subject to central-level policy coordination. According to official Chinese 2000 census data, of approximately 5.42 

million Tibetans in China, approximately 2.43 million lived in the 

TAR and approximately 2.57 million lived in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan.35 The expanded Tibetan policy area, with an area of approximately 2.24 

million square kilometers, is nearly double the size of the 1.2-million-square-kilometer TAR.36

The Party’s decision to expand the Tibetan policy area and coordinate policy implementation has resulted in an unprecedented 

political consequence: Chinese government and Party officials, as 

well as the Dalai Lama and his representatives, have focused their 

respective recent policy statements on the same area of administrative geography—all of the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. The 

Dalai Lama’s envoys’ November 2008 ‘‘Memorandum on Genuine 

Autonomy for the Tibetan People’’ 37 identifies the Tibetan area 

that the Memorandum seeks to address as ‘‘comprising all the 

areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous 

areas.’’ 38 The Chinese and Tibetan parties engaged in the ChinaDalai Lama dialogue continue, however, to maintain different policy approaches toward the Tibetan autonomous areas.39

218 

Hu Jintao Invokes Marxist Theory To Reinforce Struggle Against 

the Dalai Lama’s Influence 

Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao may 

have used the Fifth Forum to seek to improve the Party’s reputation as ‘‘Communist’’ by using an esoteric Marxist premise to reinforce the Party campaign against the Dalai Lama and end the 

Dalai Lama’s influence among Tibetans in China.40 Hu applied the 

Marxist theoretical concept of ‘‘special contradiction’’ to what the 

Party claims is a threat to China’s ethnic unity and stability that 

the Dalai Lama and organizations and individuals that the Party 

associates with him (‘‘the Dalai Clique’’) create.41 Marxism posits 

that a ‘‘special contradiction’’ may exist when an entity such as an 

ethnic minority group considers itself to be ‘‘alienated’’ from other 

ethnic groups, then makes the ‘‘mistake’’ of equating ‘‘alienation’’ 

with ‘‘differentiation’’ and attributing alienation to ‘‘historical categories.’’ 42 (That is, if ethnic Tibetans believe they are ‘‘differentiated’’ from ethnic Chinese, and that such a belief has a historical 

basis, then the Party blames ‘‘the Dalai Clique’’ for creating a ‘‘special contradiction’’ to Marxism.) 

Hu’s prominent mention at the Fifth Forum of the Marxist notion of ‘‘special contradiction’’ may seek to serve Party interests by 

creating the semblance of a Communist ideological basis for the 

Party insistence that the Dalai Lama aims to ‘‘separate the motherland’’ (seek independence).43 The Dalai Lama’s recurrent assertions 

that he seeks ‘‘genuine’’ (or ‘‘meaningful’’) autonomy for Tibetans, 

not independence, hinder the Party’s campaign. 

Increasing Pressure on Religion: The ‘‘Normal Order’’ for Tibetan 

Buddhism 

Hu Jintao used the powerful Fifth Forum platform to emphasize 

the Communist Party’s role in controlling Tibetan Buddhism and 

the important role of law as a tool to enforce what the Party deems 

to be the ‘‘normal order’’ for the religion. Hu instructed the forum: 

‘‘Comprehensively implement the Party’s basic principles for religious work and laws and regulations on the government’s administration of religious affairs, earnestly maintain the normal order of 

Tibetan Buddhism, and guide Tibetan Buddhism to keep in line 

with the socialist society.’’ 44

The legal measures to which Hu Jintao referred at the Fifth 

Forum empower the Chinese government to reshape and control Tibetan Buddhism (and other religions) and had not yet been created 

when the Fourth Tibet Work Forum took place in 2001.45 [See Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists ‘‘Can Believe Whatever They 

Want as Long as It’s Legal’’ in this section.] 

219 

Initial Fifth Forum Reports Do Not Address Some Key Issues 

State-run media reports on the Fifth Forum seen by the Commission in 

the weeks following the forum are also noteworthy for what they do not 

include. 

• None of the reports provided details about infrastructure and aid 

projects from 2010 to 2020 or estimates of their cost. The total cost 

of building additional railways linking Tibetan autonomous areas 

with principal cities in Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces, and 

with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, could be several 

times greater than the 33 billion yuan (US$4.7 billion) cost of constructing the Qinghai-Tibet railway.46

• None of the Fifth Forum reports provided information about 

whether Party and government personnel canvassed Tibetans at the 

grassroots level on their preferences for economic and social development. 

• None of the reports provided information on whether ‘‘Tibet work’’ 

over the coming decade aims to improve the human rights environment for Tibetans along with their standard of living, or whether 

officials intend to address in a reconciliatory manner any of the 

complaints that Tibetans have raised in the series of protests that 

began in March 2008.47

Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese government and the 

Dalai Lama or His Representatives 

The China-Dalai Lama dialogue resumed less than one week 

after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) concluded.48 The 

Dalai Lama’s envoys arrived in China on January 26, 2010, for the 

ninth round of formal dialogue with Communist Party officials.49

The 15-month interval between the eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts resumed in 2002.50 Du 

Qinglin, head of the Party’s United Front Work Department 

(UFWD) and the most senior Chinese official engaged in discussions with the Dalai Lama’s envoys, reportedly briefed the envoys 

on the Fifth Forum and claimed that the forum showed that ‘‘[no] 

country or party in the world can match China and the [Communist Party] in using the resources of the whole country to support the development of an ethnic region.’’ 51

Neither side reported substantive progress as a result of the 

ninth round of dialogue and both sides reiterated key positions,52

but senior figures referred to certain developments in a positive 

manner. For example, Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama’s 

envoys both emphasized the important role of Fifth Forum developments.53 Zhu Weiqun, Deputy Head of the UFWD, praised the ‘‘better attitude’’ of the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari.54 In 

March 2010, Lodi Gyari referred favorably to the Party’s Fifth 

Forum decision to consider development issues throughout all Tibetan autonomous areas: 

We welcome the fact that the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has 

looked into the issues of development in all Tibetan 

areas—the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as other Tibetan areas. It is our strong belief that all the Tibetan 

220 

areas must be under a uniform policy and a single administration. If we take away the political slogans, many of 

the issues that have been prioritized by the Forum are 

similar to the basic needs of the Tibetan people outlined 

in our Memorandum.55

Other developments at the ninth round of dialogue included: 

• Party adds more preconditions on the Dalai Lama. Du 

Qinglin listed four types of expression (or criticism) that the 

Dalai Lama must not ‘‘indulge in’’: 56

• ‘‘National interests brook no infringement’’; • ‘‘The principles of the Constitution brook no trampling 

on’’; 

• ‘‘National dignity brooks no vilification’’; and • ‘‘The common wishes of the people of all ethnic groups 

brook no deviation.’’ 

• The Tibetan ‘‘Note.’’ The Dalai Lama’s envoys provided to 

UFWD officials a ‘‘Note’’ with additional explanation of the 

eighth-round ‘‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,’’ which elaborated on behalf of the Dalai Lama 

a more detailed explanation of Tibetan aspirations for ‘‘genuine 

autonomy’’ than had been available previously.57 The Note contained ‘‘constructive suggestions for a way forward’’ and addressed ‘‘fundamental issues,’’ according to a February 10, 

2010, Special Envoy statement.58

• Party rejection of the ‘‘Note.’’ At a February 2 press conference, Zhu Weiqun rejected the Note and claimed that the 

envoys refused to ‘‘revise a single word’’ of the Memorandum 

or ‘‘make any concession.’’ 59 Zhu repeated that the Party is 

willing to discuss only the Dalai Lama’s ‘‘personal future and 

the future of those around him.’’ 60

Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists ‘‘Can Believe Whatever They 

Want as Long as It’s Legal’’ 

The Chinese government and Communist Party’s push to define 

and manage a ‘‘normal order’’ for Tibetan Buddhism, and transform 

the Tibetan Buddhist community into one that adheres to state-approved positions and practices, creates increasing restraints on the 

exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists. In March 

2010, Lhasa’s mayor summed up the limits on freedom of religion: 

‘‘In Tibet, people can believe whatever they want as long as it is 

legal.’’ 61

STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF LAW IN SHAPING, CONTROLLING

TIBETAN BUDDHISM

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government and Communist Party strengthened their push to use policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese officials, 

including President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, refer 

to as the ‘‘normal order’’ for Tibetan Buddhism. Hu directed senior 

Party leadership figures attending the Fifth Tibet Work Forum to 

guide Tibetan Buddhism ‘‘to keep in line with socialist society’’ and 

to rely on the Party’s ‘‘basic principles for religious work’’ and the 

government’s ‘‘laws and regulations’’ to achieve that end.62 [See DoVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00226 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
221 

mestically, Fifth Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010– 

2020 in this section.] Some of the principal regulatory instruments 

to which Hu referred were not issued until recent years; the most 

recent measure went into effect days before the Fifth Tibet Work 

Forum commenced. In addition to China’s principal regulatory 

measure on religion, the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs,63

the central and Tibet Autonomous Region governments have issued 

at least four regulatory measures since 2007 that provide increased 

state control of Tibetan Buddhism.64

• Effective January 1, 2007. The TAR People’s Government 

Standing Committee issued the TAR Implementing Measures 

for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (TAR Measures), imposing stricter and more detailed controls on monks, nuns, monasteries, and nunneries in the TAR than previous measures.65

• Effective March 1, 2007. The State Administration for 

Religious Affairs (SARA) issued the Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record (Record Measures), requiring nationwide re-registration of ‘‘professional religious 

personnel.’’ 66

• Effective September 1, 2007. SARA issued the Measures 

on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in 

Tibetan Buddhism. The measures could transform Tibetan 

Buddhism in China by empowering the Party and government 

to gradually reshape the religion by controlling one of the religion’s most unique and important features—lineages of teachers that Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations (trulkus) 

and that can span centuries.67

• Effective January 10, 2010. The Buddhist Association of 

China 68 issued the Measures for Confirming the Credentials of 

Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel (Confirming 

Measures).69 The measures provide that Tibetan Buddhist ‘‘religious personnel’’ whose credentials were ‘‘confirmed’’ prior to 

the measure’s effective date need not repeat the confirmation 

process, but that the monastery or nunnery Democratic Management Committee (DMC) 70 must examine and verify the 

monk’s, nun’s, or trulku’s conformity with political, professional, and personal criteria.71 After the DMC submits an opinion on the applicant to the local Buddhist Association for 

approval, the association will issue a registration certificate to 

the ‘‘religious professional.’’ 72 The TAR government reported 

on the date the Confirming Measures took effect that it would 

complete re-registration by the end of 2010—including recording the government’s assessment of the ‘‘qualifications’’ of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and ‘‘living Buddhas,’’ a Chinese 

term for trulkus.73

The number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns subject to reregistration under the Record Measures and Confirming Measures 

is substantial. The central government has reported the total number of monks and nuns in the Tibetan areas of China as approximately 120,000 as long ago as 1997 74 and as recently as June 

2009, according to a U.S. State Department report.75 The impact 

of the measures could result in substantial losses to the monastic 

community if authorities apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities suspect of 

222 

holding beliefs that the government does not deem to be ‘‘legal.’’ 

Such views include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and 

support of the Dalai Lama’s recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi 

Nyima as the Panchen Lama.76

Three Top-Ranking Lamas: Deepening Alarm; a Hint on Location; Explanation of Escape From Tibet 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Dalai Lama expressed deepening alarm on the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China. 

A senior Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) official commented on the current status of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, who was five years old when he 

disappeared after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the 11th Panchen 

Lama in May 1995.77 The Karmapa, the spiritual head of the Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism,78 explained publicly why he decided to escape from Tibet at the end of 1999. 

• The Dalai Lama spoke in his 2010 annual March 10 address 79

about the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism under current Chinese policies: ‘‘Today, the Chinese authorities are conducting various political 

campaigns, including a campaign of patriotic re-education, in many 

monasteries in Tibet. They are putting the monks and nuns in prison-like conditions, depriving them [of] the opportunity to study and 

practice in peace. These conditions make the monasteries function 

more like museums and are intended to deliberately annihilate [Tibetan] Buddhism.’’ 80

• The Panchen Lama (Gedun Choekyi Nyima) and his family are 

‘‘living a very good life in Tibet,’’ Chairman of the TAR government 

Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) told reporters on March 7.81 He said 

that Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family ‘‘are reluctant to be 

disturbed,’’ 82 and described Gedun Choekyi Nyima as a ‘‘victim’’ 

[apparently of the Dalai Lama] who ‘‘lives the life of an ordinary citizen like us.’’ 83 Also in March, Gyaltsen Norbu, the Panchen Lama 

that the Chinese government installed in December 1995,84 entered 

the ‘‘political arena’’ as a member of the Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference.85

• The Karmapa, in a January 2010 interview, stated that he fled 

from Tibet to India because he feared that ‘‘the Chinese government 

would have assigned me political duties as I became older.’’ 86 Life 

in China might have been ‘‘endurable’’ if he had been able to focus 

only on his religious functions, he said. The Karmapa fled his religious seat at Tsurphu Monastery, located in Duilongdeqing (Toelung 

Dechen) county, Lhasa municipality, TAR, on December 28, 1999, at 

the age of 14 and arrived in Dharamsala, India, the Dalai Lama’s 

residence in exile, on January 5, 2000.87

Tibetan Development Initiatives: Party Claims National, 

International Stakes for Its ‘‘Tibet Work’’ 

The January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) set out 

Communist Party and central government economic development 

objectives for 2010 to 2020. The objectives principally focus on 

accelerating and strengthening a development model that subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture to Party and government priorities. President and Party General Secretary Hu 

223 

Jintao claimed high stakes nationally and internationally for the 

success of such objectives, telling forum attendees that Party initiatives in Tibetan areas address ‘‘the urgent need in safeguarding 

ethnic solidarity, safeguarding social stability, and safeguarding 

national security,’’ as well as ‘‘the urgent need in creating a favorable international environment.’’ 88 Hu outlined Fifth Forum development objectives that included building major infrastructure 

projects,89 increasing natural resource exploitation,90 and continuing to push forward the construction of a ‘‘socialist new countryside’’ (compulsory settlement of nomadic herders and resettlement 

of farmers).91

The Fifth Forum objectives build upon the Great Western Development campaign that the State Council launched in 2000,92 and 

(because of the magnitude of forum objectives) will increase pressure on Tibetans to accept and adapt to a development model the 

fundamental properties of which the Party describes as ‘‘Chinese 

characteristics,’’ but that would retain ‘‘Tibetan traits.’’ 93 Tibetan 

resentment against Chinese policies—including poor implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 94 and consequences of 

development initiatives 95—helps to explain the wave of Tibetan 

protests that began in March 2008.96 Government and Party officials have not acknowledged publicly the unpopularity of their Tibetan development policies. 

UPDATES ON KEY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS

Railroad construction. Chinese government plans to complete 

a network of railways crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau by 2020 

have the potential to have a profound impact on the Tibetan culture and the ecological environment.97 During the Commission’s 

2010 reporting year, state-run media reports disclosed limited 

progress on Tibetan railway construction. 

• Work on the first section of the Sichuan-Tibet railway, between Chengdu city, the capital of Sichuan province, and 

Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), will start by the end of 2010, according to a January 2010 Sichuan government report.98 An 

April Chinese news report, however, said that work would 

start ‘‘next year’’(2011).99

• Construction of a railway segment from Lhasa eastward to 

Linzhi (Kongpo) that both the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-Tibet 

railways will use will start in 2013 at the earliest, according 

to a state-run media report.100 The government has not yet decided whether to route the railway to the north of the Brahmaputra River (Yarlung Tsangpo) or to the south of the river.101

A southern route would position the railroad much closer to a 

section of disputed, heavily militarized border between the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and Linzhi prefecture in the 

TAR.102 Experts favor the southern route, the report said.103

• Construction of the railway extension westward from Lhasa 

to Rikaze (Shigatse) city, initially ‘‘expected to be completed in 

2010,’’ 104 remained in preparatory stages as of March 2010.105

Construction work began on September 26, 2010, and will take 

four years to complete, according to an official news media report.106

224 

Expansion of mining. A TAR official said in March 2010 that 

the mining industry share of TAR gross domestic product would 

increase from the current level of about 3 percent to between 30 

percent and 50 percent by 2020.107 The TAR government has designated nine ‘‘special zones for mineral industries,’’ the official 

said.108 Tibetan protests against Chinese government mineral exploitation and resulting environmental damage continued during 

the Commission’s 2010 reporting year and could increase further if 

the government expands mining without adequate protection for 

Tibetans and their environment. On May 15, 2010, for example, 

People’s Armed Police reportedly fired on 200 to 300 Tibetan villagers in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, after they attempted to protest 

at the gate of a cement factory they held responsible for fouling the 

atmosphere, damaging a roadside Buddhist pagoda, and blocking 

access to their village.109 And according to a report in early May, 

‘‘thousands’’ of Tibetans renewed protests against mining on what 

Tibetans regard as a sacred mountain in Mangkang (Markham) 

county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, after the companies 

involved disregarded a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease 

the mining.110

Forced settlement of nomadic herders, resettlement of 

farmers. Chairman of the TAR government Pema Choling (Baima 

Chilin) said in March 2010 that ‘‘constantly deepening efforts to 

build a new socialist countryside’’ was a priority following the Fifth 

Forum.111 China’s state-run media reported in November 2009 that 

‘‘more than 1 million farmers and herdsmen’’ in the TAR were already ‘‘enjoying safe houses,’’ and that by the end of 2009 an additional 330,000 nomadic herders and farmers would move into new 

houses.112 These figures total approximately 1.33 million, a figure 

equal to about half the TAR Tibetan population.113 A September 

2009 State Council Information Office white paper listed ‘‘building 

settlements for formerly nomadic people’’ as a measure to ‘‘relieve 

the poverty the ethnic minorities suffer,’’ 114 but an international 

advocacy organization said in 2010 the policy threatens Tibetan nomads’ livelihoods and often results in ‘‘ghetto-like’’ conditions.115

Managing the ‘‘floating population.’’ Lhasa’s mayor said in 

March 2010 that following the March 2008 Lhasa rioting, the city 

had implemented measures ‘‘reinforcing the management [of] the 

floating population and communities.’’ 116 The mayor did not specify 

whether he referred to Tibetan or Han itinerant workers and 

traders.117 Chinese officials have acknowledged that Tibetan resentment against increasing numbers of non-Tibetan workers and 

traders 118 traveling into the TAR was a factor in the March 14, 

2008, Lhasa riots.119 Premier Wen Jiabao in his March 2010 National People’s Congress work report called on the government to 

improve services and ‘‘do a good job in employment and management work’’ for the ethnic minority ‘‘floating population.’’ 120 Staterun media reported that Wen’s comments were the first time the 

issue has been raised in a national work report.121

Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression 

Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined during 

the Commission’s 2010 reporting year based on Commission moniVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00230 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
225 

toring as of early September.122 The apparent decline may suggest 

that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the consequences of 

political protest in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown 

on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and 

workplaces following the wave of Tibetan political protests that 

began in March 2008. The Commission, however, cannot determine 

the extent to which the apparent decrease may have resulted from 

heightened security measures that reduce the frequency of protests 

and detentions (thus reducing the number of reports of protest and 

detention), or the extent to which Chinese government suppression 

of information flow may have prevented reports of protest and detention from reaching international monitoring and reporting organizations (thus reducing such agencies’ ability to report protests 

and detention). 

China’s security and judicial institutions’ use of laws on 

‘‘splittism’’ and ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ 123 during this reporting year 

infringed upon Chinese citizens’ constitutionally protected freedoms 

of speech, religion, association, and assembly 124—first by using the 

law on ‘‘splittism’’ to punish Tibetans who criticize or peacefully 

protest government policies, and then by using the law on ‘‘leaking 

state secrets’’ to punish Tibetans who attempt to share with other 

Tibetans information about incidents of repression and punishment. For example, a Chinese court reportedly sentenced Dondrub 

Wangchen to imprisonment on the charge of ‘‘splittism’’ for using 

film media to disseminate Tibetan views on topics such as Tibetan 

freedom and the Dalai Lama.125 Prosecutors reportedly used the 

charge of ‘‘leaking secrets’’ to seek conviction of Konchog Tsephel 

and Kunga Tseyang for using their Web sites to share with other 

Tibetans—including Tibetans outside of China—information and 

views on Tibetan experiences of detention, imprisonment, and religious and cultural repression during the ongoing crackdown.126

[See box titled Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression below for more information on these cases.] 

Chinese government officials moved during the Commission’s 

2010 reporting year to diminish or end the public influence of 

emergent Tibetan civic and intellectual leaders.127 Prior to this reporting year, the apparent misapplication of China’s Criminal Law 

to imprison Tibetan leaders and remove them from society involved 

religious figures, e.g., Bangri Chogtrul (1999),128 Sonam Phuntsog 

(1999),129 Tenzin Deleg (2002),130 and Phurbu Tsering (2008).131

During this reporting year, officials misapplied the law in order to 

imprison environmentalist and art collector Karma Samdrub and 

charge secularist intellectual Tagyal—both of whom had developed 

cooperative relationships with the government and avoided ‘‘political’’ activity, according to reports.132 Some officials may suspect 

that such leaders could encourage in Tibetan citizens a commitment to civic values and responsibilities that the Party may regard 

as a potential obstacle to the Party’s exclusive exercise of political 

power.133 Other officials may have sought retribution against the 

men for more parochial reasons.134

• In Karma Samdrub’s case, a court in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region sentenced him on June 24, 2010, to 15 

years’ imprisonment for ‘‘tomb-robbing,’’ a charge first brought 

against him in 1998 and dropped the same year.135 Officials 

226 

revived criminal proceedings against Karma Samdrub after he 

attained national acclaim as an environmentalist,136 and then 

sought the release of two of his brothers whom public security 

officials detained in August 2009 after an environmental protection organization they founded accused local officials of 

hunting protected wildlife.137

• In the case of Tagyal—an intellectual who worked at a government publishing house and advocated for a more secular Tibetan society 138—officials in Qinghai province charged him in 

May 2010 with ‘‘inciting splittism’’ after he used veiled language the previous month to urge Tibetans to avoid corrupt official channels when donating money to aid victims of the April 

2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai.139 Other accounts attribute his detention to the publication of a book he wrote 

about the 2008 Tibetan protests.140

Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression 

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, Chinese courts sentenced 

Tibetans to imprisonment for seeking to make information and views 

about the Tibetan protests and their consequences available to other Tibetans (inside and outside of China). Some of the sentenced Tibetans 

used cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. Five examples follow. 

• Dondrub Wangchen, film-maker. On December 28, 2009, the 

Xining Intermediate People’s Court, located in Xining city, Qinghai 

province, reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to six years in 

prison on the charge of ‘‘splittism’’ for making a documentary film 

featuring Tibetans in Qinghai expressing on camera their views on 

the Dalai Lama, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and 

Chinese law.141

• Konchog Tsephel, civil servant and Web site operator. On 

November 12, 2009, the Gannan (Kanlho) Intermediate People’s 

Court, located in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), 

Gansu province, reportedly sentenced Konchog Tsephel to 15 years’ 

imprisonment for ‘‘disclosing state secrets.’’ 142 The charge reportedly was linked to essays he published on his Tibetan-language Web 

site.143

• Kunga Tseyang, monk and Web site operator. On November 

12, 2009, the Gannan Intermediate People’s Court reportedly sentenced Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery monk Kunga Tseyang to five 

years in prison on the charge of ‘‘disclosing state secrets’’ for publishing essays, photographs, and environmental information on his 

Tibetan-language Web site.144

• Ngagchung, monk. In January 2010, the Ganzi (Kardze) Intermediate People’s Court, located in Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province, reportedly sentenced Serthar Buddhist Institute (Larung Gar) monk 

Ngagchung to seven years’ imprisonment for ‘‘leaking information’’ 

on the Tibetan situation to ‘‘separatist forces’’ outside of China via 

telephone and other means.145

227 

Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression— 

Continued 

• Tashi Dondrub, singer. On January 5, 2010, the Henan 

(Yulgan) Mongol Autonomous County Reeducation Through Labor 

(RTL) Committee, located in Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, ordered Tashi Dondrub, a member of the county performing 

arts troupe, to serve 15 months’ RTL for singing songs with ‘‘provocative themes’’ 146 such as nostalgia for the Dalai Lama and sadness 

at the situation following the March 2008 protests.147

UPDATES: PROTESTS, SENTENCING, POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

Although the number of published reports of Tibetan political 

protest and detention observed by the Commission declined during 

the 2010 reporting year, instances of protest continued to occur 

that suggest some Tibetan areas remain protest-prone even under 

heightened security measures. Two representative examples follow. 

• Protesters demand release of Buddhist teacher in 

Sichuan. Tenzin Deleg (A’an Zhaxi), recognized by the Dalai 

Lama as a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teacher, was convicted in a closed court in Sichuan province in November 2002 

of conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism and is 

currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment.148 In July 

2009, Tibetans in Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi 

(Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, presented to officials a petition calling for his release on 

the asserted basis that there was no proof of his guilt, he had 

not confessed to the alleged crimes, and officials had framed 

him.149 Beginning on December 5, several hundred 

Nyagchukha Tibetans participated in several days of protests 

calling for Tenzin Deleg’s release.150 Public security officials 

and People’s Armed Police reportedly beat and detained dozens 

of protesters and later released most of them.151

• Middle school students protest in Gansu, TAR. On 

March 14, 2010, 20 to 30 Tibetan middle school students joined 

by at least 100 other Tibetans in the seat of Maqu (Machu) 

county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, staged a political protest calling 

for Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama’s long life.152 Public 

security officials and People’s Armed Police reportedly detained 

at least 40 protesters.153 On March 16, 30 to 40 Tibetan students from two middle schools in Hezuo (Tsoe), the capital of 

Gannan TAP, staged a brief protest and shouted slogans.154

Public security officials reportedly detained at least 20 of the 

students. On March 22, Tibetan primary school students briefly 

staged a protest in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.155 During the protests, students in both locations reportedly called for Tibetan freedom, 

the Dalai Lama’s long life, and his return to Tibet.156

In a closely watched case,157 on December 23, 2009, the Ganzi 

TAP Intermediate People’s Court, located in Kangding (Dartsedo), 

Ganzi TAP, reportedly sentenced Phurbu Tsering,158 whom Tibetan 

Buddhists regard as a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teacher, to 

eight years and six months’ imprisonment.159 The same court had 

228 

tried him on April 21, 2009, on charges of illegally possessing 

weapons or ammunition (an offense under China’s Criminal Law, 

Article 128) and ‘‘embezzlement’’ (Criminal Law, Article 271), according to his lawyers, Jiang Tianyong and Li Fangping.160 The 

lawyers’ defense statement to the court argued that insufficient evidence was available to support either charge and the government 

could not prove that Phurbu Tsering had not been framed by someone else.161 The court reportedly sentenced Phurbu Tsering to one 

year and six months’ imprisonment for ‘‘illegal possession of ammunition’’ and seven years’ imprisonment for ‘‘misappropriation of 

public assets.’’ 162

The Commission has not observed during the 2010 reporting year 

any new developments in the cases of former monk Jigme 

Gyatso 163 (detained in 1996 and serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting 

pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub 164

(sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); 

Bangri Chogtrul165 (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincarnated teacher; detained in 1999 and serving a sentence of 18 years 

commuted from life imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’); or 

nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced in November 2007 to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a public festival).166

Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and 

Imprisonment 

As of September 3, 2010, the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database (PPD) contained records of 824 Tibetan political prisoners 

believed to be currently detained or imprisoned. Of those 824 

records, 765 are records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 

2008,167 and 59 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 

2008. It is certain that PPD information is far from complete for 

the period after March 10, 2008. 

Of the 765 Tibetan political prisoners believed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 

2008, according to PPD data: 

• Slightly more than half (388) are detained or imprisoned in 

Sichuan province; the rest are detained or imprisoned in the 

Tibet Autonomous Region (183), Gansu province (105), Qinghai 

province (87), Yunnan province (1), and the Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region (1). 

• 443 (approximately 58 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist ‘‘religious professionals’’ (monks, nuns, and trulkus). 

Sentencing information is available for 152 of the 824 Tibetans 

the PPD records as currently imprisoned or detained, as of September 3, 2010. Of the 152 Tibetan political prisoners for whom 

sentencing information is available, 116 were detained on or after 

March 10, 2008. The 116 sentences range in length from one year 

to life imprisonment.168 The average length of the 116 sentences 

imposed on Tibetan political prisoners detained on or after March 

10, 2008, is approximately five years and nine months.169 Of the 

141 Tibetan political prisoners for whom sentencing information is 

available, 36 were detained prior to March 10, 2008. The 36 sentences range in length from three years to life imprisonment.170

The average length of the 36 sentences currently being served by 

229 

Tibetan political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, is approximately 13 years and 5 months.171


10tib1.eps
230 

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau 

Introduction 

The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong 

under the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ formula articulated in the 

Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 

Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.1

The United States also supports the high degree of autonomy of 

Macau set forth in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the 

Question of Macao and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.2 The people of 

Hong Kong and Macau enjoy an independent judiciary 3 and an 

open society in which the freedoms of speech, movement, and assembly are largely respected.4

According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, ‘‘The ultimate aim is the 

selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures’’; the Basic Law also provides that 

‘‘[t]he ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage’’; furthermore, under the Basic 

Law, the mainland Chinese government authorizes Hong Kong to 

exercise ‘‘a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative 

and independent judicial power. . . .’’ 5

Macau introduced national security legislation provided by Article 

23 of the Macau Basic Law in October 2008, criminalizing treason, 

secession, subversion, sedition, theft of state secrets, and association with foreign political organizations that harm state security.6

The Macau government’s passage of the legislation in February 

2009 was praised by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, at a celebration in December 

2009 commemorating Macau’s handover, raising concerns among 

some in Hong Kong that China would try to reintroduce similar 

legislation in Hong Kong.7 When similar legislation was proposed 

for Hong Kong in 2003, public protest was strong, and the government withdrew the legislation.8

Hong Kong 

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, there has been 

limited progress toward universal suffrage in Hong Kong.9 A December 2007 decision of the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee (NPCSC) prohibited the people of Hong Kong from directly electing both the chief executive and all members of the Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage in 2012, or making 

other substantive changes to the electoral system.10 In light of the 

decision, the earliest possible dates for universal suffrage are 2017 

for the chief executive and 2020 for Legco, though there is no guarantee of universal suffrage at those times. In line with the NPCSC 

decision, the Hong Kong government issued a consultation document on constitutional reform in November 2009, and on April 14, 

2010, released its Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 

2012.11

231 

The government’s proposals cover the 2012 election only. Currently, an 800-member election committee selects the chief executive. Under the proposals, the number of members of the committee 

is enlarged to 1,200, but the makeup and procedure of appointment 

to the committee are not changed. According to a Financial Times 

article, the election committee is ‘‘dominated by pro-Beijing businessmen and community leaders.’’ 12 Currently, Legco has 60 members, only half of whom are directly elected. The other half are 

selected by ‘‘functional constituencies,’’ which represent ‘‘key economic and social sectors.’’ 13 According to one commentator, ‘‘By one 

estimate, this system allows 1% of the voters to fill half the Legco 

seats.’’ 14 The proposals add 10 seats to Legco, 5 selected by functional constituencies and 5 directly elected, thus not changing the 

proportion of Legco seats returned by direct election. The Basic 

Law provides that ‘‘passage of bills introduced by the government’’ 

require only a simple majority vote, but requires that the ‘‘passage 

of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by 

individual members of the Legislative Council’’ require a majority 

vote of each of the two groups in Legco, those directly elected 

through geographically-based elections, and those selected by the 

functional constituencies.15 The government proposals were criticized by some in Hong Kong.16 Legco approved the proposal package in June 2010, after it was amended to provide voters who do 

not belong to any functional constituency the right to elect Legco 

members from a list of candidates nominated by the district 

councilors to fill the five additional functional constituency seats.17

The vote for the package brought what the South China Morning 

Post described as an ‘‘incremental boost to democracy—but not universal suffrage.’’ 18

ACTIVE DISSENT

During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have continued 

to express their dissent, not only concerning the pace of progress 

toward universal suffrage,19 but also against other government actions, including plans to build a costly high-speed railway project.20

There were several large-scale protests during this reporting year, 

including a January 1, 2010, anti-government demonstration.21 According to a January 2010 article, ‘‘The political system in Hong 

Kong is increasingly paralyzed, and street protests are growing 

more confrontational as public dissatisfaction on economic issues 

and a lack of democracy is rising.’’ 22 The Chinese government has 

expressed its concerns over Hong Kong protests with Peng 

Qinghua, the director of the mainland’s Liaison Office in Hong 

Kong, saying that Hong Kong would not put up with what Peng 

characterized as radical demonstrations.23

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

For the most part, the people of Hong Kong continue to enjoy 

freedom of expression. For example, Hong Kong rose three 

rankings to 48th over the previous year in the 2009 Press Freedom 

Index of Reporters Without Borders.24 (For comparison, the United 

States rose from 36th to 20th during the same period, and China 

ranked 168th.) 25 According to the U.S. State Department 2009 

Human Rights Report, however, ‘‘reports of self-censorship continVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
232 

ued during the year.’’ The report noted claims that businesses with 

interests in China owned most media outlets, making them ‘‘vulnerable to self-censorship.’’ 26 The Hong Kong Journalists Association ‘‘expressed regret’’ concerning Esquire magazine’s decision to 

pull a 16-page story on the June 1989 Tiananmen protests, and one 

of Hong Kong’s free-to-air television stations was criticized at a 

public hearing for deliberately downplaying coverage of the annual 

Hong Kong commemoration of the Tiananmen protests.27 There 

were also concerns with the editorial independence of a new advisory board for the government-run Radio Television Hong Kong.28

Macau 

ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT

The ability of the people of Macau to influence their government 

is restricted by Macau’s constitutional system, under which the 

chief executive is selected by a 300-person committee, and only 12 

of 29 seats in the Legislative Assembly are filled by direct election.29 In July 2009, the selection committee chose Fernando Chui 

Sai On as the chief executive in an uncontested election.30 In September, voters selected 12 assembly members by direct election, the 

chief executive appointed 7, and an additional 10 were selected indirectly (in a manner similar to the system of functional constituencies in Hong Kong) in uncontested elections.31 The South China 

Morning Post reported that vote buying in the September legislative election was widespread, though reportedly not as widespread 

as in previous elections.32

CORRUPTION

Corruption, and the belief that business and government are too 

close, are serious issues for the people of Macau, with corruption 

fueling discontent.33 Macau ranked 43rd in the 2009 Transparency 

International Corruption Perception Index, which measures the 

perceived level of corruption in 180 countries.34 (By comparison, 

Hong Kong ranked 12th, the United States ranked 19th, and mainland China ranked 79th.) Bloomberg reported in December 2009 

that 66 percent of Macanese questioned in a survey said that getting rid of corruption should be a top priority of the new government.35

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (ARTICLE 23)

Macau enacted national security legislation in March 2009, a 

move that was highly praised by mainland authorities.36 The impact of the law is not clear at this stage. However, one media report commented on Chief Executive Chui’s use of force to put down 

a May Day demonstration in 2010, writing, ‘‘Since the passage of 

Article 23 antisubversion legislation last year, he [Chui] has a freer 

hand to legally suppress public protest.’’ 37

233 

CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enshrines 

a core set of rights and freedoms that individuals everywhere 

enjoy. Prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 

in October 1949, China voted as a member of the UN General Assembly in favor of the adoption of the UDHR in 1948. According 

to the Chinese government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights 

Action Plan (HRAP), issued in April 2009, ‘‘China will continue to 

fulfill its obligations to the international human rights conventions 

to which it has acceded, and initiate and actively participate in exchanges and cooperation in the field of international human 

rights.’’ 1

During the Commission’s 2010 reporting year, the Chinese government reiterated its stated commitment to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 

China signed in 1998. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, 

China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 

said at a UN meeting, ‘‘At present, legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 

our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and 

paving the way for its ratification.’’ 2 This statement followed similar expressions made during the Commission’s 2009 reporting year. 

In the HRAP, for example, the Chinese government said it would 

‘‘continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make 

domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the 

ground for approval of the ICCPR.’’ 3 During the February 2009 

session of the UN Human Right’s Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record, the Chinese 

government supported recommendations that it ratify the ICCPR 

and said it was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation 

through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR.4 The 

chart below lists what action China has taken on major human 

rights treaties and protocols to the treaties.5

234 

Convention or 

Protocol Ratification Status 

Declarations and 

Reservations 

(Excerpts) 

International Covenant on Economic, 

Social and Cultural 

Rights 

Ratified March 27, 

2001. 

The Covenant also applies to Hong Kong 

and Macau. 

The application of article 8.1(a) of the Covenant to the People’s 

Republic of China 

shall be consistent 

with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Trade 

Union Law of the People’s Republic of China 

and Labor Law of the 

People’s Republic of 

China. 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Signed October 5, 

1998; not yet ratified. 

The Covenant applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau as described in 

the notes accompanying the Covenant. 

Optional Protocol to 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political 

Rights 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 

Racial Discrimination 

Acceded to December 

29, 1981. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau. 

The People’s Republic 

of China has reservations on the provisions 

of article 22 of the 

Convention and will 

not be bound by it. 

235 

Convention or 

Protocol Ratification Status 

Declarations and 

Reservations 

(Excerpts) 

Convention on the 

Elimination of All 

Forms of Discrimination against Women 

Ratified November 4, 

1980. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau. 

The People’s Republic 

of China does not consider itself bound by 

paragraph 1 of article 

29 of the Convention. 

Optional Protocol to 

the Convention on the 

Elimination of All 

Forms of Discrimination against Women 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

Convention on the 

Rights of the Child 

Ratified March 2, 

1992. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau. 

The People’s Republic 

of China shall fulfill 

its obligations provided 

by article 6 of the Convention under the prerequisite that the Convention accords with 

the provisions of article 25 concerning family planning of the 

Constitution of the 

People’s Republic of 

China and in conformity with the provisions of article 2 of the 

Law of Minor Children 

of the People’s Republic of China. 

Optional Protocol to 

the Convention on the 

Rights of the Child on 

the Involvement of 

Children in Armed 

Conflict 

Ratified February 20, 

2008. 

Ratification also applies to Hong Kong 

and Macau. 

1. The minimum age 

for citizens voluntarily 

entering the Armed 

Forces of the People’s 

Republic of China is 17 

years of age. 

2. The Government of 

the People’s Republic 

of China is applying 

[safeguard measures] 

in implementing the 

foregoing provision. 

236 

Convention or 

Protocol Ratification Status 

Declarations and 

Reservations 

(Excerpts) 

Optional Protocol to 

the Convention on the 

Rights of the Child on 

the Sale of Children, 

Child Prostitution and 

Child Pornography 

Ratified December 3, 

2002. 

The Protocol also applies to Macau. The 

application of the Protocol to Hong Kong requires prior domestic 

legislation by the 

Hong Kong government and the Protocol 

shall not apply to 

Hong Kong until the 

Chinese government 

notifies otherwise. 

Convention against 

Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or 

Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment 

Ratified October 4, 

1988. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau. 

The Chinese government does not recognize the competence of 

the Committee against 

Torture as provided for 

in article 20 of the 

Convention. The Chinese government does 

not consider itself 

bound by paragraph 1 

of article 30 of the 

Convention. 

Optional Protocol to 

the Convention 

against Torture and 

Other Cruel, Inhuman 

or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

Convention relating to 

the Status of Refugees 

Acceded to September 

24, 1982. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Macau. 

[Subject to] reservations on the following 

articles: 1. The latter 

half of article 14, 

which reads ‘‘In the 

territory of any other 

Contracting State, he 

shall be accorded the 

same protection as is 

accorded in that territory to nationals of the 

country in which he 

has his habitual residence.’’ 2. Article 16(3). 

237 

Convention or 

Protocol Ratification Status 

Declarations and 

Reservations 

(Excerpts) 

Protocol relating to 

the Status of Refugees 

Acceded to September 

24, 1982. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Macau. 

With a reservation in 

respect of article 4. 

Convention on the 

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 

of Genocide 

Ratified April 18, 

1983. 

The Convention with 

the reservation made 

by China also applies 

to Hong Kong and 

Macau. 

The People’s Republic 

of China does not consider itself bound by 

article IX of the said 

Convention. 

United Nations Convention against 

Transnational Organized Crime 

Ratified September 

23, 2003. 

The Convention also 

applies to Hong Kong 

and Macau. 

The People’s Republic 

of China makes a reservation with regard to 

Article 35, paragraph 

2 of the Convention 

and is not bound by 

the provisions of Article 35, paragraph 2. 

Protocol to Prevent, 

Suppress and Punish 

Trafficking in Persons, Especially 

Women and Children, 

supplementing the 

UN Convention 

against Transnational 

Organized Crime. 

Acceded to February 

8, 2010. 

The Protocol also applies to Macau. The 

Protocol shall not 

apply to Hong Kong 

unless otherwise notified by the Chinese 

government. 

The People’s Republic 

of China shall not be 

bound by paragraph 2 

of Article 15 of the 

Protocol. 

Protocol against the 

Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 

and Air, 

supplementing the 

UN Convention 

against Transnational 

Organized Crime 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

International Convention on the Protection 

of the Rights of All 

Migrant Workers and 

Members of Their 

Families 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

238 

Convention or 

Protocol Ratification Status 

Declarations and 

Reservations 

(Excerpts) 

Convention on the 

Rights of Persons 

With Disabilities 

Ratified August 1, 

2008. 

The Convention also 

applies to Hong Kong 

and Macau. 

Optional Protocol to 

the Convention on the 

Rights of Persons 

With Disabilities 

Neither signed nor 

ratified. 

RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS 6

Forced Labor Freedom of 

Association 

Discrimination Child Labor 

C. 29 C. 

105 C. 87 C. 98 C. 100 C. 111 C. 138 C. 182 

Not 

ratified. 

Not 

ratified. 

Not 

ratified. 

Not 

ratified. 

Ratified 

November 

2, 

1990. 

Ratified 

January 12, 

2006. 

Ratified 

April 

28, 

1999. 

Ratified 

August 

8, 

2002. 

239 

VII. Endnotes 

†Voted to adopt: Senators Dorgan, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Brown, Corker, Barrasso, and 

LeMieux; and Representatives Levin, Kaptur, Honda, Walz, Wu, Smith, Manzullo, Royce, and 

Pitts. 

Not voting: Senator Brownback. 

Notes to Section I—Political Prisoner Database 

1The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of 

religion, freedom of association and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful 

social or political change and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list 

is illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners listed in the Political Prisoner Database 

were detained or imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s 

Constitution and law, by international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial 

officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt 

to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. 

If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and 

defense, as China’s Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the 

counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and 

not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a defense. 

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Expression 

1See, e.g., PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 

97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 

05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 105; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News 

Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued and effective 25 

September 05, art. 19(6); PRC Measures for Overseeing the Import and Export of Printed Materials and Audio-Visual Materials Through Customs [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo haiguan 

jinchu jing yinshuapin ji yinxiang zhipin jianguan banfa], issued 18 April 07, effective 1 June 

07, art. 4(4). 2 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 48. 

3Michael Wines, ‘‘Dissident Chinese Writer Appeals Sentence,’’ New York Times (Online), 4 

January 10; Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearing of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 August 10, Written Statement Submitted 

by Joshua Rosenzweig, Senior Manager, Research and Hong Kong Operations, The Dui Hua 

Foundation. 4 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 47–48. 

5 Ng Tze-wei, ‘‘ ‘End Hukou System’ Call Earns Rebuke,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 

6 March 10; For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From 

Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 

Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1–2. 6 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 

01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15. 7Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu 

guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing 

hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 8 February 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 

5. 8Measures for Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli banfa], 

issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16. 9PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 35. Article 41 also provides the right to criticize officials free from retaliation. PRC Constitution, art. 41. 10For example, the State Council Information Office released a white paper on the Internet 

in June 2010 which stated that the government ‘‘guarantees the citizens’ freedom of speech on 

the Internet.’’ State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State of the Internet in 

China [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10. 11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) 

of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 

of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 14th Sess., Report of the Special 

Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 

A/HRC/14/23, 20 April 10, para. 74. China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese government 

has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it is taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ‘‘The EU welcomed China’s commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.’’ Joint Statement of 

the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, ‘‘At present, legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are 

under way in China with a view to aligning our domestic legislation with the provisions of the 

[ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.’’ Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic 

of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent 

240 

Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of 

the General Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. In its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese government stated that the ICCPR was one of the ‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the 

plan was framed, and that the government ‘‘will continue legislative, judicial and administrative 

reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for 

approval of the ICCPR.’’ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan 

of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, 

during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s 

human rights record, the Chinese government supported recommendations made by Member 

States that China ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of amending 

domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through 

labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 

paras. 63, 114(1). 12 In October 2009, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution that identified a number of restrictions that are inconsistent with the freedom of expression provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (i.e., Article 19), including restrictions on 

‘‘[d]iscussion of government policies and political debate,’’ ‘‘reporting on human rights,’’ and ‘‘expression of opinion and dissent.’’ UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the 

Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 

12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i). 13See, e.g., Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 14 International experts on freedom of expression have declared licensing schemes for print 

media unnecessary and subject to abuse and have found press accreditation appropriate only 

where necessary to provide access to certain places and events. UN Press Release, UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American 

States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, ‘‘International Experts Condemn Curbs on 

Freedom of Expression and Control Over Media and Journalists,’’ 18 December 03. 15Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 16 Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ‘‘Falling Short: Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled 

as China Falters on Press Freedom,’’ 2008, 36. 17PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 105. 18See, e.g., a Beijing court’s December 2009 decision in the Liu Xiaobo case in which the court 

provided no evidence that Liu advocated violence in his works. Human Rights in China (Online), 

‘‘Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict,’’ 30 December 09. 

For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From Outset,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2. 19 ‘‘Lawyer Shang Baojun Speaks About Liu Xiaobo’s Appeal’’ [Shang baojun lushi tan liu 

xiaobo shangshu], Radio France Internationale (Online), 5 January 10; Maggie Chen, ‘‘Freedom 

of Speech Defence Bound To Fail,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 7 June 10. 20Maggie Chen, ‘‘Freedom of Speech Defence Bound To Fail,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 7 June 10. 21Michael Wines, ‘‘Dissident Chinese Writer Appeals Sentence,’’ New York Times (Online), 4 

January 10; Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearing of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 August 10, Written Statement Submitted 

by Joshua Rosenzweig, Senior Manager, Research and Hong Kong Operations, The Dui Hua 

Foundation. 22 ‘‘Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court Criminal Judgment,’’ Canyu (Online), 9 February 10. 

For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Chengdu Court Sentences Tan Zuoren to Five Years and Upholds 

Huang Qi’s Sentence,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 

10, 1. 23 Ibid. 24 Bao Daozu, ‘‘Activist on Trial for Subversion,’’ China Daily (Online), 13 August 09. 25 ‘‘Suqian Intermediate People’s Court of Jiangsu Province Criminal Verdict [in case of Guo 

Quan],’’ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), 16 October 09. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Jiangsu Court 

Affirms 10-Year Sentence of Guo Quan for Organizing Political Party Online,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2. 26 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on 

Liu Xiaobo Verdict—Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court Criminal Verdict,’’ 30 

December 09. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Beijing High People’s Court Affirms Liu Xiaobo’s 11-Year 

Sentence,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3. 27 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on 

Liu Xiaobo Verdict—Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court Criminal Verdict,’’ 30 

December 09. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Beijing Court Sentences Liu Xiaobo to 11 Years,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 1. 28For a complete English translation of each of these essays, see Human Rights in China, 

‘‘Freedom of Expression on Trial in China,’’ China Rights Forum No. 1, 2010, 17–67. For a 

CECC analysis and summary of the essays, see ‘‘Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take 

Place December 23,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 

10, 1. 29 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on 

Liu Xiaobo Verdict—Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court Criminal Verdict,’’ 30 

December 09. 

241 

30 ‘‘China Extends Detention of Leading Dissident,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 9 June 09. 31 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Liu Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison,’’ 

25 December 09. 32 ‘‘Final Decision on Liu Xiaobo’s Appeal of Inciting Subversion Case’’ [Liu xiaobo shexian 

shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan shangshu yi an zhongshen caiding shu], Boxun (Online), 9 

February 10. 33 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Shanghai Petitioner To Serve 18 Months of ReeducationThrough-Labor After Shouting Slogans,’’ 9 March 10. 34See, e.g., Alexa Olesen, ‘‘China Sentences Uighur Writer to 15 Years in Jail,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 23 July 10; ‘‘Uyghur Journalist Gets 15 Years,’’ 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 July 10. For information on the charge against him, see ‘‘Many 

Scholars Make Appeal: Release Xinjiang Reporter, Respect Freedom of Speech’’ [Zhong xuezhe 

huyu: shifang xinjiang jizhe zunzhong yanlun ziyou], Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 30 July 10. 35 James T. Areddy, ‘‘Geologist Sought Oil-Industry Data,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 6 

July 10. 36 Ibid. 37Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ‘‘China Sentences American Geologist on State Secrets 

Charge,’’ 4 July 10; Charles Hutzler, ‘‘Xue Feng, American Geologist, Held and Mistreated by 

China,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post (Online), 19 November 09. 38 Jerome A. Cohen, ‘‘Justice Denied,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 21 July 10. 39 ‘‘Quake Critic Arrested,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 June 10. 40 Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘A ‘Raging Storm’: The Crackdown on Tibetan Writers and Artists After Tibet’s Spring 2008 Protests,’’ 18 May 10. 41 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Three Fujian Digital Activists Convicted as 

Thousands Gather in Landmark Protest,’’ 16 April 10; ‘‘Criminal Judgment [of Fujian Province 

Fuzhou City Mawei District People’s Court]’’ [Xingshi panjue shu], reprinted in Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders (Online), 16 April 10, 25–26. 42 ‘‘Criminal Judgment [of Fujian Province Fuzhou City Mawei District People’s Court]’’ 

[Xingshi panjue shu], reprinted in Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 16 April 10, 25– 

26. 43 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Fujian Lawyer Lin Hongnan and 

His Law Firm Punished—Retaliation for Taking Up the ‘Three Fuzhou Netizens’ Case’’ [Fujian 

lin hongnan lushi yu lushi shiwusuo jieban ‘‘san wangmin’’ an zao baofu], 3 May 10. 44 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 50. 45Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘School Construction Critic Gets Prison Term in China,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 23 November 09. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Authorities Sentence Rights Activist 

Huang Qi to Three Years in Prison,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 

1, 8 January 10, 2. 46Keith Richburg, ‘‘China Sentences Quake Activist to 3 Years in Prison,’’ Washington Post 

(Online), 23 November 09. 47State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(5). 48 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information [Zhonghua 

renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, effective 1 May 08, arts. 9, 

13. 49 Article 8 of the previous state secrets law defines state secrets as, among other things, secrets relating to ‘‘major policy decisions on state affairs’’ (clause 1), ‘‘national economic and social 

development’’ (clause 4), ‘‘science and technology’’ (clause 5), as well as ‘‘other matters that are 

classified as state secrets by the state secret-guarding department’’ (clause 7). PRC Law on 

Guarding State Secrets, issued 5 September 88, effective 1 May 89, art. 8. Minzu University 

Professor Xiong Wenzhao has said that, under clause 7 of Article 8, ‘‘all information can be 

brought within the scope of a secret to be guarded.’’ ‘‘Guarding State Secrets Law Implemented 

for 20 Years, Scholars Suggest the Procedures for Determining a Secret Be Made Clear’’ 

[Baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi 20 nian, xuezhe jianyi mingxi dingmi chengxu], China Ningbo 

Net (Online), 20 April 09. A June 2009 China Daily editorial said: ‘‘In theory, government institutions, should they choose to do so, have the authority to label everything as State secrets.’’ 

‘‘Redefine State Secrets,’’ China Daily (Online), 23 June 09. See also, Dui Hua Human Rights 

Journal (Online), ‘‘Lawyer’s Request for RTL Information Disclosure Rebuffed by Chinese Ministry of Justice,’’ 18 June 09. 50 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 66. 51PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 10, effective 1 October 10. For 

CECC analysis, see ‘‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2. 52PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 10, effective 1 October 10, art. 

9. 53 Ibid., arts. 15, 19. 54See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 81. 55State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State of the Internet in China 

[Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10. 56 China Internet Network Information Center (Online), ‘‘26th Statistical Report on Internet 

Development in China’’ [Di 26 ci zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha tongji 

baogao], 15 July 10, 10. 57State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State of the Internet in China 

[Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10. 58 Ibid. 59 Ariana Lindquist, ‘‘In China, Labor Movement Enabled by Technology,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 17 June 10. 

242 

60Wang Chen, ‘‘Regarding Our Nation’s Internet Development and Supervision’’ [Guanyu wo 

guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National People’s Congress (Online), 29 April 10. 61 Ibid. 62 Cao Minjie, ‘‘Four Major Microblog Sites ‘Fall Back’ to Testing Mode’’ [Si da menhu weibo 

‘‘tuihua’’ cheng ceshi ban], Oriental Morning Post (Online), 15 July 10; Jonathan Ansfield, 

‘‘China Tests New Controls on Twitter-Style Services,’’ New York Times (Online), 16 July 10; 

Cara Anna, ‘‘Dozens of Outspoken, Popular Blogs Shut in China,’’ Associated Press, reprinted 

in Washington Post (Online), 15 July 10; Priscilla Jiao, ‘‘Bloggers Attract Censors’ Sights as 

Internet Crackdown Continues,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 17 July 10. For CECC 

analysis, see ‘‘Government Appears To Crack Down on Microblogs and Blogs,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 7, 19 August 10, 4. 63 Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China Starts New Bureau To Curb Web,’’ New York Times (Online), 

16 April 10. 64Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China’s Censors Tackle and 

Trip Over the Internet,’’ New York Times (Online), 7 April 10. 65Wang Chen, ‘‘Regarding Our Nation’s Internet Development and Supervision’’ [Guanyu wo 

guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National People’s Congress (Online), 29 April 10. 66Meng Jianzhu, ‘‘Endeavor To Strengthen the Construction of the Five Capabilities, Comprehensively Raise the Standard for Safeguarding Stability’’ [Zhuoli qianghua wu ge nengli 

jianshe quanmian tisheng weihu wending shuiping], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 December 09. 

For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Top Chinese Security Officials Urge Continued Crackdown in 2010,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3. 67See, e.g., ‘‘China Purges Porn Works on Internet,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 27 October 09. 68 Barbara Demick, ‘‘China Has Many ‘Dirty Words,’ ’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 21 April 

10; Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, ‘‘China’s Censors Thrive in Obscurity,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 31 March 10. 69Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 70OpenNet Initiative (Online), ‘‘Internet Filtering in China,’’ 15 June 09, 17. 71 ‘‘ ‘Nanfang Chuang’ Web Site Suddenly Suspends Operations’’ [‘‘Nanfang chuang’’ wangzhan 

turan tingzhi yunzuo], Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 October 09. 72 ‘‘Chinese Censors Block Obama’s Call To Free the Web,’’ Associated Press (Online), 16 November 09. 73Michael Bristow, ‘‘Chinese Paper Prints ‘Tiananmen Cartoon,’ ’’ BBC (Online) 3 June 10. 74 ‘‘China Blocks ‘Berlin Wall’ Twitter Page: Organisers,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 29 

October 09. 75 ‘‘China’s Instructions on Reporting on Google,’’ Washington Post (Online), 25 March 10. 76Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China’s Censors Tackle and 

Trip Over the Internet,’’ New York Times (Online), 7 April 10. 77 ‘‘Xinjiang Online, Controls Remain,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 May 10. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Internet Available in Xinjiang, But Controls Over Information Remain,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 7, 19 August 10, 4. 78OpenNet Initiative (Online), ‘‘Internet Filtering in China,’’ 15 June 09, 5; Michael Wines, 

Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,’’ New York Times (Online), 7 April 10. 79Farah Master, ‘‘China’s Web ‘Firewall’ Should Be WTO Issue: EU’s Kroes,’’ Reuters (Online), 17 May 10. 80Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China’s Censors Tackle and 

Trip Over the Internet,’’ New York Times (Online), 7 April 10. 81Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu 

guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 15. 82Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 83Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang 

xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 19– 

21. 84Li Xinzhu and Cui Xiaohuo, ‘‘Text Message Service Cut Off for ‘Bad’ Words,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 19 January 10. 85 Regulations on the Supervision of Television Drama Content [Dianshi ju neirong guanli 

guiding], issued 19 May 10, effective 1 July 10, art. 5. Article 5 provides for the common litany 

of prohibited content found in other media regulations, including content that ‘‘harms national 

unity,’’ ‘‘harms the honor or interests of the nation,’’ and ‘‘disrupts national policies on religion,’’ 

among other things. 86Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 10, effective 1 October 10. For 

CECC analysis, see ‘‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2. 91PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 10, effective 1 October 10, art. 

9. 92 Ibid., art. 28. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee 

Issues Revised State Secrets Law,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 

5, 4 June 10, 2. 93 Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China Passes Tighter Information Law,’’ New York Times (Online), 29 

April 10. 94PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 10, effective 1 October 10, art. 

50. 

243 

95PRC Tort Liability Law, enacted 26 December 09, effective 1 July 10. 96Wang Jun, ‘‘What Are the Implications of the ‘Special Internet Provision’/ ’’ [‘‘Hulianwang 

zhuantiao’’ yiweizhe shenme?], Internet Communication Magazine, reprinted in People’s Daily 

(Online), 2 April 10. 97 Ibid. 98David Drummond, ‘‘A New Approach to China,’’ Google Blog (Online), 12 January 10. 99Google and Internet Control in China: A Nexus Between Human Rights and Trade? Hearing 

of Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24 March 10, Testimony of Alan Davidson, 

Director of U.S. Public Policy, Americas, Google, Inc. 100Laura Farrar, ‘‘Google-China Move Hurts Businesses, Academics,’’ CNN (Online), 23 March 

10; John Pomfret, ‘‘For Chinese People, Loss of Google Would Mean ‘Nothing But Darkness,’ ’’ 

Washington Post (Online), 19 March 10. 101 Jane Qiu, ‘‘A Land Without Google/ ’’ Nature (Online), 24 February 10. 102David Drummond, ‘‘A New Approach to China: an Update,’’ Google Blog (Online), 22 March 

10; David Drummond, ‘‘An Update on China,’’ Google Blog (Online), 28 June 10. 103Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu 

guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 4 ; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing 

hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 

5; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen 

xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 5, 11, 12; 

Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services 

[Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January 

08, art. 7. 104 China Internet Network Information Center (Online), ‘‘Announcement on Further 

Strengthening the Examination of Domain Name Registration Information’’ [Guanyu jinyibu 

jiaqiang yuming zhuce xinxi shenhe gongzuo de gonggao], 11 December 09. 105 Xu Shenglan, ‘‘All .cn Websites Require Business License,’’ Global Times (Online), 14 December 09; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘China’s Domain-Name Limits: Web Censorship/ ’’ Time (Online), 18 

December 09. 106Owen Fletcher, ‘‘China Further Tightens Rules for Domain Name Owners,’’ IDG News 

Service, reprinted in PCWorld (Online), 23 February 10; Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and 

Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘China’s Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,’’ New York Times (Online), 7 April 10. 107 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 60. 108Wang Chen, ‘‘Regarding Our Nation’s Internet Development and Supervision’’ [Guanyu wo 

guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National People’s Congress (Online), 29 April 10; ‘‘State 

Council Information Office for First Time Confirms Promotion of Real Name Online System’’ 

[Guoxinban shouci queren tuidong wangluo shimingzhi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 

4 May 10. 109Stephen Chen, ‘‘Innocent Websites Suffer in Beijing’s Anti-Porn Push,’’ South Chinese 

Morning Post (Online), 12 February 10; ‘‘Cleaning up Online Environment in Accordance With 

Law Has Clear Impact’’ [Yifa zhengzhi wangluo huanjing qude mingxian chengxiao], Xinhua 

(Online), 10 February 10. 110Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 111Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang 

xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 

8. 112Zhang Lei, ‘‘Publish and Be Deleted,’’ Global Times (Online), 25 February 10. 113 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 61; Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding], 

issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January 08, art. 8. 114 ‘‘SARFT Intensely Checks Permits for Online Audio and Video, Three Major BT Web Sites 

Eliminated From Match’’ [Guangdian zongju yancha hulianwang shiting xuke sanda BT 

wangzhan xishu luoma], China Business News, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 7 December 

09. 115Stephen Chen, ‘‘Online Communities Shut Down for Hosting Porn, ‘Sensitive’ Content,’’ 

South China Morning Post (Online), 8 December 09. 116 Circular on Related Questions on Administration of Audio/Visual Program Transmission 

Licenses [Shiting jiemu fuwu xukezheng guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 15 September 

09. 117 In late December 2009, Xinjiang officials began to allow limited browsing on two Web sites, 

those for the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper People’s Daily and the site for the central 

government’s news agency, Xinhua. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Government 

News Office, Announcement Concerning Progressive Opening of Related Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang xiangguan tongxin yewu de gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in 

Xinhua Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 December 09. In January 2010, officials restored domestic 

text messaging services, but limited messages to 20 per day. Cui Jia, ‘‘SMS Returns to 

Xinjiang,’’ China Daily (Online), 18 January 10. That same month, officials also lifted the ban 

on international phone calls. ‘‘China Lifts Ban on International Calls in Xinjiang,’’ Agence 

France-Presse, 20 January 10 (Open Source Center, 20 January 10). 118 Xinjiang News Office, ‘‘Xinjiang Internet Services Completely Resumed on the 14th’’ 

[Xinjiang hulianwang yewu 14 ri quanmian huifu], reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 14 May 10. 119 ‘‘Police Have Evidence of World Uyghur Congress Masterminding Xinjiang Riot,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 6 July 09. 120 ‘‘Official: Internet Cut in Xinjiang To Prevent Riot From Spreading,’’ Xinhua (Online), 7 

July 09. 

244 

121The events of July 5, 2009, began as a protest against authorities’ handling of a reported 

attack on Uyghur factory workers by Han factory workers in Guangdong province and against 

the government’s general policies toward Uyghurs. Organizers reportedly used the Internet to 

mobilize support for a peaceful demonstration. Clashes with police followed, as did attacks between Uyghurs and Han Chinese that left 197 dead and 1,700 injured, according to official reports. Chinese officials claimed that Rebiya Kadeer, an exiled Uyghur living in the United 

States, had orchestrated the violence through a phone call to China, a charge she denied. During 

the July 2009 events, Chinese officials conflated peaceful attempts to demonstrate with criminal 

and violent activity. See, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 249; ‘‘Urumqi Tense, 

Quiet After Violence,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 July 09; ‘‘More Web Sites Back Online in 

Xinjiang,’’ China Daily (Online), 8 February 10. For a CECC analysis of July 5 and its aftermath, see ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2. 122 Reporters without Borders (Online), ‘‘Survey of Blocked Uyghur Websites Shows Xinjiang 

Still Cut Off From the World,’’ 29 October 09. 123Li Changchun, ‘‘Speech at the 10th Journalists’ Day and Awards Presentation Public Lecture’’ [Zai dishijie zhongguo jizhe jie ji banjiang baogao hui shang de jianghua], People’s Daily 

(Online), 8 November 09. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Top Official Emphasizes Party’s Dominance 

Over Media on Journalists’ Day,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 

9 December 09, 4. 124 ‘‘Li Changchun: Solidly Perform Propaganda Reporting Work for the Yushu Earthquake 

Disaster Relief’’ [Li Changchun: zhashi zuohao yushu kangzhen jiuzai xuanchuan baodao 

gongzuo], Xinhua (Online), 18 April 10. 125 Chi-Chi Zhang, ‘‘China Launches Global 24-Hour English TV News,’’ Associated Press (Online), 1 July 10. 126 Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ‘‘Falling Short: Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled 

as China Falters on Press Freedom,’’ 2008, 23–25. 127 ‘‘Summary: PRC Propaganda Restricts Media Coverage of Obama’s Interview With 

Nanfang Zhoumo,’’ Open Source Center, 20 November 09. 128 ‘‘Next Up on CCTV, Yet More Propaganda,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 7 January 

10. 129 ‘‘China’s Instructions on Reporting on Google,’’ Washington Post (Online), 25 March 10. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132Fiona Tam and Choi Chi-yuk, ‘‘Media Told To Cut Rescue Coverage,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 10 April 10. 133 Reporters without Borders (Online), ‘‘Propaganda Department Sets Rule for Covering 

Shanghai Expo and Qinghai Earthquake,’’ 29 April 10. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Communist 

Party Controls Media Coverage of Yushu Earthquake,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3. 134 Reporters without Borders (Online), ‘‘What You Cannot Read in the Chinese Press,’’ 4 May 

10. 135 ‘‘Liu Binjie: Focal Point for GAPP This Year Is Striking Against Fake Journalists’’ [Liu 

binjie: xinwen chuban zongshu jinnian zhongdian daji jia jizhe], Jinghua Times (Online), 4 

March 09; Circular Regarding 2009 Exchange and Issuance of Press Cards [Guanyu 2009 nian 

huanfa xinwen jizhe zheng de tongzhi], issued 3 February 09, preamble. 136 Raymond Li, ‘‘Journalists Must Face New Exam,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 11 

March 10. For CECC analysis, see ‘‘Chinese Government To Introduce Qualification Exam for 

Journalists in 2010,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 

2. 137 China News Workers’ Code of Professional Ethics [Zhongguo xinwen gongzuozhe zhiye 

daode zhunze], amended 9 November 09, preamble, arts. 1, 6. 138 ‘‘News Reporter Card Exchange To End Soon, Commercial Web Sites Have No Right To 

Report News—General Administration of Press and Publication News Publication Department 

Responsible Person Answers Journalists’ Questions’’ [Xinwen jizhe zheng huanfa jijiang jieshu 

shangye wangzhan meiyou xinwen caifangquan—xinwen chuban zongshu xinwen baokan si fuze 

ren da jizhe wen], People’s Daily (Online), 22 February 10. 139 Ibid. 140Gady Epstein, ‘‘Dark Journalism,’’ Forbes (Online), 21 July 08. 141Will Clem, ‘‘4 Dailies ‘Severely Punished for Lying,’ ’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 

26 November 09. 142 Xu Kai, ‘‘ ‘Business Watch’ Ordered To Halt Publication for One Month Because of Story 

on China State Grid Corp.’’ [‘‘Shangwu zhoukan’’ yin guojia dianwang gongsi baodao beize 

tingkan yi yue], Caijing (Online), 8 May 10. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145Sky Canaves, ‘‘Editorial Writer Punished in China,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 10 

March 10. 146 John Garnaut, ‘‘Beijing Sacks Editor for Expose,’’ Age (Online), 13 May 10; ‘‘Making Themselves Heard,’’ Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 15 May 10. 147 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 

waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17 October 08, art. 17; 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Foreign Ministry News Department Head Liu Jianchao 

Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press Conference on State Council’s Promulgation of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices 

of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists’’ [Waijiaobu xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao 

245 

jiu guowuyuan banbu shishi ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he 

waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli’’ juxing zhongwai jizhe hui], 17 October 08. 148 ‘‘Hu Jintao’s Address at the Opening Ceremony of the World Media Summit’’ [Hu jintao 

zai shijie meiti fenghui kaimushi shang de zhici], Xinhua (Online), 9 October 09. 149Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (Online), ‘‘Kashgar Police Follow, Harass Journalists,’’ 27 November 09. 150Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (Online), ‘‘Chengdu Police Rough Up Reporters Covering Trial,’’ 11 February 10. 151 Ibid. 152Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (Online), ‘‘Beijing Police Question, Threaten News 

Assistant (Update May 26),’’ 26 May 10. 153 Ibid. 154 ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Prohibit the Public From Interviewing With Foreign Media Without 

Authorization’’ [Xinjiang dangju jinzhi minzhong shanzi jieshou waimei caifang], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 15 June 10. 155Provisions on the Administration of Newspaper Publishing [Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], 

issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, 2; Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 

05, 2; Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 11. 156 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 26. 157 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China’s ‘Sweep Pornography Strike Illegal 

Publications’ Focuses on Shutting Off 38 Kinds of Political Publications?!’’ [Zhongguo ‘‘dahuang 

saofei’’ jiushi zhongdian fengdu 38 zhong zhengzhixing chubanwu?!], 1 March 10. CECC staff 

attempted to access the link to the original article on the Jilin Municipal Government Web site 

on May 17, 2010, and was able to access a search result of the article using Google but not 

the link to the full article itself. 158Michael Wines, ‘‘China Seeks To Halt Book That Faults Its Prime Minister,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 6 July 10. 159Wang Kunning et al., ‘‘News Publication System All Out Support for Earthquake Relief’’ 

[Xinwen chuban xitong quanli zhiyuan kangzhen jiuzai], China News Publication Net (Online), 

20 April 10. 160 Xi Fengyu, ‘‘Ministry of Culture Official: Protecting Intellectual Property and Nation’s Cultural Safety Are Major Focus’’ [Wenhuabu guanyuan: baohu zhishi chanquan weihu guojia 

wenhua anquan cheng zhongdian], Legal Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 26 March 

10. 161 ‘‘Copying Services in Lhasa Tightened,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 May 10. 

Notes to Section II—Worker Rights 

1 ‘‘Migrant Workers’ Children Face Barriers to Education, Activists Call for Fair Treatment,’’ 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 8 March 10. 2PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law enacted 29 December 07, effective 1 May 

08, art. 43. 3 Ibid., art. 43. 

4 Ibid., art. 43. 

5 ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the Number of Local Labor Dispute Cases in 2010’’ [Quanzong: 2010 nian difang laodong zhengyi anjian shuliang shangsheng 

qushi], People’s Daily (Online), 2 September 10. 6 Yang Lin, ‘‘Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labor Relations, Eliminate Potential Problems, and Reformulate Policy’’ [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun 

yinhuan, tiaozheng laogong zhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09. 7See, e.g., Jiangsu Province Human Resources and Social Security Office, Opinion Relating 

To Establishing the ‘‘Five in One’’ Mediation System for Labor Disputes [Guanyu jianli laodong 

zhengyi ‘‘wu wei yiti’’ tiaojie jizhi de yijian], issued 27 November 09; Chongqing Municipality 

People’s Government, Chongqing Municipality Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Measures [Chongqing shi laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai banfa], issued 19 July 10, effective 1 September 10; Yuhang District Government (Online), ‘‘Analysis of Our District’s Resolution of Labor 

Disputes in the First Quarter of 2009’’ [Woqu 2009 nian yijidu laodong zhengyi chuli qingkuang 

fenxi], 2 April 09; Taizhou City Government (Online), ‘‘Analysis of Labor Disputes in the First 

Quarter of 2009’’ [2009 nian yiji laodong zhengyi anjian qingkuang fenxi], 28 April 09; ‘‘Employers Lose Over 90 Percent of Labor Disputes’’ [Laodong zhengyi anjian yongren danwei baisu 

yuanhe 90% yishang], Eastern Legal Eye (Online), 14 May 09; Beijing Municipal Labor and Social Security Bureau (Online), ‘‘According to Law, Justly and Efficiently Resolve Labor Disputes, 

Promote the Scientific Development of the City’s Arbitration Profession—Commemorating the 

First Anniversary of the Implementation of the ‘PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration 

Law’ ’’ [Yifa gongzheng gaoxiao chuli laodong zhengyi, tuijin benshi zhongcai shiye kexue fazhan, 

jinian ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai fa’’ shishi yi zhounian], 15 

May 09; Shanghai Bureau of Justice (Online), ‘‘Xuhui District Establishes People’s Mediation 

Committees for Labor Disputes’’ [Xuhuiqu chengli laodong zhengyi renmin tiaojie weiyuanhui], 

11 November 08; Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Labor and Social Security, 2009 Opinion on the 

Resolution of Labor Disputes [2009 nian laodongzhengyi chuli gongzuo yijian], issued 13 March 

09. 8Fujian Provincial Bureau of Labor and Social Security, 2009 Main Points of Labor Dispute 

Mediation and Arbitration [2009 nian laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai gongzuo yaodian], issued 

6 February 09. 

246 

9 Ningbo Municipal Labor and Social Security Bureau (Online), ‘‘Jiangbei District’s January– 

May Labor Disputes Exhibit Five Characteristics’’ [1–5 yue jiangbeiqu laodong zhengyi anjian 

chengxian wu tedian], 1 June 09. 10Wang Jingqiong, ‘‘Courts Struggling To Handle Labor Disputes,’’ China Daily (Online), 15 

September 10; ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the Number of Local 

Labor Dispute Cases in 2010’’ [Quanzhong: 2010 nian difang laodong zhengyi anjian shuliang 

cheng shangsheng qushi], People’s Daily (Online), 2 September 10; Edward Wong, ‘‘Global Crisis 

Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in Chinese Courts,’’ New York Times (Online), 15 September 

10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘China’s Labour Dispute Court Cases Increased by Over 

Ten Percent in 2009,’’ 22 March 10; Yang Lin, ‘‘Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labour 

Relations, Eliminate Potential Problems, and Reformulate Policy’’ [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi 

laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, tiaozheng laogong zhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09. 11 ‘‘Dongguan Workers Collectively Strike, Force Factory To Make Up Back Pay’’ [Dongguan 

gongren jiti bagong poshi chang fang bu hai qian xin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 October 09; 

Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Guangzhou Again Detains Worker, Detainee Dies 

in Detention Center Again, Family Members Suspect Deaths Due to Beatings’’ [Guangzhou 

zaiya renyuan zai bao kanshousuo siwang shi jian, qinshu yi zao ouda zhisi], 19 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Xi’an Police Brutally Beat and Detain Worker Petitioner’’ [Xi’an jingcha yeman ouda zhua bu shangfang gongren], 19 March 10; Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chongqing Migrant Worker Severely Beaten While Discussing 

Wages’’ [Nongmin gong tao gongzi bei da zhi shengming chuiwei], 12 February 10; ‘‘Shanxi 

Workers Petition Provincial Government En Masse’’ [Shanxi tongchuan gongchang zhigong dao 

sheng zhengfu shangfang weiquan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 April 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Will the New Year See a Resumption of Collective Bargaining in China? ’’ 5 January 10. 12 ‘‘Enterprises That Refuse To Negotiate Can Be Fined 20,000 RMB’’ [Zhigong yu zhang xin 

qiye bu tanpan huo jiang fa 2 wan yuan], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 18 March 10. 13PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 3, 

29, 30. 14Timothy J. Webster, ‘‘Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 

Lecturer and Other Affiliate Scholarship Series, Paper 1, 2010, 66. 15 Ibid. Plaintiffs who prevailed in employment discrimination cases during this reporting year 

included: Chen Ling in Shenzhen, whose verdict was issued on March 5, 2010; and Wang Li 

in Tianhe, Guangzhou, whose verdict was issued on March 11, 2010. For a more detailed summary of cases, see Appendix on page 66 of ‘‘Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in China.’’ 16PRC Labor Contract Law, enacted 29 June 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 14. 17 Jiangsu Province High Court and Jiangsu Provincial Labour Dispute Arbitration Commission, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Employment Disputes [Guanyu shenli laodong zhengyi 

anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 14 December 09, art. 9. 18Shanghai Municipality High People’s Court, Opinion on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Labour Contract Law [Shiyong laodong hetong fa ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 

3 March 09, art. 4. 19Shai Oster, ‘‘China Faces Unrest as Economy Falters,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 22 December 08; ‘‘Wenzhou Taxi Drivers Pay Tens of Thousands per Month, City Government Proposes Six Points of Action’’ [Wenzhou chuzuche siji yue bei choucheng shangwan shi zhengfu 

ti liudian fangan], Daily Economic News, reprinted in Fenghuang Wang (Online), 30 July 09. 20Stanley Lubman, ‘‘Are Strikes the Beginning of a New Challenge? ’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 25 June 10; CECC Staff Interview. 21 Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch (Online), ‘‘Hundreds of Cotton Workers Striking in 

Suizhou, Hubei, for the Second Day’’ [Hubei suizhou shu bai mianfang gongren du lu kangyi 

jinru di ertian], 6 June 10; ‘‘More Than 900 Workers From a Japanese Plant in Xi’an Strike 

in Demand of Higher Wages’’ [Xi’an ri zi chang 900 duo ming gongren bagong yaoqiu jia xin], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 June 10; Keith Bradsher and David Barboza, ‘‘Strike in China 

Highlights Gap in Workers’ Pay,’’ New York Times (Online), 28 May 10; China Labour Bulletin 

(Online), ‘‘Police Reportedly Detain Striking Workers at Henan Cotton Mill,’’ 4 June 10; China 

Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Two Days, Two Strikes in the Pearl River Delta,’’ 8 June 10; Norihiko 

Shirouzu, ‘‘Honda Hit by Second Strike in Southern China,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 8 

June 10; ‘‘Series of Strikes at Toyota Plants Highlight Chinese Government’s Difficult Position’’ 

[Bentian xilie bagong shijian tuxian zhongguo zhengfu liangnan jumian], Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 14 June 10; ‘‘Recent Worker Actions in China,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3. See also Keith Bradsher and David Barboza, ‘‘Strike in 

China Highlights Gap in Workers’ Pay,’’ New York Times, 28 May 10. 22 Chris Buckley et al., ‘‘Q+A—What Does China’s Labour Unrest Mean for Foreign Companies? ’’ Reuters (Online), 1 July 10. 23Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, ‘‘Labor Movement’s Demand for the Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country’s Trajectory’’ [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli 

gonghui gaibian guoyun guiji], Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; Anita Chan, ‘‘Labor Unrest and 

Role of Unions,’’ China Daily, 23 June 10; Bill Schiller, ‘‘Labour Strife Rolls Across China,’’ Toronto Star (Online), 8 June 10; Han Dongfang, ‘‘China’s Workers Are Stirring,’’ International 

Herald Tribune (Online), 17 June 10. 24PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 35. 25 Bill Taylor and Qi Li, ‘‘Is the ACFTU a Union and Does It Matter? ’’ 49(5) Journal of Industrial Relations, 701, 701–715 (2007). 26PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 01; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions, adopted 26 September 03, amended 21 October 08. 

247 

27Qiu Liben, ‘‘The Silent Lambs Are No Longer Silent’’ [Chenmo de gaoyang bu zai chenmo], 

Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; Keith Bradsher, ‘‘A Labor Movement Stirs in China,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 10 June 10; Yu Jianrong, ‘‘No Social Stability Without Labor Protection,’’ China 

Media Project (Online), 15 June 10; Mingwei Liu, ‘‘Chinese Employment Relations and Trade 

Unions in Transition,’’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor 

Relations, January 2009; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Protecting Workers’ Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China’s Trade Union,’’ March 2009. 28 He Dan and Li Wenfang, ‘‘Draft Law Aims To Ease Labor Tension in Guangdong,’’ China 

Daily (Online), 6 August 10; Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Collective Contracts Sought,’’ China Daily (Online), 

9 July 10; ‘‘Unionization Campaign Against Fortune 500 Companies Intensifies,’’ China Employment Law Update, Baker & McKenzie (Online), August 2008; Mingwei Liu, ‘‘Chinese Employment Relations and Trade Unions in Transition,’’ Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, School 

of Industrial and Labor Relations, January 2009. 29 Anita Chan, ‘‘Labor Unrest and Role of Unions,’’ China Daily, 23 June 10; China Labour 

Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Protecting Workers’ Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China’s Trade Union,’’ March 2009. 30 International Trade Union Confederation (Online), ‘‘China,’’ in Asia and the Pacific, an Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2009). 31 ‘‘China’s ‘Labor Shortage’: Scholar Analyzes Labor’s Supply and Demand Deadlock’’ 

[Zhongguo ‘‘mingong huang’’ manyan xuezhe xi laodongli gongqiu jiangju], Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 February 10; ‘‘Labor Shortage Leads to Illegal Child Labor’’ [Jingti yonggong huang 

youfa feifa shiyong tonggong], Xinhua (Online), 17 July 10; ‘‘Worker Shortage Presses China’s 

Economic ‘Turbulence’ ’’ [Mingong huang poshi zhongguo jingji ‘‘bianju’’], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 10. 32 ‘‘ ‘Guangdong Province Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises’: Labor 

Union’s Opportunity and Challenge’’ [‘‘Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli’’: gonghui de 

jiyu he tiaozhan], China Economic Times, reprinted in Sannong Market (Online), 26 July 10; 

Mary E. Gallagher, ‘‘ ‘We Are Not Machines’: Teen Spirit on China’s Shopfloor,’’ China Beat (Online), 23 August 10. 33Qiu Liben, ‘‘The Silent Lambs Are No Longer Silent’’ [Chenmo de gaoyang bu zai chenmo], 

Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; ‘‘Strikes in Foreign-Funded Plants Spread to Other Provinces; 

Strikers Demand They Follow Example of Foxconn and Increase Salaries’’ [Waizi chang bagong 

chao manyan duo sheng yaoqiu fangxiao fushi kang jia xin], Ming Pao (Online), 11 June 10; 

David Barboza and Hiroko Tabuchi, ‘‘With Strikes, China’s Workers Seem To Gain Power,’’ New 

York Times (Online), 8 June 10; Andy Xie, ‘‘Dismantling Factories in a Dreamweaver Nation,’’ 

Caixin (Online), 7 June 10; ‘‘The Next China: As the Supply of Migrant Labour Dwindles, the 

Workshop of the World Is Embarking on a Migration of Its Own,’’ Economist (Online), 29 June 

10; ‘‘ ‘Guangdong Province Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises’: Labor 

Union’s Opportunity and Challenge’’ [‘‘Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli’’: gonghui de 

jiyu he tiaozhan], China Economic Times, reprinted in Sannong Market (Online), 26 July 10; 

Mary E. Gallagher, ‘‘ ‘We Are Not Machines’: Teen Spirit on China’s Shopfloor,’’ China Beat (Online), 23 August 10. 34 Anita Chan, ‘‘Labor Unrest and Role of Unions,’’ China Daily, 23 June 10. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Bill Schiller, ‘‘Labour Strife Rolls Across China: Textile Workers Toiling for Pennies Say 

They’ve Had Enough,’’ Toronto Star (Online), 8 June 10. 38 Highlighted in Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, All-China Federation of 

Trade Unions, and China Enterprise Directors Association, Guiding Opinion on How To Maintain Stable Labor Reltaions in the Current Economic Situation [Guanyu yingdui dangqian 

jingjixingshi wending laodong guanxi de zhidao yijian], issued 23 January 09, and in Jiangsu 

High People’s Court, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current 

Macroscopic Economic Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan 

shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09. 39PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, enacted 29 December 07, effective 1 

May 08, arts. 4, 5 (on negotiation and the application for mediation and arbitration), and 10 

(on organizations that provide mediation). 40 Ibid., art. 8. 41Local interpretations with explicit articles and sections addressing this include, e.g., Regulations To Promote Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 

[Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli], issued 23 September 08, effective 1 November 08, arts. 4 (on collaboration between local governments and other bodies handling labor 

relations), 13 (on negotiation between employers and workers), 34 (on the tripartite system), and 

47 (on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration), and Jiangsu High People’s Court and Labor Arbitration Committee, Opinion on Questions Regarding the Use of the ‘‘PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law’’ [Guanyu shiyong ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong zhengyi 

tiaojie zhongcai fa’’ ruogan wenti de yijian], issued and effective 10 October 08, arts. 6–10 (on 

cases and application for mediation, arbitration, and litigation). 42See, e.g., Regulations To Promote Harmonious Labor Relations in the Shenzhen Special 

Economic Zone [Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli], issued 23 September 08, 

effective 1 November 08, arts. 4, 35, 36 (on services by the labor commission and the city and 

region’s labor department), 45 (on the establishment of organizations to promote and carry out 

labor laws and regulations), 30, 34, 50, 47, 48 (on ‘‘group’’ labor disputes), 49 (on the improvement of mediation), 50 (on the involvement of the regional labor relations committee), and 54 

(on the involvement of trade unions). 43See, e.g., Jiangsu High People’s Court, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute 

Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji 

xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 

248 

3. See also ‘‘Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress,’’ China Daily (Online), 22 April 09, which 

suggests that experts encourage the use of ‘‘more out-of-court mediation’’ with ‘‘extensive participation of government departments, labor unions, residents’ or villagers’ committees as well as 

mediators.’’ Moreover, as reported in the article, Qiu Baochang, head of the Huijia Law Firm 

in Beijing was quoted as saying that ‘‘workers should not rely solely on the courts and arbitration committees. Fair labor treatment can also be achieved through negotiations between workers and enterprises.’’ 44 Jiangsu High People’s Court, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in 

the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia 

tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3(2). For 

a discussion on handling labor-related cases in people’s mediation committees, see also Aaron 

Halegua, ‘‘Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers,’’ 26(1) 

Berkeley Journal of International Law, 254, 292 (2008). 45Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 

and China Enterprise Directors Association, Guiding Opinion on How To Maintain Stable Labor 

Relations in the Current Economic Situation [Guanyu yingdui dangqian jingji xingshi wending 

laodong guanxi de zhidao yijian], issued 23 January 09, sec. 6; Jiangsu High People’s Court 

Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic 

Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi 

anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3. 46Guangdong Province People’s Congress Standing Committee (Online), ‘‘Opinions From the 

Public Openly Sought for ‘Guangdong Province’s Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management (Third Draft for Public Comment)’ ’’ [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli cao’an 

xiugai san gao zhengqiu yijian gao xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu yijian], 23 August 10. Note 

that in section 3(4) of the Jiangsu High People’s Court Guiding Opinion on the Handling of 

Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation on guidance to lower level 

courts, higher level courts are advised to supervise and guide grassroots courts in handling labor 

dispute cases, especially when there is a large number of them. Further, these courts should 

investigate or research the reasons and causes. Jiangsu High People’s Court, Guiding Opinion 

on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation 

[Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de 

zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3(4). 47 Jiangsu Province Human Resources and Social Security Office, Opinion Relating To Establishing the ‘‘Five in One’’ Mediation System for Labor Disputes [Guanyu jianli laodong zhengyi 

‘‘wu wei yiti’’ tiaojie jizhi de yijian], issued 27 November 09, arts. 6–7. 48 Chongqing Municipality People’s Government, Chongqing Municipality Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Measures [Chongqing shi laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai banfa], issued 

19 July 10, effective 1 September 10, arts. 2, 3, 6, 7. 49 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application 

of Law in the Trial of Labor Disputes (III) [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli laodong 

zhengyi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi (san)], issued 13 September 10; Yang 

Weihan, ‘‘Supreme People’s Court Issues Judicial Interpretation on Standardized Measure on 

Labor Dispute Rulings’’ [Zuigao fa fabu sifa jieshi tongyi laodong zhengyi caipan chidu], Xinhua 

(Online), 14 September 10; Edward Wong, ‘‘Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in 

Chinese Courts,’’ New York Times (Online), 15 September 10. 50 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application 

of Law in the Trial of Labor Disputes (III) [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli laodong 

zhengyi anjian shiyong falu ruogan wenti de jieshi (san)], issued 13 September 10, art. 2. 51 Ibid., art. 3. 52 Ibid., art 1. 53Simon Clarke et al., ‘‘Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in China,’’ 42(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations, 235, 240, 2004. 54Stanley Lubman, ‘‘Are Strikes the Beginning of a New Challenge? ’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 25 June 10; Simon Clarke et al., ‘‘Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in 

China,’’ 42(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations, 235, 240, 2004. 55 Yang Lin, ‘‘Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labour Relations, Eliminate Potential 

Problems, and Reformulate Policy’’ [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun 

yinhuan, tiaozheng laogong zhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09. 56 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Will the New Year See a Resumption of Collective Bargaining in China? ’’ 5 January 10. 57 ‘‘Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises Could Be Revealed Next 

Month; Emphasizes Equal Rights Among the Three Sides of Labor Relations’’ [Qiye minzhu 

guanli tiaoli youwang xia yue chutai qiangdiao laozi sanfang pingdeng quanli], Southern Daily 

(Online), 5 August 10. 58 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Guangdong’s New Labour Regulations Open the Door to 

Worker Participation in Collective Bargaining,’’ 26 July 10. 59Guangdong Province People’s Congress Standing Committee (Online), ‘‘Opinions From the 

Public Openly Sought for ‘Guangdong Province’s Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management (Third Draft for Public Comment)’ ’’ [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli cao’an 

xiugai san gao zhengqiu yijian gao xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu yijian], 23 August 10. 60 Ibid. 61 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Guangdong’s New Labour Regulations Open the Door to 

Worker Participation in Collective Bargaining,’’ 26 July 10. 62 ‘‘Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises Could Be Revealed Next 

Month; Emphasizes Equal Rights Among the Three Sides of Labor Relations’’ [Qiye minzhu 

guanli tiaoli youwang xia yue chutai qiangdiao laozi sanfang pingdeng quanli], Southern Daily 

(Online), 5 August 10. 

249 

63 ‘‘Guangdong Province Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises: Labor 

Unions’ Opportunities and Challenges’’ [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli: gonghui de 

jiyu he tiaozhan], Sannong Express (Online), 26 July 10. 64 ‘‘Legislation on Wage Negotiations Is an Opportunity for Unions and Workers’’ [Gongzi 

tanpan lifa shi gonghui ji gongren de jiyu], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 23 July 10. 65Mary E. Gallagher, ‘‘ ‘We Are Not Machines’: Teen Spirit on China’s Shopfloor,’’ China Beat 

(Online), 23 August 10. 66Guizhou Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Guizhou sheng qiye 

minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 26 November 08, effective 1 January 09. 67 Hubei Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Hubei sheng qiye 

minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 6 December 07, effective 1 February 08. 68 Jiangsu Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Jiangsu sheng qiye 

minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 27 September 07, effective 1 January 08. 69Shanxi Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Shanxi sheng qiye 

minzhu guanli tiaoli], adopted 31 May 05, effective 1 July 05. 70Zhejiang Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Zhejiang sheng qiye 

minzhu guanli tiaoli], adopted 30 March 10, effective 1 October 10. 71 Jinan City Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management [Jinan shi qiye minzhu 

guanli tiaoli], issued 20 November 09, effective 1 May 10. 72Tianjin City Regulations on Enterprise Workers Democratic Management [Tianjin shi qiye 

zhigong minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 15 November 07, effective 1 March 08. 73Mary E. Gallagher, ‘‘ ‘We Are Not Machines’: Teen Spirit on China’s Shopfloor,’’ China Beat 

(Online), 23 August 10. 74 Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, Circular Regarding the Speeding-Up of the Work of Advancing Collective Wage Consultations [Guanyu jin yi bu jiakuai tuijin gongzi jiti xieshang 

gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 25 August 10, effective 25 August 10. 75Federation of Hong Kong Industries (Online), ‘‘Guidance Notes Issued by Guangdong Government on Collective Wage Consultations’’ [Guangdong sheng qiye gongzi jiti xieshang zhiyin], 

10 August 10. 76 Hainan Province Regulations on Collective Contracts [Hainan sheng jiti hetong tiaoli], enacted 27 November 09, issued 1 January 10. 77Tianjin City Regulations on Enterprise Collective Wage Consultations [Tianjin shi qiye 

gongzi jiti xieshang tiaoli], adopted 22 July 10, effective 1 September 10. 78Li Yongqing, ‘‘Guangdong Decides To Delay ‘Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises’ ’’ [Guangdong jue huan shen ‘‘qiye minzhu guangli tiaoli’’], Wen Wei Po (Online), 18 

September 10; Xu Bo, ‘‘Guangdong Province Sets Aside Labor Legislation’’ [Guangdong sheng 

gezhi laogong lifa], Voice of America (Online), 22 September 10; Han Dongfang, China Labour 

Bulletin (Online), ‘‘China Labour Bulletin Supports Guangdong’s Efforts To Establish a Collective Wage Negotiation System,’’ 22 September 10. 79 ‘‘China Rural Migrant Workers Number Nearly 230 Million,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 24 

March 10. 80 Ibid. 81Tammy Chia, ‘‘Schools for Migrant Children in Beijing Face Demolition,’’ Kyodo News (Online), 29 January 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Call for Fairer Treatment for Migrant 

Children in Beijing Goes Unheeded,’’ 2 February 10; Meng Jing, ‘‘Blaze at Unlicensed Kindergarten Kills Infant,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 January 10; Lian Weiliang, ‘‘Allow All Infants To 

Easily Enter Nurseries; Beijing People’s Political Consultative Conference Calls To Resolve ‘Barriers Against Entering Nurseries’ ’’ [Rang suoyou baobao dou qingsong rutuo beijing zhengxie 

huyu jiejue rutuo nan], Xinhua (Online), 30 June 09; ‘‘Scholars Call on the People’s Congress 

To Enact Legislation To Treat Children Without Hukou Registration Equally’’ [Xuezhe huyu 

renda lifa pingdeng duidai fei huji ertong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 January 10; CECC, Special Topic Paper: China’s Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to Protect 

China’s Rural Migrants, 7 October 05. 82Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, ‘‘New Ongoing Violations After the Implementation of 

Labor Contract Law in China,’’ 12 June 09; Jeffrey Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International 

Labor Rights Forum (Online), ‘‘The Impact of China’s Labor Contract Law on Workers,’’ 23 February 10, 7–10, 18. 83Kam Wing Chan, ‘‘The Chinese Hukou System at 50,’’ 50(2) Eurasian Geography and Economics, 197, 197–221, 2009. 84 ‘‘Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress,’’ China Daily (Online), 22 April 09. 85 Albert Park et al., ‘‘Shock and Recovery in China’s Labour Market: Flexibility in the Face 

of a Global Financial Crisis,’’ PowerPoint Presentation given at the Chinese Economic Association Conference on Global Economic Recovery: The Role of China and Other Emerging Economies, University of Oxford, July 12–13, 2010. 86 Jeffrey Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International Labor Rights Forum (Online), ‘‘The Impact of China’s Labor Contract Law on Workers,’’ 23 February 10, 9. 87 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘New Semester Begins in Beijing, Over 10,000 

Migrant Workers’ Children Unable To Attend School’’ [Beijing xin xueqi kai xue shang wan 

nongmin gong zinu mei xue shang], 23 February 10. 88 ‘‘Scholars Call on the People’s Congress To Enact Legislation To Treat Children Without 

Hukou Registration Equally’’ [Xuezhe huyu renda li fa pingdeng duidai fei huji ertong], Radio 

Free Asia (Online), 29 January 10. 89 Ibid. 90 He Na, ‘‘Migrants Put Behind Fences,’’ China Daily (Online), 6 May 10. 91 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Research Report Regarding Issues Facing the New Generation of Migrant Workers’’ [Quanguo zong gonghui: 

guanyu xinsheng dai nongmin gong wenti de yan jiu baogao], 21 June 10. See also He Na, ‘‘UnVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00255 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
250 

like Parents, Young Migrants Will Not Take Their Fate Lying Down,’’ China Daily (Online), 23 

March 10. 92 ‘‘Agricultural Minister Han Changfu Discusses ‘Post-1990s’ Migrant Workers’’ [Nongye bu 

buzhang han changfu tan ‘‘90 hou’’ nongmin gong], China Review News, 3 March 10. See also 

‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, CoAuthor Fired,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1–2. 93Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, ‘‘Labor Movements Demand for the Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country’s Trajectory’’ [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli 

gonghui gaibian guoyun guiji], Asia Week (Online), 13 June 10. 94 He Na, ‘‘Unlike Parents, Young Migrants Will Not Take Their Fate Lying Down,’’ China 

Daily (Online), 23 March 10. 95 ‘‘China To Train Six Million Migrant Workers Each Year’’ [Zhongguo jiang meinian peixun 

nongmin gong 600 wan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 March 10. 96 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Politburo Officials Calls for Hukou Reform,’’ 4 March 10. 

See also ‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 

10, 1–2. 97 CECC Staff Interview; Zhou Jing, ‘‘Dongguan Labor Disputes Suddenly Increase’’ 

[Dongguan laodong zhengyi zhousheng], Caijing (Online), 14 January 09; Albert Park and Fang 

Cai, ‘‘The Informalization of the Chinese Labour Market,’’ Paper presented at Breaking Down 

Chinese Walls Conference, Cornell University, September 2008. 98 Albert Park and Fang Cai, ‘‘The Informalization of the Chinese Labour Market,’’ Paper presented at Breaking Down Chinese Walls Conference, Cornell University, September 2008. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 He Huifeng, ‘‘Official Blames Shenzhen Authorities,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 

27 May 10. 102 ‘‘Military-Style Management,’’ Global Times (Online), 24 May 10. 103Tim Culpan, ‘‘Hon Hai Falls on Plan To Double Wages at China Plants (Update2),’’ 

Bloomberg Businessweek (Online), 7 June 10. 104 ‘‘Minimum Wages Rise in 11 Provinces,’’ China Daily (Online), 18 May 10. 105 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Minimum Wage Set To Increase in Cities Across China,’’ 

5 February 10. 106 Ibid. 107PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 08, art. 48 108PRC Labor Contract Law, enacted 29 June 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 74. 109 Ibid., art. 85. 110 Ibid., art. 72. 111 ‘‘Migrant Worker Representative Proposes Double Compensation for Arrears’’ [Mingong ren 

dai tian qian xin pei shuang bei], Ming Pao (Online), 10 March 10. 112 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Minimum Wage Set To Increase in Cities Across China,’’ 

5 February 10. 113 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Migrant Worker Nearly Beaten to Death 

While Discussing Wages’’ [Nongmin gong tao gongzi bei da zhi shengming chuiwei], 12 February 

10. 114 Ibid. 115PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 

36. 116 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Falling Through the Floor: Migrant Women Workers’ 

Quest for Decent Work in Dongguan, China,’’ September 2006, 6, 10, 15; CECC, 2008 Annual 

Report, 31 October 08, 51. 117Dexter Roberts and Pete Engardio, ‘‘Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops,’’ Business Week (Online), 27 November 06. 118 ‘‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the Number of Local Labor Dispute Cases in 2010’’ [Quanzong: 2010 nian difang laodong zhengyi anjian shuliang cheng 

shangsheng qushi], People’s Daily (Online), 2 September 10; ‘‘In the First Half of the Year, 

Labor Dispute Cases in China Explode’’ [Shangban nian zhongguo laodong zhengyi anjian cheng 

jingpen taishi], Caijing (Online), 13 July 09. 119PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, enacted 29 December 07, effective 1 

May 08, arts. 6, 27, 39. 120 ‘‘Wages Tumble as Chinese Workers Hunt Factory Jobs,’’ Reuters (Online), 20 February 09. 121PRC Safe Production Law, enacted 29 June 02, effective 1 November 02, arts. 1–2. 122 Ibid., arts. 17, 21. 123 Ibid., art. 45. 124 Ibid., art. 52. 125 Ibid., art. 53. 126 Ibid., art. 82. 127 Austin Ramzy, ‘‘China and West Virginia: A Tale of Two Mine Disasters,’’ Time (Online), 

23 April 10. 128 Ibid. 129 Yan Jie, ‘‘Lax Law, Lack of Funds Make China’s Mines Deadliest,’’ China Daily (Online), 

10 May 10. 130Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ‘‘Silicon Sweatshops: What’s a Worker Worth? The Cold Calculus 

of Supply Chain Economics,’’ Global Post (Online), 17 March 10. 131 Ibid. 132 CECC Staff Interview. 133PRC Law on Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases, enacted 27 October 01, effective 1 May 02, art. 39; Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance [Gongshang baoxian 

251 

tiaoli], issued 27 April 03, effective 1 January 04, art 18; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Suffocated by the System,’’ 16 April 10. 134 Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance [Gongshang baoxian tiaoli], issued 27 April 

03, effective 1 January 04, arts. 17–18. 135 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Suffocated by the System,’’ 16 April 10. 136For additional analysis of China’s workplace-related injury and illness compensation process, see China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Suffocated by the System,’’ 16 April 10. 137Tan Ee Lyn, ‘‘Few China Workers With Lung Disease Get Redress—Rights Group,’’ Reuters (Online), 26 April 10. 138 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 52. 139 Ibid. 140Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ‘‘Silicon Sweatshops: The Strange Death of Li Liang. What Killed 

a Chinese Technology Worker at the Center of a Supply Chain Firestorm? ’’ Global Post (Online), 

17 March 10. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143See, e.g., William Foreman, ‘‘China Factories Break Labor Rules,’’ Associated Press (Online), 20 April 10; National Labor Committee (Online), ‘‘China’s Youth Meet Microsoft: KYE Factory in China Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. Companies,’’ 13 April 10. 144 ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 

June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 

Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99. 145PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 

15. See also PRC Law on the Protection of Minors, enacted 4 September 91, effective 1 January 

92, art. 28. See generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong 

tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 02. 146Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 

1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 6. See also ‘‘Legal Announcement—Zhejiang Determines Four Circumstances That Define Use of Child Labor’’ [Fazhi bobao: zhejiang jieding 

shiyong tonggong si zhong qingxing], China Woman (Online), 26 July 08. 147This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth 

Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe 

guo xingfa xiuzheng an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 

July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 

01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 244. 148 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Small Hands: A Survey Report on Child Labor in China,’’ 

September 2007, 3. 149 Ibid., 7–8. 150 Ibid., 15, 22, 25–32. 151 National Labor Committee (Online), ‘‘China’s Youth Meet Microsoft: KYE Factory in China 

Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. Companies,’’ 13 April 10, 3. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid., 15. 154 William Foreman, ‘‘China Factories Break Labor Rules,’’ Associated Press (Online), 20 

April 10. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns, including child labor, see, e.g., 

Zhang Pinghui, ‘‘Crackdown on Slave Labor Nationwide—State Council Vows To End Enslavement,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 21 June 07. 158 Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Urged To End ‘Child Labor’ in Schools,’’ Reuters (Online), 3 December 07; Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: End Child Labor in State Schools,’’ 3 December 

07. 159Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 

1 October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13. 160PRC Education Law, enacted 18 March 95, effective 1 September 95, amended 27 August 

09, art. 58. 161 ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage minors only where it is an 

‘‘integral part’’ of a course of study or training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member 

States to eliminate the ‘‘worst forms of child labor,’’ including ‘‘forced or compulsory labor.’’ ILO 

Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO 

Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 

the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99. 162 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002) Observation, CEACR 2006/77th Session, International Labour Organization, 2006. 163Laogai Research Foundation, Report on Laogai Enterprise Advertisements and Listings in 

English, February 2010, 5; Laogai Research Foundation (Online), ‘‘Laogai Forced Labor Camps: 

Listed in Dun & Bradstreet Databases,’’ 19 June 08, Introduction; U.S.-China Security Review 

Commission (Online), Policy Paper on Prison Labor and Forced Labor in China, modified 17 

February 10. 164State Council, Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the Export of Products Made by 

Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through Labor [Guanyu chongshen jinzhi laogai chanpin 

chukou de guiding], enacted and effective 5 October 91, art. 4; U.S.-China Security Review Commission (Online), Policy Paper on Prison Labor and Forced Labor in China, modified 17 February 10; Laogai Research Foundation, Report on Laogai Enterprise Advertisements and Listings in English, February 2010, 6. 

252 

165 Brahma Chellaney, ‘‘Exporting Convicts Stains China’s Reputation,’’ Globe and Mail (Online), 16 August 10. 166PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, enacted 22 November 85, effective 1 February 86, art. 8. 167 Brahma Chellaney, ‘‘Exporting Convicts Stains China’s Reputation,’’ Globe and Mail (Online), 16 August 10. For more information, see Lan Lan, ‘‘Overseas Projects Fuel Big Dreams 

for Workers,’’ China Daily (Online), 20 July 10; PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry 

of Citizens, enacted 22 November 85, effective 1 February 86, art. 8. 168People’s Daily (Online), ‘‘Commerce Ministry Denies China Exports Prison Labor,’’ 10 August 10. 169These other rights are ‘‘(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) 

the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.’’ ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 

June 98, International Labour Organization (Online), art. 2. 170See International Labour Organization (Online), ‘‘ILO Tripartite Constituents in China,’’ 

last visited 27 September 07. 171 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, International 

Labour Organization (Online), art. 2. China has been a member of the ILO since its founding 

in 1919. For more information, see the country profile on China in the ILO database of national 

labor, social security, and human rights legislation (NATLEX) (Online). 172 International Labour Organization (Online), ‘‘Ratifications of the Fundamental Human 

Rights Conventions by Country,’’ 11 September 07. 173 International Labour Organization (Online), ‘‘China: Forced Labor and Trafficking: The 

Role of Labour Institution in Law Enforcement and International Cooperation,’’ August 2005. 174See generally PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 12. 175 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by UN General 

Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8. 176 United Nations Treaty Collection (Online), Declarations and Reservations, 5 February 02. 

Article 10 of China’s Trade Union Law establishes the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 

(ACFTU) as the ‘‘unified national trade union federation,’’ and Article 11 mandates that all 

unions must be approved by the next higher level union body, giving the ACFTU an absolute 

veto over the establishment of any local union and the legal authority to block independent 

labor associations. PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 October 

01, arts. 10, 11. 

Notes to Section II—Criminal Justice 

1For information on reforms related to limiting the use of coerced confessions and executions, 

see Provisions Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty 

Cases [Guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective 

1 July 10, and Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling 

Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective 1 July 10. After several reports on the handling of suspicious detention center deaths, 

the Ministry of Public Security released new guidelines on management and education in detention centers. For more information, see ‘‘China Issues Detention Center Guideline,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 February 10. 2 ‘‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; ‘‘Lawyers’ Licenses Withheld,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 10; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Concern Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal Practice Qualification, Demand Scrapping the Annual Inspection and Annual Registration System,’’ 15 July 10. 3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) 

of 10 December 48, art. 29. 4State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(1), art. 22; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10. 5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 3, 5, 9, 19, and 20; International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 7, 9(1), 19(1), 19(2), 21, and 22(1); PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 

arts. 35 (freedom of speech, press, assembly), 37 (freedom of person), and 41 (right to criticize 

state organ or functionary). 6 Henry Sanderson, ‘‘China Activist Told To Leave City for National Day,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in Taiwan News (Online), 18 September 09. 7 ‘‘China Arrests Activists Before Obama Visit,’’ United Press International (Online), 14 November 09. 8 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Organizer of Families of Tainted Milk Powder Victims Detained,’’ 13 November 09. 9 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Shanghai Petitioner To Serve 18 Months of Reeducationthrough-Labor After Shouting Slogans,’’ 9 March 10. 10 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘During Two Sessions, More Than 20 Petitioners From Every Region Arrested and Detained’’ [Lianghui zhi shi you you 20 duo wei gedi 

fang min bei soubu guanya], 7 March 10. 

253 

11 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘On the Eve of the World Expo, Shanghai Citizens Receive Public Security Authorities’ Notice’’ [Shibohui qianxi, shanghai shimin shou dao 

gongan jiguan de shibo gaozhi shu], 13 April 10. 12 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Guizhou Authorities Suppress Activities To Commemorate June Fourth,’’ 2 June 10. 13 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Human Rights Activist Liu Dejun Beaten and 

Taken to a Remote Location by Police in the Middle of the Night’’ [Weiquan renshi liu dejun 

shenye bei jingcha ouda bing pao shenshan], 16 June 10; ‘‘Liu Dejun, Civil Rights Activist, Kidnapped by Police and Left in Mountains,’’ Boxun (Online), 15 June 10. 14 Ng Tze-wei, ‘‘Police Detain Lawyers Who Sought To Meet Obama,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 21 November 09. 15 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Lawyers Meet With Wang Yonghang; Family 

Calls for End to Persecution’’ [Lushi huijian wangyonghang jiashu xu tingzhi pohai], 18 January 

10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing January 14–22, 

2010,’’ 27 January 10. 16 ‘‘Gao Zhisheng Missing Again for 3 Months,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 July 10; ‘‘Chinese 

Dissident Disappears for Second Time,’’ Voice of America (Online), 1 May 10; Michael Wines, 

‘‘Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears Again,’’ Associated Press (Online), 30 April 10; ‘‘Chinese 

Human Rights Defender Gao Zhisheng Disappears Again,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2. 17 UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under 

Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, 

CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11. 18 China objected to the quoted UN Committee against Torture statement by stating, ‘‘The 

Government of China contends that this statement seriously distorts the truth.’’ UN Committee 

against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the 

Convention: Comments by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/ 

4, 9 December 09, 2. For examples of police torture, see Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: 

Investigate Torture Allegations in Tibet Philanthropist Trial,’’ 23 June 10; ‘‘Extorting Confessions by Torture Is an Illness of the Chinese Detention System; Call for Separation of Detention 

and Investigation Powers’’ [Xingxun bigong cheng zhongguo jiya tizhi chenke huyu shixian ji 

zhen fenli], People’s Daily (Online), 17 March 10. For examples of detention center deaths, see 

‘‘Ensure the Rights of Suspects and Unnatural Deaths Will Be Avoided’’ [Baozheng she’an 

renyuan quanli caineng bimian fei zhengchang siwang], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 

16 April 10; Chen Wenxiang, ‘‘Face-Washing? How Many More Ways To Die Can Detention Centers ‘Invent’/ ’’ [Xilian si, kanshousuo jiujing hai yao ‘‘faming’’ duoshao zhong si fa?], People’s 

Daily (Online), 10 April 10; ‘‘ ‘Bizarre’ Inmate Death Sparks Investigation,’’ China Daily (Online), 12 April 10. 19For descriptions of police abuse and torture, see Geng He’s opinion-editorial on her husband 

Gao Zhisheng’s disappearance and coverage of the high-profile Zhao Zuohai case: Geng He, ‘‘The 

U.S. Must Speak Out Against China’s Offenses,’’ Washington Post (Online), 4 February 10; 

Clifford Coonan, ‘‘Zhao Zuohai: Beaten, Framed and Jailed for a Murder That Never Happened,’’ 

Independent (Online), 14 May 10. 20 ‘‘19 Defendants Claim Confessions Extracted Through Torture’’ [19 ming beigao cheng zao 

xingxun bigong], Yancheng Evening News (Online), 4 December 09. 21On November 30, 2009, the Mengzhou Municipal Court sentenced Zhang Jiabin to three 

years’ imprisonment, Xu Libin to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, and Dong 

Dongli to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for two years. ‘‘Police Torture Suspect and Induce 

Bladder Rupture; Use Tear Gas Canister’’ [Minjing xingxun bigong zhi xianfan pangguang polie 

yong cuilei pensheqi], Dahe Net, reprinted in Global Times (Online), 26 February 10. 22 Robert Saiget, ‘‘China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail Treatment,’’ Agence FrancePresse (Online), 11 May 10; ‘‘Environmental Activist Wu Lihong Released, Alleges Abuse,’’ 

CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2. 23 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China’s Highest Court Must Overturn Death 

Sentence Based on Confession Extracted by Torture,’’ 3 August 10; Ng Tze-wei, ‘‘Lawyer Reveals 

Grim Details of Client’s Torture,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 29 July 10. 24Wang Jingqiong and Shi Baoyin, ‘‘ ‘Murderer’ Says He Was Tortured To Confess,’’ China 

Daily (Online), 12 May 10. 25 ‘‘Wrongly Jailed Man Gets State Compensation,’’ Xinhua (Online), 13 May 10. 26 ‘‘A Major Initiative To Protect the Quality of Death Penalty Cases’’ [Baozhang sixing anjian 

zhiliang de yige zhongda jucuo], Procuratorial Daily (Online), 7 June 10. 27 ‘‘Policing the Police,’’ China Daily (Online), 13 May 10. 28 ‘‘Inmate Death Sparks Investigation,’’ China Daily (Online), 12 April 10; ‘‘Ensure the Rights 

of Suspects and Unnatural Deaths Will Be Avoided’’ [Baozheng she’an renyuab guanli caineng 

bimian feizhengchang], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 31 March 10. 29Kent Ewing, ‘‘Chinese Prisons: Horror and Reform,’’ Asia Times (Online), 24 March 09. The 

first case that came to light in 2009 involved the death in February of 24-year-old Li Qiaoming 

at a detention center in Yunnan province, which was initially explained by officials to have resulted from fatal injuries sustained during a game of ‘‘hide-and-seek’’ (duo maomao) with other 

inmates. The media and blogosphere spread news of the case. Internet users expressed anger 

over the death and the unconvincing explanation given by the officials, and called for an investigation. 30 ‘‘Urgently Awaiting the End of Unnatural Deaths in Detention Centers’’ [Feizhengchang 

siwang jidai ezhi], Zhejiang Daily (Online), 24 June 10; Chen Wenxiang, ‘‘Face-Washing? How 

Many More Ways To Die Can Detention Centers ‘Invent’/ ’’ [Xilian si, kanshousuo jiujing hai yao 

‘‘faming’’ duoshao zhong sifa?], People’s Daily (Online), 10 April 10. 31See, e.g., Deng Wei, ‘‘Why Do ‘Detention Stories’ Continue Without End/ ’’ [‘‘Kanshousuo de 

gushi’’ heyi xuji buduan], Xi’an Evening News, reprinted in New People Network (Online), 17 

254 

March 10; Wang Jingqiong, ‘‘Officers Suspended After Inmate Death,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 

April 10; Wang Huazhong, ‘‘Inmate Death Sparks Investigation,’’ China Daily (Online), 12 April 

10; ‘‘What Should We Call the Next Detention Center Death/ ’’ [Kanshousuo li xia yili siwang 

gai jiao shenme], Dalian Evening News, 13 August 09. 32Wang Jingqiong, ‘‘Officers Suspended After Inmate Death,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 April 

10; ‘‘Meng Jianzhu: Successive Unnatural Deaths Severely Damage the Credibility of the Public 

Security’’ [Meng jianzhu: jielian fasheng fei zhengchang siwang shijian yanzhong sunhai gongan 

jiguan zhifa gongxinli], Legal Daily (Online), 27 March 10. 33 Circular From Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public 

Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice Regarding the Issue of ‘‘Provisions 

Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases’’ and 

‘‘Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal 

Cases’’ [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao renmin jiancha yuan gong’an bu guojia anquan bu sifa 

bu yinfa ‘‘guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding’’ he 

‘‘guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding’’ de tongzhi], issued 

13 June 10; Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling 

Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 1, 7; Provisions Concerning Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases [Guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan 

wenti de guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 18(4), 19, 34. 34 Regulations on the Discipline of Policemen [Gong’an jiguan renmin jingcha jilu tiaoling], 

issued 21 April 10, effective 1 June 10; Wang Huazhong, ‘‘Regulation Details Disciplines for Police,’’ China Daily (Online), 6 May 10; ‘‘Regulations on ‘Discipline of Policemen’ Will Go Into Effect June 1’’ [‘‘Gong’an jiguan renmin jingcha jilu tiaoling’’ jiang yu liu yue yi ri qi shixing], People’s Daily (Online), 4 May 10. 35PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 December 10, art. 26. Cheng Zhuo and Li Huizi, ‘‘China Adopts Amended State Compensation Law 

To Better Protect Human Rights,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 April 10. 36 According to Article 34 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the court ‘‘shall designate a lawyer 

that is obligated to provide legal aid to serve as a defender,’’ if the defendant does not have 

a lawyer and is blind, deaf, mute, a minor, or facing the possibility of a death sentence. Article 

42 of the Law on Lawyers states that lawyers must fulfill their obligations to provide legal aid 

services. For more information see PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 

17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 34; PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, amended 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08, art. 42. 37 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 102. 38 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 39 ‘‘ ‘Lawyers Falsification-Gate’ and ‘Law of Perjury’ ’’ [‘‘Lushi zaojiamen’’ yu ‘‘lushi 

weizhengzui’’], Qianlong Web (Online), 15 December 09. 40 ‘‘President of All China Lawyers Association Discusses Article 306 of Criminal Law’’ 

[Quanguo luxiehui zhang shou tan ‘‘bu zuowei’’ cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 25 March 10. 41 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 38. 42PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, amended 28 October 

07, effective 1 June 08; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 

96, effective 1 January 97; Zhang Liang, ‘‘ACLA Survey Shows Lack of Optimism in Professional 

Lawyer Field’’ [Quanguo lushi xiehui diaoyan xianshi lushi zhiye huanjing burong leguan], 

Legal Daily (Online), 30 December 09. 43Zhang Liang, ‘‘ACLA Survey Shows Lack of Optimism in Professional Lawyer Field’’ 

[Quanguo luxie diaoyan xianshi lushi zhiye huanjing burong leguan], Legal Daily (Online), 30 

December 09. 44Zhang Yan, ‘‘Lawyers Plagued With Red Tape,’’ China Daily (Online), 25 June 10. 45 ‘‘ACLA President Talks About ‘Omission’ for the First Time; States He Wasn’t a Puppet’’ 

[Quanguo luxiehuizhang shoutan ‘‘bu zuowei’’ cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 25 March 10. 46 ‘‘Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will Actually Contravenes the Will of 

the People’’ [Weile qianjiu minyi bugu shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi], China 

Youth Daily (Online), 18 June 09. For more information about Article 306, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 106. 47 ‘‘Chinese Article Claims That Research on the Difficulties Faced by Criminal Defense Lawyers Restricted After Revealing ‘Shocking’ Initial Results,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China (Online), 13 January 05; Tom Kellogg, Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘A Case for 

the Defense,’’ China Rights Forum, No. 2, 31–34; Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Walking on 

Thin Ice,’’ 28 April 08. 48 ‘‘ACLA President Talks About ‘Omission’ for the First Time; States He Wasn’t a Puppet’’ 

[Quanguo luxiehuizhang shoutan ‘‘bu zuowei’’ cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 25 March 10. 49 Xunjun Eberlein, ‘‘Lawyer’s Trial Rivets Public and Tests Chinese Courts,’’ New America 

Media (Online), 5 January 10. 50Lu Fei, ‘‘Li Zhuang Retracts Admission of Guilt Following Reduced Sentence,’’ Economic Observer (Online), 9 February 10; ‘‘Beijing Lawyer Given Lighter Punishment on Appeal in Mob 

Trial,’’ Xinhua (Online), 9 February 10; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘China’s Dark City: Behind Chongqing’s 

Crime Crackdown,’’ Time (Online), 15 March 10. 51 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China Must Free Activist Who Defended Earthquake Victims,’’ 23 November 09. 

255 

52 ‘‘Huang Qi,’’ New York Times (Online), 8 February 09. For more information on Huang Qi’s 

advocacy and the Tianwang Human Rights Center, see Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘HRIC 

Condemns Three-Year Sentence for Earthquake Activist,’’ 23 November 09. 53 ‘‘International Outcry After Chinese Dissident Liu Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years,’’ Times 

of London (Online), 26 December 09. 54 ‘‘Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From Outset,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2. 55The charge of ‘‘illegally excavating and robbing cultural sites or ancient tombs’’ is listed 

under 328 of the PRC Criminal Law. PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 

97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 328. ‘‘Tibetan Gets 15 Years,’’ Radio 

Free Asia (Online), 24 June 10; ‘‘Tibetan Karma Samdrup Sentenced to 15 Years; Will Appeal’’ 

[Zangzu gama sangzhu bei pan 15 jiang shangsu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 June 10. 56 Jonathan Watts, ‘‘China Jails Tibetan Environmentalist for 15 Years,’’ Guardian (Online), 

25 June 10. 57Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 

66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27; Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 

December 48, arts. 7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 21. The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of 

an individual’s liberty is permissible only ‘‘on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law’’ and that an individual must be promptly informed of the reasons for his detention and any charges against him or her. 58See, e.g., PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 

15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35, 37, 41; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, 

amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 3; PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law, enacted 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 3, 9, 10, 16; PRC Legislation 

Law, enacted 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 8(v). 59Shao Jiang, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,’’ 29 April 10. 60 Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen, ‘‘Prisoner in His Own Home: The Plight of a ‘Rights 

Lawyer’ Under Illegal House Arrest Reflects Beijing’s Fear of Dissent,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 10 June 10. 61 Ibid. 62Shao Jiang, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,’’ 29 April 10. 63 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Beijing Dissidents Cha Jianguo and Gao 

Hongming’s Movement Restricted’’ [Beijing yiyi renshi cha jianguo, gaohongming bei xianzhi 

ziyou], 31 January 10. 64 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing Weekly July 14– 

19, 2010,’’ 20 July 10. 65 CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 39; Dui Hua Foundation, Reference Materials 

on China’s Criminal Justice System, Vol. 2, June 09, iv; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 

08, 36–37; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Re-Education through Labor Abuses 

Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,’’ 4 February 09, 4. 66 Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration, ‘‘A Brief Description of the Reeducation through Labor System’’ [Laodong jiaoyang zhidu jianjie], Legal Info (Online), 18 May 10. 67 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Re-Education through Labor Abuses Continue 

Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,’’ 4 February 09. 68 ‘‘Sun Fuquan Sent to Reeducation though Labor for Disseminating Truth About June 4’’ 

[Sun fuquan yin chuanbo ‘‘liu si’’ zhenxiang bei laojiao], 23 October 09. 69Ou Yangqing, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Shanghai Activist Jian-Fang 

Chen’s RTL Decision,’’ 2 May 10. 70 Xiaorong Li and Zhang Zuhua, Charter 08 (Hong Kong: Open Books, 2009), 319. 71 ‘‘China To Speed Up Legislation on Reforming Reeducation through Labor System,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 10 March 10. 72 In April and May 2010, prominent Chinese legal scholars Jiang Ming’an, a professor at Peking University Law School, and Yu Jianrong, Chairman of the Social Issues Research Center 

of the Rural Development Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, exchanged opinion editorials debating the function of the reeducation through labor system. For more information, see Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ‘‘Professors Yu Jianrong and Jiang Ming’an Spar Over 

Future of Re-education Through Labor,’’ 9 July 10. 73 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ 12 November 09, 8. 74 ‘‘China Accused of Human Rights Abuses in Secret ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Mail (Online), 12 November 09. 75 Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Punished Supplicants,’’ Financial Times (Online), 5 March 09. 76 Xu Zhiyong, ‘‘A Visit to One of Beijing’s ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Black and White Cat Blog (Online), 

13 October 08. 77 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ 12 November 09. 78See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black 

Jails,’ ’’ 12 November 09; Gordon Ross, ‘‘China’s Secret ‘Black Jails’ Hold Sordid Tales of Injustice,’’ Inter Press Service (Online), 9 July 10; John M. Glionna, ‘‘China’s ‘Black Jails’ Shove Complaints Into the Dark,’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 11 January 10; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘New Report 

Released on China’s ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Time (Online), 12 November 09; Cara Anna, ‘‘Activist Speaks 

Out From Inside ‘Black Jail,’ ’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 

256 

5 December 09; ‘‘China Accused of Human Rights Abuses in Secret ‘Black Jails,’ ’’ Mail Foreign 

Service (Online), 12 November 09. 79 ‘‘Authorities Close Doors on Trial of Case of Li Ruirui Who Was Detained and Sexually Assaulted’’ [Dangju bi men shenli li ruirui zao guanya renyuan qiangjian an], Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 November 10. 80Wang Yan, ‘‘Settlement Upsets ‘Black Jail’ Victim,’’ China Daily (Online), 12 December 09. 81 ‘‘Receivers’ ‘Gray Industrial Chain’ Achieves Scale; Seriously Undermines the Government’s 

Image,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 24 November 09. 82Tini Tran, ‘‘State-Run Magazine Reports on Black Jails in China,’’ Associated Press (Online), 23 November 09; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘A Rare Chinese Look at Secret Detentions,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 26 November 09; Tini Tran, ‘‘Liaowang, State-Run Magazine, Exposes StateRun ‘Black Jails’ in China,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington Post (Online), 25 November 09. 83 Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 20 September 06, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New York 

University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute. 84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 

into force 23 March 76. 85 ‘‘Guangxi High Court Vice-President Ou Shaoxuan Put Under ‘Shuanggui’ ’’ [Guangxi gaoji 

fayuan fu yuan zhang ou shao xuan bei ‘‘shuanggui’’], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 October 09. 86 ‘‘Drug Officials Arrested on Bribery Charges,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 April 10. 87 Ministry of Public Security (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Public Security Holds Video Conference 

Call To Deploy ‘2010 Strike Hard Campaign’ ’’ [Gonganbu zhaokai dianshi dianhua huiyi bushu 

‘‘2010 yanda zhengzhi xingdong’’], 13 June 10; Yu Lan, ‘‘CASS: China’s Violent Crimes Rise for 

the 1st Time in a Decade,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 25 February 10; Alexa Olesen, ‘‘Spiraling 

Violent Crime Triggers Concern in China,’’ Associated Press (Online), 3 June 10. 88 Jin Zhu, ‘‘ ‘Strike Hard’ Campaign Targets Violent Crimes,’’ China Daily (Online), 15 June 

10. 89 Ibid. 90 Cara Anna, ‘‘Former China Police Chief Gets Death in Gang Case,’’ Associated Press (Online), 14 April 10. 91 Austin Ramzy, ‘‘China’s Dark City: Behind Chongqing’s Crime Crackdown,’’ Time (Online), 

15 March 10. 92 ‘‘Justice Official Loses Death Sentence Appeal in Chongqing,’’ China Daily (Online), 21 May 

10. 93Wang Huazhong and Ma Wei, ‘‘Convicted Ex-Top Cop Asks for Leniency,’’ China Daily (Online), 14 May 10. 94 Chinese Law Prof Blog (Online), ‘‘Jiang Ping: ‘China’s Rule of Law Is in Full Retreat,’ ’’ 21 

February 10. 95 Yang Ming, ‘‘Strike Hard Returns’’ [Youjian yanda], Oriental Outlook (Online), 1 July 10. 96 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 97 ‘‘Health of Chen Guangcheng, Imprisoned Blind Activist, in Danger,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 16 

October 09. 98 ‘‘Ill but No Medical Parole, Government Controls Fate of Defenders’’ [You bing bu bao wai 

wu bing po zhuyuan zhengfu zuoyou weiquan zhe mingyun], Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 May 

10; ‘‘China and US To Discuss Human Rights as Beijing Cracks Down on Jailed Dissidents,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 17 May 10; Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Liver Cancer Suspected, Activist Hu Jia Seeks Medical Parole,’’ 9 April 10. 99 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Writer Zhang Jianhong, Gravely Ill, Is Released on Medical Parole; Family Struggles To Pay for Treatment,’’ 8 June 10. 100Measures for Carrying Out Medical Parole for Prisoners [Zuifan baowai jiuyi zhixing 

banfa], issued 31 December 90, art. 2(2); Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Writer Zhang 

Jianhong, Gravely Ill, Is Released on Medical Parole; Family Struggles To Pay for Treatment,’’ 

8 June 10. 101 ‘‘Wang Shengjun: Strictly Apply the Relevant Facts, Evidence and Laws in Capital Cases 

So as To Ensure the Quality of Trials’’ [Wang shengjun: yan ba sixing anjian shishi guan 

zhengju guan falu guan quebao shenpan zhiliang], Xinhua (Online), 11 March 10. 102 ‘‘China Executes Thousands: Amnesty,’’ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (Online), 30 

March 10. 103 Bao Daozu, ‘‘China May Drop Death Penalty for 13 Economic Crimes,’’ China Daily (Online), 24 August 10; ‘‘Criminal Law Draft Revision (8) Removes 13 Economic Crimes From Death 

Penalty’’ [Xingfa xiuzheng an (ba) ni quxiao 13 ge jingji xing fei baoli fanzui sixing], People’s 

Daily Network (Online), 23 August 10. 104Peter Simpson and David Williams, ‘‘Gordon Brown Leads Furious Outcry as China Executes British Drugs Mule by Lethal Injection,’’ Daily Mail (Online), 30 December 09. 105 Rosa Prince, ‘‘Akmal Shaikh Execution Leaves Sino-British Relations at a Low Point,’’ 

Telegraph (Online), 30 December 09. 106 ‘‘British Citizen Akmal Shaikh Executed in China,’’ Telegraph (Online), 29 December 09. 107 ‘‘China Calls for Steady Development of Sino-British Ties,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in Global 

Times (Online), 5 January 10. 108 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China: British Man Facing Imminent Execution,’’ 21 October 09. 109 Cristian Segura, ‘‘China Injects ‘Humanity’ Into Death Sentence,’’ Asia Times (Online), 16 

December 09; Liu Ligang, ‘‘Liaoning Completely Implements Death by Injection, Becomes the 

257 

First Province To Say Goodbye to Executions by Firing Squad’’ [Liao quanmian shixing zhushe 

sixing cheng quanguo shou ge gaobie ‘‘qiangjue’’ shengfen], Xinhua (Online), 10 December 09. 110 ‘‘Next Year Beijing Will Fully Implement Lethal Injections’’ [Beijing ni mingnian qi 

quanmian shixing zhushe sixing], Global Times (Online), 5 November 09. 

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Religion 

1PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 36. This section of the Commission’s Annual Report primarily uses the 

expression ‘‘freedom of religion’’ but encompasses within this term reference to the more broadly 

articulated freedom of ‘‘thought, conscience, and religion’’ (see, e.g., the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A 

(III) of 10 December 48, art. 18). For protections in international law, see, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly 

resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International 

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly 

resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring 

States Parties to ‘‘ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with 

[the parents’] own convictions’’); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and 

opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 

20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of 

All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the 

ICCPR for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General 

Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 

93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. China 

signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese Government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and 

says it is taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint Statement 

of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ‘‘The EU welcomed China’s commitment to ratifying the 

[ICCPR] as soon as possible.’’ Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China 

Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu 

Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, ‘‘At present, 

legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 

our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.’’ Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by 

H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. In its 2009–2010 National 

Human Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese Government stated that the 

ICCPR was one of the ‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the plan was framed, and that the 

government ‘‘will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic 

laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.’’ 

State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, during the UN Human 

Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, 

the Chinese Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify 

the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them 

compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 

Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). 2For more on unregistered groups in China, see, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09. 3State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Central Authorities’ Decision Restructures Main Leadership Posts at State Administration for Religious Affairs’’ [Zhongyang jueding 

guojia shiwuju zhuyao lingdao zhiwu tiaozheng], 21 September 09. 4See, e.g., ‘‘Religious Harmony: New Frontiers in Religion Work’’ [Zongjiao hexie: zongjiao 

gongzuo de xin jingjie], People’s Daily (Online), 13 January 10; ‘‘Senior Leader Urges Religious 

Believers To Help Promote Development, Stability,’’ Xinhua (Online), 9 February 10. For an 

overview of past efforts to articulate a ‘‘positive role’’ for religion, see ‘‘Politburo Study Session 

Calls for Uniting Religious Communities Around Party,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, January 2008, 3. 5Wang Zuo’an, ‘‘Strengthen Ability To Do Work on Religion’’ [Zengqiang zuohao zongjiao 

gongzuo de nengli], Qiushi (Online), 1 February 10. 6 ‘‘Forum Convenes on 5th-Year Anniversary of Implementation of ‘Regulation on Religious Affairs,’ Hui Liangyu Attends and Makes Important Speech’’ [‘‘Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ shishi 5 

zhounian zuotanhui zhaokai hui liangyu chuxi bing zuo zhongyao jianghua], China Religions 

(Online), 12 April 10; Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05. 7See the RRA generally for provisions defining the scope of state control over various internal 

affairs of religious groups. For detailed analysis of specific articles, see, e.g., ‘‘Zhejiang and Other 

Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10. 8The RRA conditions protections on religious groups registering as official organizations and 

registering venues with the government. Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 

issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 12–15. For information on harassment 

of unregistered groups, see subsections on specific religious communities within this section. See 

also Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

258 

Religious Freedom Report—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 

09. 9 Hubei Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Hubei sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 

31 July 09, effective 1 October 09, arts. 30–35; Hainan Province Provisions on the Management 

of Religious Affairs [Hainan sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli ruogan guiding], issued 25 September 

09, effective 1 December 09, art. 10. Compare these provisions with those in the older regulations they replace. Hubei Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Hubei 

sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 14 January 01, effective 1 April 01, art. 7; Hainan 

Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Hainan sheng zongjiao shiwu 

guanli tiaoli], issued 26 September 97, effective 22 October 97 (lacking a provision on cross-provincial movement of religious personnel that is present in the 2009 measures that replace them). 

For analysis of the new regulation and provisions, see ‘‘Three Provinces Issue New or Amended 

Regulations on Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 4. In addition, in 2010, the Guangdong province People’s Congress Standing Committee 

amended its 2000 regulation on religious affairs. Guangdong Province Regulation on Religious 

Affairs [Guangdong sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 June 00 as the Guangdong Province 

Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Guangdong sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli 

tiaoli], amended and name changed on 22 January 10, effective 1 March 10. 10Measures on the Supervision and Management of Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious 

Activities (Trial) [Zongjiao huodong changsuo caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 

January 10, effective 1 March 10. 11See analysis in ‘‘New Measures Regulate Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3. For provisions 

articulating broad oversight of venues and as well as protection for the sites, see Measures on 

the Supervision and Management of Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities (Trial) 

[Zongjiao huodong changsuo caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 January 10, effective 1 March 10, arts. 6, 7. 12Measures on the Supervision and Management of Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious 

Activities (Trial) [Zongjiao huodong changsuo caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 

January 10, effective 1 March 10, art. 2. 13State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues Concerning the Management 

of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng 

waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, art. 8(3). 14This section pertains to what official sources refer to as ‘‘Buddhism in the Han tradition,’’ 

an inaccurate umbrella term that encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from 

the Tibetan tradition. ‘‘Buddhism in the Han tradition’’ (hanchuan fojiao) is inaccurate in religious terms. Buddhists divide themselves according to a number of traditions, ritual practices, 

and schools of thought, but not in purely ethnic terms. It is also worth noting that with the 

possible exception of the Chan school of Buddhism, there is arguably no true ‘‘Han tradition’’ 

of Buddhism. All non-Chan schools of Buddhism in China can be clearly traced to Indian 

sources. In addition, there are Chinese citizens belonging to officially recognized ‘‘ethnic minority’’ groups, such as the Dai, that practice Theravada Buddhism—a branch of Buddhism completely outside of what Chinese officials mean by the ‘‘Han tradition’’ (non-esoteric Mahayana 

Buddhism—a branch of Buddhism of Indian origin as practiced by non-Tibetans). 15 Constitution of the Buddhist Association of China [Zhongguo fojiao xiehui zhangcheng], enacted 18 September 02, art. 3; Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 

30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 27–29. 16See the discussion of the legal framework for religion in China in the Introduction of this 

section for more information. 17See, e.g., case studies from ‘‘China—Taoist, Buddhist Associations’ Websites Suggest Constraints,’’ Open Source Center, 23 November 09. 18 Buddhism Online (Online), ‘‘Director Wang Zuo’an’s Remarks at the Eighth National Conference of the Buddhist Association of China’’ [Wang zuo’an ju zhang zai zhongguo fojiao xiehui 

di ba ci quanguo daibiao huiyi shang de jiang hua], 2 February 10. 19 Ibid. 20See, e.g., Mashang Party Committee and Mashang People’s Government, Mashang Work 

Summary for First Half of 2009 and Work Plan for Second Half of 2009 [Mashang zhen 2009 

nian shangbannian gongzuo zongjie ji xiabannian gongzuo dasuan], 25 December 09; Qidong 

Municipal Anti-Cult Association (Online), ‘‘Introduction to Anti-Cult Knowledge in 2010’’ [2010 

nian fanxiejiao zhishi jieshao], 4 June 10. 21Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With Designating and Banning Cult 

Organizations [Guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 April 

00. 22See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Circular Regarding the 

Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s Official Law Enforcement Powers [Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 

tongzhi], issued 1 December 09; Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 2009 

Work Summary and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian 

gongzuo zhongdian], 17 November 09; Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 

Wuxi City Propaganda Manual for Governance of Unapproved Sites (Temples) [Wuxi shi weijing 

pizhun changsuo (simiao) zhili gongzuo xuanchuan shouce], 19 October 09; Wuzhong District 

Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work 

Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu 

gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09; Yangzhou Religious Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Jiangdu Television Station Special Exposes Tricks of Fake Monks and Fake Daoist Priests’’ [Jiangdu dianshitai zhuanti 

jiechuan jia seng jia dao de pianshu], reprinted in Yangzhou Municipal People’s Government 

(Online), 2 June 10; Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu 

259 

kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], 

issued 15 September 09. 23See, e.g., Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Wuxi City Propaganda Manual for Governance of Unapproved Sites (Temples) [Wuxi shi weijing pizhun changsuo (simiao) 

zhili gongzuo xuanchuan shouce], 19 October 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs 

Bureau, District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work 

Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09. 24See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Circular Regarding the 

Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s Official Law Enforcement Powers [Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 

tongzhi], issued 1 December 09; Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 2009 

Work Summary and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian 

gongzuo zhongdian], 17 November 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 

District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu 

minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09; 

Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic 

Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 

yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09. 25 ‘‘The Flower of Ethnic Unity Is in Full Bloom, Religion Has Stepped Onto the Harmonious 

Path’’ [Minzu shengkai tuanjie hua, zongjiao tashang hexie lu], People’s Daily (Online), 1 September 09. 26See, e.g., Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 2009 Work Summary 

and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo zhongdian], 

17 November 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu 

gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09. 27Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Wuxi City Propaganda Manual for 

Governance of Unapproved Sites (Temples) [Wuxi shi weijing pizhun changsuo (simiao) zhili 

gongzuo xuanchuan shouce], 19 October 09. 28 Estimates of the size of China’s Catholic community vary widely, and there are large discrepancies between Chinese Government estimates and foreign media estimates. For example, 

senior Party leader Jia Qinglin has estimated the Catholic population at 4 million, although it 

is unclear whether or not his estimate applies to both registered and unregistered Catholics. 

Bao Daozu, ‘‘Religion ‘Can Promote Harmony,’ ’’ China Daily (Online), 4 March 08. Foreign 

media estimates range from 6 to over 12 million. See, e.g., Ambrose Leung, ‘‘Tsang Had Audience With Pope but Cancelled,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 26 March 10; ‘‘Cardinal for 

China,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 16 April 09; James Pomfret, ‘‘New Hong Kong Bishop 

Pressures China on Religious Freedom,’’ Reuters (Online), 16 April 09. 29For information on the history of this policy, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 

06, 87. 30See CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 96–97, for information on coercion to participate in bishop appointments in previous years. 31 Ambrose Leung, ‘‘Beijing and Vatican Focus on Long-Term Future,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 1 November 09; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010 Annual Report, May 2010, 109. 32 Examples of bishops approved by both the CPA and the Holy See this year include Bishop 

Cai Bingrui of the Xiamen diocese in Fujian province, Bishop Meng Qinglu of the Hohhot diocese in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), Bishop Shen Bin of the Haimen diocese 

in Jiangsu province, Bishop Du Jiang of the Bameng diocese in the IMAR, and Bishop Han 

Yingjin of the Sanyuan diocese in Shaanxi province. ‘‘Church Communities Welcome Xiamen 

Bishop,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 10 May 10; Tom Mitchell, ‘‘China Ordains 

Bishops Backed by the Vatican,’’ Financial Times (Online), 10 May 10; ‘‘Haimen Bishop Ordained With Papal Mandate,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 21 April 10; Wang 

Zhicheng, ‘‘Bishop Placed Under House Arrest for Refusing To Co-Celebrate Mass With Excommunicated Bishop,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 8 April 10; ‘‘Fourth China Bishop Ordained This Year,’’ 

Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 June 10. 33 Ankang Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs (Online), ‘‘Liu Bainian, Vice-Chair of the China 

Catholic Patriotic Association, Visits Ankang To Inspect and Guide Catholic Work’’ [Zhongguo 

tianzhujiao aiguo hui fu zhuxi liu bainian lai an jiancha zhidao tianzhujiao gongzuo], 20 January 10. 34See, e.g., ‘‘Study Deeply and Implement the Spirit of the 2010 National Meeting for Work 

on Religion’’ [Shenru xuexi guanche 2010 nian quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi jingshen], China 

Religion (Online), 3 March 10; Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), 

‘‘Zhongshan Municipal Catholic Patriotic Association Convenes Second Representative Assembly’’ [Zhongshan shi tianzhujiao aiguo hui zhaokai di er jie daibiao da hui], 20 January 10; Li 

Yi, Songjiang District Religious and Ethnic Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Our District’s Third Representative 

Assembly of Catholics Convenes’’ [Wo qu tianzhujiao di san ci daibiao huiyi zhaokai], reprinted 

in Songjiang District United Front Work Department (Online), 18 January 10. 35See, e.g., Qujiang People’s Government, Program Regarding the Implementation of Investigations into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 

daojiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang’an], 8 January 10; Taijiang District 

People’s Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian 

gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding 

Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu 

kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], 

issued 15 September 09. 

260 

36Wang Zhicheng, ‘‘Bishop Placed Under House Arrest for Refusing To Co-Celebrate Mass 

With Excommunicated Bishop,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 8 April 10. 37 Ibid. 38Michael Wines, ‘‘Bishop Yao Liang, 87, Imprisoned in China for Loyalty to the Vatican, 

Dies,’’ New York Times (Online), 6 January 10. 39Zhen Yuan, ‘‘Underground Bishop of Xiwanzi Dies, Security Tightened for Funeral,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 4 January 10. 40 ‘‘Over 20 Thousand Official and Underground Catholics at the Funeral of the Bishop of 

Wenzhou,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 15 October 09. 41 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010 Annual Report, May 2010, 110. 42 Bernardo Cervellera, ‘‘In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 29 October 09. 43See, e.g., Hebei Province Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, ‘‘Hebei Province Ethnic 

and Religious Affairs Bureau Bulletin No. 16: the ‘Year of Cadre Work-Style Building’ Activities’’ 

[Sheng minzongting ‘ganbu zuofeng jianshe nian’ huodong di 16 qi jianbao], 28 December 09; 

Shandan County United Front Work Department, ‘‘Regarding Thoughts on Accelerating the Socioeconomic Development of Ethnic and Religious Neighborhoods’’ [Guanyu jiakuai minzu 

zongjiao qunzhong jujuqu jingji shehui fazhan de sikao], reprinted in Shandan County People’s 

Government (Online), 20 November 09; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Wuxi 

City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Work To Promote Administration According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa 

xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09. 44See, e.g., Qujiang People’s Government, Program Regarding the Implementation of Investigations Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 

daojiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang’an], 8 January 10; Shandan County 

United Front Work Department, ‘‘Regarding Thoughts on Accelerating the Socioeconomic Development of Ethnic and Religious Neighborhoods’’ [Guanyu jiakuai minzu zongjiao qunzhong 

jujuqu jingji shehui fazhan de sikao], reprinted in Shandan County People’s Government (Online), 20 November 09; Taijiang District People’s Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 

nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic 

and Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 

Work To Promote Administration According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju 

guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09; Zetan 

Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, 

tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09. 45See, e.g., Qujiang People’s Government, Program Regarding the Implementation of Investigations into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 

daojiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang’an], 8 January 10; Taijiang District 

People’s Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian 

gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Work To Promote Administration 

According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa 

xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09; Zetan Township Communist Party 

Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, 

Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang 

diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09. 46See, e.g., Qujiang People’s Government, Program Regarding the Implementation of Investigations Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 

daojiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang’an], 8 January 10; Zetan Township 

Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for 

Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, 

tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09. 47 ‘‘Fujian Priest Detained Over Youth Camp,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 11 

March 10. 48 ‘‘CHINA—Another ‘Underground’ Priest Detained,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 

23 March 10. 49 ‘‘Baoding Bishop Explains Departure From ‘Underground’ Church,’’ Union of Catholic Asian 

News (Online), 12 November 09. 50Zhen Yuan, ‘‘Underground Bishop: I Joined the Patriotic Association for the Good of the 

Church,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 11 November 09. 51 Bernardo Cervellera, ‘‘In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 29 October 09. 52 Ibid. 53 ‘‘Bishop Francis An Shuxin Openly Installed,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 9 August 10; Wang Zhicheng, ‘‘Bishop An Shuxin, Former Underground Bishop Installed as Ordinary 

of Baoding,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 7 August 10. 54 ‘‘Bishop Jia Zhiguo of China’s Zhengding Diocese Released’’ [Zhongguo zhengding jiaoqu jia 

zhiguo zhujiao huoshi], CathNews China (Online), 8 July 10; ‘‘Chinese Underground Bishop Released,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 8 July 10; Wang Zhicheng, ‘‘Mgr. Jia Zhiguo, 

Underground Bishop, Released After 15 Months,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 8 July 10. 55 Bernardo Cervellera, ‘‘Police Arrest Underground Zhengding Bishop Jia Zhiguo,’’ AsiaNews 

(Online), 31 March 09. 56 ‘‘Inner Mongolia, the Only Catholic Church in Ordos Demolished To Build a New Road,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 10 June 10; ‘‘Only Catholic Church in Ordos Demolished’’ [E’erduosi shi 

weiyi de tianzhu jiaotang bei chai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 June 10. 

261 

57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59For more information on the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, see Falun Gong in this section 

for more information. 60For more information, see ‘‘China’s Marian Shrines,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 27 May 04. 61 Holy See, Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated 

Persons, and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China, 27 May 

07. 62See, e.g., Taijiang District People’s Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzong ju 2009 nian 

gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Work 

To Promote Administration According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 

2009 niandu tuijin yifa xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09. 63See, e.g., ‘‘Believers From Various Locations in the Mainland Answer Pope’s Call To Pray 

for the Chinese Church’’ [Dalu ge di xinzhong xiangying jiaozong wei zhongguo jiaohui qidao], 

CathNews China, reprinted in Catholic Online (Online), 25 May 10; ‘‘Mainland Catholics Pray 

for China Church,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 May 10. 64See, e.g., ‘‘Mainland Catholics Pray for China Church,’’ Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 May 10; Wang Zhicheng, ‘‘Even in Persecution We Pray to Our Lady of Sheshan,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 24 May 10. 65For more information about the history of the ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign against Falun Gong, 

see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 120–26. 66For more information on the teachings and practices of Falun Gong, see David Ownby, 

Falun Gong and the Future of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 67For more information on the events leading to the crackdown on Falun Gong, see Human 

Rights Watch, Dangerous Meditation: China’s Campaign Against Falun Gong, January 2002, 

17–43. 68Official estimates placed the number of adherents inside China at 30 million prior to the 

crackdown. Falun Gong sources estimate that there was twice that number. Maria Hsia Chang, 

Falun Gong: the End of Days (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 2. In April 2009, Han 

Zhiguang, a Chinese attorney who has defended Falun Gong clients, reported that there remain 

‘‘huge numbers’’ of practitioners in China and that the movement is ‘‘expanding.’’ See Malcolm 

Moore, ‘‘Falun Gong ‘Growing’ in China Despite 10-Year Ban,’’ Telegraph (Online), 24 April 09. 69Dafa Information Center (Online), ‘‘Shanghai Expo Fuels Falun Gong Crackdown, Over 120 

Abductions,’’ 5 May 10; Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Comrade Xu Lin’s 

Speech to the New District Political-Legal Comprehensive Management Work Meeting’’ [Xu lin 

tongzhi zai xinqu zhengfa zongzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 1 February 10; Pudong 

District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Hangtou Residential Committees Launch Anti-Cult 

Propaganda and Education Activities To Welcome the World Expo’’ [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying 

shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Pudong District People’s Government 

(Online), ‘‘Residential Committee Work Meeting on Sorting Through Unstable Factors’’ [Juwei 

bu wending yinsu paimo gongzuo huiyi], 21 January 10; Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Chongming County Bureau of Civil Affairs Launches ‘Welcome World Expo, 

Speak in a Civilized Way, Oppose Cults’ Week of Propaganda Education Activities’’ [Chongming 

xian minzhengju kaizhan ‘ying shibo, jiang wenming, fan xiejiao’ xuanchuan jiaoyu zhou 

huodong], 2 April 10. 70Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ‘‘Shanghai Expo Fuels Falun Gong Crackdown, 

Over 120 Abductions,’’ 5 May 10. 71PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 300; ClearWisdom (Online), ‘‘Husband and Wife Sentenced to 

Prison for Practicing Falun Gong’’ [Fuqi er ren tong bei panxing, meiman jiating lizi san], 20 

January 10. 72 Xu was sentenced to three years in prison in 2008, and there have been no reports indicating that she has been released early. For more information on Xu’s case, see, e.g., Amnesty 

International (Online), ‘‘China: Fear of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment/Prisoner of Conscience,’’ 

28 November 08; ‘‘Artist Xu Na Is Sentenced to Three Years in Prison’’ [Huajia xu na bei pan 

san nian tuxing], 25 November 08; Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Falun Gong Follower Receives 

3-Year Sentence,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in International Herald Tribune (Online), 25 November 08. 73 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 124–26. 74PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 300; ‘‘Sentenced to Seven Years for Defending Falun Gong, 

Attorney Wang Yonghang’s Family Calls for Support’’ [Wei falun gong bianhu huoxing qi nian, 

lushi wang yonghang jiashu huyu guanzhu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 January 10; Chinese 

Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Dalian Human Rights Lawyer Wang Yonghang Sentenced 

to Seven Years in Prison’’ [Dalian weiquan lushi wang yonghang bei panxing 7 nian], 5 December 09; Lucy Hornby, ‘‘China Disbars Two Rights Defense Lawyers,’’ Reuters (Online), 9 May 

10. 75Tang Jitian said that the disbarment was ‘‘revenge for what we have done. It’s to scare our 

friends who are doing the same things. It has a chilling effect on them.’’ Edward Wong and 

Xiyun Yang, ‘‘China Bans Two Rights Lawyers for Life,’’ New York Times (Online), 10 May 

2010. See also Lucy Hornby, ‘‘China Disbars Two Rights Defense Lawyers,’’ Reuters (Online), 

9 May 10. The Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice alleged that the two attorneys had ‘‘disrupted the order of the court and interfered with the regular litigation process.’’ The lawyers 

262 

dispute the charges, and experts note that it is very unusual for lawyers to be disbarred in 

China on such charges. 76Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Rights Lawyers Disappears Again,’’ New York Times (Online), 30 

April 10. For more information on Gao Zhisheng and the torture that he has suffered in custody, 

see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 97–98, 125. See Section III—Access to Justice— 

Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders for more information. 77Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears Again,’’ New York Times (Online), 30 

April 10; Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘Missing Dissident Found in Northern China,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 29 March 10; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘A Chinese Dissident’s Mysterious Reappearance,’’ Time 

Magazine (Online), 29 March 10; ‘‘Crusading Chinese Lawyer Gives Up Activism,’’ Associated 

Press (Online), 7 April 10. 78Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Residential Committee Work Meeting on 

Sorting Through Unstable Factors’’ [Juwei bu wending yinsu paimo gongzuo huiyi], 21 January 

10. 79Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Comrade Xu Lin’s Speech to the New District Political-Legal Comprehensive Management Work Meeting’’ [Xu lin tongzhi zai xinqu 

zhengfa zongzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 1 February 10. 80Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Hangtou Residential Committees Launch 

Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education Activities To Welcome the World Expo’’ [Hangtou juwei 

kaizhan ying shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Shanghai Municipal 

People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Chongming County Bureau of Civil Affairs Launches ‘Welcome 

World Expo, Speak in a Civilized Way, Oppose Cults’ Week of Propaganda Education Activities’’ 

[Chongming xian minzhengju kaizhan ‘‘ying shibo, jiang wenming, fan xiejiao’’ xuanchuan jiaoyu 

zhou huodong], 2 April 10. 81 A ‘‘concrete demand’’ is the exact phrase used by officials to indicate that the propaganda 

campaign was mandatory. Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Hangtou Residential 

Committees Launch Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education Activities To Welcome the World 

Expo’’ [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10. 82Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Hangtou Residential Committees Launch 

Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education Activities To Welcome the World Expo’’ [Hangtou juwei 

kaizhan ying shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Nanmatou Road Subdistrict Implementation Opinion Regarding Security Defense and Mass Prevention Work To Welcome the World Expo’’ [Nanmatou lu jiedao 

guanyu ying shibo anquan baowei qunfangqunzhi gongzuo de shishi yijian], 13 September 09; 

Tang Township People’s Government (Online), 2009 Tang Township Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Summary and 2010 Work Plan [2009 nian tang zhen shehui zhi’an 

zonghe zhili gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo jihua], 14 December 09; Xuhui District People’s Government (Online), Fenglin Subdistrict 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plan 

[Fenglin jiedao 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie he 2010 nian gongzuo jihua], 19 January 10. 83Gulou District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Wushan Community: Community Stability 

Work During the Period of the Shanghai World Expo’’ [Wushan shequ: shanghai shibohui qijian 

shequ weiwen gongzuo], 26 April 10. 84 Huang Yanwen, Shicheng County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Mulan Township 

Launches Propaganda Activities To Guard Against ‘Falun Gong’ Cult Organization’s Interference and Sabotage of the Shanghai World Expo’’ [Mulan xiang kaizhan fangfan ‘‘falun gong’’ 

xiejiao zuzhi ganrao pohuai shanghai shibohui xuanjiang huodong], 22 April 10. 85For more detailed information on the 6–10 Office, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 88–90, and CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 121–123. 86Qibao Township People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Qibao Township Political-Legal Committee 

and Village and Residential Committees Sign Special 610 Work Responsibility Agreement’’ 

[Qibao zhen zhengfawei yu cunjuwei qianding 610 zhuanxiang gongzuo zerenshu], 9 February 

10. 87Tang Township People’s Government (Online), 2009 Tang Township Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Summary and 2010 Work Plan [2009 nian tang zhen shehui 

zhi’an zonghe zhili gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo jihua], 14 December 09. 88See, e.g., Jing’an County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Gaohu Launches Warning and 

Education Plan To Prevent ‘Falun Gong’ Cult Organization From Using RMB To Carry Out Reactionary Propaganda’’ [Gaohu zhen kaizhan fangfan ‘‘falungong’’ xiejiao zuzhi liyong renminbi 

jinxing fandong xuanchuan de jingshi jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong fang’an], 8 January 10; 

Mentougou District People’s Government and Party Committee (Online), ‘‘Deeply Carry Out the 

Scientific Development Concept, Strongly Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work’’ [Shenru guanche 

luoshi kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 09. 89See, e.g., Jing’an County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Gaohu Launches Warning and 

Education Plan To Prevent ‘Falun Gong’ Cult Organization From Using RMB To Carry Out Reactionary Propaganda’’ [Gaohu zhen kaizhan fangfan ‘‘falungong’’ xiejiao zuzhi liyong renminbi 

jinxing fandong xuanchuan de jingshi jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong fang’an], 8 January 10; Lishui 

County Office of the Leading Group for Administering the County by Law and Lishui County 

Bureau of Justice (Online), ‘‘Lishui County 6–10 Office Organizes Special Study Session for 

Transformed ‘Falun Gong’ Practitioners’’ [Lishui xian 610 bangongshi zuzhi ‘‘falungong’’ 

zhuanhua renyuan zhuanti xuexi], 21 January 10; Mentougou District People’s Government and 

Party Committee (Online), ‘‘Deeply Carry Out the Scientific Development Concept, Strongly 

Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work’’ [Shenru guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin 

fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 09; Pudong District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Comrade 

Xu Lin’s Speech to the New District Political-Legal Comprehensive Management Work Meeting’’ 

[Xu lin tongzhi zai xinqu zhengfa zongzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 1 February 10. 90Ministry of Commerce, Pingjiang County Bureau of Commerce 610 Work Report [Pingjiang 

xian shangwuju 610 gongzuo huibao], 27 November 09. 

263 

91Mentougou District People’s Government and Party Committee (Online), ‘‘Deeply Carry Out 

the Scientific Development Concept, Strongly Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work’’ [Shenru 

guanche luoshi kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 09. 92 ‘‘Wang Zuo’an: ‘Interpreting Scripture’ and New ‘Wa’z’ ’’ [Wang zuo’an: ‘‘jiejing’’ yu xin 

‘‘wo’erzi’’], China Religions (Online), 7 April 10. 93 ‘‘Never Believe Vicious Language, Safeguard Ethnic Unity’’ [Juebu qingxin eyan weihu 

minzu tuanjie], 4 China Muslim 33 (2009). For additional information on the sermon, see ‘‘Wang 

Zuo’an: ‘Interpreting Scripture’ and New ‘Wa’z’ ’’ [Wang zuo’an: ‘‘jiejing’’ yu xin ‘‘wo’erzi’’], China 

Religions (Online), 7 April 10. 94See, e.g., Lingwu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Concerning Summary of 

Work in 2009 and Main Points of Work in 2010 [Guanyu 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian 

gongzuo yaodian], 28 October 09, reprinted in Lingwu People’s Government (Online), 30 December 09; Yiyang Municipal United Front Work Department (Online), ‘‘Municipal Islamic Association Convenes Second Representative Assembly and Smoothly Changes Leadership’’ [Shi 

yisilanjiao xiehui zhaokai di er ci daibiao dahui bing shunli huanjie], 21 December 09; Chengde 

Municipal United Front Work Department (Online), ‘‘Put in Heart and Consolidate Strength, 

Advance Bravely Hand in Hand Launching New Dimensions in United Front Work’’ [Ning xin 

ju li xieshou fenjin kaichuang tongzhan gongzuo xin jumian], 18 March 10; Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, Report Concerning Circumstances of 

Whole Region’s Work on the Management of Religious Affairs [Guanyu quanqu zongjiao shiwu 

guanli gongzuo qingkuang de baogao], 7 April 10. 95Wulan County Communist Party Committee Organization Department, Report on Investigation Into Current Conditions for Venues for Islamic Activities in Wulan County [Wulan xian 

yisilanjiao huodong changsuo xianzhuang diaocha baogao], 18 November 09. 96See Section IV—Xinjiang for information on security campaigns. 97See examples in this section as well as a document defining ‘‘23 types of illegal religious 

activities,’’ such as ‘‘letting students pray,’’ conducting certain religious practices pertaining to 

marriage and divorce, holding private religious instruction classes, ‘‘distorting religious doctrine,’’ ‘‘fabricating history,’’ ‘‘inciting religious fanaticism,’’ and advocating ‘‘Pan-Islamism’’ and 

‘‘Pan-Turkism.’’ Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal Religious Activity [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de jieding], 2008, arts. 3, 4, 5, 20. For information on human rights standards, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 

and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 

2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ‘‘ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions’’); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, 

entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR 

for an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, 

para. 1. 98 Yuan Lei, ‘‘Nur Bekri Investigates Conditions in Hotan, Kashi, and Aksu,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 

18 August 09 (Open Source Center, 11 September 09). 99 Xiaokaiti Imin, ‘‘Patriotic Religious Personages Should Bring Into Play Role of Non-Party 

Grassroots Cadres’’ [Aiguo zongjiao renshi yao fahui feidang jiceng ganbu zuoyong], Tianshan 

Net (Online), 16 December 09. 100 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, 2009 Government Work Report [2009 

nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 18 January 10. 101 ‘‘Women’s Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting Unity and Safeguarding 

Stability’’ [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu tuanjie, weihu shehui wending zhong dandang 

zhongren], People’s Daily (Online), 12 January 10. 102 ‘‘Xinjiang Women’s Federation: Bring Into Play Role of ‘Half the Sky’ in Promoting Ethnic 

Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability’’ [Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu 

shehui wending zhong fahui ‘‘banbiantian’’ zuoyong], People’s Daily (Online), 20 November 09; 

‘‘Women’s Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting Unity and Safeguarding Stability’’ [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu tuanjie, weihu shehui wending zhong dandang zhongren], 

People’s Daily (Online), 12 January 10. See additional analysis in ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Tighten 

Controls Over Muslim Women,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 

4 June 10, 2. 103 ‘‘Xinjiang Women’s Federation: Bring Into Play Role of ‘Half the Sky’ in Promoting Ethnic 

Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability’’ [Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu 

shehui wending zhong fahui ‘‘banbiantian’’ zuoyong], People’s Daily (Online), 20 November 09. 104For background on previous proposals to regulate bu ̈wi and for more information on these 

religious specialists, see ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Train, Seek To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2. 105 ‘‘Xinjiang Women’s Federation: Bring Into Play Role of ‘Half the Sky’ in Promoting Ethnic 

Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability’’ [Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu 

shehui wending zhong fahui ‘‘banbiantian’’ zuoyong], People’s Daily (Online), 20 November 09; 

‘‘Women’s Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting Unity and Safeguarding Stability’’ [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu tuanjie, weihu shehui wending zhong dandang zhongren], 

People’s Daily (Online), 12 January 10. See additional analysis in ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Tighten 

Controls Over Muslim Women,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 

4 June 10, 2. 

264 

106 ‘‘Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist Thought—Summary of Autonomous 

Region’s 2009 ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work’’ [Laolao 

zhanling shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ gongzuo 

zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10. 107Liu Qingxia, ‘‘Urumqi Municipal Public Security Organs Track Down 13 Tons of Illegal Religious Books’’ [Wulumuqi shi gongan jiguan chahuo 13 dun feifa zongjiao shuji], Xinhua (Online), 10 February 10. 108 Aqsu Municipal People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Implement Six Big Projects To Build New 

Pattern in Community Work’’ [Shishi liu da gongcheng goujian shequ gongzuo xin geju], 26 January 10. 109 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Government, Bulletin Regarding Effective Construction 

Work [Jiguan xiaoneng jianshe gongzuo jianbao], 6 April 10. 110Study and Practice Activities Office, ‘‘Kashgar District Deepens Study and Practice Activities for Scientific Development Concept’’ [Kashi diqu shenru xuexi shijian kexue fazhan guan 

huodong], 13 October 09. 111 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, 2009 Government Work Report [2009 

nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 18 January 10. For reports from lower level governments, see, 

e.g., Hami District Government, Hami District 2010 Work Arrangements [Hami diqu xingshu 

2010 nian gongzuo anpai], 4 January 10; Turpan District Government, Turpan District Implements 2009 Notice Number 112: Notice Concerning Printing and Distributing ‘‘District Administrative Office Party Leading Group Implementation Plan on Rectifying and Reforming Study 

and Practice Activities for Scientific Development Concept’’ [Tudi xing 2009 112 hao: guanyu 

yinfa ‘‘diqu xingshu dangzu xuexi shijian kexue fazhan guan huodong zhenggai luoshi fang’an’’ 

de tongzhi], 24 August 09; Fuyun County Government (Online), ‘‘Four Measures From Fuyun 

County Simultaneously Do Good Job of Work To Curb Scattered Pilgrimages’’ [Fuyun xian si 

cuo bingju zhuahao zhizhi lingsan chaojin gongzuo], 7 April 10; Hoboksar Mongol Autonomous 

County Government (Online), ‘‘District Convenes United Work Front Department, Ethnic and 

Religious Affairs Commission Meeting on Work To Curb Scattered Pilgrimages’’ [Diqu zhaokai 

tongzhan, minzong ji zhizhi lingsan chaojin gongzuo huiyi], 7 April 10. 112Kashgar District Personnel Bureau, 2010 Shule County Announcement on Publicly Recruiting Song and Dance Ensemble Performers [Er ling yi ling nian shule xian mianxiang 

shehui gongkai zhaopin wengongtuan biaoyan renyuan gonggao], 5 March 10; Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region Education Department, 2009 Turpan District Experimental Middle School 

Announcement on Recruiting Teachers [2009 nian tulufan diqu shiyan zhongxue mianxiang 

shehui zhaopin jiaoshi gonggao], 11 September 09. 113 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 

09. 114 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Law on the Protection of Minors’’ [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu shishi ‘‘weichengnianren baohufa’’ banfa], issued 25 

September 93, effective 25 September 93, art. 14. 115 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Protection of Minors [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 

09, art. 34. 116See analysis in ‘‘New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To Expand Controls Over Children’s 

Religious Freedom (Includes Update),’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

No. 1, 8 January 10, 2, and ‘‘Draft Regulation in Xinjiang Could Strengthen Legal Prohibitions 

Over Children’s Freedom of Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

No. 4, 2009, 3. 117 Ili Party Committee Organization Department (Online), ‘‘Strengthen Ethnic Unity Education, Uphold Harmony and Stability on School Campuses’’ [Jiaqiang minzu tuanjie jiaoyu 

weihu xiaoyuan hexie wending], 20 May 10. For detailed information on the ‘‘six forbiddens,’’ 

see Chapchal County Government (Online), ‘‘Compilation of Questions for Knowledge Contest 

on ‘Promoting Unity, Opposing Separatism, Upholding Stability’ ’’ [‘‘Zengjin tuanjie, fandui 

fenlie, weihu wending’’ zhishi jingsai ti huibian], 31 August 09. 118 ‘‘New Details on Arrests,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 May 10; ‘‘4 Kids of Turghan Polat, 

Bulaqdadamtu Village, Are Detained’’ [Bulaqdadamtu kentidiki turghan polatning 4 perzenti 

tutqun qilinghan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 May 10. 119 Ibid. 120 ‘‘Police Raid Quran Group,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 June 10; ‘‘Police in Maralbe ́shi 

County Punished Uyghur Women’’ [Maralbe ́shi nahiyisi saqchiliri uyghur ayallirini jazalidi], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 June 10. 121 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

Religious Freedom Report—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 

09. 122 Ibid. 123 Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘Fast-Growing Christian Churches Crushed in China,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 10 December 09. 124The term in Chinese is shenxue sixiang jianshe. For more information on theological reconstruction, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 132–35, and ‘‘Official Protestant 

Church Politicizes Pastoral Training, ‘Reconstructs’ Theology,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 125 In Chinese, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China Christian Council are commonly referred to as the lianghui (two organizations), which reflects the fact that the top leadership and general functions of the two often overlap. 126 ‘‘Jia Qinglin Holds New Year’s Chat With Leaders of National Religious Organizations’’ 

[Jia qinglin yu quanguoxing zongjiao tuanti fuzeren juxing yingchun zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 

8 February 10. 

265 

127 Ibid. 128State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘2010 Welcoming Spring Tea Party for 

Religious Figures Is Held in Beijing’’ [2010 nian zongjiaojie renshi yingchun cha hua hui zai 

jing juxing], 10 February 10. 129 ‘‘Jia Qinglin Holds New Year’s Chat With Leaders of National Religious Organizations’’ 

[Jia qinglin yu quanguoxing zongjiao tuanti fuzeren juxing yingchun zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 

8 February 10. 130See, e.g., Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), ‘‘Jieyang Municipal Committee of the Three-Self Movement of Protestant Churches and China Christian Council Propose Activities To Push Forward With the Building of Harmonious Churches’’ [Jieyangshi 

jidujiao lianghui changyi tuidong hexie jiaotang chuangjian huodong], 23 December 09; Hubei 

Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), ‘‘Huangshi Municipal Committee of the 

Three-Self Movement of Protestant Churches and China Christian Council Push Ahead With the 

Study of Theological Reconstruction’’ [Huangshi shi jidujiao ‘‘lianghui’’ tuijin shenxue sixiang 

jianshe yantao], 1 December 09; Jiangsu Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), 

‘‘Huai’an Municipal Committee of the Three-Self Movement of Protestant Churches and China 

Christian Council Along With County (District) TSPM Committees Conduct 2009 Work Assessment’’ [Huai’anshi jidujiao lianghui he xian (qu) sanzijinxing 2009 niandu gongzuo kaoping], 2 

February 10; Suzhou Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), ‘‘Suzhou Municipal Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches and China Christian Council Convene 2009 Summary Work and Report Meeting’’ [Suzhoushi jidujiao lianghui 

zhaokai 09 niandu zongjie gongzuo ji shuzhi huiyi], 27 January 10. For more information, see 

also ‘‘Official Protestant Church Politicizes Pastoral Training, ‘Reconstructs’ Theology,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 131See, e.g., ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Handan Officials Disrupt Worship Concert and Beat Christians,’’ 9 January 10; ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Korla Police and Farm Leaders Burn Bibles and Persecute Elderly Christians,’’ 8 January 10; ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Shuozhou Pastor’s Home Destroyed; 6 Christian Leaders Detained,’’ 28 January 10; ‘‘Fate of Church Members Unknown,’’ 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 January 10; ‘‘Nanyang Authorities Bust Theology Class, Disperse 

Over 30 Christian Students’’ [Nanyang dangju chachao shenxue ban, qusan sanshi duo jidu tu 

xueyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 March 10; ‘‘Suining House Church: Eight People Detained, Two Beaten’’ [Suining jiating jiaohui ba ren bei kou liang ren bei da], Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 18 May 2010; Verna Yu, ‘‘Christians’ Detention Sparks Concern,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 11 January 10. 132See, e.g., Qian Xinan Prefectural People’s Government, Qian Xinan Prefectural Government Report Concerning Circumstances of Religious Work [Qian xinan zhou renmin zhengfu 

guanyu zongjiao gongzuo qingkuang de baogao], 11 March 10; Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Ethnic 

and Religious Affairs, ‘‘Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 

2009 Moving Forward With Administrative Work’’ [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 

2009 niandu tuijin yifa xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 8 April 10. 133See, e.g., Cara Anna, ‘‘China Blocks Unregistered Church Service Again,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 15 November 09; ‘‘Gathering of 700 Shouwang Church 

Members Blocked’’ [Shouwang jiaohui 700 jiaotu juhui shouzu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 November 09; ‘‘Protestant Clergyman Arrested in Guangzhou,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 11 May 10; 

Verna Yu, ‘‘Police Detained Clergymen To Disrupt Service, Church Says,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 23 November 09; ‘‘Wang Dao of Liangren Church Detained, Home Searched; Believers Meet for First Time at Park, Dispersed’’ [Liangren jiaohui wang dao bei chaojia ji juliu; 

xintu shouci gongyuan juhui bei qusan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 May 10. 134 Cara Anna, ‘‘China Blocks Unregistered Church Service Again,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 15 November 09; ‘‘Gathering of 700 Shouwang Church 

Members Blocked’’ [Shouwang jiaohui 700 jiaotu juhui shouzu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 November 09. 135 Verna Yu, ‘‘Police Detained Clergymen To Disrupt Service, Church Says,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 23 November 09. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 ‘‘Protestant Clergyman Arrested in Guangzhou,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 11 May 10; ‘‘Wang 

Dao of Liangren Church Detained, Home Searched; Believers Meet for First Time at Park, Dispersed’’ [Liangren jiaohui wang dao bei chaojia ji juliu; xintu shouci gongyuan juhui bei qusan], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 May 10. 139 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Wang Dao Released on Bail, Awaiting Trial,’’ 14 June 10; ChinaAid 

(Online), ‘‘Pastor Bike Visits Wang Dao,’’ 22 June 10. 140 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Guangzhou Pastor Wang Dao Calls for Continuing Prayer To Fight’’ 

[Guangzhou wang dao mushi huyu jixu daogao zhengzhan], 18 August 10; ChinaAid (Online), 

‘‘News Flash: Pastor Wang Dao Taken Away by Public Security Personnel Again, Released After 

Brief Detention’’ [Kuai xun: wang dao mushi zai ci bei guo’an dai zou, duanzan kouya hou 

shifang], 13 August 10. 141 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Pastor Zhang Mingxuan and Wife Released’’ [Zhang mingxuan mushi 

fufu huoshi], 15 June 10. 142 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘By Dawn’s Early Light: 400 Launch Violent Attack on Fushan House 

Church,’’ 15 September 09; ‘‘Shanxi Linfen Household Church Endures an Escalation in Government Pressure’’ [Shanxi linfen jiating jiaohui shou zhengfu daya shengji], Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 September 09; ‘‘Protestant Church Destroyed by Police in Shanxi, Dozens of Faithful 

Wounded,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 17 September 09. 143 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘By Dawn’s Early Light: 400 Launch Violent Attack on Fushan House 

Church,’’ 15 September 09; ‘‘Protestant Church Destroyed by Police in Shanxi, Dozens of Faithful Wounded,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 17 September 09. 144 Ibid. 

266 

145 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘By Dawn’s Early Light: 400 Launch Violent Attack on Fushan House 

Church,’’ 15 September 09; ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Linfen Fushan Church Leaders Rushed to Trial 

Without Notice,’’ 13 November 09. 146 ‘‘Protestant Church Destroyed by Police in Shanxi, Dozens of Faithful Wounded,’’ AsiaNews 

(Online), 17 September 09. 147 ‘‘Shanxi Linfen Household Church Endures an Escalation in Government Pressure’’ 

[Shanxi linfen jiating jiaohui shou zhengfu daya shengji], Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 September 09. 148Linfen City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Ding Wenlu, Linfen Municipal Party 

Committee Standing Committee Member and Head of United Front Work Department, Inspects 

the City’s Ethnic and Religious Work’’ [Linfen shi wei changwei, tongzhanbu zhang ding wenlu 

diaoyan shi minzu zongjiao gongzuo], reprinted in Linfen Municipal People’s Government (Online), 18 November 09. 149 Ibid. 150Linfen City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Linfen Municipal Party Committee Secretary Xie Hai Stresses the Strengthening of Ethnic and Religious Work in Practical Ways’’ 

[Linfen shi wei shuji xie hai qiangdiao yao qieshi jiaqiang minzu zongjiao gongzuo], reprinted 

in Linfen Municipal People’s Government (Online), 18 November 09. 151 Ibid. 152 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Fushan House Church Christian Sentenced to 7-Years in Prison,’’ 25 

November 09. 153 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘10 More Arrested After Detainees Refuse To Leave Without Fellow 

Linfen Pastor,’’ 18 October 09. 154 ‘‘China Sentences 5 Church Leaders to Labor Camp,’’ Associated Press (Online), reprinted 

in Washington Post, 2 December 09. 155 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Fushan House Church Christian Sentenced to 7-Years in Prison,’’ 25 

November 09. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid.; ‘‘Linfen Golden Lamp Church To Be Demolished After Two Sessions’’ [Linfen 

jindengtang jiaotang ‘‘lianghui’’ hou jiang bei dangju qiangchai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 

March 10. 158 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Prominent Chinese Legal Researcher Abruptly Dismissed for ‘Political 

Reasons,’ ’’ 3 November 09. 159 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering Linfen Court, Barred 

From Travel,’’ 13 July 10; ‘‘Christians Come Under Attack in China,’’ Toronto Star (Online), 7 

August 10. 160 ‘‘China Moves Uyghur Christian Prisoner, Allows Family Visit,’’ Compass Direct News (Online), 29 April 10. 161 Ibid.; ‘‘Second Trial for Alimjan Affirms First Ruling of 15 Year Prison Sentence’’ 

[Alimujiang an ershen caiding weichi yuanpan shiwu nian tuxing], Radio Free Asia (Online), 

7 April 10. 162 ‘‘China Moves Uyghur Christian Prisoner, Allows Family Visit,’’ Compass Direct News (Online), 29 April 10. 163 Ibid. 164 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Countries of Particular 

Concern: People’s Republic of China,’’ Annual Report 2010, May 2010, 112. 165 ‘‘Religious Rights Abuses Cited,’’ Compass Direct News (Online), 7 May 09; ‘‘Tortured 

Christian Lawyer Arrested as Officials Deny Abuses,’’ Compass Direct News (Online), 11 February 09. 166The Chinese term is xiejiao zuzhi. In 1995, the State Council and the Communist Party 

Central Committee formally outlawed a number of ‘‘heretical’’ or ‘‘cult’’ groups with Protestant 

roots. ‘‘Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups,’’ Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, iii. Article 300 of the PRC Criminal 

Law outlaws ‘‘using cult organizations to undermine the implementation of the law.’’ PRC 

Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 

December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 

28 February 09, art. 300. 167Fengang Yang, ‘‘The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China,’’ 47 Sociological 

Quarterly 93, 106–108 (2006). It is unknown how many members of these groups have been arrested or detained in recent years, but the total has likely risen on account of the extensive 

‘‘anti-cult’’ crackdown of the last decade. For more information on the scale of the anti-cult 

crackdown, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 87–93. In the 17 months prior to 

the July 1999 commencement of the anti-cult crackdown, the Ministry of Public Security reported over 20,000 arrests of ‘‘cult’’ members from mostly Protestant groups. ‘‘Selection of Cases 

From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups,’’ Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua 

Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, iv. 168Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With Designating and Banning Cult 

Organizations [Gong’an bu guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 

April 00. 169The government labeled the church a ‘‘counterrevolutionary group’’ in 1983 and designated 

it a ‘‘cult organization’’ in 1995. ‘‘Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant 

Groups,’’ Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, vii; Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gong’an bu guanyu rending he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 April 

00. 170Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of Beijing’s Fengtai 

District (Online), ‘‘Promoting Harmony, Everyone Has a Duty’’ [Cujin hexie, renren youze], 11 

July 08. 

267 

171 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘The Oppression of Linfen-Fushan Church Continues,’’ 7 October 09. 

See Major Cases of Harassment, Detention, and Interference With Places of Worship in this section for more information. 172 Ibid. 173 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘10 More Arrested After Detainees Refuse To Leave Without Fellow 

Linfen Pastor,’’ 18 November 09. 174 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Shuozhou Pastor’s Home Destroyed; 6 Christian Leaders Detained,’’ 28 

January 10. 175 ‘‘Five Members of House Church in Shuozhou, Shanxi Formally Arrested’’ [Shanxi 

shuozhou wu ming jiating jiaohui jiaoyou bei zhengshi daibu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 February 10. 176 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Christians in Shangqiu, Henan Including Gao Jianli Bring Suit 

Against RTL Committee, Rejected’’ [Henan shangqiu jidutu gao jianli deng su laojiao wei bei 

bohui], 3 August 10; ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Court Upholds Decision Sentencing Two Henan Christians,’’ 3 August 10. 177 Ibid. 178The word ‘‘Taoism’’ and its derivatives are also often spelled with a ‘‘D’’ instead of a ‘‘T,’’ 

e.g., ‘‘Daoism’’ or ‘‘Daoist.’’ 179 Article 3 of the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) Constitution says that the State Administration for Religious Affairs is the ‘‘administrative unit in charge of’’ the CTA. Constitution of 

the Chinese Taoist Association [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhangcheng], enacted 24 June 05, art. 

3. 180See, e.g., case studies from ‘‘China-Taoist, Buddhist Associations’ Websites Suggest Constraints,’’ Open Source Center, 23 November 09. 181 Chinese Taoist Association (Online), ‘‘Chinese Taoist Association’s Eighth National Conference Convenes in Beijing’’ [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui di ba ci quanguo daibiao huiyi zai jing 

kaimu], 22 June 10. 182See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Circular Regarding the 

Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau’s Official Law Enforcement Powers [Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 

tongzhi], 1 December 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu 

minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09. 183See, e.g., Wuxi Municipal Park Administration Center, Opinions Regarding Doing Religious 

Safety and Stability Work Well During the Shanghai 2010 World Expo [Guanyu zuohao shibo 

qijian zongjiao anquan wending gongzuo de yijian], 17 April 10; Wuzhong District Ethnic and 

Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 

2010 Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 

22 December 09. 184Wuxi Municipal Park Administration Center, Opinions Regarding Doing Religious Safety 

and Stability Work Well During the Shanghai 2010 World Expo [Guanyu zuohao shibo qijian 

zongjiao anquan wending gongzuo de yijian], 17 April 10. 185Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC 

[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 

January 94, effective 31 January 94, art. 4; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on 

the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin 

gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 

00, effective 26 September 00, arts. 7, 17(5). 186The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Online), ‘‘Statement From the First Presidency,’’ 30 August 10; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Online), ‘‘Church in 

Talks To ‘Regularize’ Activities in China,’’ 30 August 10. 187 Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Heilongjiangsheng 

zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 12 June 97, effective 1 July 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity 

[Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, effective 23 January 96, art. 2. 188 ‘‘An Orthodox View,’’ Global Times (Online), 4 January 10. 189Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church (Online), 

‘‘Talks on Russian-Chinese Relations in Religious Sphere Held in Beijing,’’ 17 November 09; 

State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Vice-Director Jiang Jianyong Sees Delegation From the Presidential Council for Cooperation With Religious Organizations’’ [Jiang 

jianyong fujuzhang huijian eluosi zongtong zhishu de zongjiao tuanti hezuo weiyuanhui 

daibiaotuan yixing], 18 November 09. 190For detailed information, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 141. 

Notes to Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights 

1See generally PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May 84, effective 1 October 

84, amended 28 February 01. 2 Ibid., preamble. 

3See discussion within for more information on restrictions on ethnic minority rights in 

China. For a detailed discussion of the relevant domestic legal framework, see Special Focus 

for 2005: China’s Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy 

Law in CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13–23. Regarding international human 

rights standards, see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 

by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A 

(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 26, 27; International Covenant 

on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resoluVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
268 

tion 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 2(2); Convention on 

the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by 

UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, 

arts. 2(1), 30. See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 

Discrimination (CERD), adopted and opened for signature and ratification by UN General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 65, entry into force 4 January 69. Article 1(1) of 

CERD defines racial discrimination to mean ‘‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 

based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 

nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 

rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 

of public life.’’ China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. 

China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese Government has committed to ratifying the 

ICCPR and says it is taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint 

Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ‘‘The EU welcomed China’s commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.’’ Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, 

‘‘At present, legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view 

to aligning our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for 

its ratification.’’ Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the 

United Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the 

Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. In its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese Government stated that the 

ICCPR was one of the ‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the plan was framed, and that the 

government ‘‘will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic 

laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.’’ 

State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, during the UN Human 

Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, 

the Chinese Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify 

the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them 

compatible with the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 

Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 27. 5For a discussion of longstanding controls over how ethnic groups may express their ethnicity, 

see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 147. 6Due to imprecision that can be engendered in the translation process, some scholars writing 

in English choose to leave the term minzu untranslated. See, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, ‘‘Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,’’ East-West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 49 (endnote 4); Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xx–xxv. 

This section uses ‘‘ethnic minorities’’ both to refer to the status of such groups as defined in 

international human rights instruments and in reference to China’s categorizations of shaoshu 

minzu. While recognizing the challenges of translating the term, this section follows the Chinese 

Government’s and media’s current use of ‘‘ethnicity’’ when referring to minzu in English-language publications and in the official name of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia 

minzu shiwu weiyuanhui). 7State Council Information Office, White Paper on Ethnic Policy, China Daily (Online), 27 

September 09. For other examples defending state policy, see, e.g., Choi Chi-Yuk, ‘‘Policies Not 

To Blame for Rioting, Official Says,’’ South China Morning Post, 22 July 09 (Open Source Center, 22 July 09); ‘‘FYI—CCTV–4 Live Coverage of PRC State Council Press Conference on Ethnic 

Policy,’’ Open Source Center, 21 July 09; ‘‘Chinese Vice Premier Stresses Ethnic Unity,’’ China 

Daily, 22 December 09 (Open Source Center, 22 December 09); ‘‘Sita: Our Country’s Regional 

Ethnic Autonomy System Is a Success’’ [Sita: woguo de minzu quyu zishi zhidu shi chenggong 

de], People’s Daily, reprinted in United Front Work Department (Online), 8 March 10; ‘‘Hui 

Liangyu Stresses at Plenary Session of State Ethnic Affairs Commission Going a Step Further 

To Ramp Up the Foundation of Ethnic Work and Promote Great Unity for All Ethnic Groups 

and Accelerated Development in Ethnic Areas’’ [Hui liangyu zai guojia minwei weiyuan quanti 

huiyi shang qiangdiao jinyibu hangshi minzu gongzuo de jichu cujin ge minzu datuanjie he 

minzu diqu jiakuai fazhan], Xinhua, reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 21 

December 10. 8For general statements, see, e.g., ‘‘Absolute Equality for All Ethnicities Is the Cornerstone 

of China’s Ethnic Policy’’ [Ge minzu yilu pingdeng shi zhongguo minzu zhengce de jishi], Seeking Truth (Online), 16 November 09; Central Propaganda Bureau and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Outline Concerning Propaganda and Education on the Party and State’s Ethnic Policy 

[Dang he guojia minzu zhengce xuanchuan jiaoyu tigang], 5 February 09 (estimated date). For 

more information on official statements blaming events in Tibet in 2008 and in the XUAR in 

2009 on overseas ‘‘hostile forces,’’ see, e.g., CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 185–186; 

CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 249. 9See, e.g., ‘‘Views of Beijing Experts on ‘Xinjiang’ Ethnic Relations Issue’’ [Be ́ngdiki 

mutexessislerning ‘shinjang’diki milletler munasiwiti mesilisi heqqidiki qarashliri], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 17 November 09; ‘‘Prominent Tibetan Communist Yangling Dorje’s Critique of 

China’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Policy,’’ Tibetan Culture Net, 31 December 09 (Open Source 

Center, 7 January 10); Raymond Li, ‘‘Delegate Dares To Challenge Official Policy on Xinjiang,’’ 

South China Morning Post, 9 March 10 (Open Source Center, 9 March 10). 

269 

10State Council Information Office, White Paper on Ethnic Policy, China Daily (Online), 27 

September 09. 11See the following documents issued in 2008 and 2009: Central Propaganda Bureau and 

State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Outline Concerning Propaganda and Education on the Party 

and State’s Ethnic Policy [Dang he guojia minzu zhengce xuanchuan jiaoyu tigang], 5 February 

09 (estimated date); Ministry of Education and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity Education in Schools (Trial) [Xuexiao minzu tuanjie jiaoyu zhidao 

gangyao (shixing)], issued 26 November 08. For analysis, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 

October 09, 145–146. 12 ‘‘CPC Vows To Crack Down on ‘Ethnic Separatist Activities,’ ’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Daily (Online), 18 September 09; Jia Nan, ‘‘State Ethnic Affairs Commission: Stress Great Efforts in 2010 in Implementation of Ethnic Policy and Blazing Trails’’ [Guojia minwei: 2010 nian 

tuchu zhuahao minzu zhengce luoshi he chuangxin deng], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central 

People’s Government (Online), 24 December 09; State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), ‘‘Central Propaganda Bureau, United Front Work Department, and State Ethnic Affairs Commission 

Put Forth ‘Opinion on Further Launching Activities To Establish Ethnic Unity and Progress’ ’’ 

[Zhongyang xuanchuanbu, zhongyang tongzhanbu, guojia minwei chutai ‘‘guanyu jinyibu 

kaizhan minzu tuanjie jinbu chuangjian huodong de yijian’’], 4 March 10; Central Propaganda 

Bureau, United Front Work Department, and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Further Launching Activities To Establish Ethnic Unity and Progress [Guanyu jinyibu kaizhan 

minzu tuanjie jinbu chuangjian huodong de yijian], issued 1 February 10. 13See, e.g., Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Department Opinion on Further 

Strengthening Implementation of Ethnic Unity Propaganda and Education Activities in All Levels and Types of Schools Throughout the Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu jiaoyuting guanyu zai 

quanqu geji gelei xuexiao jinyibu jiaqiang minzu tuanjie xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong de shishi 

yijian], issued 9 September 09; ‘‘Beijing To Drive Ahead Wholeheartedly With ‘Five Enters’ 

Project for Ethnic Unity Education [Beijing jiang quanli tuijin minzu tuanjie jiaoyu ‘‘wu jin’’ 

gongcheng], China Ethnicities News (Online), 19 January 10; Qingdao Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ‘‘Qingdao Drafts ‘Opinion on Carrying Out in Deep-Going Way Ethnic Unity Propaganda and Education Activities’ ’’ [Qingdao shi zhiding ‘‘guanyu shenru kaizhan minzu tuanjie 

xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong de yijian’’], reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 

18 January 10; ‘‘Highlights: Reports on Ethnic Stability Issues in PRC Provinces 1 Dec 09–28 

Feb 10,’’ Open Source Center, 30 March 10. 14State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. III(1). 15 Yu Xiaojie, ‘‘Uphold a People-Centered Approach and Revel in the Light of Human Rights— 

Roundup at the Midpoint of the ‘National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010),’ ’’ Xinhua, 

4 December 09 (Open Source Center, 13 December 09). 16State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Improving Work on the Management of Ethnic 

Minority Languages [Guojia minwei guanyu zuo hao shaoshu minzu yuyan wenzi guanli 

gongzuo de yijian], issued 14 May 10; Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 

Outline of National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development 

(2010–2020) [Guojia zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao], issued 29 July 10. 

For a summary of aspects of the July plan, see ‘‘China Vows Stronger Support for Education 

for Ethnic Minority Groups,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 July 10. 17State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Improving Work on the Management of Ethnic 

Minority Languages [Guojia minwei guanyu zuo hao shaoshu minzu yuyan wenzi guanli 

gongzuo de yijian], issued 14 May 10, art. 2(5); Communist Party Central Committee and State 

Council, Outline of National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development (2010–2020) [Guojia zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao], issued 29 July 

10, art. 27. 18See Section IV—Xinjiang for more information as well as, e.g., Ben Blanchard, ‘‘Tibetans’ 

Mother Tongue Faces Tide of Chinese,’’ Reuters, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 13 July 

10. 19See, e.g., Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and 

Rising Tensions,’’ 2007, 22–24; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘China’s Push To Develop Its West Hasn’t 

Closed Income Gap With East, Critics Say,’’ Washington Post (Online), 29 June 10. See also 

CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263–64, 282–88. 20See, e.g., ‘‘Premier Wen Says China Will Continue Developing Western Region,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 16 October 09; ‘‘Chinese Leaders Call for More Efforts To Develop West,’’ Xinhua (Online), 6 July 10; ‘‘100 Billion To Go to Poorer West China,’’ China Daily (Online), 7 July 10; 

Lan Xinzhen, ‘‘What’s Best for the West,’’ Beijing Review, 19 July 10 (Open Source Center, 20 

July 10). 21 ‘‘Transcript of Interview With Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Assistant Chairman, 

Public Security Department Head Zhao Liping’’ [Neimeng zizhiqu zhuxi zhuli, gongan tingzhang 

zhao liping fangtan wenzi shilu], People’s Daily, reprinted in Police Net (Online), 4 December 

09. 22 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Department, Opinion on Further Strengthening Implementation of Ethnic Unity Propaganda and Education Activities in All Levels and 

Types of Schools Throughout the Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu jiaoyuting guanyu zai quanqu geji 

gelei xuexiao jinyibu jiaqiang minzu tuanjie xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong de shishi yijian], issued 

9 September 09. 23For general information, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 149. For reports from the past year, see, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘China To Speed Up Clearing Nomads From Grasslands,’’ Reuters (Online), 8 July 10; Etuokeqian Banner People’s Government 

(Online), ‘‘Etuokeqian Banner’s Smooth Headway on Major Projects and Key Projects Pushed 

Forward in One Quarter’’ [Eqian qi yi jidu zhongdian tuijin de zhongyao xiangmu ji zhongdian 

xiangmu jinzhan shunli], 19 April 10; ‘‘Ordos City Prohibits Wholesale Transfer of Population 

270 

in Development Zone, Transfer Carried Out in Orderly [Way]’’ [E’erduosi shi jinzhi kaifaqu 

renkou zhengti banqian zhuanyi youxu tuijin], Xinhua (Online), 13 October 09; ‘‘China Spends 

6.5 Bln Yuan Protecting Northern Grasslands,’’ Xinhua (Online), 7 December 09. 24Gregory Veeck and Charles Emerson, ‘‘Develop the West Assessed: Economic and Environmental Change in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China 2000–2005,’’ 

25 (Nos. 1 and 2) Asian Geographer 61 (2006) (based on information on page 13 of prepublication article on file with the Commission); China’s Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 

April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University; Dee Mack Williams, Beyond Great Walls (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2002), 40–60; Qiu Lin, ‘‘Scholars Urge Improving Grassland Policies,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 31 July 09. 25Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), ‘‘Principal of Mongol-Tibetan Medical School Arrested in Mongolia by Chinese Police,’’ 19 October 09. For an account 

of the incident in a Mongolian newspaper, see ‘‘General D. Murun Says Mongolian Police Helped 

Chinese,’’ Zuunii Medee, 28 October 09, translated in Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online). 26Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), ‘‘Southern Mongolian Representative to United Nations Conference Arrested at Beijing Airport,’’ 23 April 10. Sources cited 

in a July 2010 Amnesty International report conjectured that Sodmongol was held in detention 

in Chaoyang city, Liaoning province, and that the procuratorate was investigating the case, but 

officials have not confirmed his whereabouts, according to the report. Amnesty International 

(Online), ‘‘Document—China: Ethnic Mongolian Activist Detained in China: Sodmongol,’’ 15 July 

10. 

Notes to Section II—Population Planning 

1The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, canonized as a ‘‘fundamental 

state policy’’ in 1982, and codified as national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China’s 31 provinces—accounting for 53.6 percent of China’s population—allow rural dwellers to have a second 

child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang et al., ‘‘China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,’’ 33 Population and Development Review 133, 138 

(2007). 2See, e.g., ‘‘Time For Families To Have Two Children Each,’’ China Daily (Online), 1 February 

10; Liu Ming, ‘‘Ease One-Child Policy and Invite Disaster,’’ China Daily (Online), 1 February 

10; ‘‘Most People Want Two Children, Survey Says,’’ China Daily (Online), 27 March 10; Yao 

Yijiang, ‘‘30 Years of Family Planning, To Change or Not To Change to a Two Child Policy: At 

a Historical Juncture, Undergoing Heated Debate’’ [Jihua shengyu 30 nian, bian haishi bubian 

ertai zhengce: lishi guankou, zhengzai jibian], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 17 March 

10. 3For example, officials in Huanggang township (Xiushui county, Jiangxi province) described 

a family planning campaign in July 2009 that focused on the ‘‘two inspections and four procedures,’’ (liangjian sishu) which refers to IUD inspections, pregnancy examinations (the two inspections), IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid-to-late term abortions, and sterilization 

(the four procedures). See Xiushui County Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), 

‘‘Huanggang Township’s Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family Planning 

Work Dispatch Meeting’’ [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu 

gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09. 4See, e.g., in Fujian’s Sha county, family planning officials are required to insert an IUD in 

women within three months of the birth of a first child. Sha County Zhenghu Township People’s 

Government (Online), ‘‘Recommendations Regarding Zhenghu Township’s Population and Family Planning Work for 2009’’ [Guanyu zuohao 2009 niandu zhenghu xiang renkou yu jihua 

shengyu gongzuo de yijian], 18 February 09. 5PRC Population and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 

02, art. 4. According to Article 4, officials ‘‘shall perform their administrative duties strictly in 

accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon 

the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.’’ 6 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 109; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2008, China 

(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09; UN Committee against Torture, 41st 

Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture—China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 3– 

21 November 08, 12. 7For examples of the sterilization requirements, see Qiaojia County People’s Government Circular on the Completion of 2010 Population and Family Planning Work [Qiaojia xian renmin 

zhengfu guanyu zuohao 2010 nian renkou yu jihua shengyu gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 29 January 10; Guangzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Bureau (Online), ‘‘Seeking Advice Regarding the Issue of Tubal Ligation’’ [Zixun biaoti: guanyu jieza wenti], 6 July 09. 8 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 

09, 6. The Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the 

link between the term remedial measures and abortion: ‘‘early term abortion refers to the use 

of surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation, it is 

a remedial measure taken after the failure of contraception.’’ See Beijing Municipal Population 

and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Early Term Abortion’’ [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 

April 09. 9For a recent example from an urban area, see Xincun Village Committee’s Self-Governing 

Regulations for Family Planning [Xincun cunweihui jihua shengyu zizhi zhangcheng], issued 16 

January 09. For a recent example from a rural area, see Jiangxi Provincial Population and FamVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00276 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
271 

ily Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Anyi County Unleashes an Upsurge of Population and Family Planning Activities To ‘Welcome Three Festivals, Battle for 100 Days, Achieve Three Breakthroughs’ ’’ [Anyi xian xianqi ‘‘ying sanjie, zhan baitian, san tupo’’ renkou jisheng huodong 

gaochao], 24 February 10. 10 CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 108. 11The PRC Population and Family Planning Law became effective in 2002. PRC Population 

and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02; United Nations, 

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 

Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 95, para. 17; United Nations, Programme of Action of the 

International Conference on Population and Development, adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5–13 September 94, para. 7.2. On the concept 

of ‘‘illegal pregnancy’’ and its use in practice, see Elina Hemminki et al., ‘‘Illegal Births and 

Legal Abortions—The Case of China,’’ Reproductive Health (Online), Vol. 2, No. 5, 11 August 

05. 12 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 

opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 

18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, arts. 2, 3, 16(1)(e). 13 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 

accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, arts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 26. 14 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN 

General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 

10(3). 15PRC Population and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 

02, art. 4. 16 Ibid., art. 39. 17 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 153–156; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 98–99; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 110. 18 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing August 25, 

2010,’’ 25 August 10. 19Puning City People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Our City Starts a Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children’’ [Woshi xianqi erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10; 

Yifeng County Circular Regarding the Earnest Launch of Family Planning Technical Services 

for the 2010 Spring Festival [Guanyu renzhen kaizhan 2010 nian chunji jihua shengyu jishu 

fuwu huodong de tongzhi], issued 18 March 10. 20 Jiangxi Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Anyi County 

Unleashes an Upsurge of Population and Family Planning Activities To ‘Welcome Three Festivals, Battle for 100 Days, Achieve Three Breakthroughs’ ’’ [Anyi xian xianqi ‘‘ying sanjie, zhan 

baitian, san tupo’’ renkou jisheng huodong gaochao], 24 February 10. 21Gulou Subdistrict Office of the Echeng District People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Comrade Ke 

Yanmin’s Speech to the Subdistrict Plenary Work Meeting for the Large-Scale Family Planning 

Operation for Spring 2010’’ [Ke yanmin tongzhi zai quanjie 2010 nian jihua shengyu chunji 

daxingdong gongzuo dahui shang de jianghua], 3 March 10. 22 Xincun Village Committee’s Self-Governing Rules for Family Planning [Xincun cunweihui 

jihua shengyu zizhi zhangcheng], issued 16 January 09. 23The nine provinces in which local governments produced these reports were, as detailed 

later in the paragraph: Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Anhui, Zhejiang, 

and Yunnan. 24For a Henan province example, see Jiyuan City Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Our City Convenes 2010 Population and Family Planning Work Conference on 

Spring Service Activities’’ [Woshi zhaokai 2010 nian renkou he jihua shengyu ji chunji fuwu 

huodong gongzuo huiyi], 4 March 10; for a Hubei province example, see Yingshan County Population and Family Planning Bureau (Online), ‘‘Xiao Ang: By Any Means, Stabilize Low Birth 

Level’’ [Xiao ang: qianfangbaiji wending di shengyu shuiping], 17 March 10; for a Guangdong 

province example, see Lechang City People’s Government, Lechang City Circular on the Launch 

of Family Planning Concentrated Service Activities in Spring 2010 [Guanyu kaizhan 2010 nian 

jihua shengyu chunji jizhong fuwu huodong de tongzhi], issued 11 March 10; for a Jiangsu province example, see Suqian Municipal People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Stand at a New Starting 

Point, Seek New Breakthroughs, Achieve New Strides’’ [Lizu xin qidian mouqiu xin tupo shixian 

xin kuayue], 18 January 10; for a Jiangxi province source, see PRC National Population and 

Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Jiangxi: All-Province Population and Family Planning 

Work Conference Convenes in Nanchang’’ [Jiangxi: quansheng renkou jisheng gongzuo huiyi zai 

nanchang zhaokai], 24 March 10. 25Panjin Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘By Any Means, 

Xinglongtai District Drives Population and Family Planning Work Into the Fast Lane’’ 

[Xinglongtai qu qianfangbaiji yindao renkou jisheng gongzuo shiru ‘kuai chedao’], 31 March 10. 26 Xingzi County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Regarding the Policy on the Planned Birth 

of a Second Child’’ [Guanyu jihua shengyu ertai zhengce], 1 March 10. 27 ‘‘City Cuts Fines On Second Child,’’ Global Times (Online), 23 August 10. According to the 

report, ‘‘The fine for an extra child is based on the official measure of average annual income: 

26,738 yuan ($3,937) for an urban Beijinger and 11,986 yuan ($1,765) for a rural resident. Parents are fined six to 10 times that figure for a second baby or six to 20 times for a third or 

more.’’ See also An Evaluation of 30 Years of the One-Child Policy, Hearing of the Tom Lantos 

Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, Testimony of Toy 

Reid, Senior Research Associate, Congressional-Executive Commission on China; CECC, 2009 

Annual Report, 10 October 09, 151–152. 28 ‘‘Famous Scholar Yang Zhizhu Fired for Challenging Family Planning Regulations’’ 

[Zhuming xuezhe yang zhizhu yin tiaozhan jihua shengyu zhengce bei jiepin], Chinese Human 

272 

Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 6 April 10; ‘‘Beijing Professor Yang Zhizhu Fired 

for Exceeding One-Child Policy Limit’’ [Beijing jiaoshou yang zhizhu yin chaosheng bei jiepin], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 April 10; ‘‘City Cuts Fines On Second Child,’’ Global Times (Online), 

23 August 10. 29 ‘‘City Cuts Fines on Second Child,’’ Global Times (Online), 23 August 10. According to one 

expert quoted in this report, ‘‘Children born outside State scrutiny will enjoy equal rights as 

the first child only after the family pays the fine and registers them.’’ 30 Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ‘‘Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant Workers Face Dilemma,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 10 March 10; Tao Ran, ‘‘Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way To Reform,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 22 March 10. 31 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 32See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 155. The Commission analyzed local government reports which show targeting of migrant workers in Zhejiang and Yunnan provinces. As 

this section details, the Commission has examined such reports in the 2010 reporting year 

issued by local governments in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Fujian provinces 

as well as a central-level directive that applies to all governments within the following provincial-level jurisdictions: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, 

Shandong, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. 33The implementation plan defines the Bohai Region as encompassing the following provincial-level jurisdictions: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, 

Shandong, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. PRC National Population and Family 

Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Bohai Rim Floating Population Family Planning Region’s 

‘Chess Board’ Work Implementation Plan’’ [Huan bohai liudong renkou jihua shengyu quyu ‘yi 

pan qi’ gongzuo shishi fang’an], 11 April 10. 34PRC National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Bohai Rim Floating 

Population Family Planning Region’s ‘Chess Board’ Work Implementation Plan’’ [Huan bohai 

liudong renkou jihua shengyu quyu ‘yi pan qi’ gongzuo shishi fang’an], 11 April 10. 35Fuzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Ten Floating 

Population Family Planning Regions at the District and County Levels in Fuzhou Municipality 

and Shanghai Municipality Hold a Signing Ceremony for a Cooperation Agreement in Shanghai’’ 

[Fuzhou shi yu shanghai shi shi quxian liudong renkou jihua shengyu quyu xiezuo qianyue yishi 

zai shanghai juxing], 16 March 10. 36Zhoushi Town Opinion on the Implementation of a Special Family Planning Rectification 

Operation for the Floating Population [Zhoushi zhen liudong renkou jihua shengyu zhuanxiang 

zhengzhi xingdong shishi yijian], issued 3 June 09. 37The text of the measures specifies Anhui province as the area of jurisdiction, but the regulations were found by Commission staff on the official Web site of a municipal government in 

neighboring Shandong province. Binzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, ‘‘Family Planning Management Measures for the Floating Population’’ [Liudong renkou 

jihua shengyu guanli banfa], issued 24 December 09. 38 Ibid. 39Qiaojia County People’s Government Circular on the Completion of 2010 Population and 

Family Planning Work [Qiaojia xian renmin zhengfu guanyu zuohao 2010 nian renkou yu jihua 

shengyu gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 29 January 10. 40 Ibid. 41Qianxi County Population and Family Planning Bureau, Circular Regarding the Launch of 

Special Rectification Activities for Population and Family Planning Work [Guanyu kaizhan 

renkou jisheng gongzuo zhuanxiang zhengzhi huodong de tongzhi], issued 4 March 10. 42 Ibid. 43Puning City People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Our City Starts a Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children’’ [Wo shi xianqi erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10. 44 ‘‘Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family Planning Difficulties’’ 

[Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 

10. 45Puning City People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Our City Starts a Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children’’ [Wo shi xianqi erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10. 46 ‘‘Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family Planning Difficulties’’ 

[Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 

10. 47 A local Chinese journalist from the Southern Rural News conducted extensive undercover 

interviews with locals and witnessed detentions firsthand in four townships in Puning 

(Hongyang, Daba, Liaoyuan, and Chiwei). ‘‘Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break 

Through Family Planning Difficulties’’ [Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng nandian], 

Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 10. 48 ‘‘Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family Planning Difficulties’’ 

[Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 

10. 49 Ibid. 50For examples from Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Gansu provinces, and the Guangxi Zhuang 

Autonomous Region (GZAR), see Yongxiu County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Yongfeng Reclaimed Land Site Pushes Strongly Ahead With Tubal Ligations of Households With Two Female Children’’ [Yongfeng kenzhi chang zhashi tuijin liangnu hu jieza gongzuo], 26 April 10 

(Jiangxi); Jiangsu Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Tongzhou 

District Convenes All-District Meeting To Push Forward With Establishing a ‘15th’ Provincial 

Population Coordinated Development Advanced District’’ [Tongzhou qu zhaokai quanqu 

chuangjian ‘‘shiyiwu’’ sheng renkou xietiao fazhan xianjin qu tuijin hui], 21 April 10 (Jiangsu); 

273 

Huangshan Municipal People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Xiuning County Party Secretary Lu Qun 

Raises ‘Four Demands’ for Population and Family Planning Work Across the County’’ [Xiuning 

xianwei shuji lu qun dui quanxian renkou jisheng gongzuo tichu ‘‘sidian yaoqiu’’], 26 March 10 

(Anhui); Huan County People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Huan County Vice-Magistrate Li 

Yuanqing’s Report to the County Population and Family Planning Meeting’’ [Zhengfu 

fuxianzhang li yuanqing zai quanxian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo huiyi shang baogao], 

3 March 10 (Gansu); Hezhou Municipal People’s Government (Online), ‘‘Vice-Mayor Liu 

Xueping’s Speech to the All-City Population and Family Planning Work Conference’’ [Fu 

shizhang liu xueping zai quanshi renkou jisheng gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 24 March 

10 (GZAR). 51For examples, see ‘‘Time for Families To Have Two Children Each,’’ China Daily (Online), 

1 February 10; Liu Ming, ‘‘Ease One-Child Policy and Invite Disaster,’’ China Daily (Online), 

1 February 10; ‘‘Most People Want Two Children, Survey Says,’’ China Daily (Online), 27 March 

10; Yao Yijiang, ‘‘30 Years of Family Planning, To Change or Not To Change to a Two Child 

Policy: At a Historical Juncture, Undergoing Heated Debate’’ [Jihua shengyu 30 nian, bian 

haishi bubian ertai zhengce: lishi guankou, zhengzai jibian], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 17 March 10. 52Zhao Chunzhe, ‘‘Beijing To Loosen Control on One-Child Policy,’’ China Daily (Online), 25 

January 10; ‘‘Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission: ‘Preparing To 

Relax Conditions for Having a Second Child’ Report Strays From the Truth’’ [Beijing shi renkou 

jishengwei: ‘‘yunniang fangkuan shengyu ertai tiaojian’’ baodao shishi], Xinhua, reprinted in 

Legal Daily (Online), 25 January 10. 53 ‘‘Long-Hated One-Child Rule May Be Eased in China,’’ Associated Press (Online), 25 April 

10. 54 ‘‘China To Maintain Low Birth Rate: Vice Premier,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 January 10; ‘‘Wen 

Jiabao: Do a Good Job With Population and Family Planning Work, Continue To Stabilize Low 

Birth Level’’ [Wen jiabao: zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo, jixu wending dishengyu 

shuiping], Xinhua, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 

5 March 10. 55The UN sets the threshold for classification as an aging society at 10 percent of the total 

population. Shan Juan, ‘‘Aging Seniors Facing Life Without Proper Care,’’ China Daily (Online), 

30 December 09. 56 John Gordon, et al., Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran: Implications 

for U.S. Navy Strategic Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 60. 57 Cary Huang, ‘‘Leadership Wakes to Grey Storm of Ageing Population,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 November 09. 58 John Gordon, et al., Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran: Implications 

for U.S. Navy Strategic Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 61; U.S. Census 

Bureau (Online), ‘‘International Data Base—China,’’ last visited 31 March 10. 59 ‘‘China To Maintain Low Birth Rate: Vice Premier,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 January 10; ‘‘Wen 

Jiabao: Do a Good Job With Population and Family Planning Work, Continue To Stabilize Low 

Birth Level’’ [Wen jiabao: zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo, jixu wending dishengyu 

shuiping], Xinhua, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 

5 March 10. 60 Cary Huang, ‘‘Leadership Wakes to Grey Storm of Ageing Population,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 November 09. 61See Mikhail Lipatov et al., ‘‘Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex 

Ratio at Birth in China,’’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Social Sciences of the United 

States of America, 9 December 08, vol. 105 (49), 19171. According to this study, ‘‘The root of 

the [gender imbalance] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference.’’ See also Chu 

Junhong, ‘‘Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central China,’’ 27 

Population and Development Review 2 (2001), 259; Joseph Chamie, ‘‘The Global Abortion Bind: 

A Woman’s Right To Choose Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,’’ Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08. 62 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ‘‘Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out 

of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch’’ [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 

ge guanggun], 27 January 10. 63 ‘‘China To Be Short 24 Million Wives, Study Says,’’ Associated Press (Online), 12 January 

10. 64For 2000 PRC census data and information on global norms for sex ratio at birth, see Barry 

Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 

171–172. According to this study, ‘‘In the 2000 census, the relative number of boys per 100 girls 

in the 0–4 age group was 120.8, clearly outside the normal range.’’ 65 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ‘‘Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out 

of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch’’ [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 

ge guanggun], 27 January 10. 66 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: For Blind Activist, Prison Release May Not Mean 

Freedom,’’ 9 September 10; Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Advocate Released From Prison, but Confinement Continues,’’ New York Times (Online), 9 September 10; William Wan, ‘‘Release of Chinese Activist Brings Crackdown to His Village,’’ Washington Post (Online), 9 September 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Activist Chen Guangcheng Released After Serving Full 

Sentence,’’ 9 September 10; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 98; Li Jinsong, Chinese 

Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, Liu Jie, and Other Officials 

for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation’’ [Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian 

fanyou baofu xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao’an konggao han], 5 April 08. 67 ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Not in Good Health and Yuan Weijing Beaten, Hong Kong’s China 

Human Rights Watch Lends Support’’ [Chen guangcheng shenti qianjia ji yuan weijing bei ou, 

274 

xianggang zhongguo weiquan lushi guanzhu zu shengyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 April 

09. 68 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Blind ‘Barefoot Lawyer’ Chen 

Guangcheng’s Wife Yuan Weijing’s Family Letter,’’ 17 September 09; Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders (Online), ‘‘Several Activists and Dissidents Languish in Detention Despite Serious Illnesses,’’ 5 November 09. 69 Anita Chang, ‘‘Blind Activist Lawyer Set To Be Released in China,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 8 September 10; William Wan, ‘‘Release of Chinese Activist Brings 

Crackdown to His Village,’’ Washington Post (Online), 9 September 10. 70William Wan, ‘‘Release of Chinese Activist Brings Crackdown to His Village,’’ Washington 

Post (Online), 9 September 10. 71 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: For Blind Activist, Prison Release May Not Mean 

Freedom,’’ 9 September 10; Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Advocate Released From Prison, but Confinement Continues,’’ New York Times (Online), 9 September 10. 72 ‘‘Profiles of Prominent Chinese Rights Defence Lawyers—Chen Chuangcheng,’’ in A Sword 

and a Shield, eds. Stacy Mosher and Patrick Poon (Hong Kong: China Human Rights Lawyers 

Concern Group, 2009), 14. 73Melinda Liu, ‘‘Barefoot Lawyers,’’ Newsweek (Online), 4 March 02; Jerome A. Cohen, 

‘‘Breaking Point? The Persecution of ‘Barefoot Lawyer’ Chen Guangcheng Adds to China’s Miserable Record,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 14 September 10. 74 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 157; Li Jinsong, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, Liu Jie, and Other Officials for Trumped Up 

Charges and Retaliation’’ [Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu 

xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao’an konggao han], 5 April 08. 75Philip P. Pan, ‘‘Rural Activist Seized in Beijing,’’ Washington Post (Online), 7 September 

05; ‘‘Authorities Formally Arrest Legal Advocate Chen Guangcheng,’’ Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China (Online), 30 August 06, citing ‘‘Yuan Weijing Receives Notification From 

Yinan County Public Security Office of the Formal Arrest of Chen Guangcheng’’ [Yuan weijing 

shoudao yinan xian gong’an ju daibu chen guangcheng tongzhishu (tu)], Boxun (Online), 25 June 

06. 76 ‘‘Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His Defense Team Into Custody,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 4–5, citing Maureen 

Fan, ‘‘Chinese Rights Activist Stands Trial After Police Detain Defense Team,’’ Washington Post 

(Online), 19 August 06. 77 ‘‘Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His Defense Team Into Custody,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 4–5, citing ‘‘Blind Mob 

Organizer Sentenced to Imprisonment,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 25 August 

06. 78 ‘‘Appellate Court Orders Retrial of Chen Guangcheng Case,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5, citing ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Appeals Decision, Zhao 

Yan Has Misgivings About Own Appeal’’ [Cheng guangcheng bufu panjue tichu shangsu, zhao 

yan dui shangsu baoyou gulu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 September 06; ‘‘Blind Activist Chen 

Guangcheng Appeals First Judgment’’ [Mangren weiquan renshi chen guangcheng dui yishen 

ti shangsu], Voice of America (Online), 3 September 06. 79 ‘‘Appellate Court Orders Retrial of Chen Guangcheng Case,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5, citing ‘‘Chen Guangcheng’s Trial Judgment Made 

Invalid, Sent Back for Retrial’’ [Chen guangcheng an yishen panjue zuofei fahui chongshen], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 October 06; ‘‘Appeals Court Overturns Blind Chinese Activist’s 

Guilty Verdict,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 October 06. 80 ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed Retrial,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 1–3, citing ‘‘Shandong Court Upholds Jail Sentence for Blind Mob Organizer,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China.org.cn (Online), 1 December 06. 81 ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed Retrial,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 1–3. 82 ‘‘Final Judgment Affirms Original Sentence in Chen Guangcheng Case, Lawyers Plans To 

Apply for Serving Sentence Outside Prison, Continue Appeals’’ [Chen guangcheng an zhongshen 

weichi yuanpan lushi ni shenqing jianwaizhixing ji jixu shensu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 

January 07. 83 ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed Retrial,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 1–3. 84 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Rights Defender Receives Malreatment in Prison: Examination of Government’s International Commitment Against Torture’’ [Weiquan renshi 

yuzhong shou nuedai: dui zhengfu fan kuxing guji chengruo de jianyan], 21 June 07; ‘‘Chinese 

Activist Beaten in Jail,’’ BBC (Online), 22 June 07. 85Maureen Fan, ‘‘Wife of Activist Detained at Beijing Airport, Authorities Forcibly Return Her 

to Home Village,’’ Washington Post (Online), 25 August 07. 86 Ibid. 87See, e.g., ‘‘Reflections on a Visit to Chen Guangcheng’s Family, We Were Beaten Out of the 

Village,’’ Wang Keqin’s Blog (Online), 14 March 09; ‘‘Chen Guangcheng Not in Good Health and 

Yuan Weijing Beaten, Hong Kong’s China Human Rights Watch Lends Support’’ [Chen 

guangcheng shenti qianjia ji yuan weijing bei ou, xianggang zhongguo weiquan lushi guanzhu 

zu shengyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 April 09; Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China: 

Wife of Human Rights Activist Beaten,’’ 20 April 09. 88Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 August 10, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, New York University School of Law; Co-director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute; and Adjunct 

Senior Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. See also ‘‘Reflections on a Visit 

to Chen Guangcheng’s Family, We Were Beaten Out of the Village,’’ Wang Keqin’s Blog (OnVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00280 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
275 

line), 14 March 09; Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China: Wife of Human Rights Activist 

Beaten,’’ 20 April 09. 

Notes to Section II—Freedom of Residence and Movement 

1PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin gonheguo hukou dengji 

tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58. 2Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ‘‘Is China Abolishing the Hukou System/ ’’ 195 China 

Quarterly 582, 587 (2008). 3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2 and 13(1); International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, 

entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), and 26. 4 ‘‘China Loosens Student Hukou Controls,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in City of Kunming’s Web Site, 

19 May 10; Tania Branigan, ‘‘Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their 

Children,’’ Guardian (Online), 15 March 10. 5PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, effective 1 July 86, amended 29 June 

06, art. 2; State Council Decision Regarding Grassroots Education Reform and Development 

[Guowuyuan guanyu jichu jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan de jueding], issued 29 May 01; Ministry of 

Education, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, et al., Guiding Opinion on Improving Compulsory Education of Migrant Workers’ Children [Guanyu jinyibu zuo hao jincheng 

wugong jiuye nongmin zinu yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo de yijian], issued 17 September 03. For more 

information on government education policies regarding migrant workers, see Wu Xinhui and 

Liu Chengxian, ‘‘A Way Out and Guarantee—State Policy for the Education of Migrant Workers’ 

Children’’ [Chulu yu baozhang—nongmingong zinu jiaoyu de guojia zhengce], China Youth Research Net (Online), 28 September 07. 6Tania Branigan, ‘‘Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their Children,’’ 

Guardian (Online), 15 March 10; ‘‘Migrant Children Denied School,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 

2 March 10; Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Migrant Children Face Education Divide,’’ China Daily (Online), 

14 July 10; Ren Zhongxi, ‘‘School Closures Highlight Migrant Education Issue,’’ China.org.cn 

(Online), 8 March 10. 7Sky Canaves and Sue Feng, ‘‘The Trials of Migrant Schools in Beijing,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 5 March 10; Ren Zhongxi, ‘‘School Closures Highlight Migrant Education Issue,’’ 

China.org.cn (Online), 8 March 10. 8 Alice Yan, ‘‘Condemned by Hukou to Education Apartheid,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10. 9Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Migrant Children Face Education Divide,’’ China Daily (Online), 14 July 10. 

10 Ibid. 11 Alice Yan, ‘‘Condemned by Hukou to Education Apartheid,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10; ‘‘Beijing Student Commits Suicide for Hukou,’’ Xinhua (Online), 23 July 10; ‘‘Migrant Children Face Education Divide,’’ China Daily (Online), 14 July 10. 12 Alice Yan, ‘‘Condemned by Hukou to Education Aparthied,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10; ‘‘Migrant Children Face Education Divide,’’ China Daily (Online), 14 July 10. 13For an article discussing representative hukou legislation, see Fiona Tam, ‘‘Migrant Workers Get Chance for Urban Residency,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 9 June 10. 14For a review of hukou reforms since 2005, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 

103–112; ‘‘Invisible and Heavy Shackles,’’ Economist (Online), 6 May 10. 15 ‘‘China’s Floating Population Exceeds 210m,’’ Xinhua (Online), 27 June 10; Kam Wing Chan 

and Will Buckingham, ‘‘Is China Abolishing the Hukou System/ ’’ 195 China Quarterly 582, 596– 

599 (2008). 16 ‘‘Invisible and Heavy Shackles,’’ Economist (Online), 6 May 10. 17Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ‘‘Is China Abolishing the Hukou System/ ’’ 195 

China Quarterly 582, 594–596 (2008). 18 Ibid., 582, 597. 19 ‘‘Invisible and Heavy Shackles,’’ Economist (Online), 6 May 10. 20For a review of hukou reforms since 2005, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 

103–112. 21 Han Changfu, ‘‘Agriculture Minister Han Changfu Discusses Post-1990s Migrant Workers’’ 

[Nongyebu buzhang han changfu tan jiushihou nongmingong], People’s Daily, reprinted in China 

Review News (Online), 1 February 10. Agricultural Minister Han Changfu wrote an essay in 

People’s Daily calling on the central government to make the necessary policy and administrative preparations as more migrants became urban residents; Zhou Yongkang, ‘‘Promote the InDepth Resolution of Social Contradictions, Be Innovative in Social Management, and Enforce 

the Law Fairly and Honestly, Providing Even More Powerful Rule-of-Law Support for Both Good 

and Rapid Economic and Social Development’’ [Shenru tuijin shehui maodun huajie, shehui 

guanli chuangxin, gongzheng lianjie zhifa, wei jingji shehui youhao youkua fazhan tigong 

gengjia youli de fazhi baozhang], Seeking Truth, No. 4., 16 February 10, reprinted in Xinhua 

(Online). Zhou Yongkang, a ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, referenced 

the need to accelerate hukou reform and efforts to resolve the challenges facing migrant workers. ‘‘Premier Wen Jiabao Chats With Online Users’’ [Wen jiabao zongli yu wangyou zaixian 

jiaoliu], Xinhua (Online), 28 February 10. Premier Wen said that China would advance reforms 

of the hukou system for the new generation of migrant workers. 22Development Research Center of the State Council, ‘‘Gradually Advancing Hukou Reform, 

Achieving Substantive Equality of Rights’’ [Tidu tuijin huji gaige shixian quanli shizhi 

pingdeng], China Economic Times, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 9 June 10. 23 ‘‘Invisible and Heavy Shackles,’’ Economist (Online), 6 May 10. 24For a detailed account of the joint editorial and circumstances surrounding its 

depublication, see ‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours 

276 

After Publication, Co-Author Fired,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 

4, 21 April 10, 1–2. 25Guangzhou Development and Reform Commission, Implementing Opinion Regarding the 

Advancing of Urban-Rural Hukou System Reforms [Guanyu tuijin chengxiang huji zhidu gaige 

de shishi yijian], issued 31 August 09. For a summary of the Guangzhou hukou reform in 

English, see ‘‘Hukou Reform Experiment Begins in Guangzhou,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2–3. 26Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ‘‘Is China Abolishing the Hukou System/ ’’ 195 

China Quarterly 582, 596–599 (2008). 27 ‘‘Invisible and Heavy Shackles,’’ Economist (Online), 6 May 10. 28 Chongqing Municipal Government, Opinion on Systematically Reforming Urban-Rural 

Household Registration [Guanyu tongchou chengxiang huji zhidu gaigede yijian], issued 25 July 

10. 29 Ibid., arts. 3, 6(1)–(10). 30 Ibid., art. 6(1). 31Wu Hongying and Huang Haiyang, ‘‘Ten Million Migrant Workers Will Move Into Urban 

Area in Ten Years, Chongqing Initiates Household Registration Reform on a Trial Basis’’ 

[Shinian qianwan nongmin jincheng chongqing shi shui huji gaige], 21st Century Business Herald, 14 July 10. 32 For English translation of the editorial, see Chinese Law Prof Blog (Online), ‘‘The Famous 

Hukou Editorial,’’ 26 March 10, last visited 21 June 10; ‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1–2. 33 ‘‘Joint Editorial From 13 Newspapers Urges Speedy Household Registration Reform’’ 

[Quanguo 13 jia baozhi fabiao gongtong shelun duncu jiasu huji gaige], Sina Hong Kong (Online), 1 March 10. 34 Ibid. 35 ‘‘Hukou Editorial Gone From Some Sites,’’ China Realtime Report (Online), 3 March 10; 

Sharon Lafraniere, ‘‘Editor Is Fired After Criticizing Chinese Registration System,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 9 March 10. For a detailed account of facts surrounding the joint hukou editorial, see ‘‘Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 

10, 1–2. 36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into 

force 23 March 76, art. 12. 37PRC Passport Law, enacted 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, art. 13(7). 38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 13(1), 13(2); International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 

66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 12(4), and 26. 39 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 164; Justin McCurry, ‘‘Chinese Dissident 

Stranded at Tokyo Airport Set To Return Home,’’ Guardian (Online), 1 February 10. 40Louisa Lim, ‘‘In Shanghai, Alternatives to the World Expo,’’ National Public Radio (Online), 

4 May 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing Weekly,’’ 

31 May 10. 41 Charles Hutzler, ‘‘China Bans Poet From Traveling to US Conference,’’ Associated Press 

(Online), 25 March 10. 42 Ibid. 43Philip Gourevitch, ‘‘Liao Yiwu’s Persistent Voice,’’ New Yorker (Online), 2 March 10; Steven 

Erlanger and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘Uneasy Engagement: at Book Fair, a Subplot About Chinese 

Rights,’’ New York Times (Online), 18 October 09. 44Steven Erlanger and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘Uneasy Engagement: at Book Fair, a Subplot 

About Chinese Rights,’’ New York Times (Online), 18 October 09. 45Sapa-dpa, ‘‘Chinese Author Put Under House Arrest,’’ (South Africa) Sunday Times Live 

(Online), 1 March 10; Letter from Liao Yiwu, to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, translated 

from Chinese by Human Rights in China (Online), 5 February 10. 46 ‘‘Uyghur Scholar Slams Exit Ban,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 April 10. 47 ‘‘Travel Ban for Uyghur Scholar,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 May 10. 48 ‘‘Uyghur Scholar Slams Exit Ban,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 April 10; ‘‘Uyghur Barred 

from Travel,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 April 10. 49 ‘‘Travel Ban for Uyghur Scholar,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 May 10. 50 Ibid. 51 ‘‘Hong Kong Activists Denied Entry to Macao,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 19 December 

09. 52 Ibid. 53Du Yali, ‘‘Leung Kwok-Hung Denied Entry to Macao; Has Returned to Hong Kong’’ [Liang 

guoxiong bei jurujing aomen yi fandi xiang gang], Radio Television Hong Kong (Online), 19 December 09. 54 ‘‘Macao Bans HK Activists After May Day Rally,’’ Reuters (Online), reprinted in Epoch 

Times, 13 May 07. 55 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Tightens the Screws 

Ahead of National Day,’’ 1 October 10; ‘‘Restrictions on Dissidents and Human Rights Defenders 

Have Still Not Been Lifted as of October 9’’ [Yijian renshi yu weiquanzhe 10 yue 9 ri rengwei 

jiejin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 October 09. 

277 

56 ‘‘Restrictions on Dissidents and Human Rights Defenders Have Still Not Been Lifted as of 

October 9’’ [Yijian renshi yu weiquanzhe 10 yue 9 ri rengwei jiejin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 

9 October 09. 57 Ibid. 58 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Tightens the Screws 

Ahead of National Day,’’ 1 October 10. 59 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing May 25–31,’’ 31 

May 10. 60 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing May 25–31,’’ 31 

May 10; ‘‘Tang Jitian Meets With U.S. Officials To Talk About Human Rights and Religion: 

Lawyer Li Xiongbing Not Allowed To Leave Home’’ [Tang jitian tan jian meiguanyuan tan 

renquan zongjiao li xiongbing lushi bei jinzhi chumen], Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 May 10. 61 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing May 25–31,’’ 31 

May 10. 62 Ibid. 63 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing June 1–7, 2010,’’ 

7 June 10. 

Notes to Section II—Status of Women 

1The 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan states that women should occupy 50 

percent of government leadership positions in central government ministries, provincial governments, and city governments. State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 

Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. III(2). The Law on the Protection 

of Women’s Rights and Interests and the Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and 

local people’s congresses stipulate that an ‘‘appropriate number’’ of female deputies should serve 

at all levels of people’s congresses. PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, 

enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral Law 

of the National People’s Congress and local people’s congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 27 

October 04, art. 6. 2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 

opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 

18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, art. 7. 3 ‘‘ ‘She’ Officials’’ [‘‘Ta’’ guanyuan], Southern Daily (Online), 8 March 10. 

4Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by 

Mme. Meng Xiaosi, Head of Chinese Delegation to 54th Session of the Commission on the Status 

of Women, Vice-Chairperson of the National Working Committee on Women and Children Under 

the State Council of China,’’ 1 March 10. According to Meng, ‘‘At present, there are 8 women 

among the state leaders, 230 ministerial and vice-ministerial/provincial level women leaders, 

and 670 mayors and deputy mayors of the over 600 cities of China. Women account for over 

40% of government officials compared with less than 1/3 of 1995.’’ See also ‘‘ ‘She’ Officials’’ [‘‘Ta’’ 

guanyuan], Southern Daily (Online), 8 March 10. According to this report, of the eight women 

in Party and central government leadership positions mentioned by Meng Xiaosi above, some 

are in deputy positions. The report also notes that, currently, 3 of the 28 departments under 

the State Council are headed by women. 5 ‘‘ ‘She’ Officials’’ [‘‘Ta’’ guanyuan], Southern Daily (Online), 8 March 10. 

6 2010 data provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, however, now ranks China 53rd out 

of 186 countries with regard to women’s representation in national parliaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union (Online), ‘‘Women in Parliaments: World Classification,’’ 31 May 10. 7 ‘‘ ‘She’ Officials’’ [‘‘Ta’’ guanyuan], Southern Daily (Online), 8 March 10. The target of 30 percent female representation in leadership positions was set by the UN Commission on the Status 

of Women at its 34th session in 1990. United Nations Publications, reprinted in Bnet (Online), 

‘‘Target: 30 Percent of Leadership Positions to Women by 1995—United Nations Commission on 

the Status of Women,’’ June 1990. 8 ‘‘Chen Zhili: ACWF Actively Promotes Female Political Participation’’ [Chen zhili biaoshi 

fulian jiang jiji tuidong funu canzheng yizheng], China Radio International (Online), 6 March 

10. 9Women’s Watch-China (Online), Annual Report 2008, 2009, 17. 

10 Ibid., 18. According to this report, ‘‘[s]ome scholars have pointed out that village rules and 

regulations are much more important than other similar customary laws, mainly because they 

have greater force than even national laws in most villages, and are regarded as the supreme 

principle in handling the village’s daily affairs.’’ 11 Ibid., 20. 12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General 

Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7; PRC 

Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3. 13PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, arts. 

12, 13. PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 22–27; PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3. See also Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The 

E-Newsletter 54 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 10. According to this analysis, Chinese laws on 

employment discrimination are ‘‘riddled with flaws and loopholes by virtue of having no enforcement mechanism. Should an employer refuse to recruit a female applicant, she has little recourse other than to appeal to the local women’s federation. As there is no law in force through 

which to file a lawsuit against the prejudice itself, the only option at present is to file for labor 

arbitration.’’ 14 ‘‘Survey Reveals Over Ninety Percent of Female College Students Experience the Trouble 

of Gender Discrimination in Employment’’ [Diaocha xianshi: yu jiucheng nu daxuesheng jiuye 

shou xingbie qishi kunrao], CCTV, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 16 September 09. 

278 

15Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 54 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 10. 16 Jia Feishang, ‘‘Male Students Have Edge in Jobs,’’ Shanghai Daily (Online), 3 March 10. 17Women’s Studies Institute of China, reprinted in All-China Women’s Federation (Online), 

‘‘Gender Tops List of University Graduate Employment Discriminations,’’ 30 July 10. The report 

does not specify how many state-operated enterprises, government agencies, or public institutes 

were surveyed. 18Shenzhen Hengping Jigou (Online), An Investigative Report on the Shenzhen Employment 

Discrimination Situation [Shenzhen jiuye qishe zhuangkuang diaocha baogao], May 2010, 18. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and Party officials are 60 and 

55, respectively, while retirement ages for male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, 

respectively. ‘‘China’s Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged for Violating Constitution’’ [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding beitiqing weixian shencha], China 

Law Education (Online), 16 March 06. 22Wang Yijun and Cui Li, ‘‘National People’s Congress Standing Committee Enforcement Investigation Reveals Covert Gender Discrimination Still Exists in Employment’’ [Renda 

changweihui zhifa jiancha faxian jiuye reng cun yinxing xingbie qishi], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 June 10. 23 Ibid. See also ‘‘Centennial of Women’s Day,’’ China Daily (Online), 8 March 10. According 

to this report, women are sometimes ‘‘pushed into early retirement’’ and many are ‘‘passed over 

for promotion’’ as they near retirement age. 24Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘Shenzhen Promises To Launch First Gender Equality Promotion Regulation’’ [Shenzhen youwang chutai shoubu xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli], 28 December 09. 25 Ibid. 26Liu Minghui, Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 3. See also ‘‘Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men 

To Enjoy 30 Days Paternity Leave’’ [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi 

kewang xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10. 27See, e.g., Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘Shenzhen Promises to Launch First Gender 

Equality Promotion Regulation’’ [Shenzhen youwang chutai shoubu xingbie pingdeng cujin 

tiaoli], 28 December 09; ‘‘Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men 

To Enjoy 30 Days Paternity Leave’’ [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi 

kewang xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10; Liu Minghui, 

Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 3. 28 He Huifeng, ‘‘Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for Dads,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 22 January 10. 29Liu Minghui, Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 4. According to this report, in the draft Shenzhen Regulation, ‘‘direct gender discrimination is defined as any gender-based exclusion or restriction with the result and purpose 

to damage or impede a citizen to enjoy or exercise their political, economic, social, cultural, civil 

or any other rights and freedoms on the basis of gender equality. Indirect gender discrimination 

is defined as a considerable degree of more adverse impacts on a particular gender though there 

is no difference in treatment based on gender, marital status, pregnancy and childbirth.’’ 30 He Huifeng, ‘‘Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for Dads,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 22 January 10. 31Liu Minghui, Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,’’ February 2010, 9. 32 ‘‘Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men To Enjoy 30 Days 

Paternity Leave’’ [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi kewang xiang 30 tian 

yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10. 33Liu Minghui, Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,’’ February 10, 10. 34 Ibid., 14–15. 35 Ibid., 10. 36 He Huifeng, ‘‘Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for Dads,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 22 January 10. 37 ‘‘Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men To Enjoy 30 Days 

Paternity Leave’’ [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi kewang xiang 30 tian 

yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10. 38PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, effective 

1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law, enacted 10 September 80, 

effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3. 39PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, arts. 234, 236, 260. 40 ‘‘Domestic Violence Occurs in Nearly 30 Percent of Chinese Families, Experts Call for Legislation To Protect Victims’’ [Zhongguo jin 30% de jiating cunzai jiating baoli, zhuanjia huyu wei 

fan jiabao lifa], People’s Daily (Online), 27 November 09. 41PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, effective 

1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage Law, enacted 10 September 80, 

effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3. For Chinese scholars’ discussion of the 

shortcomings of current national-level legislation, see ‘‘All-China Women’s Federation Strongly 

Promotes Anti-Domestic Violence Law’’ [Quanguo fulian litui fan jiating baoli fa], People’s Representative News (Online), 31 December 09; Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘Proposal for Law 

on Prevention and Curbing of Domestic Violence Comes Out’’ [Yufang he zhizhi jiating baoli fa 

jianyi gao chulu], 28 November 09; ‘‘China Scholars Call for Attention on ‘Anti-Domestic VioVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
279 

lence’ Legislation’’ [Zhongguo xuezhe huyu guanzhu ‘‘fan jiating baoli’’ lifa], Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 13 January 10. See also ‘‘All-China Women’s Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for 

Draft Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3. 42 ‘‘All-China Women’s Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for Draft Anti-Domestic Violence 

Legislation,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3; ‘‘Domestic Violence Occurs in Nearly 30 Percent of Chinese Families, Experts Call for Legislation 

To Protect Victims’’ [Zhongguo jin 30% de jiating cunzai jiating baoli, zhuanjia huyu wei fan 

jiating baoli fa], People’s Daily (Online), 27 November 09; ‘‘Experts Discuss Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation: ‘Cohabitants Who Encounter Domestic Violence’ Can Also Apply for Protection 

Orders’’ [Zhuanjia tan fan jiabao lifa: tongju zao ‘‘jiabao’’ ye ke shenqing baohuling], People’s 

Daily (Online), 12 January 10. 43Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘Proposal for Law on Prevention and Curbing of Domestic 

Violence Comes Out’’ [Yufang he zhizhi jiating baoli fa jianyi gao chulu], 28 November 09. 44 ‘‘Current Situation and Characteristics of China Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation’’ 

[Zhongguo fan jiating baoli lifa de xianzhuang yu tedian], People’s Daily (Online), 26 November 

09. 45 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 

opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 

18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11. 46PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, effective 

1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 40, 58. 47 Ibid. For discussion on the shortcomings of the LPWRI in addressing sexual harassment, 

see Women’s Watch-China (Online), Annual Report 2008, 2009, 30. 48Women’s Watch-China (Online), Annual Report 2008, 2009, 30. 49 ‘‘Defending Rights of Women Who Face Workplace Sexual Harassment Difficult, Related 

Regulations Have a Ways To Go’’ [Zhichang nuxing yu xing saorao hou weiquan kunnan 

xiangguan guiding dai wanshan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 11 May 10. 50 CECC Staff Interview. See also ‘‘Defending Rights of Women Who Face Workplace Sexual 

Harassment Difficult; Related Regulations Have a Ways To Go’’ [Zhichang nuxing yu xing 

saorao hou weiquan kunnan xiangguan guiding dai wanshan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua 

(Online), 11 May 10. According to this report, women who encounter sexual harassment typically do not report offenses due to worries that it might harm their own reputation, have a negative impact on their families, or even cause them to lose their jobs. 51Women’s Watch-China (Online), ‘‘The E-Newsletter 52 of WW-China,’’ December 2009, 3, 10. 52 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Trade Union Recommended Sacking Sexual Harassment 

Victim,’’ 22 December 09. 53 CECC Staff Interview. 54Maple Women’s Psychological Counseling Center Beijing (Online), ‘‘ ‘Law on Prevention of 

Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,’ Submitted to the National People’s Congress (Draft Proposal)’’ [Xiang quanguo renda tijiao ‘‘gongzuo changsuo xingsaorao fangzhifa’’ (jianyi gao) yi an], 

17 March 09. 55 China Best Practices—Infanticide, What if the Infant Is Still Alive After Induced Labor? 

Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, Report Submitted by ChinaAid and Women’s Rights Without Frontiers; China’s OneChild Policy, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, Testimony of Reggie Littlejohn, President, Women’s Rights Without 

Frontiers. 56SOS Children’s Villages, Canada (Online), ‘‘Chinese Child Traffickers Detained,’’ 29 March 

10. According to this report, ‘‘The combination of these factors [China’s one child policy and a 

traditional preference for male heirs] has meant that China suffers high rates of female infanticide, sex-selective abortion, as well as widespread abandonment and human trafficking of the 

girl-child.’’ 57 United Nations Development Programme (Online), Power, Voice and Rights: A Turning 

Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific, 8 March 10. 58 According to statistics quoted in the report, China is ‘‘missing’’ 42.6 million women, 44 percent of Asia’s 96.2 million ‘‘missing’’ women. United Nations Development Programme (Online), 

Power, Voice and Rights: A Turning Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the Pacific, 8 March 

10, 34. 59See Mikhail Lipatov, Shuzhuo Li, and Marcus W. Feldman, ‘‘Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China,’’ 105 (49) Proceedings of the National Academy of Social Sciences of the United States of America, 19171 (2003). According to 

this study, ‘‘The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference.’’ 

See also Chu Junhong, ‘‘Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central China,’’ 27 Population and Development Review 259 (2001); Joseph Chamie, ‘‘The Global 

Abortion Bind: A Woman’s Right To Choose Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,’’ Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08. 60State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry of Health, State Food and 

Drug Administration, Regulations Regarding the Prohibition of Non-Medically Necessary Gender Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy [Guanyu jinzhi fei 

yixue xuyao de tai’er xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, effective 1 January 03. For a discussion of these regulations, see 

‘‘China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Net (Online), 22 March 03. 61 ‘‘Experts: Gender Discrimination Creates China’s Sex Ratio Imbalance,’’ Xinhua (Online), 3 

April 10. 62 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ‘‘Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out 

of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch’’ [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 

ge guanggun], 27 January 10. 

280 

63 ‘‘China To Be Short 24 Million Wives, Study Says,’’ Associated Press (Online), 12 January 

10. 64For China’s 2000 census data and information on global norms for sex ratio at birth, see 

Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 

2007), 171–172. 65 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ‘‘Difficulty Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out 

of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch’’ [10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 

ge guanggun], 27 January 10. 66Wei Xing Zhu, Li Lu, and Therese Hesketh, ‘‘China’s Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion 

and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 National Intercensus Survey,’’ British Medical Journal (Online), 9 April 09, 4–5. 67SOS Children’s Villages, Canada (Online), ‘‘Chinese Child Traffickers Detained,’’ 28 March 

10. 68Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, ‘‘Gendercide and the Cultural Context of Sex 

Trafficking in China,’’ 32 Fordham International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Women in a 

Changing China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 

March 10, Testimony of Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-at-Large and Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 

Notes to Section II—Human Trafficking 

1The specific phrase used to describe the concept of trafficking in Chinese government documents, including the National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children 

(2008–2012) as well as related regulations, circulars, and opinions, is guaimai funu ertong, 

which literally means ‘‘the abduction and sale of women and children.’’ See, e.g., State Council 

General Office, China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012) [Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)], 

issued 13 December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also Qinghai Province Implementing Rules 

and Regulations for the Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008– 

2012) [Qinghai sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008–2012 nian)], 

issued 22 December 09; Zhuzhou City Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and 

Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua], issued 31 December 09; 

Opinion of Bazhong City People’s Government Office Regarding the Implementation of ‘‘China’s 

National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)’’ [Bazhong 

shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche guowuyuan ‘‘zhongguo fandui guaimai funu 

ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)’’ de shishi yijian], issued 25 August 09. 2 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The Chinese government had been considering accession to the UN TIP Protocol for the past few years. China’s laws and regulations already include more than 95 percent of the protocol’s contents. CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 

October 08, 120–21. See also Wang Zhuoqiong, ‘‘China Set To Ratify UN Trafficking Protocol,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 24 October 08. 3 National People’s Congress, National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision Regarding Acceding to the ‘‘United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 

in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against 

Transnational Organized Crime’’ [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu 

jiaru ‘‘lianheguo daji kuaguo youzuzhi fanzui gongyue guanyu yufang, jinzhi he chengzhi fanyun 

renkou tebie shi funu he ertong xingwei de buchong yidingshu’’ de jueding], 26 December 09. 

For additional information regarding China’s accession to the UN TIP Protocol, see Chen Jia, 

‘‘China Joins UN Fight Against Human Trafficking,’’ China Daily (Online), 23 December 09. 4Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Interim Assessment—China, 24 February 10. According to this report, ‘‘Forced adult 

and forced child labor remained a problem throughout the country. Government efforts described 

as addressing human trafficking, however, continued to be aimed largely at the trafficking of 

women and children. The government did not take steps to enact legislation to prohibit all forms 

of trafficking, though it ratified the UN TIP Protocol in December 2009.’’ 5PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 

06, 28 February 09, art. 240. 6 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol states: 

‘‘ ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 

of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving 

or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’’ See also Office 

to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons 

Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. According to this report, ‘‘China’s definition of trafficking does 

not prohibit non-physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage, involuntary servitude, forced 

labor, or offenses committed against men, although many aspects of these crimes are addressed 

in other articles of China’s criminal law. China’s legal definition of trafficking does not automatically regard children over the age of 14 who are subjected to the commercial sex trade as 

trafficking victims.’’ 7State Council General Office, China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in 

Women and Children (2008–2012) [Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008– 

281 

2012 nian)], issued 13 December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also Qinghai Province Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and 

Children (2008–2012) [Qinghai sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize 

(2008–2012 nian)], issued 22 December 09; Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Gansu 

Province Implementation of ‘‘China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in 

Women and Children (2008–2012)’’ [Gansu sheng shishi ‘‘zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong 

xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)’’ fang’an shishi xize], issued 29 April 10; Zhuzhou City Action 

Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu 

ertong xingdong jihua], issued 31 December 09; Opinion of Bazhong City People’s Government 

Office Regarding the Implementation of ‘‘China’s National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking 

in Women and Children (2008–2012)’’ [Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche 

guowuyuan ‘‘zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)’’ de shishi 

yijian], issued 25 August 09. 8 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 118. As documented and defined internationally, 

major forms of human trafficking include forced labor, bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, child soldiers, forced prostitution, children exploited for commercial sex, child sex tourism, and debt bondage and involuntary servitude among migrant laborers. Office to Monitor and 

Combat Trafficking In Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008, 

Major Forms of Trafficking in Persons, 4 June 08, 19–25. 9Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10; Juliet Shwe Gaung, ‘‘Forced Marriages Driving 

Human Trafficking, UN Says,’’ Myanmar Times (Online), 8 March 10. 10 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10; See also Women in a Changing China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 10, Testimony of Mark 

Lagon, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 

Persons, U.S. Department of State. 11 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 121. Countries where women and children are 

trafficked into China include North Korea, Vietnam, and Burma. See, e.g., Office to Monitor and 

Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010— 

China, 14 June 10; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘Chinese Border Town Emerges as New Front Line in 

Fight Against Human Trafficking,’’ Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09; ‘‘Analyzing the 

Underlying Interest in Transnational Marriages: High Income Urban Males Visit Vietnam To 

Find a Mate’’ [Jiexi liyi xia de kuaguo hunyin, gao shouru dushi nan fu yuenan qiu’ou], Southern Metropolis Weekly, reprinted in Sina (Online), 6 April 10. See also Women in a Changing 

China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 10, Testimony of Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 12Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10. 

See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 121. 13Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 14 June 10. According to the 

U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, ‘‘NGOs and researchers estimate that tens 

of thousands of undocumented North Koreans currently live in northeast China, and as many 

as 70 percent of them are women. There is no reliable information on how many of these North 

Koreans are or have been trafficked, but their status in China as economic migrants who may 

be deported to North Korea makes them particularly vulnerable to trafficking.’’ 14Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Interim Assessment—China, 24 February 10; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 

June 10. For information on allegations of child labor at one of Microsoft’s supplier factories, 

see National Labor Committee (Online), ‘‘China’s Youth Meet Microsoft,’’ April 2010. 15 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03. 16Man Guihua, All-China Women’s Federation (Online), ‘‘The Fight Against Human Trafficking,’’ 14 December 09; ‘‘China Faces Growing Gender Imbalance,’’ BBC (Online), 11 January 

10. Researchers quoted in this article reported that human trafficking in China has become 

‘‘rampant.’’ 17Malcolm Moore, ‘‘Chinese Police Rescue 2,000 Kidnapped Children,’’ Telegraph (Online), 28 

October 09; Mark Colvin, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Crackdown on Child Trafficking,’’ ABC (Online), 

29 October 10; Lucy Hornby, ‘‘China Police Rescue Trafficked Children,’’ Reuters (Online), 21 

June 09. 18 Juliet Shwe Gaung, ‘‘Forced Marriages Driving Human Trafficking, UN Says,’’ Myanmar 

Times (Online), 8 March 10; Virginie Mangin, ‘‘Parents Left Bereft by Curse of China’s Child 

Snatchers,’’ National (Online), 12 March 10; ‘‘The Reason Child Trafficking Crimes Are 

Unstoppable’’ [Guaimai ertong fanzui weihe luda bujue], China Comment Magazine, reprinted 

in Xinhua (Online), 24 March 09. 19 ‘‘The Reason Child Trafficking Crimes Are Unstoppable’’ [Guaimai ertong fanzui weihe luda 

bujue], China Comment Magazine, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 March 09; Lucy Hornby, 

‘‘China Police Rescue Trafficked Children,’’ Reuters (Online), 21 June 09. For examples of cases 

in which parents sold their children this year, although not explicitly as a direct result of the 

one child policy, see Zhou Xuelian, ‘‘21-Year-Old Youngster ‘Sells’ 6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell 

Phone To Play With’’ [21 sui shuawa dang laohan ‘‘mai’’ 6 tian da de erzi mai bu shouji shua], 

Chongqing Times (Online), 9 December 09; ‘‘Child Trafficking Ring Cracked in Harbin, Suspect 

Is Chair of OB/GYN Department in Hospital’’ [Harbin pohuai yiqi guaimai ertong an xianyiren 

shi yiyuan fuchanke zhuren], 7 January 10. 

282 

20 ‘‘US Envoy: Economic Crisis Drives Human Trafficking,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in 

Google (Online), 4 December 09. See, e.g., Jane Chen, ‘‘Parents Sold Baby and Bought a Phone,’’ 

Shanghai Daily (Online), 9 December 09. See also Zhou Xuelian, ‘‘21-Year-Old Youngster ‘Sells’ 

6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell Phone To Play With’’ [21 sui shuawa dang laohan ‘‘mai’’ 6 tian da 

de erzi mai bu shouji shua], Chongqing Times (Online), 9 December 09. 21 ‘‘Chinese Women Taught To Avoid People-Traffickers,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily 

(Online), 8 March 10. 22Pino Cazzaniga, ‘‘Fleeing From North Korea To Be Sold in China as Brides or Prostitutes,’’ 

AsiaNews.it (Online), 15 February 10; Bill Allan, ‘‘They Fled From the Nightmare of North 

Korea—Only To Be Sold Into Slavery in China,’’ Herald Scotland (Online), 20 June 10; Keith 

B. Richburg, ‘‘Chinese Border Town Emerges as New Front Line in Fight Against Human Trafficking,’’ Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09. 23Scott Tong, ‘‘Take My Daughter: Confessions of a Chinese Baby Trafficker,’’ Marketplace 

(Online), 5 May 10. 24Tania Branigan, ‘‘The Chinese Toddler Chained Through Love and Fear,’’ Guardian (Online), 4 February 10; ‘‘Migrant Children Become At-Risk Group for Trafficking’’ [Liudong ertong 

chengwei bei guaimai de gaowei qunti], Peace Net, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 7 January 10; 

China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘The Children of Migrant Workers in China,’’ 8 May 09; 

Damian Grammaticas, ‘‘Chinese Children Snatched and Sold on to Couples,’’ BBC (Online), 27 

November 09. 25Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10, 113. 26 Ibid., 217. 27 ‘‘Explosion in Fireworks Workshop Occurs in Hezhou City, Guangxi Province, 1 Child 

Killed, 12 Seriously Injured’’ [Guangxi hezhou fasheng yiqi baozhu zuofang baozha an 13 ertong 

1 si 12 zhongshang], Southern Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Zhu’ao Net (Online), 13 November 09. 28 Jiang Guibin and Tang Xuping, ‘‘ ‘Child Workers’ Injured and Killed in Hezhou Fireworks 

Factory Explosion Case Were All ‘Left Behind Children’ ’’ [Hezhou baozhu zuofang baozha 

shijian zhong sishang ‘tonggong’ junwei ‘liushou ertong’], Xinhua (Online), 14 November 09. See 

also Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10, 112. 29Liang Shubin, ‘‘Child Trafficking Ring Cracked in Harbin, Suspect Is Chair of OB/GYN Department in Hospital’’ [Harbin pohuai yiqi guaimai ertong an xianyiren shi yiyuan fuchanke 

zhuren], Xinhua, reprinted in China Peace Net (Online), 7 January 10. 30 According to the Chinese government’s second reservation in its written decision to accede 

to the UN TIP Protocol, Hong Kong is not a party to the UN TIP Protocol. Human trafficking 

cases in Hong Kong are treated separately under Hong Kong law. National People’s Congress, 

National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision Regarding Acceding to the ‘‘United 

Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’’ [Quanguo 

renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu jiaru ‘‘lianheguo daji kuaguo youzuzhi 

fanzui gongyue guanyu yufang, jinzhi he chengzhi fanyun renkou tebie shi funu he ertong 

xingwei de buchong yidingshu’’ de jueding], 26 December 09. 31Office of the President of the Philippines, Commission on Filipinos Overseas (Online), ‘‘Two 

Filipinos Convicted of Human Trafficking in Hong Kong,’’ 15 March 10. 32 Ibid. See also Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of 

State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010—Hong Kong, 14 June 10, 167. According to the State 

Department report, the two Filipina offenders lured three women. 33 Jane Chen, ‘‘Parents Sold Baby and Bought a Phone,’’ Shanghai Daily (Online), 9 December 

09; Zhou Xuelian, ‘‘21-Year-Old Youngster ‘Sells’ 6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell Phone To Play 

With’’ [21 sui shuawa dang laohan ‘‘mai’’ 6 tian da de erzi mai bu shouji shua], Chongqing 

Times (Online), 9 December 09. 34 Chen Yong, ‘‘Gambling Couple Gave Birth to Children and Sold Them for Money To Squander, Grandmother Contacted Buyer’’ [Haodu fuqi sheng haizi maiqian huihuo nainai lianxi 

maijia], Northeast Net (Online), 5 July 10. 35 ‘‘China’s Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort Law,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 

December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 

Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/ 

55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). 36 ‘‘Trafficking Crackdown: ‘Babies Looking for Home’ Campaign Results in Another Two ‘Babies’ Finding Their Homes’’ [Daguai: ‘‘baobei xunjia’’ huodong you you liangming ‘‘baobei’’ 

zhaodao jia], Xinhua (Online), 24 December 09; Ministry of Public Security (Online), ‘‘National 

Anti-Trafficking DNA Database Set Up’’ [Quanguo ‘‘daguai’’ DNA shujuku jiancheng], 30 April 

09; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. 37Ministry of Public Security (Online), ‘‘Information on Unidentified Trafficked Children’’ [Wei 

chaqing shenyuan de bei guaimai ertong xinxi], accessed 23 September 10. 38Ministry of Public Security, Opinion on Lawful Punishment for the Crime of Abducting and 

Selling Women and Children [Guanyu yifa zhengzhi guaimai funu ertong fanzui de yijian], 2 

April 10. 39 Chen Jia, ‘‘Parents of Missing Teenagers Win in New Trafficking Law,’’ China Daily (Online), 11 March 10. 40State Council General Office, China’s National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in 

Women and Children (2008–2012) [Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008– 

2012 nian)], issued 13 December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 176; Qinghai Province Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Plan 

of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012) [Qinghai sheng fandui 

283 

guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008–2012 nian)], issued 22 December 09; Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Gansu Province Implementation of ‘‘China’s National 

Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)’’ [Gansu sheng 

shishi ‘‘zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)’’ fang’an shishi 

xize], issued 29 April 10; Zhuzhou City Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and 

Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua], issued 31 December 09; 

Opinion of Bazhong City People’s Government Office Regarding the Implementation of ‘‘China’s 

National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)’’ 

[Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche guowuyuan ‘‘zhongguo fandui 

guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008–2012 nian)’’ de shishi yijian], issued 25 August 09. 41See, e.g., ‘‘China, Laos Set Up Liaison Office To Fight Human Trafficking,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

17 October 09; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘Chinese Border Town Emerges as New Front Line in Fight 

Against Human Trafficking,’’ Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09; Ma Guihua, ‘‘China 

Joins Mekong Countries in Fighting Cross-Border Human Trafficking,’’ 29 November 09. 42Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. 43 Ibid. 44Zhang Yuchen, ‘‘A League of Their Own Out To Trace Missing Children,’’ China Daily (Online), 28 April 10; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of 

State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. 45 Virginie Mangin, ‘‘Parents Left Bereft by Curse of China’s Child Snatchers,’’ National (Online), 12 March 10; ‘‘Parents of Abducted Children Protest in South China,’’ Reuters, reprinted 

in Radio Nederland Wereldomroep (Online), 18 January 10; Peter Hitchens, ‘‘Gendercide: China’s Shameful Massacre of Unborn Girls Means There Will Soon Be 30m More Men Than 

Women,’’ Daily Mail (Online), 10 April 10. According to this article, Chinese officials ‘‘even chase 

after citizens who go to Peking to complain about their treatment, or to petition for help. Parents who had put up posters begging for news of their stolen children were shocked to find that 

officials immediately snatched them from walls.’’ 46Mark MacKinnon, ‘‘The Search for China’s Stolen Children,’’ Globe and Mail (Online), 25 

December 09; John Vause, ‘‘Parents Seek Answers After Children Abducted,’’ CNN (Online), 10 

August 09. One parent of a missing child told CNN, ‘‘During sensitive times, like Children’s 

Day, the government forces me to leave town . . . they were afraid I would organize some activities like searching for kids.’’ 47Damian Grammaticas, ‘‘Chinese Children Snatched and Sold on to Couples,’’ BBC (Online), 

27 November 09. 48 ‘‘China’s Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort Law,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 

December 09. 49PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 240. 50 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol states: 

‘‘ ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 

of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving 

or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’’ See also Office 

to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons 

Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. According to this report, ‘‘China’s definition of trafficking does 

not prohibit non-physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage, involuntary servitude, forced 

labor, or offenses committed against men, although many aspects of these crimes are addressed 

in other articles of China’s criminal law. China’s legal definition of trafficking does not automatically regard children over the age of 14 who are subjected to the commercial sex trade as 

trafficking victims.’’ 51 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175. 52 Ibid. For information concerning the distinction between human smuggling and trafficking, 

see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Online), ‘‘Human Smuggling and Trafficking,’’ 

20 January 10. 53Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. 54Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Interim Assessment—China, 24 February 10; Human Rights Watch (Online), World 

Report 2010—North Korea, 20 January 10; Women in a Changing China, Staff Roundtable of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 10, Testimony of Mark Lagon, 

Former Ambassador-at-Large and Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 55Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10. 56 Ibid. 

Notes to Section II—North Korean Refugees in China 

1 ‘‘Crackdown on North Koreans,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 September 09. 

2 Ibid. 

3The 1951 Convention and its Protocol define a refugee as someone who, ‘‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 

284 

social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 

to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’’ They mandate that 

‘‘[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 

the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’’ Convention 

Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 

the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 

429(V) of 14 December 50, arts. 1, 33. China acceded to the Convention on September 24, 1982. 4Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu Holds January 22, 2008, Press Conference’’ [2008 nian 1 yue 22 ri waijiaobu fayanren jiang yu juxing lixing 

jizhehui], 22 January 08. 5 UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16–17. 6 Ibid. 

7 ‘‘Crackdown on North Koreans,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 September 09. 

8 John Garnaut, ‘‘Crackdown Reduces Flow of Fleeing North Koreans,’’ Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 26 October 09. 9 ‘‘Crackdown on North Koreans,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 September 09. 

10 John M. Glionna, ‘‘Aiding North Korea Defectors: A High-Stakes Spy Mission,’’ Los Angeles 

Times (Online), 25 November 09. 11Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, No. 328, January 2010. 12Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, No. 332, February 2010. 13 ‘‘Some 50 Refugees in S. Korea Diplomatic Missions,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 

AsiaOne News (Online), 8 March 10. 14 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 

March 10. 15Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 

May 10. 16 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts 

of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 2009, 18–19. 17Lee Sung Jin, ‘‘Current Situation on Refugees in China,’’ Daily NK (Online), 10 May 09. 18 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Christian Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Aiding North Korean Refugees,’’ 1 September 09. 19Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 

May 10. 20 Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Survival Under Torture: Briefing Report 

on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK, September 2009, 24–31; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report 

of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: 

Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 10. 21Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, East-West Center (Online), ‘‘Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison Camp Experiences,’’ October 2009, 11–12. 22 Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International 

Economics, Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, 

March 2008, 6; Tom O’Neill, ‘‘Escape From North Korea,’’ National Geographic (Online), 1 February 09; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Online), A Prison Without Bars: 

Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North 

Korea, March 2008, Preface, 28. 23Tom O’Neill, ‘‘Escape From North Korea,’’ National Geographic (Online), 1 February 09; 

John M. Glionna, ‘‘Aiding North Korea Defectors: A High-Stakes Spy Mission,’’ Los Angeles 

Times (Online), 25 November 09. 24 A total of 1,346 refugees were interviewed at 11 sites in northeastern China. Yoonok Chang, 

Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 12–13, 

24. 25 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Online), A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North 

Korea, March 2008, 30. 26 Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International 

Economics, Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, 

March 2008, 9, 21. 27 UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; Citizens’ Alliance for 

North Korean Human Rights, Survival Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK, September 2009, 23–33; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff 

Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum Foundation. 28 Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Survival Under Torture: Briefing Report 

on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK, September 2009, 27; Committee for Human Rights 

in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to 

China, March 2009, 15; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; 

The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum 

Foundation. 

285 

29 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts 

of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 2009, 46–49; Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, 

and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of 

North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 13. 30Tom O’Neill, ‘‘Escape From North Korea,’’ National Geographic (Online), 1 February 09. 31Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 

May 10. 32 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts 

of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 2009, 28–33; ‘‘North Korean Trafficked Brides,’’ 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 April 09. 33 ‘‘North Korean Women Sold in China,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 April 09. 34 Joel R. Charny, et al., Refugees International, Acts of Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting 

North Koreans in China, April 2005, 11. 35 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts 

of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 2009, 20–21; Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10. 36Pino Cazzaniga, ‘‘Fleeing From North Korea To Be Sold in China as Brides or Prostitutes,’’ 

AsiaNews.it (Online), 15 February 10; Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 

$1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10. 37 Nam You-Sun, ‘‘N. Korean Women Up for Sale in China: Activist,’’ Agence France-Presse 

(Online), 12 May 10; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, 

Defense Forum Foundation. 38 Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts 

of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 2009, 33–36; Norma Kang Muico, Anti-Slavery 

International, ‘‘An Absence of Choice: The Sexual Exploitation of North Korean Women in 

China,’’ 9 November 05, 5; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, 

President, Defense Forum Foundation. 39 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 

Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 7. 40 Article 9 of the UN TIP Protocol provides that ‘‘State Parties shall establish comprehensive 

policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and 

(b) To protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from revictimization.’’ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 

and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 

15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 9. Article 6 of the Convention on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides that ‘‘States Parties shall 

take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women 

and exploitation of prostitution of women.’’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN 

General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, art. 

6. 41Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10, 107. 42Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 

May 10. 43Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking 

in Persons Report 2010—China, 14 June 10, 107. 44Lina Yoon, ‘‘Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,’’ Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09. 45Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ‘‘Shadow Children Denied National ID,’’ 6 

July 09. 46PRC Nationality Law, enacted and effective 10 September 80, art. 4. Every citizen in China 

is registered under the household registration (hukou) system. Human Rights Watch (Online), 

‘‘Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China,’’ April 2008, 3. 47PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, effective 1 July 86, amended 29 June 

06, effective 1 September 06, arts. 5, 10. 48 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China,’’ April 2008, 3, 9–11; Lina Yoon, ‘‘Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,’’ Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09. 49 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, art. 22; PRC Nationality Law, enacted and effective 

10 September 80, art. 4; PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, effective 1 July 

86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, art. 5; Lina Yoon, ‘‘Stateless Children: North 

Korean Refugees in China,’’ Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09. 50 Human Rights Watch (Online), Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean 

Women in China, April 2008, 8; Lee Tae-hoon, ‘‘Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 

$1,500,’’ Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10; Lina Yoon, ‘‘Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,’’ Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09; Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ‘‘Shadow Children Denied National ID,’’ 6 July 09. 51Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ‘‘Food Prices Rocket in North Korea,’’ 10 

April 10; Chico Harlan, ‘‘N. Korea Lifts Restrictions on Private Markets as Last Resort in Food 

Crisis,’’ Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10. 52 Chico Harlan, ‘‘N. Korea Lifts Restrictions on Private Markets as Last Resort in Food Crisis,’’ Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10. 

286 

53 Blaine Harden, ‘‘North Korea Revalues Currency, Destroying Private Savings,’’ Washington 

Post (Online), 2 December 09; Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ‘‘Food Prices 

Rocket in North Korea,’’ 10 April 10; ‘‘N. Korea Completely Cuts off State Rations: Aid Group,’’ 

Agence France-Presse (Online), 14 June 10; Chico Harlan, ‘‘N. Korea Lifts Restrictions on Private Markets as Last Resort in Food Crisis,’’ Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10. 54Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘Views Show How North Korea Policy Spread Misery,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 9 June 10. 55 A survey conducted from August 2004 to September 2005 found that most refugees crossed 

the border for ‘‘economic’’ reasons. Yoonok Chang, with Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 

‘‘North Korean Refugees in China: Evidence From a Survey,’’ in The North Korean Refugee Crisis: Human Rights and International Response, eds. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006), 19. 56Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu Holds January 22, 2008, Press Conference’’ [2008 nian 1 yue 22 ri waijiaobu fayanren jiang yu juxing lixing 

jizhehui], 22 January 08. 57 UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16–17. 58 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, art. 33; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16–17. 59 ‘‘Crackdown on North Koreans,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 September 09. 

Notes to Section II—Public Health 

1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12. 2Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Minister of Health Chen Zhu Attends Press Conference at 

Third Session of Eleventh NPC on ‘Ensuring and Improving the People’s Livelihood’ ’’ [Chen zhu 

buzhang chuxi shiyi jie quanguo renda sanci huiyi ‘‘baozhang he gaishan minsheng’’ zhuanti 

jizhehui], 8 March 10. At a March 8, 2010, press conference, Minister of Health Chen Zhu revealed that ‘‘Eighty percent of China’s quality medical resources flow to the urban areas when 

a majority of our populace still dwells in the countryside.’’ See also ‘‘Chinese Experts Stress 

Need for Basic Health Care,’’ Washington Post (Online), 7 March 10. According to this article, 

‘‘The high cost and poor availability of health services are among the biggest complaints of the 

Chinese public.’’ 3See, e.g., ‘‘Basic Medicine System To Cover 30% of Grass-Roots Hospitals by February: Official,’’ Xinhua (Online), 27 February 10; Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Health Issues 

‘PRC National Formulary (Chemical Drugs and Biological Products Chapter) 2010 Edition’ ’’ 

[Weishengbu fabu ‘‘Zhongguo guojia chufang ji (huaxue yaopin yu shengwu zhipin juan) 2010 

nian ban’’], 8 February 10; Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Six Departments and Committees 

Jointly Print and Distribute ‘Plan for the Construction of a Basic Healthcare Team With General Practitioners as the Focal Point’ ’’ [Liu buwei lianhe yinfa ‘‘yi quanke yisheng wei zhongdian 

de jiceng yiliao weisheng duiwu jianshe guihua’’], 1 April 10. 4See, e.g., Han Xue, ‘‘42 Counties and Cities in Heilongjiang To Implement Basic Healthcare 

Reform Pilot Projects’’ [Heilongjiang 42 ge xianshi jiang shishi jiceng yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige 

shidian], Dongbei Net (Online), 9 July 10; Song Qianyun, ‘‘Guizhou Strengthens Measures, High 

Level Completion of Tasks in Deepening Healthcare Reform’’ [Guizhou qianghua cuoshi 

gaoshuiping wancheng shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige renwu], Guizhou Daily News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 25 June 10; Wu Yueqiang, ‘‘Jiangxi Province Announces This Year’s 

Target Tasks for Deepening Healthcare Reform’’ [Jiangxi sheng gongbu jinnian shenhua yiyao 

weisheng tizhi gaige mubiao renwu], Jinshi Net-Nanchang Evening News, reprinted in 

Jinshi.net (Online), 9 July 10; Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission, ‘‘Meeting on 2010 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Work on Deepening Healthcare Reform Convenes Today’’ [2010 nian ningxia huizu zizhi qu shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige 

gongzuo huiyi jinri zhaokai], reprinted in Sina (Online), 9 July 10. 5Gu Xin, ‘‘Distribute Medical Service Evenly,’’ China Daily (Online), 24 November 09. According to this report, ‘‘In some rural, mountainous and outlying regions, people have no access to 

even basic medical services given the small number of public healthcare providers, let alone specialized care from the poorly-equipped hospitals. The underlying factor for this should be attributed to government efforts to maintain the dominant status of public hospitals in large cities. 

For a long time, big hospitals, especially in big cities, have enjoyed an absolute advantage over 

their counterparts in rural and outlying areas in being awarded public inputs. At the same time, 

medical workers in under-funded hospitals have tried to move to big cities and economically developed regions to get higher pay.’’ 6 ‘‘Govt’ Promises Equitable Healthcare for All,’’ China Daily, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government (Online), 8 January 08. 7See, e.g., Che Yuming, ‘‘Li Keqiang: Hurry To Implement Five Focal Tasks of Healthcare Reform’’ [Li keqiang: ba yigai wuxiang zhongdian renwu zhuajin luodao shichu], Xinhua (Online), 

4 December 09; ‘‘Chinese President Calls for Universal Basic Health Care,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 

May 10. 8Drew Thompson, ‘‘China’s Health Care Reform,’’ Council on Foreign Relations (Online), 30 

April 09 (‘‘There is widespread insecurity about health care in the country, with more than 60 

percent of Chinese citizens surveyed unsatisfied with the health services they receive.’’). See also 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘‘China’s Capacity To Manage Infectious Diseases: Global Implications,’’ March 2009, VII; State Council Information Office, State Council 

Opinion on Deepening Healthcare Reform [Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua 

yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige de yijian], issued 17 March 09; State Council Information Office, 

287 

State Council Circular Regarding the Printing and Distribution of the 2009–2011 Healthcare Reform Implementation Plan [Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige jinqi zhongdian 

shishi fang’an (2009–2011 nian) de tongzhi], issued 18 March 09. 9Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Health and Five Other Ministries Deploy Public 

Hospital Reform Pilot Project’’ [Weishengbu deng wu buwei bushu gongli yiyuan gaige shidian 

gongzuo], 23 February 10; Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Health and Five Other Ministries Jointly Issue ‘Guiding Opinions on the Public Hospital Reform Pilot Project’ ’’ 

[Weishengbu deng wu buwei lianhe fabu ‘‘guanyu gongli yiyuan gaige shidian de zhidao yijian’’], 

23 February 10. 10 ‘‘Basic Medicine System To Cover 30% of Grass-Roots Hospitals by February: Official,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 27 February 10; Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Health Issues ‘PRC 

National Formulary (Chemical Drugs and Biological Products Chapter) 2010 Edition’ ’’ 

[Weishengbu fabu ‘‘Zhongguo guojia chufang ji (huaxue yaopin shengwu zhipin juan) 2010 nian 

ban’’], 8 February 10. 11Ministry of Health (Online), ‘‘Six Departments and Committees Jointly Print and Distribute 

‘Plan for the Construction of a Basic Healthcare Team With General Practitioners as the Focal 

Point’ ’’ [Liu buwei lianhe yinfa ‘‘yi quanke yisheng wei zhongdian de jiceng yiliao weisheng 

duiwu jianshe guihua’’], 1 April 10. 12Wu Yueqiang, ‘‘Jiangxi Province Announces This Year’s Target Tasks for Deepening 

Healthcare Reform’’ [Jiangxi sheng gongbu jinnian shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige mubiao 

renwu], Jinshi Net-Nanchang Evening News, reprinted in Jinshi.net (Online), 9 July 10. 13 Yuhui Li and Linda Dorsten, ‘‘Regional and Urban/Rural Differences of Public Health in 

China,’’ 2 Global Journal of Health Science 20, 21 (April 2010). 14 ‘‘Medical Insurance To Cover All Urban Residents This Year,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Economic Net (Online), 23 February 09; Yuhui Li and Linda Dorsten, ‘‘Regional and Urban/ 

Rural Differences of Public Health in China,’’ 2 Global Journal of Health Science, 20, 25 (April 

2010). 15 Jingjing Yang, ‘‘Imbalance Grows at Chinese Hospitals,’’ New York Times (Online), 26 April 

10; Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘In China, Rx for Ailing Health System,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 

15 October 09; Gu Xin, ‘‘Distribute Medical Service Evenly,’’ China Daily (Online), 24 November 

09. According to this report, ‘‘For a long time, big hospitals, especially in big cities, have enjoyed 

an absolute advantage over their counterparts in rural and outlying areas in being awarded 

public inputs. At the same time, medical workers in under-funded hospitals have tried to move 

to big cities and economically developed regions to get higher pay.’’ 16See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183; ‘‘Migrant Restrictions in China Stirs 

Outcry,’’ CNN (Online), 12 March 10; Aris Chan, China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Paying the 

Price for Economic Development: The Children of Migrant Workers in China,’’ November 2009, 

29–31, 45–48, 57; Carl Minzner, ‘‘The System That Divides China,’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 

16 March 10. 17 ‘‘City Cuts Fines on Second Child,’’ Global Times (Online), 23 August 10. According to one 

expert quoted in this report, ‘‘Children born outside State scrutiny will enjoy equal rights as 

the first child only after the family pays the fine and registers them.’’ 18 Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ‘‘Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant Workers Face Dilemma,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 10 March 10; Tao Ran, ‘‘Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way To Reform,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 22 March 10. 19 ‘‘Resources Imbalance Challenges China’s Health Care Reform: Minister,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

28 September 09; ‘‘China Endeavors To Bring Affordable Medical Services to Farmers,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 2 January 10; Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘In China, Rx for Ailing Health System,’’ Wall Street 

Journal (Online), 15 October 09; Gu Xin, ‘‘Distribute Medical Service Evenly,’’ China Daily (Online), 24 November 09. According to this report, ‘‘In some rural, mountainous and outlying regions, people have no access to even basic medical services given the small number of public 

healthcare providers, let alone specialized care from the poorly-equipped hospitals.’’ 20 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183. 21 Ibid. 22 ‘‘China Audits Rural Cooperative Medical Care System,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily 

(Online), 6 June 10. According to official statistics quoted in this report, 833 million farmers, 

or 94 percent of the rural population, were participating in the rural cooperative medical system 

as of the end of 2009. This is an increase over the 85.9 percent coverage reported in the Commission’s 2009 Annual Report. CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183. 23 ‘‘Missing the Barefoot Doctors: Many a Problem Lies in the Way of a ‘New Socialist Countryside,’ ’’ Economist (Online), 11 October 07. 24Shanlian Hu, Shenglan Tang, Yuanli Liu, Yuxin Zhao, Maria-Luisa Escobar, and David de 

Ferranti, ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ 372 

Lancet, 1846 (22 November 08); ‘‘Case Studies in Chinese Health Care Reform,’’ Economic Observer (Online), 4 November 08. 25 ‘‘Case Studies in Chinese Health Care Reform,’’ Economic Observer (Online), 4 November 

08. See also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183. 26 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN 

General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, 

art. 12(2c). See also ‘‘China Pledges To Step Up Fight Against Infectious Diseases,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 June 10. 27See discussion below for more details. 28 ‘‘Hand-Foot-Mouth Disease Epidemic Spreads Early’’ [Shouzukou bing yiqing tiqian gaofa], 

Beijing News (Online), 7 May 10; ‘‘Hand-Foot-Mouth Disease Claims 94 Lives in China,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 14 April 10. See also Fang Xiao, ‘‘Alarming Outbreak of Mutated Hand, Foot, and 

Mouth Disease in Guangxi,’’ Epoch Times (Online), 5 May 10. 

288 

29Margie Mason, ‘‘1 Chinese Baby Born With Syphilis Every Hour,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 5 May 10. See also Joseph D. Tucker, et al., ‘‘Syphilis and 

Social Upheaval in China,’’ 362 New England Journal of Medicine, 1658, 1658–1661 (6 May 10). 30 Jane Chen, ‘‘10 Patients Claim Hep C Infection From Dialysis,’’ Shanghai Daily (Online), 

16 April 10. 31 ‘‘Infectious Diseases Kill 1,269 in China in April; Over Half AIDS Cases,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

11 May 10; Yang Wanli, ‘‘China’s HIV/AIDS Total To Hit 740,000,’’ China Daily (Online), 23 

December 09. See also ‘‘Ministry of Health Ranks HIV/AIDS Deadliest Infectious Disease in 

China, Government Harassment of Advocates Continues,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2; ‘‘China’s Minister of Health Warns of HIV Spread,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 24 November 09. 32Tan Ee Lyn, ‘‘China Fights Growing Problem of Tuberculosis,’’ Reuters (Online), 5 January 

10. 33 ‘‘Resources Imbalance Challenges China’s Health Care Reform: Minister,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

28 September 09; L.H. Chan, P.K. Lee, and G. Chan, ‘‘China Engages Global Health Governance: Processes and Dilemmas,’’ 4 Global Health 1, 5 (January 2009). For examples of some factors that contribute to greater risk of the spread of infectious disease in rural areas, see Yuhui 

Li and Linda Dorsten, ‘‘Regional and Urban/Rural Differences of Public Health in China,’’ 2 

Global Journal of Health Science 20, 24 (April 2010). 34L.H. Chan, P.K. Lee, and G. Chan, ‘‘China Engages Global Health Governance: Processes 

and Dilemmas,’’ 4 Global Health 1, 5 (January 2009). Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch (Online), 

‘‘Chinese Corruption Is Hazardous to Your Health,’’ 13 May 10. 35Shan Juan, ‘‘Probe Ordered Into Tainted Vaccines,’’ China Daily (Online), 18 March 10. 36 Ibid. 37 Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Chinese Corruption Is Hazardous to Your 

Health,’’ 13 May 10. 38 Ibid. 39Qide Han, et al., ‘‘China and Global Health,’’ 372 Lancet 1439, 1439–1441 (October 2008). 

See also Peter Foster, ‘‘China Threatens World Health by Unleashing Waves of Superbugs,’’ 

Telegraph (Online), 5 February 10; Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘In China, Rx for Ailing Health System,’’ 

Wall Street Journal (Online), 15 October 09. 40 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Take Action, Tiananmen: 2008 and Beyond,’’ China Rights Forum, 

No. 2, 2008, 43. 41 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN 

General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, 

art. 12(1). 42Mitch Moxley, ‘‘China Tackles Mental Health Woes,’’ Inter Press Service, reprinted in Asia 

Times (Online), 9 July 10. 43Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China Has 100 Million People With Mental Illness,’’ Telegraph (Online), 

28 April 10. 44 ‘‘Psychiatric Institutions in China,’’ 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 10). According to this editorial, 

‘‘The average number of qualified psychiatrists worldwide is four per 100 000 individuals: in 

China, it is about 1.26.’’ 45Kathrin Hille, ‘‘School Killings Cast Spotlight on Social Stresses in China,’’ Financial Times 

(Online), 15 May 10; Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China To Build 550 Mental Hospitals in Response to 

School Stabbings,’’ Telegraph (Online), 21 June 10; ‘‘Psychiatric Institutions in China,’’ 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 10). According to this editorial, ‘‘The average number of qualified psychiatrists 

worldwide is four per 100,000 individuals: in China, it is about 1.26.’’ 46 ‘‘Psychiatric Institutions in China,’’ 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 10). According to this editorial, 

‘‘The average number of qualified psychiatrists worldwide is four per 100 000 individuals: in 

China, it is about 1.26.’’ See also ‘‘Prevalence, Treatment, and Associated Disability of Mental 

Disorders in Four Provinces in China During 2001–05: An Epidemiological Survey,’’ 373 Lancet 

2041, 2049 (13 June 09). According to this study, an estimated 91 percent of the screened individuals who suffered from some form of mental illness in China never sought help. 47See, e.g., Shan Juan, ‘‘After a Spate of Brutal Murders, Mental Health Gets a Closer Look,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 25 May 10; Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China To Build 550 Mental Hospitals in Response to School Stabbings,’’ Telegraph (Online), 21 June 10. 48Shan Juan, Hu Meidong, and Zhu Xingxin, ‘‘School Killings Reveal Mental Health Woes,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 24 March 10; Joel Martinsen, ‘‘School Violence: Does It Belong in the 

News/ ’’ Danwei (Online), 30 April 10; Shirley S. Wang, ‘‘For China, Attacks Shine a Light on 

Its Treatment of the Mentally Ill,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 3 May 10; Dan Martin, ‘‘China 

School Attacks Expose Mental Health Dilemma,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 May 10; 

Shan Juan, ‘‘After a Spate of Brutal Murders, Mental Health Gets a Closer Look,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 25 May 10; Deng Jingyin, ‘‘Mental Health Gets a Boost,’’ Global Times (Online), 22 

June 10. 49Tini Tran, ‘‘China School Attacks Highlight Mental Health,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in 

Google (Online), 14 May 10. See also Shan Juan, Hu Meidong, and Zhu Xingxin, ‘‘School Killings 

Reveal Mental Health Woes,’’ China Daily (Online), 24 March 10. According to this report, 

Zheng Mingsheng, who stabbed eight children to death and injured five more in Fujian province 

in March, ‘‘is said to have a history of mental illness.’’ Deng Jingyin, ‘‘Mental Health Gets a 

Boost,’’ Global Times (Online), 22 June 10. According to this report, a man who killed his daughter and her classmate in Heilongjiang province in May suffered from a ‘‘mental disorder.’’ 50Shan Juan, ‘‘After a Spate of Brutal Murders, Mental Health Gets a Closer Look,’’ China 

Daily (Online), 25 May 10. 51 Ibid. 52Zhou Yingfeng, ‘‘China To Renovate and Expand 550 Mental Hospitals, Prevent [Mentally] 

Ill From Creating Disturbances and Causing Trouble’’ [Wo guo jiang gaikuangjian 550 suo 

jingshenbing yuan fangbingren zhaoshi zhaohuo], Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 

289 

21 June 10. See also Deng Jingyin, ‘‘Mental Health Gets A Boost,’’ Global Times (Online), 22 

June 10. 53 ‘‘Psychiatric Institutions in China,’’ 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 10). 54 Huang Jingjing, ‘‘Experts Consider Law on Mental Health,’’ Global Times (Online), 17 June 

09. 55 Ibid. 56 Huang Jingjing, ‘‘Experts Consider Law on Mental Health,’’ Global Times (Online), 17 June 

09. 57 ‘‘Worldview: NGOs a Paradox in Today’s China,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer (Online), 23 May 10. 

According to Minister of Health Chen Zhu, quoted in this article, ‘‘NGOs have an indispensable 

role in health care . . . [t]he participation of NGOs has played an active role in raising social 

awareness and ending stigma and in prevention measures.’’ 58See, e.g., ‘‘Ministry of Health Ranks HIV/AIDS Deadliest Infectious Disease in China, Government Harassment of Advocates Continues,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 

Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2. 59 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 203. 60State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues Concerning the Management 

of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng 

waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10. See also 

Verna Yu, ‘‘Beijing Tightens Rules on Foreign Funding of NGOs,’’ South China Morning Post, 

15 March 10; Cara Anna, ‘‘NGOs in China Say Threatened by New Donor Rules,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 12 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Prominent 

NGO Raise Concern Over New Regulations on Receiving Foreign Funding,’’ 16 March 10. 61 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China NGOs,’’ Reuters 

(Online), 12 March 10. 62 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), ‘‘Henan HIV/AIDS-Infected 

Rights Defender Tian Xi Criminally Detained’’ [Henan aizibing ganran weiquan renshi tian xi 

bei xingshi juliu], 23 August 10. 63 Ibid. 64 Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, ‘‘Henan HIV/AIDS Rights Defender Tian Xi Arrested’’ 

[Henan aizibing weiquan renshi tian xi bei zhixing daibu], 24 August 10. 65 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), ‘‘Henan HIV/AIDS-Infected 

Rights Defender Tian Xi Criminally Detained’’ [Henan aizibing ganran weiquan renshi tian xi 

bei xingshi juliu], 23 August 10. 66 Ibid. 67 ‘‘Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months’ Imprisonment,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, March–April 2008, 1. See also the CECC Political Prisoner 

Database for more information. 68 ‘‘Hu Jia Denied Medical Parole, Family Members Urge [Authorities] To Show Written Examination Report’’ [Hu jia baowai jiuyi shenqing beiju, jia ren cu chushi shumian jiancha 

baogao], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 April 10; ‘‘Jailed China Activist Hu Jia May Have Cancer: 

Wife,’’ Reuters (Online), 8 April 10. 69Gillian Wong, ‘‘China AIDS Activist Flees to US After Harassment,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 10 May 10. 70 Ibid. 71 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Beijing’s ‘Aizhixing’ Has Tax Records Investigated After Delay’’ [Beijing ‘‘aizhixing’’ shuiwu jicha zanshiyan hou], 25 March 10; ‘‘China’s 

Crackdown on Nonprofit Groups Prompts New Fears Among Activists,’’ Washington Post (Online), 11 May 10. According to this article, Wan Yanhai indicated concern that his organization 

may eventually be shut down. 72 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 204–05. In July 2009, Beijing officials fined and 

then shut down the organization for not being legally registered with the government as a nongovernmental organization. 73 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing Weekly June 8– 

14, 2010,’’ 15 June 10. 74 Ibid. 75 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing Weekly April 

27–May 3, 2010,’’ 4 May 10. 76PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 29, 

30; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN 

General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, 

arts. 7, 13; PRC Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, issued 28 December 90, amended 

24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 25, 30–40; Ministry of Education Circular Regarding 

Further Standardizing Physical Examinations [Prior to] School Enrollment or Employment To 

Protect the Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen Carriers to School Enrollment or Employment 

[Guanyu jinyibu guifan ruxue he jiuye tijian xiangmu weihu yigan biaomian kangyuan 

xiedaizhe ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], issued 10 February 10. 77 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Hepatitis B Activists Publish Major New Research Report 

Highlighting Employment Discrimination in China,’’ 13 January 10. 78Ministry of Education, Circular Regarding Further Standardizing Physical Examinations 

[Prior to] School Enrollment or Employment To Protect the Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen Carriers to School Enrollment or Employment [Guanyu jinyibu guifan ruxue he jiuye tijian 

xiangmu weihu yigan biaomian kangyuan xiedaizhe ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], issued 

10 February 10. 79 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Job Seeker Successfully Sues Hospital for Violation of 

Right to Privacy,’’ 9 March 10. 80 ‘‘Many Kindergartens in Haikou Refuse Hepatitis B Children,’’ Sina (Online), 2 March 10; 

Yirenping (Online), ‘‘Infant in Haikou Barred From Entering Kindergarten, Ministry of EduVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00295 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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cation, Ministry of Health Denounced’’ [Haikou shi yigan baobao nan ruyuan, jiaoyuju, 

weishengju zao jubao], 4 March 10. 81 ‘‘Health Care Management Measures for Nurseries and Kindergartens (Draft),’’ China News 

Services (Online), 30 July 09. 82Zhang Yue and Shan Juan, ‘‘Job Seeker Files Case on HIV Discrimination,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 31 August 10. 83 Ibid.; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Anhui Court Accepts HIV Discrimination Lawsuit,’’ 

31 August 10. See also Li Guangming, ‘‘Anhui University Student Sues Bureau of Education 

After Refused Employment Because of Positive HIV/AIDS Test Results in Physical Examination’’ [Yin tijian aizi yangxing qiuzhi bei ju anhui yi daxue sheng qisu jiaoyuju], Legal Daily 

(Online), 26 August 10. 84 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Anhui Court Accepts HIV Discrimination Lawsuit,’’ 31 August 10. 85Zhang Yue and Shan Juan, ‘‘Job Seeker Files Case on HIV Discrimination,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 31 August 10. 86 Ibid. 

Notes to Section II—Climate Change and the Environment 

1Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat, 9 March 10 (to include China in the list of Parties). 2Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat, reprinted in ChinaFAQs (Online), 28 January 10 (letter regarding autonomous domestic mitigation actions). 3 Ibid. 

4 Xie Zhenhua, ‘‘China’s Challenges Limit Control of Emissions (Authority Forum)’’ [Zhongguo 

tiaozhan kongzhi paifang jixian (quanwei luntan)], People’s Daily (Online), 6 January 10. 5Kathrin Hille, ‘‘China Sets Date for CO2 Cut,’’ Financial Times (Online), 15 August 09. The 

above source notes that Su Wei, Director General of the Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, reportedly told the Financial Times that 

‘‘China’s emissions will not continue to rise beyond 2050.’’ On the other hand, the source below 

notes that Wan Gang, the Minister of Science and Technology, reportedly told the Guardian that 

carbon emissions in China would peak sometime between 2030 and 2040. Jonathan Watts, ‘‘China’s Carbon Emissions Will Peak Between 2030 and 2040, Says Minister,’’ Guardian (Online), 

6 December 09. 6State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7. The Action Plan outlines numerous specific science-based 

goals related to energy and climate change. The plan calls for ‘‘[i]mplementing China’s National 

Plan for Coping with Climate Change by slowing down greenhouse gas emission. While enhancing energy utilization efficiency and developing renewable energy resources to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide, China will strive to maintain the discharge of nitrous oxide in the processes of industrial production at the 2005 level, to increase the forestry coverage to 20 percent, 

and increase the annual carbon sink by about 50 million tons of carbon dioxide over the level 

of 2005.’’ Other actions include: ‘‘[d]oing all we can to make the ratio of energy consumption 

per GDP unit in 2010 around 20 percent lower than that in 2005,’’ and ‘‘[d]eveloping renewable 

energy resources, and working toward the goal of increasing their consumption to 10 percent 

of the total energy consumption by 2010.’’ 7See, e.g., State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China 

(2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7; Outline of the Economic and Social Development 11th Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 

guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shiyi ge wunian guihua gangyao], Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Net (Online), 16 March 06, chap. 3; National Development and Reform Commission, Medium 

and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version), China 

Internet Information Center (Online), September 2007, sec. 3.2(1); ‘‘China’s National Climate 

Change Programme,’’ China Climate Change Info-Net (Online), June 2007. 8Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Carbon Pledge on Track With Past Performance,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 28 November 09. 9PRC Renewable Energy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kezaisheng nengyuan fa], enacted 28 February 05, effective 1 January 06, amended 26 December 09, effective 1 April 10. 10 ‘‘National Energy Commission Established New Energy Sources Could Benefit First’’ 

[Guojia nengyuanwei chengli xin nengyuan keneng xian shouyi], Daily Economic News, reprinted in China Energy Net (Online), 28 January 10. The establishment of the National Energy 

Commission was formally approved in 2008. State Council General Office, Circular Regarding 

Establishment of National Energy Commission [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu chengli guojia 

nengyuanweiyuanhui de tongzhi], issued 22 January 10. The National Energy Commission will, 

among other tasks, participate in energy research projects, devise energy development strategies, and play a coordinating role on some major issues. 11 ‘‘Local Development and Reform Commissions Will Establish Climate Change Response Offices and Issue Emission Reduction Plans’’ [Gedi fagaiwei jiang she yingdui qihou bianhuachu 

chu jianpai fangan], Dongfang Net, reprinted in Netease (Online), 3 January 10. 12See, e.g., Hui Qi, China Development Brief (Online), ‘‘Introducing Chinese Civil Society’s 

Projects To Address Climate Change’’ [Zhongguo gongmin shehui yingdui qihou bianhua 

xiangmu], 12 March 10; Greenpeace China (Online), ‘‘Greenpeace China, Oxfam Hong Kong, 

WWF Hong Kong and Twelve Other Community Organizations Ally Against Climate Change,’’ 

25 May 09; Huo Weiya, Chinadialogue (Online), ‘‘The New Face of Youth Activism in China,’’ 

6 December 07; Heinrich Bo ̈ll Stiftung (Online), ‘‘Environment and Climate,’’ last visited 4 October 10. 

291 

13Friends of Nature et al. (Online), ‘‘A Warming China: Thoughts and Actions for the Chinese 

Civil Society’’ [Biannuan de zhongguo: gongmin shehui de si yu xing], 20 December 07; Friends 

of Nature (Online), ‘‘How Chinese Civil Society Can Participate in Responding to Climate 

Change Disasters’’ [Zhongguo gongmin shehui zuzhi ruhe canyu yingdui qihou zaihai], February 

2010. The source above notes that seven Chinese environmental groups issued a report regarding ways in which Chinese citizen groups could participate in climate disaster actions. 14Shai Oster, ‘‘Not All in China Resist Carbon Caps,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 9 December 09. This source discusses the incident in December 2009, where a group of 200 Chinese business leaders issued a statement in which they said they would promote absolute emissions reduction targets for Chinese enterprises. 15 Jonathan Watts, ‘‘Pants for Progress: Chinese Climate Protesters Strip Off on Train,’’ 

Guardian (Online), 18 January 10. 16Transparency in Environmental Protection and Climate Change in China, Staff Roundtable 

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Deborah 

Seligsohn, Senior Advisor, China Climate and Energy Program, World Resources Institute. Ms. 

Seligsohn stated that ‘‘[i]n contrast to energy data, China has substantially less experience collecting and reporting greenhouse gas emissions data.’’ 17Teng Fei et al., World Resources Institute (Online), ‘‘Mitigation Actions in China: Measurement, Reporting and Verification,’’ June 2009, 9. 18 ‘‘China Revises Statistics Law To Curb Data Falsification,’’ Xinhua (Online), 27 June 09. 19 ‘‘China Agrees Energy Data Deal,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 November 09. 20 National Development and Reform Commission, China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing 

Climate Change—The Progress Report 2009, reprinted in China Climate Net (Online), November 2009. These include the Circular of the State Council on Approving and Forwarding the 

Plan and Measures for Implementing the Statistics, Monitoring and Assessment of Energy Conservation and Pollution Reductions jointly issued in 2007 by several ministries. The National 

Bureau of Statistics established a special department in 2008, the Department of Energy Statistics, which is tasked with organizing the survey, collection, compilation, and publication of energy data. 21 ‘‘China Agrees Energy Data Deal,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 November 09. Radio Free 

Asia reported Professor Philip Andrews-Speed, an expert on Chinese energy issues at the University of Dundee in Scotland, as saying Chinese energy data has accuracy problems because 

of the large number of data sources and the alleged practice by officials of modifying data to 

meet government targets and advance their personal careers. Transparency in Environmental 

Protection and Climate Change in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Deborah Seligsohn, Senior Advisor, China Climate 

and Energy Program, World Resources Institute. Ms. Seligsohn stated that ‘‘[t]here is no doubt 

data could be improved . . . [w]hile [the National Bureau of Statistics] has become much more 

willing to revise its data sets . . . Chinese revisions of recent-year data do not always include 

revisions of prior-year data, making time series analysis difficult.’’ 22 Coral Davenport, ‘‘Kerry’s Reality Check in Copenhagen,’’ CQ Today (Online), 17 December 

09. In December 2009, Su Wei, China’s primary climate change negotiator, said: ‘‘It’s not necessary for others to have worries about China’s reductions commitment, because these have 

been approved by the National People’s Congress . . . [t]he delegates in Congress have the role 

of supervision . . . .’’ 23 Ibid. Su Wei also stated, ‘‘[t]he channels of information are open . . . [i]nstitutions and 

countries who have questions about China’s commitment will be answered.’’ 24 Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), UNFCCC, Conference of Parties, 15th Sess., FCCC/ 

CP/2009/11/Add. 1, 18 December 09, art. 5. Article 5 of the Copenhagen Accord states: ‘‘. . . 

[m]itigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national communications consistent 

with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference 

of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise communicated 

to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by NonAnnex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the 

result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. NonAnnex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through 

National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under 

clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along 

with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support . . . . These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and 

verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.’’ 25 ‘‘Build Consensus and Strengthen Cooperation To Advance the Historical Process of Combating Climate Change,’’ Xinhua (Online), 18 December 09. Wen said China ‘‘. . . will further 

enhance the domestic-statistical, monitoring and evaluation methods, improve the way for releasing emission reduction information, increase transparency and actively engage in international exchange, dialogue and cooperation.’’ 26 International Energy Agency (Online), Joint Statement by the National Energy Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the International Energy Agency, 14 October 09, para. 

16. China and the IEA announced China would engage in several programs including one related to energy statistics: ‘‘[a]ccurate, complete and timely energy statistics are essential in all 

countries to inform wise policy choices and foster market stability. Experts from China and of 

the IEA will continue to work together on capacity building to strengthen China’s energy statistical system, and will co-operate in the development of internationally comparable statistics and 

indicators of energy efficiency in all sectors, to support energy policy making in China.’’ 27 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Online), Memorandum of Cooperation Between the 

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ronmental Protection Agency of the United States of America To Build Capacity To Address Climate Change, 17 November 09, sec. 2. The memorandum states: ‘‘[t]he cooperative activities undertaken pursuant to this Memorandum of Cooperation, hereinafter referred to as the ‘MOC,’ 

may involve the following areas: 1. Capacity building for developing greenhouse gas inventories; 

2. Education and public awareness of climate change; 3. The impacts of climate change to economic development, human health and ecological system, as well as research on corresponding 

countermeasures; and 4. Other areas as determined by the Participants.’’ 28 U.S. White House (Online), U.S.-China Joint Statement, 17 November 09. 29State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7; National Development and Reform Commission, Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version), 

China Internet Information Center (Online), September 2007, secs. 3.2, 4, and 4.1. 30Peter H. Gleick, ‘‘Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China’’ in Peter H. Gleick et 

al., The World’s Water 2008–2009 (Washington: Island Press, 2009), 145–146. 31See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick, ‘‘Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China,’’ in Peter H. 

Gleick et al., The World’s Water 2008–2009 (Washington: Island Press, 2009), 145–146; Jim 

Yardley, ‘‘Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human Costs, Choking on Growth, Part 

IV,’’ New York Times (Online), 19 November 07; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 

103; ‘‘Three Gorges Resettlement Activist Paralyzed After Assault,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 10–11; Stacy Mosher, ‘‘The Case of Fu Xiancai,’’ China 

Rights Forum, No. 3, 2006, 48–51. 32Wan Huazhong, ‘‘Dam Forces Relocations of 300,000 More,’’ China Daily (Online), 21 January 10; ‘‘Three Gorges Relocated Migrants: Return to Emptiness and Wondering Ever Since’’ 

[Sanxia waiqian yimin, guiqu lai xikong paihuai], Southern Daily (Online), 10 March 10. 33Wan Huazhong ‘‘Dam Forces Relocations of 300,000 More,’’ China Daily (Online), 21 January 10. The article noted that as of January 2010, an additional 300,000 people living in the 

reservoir area still needed to be relocated to ensure people’s safety from geographic hazards, 

such as landslides. ‘‘Central China City Relocates 150,000 People for Three Gorges Project in 

17 Years,’’ Xinhua (Online), 10 January 10. 34Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Protest Over Dam Project Ends After 20-Hour Stand-Off,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 26 April 10; ‘‘Sichuan Farmers Protest of Dadu Dam Seen To Have Little 

Impact,’’ South China Morning Post, 4 January 05 (Open Source Center, 4 January 05); ‘‘100,000 

Protesters Clash With Police Over Dam Project in Sichuan,’’ Tai Yang Pao, 1 November 04 

(Open Source Center, 1 November 04). The Pubugou Dam was the site of one of China’s most 

serious outbreaks of rural unrest in 2004 when tens of thousands of citizens protested against 

the dam’s construction. 35Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Protest Over Dam Project Ends After 20-Hour Stand-Off,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 26 April 10. 36Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Six Arrested for Defying Eviction Over Dam Work,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 24 June 10. 37 Ibid. 38Philip Brown and Yilin Xu, Social Science Research Network (Online), ‘‘Hydropower Development and Resettlement Policy on China’s Nu River,’’ 2010, 13–17. 39Qian Haoping, ‘‘Shaanxi Weinan Police Go to Beijing To Detain Writer, Say His Book Publication Involves Illegal Business Operations’’ [Shaanxi weinan jingfang jinjing zhuazou zuojia 

cheng qi chushu she feifa jingying], Beijing News, reprinted in Phoenix Net (Online), 1 September 10. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 He Xin, Liu Chang, Qin Xudong, and Tang Ying, ‘‘Yellow River Reportage Lands Writer in 

Jail,’’ Caixin (Online), 10 September 10. 44 ‘‘In Writer’s Arrest, a New Cry for Rule of Law,’’ Century Weekly, reprinted in Caixin (Online), 10 September 10. 45Zhou Ze, ‘‘Doubts About Relevant Weinan Department’s Notifications Regarding the Xie 

Chaoping Case Communicated by the News’’ [Dui xie chaoping an xinwen tongji shang weinan 

youguan bumen tongbao qingkuang de zhiyi], Caijing (Online), 18 September 10; ‘‘Police Enter 

Beijing To Detain a Person, Xie Chaoping ‘Guilty of Speech’ or ‘Illegal Business Activities?’ ’’ 

[Jingcha jinjing zhuaren, xie chaoping ‘‘yiyan huozui’’ haishi ‘‘feifa jingying’’], Southern Daily 

(Online), 2 September 10; ‘‘Please Let Us Believe Xie Chaoping Is Not ‘Guilty of Speech’ ’’ [Qing 

rang women xiangxin xie chaoping bushi ‘‘yinyan huozui’’], Zhengyi Net (Online), 3 September 

10; ‘‘Mistakes in the Xie Chaoping Case Should Be Rectified as Soon as Possible’’ [Xie chaoping 

an ying jinkuai jiucuo], Century Weekly (Online), 4 September 10; ‘‘Regarding the Process of 

Publishing ‘The Great Migration’ and Numerous Questions About Weinan Police Involvement’’ 

[Guanyu ‘‘daqianxi’’ chuban de jingguo ji dui weinan jingfang jieru de zhuduo bujie], Caixin (Online), 3 September 10. 46 ‘‘Weinan ‘Book Case’ Procuratorate Rejects Arrest of Xie Chaoping’’ [Weinan ‘‘shu’an’’ 

jianfang jubu xie chaoping], Caijing (Online), 17 September 10. 47 Ibid. 48 ‘‘Weinan ‘Book Case’ Worker at a Print Shop Detained Because of ‘The Great Migration’ ’’ 

[Weinan ‘‘shu’an’’ yi yinshuachang zhigong yin ‘‘daqianxi’’ beizhua], Caijing (Online), 16 September 10; ‘‘Tracking Down ‘Great Migration’ Printer Zhao Shun’’ [Zhuixun ‘‘daqianxi’’ 

yinshuaren zhaoshun], Voice of America (Online), 20 September 10. 49 National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Deputy Director Zhao 

Baige and Other Leaders Give Lectures at an International Research Forum on Population and 

Climate Change’’ [Zhao baige fuzhuren deng lingdao zai renkou yu qihou bianhua guoji yanxiu 

banshang zuo zhuanti yanjiang], 28 April 10; ‘‘China Says Population Controls Help Fight Climate Change,’’ Reuters (Online), 11 December 09. 

293 

50 National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ‘‘Deputy Director Zhao 

Baige and Other Leaders Give Lectures at an International Research Forum on Population and 

Climate Change’’ [Zhao baige fuzhuren deng lingdao zai renkou yu qihou bianhua guoji yanxiu 

banshang zuo zhuanti yanjiang], 28 April 10. 51See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 151. 52Ministry of Environmental Protection, First National Pollution Source Survey Report [Diyi 

ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha gongbao], 6 February 10. The ministry started the survey in December 2007 and incorporated data from 5.93 million sources. 53Ministry of Environmental Protection (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Environmental Protection: Four 

Points From Results of First National Pollution Source Survey’’ [Huanbaobu: diyi ci quanguo 

wuranyuan pucha gongzuo chengguo you si fangmian], 9 February 10; Shai Oster, ‘‘China Sees 

Vast Pollution,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 10 February 10; Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘China’s Water Pollution Level Higher Than Estimated in 2007,’’ Reuters (Online), 10 February 10. 54Ministry of Environmental Protection (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Environmental Protection: Four 

Points From Results of First National Pollution Source Survey’’ [Huanbaobu: diyi ci quanguo 

wuranyuan pucha gongzuo chengguo you si fangmian], 9 February 10. 55Zhang Ruidan, ‘‘Widest Pollution Trail Leads to Farm Fields,’’ Caixin (Online), 25 February 

10. 56Ministry of Environmental Protection, First National Pollution Source Survey Report [Diyi 

ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha gongbao], 6 February 10; Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘China’s 

Water Pollution Level Higher Than Estimated in 2007,’’ Reuters (Online), 10 February 10. 

Greenpeace campaign director Sze Pang Cheung urged the government to give the public access 

to the survey data. 57Lee Liu, Environment Magazine (Online), ‘‘Made in China: Cancer Villages,’’ March/April 

2010. See section of report titled ‘‘How Real Is the Cancer-Village Phenomenon, and Who Is 

Spreading the Word/ ’’ for more information about the various Chinese research projects examining ‘‘cancer villages.’’ 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7. The action plan states: ‘‘[u]pholding the principle 

of harmonious development between man and nature and the rational exploitation and utilization of natural resources, China will take an active part in international cooperation in an effort 

to create an environment favorable for human existence and sustainable development and build 

a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society to guarantee the public’s environmental 

rights.’’ 61 Ibid. It states ‘‘[s]pecial actions will be taken to protect public health by intensifying monitoring over and punishing enterprises that discharge pollutants against the law, and by investigating and severely punishing acts and cases of violating laws and regulations on environmental protection.’’ 62 Ibid. 63 Cui Peng, ‘‘National Audit Office: False Reports Divert 515 Million Yuan for Water Pollution Prevention’’ [Shenjishu: shui wuran fangzhi nuoyong xubao 5.15 yiyuan], People’s Daily 

(Online), 29 October 09. 64 Ibid. 65 ‘‘Main Culprit Behind Jiahe’s ‘Blood Lead Incident’ (2)’’ [Jiahe ‘‘xieqian shijian’’ beihou 

yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News (Online), 16 March 10. The news story reported that Jiahe County 

People’s Congress Standing Committee member Luo Jiangbing said some of the new enterprises 

in the county would open for operations prior to conducting an environmental impact assessment (EIA), some would not even conduct an EIA, and others would open for business without 

meeting the requirements of an EIA. 66Wang Gang et al., ‘‘Pollution in the Go: Mistakes During the Transfer of Industries’’ [Wuran 

qianzou: chanye zhuanyizhong de fazhan wuqu], in Change: Chinese Environmental Journalists 

Survey Report [Gaibian: zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao], ed. Wang Yongchen (Beijing: 

SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2007), 198–200; ‘‘Main Culprit Behind Jiahe’s ‘Blood Lead Incident’ (2)’’ [Jiahe ‘‘xieqian shijian’’ beihou yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News (Online), 16 March 10. 

During the reporting year, Lei Xiangdong, the Director of the Jiahe Environmental Protection 

Bureau in Hunan province, commented that some enterprises using antiquated equipment had 

been shut down in neighboring Guangdong province, and then moved to the poorer county of 

Jiahe. He continued by saying ‘‘everyone is developing the economy, Jiahe is backwards, it is 

not easy to get a few enterprises to move [here], it is not good to discipline them.’’ 67Ministry of Supervision (Online), ‘‘2009 Discipline Inspection and Supervision Entities Case 

Investigation and Management Work Situation Press Conference,’’ 7 January 10. 68 Cui Peng, ‘‘National Audit Office Announced ‘Three Rivers and Three Lakes’ Water Pollution Prevention and Control Achievements Audit Investigation Results,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 

29 October 09. The article noted that 515 million yuan in project funding had been misappropriated or appropriated using falsified reports; 214.3 million yuan in project funding had not 

been collected or was [on the books as being] in arrears (as waste management fees or pollution 

levies) in nine provinces, autonomous regions, or cities; and 151 million yuan in project funding 

had been misappropriated or held back (retained for one’s own use) by enterprises in 13 provinces, autonomous regions, and cities. 69 ‘‘Transparency in China: Implications for the Environment and Climate Change,’’ Staff 

Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Barbara Finamore, Senior Attorney and Director, China Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, 7. 70 Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs, 

‘‘Breaking the Ice on Open Environmental Information’’ [Huanjing xinxi gongkai jiannan 

294 

pobing], June 2010; Alex Wang, Switchboard (Online), ‘‘Assessing the State of Environmental 

Transparency in China,’’ 7 June 10. 71Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2009 Annual Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 

2009 niandu baogao], 18 March 10. Citizens requested information primarily about environmental impact assessment reports, environmental monitoring data, and environmental laws and 

regulations among other items. CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 198; Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008 Government Open Information Work Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 2008 niandu baogao], 20 

March 09. 72Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2009 Annual Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 

2009 niandu baogao], 18 March 10. 73 Ibid. Six were submitted by the same person in connection with Ministry of Environmental 

Protection matters (the ministry upheld the original decision in all six) and three in connection 

with local environmental protection bureau matters. 74 Ibid. 75 Ren Xinghui, ‘‘Explanation for the Circumstances of My Open Government Information Request Regarding Three Gorges Dam Construction Funding’’ [Wo shenqing sanxia gongcheng 

jianshe zijin xiangguan zhengfu xinxi gongkai de qingkuang shuoming], reprinted in China 

Transparency (Online), 9 December 09. He sent requests to the Ministry of Finance, the Three 

Gorges Project Construction Committee under the State Council, and the China Yangtze Three 

Gorges Project Development Corporation. 76 Ibid.; Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People’s Republic of China Regulations 

on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli 

ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 29 April 08, art. 14. 77Shai Oster, ‘‘Activists Test China’s Openness Vows,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 10 March 

10. 78Three Gorges Watch (Online), ‘‘Already Raised Appeal in Case Against Ministry of Finance 

for Non-Disclosure of Three Gorges Construction Funding Information’’ [Su caizhengbu sanxia 

jianshe zijin xinxi bu gongkai an, yitiqi shangsu], 21 April 10. 79 Ibid. 80 Cara Anna, ‘‘First Details on China Oil Spill’s Cause Emerge,’’ Associated Press, reprinted 

in Google (Online), 23 July 10. 81 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Group Says China’s Official Oil Spill Figure May Be Too Low,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 30 July 10. 82Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Sludge, Sludge, Wink, Wink: How Collusion Abets Pollution,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 27 July 10. 83 ‘‘Pollution From Copper Mine Kills Millions of Fish,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 July 

10. 84 Alex Wang, ‘‘Zijin Mining Group’s Inadequate Disclosure of China Acid Spill, What Needs 

To Be Done/ ’’ Greenlaw (Online), 24 July 10. 85Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Sludge, Sludge, Wink, Wink: How Collusion Abets Pollution,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 27 July 10. The South China Morning Post reported that because of the 

June pollution incident, approximately 200 fishermen from several nearby villages obstructed 

the gate of the county government building with two tons of dead fish on June 23, 2010, but 

as of the end of July, residents said top local authorities had not taken real action so far to 

address citizen complaints about the pollution problem. 86 Alex Wang, ‘‘The Real Significance of China’s First Environmental Group-Led Lawsuit 

Against the Government,’’ Switchboard (Online), 10 August 09; ‘‘China’s First Environmental 

Administrative Public Interest Litigation Case by a Social Organization Opens in Guiyang’’ 

[Quanguo shouli shetuan zuzhi huanjing xingzheng gongyi susongan guiyang kaishen], 3 February 09. On September 1, 2009, one hour into the trial, the All-China Environment Federation 

agreed to withdraw the case against the Qingzhen City Ministry of Land and Resources in 

Guizhou province. 87Qin Xudong, ‘‘China’s First Environmental Civil Case Ends in Mediation,’’ Caijing (Online), 

30 September 09. The All-China Environment Federation accepted a mediated settlement in its 

case against the Jiangyin Port Container Company in July 2009 in Wuyi city, Jiangsu province. 88 ‘‘Follow-Up on Jinsha River Environmental Public Interest Rights Defense Incident’’ 

[Jinshajiang huanjing gongyi weiquan shijian zhuizong], China Economic Times (Online), 27 August 09. 89 Ibid. Prior to Wu dropping his request, the Chongqing City Environmental Protection Bureau and the All-China Environment Federation consulted with Wu. 90Zhangjiajie Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Online), ‘‘National Environmental 

Petition Work: Videoconference Convenes’’ [Quanguo huanjing xinfang gongzuo, shipin huiyi 

zhaokai], 14 April 10. 91 Jinhua Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Environmental 

Protection Convenes First National Environmental Petition Work Videoconference’’ [Huanbaobu 

zhaokao di yici quanguo huanjing xinfang gongzuo shipin huiyi], 15 April 10. 92 Ibid. 93Li Jing, ‘‘Heavy Metal Pollution To Be Controlled,’’ China Daily (Online), 27 January 10. 

In January 2010, the Minister of Environmental Protection said the ministry would issue a plan 

to manage and remediate heavy metal pollution by June 2010 after review by the State Council. 

Alex Wang, ‘‘More Heavy Metal Mania: Another China Pollution Round-Up,’’ Switchboard (Online), 2 November 09; Wang Qian, ‘‘China Cracks Down on Heavy Metal Pollution,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 10 April 10. The Ministry of Environmental Protection conducted a nationwide campaign to investigate enterprises that are sources of heavy metal pollution. 

295 

94 Jinhua Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Online), ‘‘Ministry of Environmental 

Protection First National Environmental Petition Work Videoconference’’ [Huanbaobu zhaokai 

diyici quanguo huanjing xinfang gongzuo shipin huiyi], 15 April 10. 95For more information about the Wugang case, see ‘‘Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan 

Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental Accountability,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2; Michael Wines, ‘‘Lead 

Sickens 1,300 Children in China,’’ New York Times (Online), 20 August 09. 96 ‘‘Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions 

About Governmental Accountability,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 

1, 8 January 10, 2; ‘‘China Detains 15 Over Lead Protest,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Wall 

Street Journal (Online), 3 September 09; Song Shengxia, ‘‘Police Deny Arresting Parents Over 

Lead Case,’’ Global Times (Online), 4 September 09; ‘‘Parents of Poison Victims Say China Linking Them to Falun Gong,’’ CNN (Online), 3 September 09. 97For more information about the Shaanxi lead poisoning case, see ‘‘Lead Poisoning Incident 

in Shaanxi Leads to Protests, Rights Infringements Reported,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 8; Tu Chonghang, ‘‘Shaanxi Lead Poisoning Incident 

From Start to Finish’’ [Shaanxi fengxiang qian zhongdu shijianshiwei], Beijing News, reprinted 

in China Law Information Net (Online), 21 August 09. 98 Jonathan Watts, ‘‘China Defends Detention of Lead Poisoning Victims Who Sought Medical 

Help,’’ Guardian (Online), 16 March 10; ‘‘Main Culprit Behind Jiahe’s ‘Blood Lead Incident’ (2)’’ 

[Jiahe ‘‘xieqian shijian’’ beihou yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News (Online), 16 March 10. 99 Choi Chi-yuk, ‘‘Landfill at Water Source Stirs Up Unrest in Anhui,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 28 July 10; ‘‘Popular Protest Against Landfill in Shucheng County Met With Police Force’’ [Shucheng minzhong kangyi lajidui tianqu zaoyu jingcha baoli], Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 July 10; ‘‘Shucheng County, Anhui Province Residents Protest Construction of Landfill, 

Clash Between Police and Citizens Shelves Project’’ [Anhui shucheng baixing kangyi xingjian 

lajichang jingmin chongtu jihua gezhi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 July 10. 100Liu Shuduo, ‘‘Guangxi Villagers Resist Re-siting of Landfill, Six People Detained, Eight 

People’s Whereabouts Unknown’’ [Guangxi cunmin dizhi lajichang gaizhi, 6 ren beiju 8 ren 

xialuo buming], Global Times (Online), 25 July 10. 101 ‘‘Police Fire Teargas and Arrest Villagers Protesting Chosen Location for Landfill Site’’ 

[Cunmin dizhi lajichang xuanzhi jiangfang fashe cuilei waci jincun zhuaren], China Economic 

Times (Online), 26 July 10. 102 Ibid. 103PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 64. Public security officials are required to notify family members or employers of 

the reasons for and place of a person’s detention within 24 hours. 104 ‘‘Police Fire Teargas and Arrest Villagers Protesting Chosen Location for Landfill Site’’ 

[Cunmin dizhi lajichang xuanzhi jiangfang fashe cuilei wacijincun zhuaren], China Economic 

Times (Online), 26 July 10. 105 Ibid. 106Li Dewen, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘In Jiangsu Province, Wujiang City, 

Pingwang Town, Tens of Thousands Join Demonstration’’ [Jiangsu wujiang pingwanzhen 

shuwan jumin lianxu juxing kangyi shiwei], 25 October 09; ‘‘Wujiang, Jiangsu Waste Cogeneration Power Plant, a 300 Million Yuan Investment, Is Closed Because of Citizen Resistance’’ 

[Jiangsu wujiang touzi 3yi laji fadianchang yin qunzhong dizhi beijiaoting], Southern Daily (Online), 2 November 09; ‘‘Tens of Thousands of People Continuously Protest in the Streets Against 

Putting Into Operation a Waste Incineration Cogeneration Plant in Wujiang, Jiangsu’’ [Jiangsu 

wujiang laji ranshaochang touchan shuwan ren lianxu jietou kangyi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 

22 October 09. 107 ‘‘Oppose Beijing Waste Incineration, Protect Rights: Bieshu District PK Asia’s Largest Incineration Plant’’ [Beijing fan laji ranshao weiquan: bieshuchu pk yazhou zuida ranshaochang], 

Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 3 March 10; Li Jing, ‘‘Green NGO Drives Change at 

Grass Roots,’’ China Daily (Online), 20 April 10; ‘‘Officials State Beijing Already Has No Room 

To Put Garbage, Incineration Plant Construction Plan Will Not Change’’ [Guanyuan cheng beijing yi wudi mai laji ranshaochang jianshe guihua bu hui gaibian], Beijing Times (Online), 11 

May 10. One community of residents, known by the name Aobei, submitted a 25,000-word alternative proposal to authorities. 108 Chloe Lai, ‘‘Stealth Protest Over Waste Burning Takes Off,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 15 November 09; Fang Zilin, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Panyu, 

Guangdong Residents Opposed to Garbage Incinerator Construction Stage Sit-In Protest’’ 

[Guangdong panyu fandui jian laji fenshaochang de shimin kaishi jingzuo kangzheng], 23 November 09. Citizens also used other tactics such as producing t-shirts and bumper stickers and 

collecting thousands of signatures for a petition. 109 Chloe Lai, ‘‘Stealth Protest Over Waste Burning Takes Off,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 15 November 09. 110 ‘‘Guangzhou Proprietors Oppose Construction of Waste Incineration Plant in Their District’’ [Guangzhou yezhu fandui qunei jian laji ranshaochang], Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 November 09. 111 ‘‘China’s Guangzhou Suspends Incinerator Project Until Environmental Assessments OK,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 23 November 09; Ivan Zhai, ‘‘Controversial Incinerator Project on Hold,’’ South 

China Morning Post (Online), 12 December 09; ‘‘Disputed Garbage Incinerator Project Suspended in South China,’’ Xinhua (Online), 21 December 09. 112Kristine Kwok, ‘‘Tibetans Beaten During Angry Protests,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 19 May 10; ‘‘Enterprise Development Leads to Environmental Disaster Citizen Protest in 

Tibetan Areas Suppressed’’ [Qiye kaifa zhi huanjing zainan zangqu minzhong kangyi zao 

zhenya], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 May 10. 113 Ibid. 

296 

114 ‘‘Villagers Renew Mine Protests,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 May 10; ‘‘Tibetans Held 

After Protest,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 10. 115 ‘‘Tibetans Held After Protest,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 10. 116 ‘‘Thousands of Guangxi Villagers Clash With Polluting Factory, Many Detained After 

Blocking Roads and Protesting’’ [Guangxi qian cunmin chong wuranchang dulu kangyi duoren 

beiju], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 July 10. 117 Choi Chi-yuk, ‘‘How Greed Turned River Into Pea Soup and Left Village in Despair,’’ South 

China Morning Post (Online), 23 July 10. 118 ‘‘Thousands of Guangxi Villagers Clash With Polluting Factory, Many Detained After 

Blocking Roads and Protesting’’ [Guangxi qian cunmin chong wuranchang dulu kangyi duoren 

beiju], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 July 10. 119 ‘‘17 Jingxi County Rioters Arrested in Guangxi, Police Seal Village’’ [Guangxi jingxi xian 

saoluan 17 ren beibu jingcha fengcun], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 July 10. 120 ‘‘Rights Defender Xiao Qingshan Detained for Seven Days for Publicizing Environmental 

Protection’’ [Weiquan renshi xiao qingshan yin xuanchuan huanbao bei juliu qiri], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 07 April 10. 121 ‘‘Beijing Non-Governmental Environmental Protection Forum Prevented, Some Participants Summoned, Houses Searched, and Some Put Under Soft Detention’’ [Beijing minjian 

huanbao yantao bei jin zao chuanhuan chaojia ruanjin zhe zong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 

April 10. At the forum, participants were scheduled to discuss China’s drought and the role of 

non-governmental groups in addressing the problem. Gu reported that the police who questioned 

him thought that the 30 people who were involved in organizing or were possibly going to attend 

the forum could be put under surveillance, warned not to go, interrogated, or put under soft 

detention. 122 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Police Raid Home of Beijing Activist Gu 

Chuan as Pressure on Human Rights Defenders Increases,’’ 9 April 10. Authorities requested 

information about his bank account, confiscated his computers, notebooks, and other belongings, 

without producing a warrant, and interrogated him for seven hours. 123 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10. 124 ‘‘Tibetan Environmentalist Jailed for 5 Years,’’ Reuters (Online), 3 July 10. 125 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10; Cara Anna, ‘‘China Now Pressuring Tibetans Outside Politics,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! (Online), 18 June 10. 126 Robert Saiget, ‘‘China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail Treatment,’’ Agence FrancePresse (Online), 11 May 10; ‘‘Taihu Lake Defender Wu Lihong Released From Prison, Local Authorities Block People From Greeting Him’’ [Taihu weishi wu lihong chuyu dangju zuzhi 

minzhong yingjie], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 April 10; ‘‘Environmental Activist Wu Lihong 

Released, Alleges Abuse,’’ CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; 

CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 138. 127 Robert Saiget, ‘‘China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail Treatment,’’ Agence FrancePresse (Online), 11 May 10; ‘‘Environmental Activist Wu Lihong Completes Sentence, Publicly 

Requests Authorities To Restore His Reputation’’ [Huanbao renshi wulihong xingman huoshi 

gongkai yaoqiu dangju huifu mingyu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 May 10. 

Notes to Section III—Civil Society 

1 Civil society organizations in China include a range of groups, such as national mass organizations that Party authorities created and fund, smaller citizen associations registered under 

national regulations, and loose networks of unregistered grassroots organizations. The Chinese 

organizational forms that most nearly correspond to the Western concept of a non-governmental 

organization are social organizations (SOs) [shehui tuanti], non-governmental and non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs) [minban feiqiye danwei], and foundations [jijinhui]. SOs are voluntary organizations; they include academic, professional, or trade organizations, as well as voluntary associations of individuals with a common interest. NGNCEs are non-governmental service providers, including schools, hospitals, sports organizations, or employment service organizations. Foundations are non-profit and non-governmental organizations managed through the use 

of funds voluntarily donated by foreign and domestic social organizations. Foundations often 

promote the development of scientific research, culture, education, social welfare, and social 

services. The State Council issued the current national regulations governing SOs and NGNCEs 

in 1998, and those regulating foundations in 2004. The proliferation of different organizational 

forms stems in part from the fact that China has only recently concentrated on creating a comprehensive system of governance for the large number of private voluntary organizations that 

have emerged in the wake of the enormous social changes of the 1980s and 1990s. It is also 

a result of strict registration regulations that drive many civil society organizations to operate 

without government registration. 2Ministry of Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Statistics, Quarterly Report [Minzheng shiye tongji ji 

bao], 2010; see also CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 120; CECC, Topic Paper: Chinese Civil Society Organizations, 12 August 05. 3 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 204. 

4 Ibid. For more detailed definitions of civil society organizations in China, see CECC, Topic 

Paper: Chinese Civil Society Organizations, 12 August 05. 5 ‘‘How China’s NGOs Can Make a Difference,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 14 December 09; Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘China’s Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups Prompts New Fears 

Among Activists,’’ Washington Post (Online), 11 May 10. 6 China Labour Bulletin (Online), ‘‘Beijing Gives Local Governments 30 Days To Implement 

Anti-HBV Discrimination Measures,’’ 12 February 10. 7 John Carney, ‘‘Vilified Oxfam Points to Good Works in China,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 21 March 10. 

297 

8Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘China’s Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups Prompts New Fears Among 

Activists,’’ Washington Post (Online), 11 May 10; Chen Xiangyang, ‘‘The Current State and 

Challenges of Non-Governmental Organizations in China’’ [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo de 

xianzhang ji tiaojian], China Economic Times, 26 May 05. 9 Chen Xiangyang, ‘‘The Current State and Challenges of Non-Governmental Organizations in 

China’’ [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo de xianzhang ji tiaojian], China Economic Times, 26 

May 05. 10Keith B. Richburg, ‘‘China’s Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups Prompts New Fears Among 

Activists,’’ Washington Post (Online), 11 May 10. 11PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 35. 12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art 22. 13For the purposes of this section, the term ‘‘NGO’’ refers to NGOs recognized in Chinese law 

(of which the various types recognized under Chinese law are sometimes referred to collectively 

in English as civil society organizations or social organizations), as well as those not registered 

with the government, or those that operate as a legally recognized organization but are not considered an NGO according to Chinese law. 14 Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti 

dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, art. 6; Yu Fangqiang, ‘‘Challenges for 

NGOs in China,’’ Asia Catalyst (Online), 2 June 09. 15 Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti 

dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, art. 27. 16 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,’’ 14 June 05, sec. 

VI, 42–49. 17 Yu Fangqiang, ‘‘Challenges for NGOs in China,’’ Asia Catalyst (Online), 2 June 09. 18 Asia Catalyst (Online), ‘‘Restrictions on AIDS NGOs in Asia,’’ 1 December 09, 10. 19 Verna Yu, ‘‘China’s NGOs Fear for the Worst,’’ Asia Times (Online), 15 August 09. 20 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Deeply Concerned About Beijing 

Civil Organization ‘Gongmeng’ Being Unreasonably Clamped Down,’’ 17 July 09. 21 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Law Research Center Is Shut Down as Authorities Tighten Control on Civil Society Groups,’’ 17 July 09. 22 Verna Yu, ‘‘China’s NGOs Fear for the Worst,’’ Asia Times (Online), 15 August 09. 23Gillian Wong, ‘‘China AIDS Activist Flees to US After Harassment,’’ Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10. 24 ‘‘Beijing on Alert as Annual Political Session Opens,’’ Associated Press (Online), 2 March 

10. 25Gillian Wong, ‘‘China AIDS Activist Flees to US After Harassment,’’ Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10. 26 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing 23–30 March 2010,’’ 1 April 

10. 27Gillian Wong, ‘‘China AIDS Activist Flees to US After Harassment,’’ Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10. 28Peking University Department of Social Sciences (Online), ‘‘Public Announcement’’ [Gong 

gao], 25 March 10; ‘‘Rights Defense NGOs Affiliated With Peking University Suddenly Killed’’ 

[Beida xia xia weiquan NGO tu bei sha], Ming Pao (Online), 30 March 10. 29 ‘‘RFA Exclusive: Guo Jianmei Says Peking University Should Not Have Removed the Center’’ [RFA dujia: guo jianmei cheng beida che zhongxin bu ying gai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 

29 March 10. 30 ‘‘NGOs Fear Tighter State Curbs After University Cuts Links,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 30 March 10; Zhang Jieping, ‘‘Public Interest Lawyer Guo Jianmei’s NGO Faces Pressure’’ [Gongyi lushi guo jianmei NGO bei daya], Asia Week (Online), 11 April 10. 31Ministry of Education, Urgent Notice From the Party Committee of the Ministry of Education Regarding Preventing Oxfam International’s Chinese Office in Hong Kong From Recruiting ‘‘University Student Volunteers’’ via the Internet [Guanyu fangzhi xianggang le shi hui 

zhongguo fen bu tongguo hulianwang zai wo gaoxiao zhaopin daxuesheng zhiyuan zhe de jinji 

tongzhi], issued 4 February 10; Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Tells Schools To Shun Relief Agency 

Oxfam,’’ Associated Press (Online), 23 February 10; He Bei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 

(Online), ‘‘Ministry of Education Orders College Students Not To Participate in Hong Kong 

Oxfam’’ [Zhongguo jiaoyu bu leling daxuesheng bude canyu xianggang le shi hui], 23 February 

10. 32 Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Tells Schools To Shun Relief Agency Oxfam,’’ Associated Press 

(Online), 23 February 10; ‘‘Mainland Suddenly ‘Clamps Down,’ Oxfam Will Cease Training Programs’’ [Neidi tu fengsha le shi hui ting peixun], Sina (Online), 24 February 10. 33State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues Concerning the Management 

of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng 

waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10. 34 Ibid., art. 2. 35 Ibid., art. 5(1). 36 Ibid., art. 5(2). 37 Ibid., art. 5(3). 38 Ibid., art. 5(4). 39 Ibid., art. 5(3). 40Zhang Han, ‘‘NGOs Feel the Squeeze,’’ Global Times (Online), 19 May 10. 41 ‘‘Hot Topic: China Suppresses NGOs,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 May 10. 42State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues Concerning the Management 

of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng 

waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, IntroVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00303 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
298 

duction; Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China NGOs,’’ Reuters (Online), 12 March 10. 43State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues Concerning the Management 

of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng 

waihui guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, art. 8; 

Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China NGOs,’’ Reuters (Online), 12 March 10. 44 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘‘New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China NGOs,’’ Reuters 

(Online), 12 March 10. 45Meg Davis, ‘‘China’s New Nonprofit Regulations: Season of Instability,’’ Asia Catalyst (Online), 14 June 10. 46 ‘‘Government Advances Civil Society-Related Reforms in Shenzhen,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3. 47Ministry of Civil Affairs and Shenzhen Municipal Government, Cooperation Agreement on 

Pushing Forward With Integrated Reforms to Civil Affairs Undertakings [Tuijin minzheng shiye 

zonghe peitao gaige hezno xieyi], issued 20 July 09, item 11. 48Karla W. Simon, Professor, the Catholic University of America, at Lecture, ‘‘Half a Century 

of Asian Law: A Celebration of Prof. Jerome Cohen,’’ George Washington University, 20 February 10. 49Karla W. Simon, ‘‘Two Steps Forward and One Step Back—Developments in the Regulation 

of Civil Society Organization in China,’’ PowerPoint Presentation, Available at International 

Center for Civil Society Law (Online), October 2009, slide 12. 50State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(6). 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations [Shehui tuanti 

dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, art. 2. 55 Ibid., arts. 3–10. 56 Ibid., art. 4. 57Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Non-Commercial Institutions [Shiye danwei dengji guanli zhanxing tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, amended 

27 June 04, art. 2. 58 Regulations for the Management of Foundations [Jijinhui guanli tiaoli], issued 8 March 04, 

effective 1 June 04, art. 3. 59 Ibid., arts. 6–10. 60 Ibid., arts. 8(3), 20, 29. 61 Ibid., art. 6. 

Notes to Section III—Institutions of Democratic Governance 

1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 21. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76. China signed 

the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says 

it is taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint Statement of 

the 12th EU-China Summit said, ‘‘The EU welcomed China’s commitment to ratifying the 

[ICCPR] as soon as possible.’’ Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China 

Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu 

Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, ‘‘At present, 

legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 

our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.’’ Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by 

H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. In its 2009–2010 National 

Human Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese government stated that the ICCPR 

was one of the ‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the plan was framed, and that the government ‘‘will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.’’ State Council 

Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 

13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council’s 

Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record, the Chinese government supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal 

procedure law and laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with 

the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). 3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25; General 

Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of 

Equal Access to Public Service, 12 July 96. 4 Joseph Fewsmith, ‘‘Inner-Party Democracy: Development and Limitations,’’ China Leadership Monitor, No. 31, Winter 2010, 1, 9. 5 ‘‘At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches 77,995,000 Nationally’’ [Jiezhi 

2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da 7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News 

Net (Online), 28 June 10. 

299 

6 Ibid. 

7 ‘‘At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches 77,995,000 Nationally’’ [Jiezhi 

2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da 7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News 

Net (Online), 28 June 10. There are 6,629 urban street Party organizations, 34,224 town organizations, 80,000 residential committees, and 598,000 village committees. 8 Ibid. Over 99 percent of the various types of eligible enterprises have party organizations. 

9 Ibid. Of the country’s 570,000 public service organizations, 471,000 have party organizations. 

10 Ibid. The numbers here include 13,000 eligible ‘‘social organizations’’ (shehui tuanti), of 

which 12,000 have Party organizations, and 16,000 eligible ‘‘non-profit enterprises’’ (minban 

feiqiyi), of which 15,000 have Party organizations. 11 Benjamin Read, ‘‘Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips,’ ’’ 163 China Quarterly 806, 

815 (2000). During the Mao Zedong period (1949 to 1976), these committees were responsible 

for political campaigns, struggle sessions, and household registry checks, among other unpopular 

tasks. 12 Ibid., 806–808 (2000). The residents’ committees implement Party and government policies, 

such as birth control, and engage in a number of other tasks, including providing social services, 

collecting fees, and mediating disputes. They maintain close ties to police stations. Willy Lam, 

Jamestown Foundation (Online), ‘‘CCPLA: Tightening the CCP’s Rule Over Law,’’ China Brief, 

Vol. IX, No. 7, 2 April 09. The residents’ committees also help to organize citizens for security 

tasks, such as mobilizing residents in the runup to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games 

and during the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference. 13 ‘‘During Workshop of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the CPC Central 

Committee, Zhou Yongkang Stresses That We Should Earnestly Study and Carry Out the Spirit 

of the Fourth Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee and We Should Also Push Forward 

Political and Legal Work and Construction of Political and Legal Ranks With Party Construction,’’ Xinhua, 10 October 09 (Open Source Center, 10 October 09). In a speech during a workshop of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central 

Committee in October 2009, Zhou Yongkang emphasized that the Party ‘‘should focus on party 

construction’’ and ‘‘should focus on the grassroots level and steadily solve the fundamental problems in political and legal work.’’ 14 ‘‘Hu Jintao: Grasp Well Party Building Work in the Military, Raise the Scientific Standards 

of Party Building in the Military’’ [Hu jintao: zhuahao jundui dang de jianshe gongzuo tigao 

jundui dang de jianshe kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua (Online), 24 July 10. 15Li Yajie, ‘‘Xi Jinping: Under New Circumstances Comprehensively Strengthen and Improve 

Building the Party in Institutions of Higher Education’’ [Xi jinping: quanmian jiaqiang he gaijin 

xinxingshixia gaoxiaodang de jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in China Education News Net, 24 December 09; ‘‘Summary of the First National Meeting Regarding Party Construction Work in Institutes of Higher Education’’ [Di yici quanguo gaoxiao dang de jianshe gongzuo huiyi qingkuang 

gaishu], Xinhua, reprinted in Ministry of Education (Online), last visited 28 September 10. The 

Central Committee of the Communist Party increased efforts to strengthen Party construction 

in institutions of higher education in 1990, not long after the June 4, 1989, student-led 

Tiananmen protests. 16 ‘‘Chinese VP Stresses Party Building in Social Organizations,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 January 

10; Huang Xiaohua, ‘‘My Province Puts Forward This Year’s New Party Construction Goal; 

Every Social Organization Will Establish a Party Organization’’ [Wo sheng tichu jinnian 

dangjian xin mubiao suoyou shehui zuzhi douyao jianli dang zuzhi], Hainan Daily (Online), 23 

June 10. For example, the Hainan Provincial Social Organization Party Work Committee will 

require each social organization to establish some type of Party organization by the end of the 

year. 17 Hu Bi, ‘‘(Changes in Chinese ‘Way of Governance,’ Central Authorities) ‘Safeguarding Stability’: A System Quietly Takes Shape,’’ Southern Weekend, 3 March 10 (Open Source Center, 

17 March 10). 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.; ‘‘Interview With Comrade Liu Xingchen, Assistant to the Head of Kailu County, Party 

Committee Secretary of the Public Security Bureau and Director of the Public Security Bureau’’ 

[Kailuxian xianzhang zhuli, gonganju dangwei shuji, juzhang liu xingchen tongzhi], Xinhua (Online), 28 August 09. Informants in these networks try to identify troublemakers and to pinpoint 

potential social instability problems before they erupt, including problems that may lead citizens 

to take grievances to higher levels of authority. According to this article, officials in Kailu county 

in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region reportedly established a network of over 12,000 informants for a population of 400,000 citizens. The assistant to the leader of Kailu county, Liu 

Xingchen, told Xinhua that ‘‘[e]very policeman . . . no matter their division or particular police 

station, has to establish at least 20 informants in their community, village, [or] work unit . . . 

.’’ 20 ‘‘DSD Police Recruit and Maintain Informant Networks Among University Students,’’ China 

Digital Times (Online), 11 April 10. Officials at Dezhou University recruited, managed, and rewarded student security informants for valuable information and directed them to assist in carrying out the university’s security and stability work. Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Recruits Classroom Snoops To Fight Violence and Pornography,’’ Guardian (Online), 19 March 10. In 

Kunming, Yunnan province, police and education departments reportedly requested primary and 

secondary school teachers to choose students to be ‘‘little security informants’’ to collect information and report on a variety of student behaviors, amid concerns regarding school violence. 21 ‘‘Domestic Security To Remain a Challenge in 2010: Police,’’ Global Times, 29 December 09 

(Open Source Center, 29 December 09). 22 ‘‘Focus of Efforts To Maintain Stability Is Crackdown on ‘Internal Three Forces’ Involving 

Workers, Farmers, Military Personnel,’’ Ming Pao, 13 March 10 (Open Source Center, 16 March 

10). 

300 

23Tsinghua University Sociology Department Social Development Research Group, ‘‘New 

Thinking About ‘Stability,’ Systematize Interest Articulation, Realize Lasting Stability and Durable Peace’’ [‘‘Weiwen’’ xin silu: liyi biaoda zhiduhua, shixian changzhi jiuan], Southern Weekend (Online), 14 April 10. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 ‘‘Public Security Expenditures Increase Surpass Military Spending’’ [Gongan zhichu zeng 

fuchao junfei], Ming Pao, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 6 March 10. 27Tsinghua University Sociology Department Social Development Research Group, ‘‘New 

Thinking About ‘Stability,’ Systematize Interest Articulation, Realize Lasting Stability and Durable Peace’’ [‘‘Weiwen’’ xin silu: liyi biaoda zhiduhua, shixian changzhi jiuan], Southern Weekend (Online), 14 April 10. 28 Ibid. The study suggests that the use of the funds does not promote social equity and ‘‘may 

undermine overall social values, including those of morality and justice.’’ 29Shi Zhifeng and Liu Meng, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘News Flash: Liu 

Xianbin Officially Arrested’’ [Kuaixun: liu xianbin yi bei zhengshi daibu], 6 July 10; ‘‘China Detains Democracy Advocate for New Activism,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post 

(Online), 30 June 10; Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Chinese Democracy Activist Detained: 

Liu Xianbin,’’ 5 July 10. 30 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Chinese Democracy Activist Detained: Liu Xianbin,’’ 5 

July 10; ‘‘China Detains Democracy Advocate for New Activism,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in 

Washington Post (Online), 30 June 10. 31 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Democracy Activist Gets Ten Years for ‘Subversion of 

State Power,’ ’’ 16 October 09. See also the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information on Guo’s case. 32 ‘‘Guo Quan Case: Jiangsu Provincial High People’s Court Criminal Judgment’’ [Guo quan 

an: jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan xingshi caidingshu], Boxun (Online), 4 January 10. 33 ‘‘Worker Is Jailed for Joining a Party,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 11 February 

10; Dong Lei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Youth With Mental Disorder Is Tried 

on Suspicion of ‘Subverting State Power’ ’’ [Jingshenbing qingnian beiyi shexian ‘‘dianfu guojia 

zhengquan’’ shenpan], 15 December 09. See also the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China Political Prisoner Database for more information on Xue’s case. 34Dong Lei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Youth With Mental Disorder Is Tried 

on Suspicion of ‘Subverting State Power’ ’’ [Jingshenbing qingnian beiyi shexian ‘‘dianfu guojia 

zhengquan’’ panduan], 15 December 09; ‘‘Worker Is Jailed for Joining a Party,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 11 February 10. 35Zhang Zequn, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Guangdong Shaoguan Democracy Activist Luo Yongquan Ordered To Serve Two Years Reeducation Through Labor’’ 

[Guangdong shaoguan minzhu renshi lou yongquan beichu laojiao liangnian], 3 August 09. See 

also the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database for more information on Luo’s case. 36 Xu Dongmei, Research on Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo 

gongchandang dangnei minzhu yanjiu], (Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 

2004), 7. 37Deng Xiaoping, ‘‘Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Communist Party of 

China,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 16 September 56. According to Deng, ‘‘[t]he measures taken for 

the development of inner-Party democracy are not meant to weaken necessary centralization in 

the Party, but to supply it with a powerful and vigorous base.’’ Constitution of the Communist 

Party of China, as amended 21 October 07. According to the Party constitution, ‘‘Democratic 

centralism is a combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of the Party and is also the 

mass line applied in the Party’s political activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well as its members.’’ Xu Dongmei, Research on 

Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei minzhu 

yanjiu], (Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 2004), 3. Development of innerParty democracy was all but abandoned during the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), but was 

revived after 1978 when the concept of ‘‘collective leadership’’ once again became a guiding principle of the Party. 38 Joseph Fewsmith, ‘‘Inner-Party Democracy: Development and Limitations,’’ China Leadership Monitor, No. 31, Winter 2010, 1, 9. 39 Chen Xinyu, ‘‘Yibin: Gong County Establishes Public Opinion Observer System, Raises Public Trust in Candidate Selection’’ [Yibin: gongxian jianli minyi guanchayuan zhidu tigao xuanren 

yongren gongxindu], Sichuan News Net (Online), 9 June 10; Chen Xinyu, Shi Xisheng, and Liu 

Xiaofang, ‘‘Suzhou Community Resident’s Committees Commonly Elected Through Direct Elections’’ [Suzhou shequ juweihui huanjie pubian caiyong zhixuan laiyuan], Suzhou Daily, reprinted in Suzhou Hotline (Online), 9 April 10. 40 Ibid.; Hangzhou Municipality, Yuhang District, Bureau of Civil Affairs (Online), ‘‘Speech at 

the 2010 Annual Community Organization Elections Conference’’ [Zai 2010 nian shequ zuzhi 

huanjie xuanju dahuishang de jianghua], 26 April 10; Dai Candong et al., ‘‘Binjiang District 

Smoothly Completes Community Party Organization Election Work’’ [Bingjiangqu shunli 

wancheng shequ dang zuzhi huanjie xuanju gongzuo], Hangzhou Daily Net (Online), 2 June 10; 

Liu Wei, ‘‘Gongshu Promotes First Citywide Community Election Observer System’’ [Gongshu 

zai quanshi shoutui shequ huanjie xuanju guangchayuan zhidu], Hangzhou Daily (Online), 30 

May 10. Other listed eligible professions included members of the eight ‘‘approved’’ democratic 

parties, students or teachers in law and politics departments at institutes of higher education, 

and members of law firms or social organizations. Guangdong Province Civil Affairs Department, Circular Regarding Further Efforts To Improve Village (Residents’) Committee Election 

301 

Monitor Systems [Guanyu jinyibu wanshan cun (ju) weihui xuanju guanchayuan zhidu de 

tongzhi], issued 13 March 08. Earlier domestic pilot projects with election monitoring systems 

took place in Guangdong. 41State Council Information Office, White Paper on China’s Political Party System [Zhongguo 

de zhengdang zhidu baipishu], Xinhua (Online), 15 November 07, preface. 42State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(6), (8). The 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action 

Plan declared in relation to the National People’s Congress among other items, that ‘‘[t]he people’s congress system will be improved. Revisions will be made to the Election Law to improve 

the election system . . . and the close ties between the deputies and their constituencies will 

be maintained.’’ In addition, the plan states that ‘‘[t]he Law on the Supervision by the Standing 

Committees of People’s Congresses at All Levels shall be implemented to strengthen supervision 

by the people’s congresses over administrative, trial and procuratorial organs, focusing on conspicuous problems that have a bearing on the overall situation of reform, development and stability, affect social harmony or cause strong public resentment.’’ 43 Ibid., sec. 2(6)–(8). The 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan declared in relation 

to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), among other items, that 

‘‘[p]olitical consultation will be incorporated further in the decision-making procedures, and the 

effectiveness of the participation and deliberation of state affairs by personages from non-Communist parties and people with no political affiliation will be enhanced.’’ The Action Plan also 

stated that ‘‘[t]he proportions of deputies from social organizations to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at all levels will be increased.’’ In addition, the plan states that 

‘‘[t]he democratic supervision mechanism of the CPPCC will be improved, making institutional 

improvements in the links of getting information, communication and feedback to guarantee 

unblocked channels for democratic supervision and enhance the quality and efficiency of democratic supervision. Full play will be given to the role of CPPCC bills and proposals in democratic 

supervision, and government departments concerned shall handle them seriously, and give formal replies without delay.’’ 44 ‘‘Full Text: Speech on Implementation of National Human Rights Action Plan of China 

(2009–2010),’’ Xinhua, 3 December 09 (Open Source Center, 3 December 09). 45 Ibid. 46 ‘‘Next Step in Equal Rights for Urban and Rural [Areas]’’ [Chengxiang tongquan xia yibu], 

Century Weekly, reprinted in Caixin Net (Online), 15 March 10. 47 ‘‘Deyang: The Country’s First Professional People’s Congress Deputies Will Without Delay 

Take Office in Luojiang County’’ [Deyang: quanguo shouge zhuanzhi renda daibiao luojiangxian 

zou mashang ren], Sichuan People’s Net (Online), 12 July 10; Yu Jianrong, ‘‘Professional People’s Congress Deputies Is Socialist Democracy’s New Path’’ [Zhuanzhi renda daibiao shi shehui 

zhuyi minzhu de chuangxin], Oriental Morning Post (Online), 19 July 10; ‘‘Professionalization 

of People’s Congress Deputies Is the Direction of Basic Level Political Development’’ [Renda 

daibiao zhuanzhihua shi jiceng zhengzhi fazhan de fangxiang], Sichuan Daily, 30 June 10 (Open 

Source Center, 30 June 10). 48State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(6)–(8). The Human Rights Action Plan states that 

‘‘[t]he Law on the Supervision by the Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at All Levels 

shall be implemented to strengthen supervision by the people’s congresses over administrative, 

trial and procuratorial organs focusing on conspicuous problems that have a bearing on the overall situation of reform, development and stability, affect social harmony or cause strong public 

resentment.’’ 49 ‘‘Wu Bangguo: This Year NPC Will Make Inquires of State Council Ministries’’ [Wu 

bangguo: renda jinnian jiang dui guowuyuan bumen kaizhan zhixun], Southern Weekend (Online), 10 March 10. 50 Yang Tao, ‘‘ ‘Two Highs’ Reports Advance Amid ‘High Opposition Votes’ ’’ [‘‘Lianggao baogao’’ 

zai ‘‘gao fandui piao’’ zhong jinbu], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 15 March 10. 51 ‘‘National People’s Congress Closes, Total of 506 Motions Raised’’ [Quanguo renda huiyi 

bimu gongti 506 jian yi’an], Southern Weekend (Online), 14 March 10. 52Mimi Lau, ‘‘Mainland Newspapers Speak Out on Muzzling Delegates on Sensitive Issues,’’ 

South China Morning Post (Online), 08 March 10. 53PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, Preamble (‘‘Multi-party cooperation and political consultation system under the 

leadership of the Communist Party of China shall continue to exist and develop for a long time 

to come.’’). 54Guangzhou Municipal Communist Party Central Committee, Rules on Political Consultation 

(Trial Implementation) [Zhengzhi xieshang guicheng (shixing)], issued 3 September 09, arts. 3– 

6. Article 3 provides for ‘‘consultation before deciding important policies and during the implementation of those policies.’’ 55 Ibid., arts. 4, 5, 8. 56 Ibid., arts. 6, 9. 57 ‘‘Guangzhou Issues Political Consultation Regulations in New Political Reform Scheme’’ 

[Zhenggai xinyou sui chutai zhengzhi xieshang guicheng], Wen Wei Po (Online), 9 August 09. 58PRC Organic Law of the Villagers Committees, enacted and effective on 4 November 98. 

According to Article 2 of this law, village committees are ‘‘the primary mass organization of selfgovernment’’ through which ‘‘villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves and serve 

their own needs and in which election is conducted, decision adopted, administration maintained 

and supervision exercised by democratic means.’’ According to Article 3, the Party branches at 

the village level should play ‘‘the core leading role’’ [in village governance]. Article 4 states that 

the village committees ‘‘shall assist the said [township] people’s government in its work.’’ 59Mao Lei and Qin Peihua, ‘‘Organic Law of Village Committees Implementation Problems 

Need To Give Rise to Serious Attention’’ [Cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa shishizhong cunzai wenti 

302 

xu yinqi zhongshi], People’s Daily, reprinted in National People’s Congress (Online), 22 December 09. According to this report, in some villages, ‘‘organizations pay little attention to self-governance, do not support, or have delayed holding village committee elections for a long time.’’ 

In other villages, Party committees have controlled everything and not ‘‘brought elected village 

committees into play’’ and have held village representative meetings in form only. 60 Hui Ji, Zhejiang Normal University Village Research Center (Online), Research Report on 

Guizhou Province Open Government Affairs and Democratic Management ‘‘Difficult Villages’’ 

Governance Work [Dui guizhousheng cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ‘‘nandiancun’’ zhili 

gongzuo de diaoyan baogao], 11 December 09. Guizhou province reportedly had a total of 542 

‘‘difficult villages’’ with various problems. 61 Ibid. 62 ‘‘(Ministry of Civil Affairs) National Open Village Affairs and Democratic Management ‘Difficult Villages’ Governance Work Experience Exchange Conference Opens’’ [(Minzhengbu) 

quanguo cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ‘‘nandiancun’’ zhili gongzuo jingyan jiaoliuhui 

zhaokai], People’s Daily, reprinted in Wenzhou Bureau of Civil Affairs (Online), 15 December 

09. 63 Ibid. 64 Central People’s Government, Open Village Affairs and Democratic Management Difficult 

Villages Governance Work Plan (2009–2011) [Cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli nandiancun 

zhili gongzuo jihua (2009–2011)], issued 16 July 09; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Opinion Regarding 

Developing Open Village Affairs and Democratic Management ‘Difficult Villages’ Governance 

Work [Guanyu kaizhan cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ‘‘nandiancun’’ zhili gongzuo de ruogan 

yijian], issued 24 February 09. 65 ‘‘China Considers Law To Give Rural Residents More Power in Village Affairs, Elections,’’ 

Xinhua, reprinted in National People’s Congress (Online), 23 June 10; Wei Minli et al., ‘‘Guarantee Hundreds of Millions of Villagers Will Be the Masters of Their Own Affairs, Organic Law 

of Villagers’ Committees Draft Revisions To Resolve ‘Three Difficulties’ ’’ [Baozhang yiwan 

nongmin dangjiazuozhu cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa xiuding caoan pojie ‘‘sannan’’], Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09; Wang Weibo, ‘‘Strengthen Party Leadership: China’s Village Self Autonomy Facing a Change? ’’ [Wang Weibo: qianghua dang de lingdao: zhongguo de cunmin zizhi 

mianlin zhuanze?], China Newsweek, reprinted in China Elections and Governance (Online), 15 

July 10; Li Huizi and Yu Xiaojie, ‘‘Law Changes To Give Chinese Villagers Greater Say in Removing Officials,’’ Xinhua (Online), 23 December 09. 66Wei Minli et al., ‘‘Guarantee Hundreds of Millions of Villagers Will Be The Masters of Their 

Own Affairs, Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees Draft Revisions To Resolve ‘Three Difficulties’ ’’ [Baozhang yiwan nongmin dangjiazuozhu cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa xiuding caoan pojie 

‘‘sannan’’], Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09; ‘‘China Considers Law To Give Rural Residents 

More Power in Village Affairs, Elections,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in National People’s Congress (Online), 23 June 10; Li Huizi and Yu Xiaojie, ‘‘Law Changes To Give Chinese Villagers Greater 

Say in Removing Officials,’’ Xinhua (Online), 23 December 09. 67Wang Weibo, ‘‘Strengthen Party Leadership: China’s Village Self Autonomy Facing a 

Change? ’’ [Wang weibo: qianghua dang de lingdao: zhongguo de cunmin zizhi mianlin 

zhuanze?], China Newsweek, reprinted in China Elections and Governance (Online), 15 July 10. 68 Chinese Communist Party (Online), ‘‘Public Invited To Comment on Draft Revision of Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees,’’ 28 December 09. 69 Yao Lifa and Han Ye, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘ ‘Village Officials’ From 

Four Chinese Provinces Convene News Conference’’ [Zhongguo sisheng ‘cunguan’ zai beijing 

zhaokai xinwen fabuhui], 27 February 10. 70 ‘‘China To Extend Anti-Corruption Fight to Non-Public Entities,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 22 February 10. 71Transparency International (Online), ‘‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,’’ November 2009. 72Ministry of Supervision (Online), ‘‘2009 Discipline Inspection and Supervision Agencies Case 

Investigation and Management Work Situation Press Conference’’ [2009 niandu jijian jiancha 

jiguan chaban anjian gongzuo qingkuang xinwen tongqihui], 07 January 10. 73 ‘‘Chinese Lawmakers Urge Amplified Anti-Corruption Efforts To Maintain Social Stability,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 10 March 10. 74 ‘‘China Reveals Stimulus Graft,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Wall Street Journal (Online), 20 May 10. 75 Ibid. 76State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009– 

2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(8). The Human Rights Action Plan states that ‘‘[l]aws 

and regulations on the prevention and punishment of corruption will be strictly implemented, 

so will rules that require leading cadres to be clean and self-disciplined . . . . Full play will 

be given to the role of administrative supervision to resolutely stop unhealthy practices that 

hurt the fundamental interest of the public, and effective measures will be taken to deal with 

major issues that cause strong public resentment.’’ 77Dai Zhiyong, ‘‘If the People Can Learn To Compromise, Please Learn To Govern Honestly’’ 

[Ruguo minzhong neng tuoxie, qing ni xuezhe zuo qingguan], Southern Weekend (Online), 23 

September 09. In September 2009, the Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission reportedly announced that officials must disclose their personal records related to housing, investments, and the employment status of their spouse and children. He Huifeng, ‘‘Guangdong Officials To Disclose Assets—But Not to the Public,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 15 October 

09. Several provinces and cities have initiated similar asset reporting requirements for select 

categories of officials including, a city in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, cities in 

Hunan and Guangdong provinces, and the municipality of Shanghai, although in many cases 

reported information remained within the Communist Party unavailable to the public. 78 Raymond Li, ‘‘Liaison Offices Face Closure in Anti-Graft Drive,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 25 January 10; General Office of the State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening 

303 

and Standardizing Management of Local Government Liaison Offices in Beijing [Guowuyuan 

bangongting guanyu jiaqiang he guifan gedi zhengfu zhu Beijing banshi jigou guanli de yijian], 

19 January 10, sec. 2. Beijing-based liaison offices reportedly are the source of lobbying efforts 

of local and regional governments and state-run companies, and according to the South China 

Morning Post may number as high as 10,000 based on ‘‘official media reports.’’ In January 2010, 

the central government mandated that by June, county-level government ‘‘liaison offices’’ in Beijing must close, city-level offices could remain after approval of the government at the relevant 

administrative level, and provincial-level government and agency liaison offices could remain 

open. 79 ‘‘The Party Central Committee Issues Clean Government Norms [With] 52 ‘Prohibitions’ To 

Standardize Party Cadre Behavior’’ [Zhongyang banbu lianzheng zhunze 52 ‘‘buzhun’’ guifan 

dangyuan ganbu xingwei], Xinhua, reprinted in Ministry of Supervision (Online), 24 February 

10. See especially Articles 5, 7, 8; ‘‘Chinese Communist Party Issues New Ethics Code,’’ Associate Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 February 10. 80Woods Lee, ‘‘Party Website Opens To Expose Corruption,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 30 October 09. The Internet address of this particular Web site is 12388.gov.cn. 81Zhao Yang, ‘‘Supreme People’s Procuratorate: More Than 70 Percent of the Cases of WorkRelated Offenses Originate From Citizen Reports’’ [Zuigaojian: qicheng yishang zhiwu fanzui 

anjian yuanyu qunzhong jubao], Legal Daily (Online), 21 June 10. 82Du Meng, ‘‘70% of Whistleblowers Subject to Retribution, Trend Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish Scope’’ [70% jubaozhe zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu 

jieding], Legal Daily (Online), 17 June 10. 83Mandy Zuo, ‘‘Amendment To Shield Informants,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 23 

June 10. 84Du Meng, ‘‘70% of Whistleblowers Subject to Retribution, Trend Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish Scope’’ [70% jubaozhe zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu 

jieding], Legal Daily (Online), 17 June 10. 85Zou Le, ‘‘Internet Critic Vows To Zip His Mouth,’’ Global Times (Online), 11 March 10. 86 Yan Jie, ‘‘Detention Order Is Revoked,’’ China Daily (Online), 11 March 10. 87Mandy Zuo, ‘‘Amendment To Shield Informants,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 23 

June 10. 88Wang Jinbao, ‘‘Thoughts on Political Reform Behind the Training of ‘County-Level Officials,’ ’’ China News Weekly, 29 March 10 (Open Source Center, 19 April 10). Other signs include 

promotion of a personnel system that would have provincial Party committees appoint (or approve of) county-level Party committees (instead of Party committees at the next highest level), 

continuous rounds of training of county-level officials at the Communist Party School throughout 

the year, and measures promoting fiscal reform at the county level, among others. 89 Ibid. 90 ‘‘Supreme Court Requests Elimination of Localities’ ‘Local Policies’ To Resolve Difficulties 

With Bringing Administrative Lawsuits [Zuigaofa yaoqiu qingchu gedi ‘‘tuzhengce’’ jie xingzheng 

susong gaozhuang nan], Xinhua (Online), 23 May 10. 91 ‘‘ ‘Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions’ Appearance Wins Central Approval’’ [‘‘Hunan sheng xingzheng chengxu guiding’’ chutai huo zhongyang kending], China 

News (Online), 14 May 10. 92 Ibid. 93Lian Qingqing, ‘‘Guangdong Drafts Provisions on ‘Red [Letter] Head Documents,’ Effective 

Period May Not Exceed Five Years’’ [Guangdong ni guiding ‘‘hongtou wenjian’’ you xiaoqi 

zuichang 5 nian], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in Dayang Net (Online), 11 December 09. Trial 

regulations may only remain effective for two years. 94 China Transparency (Online), ‘‘Experts: Large Advances in Open Budgeting, Distance to 

Public Expectations Is Still Wide’’ [Zhuanjia: yusuan gongkai jinbu henda juli gongzhong qidai 

shanggyuan], 28 March 10. 95 ‘‘National People’s Congress Requests State Council Departments Make Budgets Public’’ 

[Quanguo renda yaoqiu gongkai guowuyuan ge bumen yusuan], People’s Daily, reprinted in 

Netease (Online), 11 March 10. 96 Jiang Yanxin, ‘‘Next Year Beijing Government Departments Will Make Budgets Completely 

Public’’ [Beijing zhengfu bumen mingnian jiang quanbu gongkai yusuan], Beijing News, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 1 June 10. 97Guo Aidi, ‘‘Budgets Made Public by Beijing Municipal Ministries and Commissions Considered Too General and Unclear’’ [Beijingshi buwei gongbu yusuan bei zhi taicu fang kanbudong], 

Beijing Times, reprinted in Phoenix (Online), 21 May 10. 98Liu Zichao, ‘‘Pushing Open the Door to Public Budgets’’ [Tuaikai gonggong yusuan zhimen], 

Southern Weekend (Online), 7 January 10. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 He Yingsi, ‘‘Guangzhou Makes Public Online the Financial Budgets of 114 Government 

Agencies’’ [Guangzhou wangshang gongkai 114 ge zhengfu bumen caizheng yusuan], Guangzhou 

Daily (Online), 23 October 09. Li Detao reported that in 2009, the Shenzhen Ministry of Finance 

allowed citizens to view its budget in its reading room. 102 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information [Zhonghua 

renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, effective 1 May 08. For more 

information, see ‘‘China Commits to ‘Open Government Information’ Effective May 1, 2008,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2. 103 Ibid. 104Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People’s Republic of China Regulations on 

Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli 

ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 29 April 08. 

304 

105State Council General Office, Opinions on Performing Well the Work of Disclosing Government Information on Request [Guanyu zuohao zhengfu xinxi yi shenqing gongkai gongzuo de 

yijian], issued 12 January 10, art. 1. 106 Ibid., arts. 2 (scope of government information), 3 (handling a request affecting multiple 

agencies), 5 (increasing disclosure to decrease volume of requests), 6 (improve services), and 7 

(secrecy of information). 107Supreme People’s Court, Measures on Several Issues Concerning Adjudication of Administrative Cases Involving Open Government Information (Public Comment Draft) [Guanyu shenli 

zhengfu xinxi gongkai xingzheng anjian ruogan de guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)], released 3 November 09. 108Wang Doudou, ‘‘Open Government Information Judicial Interpretation Solicits 411 Suggestions’’ [Zhengfu xinxi gongkai sifa jieshi zhengqiu yijian 411 tiao], China Court Network (Online), 3 March 10. 109Wang Doudou, ‘‘Supreme Court States Open Information Scope Will Not ‘Shrink’ ’’ [Zuigao 

fayuan cheng xinxi gongkai fanwei buhui ‘‘suoshui’’], Legal Daily, reprinted in China Court Network (Online), 3 March 10. 110Supreme People’s Court, Opinion Regarding the Protection of Plaintiffs Right To Sue in 

Administrative Litigation Cases [Guanyu yifa baohu xingzheng susong dangshiren suquan de 

yijian], issued 11 November 09, art. 3. 111 Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ‘‘Update on China’s Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,’’ 23 

April 10. According to this report, ‘‘Substantial challenges continue to frustrate realization of 

the Chinese people’s ‘right to know,’ ’’ including conflicts with China’s state secrets laws, and 

‘‘[w]hat was less predictable was the dynamism of the Chinese people’s response to this new 

channel for interacting with their government, evidence of the increasing awareness of their 

rights and interests as citizens and taxpayers . . . .’’ 112 Beijing officials reported receiving 6,889 OGI requests in 2009. Beijing Municipal People’s 

Government 2009 Open Government Information Work Annual Report [Beijing shi renmin 

zhengfu 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC Central People’s Government (Online), 6 April 10, 9. Shanghai officials reported receiving 11,773 OGI requests in 

2009. 2009 Shanghai Open Government Information Work Annual Report [2009 Shanghai 

zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (Online), March 2010, 11. Guangzhou officials reported receiving 798,279 OGI requests in 2009. 

Guangzhou Municipality 2009 Open Government Information Work Annual Report [Guangzhou 

shi 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Guangzhou Municipal People’s 

Government (Online), 25 March 10. The figures from the three Open Government Information 

reports included above are inclusive of the requests reportedly received by municipal-level government agencies as well as the requests received by district and county administrative areas 

within the municipality. Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ‘‘Update on China’s Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,’’ 23 April 10. Guangzhou was the first municipality to adopt Open Government Information provisions. 113Liu Zichao, ‘‘Pushing Open the Door to Public Budgets’’ [Tuaikai gonggong yusuan 

zhimen], Southern Weekend (Online), 7 January 10. 114 ‘‘Tearing Down Your House, It Has Nothing to Do With You? ’’ [Chai ni fangzi, yu ni 

wuguan?], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 23 June 10. 115 Alexa Olesen, ‘‘China Activist Demands Quake Recovery Budget Info,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 3 March 10. 116 Huang Yijun, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Lawyer Yan Yiming Seeks the 

Whereabouts of 40 Billion Yuan Ahead of the ‘Two Sessions’ ’’ [Yan yiming lushi ‘‘lianghui’’ qian 

zai zhui 4 wanyi touzi quxiang], 25 February 10. 117 Han Haikuo and Li Hailing, ‘‘Yunnan Province Administrative Transparency Score 0, Response: Relevant Departments Did Not Respond’’ [Yunnan xingzheng toumingdu de 0 fen, 

huiying: xiangguan bumen dou mei huihan], China News Net, reprinted in Legal Daily (Online), 

18 June 10; Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ‘‘Update on China’s Open 

Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,’’ 23 April 10; Center for Public Participation Studies and Support, Annual Watch Report 

on China’s Administrative Transparency—2008 (Abridged Version) [Zhongguo xingzheng 

toumingdu niandu guancha baogao—2008 niandu (jieben)], 2 April 10; Suzanne Piotrowski et 

al., ‘‘Key Issues for Implementation of Chinese Open Government Information Regulations,’’ 69 

Public Administration Review, Issue 1, 129, 133 (2010). 118 Center for Public Participation Studies and Support, Annual Watch Report on China’s Administrative Transparency—2008 (Abridged Version) [Zhongguo xingzheng toumingdu niandu 

guancha baogao—2008 niandu (jieben)], 2 April 10; Suzanne Piotrowski et al., ‘‘Key Issues for 

Implementation of Chinese Open Government Information Regulations,’’ 69 Public Administration Review, Issue 1, 129, 133 (2010). 119 Ibid. 120 Beijing Municipal People’s Government 2009 Open Government Information Work Annual 

Report [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], 

PRC Central People’s Government (Online), 6 April 10, 11; 2009 Shanghai Open Government 

Information Work Annual Report [2009 Shanghai zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu 

baogao], Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (Online), March 2010, 13; Guangzhou Municipality 2009 Open Government Information Work Annual Report [Guangzhou shi 2009 nian 

zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Guangzhou Municipal People’s Government (Online), 25 March 10; Chongqing Municipal People’s Government 2009 Open Government Information Work Annual Report [Chongqing shi renmin zhengfu 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai 

gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC Central People’s Government (Online), 6 April 10. 

305 

121 2009 Shanghai Open Government Information Work Annual Report [2009 Shanghai 

zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (Online), March 2010, 13. 122 Ibid.; Beijing Municipal People’s Government 2009 Open Government Information Work 

Annual Report [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu 

baogao], PRC Central People’s Government (Online), 6 April 10, 11. 123 Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ‘‘Update on China’s Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,’’ 23 

April 10. 124Kong Lingquan, ‘‘Lawyer Requests Information Disclosure From 80 Provincial and City 

Governments, Receives Cold Response’’ [Lushi xiang 80 ge sheng shi zhengfu shenqing xinxi 

gongkai jiedao lengdan huifu], Democracy & Law, reprinted in Jin Yang Net (Online), 19 June 

10. 125Li Yizhong, ‘‘Wuhan Municipality’s First Open Government Information Case Concludes, 

Illegal Administrative Action Affirmed’’ [Wuhan shouli zhengfu xinxi gongkai an shenjie queren 

xingzheng xingwei weifa], Changjiang Daily, reprinted in Eastday (Online), 30 January 10. 126 ‘‘Beijing Resident Sues Environmental Protection Bureau for Illegal Approval, Loses Lawsuit’’ [Beijing jumin gao huanbao ju weigui shenpi baisu], Jinghua Times, reprinted in Sina (Online), 22 May 10. 127Li Li, ‘‘Outline of Achievements of 6-Year ‘Open Door Legislation’ Issued, State Council Solicited Public Comments on 67 Administrative Regulations’’ [Gangyao banbu 6 nian ‘‘kaimen 

lifa’’ cheng changtai guowuyuan yi dui 67 jian xingzheng fagui gongkai zhengqiu yijian], Legal 

Daily (Online), 25 March 10. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 U.S.-China Business Council (Online), ‘‘PRC Transparency Tracking,’’ updated April 2010. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 For more information about public hearing topics in China, see Section III—Institutions 

of Democratic Governance in CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 208–216; Peng 

Zongchao et al., Public Hearing Systems in China: Transparent Policymaking and Public Governance [Tingzheng zhidu: touming juece yu gonggong zhili], (Beijing: Tsinghua University 

Press, 2004), 3, 5. According to Article 42 of the PRC Law on Administrative Punishment, a 

qualified party may request a public hearing regarding orders to stop production, revocation of 

permits or licenses, and administrative fines. PRC Law on Administrative Punishment, enacted 

17 March 96, effective 1 October 96, art. 42. In the late 1990s and in the current decade, public 

hearing systems have been added to a variety of other administrative, legislative, and judicial 

laws and regulations. By the end of 2004, nearly one-third of China’s provinces, cities, and district courts established a public hearing system in state compensation cases. ‘‘Public Hearings: 

Driving Engine of Democracy in China,’’ Xinhua (Online), 5 October 06. One Chinese scholar 

remarked that ‘‘people are more willing to cooperate with the authorities in implementation of 

public policy if they can contribute to the policy-making process.’’ Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Chinese Lawyer Challenges Filtering Software Order and Requests Public Hearing,’’ 15 

June 09; State Council, Decision Regarding Strengthening Municipal and County Government 

Law-Based Administration [Guanyu jiaqiang shixian zhengfu yifa xingzheng de jueding], issued 

18 June 08. The State Council directive states that government agencies may ‘‘hold hearings 

for issues subject to examination and approval which concern the major public interests or the 

vital interests of the people.’’ Colin Knox and Zhang Qun, ‘‘Building Public Service-Oriented 

Government in China,’’ 20 International Journal of Public Sector Management, No. 5, 449, 449– 

464 (2007). One finding of this study is that in the case observed, the decisionmaking process 

was not ‘‘improved’’ by the hearing process because of the lack of valuable debate. 134 Yangjiang Municipal Development and Reform Commission, Yangjiang Municipal People’s 

Government Administrative Policy Procedure Provisions [Yangjiangshi renmin zhengfu 

xingzheng juece chengxu guiding], issued 8 February 10; Huangshan Municipal Government, 

Important Administrative Policy Procedure Provisions [Zhongda xingzheng juece chengxu guiding], issued 16 December 09; Suzhou Municipal Government Legislative Affairs Office (Online), 

‘‘Analysis of ‘Suzhou Municipal People’s Government Key Administrative Policy Procedure Provision’ ’’ [‘‘Suzhoushi renmin zhengfu zhongda xingzheng juece chengxu guiding’’ jiedu], 21 February 10. 135 Chen Fei, ‘‘China Will Pursue Public Hearing Systems for Major Administrative Policies 

at Both Municipal and County Levels’’ [Zhongguo zai shixian liangji zhengfu tuixing zhongda 

xingzheng juece tingzheng zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 18 June 08; State Council, Decision Regarding Strengthening Municipal and County Government Law-Based Administration [Guanyu 

jiaqiang shixian zhengfu yifa xingzheng de jueding], issued 18 June 08. 136 ‘‘Outlandish Situations at Water Hearings Around the Country Productions Just for Show 

Are Incessant, [Lead to] Calls for Accountability System’’ [Gedi shuijia tingzhenghui guaizhuang 

buduan zaojiafeng huyu wenze jizhi], China News Net, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 December 09; Guo Wenjing, ‘‘Put in Place: There Is a Demand for the Appearance of Justice but an 

Even Greater Demand for Substantive Justice’’ [Chutai: yao xingshi zhengyi gengyao shizhi 

zhengyi], Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09; ‘‘Beijing Denies Public Hearings Just for Show,’’ 

South China Morning Post (Online), 9 January 10. 137 Ibid. 138Wang Jingbo, ‘‘Professor Says Public Hearings Have Little Meaning as Government Holds 

Them After Policies Are Decided’’ [Jiaoshou cheng zhengfu juece hou zai juxing tingzhenghui 

yiyi buda], People’s Daily (Online), 28 December 09. 

306 

Notes to Section III—Commercial Rule of Law 

1 A complete and up-to-date compilation of information on China’s participation in the World 

Trade Organization (WTO), including principal accession documents (Working Party Report, 

Protocol of Accession, General Council decision), schedules, trade policy reviews, and dispute 

case documents can be found on the WTO Web site, at www.wto.org. 2World Trade Organization (Online), ‘‘Understanding the WTO: Basics, Principles of the Trading System,’’ last visited 27 September 10. 3World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/ 

L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C). 4 ‘‘U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy Review,’’ China Trade 

Extra (Online), 7 June 10. For Chinese trade statistics, see Ministry of Commerce (Online), ‘‘Top 

Ten Trading Partners (2008/10),’’ 12 January 08. 5 ‘‘U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy Review,’’ China Trade 

Extra (Online), 7 June 10. For additional reports of protectionism, see Paul Mooney, ‘‘Hurdles 

Get Higher for Foreign Firms,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 16 May 10; Keith Bradsher, 

‘‘Foreign Companies Chafe at China’s Restrictions,’’ New York Times (Online), 16 May 10; ‘‘Shift 

Underway in U.S. Corporate Attitudes Toward Chinese Economic Policies,’’ China Trade Extra 

(Online), 17 March 10; Andrew Browne, ‘‘U.S. Businesses Wary About Protectionism in China,’’ 

Wall Street Journal (Online), 26 April 10. 6 ‘‘U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy Review,’’ China Trade 

Extra (Online), 2 June 10. 7 AmCham-China, American Business in China 2010 White Paper, 2010, 26–27. 

8 Ibid., 27–28. 

9 ‘‘U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy Review,’’ China Trade 

Extra (Online), 2 June 10. 10World Trade Organization, DS340, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 

Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/ 

R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 

July 08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/ 

R, 15 December 08. 11For discussions of industrial policies in China, see Alexandra Harney, ‘‘Where’s the Chinese 

Toyota? ’’ Foreign Policy (Online), 8 December 09; China’s Industrial Policy and Its Impact on 

U.S. Companies, Workers and the American Economy, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission, 24 March 09, Testimony of Alan Wm. Wolff, Partner, Dewey & 

LeBoeuf, Washington, DC. 12World Trade Organization, DS340, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 

Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/ 

R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 

July 08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/ 

R, 15 December 08. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 160. 13World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/ 

L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C)2. For information on the WTO principle of transparency, 

see World Trade Organization (Online), ‘‘Evolving Trade Increases Need for ‘Active Transparency,’ Lamy Tells Lawyers,’’ 22 October 07; World Trade Organization (Online), ‘‘Principles 

of the Trading System,’’ last visited 27 September 10. 14 ‘‘China Adopts Plan To Promote Cultural Industry,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 23 July 09. For background information on China’s cultural industrial policy, see Guan 

Ping Hing, Hao Wei, and Xi Wang, ‘‘Culture Industry Policy in China and the United States: 

A Comparative Analysis,’’ Dissertations, Theses and Capstone Projects, Kennesaw State University, Paper 18 (2009). 15PRC Central People’s Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate the Cultural Industry 

[Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 September 09. 16 Ibid., sec. 1, art. 3, para. 1. 17PRC Central People’s Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate the Cultural Industry 

[Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 September 09. 18World Trade Organization, DS363, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Report of the 

Panel, WT/DS363/R, 12 August 09. 19 Ibid. See also Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 09. See also 

‘‘WTO Rules Against Chinese Trade Restrictions on Books, DVDs, Music, and Films,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 4. 20Ministry of Culture, Guiding Opinion Concerning Speeding Up Development of the Cultural 

Industry [Jiakuai wenhua chanye fazhande zhidau yijian], issued 10 September 09. 21PRC Central People’s Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate the Cultural Industry 

[Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 September 09, sec. 4, arts. 4–5. 22Li Yanzheng, ‘‘10 Billion Cultural Industry Investment Fund To Be Launched Soon’’ [Bai 

yi wenhua chanye touzi jijin jijiang tuichu], Shanghai Securities News (Online), 26 September 

09; ‘‘Central Propaganda Department: China Film Recommended for Listing After Restructuring’’ [Zhongxuanbu cheng wenqi gaizhi hou tuijian shangshi zhongdian tui zhongying jituan], 

Oriental Morning Post, reprinted in Phoenix Net (Online), 29 September 09; Zhu Yin, Zhou 

Songlin, and Chen Guang, ‘‘Cultural Enterprises To Speed Up Entering Capital Market’’ 

[Wenhua qiye yu jiasu maixiang ziben shichang], China Securities Journal (Online), 30 March 

10. 23Zhu Yin, Zhou Zonglin, and Chen Guang, ‘‘Cultural Enterprises To Speed Up Entering Capital Market’’ [Wenhua qiye yu jiasu maixiang ziben shichang], China Securities Journal (Online), 30 March 10. 

307 

24Wang Ziyu and Cao Zhen, ‘‘China Cultivates Culture—by Raising Cash,’’ Caixin (Online), 

28 April 10; ‘‘Cultural Industries To Get More Financial Support,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Daily (Online), 8 April 10. 25PRC Central People’s Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate the Cultural Industry 

[Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 September 09, sec. 2, art. 2. 26 ‘‘13 Printing and Reproduction Enterprises Becoming Major Culture Export Enterprises’’ [13 

jia yinshua yuzhi qiye chengwei wenhua chukou zhongdian qiye], China Print Net (Online), 25 

November 09. 27 ‘‘General Administration of Press and Publication Issues Guiding Opinions for the Establishment of Five Key Tasks, Cultivating Six or Seven Enterprises That Surpass 10 Billion Yuan 

in Sales in Five Years’’ [Xinwen chuban chanye fazhan zhidao yijian chutai wu da renwu 

queding wu nian peiyu liu qi jia zichan guo bai yi qiye], Xinhua, reprinted in Legal Daily (Online), 5 January 10. 28 ‘‘China Establishes First Batch of Animation Enterprises, Five Tax Reductions and Exemptions To Support Innovation’’ [Quanguo rending shoupi dongman qiye wu zhong shuishou 

jianmian zhichi yuanchuang], National Business Daily (Online), 8 January 10. 29 ‘‘General Office of State Council Encourages Financial Institutions To Raise Support for 

Film Enterprises’’ [Guoban: guli jinrong jigou jiada dui dianying qiye de zhichi lidu], China 

News Net (Online), 25 January 10; State Council General Office, Guiding Opinion on Promoting 

the Development of a Flourishing Movie Industry [Guanyu cujin dianying chanye fanrong 

fazhan de zhidao yijian], issued 21 January 10. 30 Chen Fang, ‘‘General Administration of Press and Publication To Work Out International 

Best Seller Plan’’ [Zhongguo xinwen chuban zongshu jiang zhiding guoji changxiao shu jihua], 

China Net, reprinted in General Administration of Press and Publications (Online), 26 March 

10. 31See, e.g., Clarence Tsui, ‘‘Chinese Filmmakers Are Struggling To Have Their Documentaries 

Shown on the Mainland—Where It Counts,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 18 June 10; 

Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ‘‘Attacks on the Press 2009: China,’’ 16 February 10. 32Ministry of Culture General Office Circular Concerning Carrying Out Special Governing Action in the Cultural Market During the 2010 New Year and Spring Festival Period [Wenhuabu 

bangongting guanyu kaizhan 2010 nian yuandan, chunjie qijian wenhua shichang zhuanxiang 

zhengzhi xingdong de tongzhi], issued 4 December 09; ‘‘Ministry of Culture To Carry Out Special 

Governing Action in Cultural Markets’’ [Wenhuabu jiang kaizhan wenhua shichang zhuanxiang 

zhengzhi xingdong], China Cultural Industries (Online), 18 December 09. 33Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform 

Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce 

(xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 September 09; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission, Order No. 10 [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo ye he xinxi bu he zhonghua 

renmin gonghe guo guojia fagai ge weiyuanhui ling di 10 hao], issued 15 August 09, effective 

1 September 09; PRC Central People’s Government, Auto Industry Restructuring and Promotion 

Plan [Qiche chanye tiaozheng he zhenxing guihua], 20 March 09. See also ‘‘China Revises 2004 

Auto Policy,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3; 

‘‘China Issues Auto Stimulus Program To Boost the Auto Sector,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3–4. 34Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform 

Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce 

(xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 September 09; For a discussion of the policy, see ‘‘China Revises 2004 Auto Policy,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3. 35Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform 

Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce 

(xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 September 09; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission, Order No. 10 [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo ye he xinxi bu he zhonghua 

renmin gonghe guo guojia fagai ge weiyuanhui ling di 10 hao], issued 15 August 09, effective 

1 September 09. For a discussion of the policy, see ‘‘China Revises 2004 Auto Policy,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3. 36World Trade Organization, DS340, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 

Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/ 

R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 

July 08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/ 

R, 15 December 08. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Despite Trade Rulings, Beijing Gains From Delay Tactics,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 30 August 09. 41See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy, National Development and Reform Commission Order No. 8 [Qiche chanye fazhan 

zhengce, zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuan hui ling di 8 ce], 21 May 

04, art. 7. 42 Nelson D. Schwartz, ‘‘Chinese Company Buys Rights To Make Old Saab Models,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 14 December 09. 43 Norihiko Shirouzu, ‘‘China’s Geely Lines Up Bank Loans for Volvo Bid,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 1 December 09; ‘‘China’s Geely To Put $900 Million More Into Volvo,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in New York Times (Online), 30 March 10; Li Fangfang, ‘‘Geely Buys Volvo in Biggest 

Overseas Foray,’’ China Daily (Online), 29 March 10. 

308 

44World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/ 

L/432, 10 November 2001, Part I, 2(C). 45 United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 

Trade Barriers: China, 2010. 46 Ibid. 47 US-China Business Council (Online), ‘‘PRC Transparency Tracking,’’ April 2010. 48See, e.g., US-China Business Council (Online), China’s JCCT Commitments, 2004–09, May 

2009. 49 United States Trade Representative (Online), ‘‘U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce 

and Trade Fact Sheet,’’ 2009. 50Ministry of Finance (Online), ‘‘Advance the Standards and Perfect the Government Procurement System’’ [Jinyibu guifan he wanshan zhengfu caigou zhidu], 7 May 10. 51World Trade Organization (Online), ‘‘General Overview of WTO Work on Government Procurement,’’ last visited 27 September 10. 52World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China WT/ACC/ 

CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 337–341. 53 United States Trade Representative (Online), ‘‘U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce 

and Trade Fact Sheet,’’ 2009. 54PRC Government Procurement Law, enacted 29 June 02, effective 1 January 03; State 

Council Legislative Affairs Office, PRC Government Procurement Law Implementing Rules 

(Comment Draft) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu caigou fa shishi tiaoli (zhengqiu yijian 

gao)], 11 January 10. For an English translation, see ‘‘Implementation Rules for Government 

Procurement Law of the People’s Republic of China,’’ China Law Professors Blog (Online), 24 

January 10. 55 Yu Ran, ‘‘Govt Purchasing Laws To Tighten,’’ China Daily (Online), 20 January 10. 56Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, 

and General Administration of Customs, Notice on Collecting Public Comments on Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Domestically-Made Products (Comment Draft) 

[Guanyu zhengfu caigou benguo chanpin guanli banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao) gongkai zhengqiu 

yijian de gongao], 21 May 10. 57For additional information, see US-China Business Council (Online), ‘‘US-China Business 

Council Comments on Draft Implementing Regulations on the PRC Government Procurement 

Law,’’ February 2010. 58See, e.g., Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and 

Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan 

zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 

1 September 09, arts. 7–12. 59 ‘‘Currency, Indigenous Innovation To Top U.S. Economic Agenda for S&ED,’’ China Trade 

Extra (Online), 5 May 10; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘China Modifies Government Procurement Policies, 

but Foreign Concerns Remain,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 19 April 10; ‘‘Industry Comments 

on the Draft Notice Launching the National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work 

for 2010,’’ China Trade Extra (Online), 10 May 10. 60See, e.g., Circular of the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China on Printing 

and Distributing the Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of Import 

Products, reprinted in Invest in China (Online), issued 27 December 07. 61Ministry of Science and Technology, National Development and Reform Commission, and 

Ministry of Finance, Circular Concerning Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation Products Accreditation Work [Kaizhan 2009 nian guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin rending gongzuo 

de tongzhi], issued 30 October 09. 62 Ibid. Article 4 of the National Indigenous Innovation Products Application Instructions 

(2009) [Guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin shenbao shuoming (2009 niandu)], appended to the Circular, provides that, in order to qualify for certain preferences in government procurement, covered products (1) must be produced by an enterprise in China that owns the intellectual property; (2) be covered by a trademark that was first registered in China by a Chinese company; 

(3) be innovative and internationally competitive; and (4) meet Chinese technical standards. 63Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Finance, and State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Catalogue Guiding Domestic Innovation in Major Technology Equipment [Zhong da jishu zhuangbei 

zizhu chuangxin zhidao mulu], issued 25 December 09; ‘‘Chinese Agencies Lay Out New Policies 

To Favor ‘Indigenous Innovation,’ ’’ China Trade Extra (Online), 6 January 10. 64 ‘‘China Defends Innovation Policy, but U.S. Industry Wants Overhaul,’’ China Trade Extra 

(Online), 3 March 10. 65See, e.g., ‘‘China Defends Innovation Policy, but U.S. Industry Wants Overhaul,’’ China 

Trade Extra (Online), 3 March 10. 66Ministry of Science and Technology, National Development and Reform Commission, and 

Ministry of Finance Announcement of Open Solicitation of Comments on ‘‘Circular Regarding 

Launch of the National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010 (Comment 

Solicitation Draft)’’ [Kejibu, fazhangaige wei he caizhengbu gongkai zhengqiu dui ‘‘guanyu 

kaizhan 2010 nian guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin rending gongzuode tongzhi (zhengqiu yijian 

gao) yijiande gonggao], issued 10 April 10. 67Stanley Lubman, ‘‘China Modifies Government Procurement Policies, but Foreign Concerns 

Remain,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 19 April 10. 68 ‘‘Industry Comments on the Draft Notice Launching the National Indigenous Innovation 

Product Accreditation Work for 2010,’’ China Trade Extra (Online), 10 May 10. 69 United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, 30 April 10, 19. 70 Ibid. 71Decision of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee Regarding Amendments to 

the PRC Patent Law [Renda changweihui guanyu xiugai ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo 

309 

zhuanlifa’’ de jueding], adopted 27 December 08, effective 1 October 09; State Council Decision 

Concerning the ‘‘Amendment of the PRC Patent Law Implementing Rules’’ [Guowuyuan guanyu 

xiugai ‘‘zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhuanlifa shishi xize’’ de jueding], adopted 30 December 

09, issued 9 January 10, effective 1 February 10. 72 United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, 30 April 10, 22. 73PRC Copyright Law, enacted 7 September 90, effective 1 June 91, amended 27 October 01 

and 26 February 10, art. 5. See also Gao Yu, ‘‘Slow Death for China’s Copyright Controversy: 

A WTO Ruling Targeting China’s Copyright Protection System Sounded the Death Knell for a 

Long-Criticized Legal Loophole,’’ Caixin (Online), 4 March 10. 74 National Copyright Administration, Measures for Registration of Copyright Pledges (Comment Draft) [Zhuzuoquan zhiquan dengji banfa (zhengqiu yijian gao)], Xinhua (Online), 26 April 

10. 75Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases (2009) (Abstract) 

[Zuigao renmin fayuan zhishi chanquan anjian niandu baogao (2009) (zhai yao)], 22 April 10, 

reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), May 2010. 76Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases (2009) [Zuigao 

renmin fayuan zhishi chanquan anjian niandu baogao (2009)], 26 April 10. 77Kathrin Hille, ‘‘Chinese Court Rules Against Microsoft in IPR Case,’’ Financial Times (Online), 17 November 09. 78 ‘‘Microsoft Wins Software Piracy Lawsuit in China,’’ Global Times (Online), 23 April 10. 79Loretta Chao, ‘‘China Company Plans To Appeal Microsoft Decision,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 23 April 10. 80Ministry of Commerce, Measures Regarding the Declaration of Concentration of Business 

Operators [Jingying zhe ji zhong shen bao banfa], adopted 15 July 09, issued 21 November 09, 

effective 1 January 10; Ministry of Commerce, Measures Regarding Investigations Into Concentrations of Business Operators [Jingying zhe ji zhong shencha banfa], adopted 15 July 09, 

issued 24 November 09, effective 1 January 10. 81State Administration for Industry and Commerce (Online), ‘‘Online Request for Comments 

on a Set of Three ‘Measures of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on Preventing Monopolistic Agreements or Conduct’ Implementing the Antimonopoly Law’’ 

[Wangshang zhengqiu yijian: ‘‘gongshang xingzheng guanli jiguan jinzhi longduan xieyi 

xingweide guiding’’ deng sange fanlongduan fa peitao guizhang], 25 May 10. 82Sundeep Tucker and Patti Waldmeir, ‘‘The People’s Police,’’ Financial Times (Online), 29 

November 09. See also Ministry of Commerce, Decision Concerning Conditional Approval in 

Antimonopoly Investigation of American Automaker GM’s Acquisition of Delphi [Guanyu fu 

tiaojian pizhun meiguo tongyong qiche gongsi shougou de’erfu gongsi fanlongduan shencha 

jueding], 28 September 09; ‘‘Anti-Monopoly Ministry Tells Panasonic To Divest Overseas Assets,’’ China Law & Practice (Online), 10 November 09; ‘‘China’s MOC Sets Conditions on GMDelphi Deal,’’ Xinhua (Online), 28 September 09. 83 Julia Kong, ‘‘China’s Merger Review System Evolves,’’ China Business Review, May–June 

10, 38; Ministry of Commerce, Decision Concerning an Antimonopoly Law Investigation Decision 

on Conditional Approval of Novartis’s Acquisition of Alcon Laboratories [Guanyu futiaojian 

pizhun nuo hua gufen gongsi shougou ai’erkang gongsi fanlongduan shencha jueding], issued 13 

August 10. 84Sundeep Tucker and Patti Waldmeir, ‘‘The People’s Police,’’ Financial Times (Online), 29 

November 09. 85 85 Wentong Zheng, ‘‘China’s Antimonopoly Law—One Year Down: Part 6. Bigger Is Better? 

Tensions Between Industrial Policy and Antitrust in China,’’ Law Professor Blogs Network, 

Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, 11 January 10. See also Automobile Industry Development 

Policy (Revised), which calls for the development of large auto enterprise groups, and the 2009 

Program for the Adjustment and Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry, which calls for the formation of two to three large auto groups and four to five smaller ones through a process of takeovers and reorganization. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche 

chanye fazhan zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 

09, effective 1 September 09; State Council General Office, Program for the Adjustment and Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry [Qiche chanye tiaozheng he zhenxing guihua], 20 March 09. 86Zhan Hao, ‘‘The PRC Anti-Monopoly Law: One Year On,’’ China Law & Practice (Online), 

September 2009. 87For a discussion of the Food Safety Law and its implementing legislation, see CECC, 2009 

Annual Report, 10 October 09, 222–23. 88 ‘‘China Holds a Public Hearing on ‘Administrative Regulations on Supervision of Food Additive Production’ ’’ [Zhongguo tingzheng ‘‘shipin tianjiaji shengchan jiandu guanli guiding’’], China 

News Service (Online), 23 January 10; Ministry of Health, Administrative Measures on New 

Types of Food Additives [Shipin tianjiaji xin pinzhong guanli banfa], adopted 15 March 10, 

issued and effective 30 March 10; Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry and Information 

Technology, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and State Food and Drug Administration, Administrative Regulations of Risk Monitoring of Food Safety (Trial) [Shipin anquan fengxian jiance 

guanli guiding (shixing)], issued and effective 11 February 10; ‘‘State Food and Drug Administration Issues Implementing Plan on Rectification in Catering Service Food Safety in 2010’’ 

[Guojia yaojianju fabu ‘‘2010 nian shiyin fuwu shipin anquan zhengduan gongzuo shishi fang’an’’ 

mingque jinnian zhengduan renwu quebao yinshi anquan], Legal Daily (Online), 22 March 10; 

State Council Circular Regarding the Establishment of the Food Safety Commission of the State 

Council [Guowuyuan guanyu sheli guowuyuan shipin anquan weiyuanhui de tongzhi], issued 6 

February 10; ‘‘State Council To Set Up Food Safety Commission: Li Keqiang Named Director’’ 

[Guowuyuan sheli shipin anquan weiyuanhue li keqiang churen zhuren], China News Service 

(Online), 9 February 10. 

310 

89 ‘‘The Hidden Dangers Within China’s Food Safety’’ [Zhongguo shipin anquan you yinhuan], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 April 10. 90 Ibid. 91 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 221. 92 ‘‘Rights Defender Zhao Lianhai Wears Fetters to Court as Tainted Milk Victim Becomes Defendant’’ [Zhao lianhai weiquan dai jiaoliao chuting du naifen shouhaizhe cheng beigao], Radio 

Free Asia (Online), 30 March 10; ‘‘Tainted Milk Activist Goes on Trial in China,’’ Associated 

Press (Online), 30 March 10. 93Wang Duan, ‘‘Tainted Milk Victims Take Fight to Hong Kong,’’ Caixin (Online), 6 May 10; 

‘‘Sanlu Milk Powder Victims Go to Hong Kong To Seek Justice’’ [Sanlu naifen shouhaizhe dao 

xianggang xunqiu gongdao], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 April 10. 94 ‘‘Hong Kong Court Refuses ‘Tainted Milk Powder Case,’ Family Members Indicate [Children’s] Irreversible Kidney Damage’’ [Xianggang fayuan ju shouli ‘‘du naifen’’ suopei jiazhang 

zhi shen sunshang buke nizhuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 May 10. 95 ‘‘English Consumers Receive Compensation for Toxic Sofas Manufactured in China’’ [Yinhan 

du zhongguo zhe shafa shouhaizhi yingguo xiaofeizhe huo peichan], Radio Free Asia, 27 April 

10; ‘‘China Will Look Into Report of Cadmium in Children’s Jewelry,’’ USA Today (Online), 10 

January 10; Karen Sloan, ‘‘A Second Award in Chinese Drywall Litigation,’’ National Law Journal (Online), 29 April 10. 96 ‘‘China To Implement ‘Blacklist’ System for Enterprises With Illegal Quality Behaviors’’ [Wo 

guo jiang quan mian shishi zhiliang we fa wir gui qiye ‘‘hei mingdan’’ zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 

11 January 10; ‘‘AQSIQ To Issue Recall System for Home Appliances Within the Year’’ [Zhijian 

zongju ni nian nei chutai jiadian zhaohui zhidu], China Legal Information Center (Online), 23 

April 10. 97PRC Tort Liability Law, enacted 26 December 09, effective 1 July 10. 98 Ibid., chap. 5. 99 Ibid., chap. 5, art. 47. 100General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 47, 61 Stat. A–11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 

U.N.T.S. 194, art. XV(4). 101 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 22 July 44, entry into force 27 

December 45, art. IV—Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements, Section I—General Obligations of Members, subsection (iii), International Monetary Fund (Online). 102Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, Congressional Research Service (Online), ‘‘China’s 

Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues,’’ 18 August 10, 1. 103Paul Krugman, ‘‘Chinese New Year,’’ New York Times (Online), 1 January 10. 104Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, Congressional Research Service (Online), ‘‘China’s 

Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues,’’ 18 August 10, 1; Jason Subler and Lu Jianxin, 

‘‘China Loosens Currency Grip as G20 Summit Looms,’’ Reuters (Online), 21 June 10; Michael 

Casey, ‘‘Showdown Looms Over China’s Currency at G–20,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 11 

June 10. 105 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, 8 July 10, 5. 106 United States Trade Representative, ‘‘WTO Case Challenging China’s Export Restraints on 

Raw Materials Inputs,’’ June 2009. 107World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/ 

L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 11.3, and Annex 6; World Trade Organization, Report of the 

Working Party on the Accession of China WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 162, 165. 108 United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67. 109World Trade Organization, DS394, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various 

Raw Materials; ‘‘U.S., EU, Mexico File Panel Request on China Raw Materials Curbs,’’ China 

Trade Extra (Online), 4 November 09; United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade 

Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67; United States Trade Representative, ‘‘United 

States Requests WTO Panel Against China Over Export Restraints on Raw Materials,’’ November 2009. 110World Trade Organization, DS394, WT/DS394/8, WT/DS395/8, WT/DS398/7, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, Constitution of the Panel Established 

at the Requests of the United States, the European Communities and Mexico, Note by the Secretariat, 30 March 10. 111World Trade Organization, DS394, WT/DS394/8, WT/DS395/8, WT/DS398/7, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, Communication From the Panel, 18 

May 10. 112 ‘‘U.S., EU, Mexico File Panel Request on China Raw Materials Curbs,’’ China Trade Extra 

(Online), 4 November 09; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘‘Backlash Over China Curb on Metal Exports,’’ Telegraph (London) (Online), 29 August 10. 113 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘‘Backlash Over China Curb on Metal Exports,’’ Telegraph (London) (Online), 29 August 10. See also, Ministry of Commerce, ‘‘U.S. Media Believe China’s Strict 

Control of the Rare Earths Market Is Not Worth the Effort’’ [Mei ti renwei zhongguo yankong 

xitu shichang debuchangshi], 20 August 10. 114 ‘‘Key China Commission Recommendations Aims at Trade Frictions,’’ China Trade Extra 

(Online), 15 November 09. See also United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade 

Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67, 82. 115 ‘‘Foreigners Invest in Rare Earth Deep Processing in China,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 9 August 10. (In 2009, China’s rare earth ore output hit 129,400 tons and refined and separated rare 

earth product output stood at 127,300 tons, supplying over 95 percent of the global demand.) 

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘‘Backlash Over China Curb on Metal Exports,’’ Telegraph (London) 

(Online), 29 August 10. 

311 

116 ‘‘China Dangles Rare-Earth Resources To Lure Investment,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 

15 August 10. See also Zhang Qi’an, ‘‘Five Ore Industry Associations: Do Not Excessively Restrict Rare Earths Exports’’ [Wu kuang shanghui: buying guofen xianzhi xitu chukou], Caijing 

(Online), 23 August 10. For details on the quotas, see Ministry of Commerce, Circular Concerning Transmitting the Second Tranche of Rare Earth Export Quotas for 2010 [Shangwubu 

guanyu xiada 2010 nian di’er pi yiban maoyi xitu chukou pei’e de tongzhi], 5 July 10. 117Zhang Qi, ‘‘ ‘Bigger Say’ Set on Rare Earths Market,’’ China Daily (Online), 10 August 10. 118Ministry of Commerce, Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue (Revised 2007): 

Prohibited to Foreign Investment Catalogue [Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2007 nian 

xiuding) jinzhi waishang touzi chanye mulu], 5 May 09, art. (II)(3)(ii). 119 Ibid., art. (III)(10)(iii). 120PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 10. 121PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 47. 122PRC Granting and Assigning Leaseholds in State-Owned Urban Land Tentative Regulations, issued and effective 19 May 90, art. 12. 123PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 10; PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, arts. 

61–64; PRC Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, enacted 29 March 02, effective 1 March 03, 

arts. 5, 12, 20; Steve Dickinson, ‘‘China Real Estate Laws, Part I,’’ China Law Blog (Online), 

1 May 07. 124See, e.g., Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Shanghai Residents Fight Forced Demolitions,’’ China Daily (Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights 

Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10; Qin Zhongwei, ‘‘Partial 

Victory in Demolition Fight,’’ China Daily (Online), 9 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘On the Eve of the World Expo, Shanghai Resident Meng Shaojie and Family Encounter Violent Forced Demolition’’ [Shibo hui qianxi shanghai meng shaojie yijia zaoyu baoli 

qiangchai], 19 April 10; Wang Xiang, ‘‘Forced Demolition Leads to 11 Years in Jail,’’ Shanghai 

Daily (Online), 21 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Violent Forced Relocation in Beijing’’ [Fasheng zai beijing de bao li bi qian], 26 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To Stop Forced Demolition in 

Fangcheng, Guangxi’’ [Guangxi fangcheng jingcha kaiqiang dashang zulan qiang chai de 

minchuang], 26 April 10. 125 International Federation for Human Rights (Online), ‘‘Written Statement on the Right to 

Housing in China,’’ 25 June 07. See also Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Online), ‘‘Submission to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,’’ September 2008. 126Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, Center for Global Liberty & Prosperity, Cato Institute, 

‘‘Securing Land Use Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth,’’ 

Development Policy Analysis, No. 3, 15 October 07, 1; China Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 6. 127Michael Vines and Jonathan Ansfield, ‘‘Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese Resist,’’ New 

York Times (Online), 26 May 10. 128 Ibid. 129William Ide, ‘‘Analysts: US-China Debate Over Currency Misses Larger Issues,’’ Voice of 

America News (Online), 15 April 10; Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation (Online), ‘‘10 China 

Myths for the New Decade, Backgrounder 2366,’’ 28 January 10. 130 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10. 131 Ibid.; ‘‘Prevent Violent Demolition,’’ China Daily (Online) 10 April 10; 132 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4: 

The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 11(1)) 13 December 91, para. 18. 133 China Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 

Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 9. 134PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 42. 135 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out, Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10. 136PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property, issued and effective 30 August 07. 137 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10; Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Shanghai Residents 

Fight Forced Demolitions,’’ China Daily (Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘On the Eve of the World Expo, Shanghai Resident Meng Shaojie and Family 

Encounter Violent Forced Demolition’’ [Shibohui qianxi shanghai meng shaojie yijia zaoyu baoli 

qiangchai], 19 April 10; Wang Xiang, ‘‘Forced Demolition Leads to 11 Years in Jail,’’ Shanghai 

Daily (Online), 21 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Violent Forced Relocation in Beijing’’ [Fasheng zai beijing de baoli biqian], 26 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To Stop Forced Demolition in 

Fangcheng, Guangxi’’ [Guangxi fangcheng jingcha kaiqiang dashang zulan qiang chai de 

minzhong], 26 April 10. 138 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10, 5–7. 139For a report on several specific cases, see Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 

‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10. See also Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘Shanghai Residents Fight Forced Demolitions,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To Stop Forced Demolition in Fangcheng, Guangxi’’ [Guangxi fangcheng jingcha 

kai qiang dashang zu lan qiangchai de minzhong], 26 April 10; Malcolm Moore, ‘‘Chinese Granny Buried Alive by Property Developers,’’ Telegraph (Online), 6 March 10; Chinese Human 

312 

Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Violent Forced Relocation in Beijing’’ [Fasheng zai beijing de baoli 

biqian], 26 April 10. 140 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China’s Breakneck Real Estate Development,’’ 9 February 10, 1; Huang Zhiling and Liu Weitao, 

‘‘Burning Issue,’’ China Daily (Online), 8 December 09; Michael Wines and Jonathan Ansfield, 

‘‘Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese Resist,’’ New York Times (Online), 26 May 10; Roger Cohen, 

‘‘A Woman Burns,’’ New York Times (Online), 25 January 10. 141 Huang Zhiling and Liu Weitao, ‘‘Burning Issue,’’ China Daily (Online), 8 December 09. 142 China Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 

Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 9; Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Moves To Stop Developers 

Forcing People From Homes With Violence,’’ Guardian (Online), 28 January 10; 143State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Provisions Governing the Requisition and Compensation of State-Owned Land (Comment Draft) [Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu 

buchang tiaoli (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 29 January 10. 144 Ibid., arts. 2, 3. 145State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Provisions Governing the Requisition and Compensation of State-Owned Land (Comment Draft) [Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu 

buchang tiaoli (zhengqiu yijian gao)], issued 29 January 10, art. 40; ‘‘Demolition Law Criticized,’’ 

China Daily (Online), 2 February 10. 146Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Moves To Stop Developers Forcing People From Homes With Violence,’’ Guardian (Online), 29 January 10; ‘‘Demolition Law Criticized,’’ China Daily (Online), 

2 February 10; ‘‘Laws for Seizing Land May Change,’’ China Daily, reprinted in Sina (Online), 

30 January 10. 147Mandy Zuo, ‘‘Revision of Demolition Law Put on Back-Burner,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 26 July 10. 148 Ibid.; State Council General Office Emergency Circular Regarding Improving Strict Management of Land Requisition and Demolition Work and Earnest Protection of the Legal Rights 

of Citizens [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jin yibu yange zheng di chaiqian guanli gongzuo 

qieshi weihu qunzhong hefa quanyi de jinji tongzhi], issued 15 May 10; Ministry of Land and 

Resources Circular Concerning Improving the Accomplishment of Land Requisition Work [Guotu 

ziyuan bu guanyu jinyibu zuohao zheng di guanli gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 26 July 10. 149 ‘‘New Demolition Payment Rules Are Coming,’’ China Daily (Online), 26 May 10. 150 Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 

Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 39–40. 151 Ibid., 40. 152PRC Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, enacted 29 August 02, effective 1 March 03, 

art. 20. 153 Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 

Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 44. 154 Ibid., 47. 155PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 42. 156 Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ‘‘Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 

Eviction Regime in China,’’ 29 March 10, 48. 157 ‘‘China Issues Rules To Prevent Officials Meddling in Real Estate Affairs,’’ Xinhua (Online), 18 May 10. 158 Aaron Back, ‘‘China Should Adopt a Property Ownership Tax—Think Tank,’’ Dow Jones, 

reprinted in Wall Street Journal (Online), 4 May 10. 159State Council General Office Circular Concerning Promotion of Stable and Healthy Development of the Real Estate Market [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu cujin fang di chan 

shichang, ping wen jiankang fazhan de tongzhi], 7 January 10; ‘‘Chinese Gov’t Tightens Property Rules,’’ Global Times, reprinted in Sina (Online), 11 January 10. 160State Council Circular on Determined Suppression of the Exceedingly Rapid Rise of Certain Urban Housing Prices [Guowuyuan guanyu jianjue ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia guokuai 

shangzhang de tongzhi], issued 17 April 10. 161 ‘‘Bank of China: In Principle Temporarily Stop Issuing Housing Loans for Third Homes 

and Above’’ [Zhonghang: yuanze shang zan ting fa fang di san tao yishang zhu fang daikuan], 

Xinhua (Online), 23 April 10. 162 ‘‘China Said To Block Real Estate Fund-Raising,’’ New York Times (Online), 28 April 10. 163Ministry of Land and Resources Circular on Issues Relevant To Strengthening the Supply 

and Regulation of Land Use for Real Property [Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu jiaqiang fangdichan 

yongdi gongying he jianquan youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 8 March 10. 164 ‘‘Beijing To Prohibit Sales of ‘Hotel Apartments’ Beginning Next Month’’ [Beijing xia yue 

qi jin shou ‘‘jiudian shi gongyu’’], Caijing (Online), 20 May 10; Yu Bingbing, ‘‘Beijing To Issue 

New Real Estate Policy on April 28, Limits Set on Number of Houses in the Name of Local Residents’’ [Beijing jiang tui shou ge defang loushi xinzheng chuan xianzhi jumin gou fang tao shu], 

Xinmin Evening News, reprinted in China Securities Network (Online), 28 April 10; Sandy Li, 

‘‘Shanghai Plans Tax To Slow Down Home Prices, City Follows Chongqing’s Lead in Effort To 

Curb Speculation,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 9 April 10; ‘‘Real Estate Rules Prove 

Effective in Hainan,’’ China Law & Practice (Online), April 2010. 

Notes to Section III—Access to Justice 

1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 8. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 2. China signed the 

ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese Government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it 

is taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint Statement of the 

12th EU-China Summit said, ‘‘The EU welcomed China’s commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] 

313 

as soon as possible.’’ Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China Internet 

Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, ‘‘At present, legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning our domestic 

legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.’’ Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the 

Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation of Human 

Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. In its 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action 

Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese Government stated that the ICCPR was one of the ‘‘fundamental principles’’ on which the plan was framed, and that the government ‘‘will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.’’ State Council Information Office, 

National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 

Review of the Chinese Government’s human rights record, the Chinese Government supported 

recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said 

China was in the process of amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and 

laws relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. UN 

GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 

Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). 3 According to Article 41 of the PRC Constitution, ‘‘Citizens have the right to make to relevant 

state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violations of the law or dereliction 

of duty by any state organ or functionary, but fabrication or distortion of facts with the intention 

of libel or frame-up is prohibited. In case of complaints, charges, or exposures made by citizens, 

the state organ concerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after ascertaining the 

facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges, and exposures, or retaliate against the 

citizens making them. Citizens who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil 

rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the 

law.’’ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, art. 41. 4For more information on Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders in China, see Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2009),’’ 25 April 10. 5 Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Punished Supplicants,’’ Financial Times (Online), 5 March 09; Human 

Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in Hell,’’ 12 November 09, 3; Foster Klug, ‘‘Rights Group 

Claims Chinese Abuse of Critics,’’ Associated Press (Online), 21 January 10. 6See, e.g., ‘‘Impartial Administration of Justice Is the Tool for Maintaining Rights and Stability’’ [Gongzheng de sifa cai shi weiquan he weiwen de liqi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 24 May 10. 7Supreme People’s Court, Opinion on Protecting the Procedural Rights of Administrative Litigants [Guanyu yifa baohu xingzheng susong dangshiren suquan de yijian], issued 9 November 

09. 8 You Wei, ‘‘Courts Are Reluctant To Accept Difficulties of ‘Citizens Sue Officials’ Cases’’ 

[Fayuan bu yuan shouli ‘‘min gao guan’’ de kuzhong], Legal Daily (Online), 25 May 10; ‘‘Supreme People’s Court Requests Resolutely Resisting and Eliminating ‘Local Policies’ of Administrative Litigation’’ [Zuigao fayuan yaoqiu jianjue dizhi he qingchu xingzheng susong shou an ‘‘tu 

zhengce’’], Xinhua (Online), 22 May 10. 9 ‘‘Impartial Administration of Justice Is the Tool for Maintaining Rights and Stability’’ 

[Gongzheng de sifa cai shi weiquan he weiwen de liqi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 

24 May 10. 10 Ibid. 11 Chen Fei, ‘‘Administrative Reconsideration Law Revisions To Be Included in the State 

Council Legislative Agenda; Legislative Affairs Office Provides Detailed Explanation’’ 

[Xingzheng fuyi fa xiugai lie ru guowuyuan lifa jihua fazhi ban xiangjie], Xinhua (Online), 10 

June 10. 12PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, enacted 29 April 99, effective 1 October 99, arts. 

6, 14. The Chinese administrative law system speaks in terms of ‘‘concrete’’ acts, which refer 

to actions by a government official or agency against a specific target with regard to a specific 

matter. ‘‘Abstract’’ acts refer to universally binding documents issued by administrative agencies 

to regulate behavior. 13Li Li, ‘‘Revisions to the Administrative Review Law Are Bound To Expand the Scope of 

Cases Accepted’’ [Xiugai hang zheng fuyi fa shou an fanwei shibi kuoda], Legal Daily (Online), 

29 June 10. 14 Chen Fei, ‘‘Administrative Reconsideration Law Revisions To Be Included in the State 

Council Legislative Agenda; Legislative Affairs Office Provides Detailed Explanation’’ 

[Xingzheng fuyi fa xiugai lie ru guowuyuan lifa jihua fazhi ban xiangjie], Xinhua (Online), 10 

June 10. 15PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 29 

April 10, effective 1 December 10; ‘‘China Adopts Amended State Liability Compensation Law,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 29 April 10. 16 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing April 27–May 

3, 2010,’’ 4 May 10; PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 January 95, 

amended 29 April 10, effective 1 December 10; ‘‘China Adopts Amended State Liability Compensation Law,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 April 10. 

314 

17PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 29 

April 10, effective 1 December 10, arts. 3(3), 26, 35. 18 Cheng Zhuo and Li Huizi, ‘‘China Adopts Amended State Compensation Law To Better Protect Human Rights,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 April 10; ‘‘Interpretation of the Amended Law on State 

Compensation’’ [Jiedu xiuzheng hou de guojia peichang fa], Xinhua (Online), 30 April 10. 19Du Ming, ‘‘Let the Saying ‘The State Compensation Law Is the Non-Compensation Law’ 

End Here’’ [Rang ‘‘guojia peichangfa shi bu pei fa’’ de shuofa congci xiaoshi], Legal Daily (Online), 3 May 10; Cary Huang, ‘‘Controversial Compensation Law on Detainees Approved,’’ South 

China Morning Post (Online), 30 April 10. 20 According to the Supreme People’s Court’s ‘‘2009 National Court Statistics on the Circumstances of State Compensation Cases,’’ there were a total of 1,531 compensation cases accepted and 450 cases received compensation. Supreme People’s Court, 2009 National Court Statistics on the Circumstances of State Compensation Cases, 8 April 10. 21 ‘‘From Psychological Comfort to Psychological Compensation’’ [Cong jingshen fuwei kaishi, 

xiang jingshen peichang nuli], Southern Metropolis Daily (Online), 30 April 10. 22 Cary Huang, ‘‘Controversial Compensation Law on Detainees Approved,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 30 April 10; ‘‘Law Revision Falls Short,’’ China Daily (Online), 30 April 

10. 23PRC Administrative Supervision Law, enacted and effective 9 May 97, amended 25 June 

10, effective 1 October 10; ‘‘China’s Amendments Will Increase Power of Administrative Supervision; New Law To Be Implemented on October 1’’ [Zhongguo xiufa jia da xingzheng jiancha 

lidu xinfa jiang yu 10 yue 1 ri shixing], Xinhua (Online), 25 June 10. 24 ‘‘China Mulls Law To Increase Protection of Informants,’’ Xinhua (Online), 22 June 10. 25 ‘‘SPP Documents Show 70% of Complainants Have Suffered Retaliation’’ [Zuigao jian cailiao 

xianshi 70% jubao zhe ceng zao daji baofu], People’s Daily (Online), 19 June 10. 26Zhao Yanrong, ‘‘More Mediation Offices Coming,’’ China Daily (Online), 31 March 10; Ma 

Limin, ‘‘Sichuan: ‘Great Mediation’ Allows Society To Be More Harmonious’’ [Sichuan:‘‘da 

tiaojie’’ rang shehui gengjia hexie], Legal Daily (Online), 22 March 10; ‘‘NPC Standing Committee Reviews Many Laws’’ [Quanguo renda changwei hui shenyi duo bu falu an], Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times (Online), 22 June 10. 27 ‘‘Role of Mediation,’’ China Daily (Online), 30 August 10; Chen Fei et al., ‘‘People’s Courts 

Strengthen Mediation for ‘Litigation Explosion’ ’’ [Renmin fayuan jiaqiang tiaojie yingdui 

‘‘susong baozha’’], China Internet Information Center (Online), 12 March 10. 28Dengjun Ming and Xie Mu, ‘‘Construction of the ‘Great Mediation’ System To Promote 

Three Key Tasks’’ [Goujian ‘‘da tiaojie’’ zhidu tuijin san xiang zhongdian gongzuo], Court News 

Network (Online), 12 June 10. 29 ‘‘Bright Spots Frequently Appear in People’s Mediation Law’’ [Renmin tiaojie fa liangdian 

pinxian], Legal Daily (Online), 30 August 10; Guo Xiaoyu, ‘‘Milestone in the Development of the 

Mediation System’’ [Renmin tiaojie zhidu fazhan de lichengbei], Legal Daily (Online), 6 September 10. 30Zhou Yingfeng et al., ‘‘China Will Pass Legislation To Improve People’s Mediation System 

To Build ‘First Line of Defense’ in Stability Maintenance’’ [Woguo jiang lifa wanshan renmin 

tiaojie zhidu gouzhu wei wen ‘‘di yi dao fangxian’’], Xinhua (Online), 22 June 10. 31Pei Zhiyong, ‘‘Harmony Valued, Mediation First—Sichuan Completes Building of ‘Great Mediation’ Work System’’ [He wei gui diao wei xian sichuan quanmian goujian ‘‘da tiaojie’’ gongzuo 

tixi], People’s Daily (Online), 23 March 10. 32 ‘‘Zhou Yongkang: Firmly Grasp the Full Services of Three Key Economic and Social Development Work’’ [Zhou yongkang: renzhen zhua hao san xiang zhongdian gongzuo quanli fuwu 

jingji shehui fazhan], Xinhua (Online), 6 January 10. 33 ‘‘NPC Standing Committee Reviews Many Laws’’ [Quanguo renda changwei hui shenyi duo 

bu falu’an], Global Times (Online), 22 June 10. 34Wang Doudou, ‘‘Mediation Law Allows ‘Flowers of the Orient’ To Deliver More Gorgeous 

Bloom’’ [Renmin tiaojie fa rang ‘‘dongfang zhi hua’’ gengjia xuanlan zhan fang], Legal Daily (Online), 29 August 10; ‘‘Chinese Legislature Passes People’s Mediation Law,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 

August 10. 35Zhu Zhe and Lan Tian, ‘‘Mediation Draft Law Could Ease Tension,’’ China Daily (Online), 

23 June 10. 36 ‘‘Chinese Legislature Passes People’s Mediation Law,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 August 10. 37 Ibid.; PRC Mediation Law, enacted 28 August 09, effective 1 January 10, arts. 8, 9. 38PRC Mediation Law, enacted 28 August 09, effective 1 January 10, art. 13. 39 Ibid., art. 14. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ananth Krishnan, ‘‘China Passes Mediation Law To Aid Strained Judiciary,’’ The Hindu 

(Online), 30 August 10. 43Li Gang, ‘‘Courts Can ‘Mediate,’ but Enforcement Is Another Matter’’ [Fayuan ‘‘tiaojie’’ 

rongyi zhixing nan], Beijing Youth Daily (Online), 7 July 10. 44Marianne Barriaux, ‘‘China’s Human Rights Lawyers Face Uphill Struggle,’’ Agence FrancePresse (Online), 11 May 10. For additional examples of the ‘‘clampdown’’ on lawyers and activists, see the following sources: Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human 

Rights Briefing May 25–31, 2010,’’ 31 May 10; ‘‘Tang Jitian Meets With U.S. Officials To Talk 

About Human Rights and Religion; Lawyer Li Xiongbing Not Allowed To Leave Home’’ [Tang 

jitian tan jian mei guanyuan tan renquan zongjiao li xiongbing lushi bei jinzhi chumen], Radio 

Free Asia (Online), 25 May 10. 45 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Activist Surfaces After a Year in Custody,’’ New York Times (Online), 28 March 10; Chris Buckley and Bejamin Kang Lim, ‘‘Well-Known Missing Chinese Rights 

Lawyer Alive,’’ Reuters (Online), 28 March 10. 

315 

46 After his reported release in late March, Gao spoke with Western media outlets. Chris 

Buckley and Benjamin Kang Lim, ‘‘Well-Known Missing Chinese Rights Lawyer Alive,’’ Reuters 

(Online), 29 March 10; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Activist Surfaces After a Year in Custody,’’ 

New York Times (Online), 28 March 10; ‘‘Missing Lawyer Says He Is in Northern China,’’ Associated Press (Online), 28 March 10. 47Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears Again,’’ New York Times (Online), 30 

April 10; Michael Wines, ‘‘Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears After Release,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 14 April 10. 48 Jerome A. Cohen and Beth Schwanke, ‘‘The Silencing of Gao Zhisheng,’’ Wall Street Journal 

(Online), 31 May 10. 49 ‘‘Law Firm That Defends Dissenters To Be Closed, Say Activists,’’ Agence France-Presse, 

reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 22 February 09; Lei Huo, Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘When Does ‘Suspension for Rectification’ End for Beijing Law Firm’’ 

[Beijing yitong lushishiwusuo ‘‘tingye zhengdun’’ heshi liao], 2 February 10; ‘‘Yitong Law Firm 

Begins Its Six-Month Reform, Who Will Protect the Interests of the Clients/ ’’ [Yitong kaishi 

tingye zhengdun liu ge yue lushi bei zheng dangshi ren liyi shui lai weihu?], Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 19 March 09. 50 Xia Yu, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Administrative Officials Secretly Order 

Landlord Not To Renew Contract, Drawing Beijing’s Anhui Law Firm Into Hopeless Situation’’ 

[Xingzheng ganyu miling fang zhu bu xuyue, beijing anhui lushi shiwusuo xianru juejing], 25 

March 10. 51 Raymond Li, ‘‘Lawyer Recovers From Setback in Women’s Rights,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 6 June 10. 52 Edward Wong, ‘‘AIDS Activist Leaves China After Government Pressure,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 10 May 10. 53 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Chinese Activists Under Threat After Obama Visit,’’ 20 

November 09. 54 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Beijing Human Rights Lawyer 

Jiang Tianyong Illegally Taken Away by Public Security Officers,’’ 11 November 09; Julia Duin, 

‘‘China Holds Lawyer Who Tried To See Obama,’’ Washington Times (Online), 24 November 09. 55 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Chinese Activists Under Threat After Obama Visit,’’ 20 

November 09. 56 ‘‘ ‘Fuzhou Internet Users’ Defamation Case’ Lawyer’s Law Firm Closed Down Because of Director’s Suspended License’’ [‘‘Fuzhou wangmin feibang an’’ daili lu suo zao jiesan bei tingye 

lushi ceng shi lu guan chu zhang], Southern Weekend (Online), 28 April 10; China Human 

Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Fujian Lawyer Lin Hongnan and His Law Firm Punished; Retaliation for Taking Up the ‘Three Fuzhou Netizens’ Case,’’ 3 May 10. 57Li Bao, ‘‘Fujian Court Opens Second Instance Trial in Defamation Case Against Fujian 

Netizens’’ [Fujian kaiting ershen wangyou feibang an], Voice of America (Online), 13 June 10. 58 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Lawyers Meet With Wang Yonghang; Family 

Calls for End to Persecution’’ [Lushi huijian wang yonghang jiashu xu tingzhi pohai], 18 January 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing January 14– 

22, 2010,’’ 27 January 10. 59 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering Linfen Court, Barred 

From Travel,’’ 13 July 10; ‘‘Christians Come Under Attack in China,’’ Toronto Star (Online), 7 

August 10. 60 Ibid. 61 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘U.S. Ambassador Meets With Chinese Rights Lawyer Zhang Kai Following Ban,’’ 20 July 10. 62 ChinaAid (Online), ‘‘Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering Linfen Court, Barred 

From Travel,’’ 13 July 10. For more information on the Linfen-Fushan Church raid, see Section 

II—Freedom of Religion. 63 Ibid. 64 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Online Petition: Support Human 

Rights Lawyers Who Failed the ‘Annual Assessment and Registration,’ ’’ 24 July 09; ‘‘Lawyers’ 

Licenses Withheld,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 10; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 234. 65 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 234; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern 

Group (Online), ‘‘Online Petition: Support Human Rights Lawyers Who Failed the ‘Annual Assessment and Registration,’ ’’ 24 July 09; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), 

‘‘Concern Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal Practice Qualification, Demand 

Scrapping the Annual Inspection and Annual Registration System,’’ 16 July 10. 66 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Concern Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal Practice Qualification, Demand Scrapping the Annual Inspection 

and Annual Registration System,’’ 16 July 10; ‘‘Lawyers’ Licenses Withheld,’’ Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 18 July 10. 67 ‘‘Lawyers’ Licenses Withheld,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 10. 68 Ibid. 69 Beijing Bureau of Justice, Administrative Penalty Decision—Beijing Bureau Penalty Decision [2010] No. 2 [Xingzheng chufa jueding shu jingsi fajue (2010) 2 hao], issued 30 April 10; 

Beijing Bureau of Justice, Administrative Penalty Decision—Beijing Bureau Penalty Decision 

[2010] No. 3 [Xingzheng chufa jueding shu jingsi fajue (2010) 3 hao], issued 30 April 10; Human 

Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Beijing Judicial Bureau Revokes Licenses of Two Rights Defense 

Lawyers,’’ 7 May 10; Lucy Hornby, ‘‘China Disbars Two Rights Defense Lawyers,’’ Reuters (Online), 9 May 10. 70 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Lawyers Facing License Revocation Detail Irregular 

Courtroom Activities Permitted by Judge,’’ 20 April 10. 

316 

71 Edward Wong, ‘‘2 Chinese Lawyers Are Facing Disbarment for Defending Falun Gong,’’ 

New York Times (Online), 21 April 10. 72For commentary on the two measures, see ‘‘Ministry of Justice Issues Two Measures To 

Strengthen the Supervision of Law Firms and Lawyers’ Activities’’ [Sifabu chutai liang banfa 

jiaqiang dui lushi lusuo zhiye huodong jiandu], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 9 

April 10; Measures for the Annual Inspection and Evaluation of Law Firms [Lushi shiwu suo 

niandu jiancha kaohe banfa], issued 7 April 10, effective 9 April 10; Measures on Punishing Illegal Acts of Lawyers and Law Firms [Lushi he lushi shiwu suo weifa xingwei chufa banfa], 

adopted 7 April 10, effective 1 June 10. 73 ‘‘Ministry of Justice Department of Lawyers and Public Notaries Spokesperson Answers 

Questions on the Revised ‘Measures on Punishing Illegal Acts of Lawyers and Law Firms’ ’’ [Sifa 

bu lushi gongzheng si fuze ren jiu xiuding hou de ‘‘lushi he lushi shiwu suo weifa xingwei chufa 

banfa’’ da jizhe wen], Legal Daily (Online), 5 April 10. 74 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing April 7–12, 2010,’’ reprinted in Amnesty International UK—Blogs (Online), 14 August 10. 75 Cara Anna, ‘‘2 China Lawyers Who Defended Falun Gong Face Ban,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Seattle Times (Online), 21 April 10. 76 Carl Minzner, ‘‘Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,’’ 42 Stanford 

Journal of International Law 103, 104–06, 116–17 (2006). Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the xinfang system, in theory, has ideally functioned to enhance relations 

among the Communist Party, the government, and the people. Sun Weiben ed., PRC Administrative Management Encyclopedia [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng guanli dacidian], 

(Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 1992), 329. The practice of submitting grievances to local 

authorities has existed in China since imperial times. Carl Minzner, ‘‘Xinfang: An Alternative 

to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,’’ 41 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 111–120 

(2006). 77 According to Article 41 of the PRC Constitution, ‘‘Citizens have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violations of the law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary, but fabrication or distortion of facts with the 

intention of libel or frame-up is prohibited. In case of complaints, charges, or exposures made 

by citizens, the state organ concerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after 

ascertaining the facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges, and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them. Citizens who have suffered losses through infringement 

of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law.’’ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 

93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 41. The right is also protected by the more recent 2005 National Regulations on Letters and Visits. Regulations on Letters and Visits [Xinfang tiaoli], 

issued 5 January 05, effective 1 May 05, arts. 1, 3. 78 Carl Minzner, ‘‘Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,’’ 42 Stanford 

Journal of International Law 103, 107 (2006). 79 Regulations on Letters and Visits [Xinfang tiaoli], issued 5 January 05, effective 1 May 05, 

arts. 9–13, 15; Sun Weiben ed., PRC Administrative Management Encyclopedia [Zhonghua 

renmin gongheguo xingzheng guanli dacidian], (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 1992), 257; 

Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘ ‘We Could Disappear at Any Time’: Retaliation and Abuses 

Against Chinese Petitioners,’’ December 2005, 17–18. 80 Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Punished Supplicants,’’ Financial Times (Online), 6 March 09; Human 

Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in Hell,’’ 12 November 09, 3. According to the Human 

Rights Watch report, ‘‘The majority of black jail detainees are petitioners—citizens from rural 

areas who come to Beijing and provincial capitals seeking redress for abuses ranging from illegal land grabs and corruption to police torture.’’ 81 Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Punished Supplicants,’’ Financial Times (Online), 6 March 09. 82Zhou Yongkang, ‘‘Promote the In-Depth Resolution of Social Contradictions, Be Innovative 

in Social Management, and Enforce the Law Fairly and Honestly, Providing Even More Powerful Rule-of-Law Support for Both Good and Rapid Economic and Social Development’’ [Shenru 

tuijin shehui maodun huajie, shehui guanli chuangxin, gongzheng lianjie zhifa, wei jingji shehui 

youhao youkuai fazhan tigong gengjia youli de fazhi baozhang], Seeking Truth (Online), 16 February 10. 83 Ibid. ‘‘The center of gravity in the effort to resolve social contradictions is at the grass-roots 

level. . . . [The] villages and towns (neighborhoods) must integrate their forces with regard to 

. . . upholding stability, complaints, etc., . . . and striving to see that ‘minor matters do not 

get out of the villages, major matters do not get out of the towns (or townships), and that contradictions are not passed up to higher levels.’ ’’ 84 ‘‘78% of Grassroots Courts Have Case Petitioning Offices,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 4 November 09. 85 ‘‘New Focus of Efforts To Maintain Stability Strike Hard Against Unions, Farmers, and 

Military [Internal Three Forces]’’ [Weiwen xin zhongdian daji gong nong bing (nei sangu shili)], 

Ming Pao, 13 March 10 (Open Source Center, 13 March 10). The other two threats are military 

personnel rights protection groups and underground labor unions. 86 ‘‘Central Document Reveals: Reprimands of Petitioners Will Be Intensified’’ [Zhongyang 

wenjian baoguang: dui fangmin yao jiada xunjie lidu], Boxun (Online), 16 August 09. The Boxun 

article revealed that, in May 2009, the Central Prominent Xinfang Problems and Mass Incidents 

Joint Conference Office issued a circular urging relevant official offices to strengthen implementation of a 2008 opinion mandating increasing admonishments ‘‘according to law’’ for ‘‘abnormal 

petitioning.’’ 87 ‘‘Shenzhen Authorities Issue Circular Outlining Punishments for ‘Abnormal Petitioning,’ ’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2; Huang Guan, 

‘‘Handling ‘Abnormal Petitioning,’ Persuade, Do Not Just Block’’ [Duidai ‘‘feizhengchang 

shangfang,’’ zaishu buzai du], Xinhua (Online), 13 November 09. 

317 

88 Ibid. 89 ‘‘Shenzhen Expands Measures Against ‘Abnormal Petitioning,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3. For examples of measures issued in other cities 

and provinces, see, e.g., ‘‘A Government Document Clearly Shows the Basis for Stern Approach 

Toward Petitioners: Inner Mongolia Document’’ [Dui fangmin yanli youyin, zhengfu wenjian 

mingshi: neimenggu wenjian], Boxun (Online), 13 November 09; ‘‘Jiangsu Province Four Departments Take Stage With Secret Document Cracking Down on Petitioners Who Take Grievances 

to Beijing’’ [Jiangsusheng sibumen chutai mimi wenjian yanda jinjing shangfang], Boxun (Online), 14 January 09; ‘‘Wuhan ‘Manage According to Law Abnormal Petitioning Behavior in Beijing Propaganda Statement’ Revealed’’ [Wuhan ‘‘yifa chuzhi jin jing fei zhengchang shangfang 

xing wei xuanchuan ci’’ puguang], Boxun (Online), 20 July 08. 90 ‘‘Shenzhen Expands Measures Against ‘Abnormal Petitioning,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3; ‘‘Shenzhen Residential Permit Office: Habitual 

Petitioners Added to Blacklist’’ [Shenzhen ban juzaizheng chaoji shangfangzhe bei lieru 

heimingdan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 April 10. 91Wang Junxiu et al., ‘‘Petitioner Who Went to Higher-Level Authorities Detained Files Administrative Suit Against Police Station for Illegal Detention’’ [Shangfangzhe beiju zhuanggao 

gonganju xingzheng weifa], China Youth Daily, 14 November 09 (Open Source Center, 14 November 09). 92 He Xianwen, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Liuzhou, Guangxi Petitioners 

Sent to One Year Reeducation Through Labor for Petitioning’’ [Guangxi liuzhou wu fangmin yin 

shangfang bei liaojiao yinian], 24 January 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 

(Online), ‘‘Liuzhou Petitioner Series (9): Zeng Zhaokuang Sent to Reeducation Through Labor 

for Petitioning in Beijing’’ [Liuzhou fangmin xilie (9): zeng zhaokuang yin shangfang bei laojiao], 

24 February 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Liuzhou Petitioner 

Series (8) Petitioner Jin Li Sent to Reeducation Through Labor for One Year’’ [Liuzhou fangmin 

xilie (8) fangmin jinli bei laojiao yinian], 10 February 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders (Online), ‘‘Liuzhou Petitioner Series (7) Misdiagnosis and Missed Diagnosis Results 

in Patient’s Death’’ [Liuzhou fangmin xilie (7) wuzhen louzhen zhizhe siwang], 10 February 10. 93 Yueyang County Measures on 2010 Xinfang Work Responsibility Target Evaluation [2010 

nian xinfang gongzuo mubiao guanli kaohe banfa], 6 April 10. Officials in Yueyang have partial 

points deducted if there is more than one petition per 10,000 population per month and have 

10 points deducted any time mass petitions are taken to Beijing. Human Rights Watch (Online), 

‘‘An Alleyway in Hell,’’ 12 November 09, 9. 94 Carl Minzner, ‘‘Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,’’ 42 Stanford 

Journal of International Law 103, 154 (2006); Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘An Alleyway in 

Hell,’’ 12 November 09, 9. 95 ‘‘Families of 200 Students Killed in Sichuan Earthquake Storm City Government, Blocked 

by Special Police’’ [Chuan zhen liang bai li nan xuesheng jiashu chuang shi zhengfu bei tejing 

zuzhi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 June 10. 96 Ibid. 97 ‘‘Retribution for Representatives Who Organized Teachers To Kneel and Present Petitions 

in Hubei’’ [Hubei zuzhi min shi xia gui qingyuan daibiao zao qiu hou suan zhang], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 25 June 10. 98Liu Feiyue, Civil Rights and Livelihood, ‘‘Gongan County, Hubei Organizer Yang Huanqing 

Sent to Reeducation Through Labor for Organizing Teachers To Petition’’ [Hubei sheng gongan 

xian yang huanqing bei yi zuzhi minshi shangfang laojiao], reprinted in Chinese Human Rights 

Defenders (Online), 28 November 09. 99Tania Branigan, ‘‘Shanghai 2010 Expo Is Set To Be the World’s Most Expensive Party,’’ 

Guardian (Online), 21 April 10. 100 According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Shanghai officials estimate that ‘‘70–80 

percent’’ of petitioning cases originating in the city are related to forced evictions or housing 

demolitions. See Tania Branigan, ‘‘Shanghai 2010 Expo Is Set To Be the World’s Most Expensive 

Party,’’ Guardian (Online), 21 April 10; Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China Silences Women 

Housing Rights Activists Ahead of Expo 2010,’’ 30 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 

(Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,’’ 29 April 10. 101 ‘‘China’s Forced Evictions Cause Instability,’’ Reuters (Online), 28 March 10; Amnesty 

International (Online), ‘‘China Silences Women Housing Rights Activists Ahead of Expo 2010,’’ 

30 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Chinese Government Silences Activists 

Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,’’ 29 April 10. 102 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing Weekly June 

8–14, 2010,’’ 15 June 10. 103 Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits ‘‘arbitrary arrest (and) 

detention’’ and guarantees ‘‘full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent impartial tribunal.’’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General 

Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9. Article 37 of the PRC Constitution 

stipulates that arrests must be conducted ‘‘with the approval or by decision of a people’s 

procuratorate or by decision of a people’s court, and arrests must be made by a public security 

organ. Unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of person by detention or other 

means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.’’ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, 

art. 4. 104 ‘‘Veteran Starved in Black Jail,’’ Radio Free Asia, reprinted in Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 June 10. 105Qi Wuji, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Beijing Activist Li Jinping Detained 

in Black Jail’’ [Beijing weiquan renshi li jinping beiguan heijianyu], 10 May 10; Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘China Human Rights Briefing May 4–10, 2010,’’ 11 May 10. 

318 

106 Hu Guohong reported being detained in mental hospitals on multiple occasions during politically sensitive dates in China. ‘‘British Journalist Detained in Wuhan, Interviewee Doesn’t 

Dare Return Home’’ [Yingmei jizhe wuhan caifang bei kou bei fangzhe bugan huijia], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 2 December 09. Peng Baoquan was committed to a mental hospital for several 

days after he was detained for taking pictures of a petitioner protest. ‘‘The Truth Behind Petitioning, Taking Pictures and Being Labeled as ‘Mentally Ill’ ’’ [Shangfang, paizhao, ‘‘bei 

jingshenbin’’ de zhenxiang], Huangqiu Net (Online), 28 April 10; ‘‘Shiyan ‘Psychiatric Patient’ 

Discusses Before and After the Hospital, Hopes To Take Off the [Mental Illness] Hat’’ [Shiyan 

‘‘jingshenbingren’’ jianshu ruyuan qianhou xiwang zhaidiao ‘‘maozi’’], Nanfang Daily Net (Online), 17 April 10. Yang Jia’s mother, Wang Jingmei, reportedly was detained in a mental institution in Beijing for months while authorities investigated and interrogated her son. ‘‘Sending 

Petitioners to Psychiatric Hospitals Is One Way To Pressure Them’’ [Song jingshenbingyuan shi 

daya fangmin de yizhong fangshi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 February 10. For a case of a 

petitioner being committed for a longer period of time, see Wang Yibo, ‘‘Suit Against the Township Government; Luohe Peasant Locked in Psychiatric Hospital for Six-and-a-Half Years’’ 

[Zhuang gao xiang zhengfu luohe yi nongmin bei guan jingshen bing yuan liunian ban], China 

Youth Daily (Online), 23 April 10; ‘‘Nation Rapt by Detained Petitioner’s Story,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 22 May 10. 107Wang Yibo, ‘‘Suit Against the Township Government; Luohe Peasant Locked in Psychiatric 

Hospital for Six-and-a-Half Years’’ [Zhuang gao xiang zhengfu luohe yi nongmin bei guan 

jingshen bing yuan liunian ban], China Youth Daily (Online), 23 April 10; Wang Yibo, ‘‘Henan 

Luohe Villager Sued Township Government for Being Locked in Psychiatric Hospital Six-anda-Half Years’’ [Henan Luohe nongmin zhuanggao xiang zhengfu beiguan jingshenbingyuan 6 

nianban], Xinhua (Online), 23 April 10. 108 ‘‘Hundreds of Lawyers Sign Proposal for Prosecution To Stop False ‘Mentally Ill’ Judgements’’ [Baiyu lushi qianming jianyi jiancha jiguan daji ‘‘jingshenbing’’ zaojia], Xinhua (Online), 

27 April 10. 109 ‘‘Sending Petitioners to Psychiatric Hospitals Is One Way To Pressure Them’’ [Song 

jingshenbingyuan shi daya fangmin de yizhong fangshi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 February 

10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Silencing Complaints: Human Rights Abuses 

Against Petitioners in China,’’ 14 March 09. This report presents findings from a previous survey of more than 3,300 petitioners in October 2007 that asserts approximately 3.1 percent of 

them had been sent to psychiatric institutions at some point because of their petitioning activities. 

Notes to Section IV—Xinjiang 

1For detailed information, including information on China’s domestic obligations toward ethnic minorities, see Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights, as well as the section on ‘‘Ethnic Minority Rights’’ in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 105–106, and ‘‘Special Focus for 2005: 

China’s Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,’’ 

CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13–23. 2See the subsections that follow, as well as Section II—Freedom of Religion—Islam—Islam 

in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—for examples of violations of such rights as those 

to free expression, assembly, religion, and fair criminal trials and the linguistic, religious, and 

cultural rights of ethnic minorities. For protections in international law, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A 

(III) of 10 December 48, arts. 11, 18, 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into 

force 23 March 76, arts. 9, 18, 19, 21, 27. For detailed information, see also Section II—Ethnic 

Minority Rights, as well as the section on ‘‘Ethnic Minority Rights’’ in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 105–108, and ‘‘Special Focus for 2005: China’s Minorities and Government 

Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,’’ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 

05, 13–23. 3See, e.g., ‘‘Hu Jintao’s Important Speech Delivered at the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Cadre Meeting’’ [Hu jintao zai xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang fabiao 

zhongyao jianghua], Xinhua (Online), 25 August 09; Cheng Lixin, Wang Xinhong, and Li Hua, 

‘‘Eighth (Enlarged) Plenary Session of Seventh Regional CPC Committee Calls for Unifying 

Thinking, Enhancing Understanding, Firming Up Confidence, and Clearing Away Difficulties To 

Forge Ahead,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 25 October 09 (Open Source Center, 20 November 09); ‘‘Painstakingly Prepare for Central Work Forum on Xinjiang’’ [Jingxin choubei zhongyang xinjiang 

gongzuo zuotanhui], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 28 January 10; ‘‘Government 

Work Report Made by Nur Bekri (Summary)’’ [Nu’er baikeli suo zuo zhengfu gongzuo baogao 

(zhaiyao)], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 13 January 10. 4 ‘‘Main Restructuring of Duties for Leading Comrades in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee’’ [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu dangwei zhuyao lingdao tongzhi zhiwu 

tiaozheng], Xinhua (Online), 24 April 10. 5 Cheng Lixin, ‘‘Zhang Chunxian Stresses: Stability Is the Expectation of People of All 

Ethnicities’’ [Zhang chunxian qiangdiao: wending shi ge zu renmin de qipan], Xinjiang Metropolitan News, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 7 May 10. On past statements, see, e.g., 

CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 245. 6See box titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang for information on cases of people detained on security-related charges for criticizing the government or otherwise exercising their 

right to free expression. For information on efforts to politicize security concerns and single out 

Western human rights organizations and advocates in the aftermath of events in July 2009, see, 

e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 245–248. 7 Cui Jia, ‘‘Xinjiang Security Funding Increased by 90 Percent,’’ China Daily (Online), 13 January 10; Su Junya, ‘‘40.6 Billion in Financing Budgeted for Projects To Protect People’s Livelihoods’’ [Xinjiang 406 yi caizheng yusuan bao minsheng gongcheng], Tianshan Net (Online), 14 

319 

January 10; Han Xiaoyi, Huang Yan, and Zhang Xinjun, ‘‘3rd Session of 11th Xinjiang Autonomous Region People’s Congress Concludes’’ [Xinjiang zizhiqu shiyi jie renda sanci huiyi bimu], 

Tianshan Net, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 17 January 10. 8 Compare the most recent version of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on 

the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu shehui zhi’an 

zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97 and 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, arts. 5, 11, 16, 25, 31, 42, to the 1997 version of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er 

zizhiqu shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, effective 11 December 97. For a detailed comparison between the two versions, see ‘‘Revised Regulation From Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3. 9For examples of such cases, see, e.g., ‘‘Number of Trials for State Security Crimes in Xinjiang 

Increases in 2009,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 

10, 3. 10For a detailed comparison between the XUAR regulation and other provincial-level regulations, see ‘‘Revised Regulation From Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3. 11 ‘‘Xinjiang Beefs Up Special Police Unit for Safety,’’ Xinhua (Online), 3 February 10. 12 ‘‘At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach 60,000’’ [Jinnianmo 

wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 wan zhi], China News Service (Online), 

15 January 09. 13 ‘‘Urumqi To Establish 10,000 Person Full-Time Patrol Team’’ [Wulumuqi shi jiang jian wan 

ren zhuanzhi xunluodui], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 24 September 

09. 14 ‘‘Urumqi Public Security Organs Deploy Special Social Order Prevention and Control Operation’’ [Wu shi gong’an jiguan bushu zhi’an fangkong zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 18 June 10. 15Li Xing, ‘‘Wang Lequan Speaks at Meeting To Summarize, Commend Stability Maintenance 

Work in the Autonomous Region, Stresses Need To Consolidate and Expand Further What Has 

Been Achieved,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 9 February 10 (Open Source Center, 25 February 10). 16 Based on Commission search of legal databases in China. 17See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic Unity Education 

[Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, arts. 12, 18, 22. For detailed analysis of the regulation, see ‘‘ ‘Ethnic Unity’ Regulation 

Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free Expression,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 

Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 18 Ibid., art. 37. 19 ‘‘Those Who Fabricate and Spread Harmful Information Will Be Severely Punished in Accordance With Law’’ [Bianzao chuanbo youhai xinxizhe jiang yifa yancheng], Urumqi Online, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 26 January 10; ‘‘Public Security Organs at All Levels in Xinjiang 

Strike Hard Against Cases of Fabricating and Intentionally Spreading Harmful Information’’ 

[Xinjiang geji gongan jiguan yanli daji bianzao guyi chuanbo youhai xinxi anjian], Tianshan Net 

(Online), 7 February 10. 20See, e.g., ‘‘Xinjiang To Strengthen Education on National Unity Among Youth,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 October 09; ‘‘Xinjiang Normal University Uses Various Means To Launch Ethnic Unity 

Education, Over 10,000 Students and Staff Participate in the Studies’’ [Xinjiang shida duozhong 

jucuo kaizhan minzu tuanjie jiaoyu wan yu xuesheng zhigong canjia xuexi], Legal Daily, reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 15 October 09; Wang Fei, ‘‘Content on Ethnic Unity Education Brought Into Next Year’s High School Entrance Exams’’ [Minzu tuanjie 

jiaoyu neirong mingnian naru wulumuqi zhongkao], Xinhua (Online), 21 October 09. 21See analysis in ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to 

July 5 Incident,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 2. 22See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Countering Riots, China Rounds Up Hundreds,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 19 July 09; David Eimer, ‘‘As China Reels From 184 Deaths in Urumqi Riots, a Beaten 

Woman Fears for Her Husband,’’ Telegraph (Online), 11 July 09; ‘‘Tight Security in Xinjiang,’’ 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 July 09; Kathrin Hille, ‘‘Xinjiang Widens Crackdown on Uighurs,’’ 

Financial Times (Online), 19 July 09. See also analysis in ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 2. 23 Ibid. 24 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘ ‘We Are Afraid To Even Look for Them’: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests,’’ October 2009, 5. 25 Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ‘‘Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices From the 2009 Unrest in Urumqi,’’ 1 July 10, 28–30. 26 ‘‘Xinjiang High People’s Court Establishes Leading Group for Trying ‘7–5’ Cases’’ [Xinjiang 

gaoyuan chengli shenli ‘‘7–5’’ anjian lingdao xiaozu], Legal Daily, reprinted in Gansu Daily (Online), 16 July 09. 27 ‘‘Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 437 Cases of Endangering State Security’’ 

[Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua (Online), 15 January 09. 28 Beijing Judicial Bureau Lawyer Work Management Division (Online), ‘‘Beijing Judicial Bureau Lawyer Work Management Division’s Urgent Notice Regarding Requiring All Lawyers in 

the City To Be Cautious in Offering Legal Services in the Urumqi ‘July 5’ Beating, Smashing, 

Looting, and Burning Serious Violent Criminal Incident’’ [Beijing shi sifaju lushi gongzuo 

guanlichu guanyu yaoqiu quanshi lushi shenzhong wei wulumuqi shi ‘7.5’ da za qiang shao 

yanzhong baoli fanzui shijian tigong falu fuwu de jinji tongzhi], 8 July 09; ‘‘Xinjiang Lawyers 

Indicate All Legal Arrangements in Relation to July 5 Incident Will Be Made by Authorities’’ 

320 

[Xinjiang lushi zhi 7.5 shijian xiangguan susong you guanfang tongyi anpai], Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 14 July 09; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Concern over 

Mainland Lawyers’ Freedom To Legal Practice [sic] on Urumqi Protest Cases,’’ 15 July 09. See 

also ‘‘Defense Attorneys Free for Riot Suspects,’’ Global Times (Online), 24 July 09. Following 

the first set of trials in October, Li Fangping, a human rights lawyer in Beijing, said he was 

not aware of any Beijing lawyers who were representing defendants in the Xinjiang trials. ‘‘China’s Xinjiang Trials Fail Global Standards: Rights Group,’’ Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 

Yahoo! (Online), 16 October 09. 29 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘China: Authorities Widen Crackdown After Xinjiang 

Riots,’’ 10 July 09. 30 Journalists present at one day of the trials, cited in a December 23 article from the Australian, said that authorities told them ‘‘not to write detailed reports or conduct their own investigations into the murders or the accused,’’ according to a paraphrasing of their remarks. The 

journalists also said they were notified of the trials less than one day in advance, according to 

the article. Michael Sainsbury, ‘‘More Uighurs Sentenced to Death in China,’’ Australian (Online), 23 December 09. On criminal procedure, see PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 

79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 151(5). 31Michael Sainsbury, ‘‘More Uighurs Sentenced to Death in China,’’ Australian (Online), 23 

December 09. 32On failure to publicize judgments in the trials, see the analysis in ‘‘198 People in Xinjiang 

Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of Transparency,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. On criminal procedure, see PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 163. 33 ‘‘Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 Sentenced for Deadly Riot,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 7 March 10; ‘‘198 People in 97 Cases Already Tried and Sentenced in Urumqi 

‘7–5’ Incident’’ [Wulumuqi ‘‘7–5’’ shijian yi shenli xuanpan 97 an 198 ren], Xinhua (Online), 7 

March 10. See analysis in ‘‘198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by 

Lack of Transparency,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 

10, 2. 34 Information in this table is based on CECC analysis of Chinese media reports on the Internet and on PDFs of hard copy articles from the Xinjiang Daily made available through Open 

Source Center. See ‘‘198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of 

Transparency,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. 35 ‘‘Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 437 Cases of Endangering State Security’’ 

[Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua (Online), 15 January 09; Cui Jia, ‘‘Xinjiang Courts Handle Rising Security Cases,’’ China Daily (Online), 16 January 09. For additional background and analysis, see ‘‘Number of Trials for State Security Crimes 

in Xinjiang Increases in 2009,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 

5 February 10, 3. 36For information on the 2008 statistics, see ‘‘State Security Cases From Xinjiang Appear To 

Surge in 2008,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 2009, 3. 37See generally analysis of the July trials, including information on the charges involved, in 

‘‘198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of Transparency,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. For Chinese reporting on the trials, including information on charges involved, see, e.g., ‘‘Judgment Pronounced 

in Three Cases in Urumqi Incident of Serious Violent Crimes of Beating, Smashing. Looting, 

and Burning’’ [Wulumuqi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui shijian san anjian yishen 

xuanpan], Xinhua (Online), 12 October 09; Rena Wubuli, ‘‘Urumqi Openly Tries Three Cases of 

Serious Violent Crimes of Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning’’ [Wulumuqi gongkai shenli 

sanqi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 15 October 09; ‘‘Urumqi Intermediate Court Openly Tries and Pronounces Judgment in 

Five Serious Violent Criminal Cases of Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning’’ [Wulumuqi 

zhongyuan gongkai shenli xuanpan wu qi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui anjian], 

Xinhua (Online), 3 December 09; ‘‘Urumqi Intermediate Court Again Openly Tries and Pronounces Judgment in Five Serious Violent Criminal Cases of Beating, Smashing, Looting, and 

Burning’’ [Wulumuqi zhongyuan you gongkai shenli xuanpan wu qi da za qiang shao yanzhong 

baoli fanzui anjian], Xinhua (Online), 4 December 09; Cao Huijuan, ‘‘Urumqi Intermediate Court 

Publicly Pronounces Judgment in Five Serious Violent Criminal Cases’’ [Wulumuqi zhongyuan 

gongkai xuanpan wu qi yanzhong baoli fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang 

Bingtuan Net (Online), 24 December 09. 38 As discussed in this section, it appears likely that not all trials related to July 2009 events 

were reported in the media, meaning some trials related to alleged crimes committed in July 

2009 could have involved state security crimes but were not publicized. It is also possible that 

the number of trials connected in some way to events in July 2009 exceeds the number officially 

categorized as related to the July events and publicized as such. 39See, e.g., CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 168–171; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 

10 October 2009, 243–248. 40 ‘‘Official: Internet Cut in Xinjiang To Prevent Riot From Spreading,’’ Xinhua (Online), 7 

July 09. 41 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Government News Office, ‘‘Announcement 

Concerning Progressive Opening of Related Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang 

xiangguan tongxin yewu de gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 December 09. 42See, e.g., ‘‘Urumqi Tense, Quiet After Violence,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 July 09; Cui 

Jia, ‘‘More Web Sites Back Online in Xinjiang,’’ China Daily (Online), 8 February 10. For additional analysis, see ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow 

of Information,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2. 

321 

43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19. 44 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People’s Government News Office, ‘‘Announcement 

Concerning Progressive Opening of Related Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang 

xiangguan tongxin yewu de gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 December 09; Cui Jia, ‘‘SMS Returns to Xinjiang,’’ China Daily (Online), 18 January 

10; ‘‘China Lifts Ban on International Calls in Xinjiang,’’ Agence France-Presse, 20 January 10 

(Open Source Center, 20 January 10); ‘‘Across China: Xinjiang,’’ China Daily (Online), 10 February 10; ‘‘Nur Bekri: All Commercial Web Sites in Xinjiang Already Fully Open’’ [Nu’er baikeli: 

xinjiang suoyou shangye wangzhan yi quanbu kaifang], Xinhua (Online), 7 March 10. 45 Xinjiang News Office, ‘‘Xinjiang Internet Services Completely Resumed on the 14th’’ 

[Xinjiang hulianwang yewu 14 ri quanmian huifu], reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 14 May 10. 46See, e.g., ‘‘Xinjiang Online, Controls Remain,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 May 10; Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Open Letter to the [sic] Xinjiang’s Party Secretary,’’ 20 May 10. 47 ‘‘Xinjiang Strictly Limits Outside Information, Prohibits Online Discussion of July 5’’ 

[Xinjiang yankong jingwai xinxi jinzhi wangluo tanlun qi wu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 June 

10; ‘‘Close to Riot Anniversary, Heavy Forces in Urumqi ‘Strike Hard’ ’’ [Linjian saoluan 

zhounian wulumuqi zhongbing ‘‘yanda’’], Ming Pao, reprinted in Yahoo! (Online), 19 June 10; 

‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Prohibit Public From Accepting Interviews With Foreign Media Without 

Authorization’’ [Xinjiang dangju jinzhi minzhong shanzi jieshou wai mei caifang], Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 15 June 10; China’s Far West: Conditions in Xinjiang One Year After Demonstrations and Riots, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 19 July 

10, Written Statement Submitted by Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Correspondent for BNA, 

Inc., and Freelance Journalist. 48 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion Regulation [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 

40. See additional analysis in ‘‘Xinjiang Government Issues Internet Regulation, Keeps Strict 

Controls on Information,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 3–4. 49For a comparison of the XUAR regulation to regulations elsewhere in China, see ‘‘Xinjiang 

Government Issues Internet Regulation, Keeps Strict Controls on Information,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 3–4. 50Wen Linuo, ‘‘ ‘Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion Regulation (Draft)’ Submitted 

for Deliberation’’ [‘‘Zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli (cao’an)’’ tijiao shenyi], Xinjiang Metropolitan 

News, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 23 September 09, paraphrasing the remarks of 

XUAR People’s Congress Legal Committee Vice Chairman Abdurazak To ̈mu ̈ r. 51 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion Regulation [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 

41. 52Kashgar District Public Security Bureau, Kashgar District Procuratorate, Kashgar District 

Intermediate Court (Online), ‘‘Announcement Concerning Striking Hard in Accordance With 

Law Against Using the Internet, Cell Phone, Etc. To Carry Out Criminal Activity’’ [Guanyu yifa 

yanli daji liyong hulianwang, shouji deng jinxing fanzui huodong de tonggao], 10 March 10. 53 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10. 

For details on specific stipulations related to controls over free expression, see, e.g., articles 12, 

13, 14, 18, 22, and 23, as well as detailed analysis of the regulation in ‘‘Xinjiang ‘Ethnic Unity’ 

Regulation Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free Expression,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 54 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 1994, 

amended 11 December 1997, revised 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, art. 25. For detailed analysis of the regulation, see ‘‘Revised Social Order Regulation in Xinjiang Places New 

Emphasis on State Security,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 

March 10, 3. 55 ‘‘Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist Thought: Summary of Autonomous 

Region’s 2009 ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work’’ [Laolao 

zhanling shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ gongzuo 

zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10. 56 ‘‘Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist Thought: Summary of Autonomous 

Region’s 2009 ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Work’’ [Laolao 

zhanling shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ gongzuo 

zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10. 57See, e.g., ‘‘Build a Firm Line of Defense Against Separatism and Infiltration, Interview With 

Zhou Huilin, Deputy Director of National ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal 

Publications’ Office’’ [Gouzhu fan fenlie fan shentou de jiangu fangxian fang quanguo ‘‘saohuang 

dafei’’ bangongshi fuzhuren zhou huilin], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 December 09; ‘‘National 

‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ ‘Tianshan Project’ Forum 

Opens in Xinjiang [Quanguo ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ ‘‘tianshan gongcheng’’ zuotanhui zai xinjiang 

zhaokai], China Press and Publications Net, reprinted in Liaoning Province Press and Publications Bureau (Online), 25 November 09. 58 ‘‘Build a Firm Line of Defense Against Separatism and Infiltration, Interview With Zhou 

Huilin, Deputy Director of National ‘Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Office’’ [Gouzhu fan fenlie fan shentou de jiangu fangxian fang quanguo ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ 

bangongshi fuzhuren zhou huilin], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 December 09. 59 ‘‘Two Held for Leaks,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 September 09; ‘‘Standoff Over Death 

in Custody,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 September 09. 

322 

60 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘UA 252/09 Risk of Torture. China: Haji Memet (m), 

Abdusalam Nasir (m),’’ 25 September 09. 61 ‘‘Uyghur Held in Leak Case,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 June 10. Based on information 

reported in the article, the current status of Haji Memet appears unclear. 62See, e.g., Alexa Olesen, ‘‘China Sentences Uighur Writer to 15 Years in Jail,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 23 July 10; ‘‘Uyghur Journalist Gets 15 Years,’’ 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 July 10. For information on the charge against him, see ‘‘Many 

Scholars Make Appeal: Release Xinjiang Reporter, Respect Freedom of Speech’’ [Zhong xuezhe 

huyu: shifang xinjiang jizhe zunzhong yanlun ziyou], Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 30 July 10. 63 ‘‘Uyghur Webmasters Sentenced,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 July 10; Uyghur American 

Association (Online), ‘‘Uyghur American Association Strongly Condemns the Sentencing of Three 

Uyghur Webmasters,’’ 29 July 10; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Imprisons 3 Men Who Maintained 

Uighur Web Sites,’’ New York Times (Online), 30 July 10. 64 Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Imprisons 3 Men Who Maintained Uighur Web Sites,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 30 July 10. 65 Uyghur American Association (Online), ‘‘Uyghur American Association Strongly Condemns 

the Sentencing of Three Uyghur Webmasters,’’ 29 July 10. The Uyghur American Association 

article notes that the precise dates Nijat Azat and Nureli were taken into detention are not 

known. Unidentified men took Dilshat Perhat from his home on August 7, 2009. In addition, 

authorities previously had detained Dilshat Perhat from July 24 until August 2 to interrogate 

him about events on July 5. Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Manchester Student Appeals for 

Brother’s Release From Detention in China,’’ 22 October 09; ‘‘Call for Uyghurs’ Release,’’ Radio 

Free Asia (Online), 15 December 09. 66 ‘‘Call for Uyghurs’ Release,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 December 09; ‘‘Founders of 

Uyghur Web Sites Such as Diyarim and Selkin Are Being Detained in ‘Black Jails’ (1)’’ [Diyarim 

we selkin qatarliq uyghur tor betlirining qurghuchiliri ‘qara tu ̈ rmiler’de tutup turulmaqta (1)], 

Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 December 09; ‘‘Founders of Uyghur Web Sites Such as Diyarim 

and Selkin Are Being Detained in ‘Black Jails’ (2)’’ [Diyarim we selkin qatarliq uyghur tor 

betlirining qurghuchiliri ‘qara tu ̈ rmiler’de tutup turulmaqta (2)], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 

December 09. 67 Alexa Olesen, ‘‘Chinese Economist Missing, Apparently Detained,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 9 July 09. 68 Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘ ‘Justice, Justice’: The July 2009 Protests in Xinjiang, 

China,’’ 2 July 10, 25; ‘‘Uyghur Web Moderators Get Life,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 August 

10; Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ‘‘Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices From the 2009 Unrest in Urumqi,’’ 1 July 10, 16. 69 Xinjiang Public Security Department Information Office, ‘‘Those Who Fabricate and Spread 

Harmful Information Will Be Severely Punished in Accordance With Law’’ [Bianzao chuanbo 

youhai xinxizhe jiang yifa yancheng], reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 26 January 10; Li Qin, ‘‘Public Security Organs at All Levels in Xinjiang Strike Hard Against Cases of Fabricating and Intentionally Spreading Harmful Information’’ [Xinjiang geji gongan jiguan yanli daji bianzao guyi 

chuanbo youhai xinxi anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 10; ‘‘Xinjiang Investigates and 

Handles Over 100 Cases of Fabricating and Spreading Harmful Information’’ [Xinjiang chachu 

bai yu qi bianzao chuanbo youhai xinxi an], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan Net 

(Online), 25 February 10. 70 ‘‘Creating and Spreading Rumors, Harming Public Rights and Interests Will Receive Legal 

Punishment’’ [Zaoyao chuanyao weihai gongmin quanyi yao shou falu chengchu], Xinjiang Legal 

Daily (Online), 19 May 10. 71For comprehensive reporting on the Forum, see, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘The 

CPC Central Committee and State Council Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen 

Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, 

Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,’’ 

Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10). For information on past development efforts, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263–264. 72Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and State Council Hold 

Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang 

Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, 

and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,’’ Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 

10). See also Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ‘‘Xinjiang Support Package Unveiled,’’ China Daily (Online), 

21 May 10. 73See, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and State Council 

Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou 

Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, 

Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,’’ Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 

23 May 10). 74Wang Jing, ‘‘Natural Resource Tax Reformed, Xinjiang Precedes Others’’ [Ziyuan shui gaige 

xinjiang xianxing], Caixin (Online), 21 May 10. 75See, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and State Council 

Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou 

Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, 

Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,’’ Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 

23 May 10). See also Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ‘‘Xinjiang Support Package Unveiled,’’ China Daily 

(Online), 21 May 10. 76 Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ‘‘Xinjiang Support Package Unveiled,’’ China Daily (Online), 21 May 

10. See also Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and State Council 

Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou 

Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, 

323 

Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,’’ Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 

23 May 10). 77 Ibid. For more information on the population make-up in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, see Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Online), ‘‘Inquiry into Issues 

Regarding Development of Bingtuan Units With Ethnic Minority Inhabitants, Against a Background of Economic Assimilation’’ [Jingji ronghe beijing xia bingtuan shaoshu minzu juju 

danwei fazhan de xiangguan wenti tantao], 20 April 10; State Council Information Office, White 

Paper on the History and Development of Xinjiang, May 2003. 78 Cui Jia, ‘‘New Measures To Boost Xinjiang Livelihoods,’’ China Daily (Online), 28 May 10. 

See Language Policy and Bilingual Education in this section for more information on bilingual 

education. 79 ‘‘Zhang Chunxian: Focus on Grasping 7 Aspects of Work To Extend to Xinjiang People’’ 

[Zhang chunxian: zhongdian zhuahao qi fangmian gongzuo huiji xinjiang renmin], Xinjiang 

Daily (Online), 28 May 10. 80For examples of the Mandarin focus of bilingual education in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see, e.g., Shen Yaping and Duan Zhu, ‘‘Results of Xinjiang’s Promotion of ‘Bilingual Education’ Remarkable’’ [Xinjiang tuijin ‘‘shuangyu jiaoxue’’ chengxiao xianzhu], Xinjiang 

Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 7 December 05; Cui Jia, ‘‘Mandarin Lessons in 

Xinjiang ‘Help Fight Terrorism,’ ’’ China Daily (Online), 4 June 09; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic Affairs Commission, ‘‘This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle 

Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try ‘Bilingual’ Education’’ [Jin qiu xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi 

chuzhong changshi ‘‘shuangyu’’ jiaoxue], reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 

9 May 08. 81Li Dehua and Yan Wenlu, ‘‘Xinjiang’s Ethnic Minority Students To Master Putonghua by 

2020’’ [2020 nian xinjiang shaoshu minzu xuesheng ke tong guoyu], China News Service, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 28 May 10. 82See, e.g., PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 

15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 4, and PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 

31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 37. 2005 Implementing 

Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority languages, but also 

place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting bilingual education and bilingual teaching 

staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the ‘‘PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law’’ 

[Guowuyuan shishi ‘‘zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa’’ ruogan guiding], issued 

19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22. 83 Jing Bo, ‘‘750,000 Ethnic Minority Students in Xinjiang Receive ‘Bilingual’ Education’’ 

[Xinjiang 75 wan shaoshu minzu xuesheng jieshou ‘‘shuangyu’’ jiaoxue], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 12 January 10. 84 Ibid. 85 ‘‘China To Invest Over 5 Billion To Strengthen Xinjiang ‘Bilingual’ Education’’ [Zhongguo 

jiang touzi yu 50 yi jiaqiang xinjiang ‘‘shuangyu’’ jiaoyu], China News Service, reprinted in 

NetEase (Online), 3 December 09; ‘‘Xinjiang Universalizes Ethnic Minority Preschool Two-Year 

‘Bilingual’ Education by 2012’’ [2012 Xinjiang puji shaoshu minzu xueqian liangnian ‘‘shuangyu’’ 

jiaoyu], Tianshan Net (Online), 12 January 10. See also ‘‘Xinjiang’s Ethnic Minority Students 

To Master Putonghua by 2020’’ [2020 nian xinjiang shaoshu minzu xuesheng ke tong guoyu], 

China News Service, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 28 May 10. 86See citations that follow, as well as, e.g., ‘‘Education Department 2010 Education Work 

Meeting Puts Forth New Multipronged Policy’’ [Jiaoyuting 2010 nian jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi 

chutai duoxiang xinzheng], Xinjiang Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 February 10. 87 CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 259; Xinjiang Education Department, Circular 

Concerning Organization and Implementation of 2008 Fall Quarter Secondary and Elementary 

Ethnic Minority ‘Bilingual’ Teacher Training Project [Guanyu zuzhi shishi 2008 nian qiuji 

xinjiang zhong xiaoxue shaoshu minzu ‘‘shuangyu’’ jiaoshi peixun gongcheng de tongzhi], issued 

5 June 08. 88Zhang Xinjun, ‘‘Xinjiang Implements Free Education for Students at Teachers Colleges, 

This Year Plans To Recruit 6000’’ [Xinjiang shishi mianfei shifansheng jiaoyu jinnian jihua 

zhaosheng 6000 ming], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 3 March 10. 89Du Guanrui, ‘‘Xinjiang To Recruit 66,000 in 2010 College Entrance Exams’’ [Xinjiang 2010 

nian gaokao zhaosheng 6.6 wan], Xinjiang Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 3 March 03. 90 ‘‘Xinjiang Government Job Candidates Required To Be Bilingual,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 April 

10; Li Minyan, ‘‘Xinjiang Government Employees Pass Through Bilingual Barrier Before Taking 

Up Posts’’ [Xinjiang gongwuyuan shanggang xian guo shuangyu guan], Xinjiang Metropolitan 

News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 28 April 10. 91See, e.g., ‘‘Autonomous Region’s First Term of ‘Bilingual’ Capacity Strengthening Class Concludes’’ [Zizhiqu shou qi ‘‘shuangyu’’ nengli qianghua ban jieye], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 17 July 

10; Kashgar District Government (Online), ‘‘Shufu County Carries Out ‘Bilingual Exam’ for 

Township and Town Cadres’’ [Shufu xian dui xiangzhen ganbu ‘‘shuangyu’’ jinxing kaohe], 12 

July 10. 92 ‘‘National Population and Family Planning Commission Starts Series of Operations To Support Xinjiang’’ [Guojia renkou jishengwei qidong zhiyuan xinjiang xilie xingdong], China Population News, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 3 November 09. For additional analysis, see ‘‘Authorities Begin New Incentive Initiative To Continue 

Population Control in Xinjiang,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 

8 January 10, 2. 93 ‘‘State Supports 26 Xinjiang Counties in Starting ‘Family Planning Special Rewards Policy’ ’’ 

[Guojia fuchi xinjiang 26 ge xian qidong ‘‘jihua shengyu teshu jiangli zhengce’’], Xinhua (Online), 

2 November 09. For additional analysis, see ‘‘Authorities Begin New Incentive Initiative To ConVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00329 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
324 

tinue Population Control in Xinjiang,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

No. 1, 8 January 10, 2. 94 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Population and Family Planning 

[Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], issued 28 November 02, effective 1 

January 03, amended 26 November 04 and 25 May 06, art. 15. 95Fang Yunjing and Gao Cong, ‘‘Nuerlan Abudumanjin Calls for Tighter Control on Population Growth, Sense of Urgency About Growth Which Is Too Fast,′′ Xinjiang Daily, 20 March 

10 (Open Source Center, 23 April 10). 96See, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 2009, 262; ‘‘Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing 

Births in Minority Areas To Curb Population Growth,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, April 2006, 15–16. 97See Population Planning Policies in this section for more information. 98 ‘‘Uyghur Grandfather Detained,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 October 09; ‘‘Arzigu ̈l Tursun’s 

Dad, Tursunjan Hesen, Is Arrested’’ [Arzigu ̈l tursunning dadisi tursunjan hesen qolgha e ́linghan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 October 09. For more information on Arzigul Tursun, 

see ‘‘Authorities Cancel Plans To Subject Uyghur Woman to Forced Abortion (Update),’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2008, 3; ‘‘New Son for Uyghur 

Woman,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 February 09. 99 ‘‘Arzigu ̈l Tursun’s Dad, Tursunjan Hesen, Is Arrested’’ [Arzigu ̈l tursunning dadisi tursunjan 

hesen qolgha e ́linghan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 October 09; ‘‘Uyghur Grandfather Detained,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 October 09. 100Kelly Chan, ‘‘Urumqi Acts Against Migrants,’’ South China Morning Post, 10 August 09 

(Open Source Center, 10 August 09); ‘‘Xinjiang To Clean Up and Reorganize Disorderly Flow 

of Floating Population’’ [Xinjiang jiang qingli zhengdun liudong renkou wuxu liudong], Xinhua, 

reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 9 August 09. 101 ‘‘Xinjiang To Clean Up and Reorganize Disorderly Flow of Floating Population’’ [Xinjiang 

jiang qingli zhengdun liudong renkou wuxu liudong], Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 9 August 09. 102 ‘‘Shuimogou District, Urumqi, Implements Three Grades of Control on Housing Rentals’’ 

[Wulumuqi shi shui qu fangwu chuzu shixing sanji guanli], Xinhua (Online), 2 December 09. 103See generally Urumqi Municipality Regulation on the Management of Room Rentals 

[Wulumuqi shi fangwu zulin guanli tiaoli], adopted 23 April 10, issued 10 June 10, effective 1 

July 10. 104 ‘‘Urumqi Puts Forth Regulation To Standardize Management of Rental Housing’’ 

[Wulumuqi chutai fagui guifan fangwu zulin guanli], Tianshan Net (Online), 26 April 10. 105 Compare the most recent version of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation 

on the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu shehui zhi’an 

zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97 and 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, arts. 5(7), 14, 19, 36 to the 1997 version of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu’er 

zizhiqu shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, effective 11 December 97, art. 29. For a comparison between the XUAR regulation and other provincial-level regulations, see ‘‘Revised Regulation From Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 106 ‘‘Slum, Shanty Towns To Be Removed From Urumqi,’’ Xinhua (Online), 11 July 10. 107 ‘‘Heijiashan, Urumqi, Realizes Total Coverage in Management of Floating Population’’ 

[Wulumuqi heijiashan shixian quan fugai guanli liudong renkou], Tianshan Net (Online), 6 July 

10; Mao Yong, ‘‘Rectification Activities in Areas Heavily Hit in Urumqi ‘7–5’ Incident, Over 900 

‘Uninvited Tenants’ Advised To Leave’’ [Wu shi ‘7–5’ shijian zhong zaiqu zhengzhi quan li 900 

yu ming ‘busu fangke’], Xinhua (Online), 23 November 09. 108 ‘‘Slum, Shanty Towns To Be Removed From Urumqi,’’ Xinhua (Online), 11 July 10. 109 Autonomous Region Party Committee, Autonomous Region People’s Government Opinion 

Concerning Employment Promotion Work [Zizhiqu dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu 

cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian], issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2). 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid., art. 1(5). 112 National Bureau of Statistics of China (Online), ‘‘Communique ́ of Main Data for Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region From 2005 National 1 Percent Population Sampling’’ [Xinjiang 

weiwu’er zizhiqu 2005 nian quanguo 1% renkou chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju gongbao], 20 

March 06. 113 Autonomous Region Party Committee, Autonomous Region People’s Government Opinion 

Concerning Employment Promotion Work [Zizhiqu dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu 

cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian], issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2). See also descriptions of the 

opinion in, e.g., Zhang Xinyu and Liu Yuexian, ‘‘ ‘Autonomous Region Party Committee, People’s 

Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work’ Put Into Effect in October’’ 

[‘‘Zizhiqu dangwei, renmin zhengfu guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian’’ 10 yue shishi], 

Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Economic Net (Online), 24 September 09; ‘‘China’s Xinjiang 

Orders Businesses To Recruit More Locals,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 24 

September 09. 114See references to adhering to the opinion, which do not include reference to taking steps 

to promote hiring of ethnic minorities, at, e.g., ‘‘Baicheng County Vigorously Implements Activity for ‘Year for All the People To Undertake Pioneering Work’ ’’ [Baicheng xian dali shishi 

‘‘quanmin chuangye nian’’ huodong], Tianshan Net (Online), 23 February 10; ‘‘Xinjiang’s 

Kashgar District Urgently Requires 50,000 Construction Workers From Interior This Year’’ 

[Xinjiang kashi diqu jinnian jixu neidi wu wan ming jianzhu gongren], China News Service, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 8 March 10. 115See, e.g., Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority, ‘‘Introduction to General Situation for 

2010 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Recruitment of Civil Servants’’ [2010 

325 

nian bingtuan mianxiang shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan zongti qingkuang jieshao], reprinted in 

Huatu Education (Online), 15 May 10; Xinjiang PetroChina Pipe Engineering Co., Ltd., ‘‘Ordinary Workers, Description and Qualifications for Positions’’ [Pugong zhiwei miaoshu ji yaoqiu], 

Internet Recruiting Association (Online), 11 August 10. Also see analysis in ‘‘Discriminatory Job 

Hiring Practices Continue in Xinjiang,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

No. 8, 2010 (forthcoming). For reports from past years, see, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 

10 October 07, 107; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264. 116See analysis in ‘‘Discriminatory Job Hiring Practices Continue in Xinjiang,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 2010 (forthcoming). See also Bingtuan Personnel 

Testing Authority, ‘‘Introduction to General Situation for 2010 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Recruitment of Civil Servants’’ [2010 nian bingtuan mianxiang shehui 

zhaolu gongwuyuan zongti qingkuang jieshao], reprinted in Huatu Education (Online), 15 May 

10. 117For detailed information on the program and reports from previous years on the use of coercion to gain participation and on exploitative working conditions, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264–266. For a report from the past year, see Choi Chi-Yuk and Ng TzeWei, ‘‘Broken Promises, Broken Dreams for Migrant Workers in Guangdong,’’ South China 

Morning Post, 30 December 09 (Open Source Center, 30 December 09). For information on the 

program as described in official Chinese sources, see, e.g., State Council Information Office, 

White Paper on Development and Progress in Xinjiang, 21 September 09; ‘‘Urumqi July 5 Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang’s Labor Export Policy’’ [Wulumuqi ‘‘7–5’’ shijian buyingxiang 

xinjiang laowu shuchu zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 09. 118See, e.g., A.S. Bhalla and Shufang Qiu, Poverty and Inequality Among Chinese Minorities 

(London: Routledge, 2006), 139; James A. Millward, ‘‘Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning Point? ’’ 28 Central Asian Survey No. 4, 347, 349 (2009). 119 ‘‘Nu’er Bekri Refutes the Allegation That Women of Uyghur Ethnic Group ‘Are Forced To 

Work in the Interior of the Country,’ ’’ Xinhua, 18 July 09 (Open Source Center, 20 July 09). 120 A description of the Guangdong program as government sponsored is in Liang Qiwen, 

‘‘Rape Rumor Led to Brawl, 2 Killed,’’ China Daily (Online), 30 June 09. For additional information, see ‘‘Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2. 121 ‘‘Urumqi ‘7–5’ Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang’s Labor Export Policy’’ [Wulumuqi ‘‘7– 

5’’ shijian buyingxiang xinjiang laowu shuchu zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 

09; ‘‘Resolutely Drive Ahead With Projects for the People’s Livelihood for On-the-Spot Labor 

Transfers and Employment in the Interior’’ [Jiandingbuyi tuijin jiudi zhuanyi he neidi jiuye zhe 

xiang minsheng gongsheng], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 30 July 09. 122 ‘‘Isolated Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March Toward Openness’’ [Xinjiang 

shaoshu minzu nongmin’gong cong fengbi maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Ethnicities News (Online), 25 January 10. 123 ‘‘Urumqi ‘7–5’ Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang’s Labor Export Policy’’ [Wulumuqi ‘‘7– 

5’’ shijian buyingxiang xinjiang laowu shuchu zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 

09. 124The XUAR Human Resources and Social Security Department replaced the XUAR Labor 

and Social Security Department. ‘‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Human Resources and 

Social Security Department Hangs Out Its Shingle’’ [Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu renli ziyuan he 

shehui baozhang ting guapai], Tianshan Net (Online), 23 June 09. 125 ‘‘Isolated Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March Toward Openness’’ [Xinjiang 

shaoshu minzu nongmingong cong fengbi maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in China 

Ethnicities News (Online), 25 January 10. 126Liu Shihe, ‘‘Qaba County: Earned Income From Transfer of Surplus Woman Labor Force 

Exceeds Ten Million Yuan’’ [Habahe xian: funu fuyu laodongli zhuanyi chuangshou chao 

qianwan yuan], Xinhua (Online), 19 November 09. 127Zhao Jun, ‘‘69 Girls From Peyziwat Go to Zhejiang To Work’’ [Jiashi 69 ming guniang fu 

zhejiang wugong], Tianshan Net, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 31 January 10. 128For general developments from the past year and background on the project, see ‘‘Chinese 

Media Reports on Continued Demolition in Kashgar, Resettlement Numbers Vary,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3, and ‘‘Demolition of Kashgar’s 

Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2. 129 Abulimiti Suopiaji, ‘‘Reconstruction of Kashgar’s Old City Achieves Zero Petitions to Higher 

Authorities’’ [Kashi shi laocheng qu gaizao shixian ling shangfang], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in 

Xinhua (Online), 4 March 10. For analysis of this development, see ‘‘Kashgar Authorities Announce ‘Zero Tolerance’ for Petitioning Higher Level Authorities About Old City Demolition,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. 130 Abulimiti Suopiaji, ‘‘Reconstruction of Kashgar’s Old City Achieves Zero Petitions to Higher 

Authorities’’ [Kashi shi laocheng qu gaizao shixian ling shangfang], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in 

Xinhua (Online), 4 March 10. 131 Ibid. 132Zhu Mingjun, ‘‘Kashgar Makes Files of Historic Architecture, Excavates and Protects Traditional Local Cultural Buildings’’ [Kashi shi wei lishi jianzhu jiandang wajue baohu chuantong 

wenhua de minjian jianzhu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 1 November 09. 133See, e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), ‘‘District Launches Meeting To Report on 

the Comprehensive Administration of Kashgar Old City’’ [Diqu zhaokai kashi shi laocheng qu 

zonghe zhili xiangmu huibaohui], 13 August 09; Michael Wines, ‘‘To Protect an Ancient City, 

China Moves To Raze It,’’ New York Times (Online), 27 May 09. See analysis in ‘‘Demolition 

of Kashgar’s Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2. 

326 

134For assessments of the area’s cultural heritage, see, e.g., ‘‘Demolition of Kashgar’s Old City 

Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2. For information on subsequent 

demolitions of historic property, see ‘‘Xanliq Madrassa—Level-One Protected Cultural Relic in 

Kashgar—Is Destroyed’’ [Qeshqerde 1-derijilik qoghdilidighan medeniy yadikarliq—xanliq 

medrisi che ́qiwe ́tildi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 June 09; Ng Tze-wei, ‘‘Uygurs Decry ‘Reconstruction Project’ Set To Change the Face of Old Town in Kashgar,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 30 December 09. 135See, e.g., ‘‘Kashgar, Xinjiang, Old City Reconstruction Completely Conforms to International Practice’’ [Xinjiang kashi laocheng qu gaizao wanquan fuhe guoji guanli], China News 

Service, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 8 March 10; Kathleen E. McLaughlin, 

‘‘Unesco, China and a Uighur Mystery,’’ Global Post (Online), 13 January 10. 136Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ‘‘Unesco, China and a Uighur Mystery,’’ Global Post (Online), 13 

January 10. 137See past examples in CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 176; CECC, 2009 Annual 

Report, 10 October 09, 261–262. See also cases cited in Amnesty International (Online), ‘‘Open 

Letter on Uighur Asylum Seekers in Cambodia,’’ 16 December 09. 138See, e.g., Sebastian Strangio, ‘‘Uighurs’ Fate Seen as Stain on Kingdom,’’ Phnom Penh Post 

(Online), 21 December 09 (reporting three children among those deported, ages not provided); 

World Uyghur Congress (Online), ‘‘World Uyghur Congress ‘Outraged’ by Cambodia’s Return of 

Uyghurs to China,’’ 22 December 09 (noting the group included a one-year-old infant and a sixmonth-old infant); Frank Brennan, ‘‘Uighurs Failed by Cambodia’s Sham Refugee Law,’’ Eureka 

Street (Online), 3 March 10 (citing information from the Jesuit Refugee Service, which assisted 

the Uyghurs in Cambodia, and noting that two infants were in the group). 139 In condemning the deportation of the group, the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) noted that the deportation violated the principle of non-refoulement, which 

applies to refugees and asylum seekers, and breaches refugee law for returning the group before 

the UNHCR had made a refugee status determination. ‘‘UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced 

Return of Uighur Asylum-Seekers From Cambodia,’’ UN News Centre (Online), 21 December 09. 

On the principle of non-refoulement, see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 

28 July 51 by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 

Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 50, 

art. 33(1). In addition, under the Convention Against Torture, ‘‘No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 

believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’’ Convention against Torture 

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, entry into force 26 June 87, art. 3(1). UN Special 

Rapporteur Manfred Nowak described the deportation as a violation of the Convention against 

Torture. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), ‘‘UN Expert on Torture 

Seriously Concerned About Forcible Return of Ethnic Uyghurs From Cambodia to China,’’ 22 

December 09. 140Sebastian Strangio, ‘‘Uighurs’ Fate Seen as Stain on Kingdom,’’ Phnom Penh Post (Online), 

21 December 09; John Pomfret, ‘‘Uighur Protesters Land in Cambodia,’’ Washington Post (Online), 3 December 09; ‘‘Deported Uyghur Had Cambodian Visa,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 

December 09. 141 ‘‘PRC FM Spokesman Warns Against UN ‘Haven’ for Criminal Uyghurs in Cambodia,’’ 

Agence France-Presse, 15 December 09 (Open Source Center, 15 December 09). 142See, e.g., ‘‘UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of Uighur Asylum-Seekers From 

Cambodia,’’ UN News Centre (Online), 21 December 09; Sebastian Strangio, ‘‘Uighurs’ Fate Seen 

as Stain on Kingdom,’’ Phnom Penh Post (Online), 21 December 09. 143Seth Mydans, ‘‘After Expelling Uighurs, Cambodia Approves Chinese Investments,’’ New 

York Times (Online), 21 December 09. 144 ‘‘China Says Handling With [sic] Citizens Deported From Cambodia Its Own Affair,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09. 145Zhou Yingfeng and Cui Qingxin, ‘‘Our Country Busts Major Terrorist Group Case, Details 

on Public Security Bureau Announcement’’ [Woguo pohuo zhongda kongbu zuzhi an gong’anbu 

gongbu xiangqing], Xinhua (Online), 24 June 10. 146 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Online), ‘‘The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on their Application,’’ December 1996, II(i)(10). See also Monette Zard, ‘‘Exclusion, Terrorism and the Refugee Convention,’’ Forced Migration Review (Online), June 2002. 147 ‘‘Uyghur Asylum Bid in Cambodia,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 December 09. 

Notes to Section V—Tibet 

1For more information on Chinese Government plans, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 

2008–2009, 22 October 09, 39–51. 2See, e.g., ‘‘Chinese Vice Premier Urges U.S. To Respect China’s Core Interests,’’ Xinhua (Online), 15 March 10; Zhang Shuo, ‘‘Exclusive Interview With China’s Former Diplomat on Three 

Questions in China-US Relations,’’ Xinhua, 9 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 9 

March 10); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Transcript of Regular News Conference by PRC Foreign 

Ministry on 23 February 2010, Moderated by Spokesman Qin Gang,’’ 23 February 10 (translated 

in Open Source Center, 23 February 10). See also CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 

22 October 09, 5–8. 3Zhang Shuo, ‘‘Exclusive Interview With China’s Former Diplomat on Three Questions in 

China-US Relations,’’ Xinhua, 9 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 9 March 10) (‘‘The 

US side should particularly handle the Taiwan and Tibet issues appropriately . . . stop doing 

anything that harms China’s core interests and major interests . . . .’’); ‘‘China Expects Positive 

Results From Obama’s Visit,’’ Xinhua (Online), 10 November 09 (‘‘In response to questions concerning Taiwan and Tibet, Qin . . . [said] the two countries should respect each other’s core 

327 

interests and concerns.’’); Prepared Statement of Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of the People’s 

Republic of China, ‘‘Address at the Dinner Marking the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment 

of China-US Diplomatic Relations Hosted by the Brookings Institution,’’ reprinted in The Brookings Institution (Online), 11 December 08 (‘‘Taiwan and Tibet-related issues concern China’s 

core interests.’’). 4 ‘‘Policy on Tibet Is Consistent,’’ China Daily (Online), 17 October 09 (United Front Work Department Executive Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun stated, ‘‘However, the so-called ‘middle line’ is 

still in nature ‘Tibet independence.’ ’’); ‘‘Claiming ‘Fear in Tibet’, Dalai Lama Tells Lies Again,’’ 

People’s Daily, reprinted in China Tibet (Online), 6 November 09 (‘‘50 years have passed since 

the 14th Dalai Lama fled abroad. During that period, the Dalai Lama claimed himself to be 

a ‘religious leader,’ but engaged himself in many political events aiming at splitting China and 

disrupting the development of Tibet.’’); ‘‘China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 12 November 09 (‘‘[Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang] characterized the 

Dalai Lama as ‘the ringleader of feudal serf system,’ saying his acts separated the motherland 

and breached the country’s unity and territorial integrity.’’). 5 ‘‘China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 November 09 (Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang: ‘‘China is firmly opposed to the Dalai Lama’s acts in international arena and opposed to any contact between the Dalai Lama and leading officials of foreign governments in whatever name or capacity.’’); Wang Wei and Ge Xiangwen, ‘‘Obama’s Upcoming Visit to China Will Promote the Development of China-US Relations in the New Period—Exclusive Interview With Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong,’’ 

Xinhua, 8 November 09 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 November 09) (Zhou Wenzhong 

[implied reference to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan and Uyghur entities]: ‘‘The Chinese side 

also hopes that the US side will fulfill its commitment with actual deeds on not providing any 

support or convenience for anti-Chinese separatist forces.’’); ‘‘China Urges U.S. To Respect Its 

Stance on Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 November 09 (‘‘[Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang] 

characterized the Dalai Lama as ‘the ringleader of feudal serf system,’ saying his acts separated 

the motherland and breached the country’s unity and territorial integrity.’’). 6Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), ‘‘Statement From the Press Secretary on the President’s Meeting With His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama,’’ 18 February 10. 7See, e.g., ‘‘China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 November 

09 (Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang: ‘‘China is firmly opposed to the Dalai Lama’s acts 

in international arena and opposed to any contact between the Dalai Lama and leading officials 

of foreign governments in whatever name or capacity.’’); ‘‘If the United States Challenges China’s Core Interests, It Will Pay a Heavy Price,’’ Hong Kong China News Agency, 7 January 10 

(translated in Open Source Center, 10 January 10) (‘‘But viewing from the current China-US 

relations, the US Government has acted willfully regardless of China’s interests. The United 

States may pay a heavy price for this, heavier than any time in the past.’’); ‘‘China-U.S. Relationship Enters ‘Dalai Round,’ ’’ People’s Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 5 February 10 (‘‘The China-U.S. relationship has undergone drastic changes within a period of only 

1 month in early 2010. The Dalai Lama, who is just like an old drum that has nearly been 

cracked by the west and China, is likely to bring this round of the China-U.S. conflict to a climax.’’). 8Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), ‘‘Press Briefing by Press Secretary 

Robert Gibbs,’’ 6 October 09. 9 ‘‘Factbox: Obama Has Busy Itinerary on Whirlwind Asian Tour,’’ Reuters (Online), 12 November 09. 10Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), ‘‘Briefing by White House Press 

Secretary Robert Gibbs and CEA Chair Christina Romer, 2/11/10,’’ 11 February 10. 11See, e.g., ‘‘What’s the Purpose of Dalai Lama’s Incitement/ ’’ People’s Daily, reprinted in 

China Tibet Online (Online), 5 November 09 (‘‘Recently, the Dalai Lama is going through a dramatically tough time in the international arena. He has been given the silent treatment, even 

U.S. President Barack Obama had quietly refused to meet him.’’); ‘‘Wen Wei Po: Why ‘Dalai 

Card’ Depreciated,’’ People’s Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 5 November 09 

(‘‘Certainly, the White House couldn’t admit the open secret that President Obama bent to China’s pressure, and said Obama hadn’t refused to meet with the Dalai Lama and would do that 

later.’’). 12See, e.g., ‘‘Transcript of Regular News Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry on 27 March 

2008, Moderated by Spokesman Qin Gang,’’ Xinhua, 27 March 08 (translated in Open Source 

Center, 27 March 08) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Qin Gang: ‘‘Tibet affairs are China’s internal affairs.’’ Qin also said, ‘‘I would like to point out here that the Tibet issue falls 

entirely within China’s internal affairs and brooks no interference by foreign countries.’’). 13 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10); ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ 

Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 

March 10, 2. 14 ‘‘Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for Governing Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 

10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 January 10); ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 15 ‘‘CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Convenes Meeting To Study, Promote Work on 

Tibet’s Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Order and Stability,’’ Xinhua, 8 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 January 10). 16 ‘‘Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for Governing Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 

10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 January 10); ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 

328 

17 ‘‘Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for Governing Tibet,’’ Xinhua, 

10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 January 10). CECC staff have determined 

that the phrase ‘‘Tibetan traits’’ is more suitable than ‘‘Tibetan characters’’ as provided in the 

OSC translation. ‘‘Hu Calls for Great Wall of Stability in Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 9 March 09. 

President Hu Jintao used similar language in March 2009 when he told Tibetan deputies to the 

National People’s Congress that the TAR ‘‘must stick to the development road with Chinese 

characteristics and Tibetan features.’’ 18See, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 25–28; Section IV— 

Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 187–191; Monitoring 

Compliance with Human Rights—Special Focus for 2005: China’s Minorities and Government 

Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law in CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13–23. 19 ‘‘List of Political Bureau Members of 17th CPC Central Committee,’’ Xinhua (Online), 22 

October 07. Of the 25 Politburo members, one is listed as an ethnic Hui. 20 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10); ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ 

Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 

March 10. 21 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). In addition to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the other seven members of the Standing Committee are: Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee Wu Bangguo; Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin; Head of the Party Leading Group for Publicity and Ideological 

Work Li Changchun; Vice President of China Xi Jinping; Vice Premier of the State Council Li 

Keqiang; Secretary of the Party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection He Guoqiang; and 

Secretary of the Party Central Committee’s Politics and Law Commission Zhou Yongkang. 

Xinhua reported that a total of 332 officials representing the Communist Party and central government, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), other provincial-level areas, the People’s Liberation Army, and the People’s Armed Police attended the meeting. 22 ‘‘Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji Address CPC, State Council Tibet Work Meeting in Beijing,’’ 

Xinhua, 29 June 01 (translated in Open Source Center, 29 June 01). 23Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, 

Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 percent of Tibetans were classified as ‘‘rural’’ 

population: Table 1–2 shows the total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 1–2a 

shows the ‘‘city’’ population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1–2b shows the ‘‘town’’ population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 1–2c shows the ‘‘rural’’ population of Tibetans in 

2000 as 4,721,199. 24For more information on the wave of protests (and some rioting) that began on March 10, 

2008, in Lhasa then spread across the Tibetan areas of China, see Section V—Tibet in CECC, 

2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 182–204; ‘‘Protests Fueled by Patriotic Education Continue 

Amidst Lockdowns,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 10 April 08. 25 National Bureau of Statistics of China (Online), China Statistical Yearbook 2008, last visited 26 March 10, Table 9–21. The national average per capita net income of rural households 

in 2007 was 4,140 yuan; the Tibet Autonomous Region average per capita net income of rural 

households in 2007 was 2,788 yuan (67 percent of the national average). 26 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). 27 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). For information on the compulsory settlement of Tibetan nomadic herders, which, according to the Chinese Government, makes improved government services available to the herders, see Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘ ‘No One Has the Liberty To 

Refuse’—Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,’’ June 2007. 28 Ibid. 29 ‘‘Tibet Parliament Session Announces Leadership Changes,’’ Xinhua (Online), 15 January 

10. Xinhua reported that Pema Choling (Padma Choling, Baima Chilin) was Vice Chairman of 

the TAR government until the TAR People’s Congress ‘‘unanimously elected’’ him to the post 

of Chairman of the government. Pema Choling replaced Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) as 

head of the TAR government. (‘‘Elections’’ of officials by deputies to people’s congresses are procedural formalities, not electoral contests.) 30 ‘‘Tibet Chairman Baima Chilin: It Is Necessary To Continuously and Vigorously Implement 

the Strategy of ‘Making the People Well-Off and of Invigorating Tibet,’ ’’ Xinhua, 9 March 10 

(translated in Open Source Center, 20 March 10). 31See, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 46–53; ‘‘SichuanTibet Railway Work To Start, Impact May Far Surpass Qinghai-Tibet Railway,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 1. 32 ‘‘China To Achieve Fast-Paced Development, Lasting Stability in Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

23 January 10. 33 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). Xinhua reported that the forum called on ‘‘central authorities’’ 

to ‘‘provide greater policy support and promote new steps forward in the development of the TiVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00334 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
329 

betan-inhabited areas in these four provinces’’ and for provincial Party and government officials 

to ‘‘grasp [Tibet work] as a key task in their respective economic and social development, and 

mobilize forces of various quarters of the whole province to support the development of these 

areas.’’ 34 Ibid. 35Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, 

Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10–4. The following are figures for the 2000 Tibetan population in the Tibet 

Autonomous Region and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures (TAPs) and Tibetan autonomous 

counties (TACs) in other provinces. Tibet Autonomous Region (2,427,168). Qinghai province: 

Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (62,520); Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (235,663); Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (40,371); Huangnan (Malho) TAP (142,360); Guoluo (Golog) TAP (126,395); and Yushu 

(Yushul) TAP (255,167). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (329,278), and Tianzhu (Pari) 

TAC, Wuwei prefecture (66,125). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (703,168); Aba (Ngaba) 

Tibetan and Qiang AP (455,238); and Muli (Mili) TAC (40,312). Yunnan province: Diqing 

(Dechen) TAP (117,099). 36Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: self-published CD– 

ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: Haibei (Tsojang) TAP 

(52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 square kilometers, or 6,912 

square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444 square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and 

Yushu (Yushul) TAP (197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: 

Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) and Tianzhu (Pari) 

TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP 

(153,870 square kilometers, or 59,409 square miles); Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles); and Muli (Mili) TAC 

(11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP 

(23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). The Table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological Survey: one square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. Based on data in the Table, the 10 

TAPs and 2 TACs have a total area of approximately 1.04 million square kilometers (402,000 

square miles). The TAR and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties are contiguous 

and total approximately 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 square miles). Xining municipality and Haidong prefecture, located in Qinghai province, have a total area of 20,919 square 

kilometers, or 8,077 square miles, and are not Tibetan autonomous areas. 37Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 

‘‘The Way Forward on Tibet,’’ reprinted in Center for Strategic and International Studies (Online), 5 March 10. In his statement, Lodi Gyari refers to ‘‘the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People that we had presented during the Eighth Round in November 2008.’’ 

‘‘Statement of Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Tibetan Delegation, Following the 

8th Round of Discussions With Representatives of the Chinese Leadership,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 6 November 08. The eighth round of dialogue took place in China on 

October 30 to November 5, 2008. For analysis of the Memorandum, see CECC, Special Topic 

Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 17–28. 38 ‘‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile 

(Online), 16 November 08. 39For information on the Chinese and Tibetan dialogue positions, see, e.g., CECC, Special 

Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 13–29; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 

09, 273–277; ‘‘China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to Dialogue,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 17 November 08; Section IV— 

Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 184–191. 40For more information on the Communist Party’s anti-Dalai Lama campaign and efforts to 

end the Dalai Lama’s influence on Tibetans in China, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 

October 09, 270, 278, 283; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 185–186; CECC, 2007 

Annual Report, 10 October 07, 192–205; and CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 83– 

84. 41 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). 42The explanation is available in an academic abstract available on the Web site of Sun Yatsen University in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province. Liu Senlin, ‘‘Abstract: Contradictions 

Within Modern Dialectics—Reflecting on the Marxist Dialectic Group’’ [Maodun de xiandai 

xingsi—dui makesizhuyi qunti bianzhengfa de yi zhong sikao], Sun Yat-sen University (Online), 

Department of Philosophy, 6 May 03. (Scroll down the Web page for an English translation.) 43 ‘‘State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,’’ Xinhua, 

2 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10). Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department, used the term ‘‘separating the motherland’’ (i.e., splittism, separatism) in listing the Party’s principal demands of the Dalai Lama. 44 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). 

330 

45 ‘‘Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji Address CPC, State Council Tibet Work Meeting in Beijing,’’ 

Xinhua, 29 June 01 (translated in Open Source Center, 29 June 01) (‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council held the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in Beijing on 25–27 June.’’). 46 Cao Deshung, ‘‘Tibet Rail Construction Completed,’’ China Daily (Online), 15 October 05; 

CECC Staff Analysis. Building several additional railways through rugged, high-elevation terrain, and paying costs that may be higher than during the 2001 to 2005 construction period 

of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, could reach a total cost that is a multiple of the cost of the 

Qinghai-Tibet railway. For information on planned railways linking Tibetan autonomous areas 

to adjacent provincial-level administrative areas, see ‘‘Sichuan-Tibet Railway Work To Start, Impact May Far Surpass Qinghai-Tibet Railway,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 

Update, No. 5, 2009, 1; CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 45–51; 

CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 285–286; and CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 193. 47 CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 184–185 (‘‘Peaceful Tibetan protesters called for 

Tibetan independence, the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, the release of the Panchen Lama, and 

freedom of religion generally.’’). 48 ‘‘China To Achieve Fast-Paced Development, Lasting Stability in Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 

23 January 10. The Fifth Forum took place from January 18 to 20. 49Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ‘‘Press Statement,’’ 25 January 10. According to the January 25 press statement, the Dalai Lama’s envoys would arrive in China ‘‘tomorrow’’ (i.e., January 26). 50 ‘‘Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),’’ China Daily (Online), 11 February 10 (UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun: ‘‘This was the longest interval after 

we resumed contact and talks in 2002.’’). ‘‘China-Dalai Lama Dialogue Round Ends: Party Restates Hard Line, Tibetans Begin Meeting,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2008, 2. The report discusses the seventh round of dialogue in July 2008 and 

the eighth round in November 2008. ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Envoys To Begin China Visit on May 3,’’ 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 5 May 08. The report lists the first six 

sessions of dialogue: September 2002, May–June 2003, September 2004, June–July 2005, February 2006, and June–July 2007. All of the rounds of dialogue took place in China except in 

2005, when the envoys met their counterparts in Bern, Switzerland. 51 ‘‘Du Qinglin Receives Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,’’ Xinhua, 1 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 February 10). 52For information on the Chinese and Tibetan dialogue positions, see, e.g., CECC, Special 

Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 13–29; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 

09, 273–277; ‘‘China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to Dialogue,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 30 July 08; Section IV—Tibet: 

Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 184–191. 53 ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of 

the Delegation Which Visited China in January 2010,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 

2 February 10 (‘‘[The Chinese side] also provided us with a detailed briefing on recent developments relating to Tibet, particularly on the important Fifth Tibet Work Forum.’’). ‘‘Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),’’ China Daily (Online), 11 February 

10. UFWD Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun said that UFWD Head Du Qinglin told the Dalai Lama’s 

envoys that the ‘‘Fifth National Conference on Work in Tibet’’ (Fifth Tibet Work Forum) ‘‘established the strategic target for Tibet to achieve leap-forward development and long-lasting peace 

and stability.’’ 54 ‘‘Zhu Weiqun: The Recent Talks With the Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives Had One 

Thing Different From the Past,’’ Zhongguo Tongxun She, 4 February 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 4 February 10). 55Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 

‘‘The Way Forward on Tibet,’’ reprinted in Center for Strategic and International Studies (Online), 5 March 10. 56 ‘‘State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,’’ Xinhua, 

2 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10); ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy 

of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Which Visited China 

in January 2010,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 2 February 10. In his statement, the 

Special Envoy referred to the new conditions as ‘‘the four not to indulge in,’’ but he did not list 

them. 57 ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of 

the Delegation Which Visited China in January 2010,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 

2 February 10; ‘‘Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 16 November 08. 58 ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of 

the Delegation Which Visited China in January 2010,’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 

2 February 10. 59 ‘‘Press Conference on Central Govt’s Contacts With Dalai Lama (Text),’’ China Daily (Online), 11 February 10. 60 ‘‘State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,’’ Xinhua, 

2 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10). 61 Cui Jia, ‘‘Tibet’s Development on Course,’’ China Daily (Online), 11 March 10. 62 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). 63 Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 

March 05, translated in China Elections and Governance (Online). 

331 

64Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ 

(Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi ‘‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei’an banfa], issued 

29 December 06, effective 1 March 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on 

the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan 

fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 13 July 07, issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 

07. 65Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ 

(Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi ‘‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07. For more information on the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 10 October 07, 193–196. 66State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei’an banfa], issued 29 December 06, effective 1 

March 07, arts. 2–8. 67State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], 

passed 13 July 07, issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on the 

measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 10 October 

07, 196–197; ‘‘New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 22 August 07. 68The Buddhist Association of China is a ‘‘patriotic religious organization’’ established under 

Chinese Government regulation and charged with serving as a ‘‘bridge’’ linking Buddhists to the 

Chinese Government and the Communist Party. See, e.g., ‘‘At the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau’s Second Collective Study, Hu Jintao Stresses the Need To Comprehensively Implement the Party’s Basic Policy on Religious Work and Actively Do a Good Job in Religious Work 

Under the New Situation,’’ Xinhua, 19 December 07 (translated in Open Source Center, 20 December 07). Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao discussed the role of ‘‘patriotic religious organizations’’ in performing the Party’s ‘‘religious work.’’ Regulation on Religious Affairs 

[Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 6, translated in China 

Elections and Governance (Online) (‘‘The establishment, alteration, or cancellation of registration, of a religious body shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations 

on Registration Administration of Associations. The articles of association of a religious body 

shall comply with the relevant provisions of the Regulations on Registration Administration of 

Associations.’’). Lazhen, ‘‘Tibet Leader Speaks on Dalai, Regional Stability,’’ Tibet People’s 

Radio, 27 October 99 (translated in Open Source Center, 27 October 99). Jiabao, Vice Chairman 

of the TAR government, told ‘‘regional leaders’’ attending the seventh congress of the Tibet 

Branch of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), ‘‘The BAC is a patriotic religious organization under the leadership of the party and the government and is a bridge for linking believers 

with the party and the government.’’ 69 Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zang chuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], 

issued 8 May 09, effective 10 January 10. 70 Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 

March 05, art. 17, translated in China Elections and Governance (Online). 71 Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zang chuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], 

issued 8 May 09, effective 10 January 10, arts. 3, 14. Article 3 lists, among other things, political 

prerequisites: ‘‘Support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Socialist system, love the country and love religion, uphold the laws, regulations, rules and policies of the 

state, have a clear-cut stance on upholding the unification of the Motherland, oppose ethnic 

splittism, and uphold concord between religions and a harmonious society.’’ Article 14 stipulates: 

‘‘The professional religious personnel already confirmed prior to the implementation of this 

Measure do not need to perform anew the confirmation procedures. The ‘Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel Certificate’ may be issued after the professional religious personnel’s Democratic Management Committee had put forth an examination opinion according to the 

provisions of Article 3 of this Measure, reported to the local Buddhist Association for approval, 

and reported to the local county-level People’s Government Religious Affairs department for recording.’’ 72 Ibid., art. 14. 73 ‘‘Tibet To Complete Registration and Record Keeping of Places of Religious Activities and 

Qualifications of Living Buddhas This Year,’’ Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source 

Center, 11 January 10). According to the article, then-Chairman of the TAR government, Jampa 

Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) ‘‘disclosed’’ that authorities would complete ‘‘registration and record 

filing of places of religious activities and the qualifications of living Buddhas, monks and nuns 

this year.’’ (Chinese officials and media often refer to a trulku, a teacher whom Tibetan Buddhists believe is part of a lineage of reincarnations that can span centuries, as a ‘‘living Buddha.’’) 74State Council Information Office, White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China 

[Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou zhuangkuang], 16 October 97. ‘‘Currently China has 

13,000-some Buddhist temples and about 200,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. Among them are 

120,000 lamas and nuns, more than 1,700 Living Buddhas, and 3,000-some temples of Tibetan 

Buddhism and nearly 10,000 Bhiksu and senior monks and more than 1,600 temples of Pali 

Buddhism.’’ 75 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

Religious Freedom Report 2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09. 

According to the report: ‘‘According to the June 21, 2009, People’s Daily, there are 3,000 Tibetan 

Buddhist monasteries with 120,000 monks and nuns in the TAR and Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan 

332 

and Yunnan Provinces. In the TAR, there are 1,789 religious venues with 46,000 monks and 

nuns.’’ 76The Chinese Government accuses the Dalai Lama of ‘‘splittism,’’ a crime under China’s 

Criminal Law. PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 

97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 

05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 103. CECC Staff Interview, September 2003. A Chinese 

judicial official explained that a photograph of Gedun Choekyi Nyima is illegal because the Chinese Government had already approved a legal Panchen Lama (Gyaltsen Norbu). According to 

the official, disseminating photos of an illegal Panchen Lama can endanger the sovereignty and 

unity of the country, and aims to split the country. 77P. Jeffrey Hopkins, ‘‘The Identification of the Eleventh Panchen Lama,’’ University of Virginia, Center for South Asian Studies Newsletter, Fall 1995. ‘‘May 14, 1995. After extensive 

analysis of over thirty children is performed, four prophecies are consulted from oracles, and 

nine divinations including the dough-ball ritual are performed, the Dalai Lama formally recognizes a six-year-old boy, Dedhun [Gedun] Choekyi Nyima, born on April 25, 1989, in the Lhari 

District of Nagchu, Tibet, as the eleventh Panchen Lama.’’ 78The Welcome message on the home page of the 17th Karmapa contains this greeting: ‘‘Welcome to the site of H.H. 17th Karmapa Trinley Thaye Dorje, the spiritual head of the Karma 

Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.’’ 79The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising on 

March 10 of every year that he has lived in exile, beginning in 1960. Office of His Holiness the 

Dalai Lama (Online), ‘‘Chronology of Events,’’ last visited 1 April 10 (refers to the March 10, 

1959, events as the beginning of the ‘‘Tibetan People’s Uprising’’); Office of His Holiness the 

Dalai Lama (Online), ‘‘Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 51st Anniversary of 

the Tibetan National Uprising Day,’’ 10 March 10 (title of speech refers to the March 10, 1959, 

events as the ‘‘Tibetan People’s Uprising’’). 80Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ‘‘Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama 

on the 51st Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day,’’ 10 March 10. 81 ‘‘China Says Missing Panchen Lama Is Living in Tibet,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in New 

York Times (Online), 7 March 10. 82 Ibid. 83 ‘‘Baima Chilin: Dalai’s Designated So-Called Reincarnation Soul Boy Is a Victim and Now 

Lives Like an Ordinary Citizen,’’ Xinhua, 7 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 

March 10). 84 ‘‘New Panchen Lama Enthroned at Ceremony, 8 December Events Summarized,’’ Xinhua, 

8 December 95 (Open Source Center, 8 December 95). The enthronement ceremony in Rikaze 

(Shigatse) was on December 8, 1995. ‘‘The ceremony was jointly presided over and monitored 

by Li Tieying, the representative of the State Council and a State Councilor, Gyalcan Norbu 

[Gyaltsen Norbu], special commissioner and chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Government, and Ye Xiaowen, special commissioner and director of the State Council’s Religious Affairs Bureau.’’ (The Chairman of the TAR government and the boy whom Chinese officials installed as the Panchen Lama were both named Gyaltsen Norbu.) 85 ‘‘11th Panchen Lama Makes Debut in China’s Political Arena,’’ Xinhua (Online), 4 March 

10. 86 ‘‘Lama Feared China’s Control,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 January 10. 87Kagyu Office of His Holiness the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa (Online), ‘‘Press Statement From 

His Holiness the 17th Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje,’’ 27 April 01 (flight into exile); Kagyu Office of His Holiness the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa (Online), ‘‘His Holiness the 17th Gyalwang 

Karmapa,’’ last visited 27 May 10 (age at flight into exile). 88 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). For more information, see ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2. 89 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 

Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 25 January 10). ‘‘By 2015 . . . the construction of the infrastructure will have 

made great progress . . . . By 2020 . . . the conditions of the infrastructure will have been comprehensively improved . . . .’’ (Reports seen by Commission staff on Hu’s Fifth Forum remarks 

did not include mention of a network of railways planned for the Tibetan plateau.) 90 Ibid. ‘‘Hu Jintao pointed out that in promoting Tibet’s development by leaps and bounds, 

it is all the more necessary to . . . turn Tibet into . . . an important strategic resources reserve 

base. . . . Hu Jintao emphasized that it is necessary to . . . strengthen the construction of the 

infrastructure and the development of the energy resources . . . .’’ 91 Ibid. ‘‘Continue to push forward the building of a socialist new countryside with the comfortable housing project as a breakthrough point . . . .’’ For more information on compulsory 

settlement, see ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ Priorities at 

‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2; 

Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘ ‘No One Has the Liberty To Refuse’—Tibetan Herders Forcibly 

Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,’’ June 2007. 92State Council Office for the Development of the West Region, Opinions on the Implementation of Certain Policy Measures for the Large-Scale Development of the West Region, issued 28 

August 01 (translated in Open Source Center, 20 December 01). (The opinion provides 2000 as 

the date of a State Council circular on implementation of the Great Western Development campaign.) 93 ‘‘Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for Governing Tibet, Tibet Finishes Painting ‘Warm Spring Picture’ of New Year,’’ Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open 

Source Center, 10 January 10); ‘‘Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010–2020 ‘Tibet Work’ 

333 

Priorities at ‘Fifth Forum,’ ’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 

March 10, 2. 94PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 

28 February 01, effective same day. For information on implementation of the Regional Ethnic 

Autonomy Law, see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 25–28; 

Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 187– 

191; Section III—Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights—Special Focus for 2005: China’s 

Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law in CECC, 

2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13–23. 95See, e.g., subsection titled Officials Acknowledge Tibetan Resentment Against the ‘‘Floating 

Population,’’ but Call for More, Better Migrant Services in CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 

2008–2009, 22 October 09, 43–46; subsection titled Economic Development vs. Ethnic Minorities’ 

Autonomous Rights in CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 192–194; subsection titled 

Tibetan Culture Under Chinese Development Policy and Practice in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 

10 October 07, 200–207; subsection titled Culture, Development, and Demography in CECC, 

2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 165–170. 96The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace, Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written Statement Submitted by Steven Marshall, Senior Advisor, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (‘‘Increasing Tibetan resentment against 

Chinese policies that impact diverse areas of Tibetan life—religious and economic, urban and 

pastoral—sheds light on why monks, townsfolk, and nomads risked participating in protests 

across a wide swath of the Tibetan plateau.’’). 97 CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 10, 46–53; CECC, 2009 Annual 

Report, 10 October 09, 285–286. 98Sichuan Provincial People’s Government (Online), ‘‘A Series of Major Projects To Kick Off 

in 2010,’’ 25 January 10; ‘‘Work on the Chengdu-Kangding Railway Planned To Start Next Year, 

Travel Time From Chengdu to Erlang Shan To Be 1.5 Hours’’ [Chengkang tielu yuji mingnian 

donggong cong chengdu dao erlangshan 1.5 xiaoshi], Huaxi Metropolitan News, reprinted in 

Sichuan Online (Online), 2 April 10. According to the Huaxi Metropolitan News report, the 

length of the Chengdu-Kangding link would be 344 kilometers. 99 ‘‘Work on the Chengdu-Kangding Railway Planned To Start Next Year, Travel Time From 

Chengdu to Erlang Shan To Be 1.5 Hours’’ [Chengkang tielu yuji mingnian donggong cong 

chengdu dao erlangshan 1.5 xiaoshi], Huaxi Metropolitan News, reprinted in Sichuan Online 

(Online), 2 April 10. 100Du Qingfeng and Zhang Mingha, ‘‘Pre-feasibility Study Underway for Lhasa-Linzhi Railway Construction’’ [Lasa zhi linzhi tielu jianshe jinxing yu kexingxing yanjiu], Tibet Daily, 13 

April 10, reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 15 April 10. 101 Ibid. 102 Edward Wong, ‘‘Dalai Lama To Visit Indian Region Claimed by China,’’ New York Times 

(Online), 22 October 09. The article describes the area as ‘‘heavily militarized’’ and ‘‘the focus 

of an intense territorial dispute between China and India.’’ Wang Yueh, ‘‘India Plans To Independently Develop a Disputed Area of Southern Tibetan Region,’’ Wen Wei Po, 20 August 09 

(translated in Open Source Center, 24 August 09). Michael Richardson, ‘‘Assuaging China’s Expanding ‘Core’ Concerns,’’ Japan Times (Online), 14 March 10 (‘‘Beijing insists that around 

90,000 square kilometers of territory in India’s mountainous northeast, covering virtually the 

whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh, is part of China.’’). For information on the link between 

the China-Dalai Lama dialogue and the China-India territorial dispute over Arunachal Pradesh, 

see, e.g., ‘‘China Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to Dialogue,’’ 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 30 July 08. 103Du Qingfeng and Zhang Mingha, ‘‘Pre-feasibility Study Underway for Lhasa-Linzhi Railway Construction’’ [Lasa zhi linzhi tielu jianshe jinxing yu kexingxing yanjiu], Tibet Daily, 13 

April 10, reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 15 April 10. 104 ‘‘Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 April 09 (‘‘China is also 

building a 254-km railway linking Xigaze with the regional capital Lhasa. Construction on the 

11-billion-yuan [US$1.61 billion] Qinghai-Tibet railway’s extension line started in 2008 and was 

expected to be completed in 2010.’’). See also ‘‘Government Announces Extension of QinghaiTibet Railway to Rikaze,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 

2006, 15. 105 Baqiao Wangjie, ‘‘An Expert From the Ministry of Railways Conducts On-Site Inspection 

of Preparatory Work for Lhasa-Shigatse Railway’’ [Tiedaobu zhuanjia shidi kaocha la ri tielu 

qianqi gongzuo], Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 10 March 10 (‘‘Shigatse 

Prefecture administration office leaders pointed out when reporting on preparatory work for the 

Lhasa-Shigatse Railway that the Lhasa-Shigatse route plan has already been confirmed and 

that they fully support it, and that they would do a good job of coordination, propaganda, land 

acquisition, demolition, relocation and compensation, logistical support and security management etc in order to create a good external environment for the project’s construction.’’). 106 ‘‘China Begins Extending Plateau Railway to Tibet’s Second Largest City,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 September 10. 107 ‘‘Tibet To Step Up Exploitation of Mineral Resources, Vowing To Be ‘Rational,’ ’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 12 March 10. 108 Ibid. According to the report, Dorje, a senior official with the TAR Land and Resources Department, said that resource exploitation would be ‘‘rational’’ and ‘‘minimize its impact on the 

environment.’’ 109 ‘‘Clash Over Cement Factory,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 May 10. According to RFA 

sources, 15 Tibetans were injured and 4 were detained. The factory began operation in 1985 

but processing and excavation areas have been expanded recently. Villagers petitioned government authorities in May 2010 for redress, claiming that the factory was ‘‘polluting the environVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00339 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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ment, severely damaging farms and pastures, disrupting villagers’ normal life, blocking village 

roads, and forcibly annexing village property, roads, religious sites, etc.’’ 110 ‘‘Villagers Renew Mine Protests,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 May 10. According to an 

RFA source, ‘‘thousands’’ of Tibetans had ‘‘attempted to block the Chinese from resuming mining 

activities,’’ and 5,000 People’s Armed Police were in the area. For information on the 2009 agreement to cease mining, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 287; ‘‘Mine Standoff Said 

Resolved,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 May 09. 111Qin Jiaofeng, Gama Duoji, and Quan Xiaoshu, ‘‘Make Every Effort To Promote Leapfrog 

Development in Tibet Through Adherence to ‘Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Traits’— 

Interview With National People’s Congress Deputy and Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman 

Padma Choling,’’ Xinhua, 10 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 March 10). 112 ‘‘Claiming ‘Fear in Tibet,’ Dalai Lama Tells Lies Again,’’ People’s Daily, reprinted in China 

Tibet Online (Online), 6 November 09. 113Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, June 2008), Table 3–4, 

‘‘Population Nationality.’’ In 2007, Tibetans made up 2,602,788 (95.1 percent) of the total TAR 

population of 2,735,867. ‘‘Claiming ‘Fear in Tibet,’ Dalai Lama Tells Lies Again,’’ People’s Daily, 

reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 6 November 09. According to the report, approximately 1.33 million TAR farmers and herders would have been moved into new housing by the 

end of 2009. 114State Council Information Office, White Paper on China’s Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups, 27 September 09. 115 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Top-Level Meeting in Beijing Sets Strategy on 

Tibet,’’ 29 January 10 (settlement threatening livelihoods); International Campaign for Tibet 

(Online), ‘‘ ‘An eco-friendly tourist city’: China’s Emerging Reconstruction Plans for Kyegu,’’ 5 

May 10 (‘‘ghetto-like’’ conditions arising in settlements). 116 Cui Jia, ‘‘ ‘Tibet’s Development on Course,’ ’’ China Daily (Online), 11 March 10. Lhasa 

Mayor Dorje Tsedrub (Doje Cezhug) made the remarks. 117 CECC Staff Analysis. The mayor’s remarks do not indicate whether official concern was 

focused mainly on non-Tibetan itinerant workers, whose presence some Tibetans resent, or on 

Tibetan itinerant workers, whom government officials may suspect of having participated in the 

rioting. See, e.g., subsection titled Officials Acknowledge Tibetan Resentment Against the 

‘‘Floating Population,’’ but Call for More, Better Migrant Services in CECC, Special Topic Paper: 

Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 43–46. 118For a discussion of official Chinese reports on the number and characterization of passengers traveling on the Qinghai-Tibet railway into the Tibet Autonomous Region, and of the 

views of some Tibetan residents of Lhasa toward the increase in non-Tibetans in Lhasa, see subsection titled Qinghai-Tibet Railway Carries 1.5 Million Passengers Into the TAR in First Year 

in Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203– 

204. 119 ‘‘Transcript of Tibet Officials’ 6 Mar Interview With Reporters During NPC Session,’’ 

Xinhua, 6 March 09 (translated in Open Source Center, 15 March 09); Lan Jinshan, ‘‘Zhang 

Yijiong’s Emphasis on the Promotion of Services and Management for Floating Population Sets 

a New Platform’’ [Zhang yijiong qiangdiao tuidong liudong renkou fuwu he guanli mai shang 

xin taijie], China Tibet News (Online), 3 September 08. See also ‘‘Unavoidable Internal Problems, Separatists Blamed for Lhasa Riot,’’ China Daily (Online), 19 March 09. 120 Xu Changan, ‘‘Wen Jiabao Explains China’s Ethnic Policy With Its Firm, Soft Aspects in 

Work Report,’’ Xinhua, 5 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 14 March 10). 121 Ibid. According to the report, ‘‘Analysts say this is the first government work report that 

raises the issue of reviewing services for and the management of the minority floating population.’’ 122 CECC Political Prisoner Database. Based on Political Prisoner Database data as of September 3, 2010, 98 political detentions of Tibetans were recorded for the portion of the Commission’s 2010 reporting year included in September 2009 through August 2010. In comparison, the 

PPD records the political detention of 181 Tibetans during the same period included in the Commission’s 2009 reporting year (September 2008 through August 2009). 123PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, 

amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 

29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 103 (‘‘splitting the State or undermining unity of the country’’), 

art. 111 (‘‘unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the territory’’). 124PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 

99, 14 March 04, arts. 35 (‘‘freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association’’), 36 

(‘‘freedom of religious belief’’). 125 ‘‘China Jails Tibetan Filmmaker,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 January 10. According to 

RFA, Tibetans discussed on camera ‘‘their views on Tibet’s exiled leader the Dalai Lama, the 

Beijing Olympics, and Chinese laws.’’ 126 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Founder of Tibetan Cultural Website Sentenced to 15 Years in Closed-Door Trial in Freedom of Expression Case,’’ 16 November 09; 

Woeser, ‘‘Tibetans Currently Suffering the Calamity of Imprisonment’’ [Zhengzai jingshou 

laoyuzhizai de zangren], Middle Way Blog, 19 December 09; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 

and Democracy (Online), ‘‘A Tibetan Writer-Photographer Sentenced,’’ 19 November 09; ‘‘Chinese Courts Use ‘Secrets’ Law To Sentence Tibetan Online Authors to Imprisonment,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10. 127 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10 (‘‘These people embody the characteristics the government says it wants 

in modern Tibetans . . . yet they, too, are being treated as criminals.’’); TibetInfoNet (Online), 

‘‘Landmark Sentencing/ ’’ 30 June 10 (‘‘. . . potentially a hard blow for the further development 

of the vigorous grassroots social and ecological activism that has spread over many parts of TiVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:21 Oct 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00340 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\61507.TXT DEIDRE
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betan regions.’’); Cara Anna, ‘‘China Now Pressuring Tibetans Outside Politics,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Yahoo (Online), 18 June 10 (‘‘. . . activist groups say a growing number of 

Tibetan intellectuals are coming under pressure from authorities determined to squelch all 

forms of dissent.’’). 128 CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also International Campaign for Tibet (Online), 

‘‘Fears for School Founder in Prison,’’ 12 September 05; Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ‘‘Clemency Granted to Tibetan Monk, Labor Activist,’’ 28 February 06. 129 CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Criminal Verdict of the 

Sichuan Province Ganzi Tibetan Minority Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court, 

2000. Ganzi Intermediate Court Verdict No. 11,’’ in Selection of Cases from the Criminal Law, 

August 2003, 42–55; ‘‘Party Congress Promotes Officials Linked to Harsh Policies Toward Tibetans,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 2. 130 CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also ‘‘Relatives Visit Imprisoned Buddhist Teacher 

Tenzin Deleg, Officials Report Ill Health,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

No. 6, 12 July 10, 4; CECC, Topic Paper: The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case 

Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality, 10 February 03. 131 CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 

142; CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 79–81; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Influential Tibetan Lama Sentenced to Eight and a Half Years in Prison,’’ 4 January 10. 132TibetInfoNet (Online), ‘‘Landmark Sentencing/ ’’ 30 June 10 (Karma Samdrub ‘‘establishment of an ambitious museum of Tibetan culture, in partnership with the [Party’s United Front 

Work Department]’’); Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Tibetans Fear a Broader Crackdown,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 June 10 (Karma Samdrub was the ‘‘kind of [Tibetan] 

who put the Chinese Communist Party at ease’’); Cara Anna, ‘‘China Now Pressuring Tibetans 

Outside Politics,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo (Online), 18 June 10 (Karma Samdrub 

‘‘won national awards and praise, and he stayed out of the region’s highly charged politics’’; 

Tagyal was ‘‘was seen by fellow Tibetans as an ‘official intellectual’ for usually toeing the Communist Party’s line’’); ‘‘Tibetan Quake Critic Still Held,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 April 10 

(Tagyal ‘‘has written books that largely aligned with the Chinese government’s views on modernization, religion, and culture in Tibet.’’); High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ‘‘Earthquake in 

Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual ‘Shogdung’ Detained in Xining,’’ 26 April 10 (Tagyal ‘‘argued 

that Tibetans should embrace modernisation and disassociate from traditional Buddhism learning as a means of overcoming their present condition.’’). 133 CECC Staff Analysis. 134Some reports observed that in Karma Dondrub’s case, charges may have been revived as 

retribution for his efforts to obtain release from detention or imprisonment of his two brothers 

who founded an environmental organization that criticized local officials for hunting protected 

wildlife. In Taygal’s case, detention followed veiled advice in a blog posting to which he was a 

signatory urging Tibetans who wished to contribute to relief funds for victims of the April 14, 

2010, Yushu earthquake to do so through non-Party, non-government channels. See, e.g., 

Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10 (‘‘relatives and friends believe revival of the decade-old charges stems from 

his efforts to gain the release of his two brothers’’); High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ‘‘Earthquake in Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual ‘Shogdung’ Detained in Xining,’’ 26 April 10 (‘‘do 

not send your donations to the accounts of a certain organisation or a certain group as if you 

were paying taxes’’). 135 ‘‘Old Charge Resurfaces Against Prominent Tibetan,’’ Reuters (Online), 1 June 10; ‘‘Tibetan 

Activist on Trial,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 June 10; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Tibetans Fear a 

Broader Crackdown,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 June 10. 136 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10. According to the report, Karma Samdrub founded the Qinghai Three 

River Environmental Protection Group which won awards including ‘‘a one million yuan (about 

US$130,000) grant as a ‘Model Project’ from the One Foundation, a charity created by the Chinese martial art movie star Jet Li; and the Earth Prize, an environmental prize jointly administered by Friends of the Earth Hong Kong and the Ford Motor company.’’ 137 Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Puts on Hold Trial of Tibet Environmentalist,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in Yahoo! (Online), 21 June 10 (‘‘accused local officials in eastern Tibet of 

poaching endangered species’’). Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘China: Drop Charges Against 

Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,’’ 10 June 10 (environmental organization; Jigme 

Namgyal’s sentence). According to the report, security officials accused Jigme Namgyal of offenses including ‘‘interfering with state power organizations’’ and ‘‘harming social stability’’ and 

ordered him on November 13, 2009, to serve one year and nine months’ reeducation through 

labor. ‘‘Tibetan Environmentalist Jailed for 5 Years,’’ Reuters (Online), 3 July 10. The Changdu 

(Chamdo) Intermediate People’s Court reportedly sentenced Rinchen Samdrub to five years’ imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’ because an article supportive of the Dalai Lama was posted 

on his Web site. ‘‘China ‘Jails Tibet Activist for Five Years,’ ’’ BBC (Online), 3 July 10. Rinchen 

Samdrub reportedly denied posting the article to his Web site. 138 High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ‘‘Earthquake in Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual 

‘Shogdung’ Detained in Xining,’’ 26 April 10 (‘‘embrace modernisation and disassociate from traditional Buddhism learning’’); Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Tibetans Fear a Broader Crackdown,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 June 10 (‘‘previously derided by many Tibetans 

for being ‘an official intellectual’ ’’). 139 ‘‘Quake Critic Arrested,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 June 10; High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ‘‘Earthquake in Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual ‘Shogdung’ Detained in Xining,’’ 26 

April 10. The High Peaks Pure Earth article provides a translation of a statement in a blog 

post to which Shogdung (Tagyal) was a signatory. The statement advised would-be contributors 

to Yushu quake victims, ‘‘However, do not send your donations to the accounts of a certain 

336 

organisation or a certain group as if you were paying taxes. The best thing to do is to send 

somebody one can fully trust to send one’s contributions.’’ 140See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘A ‘Raging Storm’: The Crackdown on 

Tibetan Writers and Artists After Tibet’s Spring 2008 Protests,’’ 18 May 10. 141 ‘‘Filmmaker’s Family To Appeal,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 January 10. According to the 

RFA article, which cited Reporters Without Borders (RSF), security officials detained Dondrub 

Wangchen on March 23, 2008. ‘‘China Jails Tibetan Filmmaker,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 

January 10. RFA sources reported that a ‘‘secret’’ trial convicted Dondrub Wangchen of ‘‘splitting 

the motherland.’’ See PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 

1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 

February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 103 (‘‘splitting the State or undermining unity 

of the country’’). See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on the case. 142 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Founder of Tibetan Cultural Website Sentenced to 15 Years in Closed-Door Trial in Freedom of Expression Case,’’ 16 November 09; ‘‘Chinese Courts Use ‘Secrets’ Law To Sentence Tibetan Online Authors to Imprisonment,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2. CECC Staff Analysis. 

Based on the ICT report that ‘‘disclosing state secrets’’ was involved, the charge may have been 

based on Article 111 of China’s Criminal Law (‘‘unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the territory’’). 143Woeser, ‘‘Tibetans Currently Suffering the Calamity of Imprisonment’’ [Zhengzai jingshou 

laoyuzhizai zangren], Middle Way Blog, 19 December 09. According to Tibetan blogger Woeser 

(Oezer, Weise), ‘‘Kunchok Tsephel was both a co-founder and editor of the first Tibetan literary 

website in China. . . . The accusations against [Konchog Tsephel] are connected to essays he 

published on his website . . . .’’ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information 

on the case. 144Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘A Tibetan Writer-Photographer Sentenced,’’ 19 November 09; ‘‘Chinese Courts Use ‘Secrets’ Law To Sentence Tibetan 

Online Authors to Imprisonment,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 

2, 5 February 10, 2. CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the TCHRD report that ‘‘disclosing state 

secrets’’ was involved, the charge may have been based on Article 111 of China’s Criminal Law 

(‘‘unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual 

outside the territory’’). See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on the 

case. 145Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Chinese Court Sentences 

Serthar Monk to Lengthy Prison Term,’’ 25 March 10 (detained ‘‘on suspicion of leaking information about Tibet’s situation to the ‘separatist forces’ outside [Tibet]); ‘‘Nephew of Deceased Buddhist Master Held for Almost a Year,’’ Phayul (Online), 23 June 09 (‘‘held on charges of leaking 

information to ‘separatist forces’ through phone and other means’’). CECC Staff Analysis. Based 

on TCHRD and Phayul reports of ‘‘leaking information’’ to ‘‘separatist forces’’ outside of China, 

the charge may have been based on Article 111 of China’s Criminal Law (‘‘unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the territory’’). See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information on the case. 146 ‘‘Tibetan Singer Gets Prison,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 March 10. 147 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetan Singer Tashi Dhondup Detained,’’ 8 

December 09. According to the ICT report, the lyrics of the CD entitled ‘‘Torture Without 

Wounds’’ expressed Tashi Dondrub’s ‘‘pain over the situation in Tibet’’ and ‘‘the widely-held desire of the Tibetan people for the Dalai Lama to return home.’’ 148 Human Rights Watch (Online), Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The Case of Tenzin Delek, 9 February 04, 12 (‘‘Dalai Lama recognized him as a tulku (reincarnated lama)’’); ‘‘Two Tibetans Sentenced to Death in SW China,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 January 03 (‘‘death sentence with a twoyear reprieve for inciting the split of the country and scheming explosions’’; ‘‘court did not hold 

an open hearing because some of the defendants’ criminal acts were related to state secrets’’); 

‘‘Tibetan Monk Death Penalty Commuted to Life in Prison,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 Jan 05 (‘‘commuted the death penalty with a two-year reprieve’’). See also CECC, Topic Paper: The Execution 

of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate 

on Legality, 10 February 03; Human Rights Watch (Online), Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The Case 

of Tenzin Delek, 9 February 04. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information 

on the case. 149 High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ‘‘From Woeser’s Blog: The People of Yajiang in Kham Petition for the Retrial of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche,’’ 9 December 09. The High Peaks Pure Earth 

article provides a translation of the petition that contains three sections describing objections 

to the verdict: ‘‘No proof,’’ ‘‘A’an Zhaxi himself refuses to admit his guilt,’’ and ‘‘Officials plotted 

to frame.’’ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Defy Security Crackdown To 

Demonstrate in Support of Imprisoned Tibetan Lama,’’ 17 December 09. The report states that 

the petition was ‘‘signed by thousands of Tibetans, often with a thumbprint.’’ ‘‘Tibetan Monk 

Protests Innocence in Smuggled Audiotape,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 January 03. The RFA 

report states that the smuggled tape contains Tenzin Deleg’s statement, ‘‘Whatever [the authorities] do and say, I am completely innocent.’’ 150 ‘‘Tibetan Protest Numbers Grow,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 December 09 (‘‘Between 500 

and 600 Tibetans from the Golok and Othok areas of Nyakchukha who were detained during 

protests beginning Dec. 5 are being held by Chinese forces . . . .’’); Tibetan Centre for Human 

Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Continue With Fasting and Protest, Situation Extremely Volatile in Nyachuka: Update,’’ 11 December 09 (‘‘. . . the Tibetans are still pressing 

the County government officials, although the deadline for petitioners and protesters to retreat 

to their respective villages was expired on (3:00 PM, yesterday, 10 December 2009) . . .’’; ‘‘Seven 

Released in Nyagchuka, Situation ‘Tense,’ ’’ Phayul (Online), 18 December 09 (‘‘Around twenty 

Tibetans are still held in detention following protests by hundreds of local Tibetans . . . .’’). See 

also ‘‘Tibetan Protest Over Monk,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 December 09; Tibetan Centre for 

337 

Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Sixty Tibetans Detained in Kardze for Petitioning,’’ 8 

December 09; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘China Sends Additional Military Forces To Contain the Situation in Nyachuka: Update,’’ 9 December 09; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Defy Security Crackdown To Demonstrate in 

Support of Imprisoned Tibetan Lama,’’ 17 December 09. 151 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Defy Security Crackdown To Demonstrate in Support of Imprisoned Tibetan Lama,’’ 17 December 09 (‘‘dozens of Tibetans have 

been detained and beaten after peaceful demonstrations’’); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 

and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Sixty Tibetans Detained in Kardze for Petitioning,’’ 8 December 09; 

‘‘Seven Released in Nyagchuka, Situation ‘Tense,’ ’’ Phayul (Online), 18 December 09 (‘‘Around 

twenty Tibetans are still held in detention following protests by hundreds of local Tibetans . . . .’’). 152 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Mark Uprising Anniversaries Despite 

Crackdown: Lhasa Like a ‘War-Zone,’ ’’ 22 March 10 (‘‘20–30 students from the Machu Tibetan 

Middle School began a peaceful protest’’; ‘‘students were soon joined by more than 100 local Tibetans (some sources say several hundred)’’); ‘‘Tibetan Students Stage Protest,’’ Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 16 March 10 (‘‘about 30 students from the Tibetan Middle School in Machu protested 

in streets close to the county center’’; ‘‘The student protesters were joined by 500 to 600 [other] 

Tibetans.’’). 153 ‘‘Tibetan Students Stage Protest,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 10. 154 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Mark Uprising Anniversaries Despite 

Crackdown: Lhasa Like a ‘War-Zone,’ ’’ 22 March 10. According to the report, ‘‘Tibetan students 

from two middle schools in Tsoe . . . demonstrated peacefully in the streets on March 16. . . . 

[Around] 30 or 40 students took part in the protest [which was] quickly broken up after the 

students were surrounded by armed police. More than 20 students . . . were detained, and are 

believed to be still in custody for questioning and ‘education.’ ’’ 155 ‘‘Primary School Students Stage Protest in Kham Driru,’’ Phayul (Online), 24 March 10. 156 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Mark Uprising Anniversaries Despite 

Crackdown: Lhasa Like a ‘War-Zone,’ ’’ 22 March 10; ‘‘Primary School Students Stage Protest 

in Kham Driru,’’ Phayul (Online), 24 March 10. 157Phurbu Tsering’s case has been reported on by news agencies including the New York 

Times (25 April 09), the Wall Street Journal (27 April 09), the Associated Press (21 April 09), 

Reuters (28 April 09, 31 December 09), BBC (1 January 10), and Times Online (London, 27 April 

09, 30 December 09). 158For more information on Phurbu Tsering and his case, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: 

Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 79–81. 159Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘China Sentences Tulku 

Phurbu Tsering Rinpoche to 8 Years, 6 Months in Jail,’’ 29 December 09; ‘‘Tibetan ‘Living Buddha’ Phurbu Tsering Jailed by China,’’ BBC (Online), 1 January 10. 160Gillian Wong, ‘‘Tibetan Lama on Trial for Weapons Charge in China,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in Google (Online), 21 April 09 (‘‘illegally possessing weapons, his Beijing-based lawyer 

Li Fangping told The Associated Press in a phone interview’’); Edward Wong, ‘‘Senior Tibetan 

Cleric Faces Prison in China,’’ New York Times (Online), 25 April 09 (‘‘charges of weapons possession and embezzlement, according to his two lawyers [Jiang Tianyong and Li Fangping]’’); 

PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 

25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 

28 February 09, arts. 128(1), 271. Article 128(1): ‘‘Whoever, in violation of the regulations governing control of guns, illegally possesses or conceals any guns or ammunition shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or public 

surveillance . . . .’’ Article 271: ‘‘Any employee of a company, enterprise or any other unit who, 

taking advantage of his position, unlawfully takes possession of the money or property of his 

own unit . . . if the amount is huge, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not 

less than five years and may also be sentenced to confiscation of property.’’ 161 CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 10 October 10, 79–81; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Verdict on Tibetan Lama Deferred: Chinese Lawyers’ Statement on 

Charges Against Phurbu Rinpoche,’’ 27 April 09. The ICT report describes the defense statement 

as ‘‘a document presented to the court.’’ 162 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Influential Tibetan Lama Sentenced to Eight 

and a Half Years in Prison,’’ 4 January 10. The ICT report cited a December 30, 2009, entry 

on the Tibetan writer Woeser’s blog. 163Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Addendum, Mission to 

China, 29 December 04, 22; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 112. Jigme Gyatso was 

sentenced in 1996 to 15 years’ imprisonment for counterrevolution. Chinese officials told a UN 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) delegation in September 2004 that he was 

guilty of ‘‘planning to found an illegal organization and seek to divide the country and damage 

its unity.’’ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion 

No. 8/2000, adopted 17 May 00, 67–70. The UNWGAD opinion on the case found that ‘‘there 

is nothing to indicate that the ‘illegal organization’ . . . ever advocated violence, war, national, 

racial, or religious hatred’’ and that Jigme Gyatso was ‘‘merely exercising the right to freedom 

of peaceful assembly with others in order to express opinions . . .’’ 164 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 111–112. Choeying Khedrub, a monk of 

Tsanden Monastery in the TAR, was sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for his role in a 

group of men who allegedly printed pro-independence leaflets. According to information that the 

Chinese Government provided to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD), 

he was found guilty of endangering state security and ‘‘supporting splittist activities of the Dalai 

clique.’’ The UNWGAD reports that the Chinese response ‘‘mentions no evidence in support of 

338 

the charges, or if they used violence in their activities,’’ and finds that the government ‘‘appears’’ 

to have misused the charge of endangering state security. 165 CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 210. Bangri Chogtrul (Jigme Tenzin Nyima), 

who lived as a householder in Lhasa and managed a children’s home along with his wife, was 

convicted of inciting splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment in a closed court in Lhasa in 

September 2000. ‘‘Lhasa Court Commutes Life Sentence for Children’s Home Director to 19 

Years,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 18. The sentencing 

document lists evidence against Bangri Chogtrul that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. 

Jigme Tenzin Nyima acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and 

knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and rejected the court’s portrayal 

of events. 166 CECC Political Prisoner Database. On August 1, 2007, Tibetan nomad Ronggye Adrag 

climbed onto a stage at a horse-racing festival in Litang (Lithang) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, 

Sichuan province, and shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, freedom of 

religion, Tibetan independence, and the releases of Gedun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama 

identified by the Dalai Lama) and Tenzin Deleg (a Buddhist teacher from the same area imprisoned in 2002 on charges of splittism and involvement in a series of bombings). The Ganzi Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him on November 20, 2007, to eight years’ imprisonment for 

inciting splittism (Criminal Law, Article 103(2)). ‘‘CECC Political Prisoner Data Shows Rise in 

Tibetan Detentions in 2007,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 31 January 08; ‘‘China Sentences 4 for Spying, Secessionist Activities,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 November 

07; ‘‘Tibetan Sentenced for ‘Inciting To Split Country’ at Sports Event,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 November 07; ‘‘Tibetan Nomad Calling for Dalai Lama’s Return Convicted of Subversion and 

Splittism,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 1 November 07. The CECC 

report cites an October 30, 2007, Radio Free Asia report that the Ganzi Intermediate Court convicted Ronggye Adrag on charges of splittism and subversion (Criminal Law, arts. 103, 105). 

(The court, however, did not sentence Ronggye Adrag on the charge of subversion.) 167 In addition to the 732 Tibetan political prisoners believed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database recorded as of June 10, 2010, an additional 63 Tibetan political prisoners detained or 

imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are known or believed to have been released, or 

who reportedly escaped or died. 168For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the Political Prisoner Database provides 

20 years as a nominal length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the actual 

average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment is not available. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 

Notes to Section VI—Developments in Hong Kong and Macau 

1 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102–383, enacted 5 October 92; Basic 

Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted 

by the National People’s Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97; Joint Declaration of the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic 

of China on the Question of Hong Kong, adopted 19 December 84. 2 U.S.-Macau Policy Act of 2000, Public Law No. 106–570, enacted 27 December 2000; Joint 

Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 

Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau, adopted 13 April 87; Basic Law of the Macau 

Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 83. 3 Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 83; Basic 

Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted 

by the National People’s Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, art. 85. 4 Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, arts. 27, 34; 

Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 

enacted by the National People’s Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, arts. 27, 32. 5 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 

China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, chap. IV, art. 

45 (selection of chief executive), art. 68 (election of Legislative Council), and chap. 1, art. 2 

(‘‘high degree of autonomy’’). 6 Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 23. For 

a discussion of the passage and terms of the legislation, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 302–304. 7Fanny W.Y. Fung and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Macau Security Law Praised at Handover Event,’’ 

South China Morning Post (Online), 5 December 09. 8Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Emboldened Hong Kong Protesters Call for Free Elections,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 9 July 03; ‘‘Hong Kong Withdraws National Security Bill,’’ China Daily (Online), 

5 September 03. 9For additional information on the proposals, see ‘‘Hong Kong Government Releases Proposals 

for Constitutional Reform,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 

10, 2. 10 National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Decision of the Standing Committee of the 

National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive 

339 

of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the 

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal 

Suffrage, issued 29 December 07. 11Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ‘‘Package of Proposals for the 

Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012: Consultation Document,’’ reprinted in Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in the United States, 

14 April 10. 12Tom Mitchell, ‘‘Hong Kong By-Election Thwarted by Beijing,’’ Financial Times (Online), 16 

May 10. 13 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 14 Robert Keatley, ‘‘Universal Suffrage Remains the Goal—but Not Yet in Sight,’’ Hong Kong 

Journal (Online), April 2010. 15 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 

China, enacted by the National People’s Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, Annex II, Part 

II. 16 Jonathan Cheng, ‘‘Hong Kong Lays Out Electoral Changes,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 

19 November 09. 17 ‘‘Lawmakers Pass Political Reform Package,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 25 June 

10; Robert Keatley, ‘‘Beijing Bends—Just a Little—and Brings a Hint of Hope to Hong Kong 

Politics,’’ Hong Kong Journal (Online), June 2010. 18Polly Hui, ‘‘Outcry as Hong Kong Adopts Democratic Reforms,’’ Associated Press, reprinted 

in Google News (Online), 25 June 10; Regina Leung, ‘‘Ho Says Democrats Will Join July 1 Protest,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 28 June 10. 19 ‘‘Democracy Rally Stand-Off Ends in Arrest of Student,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 20 March 10; Min Lee, ‘‘Thousands Demand Democracy in Hong Kong,’’ Associated Press, 

reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 1 January 10. 20 James Pomfret, ‘‘Hundreds Protest Costly Railway Project in Hong Kong,’’ Reuters (Online), 

8 January 10. 21 Albert Wong and Eva Wu, ‘‘Multitudes March for Universal Suffrage,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 2 January 10. 22Keith Bradsher, ‘‘As Hong Kong’s Political System Stalls, So Does Its Democracy Movement,’’ New York Times (Online), 28 January 10. 23Fanny W.Y. Fung and Albert Wong, ‘‘Beijing Warning Over HK Protests,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 7 January 10. See also ‘‘China Warns Again Against Hong Kong Democracy Push,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 07 March 10. 24Dan Kadison and Lawrence Chung, ‘‘HK Rises in Press Freedom Index, but KMT ‘Interference’ Hits Taiwan,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 22 October 09. 25 Reporters Without Borders (Online), Press Freedom Index 2009. 26 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. See also Eva Wu, ‘‘RTHK Chief Wants Charter Issues To Be Spelled Out,’’ South 

China Morning Post (Online), 10 November 09; Danny Mok, ‘‘RTHK Fears Impact of Editorial 

Advisory Body,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 5 January 10. 29 Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 

enacted by the National People’s Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, Annexes I, 

II. 30 Chia-Peck Wong, ‘‘China’s Hu Says Macau Should Diversify Its Economy (Update 1),’’ 

Bloomberg (Online), 20 December 09. 31 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Report 

on Human Rights Practices—2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 

10. 32Fox Yi Hu, ‘‘Vote-Buying Not as Obvious but Still Widespread,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 25 September 09. 33 CECC Staff Interviews; Fox Yi Hu, ‘‘Top Officials’ Business Interests Pose Hurdle to ‘Sunshine Law’ in Macau,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 11 January 10; Chia-Peck Wong, 

‘‘China’s Hu Says Macau Should Diversify Its Economy (Update 1),’’ Bloomberg (Online), 20 December 09. 34Transparency International (Online), Corruption Perceptions Index 2009. 35See Chia-Peck Wong, ‘‘China’s Hu Says Macau Should Diversify Its Economy (Update 1),’’ 

Bloomberg (Online), 20 December 09 (concerning a survey conducted by the One Country Two 

Systems Research Centre). 36Fanny W.Y. Fung and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Macau Security Law Praised at Handover Event,’’ 

South China Morning Post (Online), 5 December 09. For detailed information on the law and 

its passage, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 302–304. 37 Jillian Melchior, ‘‘Macau May Day,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 13 May 10. 

Notes to China’s International Human Rights Commitments 

1State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. V. 2Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Online), ‘‘Statement by H.E. 

Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, 

at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation 

of Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),’’ 20 October 09. 

340 

3State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010), 

Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. V(1). 4 UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 63, 114(1). 5The information in the chart is based on information provided on the United Nations Treaty 

Collection Web site at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx. 6The information in the chart is based on information provided on the International Labour 

Organization Web site at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 

Æ