### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00718- CR

Ra ym ond G ar c ia, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 90441 43, H ONO RAB LE JON N. WIS SER, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
Th e jur y fo un d a pp e lla nt R ay mon d G arc ia

g uil ty of the of fe ns e s o f a g g ra

vate d a ssa ult with a dea dly

wea pon, felony

assau l t

— fa m i l y

violence, violation of a protec tive order , and endang eringa child. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann
. §§ 22 .0 1( a )( 1) , ( b) (2 ) ( fe lony a ssa ult —f a mil y violence) , 22.02(a) (2) ( ag g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon), 22.041 (e ndanger i n g a child), 25 .0 7 ( vio latio n o f protec tiv e or de r) (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) . In s ix iss ue s o n a pp e a l, G arc ia

a sse rt s a Confrontat io nCl a

u s e v io lati o n , c la im s mu lt ip le e r r o r s in th e ju r y c h ar g e , an d

c h a ll e n g e s the
c on sti tut ion a lity

of se c tio n 2 5. 07 of

the pe na l c od e . We wi ll a ff ir m.
BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that o n the af ternoon of July

17, 2003, Offic er William Nore ll of the Austin Poli ce D epar tment was dispatche d to an apa rtment wher e a “f

amily disturbance wi th a n a ssa ult ” ha d be e n re po rt e d. No re ll tes tif ie d that, u po n a rr iva l, h e e nc ounte re d Jes sic a Ga rc ia2

and her “proba bly six or seve n y ear

old” daug hter sitting on the ste ps of the stairwa y outside the apar tment. Norell explained that J essica’ s ey es we re swollen and he c ould tell that she was upset
and ha d b e e n c ry

ing . O ve r a

he ars ay and Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e ob je c tio n by de fe ns e c ouns e l, N or e ll testified to what Jessica told him about what had happe ned:
She told me that she had been at her pa rents’ house the nig ht before , spent the nig ht with them for some re ason, and w hen she c ame home, Mr . Gar cia wa s in her a pa rtme nt. She told me that Mr. Gar cia was not supposed to be in the house due to a pr otective or de r t hat w a s is su e d. An d th a t Mr . G arc ia wa nte d h e r a nd the c hil dr e n to g o w ith him t o his parents’ house on Bla ckson Street. And she told him t hat she wa s not g oing a nd the childre n wer e not g oing, a nd that he was not even supposed to be there beca use of the pr otective or der. S h e s ai d t h at wh en s h e t o l d

h i m t h at s h e w as n ’t go i n g an d t h e c h i l dre nwe re n ’t go i n g, that he bec ame upse t and started to g et violent with her. He—I believe he—at first, he g rabbe d the fire place poker a nd started thre ateningher wi th i t. A nd

the n s he sa id sh e fe are d bo dil y inj ur y , th a t he wa s g oin g to h

ur t he r w ith the po ke r a

nd take the c hil d, the y oung e r c hil d. An d sh e sa id t hat a ft e r t he argume nt, afte r the thre ateningwith the poker, he eventua lly ended up punching her in the le ft e y e , in the le ft fo re he a d a

nd the n in he r l e ft arm . Nore ll also ex plained that Jessica told him t hat “ther e was a st rug g le” over their twoy ear -old son an d that Gar cia “ g rabbe d the child by the ar ms and pulled extremely

hard w hile she [J essica] was pulling to ma intain c ontrol of the child.” J essica told Norell that Gar cia “ left out the do or ” wi th t

he c hil d a nd “ bo ard e d a bu s th a t ha d ju st a rr ive d. ” Jess ic a

tol d N or e ll that G arc ia

tol d her that “he wa s g oing to his par ents’ house.” Nore ll broadc ast Gar cia’ s descr iption over the police radio so that other

office rs could try

to locate him. Offic er Rica

rdo Reza of the Austin Police Depa rtment testified that he e ncounter ed Ga rc ia “ wa lki ngin a

fi e ld” and

“ c arr yinga tw o- y e ar- old

kid .” Re za e xpla ine d th a t, o nc e Ga rc ia3

noticed him, Gar cia be g an running awa y , still car rying the child. Reza ran after him. Duringthe foot
c ha se , Re za me t up wi th Cor po ra l An dr e w Ha

y ne s, wh o joi ne d Re za in the purs uit of Ga rc ia . G arc ia
e ve ntu a lly

ra n thro ug h th e pa

rk inglot of a g a s st a tio n w he re , a c c or din g to R e za, Ga rc ia “ take s h is kid from his arm, plac es him on the trunk of a vehicle, and without stopping or slowing down, place s h is s o no nth e tr

u n k , an d th e n he re a ll y

ta k e s o f f s p r in ti n g e a s tb o u n d

to w ar d s St
. Jo h n s . ” Re za te sti fi e d th a t H ay

ne s re ma ine d with the c hil d whi le Re za co nti nu e d the purs uit
. Ga rc ia wa s f ina lly appre hended outside the Americ an Inn along the I H-35 fr ontag e roa d.

Gar cia wa s char g ed with one c ount of ag g ravated as s au l t , o ne count of assault—family v i olence , one count of violating a

protec tive order , and one c ount of enda ng ering a child. The count cha

rg ing G arc ia with endang eringa child conta ined two par ag raphs a lleg ing that Gar cia c ommitt ed the of

fense either by “striking J essica Garc ia wit h his hand while the said Jessica Gar cia wa s holding” the child or by “pulling the child with his hand.” The jury found Gar cia guilty of all four

counts in the indictment. The district cour t
a sse sse d p un ish me nt a

t 20 y e ars ’ c on fi ne me nt f

or the of fe ns e of e nd ang e ri ng a c hil d a nd 25 y e ars ’ confine ment for the offe nses of ag g ravated assault, fe lony assault—family

violence, a

nd violation of a pr otective or der, w ith the sentence s running concur rently . This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Conf rontation Clause violation I n h is fi rst is su e , G arc ia

a sse rt s th a t hi s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o c on fr on t and c ro ssexamine witnesses was violated when the district c ourt allowed Offic er Nore ll to testi fyto out-ofcourt stateme nts made by J essica. See U
. S
. C o n s t
. a m e n d
. V I.Gar cia wa s tried in September 2004, le ss than seven months af ter Crawf ord was de cided. 1 After this Court decided Cassidy , the cour t of criminal appe als held that “a testim o n ial 2 statement is inadmissible absent a showingthat t h e d ec lara nt is presently

unavailable and the defe ndant had a

prior opportunity

for c ross-examination, e v e n if thesta te me nt f all s u nd e r a fir ml y rooted hearsay e

xce ption or bears particularized g uara ntees of trustworthiness.” W all v . S tate , 184 S.W .3d 730, 734-35 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006) (empha sis added). 4 Be fore Offic er N orell testified to Jessica’s out-of- court stateme nts describing what ha pp e ne d o n th e night in que sti on , Garc ia ob je c te d to the a dmi ssi on

of the state me nts on

the ba sis of hea rsay and “the violation of the defe ndant’s rig ht to cross-examine . . . and confront the witnesses ag ainst him.” The district cour t then asked the S t at e about the applica bility of Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Citi ng to this C ourt’s opinion in Cas sid yv . S tate , 149 S.W .3d 712 1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d), cert. de nied , 544 U.S. 925 (2005), the S t at e re s p o nded that Cra wfo rd did not apply to “excited ut tera nces” and, “even if Cra wfo rd a pp lie s, his [Ga

rc ia ’s ] Sixth 2 Amendment rig ht will be satisfied, bec ause Ms. Gar cia is pr esent and available to be cr oss-examined and she w ill be of

fer ed as a witness in this case .” Concluding that J essica’ s availability “took ca re of the Cra wfo rd

qu es t i o n , ” t h e d i s t r i c t co u rt o v erru l edGa rc i a’ s o b j ec t i o n . Ho we v er , al t h o u gh Jess ic a wa s su bp oe naed to t e sti fy

and a pp e are d in

c ourt on the fi rs t th re e da

y s o f t he tr ia l, s he did not appea r in court on the da

y she wa s scheduled to testify and, in fa ct, neve r testified. We reviewalleg ed violations of the Confrontation Cl ause de novo
. Se e W all v . S tate , 18 4 S. W.3 d 7 30 , 7 42 -4 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); se e als o Li lly v . V irg ini a , 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1 99 9) (s ta tin g tha

t c ourt s sh ou ld “ ind e pe nd e ntl y re vie w” wh e the r ou t- of -c ourt state me nts vio late Confrontation Clause). We must aff irm a trial court’s ruling if it is correc t under a ny theory of law applicable to the case and supported by the re cord e ven if the tria l c ourt g ives the wrong rea son for its ruling. Es tra da v . S

tate , 154 S.W .3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).5 I n Cra wfo rd , th e Sup re me Court int e rp re te d th e Con fr on tatio n Cla us e to p ro hib it a witness from re counting a dec lara nt’s out-of-c ourt statements that ar e testi m o n i al unless (1) the decla rant is unava ilable to testify and (2) the def

endant ha d a prior oppor

tunity to cross-e x amine the decla rant, re g ardle ss of whethe r the de claran t ’s s t at em ents are deeme d reliable by the cour t. See Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 68.

The Supreme Court rec ently explained the distinction betwe en testimonial and nonte sti mon ia l st a te me nts :
Statements are nontestimonial when made i n the course of police interr og ation under c ir c ums tanc e s o bje c tiv e ly ind ic a tin g that the pr ima

ry purp os e of

the int e rr og a tio n is to e nable police assistance to me et an ong oing e merg ency . They are testimonial when the circ umstances objectively indicate that ther e is no such ong oing e merg ency , and that th e pr ima

ry purp os e of

the int e rr og a tio n is to e sta bli shor prove pa st e ve nts potentially

rele vant to later c riminal prosec ution.
Davis v. W

ashington , 126 S. Ct . 2266, 2273-74 (2006)
. I n Da v is , the Supreme Court a ddresse d whether statements made by a v ictim of domestic violence to a 911 oper ator were testimoni al i n nature
. Id . at 2276-77. In concludingthat the ca ller’s stateme nts were not testimoni al and thus admissible, the Court looked t o the following fa c tor s: ( 1) the c a lle r wa s de sc ri bin g e ve nts a s th e y we re a c tua lly

ha pp e nin g rathe r t

ha n p a st e ve nts ; (2) a ny rea sonable listener

would rec og nize that the caller was fa cing an ong oing emerg ency ; (3) the nature of what was aske d an d an s we re d , when view ed objec tively , was such that the elicited statements wer e nec essar

y to be able to resolve the prese nt emerg ency , rathe r than simply to learn what had ha

ppened in the pa st; and (4) the ca ller wa s fra ntically answe ring the 911 emer g ency operator’s questions over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or eve n safe
. Id . The Court stated that the ca ller wa s “see king a id, not telling a story about the past.” Id . at 22796 The Court also observe d that “initial inquiries” by law enf orce ment office rs ar

riving
a t c ri me sc e ne s invo lvi ng“ do me sti c dis pu te s” “ may of te n” pr od uc e no nte sti monia l st a te me nts be c a us e “ of fi c e rs c a ll ed to inve sti g a te
. . . n e e d to kn owwh om t he y are de a lin g wi th i n o rd e r t o assess the situation, the threat to their own safe ty , and possi ble dange r t o the potential victim.” Id
. Such statements may

be nontestimonial if they constitute “a c ry

for he lp” or “ t h e p rovision of information ena

bling of fice rs to end a thr eate ning situation.” Se e id
. I n th is c a se , O ff

ic e r N or e ll t e sti fi e d th a t he arr ive d at th e a pa rtme nt a pp rox im ate ly

“ fi ve to te n min

ute s” a ft e r Jess ic a ha d c a lle d 91 1 to re po rt that G arc ia

ha d ta ke n th e c hil d. Up on

his
arr iva l, Je ssi c a

tol d No re ll that Ga

rc ia ha d f or c ibl y take n th e ir

tw o- y e ar- old

so n a wa y fr om h e r a

rm s and lef t with the child on a bus. J essica expl ained to Nore ll that she “fear ed that he [ the child] mi g ht be injured beca

use of the forc e that was used when Mr. Gar cia pulled him f rom her arms.” J essica also told N o re l l that she had a protec tive order

ag ainst Garc ia prohibiting him fr om being at her house, and that Gar cia had violated that order
. J essica further explained that Garc ia had thre atene d her w ith a firepla ce poke r and punched he r in her e y e, for ehea d, and lef t arm. Althoug h these we re all statements desc ribing past eve nts, we conc lude that they wer e made during the cour s e o f an
o n g o i n g e m e r g e n c y.

T h e assault may

have e nded bef

ore O ffice r Nore ll arrived at the scene , but the situation had not y et bee n resolved—a two-y ear -old child was missing, taken by a man who, even though he was the c hild’s father , had re portedly just violated a prote ctive orde r, assa ulted the child’s mot he r, and po ssi bly inj ur e d the c hil d. Th e inf or matio n J e ssi c a pr ov ide d to No re ll e na ble d N or e ll to inform other off

icer s of Gar cia’ s possible destination and what kind of person they wer e dea ling wi th. Withou t thi s in fo rm a tio n, the of fi c e rs may

no t ha ve be e n a ble to l oc a te Ga

rc ia and sa fe lyI n a “ Sup ple me nta l A uth or ity to A pp e lla nt’ s B ri e f, ” Ga

rc ia c ite s th is C ourt ’s op in ion in 3 Da v is v . S

tate , 169 S.W .3d 660 (Tex. App.—Austi n 2005, pet. g rante d), for the proposition that statements ar e testi monial if they are made to “a police officer carr ying out an investi g ation.” See id . at 667. Howe ver, we decided Da v is prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. W ashington , in which the Supreme Court e x plained that questioning by police office rs car rying out inv e sti g a tio ns may

or may no t “ y ie ld no nt estimon ia l ans we rs ” de pe nd ingon the “ e xig e nc ie s” surr ound inge a c h p art ic ula r i nv e sti g a tio n. 12 6 S. Ct. 22 66 , 2 27 9 ( 20 06 ). W e als o no te th a t th is Court held in Da v is that “ [e]a c h c a se mus t be e xami ne d o n it s f a c ts t o d e te rm ine if

the e vid e nc e is testimonial.” 169 S.W .3d at 671. 7 rec over the child. We hold that J essica’ s statements t o Offic er Norell were made during “an ong oing
emer g ency” a n d co n stitut ed “the provision of information ena bling of fice rs to end a thr eate ning situation.” Se e id
. The statements were thus nontestimoni al in nature , and their a dmission di d not violate the Confrontation Cl ause. We overrule Gar cia’ s first issue. 3 Deadly weapon instruction

I n his second issue, Ga

rcia contends that the di strict court’s instruc tions to t he jury reg arding a d eadly

wea pon definition constituted an impermissible comment on the we ight of the evidenc e. The jury

char g e def

ined “de adly

wea pon” as “ any

thing manif

estly desig ned, made , or adapte d for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury ; or any thing that in the manne r of its use or intended use is capa ble of causing death or

serious bodily

injury .” This def

inition t rac ks the lang uag e provided in the penal code. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(17) (West Supp. 2006). I n the applicat i o n p ar ag raph a lleg ing a g g ravated assault, howe ver, only the sec ond part of the definition was included:
Now bea ring in mind the fore g oing instruc tions, if y ou believe f rom the evide nce bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant Ray mond G arc ia . . . did then and ther e: int ent io nal ly

or k no wi ngly

th reat en J ess ica Garci a wi th im mi nen t b od il y in jury , a nd did8

then and there use or exhibi t a dea dly wea pon, to wit: a fireplac e poker , which in the ma nn e r o f it s u se or inte nd e d u se was cap ab le of

c au sin g d

e ath or se rio us bo dil

y inj ur y , during the commission of this offense; y ou will find the defendant guilty
. . . . (Emphasis adde d)

Gar cia a sserts t h at “[ e] x plaining two w ay s an objec t can mee t the definition of a deadly we apon in the first pa rag raph of

the cha rg e and inc luding only

one of those w ay s in the application para g raph can imply to the jury that the judg e is there by

informing them that [t he judg e] ha s f ound the ob je c t in qu e sti on to m e et th e le g a l de fi nit ion of a de a dly we a po n. ” Th e State responds that the c harg e “pr ovided the jurors with the exact definition from the Te x as Penal Code, then t ai lo r e d

th e d e f in it io nin th e a p p li c a ti o nto in c lu d e o n ly th e la w a p p li c a b le to th e c a s e . ” We ag ree with the State.

The c ode of c riminal proce dure pr ovides that the judg e shall deliver to the jury

“a written charg e dis tinctly setting f orth the law a

pplicable to the c ase; not expressing any opinion as to the weig ht o f t h e ev i d ence, not summing up the testimony , discussing the fac ts or using a ny
ar g u me n t i nh is c h ar g e c a lc u late d to ar o u s e th e s y

mp a thy o r e xc it e th e p a s s io n s o f

th e ju r y . ” T e x. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 36.14 (West Supp. 2006). We can f ind no authority

for Ga rcia ’s contention that including only the sec ond part of the de adly

wea pon definition in the application par ag raph constitutes a comment on the weig ht of the e vidence . We concl u d e that the dist rict cour t permissibly

tailored the de finition to i nclude only the law a pplicable to the c ase. A s Gar cia concede s, a fireplace poker is not a deadly wea pon pe r se . I t is not “manifestly desig ned, made , or adapted for the purpose of

inflicting de ath or ser ious bodily injury .” The ref

ore, the first part of

the dea dly

wea pon definition does not a

pply to this case,9

and it was not err or for the district c ourt to e x clude that part of the definition from the a pplication para g raph. We ove rrule G arc ia’s sec ond issue. Jury unan im ity

I n his third and fourth issues, Ga rcia asser ts that he suff

ere d eg reg ious harm when “two s ep arate offe nses of e ndang eringa child we re submitted to the jury in the disjunctive,” thus deprivinghim of his “rig ht to a unanimous verdict.”

T h e T e xa s Co n s ti tuti o n r e qu ir e s a u n an im o u s v e r d ic t i nf

e lo n y c r im in a l c a s e s . T e x. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 36.29(a) (West Supp. 2006). Allowing a jury to ch o o s e fr o m s ever al sepa rate acts, e ach of

which is a violation of a spe cific statute, w ithout requiring the jury to a g ree on which act was committed violate s the unanimity require ment. Ngo v. Sta te , 1 7 5 S
. W
. 3 d

7 3 8 , 7 4 7
- 4 8 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) ; Fr an cis v . S tate , 36 S.W .3d 121, 124-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Howeve r, allowing a jury to choose be tween a lternative the ories of how an off ense w as c o m m i t t ed d oes not run af oul of the unanimous-ve rdict re quirement. Martinez v. Sta te , 12 9 S.W. 3d 10 1, 10 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Kitc he ns v . S tate , 8 2 3 S. W. 2 d

2 5 6 , 2 5 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1991). I f an indictment a lleg es diffe ring means of c ommitt ing a n offe nse, a tria l court does not err

by char g ing the jury

in the disjunctive. J

on es v. S tate , 1 8 4 S. W. 3 d

9 1 5 , 9 2 2 n . 6 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).

P ar a g r a p h V III o f t h e j u r

y c h ar g e c o n t a i n e d t h e a

p p l i c a t i o n p ar a g r a

p h f o r C o u n tIV of the indictment, Endang eringa Child:
Now bea r in g in mi n d th e f o r e g o in g in s tr

u c ti o n s , if

y o ub e li e v e f

r o m t h e e v idence bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defendant Ray mond Gar cia .
. . did then and ther e:10

intentionally , knowing ly , or re ckles s l y , eng ag e in conduc t that placed Ra y mond Ga rc ia , Jr. , a c hil d 1 4 y e ars of a g e or y oung e r, in i mmi ne nt d ang e r o f d e a th, bo dil y injury , or phy sical or menta l impairment, by striking Jessica Ga

rcia with his hand while the said Jessica Gar cia wa s holding Ray mond Garc ia, J r.; and / or i n t en t i onally , knowing ly , or re cklessly , eng ag e in conduc t that placed Ra y mond Ga rc ia , Jr. , a c hil d 1 4 y e ars of

a g e or y oung e r, in i mmi ne nt d ang e r o f d e a th, bo dil y injury , or phy sical or menta l impairment, by pulling Ray

mond G arc ia with his ha

nd; y ou will find the defe ndant g uilty of Endang eringa Child . . . . Parag raph X VI Iof the jury char g e instructed the jury that its “verdicts must be unanimous.” Ga rc ia a sse rt s th a t Par a g ra

ph VI I I c on ta ine d two se pa ra te of fe ns e s, and

tha t G arc ia
wa s d e pr ive d h is r ig ht t o a un anim ou s v e rd ic t be c a

us e so me of the jur or s cou ld have be lie ve d G arc ia struck Jessica while she wa s holding the child while other jurors believed Gar cia pulled the child. The State argues that the para g raph contained two differ ent means of committing a single offe nse, and that the juror s need not a g ree on t h e manner in which Ga rcia committed the offe nse for the unanimity

require ment to be satisfied. A p e r s o nc o m m i t s t h e o f

f e n s e o f e n d an g e r i n g a

c h i l d “ i f h e i n t e n t i o n a l l y, kn o w i n g l y,
re c kle ssl y , o r w ithc ri min a l ne g lig e nc e , b y act or omi ssi on , e ng a g e s in

c on du c t th a t pl a c e s a

c hil d y oung er tha

n 15 y ear s in imminent dang er of death, bodily injury , or phy sical or mental impairment.” Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.041( c). O bviously , there are numerous wa y s in which one c an plac e a child in “immin en t dang er of death, bodily

injury , or phy sical and me ntal impairment.” See, e .g. , Ro dr igu e z v . S tate , 137 S.W .3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (dr iv i ng wh ile int oxic a te d w ithc hil dr e n p re se nt i n v ehi c le ); W alk e r v . S tate , 9 5 S. W. 3 d

5 1 6 , 5 2 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 2, pe t. r e f’ d) (e va din g arr e st a nd vio latin g tr a ff

ic laws wi th c hil d pr e se nt i n11

ve hic le ); Con tre ra s v . S

tate , 54 S.W .3d 898, 905 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (failing to provide ade quate nour ishment to child).

“ [I ]t ha s lon g be e n the g e ne ra l ru le that wh e n a sin g le c ri me c an be com mi tt ed in various wa

y s, jurors nee d not ag ree upon the mode of co mmissi on.” Fran c is , 36 S.W .3d at 124. When a lternate manner s and means of committing an offe nse are submitt ed to the jury i n t he disjunctive, it is appropriate f or the jury

to return a g ener al verdic t f or that offe nse if the e vidence supports a conviction under a ny one of the m. Kitchens , 823 S.W. 2d a t 25 8; Ma rin os v . S

tate , 186 S.W .3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).

Th e S tat e pre sen tedevi den ce of andall eged t wo d if

feren t w ay s i n wh ich Garci a co uld have e nd ang e re d th e c hil d. Of fi c e r N or e ll t e sti fi e d th a t Jes sica tol d h im that, d

ur inga sin g le inc ide nt, Ga

rc ia str uc k he r wh ile sh e wa s ho ldi ng the c hil d and that G arc ia

the n p ro c e e de d to pu ll the child away from her arms. Thus, there is evidenc e supporting a convic tion under either of the way s Garc ia could have committed the offe nse. In a ca se s u ch as t h i s , i n which the State a lleg es dif fe re nt m ann e rs or

me a ns of c omm itt inga

sin g le of fe ns e , this satis fi e s the un anim ity re qu ir e me nt. See M arinos , 1 86 S.W. 3d

a t 17 5. We o ve rr

ule Ga rc ia ’s thi rd

and fo ur th i ssu e s.
Co nst it ut ion ali ty

of se c ti on 2 5. 07 of t he pe nal c ode I n his fifth and six th issues, Gar cia a rg ues that sec tion 25.07 of the pena l code, whic h makes it an off

ense to violate a protec tive order , is facia lly overbr oad and va g ue in violation of the First and F ourtee nth Amendments. See U.S. Const. amend. I , XI V.

Th e pe na l c od e pr ov isi on a t is su e pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art : (a) A per son commits an offense if, in violation of an orde r issued under S ection 6.504 or Chapter

85, Fa mily Code, under A rticle 17
. 2 9 2 , C ode of Criminal12

Procedur e, or by

another jurisdiction as provided by Cha p t er 8 8 , Family

Code, the p e r s o nkn o w i n g l y o r

i n t e n t i o n a l l y:

. . . . (2 ) c omm

un ic a te s: (A) dir ectly

with a protec ted individual or a membe r of the family or household in a threa

tening or har assing manner ; (B ) a thre at throug h any

person to a pr otected individual or a member of the fa mily or household; or (C) in an yma nn e r with the protec ted individual or a member

of the family or household except throug h the per son’s attorney or a pe rson a pp oin te d b y

the c ourt , if the or de r pr oh ibi ts a ny c omm un ic a tio n w ith a prote cted individual or a member of

the family

or household;
Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 25.07( a)( 2) (e mphasis added)
.

Gar cia c ontends that the st atute is overbr oad because it prohibits all communication with the p ro t ec t ed i ndividual, except throug h the protec ted individual’s attorney or a pe rson appointed by

th e court, se e id
. § 2 5
. 0 7 (a )( 2 )( C ), an d b ec au s e “ h ar as s i n g” o r “ t h re at en i n g” communication may , in cer tain ci rc umstances, e ncompass prote cted spe ech. Se e id . §§ 25.07(a) (2)( A), (B ). Gar cia asser ts that the statute is vag ue bec ause it fa ils to define what kind of communication is considere d “har assing .” Stan dard of rev iew Whenever

we a re c onfronted w ith an attack upon the constitutionalit y of a statute, we p r e s u m e t h a tt h e s t a tu t e i s v a l i d an d t h a tt h e l e g i s l a tu r e h a s n o ta c t e d u n r e a s o n a

b l y o r ar b i t r ar i l y. Ro dr igu e z v . S tate , 93 S.W .3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The burden r ests upon the individual who cha lleng es the s t at ute to establish its unconstitut ionality
. Id . I n the abse nce of contra ry evidenc e, we will presume that the l eg islature ac ted in a constitutionally sound fashion. Id . We wi ll13

uphold a st atute if we c an dete rmine a r easona ble construc tion that will render it constitutional and
car ry out leg islative intent. Se e Sh e ldo n v . S tate , 1 00 S.W. 3d 49 7, 50 0 (T e x. Ap p— Au sti n 2 00 3, pe t.
re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g El

yv . S tate , 582 S.W .2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). A f a c ia l c ha lle ng e to a

statut e —th e ty

pe that G arc ia

a sse rt s h e re —is the mos t di ff ic ult challeng e to mount suc cessf ully beca use the challeng er must establish that no set of c ircumstance s exis ts under which the statute will be valid. Sa nt iko s v. St ate , 8 36 S.W. 2d 63 1, 63 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ); Sh aff

e r v . S tate , 1 84 S.W. 3d 35 3, 36 4 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 6, no pe t.) ; Frieling

v . S tat e , 67 S.W .3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref ’d). Ov e rb re ad

th I n a na ly zinga faci al cha lle ng e to t

he ov e rb re a dth

and va g ue ne ss o f a

law, we fi rs t deter mine whether

the statute rea ches “a substantial a mount of constitutionally

protec ted conduc t.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 4 55 U. S. 4 89 , 4 94 (1 98 2) . Astatut e is o ve rb ro a d if

it s we e ps wi thi n it s c ov e ra g e sp e e c h o r o the r c on du c t pr ote c te d by th e F ir st Amendment. Cla rk

v . S tate , 665 S.W .2d 476, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Speec h is not protected by the Fir st Amendment when it is the ver y vehicle of

the cr ime itself. Fr ie lin g v . S tate , 67 S.W .3d 46 2, 47 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 02 , p et. ref’d) . Astatut e wi ll n ot b e inv a lid a te d f or ov e rb re a dth
mere ly beca

use i t is possi ble to imag ine some unconstitutional applications. State v. Holcom be , 145 S .W.3d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d , 1 8 7 S. W. 3 d 4 9 6 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 06). “B eca use of the w ide-re achingeff ects of strikingdown a s t at u t e on its fac e at the r equest of one whose own c onduct m ay b e punished despite the F irst Amendment, we ha ve re cog nized that the
o v erb re adth doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ and have employ ed it with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last re sort.’” New Y

ork v. Fe rber , 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). We w ill not strike down a statute for“ F a mil y vio le nc e ” me ans : 4 (1) a n act by a member

of a f ami l y or household ag ainst another me mber of the fa mil y or ho us e ho ld that is int e nd e d to re su lt in ph y sic a l ha rm , b od ily

inj ur y , a ssa ult , o r s e xu a l a s s a

u lt o r th a t i s a thr e a t t h a t r e a s o n a

b ly p la c e s th e me mb e r

in f e ar of imminent phy sical har

m, bodily inj u r y , assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defe nsive measur es to protec t oneself; ( 2 ) a b u s e , a s t h a tt e r

m i s d e f i n e d b y S e c t i o n s 2 6 1
. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( C ) , ( E ) , an d ( G ) , b y a member of

a fa mily or household towar d a child of the family or household; or (3) dating violenc e, as that term is defined by Section 71.0021. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.004 ( West 2002). 14 ov e rb re a dth

un le ss t he re is “ a re a lis tic da

ng e r t hat th e statut e its e lf

wi ll s ig nificantly

c omp ro mis e
rec og nized First Amendment prote ctions of pa rt ies not befor e the Court.” Se e Me mb e rs o f Cit y Council v. Taxpaye rs for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984).

At the ou tse t, w e no te the lim ite d a pp lic a bil ity of this s tatut e . I t a pp lie s o nly

to persons who a

re c urre ntly

subject to ce rtain kinds of cour t orders. See Tex. P en. C ode Ann. § 25.07(a) (limiti ng applicability of sec tion to persons who violate orde rs “issued unde r Section 6.504 or Chapter

85, Fa mily Code, under A rticle 17.292, Code of Criminal Proced u re , o r by another jur isd ic tio n a s pro vid e d by Cha pte r 88, F a mil y

Cod e ” ); Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 8 5. 02 2( b) (2 ) ( Wes t 2002) (pe rmitting cour t t o p rohi bit “the per son found to have c ommitt ed fa mily violence” from communicating with protecte d individual or “a me mber of the family or household of a

person protec ted by an order ”). Be fore a person may be subject to the se ty pes of protec tive order s, either the per son must be arr ested for stalking pur suant to section 42.072 of the pe nal code , see Tex. Code Cr i m . P r o c . A n n . art
. 1 7
. 2 9 2 ( a ) ( W e s t S u p p . 2 0 0 6 ) , o r t h e i s s u i n g c o u rt m u s t f i n d “ t ha t f

a mil y
v i o l en ce h as occ urre d and is likely to occur in the future.” See T e x. F a m. Co d e A n n . § 8 1
. 001 415

(West 2002). Also, in most cases involving f amily violence, the duration of a protec tive order cannot exceed two y ear s. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 85.025( a) ( West 2002). I n summary , section 25.07 only

applies under a narrow set of circumstance s to a narrow class of i ndividuals for a limit ed amount of time.

Wit h the nar

row scope of the statute in mind, we f irst addre ss sections 25.07(a) (2)( A) and (B ), which pr ohibit persons from communicating “ direct l y with a protec ted individual or a member of

the family

or household in a threatening or harassing manner ” or f rom communicating

“ a t hr eat throug h any

person to a pr otected individual or a member of

the family

or household.” Tex. P en. Code Ann. §§ 25.07( a)( 2)(A) , (B ) (e mphasis added)
.

These se ctions do not prohibit all communication with a protecte d individual, but only communication that is threate ning or hara ssing. Contrar

y to Ga rc i a’s assertion, threats and hara ssment are not entitled to First Amendment prote ction. See, e .g. , W a t t s v. Un ited States , 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (“What is a threat must be distinguished fr om what is constitutionally protec ted sp e e c h. ” ); Test Masters Educ. Serv s. v. Singh , 428 F.3d 559, 580 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stating that there is a “ dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n c omm un ic a tio n a

nd ha ra ssm e nt” and that “ c ourt s have the po we r t o e njo in ha ra ssi ngc omm

un ic a tio n” ); Thorne v. Bailey , 846 F.2 d 2 4 1 , 2 43 (4th Cir. 1988) (“ Prohibiti ng ha ra ssm e nt is no t pr oh ibi tin g sp e e c h, be c a us e ha ra ssm e nt is n ot p ro te c te d s pe e c h. ” ); W e bb v . S tate , 991 S.W .2d 408, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (“A thre at is not protected speec h.”). B eca

use these se ctions are limit ed to communication t hat i s threatening or har assing , we conclude that they

do not rea ch “a

substantial amount of constitutionally protec ted conduc t.” See Village of Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 494.16 We next addre ss section 25.07(a) (2)( C), which proh i b i t s p er s o n s from communica ting “i nan y m an n er wi t h t h e p ro t ec t ed i n d i v i d u al o r a m em b er o f t h e f

am i l y o r h o u s eh o l d

ex ce p tt h ro u gh the per son’s attorney

or a person appointed by the court, if the orde r prohibits any communication with a protec ted indivi d u al o r a m em b er of the family

or household.” T ex. P en. Code Ann. § 25.07(a) (2)( C). Although this sec tion applies t o any manner of communi cation, we ag ain note that it only prohibits communication in the context of a pre- exis ting court order issued ag ainst a per son who has be en ar

rested f or stalking , see Tex. Code Crim. Proc
. Ann. art. 17.292(a ), or ba sed upon a court finding that “fa

mily violence has occur

red and is likely to occur in the future.” See Te x. F a m. Code Ann. § 81.001. The section thus has a na rrowly -def

ined scope , limit ed to per sons whose prior actions towar d the protec ted individual w ere of such a threatening nature that a court fe lt just ified in i ssu inga

pr ote c tiv e or de r a g a ins t th a t pe rs on . A lso , th e se c tio n o nly a pp lie s if the cour t order prohibits any

communication. Ther efor e, the section does not a pply to all protective or ders. F urther, the sec tion permits communication with the protecte d individual or a member of t h e famil y

or household as long as it is “throug h the per son’s attorney or a pe rson appointed by the cour t.” We conclude that section 25.07 does not re ach a “s u bstantial amount of constitutionally

protec ted conduc t.” See V illage of Hoffman Estates , 45 5 U. S. at 49 4. We o ve rr ule Ga rc ia ’s fi ft h is su e s. V ag ue ne ss A statute ca

n be void f

or vagueness even if it does not rea ch a substantial amount of constitutionally

protec ted conduc t. City of Chi cago v. M orales , 5 27 U. S. 4 1, 52 (1 99 9)
. A law i s void for vag ueness if its prohibitions are not clea rly define d. Gray ne d v . Ci ty of R oc k for d , 4 08 U. S. 104, 108 (1972). A law m ust g ive a pe rson of ordina ry intelligenc e a r easona

ble opportunity

to knowWe n ote that a statut e is n ot v a g ue me re ly be c a us e its wo rd s or ph ra se s are no t sp e c if ic a lly 5 define d. Se e Mo rg

an v . S tate , 55 7 S.W. 2d 51 2, 51 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); In re Browning , 113 S.W .3d 851, 864 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied). When words are not define d in a statute, the y are or din ari ly

g ive n th e ir pla in me anin g un le ss the statut e c le arl y sh ow s th a t th e y

we re us e d in some other se nse. Da nie ls v . S tate , 754 S.W .2d 214, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

17 what is prohibited. Id . Ala w a lso mus t pr ov ide e xplic it s tand ard s to thos e wh o en fo rc e and a pp ly it. Id . A vague law “ impermissibly deleg ates ba sic policy

matters to policemen, judg es, and jurie s fo r resoluti on on an ad hoc and subjec tive basis, with the attendant da ng ers of arbitra ry and discrimi n at o ry ap plication.” Id . at 10 8- 09 . Asc ie nte r r e qu ir e me nt c an o ve rc ome pr ob le ms w ith vag ue statutory

lang uag e. See W

ise nb ak e r v . S tate , 860 S.W .2d 681, 689 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, pe t. r e f’ d) ; see also Village of Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 499.

Section 25.07 contains a scienter require ment—the prohibited conduc t must be done

“ kn ow ing ly

or int e nti on a lly .” Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 2 5. 07 (a ). S peci fy ingan in te nt e le me nt, howeve r, does not save a c riminal statute from vagueness whe re the conduct whic h must be motivated by intent, a s well as the standa rd by which that conduc t is to be assessed, re main vague. See Krame r v. Price , 7 12 F .2d 17 4, 17 8 ( 5th Cir . 1 98 3) . T he c on du c t at is su e in t his c a se is “har assing ” communication. Garc ia contends that section 25.07 is vag ue bec ause it fails to define the term “ hara ssing.” 5

I n his brief, Ga

rcia relies primar ily

on Lon g v . S

tate , 9 31 S.W. 2d

28 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1996). In Long , the cour t of crimi n al ap p ea l s addre ssed the constitutionality of the 1993 version of the stalking statute, focusing on the provision that made it an of fense to eng ag e in re peate d conduct “ that is reasona

bly likely to hara ss, annoy , alar

m, abuse, torment , or emba rra ss ” another person. Id
. at 288. The court found that these wor ds were “susce ptible to uncerta inties of meaning .”18

Id . at 28 9. Th e c ourt

did no t, h ow e ve r, fo c us e xclu siv e ly on the te rm “ ha ra ss, ” bu t e xami ne d it toge ther wit h t h e s urroundingwords in the provision. The c ourt found that the wor ds “har ass,”

“ a larm ,” “ a

bu se ,” and

“ tor me nt” we re “ of

low e no ug h e mot ion a l in te ns ity” that the y “ imp lic a te F ir st Amendment fr eedoms.” Id
. at 2 96. Concluding that the “leg islature obviously intended low i n t en s i t y em o t i o n s t o t ri gger

t h e s t at u t e, ” t h e c o u rt r e f u s e d t o s av e t h e s t at u t e b y

ap p l y i n g a
narr owing construction that “inc rea sed the intensity of the c onduct under

scrutiny .” Id
. The c ourt held the statute to be “ unconstitutionally vague on its fac e.” Id . at 297. Two y ear s after Long was decided, the supreme c ourt direc tly addre ssed the mea

ning
o f t h e word “hara ss.” See Comm ission for Lawyer Discipline v. Be nton , 9 8 0 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 5 ( T e x. 1998). At issue wa s the constituti o n al i t y o f a dis ciplinary rule of pr ofessional c onduct that prohibited lawy er s fr o m m ak ing c omments to a juror “that are calc ulated mer ely to hara ss or embar rass the juror

or to influence his actions in future jury service .” See Tex. Disciplinar y R. Prof’l Conduct 3.06(d). The court a cknowledg ed that, “in c olloquial usag e,” “ hara ss” may be conside red vag ue. Benton , 980 S.W .2d at 439. However, the court stated that “we a re bound” to construe the word to “a

void constituti onal infirmity if possible.” Id . L ooking f or g uidance to statutes in other jurisdictions, “in particular criminal stalking statutes, contain ingdefinitions of the word ‘ hara ss’ that have w ithstood vague ness cha lleng es,” the court c onstrued “ha rass” to include the following elements: (1) a course of conduct, (2) direc ted at a specific person or persons, (3) causingor tending to cause substantial distress, and (4) having no leg itimate purpose. Id . Although the court a pplied this definition to a discipli nary rule, the c ourt observe d that “thus define d, ‘h ar as s’ is not impermissibly

vague eve n in a c rim ina l st atu te .” Id . at 439 -4 0 (e mph a sis a dd e d)
. Ha vin g na rr ow lyWe are not convince d that, as the ter m is used in section 25.07, “har ass” is of “ low 6 emotional intensity .” Unlike the former stalking statute, se ction 25.07 prohibits communication that i s ei t h er “t h re at en i n g o r h ar as s i n g. ” T ex . P en . C o d e A n n . § 2 5
. 0 7 (a )( 2 )( A)
. W h at ev er “h ar as s i n g” means, by

connec ting it to the word “ threatening ,” we believe the l egi s l at ure intende d it to be of highe r emoti onal i ntensity than i t was in the former stalking statute. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 31 1. 01 1( a ) ( Wes t 19 98 ) ( statut or y wo rd s are to b e “ re a d in

c on te xt”) ; Ngu

y e n v . S tate , 1 S.W .3d 694, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (cour t “ca nnot interpret a

phrase within a statute in isolation”); Tho ma s v . S

tate , 919 S.W .2d 427, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“We alwa y s strive to g ive words a

nd phrase s meaningwithin the context of the larg er pr ovision.”). 19 de fi ne d th e te rm

“ ha ra ss, ” the su

pr e me c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e ru le wa s n ot u nc on sti tut ion a lly vag ue. Id . at 442.

We a re thu s c on fr on te d w ithtw o p os sib le c on stru c tio ns of se c tio n 2 5. 07 , o ne in wh ic h th e statut e is f

ound to b e va g ue be c a

us e of the “ lo w emo ti ona l in te ns ity” and “ un c e rt a in 6 meaning ” of the word “ hara ss,” see Long , 931 S.W .2d at 289, 296-97, and another in which the word “har ass” is subject to a na rrowingdefinit ion that saves the statute f rom “c onstitut ional infirmity .” See B enton , 980 S.W .2d at 439-40.

“Where a statute is susceptible of t wo co n s tructions, by one of w hich g rave and doubtful constitutional questions arise an d b y t h e other of which suc h questions are avoided, [the court’s] duty is to a dopt the latter.” State v. Edmond , 933 S.W .2d 120, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (q u o t i n g United St ates ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co. , 213 U.S. 366 (1909)). We are “oblig ed to assume that the L eg islature intended the interpre tation which sec ures the statute’s constitutional application.” Id .; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(1) ( West 2005) (when leg islature ena cts statute, “it is presumed that compliance with the consti tutions of t his state and the United States is intended”)
.Ga rc i a a l s o co n t en d s t h at s ec t i o n2 5
. 0 7 fa i l s t o cl ar i fy t h e s t an d ar d

b y wh i ch “h ar as s i n g” 7 communication is to be assesse d. I n acc ordanc e with our incor poration into the statute of the su pr e me c ourt ’s de fi nit ion

of “ ha ra ss, ” we wi ll a lso inc or

po ra te a “ re a so na ble pe rs on ” sta

nd ard int o section 25.07, as that is the standa rd used in the statutes the supr eme c ourt reli ed u pon. See Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Be nton , 980 S.W .2d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (c iting Sn owd e n v . S tate , 6 77 A. 2d

33 , 3 6 n .1 (D e l. 1 99 6) (“ ‘H ara ss’ me ans a kn ow ing and wi llf ul c ours e of conduc t direc ted at a spec ific per son which ser iously alar ms, annoy s, or har asses the pe rson, and wh ic h s e rv e s n o le g iti mate purp os e . T he c ours e of c on du c t mu st b e su c h a s w ou ld c a us e a re a so na ble pe rs on to s uf fe r s ub sta nti a l e mot ion a l di str e ss, and mus t a c tua lly

c a us e su bs ta nti a l e mot i o n a l d i s t

r e ss to th e per so n. ” ); J

oh ns on v . S

tate , 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the statute def ines “har ass” a s “a know ing a nd willful course of

conduct d i re cted at a spec ific per son which ca uses emotional distress by placing such person in r easona ble fea r of death or bodily harm to himself or he rs e lf or to a me mbe r of

his or he r i mme diate fa

mil y . . . . ” ); State v. Fonsec a, 670 A.2d 1237, 1238 (R.I . 1996) (“ ‘Ha

rasse s’ m eans a knowing and willful course of conduc t directe d at a spe cific pe rson which ser iously

alar ms, annoy s, or hara sses the per son and which se rves no leg itimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would c ause a rea sonable pe rson to suffe r substantial emotional distress, or be in fe ar of

bodily injury .”))
. A “r easona

ble per son” standar d is also the standard a pproved by the court of c riminal appea ls. See Lon g v . S tate , 9 31 S.W. 2d

28 5, 28 9- 90 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); se e als o W oo ds on v . S

tate , 191 S.W. 3d 28 0, 28 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 200 6, pe t. re f’ d) (“ A statut e wh ic h inc or po ra te s a ‘ re a so na

ble person’ standard w ill gene rally be suff icient to pass constitutional muster.”). Gar cia asserts that the cour t of criminal appe als in Long reje cted the supr eme c ourt’s 8 approa ch to na

rrowly construing the term “har ass” in this manner . Howeve r, we can f ind nothing in Long , a ca se dec ided two y ear s prior to Benton , that reje ct s o r ev en d i s approves of such a n approa ch. In fac t, the court in Long wrote that courts “have a g ener al duty to employ

narr owing c on str uc tio ns to p re ve nt a

statut e fr om b e ingun c on sti tut ion a l.” 93 1 S. W.2 d at 295 . T he c ourt did state that we “may

not rewr ite a statute in orde r to save it if it is not readily subject to a na

rrowing construction.” Id . Howeve r, we are not rewr iting sec tion 25.07. W e ar e simply definingthe term
“ ha ra ss” in a mann e r c on sis te nt w iththe su pr e me c ourt ’s pr ior

de fi nit ion

of the te rm . 20 We acc ording ly

construe “ hara ss” in a manne r consistent wit h the construction adopted by the supreme court in Benton
. See 980 S.W .2d at 439-40. Thus de fined, we hold that section 25.07 7 is not im permissibly

vague. We overrule Gar cia’ s six th issue.

821 CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled Gar cia’ s issues on appea l, we af fi rm t he judg ment of the district court.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: September

29, 2006 Pub lis h