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77–802 PDF 2013

MEASURING BORDER SECURITY: U.S. BORDER 

PATROL’S NEW STRATEGIC PLAN AND THE 

PATH FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 8, 2012 

Serial No. 112–88 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairwoman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

PAUL ANSTINE, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief, Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11 

Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

Mr. Marc R. Rosenblum, Specialist in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Article, Houston Chronicle .................................................................................. 65 

(1) 

MEASURING BORDER SECURITY: U.S. BORDER 

PATROL’S NEW STRATEGIC PLAN AND THE 

PATH FORWARD 

Tuesday, May 8, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, McCaul, Duncan, Cuellar, 

Thompson, and Jackson Lee. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Committee on Homeland Security, the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine our Border Patrol’s 

new strategic plan. We have a great lineup of witnesses today. 

But before we begin talking about our border, I think it is appropriate for this subcommittee to acknowledge the extraordinary professionalism and work that happened with the FBI and the CIA in 

regard to foiling this recent bombing plot that was happening in 

Yemen. 

I would say one thing that is very, very clear to all of us is that 

the war on terror is not over. We have so many enemies of freedom 

that are bent on attacking this Nation. I think, again, Americans 

can be comforted by the fact that we have such high vigilance and 

so many professional folks in all our agencies. We are going to hear 

from a number of them today. But they are working on the front 

lines each and every day to protect us, protect Americans against 

the enemies of freedom. 

One of the things that is incumbent on us as a Congress is to 

make sure that we provide these individuals at the various agencies with the tools that they need, the resources that they need, the 

training that they need to be able to stop a plot such as we saw 

here, as is becoming clearer of some of the various things that happened. But being from the Detroit area where the underwear bomber, Christmas day bomber, almost blew up about 300 folks over my 

hometown several years ago, we always need to be ever-vigilant, of 

course. 

But, again, on behalf of the committee, subcommittee, certainly 

the entire committee, I think we all are very, very thankful that 

this plot was stopped. 
2 

Today our subcommittee is going to be talking, as I said, about 

the Border Patrol’s new strategic plan. Our witnesses today are 

Chief Fisher of the U.S. Border Patrol; Rebecca Gambler, who is 

the Director of Homeland Security and Justice section within the 

GAO; and Marc Rosenblum, who is a specialist in immigration policy from the Congressional Research Service. We welcome them all. 

I will make the formal introductions after the opening statements. 

Clearly, along the enumerated powers of the Congress, providing 

for the common defense, which is actually in the Preamble of our 

Constitution, gives this committee the authority and responsibility 

to ensure that we do secure our Nation’s borders. How we determine that or measure that and what a secure border actually looks 

like has been the subject of much of this subcommittee’s work during this Congress. 

The U.S. Border Patrol recently released an updated 5-year strategic plan. It is the first updated strategy since 2004. This new 

strategic plan is intended to mark a shift in focus from being resource-based to risk-based, focusing resources on the greatest border threats that we face. Principal themes for the new strategic 

plan are information, integration, and rapid response, all of which 

are very important aspects to consider as we work to secure our 

border. 

The Border Patrol certainly has to make the best use of the resources that Congress provides to it and be poised to respond 

quickly if conditions change, which they always are evolving and 

changing. I certainly want to say that I am very encouraged that 

the Border Patrol decided to update this strategy to reflect the reality that we face on the border today. 

But I am a bit concerned that the 2012 to 2016 Strategy lacks 

a tangible way to measure our efforts on the border, and we are 

going to be exploring that today. The new strategy I think is absent 

in an emphasis on proven techniques, such as defense-in-depth, 

which makes full use of interior checkpoints to deny successful migration, which was a key facet of the 2004 Strategy, yet it is not 

mentioned at all in this new strategic plan, so I am sure there will 

be a question on why that was not included. 

Basing operations and patrolling using the best intelligence to inform how and where agents patrol is smart, and the new strategy 

rightly focuses on using information to better secure our borders. 

But intelligence is an imperfect tool, and some degree of randomness should be incorporated to keep drug cartels or what have you 

from finding holes in our defenses or watching and tracking our 

patterns. 

The most important question I think in many minds is: How do 

we know if this new strategy is working, and so how can we measure it? The Border Patrol’s previous National strategy, again released in 2004, was predicated on the concept of gaining and maintaining miles of operational control. That sort of became the de 

facto term of art, if you will, that indicated how much or how little 

of the border the Border Patrol could effectively control. However, 

it is clear that the Department of Homeland Security is backing 

away from the use of that term, ‘‘operational control,’’ in its absence in this strategy. 
3 

In 2010, the Department really stopped reporting to Congress 

the number of miles of border under operational control, and, to 

date, we have not been supplied with an alternative measure to replace this operational control matrix. Performance measures, such 

as the number of apprehensions, as noted by the GAO in their testimony, are really not adequate to measure border security 

progress. I think as I have said and many Members of this subcommittee have said often in the past, we are open to a new, more 

robust standard if it supplements operational control and if it better describes the level of security at the border. But when we hear 

terms like ‘‘the border is more secure than ever,’’ well, that may be 

so, but how do you measure that, by what? That is what we are 

really looking for. 

Conditions along the Nation’s border continue to evolve. It is 

clear we need to have an agreed-upon measure to understand 

progress, as I say, or lack thereof. The border is certainly a much 

different place now than it was in 2004, and Congress, of course, 

has invested in doubling the size of the Border Patrol, building 

hundreds of miles of fence, utilizing new technology such as the unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs, that this subcommittee and the 

full committee have had many hearings about. However, as the 

GAO has noted, all of these elements were also prevalent in the 

2004 Strategy, so, again, we will be interested in learning what is 

different or new in the 2012 plan. 

As mentioned in the new strategic plan, the Department is working on something called the Border Condition Index, the BCI, 

which is supposed to be an objective measure to inform and to matrix our border security efforts. We have heard some reports that 

the anticipated new standard is running into some delays, maybe 

it is unworkable. Again, I think we will be eager to hear how that 

is all happening. 

Using apprehensions as a measure of progress tells us an incomplete story, really. There are a number of reasons why I think migration across our border is down. Certainly, our efforts are one of 

the components, but the economy has been weakened; drug cartels 

make trying to cross the border a dangerous endeavor for many 

that were trying; and, certainly, changing demographics. All of 

these things are critical elements that play a role in the reduced 

number of illegal aliens who are crossing the border or attempting 

to cross the border. 

I say that by not taking away for a moment from the work that 

the Border Patrol has done. I think our enhanced enforcement efforts and the introduction of significant consequences, such as prosecution for multiple crossers and smugglers, have made a tremendous difference. At the same time, I think we obviously can’t be 

complacent, as the number of illegal aliens crossing in places such 

as the Rio Grande Valley sector in Texas have recently increased, 

actually, which is bucking the National trend. 

So we have called on the Department of Homeland Security to 

produce a comprehensive strategy to secure the border that informs 

the Congress and the American people of the resources that are 

needed to make that a reality. I certainly hope that the forthcoming implementation plan will indicate what a secure border 

looks like and provides us a pathway to get there. 
4 

I also want to mention it is the 88th anniversary, actually, of the 

founding of the U.S. Border Patrol. That is going to be later this 

month. Over that time, the men and women in green have served 

our Nation in such an extraordinarily remarkable and professionally well-executed way. On behalf of this committee, I certainly 

want to commend all of the men and women of the Border Patrol 

for the work that they have done over the last decade, as well, the 

last 88 years, but certainly since 9/11 and since we have really 

started to focus on our border in a much more intense way. They 

have just done an extraordinarily professional job for all of us. 

So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how 

this change in strategy will move the ball forward to make for a 

more secure border. 

[The statement of Mrs. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN CANDICE S. MILLER

MAY 8, 2012 

Among the enumerated powers of the Congress, providing for the common defense 

gives this committee the authority and responsibility to ensure that we secure the 

Nation’s borders. 

How we determine, or measure, what a secure border looks like has been the subject of much of this subcommittee’s work this Congress. This hearing will continue 

the subcommittee’s oversight in this area. 

The U.S. Border Patrol recently released an updated 5-year strategic plan, the 

first updated strategy since 2004. According to Border Patrol leadership, the new 

Strategic Plan is intended to mark a shift in focus from being ‘‘resource’’-based to 

‘‘risk’’-based, focusing resources on the greatest border threats. 

The principal themes for the new strategic plan are information, integration, and 

rapid response—all important aspects to consider as we work to secure the border. 

The Border Patrol has to make the best use of the resources this Congress provides 

and be poised to respond quickly if conditions change. 

I want to say at the outset that I am encouraged that the Border Patrol decided 

to update this strategy to reflect the reality we face on the border today, but I am 

concerned that the 2012–2016 Strategy lacks a tangible way to measure our efforts 

on the border. 

I would like to highlight the absence of proven techniques such as defense-indepth, which makes full use of interior checkpoints to deny successful migration, 

which was a key facet of the 2004 Strategy yet it is not mentioned at all in the 

2012 Strategic plan. I will be interested to hear why that was not included. 

Basing operations and patrolling using the best intelligence to inform how, and 

where, agents patrol, is smart, but intelligence is an imperfect tool and some degree 

of randomness should be incorporated to keep drug cartels from finding holes in our 

defenses, or watching and tracking our patterns. 

Border Patrol’s previous National strategy, released in 2004, was predicated on 

the concept of gaining and maintaining miles of operational control. 

It became the de facto term of art that indicated how much or how little of the 

border the Border Patrol could effectively control. 

However, it is clear that the Department of Homeland Security is backing away 

from the use of ‘‘operational control’’ given its absence in this strategy. 

In 2010, the Department stopped reporting to Congress the number of miles of 

border under operational control, but to date has not supplied an alternative measure to replace operational control. Performance measures such as the number of apprehensions, as noted by GAO in their testimony, are not adequate to measure border security progress. 

As I have said before, I am certainly open to a new, more robust standard if it 

supplements operational control and better describes the level of security at the border, but we cannot merely take the Secretary’s word that the border is more secure 

than ever. 

Conditions along the Nation’s border continue to evolve and its clear we need an 

agreed-upon measure to understand progress, or lack thereof. The border is a vastly 

different place than it was in 2004 because Congress invested in doubling the size 

of the Border Patrol, building hundreds of miles of fence, and utilizing new technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles. 
5 

However, as the GAO has noted, all of these elements were also prevalent in 2004 

Strategy, so I will be interested in learning what is different or new in the 2012 

plan. 

As mentioned in the new strategic plan, the Department is working on something 

called the Border Condition Index which is supposed to be an objective measure to 

inform our border security efforts. 

However, I have heard reports that the anticipated new standard is running into 

delays, and may even be an unworkable measure. So, I am eager to hear how this 

Congress and the American people can adequately judge progress on border security 

in the interim. 

Our economy is fragile, drug cartels make trying to cross the border a dangerous 

endeavor, and changing demographics all play a role in the reduced number of illegal aliens who cross the border. 

That is not to take away from the work the Border Patrol has done—I’m certain 

that our enhanced enforcement efforts and the introduction of significant consequences, such a prosecution for multiple crossers and smugglers have made a difference. 

But I want to caution that we should not become complacent as the number of 

illegal aliens crossing in places such as the Rio Grande Valley Sector in Texas have 

recently increased, bucking the National trend. 

I have called on the Department of Homeland Security to produce a comprehensive strategy to secure the border that informs the Congress of the resource needs 

to make that a reality. My hope is that the forthcoming implementation plan will 

indicate what a secure border looks like and provides a path to get us there. 

The 88th anniversary of the founding of the U.S. Border Patrol will take place 

later this month and over that time, the men and women in green have served our 

Nation well. 

On behalf of this committee, I want to commend the men and women of the Border Patrol for the work they have done over the last decade to make our border 

more secure, but we cannot cede an inch to drug cartels, human traffickers, smugglers, and potential terrorists. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how this change in strategy 

will move the ball forward toward a more secure border. 

Mrs. MILLER. At this time, I would recognize our Ranking Member, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for his opening statement. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman, for having this meeting. I am glad that we are here to examine the Border 

Patrol’s recently released strategic plan. 

I have long believed that border security is a core element of the 

Department of Homeland Security. After the terrorism attacks of 

September 11, 2001, Congress made providing the resources necessary to secure that. We learned a lot from what happened on 

September 11, 2001, and we certainly want to make sure that we 

secure our land, air, marine, maritime borders, make sure that is 

a top priority for all of us. 

As a result, the number of Border Patrol agents patrolling America’s border has more than doubled. As of last month, there were 

21,328 Border Patrol agents. 

Chief Fisher, I think you all just recently had your 1,000 graduating class, and congratulations on that. 

Additional resources also allow for expanded border infrastructure such as fencing and technology such as mobile surveillance 

units. The U.S. Border Patrol refocused its priorities in response to 

9/11 while remaining committed to its traditional duties of preventing illicit trafficking of people and contraband between our official ports of entry. 

To that end, the Border Patrol released its first National strategic plan in March 2004. That plan provided the framework for 

the on-going acquisition and deployment of personnel, technology, 
6 

and infrastructure resources along our Nation’s border. In the intervening years, the Border Patrol has continued to grow and has 

only recently begun to level off its expansion. 

This is a very appropriate time for the agency to set forth a new 

strategic plan which seeks to assure the new Border Patrol is as 

effective and efficient as possible. Indeed, in order to best utilize 

Border Patrol’s workforce and advanced technology, the agency has 

developed a risk-based strategy, which, again, is something that— 

just like the Chairwoman and I were interested in measures, because at the end of the day we want to see, if you put X amount 

of dollars into an agency, what are the results, how do you measure 

results? This is something that we certainly, working with all the 

folks here, we want to make sure. Trying to find the right results 

can be difficult, I understand that, but we appreciate all the work 

that you all have been doing to make sure that we focus on results. 

The new strategic plan is focused on identifying high-risk areas 

and flows and targeting the response to meet those threats. Cooperation is also key to the 2012 Strategy as it would serve as a 

guide in the overall efforts of CBP, another agency within DHS, to 

ensure progress continues on our borders. The 2012 Strategy also 

builds on a strong relationship with Mexico and Canada as it relates to border management and security. 

I am hopeful that today’s discussion will help us gain a better 

perspective not only of where Border Patrol is today but also on the 

future direction of the agency. I am also particularly interested in 

finding out how Border Patrol will continue to build on the strong 

relationships with its State and local counterparts on the Southern 

Border. 

Chief, you and I have talked about the importance of making 

sure that they are all working, because we can’t do it by ourselves, 

we have to involve the States and, of course, the local governments. 

I appreciate all the work that you are doing in that effort. 

Living on the Southern Border has given us a first-hand knowledge of the challenges facing the region and the importance of providing not just the tools necessary to enhance border security but 

also a sound plan to get us there. I am also interested from our 

witnesses about how they believe we can get to that point. 

I want to thank Chairwoman Miller for having this meeting but 

also for the field hearing, for allowing us to be down there in my 

hometown of Laredo. Congressman Mike McCaul was there. We got 

to see the work that has been done, not only the ports of entry, but 

we also got on the boats and went up and down the Rio Grande. 

We want to thank you, Chief, for the work that you all are doing 

in providing that type of work down there. 

So I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us here today. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his comments. We heard 

excellent reports about your field hearing there, and Chairman 

McCaul and Mr. Cuellar as well. So I thought that was an excellent, excellent, excellent effort on all of your behalf, and I appreciate your service to do such a thing. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 
7 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking 

Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 

Thompson, for any statements that he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

I welcome our witnesses here. Some I have seen one or two times 

in the past. I am looking forward to your testimony. 

I have long encouraged the Department of Homeland Security to 

develop a comprehensive strategy for securing America’s borders. It 

is still my hope that the Department will do so. While not a Department-wide strategy, I am pleased that the U.S. Border Patrol 

has developed a new plan, the Border Patrol Strategic Plan 2012 

to 2016, to guide the agency over the next 4 years. 

With the support of Congress, the Border Patrol has experienced 

unprecedented growth over the last decade in terms of both personnel and resources. As the Ranking Member of the subcommittee 

has already indicated, the number of Border Patrol agents has 

more than doubled over the last decade, from over 10,000 in 2002 

to over 21,000 today. DHS has also added hundreds of miles of pedestrian fencing and vehicle barriers in that time, with about 650 

miles in place along the Southwest Border today. Furthermore, 

DHS has deployed additional technology and equipment to the borders, including mobile surveillance systems, cameras, and UAVs. 

Given these sweeping changes, it seems necessary and appropriate for the Border Patrol to set forth a new strategy based on 

current realities. That said, the Border Patrol’s strategic plan is a 

relatively brief document compared to the breadth and depth of the 

mission before the law enforcement agency. I look forward to hearing more details today from Chief Fisher about the strategic plan 

and how it will be implemented in the near term and in the coming 

years. 

I do have some initial thoughts on the plan, however. One of the 

concerns I have expressed during prior oversight hearings on the 

rapid growth of the Border Patrol was the need to ensure proper 

training and supervision of less experienced agents. I was pleased 

to see that the strategic plan gives consideration to supporting the 

men and women of the Border Patrol and ensuring that the agency 

matures as an organization. 

The strategic plan also discusses the Border Condition Index, 

BCI, which the Border Patrol is developing to replace operational 

control as a metric for measuring border security. We are told that 

the new BCI is intended to capture a more comprehensive picture 

of border conditions, including border security, public safety, and 

quality of life. It is my hope that the BCI will truly offer a better 

indicator of the situation along the border and is not just a case 

of finding a new ruler when you do not like the first measurement. 

I look forward to hearing more detail about the BCI at this hearing 

and once the new system is implemented. 

I thank the witnesses for joining us today and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements might be submitted for the record. 

First of all, Michael Fisher. Chief Fisher was named the chief of 

the U.S. Border Patrol in May 2010. Chief Fisher started his duty 
8 

along the Southwest Border in 1987 in Arizona. He successfully 

completed the selection process for the Border Patrol Tactical Unit 

in 1990 and was later selected as the field operation supervisor for 

the tactical unit. Following this, he served as a deputy chief patrol 

agent in the Detroit sector and as an assistant chief patrol agent 

in Tucson, Arizona. 

Rebecca Gambler is an acting director in the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office’s Homeland Security and Justice team, where 

she leads the GAO’s work on border security and immigration 

issues. She joined GAO in 2002 and has worked on a wide range 

of issues related to homeland security and justice, including border 

security, immigration, and DHS management and transformation. 

Marc Rosenblum is a specialist in immigration policy at the Congressional Research Service and an associate professor of political 

science in the University of New Orleans. Dr. Rosenblum is the author of ‘‘The Transnational Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy’’ and 

the co-editor of ‘‘The Oxford Handbook of International Migration.’’ 

He has also published over 40 academic journal articles, book chapters, and policy briefs on immigration policy and U.S.-Latin American relations. 

So we welcome all of the witnesses. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Chief Fisher for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF, BORDER PATROL, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Chief FISHER. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and 

other distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is indeed a 

privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the 

work that U.S. Customs and Border Protection does in securing 

America’s borders. 

May 28, 2012, will mark the 88th birthday of the United States 

Border Patrol. As this day approaches, I am reminded of how Western author Louis L’Amour defined the term ‘‘riding for the brand’’ 

as a compliment or an expression of loyalty to a cowboy’s outfit. 

For 88 years, the men and women of the United States Border Patrol have been riding for a unique and particular brand. Since the 

days of the mounted watchmen who rode the borderlands of the 

Southwest, the Border Patrol has done no less than protect and defend this country’s borders. As L’Amour wrote, ‘‘If a man did not 

like a ranch or the way they conducted their affairs, he was free 

to quit. And many did. But if he stayed on, he gave loyalty and expected it.’’ For 88 years, the men and women of the Border Patrol 

have stayed on, giving their loyalty to their mission and this Nation. 

Since May 28, 1924, the U.S. Border Patrol has responded to an 

ever-changing and maturing Nation as it recognized the need to 

curb the influx of people and contraband entering its borders. As 

the Nation evolved, so did the job. During the Prohibition era, inspectors pursued liquor smugglers in the mountains of Arizona. As 

World War II raged in Europe and Asia, Border Patrol inspectors 

scanned the Atlantic horizon for enemy submarines off the coast of 

Florida. The Cold War found Border Patrol personnel on board domestic airline flights, serving as U.S. air marshals. During the civil 

rights movement, the U.S. Border Patrol joined U.S. Marshals to 
9 

enforce Federal law by protecting James Meredith as he registered 

as the University of Mississippi’s first African American student. In 

the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Border Patrol agents responded to 

help victims and restore order. During the reconstruction of Iraq 

and Afghanistan, agents stepped up across the ocean to bring security and support. 

Whether dealing with the problem of illegal immigration or facing the threat of international terrorism, Border Patrol agents have 

done their job with vigilance, integrity, and pride. The threats have 

changed over the years, but the basic mission remains unaltered. 

Defending and protecting our Nation’s borders is the Border Patrol’s brand—a brand that is as important today as it was in the 

past. 

This month, as we take increased devotion from our past to carry 

out our great task of securing America’s borders, it is altogether fitting and proper that I am here to discuss the Border Patrol’s future 

through the 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan. 

The border is a very different environment today than when I 

began my career. I have personally witnessed the evolution of the 

border over the past 25 years, both in terms of additional resources 

applied against the threat as well as the change in the adversary’s 

tactics. The Border Patrol Strategic Plan builds on the foundation 

of the 2004 National Strategy. The 2004 Strategy focused on getting the Border Patrol organized and resourced through the unprecedented deployment of personnel, technology, and infrastructure. Our 2012–2016 Strategic Plan involves a set of objectives, 

strategies, programs, and initiatives that apply information, integration, and rapid response to develop and deploy new and better 

tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve our strategic objectives. 

The principal theme of our strategy is to use information, integration, and rapid response to meet all threats. These pillars are 

essential as we continue to build upon an approach that puts the 

Border Patrol’s greatest capabilities in place to combat the greatest 

risks. 

First, information provides situational awareness and intelligence developed by blending things such as reconnaissance, community engagement, sign cutting, tracking, and technology to enable Border Patrol agents to get ahead of the threat. 

Second, integration denotes our comprehensive planning and execution of border security operations that leverages partnerships to 

ensure we bring all available capabilities and tools to bear in addressing threats. 

Last, through rapid response, we will deploy capabilities timely 

and effectively to meet and mitigate the risks we confront. Put simply, rapid response means the Border Patrol and its partners can 

quickly and appropriately respond to dynamic threats. 

Our strategy has two interrelated and interdependent goals. Goal 

No. 1 is to secure America’s borders. The Border Patrol will work 

to achieve this goal by preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States, managing risk, disrupting and degrading transnational criminal organizations, employing a wholeof-Government approach, and increasing community engagement. 
10 

First, the current risk environment is characterized by a variety 

of constantly evolving threats, and the Border Patrol must harness 

information and intelligence to ensure that operations are focused 

and targeted against potential terrorist threats and transnational 

criminal organizations. The Border Patrol’s ability to prevent and 

disrupt such threats is enhanced through increased information 

sharing and operational integration, planning, and execution with 

our domestic and foreign law enforcement partners. 

Likewise, developing and deploying the best possible information 

and intelligence is critical to assessing and managing risk. The 

Border Patrol’s capabilities must continue to adapt to ensure that 

resources are being used effectively and efficiently. 

For example, the Border Patrol employs a tactical strategy 

known as change detection capability, which uses various techniques to gather situational awareness in low-threat areas. Change 

detection capability allows the Border Patrol to continue focusing 

other capabilities on areas where the highest risk exists but ensures that any threat adaptation is identified quickly. 

In addition to assessing the threat and risk, the Border Patrol 

must continue to develop its mobile response capability to quickly 

redeploy scaleable capabilities to the highest-risk areas. Through 

targeted enforcement against the highest-priority threats and the 

expansion of programs that aim to reduce smuggling and associated crimes, the Border Patrol will increase the ability to disrupt 

and degrade transnational criminal organizations along our borders. Our consequence delivery system is one example of our ability 

to apply targeted and effective strategies that guide management 

and agents through a standardized process designed to uniquely 

evaluate each subject and identify the ideal consequence that 

breaks the smuggling cycle. 

In order to maximize enforcement benefits from combined resources, we must move beyond collaboration toward integration. 

Our border security mission involves a multitude of entities in the 

application of a whole-of-Government approach to ensure that we 

are working together in an integrated way. 

Last, the Border Patrol will continue to engage and educate the 

public on border activities and issues to leverage the critical assistance of our border communities. Active engagement by the Border 

Patrol with local law enforcement and the public can assist in lowering crime and reducing violence in border communities. 

Goal No. 2 is to mature, refine, and integrate the Border Patrol’s 

institutional capabilities and techniques. The Border Patrol will 

achieve this goal by strengthening our investment in its people, 

supporting our employees, preserving our organizational integrity, 

improving our processes, systems, and doctrine, and enhancing our 

efficiencies. 

First, we must strengthen our investment in our people and capabilities through improved education, training, and support of the 

Border Patrol personnel. Second, we must reinforce employee support initiatives in programs that continue to provide ways for Border Patrol employees to remain resilient in the performance of 

their day-to-day duties. Third, the Border Patrol must address 

threats to organizational integrity and remain vigilant in training 

and promoting initiatives to combat corruption to ensure morale 
11 

and mission are not compromised. Leaders must set the example 

and promote integrity through the Border Patrol to reduce the potential for corruption. 

As the Border Patrol grows and matures, it is necessary to develop an institutionalized doctrine within the organization that will 

help execute the long-term strategic plan and enable the Border 

Patrol to seamlessly link the operational force to emerging tactics, 

techniques, and procedures of our adversaries. 

Last, it is the Border Patrol’s responsibility to ensure that its 

leaders, agents, and support personnel are good stewards of the 

American tax dollars. As the Border Patrol progresses toward organizational rigor and maturity, an essential element will be the development and continual refinement of comprehensive, demanding, 

and results-driven performance measures that hold us to account. 

The Border Patrol strategic plan marks an important point in 

the growth and development of the U.S. Border Patrol and establishes an approach that is tailored to meet the challenges of securing a 21st Century border against a variety of dynamic threats and 

dangerous adversaries. Ultimately, leveraging all available actions, 

programs, and techniques encompassed within our strategic plan 

will strengthen the Border Patrol internally, increase capabilities 

and our operations, and enhance border security and ultimately 

National security through the use of information, integration, and 

rapid response. 

Again, Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. I look forward to working with you and the committee as we 

design the strategic implementation plan. At this point, I welcome 

your questions. 

[The statement of Chief Fisher follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER

MAY 8, 2012 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the 2012–2016 

Border Patrol Strategic Plan and its role within the work that U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) does in securing America’s borders. 

As America’s front-line border agency, CBP’s priority mission is to protect the 

American public, while facilitating lawful travel and trade. To do this, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based approach to enhance the security of our borders, 

while facilitating the flow of lawful people and goods entering the United States. 

This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point of entry 

or program. It also extends our zone of security outward, ensuring that our physical 

border is not the first or last line of defense, but one of many. 

BORDER SECURITY COMMITMENT

Over the past 3 years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has dedicated 

historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources in support of our border security efforts and accomplishments. Most recently, the President’s fiscal year 2013 

budget request continues these efforts by supporting the largest deployment of law 

enforcement officers to the front line in our agency’s history: 21,370 Border Patrol 

agents, over 1,200 air and marine agents, and 21,186 CBP officers, all who work 

24/7 with State, local, Tribal, and Federal law enforcement in targeting illicit networks trafficking in people, drugs, weapons, and money. Over the last year, we have 

brought greater unity to our enforcement efforts, expanded collaboration with other 

agencies, and improved response times. 

CBP has also deployed additional technology assets—including mobile surveillance units, thermal imaging systems, and large- and small-scale non-intrusive inspection equipment—along our Nation’s borders, and currently has over 270 air-
12 

crafts including nine Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and 301 patrol and interdiction vessels that provide critical aerial and maritime surveillance and operational 

assistance to personnel on the ground. The UAS program is rapidly changing how 

ground assets are deployed, supplying Border Patrol Agents with unparalleled situational awareness through its broad area electronic surveillance capabilities. Going 

forward, CBP will continue to integrate the use of these specialized capabilities into 

the daily operations of CBP’s front-line personnel to enhance our border security efforts. 

The results of these resources dedicated to the border and our layered approach 

to security are clear. Border Patrol apprehensions along the Southwest Border—a 

key indicator of illegal immigration—have decreased 53 percent since fiscal year 

2008, and are less than one-fifth of what they were at their peak in 2000. We have 

matched these decreases in apprehensions with increases in seizures of cash, drugs, 

and weapons. During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, DHS seized 74 percent more 

currency, 41 percent more drugs, and 159 percent more weapons along the Southwest Border as compared to fiscal year 2006–2008. In fiscal year 2011, CBP seized 

more than $126 million in illegal currency and nearly 5 million pounds of narcotics 

Nation-wide. At the same time, according to 2010 FBI crime reports, violent crimes 

in Southwest Border States have dropped by an average of 40 percent in the last 

two decades. Currently, some of the safest cities in America are border communities. 

Every key measure shows we are making significant progress; however, we must 

remain vigilant and focus on building upon an approach that puts the Border Patrol’s greatest capabilities in place to combat the greatest risks. 

BUILDING ON THE PAST—FOCUSING ON THE FUTURE

Beginning with ‘‘Operation Hold the Line’’ in El Paso in 1993, ‘‘Operation Gatekeeper’’ in San Diego, CA in 1994, and ‘‘Operation Rio Grande’’ in Brownsville, TX 

in 1997, the Border Patrol strategically deploys resources to meet the highest-priority threats. 

The evolution of the Border Patrol as a risk-based, intelligence-driven law enforcement organization is part of a much larger change in the U.S. Government’s approach to border and homeland security, which began with the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks. The 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012 Strategic Plan) 

builds on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy. The Border 

Patrol’s 2004 Strategy focused on getting the Border Patrol organized and resourced 

to meet its new, post-9/11 mission and succeed in its new parent organization. For 

instance, it facilitated the unprecedented deployment of personnel, technology, and 

infrastructure to secure the Nation’s borders. 

The 2012 Strategic Plan draws on earlier applications of a risk-based approach 

as part of the administration’s comprehensive approach to border security. 

2012–2016 BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN

The 2012 Strategic Plan, applying the principles of risk management, sets a 

strong foundation for the continued evolution of the Border Patrol as an integral 

part of CBP’s overall border management and homeland security enterprise. 

The 2012 Strategic Plan encompasses three key objectives and strategies concerning border security today. First, the Strategic Plan supports National-level 

strategies, such as the President’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime and the National Drug Control Strategy. Second, it supports Departmental 

strategies, in particular the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Finally, 

it supports CBP-wide planning and integration efforts. It means being more effective 

and efficient in our operations to mitigate risks. It also means continued integration 

within CBP and working with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners. 

The 2012 Strategic Plan involves a set of objectives, strategies, programs, and initiatives which apply information, integration, and rapid response to develop and deploy new and better tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve its strategic objectives. 

INFORMATION, INTEGRATION, AND RAPID RESPONSE

The principal theme of the 2012 Strategic Plan is to use information, integration, 

and rapid response to meet all threats. These pillars are central as we continue to 

build upon an approach that puts the Border Patrol’s greatest capabilities in place 

to combat the greatest risks. 

Information gathered from reconnaissance, community engagement, sign-cutting, 

and technology together provide situational awareness and intelligence and helps us 

to best understand and assess the threats we face along our borders. Information 
13 

and intelligence will empower Border Patrol leadership and front-line agents to get 

ahead of the threat, be predictive and proactive. 

Integration denotes CBP corporate planning and execution of border security operations, while leveraging partnerships with other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 

international organizations. 

Integration of effort with these organizations will ensure we bring all available 

capabilities and tools to bear in addressing threats. 

Last, through rapid response, we will deploy capabilities efficiently and effectively 

to meet and mitigate the risks we confront. Put simply, rapid response means the 

Border Patrol and its partners can quickly and appropriately respond to changing 

threats. 

GOAL 1: SECURE AMERICA’S BORDERS

The 2012 Strategic Plan has two interrelated and interdependent goals. In the 

first goal, the Border Patrol will work with its Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 

international partners to secure America’s borders using information, integration, 

and rapid response in a risk-based manner. There are five objectives within this 

goal: 

I. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from Entering the United States 

II. Manage Risk 

III. Disrupt and Degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) 

IV. Whole-of-Government Approach 

V. Increase Community Engagement 

I. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons From Entering the United States 

The current risk environment is characterized by constantly evolving threats that 

are both complex and varying, and the Border Patrol must strategically apply intelligence to ensure that operations are focused and targeted against the greatest 

threats. The Border Patrol’s ability to prevent and disrupt such threats is enhanced 

through increased information sharing and operational integration, planning, and 

execution with our domestic and foreign law enforcement partners. Integration with 

our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners’ intelligence and enforcement capabilities into the planning and execution of CBP operations is critical 

to our ability to secure our Nation’s borders. 

II. Manage Risk 

Developing and deploying the best possible information and intelligence is critical 

to assessing and managing risk. The Border Patrol has made significant progress 

in securing the Nation’s borders through the deployment of personnel, technology, 

and infrastructure. These enhanced resources have made our borders more secure. 

Yet as threats along the border continue to evolve, CBP’s capabilities to meet these 

threats must also continue to adapt. Accordingly, as we evolve from a resourcebased approach towards a more risk-based approach, we must be able to focus the 

Border Patrol’s capabilities in rapidly responding to threats along the border. 

Given the dynamic nature of cross-border threats, the Border Patrol must become 

more mobile to respond appropriately to the changing threat. Mobile Response Capability provides the Border Patrol with the flexibility to deploy capabilities to the 

highest-risk areas of the border. The Border Patrol also deploys scalable capabilities 

to areas—before they become high-risk—to maintain the highest possible levels of 

security in each border area. This capability builds on situational awareness, because the Border Patrol must know when, where, and to what extent to deploy its 

capabilities. 

III. Disrupt and Degrade TCOs 

Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) represent a significant cross-border 

threat to homeland security. These organizations control most cross-border trafficking in guns and illegal drugs, as well as an increasing percentage of human 

smuggling and trafficking. With efforts in place to understand the origin and magnitude of threats along the border, the Border Patrol can now focus on specific 

threats like TCOs, and work to disrupt and degrade their operations. The Border 

Patrol’s response to this threat also will involve close collaboration within CBP and 

includes Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to advance the common goal of 

disrupting and degrading TCO activity. For example, CBP has developed, with the 

support of its strategic partners, a new Consequence Delivery System (CDS) that 

guides agents through a process designed to evaluate each subject and identify the 

appropriate consequence to break the smuggling cycle. Consequences delivered 

under this system that execute targeted enforcement techniques range from administrative, criminal prosecution, and programmatic elements that are designed to im-
14 

pact and change the way TCOs conduct business and stem the flow of illegal activity. 

IV. Whole-of-Government Approach 

The U.S. Border Patrol will continue to integrate targeting practices and joint operations with CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Office of Air and Marine 

(OAM) to better achieve its goals. The Border Patrol also will work with its Federal, 

State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners to achieve a holistic approach to 

border security. This is accomplished by establishing a unity of purpose; advancing 

operational integration and jointly planned targeted operations; developing intelligence and accomplishing intelligence fusion; and creating integrated partnerships. 

This whole-of-Government approach, coupled with the application of the principles 

of targeted enforcement, consequence delivery, and operational discipline, provides 

the capability necessary to enhance the Border Patrol and its partners’ abilities to 

address threats or emergencies within a region. 

V. Increase Community Engagement 

The Border Patrol will continue to use its collective capabilities to engage and 

educate the public on border activities and issues so we can leverage the critical assistance of our border communities. Active engagement by the Border Patrol with 

local law enforcement and the public can assist in lowering crime and reducing violence. Additionally, through briefings, tours, informal meetings, and stakeholder 

‘‘academies,’’ the Border Patrol is able to show the operational achievements and 

challenges, which are essential to fostering support from our partners and stakeholders. 

GOAL 2: STRENGTHEN THE BORDER PATROL

The Border Patrol must also continue to mature, refine, and integrate its capabilities and techniques. To meet current and future operational and organizational requirements, it is essential to develop, deploy, and manage institutional capabilities 

within the Border Patrol. This includes areas such as human capital management, 

training, leadership development, employee support, organizational integrity, doctrine development, and technology research and development. The Border Patrol 

will strengthen its institutional capabilities through five objectives: 

I. Strengthen Investment in People 

II. Support Border Patrol Employees 

III. Preserve Organizational Integrity 

IV. Improve Organizational Processes, Systems, and Doctrine 

V. Enhance Overall Efficiency of the Border Patrol 

I. Strengthen Investment in People 

People are our most valuable asset. The Border Patrol must hire the most qualified applicants and train new employees to be successful in performing the mission. 

Leaders must ensure that employees have the opportunity to reach their highest potential by receiving the appropriate education, training, and work experiences to 

progress in the organization. Border Patrol will use a multi-tiered approach incorporating education, training, and work experience to maximize the effectiveness of 

Border Patrol personnel, such as succession management, targeted placement, advanced education and training, joint and inter-agency assignments, and mentoring. 

II. Support Border Patrol Employees 

We must reinforce employee-support initiatives and programs that continue the 

tradition of the Border Patrol. Given the challenges law enforcement face in their 

daily work, it is incumbent upon leadership to provide ways for Border Patrol employees to remain resilient in the performance of their day-to-day duties. The National Critical Incident Response Team, a component of the Border Patrol’s Traumatic Incident Management Plan, supports CBP employees involved in small- and 

large-scale, critical-incident operations. The team consists of peer support members, 

chaplains, and mental-health professionals who have specialized training in criticalincident-response management. 

III. Preserve Organizational Integrity 

The U.S. Border Patrol is fortunate in that the documented cases of corrupt employees represent only a minute percentage of the workforce. However, any instance 

of corruption within our ranks always has been—and always will be—unacceptable. 

We are committed to organizational integrity and remain vigilant in training and 

promoting initiatives to combat corruption to ensure morale and mission are not 

compromised. Leaders must set the example and promote integrity throughout the 

Border Patrol to reduce the potential for corruption. 
15 

IV. Improve Organization Processes, Systems, and Doctrine 

As the Border Patrol grows and matures, it is necessary to codify best practices 

and policies to ensure that the organization continues to provide professional border-enforcement capability for the United States. Doctrine will focus on overarching 

enduring principles, sector operations, and future border security initiatives that all 

agents can use to execute their mission in the field. 

V. Enhance Overall Efficiency of the Border Patrol 

It is the Border Patrol’s responsibility to ensure that its leaders, agents, and support personnel are good stewards of American tax dollars. As the Border Patrol progresses toward organizational rigor and maturity, an essential element will be the 

development and continual refinement of comprehensive, demanding, and resultsdriven performance measures that hold us accountable. Even as the organization internalizes these standards, it also must effectively communicate overall performance 

to its most important stakeholders—the American public. 

CONCLUSION

The 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan marks an important point in the 

growth and development of the U.S. Border Patrol, and establishes an approach that 

is tailored to meet the challenges of securing a 21st Century border against a variety of different threats and adversaries. Ultimately, leveraging all available actions, 

programs, and techniques encompassed within the 2012 Strategic Plan will 

strengthen the Border Patrol internally, increase capabilities and operations, and 

enhance border security through information, integration, and rapid response. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work of CBP, our efforts in securing our borders, and the 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan. I 

look forward to answering your questions at this time. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thanks very much, Chief. 

At this time, I would recognize Ms. Gambler for her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GAMBLER. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking 

Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate 

the invitation to testify at today’s hearing to discuss GAO’s work 

on border security programs and performance measurement which 

could inform the Border Patrol’s efforts as it transitions to its new 

strategic plan. 

The Border Patrol is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing U.S. borders between ports of entry. From fiscal 

year 2004 through 2011, the number of Border Patrol agents nearly 

doubled, from about 10,800 to nearly 21,500. Also, the Department 

of Homeland Security has reported that since fiscal year 2006 

about $4.4 billion has been invested in border technology and infrastructure. 

The Border Patrol is issuing a new strategic plan to guide its 

border security efforts. According to the Border Patrol, this plan 

will involve use of a risk-based approach based on the three key 

elements of information, integration, and rapid response. 

Today I would like to focus my remarks on two key areas related 

to Border Patrol strategy. First, I would like to highlight GAO’s 

prior work related to the Border Patrol’s implementation of its 

2004 National Strategy. Second, I would like to highlight GAO’s 

prior work reviewing performance measures and indicators for border security. 

With regard to my first point, our work has shown that the Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security more broad-
16 

ly, have made progress in developing and deploying capabilities related to the three key elements of the new strategic plan. Specifically, the Border Patrol and the Department have deployed capabilities to provide information and situational awareness, for securing the border to coordinate efforts with border partners, and to 

provide for mobile response. 

For example, the Department has deployed various technology 

systems to increase situational awareness, primarily along the 

Southwest Border. Further, the Border Patrol and its international 

and domestic law enforcement partners have established task 

forces for coordinating security activities along the Northern Border. 

While these are positive developments, our work has identified 

key challenges facing the Border Patrol and the Department of 

Homeland Security in implementing the border security strategy. 

Consideration of these challenges could inform Border Patrol effort 

as the agency begins to implement its new strategic plan. 

For example, we have reported on the need for the Department 

to better assess the benefits and performance of technology and infrastructure deployed along the Southwest Border to help provide 

situational awareness. We have also reported on the need for the 

Department to enhance its oversight of task forces to help identify 

and reduce any potential duplication of effort. 

Now turning to the issue of performance measurement, the Department of Homeland Security’s goal and measure of operational 

control was used in conjunction with the Border Patrol’s 2004 

Strategy. Operational control was defined as the number of border 

miles where the Border Patrol had the ability to detect, respond, 

and interdict cross-border illegal activity. The Department last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control of 

the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, the Department reported achieving operational control for about 1,100 miles, or 13 

percent, of more than 8,600 miles across U.S. Northern, Southwest, 

and Coastal Borders. On the Southwest Border specifically, the 

Border Patrol reported achieving operational control of 873 miles, 

or 44 percent, of the nearly 2,000 miles of the U.S. border with 

Mexico. 

The Department of Homeland Security and Border Patrol have 

several efforts under way to develop new measures or indicators for 

assessing border security programs. Until these efforts are completed, the Department is using interim measures, such as the 

number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border. These measures provide some useful information but do not position the Department to be able to report on how effective its efforts are at securing the border. 

In closing, as the Border Patrol transitions to a new strategic 

plan, it will be critical for the Border Patrol itself and the Department more broadly to provide effective direction and oversight of 

its implementation. It will also be important for the Border Patrol 

and the Department to continue to develop performance measures 

that are linked to missions and goals, include targets, and produce 

reliable results. 

This concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions Members may have. 
17 

[The statement of Ms. Gambler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER

MAY 8, 2012 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–12–688T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Border Patrol, within DHS’s CBP, is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the National borders between the U.S. ports of entry (POE). DHS 

has completed a new 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012–2016 Strategic 

Plan) that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk management instead of 

increased resources to achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement 

highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border Patrol’s progress 

and challenges in: (1) Implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy, and (2) 

achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. This 

statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions 

taken to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop performance 

measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things, strengthen 

border security technology, infrastructure, and partnerships. DHS concurred with 

the recommendations and has reported actions planned or underway to address 

them. CBP reviewed a draft of information contained in this statement and provided 

comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. 

BORDER PATROL STRATEGY.—PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION AND

ASSESSMENT EFFORTS

What GAO Found 

GAO’s prior work has highlighted progress and challenges in various areas related to Border Patrol’s implementation of its 2004 National Strategy, which could 

provide insights as Border Patrol transitions to its 2012 Strategic Plan. Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012 Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners working together to use a riskbased approach to secure the border, and include the key elements of ‘‘Information, 

Integration, and Rapid Response’’ to achieve objectives. These elements were similar 

to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAO’s past work highlighted the progress and 

challenges the agency faced obtaining information necessary for border security; integrating security operations with partners; and mobilizing a rapid response to security threats. Border Patrol successfully used interagency forums and joint operations 

to counter threats, but challenges included assessing the benefits of border technology and infrastructure to, among other things, provide information on situational 

awareness. For example, in May 2010 GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not accounted 

for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on security. GAO 

recommended that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure 

on border security, with which CBP concurred. Further, GAO identified challenges 

in DHS efforts to coordinate with partners that help to secure the border. For example, in December 2010 GAO reported that various Northern Border security partners cited on-going challenges sharing information and resources for border security 

operations and investigations, and that DHS did not have mechanisms for providing 

oversight. GAO recommended that DHS provide oversight, to which DHS concurred 

and stated that in January 2012 the Department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements. 

GAO’s prior work showed that as of September 30, 2010, Border Patrol reported 

achieving its 2004 goal of operational control—where Border Patrol has the ability 

to detect and interdict illegal activity—for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across 

U.S. Northern, Southwest, and Coastal Borders. DHS transitioned at the end of fiscal year 2010 from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for 

border security to using an interim measure of apprehensions on the Southwest Bor-
18 

1POE are officially designated places that provide for the arrival to, or departure from, the 

United States. 2Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 285, amended by The GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) 

of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–352, 124 Stat. 3866. Under GPRA, agencies are required to hold programs accountable to Congress and the public by establishing program goals, identifying performance measures used to indicate progress toward meeting the goals, and using the results 

to improve performance, as necessary. The information is publicly reported each year in the Department’s performance accountability report. Under the amendments made by GPRAMA, agencies are to describe how the performance goals contribute to the agency’s strategic plan, establish clearly-defined milestones for achieving performance goals, and describe how they will ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data used to measure progress. 3 In the context of risk management, ‘‘risk-based’’ and ‘‘risk-informed’’ are often used interchangeably to describe the related decision-making processes. However, according to the DHS 

Risk Lexicon, risk-based decision making uses the assessment of risk as the primary decision 

driver, while risk-informed decision making will consider other relevant factors such as effectiveness and cost in addition to risk-assessment information. In our prior work we have reported 

on the importance of risk-informed decision making with respect to homeland security strategies 

given DHS’s limited resources. See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Actions Needed to 

Reduce Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost Savings, and Strengthen 

Mission Functions, GAO–12–464T (Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2012). 

der. DHS reported that this interim measure would be used until such time as DHS 

developed a new goal and measure for border security that will reflect a more quantitative methodology across border locations and the agency’s evolving view of border security. As GAO previously testified, this interim measure, while providing useful information on activity levels, is an output measure that does not inform on program results. Therefore, it limits oversight and accountability and has reduced information provided to Congress and the public on program results. DHS stated that 

it had several efforts underway to establish a new measure used to assess efforts 

to secure the border but as this measure is under development, it is too early to 

assess it. 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work highlighting the U.S. Border 

Patrol’s progress and challenges implementing its 2004 National Border Patrol 

Strategy (2004 Strategy) that could be relevant to the new 2012–2016 Border Patrol 

Strategic Plan (2012–2016 Strategic Plan). Border Patrol, within the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the National borders between 

the designated U.S. land border ports of entry (POE).1 Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy 

to secure the borders focused on ensuring the agency had the right mix of personnel, 

technology, and infrastructure across locations, and Border Patrol experienced significant increases in these resources since 2004. For example, from fiscal year 2004 

through 2011, the number of Border Patrol agents has nearly doubled from about 

10,800 to nearly 21,500; and DHS reported that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 

billion has been invested in border technology and infrastructure. These resources 

were used to support the DHS goal to achieve operational control of the Nation’s 

borders. The extent of operational control—also referred to as effective control—was 

defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the ability to detect, 

respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress 

and status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year 2010, and 

reported this information to Congress and the public in its Fiscal Year 2008–2010 

Annual Performance Report in accordance with requirements in the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).2 DHS has completed but not yet publically released a new 2012–2016 Strategic Plan that Border Patrol officials stated 

will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve border 

security and that will continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 Strategy.3

However, the performance goal and measures that will be used to provide oversight 

and accountability for the new strategic plan have not yet been established. In its 

Fiscal Year 2010–2012 Annual Performance Report and subsequent reports, DHS replaced the border security goal and measure of operational control with an interim 

measure of the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border to report its status and progress in achieving border security to Congress and the public. As of April 

2012, DHS had yet to develop a new goal for border security. DHS reported that 

the interim measure of apprehensions on the Southwest Border would be used until 

such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for border security that will 

reflect a more quantitative methodology across border locations and the agency’s 

evolving view of border security. 

In the past, we have reviewed and reported on a variety of border security programs and related performance goals and measures supporting the 2004 Strategy 

that could inform discussions regarding the 2012–2016 Strategic Plan. Today I will 
19 

4The ORBBP is Border Patrol’s standardized National planning process that links sector- and 

station-level planning, operations, and budgets. This process documents how sectors identify and 

justify their requests to achieve effective control of the border in their area of responsibility, 

and enables Border Patrol to determine how the deployment of resources, such as technology, 

infrastructure, and personnel, can be used to secure the border. 5See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies 

Related to Terrorism, GAO–04–408T (Washington, DC: Feb. 3, 2004); Rebuilding Iraq: More 

Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO–06–788 (Washington, 

DC: July 11, 2006); and Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season 

Performance Measures, GAO–03–143 (Washington, DC: Nov. 22, 2002). 6 ‘‘Sign’’ is the collective term for evidence that Border Patrol agents look for and find after 

they have dragged dirt roads using tires lying on their sides flat on the ground and pulled by 

Continued 

highlight key issues on the Border Patrol’s progress and challenges relevant to: (1) 

Implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy, and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. 

In addition, appendices I and II provide information on characteristics of effective 

National security strategies and performance measures, respectively. 

My statement is based on prior products issued from 2007 to the present that examined DHS’s efforts to secure the U.S. borders (see related GAO products at the 

end of this statement), with selected updates related to the Border Patrol’s new 

strategic plan conducted in April and May 2012. For those reports and testimonies, 

we obtained and analyzed documents and information from officials from various 

components of DHS; the Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department of Interior 

(DOI); the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); and Canadian, Tribal, 

State, and local law enforcement agencies with a vested interest in border security 

along the Northern or Southwest Borders. More detailed information about our 

scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. For the selected 

updates we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding the forthcoming 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan and the status of agency efforts to 

develop performance measures for assessing the security of the border between the 

POEs, as well as reviewed relevant information contained in Border Patrol 2012 

Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP)—operational assessments—and other documents.4 We also reviewed our prior work on key elements of 

effective National security strategies and previous work on key attributes of successful performance measures consistent with GPRA.5 Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. These standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. 

BORDER PATROL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IMPLEMENTING KEY ELEMENTS OF ITS

2004 NATIONAL STRATEGY

The Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, as a framework for the agency’s new priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States and to support its traditional mission of preventing aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from crossing U.S. borders illegally. The 2004 Strategy was designed to facilitate the build-up and deployment of agency and border resources and to consolidate the agency into a more centralized organization. 

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that the 2012–2016 Strategic Plan will 

rely on Border Patrol and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners 

working together to use a risk-based approach to secure the border that uses the 

key elements of ‘‘Information, Integration, and Rapid Response’’ to achieve Border 

Patrol strategic objectives. Our past reviews of border security programs contained 

information on the progress and challenges related to implementing these key elements. Our observations are as follows. 

Obtaining Information Necessary for Border Security.—Critical to implementation 

of the 2004 Strategy was the use of intelligence to assess risk, target enforcement 

efforts, and drive operations, according to the strategy. As part of their intelligence 

efforts, CBP and Border Patrol worked to develop and deploy the next generation 

of border surveillance and sensoring platforms to maximize the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol headquarters officials reported that the new 2012–2016 Strategic Plan also has a focus 

on information that provides situational awareness and intelligence developed by 

blending technology, reconnaissance, and sign-cutting 6 and tracking, to understand 
20 

chains behind an SUV. ‘‘Sign’’ can be footprints, animal prints, and tire or bicycle tracks—any 

indication in the polished surface created by the drag. The term ‘‘cutting’’ refers to the practice 

of concentrating on the marks within discrete, manageable slices or segments of terrain. Border 

Patrol agents track illegal cross-border activity by cutting for sign to find persons who may have 

crossed the border illegally. 7For example, one station in a northern sector requested additional agents to enhance limited 

border detection and enforcement capability to an acceptable level, and one station in a southwest sector reported a need for fixed and mobile technology to secure the remote and rugged 

terrain, reporting that without this technology, rapid response was often impossible. 8For example, one station in a northern sector reported that insufficient infrastructure and 

personnel meant violators had a high probability of crossing a remote/rural border area undetected, and one station in a southwest sector reported that lack of infrastructure hindered its 

ability to address a more than 91 percent increase in aliens who are able to get away before 

apprehension. 9 $1.5 billion then-year dollars. Then-year dollars reflect the cost at the time of the procurement. 10GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO–12–22 (Washington, DC: Nov. 4, 2011). 11GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO–10–651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010). 

the threats faced along the Nation’s borders. Our prior work reviewing CBP’s efforts 

to deploy capabilities to, among other things, provide situational awareness along 

U.S. borders provides insights that could inform Border Patrol considerations in implementing its new strategic plan. 

As of fiscal year end 2010, Border Patrol reported having substantial detection resources in place across 45 percent of the Nation’s border miles. The remaining 55 

percent of border miles—primarily on the Northern and Coastal Borders—were considered vulnerable due to limited resource availability or inaccessibility, with some 

knowledge available to develop a rudimentary border control strategy. Our review 

of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments also showed concerns about resource 

availability to provide the information necessary to secure the border. Across Border 

Patrol’s 20 sectors located on the Northern, Southwest, and Southeast Coastal Borders, all sectors reported a need for new or replacement technology used to detect 

and track illegal activity, and the majority (19) reported a need for additional agents 

to maintain or attain an acceptable level of border security.7 Additionally, 12 sectors 

reported a need for additional infrastructure.8

DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol are continuing to focus attention on development, 

acquisition, and deployment of technology and infrastructure needed to provide the 

information necessary to secure the borders, with priority for the Southwest Border. 

Our past work highlighted the continuing challenges the agency faced implementing 

technology and infrastructure at the U.S. land borders. • Technology.—We previously reported that in January 2011, after 5 years and a cost of nearly $1 billion, DHS ended the Secure Border Initiative Network 

(SBInet), a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar technology effort aimed at securing 

U.S. borders because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards. 

DHS developed a successor plan to secure the border—the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan—where CBP is to focus on developing terrainand population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as 

camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region beginning with highrisk areas in Arizona. In November 2011, we reported that CBP’s planned technology deployment plan for the Arizona border, the Arizona Border Surveillance 

Technology Plan, was expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over 10 years.9

However, we also reported that CBP did not have the information needed to 

fully support and implement the technology deployment plan in accordance with 

DHS and Office of Management and Budget guidance, among other things.10

We recommended that DHS determine the mission benefits to be derived from 

implementation of the plan and develop and apply key attributes for metrics to 

assess program implementation. DHS concurred with our recommendation and 

reported that it planned to develop a set of measures to assess the effectiveness 

and benefits of future technology investments. • Infrastructure.—In May 2010, we testified that CBP had not accounted for the 

effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border security.11 Border fencing was designed to impede people on foot and vehicles from 

crossing the border and to enhance Border Patrol’s ability to detect and interdict violators. CBP estimated that border fencing and other infrastructure had 

a life-cycle cost of about $6.5 billion for deployment, operations, and maintenance. CBP reported a resulting increase in control of Southwest Border miles, 

but could not account separately for the effect of the border fencing and other 

infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, we recommended that CBP conduct 
21 

12GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO–09–896 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2009). 13The Secretary of Homeland Security established HSI pursuant to section 312 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. § 192. 14GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO–11–97 (Washington, DC: Dec. 17, 2010), and Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO–11–177 (Washington, DC: Nov. 18, 2010). 15These partners included DHS’s Offices of Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration, and USDA’s U.S. Forest Service. 16GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO–10–822T (Washington, DC: June 2010), and Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO–09–904SP (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2009). 

an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border security.12 CBP concurred and reported that it had contracted with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI)—a Federally-funded research and development center—to analyze 

the effect of tactical infrastructure on the security of the border.13 As of May 

2012, CBP had not provided an update on this effort. 

Integrating Border Security Operations with Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and 

International Partners.—Leveraging the law enforcement resources of Federal, 

State, local, Tribal, and international partners was a key element of Border Patrol’s 

2004 Strategy and Border Patrol’s implementation of the strategy, on the Northern 

and Coastal Borders where Border Patrol had fewer resources relative to the size 

of the geographic area, and on the Southwest Border where Border Patrol used the 

assistance of law enforcement partners to conduct surge operations in high-priority 

areas. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that integration of border security 

operations will be a key element of the 2012–2016 Strategic Plan across all borders. 

Our prior work reviewing coordination among various stakeholders with responsibilities for helping to secure the border provides insights for consideration as Border 

Patrol transitions to its new strategic plan. 

We previously reviewed Border Patrol efforts to coordinate law enforcement resources across partners on the Northern Border and on Federal border lands.14 On 

the Northern Border, we reported in December 2010 that Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Canadian partners operating in four Border Patrol sectors we visited stated 

that efforts to establish interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common understanding of border security status and threats, and that joint operations 

helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, 

numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be 

overlapping. We found that DHS did not oversee the interagency forums established 

by its components. Further, we also reported that while Border Patrol and other 

Federal partners stated that Federal agency coordination to secure the Northern 

Border was improved, partners in all four sectors we visited cited long-standing and 

on-going challenges sharing information and resources for daily border security related to operations and investigations.15 Challenges were attributed to continued 

disagreement on roles and responsibilities and competition for performance statistics used to inform resource allocation decisions. DHS established and updated 

interagency agreements designed to clarify roles and responsibilities for agencies 

with overlapping missions or geographic areas of responsibility, but oversight by 

management at the component and local levels had not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements. We previously reported that Governmentwide efforts to strengthen interagency collaboration have been hindered by the lack 

of agreement on roles and responsibilities and agency performance management systems that do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration.16 Thus, we recommended, among other things, that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its components and provide regular oversight of component compliance with the provisions of interagency Memorandum of 

Understandings. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that the 

structure of the Department precluded DHS-level oversight, but that it would review the inventory of interagency forums through its strategic and operational planning efforts to assess efficiency. DHS officials stated that in January 2012 the Department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to address our rec-
22 

17 According to DHS officials, this intercomponent Advisory Council meets quarterly to, among 

other things, identify cross-cutting issues, identify areas for closer collaboration, and share best 

practices. 18GAO–11–97. 19GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO–06–15 (Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005), and Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources, and 

Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, GAO–09–93 (Washington, DC: Nov. 25, 2008). 20GAO–11–177. 

ommendation that DHS provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements.17

We also reported in December 2010 that while there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from partners on the Northern Border, the extent of law enforcement resources available to address border security vulnerabilities was not reflected 

in Border Patrol’s processes for assessing border security and resource requirements.18 We previously reported that Federal agencies should identify resources 

among collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS had 

not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives—including partnerships—to existing border vulnerabilities to inform Federal resource allocation decisions.19 Development of policy and guidance to integrate available partner resources in Northern Border security assessments and resource planning documents 

could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information necessary 

to make resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities. 

Thus, we recommended that DHS direct CBP to develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate the available partner resources in Northern 

Border sector security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has taken action to formulate new policy and 

guidance in associated strategic planning efforts. 

In our November 2010 report on interagency coordination on northern Federal 

borderlands in Border Patrol’s Spokane sector and southwest Federal borderlands 

in Border Patrol’s Tucson sector, we reported, among other things, that Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA had established forums and liaisons to exchange information.20 However, while information sharing and communication among these agencies had increased in recent years, critical gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to share intelligence information and compatible secure radio 

communications for daily border security operations. We reported that coordination 

in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement 

response to illegal activity. In addition, there was little interagency coordination to 

share intelligence assessments of border security threats to Federal lands and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. We 

reported that interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in 

these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and knowledge 

for more effective border security operations on Federal lands. Thus, we recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA take the necessary action to further implement interagency agreements. The departments concurred with our recommendation. In response, Border Patrol issued a memorandum to all Border Patrol sectors 

emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on Federal lands. While this action is a positive step toward implementing our recommendation, we continue to believe that DHS should take additional steps necessary to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements, including provisions to share intelligence and resource requirements for enhancing border security on Federal lands. 

Mobilizing a Rapid Response to Border Security Threats.—One of the elements of 

Border Patrol’s 2004 National Strategy was to improve the mobility and rapid deployment of personnel and resources to quickly counter and interdict threats based 

on shifts in smuggling routes and tactical intelligence. CBP reported expanding the 

training and response capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response teams 

to support domestic and international intelligence-driven and antiterrorism efforts 

as well as other special operations. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that 

‘‘Rapid Response,’’ defined as the ability of Border Patrol and its partners to quickly 

and appropriately respond to changing threats, will also be a key element of the 

2012–2016 Strategic Plan; and in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol allocated agent positions to provide a National group of organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are capable of rapid movement to regional and National incidents 

in support of priority CBP missions. Our prior work and review of Border Patrol’s 

2012 operational assessments provide observations that could inform Border Patrol’s 

transition to and implementation of its new strategic plan. 
23 

21GAO, Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a Department of Defense Role in 

Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border, GAO–12–657T (Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 2012). 22GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and 

Marine Assets, GAO–12–518 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2012). 23GAO–12–518. 24 Aircraft deployment plans are intended to match assets to operational requirements. 

Our review of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments showed that Border 

Patrol sectors had used resources mobilized from other Border Patrol sectors or provided by law enforcement partners to maintain or increase border security. Border 

Patrol, for example, mobilized personnel and air assets from Yuma sector to neighboring Tucson sector, which cited that the coordination of operational activities was 

critical to the overall success of operations. Similarly, National Guard personnel and 

resources have been used to bridge or augment Border Patrol staffing until new 

agents are trained and deployed. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimated costs 

of about $1.35 billion for National Guard support of DHS’s border security mission 

in the four Southwest Border States (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) 

from June 2006 through September 30, 2011. 

However, Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they had not fully assessed to what extent the augmented mobile response resources would be sufficient 

to preclude the need to re-deploy personnel and resources needed to secure higherpriority border locations at the expense of lower-priority locations, or changes in the 

type or continued need of resources from its law enforcement partners. Within Border Patrol, for example, our review of the 2012 operational assessments showed that 

Border Patrol reported difficulty maintaining border control in areas from which resources have been redeployed. Border Patrol stations within six of the nine Southwest Border sectors have reported that agent deployments to other stations have affected their own deployment and enforcement activities. 

Border Patrol law enforcement partners also cited challenges. For example, we 

testified in April 2012 that DOD officials expressed concerns about the challenges 

to identify and plan a DOD role in the absence of a comprehensive strategy for 

Southwest Border security.21 In addition, we reported in March 2012 that while 

Border Patrol expects an increase in air support for rapid deployment of its mobile 

forces, it had not fully coordinated requirements with CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM).22 OAM officials stated that while they deployed a majority of resources 

to high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other National priorities, and the 

need to maintain presence across border locations limited the amount of resources 

they could redeploy from lower-priority sectors. In addition, the agency does not 

have documentation of analyses assessing the effect of these constraints and whether actions could be taken to change the mix and placement of resources within 

them.23 In response to our recommendation, in part, that CBP reassess the mix and 

placement of OAM air resources to include anticipated CBP strategic changes, DHS 

agreed and stated that it planned to complete such actions as part of the next 

iteration of the Aircraft Deployment Plan.24

BORDER PATROL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING ITS STRATEGIC GOAL FOR

BORDER SECURITY

The DHS goal and measure of operational control used in conjunction with the 

2004 Strategy provided oversight of five levels of border control that were based on 

the increasing availability of information and resources, which Border Patrol used 

to detect, respond, and interdict illegal cross-border activity either at the border or 

after entry into the United States (see table 1). The top two levels—‘‘controlled’’ and 

‘‘managed’’—reflect Border Patrol’s reported achievement of ‘‘operational control,’’ in 

that resources were in place and sufficient to detect, respond, and interdict illegal 

activity either at the immediate border (controlled level) or after the illegal entry 

occurs (managed level), sometimes up to 100 miles away. The remaining three levels 

reflected lower levels of border control, where Border Patrol has less ability to detect, respond to, or interdict illegal activity due to insufficient resources or inaccessibility. 
24 

25Operational statistics generally include the number of apprehensions, known illegal border 

entries, and volume and shift of smuggling activity, among other performance indicators. Border 

Patrol officials at sectors and headquarters convene to discuss and determine the number of border miles under operational control for each sector based on relative risk. 

TABLE 1: DEFINITIONS OF BORDER PATROL LEVELS OF BORDER 

SECURITY UNDER 2004 STRATEGY 

Level of Border Security Definition 

Controlled—operational 

control.

Continuous detection and interdiction resources at the 

immediate border with high probability of apprehension upon entry. 

Managed—operational control.Multi-tiered detection and interdiction resources are 

in place to fully implement the border control strategy with high probability of apprehension after 

entry. 

Monitored ........................... Substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility and resources continue to affect ability to respond. 

Low-level monitored .......... Some knowledge is available to develop a rudimentary 

border control strategy, but the area remains vulnerable because of inaccessibility or limited resource 

availability. 

Remote/low activity ............ Information is lacking to develop a meaningful border 

control strategy because of inaccessibility or lack of 

resources. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Border Patrol data. 

DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles 

across U.S. Northern, Southwest, and Coastal Borders at the time it discontinued 

use of this performance goal at the end of fiscal year 2010 (see fig. 1). Nearly 80 

percent of border miles Border Patrol reported to be under operational control were 

on the U.S. Southwest Border with Mexico. Border Patrol sector officials assessed 

the miles under operational control using factors such as operational statistics, 

third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource deployments 

and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.25 Our analysis of the 1,107 border 

miles Border Patrol reported to be under operational control showed that about 12 

percent were classified as ‘‘controlled,’’ which was the highest sustainable level for 

both detection and interdiction at the immediate border. The remaining 88 percent 

of these 1,107 border miles were classified as ‘‘managed,’’ in that interdictions may 

be achieved after illegal entry by multi-tiered enforcement operations. 
25 

Across the 20 Border Patrol sectors on the National borders, Yuma sector on the 

Southwest Border reported achieving operational control for all of its border miles 

as of the end of fiscal year 2010. In contrast, the other 19 sectors reported achieving 

operational control ranging from 0 to 86 percent of their border miles (see fig. 2). 

Border Patrol officials attributed the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors, including a need to prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have 

greater risk of illegal activity as well as terrain and transportation infrastructure 

on both sides of the border. 
26 

Our analysis of the remaining 7,500 National border miles that Border Patrol reported as not under operational control at the end of fiscal year 2010 showed that 

nearly two-thirds of these border miles were considered at the level of ‘‘low-level 

monitored,’’ meaning that some knowledge was available to develop a rudimentary 

border control strategy, but border security was vulnerable due to limited resources 

or inaccessibility (see fig. 3). The approximate one-third of these border miles remaining at the higher ‘‘monitored’’ level were judged to have substantial detection 

resources in place, but accessibility and resources continue to affect Border Patrol’s 

ability to respond. Border Patrol reported that these two levels of control were not 

acceptable for border security. No border miles were classified at the lowest-level of 

‘‘remote/low activity’’ as a result of insufficient information to develop a meaningful 

border control strategy. 
27 

26GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border, GAO–11–374T (Washington, DC: Feb. 15, 2011). 27For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona Border 

Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005). 

DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure 

for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010–2012 Annual Performance Report, which 

since September 30, 2010, has reduced information provided to Congress and the 

public on program results. Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and 

measure that reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the Department’s 

evolving vision for border control, DHS established an interim performance measure 

until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. As we previously 

testified, this interim GPRA measure—the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border between the ports of entry (POE)—is an output measure, which, while 

providing useful information on activity levels, does not inform on program results 

and therefore could reduce oversight and DHS accountability.26 Studies commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials do not compare these numbers to 

the amount of illegal activity that crosses the border.27 CBP officials told us they 

would continue to use interim measures for GPRA reporting purposes until new outcome measures are implemented; as of April 2012 CBP officials did not have an estimated implementation date for a new border security goal and measure. 

DHS stated that it had three efforts underway to improve the measures used to 

assess its programs and activities to secure the border. However, as these measures 

have not yet been implemented, it is too early to assess them and determine how 

they will be used to provide oversight of border security efforts. One of two efforts, 

led by CBP with assistance from the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), is to develop a Border Condition Index (BCI) that is intended to be a new outcome-based 

measure that will be used to publicly report progress in meeting a new border security goal in support of GPRA. The BCI methodology would consider various factors, 

such as the percentage of illegal entries apprehended and community well-being. 

CBP is in the process of finalizing the BCI measure and did not provide us with 

a time frame for its implementation. The second CBP effort is to create a measure 
28 

1See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies 

Related to Terrorism, GAO–04–408T (Washington, DC: Feb. 3, 2004), and Rebuilding Iraq: More 

Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO–06–788 (Washington, 

DC: July 11, 2006). 2 If the details of the analyses are classified, an unclassified version could include a broad description of the analyses and stress the importance of risk assessments to implementing parties. 3 Risk assessment includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a consequences assessment (formerly referred to as a ‘‘criticality’’ assessment). For more in-depth discussion of these subjects, see GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO–02–150T (Washington, DC: Oct. 12, 2002). 

of the change in illegal flow of persons across the Southwest Border using a statistical model developed by HSI, which uses data on apprehensions and recidivism 

rates for persons illegally crossing the border. DHS officials said that they had not 

yet determined whether results from this model would be used for GPRA reporting 

in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS Annual Performance Plan, or for internal management 

purposes and reported to Congress in support of the annual budget request. The 

third effort, led by Border Patrol, is to standardize and strengthen the metrics that 

had formerly supported the measure of ‘‘border miles under effective (operational) 

control’’ that DHS removed as a GPRA goal and measure beginning in fiscal year 

2011. As of April 2012, Border Patrol headquarters officials were working to develop 

border security goals and measures, but did not yet have a target time frame for 

implementation. 

While these new metrics are in development, Border Patrol operational assessments from fiscal years 2010 and 2012 show that field agents continued to use a 

different and evolving mix of performance indicators across Border Patrol sectors to 

inform the status of border security. These performance indicators generally included a mix of enforcement measures related to changes in the number of estimated known illegal entries and apprehensions, as well as changes in third-party 

indicators such as crime rates in border communities. Border Patrol officials said 

that the differences in the mix of performance indicators across sectors and time reflected differences in sector officials’ judgment of what indicators best reflect border 

security, given each sector’s unique circumstance. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were moving to standardize the indicators used by sectors on 

each border but did not yet have a time frame for completing this effort. 

Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Cuellar this completes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the Members of the 

subcommittee may have. 

APPENDIX I: CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES

We have previously reported on desirable characteristics of effective security 

strategies through our prior work on National security planning.1 These six characteristics and their elements could assist Border Patrol in its efforts to ensure that 

the 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012–2016 Strategic Plan) is an effective mechanism for achieving results. • Purpose, scope, and methodology.—This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by which it was 

developed. Border Patrol could discuss the specific impetus that led to the new 

strategic plan, for example, a terrorist event or changes in the external environment such as decreases in illegal activity or changes in organizational makeup 

such as significant increases in resources and capabilities. In addition to describing what the strategy is meant to do and the major functions, mission 

areas, or activities it covers, a National strategy would address its methodology, 

such as which organizations drafted or provided input to the document. For example, Border Patrol could identify parties or stakeholders who were consulted 

in the development of the strategy, such as Federal law enforcement partners, 

relevant State and local agencies, and Tribal organizations. 

• Problem definition and risk assessment.—This characteristic addresses the particular National problems and threats the strategy is directed towards. Border 

Patrol could develop a detailed discussion of primary threats—such as the illegal flow of migrants, smugglers, and other criminals or persons linked with terrorism across the border—as well as their causes and operating environment.2

This characteristic also entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the 

threat to, and vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations.3 Border Patrol 

could ensure that the strategic plan is informed by a National risk assessment 

that includes a comprehensive examination of threats and vulnerabilities across 

all U.S. borders, to include key infrastructures and assets. A discussion of the 

quality of data available for this assessment, such as known constraints or defi-
29 

4 Risk management also involves assessing risk through an assessment of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

ciencies in key data on estimated volume of persons illegally crossing the border, could also be pertinent. 

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures.—This characteristic addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to achieve 

those results, and priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. For example, Border Patrol could identify what the strategic plan is attempting to achieve—a specific end-state such as securing the Nation’s borders—and identify and prioritize the specific steps and activities needed to 

achieve that end-state, such as prioritizing the resourcing of sectors and stations in high-risk border areas. Identifying milestones and performance measures for achieving results according to specific time frames could help to ensure 

effective oversight and accountability. Border Patrol could, for example, identify 

milestones for developing an implementation plan, with time frames, which 

would guide the execution of the strategy and ensure that key steps such as 

completing a comprehensive risk assessment or developing appropriate outcome 

measures are achieved. This characteristic also emphasizes the importance of 

establishing outcome-related performance measures that link back to goals and 

objectives. For example, Border Patrol could develop outcome measures that 

show to what extent it has met its goal for securing the Nation’s borders. 

• Resources, investments, and risk management.—This characteristic addresses 

what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources and investments 

needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted based on balancing risk reductions with costs.4 A National strategy could include criteria 

and appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources based on identified needs. 

Border Patrol could develop information on the costs of fully implementing the 

strategic plan, as well as a comprehensive baseline of resources and investments needed by sectors and stations to achieve the mission of securing the Nation’s borders. According to our previous work, risk management focuses security efforts on those activities that bring about the greatest reduction in risk 

given the resources used. The strategic plan could elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned previously and provide guidance on how to manage resources 

and investments. 

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination.—This characteristic addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts. A strategy 

could clarify organizations’ relationships in terms of partnering and might also 

identify specific processes for coordination between entities. For example, Border Patrol could build upon relations with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law 

enforcement organizations by further clarifying how these relationships can be 

organized to further leverage resources. 

• Integration and implementation.—This characteristic addresses how a National 

strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities, and to subordinate levels of Government and their plans to implement the strategy. For 

example, a National strategy could discuss how its scope complements, expands 

upon, or overlaps with other National strategies. Border Patrol could ensure 

that its 2012–2016 Strategic Plan explains how it complements the strategies 

of other CBP agencies, such as the Office of Air and Marine and the Office of 

Field Operations, which oversees the Nation’s ports of entry, as well as U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s overall strategy. 

APPENDIX II: CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Border Patrol performance measures should be developed in the context of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission and objectives for securing the U.S. border. In its Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2010–2012, DHS discussed border security 

under Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders. Under this mission, there 

were interim Border Patrol performance measures supporting Goal 2.1: Secure U.S. 

Air, Land, and Sea Borders, defined as preventing the illegal flow of people and 

goods across U.S. air, land, and sea borders. There were two objectives supporting 

this goal: 

• Objective 2.1.1 Prevent illegal entry of people, weapons, dangerous goods and 

contraband, and protect against cross-border threats to health, the environment, 

and agriculture, while facilitating the safe flow of lawful travel and commerce. 
30 

1Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Meas- ures, GAO–03–143 (Washington, DC: Nov. 22, 2002). 2OFO uses a statistical program (model), COMPEX, which estimates the total amount of illegal activity passing undetected through U.S. ports of entry—including persons transporting illegal drugs, guns, or other banned substances—to calculate the apprehension rate and gauge the 

effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection officers to interdict them. As of March 2011, 

OFO officials said COMPEX was used at air and land ports of entry, but not sea ports of entry, 

and at land ports of entry it was used for passenger vehicles, but not cargo vehicles or pedestrians. 

• Objective 2.1.2 Prevent illegal export and exit of weapons, proceeds of crime, 

and other dangerous goods, and the exit of malicious actors. 

We have previously reported on key attributes of successful performance measures 

consistent with GPRA.1 Some of these attributes suggest that U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol consider the following in efforts to develop and standardize performance indicators and metrics: • Measures should cover the core program activities that Border Patrol is expected 

to perform.—At the broadest level, the DHS goal suggests measuring Border Patrol outcomes for preventing the illegal flow of people across the border between 

the ports of entry, as well as the illegal flow of goods. Border Patrol metrics 

comparing estimated illegal entries to apprehensions could serve to show how 

its efforts contribute to stemming the illegal flow of people across the border. 

As of April 2012, Border Patrol did not have a metric for performance related 

to stemming the illegal flow of goods, such as drugs, between the ports of entry 

in support of the border security goal. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they were not likely to develop a measure, per se, on contraband seizures that would apply across all sectors. According to these officials, although 

the Border Patrol plays a vital role in seizing contraband at the borders, it 

views this role as part of the larger security function played by many different 

agencies at all Government levels. • Measures should be balanced to cover CBP and DHS priorities.—Border Patrol 

could establish specific performance measures that support CBP and DHS priorities, such as those listed in the objectives supporting the overall DHS goal. For 

example, in measuring the ability to prevent the illegal flow of persons, Border 

Patrol, in consultation with CBP and DHS, could choose to separately measure 

the illegal flow of migrants, smugglers, and other criminals, or persons linked 

with terrorism, crossing the border between the ports of entry. Similarly, in 

measuring the ability to prevent the flow of dangerous goods, Border Patrol 

could choose to separately measure the flow of weapons, illegal drugs, or proceeds of crime, such as bulk cash. Border Patrol could also establish separate 

performance measures for its ability to prevent the entry and exit of persons 

and goods across the border. • Measures should link and align with measures of other components and at successive levels of the organization.—DHS could ensure that performance measures established by Border Patrol align with measures at the CBP and Departmental level, as well as those established by other components that contribute 

toward the goal to secure our borders, such as Customs and Border Protection’s 

Office of Field Operations (OFO), which has responsibility for securing the border at the ports of entry. For example, Border Patrol metrics estimating the 

flow of illegal entries between the ports of entry aligns with OFO metrics to 

measure for the illegal flow of persons through the ports of entry,2 and metrics 

of both components could be aligned with an overall effort by CBP to measure 

the overall flow of persons illegally crossing the Southwest Border. DHS could 

also choose to establish a performance measure informing on the flow of persons 

into the United States who overstay their authorized period of admission or 

other means that could similarly link to the overall DHS estimate of persons 

illegally residing in the United States. Linking performance measures such as 

these across the organization informs on how well each program or activity is 

contributing toward the overall goal to prevent illegal entry of persons, reinforces accountability, and ensures that day-to-day activities contribute to the results the organization is trying to achieve. • Measures should reflect Government-wide priorities, such as quality, timeliness, 

and cost of service.—Border Patrol could establish performance measures that 

are consistent with any measures developed by CBP and DHS to reflect the 

time frames and cost efficiencies in securing the border across locations. For example, CBP and DHS could establish measures that reflect the overall cost or 

time frame to secure the border as indicated by changes in the illegal flow of 

persons or goods relative to its investment across components and programs. At 

the Border Patrol level, such a measure could compare the relative cost effi-
31 

3For example, Border Patrol officials said they were working to standardize the methodology 

used by sectors to estimate the number of illegal entries. 4 Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that this was because the threat of illegal entries 

differs across borders. 5GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD–99–69 (Washington, DC: Feb. 26, 1999). 

ciencies achieved across border locations that use a different mix of personnel, 

technology, or strategies to secure the border. 

• Measures should have a numerical goal, be reasonably free from significant bias 

or manipulation, and be reliable in producing the same result under similar conditions.—As of April 2012, Border Patrol was working to improve the quality 

of its border security measures to reflect a more quantitative methodology to estimate the number of illegal entries across the border compared to apprehensions, and other metrics.3 However, Border Patrol officials said that comparable 

performance measures should not be applied to the Northern or Coastal Borders, providing an inconsistent picture of security for the majority of U.S. border miles.4 We reported that in circumstances where complete information is 

not available to measure performance outcomes, agencies could use intermediate goals and measures to show progress or contribution to intended results.5 For example, Border Patrol could lack the detection capability necessary 

as a first step to estimate illegal entries across most of the Northern Border 

and some other border locations. In these circumstances, Border Patrol could 

choose to establish performance measures tracking progress in establishing this 

detection capability. Once Border Patrol achieves the ability to detect illegal activity across its borders, it could then transition to measures for reducing the 

flow of illegal activity and for interdiction. On the Southwest Border, Border Patrol could also choose to establish intermediate measures in reaching Southwest 

Border security goals. Such intermediate performance measures could include 

those that use Global Positioning System data for each apprehension to show 

Border Patrol progress in apprehending persons at or close to the border compared to enforcement tiers located miles away. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much for that testimony, Ms. Gambler. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes Dr. Rosenblum for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM, SPECIALIST IN 

IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Thank you. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Cuellar, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to present testimony today on behalf of 

the Congressional Research Service. 

My testimony makes three main observations. First, the U.S. 

border in 2012 is a very different place than it was in the mid1990s when the core of the current Border Patrol strategy was developed. Second, the changes at the border have entailed costs, and 

I will discuss a few of them. These observations lead to the third, 

which is that the new Border Patrol strategy comes at an appropriate time and raises important questions. In some ways, we are 

at a critical juncture with respect to how we define border security 

and how we understand risks and threats to the United States. 

Let me begin with the changes at U.S. borders. The core of the 

current strategy since the mid-1990s is prevention through deterrence—the idea that the concentration of personnel, infrastructure, 

and surveillance technology along heavily-trafficked regions of the 

border will discourage unauthorized aliens from attempting to 

enter the United States. A new strategy was published in 2004 

that continued to emphasize investments along the border and in 

the post-9/11 environment also focused on intelligence to assess 
32 

risk and to target enforcement to the greatest security threats, including potential terrorists. At the same time, DHS announced the 

Secure Border Initiative, a National program emphasizing personnel, surveillance technology, and fencing, as well as interior enforcement and new removal practices. 

My written testimony includes several data points that show that 

these plans have largely been implemented, and we have heard 

some about it already. One example is the growth in Border Patrol 

personnel: Slow growth in the 1980s, faster growth in the 1990s, 

and even faster growth in the most recent decade, all of it concentrated primarily on the Southwest Border. 

More importantly, there is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that these investments have begun to pay off. As we have 

already heard, apprehensions of unauthorized migrants, while an 

imperfect measure, are at their lowest level in about 40 years. My 

written testimony includes several additional indicators that suggest falling illegal migration. 

Several factors have contributed to this trend, as the Chairwoman noted, including the U.S. economic downturn, crime and violence in northern Mexico, Mexico’s strong economic recovery since 

2010, demographic changes in Mexico. But the data suggests that 

U.S. enforcement efforts are likely an important contributing factor 

behind declining illegal migration. 

This figure illustrates one of the causal dynamics. The figure 

shows two measures of the fees migrants pay to be smuggled from 

Mexico to the United States. Smuggling fees were essentially flat 

during the 1980s and then rose sharply beginning in the early 

1990s through the first half of the last decade. So the figures suggest that it was relatively easy to cross the border during the 1980s 

but became much more difficult to do so during the 1990s as enforcement intensified. 

These gains at the border have entailed costs. One way to think 

about cost is in terms of direct appropriations, and my written testimony describes the dramatic growth in border spending. My written testimony also identifies a number of unintended consequences 

of border enforcement on migration flows and a number of indirect 

costs of border enforcement on crime, migrant mortality, the environment, border communities, and U.S. foreign relations. 

Border enforcement also entails opportunity costs. How does 

funding for enforcement between ports of entry compete with other 

DHS priorities and with priorities outside of DHS? For example, 

this figure compares resources that have gone to border security 

between ports of entry to resources for inspections and enforcement 

at ports of entry. Funding for enforcement between the ports has 

more than doubled since 2004, while funding at the ports has increased by less than a third. FTEs, full-time employment, lines for 

enforcement between the ports has increased 99 percent, while the 

FTEs at the ports have increased just 12 percent. 

We often think of border security in terms of how many unauthorized migrants make it through the Arizona desert, but the 

2012 Strategy highlights the Border Patrol and DHS’s broader approach to risk management. Four types of transnational threats 

may be especially important to consider: Weapons of mass destruction, drugs and other contraband, potential terrorists and other bad 
33 

1This section and much of this testimony draws heavily on CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum (hereinafter CRS, 

Continued 

actors, and then regular unauthorized migrants. These threats 

have different risk profiles. Most experts agree that WMD are a 

high-consequence, low-probability threat. Regular illegal migration 

is a lower-consequence, higher-probability threat. The entry of illegal drugs falls somewhere in between on both of these dimensions. 

The threats also differ across border zones. The Southwest Border between ports of entry is a point of vulnerability with respect 

to illegal migration and marijuana smuggling. But WMDs and 

other drugs and contraband, both are considered more likely to be 

smuggled into the United States through a port of entry rather 

than carried across the border. Given existing infrastructure, the 

Southwest Border also may not be the greatest point of vulnerability with respect to terrorists and other bad actors, who may be 

more likely to attempt illegal entry through a port or to enter the 

United States from Canada or at a Coastal Border. 

Given the gains we have made at the border, the new Border Patrol strategy offers a moment to think about the broader context 

and bottom-line goals for U.S. border security. What are the most 

serious security threats confronted by the United States? Where 

are its greatest points of vulnerability? What additional investments in policies may most effectively reduce risks to the United 

States? 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM

MAY 8, 2012 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee, 

I am honored to present testimony today on behalf of the Congressional Research 

Service. My testimony today makes three main observations: 

• The U.S. border in 2012 is a very different place than it was in the mid-1990s 

when the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed 

the core of the current U.S. Border Patrol strategy. The U.S. Border Patrol 

(USBP) and other components within the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) have made major changes at the border and in the broader immigration 

control system; and these changes appear to have contributed to a sharp reduction in illegal migration, though increased enforcement is just one of many factors that explains the reduction. 

• These gains entail costs, including direct appropriations for border security, indirect costs, and unintended consequences of the current approach, and opportunity costs that come from high investments between ports of entry on the 

Southwest Border, arguably at the expense of competing priorities. 

• The first two observations suggest that the new USBP comes at an appropriate 

time and raises important questions. The USBP’s mission is to prevent illegal 

entries between ports of entry, and most of its resources are on the Southwest 

Border. Yet many of the most serious transnational criminal and terrorist 

threats to the United States may be more likely to exploit points of vulnerability at ports of entry (POE) and at Northern and Coastal Borders, rather 

than to risk entry across the Southwest Border in light of existing enforcement 

measures there. 

THE CURRENT BORDER STRATEGY: PREVENTION THROUGH DETERRENCE 1

Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by a strategy 

of ‘‘prevention through deterrence’’—the idea that the concentration of personnel, in-
34 

Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry); please see that report for a fuller discussion 

of these issues and additional citations. 2Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, ‘‘National Border Patrol Strategy,’’ 2004. 3DHS, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,’’ http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/ 

presslreleasel0794.shtm. 4Department of Homeland Security, DHS FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification, p. 

CBP–BSFIT 3. 5The Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101–649), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, Pub. L. 104–208, Div. C), the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 

(USA PATRIOT, Pub. L. 107–56), and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

(Pub. L. 108–458). 

frastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized aliens from attempting to enter the United States. 

The strategy was developed in 1994 as part of the former INS’ ‘‘National Strategic 

Plan’’ (NSP) in response to a widespread perception that the Southwest Border was 

being overrun by unauthorized immigration and that drug smuggling was a serious 

threat along the Southwest Border. The plan described a multi-phased approach. 

Implementation began with Operations ‘‘Hold the Line’’ and ‘‘Gatekeeper’’ in El 

Paso, TX, and San Diego, CA; and the plan called for expanding enforcement in 

three additional phases to cover the remaining areas of the Southwest Border followed by the Gulf Coast and Northern Borders. In descending order of importance, 

the plan emphasized personnel, equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure. 

Shortly after the creation of DHS, USBP began to formulate a new National strategy to better reflect the realities of the post-9/11 security landscape. Published in 

March 2004, the strategy places greater emphasis on interdicting terrorists and features five main objectives: (1) Establishing the substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the 

ports of entry; (2) deterring illegal entries through improved enforcement; (3) detecting, apprehending, and deterring smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; (4) leveraging ‘‘Smart Border’’ technology to multiply the deterrent and enforcement effect of agents; and (5) reducing crime in border communities, thereby 

improving the quality of life and economic vitality of those areas.2 Thus, the 2004 

Strategy builds on ‘‘prevention through deterrence,’’ but places added emphasis on 

the rapid deployment of USBP agents to respond to emerging threats. This approach 

depends on tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence to assess risk and target 

enforcement efforts, relying on surveillance systems and close coordination with U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Intelligence and other intelligence 

apparatuses. The plan formulates different strategies for each of the agency’s three 

operational theaters: The Southwest Border, the Northern Border, and the coastal 

waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. 

In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced a comprehensive multi-year plan, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), to secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal migration, reiterating many of the themes from the 1994 and 

2004 Border Patrol Strategies. Under SBI, DHS announced plans to obtain operational control of the Northern and Southern Borders within 5 years by focusing attention in five main areas: Increased staffing, improved detention and removal capacity, surveillance technology, fencing and tactical infrastructure, and interior immigration enforcement.3 DHS noted that these programs initially would focus on the 

southwest land border between official ports of entry and that it would deploy a mix 

of personnel, technology, infrastructure, and response assets in order to ‘‘provide 

maximum tactical advantage in each unique border environment.’’4

CHANGES SINCE THE 1990S

With the implementation of prevention through deterrence beginning in the 1990s 

and elements of SBI since 2005, U.S. border security and immigration enforcement 

look quite different today. Changes include: (1) New enforcement resources at the 

border, (2) different enforcement practices at the border, and (3) additional modifications to the migration control system at ports of entry and within the United States. 

Most importantly, a growing body of evidence suggests that illegal migration to the 

United States has fallen to its lowest level in decades, although it is not possible 

to describe how much of the decrease is a function of border enforcement versus several other factors that also likely have contributed to reduced flows. 

Additional Resources: Border Patrol Personnel 

Congress has passed at least four laws since 1986 authorizing increases in Border 

Patrol personnel.5 Appropriators generally have supported such growth; and as Fig-
35 

6 CRS analysis based on data from Syracuse University Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse and USBP Office of Legislative Affairs. 7 CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, Sept. 20, 2011. 

8Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Secure and Manage Our Borders,’’ http://www.dhs.gov/ 

xabout/gcl1240606351110.shtm. 9 Also see CRS Report R41286, Securing America’s Borders: The Role of the Military, by R. 

Chuck Mason. 10Pub. L. 109–367 identified five specific stretches of the border where fencing was to be installed; CBP Congressional Affairs provided CRS with this estimate of the total mileage covered 

by the law on September 25, 2006. 

ure 1 illustrates overall USBP staffing has grown about ten-fold from 2,268 in 1980 

to 21,370 today. The Border Patrol numbered just 4,287 when the Prevention 

through Deterrence strategy was articulated in 1994; Border Patrol numbers roughly doubled during the remainder of the 1990s as the strategy was implemented; and 

numbers have more than doubled again in the post-9/11 period.6

These data on USBP personnel understate law enforcement staffing along U.S. 

borders, because numerous other Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement 

officials also operate in the border region, including 5,551 CBP officers at Southwest 

Border POEs in 2011.7 About a quarter of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 20,000 personnel were deployed to the Southwest Border in fiscal year 

2011,8 along with about 1,200 National Guard troops.9

Additional Resources: Border Fencing 

The former INS installed the first border fencing beginning in 1990, eventually 

covering the 14 miles of the border east of the Pacific Ocean near San Diego. Congress expressly authorized the construction and improvement of fencing and other 

barriers under Section 102(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; Pub. L. 104–208, Div. C), which also required the 

completion of a triple-layered fence along the 14 miles near San Diego. The Secure 

Fence Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109–367) amended IIRIRA to require double-layered 

fencing along five segments of the Southwest Border, totaling about 850 miles.10

IIRIRA was amended again by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 

2008 (Pub. L. 110–161), which requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to construct reinforced fencing ‘‘along not less than 700 miles of the Southwest Border 
36 

11Pub. L. 110–161, Div. E, § 564. 12 Ibid. 13 CBP Office of Congressional Affairs communication with CRS, April 11, 2012. 14The former INS’ Integrated Surveillance Information System (ISIS) was initiated in 1998. 

ISIS was folded into a broader border surveillance system named the America’s Shield Initiative 

(ASI) in 2005, and ASI was made part of DHS’ Secure Border Initiative (SBI) the following year, 

with the surveillance program renamed SBInet. 15See e.g., testimony of DHS Inspector General Richard L. Skinner before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, New Secure Border Initiative, 109th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2005; and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO–09–896, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/ 

new.items/d09896.pdf. 16See DHS Inspector General (IG), Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, DHS OIG–09–80, Washington, DC, June 

2009; and DHS IG, Controls Over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved, DHS 

OIG–10–96, Washington, DC, June 2010. 17See DHS, Report on the Assessment of the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) Program, Washington, DC, 2010; DHS, Annual Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2011, Washington, 

DC, 2011, p. 14. 

where fencing would be most practical and effective.’’11 The Act further specifies, 

however, that the Secretary of Homeland Security is not required to install 

‘‘fencing . . . in a particular location . . . if the Secretary determines that the use 

or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and 

maintain operational control over the international border at such location.’’12 As of 

April 11, 2012, DHS had installed 352 miles of pedestrian fencing and 299 miles 

of vehicle fencing (total of 651 miles) out of 652 miles DHS had identified as appropriate for fencing and barriers.13

Additional Resources: Surveillance Assets 

The Border Patrol utilizes advanced technology to augment its agents’ ability to 

patrol the border. Under a series of related programs since the 1990s,14 the border 

surveillance system has consisted of a network of Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) 

systems (including cameras and infrared systems) and sensors (including seismic, 

magnetic, and thermal detectors) linked into a computer network. USBP personnel 

in a central location screen the network, monitor locations where sensor alarms are 

tripped, and alert field agents to intrusions and coordinate responses. These systems 

have struggled to meet deployment time lines and to provide USBP with the promised level of ‘‘situational awareness’’ with respect to illegal entries,15 and have come 

under criticism for non-competitive contracting practices, inadequate oversight of 

contractors, and cost overruns.16 DHS ordered a Department-wide assessment of the 

most recent surveillance system, SBInet, in January, 2010 and terminated the program in January 2011.17

Under DHS’ new Alternative Surveillance Technology Plan, DHS plans to deploy 

a mix of RVS systems consisting of fixed daylight and infrared cameras that transmit images to a central location, mobile surveillance systems mounted on trucks and 
37 

18Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and System 

Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and Oversight; 

and Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism; Committee on Homeland Security, House 

of Representatives, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to Reassess 

and Better Manage Key Technology Program, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., Thursday, June 17, 2010. 19See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th 

Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. 20See CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens, by Alison 

Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem. Under the 2006 policy, most Mexicans apprehended at the 

Southwest Border were not placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they had previous 

criminal convictions. 21Most Mexicans were returned by bus with minimal processing—an option not available for 

aliens from most countries. 22DHS estimated that there were 623,292 alien ‘‘absconders’’ in August 2006, many of whom 

had failed to appear for removal hearings after being apprehended at the border. See Doris 

Meissner and Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting Course, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, February 2009, p. 44, http:// 

www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHSlFeb09.pdf. 23 CBP, ‘‘DHS Secretary Announces End to ‘Catch and Release’ on Southern Border,’’ http:// 

www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/admin/c1larchive/messages/endlcatchlrelease.xml. 24 Aliens apprehended at the border may face criminal charges for illegal entry (8 U.S.C. 

§ 1325) or (on a subsequent apprehension) illegal re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1326), and in some cases 

they may face charges related to human smuggling (8 U.S.C. § 1324) and visa and document 

fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1546). See CRS Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Michael John Garcia. In contrast, unlawful presence, absent additional factors, is a civil 

violation. 

monitored in the truck’s passenger compartment, hand-held equipment, and existing 

SBInet integrated towers.18 In addition to these ground-based surveillance assets, 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) deploys 270 aircraft and 280 marine vessels 

to conduct surveillance operations and contribute to the interdiction of unauthorized 

aliens and other smuggling operations, and OAM operates nine unmanned aircraft 

systems along the borders. 

New Border Enforcement Practices: Enforcement with Consequences 

Since about 2005, CBP has been phasing in a new set of enforcement practices 

that it now describes as ‘‘enforcement with consequences.’’ Historically, immigration 

agents returned most people apprehended at the border to Mexico with minimal 

processing or (in the case of non-Mexicans) often released them pending a formal 

deportation or removal hearing. The enforcement with consequences approach seeks 

to minimize such ‘‘low consequence’’ responses in order to raise the costs to migrants 

of being apprehended, to make it more difficult for illegal migrants to reconnect 

with smugglers following a failed entry attempt, and thereby to discourage people 

who have been apprehended from making subsequent efforts to enter the United 

States illegally.19 The approach includes the following elements: • Expedited removal (ER).—ER is a provision of the INA that allows certain arriving aliens without documents to be formally removed from the United States 

without an inadmissibility hearing or an appearance before an immigration 

judge. Thus, ER orders can be implemented quickly and at minimal expense, 

but carry the same administrative penalties as standard removal orders. After 

being added to the INA in 1996, ER initially was reserved for aliens apprehended at ports of entry. With a series of notices in 2002–2006, ER was expanded to cover certain aliens who had entered the United States within the 

previous 2 weeks and were apprehended within 100 miles of any U.S. border.20

• Detention.—Non-Mexicans apprehended at the border usually are placed in removal proceedings prior to being returned by air to their country of origin.21

Historically, backlogs in the immigration court system meant that most such 

aliens were released on bail or their own recognizance for some period of time 

between their apprehension and removal hearing; and many failed to show up 

for their hearings.22 Under a policy implemented in August 2006, DHS now detains 100% of removable non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until their 

removal orders are finalized and executed.23

• Immigration-related criminal charges.—Unauthorized aliens apprehended at 

the border may face Federal immigration charges, but historically most have 

not been charged with a crime.24 In cooperation with the Department of Justice, 

CBP has worked since 2005 to bring criminal charges against such aliens more 

often. The most systematic effort in this regard has been Operation Streamline, 

a program through which CBP works with U.S. Attorneys and District Court 

judges in border districts to expedite criminal justice processing. Operation 
38 

25 According to CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, November 1, 2011, Operation Streamline was 

initiated in the Yuma Sector in December 2006, Laredo Sector in October 2007, Tucson Sector 

in January 2008, and Rio Grande Valley Sector in June 2008. A total of 164,639 people were 

processed through Operation Streamline through the end of fiscal year 2011. 26See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Does Administrative Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher, 112th 

Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Alan Bersin, The State of US/Mexico Border Security, Center for American Progress, August 4, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2011/08/usmexicoborder.html. Bersin 

indicated that certain aliens would not be subject to enforcement with consequences, such as 

aliens younger than 18 years old traveling without a parent or legal guardian. 30 Not all people facing charges were apprehended by USBP, and not all aliens subject to removal were apprehended during the same fiscal year. Thus, the proportion of aliens facing enforcement with consequences as described in Figure 3 is not precisely defined as a percentage 

of USBP apprehensions, though USBP apprehensions represent the great majority of such cases. 

Streamline was established in the USBP’s Del Rio Sector in December 2005, 

and expanded to four additional sectors by June 2008.25

• Remote repatriation.—Under the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), certain 

Mexicans apprehended near the border are repatriated to border ports hundreds 

of miles away—typically moving people from Arizona to Texas or California.26

Under the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), certain Mexican nationals are repatriated to their home towns within Mexico, rather than being 

returned just across the border.27

To manage these diverse programs, CBP has developed a ‘‘Consequence Delivery 

System . . . to uniquely evaluate each subject and identify the ideal consequences 

to deliver to impede and deter further illegal activity.’’28 According to public comments by former CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, the goal of the program, in certain 

sectors of the border, is to ensure that virtually everyone who is apprehended faces 

‘‘some type of consequence,’’ and to eliminate voluntary return in most cases.29

Figure 3 depicts two indicators of enforcement with consequences: Removal cases 

initiated by the Border Patrol and immigration-related criminal charges brought in 

the Federal court system, including illegal entry and illegal re-entry. As the figure 

indicates, the number of immigration-related criminal cases tripled between fiscal 

year 1999 and fiscal year 2010 (from 28,764 to 84,388 cases); and USBP removals 

increased fourteen-fold from 12,867 to 189,653. These increases occurred at a time 

of falling alien apprehensions, as described below, so that the ratio of such consequences relative to all USBP apprehensions increased from 1% in 1999 to 58% in 

2010.30
39 

31See archived CRS Report RL31733, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for 

Congress, by John Frittelli; and archived CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) Program, by Lisa M. Seghetti and Stephen R. Vin ̃ a. 32See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal 

Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel. 33See CRS Report R40446, Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification, by Andorra Bruno. 34See CRS Report R41423, Authority of State and Local Police to Enforce Federal Immigration 

Law, by Michael John Garcia and Kate M. Manuel. 

Additional Changes to the Migration Control System 

Changes to the Border Patrol’s enforcement resources and practices have not occurred in isolation. While the focus of this hearing is on the Border Patrol, the effects of Border Patrol policies also depend on CBP enforcement efforts at POEs and 

on immigration enforcement within the United States. Without addressing them in 

detail, four changes since the 1990s have further contributed to a changed immigration control environment: More robust screening at ports of entry;31 expanded removals from the interior, including through the Secure Communities program;32 the 

expansion of the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system and 

other worksite enforcement efforts,33 and the passage of dozens of State and local 

laws—some of which are subject to legal challenges—related to the use of E-Verify, 

the role of State and local law enforcement officials in immigration enforcement, and 

other measures to combat illegal migration.34
40 

35For a fuller discussion of enforcement outcomes, see CRS, Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. 36See e.g., CBP, Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, 

Washington, DC, March 15, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/factlsheets/ 

cbploverview/fy2010lfactsheet.xml. 37 Also see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2012, Report to Accompany 

H.R. 2017, 112th Cong., 1st sess., May 6, 2011, H. Rept. 112–91 (Washington: GPO, 2011), p. 

33. 

BORDER ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES 35

Total Apprehensions 

For many years, the INS and DHS have used USBP apprehensions as a proxy 

to measure illegal entries,36 and changes in apprehensions as an indicator of border 

enforcement outcomes. As Figure 4 illustrates, total USBP apprehensions have fallen each year since 2005, and the 2011 total of 328,000 apprehensions was less than 

one-fifth the 1.68 million apprehensions recorded in 2000. Apprehensions in 2011 

were at their lowest point since 1970. 

While apprehensions data are useful indicators of illegal inflow trends, they are 

problematic indicators of unauthorized migration for at least three reasons. First, 

apprehensions data exclude successful unauthorized aliens, certain unsuccessful unauthorized aliens (including aliens who are denied entry by CBP officers at ports 

of entry, aliens who are apprehended by law enforcement officials other than USBP, 

and aliens who die while crossing the border); and would-be unauthorized aliens 

who are deterred at the border or who never attempt to migrate at all. These exclusions mean that apprehensions data are an incomplete picture both of unauthorized 

migration and of migration enforcement. Second, apprehensions data count events 

rather than people. Thus, an unauthorized migrant who is caught trying to enter 

the country three times in one year counts as three apprehensions in the data set. 

Apprehensions data therefore may over-estimate the actual number of people trying 

to cross the border. Third, apprehensions are a function of illegal flows and of the 

unknown effectiveness of border enforcement. Thus, fewer apprehensions may reflect fewer attempts at illegal entry, lower apprehension rates for the same number 

of entries, or some combination of the two.37 The Border Patrol estimates the number of successful illegal entries (‘‘get-aways’’) and the number deterred at the border 
41 

38 According to CBP’s Office of Legislative Affairs (December 22, 2011) and other sources, CBP 

reportedly plans to incorporate its estimate of successful illegal entries into a soon-to-be-released 

‘‘border conditions index.’’ 39 US–VISIT Office of Legislative Affairs, December 16, 2011. 40See Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, ‘‘Access to Border-Crossing Guides and 

Family/Friends on First Undocumented Trip,’’ http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/002coyoteen.aspx. 41See Bryan Roberts, Gordon Hanson, and Derekh Cornwell, et al., An Analysis of Migrant 

Smugglng Costs Along the Southwest Border, DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, 

Continued 

(‘‘turn backs’’), but these data are limited by the agency’s surveillance capacity, 

among other factors, and are not available to outside researchers.38

Given these limits, it is useful to consider several additional data sources that 

offer insight into illegal migration and the effectiveness of border enforcement and 

migration control efforts. 

Unique Apprehensions 

The DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) is a biometric 

database that includes about 138 million individual records.39 Since late 1999, the 

system has been deployed to all USBP stations, allowing DHS to track individual 

case histories of most people apprehended by USBP, among others. The IDENT 

database provides additional insight into enforcement outcomes by describing the 

number of unique individuals apprehended by USBP per year, rather than the number of apprehension events. As Figure 5 indicates, the number of unique individuals 

apprehended by USBP fell from about 880,000 in 2000 to about 618,000 in 2003 before climbing back to about 818,000 in 2005 and then dropping sharply to about 

269,000 individuals in 2011. Thus, perhaps more importantly, the ratio of total apprehensions to unique individuals apprehended also fell during this period: from an 

average of 1.63 apprehensions per individual in 2000 to an average of 1.27 apprehensions per individual in 2011. Figure 5 also presents IDENT data on the percentage of unique subjects apprehended by the Border Patrol more than once in a fiscal 

year (the recidivism rate). The recidivism rate peaked at 28% in 2007 and fell to 

20% in fiscal year 2011, the lowest level since USBP began collecting these data. 

Smuggling Fees 

The great majority of unauthorized migrants to the United States make use of 

human smugglers to help them enter the United States.40 Migrants’ reliance on 

human smugglers, along with prices charged by smugglers, are an additional potential indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. border enforcement efforts, as more effective enforcement should increase the costs to smugglers of bringing migrants across 

the border, with smugglers passing such costs along to their clients in the form of 

higher fees.41 Figure 6 summarizes available time-series data describing average 
42 

DC, November 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smugglingwp.pdf. 42See attachment for sources. 43 University of California—San Diego (UCSD) Mexico Migration Field Research Project, data 

provided to CRS Sept. 23, 2010. 44Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, ‘‘Probability of Apprehension on an Undocumented Border Crossing,’’ http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/008apprehension-en.aspx. 

The probability of apprehension fell somewhat during the 1990s to less than 20% in 2001, possibly as a function of increased use of smugglers during this period. This trend was reversed 

between 2001 and 2006, as the probability of apprehension climbed to an all-time high of about 

35%; but by 2011 the probability of apprehension had once again fallen below 20%. 

smuggling fees paid by certain unauthorized migrants for transport from Mexico to 

the United States, based on surveys conducted with unauthorized migrants in the 

United States and in Mexico (i.e., after migrants had returned home). According to 

these data, smuggling fees were mostly flat throughout the 1980s, at about $750– 

$1,000 (in 2010 dollars), with an average annual growth rate of less than 1.5%. 

Smuggling fees began to rise during the early 1990s, climbed by over 7% per year 

throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to $2,400–$2,700 in 2005–2006, and have remained roughly flat since that time—possibly because the economic downturn since 

2007 has placed a cap on what smugglers may charge.42 These data suggest that 

crossing the border illegally became more difficult (or at least most expensive) in 

the decade after the USBP began to implement its National strategy. 

Probability of Apprehension 

Social science research also provides data (reported by migrants in the United 

States and Mexico) on the probability that migrants will be apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally. Existing data sources indicate that 

many migrants are apprehended one or more times prior to successfully entering 

the United States. According to one source, a growing proportion of Mexicans who 

attempt to migrate illegally are apprehended at the border at least once: 28% for 

one sample of migrants who attempted to enter prior to 1986 versus 41% for aliens 

attempting entry in 2002–2009.43 Another major survey finds that the probability 

of being apprehended on any given crossing has hovered around 25% since 1965.44
43 

45 In the UCSD surveys, 98% of intending migrants from Jalisco, Mexico eventually managed 

to enter the United States before 1986, and 97% eventually succeeded in 2002–2009. Overall, 

the UCSD researchers recorded eventual success rates of 92% or higher in four different surveys 

conducted between 2005 and 2009. CRS’ analysis of data provided by the Princeton survey suggests that 99% of Mexicans surveyed reported being able to enter the United States illegally 

after one or more attempts. 46See Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico 

Falls to Zero—And Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, 2012, http:// 

www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf, p. 23. 47 Ibid., p. 24. 48 Ibid., pp. 24–25. 49See for example, Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, and Graeme Hugo, et al., Worlds In 

Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium, 2nd ed. (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2005). 

Yet both surveys have found that the vast majority of migrants who attempt to 

cross the border eventually succeed.45 Taken together, these data offer additional 

evidence that it became somewhat more difficult to cross the Southwest Border illegally in the decade after 1994, but that the border remains broadly vulnerable to 

illegal crossers. 

Survey Data from Mexico 

The Pew Hispanic Center has analyzed survey data collected in Mexico from illegal migrants who were transferred from U.S. custody to Mexican authorities. In research published in 2012, Pew reports the following findings: 

• Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were more likely to have lived in the United 

States for a long period of time than Mexicans surveyed during earlier periods. 

In 2010, 27% of repatriated Mexicans had lived in the United States for at least 

a year, compared to 6% in 2005 and 5% in 2000. And 17% of repatriated Mexicans had lived in the United States for at least 5 years, compared to just 2% 

in 2005.46

• Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were more likely to have been apprehended at 

work or at home than Mexicans surveyed during earlier periods: 17% in 2010 

versus 3% in 2005. The proportion of Mexicans surveyed who had been apprehended at the border fell from 49% in 1995 to 33% in 2005 to 25% in 2010.47

• Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were less likely than those repatriated in previous 

years to report that they intended to return to the United States. Among those 

who migrated illegally to look for work (83% of those in the survey), 60% reported that they intended to return to the United States immediately, and 80% 

reported that they intended to return eventually, down from 81% and 92%, respectively, in 2005. Among new unauthorized migrants (those who had spent 

less than a week in the United States before being repatriated to Mexico), 18% 

of those repatriated in 2010 reported that they would not return to the United 

States compared to 6% in 2005.48

Conclusions: The Effectiveness of U.S. Border Control and Migration Enforcement 

Taken together, the data described above suggest that illegal inflows have fallen 

substantially during the last 5 years, and that border control and migration enforcement policies likely have contributed to this downturn. Yet available data do not 

allow for a precise description of the importance of migration enforcement relative 

to other factors that also influence illegal migration, or for concrete conclusions 

about the effectiveness of border control and migration enforcement. 

A fundamental obstacle to evaluating the effectiveness of migration enforcement 

measures is that individual and aggregate migration decisions are highly complex, 

reflecting not only the risk of apprehension and the costs of migration, but also— 

at least as importantly—a range of socio-economic ‘‘push’’ and ‘‘pull’’ factors at both 

ends of the migration chain, as well as social and family networks that facilitate 

migration.49 Thus, even if we know with certainty that illegal inflows have fallen 

in a given period, as appears to be the case since 2007, it is not possible to describe 

how much of the downturn is a result of enhanced enforcement, and how much is 

a function of these other factors. It is especially difficult to measure ‘‘remote deterrence’’: the decision by potential migrants, who may be thousands of miles from the 

border, to choose not to embark on a trip to the United States—though such deterrence may well reflect U.S. enforcement efforts. 

Assigning causality is particularly difficult in the case of the post-2007 downturn 

because many of the most significant new enforcement efforts—including a sizeable 

share of new border enforcement personnel, most border fencing, new enforcement 

practices at the border, and many of the new migration enforcement measures within the United States—have occurred in the context of the most severe recession 
44 

50See David Scott Fitzgerald, Rafael Alarco ́n, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff, Recession Without Borders: Mexican Migrants Confront the Economic Downturn (La Jolla, CA and Boulder, CO: Center 

for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS) and Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2011). 51 According to Mexican data, Mexico’s GDP grew by 5.5% in 2010 and 3.9% in 2011; see Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero— 

And Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 

files/2012/04/PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf, p. 31. 52Pew Hispanic Center, The Mexican-American Boom: Births Overtake Immigration, July 14, 

2011, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/144.pdf, p. 7. 

since the 1930s. The economic downturn has been particularly intense in certain industries that have historically employed a large number of unauthorized migrants. 

Additional factors may have further contributed to reduced illegal migration from 

Mexico, historically the source of about 60% of unauthorized migrants in the United 

States. Abuses of migrants by smugglers and transnational criminal organizations 

and high levels of border-area violence appear to have discouraged some potential 

Mexican migrants.50 The Mexican economy has recovered from the 2007–08 downturn more quickly than the U.S. economy, and expanding job opportunities in Mexico may have discouraged some would-be migrants.51 Perhaps most importantly, 

long-term demographic trends mean that relatively few Mexican workers have entered the labor market in recent years, as Mexico’s fertility rate has fallen from an 

average of 7.2 children per woman in 1960 to about 2.2 today.52

THE COSTS OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT

As described above, the prevention through deterrence approach to border security 

has been resource-intensive, relying on the deployment of personnel, infrastructure, 

and technology to U.S. borders. To evaluate the strategy and weigh it against alternative approaches, it may be useful to consider the costs of border enforcement, including direct costs, indirect costs and benefits, and opportunity costs. 

Direct Costs 

The two largest components of the Border Patrol’s prevention through deterrence 

approach, when measured in terms of direct spending, have been outlays for personnel and for border fencing and surveillance technology, depicted in Figure 7. As 

the figure indicates, USBP funding grew from $232 million in 1989, to $1.3 billion 

in fiscal year 2002 (the last data available prior to the creation of DHS), to $3.6 

billion in fiscal year 2012—a nominal increase of 1,450% and an increase of 750% 

when accounting for inflation. Appropriations for fencing and technology increased 

from $25 million in fiscal year 1996 to $298 million in fiscal year 2006, an elevenfold increase (eight-fold when adjusting for inflation), and then jumped to $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2007 before falling to $573 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $400 

billion in fiscal year 2012. 
45 

53For a fuller discussion of indirect costs and benefits, see CRS, Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry. 

Indirect Costs and Benefits 53

Border enforcement also may entail a number of indirect, and sometimes unintended, costs and benefits that also may be useful to consider as part of a comprehensive analysis of the issue: 

• Crime and migrant mortality.—The concentration of enforcement resources 

around the border may exacerbate crime and migrant mortality by making migrants more reliant on smugglers and more likely to cross in dangerous locations. On the other hand, if enforcement deters illegal crossers, such prevention 

should reduce crime and mortality; and the concentration of law enforcement 

personnel near the border may further enhance public safety and migrant protection. The empirical record suggests that crime rates have fallen in certain 

Southwest Border cities faster than in other cities of a similar size, but the impact of border enforcement on border area crime and migrant mortality is unknown because available data cannot separate the influence of border enforcement from other factors. Available data about known migrant deaths along the 

Southwest Border suggest that mortality rates have risen and that border crossings have become more hazardous since the ‘‘prevention through deterrence’’ 
46 

54For example, see Wayne Cornelius, ‘‘Evaluating Recent US Immigration Control Policy: 

What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us,’’ in Crossing and Controlling Borders: Immigration Policies and Their Impact on Migrants’ Journeys, ed. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, and 

Kerstin Rosenhow (Farmington, MI: Budrich Unipress Ltd, 2011). 55See for example, Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen, and Jorge Narvaez, ‘‘Double Jeopardy: 

How U.S. Enforcement Policies Shape Tunkaseno Migration,’’ in Mexican Migration and the U.S. 

Economic Crisis, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Davide FitzGerald, Pedor Lewin Fischer, and Leah 

Muse-Orlinoff (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2010), p. 66. 56See for example, Richard Marosi, ‘‘Border Battle Over Illegal Immigration Shifts to Beaches,’’ Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2011; Associated Press, ‘‘Major Drug Tunnel Found in San 

Diego,’’ Washington Post, November 30, 2011. 57See for example, NY School of Law, NY Civil Liberties Union, and Families for Freedom, 

Justice Derailed: What Raids On New York’s Trains And Buses Reveal About Border Patrol’s 

Interior Enforcement Practices, New York: November, 2011, http://www.nyclu.org/files/ 

publications/NYCLUljusticederailedweb.pdf; Lornet Turnbull and Roberto Daza, ‘‘Climate of 

Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants,’’ Seattle Times, June 26, 2011. 58Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Impact Statement for the Completion of 

the 14-mile Border Infrastructure System, San Diego, California (July 2003), pp. 1–11. 59See e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, ‘‘Wildlife and Border Policy,’’ http://www.defenders.org/ 

programslandlpolicy/habitatlconservation/federalllands/borderlpolicy/. Also see CRS 

Report R42346, Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, by Ross W. Gorte et al. 60On U.S.-Canadian border issues, see CRS Report 96–397, Canada-U.S. Relations, coordinated by Carl Ek and Ian F. Fergusson; on U.S.-Mexican border issues, see Marc R. Rosenblum, 

Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, Migration Policy Institute, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/USMexico-cooperation.pdf. 

policy went into effect in the 1990s, though once again the precise impact of enforcement on migrant deaths is unknown. • Migrant flows.—Social science research suggests that border enforcement has 

had the unintended consequence of encouraging unauthorized migrants to settle 

permanently in the United States rather than working temporarily and then returning home, as was more common prior to the mid-1980s.54 A second unintended consequence of enhanced border enforcement between ports of entry has 

been an apparent increase in illegal entries through ports of entry and other 

means.55 There is also anecdotal evidence that unauthorized aliens have turned 

to maritime routes and border tunnels as alternative strategies to cross the 

U.S.-Mexican border.56

• Effects on border communities and environmental impact.—As with border 

crime and violence, the effects of enforcement on border communities and the 

environment are complex because they reflect changes in migrant behavior and 

the secondary effects of enforcement per se. Border enforcement benefits local 

communities because unauthorized migration imposes costs on local services, 

strains public safety resources, and undermines the rule of law. Yet enforcement also may disrupt local economic activity by discouraging travel and commerce; and some residents of border communities see enhanced border enforcement as leading to racial profiling, wrongful detentions, and other adverse consequences.57 Similarly, border enforcement may benefit the environment because some illegal border crossers transit through sensitive environmental 

areas, cutting vegetation for shelter and fire, causing wildfires, increasing erosion through repeated use of trails, and discarding trash.58 At the same time, 

the construction of fencing, roads, and other tactical infrastructure may damage 

sensitive border-area ecosystems; and some environmental groups have opposed 

border infrastructure projects.59

• U.S. foreign relations.—The United States has strong border partnerships with 

Mexico and Canada, but issues related to migration control and border enforcement have been occasional sources of tension, particular in the U.S.-Mexican 

case, and may lead to missed opportunities for deeper cooperation at the border 

and beyond.60

Opportunity Costs 

In a world of scarce resources, funding for USBP may be seen as competing with 

funding for other DHS components like CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO), 

which is responsible for inspections and enforcement at POEs, and ICE, which is 

responsible for DHS investigations and most enforcement activities related to 

transnational crime within the United States, among other competing priorities. 

For example, Figure 8 focuses on the allocation of resources to enforcement between POEs vs. inspections and enforcement at POEs since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The bars indicate the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) positions funded for these two activities, and the lines represent total 

Congressional appropriations to each (including funding to USBP and for fencing 
47 

61 Information about the 2012 National Strategy is based on USBP Office of Legislative Affairs 

staff briefing for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, February 13, 2012. 

and tactical infrastructure in the case of enforcement between the ports). As the figure illustrates, resources between the ports (the green bars and lines in the figure) 

have grown much faster than OFO resources (the blue lines and bars in the figure). 

Funding for enforcement between the ports more than doubled in the 2004–2012 period, from $1.9 to $4.0 billion (108% growth), while OFO funding has increased by 

less than one-third, from $2.2 to $2.9 billion (32%). Similarly, FTEs for enforcement 

between POEs increased from 11,745 to 23,306 (98% growth), while OFO FTEs increased from 17,467 to 21,893 FTEs (25% growth). 

2012 NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY

Based on preliminary information USBP has made available about the 2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan,61 the plan will emphasize a risk-based approach to border 

security that emphasizes the use of information and intelligence to identify threats, 

and the integration and rapid deployment of USBP resources to target enforcement 

to the points of greatest vulnerability and where the risk of incursion is highest. 

Whereas the 1994 plan focused primarily on moving adequate resources into the 

border region, the 2004 plan began to focus attention on how such resources were 

allocated, and the 2012 plan reportedly will continue the shift in this direction to 

focus enforcement on high-priority targets. The plan reportedly will continue to 

strike a balance between USBP’s traditional emphasis on preventing illegal migration and the agency’s post-9/11 priority missions of preventing the entry of terrorists 

and terrorist weapons, along with the recent U.S. focus on combating transnational 

criminal organizations. 

CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, AND POLICY RESPONSES

The 2012 USBP Strategic Plan reportedly describes the goal of border security in 

terms of risk management: A process that involves ‘‘identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or controlling it 

to an acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any actions 
48 

62DHS Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon, September 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/ 

xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf, p. 30. 63 Ibid., pp. 27–38. 64See for example, U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National 

Drug Threat Assessment: 2011, Washington, DC: August, 2011. 65See for example, testimony of K. Jack Riley before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity, Border Security and the Terrorist Threat, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., August 8, 2006. 

taken.’’62 DHS defines risk as a function of specific threats, America’s vulnerability 

to such threats, and their potential consequences.63

From a border security perspective, four types of transnational threats may be especially important to consider: Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drugs and 

other contraband, potential terrorists and other ‘‘bad actors,’’ and ‘‘regular’’ unauthorized migrants (illegal migration). These threats have substantially different 

overall risk profiles. By most estimates, the entry of WMD and ‘‘bad actors’’ are 

high-consequence but low-probability risks. Conversely, compared to the threats 

from WMD and ‘‘bad actors,’’ illegal migration is a lower-consequence, higher-probability event—though some of the consequences of unauthorized migration do not 

lend themselves to precise measurement, and people may disagree about how to 

evaluate them. The entry of drugs and other contraband fall in between these two 

extremes. 

Important differences also exist across different border zones in terms of America’s vulnerability to transnational threats. For example, while the Southwest Border between POEs historically has been a major point of vulnerability with respect 

to illegal migration and marijuana smuggling, most experts do not consider the 

Southwest Border between POEs to be the most important point of vulnerability to 

WMDs or other types of drugs and contraband, both of which are more likely to be 

smuggled into the United States through a port.64 Similarly, given existing enforcement infrastructure, the Southwest Border may not be the greatest point of vulnerability with respect to individual ‘‘bad actors,’’ who may be more likely to attempt 

illegal entry through POEs or to enter the United States from Canada or at a Coastal Border.65

A third set of considerations focuses on expected policy benefits: The potential for 

a given policy to reduce risk. Most border security policies per se are designed to 

reduce vulnerability to a threat or group of threats. Policies within the United 

States also may be designed to lower the consequences and/or likelihood that a potential event will occur, for example, by hardening infrastructure, reducing demand 

for illegal employment, or disrupting smugglers’ financial networks. 

For these reasons, the USBP 2012 National Strategy appears to raise important 

and appropriate questions about future U.S. border security investments and policies. What are the most serious security threats confronted by the United States, 

and where are its greatest points of vulnerability? What additional investments and 

policy responses would produce the greatest reduction in risks to the United States? 

While some of the answers undoubtedly will direct attention to traditional investments in Southwest Border personnel, infrastructure, and technology, USBP’s focus 

on risk management also may direct additional attention to how we manage flows 

through ports of entry and to enforcement policies within the United States. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, particularly you, Chief, who I am noticing is really the only person in uniform. We are all here telling you of our hopefully constructively 

critical way of looking at all of this in your new strategic plan. I 

appreciated you articulating again the long and distinguished history of the CBP, certainly. 

I also was taking some notes as you were talking, and I have 

been looking at your new strategic plan here a bit, and as you mentioned information, integration, and rapid response and also about 

the amount, I think Ms. Gambler mentioned, over $4 billion that 

the Congress and American taxpayers have invested in technology 

and these kinds of things. You know, with all the technology that 

we do need to utilize, obviously, for all of our borders, sometimes 

there is really no second for human intel, really. As I mentioned 

at the outset, with foiling this bomb plot, I am certain that much 
49 

of that was human intel and the work of our intelligence community, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, et cetera. The same 

thing applies, I think, for border security in many, many ways. 

It seems to me that a good way to get that kind of intelligence— 

and it is utilized, or, certainly, as you mention it in the strategic 

plan—is when you talk about increasing community engagement 

and other kinds of things with all the various stakeholders at all 

of our borders. We have often said that they are really a force multiplier. I think you can probably get a lot more intel from the local 

law enforcement that is, sort of, out in the neighborhoods a bit and 

sharing that information with you, whether that is at the Southern 

Border, the Northern Border, our Coastal Borders, what have you. 

One thing about the street, the street talks. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. MILLER. The street talks. Your officers are trained to understand and start to develop a threat assessment based on some of 

that intel. 

Also—and I am not sure if you have that in here, but I was recently—and, of course, I am from the Detroit sector, and was recently over on the Canadian side of the Blue Water Bridge looking 

at what our Canadian counterparts were doing, and I had one of 

your officers with us. What did they have there more than anything? Dogs. The dogs were sniffing—I mean, with all this technology, the dogs were sniffing everything that went through, 

whether it is people or drugs. Their ability for apprehensions was 

not something high-tech. So, particularly when you have all these 

military dogs coming back now that have had the ability to sniff 

with IEDs and everything else—and I know we have talked about 

how that can be a layer of your strategic approach to border security. 

But I mention that because when we talk about defense-in-depth, 

really looking at ports of entry, making utilization of interior 

checkpoints, I know along the Northern Border and I think the 

Southern as well, a big part of what you were doing was, like, 

going into the bus terminals, talking to folks at transportation 

hubs, et cetera, sometimes just a random approach that you start 

picking up intel that is incredibly important. 

I guess I would first ask: Are you still doing that? I am not sure 

if you still continue to do that. What is your thought about utilizing 

the community engagement, et cetera, for intelligence gathering, 

which I think is certainly as critical a component as even UAVs or 

anything else? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, Chairwoman. Well, to your first point, we are 

still doing checkpoints, although we are moving away from the 

term ‘‘defense-in-depth’’ because defense-in-depth in the previous 

strategy really implied a first and fundamental strategic imperative which was terrain denial. So in that context, it made sense to 

have some defense-in-depth-like checkpoint operations, whether 

they were tactical or permanent. So we will continue, and that is 

what we have asked the field chiefs to take a look at. 

Just because it is not necessarily written in those few pages of 

the strategy—remember, the strategy is a broad framework of how 

we want the organization to start thinking. So there are going to 

be things that even since 2004 that we will continue to do. If it 
50 

makes sense to continue on that path forward, we will do that. I 

think some of our terminology in what we are trying to accomplish 

is also going to change. 

With respect to the community engagement, it is going to be critical for our leaders to understand the change from community relations toward community engagement. As you so artfully articulated, you know, we have 21,370 Border Patrol agents; we also 

have 21,370 intelligence collectors. We have to train the Border Patrol agents to recognize that every individual that they encounter 

is a potential source of information. 

When you say ‘‘information,’’ also, it is because we also don’t 

want to discount open-source information. People that live in the 

border communities, quite frankly, have a lot of information that, 

unless we ask them, aren’t going to be able to share that with us. 

I think that was some of the lessons learned in 2006 and into 2007, 

that the Department of Defense in shifting their thinking in terms 

of their strategy and how they were going to actually confront, you 

know, the threats that they were seeing overseas. 

It is the same broad approach that we are taking in recognizing 

that we have to make sure that we don’t just ask somebody, ‘‘Hey, 

give us a call if you see something suspicious.’’ Actually take the 

time and explain to them in their particular area what is suspicious and why it is important that they respond and, to the extent that they are able to, to provide that level of information for 

us. 

So it is kind of a strategic shift, as well, in terms of what our 

expectations are of the communities in which we serve. 

Mrs. MILLER. I appreciate you saying that. Because, again, I 

think, just an example in the northern sector—and I think this is 

a pilot program; I am not sure if you have plans to replicate it 

along a northern tier or the southern tier, as well—is the Operational Integration Center in Michigan, where you literally have all 

of the various shareholders. 

You mentioned the DOD, but, I mean, it wasn’t—really, the 

9/11 Commission recommendation that I always talk about because 

I think it was one of the most important ones, we need to go from 

the need to know to the need to share, the need to share information amongst the various agencies or all of the stakeholders. In the 

case of the OIC, where you have CBP, NBP, and the Coast Guard, 

the Royal Mounted, we have the State police, the counties, as I say, 

all their marine patrols, et cetera, the local cities and village police 

departments and first responders, all of this information being analyzed by state-of-the-art data, so you are using the computers, really, to analyze the human intel that can assess the threat and then 

have a product that can be given to the men and women that are 

out on the front lines, whether that is the northern tier, southern 

tier, or what have you. I think that is something that the Department needs to think about replicating. It has had great success in 

that particular area. 

I know my time is running over here, but I do have just a—what 

is really new? What is really new in this strategic plan? I am looking at it, and everything in here—I mean, I agree with everything 

that is here, but there wasn’t really something that grabbed me as 
51 

being really new. Is there anything really new in here that you 

would highlight as a marquee component of this new plan? 

Chief FISHER. I will give you one example—actually, I will give 

you two quick examples. One is the change detection capability. 

That was something that—— 

Mrs. MILLER. The what? 

Chief FISHER. Change detection capability. 

The other one talks about optimizing capability. 

We weren’t able to do that 8 years ago because, No. 1, we didn’t 

have the level of resources and, No. 2, we didn’t have the technology that allowed us to look into areas like the Northern Border 

or some of the very remote areas along the Southern Border because we weren’t able to get into those locations. Road systems did 

not exist; the terrain did not lend itself for patrols in that area. 

With the UAS systems that CBP has had over the last few years, 

it gives us the ability now to use things like synthetic aperture 

radar, to go out and fly sorties along the border to confirm or deny 

any changes in that threat environment or any entries, which over 

the course of, say, for instance, 2 or 3 weeks we hadn’t seen anything. So that allows us to use technology to be able to understand 

where those threats are going to be evolving. 

So those phrases, although they are somewhat new, that takes 

a whole new meaning when you look at the implementation and 

what it means along our borders. 

Mrs. MILLER. Just as a follow-on, do either of the two witnesses 

have any comment in regards to that? What is really new in this 

strategic plan, as you have reviewed it? Do you agree with what 

the chief is pointing out, or do you have something else that caught 

your eye? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I think from our perspective some of the same elements are in the 2012 Strategy as were in the 2004 Strategy. I 

think there is a different level of emphasis on some of the capabilities and a different way of thinking through how those might be 

implemented going forward. So I think it is a difference in emphasis, to some extent. 

Mrs. MILLER. Doctor. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I would agree that there is a clear evolution. 

When you look at the prevention through deterrence as it was described in the 1990s through the 2004 plan, there is sort of a clear 

trend of the Border Patrol describing having adequate resources 

now put in place at the border and thinking more strategically 

about how to deploy them and how to use them flexibly. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman. 

First of all, Doctor, let me ask you—or let me just say, first of 

all, thank you for the report that you gave us. 

Also, Members, if you haven’t seen the Congressional Research 

report of the—I think it is dated January 6 of this year, called 

‘‘Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of 

Entry,’’ I would ask you—I think one of the charts that you had 

up there on how much a coyote charges and how the price has gone 

up. I appreciate the good work that you have done. 
52 

Let me ask you, since I authored—passed the law on modernizing GPRA, let me ask you about some of the GPRA changes. Do 

you know if Border Patrol—maybe it is more under the umbrella— 

have they appointed a performance improvement officer already? 

That is supposed to be under the law. If you know. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I am not certain. I don’t know. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Do you know if they started working on, according to their law, I think, a priority goal? Have they set up their 

priority goals, or is that more under the Homeland Security? There 

are certain things they are supposed to be doing under the law; I 

am just asking if they have done that already. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I am not certain about that either. I know that 

they owe some reports to you guys, and I haven’t seen all of those 

reports yet. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Chief Fisher, have you all done that? Do you know who your performance improvement officer is, or is that more under Homeland? 

Chief FISHER. It is a little bit of both, Congressman. As a matter 

of fact, within our Strategic Policy and Plans division within the 

headquarters, we have Border Patrol agents that are assigned and 

work closely—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. No—and I am sorry, I don’t mean to interrupt. I 

apologize, I really apologize. But under the law, you are supposed 

to have an executive, high-ranking officer not in the field. It is supposed to be under the law, Chief. I don’t know if it should be more 

under the umbrella that it applies. But do you know who your chief 

improvement officer is? 

Chief FISHER. I don’t know whether it is within the Border Patrol. More likely, it may be within Customs and Border Protection 

or at the Department level. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

Chief FISHER. But we do have Border Patrol agents that are assigned to run those reports and work on a continual basis to make 

sure that whatever we are reporting against the GPRA requirements each year, they are doing that both in concert with CBP and 

the Department. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Are you familiar with the Interagency Performance Improvement Council? 

Chief FISHER. I am not, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. I would ask your gentlemen there sitting, 

and ladies, behind you if they would look at House Resolution 

2142. It became law I guess over a year ago. Agencies are supposed 

to be following certain things. It has to do with the performance 

measures and what the priority goals are. I would ask you just respectfully if your folks behind you could just take notes and look 

at that law and report back to us on that. 

The reason I say that is because I know there are some 

changes—and I appreciate all the work. But, for example, there 

have been changes. I think now we are moving away from operational control. As of September 30, if you look at that definition, 

88 percent of our borders were classified as managed. There is a 

definition for managed control, as to operational controls. So, basically, we had 12 percent of all the borders—Northern, Southern 
53 

borders, Coastal areas—that were under operational control. The 

rest were under managed control. 

Is that correct, Dr. Rosenblum? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Again, there are definitions, and you go 

through what managed and operational control mean. Operational 

control means a tighter reign than managed control. 

I think out of Southwest Border, 2,000 miles, 873 were under 

operational control. On the Northern Border, I think, out of all of 

the miles that you have, 69 miles were under operational control. 

Then under the whole Coastal, east and west, only 165 miles were 

under operational control. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. They are moving now, Border Patrol is now moving into another type of performance measures. According to your 

report, since headquarters has not come up with new performance 

measures or new goals on that, according to your report, different 

officers at different ports are using different intra-measures for 

GPRA reporting measures. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. That is what I understand, that there are a 

number of additional measures that Border Patrol does track, including, you know, there are estimates of—they track apprehensions, and we know something about that. The measures that you 

were citing, the operational control and effective control, refer to 

the time within which, after somebody crosses the border, Border 

Patrol is able to apprehend them, as we were discussing earlier. 

But at the sector and station level, I understand—and Chief 

Fisher could tell you much more about this—that the stations also 

track their estimates of how many people get away and successfully enter the United States, how many people are turned back. 

Those are some of the kinds of things that could also be incorporated into our analysis of the apprehension rate and of illegal 

flows. 

Mr. CUELLAR. As of April 2012, Border Patrol headquarters officials were working to develop border security goals and measures, 

but they have not given you a target time frame as to when they 

will be implementing that. 

Because here we are talking about a strategy, correct? So the 

first part is the strategy, but then we got to go into the goals and 

then we got to go into the measure, you know: How do you measure 

results from failure? 

So, Chief, do you have an idea of when we will get to—and, 

again, thank you. I appreciate that the strategic is the first step, 

but we got to go into the goals and then the measures. Any idea 

what sort of time frame we will have for that? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir. We are looking at the beginning of the 

next calendar year. 

Although I should also mention, it is not like we are just erasing 

everything that we have done and trying to come up with new 

things. What we are trying to do is dovetail onto some of those 

things that we have previously used and inform beyond some of the 

data sets. 

I think the one that comes to mind is apprehensions. I mean, we 

have talked even within this committee about, you know, appre-
54 

hensions, in and of themselves, really don’t tell us anything in 

terms of the extent to which we are being successful and/or levels 

of border security. What is interesting, what we are doing now is 

taking a look at those apprehensions only as a start point to really 

delve down, to really understand the rate of recidivism, the rate of 

re-apprehension in different locations, and doing the comparatives 

to make sure that we are having a better sense of what is actually 

happening, not just independently trying to evaluate on whether 

the apprehensions went up or whether they went down. 

So it is a whole host of re-thinking. In some cases, we are looking 

at new measures, to include the effectiveness ratio. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes. My time is over. If I can just finish with this 

thought. I would ask you again, Chief, to look at the new GPRA. 

I would ask you all to look at the requirements that are in law already. 

I would ask you also to look at page 21, Appendix 2 of the report. 

When it talks about performance measures—and I will just highlight them. ‘‘Performance measures should cover core program activities that Border Patrol is expected to perform. Measures should 

be balanced to cover CBP and DHS priorities. Measures should link 

and align measures with other components at successful levels of 

the organizations. Measures should reflect Government-wide priorities such as quality, timeliness, and cost of service, also what it 

costs to provide that. Measures should have a numerical goal to be 

recently free from significant bias and manipulation and be reliable, producing the same results from the same conditions.’’ 

I ask you to do that, because, again, I appreciate the strategic 

plan, but we still got a lot more work to go—the goals, the priority 

goals, and the performance measures so we know exactly what we 

are measuring. Is it results or failure from work there? 

Again, I appreciate all of the good men and women that work for 

you. It is good work. I know it is very hard. GPRA is a very important part, so we can look at efficiency, effectiveness, accountability 

to the taxpayers, especially since we are putting so much money 

into Homeland Security. 

So, again, we look forward to working with you, Chief. I would 

ask you to work with Dr. Rosenblum and some of the other folks 

here on some of the ideas here, and especially the requirements 

under GPRA. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, Congressman. Thank you. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much. Appreciate it. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chief Fisher, one of the constants that this committee runs into 

is departments or agencies will come up with a new plan, a new 

strategy, but when you talk about who was involved in crafting the 

new plan or strategy, it ends up being just a snapshot of the agency rather than the agency as a whole. 

So can you tell us, in developing this new strategy, or the third 

strategy that I have been a part of, did we involve other counterparts of CBP in putting it together, like the Air and Marine and 

other operations? Tell us a little bit about that. 
55 

Chief FISHER. Yes, Congressman. That is actually a really good 

question. 

It has been in process, the design and development of the strategic plan, for about 18 months. During that process, not only within CBP and those other operational offices that you mentioned, Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and Marine, had opportunities to comment on multiple drafts as we were developing the 

strategy throughout. We also had input certainly from the Department. Even before that, as we were working with our field commanders, and we had them reach out to the employees to understand and help us develop the framework as well. We wanted to 

make sure that we harnessed the ideas from the field leadership. 

Then we took the opportunity and had about a dozen peer review, folks that were actually outside of the uniform, some retired 

Border Patrol agents, in some cases who were just outside of law 

enforcement, folks that we had, within the staff, had worked with 

throughout our last few years. Certainly respected their opinions, 

whether it was in the academic environment or whether it was in 

some outside consulting. We had them just take a look at it and 

give us their cold hits and reactions to it, as well. 

Certainly it was not done in a vacuum, and we really needed 

broad perspective in order to put this together. I would also add 

that part of the implementation plan is taking on that same approach, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, in this process, did you have any State or 

local involvement in the preparation of this plan, or was it strictly 

within CBP? 

Chief FISHER. That I am not really sure, Congressman. If it was 

done at the local level, that is probably where they would have provided some of the drafts and feedback, whether it was to the sheriffs for their input or the police departments. It was not at my direction for them to do so because it was a working draft and it really was the broad strategy. 

I will tell you when we actually design the implementation plan, 

clearly the State and locals are going to have to sit down and understand what it means to implement this strategy within their 

operational environment. So that certainly will be done with a 

broader law enforcement eye, as well. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Ms. Gambler, maybe we are a little premature, 

but are we able to quantify the new strategy that is being put forth 

at this point, or would that come a little later? We talked about 

operational control, and there were some things we could measure. 

Have we arrived at that point yet, or are we still in the infancy 

of how we put that together? 

Ms. GAMBLER. At this point, the Border Patrol has not released 

performance goals and measures for assessing how effective it will 

be at implementing its new strategic plan. That is something that 

the Border Patrol will be focusing on going forward and has efforts 

under way right now to develop some new or additional measures. 

I think you are raising an important point, which is that, in the 

interim, the Border Patrol is using the number of apprehensions on 

the Southwest Border as its primary performance measure, which 

is being reported out in the Department’s annual performance report. As we have discussed, that kind of measure has some useful 
56 

information, in that it provides insights into the activity levels of 

the Border Patrol, how many apprehensions they are making. 

But what is really important and really key going forward is for 

the Border Patrol and the Department to move toward outcome-oriented measures that would allow the Department, the Congress, 

and the public to really get a sense of how effective the Border Patrol’s efforts are. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So, chief, is that where you are headed? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Good. 

Dr. Rosenblum, you have had an opportunity to look at each one 

of the Department’s efforts. Do you have some comments on where 

we are at this point with this one? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Well, yes. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think just to echo a couple of points that were just made and 

to respond to both of your questions, in terms of these sort of outcome measures, I would just add that even as we await the new 

Border Conditions Index, there are important data sources that 

exist that we should be looking at, for example, with the data that 

DHS already tracks through the IDENT database. 

In addition at looking at apprehensions, one of the things that 

the report that Mr. Cuellar mentioned looks at is unique apprehensions, and that allows us to look at recidivism rate and reapprehension rate, which is something that Border Patrol is looking at. 

Those offer a lot of insight beyond simply apprehensions and allow 

us, you know, to say quite a bit more about what we know about 

effectiveness and about illegal flows. 

The CBP Office of Field Operations also does some tracking. 

They do, sort of, a sample of people who are admitted and wouldn’t 

normally receive secondary inspection, they subject a sample of 

them to secondary inspection. They can do an analysis that way of 

how many people appear to be getting through and to make an estimate of illegal migration through the ports. 

So there are some important data sources out there that aren’t, 

sort of, systematically part of our conversation that probably could 

be and should be. 

So I think that, you know, certainly, when you compare over 

time throughout DHS, they are collecting a lot more data and putting us in a position to say a lot more than historically we have 

been able to say about what is happening in different sectors and 

at different border zones and through the ports. So, you know, I am 

optimistic that they will continue to do a better job of tracking that 

kind of information. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield back, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to piggyback on something you said earlier, the need to 

share. Dr. Rosenblum, you mentioned the IDENT and the biometric 

ID system. How integrated is that with other agencies? 

Because we have heard some testimony about visa overstays, and 

I have raised some questions about whether these agencies are ac-
57 

tually communicating about illegal entries or visa overstays or people that the CBP sees there is a trend. So I am concerned. The 

9/11 Commission report identified that agencies weren’t talking. 

This is very, very important to me. 

How integrated do you think that is? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I mean, the agency people could give you an answer to that question. My understanding is that, I mean, as you 

know, IDENT is currently part—it is not part of CBP or ICE; it is 

a separate office within DHS under the US–VISIT system. There 

is a proposal to move it now into CPB and ICE. 

My understanding is that, you know, all of the different DHS 

agencies have access to, you know, the IDENT database through 

US–VISIT and that there is extensive at least information sharing 

between IDENT and agencies like DOD and State. State, you 

know, taps into that in the visa issuance process. But I am not 

sure I could give you an informed answer about exactly how 

smooth that integration is. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I don’t want to dwell on it. 

Chief Fisher, I will just ask that your office contact my office 

with just some information on how we are sharing some of that, 

because it is sort of off on a tangent from what we are talking 

about today. 

The lady mentioned earlier, the GAO defines operational control—‘‘The extent of operational control was defined as the number 

of border miles where Border Patrol had the ability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity.’’ That is a fairly-defined metric. 

Then she goes on in her testimony to say, ‘‘However, the performance goals and measures that will be used to provide oversight and 

accountability for the new strategic plan have not yet been established.’’ I think the gentleman from Laredo, Texas, was kind of 

going down that—how do we define the metrics? 

So, in our meeting, Chief Fisher, where you said you wanted to 

reframe operational control in this new strategy, can you elaborate 

really how you will do that? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, Congressman, I would be happy to. 

I think your question was one of the things that we were looking 

at 2 years ago. You know, certainly within the 2006 Secure Fence 

Act operational control was defined. We had a tactical definition 

that the Border Patrol chiefs in the field were using to be able to 

report. GAO has their definition. Everybody had a different understanding of what operational control was. 

I will tell you, within the organization at the tactical level, where 

these were Border Patrol chiefs that would report every year all of 

those miles that we were, you know, chalking up over the last few 

years, is that tactical definitions—let’s just take for ‘‘controlled’’ 

and ‘‘managed.’’ Each of the tactical definitions start with the 

phrase, ‘‘A border is considered or a border zone will be considered 

controlled when resources are at such a level that,’’ and then it 

kind of qualified basically what that border zone or the activity levels or some of those other things that we would use. 

Well, when you look at the definition, it was dependent, solely 

dependent, on resources. So if you didn’t have the resources at either the controlled or managed level, because both of those defini-
58 

tions started with that phrase, the Border Patrol in the field was 

not going to increase effective control, which, by definition, was either at the controlled or managed level. 

So what we wanted to be able to do in reframing that was to 

have a better understanding about, it is not necessarily dependent 

on resources as much as it is about the intelligence, what are those 

threats in the border areas, and the vulnerabilities, which were not 

equal across the board. 

So instead of having the conversation about whether the border 

is secure or not, to suggest somehow that that is an either/or proposition, what my response would then be is, well, what section of the 

border are you talking about? We can talk about Zone 21 in 

Nogales, Arizona, and we can show you all the information and intelligence that we have in that border zone. We will show you what 

deployments we have, and we will then be able to show you on a 

24-hour cycle how many people came in and, of that number, how 

many people did we apprehend? At the broader end, we can talk 

at the campaign level, for instance, our initiative in south Texas, 

for instance, the campaign. You want to have an assessment about, 

well, what is the border security status in south Texas? 

To me, it has been more about a methodology, not necessarily a 

metric. That is where, when I talk about reframing operational 

control, that to be consistent with the intent and the language 

within the 2006 Secure Fence Act, and then talk about what it 

means to prevent all entries, at what level and where do we start 

and where do we need to end for our end-state. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I think the American people do want to have 

a conversation about what level of the border is secure and what 

we are doing. There has to be some measurable parameter that I 

can talk to my constituents about the Southern Border. You can 

hold your people accountable to a standard or to an achievement. 

I think there are three things that come to mind: You know, arrests made at the border for people trying to cross illegally; apprehensions in the homeland, interior, where we have identified 

illegals that have made it through your web and they are caught, 

apprehended by ICE maybe in another city. Then I think a standard that we don’t talk about is what is the amount of drugs on the 

street. Because the illegal smuggling activity that comes into this 

country, you know, we don’t hear that much. But we need to lessen 

the amount of drugs on the street, and I think that is a parameter 

that we can use to measure your performance by. 

So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Let me thank 

you again for the field hearing in Laredo. It was very productive, 

with Mr. Cuellar. 

Chief, thank you for being here. Thanks for your service. 

I always learn something new every time I go down there. We 

note the task force, and they talked about in Nuevo Laredo the cartel activity going on there between the Sinaloa and the Zeta cartels—and this was last week—predicting that the violence was 

going to go up, that it was going to spike. Sure enough, last Friday, 
59 

23 individuals were killed in Nuevo Laredo, hung over bridges, decapitated—just a reminder that the border is not a safe place, that 

we do need to secure the border. 

I think the thing that keeps me up the night the most would be 

the idea of weapons-grade uranium being smuggled from a place 

like Iran to Venezuela and then between a port of entry. A dirty 

bomb in a major city—that, to me, is terrifying. Yet, it is not farfetched. I think that is something that is very foreseeable. 

So operational control of the border is important. Last I looked, 

it was 44 percent under operational control. You know, we have 

this new strategy now that scraps operational control, and now the 

GAO has come in to testify that this new strategy does not have 

performance measures. 

I guess I am a little confused. We are not talking about operational control anymore, we are taking that off the table, and now 

the new strategy has no performance measures at all. How can we 

possibly measure whether the border is secure or not? 

Chief. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, Congressman. We will have—we have measures right now. In other words, we are not, again, going to dismiss 

all of the measures or the metrics or the comparative statistics that 

we have done within the organization. Those continue. What we 

are trying to do is match those now with the strategic objectives 

that are outlined in this particular strategy. 

The scenario that you outlined is one of the primary factors in 

our rethinking about how we apply resources to the border. In one 

instance in 2004, quite frankly, it was brute force. We realized that 

we were getting more resources, both in terms of Border Patrol 

agents, we were getting fence built, we were getting technology. So 

the strategy really was get everything forward. We wanted to stop 

the flows that were coming in. 

The scenario that you depict is very akin to being able to identify 

a needle in the haystack, if you will. Now, in order to extract the 

needle—and I will use this in terms of a particular threat that you 

just mentioned—there are two different general approaches that 

you can do to get that needle. The first is having very specific intelligence, information regarding the intent and capability of the opposition, timing, to be able to surgically go into that haystack and 

remove it. Well, over the last 10 years or so, that really was not 

applicable in our border scenario. We were not getting that level 

of intelligence to be able to extract it that way. So the other approach that you can do to find the needle is to reduce the haystack. 

So if you look at some of the shifts in our approach between strategies, 2004 was built to be able to reduce the haystack. 

As we have done that, in terms of people coming across the border, in terms of not just the apprehensions but the individuals, 

those unique individuals that make up, our border environment in 

which we operate has changed. So what we try to do is now leverage and try to figure out, what is it going to take? Of this new strategic approach, what, then, are those metrics that are going to continue to carry over that we have traditionally been reporting? In 

addition, what are new metrics that we haven’t been reporting that 

really talk to more about the risk along our borders? 
60 

That is why when I said earlier it is more of a methodology than 

a particular metric, we want to be able to come back to the committee, either in an open or a closed hearing, to be able to tell you 

about the information and the intelligence that we are hearing either very tactically or in a broad sense, talk about the capabilities 

that CBP has, to be able to show you how we are assessing risk 

and how we are going to minimize that risk at any given—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would very much like to get that briefing. 

The one thing we learned also is that human smuggling at the 

port of entry has gone way down. We saw 5,000 18-wheelers go 

through the port of entry, and they said that they rarely find humans now in the cargo. It is mostly drugs coming through. So that 

means they are coming through the ports of entry. While the apprehensions have gone way down, the disturbing statistic is that 

the OTM rate has gone way up, the ‘‘other than Mexicans.’’ So between the port of entry is where the scenario I outlined is probably 

most likely to happen. 

I do think technology is going to be the solution to getting that, 

you know, secure. Can you tell me where you are with the latest 

advances in technology? What is your strategic plan to deliver technology to the border? 

Chief FISHER. Well, the strategic plan really talks about optimizing capability. The first thing before we say, hey, we need 10 

more of these and 15 more of these, is to take a look about what 

capability, what technology has been deployed over the last few 

years. No. 1, are we utilizing it in the right combination? 

I will give you a quick example. If you take a look at Arizona, 

we have everything from unattended ground sensors that are implanted in the ground, we have mobile surveillance systems, we 

have integrated fixed towers, we have light- and medium-lift helicopters that are running forward-looking infrared, and we have 

UASes that are running payloads. That whole suite of capability is 

something that this organization over the last few years is just trying to figure out: How do you deploy that within the theater of operation? They are not deployed equally because they all have different capabilities. 

So we have to understand organizationally and within the leadership how we maximize those capabilities, and then how we shift 

and redeploy resources from areas that were once in areas of high 

threat in terms of activity levels and redeploy those to new areas 

where we have seen the displacement or new emerging threats 

along our border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. You have an enormous challenge, 

and I thank you for your service. 

Chief FISHER. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. With that, I yield back. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlemen. 

I certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for being here 

today and your testimony. 

We are going to close the subcommittee here, but I also wanted 

to mention and follow up on something Mr. McCaul said about 

operational control. I think there is a lot of consternation on behalf 

of the subcommittee about moving away from the term ‘‘operational 

control.’’ Again, as I say, I think we are all totally open to using 
61 

a new term or a new metric if we can understand exactly what all 

of that is. 

I had a bill that actually passed the subcommittee, the full committee, and I am very, very optimistic it is going to have floor action in front of the full House very shortly, actually. That is the 

Secure Border Act of 2011. Essentially what this requires is that 

the Secretary of Homeland Security submit a comprehensive strategy to Congress within 180 days to gain and maintain operational 

control of the border within 5 years. 

We sort of anticipated, perhaps, the Department moving away 

from the strategy of utilizing the term ‘‘operational control,’’ so if 

you used any other standard—I see we have another Member, so 

we will indulge her in her questioning. But if we use any other 

term than ‘‘operational control,’’ the Secretary is required to vet 

that standard through a National laboratory that has prior expertise on border security, of which there are about a half a dozen in 

the Nation. 

Also, the Secretary would have to submit a measurement system 

to the committee within 180 days that analyzes the effectiveness 

of security at all of the land, air, and sea ports of entry, as well— 

as Mr. McCaul was mentioning about the ports of entry. Again, you 

would have to vet that through a National laboratory with expertise in border security to evaluate the port-of-entry measurement. 

So I am looking forward to floor action on that particular piece 

of legislation. I know many things pass the House and never see 

the light of day in the Senate; however, I think with this particular 

piece, we may have some success there as well. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Before you go to—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Yes, the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I would ask, to follow up on what you said, because I think you are absolutely correct. Chief Fisher—and, Ms. 

Gambler, I am sorry. You are at GAO. I apologize for that. Thank 

you for the great work. I am a big supporter of GAO and all the 

work that you did on GPRA. Appreciate it. 

One of the things we did in Texas when we went through performance measures and all that, we actually worked—the agency 

would work with the members of the State legislature to work out 

definitions, performance measures, and goals. I guess Washington 

does things a little different, where you all go off and do your own. 

It is not only you; it is the other agencies, the Executive branch. 

It doesn’t matter if it is Democrats or Republicans. 

But believe it or not, you have a lot of folks with experience here 

that could help you on some of those definitions, you know. We 

may not agree 100 percent, but any way we can bounce that off. 

Because, you know, the ideas that the Chairwoman had and some 

ideas that I have and some of the other Members here, we could 

work with you. I know Washington is done a little different, but 

on performance measures, on objectives, goals, all that, we could 

help you. So, any way we could help you, Chief Fisher, we would 

appreciate it, especially from the GAO, because I know when we 

worked on GPRA, you all were very, very, very helpful. 

I apologize, I was giving credit to Dr. Rosenblum on that, for 

your report, this report. Thank you for the work that you have 

done. 
62 

Mrs. MILLER. The Chairwoman recognizes for 5 minutes the 

gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the committee for holding this 

hearing, and let me thank all the witnesses. We are marking up 

in another committee, and I am very pleased to have the opportunity to raise some issues with you. 

First, Chief Fisher, I just want to ask just a straightforward 

question. Are you comfortable with the 2012 Strategy that you 

have put forward? 

Chief FISHER. Yes, I am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What do you think is the most important element of that strategy? 

Chief FISHER. It is the focus of—there is a common theme within 

that strategy that I certainly see, is identifying, developing, and 

training future leaders of this organization. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you see in that 2012 Strategy an undermining of the National security of the United States of America? 

Chief FISHER. I do not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you see in that 2012 Strategy an undermining of the securing of the Northern Border? 

Chief FISHER. I do not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Of the Southern Border? 

Chief FISHER. No, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me indicate that I have, I think, been 

somewhere affiliated with the Border Patrol, Customs and Border 

Protection for the entire time of my career in Congress, first on the 

Judiciary Committee and then subsequently as the Homeland Security Committee was designed and my original membership as 

this began to emerge. You came under that umbrella. 

I remember, after 2000, we worked very hard to secure night 

goggles, lap computers, vehicles, and other necessities that we 

thought were imperative for that intense work on the border of 

capturing those entering illegally. Do you think you have enough 

of those resources now? Are you able to maximize those resources 

to deal with the present conditions of the Southern Border in particular? 

Chief FISHER. To your first part, no, we probably don’t have 

enough of those resources. 

To the second part, I don’t think that we are maximizing to the 

extent that we need to all of those capabilities, which is a common 

theme within our strategy now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, the strategy is going to utilize or to improve on personnel. Is that correct? 

Chief FISHER. It will, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But, also, if we were to provide you with resources, you would add to the equipment. Is that what I am understanding? 

Chief FISHER. That is correct, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you believe you have the territorial range 

to be able to do your job? 

Chief FISHER. At this point—and that is part of the implementation plan, where I am asking the field leaders to assess what they 

have based on these new objectives. I think it is important; I am 

glad you raised that point, Congresswoman. Because I don’t want 
63 

to leave the impression nor in some of the reports that I have seen 

that suggest that this strategy does not require additional resources. It may. But what we are doing now is taking a look at the 

resources that we do have. No. 1, are we maximizing the capability 

of all of those resources? No. 2, do we have them in the right locations against the emerging threats? 

That is a process that we are looking at within the implementation. It may be coming back to this committee say, here is the 

gap—it may be in technology, it may be in other resources—that 

we will continue to do as an evolution process like any other strategy. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we can expect a report forthcoming? As you 

analyze, you will be reporting back to Congress? 

Chief FISHER. Right, we will be—and we are in the phase right 

now, have been for the last few months, we are transitioning from 

the strategic—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That is fine. 

Chief FISHER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. The other thing that I will ask is 

that the regional territory that you are working with now on the 

border, that is the territory that you feel comfortable in working 

in? 

Chief FISHER. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. 

Let me just indicate that the chief has already said that he has 

strengthened relationships with Federal, local, Tribal, and international partners, which I think is good. That is part of your strategy. I would hope, as we listen to the chief going forward, that we 

be particularly sensitive on any attempt to expand the area of control into Federal lands 100 miles in without listening to the work 

of the Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, and others 

that are dealing with this. I am quite concerned that we not listen 

to the report that may be forthcoming. I think the strategy is effective in its collaborative efforts. I think it is effective in its assessment efforts. I think it is important to do so. 

I would ask the last question to Ms. Gambler. Are you comfortable with the 2012 Strategy from the perspective of assessment? Do you have any sense that there is a need to expand the 

range into Federal lands for the Customs and Border Protection 

and Border Patrol? 

Ms. GAMBLER. I think your question is really getting at, in part, 

how well the Border Patrol coordinates with other agencies that 

have some border security responsibilities. We have reported in the 

past that CBPM, the Department, and Border Patrol have made 

progress in those coordinating mechanisms and in partnerships but 

that there was a need for some additional oversight, including additional oversight in how the Border Patrol coordinates with agencies that do have some responsibilities for border security on Federal lands. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just conclude, Madam Chairwoman— 

thank you for the time—and just indicate that, at this point, I 

would be quite concerned about any legislation suggestion that is 

countering the strategic plan and asking Congress to extend the jurisdiction of the Border Patrol hundreds of miles inland and, par-
64 

ticularly, suggesting that they be in the Federal lands at this point 

without a complete strategic report and analysis by DHS and the 

Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection of the United States. 

Let me thank you very much, and I will yield back my time. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

I certainly want to thank the witnesses for all their testimony 

today. I think it has been a very informative hearing. As has been 

said here I think by all of the Members, we look forward to working with all of you, particularly you, Chief, with the unbelievable 

mission that we have tasked your agency with. We want to make 

sure that you do get the resources and the training and the availability. 

Again, we are operating under a very tight, constrained budget 

environment here, but at the same time, border security is something that the American people have made very clear they have the 

political will to do so, and they are looking for the Congress to do 

that as well. 

So we appreciate all of you being here, and I appreciate all of the 

Members’ participation—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Chairwoman? 

Mrs. MILLER [continuing]. Today. 

The hearing record is going to be held open for 10 days if there 

are any other questions from any other Members. 

The gentlelady from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would like to submit into the record an article from the Houston Chronicle by Tony Freemantle regarding border security. 

Mrs. MILLER. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 
65 

SOME SEE BORDER SECURITY BILL AS THREAT TO ECOLOGY, PRESERVATION

By Tony Freemantle 

Big Bend National Park is one of the U.S. parks that could be affected by a proposed 

law that would allow the Department of Homeland Security to assume control of all 

Federal land within 100 miles of Mexico and Canada. Photo: Tony Freemantle/HC. 

HOUSTON AND TEXAS

Imagine sitting on a rock at Big Bend National Park gazing out over the Rio 

Grande at the Santa Elena Canyon on a clear day, Mexico so close you could reach 

out and touch it. Immemorial silence cloaks the soaring cliffs, broken only by the 

caw of a raven above and the rustle of the reeds in the river. 

Then imagine the buzzy whine of a Customs and Border Protection four-wheeler 

patrolling the sandy banks, or the growl of a grader carving a road into the 

Chihuahuan Desert to a forward operating base, or a Government helicopter bristling with surveillance equipment hovering overhead. 

Hard to imagine? 

A bill making its way through Congress would, in the interests of National security, bequeath to the Department of Homeland Security complete control of all Federal lands in a coast-to-coast zone 100 miles south of the Canadian border and 100 

miles north of the Mexican border from California to the Gulf of Mexico. 

The bill, sponsored by U.S. Rep. Rob Bishop of Utah with strong Republican support, is being touted as a necessary step in securing the Nation’s borders. But it 

is also being roundly condemned as a thinly veiled attempt to ‘‘gut a century’s 

worth’’ of environmental laws aimed at preserving public lands, historic sites, and 

National monuments. 

In essence, the National Security and Federal Lands Protection Act gives DHS, 

or more specifically U.S. Customs and Border Protection, authority to build fences, 

roads, and operating bases, to use aircraft and to install surveillance equipment and 

sensors in some of the most pristine, environmentally sensitive lands in the Nation—including Big Bend and Guadalupe National Parks and Padre Island National 

Seashore in Texas. 

And to clear the way for its stewardship of public lands, the agency would be exempt from compliance with more than 30 environmental laws—among them the National Environmental Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air 

Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 

The bill has cleared committees in the House and is on the calendar for a vote 

on the floor. There is not yet a companion bill in the Senate. 
66 

‘‘REALLY UNNECESSARY’’ 

Bishop and the other sponsors, including Texas Rep. Lamar Smith, argue that 

CBP’s mandate to secure the Nation’s borders is being ‘‘thwarted’’ by the need to 

consult with and obtain permission from Federal land managers—chiefly the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture—before conducting operations. 

‘‘The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office has found that less than half 

of the U.S.-Mexico border is under the operational control of the Border Patrol,’’ 

Smith said in a statement. ‘‘At the same time, the Obama Administration prevents 

the Border Patrol from accessing Federal lands in the name of environmental preservation. Because the Border Patrol is prohibited from securing Federal lands, drug 

smugglers and human traffickers trample the earth and terrorize communities.’’ 

Opponents, including the Department of the Interior, CBP, and National environmental organizations, charge that the proposed legislation is an ‘‘overreach,’’ since 

a 2006 memorandum of understanding between border security agencies and Federal land mangers already establishes the framework for cooperation between them. 

‘‘This is a solution looking for a problem,’’ said Dan Millis, borderlands program 

coordinator for the Sierra Club. ‘‘There is already a framework in place for Border 

Patrol to work with public land management. If Border Patrol doesn’t even have to 

try to work with managers, we will see a huge proliferation of roads, forward operating bases and fences on public lands.’’ 

The Coalition of National Parks Retirees is more blunt. The legislation would ‘‘gut 

a century’s worth of land protection’’ laws and open up ‘‘millions of pristine acres 

of National parks’’ to unregulated intrusion. 

‘‘It’s a really, really unnecessary bill,’’ said Joan Anzelmo, a former superintendent of the Colorado National Monuments and board member of the organization. ‘‘It’s an incredible assault on our National parks.’’ 

OTHER PARKS

In addition to Big Bend and Guadalupe parks in Texas, some of the other Federal 

lands that fall within the 100-mile security zone, and hence under control of DHS, 

include Saguaro National Park in Arizona, Joshua Tree National Park in California, 

Olympic National Park in Washington, Glacier National Park in Montana, Boundary Waters Wilderness in Minnesota and Acadia National Park in Maine. 

Bishop believes his bill will end a ‘‘turf war’’ between Border Patrol and Federal 

land mangers who use environmental laws to block efforts to secure the Nation’s 

borders. 

‘‘What I want to do is get the Border Patrol what they need to secure the border,’’ 

Bishop said, ‘‘and they tell me that what they need more than money and people 

is access. There are enormous swaths of public land that have effectively been ceded 

over to the drug cartels.’’ 

The DHS already has been granted waivers from a slew of environmental laws 

in order to build the controversial ‘‘fence’’ along certain sections of the U.S.-Mexico 

border, which environmentalists charge has already cause significant damage to 

Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona and to the Lower Rio Grande 

Valley National Wildlife Refuge in South Texas. 

Giving control of all lands within 100 miles of the borders to a single agency is 

unnecessary, they argue, and poses a significant danger. 

‘‘This is worse than misguided policy, although it is certainly misguided,’’ said 

Kevin Dahl, the Arizona project manager for the National Parks Conservation Association. ‘‘It’s a real danger to the parks because it means that the people who have 

made a career of public land management are not in control.’’ 

Mrs. MILLER. With that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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