THE UNITED STATES

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IBUS M RI VICTORIA

THE UNITED STATES

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Innovation in Carrier Aviation

Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedma

Mark D. Mandeles

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Newport, Rhode Island THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Thirty-Seven

August 2011

President, Naval War College

Rear Adm. John N. Christenson, USN

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 841

E-mail: press@usnwc.edu

Web: www.usnwc.edu/press

Twitter: http://twitter.com/NavalWarCollege

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Director, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Director of the Naval War College Press.

To request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions

to the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright Act

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that

reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

ISBN 978-1-884733-85-7

Tom Hone: “To Bailey Siletchnik, whom I could only beat at Scrabble by cheating.”

Norman Friedman: “To my wife Rhea, without whom nothing would be possible.”

Mark Mandeles: “To Laura.”

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables 

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 

Acknowledgments 

Foreword, by Carnes Lord 

Introduction 

CHAPTER ONE BuAer before World War II 

CHAPTER TWO BuAer in World War II 

CHAPTER THREE The Potential of the Big Bomber 

CHAPTER FOUR Royal Navy Wartime Experience and

Analysis 

CHAPTER FIVE Adopting Jet Engines 

CHAPTER SIX British and American Prospects after

the War 

CHAPTER SEVEN The Flexdeck 

CHAPTER EIGHT Catapults: Choosing an Option under

Pressure 

CHAPTER NINE Analysis 

Conclusion 

APPENDIX A The Physics of Jet Propulsion 

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APPENDIX C Problem Solving within Bureaucracies 

APPENDIX D Chronology 

Bibliography 

About the Authors 

Index 

The Newport Papers 

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List of Figures and Tables

Figures

FIGURE 1-1 Fighter Speed, in Knots, for Selected

Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and

Imperial Japanese Navy 

FIGURE 1-2 Service Ceiling, in Feet, for Selected

Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and

Imperial Japanese Navy 

FIGURE B-1 Stall Speed vs. Prototype Year 

FIGURE B-2 Takeoff Weight vs. Year 

FIGURE B-3 Roll at 25 Knots WOD vs. Year 

Tables

TABLE 2-1 Characteristics of Aircraft to Replace

the SB2C 

TABLE 2-2 BuAer’s Fighter Aircraft Characteristic

1936–43 

TABLE 2-3 Comparison of Navy Aircraft with

Army 1942 Models 

TABLE 2-4 Catapults Developed by the Naval

Aircraft Factory, 1936–45 

TABLE B-1 Carrier Fighter-Bomber/Attack Aircra

at the End of World War II 

TABLE B-2 Weight Comparison 

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A Adm. Admiral

AEW airborne early warning

ALCO American Locomotive Company

B BuAer Bureau of Aeronautics

BuOrd Bureau of Ordnance

BuShips Bureau of Ships

C CCA carrier-controlled approach

Capt. Captain

Cdr. Commander

CIC combat information center

CinC Commander in Chief

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet [in World War I

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CNR Chief of Naval Research

CO Commanding Officer

CV aircraft carrier

CVAN attack aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered

D DCNO (Air) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air

DCNO (Logistics) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics

DNC Director of Naval Construction

E EIC Engineer-in-Chief

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F FAA Fleet Air Arm

FBC Future Building Committee

ft./sec. feet per second

FY fiscal year

G g acceleration of gravity

GE General Electric

GLOMB glider bomb

H hp horsepower

HTP hydrogen peroxide

I IJN Imperial Japanese Navy

J JATO jet-assisted takeoff

L lb. pound

LSO landing signal officer

Lt. Lieutenant

Lt. Cdr. Lieutenant Commander

M MAP Ministry of Aircraft Production

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Mod. modification

mph miles per hour

N NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

NAD Naval Aircraft Department

NAMC Naval Air Material Center

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NDRC National Defense Research Committee

O ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

OSD(NA) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment)

P PRO Public Records Office

psi pounds per square inch

R R&D research and development

RAE Royal Aircraft Establishment

RAF Royal Air Force

repr. reprinted by

RG record group

RN Royal Navy

S SAM surface-to-air missile

SCB Ship Characteristics Board

T TACAN Tactical Air Navigation

U USAF U.S. Air Force

USN U.S. Navy

W WOD wind over the deck

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Acknowledgments

Our main sources for the study were Royal Navy records held by the Public Reco

Office (PRO), U.S. Navy papers held by the National Archives and by the Aviatio

tory Office of the Naval History and Heritage Command, records of the Grumm

craft Corporation held in the Northrop Grumman archives, memoirs of Royal N

(RN) and U.S. Navy (USN) personnel, memoirs of American aviation engineers, 

oral histories of Americans involved in the development of jet aircraft and mode

rier aviation. We also consulted books and articles that were well researched.

In obtaining this material, we were assisted by the following individuals: Dr. Evel

Cherpak, of the Naval War College; Dr. Curtis Utz and Dr. Timothy Francis, of th

Naval History and Heritage Command; Dr. Hill Goodspeed, of the Naval Aviatio

Museum in Pensacola, Florida; Lt. Cdr. Peter J. Hardy, RN (Ret.), of HMS Heron; 

Ms. Susan Dearing, of the Fleet Air Arm Museum. All were generous with their t

and their expertise. None bears responsibility for any errors in this study.

Vice Adm. Robert Dunn, USN (Ret.), also read an early draft of the study and ale

us to several sources we had missed, including Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm

Geoffrey Cooper. Professor Donald Chisholm of the Naval War College and Dr. J

G. Barlow of the Naval History and Heritage Command also shared their insight

Ms. G. F. Siletchnik of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center graciously constructed 

graphs in appendix B. Mr. Trent Hone organized the manuscript.

The study on which this monograph is based was commissioned by the Office of 

Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment) in the fall of 2006 as part of that office’s l

standing support for studies of military innovation. In some sense, the OSD(N

project was a follow-on to an earlier study by the present coauthors, published 

1999 as American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941 by the Nav

Institute Press.

In the mid-1980s, Andrew Marshall, the director of the Office of Net Assessment 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, encouraged a number of investigators to exam

cases of innovation in the U.S. armed forces and in the armed forces of other cou

His encouragement, coupled with the financial support of his office, led to a num

studies, among which was the book American & British Aircraft Carrier Developm

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study that you are about to read.

The success of American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941 led Mr.

Marshall to ask whether we might examine the development of the modern aircraft

carrier after World War II. We already knew that the three essential innovations—the

steam catapult, the angled flight deck, and the optical landing aid—had been developed

first in Great Britain for and by the Royal Navy. Then all three innovations had been

picked up by the U.S. Navy.

But why, Mr. Marshall wanted to know, had the Royal Navy developed these innovations first? He asked us to come together and answer that question, as well as the related

question of how these innovations were “transferred” so quickly to the U.S. Navy. Mr.

Marshall’s interest was in the process of innovation and in how innovations spread. We

have tried to find answers to his questions.

In the late spring of 2006, the authors presented Net Assessment with a proposal. In the

fall of 2006, Net Assessment agreed to fund research by Dr. Friedman and Dr. Mandeles.

At the same time, the Naval War College agreed to allow Dr. Hone to devote some of

his effort as a faculty member to the study. The written result of the research conducted

by these three analysts—delayed by some unanticipated obstacles—is in the pages

that follow.

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Foreword

In a widely noted speech to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo in May 2010, Se

tary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned that “the Navy and Marine Corps must 

willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technol

new threats, and budget realities. We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status 

that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platform

thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go tow

weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets.” Secretary Gates 

cifically questioned whether the Navy’s commitment to a force of eleven carrier s

groups through 2040 makes sense, given the extent of the anticipated superiority 

United States over potential adversaries at sea as well as the growing threat of ant

missiles. Though later disclaiming any immediate intention to seek a reduction i

current carrier force, Gates nevertheless laid down a clear marker that all who ar

cerned over the future of the U.S. Navy would be well advised to take with the ut

seriousness.

We may stand, then, at an important watershed in the evolution of carrier aviatio

reflecting not only the nation’s current financial crisis but the changing nature o

threats to, or constraints on, American sea power, as well as—something the secr

did not mention—the advent of a new era of unmanned air and sea platforms of 

types. Taken together, these developments argue for resolutely innovative thinkin

about the future of the nation’s carrier fleet and our surface navy more generally

In Innovation in Carrier Aviation, number thirty-seven in our Newport Papers m

graph series, Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles exami

watershed period in carrier development that occurred immediately following W

War II, when design advances were made that would be crucial to the centrality i

national-security policy making that carriers and naval aviation have today. In th

years several major technological breakthroughs—notably the jet engine and nuc

weapons—raised large questions about the future and led to an array of innovati

the design and operational utilization of aircraft carriers.

Central to this story is the collaboration between the aviation communities in th

navies of the United States and Great Britain during these years, building on the 

mate relationship they had developed during the war itself. Strikingly, the most i

tant of these innovations, notably the angled flight deck and steam catapult, orig

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for the U.S. Navy today with respect to its commitment to maritime security cooperation in the context of its new “maritime strategy.” It is a welcome and important addition to the historiography of the Navy in the seminal years of the Cold War.

CARNES LORD

Director, Naval War College Press

Newport, Rhode Island

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Introduction

This study is about innovations in carrier aviation and the spread of those innov

from one navy to the navy of a close ally. The innovations are the angled flight de

the steam catapult; and the mirror and lighted landing aid that enabled pilots to 

jet aircraft on a carrier’s short and narrow flight deck.

This study is different from our previous study of innovation in the developmen

use of aircraft carriers, U.S. & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, w

compared innovation in carrier aviation in the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy in t

years before World War II. At the time, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy were co

itors. The two navies did not share technical information and in fact worked to h

their advances from one another, despite the fact that they had cooperated closel

ing World War I. Only in the winter of 1940–41 was there a renewal of the close p

sional contact between the naval aviators of the two nations that had first blossom

1918. Those initial cooperative relations grew into a very strong relationship dur

World War II, when British carriers were often equipped with mostly U.S.-made 

craft and many British pilots trained in the United States.

After World War II the cooperation continued, and as we show in the pages to fo

had major benefits for both navies—but especially for the U.S. Navy, which had t

resources to construct the large carriers and carrier aircraft that came to be seen 

world standard” starting in the mid-1950s. Indeed, the cooperation between the 

Navy and the Royal Navy after World War II facilitated an eventual dramatic imp

ment in the USN’s carrier aviation, as we shall show.

Though this is a study of innovations and the diffusion of innovations, it is really 

study of professional people—civilian and military pilots, civilian and military e

neers, and leaders of military and civilian organizations. The effort to put moder

aircraft on aircraft carriers depended on courageous, dedicated, and clever indivi

in both Great Britain and the United States. These individuals did their work wit

organizations established to develop and field modern naval aircraft, especially th

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Great Britain—the Royal Aircraft Establishment, the Royal Navy, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and British aircraft manufacturers. In addition, the key players—

individuals and organizations—in our story acted within different legal and official

requirements, especially regulations and the laws governing the spending of public

funds on military procurement and research and development. Finally, the innovators

in both the United States and Britain needed the support of the major political institutions of their respective countries.

There are, then, three lenses through which we examine the events central to this story.

The first lens focuses our attention on the role of individual perception and analysis.

Why and when did innovators identify their problems and take action to solve them?

Why was it that the three essential innovations were developed in Britain first? Why

didn’t the U.S. Navy develop these innovations first, or at least in parallel with the

Royal Navy? How and why did these innovations spread from the Royal Navy to the

U.S. Navy? The second lens focuses on what happens inside an organization. It’s not

enough for an innovator to come up a new idea or with a new application of an existing technology. The leaders of the innovator’s organization need to recognize that the

innovation solves a problem or shortfall, and then they need to support its development and demonstration. These leaders need to do this despite the press of everyday

affairs—despite the attention they must devote to routine matters that require their

attention. The third lens examines the interplay of institutions that contain the organizations in which the innovators worked. These institutions and interconnections

include the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy, and the processes by which civilian political

institutions (such as the U.S. Congress) influenced naval policy.

The Importance of the Past as Prologue

In World War II, the aircraft carrier proved itself as the dominant naval weapon,

especially in the U.S. campaign against Japan in the Pacific. When World War II began

in 1939, no navy that fielded carriers possessed more than a limited number of them.

The U.S. Navy, for example, had five first-line carriers. By the end of October 1942,

only three of the five were still afloat. But a huge construction program pumped out a

fleet of American carriers by war’s end: seventeen large new carriers (with another

seven to follow after the war), eight light carriers (with another two under construction), and seventy-seven escort carriers (an additional seven would be completed after

the war). There were also three new armored-flight-deck carriers under construction

for the U.S. Navy, giving it both the largest and the most modern carrier force

by 1946.

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in the winter of 1940, when the RN invited the USN to send observers to its carri

These observers reported that the Royal Navy had combined radar warning with 

control of defensive fighters by specially trained naval personnel in “fighter direc

ships (usually carriers) to blunt Italian air attacks against RN carriers in the Med

nean. In the USN, using the radar-equipped carrier Yorktown in exercises in July 

August 1941, then–rear admiral William Halsey and his staff validated the RN’s

approach and laid the foundations for what became a very effective form of fleet 

defense by the summer of 1944.1

Equally important were technical contacts between the two governments, especia

“Tizard Mission” of September 1940. Sir Henry Tizard, who had been a pilot in W

War I and had later been instrumental in the development and construction of B

air-defense radars in the late 1930s, led a delegation of British technical experts t

Washington to reveal to the War and Navy departments a number of new devices

including the cavity magnetron and Frank Whittle’s turbojet engine. This exchan

“much more than a means for transferring hardware; it also involved the exchang

intellectual property of all types.”2

Tizard’s mission did more than set the stage fo

variety of scientific and technical cooperative efforts. It also set a precedent of co

tion that persisted even after the war was over.

The British and French governments had already been purchasing U.S.-made aircr

starting in 1939. However, with “the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and the D

Aid program which grew out of that legislation, the United States government und

the financing and direction of the production of planes for the use of our allies-to-

But production of planes for the Royal Navy and sharing of scientific and technica

mation were only part of the story of close cooperation between the USN and the R

during the war. The U.S. Navy also trained a number of RN Fleet Air Arm pilots.

This effort was sponsored in the summer of 1941 by the Navy’s senior aviator, Re

Adm. John H. Towers, then chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Towers went so fa

make sure that Fleet Air Arm recruits sent to the United States had access to the l

and best training aircraft, even if it meant shortchanging U.S. Navy needs. The re

this program was significant: “The Towers scheme was hugely important to the F

Air Arm. By November 1944 it was providing 44 percent of the pilots required by 

Royal Navy. In particular, the Fleet Air Arm had come to rely on the scheme to tu

the pilots needed to fly the American aircraft on which it increasingly depended.

results of this training program, coupled with U.S. aircraft provided through Len

Lease, can also be illustrated by considering British carrier attacks against Japane

controlled oil production facilities in Sumatra in January 1945. In one attack, of 

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the United Kingdom. All the rest had been produced in the United States, and most of

those were flown by Fleet Air Arm pilots trained in the United States.5

After the war, Fleet Air Arm pilots who had been trained in the United States formed a

club called the “British Pensacola Veterans.” There is evidence that many members of

the club strongly supported “the Anglo-American special relationship, especially during the tensions of the Cold War. That special relationship was not just a matter of

national self-interest and formal alliances: it existed in the hearts and minds of individ

uals.”6

It was also deliberately fostered by officers on both sides, especially Admiral

Towers, who, according to his biographer Clark Reynolds, had “such great respect” for

the Royal Navy.7

After World War II

The situation in naval aviation after World War II was in three important ways similar

to that after World War I. First, the huge increase in research and development (R&D)

spending during the war had produced a fistful of important aviation innovations,

including effective jet engines, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air-launched rockets,

ground-based radars to track aircraft, new aircraft designs (such as the delta wing), airborne radars, and improved facilities at existing and war-built R&D centers. Second,

rapid demobilization after war’s end had sent masses of former servicemen back into

civilian life and had cut dramatically the output from aircraft manufacturers while

slashing the sizes of their workforces. Third, spending on defense declined severely just

as senior military officers wished to invest in the new technologies produced by

wartime R&D.

Again, as after World War I, there was a national-level argument in the United States

over how military aviation should be organized. The U.S. Army’s aviators won their

campaign to have Congress create a separate aviation service, and the U.S. Air Force

(USAF) was formally established in 1947. Thereafter in the years immediately after

World War II the Air Force and Navy disputed the future role and organization of military aviation in deadly earnest, and the status of carrier aviation was always at or near

the center of these disputes.

One factor, however, was entirely new: the introduction of nuclear weapons. For a time

after World War II, it looked as though nuclear weapons had changed the whole face of

war. Given the great size and weight of the first generation of nuclear weapons, it was

clear that only large aircraft could carry them; therefore aircraft carriers and their

planes seemed irrelevant, even useless. The debate over which military arm should

carry nuclear weapons began almost immediately after their first use in August 1945

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affected the development of U.S. carrier aviation.8

As a reaction to the increasing importance of its own aviation arm, the Navy dur

World War II had restructured its own aviation organization. In Washington, in 

major organizational change, staff elements of BuAer had been reassigned to the 

of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). This reorganization moved Navy avi

in a direction almost opposite to that taken after World War I. When the Bureau 

Aeronautics was created in 1921, its official responsibilities had included develop

requirements for new aircraft; drawing up the Navy’s budget for aircraft procure

maintenance, training, and R&D; manufacturing specialized components and ev

whole aircraft at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and cr

and controlling the training (and to some degree the promotion) of naval aviato

These broad powers made the chief of the bureau one of the most visible and

influential Navy officers in Washington.

It was many of these responsibilities that were transferred out of BuAer during a

immediately after World War II, and the bureau was left mainly with the function

procuring aircraft and aircraft ordnance, setting the Navy’s aviation research age

and working with the Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) to plan the design of new 

craft carriers and the modifications of existing carriers. In short, OPNAV remove

most of BuAer’s policy-making authority, as well as the responsibility to search f

create the evidence that would support Navy aviation policies. As we shall show, 

changes in structure and authority moved BuAer personnel away from thinking 

aviation operations and focused their professional attention on developing and p

ing high-performance aircraft. That change in focus also altered the way that sen

officers in OPNAV and members of Congress would assess the work done by BuA

and its industry contractors.

The period after World War II was therefore extraordinary in many ways—indee

more ways than had been true of the period immediately after World War I. The 

of uncertainty for naval aviation personnel was incredibly high. Could surface sh

survive nuclear attack? Would high-speed, high-endurance submarines drive sur

warships from the oceans? Would developments in radar lead to the invention of

“death rays” that would kill the pilots of high-flying aircraft? Could a carrier’s in

tors defend it against attacks by supersonic bombers? If the Soviet Union—whos

mary military power rested in its army and land-based air forces—posed a grave

danger to the United States, was a powerful navy even needed, or should scarce d

resources go to the Air Force and Army?

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Logistics, noted in an “eyes only” memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations,

Adm. Chester Nimitz, that “current trends in the weight, size, speed, and characteristic

of aircraft may have a serious adverse effect on the utility of existing carriers and even

on the overall importance of carrier aviation in the future.”9

That was a formal way of

saying, “Carrier aviation—our most powerful tool in the Pacific in World War II—will

pass its prime as an operational tool unless carriers grow as new aircraft grow.”

Even before Carney penned his concerns to Nimitz, John L. Sullivan, Acting Secretary

of the Navy, had urged President Harry Truman to allow the Navy to convert its large

carrier force to a nuclear strike force by altering the carriers and their largest attack aircraft to deliver existing nuclear weapons.10 At about the same time, a note circulated

inside OPNAV suggesting that the Royal Navy was preparing to modify at least some of

its carriers so that they could launch and recover the very heavy bombers required to

lift large nuclear weapons like that used against Nagasaki in August 1945.11 What this

sort of evidence shows is that the level of strategic and technological uncertainty was so

great right after World War II as to be almost overwhelming at times. Naval personnel

in both the United States and Great Britain had to attempt to see their way forward in

the face of numerous technological, strategic, political, and financial challenges.

From our perspective, what makes this period so interesting (and also so difficult to

study) is the lack of “main organizational players” in the U.S. Navy of the kind that we

discovered in doing the research for our earlier book. In the 1920s and ’30s, the Bureau o

Aeronautics was a strong bureaucratic actor within the Navy and the key obstacle to the

unification of all military aviation in one executive department. In the 1920s especially,

BuAer was markedly experimental, supporting the installation of aircraft on submarines,

aircraft carriers, surface ships (mostly cruisers and battleships), and even on aircraftcarrying rigid airships. After 1943, however, BuAer lost its commanding position in the

Washington arena, and the process of making naval aviation policy became shared amon

different Navy offices. The “paper trail” of decisions is therefore harder to follow.

Obscuring the decision-making process even more for the postwar years was the

decline in the influence of the Navy’s General Board and of the Naval War College. The

former was a focal point of decision making in the years between World War I and

World War II. The board, which reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy, reviewed

the rationales for ship designs, which meant that it also reviewed the linkages between

any major innovation and the military requirements it was designed to meet. The secre

hearings held by the General Board were forums where major strategic, operational,

and technical issues were discussed by senior officers and technical experts. The board

survived efforts of Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King—Navy commander in chief and Chief of

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place where serious issues were discussed, argued about, and then (usually) resol

through a process of weighing hard evidence. As a result, the postwar discussions

among officers from BuAer, the Bureau of Ships (which designed carriers), and

OPNAV did not match the quality of the board’s prewar proceedings.

The Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, had pioneered war gaming ev

before World War I, but under post–World War I presidents such as Rear Admira

liam S. Sims and William V. Pratt the college explored the possibilities of naval (e

cially carrier) aviation in a deliberate and disciplined manner that produced

hypotheses that often framed the annual “fleet problems.” But during World War 

responsibility for solving operational and tactical naval problems shifted to the fl

commands, especially to the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. For example, the concept of 

combat information center (CIC) for U.S. Navy carriers grew from experiments 

summer of 1941 and from experience in the battles of Coral Sea and Midway in 

The CIC for surface ships was first developed by an officer serving on a destroyer 

fighting around Guadalcanal in the fall of 1942 and was then strongly supported 

Admiral Nimitz, and—very soon thereafter—CIC procedures were taught to new 

sonnel in schools adjacent to the combat zone by the combat veterans themselves

Because of the rise in the influence and responsibility of the Pacific Fleet staff, th

Naval War College did not regain in 1946 the responsibility it had had before Wo

War II as the source of systematic and innovative tactical and operational thinkin

Thus by 1946 three of the four “players” critical to innovation in Navy aviation b

World War II (BuAer, the Naval War College, and the General Board) had lost th

functions, and that loss had deprived the Navy of a major innovative “tool.”

But the changes had not all been for the worse. In World War II, naval aviators in 

U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy again worked closely together and began a process 

reciprocal visits and exchanging information that would help both services over 

next ten years. The U.S. Navy also came out of the war with a powerful, experienc

carrier force and a cadre of officers confident enough to take on the challenges p

by nuclear weapons and new technologies, such as jet propulsion. Finally, techno

pioneered in World War II, especially jet propulsion, aircraft designed for supers

flight, and electronics, challenged the imaginations of the foremost aircraft desig

and aircraft propulsion engineers in U.S. industry. These individuals sought ever

greater aircraft performance within the boundaries set by available and future tec

ogy, and the best naval aviators in both the United Kingdom and the United Stat

shared their enthusiasm.

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The Plan of the Monograph

Readers will have to tolerate our tacking back and forth as we trace all the threads and

outline their interrelationships. Ours is a complex story. Pieces of it have been told

before—for example, in retired Vice Adm. Jerry Miller’s Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft

Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation, published by the Smithsonian Institution in 2001, and aeronautical engineer Tommy H. Thomason’s U.S. Naval Air Superiority and Strike from the Sea. But to our knowledge no one has up to now put the piece

together in the way that we will in the pages to follow.

We will take major issues one at a time, from the development of reliable and powerful

jet engines to the work of engineers trying to design and install on carriers the catapults and arresting gear required to launch and recover ever heavier and faster aircraft.

We will also link these issues. When we began this study, we thought that those linkage

would stand out once we examined the material available in archival and other sources

For example, we had read in several places that when British naval aviators showed

their counterparts in the U.S. Navy the concept of the angled flight deck, the American

saw its value almost immediately and embraced it. That seemed to make the process of

adopting an innovation within the U.S. Navy straightforward. But matters turned out

to be more complex than that, as we shall show.

Notes

1. Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and

Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1999), pp. 67–68. See also “Radar Doctrine,

U.S. Pacific Fleet,” Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletin no. 6-41, from CinC, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to

Pacific Fleet (December 31, 1941), in Pacific

Fleet Tactical Bulletins 1941 folder, World

War II Command File, Pacific Fleet, box 250,

National Archives.

2. David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The

Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s Univ. Press and Alan

Sutton, 1996), p. 193.

3. History Unit, DCNO (Air), “Aviation Procurement, 1939–1945, Part II,” Monographs in

the History of Naval Aviation 19 (1946), p. 30.

4. Gilbert Guinn and G. H. Bennett, British Naval Aviation in World War II: The US Navy

and Anglo-American Relations (London:

Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), p. 21.

5. Ibid., p. 144.

6. Ibid., p. 165.

7. Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers:

The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1991), p. 419. See also Alan P. Dobson, U.S.

Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946 (New

York: St. Martin’s, 1986).

8. See Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals:

The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950

(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center,

1994), and Vice Adm. Jerry Miller, USN

(Ret.), Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 2001).

9. Carney to Nimitz, memorandum, 25 November 1946, subject “Merger Discussions,”

file 31 (Memos, CNO, Personal, 1942–47),

box 2, Records of the Immediate Office of

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ton, D.C.

10. Sullivan to Truman, draft letter, 24 July 1946,

Op-602/cmf, Serial 0014P602, (SC) A-23,

Naval Aviation History Office, Washington

Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

11. Copy memo, no date, no number, Naval Aviation History Office.

How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter 

Three World Wars (Annapolis, Md.: N

Institute Press, 2009), pp. 58–59.

13.Joseph C. Wylie, Jr., “The Reminiscen

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie, Jr.” (A

olis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2

pp. 38–39.

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BuAer before World War II

Before World War II, the Bureau of Aeronautics was a unique institution within 

Navy. Its leaders were charged with developing and procuring aircraft; training p

crewmen, and maintenance personnel; working with Army aviators and the Nati

Advisory Committee on Aeronautics to advance aviation research; and codifying 

tion combat doctrine and routine flying procedures. Command of BuAer was in 

hands of Navy officers, almost all of whom were qualified pilots.

As in the case of the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd), officers in charge of an

manning the divisions of BuAer came from service in the fleet and returned to fl

assignments when their tours in the bureau were over. Also like BuOrd, BuAer ha

charge of a large government-owned industrial establishment, in BuAer’s case th

Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. But BuAer’s primary aircraft suppliers we

vate firms, such as Grumman, Douglas, Consolidated, Curtiss, and Martin. The N

Aircraft Factory built aircraft and other equipment (such as catapults) that the p

vately owned industrial base could not or would not provide.1

To get high-perfor

aircraft, BuAer’s basic strategy was to promote the development of high-horsepo

aircraft engines and then invite the private aircraft manufacturers to build variou

types of planes around them. BuAer’s periodic design competitions had led to

improved piston-engine fighters and bombers for the Navy’s carriers.

In 1937, what might be called the “aviation community”—composed of civilian 

military pilots, engineers in the aircraft industry, a few scientists in universities su

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and aircraft and airline industr

executives—was still relatively small. Officers in BuAer often were friends of thei

counterparts in industry. The exchange of information among them was usually 

and informal, despite government regulations that formalized the process for pro

ing aircraft. In just a few years, this community would swell with a new generatio

pilots, engineers, technical specialists, and executives. Within a decade, officers an

civilian engineers in the U.S. Navy would be set on the task of bringing jet aircraf

CHAPTER ONE

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1940. Almost all were focused on developing, fielding, and flying the latest pistonengine planes.

In 1937, BuAer was led by a rear admiral. His immediate deputy was a Navy captain.

Below them in the hierarchy were two major organizational branches—the Executive

Branch, with divisions for planning, training, and Marine Corps aviation, and a Material Branch, with divisions for engineering, maintenance, lighter-than-air vehicles, and

procurement. BuAer also contained an administrative section and a financial division.

In January 1937, the Plans Division developed the requirements for new aircraft, in

consultation with the Engineering Division. Working with the Flight Division, the officers in these other two offices served as intermediaries between the fleet and the aircraft production firms, translating fleet requirements into specifications that the

Procurement Division would issue as the bases for periodic design competitions.2

Using this organization, the Navy had taken carrier aviation from its infancy to its

adolescence. In the early 1920s, simulations at the Naval War College based on BuAer

projections had shown the military potential of a “pulse” of striking power delivered

by a carrier’s planes. By 1929, using for the first time in a major fleet exercise the big

carriers (and converted battle cruisers) Saratoga and Lexington, carrier commanders

had shown that the potential of carriers suggested by the Naval War College simulations was attainable.3

After that, what the Navy’s aviators wanted from their bureau was

more powerful aircraft with longer ranges. With two new carriers (Yorktown and Enterprise) under construction in 1937, officers like Cdr. Marc A. Mitscher, who headed

BuAer’s Flight Division, were working to provide them the best possible airplanes.

Both new carriers were designed for the pattern of flight operations first worked out on

the experimental carrier Langley in 1925. Aircraft returning to the ship were taken

aboard over the stern, then pushed forward to a “deck park” near the bow. A wire barrier was then hoisted into place behind the parked aircraft. It protected the aircraft in

the deck park from being damaged by any plane that missed the cross-deck arrestinggear wires while attempting a landing. Once all planes were aboard, they were moved

back to the after end of the flight deck and readied for their next sorties.4

Rapid Progress in Aircraft Performance Just before the War

Navy aviation benefited from the rolling cycle of war games, fleet exercises, and aircraft

improvements in a number of ways. One of the most important was in the procurement of aircraft from private manufacturers. For example, the first carrier (Ranger)

designed as such from the beginning was not large enough to carry the torpedo planes

that had been flown from the much larger converted battle cruisers Lexington and

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asked various manufacturers to submit designs for a new dive-bomber. Northrop 

the competition in 1935 with its design of what became the XBT-1. This aircraft

reached operational squadrons in April 1938. A modified version of this plane w

become the famous Douglas SBD Dauntless of World War II fame.5

In 1931, when Ranger’s design was approved, the potential of torpedo planes seem

be very limited. Yet the fleet problems suggested that an effective torpedo plane, o

ated in conjunction with bombers and fighters, posed a distinct threat to even th

est ships. Moreover, advances in aircraft engine technology indicated to officers i

BuAer and to the members of the General Board that an improved torpedo plane 

be built. Accordingly, BuAer issued a solicitation for torpedo plane designs in 19

strongest response to the solicitation was a design by Douglas Aircraft of the Nav

first monoplane attack aircraft—later christened the TBD Devastator. Though lim

in range when carrying a thousand-pound torpedo, when it appeared the plane s

a good match for the new carriers Yorktown and Enterprise.

The rapidly improving performance of radial air-cooled piston engines for carrie

craft in the 1930s led to dramatic changes in aircraft performance, as illustrated b

following two charts. Figure 1-1 shows the steep increase in fighter speed from 1

1941 for the three navies (USN, RN, and Imperial Japanese Navy) that possessed 

ers. Figure 1-2 depicts the increase in service ceiling for selected fighters over the 

period. This performance increase gave carrier aircraft dramatically improved fig

power.

Incremental improvements in engine horsepower, the switch from biplanes to m

planes, and the effectiveness of hydraulic aircraft controls and streamlining yield

dramatic improvements in performance.6

The fleet problems showed that it was 

tial for the Navy to take advantage of these improvements.

To do that, BuAer sponsored another dive-bomber design competition in 1938. T

winners were the Curtiss XSB2C-1 and the Brewster XSB2A-1. The first became t

well-known SB2C Helldiver, which was to be produced in great quantities in Wor

War II. The Brewster design was developed as the SB2A Buccaneer, which was or

as a prototype in April 1939, produced in limited quantities during the war, and 

saw combat.

The dive-bomber competition was followed by one in 1939 for a new torpedo bo

That competition produced two rival designs: Grumman’s XTBF-1 Avenger and Ch

Vought’s XTBU-1 Sea Wolf (which was eventually produced by Consolidated Air

Grumman signed the contract to produce the Avenger prototype in 1940, and th

craft made its first flight in August 1941. The Sea Wolf ’s loaded weight was great

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the Avenger’s, and its range with a torpedo was less, so the Avenger design was chosen

by BuAer’s evaluators as the basis of the bulk of Navy carrier heavy strike aircraft production during World War II. As in the case of the dive-bombers, the growth in capability from 1934 to 1939 was impressive. The Devastator design of 1934 could range

only seven hundred miles carrying a thousand-pound torpedo. The TBF Avenger (the

1939 design) could fly 1,200 miles with a bomb or torpedo load of 1,600 pounds.7

Holding to its three-year dive-bomber design cycle, BuAer sponsored a third divebomber competition in 1941, before the United States entered World War II. Two prototypes came out of this competition: the Curtiss XSB3C-1 and the Douglas XSB2D-1.

Curtiss stopped development of its prototype at the end of 1942. Douglas signed a con

tract in 1941 for the development of its prototype and flew the plane for the first time

Fighter Speed, in Knots, for Selected Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and

Imperial Japanese Navy

Fairey Flycatcher Boeing F2B-1 Nakajima A1N1

Hawker Osprey III Grumman FF-2 Nakajima A2N1

Hawker Nimrod IIS Grumman F3F-1 Mitsubishi A5M4

Blackburn Skua Grumman F4F-4 Mitsubishi A6M2

Gloster Sea Gladiator

Hawker Sea Hurricane

Source: Norman Friedman, Carrier Air Power (New York: Rutledge, 1981), app. 2.

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in April 1943, as the BTD-1. A modification of the BTD-1 eventually became the

XBT2D-1 Sky Pirate in 1944, and a further modification of the Sky Pirate becam

famous Douglas AD-1 Skyraider, ordered into production in April 1945. The pro

created in the 1920s to tap the results of war games and fleet exercises to set the

requirements for new aircraft had worked.

Challenges to BuAer Starting in 1941

By 1941, Marc Mitscher had been promoted to captain and was assistant chief of 

under the bureau’s nationally known head, Rear Adm. John Towers. Other young

ation pioneers had also been promoted. Alfred M. Pride, a catapult designer, was 

commander and the staff officer representing Rear Admiral Towers on the Aeron

Service Ceiling, in Feet, for Selected Fighters—Royal Navy, U.S. Navy, and Im

Japanese Navy

Fairey Flycatcher I Boeing F2B-1 Nakajima A1N1

Hawker Osprey III Grumman F2F-1 Mitsubishi A5M4

Hawker Nimrod IIS Grumman F4F-4 Mitsubishi A6M2

Gloster Sea Gladiator

Hawker Sea Hurricane

Source: Friedman, Carrier Air Power, app. 2.

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was head of the Plans Division in BuAer; his counterpart in the Procurement Division

was Cdr. Lawrence Richardson. Mitscher, Ramsey, and Richardson were part of an

“inner circle” advising BuAer chief Towers, along with Capt. Sidney Kraus, head of the

Material Branch in BuAer, and up-and-coming Lt. George Anderson, who would eventually (in 1961) become Chief of Naval Operations.8

A bright young engineer by the

name of George Spangenberg worked directly under William Z. Frisbie, the respected

head of the Design Coordination and Contract Airplane Design section in BuAer’s

Engineering Division. Spangenberg described Frisbie “as the senior technical advisor to

the command structure of the Bureau of Aeronautics.”9

These officers and civilians were preoccupied with the tasks of preparing the U.S. Navy

for participation in a coalition that would fight and win World War II. Some numbers

reveal the extent to which Navy and Marine Corps aviation changed between 1937 and

1941. In 1937 the Navy had 972 combat aircraft, 113 transport and utility planes, and

161 trainers.10 The figures for 1941 were 1,774, 183, and 1,444, respectively. In 1937 the

Navy had 1,260 pilots; the Marines had 142. In 1941, the Navy had 4,112 pilots, and the

Marines had 480.11 When Rear Admiral Towers was appointed chief of BuAer in June

1939, he had under his command sixty-six officers and 171 civilians. By the summer of

1941, he had 176 officers and 518 civilians, many of them crammed into the rather

primitive BuAer spaces in “Main Navy” on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C.12

Towers and his subordinates faced wide-ranging and ambitious requirements. They

had simultaneously to ramp up the production of aircraft, recruit and train hundreds

of new pilots, construct new bases for training and for combat use, and find ways to

distribute the aircraft being produced among the Army, Navy, and foreign buyers (then

mainly Great Britain, France, and China). They also had to fund research and development of new aviation technologies. All of this had to be done in peacetime, often

against strong congressional opposition. In 1940, for example, Admiral Towers could

not persuade Congress to fund a five-year program of Navy aeronautical research,

“especially in the revolutionary field of jet propulsion.”13

Selected Navy officers discovered just how important that research could be, when they

were briefed by Sir Henry Tizard and his colleagues in Washington in September 1940.

The “Tizard Mission” showed the Americans a working cavity magnetron. The Naval

Research Laboratory had already developed and tested lower-power air search radars,

so the American officers and scientists knew how important the cavity magnetron was.

(To exploit its potential, the Americans would set up what became known as the

Radiation Laboratory at MIT. Together, researchers at the laboratory and engineers

in such firms as General Electric would develop and produce a series of effective

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cations of the turbojet engine developed by Frank Whittle. That led the National 

sory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) to cooperate with the Army and Navy i

expanding the limited research into jet propulsion starting in the summer of 194

The key point, however, is that American army and naval aviators and their civili

leagues had their hands full in 1941. In his detailed biography of BuAer chief Tow

historian Clark Reynolds notes that “Towers was lukewarm to diverting funds, pe

nel, and precious time to unproved concepts.”15 Given all the work Towers and hi

mand had to do to prepare for war, the admiral’s reluctance to support “unprove

concepts” should come as no surprise. Towers, his subordinates, and their succes

BuAer faced a huge task—acquiring thousands of first-rate aircraft and the pilot

man them, as well as the maintenance personnel to support a huge naval air forc

1,774 combat aircraft force of 1941 mushroomed to one of 29,125 combat aircra

1945. The number of Navy pilots jumped from 4,112 in 1941 to 49,819 in 1945, a

number of Marine pilots increased from 480 to 10,276 in the same time period. T

number of enlisted personnel needed to support this dramatic growth went from

13,691 (both Navy and Marines) in 1941 to 337,718 in 1945.16

The First Signs of an Impending Crisis

The Bureau of Aeronautics had developed “standard operating procedures” in th

before World War II to harness the skills of scientists, engineers, and airplane ma

turers on behalf of carrier aviation. BuAer’s design competitions and its investme

piston-engine development promoted incremental but dramatic improvement in 

performance of fighter and attack aircraft. Yet the process of learning to operate 

constantly improving aircraft from carriers, and then using the planes to defeat a

enemy, was dogged by great uncertainty.

For example, in 1935 and 1936 there was a serious debate among carrier aviators 

the proper design of fighter aircraft for carrier squadrons. Carriers were mainly o

sive weapons. In 1935 and 1936 (and even in the spring of 1941), no navy knew h

protect a carrier from an effective strike staged by opposing carrier-based bombe

carrier had lots of fighters for defense, then its strike potential went down. If its s

potential—indicated by the number of bombers and torpedo planes it carried—

high, then its airborne defense was weak. Navy aerial strike doctrine in 1935 was 

“In naval warfare control of the air is obtained through destruction of the enemi

carriers, tenders, and bases, as his air strength can be reduced much more effectiv

this manner than by attrition in the air.”17 That implied using fighters as escorts f

bombers and not as defensive weapons, especially given the fact that existing figh

were hardly faster than the bombers they were supposed to shoot down.

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order to be in a position to capitalize on it should developments warrant.”18 As the

commander of the fleet’s carrier squadrons put it in a memorandum to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in April 1936, “The need for speed [in fighters] cannot be

overstressed. It is the first and fundamental requirement in a fighting airplane and no

other characteristic is of equal importance in the design.”19 Put another way, “protection of aircraft formations is not an efficient or desirable use of single-seat [fighters].”2

The U.S. fleet commander in chief, Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, endorsed the letter with

these comments: “I agree with every word. Sound, logical & unanswerable.”21 In May

1936, Admiral Reeves sent a confidential letter to the Chief of Naval Operations,

through the chief of BuAer, stating his views in strong language: “No fleet commander

can give carrier space and personnel to squadrons of so-called fighters that cannot

destroy enemy planes and are equally worthless for other uses. And yet, no fleet commander can submit passively to the attacks of enemy bombers. THE FLEET MUST

HAVE AIRPLANES THAT CAN FIGHT OTHER AIRPLANES.”22 The Naval War College

war games and the actual fleet problems had led Reeves to this insight.

BuAer’s response, however, was not initially positive. Officers in the Plans and Engineering divisions took issue with the commander in chief ’s argument as they reviewed

his proposal in late May and June 1936. Commander Mitscher, then head of the Flight

Division in BuAer, summed up the bureau’s concerns by saying that “one fighter squad

ron per carrier should be discontinued until this argument is settled. Keep sufficient

fighters on say [sic] two carriers to carry on the development.”23 To keep development

alive, the Plans Division of BuAer asked the Engineering Division in October 1936 to

conduct a preliminary design study of a supercharged twin-engine, heavily armed

fighter.24 Rear Adm. Arthur B. Cook, BuAer’s chief, took the next step in February 1937

by directing the assistant chief of BuAer to plan on developing a “two-engine single

seat fighter.”25 Accordingly, the bureau issued a “Request for Competitive Designs and

Proposals” to industry in March 1937 that called for a two-engine, single-seat fighter

with four .50-caliber guns, a landing speed of 65 mph, and an economical speed range

of a thousand miles.26

Industry’s response was not seen as satisfactory. Part of the difficulty lay with the

bureau, as Captain Kraus, head of the Material Branch, pointed out to the assistant

chief of BuAer on 23 July 1937: “The maximum speed of prospective shore-based

bombers is derived from supercharging at high altitude. In order to utilize carrierbased fighters against them, the fighters must be supercharged to equivalent altitude.

The Bureau design of two-engined fighters did not adopt this means of obtaining performance.”27 However, the basic problem wasn’t BuAer’s. Instead, it was the fleet’s. Fleet

air commanders wanted the landing speed of carrier aircraft kept to 65 mph without

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was supposed to shut down his engine just before his plane engaged the carrier

arresting gear. As Captain Kraus pointed out, this requirement was keeping BuAe

industry from developing very high-powered aircraft with supercharging and hig

wing loadings.

What was needed as the basis of an adequate carrier-based interceptor was super

ing (for high-altitude performance) and high wing loading—which meant a heav

twin-engine plane that landed with its engines still turning over. As Kraus put it, “

use of power in deck landings permits the twin-engined design to develop its inh

superiority in performance.” Moreover, “it does not follow that the operating un

would not be willing to adopt a different landing technique in exchange for outst

ing results in performance.” As Kraus wrote, “The consistent use of power in land

believed to be a reasonable development.”28

But if the heavier, twin-engine aircraft (fighters or bombers) were to land with p

on in order to give their pilots more control, the whole concept of the deck park 

ward on the flight deck would have to be reconsidered. As noted above, a plane th

missed the arresting-gear wires would be stopped by the wires that formed a barr

across the flight deck and shielded aircraft that had already landed. But if a relati

large plane, landing with its engines running, hit the deck at a speed greater than 

five miles per hour and bounced over the arresting-gear wires stretched across th

it might hurdle over the barrier as well and pile into the planes parked forward. K

was well aware of this possible danger, and as a result he recommended that “exp

ments in deck landing with existing twin-engined aircraft regardless of their mili

suitability are indicated, if only for prudence.”29

Here was a clue to the future of carrier operations: larger, heavier, more powerfu

planes landing at higher speeds with their engines still running. Kraus did not fav

this option in 1937. He wanted an aircraft like the F8F Bearcat that Grumman de

oped in 1944—a lightweight but high-powered single-engine plane with a rapid r

climb, a powerful armament, and a relatively low landing speed. But industry had 

produce the sort of engine that could power such a plane, and there is no evidenc

senior officers took Kraus’s memorandum for what it was—a vision of a very diff

future for carrier operations.

Instead, BuAer kept after the concept of a small, light plane with high speed and

enough endurance to serve as a defensive fighter. NACA’s Director of Aeronautic

Research supported the effort, saying in April 1940 that “a fighter-type airplane c

designed, using a radial air-cooled engine, which will weigh between 4,000 and 5

pounds and will have a speed of 400 miles per hour.”30 BuAer’s Plans and Enginee

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analyses in a July 1940 memorandum to BuAer chief Towers.31 As the memorandum

pointed out, the key to high performance in an interceptor was the engine, and the

most powerful of the recent engine designs—pushing two thousand horsepower—were

heavy and consumed a lot of fuel. To get a lighter, smaller plane, the Navy would have

to either find a way to get great power from a dramatically lighter engine or accept significantly reduced endurance from a plane that carried less fuel. In addition, the interceptor would need a heavy armament, and the machine guns and their ammunition

would add to the plane’s weight. In short, the combat requirements of high speed, rapid

rate of climb, firepower, and endurance led logically to a larger, heavier airplane like th

XF4U-1—and even beyond it to heavier twin-engine designs. To make matters worse,

these powerful aircraft would have to land (with engine power off) at relatively high

speeds—at least 75 mph.

The design of the airplane was beginning to tax the physical capabilities of existing and

planned carriers and their equipment. In July 1940, the heads of BuAer’s Plans and

Engineering divisions knew what they wanted: “a further extension in range and power

of our striking force, involving basic ranges of 1,500 rather than one thousand miles

with fuel for a minimum of 2,250 miles in all types, and more effective and powerful

offensive weapons.” They also believed that “advances in power plants and aerodynamics” would allow them to attain the goal of “providing a homogeneous carrier force

which can strike a heavier total blow at a greater distance.”32 They did not discuss the

operational and technological implications of their efforts to develop improved airplanes for long-range attacks. Yet this was just the kind of question that the General

Board had assessed and reassessed all through the 1930s. BuAer’s division heads—

focused as they were on aircraft performance—did not see operational and technological trade-offs as the challenges they would soon become.

Notes

1. For a history of the Naval Aircraft Factory,

see William F. Trimble, Wings for the Navy: A

History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917–

1956 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1990).

2. See Bureau of Navigation, Navy Directory, 1

January 1937 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 234–35.

3. See Charles M. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox: The

Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911–1929

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1974).

4. Robert J. Cressman, USS Ranger: The Navy’s

First Flattop from Keel to Mast, 1934–1946

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2003).

5. Data on aircraft are from Gordon

Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United

States Navy Aircraft since 1911 (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976); and Ray

Wagner, American Combat Planes, 3rd ed.

(New York: Doubleday, 1982). The design

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tion Confidential Bulletin,” no. 3-49 (July

1949), pp. 15–17, in the collection of the

Naval Aviation History Office, Washington

Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

6. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa,

Ed Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1980), p. 44. Heinemann noted that incremental improvements to the BT-1 suggested

by BuAer’s Lt. Cdr. Walter S. Diehl helped

Douglas engineers turn the BT-1 into the

more effective SBD-1.

7. Swanborough and Bowers, United States

Navy Aircraft since 1911, pp. 165–66, 213–16.

8. See the Navy Directory, 1 April 1941. Also see

Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers:

The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p.

597 note 56.

9. George A. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” 31

August 1997, George Spangenberg Oral History, 2010, www.georgespangenberg.com,

p. 30.

10. Roy Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,

1910–1995, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Naval

Historical Center, 1997), app. 4, “Aircraft on

Hand, 1920–1965,” p. 448.

11. Ibid., app. 10, “Aviation Personnel on Active

Duty,” p. 593.

12. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, pp. 294,

356.

13. Ibid., p. 301.

14. David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The

Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press and

Alan Sutton, 1996), pp. 147, 192.

15. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers, p. 382.

16. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,

apps. 4 and 10.

17. Commander VF Squadron Five-B, letter to

Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, via

Commander Officer, U.S.S. Lexington, and

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, subject

“Employment of the Two-Seater Fighter Airplane in Carrier Operations,” Fleet Problem

para. 11.

18. Ibid., para. 15.

19. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, le

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, sub

“Fighting Airplanes—Value to the Fl

April 1936, A4-3/11-Mn/FF2-3, para

20. Ibid., para. 10(a).

21. Ibid., para. 13, p. 13.

22. Commander-in-Chief, United States 

letter to Chief of Naval Operations, v

Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, s

“Fighting Airplanes—Value to Fleet,” 

F/2491, 9 May 1936, para. 10.

23. Mitscher’s comment was handwritten 

bottom of a typed “comment” on th

mander in chief’s recommendation.

24. Plans, memorandum to Engineering

Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, s

“Two-engine VF, request for design s

file Aer-PL-3-KMN, 30 October 1936

25. Chief of BuAer, memorandum to As

Chief, subject “Experimental Plane P

for 1938,” ABC-GB, 12 February 193

26. Aer-Pr-3-CW/BA (VF), 18 March 19

ject “Class VF Airplanes—Request fo

petitive Designs and Proposals.”

27. Material, memorandum to Chief of B

via Plans and Assistant Chief of Bure

ject “Comments on Twin-Engined F

Aer-M-1-KP, 23 July 1937.

28. Ibid., paras. 7 and 8, p. 3.

29. Ibid., para. 12.

30. National Advisory Committee for Ae

tics, letter to Chief of the Bureau of A

nautics, subject “Design study of hig

fighter-type airplane using a radial a

cooled engine,” National 5212, 30 Ap

1940.

31. Plans and Engineering, memorandum 

Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, s

“Experimental Fighter Procurement,

2-VML, 27 July 1940.

32. Ibid., “Conclusion,” pp. 27–28.

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BuAer in World War II

During World War II, the Bureau of Aeronautics tried to accelerate its peacetime 

cess of development. This effort largely failed. In peacetime, the transition from a

attack-aircraft design competition to the first operational aircraft took about thr

years. Unfortunately for the Navy and BuAer, this schedule could not be compres

because the fleet’s wartime requirements shifted dramatically while the aircraft in

try was trying to produce new prototypes and thousands of approved aircraft mo

For example, BuAer ordered prototypes of the Curtiss XBTC-2, an attack aircraft 

ble of carrying a large torpedo 1,200 miles, in December 1943. But as the August 

Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin pointed out, “changes in requirements and p

ress in equipment and materials during the two-and-one-half year period of dev

ment . . . made the airplane obsolete in many respects.”1

This turn of events should not have surprised anyone in BuAer. One reason the d

opment of the XBTC-2 was delayed was that BuAer directed Curtiss in the summ

1942 to put a surface-search radar into the XBTC-1 and XBTC-2 so that the plan

could more easily find enemy targets. This had been a “lesson learned” from the 

of the Coral Sea and Midway. Unfortunately, early models of such radars were re

large and heavy, and placing them on the prototypes added so much time to the p

development and testing schedules that the XBTC-1 was canceled in 1943 and th

XBTC-2 was dropped from the Navy’s aviation program after the end of World W

Moreover, there was a conflict between quantity (getting enough airplanes for th

and quality (getting airplanes that were good enough to hold their own with any

that the enemy put up). As a consequence, the manufacturers adopted a strategy 

research and design that emphasized integrating improved components into pro

tion aircraft. This strategy had two important implications. First, it fostered the a

mulation of improvements over short time periods, by which each new aircraft m

maintained a rough parity or increased its advantage against enemy aircraft. Seco

the strategy complemented the ability of U.S. industrial engineers to crank out a 

CHAPTER TWO

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were met quickly; mass production mattered more than revolutionary design. Curtiss,

for example, instead of investing its engineering talent and its capital in ventures like

the XSB3C-1, worked on refining and improving the SB2C Helldiver—developing and

manufacturing almost a thousand SB2C-1s, over 1,100 SB2C-3s, more than two thousand SB2C-4s, and over nine hundred SB2C-5s.3

Similarly, Grumman poured talent,

time, and money into its TBF/TBM Avenger, producing TBF-2s and TBF-3s with more

powerful engines and various modified Avengers for photo reconnaissance and radar

search and warning.4

In short, developing brand-new aircraft was more risky than upgrading existing models. The large amount of information that flowed into organizations like BuAer from

the fighting forces overwhelmed the procedures that had been used to collect, analyze,

integrate, and transmit information that designers needed to create new airplanes. As

Navy historian Lee M. Pearson pointed out in 1951, “so various were the sources [of

information] that it is impossible to trace the flow of information [into BuAer]. The

official reports of task forces and CinCPac [Commander in Chief, Pacific], the action

reports of the squadrons, special reports, and interviews with officers upon their return

from the war theaters were among the chief sources.”5

BuAer civilian engineers and

their aviator colleagues faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they did their best to assess

what was happening in combat and use their assessments to improve developing and

in-production aircraft. On the other hand, once they nailed down a set of required or

desired specifications, they “fixed” what historian Pearson rightly called “the direction

of development” for at least eighteen months—no matter what was happening in combat or promised to come out of laboratory research.6

An indicator of this problem is BuAer’s effort during the war to prompt industry to

develop large, very-long-range, single-seat attack aircraft. In 1943, the bureau asked

Curtiss, Kaiser-Fleetwing, and Martin to build the planned successors to the SB2C

Helldiver. The characteristics of the three prototypes are listed in table 2-1, along with

comparative characteristics for the in-production SB2C.7

CHARACTERISTICS

CURTISS

SB2C-1C

CURTISS

XBTC-2

KAISER-FLEETWING

XBTK-1 MARTIN XBTM-1

Design gross weight

in lbs.

14,720 17,910 12,728 19,000

Designed range

in miles

1,100 with

1,000-lb. bomb

1,200 with

torpedo

1,200 with

torpedo

1,200 with

torpedo

Prototype date 1940 1946 1945 1944

TABLE 2-1

Characteristics of Aircraft to Replace the SB2C

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multiseat SB2C Helldiver were larger and heavier than the original. The XBTK-1 

intended for use on escort carriers, and so its design reversed the trend toward la

single-seat carrier aircraft that could carry either bombs or torpedoes.8

BuAer’s 1943 requests to industry were a wartime improvisation.9BuAer, acting o

what civilian engineer George Spangenberg termed “invaluable” information fro

fleet—from combat—was trying to provide the operating forces with planes that 

range farther and faster and carry more ordnance.10 But the 1943 initiative was b

on assessment of 1942 operations—that is, on carrier operations that preceded th

deployment of the SB2C Helldiver as the mainstay of carrier dive-bomber squad

The peacetime cycle of design competitions, prototype testing, deployment, and 

ment of experience could not be followed during the war, and BuAer in 1943 was 

unenviable position of trying to develop a successor to a dive-bomber (the SB2C

Helldiver) that had not even been deployed. As Spangenberg recalled, “most of th

curement rules got suspended.”11

Very important were informal contacts between BuAer personnel and industry e

neers. These contacts were facilitated by the intelligence and technical experience 

people on both sides of the relationship. Both Spangenberg and Douglas designe

Edward Heinemann, for example, noted in their respective memoirs the creativit

Cdr. (later Capt.) Walter S. Diehl, who was the senior aerodynamicist in BuAer 

1941 and the author of a pioneering study entitled Engineering Aerodynamics.

12

Spangenberg also held Heinemann in high regard. As he said in his oral history,

“Heinemann’s real strength was a good understanding of the entire airplane. He 

superb job of trying to find out what the Navy needed and trying to give them w

they needed and he also had a superb engineering organization.”13 On his part,

Spangenberg aided Douglas by helping Heinemann’s assistant, Leo Devlin, learn 

Heinemann and his colleagues—acting as the Navy’s agents—could gain major b

from a comprehensive aircraft weight reduction and control program.14

Informal contacts and conversations between government and industry engineer

not, however, completely displace the formal processes of acquisition. BuAer eng

and Navy pilots fresh from operations kept control of the way that performance

requirements were drawn up, and the engineers working in industry had to desig

build to specifications and standards set by the BuAer staff. One exception to this 

the development by Boeing of the XF8B-1. As Spangenberg remembered, “The F

started with an unsolicited proposal from Boeing,” whose chief engineer, Wellwo

Beall, had decided that he and his colleagues could produce a better long-range f

design if they were free of the Navy’s normally mandatory specifications and stan

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words, “inferior as a naval carrier airplane.”15

A more recent study of this airplane’s history takes a different view—that the Navy

actually encouraged Boeing in the firm’s effort and that “Boeing generally made a good

faith effort to meet the requirements of a specification that was, in fact, unsound.”16

Our point is that this particular design was the product of an extemporized development process accepted by BuAer officials because the routine peacetime process was

inadequate for wartime needs. As Edward Heinemann notes in his memoir, he and his

counterparts in industry therefore worked under intense “pressures of competition,

reinforced by the demands of war and, in no little way, patriotic overzealousness.”17

BuAer aggressively pursued ever larger and heavier aircraft both before and during the

war. This trend also extended to fighters, as table 2-2 shows.18

The trend is clear: with the exception of the F8F-1 Bearcat, the fighters got heavier and

larger, and their range grew. The Grumman F7F Tigercat was a twin-engine airplane,

and the Boeing XF8B-1, though designed as a long-range fighter, was seen by BuAer as

a fighter-bomber. The F8F-1 Bearcat was a deck-launched interceptor, designed to get

into the air quickly and climb to high altitude before enemy attack aircraft could overwhelm a carrier’s limited defensive combat air patrol.

The growth in size and weight of Navy carrier aircraft is even more apparent when the

various Navy heavy fighters and bombers are compared with land-based Army bombers

deployed in combat in 1942. Table 2-3 compares the Army’s A-20A and B-25 bombers

with the larger Navy prototype and production carrier fighters and bombers.19

AIRCRAFT INITIAL CONTRACT GROSS WEIGHT (LBS.) RANGE (STATUTE MI.)

Grumman F4F Wildcat 1936 8,000 for the F4F-4 770

Grumman XF5F-1

Skyrocket

1938 10,000 for prototype 780

Vought XF5U-1

Flying Flapjack

1939 16,700 for nonflying

prototype

700

Vought F4U Corsair 1938 12,000 for F4U-1D 1,000

Grumman F6F Hellcat 1941 13,000 for F6F-5 945

Grumman F7F Tigercat 1941 25,700 1,200

Boeing XF8B-1 1943 20,500 2,780

Grumman F8F-1

Bearcat

1943 9,400 1,100

TABLE 2-2

BuAer’s Fighter Aircraft Characteristics, 1936–43

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Navy aircraft developed during the war became rough equivalents of the early-war 

models. They grew progressively larger and heavier and carried very impressive ord

loads. Indeed, they even began to outgrow the ability of the CV 9 (Essex)–class carr

launch and recover them safely and efficiently.

Events in 1942 suggested to BuAer’s leaders that even larger carrier aircraft were

required, and so the bureau officially asked Grumman to develop a twin-engine t

pedo bomber for use from carriers.20 This was the XTB2F-1, which only in 1944 w

assembled as an engineering mock-up so that Grumman and BuAer engineers co

get an accurate estimate of the plane’s weight and dimensions. If built, it would h

had a loaded weight of about forty-five thousand pounds and a range of approxi

mately three thousand miles (although sources differ on the XTB2F-1’s estim

range). Its wingspan would have been slightly greater than that of the B-25 (seve

four feet versus sixty-seven feet seven inches) and its length about the same (fifty

feet). With a height of just over twenty-one feet, it could not have fit into the han

deck of a carrier of the CV 9 class, and its estimated weight was too great for that 

rier’s flight deck, elevators, and arresting gear.21 But it could carry four two-thou

pound bombs or two torpedoes. That is, it had almost three times the range of 

25 Mitchell and over twice the ordnance load. Put another way, it was a carrier-

bomber with operational (versus tactical) range and firepower.

This emphasis on operational range and firepower can be traced to the Doolittle 

from carrier Hornet in April 1942, but later wartime experience reinforced the de

develop a long-range carrier strike aircraft that could tap the operational mobilit

the U.S. carrier forces developed in 1944 through the use of underway refueling a

AIRCRAFT

YEAR PROTOTYPE

COMPLETED

DESIGNED GROSS WEIGHT

(IN LBS.)

RANGE (IN MI.) 

ORDNANCE (IN 

A-20A Havoc 1939 19,750 525 with 2

B-25 Mitchell 1940 26,208 1,300 with 3

SB2C-1C Helldiver 1940 14,720 1,110 with 1

TBF-1 Avenger 1940 13,667 1,215 with 2

F7F Tigercat 1943 25,720 1,200 with 2

XBTC-2 1946 17,910 1,245 with 2

XBTM-1 1944 19,000 1,200 with 2

BTD-1 1945 18,140 1,480 with 2

XF8B-1 1944 20,700 1,070 with 2

Comparison of Navy Aircraft with Army 1942 Models

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the spring of 1945, for example, Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher noted that his carriers had

“operated daily in a 60 mile square area East of Okinawa, less than 350 miles from

Kyushu,” where they were vulnerable to both air and submarine attack.22 With longerrange aircraft, his carriers could have maneuvered both to avoid attack and also to surprise Japanese defenders with air attacks that came from ocean areas other than those

near Okinawa.

After the war, Mitscher added another argument in favor of large carriers with verylong-range attack aircraft. As he wrote to Adm. DeWitt Ramsey, “The only two times I

was really in trouble with the task force occurred in the first and second battles of the

Philippine Seas [sic], in which battles my forces were dispersed to such an extent that

we could not concentrate and it proved a considerable handicap in my future movements. I was impressed with the absolute necessity of quick concentration, particularly

when operating against so many shore bases.”23 This is an example of what today is

referred to as “operational art”—the combining of concepts such as maneuver and fire

power and their application through the theater-level use of forces. It was the vision of

carriers able to strike enemy targets from long range and then move quickly over great

distances to recover their long-range aircraft that had inspired U.S. naval aviators for a

long time. Only with the combination of modern carriers, long-range aircraft, and

underway replenishment was this vision realistic. Unfortunately, as Mitscher knew, the

really long-range aircraft were late in coming. The Doolittle Raid, instead of being a

harbinger of massed strikes by large, long-range carrier aircraft, remained just a hint of

what might be done.

The trend toward ever larger and heavier carrier aircraft was to some degree masked by

two developments. The first was the modification of existing designs in response to

wartime experience. In late 1944, for example, Grumman proposed to BuAer that the

firm modify the existing TBF Avenger into a single-seat attack aircraft, the XTB3F-1.

BuAer had originally suggested to Grumman that the large F7F Tigercat fighter be converted into a torpedo bomber. Grumman’s response was to emphasize the potential of

the proven Avenger. BuAer accepted that argument, and the XTB3F-1 became the AF

Guardian after World War II. The second—and very important—development was the

use of carrier fighters as bombers. The F4U-4 Corsair, for example, could carry a maximum of two 1,000-pound bombs, though it usually flew with no more than one. In

effect, the Corsair did double duty as both high-performance fighter and attack and

ground-support plane. It filled a role that, in 1942, BuAer had thought could be filled

only by new bomber designs.24

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the provision of new catapults for the fleet, light, and escort carriers by the Nava

craft Factory’s Ship Experimental Unit. The factory’s “engineering department h

responsibility for the design and manufacture” of catapults (including those for c

and battleships), but the Ship Experimental Unit actually tested and installed them

During the war, engineers at the Naval Aircraft Factory “continued to look for alter

tives to the hydraulic-pneumatic catapults [then in use], which were heavy and had 

plicated cable-and-sheave systems requiring careful adjustment and constant

maintenance.”26 Of the two primary but tentative alternatives to existing catapults, 

was driven by electricity and one was built around the concept of a “slotted cylinde

In December 1944, BuAer directed the catapult developers to begin work on a sm

slotted-cylinder catapult to launch target drones. This work was to pay major div

after the war, when “existing hydraulic catapults had reached the limits of their c

ity.”27 But the point to keep in mind is the reservoir of experience that engineer

the Naval Aircraft Factory and its experimental station built up during their year

work on aircraft catapults. A partial list of their efforts—covering only the flush-

catapults for aircraft carriers and the slotted-cylinder type used for launching tar

drones—is given in table 2-4.28

BuAer had also encouraged the Naval Aircraft Factory to develop large catapults

mounted on barges that could launch heavily loaded seaplanes. In 1942, for exam

the factory had produced the Type XH, Mark III, a hydro-pneumatic device that 

accelerate a sixty-thousand-pound aircraft to 120 mph over a 248-foot track.29 Bu

catapult weighed nine hundred thousand pounds—450 tons—and so the engine

the factory searched for a far less bulky aid to takeoffs. What they came up with w

JATO (jet-assisted takeoff), involving disposable chemical accelerators or rockets

attached to the airplanes. The success of the JATO units eliminated the need for a 

CATAPULT TYPE YEARS LENGTH (IN FT.)

CAPACITY

(LBS. PER MPH) WEIGHT 

Hydro-pneumatic,

Type H, Mark II

1936–37 55 7,000 at 70 50,0

Hydro-pneumatic,

Type H, Mark II,

Mod. I

1942–45 73 11,000 at 70 65,0

Hydro-pneumatic,

Type H, Mark IVB

1942–45 96.6 18,000 at 90 233,0

Slotted cylinder

XAT, Mark II

1945 33 300 at 70 5,8

TABLE 2-4

Catapults Developed by the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1936–45

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with early jet aircraft.

There is one additional consequence of wartime aircraft and related equipment development that we must mention: the effects on people responsible for doing the work. As

Lee Pearson pointed out in 1951, the orderly process of prewar design competitions,

prototype development, and prototype testing was drastically modified because of the

pressure to produce thousands of aircraft and because of the desire of the fleet and

BuAer to make best use of improved aircraft design and technology and the lessons

learned by combat pilots.30

These twin pressures often shaped the careers of relatively inexperienced young officers. Pearson cites the experiences of BuAer’s Lt. Cdr. Joseph N. Murphy, who had

started in BuAer’s Engineering Division as a lieutenant and was selected to head scoutbomber design at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. Pearson argues that

Murphy personally began the process of analysis that shifted BuAer from a focus on

slower, two-man, unescorted dive-bombers and torpedo planes to one on single-seat

escorted attack aircraft that could carry heavy bomb loads from the CV 9s.31 Pearson

points to a January 1942 conference of officers from BuAer’s Plans and Engineering

divisions as the point at which BuAer personnel reached a consensus about the future

of attack aircraft mission requirements. That consensus led to larger, heavier, singleseat attack aircraft that could launch torpedoes as well as drop bombs. Indirectly, the

January decision, endorsed by Rear Admiral Towers in February 1942, led to the postwar Douglas AD-1 Skyraider and the Martin AM-1 Mauler.

BuAer carried its prewar organization into the initial months of World War II. When

Lieutenant Commander Murphy was making his case for a fast, single-place attack

plane in late December 1941, the head of the Experiments and Developments Section

in BuAer’s Engineering Division was Cdr. Leslie C. Stevens. The head of the Engineering Division was Capt. J. E. Ostrander. Ostrander, Stevens, and Murphy had to coordinate their work on a new attack-aircraft concept with the Plans Division, the Operating

Requirements Branch of the Plans Division, and with their own Engineering Division

colleagues who were specialists in aircraft engines and aircraft structures.32 As Pearson

points out, this coordination took place through face-to-face conferences within BuAer.

But such conferences placed a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of rather young

officers and their civilian colleagues. The aforementioned Joseph N. Murphy, for example, was a lieutenant in April 1941, a lieutenant commander by February 1942, a full

commander by late November 1942, and a captain by war’s end. Such rapid promotion

was common in World War II, but it came despite a lack of participation in multiple

design competitions. The cycle of competitions—from prototype selection to tests of

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rience—was designed to deliver to the fleet tested and proven aircraft. The pace o

time decision making, with a series of conferences serving as an arena of negotia

among representatives of BuAer’s branches, forced compromises with the prewar 

tern of identifying requirements, soliciting potential solutions from industry, and 

carefully testing prototype aircraft. The documentation of the process of develop

new aircraft was often so ad hoc, hurried, and informal that even Pearson, the of

historian, had problems tracing the course of events. Perhaps it is amazing that t

process “worked” at all.

In his memoir, Edward Heinemann describes an incident that could probably sta

many of the hurried and contentious interactions between BuAer officials and th

industry counterparts during the war. In late 1943, Douglas wanted to capture th

tract to build the successor to the SBD Dauntless and the SB2C Helldiver. Dougla

engineers, led by Heinemann, developed what became the BTD Destroyer. But th

were two other competitors, Martin (with the XBTM) and Kaiser-Fleetwing (wit

XBTK). In June 1944, all three competitors sent their design teams to meet with 

BuAer officials, including the assistant bureau chief Rear Adm. Lawrence B. Rich

and William Z. Frisbie, George Spangenberg’s boss. When Heinemann’s team got 

chance, it argued that the Destroyer was best, but “as the hours droned on it seem

if we were going around in endless circles without resolving the issue.”

Heinemann therefore boldly decided to scrap the BTD Destroyer and ask Rear A

Richardson and his staff to accept something new. He asked for thirty days’ grace 

his team came up with a producible design; the admiral gave the Douglas team o

night. Heinemann first grabbed a phone and convinced Donald Douglas to go al

Then he and his team went to work. The next day they presented their design con

to the BuAer officials, and soon they were told they could take the funds slated 

further BTD development and apply them to their new design concept, the BT2D

which became the XBT2D-1, which in its turn became the very successful postwa

AD-1 Skyraider.33

Heinemann’s story deliberately portrays himself, his design team, and others at

Douglas in a positive—even heroic—light, and we are sure that at least some of h

competitors had similar experiences. But his description of the atmosphere of wa

competition, development, and decision making is revealing. BuAer’s traditional 

its founding in 1921) approach to development had been to foster both design an

production competition within the small but talented aircraft industry. BuAer ha

directed its private suppliers to develop their designs around specific engines. Bu

policy was to invest in engine development as a means of pulling aircraft design a

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mance, and more powerful engines gave designers an incentive to come up with larger

aircraft that could carry heavier loads over greater distances. Despite the near chaos

that resulted from BuAer’s efforts to meet the challenges of mass production, mass

training, and support for a massive naval air force, the basic approach to stimulating

industry turned out to be sound for the purposes of World War II.

But the war also led to a new engine concept—the jet engine—and harnessing it for

Navy carrier operations proved to be a major challenge for the officers and civilians in

BuAer who had “won their spurs” by directing wartime quantity production of mostly

proven engine and airframe technologies. In doing that, BuAer personnel had developed a mental “tool kit” different from that needed to foster radically new technologies

and operational concepts. They had successfully adapted their organization and its pro

cedures to wartime demands and therefore saw no need later to create a new organization or new processes and relationships to mature the many innovations produced by

scientists and engineers during the war years.

Notes

1. Naval Aviation History Office, “Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin,” no. 8-44, p. 46.

2. Lee M. Pearson, “Development of the Attack

Concept,” “Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin,” no. 2-51 (August 1951), p. 8.

3. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers,

United States Navy Aircraft since 1911 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p.

151. As Swanborough and Bowers note, two

factories in Canada produced almost 1,200

additional Helldivers for U.S. Navy and U.S.

Marine Corps use.

4. Ibid., p. 214. The Eastern Aircraft subsidiary

of General Motors produced over seven

thousand Avengers in one configuration or

another. Total production of this aircraft was

almost ten thousand units.

5. Pearson, “Development of the Attack Concept,” p. 12.

6. Ibid.

7. Aircraft data are from Ray Wagner, American

Combat Planes, 3rd ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1982), pp. 366–67.

8. Pearson, “Development of the Attack Concept,” p. 14.

9. George A. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” 31

August 1997, George Spangenberg Oral History, 2010, www.georgespangenberg.com,

p. 42.

10. Ibid., p. 48.

11. Ibid., p. 50.

12. Ibid., p. 54; Edward H. Heinemann and

Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 44.

13. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” p. 61.

14. Ibid., p. 65.

15. Ibid., pp. 85–86.

16. Jared A. Zichek, The Boeing XF8B-1 Fighter:

Last of the Line (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2007),

p. 44.

17. Heinemann and Rausa, Ed Heinemann,

Combat Aircraft Designer, p. 97.

18. Fighter data from Lloyd S. Jones, U.S. Naval

Fighters (Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero, 1977), and

Zichek, Boeing XF8B-1 Fighter.

19. Aircraft data are from Wagner, American

Combat Planes; Swanborough and Bowers,

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Zichek, Boeing XF8B-1 Fighter.

20. Pearson, “Development of the Attack Concept,” p. 6.

21. Ibid., p. 15. However, Pearson also notes that

a carrier could launch so few of these large

planes that, even given their impressive ordnance loads (the XTB2F-1 was designed to

carry two two-thousand-pound torpedoes),

it still made sense for a carrier to use smaller

dive- and torpedo bombers.

22. Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent Mitscher

(New York: W. W. Norton, 1954), p. 299.

23. Ibid., p. 328.

24. Pearson, “Development of the Attack Concept,” p. 11.

25. William F. Trimble, Wings for the Navy: A

History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917–

1956 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1990), p. 288.

27. Ibid., p. 318.

28. Ibid., p. 338, app. 2.

29. Ibid.

30. Historical Section, DCNO (Air), “Av

Procurement, 1939–1945, Part I,” Un

States Naval Administration in World 

vol. 18, First Draft Narrative, 1946, in 

Naval Aviation History Office, Wash

Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

31. Pearson, “Development of the Attack 

cept,” pp. 4–5.

32. “BuAer Telephone Directory & Corre

dence Designations, 24 Feb. 1942,” in 

254, “Aviation Command 1941–52,” 

Aviation History Office, Washington 

Yard, Washington, D.C.

33. Heinemann and Rausa, Ed Heineman

Combat Aircraft Designer, pp. 104–10

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The Potential of the Big Bomber

The previous chapter focused on BuAer’s wartime efforts to work with industry 

develop and field larger and heavier attack aircraft. This chapter will continue th

story, but with a focus on Navy efforts to deliver significant amounts of ordnanc

enemy targets at ranges not thought possible in 1939. The date to begin with is 1

1942, when USS Hornet launched sixteen Army B-25 medium bombers that attac

Tokyo. The spectacular Doolittle Raid raised U.S. morale at a particularly bleak t

the war. It also inspired the naval officers who watched the bombers take off. 

carrier’s commanding officer, Capt. Marc Mitscher, and Cdr. Apollo Soucek, Hor

air officer, saw the potential for carriers to strike land targets from great distance

achieving surprise and avoiding enemy counterattack. The ability of Hornet to 

the B-25s also caught the attention of the Pacific Fleet commander (or CINCPAC

Adm. Chester Nimitz.1

This combination of a carrier and large, long-range bombers posed a major thre

land targets. Early in World War II carriers were perceived as powerful but vulne

The flight decks of U.S. carriers were not armored—could not be effectively armo

given the tonnage restrictions that had been imposed on their designs by treaty—

in early 1942 fighters could still not be directed efficiently enough by their own c

to protect them from air attack. The vulnerability of carriers, plus the limited ran

and bomb loads of existing attack aircraft, kept carriers from posing the same th

land targets as heavy land-based bombers like the B-17. By using B-25s, however, 

net showed that a limitation on carriers as a threat to land targets could be overc

increasing the size of attack aircraft.

Hornet’s raid also showed the value of operational surprise—that is, strikes from 

long range. Such strikes, mounted from outside the enemy’s warning network (th

before the days of effective wide-area radar surveillance), were far more effective 

those launched from close offshore. This operational surprise would enhance the 

ity of the few attack aircraft a single carrier could launch. As we pointed out in th

CHAPTER THREE

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to develop the twin-engine XTB2F-1. Before even a mock-up of that plane could be

constructed, however, U.S. carriers had developed techniques, through trial and error,

for attacking Japanese land targets in the islands of the South Pacific. Did this mean

that the future of “heavy attack” from carriers would not require new planes like the

XTB2F-1, just improved versions of such existing models of aircraft as the SB2C

Helldiver or the TBF Avenger?

Pilots and engineers could rely only on experience as a guide. For example, in 1942

Captain Mitscher was almost certainly aware of the role of strategic bombing as it was

understood by U.S. war planners of the time. At least since 1929 Navy and Army planners had wrestled with the question of how to end a war against Japan. The Navy could

offer blockade, which should be effective against an island country wholly dependent

on imports for almost all raw materials. However, there was always the possibility that

the Japanese would try to hold out, gambling that the United States would lack the

patience to enforce a lengthy siege.2

Invasion was never taken seriously, because the

Navy’s planners doubted that the United States could or would raise an army sufficiently large to overrun Japan. However, they thought that Japanese cities, which were

largely made of wood and paper, would burn easily and hence would make good targets. In fact, the United States had tried late in 1941 to build up a strategic bomber

force in the Philippines specifically as a deterrent against Japan (there are reports of an

attempt to leak an exaggerated version of the bomber force’s strength on the eve of

Pearl Harbor, specifically to head off any Japanese attack on the Philippines). Typically

war plans envisaged an endgame in which Army bombers would be transported to

captured islands near Japan from which they could conduct an air offensive.

Watching the B-25s take off from Hornet, Mitscher probably realized that the carrier

offered an alternative to land-based bombers. By the time of the raid, BuAer was

actively working to provide a shipboard bomber (initially the Douglas XTB2D-1, then

the Grumman XTB2F-1) with an ordnance load at least equivalent to one of Doolittle’s

B-25s. We cannot locate records of BuAer involvement in the planning of the Doolittle

Raid, but BuAer officers would have been involved in certifying that the B-25s could

indeed take off from a carrier. A few days before the raid, as we noted in the previous

chapter, Grumman was asked informally to design a twin-engine carrier bomber, later

designated TB2F. Its design specifications suggest that it was far more a “level bomber”

(that is, intended to drop ordnance in level flight) than a torpedo plane; it was about

the size of a B-25. The bomber would have been too large to stow below decks, and it

seems to have been conceived for “special operations.” It was also too delicate to

catapult.

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stage and committing the government to spend substantial sums. It decided to do 

because the Japanese had in the meantime developed radar, thereby denying any 

aircraft the chance to achieve complete surprise. Bombers would need fighter esc

penetrate alerted enemy air defenses, but the available carrier fighters lacked the 

sary range. One of the BuAer officers at the mock-up conference for the XTB2F-

objected that the airplane would still be useful for special missions, but he was

apparently overruled.

That was not the end of this particular effort to put larger bombers on carriers. A

beginning of March 1944, BuAer proposed converting a PBJ-1, which was the Na

version of North American’s B-25 Mitchell twin-engine bomber, for carrier land

and takeoffs.3

By the end of April, North American was converting a PBJ-1H (Bu

Number 35277) for arrested landings and catapult takeoffs. Once suitably modif

plane was to be delivered to the Naval Air Material Center and tested on land to d

mine its minimum carrier-landing approach speed, how late in its approach it co

safely be given a “wave off,” and how pilots should engage a carrier’s arresting ge

30 October 1944, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that a PBJ-1B and an 

Tigercat be tested aboard the carrier Shangri-La (CV 38) in November, and on 10

November Rear Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, BuAer’s chief, directed the captain of

Shangri-La to devote a day to completing at least five catapult launchings and arr

landings of the modified PBJ-1H. As Ramsey noted, “Tests of the subject airplan

should be conducted without other airplanes on the flight deck and possibly with 

riers down because of expected unsuitability of the barriers installed for stoppin

engine tricycle [i.e., with nose wheel and two main wheels] planes.”5

Also tested in this way was an Army-type P-51 Mustang fighter. According to the 

dential report of the trials, the B-25 was used to test the carrier-landing qualities 

tricycle aircraft like the F7F Tigercat fighter, then being pushed toward productio

P-51 was tested because it was a modern fighter with a liquid-cooled engine, hen

sumably different from the air-cooled types the Navy then used. Neither explana

entirely credible. The Navy already had a prototype F7F for carrier trials (indeed

trials in the same series as the B-25 and the P-51), and it was unlikely that the B-

very similar landing characteristics. The P-51 was then being considered for use a

naval fighter, but it was soon dropped in favor of a jet that its manufacturer, Nor

American, was then developing.

At the time, however, the P-51 was the best U.S. escort fighter and hence the pote

answer to the problem that had, at least in theory, killed the big Grumman bomb

difficult not to imagine that at some point in 1944 the use of carrier-based B-25s

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before the Shangri-La tests, and it had presumably been developed at a higher level of

classification. Its significance for this account is that it suggests continuing U.S. naval

interest in long-range carrier attack.

As we argued in the previous chapter, the crosscutting pressures generated by changing

operational requirements, advances in research and development, and the need for

large numbers of aircraft for combat and training disrupted the BuAer three-year

aircraft-development cycle. Heinemann’s memoir illustrates this point. In 1943, Capt.

Leslie C. Stevens, who had been head of the Experiments and Developments Section of

BuAer’s Engineering Division before being promoted and sent to the Pacific, returned

from the war theater, called Heinemann, and arranged a meeting in San Diego between

Navy and Douglas personnel to discuss the need for a new torpedo bomber.6

The concept they developed was the large (eighteen thousand pounds empty, wingspan seventy

feet, length forty-six feet) Skypirate, which was tested in 1945. Stevens was, according

to Heinemann, “covering all bets, because the forecast need for a new torpedo bomber

was indeed genuine when he talked with us in San Diego.”7

However, as we have already pointed out, in June 1944 Heinemann decided to abandon

the conventional separation of attack aircraft into torpedo planes and dive-bombers

and to develop a plane that would carry its ordnance externally, have one pilot and no

gunners, and carry a heavy bomb or torpedo load. BuAer’s senior officers and civilians,

including Captain Stevens, agreed with this approach. BuAer approved Douglas Aircraft’s mock-up of the new aircraft (the BT2D) at the end of the summer of 1944. In

the meantime, in an effort to improve the responsiveness of industry designers, BuAer

had offered to send “representatives to the Pacific combat area in order to gain firsthand knowledge of flight operations,” and Heinemann was the first to go.8

Heinemann spent about two weeks watching carrier operations, interviewing pilots

and senior officers, and capturing his observations in a diary. Some of his particular

observations affected the detailed design of the BT2D, but what mattered more was

that experienced attack pilots agreed that carriers needed just two types of aircraft, “th

best possible fighter without compromising it with bomb loads, and a dive bomber

that [had] secondary capabilities of dropping torpedoes and working as a scout.”9

Heinemann also gleaned insights from Rear Adm. Arthur W. Radford and Capt. Frederick M. Trapnell. The latter had been a test pilot at Naval Air Station Anacostia in 194

and the first Navy pilot to test the experimental XP-59A Bell Airacomet—the first U.S.-

made military jet plane.10 Heinemann also interviewed the Royal Navy’s observer on

Ticonderoga, Cdr. F. H. E. Hopkins.11

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were inspired by his interviews with Navy pilots, including eliminating the nose w

dramatically reducing the empty weight of the plane (to enable it to carry more o

nance), changing the design of the wings (to improve low-speed landing perform

and designing a cockpit that could withstand “forty-G crash-landing impacts.”12

Heinemann and his design engineers sometimes disagreed with the specification

BuAer’s design personnel wanted them to meet, but Heinemann’s contact with m

bers of BuAer and officers flying in the fleet gave him an almost unique ability to

put it, “get on the phone to the proper official and solicit action.”13 Heinemann a

in his memoir that it was the hard work of Douglas’s engineers, coupled with the 

back-and-forth negotiations between them and their counterparts in BuAer, that

allowed Douglas to take the BT2D design from paper to first test flight in just nin

months.14 George Spangenberg in BuAer had a slightly different view—that the p

sure of competition had taught designers like Heinemann the importance of disc

like weight control.15

To read Heinemann’s memoir, one would think that BuAer was focused almost e

sively on manned-aircraft design and production. However, that was not the case

1936, Lt. Cdr. Delmar S. Fahrney of BuAer began development at the Naval Aircr

Factory in Philadelphia of a radio-controlled pilotless aircraft for use as a target 

antiaircraft exercises.16 The success of that work gave Fahrney’s vision of a force o

remote-controlled “drones” (as he had named them) credibility, and the growing 

ability of television equipment suggested that drones might be used to attack tar

while the planes controlling them cruised beyond the range of antiaircraft guns. 

cessful tests in April 1942 led Fahrney’s BuAer superiors to authorize the produc

two hundred drones, but the low speed (150 mph) of the first units “made for re

enthusiasm; the drone did not appear to many aviators to be a serious combat w

capable of overcoming enemy defenses.”17 Though drones attacked Japanese targe

July and then in September 1944, the drone squadrons that had been formed at t

of 1943 were disbanded.

But drones weren’t the only new weapons developed by BuAer during the war. In 

Fahrney, by now a captain, suggested that a carrier fighter such as the F6F Hellca

tow an armed glider that it could direct—using radio—against stationary targets

Development work at the Naval Aircraft Factory began in 1941. The idea seemed 

have merit. A three-thousand-pound glider could carry four thousand pounds o

explosive, dramatically augmenting a carrier’s strike capacity. As in the case of th

drones, however, the glider bomb (christened GLOMB) was judged too vulnerab

antiaircraft fire, and the program was canceled in 1945.18

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inspired by the success of German guided missiles” used against Allied warships in the

Mediterranean in 1943.19 Four hundred were ordered in 1944. It seemed to offer a dramatic improvement in capability: “Gargoyle cost only $8900, and it required only a 35

lb. radio aboard its [launching] airplane; its wing span was only 8 ft. 6 in. It could penetrate any existing armored deck, and was considered immune to antiaircraft fire in

view of its high diving speed.”20 Unfortunately for its developers, it was not launched

successfully until July 1946, and production was canceled a year later.

The Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance also entered the guided-weapons field in World War II

In 1940, the newly established National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) began

collaborating with BuOrd on the development of reliable, powerful rocket motors that

could accelerate bombs to speeds that would allow warheads to penetrate thick concrete structures.21 That same year, the NDRC funded projects that explored missilecontrol techniques and the potential of television guidance for powered missiles and

gliders.22 Out of this research came Bat, an active-radar-homing glider launched by

patrol planes against moving targets, and Pelican, an antisubmarine glider guided from

the aircraft that carried and launched it. Bat was “the only US Navy air-to-surface missile to enter combat, although Pelican . . . came close.”23 BuOrd also worked on missiles

to carry torpedoes, missiles to attack submarines, and Dove, a bomb guided to its targe

by an infrared seeker.24

The BuAer and BuOrd guided-weapons programs were significant. As the Secretary of

the Navy pointed out in his annual report for fiscal year 1946, “At the beginning of the

fiscal year on 1 July 1945, the Bureau of Aeronautics was supervising contracts providing for over 61,000 combat and tactical airplanes and more than 14,000 ‘drones’ and

‘glombs,’ known as ‘missiles’ and ‘pilotless aircraft.’”25 That is, fully 18.6 percent of all

the Navy’s combat “flying machines” on order were unmanned. Crash programs of

research and development—programs made possible only by wartime spending—had

produced the beginnings of a guided-weapons revolution, but it would take decades fo

that revolution to mature.

In the meantime, wartime production of carriers, pilots, and carrier aircraft had generated a powerful naval air force. In October 1944, Navy strategic planners had produced

a draft plan, HOTFOOT, for a carrier-based strategic bombing offensive against Japan.

By this time there were so many fleet carriers that even their relatively small bombers

(Avengers and Helldivers) offered substantial net firepower. Navy planners argued that

once the endgame had been reached, the carriers should be used for direct attacks,

because there would no longer be many amphibious operations to support and because

the Japanese fleet would probably be immobilized by the increasingly effective

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effect testing the HOTFOOT concept. Although accounts of this raid suggest that i

less than successful, HOTFOOT survived (as HOTFOOT III), the final version estim

that carriers could deliver about half the weight of bombs that Twentieth Air For

29s were delivering. To make HOTFOOT more effective, the planners suggested re

the trend, adopted to deal with kamikazes, of increasing carrier fighter strength a

expense of attack aircraft.

By the spring of 1945 the end of the Pacific War was in sight, and that April the N

convened a high-level committee to discuss the character of the next aircraft carr

By this time planners had some hard estimates of the performance of various gu

weapons; these weapons could greatly increase the effectiveness of the limited nu

of aircraft a carrier could launch. In the Atlantic, the Germans were deploying ne

boats that could probably overcome existing kinds of defenses. The sole counter 

such craft might well be attacks at the source, either by mining approach routes t

open sea or by destroying boats in their pens. The latter was difficult, because the 

were heavily protected by concrete. However, the British had demonstrated very 

bombs capable of accelerating to supersonic speeds and penetrating such havens

Army was developing bomb-guidance systems to steer such weapons right onto t

roofs. In a future war, it could hardly be guaranteed that land-based heavy bomb

would be in position to make such attacks—or, for that matter, that they would n

so busy with other tasks that they could not be used that way. Carriers striking at 

targets might be a vital mode of fighting the next naval war.

Although the new carrier committee did not report formally until January 1946, 

early fall of 1945 BuAer was arguing that the lessons of the European war include

clear requirement for a deep-strike, carrier-based bomber capable of delivering 

to twelve thousand pounds of bombs. The reference to Europe suggests a connec

with the U-boat problem (we can find no copy of a relevant study of the Europea

war). Of course, by the fall of 1945 it was also clear that only a large aircraft coul

deliver a nuclear bomb, and the Navy was rejecting the Air Force’s attempt to sec

nuclear monopoly.

However, it appears that the BuAer proposal was not primarily for nuclear delive

That made sense at the time. It seemed that there would never be many nuclear b

and that World War III, if it came, would be fought largely with conventional we

The post-1945 U.S. Navy was struggling with the question of how to use sea pow

against a land empire—the probable new enemy, the Soviet Union. The most obv

use of sea power would be to maintain sea lines of communication with forces in

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new generation of submarines.

This conclusion, that the future lay with a large carrier bomber, was by no means

accepted widely. On 30 August 1945, Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, the Navy’s commander

in chief, had convened a series of Pacific Fleet panels to lay out the war’s lessons in such

areas as ship and aircraft characteristics, ordnance, radar, and radio (plus sonar). The

report on ship and aircraft characteristics, submitted in October, made no mention of 

heavy carrier bomber. It was concerned with amalgamating the dive- and torpedobomber types, preferably into a new single-seat bomber. This was a call for a medium

attack bomber like the new BT2D-1 (later the AD-1) Douglas Skyraider. CINCPAC was

skeptical of the practicability of this proposal, due to failed attempts to develop a multipurpose carrier bomber over the previous twenty-five years. There was even some

hope that all carrier aircraft functions might be amalgamated into a single airplane,

such as the new Grumman F7F twin-engine fighter. Noticeably lacking in the report

was interest in jet aircraft.

This report, which might be read as a rather direct extrapolation of the aircraft that

had won the carrier war in the Pacific, contrasted dramatically with the accompanying

report on submarines, which pointed toward the postwar submarine revolution. The

surviving texts of submarine officers’ responses to a questionnaire for inclusion in the

Pacific Fleet report show considerable knowledge of what was happening in Europe, as

German submarine technology was revealed. The aircraft questionnaires seem not to

have survived, but in any case the aircraft discussion shows little or no concern with

recent European developments or, indeed, with the possibility of delivering atomic

bombs from carriers (a very important theme a year later). It suggests that Vice Adm.

Alfred E. Montgomery, commander of Navy air forces in the Pacific at the end of World

War II, was right when he noted with some concern that the lessons learned in the

great carrier battles against Japan were most likely “only applicable to this war, will

soon be obsolete and if absorbed will focus the naval mind to a point [2 September

1945] which will soon be in the past and therefore misleading.”27

Notes

1. Captain Mitscher noted in his report to Admiral Nimitz that “the take-off could be

made easily when properly executed” and

that it took fifty-nine minutes to launch all

sixteen B-25s. Commanding Officer, USS

Hornet, memorandum to Commander in

Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, subject “Report of

Action, April 18, 1942, with notable events

prior and subsequent thereto”; Action Report, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (ser

01338, 4 May 1942), microfilm 385, part 1,

reel 2, “U.S. Navy Action & Operational Reports from World War II, Pacific Theater,”

part 1, Naval War College Library, Newport

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from Admiral Nimitz to Admiral King in

Washington in which the former notes that

Hornet carried its own seventy-two aircraft

in addition to the sixteen B-25s.

2. An interesting discussion of this is James B.

Wood, Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable? (New York:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

3. BuAer, memorandum to Bureau of Aeronautics Representative, El Segundo, subject

“Model PBJ-1H airplane—conversion for arrested landings and catapulting,” Aer-F-342-

JST, file VPBJ-1/F13-5, C-09661 (14 April

1944), in PBJ-1 (North American) Mitchell F

41 file.

4. BuAer, memorandum to CO NAMC, subject

“Arrested landing and Catapult tests of converted Model PBJ-1H airplane BuNo. 35277,”

Aer-F-342-JST, file VPBJ-1/F13-5, C-10529

(22 April 1944), in PBJ-1 (North American)

Mitchell F 41 file.

5. BuAer, memorandum to CO USS ShangriLa, subject “Brief Carrier operation tests of

Model F7F-1 and PBJ-1B airplanes,” Aer-F342-JST, file VPBJ-1/F13-5, C-30771 (10 November 1944), in PBJ-1 (North American)

Mitchell F 41 file.

6. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa,

Ed Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1980), p. 108. See also “BuAer Telephone Directory & Correspondence Designations, 24

Feb. 1942,” in box 254, “Aviation Command

1941–52,” Naval Aviation History Office,

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

The phone books show both personnel and

organizational changes.

7. Heinemann and Rausa, Ed Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer, p. 109.

8. Ibid., p. 110.

10. Ibid., pp. 115, 117. See also Navy Dir

1 April 1941, for then–lieutenant

commander Trapnell’s duty station.

11. Heinemann and Rausa, Ed Heineman

Combat Aircraft Designer, p. 118.

12. Ibid., p. 129.

13. Ibid., p. 131.

14. Ibid., p. 132.

15. George A. Spangenberg, “Oral Histo

August 1997, George Spangenberg Or

tory, 2010, www.georgespangenberg.

p. 59.

16. Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Weap

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1982), p. 215.

17. Ibid., p. 216.

18. Ibid., p. 201.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 202.

21. Buford Rowland and William Boyd, 

Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World W

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy Dept., 

of Ordnance, 1953), p. 294.

22. Ibid., p. 341.

23. Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons, p. 20

24. Ibid., pp. 202–203.

25. U.S. Navy Dept., Annual Report of the 

tary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 19

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Governmen

ing Office, 1947), p. 15.

26. Theodore Taylor, The Magnificent M

(New York: W. W. Norton, 1954), p. 

27. Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1992), p. 383.

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Royal Navy Wartime Experience and Analys

Until at least 1936, the Royal Navy did not try to interest the British Air Ministry 

development of high-performance fighters for its aircraft carriers, because the RN

officers did not think that an effective combat air patrol could be mounted aroun

carrier. By the time approaching bombers could be sighted and identified, it wou

too late. Consequently, the RN carriers that followed Ark Royal, which was laid d

1935, had armored flight decks so that they could absorb punishment and still op

attack aircraft. The advent of shipboard air-search radar in the first year of World 

II, however, changed the situation, and the RN procured Royal Air Force (RAF) a

U.S. Navy fighters and experimented with the central control of fighter defenses.

The RN also did not expect before World War II to have to operate its carriers aga

waves of high-performance land-based bombers—as it would be forced to do fir

Norway in 1940 and then, in 1941, in the Mediterranean. The RN’s decision to co

struct carriers with armored flight decks restricted the number of aircraft such c

could operate, so it chose to emphasize strike aircraft over fighters. The RN proje

the logic of its own decisions about carrier-based strike aircraft upon the Imperi

Japanese Navy (IJN). Accordingly, it was surprised by the IJN’s very effective carrie

based attacks in the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal in the spring of 1942.

The leaders of the RN responded to the challenges to the Fleet Air Arm posed by 

tions against the Germans in the Mediterranean and the Japanese in the Indian O

by creating the Future Building Committee (FBC), chaired by the Deputy First S

Lord, in July 1942. The FBC was “the only organization within the Admiralty cha

with the overall review of British naval requirements,” and its deliberations supp

those of the Joint (i.e., Royal Air Force/Royal Navy) Technical Committee.1

At th

of 1942, the Joint Technical Committee had accepted the idea that future strike a

would be significantly heavier, and it recommended that all future carrier aircraf

therefore be designed to use rocket-assisted takeoff equipment. The committee a

approved an increased carrier-landing speed for all aircraft.2

In February 1943, th

CHAPTER FOUR

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their land counterparts,” which implied significant increases in the size and weight of

carrier fighters.3

In March 1943, the Aircraft Design Subcommittee of the FBC was spli

off to become a distinct organization—the Naval Aircraft Design Committee. This

committee was an “early proponent of the catapult as the primary means of launching

aircraft” from carriers.4

Also in 1943, the RN’s famous test pilot Eric Brown successfully landed a combatloaded, twin-engine Sea Mosquito fighter on a carrier, and the Future Building

Committee recommended that the Mosquito design be modified to create a longrange carrier fighter equipped with radar.5

The resulting aircraft, christened Sea Hornet, first flew in April 1945.6

In September 1944 the First Sea Lord, Adm. Andrew B.

Cunningham, asked the chief of the RAF’s Air Staff to provide the RN with Mosquitoes

modified for use on carriers. Admiral Cunningham was thinking in early 1945 about

long-range attacks from RN carriers against Japanese bases like Singapore.7

The

Admiralty asked for two hundred Sea Mosquitoes “for delivery in 1945 and 250 to

follow in 1946.”8

That same month (September 1944), the Naval Aircraft Design Committee recommended to the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) that it develop a jet interceptor

for use from carriers. The members of the committee were aware that “such a fighter

would demand catapult-only launching and that no other aircraft could be within

thirty feet of it when its engine opened up to full power,” but they felt that the better

air-to-air performance of the jet would more than compensate for the problems

created by operating it from existing and planned carriers.9

By late 1944, the MAP had

stopped work on new piston-engine designs and was focused on jet turbines and

turboprops.10 In December 1944, the Naval Aircraft Design Committee “proposed that

future naval aircraft be designed without undercarriages, to land on soft (flexible)

decks,” and in February 1945 the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough

“concluded that any future high-performance naval fighter would have to be a pure jet,

and that requirements for takeoff, military load, and landing speed would have to be

modified.”11

Things were moving fast. By 7 June 1945, the Naval Aircraft Department of the RAE

had developed a “Proposed Programme of Experimental Work” for determining

whether a carrier could operate jets without undercarriages. The “target for flying trial

under seagoing conditions” was May 1946.12 This project was sent forward to the MAP

with an endorsement by the director of the RAE two days later.13 On 4 July, engineer

Lewis Boddington, who headed the Naval Aircraft Department at RAE, completed a

paper entitled “Assisted Take-off for Future Naval Aircraft,” which he presented on

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mittee. He put his main point right up front: “The large increase in take-off spee

which will result from the developments in the aircraft and its power plant, and t

resulting necessity to remove the present free-deck take-off restrictions will dem

assisted take-off under all conditions.”14

Boddington’s paper laid out many of the engineering problems entailed by operat

jets from carriers, especially the need for catapult launchings that would not be s

lent as to damage an aircraft’s structure and the need safely to recover planes land

with their engines running. He argued, first, that “future aircraft will have no un

riage and will land on flexible decks,” and, second, that “the solution of the probl

giving the best handling and deck operating conditions will be a landing deck im

ately under which will be the take-off deck. Ranged aircraft for take-off will not

obstruct any landing operations.”15 By 12 July, the deputy director of RAE’s Panel 

Flexible Landing Decks had reviewed the feasibility of an approach technique for 

rier with an (as yet only conceptual) flexible deck and had decided to recommen

of actual landings using jet aircraft. (See chapter 7 for the “flexible deck” idea.)

On 18 September 1945, Boddington presented a second paper for the Naval Airc

Research Subcommittee, “Landing of Future Naval Aircraft.” As he observed, “Th

object of this note is to briefly present the problems of landing on a carrier deck 

future and discuss the effects on the equipment and carrier design.” His argumen

that the development of jet aircraft “will result in a new approach technique end

flight parallel to the deck and engaging the mechanical arresting gear under ‘flyin

conditions.”16 His paper provided the conceptual justification for the angled fligh

As he noted, “To cover for the baulked landing, the jet engine will be running at 

full revs. . . . Non-engagement of the wire will allow the pilot to take-off [sic] aga

depending on the deck arrangements (barriers, parks, etc.) and the carrier design

allow a plane that had missed the arresting gear to get back in the air safely, the fl

deck that Boddington advocated would have to be located away from the deck pa

solution—already proposed—was to have “separate landing and take-off decks.”

Boddington also understood that jet aircraft would require more powerful catap

In Britain, catapult development was shared between the Royal Aircraft Establish

at Farnborough and the Engineer-in-Chief Department of the Royal Navy. Abou

Farnborough began experimenting with a new kind of catapult (Type K) using a 

wheel to store energy.20 In 1946, the catapult engineers supervised by Boddington 

explored the potential of gas turbines as power sources for carrier catapults.21

As the Allied armies had surged across northern France in the fall of 1944, they h

encountered the fixed sites built by the Germans to launch V-1 missiles against

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about 150 mph. Thus the catapults built by the Germans were not too different from

what a streamlined jet, with a similar takeoff speed, might require. Unlike the explosivedriven catapults then in use in the U.S. Navy for launching scout planes from cruisers

and battleships, the German catapult applied its force directly to the airplane. It was a

tube with a slot running along its upper side. A reaction in the tube pushed a piston

along it, and the piston was hooked through the slot to the airplane. In the German

case, the reaction was the decomposition of concentrated (“high-test”) hydrogen peroxide, which the British called HTP. This was one of several German applications of

HTP, others being as an oxidant in the Me-163 rocket fighter and as an oxidant in the

Walter closed-cycle U-boat. In each case, HTP showed lethal properties that more or

less disqualified it if any alternative could be found.

The British report on the V-1 catapult was written by C. C. Mitchell, at that time a

Royal Navy reservist but in peacetime a catapult designer in an Edinburgh engineering

firm that produced what the RN referred to as “accelerators” for use on carriers. He

had patented a slotted-tube catapult, which he called a “popgun” catapult, in 1938, but

the RN had not adopted it. After the war, while working for Brown Brothers (also in

Edinburgh), he realized that steam from a ship’s propulsion plant could substitute for

the dangerous HTP. He formally proposed such a catapult (it is not clear exactly when)

when trials of the Type K showed that the weight of existing hydro-pneumatic catapults was growing faster than their capacity to launch aircraft at high speeds. After

1947 the British formally chose the slotted-tube steam catapult as the sole direction for

future development. By 1950, the prototype, christened BXS.1, was ready for testing on

HMS Perseus, a war-built light carrier now used for experiments.22

The Royal Navy used low-temperature, low-pressure steam on all of its existing carriers, as well as those under construction. Low steam pressure made it easier to build a

gasket that would hold the steam inside a slotted-cylinder catapult as the steam drove

the piston—attached to the airplane—forward. However, low steam temperature and

pressure made for poor efficiency in ship propulsion. The U.S. Navy used much higher

steam temperature and pressure in its carriers’ boilers, which made them more efficien

thermodynamically and therefore increased the carriers’ endurance—a valuable capability in the Pacific War against Japan. Wartime contact with the U.S. Navy convinced

the British to develop a new generation of high-pressure steam plants for their late-war

and postwar fleets.

Because Mitchell’s catapult was adapted to the conditions of earlier British ships, it was

by no means obvious that steam was the appropriate choice if new British carriers

using higher steam pressures were built. Similarly, American observers of British

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British steam systems would succeed on board an American carrier. Wartime U.S

boilers operated at about three times the temperature and twice the pressure of B

plants, and by 1950 the U.S. Navy was contemplating doubling the pressure used 

ing wartime, to 1,200 pounds per square inch.

British wartime analysis produced the conceptual foundation for the modern air

carrier operating high-performance jet aircraft. Because jets accelerated slowly, je

craft would need assistance at takeoff. Because jets landed at higher speeds and n

to do so with their turbines turning over at close to maximum revolutions per m

the axial deck—with the deck park forward, shielded by a barrier—had to be mo

In effect, the Royal Navy had defined the “problem set” by the end of the summe

1945. From that point forward, attention focused on possible solutions.

The choice of the steam catapult coincided with the beginning of design work on 

rier modernization. As originally envisaged, modernization would have combine

steam catapult, new heavier-duty arresting gear, and a U.S.-style deck-edge eleva

latter to provide an easier flow of aircraft between hangar deck and flight deck. F

British, the new elevator—the one major American-inspired element of modern

tion—was by far the most expensive part of the project. It was incompatible with 

enclosed, protected hangars that had formed the cores of the existing British flee

ers. To install the U.S.-style elevator the British had to remove the carrier’s flight 

and tear open its hangar deck. That they were willing to do so suggests the extent 

which they considered the U.S. wartime experience, rather than their own, the ke

the future.

In effect, the Royal Navy ended World War II with a policy of developing jet aircr

replace propeller-driven types; experimenting with the flexible and angled flexib

deck; and placing steam catapults in its new and modernized aircraft carriers. A l

funds limited the speed with which these innovations could be developed, tested

installed. However, incremental development of new equipment and techniques, 

than concurrent development, allowed RN engineers and aviators to identify pro

and potential “dead ends” before large sums had been appropriated or spent.

A classic “dead end” they encountered was the “carpet,” or flexible, flight deck, w

was tested successfully at sea on the carrier Warrior in the fall and winter of 1948

The combination of the flexible deck and jet fighters without landing gear appea

successful, but it had a major flaw. As Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, RN, who 

closely identified with the origin of the angled deck for carriers, put it years later

It soon became obvious that there was a world of difference between one-off trials [of the flexi

flight deck proposed by Lewis Boddington] and practical front-line operation. Two major poi

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big problem was how to ensure that speed of operation wasn’t to be sacrificed by imposing some elab

orate mechanical substitute for the previous easy routine of just taxying [sic] forward into the deck

parks; and the vulnerability of the whole scheme was surely obvious.24

Moreover, it took a very skilled pilot to put his aircraft down on the “carpet” safely. For

example, in the first test of the flexible rubber deck at Farnborough at the end of

December 1947, RAE’s test pilot, Eric Brown, crashed his aircraft. Brown was fortunate

to survive, and his description of what happened is vivid:

After crossing the arrester wire the plane continued to swing nose-down towards the deck and

plunged into it with such violence that the nose completely vanished and penetrated right down to th

bottom layer. . . . Then it was thrown harshly up again in a nose-up attitude. I opened it up to full

power and was climbing away safely when I realized that the stick was jammed solid, with the elevators keeping the plane in a nose-up attitude. I throttled back gently and she settled on to the grass

ahead of the deck. The crash split the cockpit all round me.25

This initial accident, however, was followed by many successful attempts, once formal

tests began again at Farnborough in March 1948. Brown says in his memoir (Wings on

My Sleeve) that he made forty successful landings on the flexible deck at Farnborough

in the spring and summer of 1948.26 By November of that year, the light carrier HMS

Warrior had been fitted with a full-scale flexible deck, and Brown landed a small jet

fighter (a Vampire) on it. As his memoirs have it, “The plane’s belly scraped the wire,

the hook caught. The arrester wire and the deck had been deliberately set hard and the

chock was uncomfortable, though only for a split second.”27 Not all his landings were a

successful, but Brown nevertheless came away from the trials confident that the system

would work. He noted in his official report, “It may even be that future swept-back and

delta plan form aircraft will be forced to adopt this method of landing on carriers,

since all calculations point to serious wheeled landing problems on such aircraft.”28

Films of Brown landing his aircraft on the flexible deck were shown to staff in the U.S.

Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics when Lewis Boddington and two colleagues visited the

United States in March 1949. The British team members spent most of their time at the

naval aviation test center at Patuxent River, Maryland, the Naval Aircraft Factory in

Philadelphia, and five aircraft manufacturing firms—Grumman, McDonnell, Chance

Vought, Douglas, and North American. In his report of the trip, Boddington noted tha

“discussions were at all times free and open” and that “in general, similar methods of

solving difficulties [were] in progress in both countries.”29 Facilitating this exchange of

ideas was Capt. Frederick Trapnell, who had commanded an escort carrier in World

War II and was in March 1949 the chief test pilot at Patuxent River.

The discussions among the technical specialists went into great detail and covered such

topics as carrier-landing approach techniques, the coordination problems associated

with high-speed approaches, the gravitational forces imposed on airplane structures by

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already-recovered aircraft in the deck park from those still landing, the problems 

ciated with getting a jet to an adequate airspeed at the end of its catapult run, an

difficulties of moving increasingly heavy aircraft around on a carrier’s flight de

Boddington and his colleagues observed that it was evident to officers in BuAer t

“the direct application of present requirements and methods for catapulting and

arresting is not satisfactory,” especially for large (hundred-thousand-pound) aircra

This need to place very large aircraft on U.S. carriers was based on the formal req

ment to develop nuclear-capable bombers. It drew the Americans away from the 

ish, though the two navies otherwise shared the same basic problems that stemm

from the innovations—jet aircraft, radar, and missiles—produced during World 

The parallels between the two navies in the immediate postwar period are strikin

Because of their wartime experiences, both naval air arms wanted larger, heavier, 

longer-range aircraft for their carriers. Both had officers and engineers who belie

that it was possible to develop ways to launch and recover high-performance jet a

on carriers. Although, as Boddington observed, American engineers in aircraft fi

and military and civilian officials were working on similar problems, it was the B

who first grasped all the problems entailed in adapting existing carriers to jet air

Their initial solution to this set of problems—the flexible landing deck—did not 

vive careful scrutiny, but the idea of the slightly offset flexible deck led to the ang

deck, and it was the angled deck that opened the way for the large modern carrie

Notes

1. Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation:

The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft

(London: Conway Maritime, 1988), p. 245.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 276.

4. Ibid., p. 272.

5. Brown’s test of the prototype Sea Mosquito

on HMS Indefatigable is described and illustrated by photographs on pages 64–65 of

Brown’s Wings on My Sleeve (London: Orion

Books–Phoenix, 2007).

6. Ibid., pp. 275–76.

7. Michael Simpson, ed., The Cunningham

Papers (London: Ashgate and the Navy Records Society, 2006), vol. 2, pp. 324–25.

8. Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, p. 280.

9. Ibid., p. 272.

10. Ibid., p. 283.

11. Ibid., pp. 272, 285. See also Brown, W

My Sleeve, p. 91.

12. “Operation of Undercarriage-less Ai

Proposed Programme of Experiment

Work,” 7 June 1945 (Naval/2001-4/L

in AVIA 13/654 Ministry of Aviation 

Public Records Office [hereafter PRO

p. 5.

13. Director of RAE, memorandum to th

retary, Ministry of Aircraft Productio

ject “Operation of Undercarriage-les

Aircraft,” 9 June 1945, Naval/2001-4/

in AVIA 13/654.

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Future Naval Aircraft,” 4 July 1945, in AVIA

13/654, p. 1.

15. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

16. Lewis Boddington, “Landing of Future Naval

Aircraft,” Copy no. 30, 12 September 1945, in

AVIA 13/654, p. 1.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 4.

19. Boddington, “Assisted Take-off for Future

Naval Aircraft,” pp. 2–3.

20. Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet

Air Arm (Hersham, Surrey, U.K.: Midland,

2008), pp. 99–101.

21. Ibid., pp. 101–102.

22. Ibid., p. 281.

24. Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, RN, “The

Angled Deck Story (DRFC’s Own Account),

Rear Admiral Dennis Royle Farquharson

Cambell, C.B., D.S.C., March 2008,

www.denniscambell.org.uk, pp. 2–3.

25. Brown, Wings on My Sleeve, pp. 177–78.

26. Ibid., p. 179.

27. Ibid., p. 188.

28. Ibid., p. 190.

29. Lewis Boddington, R. R. Duddy, and

F. Holroyd, “Report on a Visit to U.S.A. to

Discuss the Operation of Aircraft from Aircraft Carriers, March 1949,” Tech Note N.A.

197, Aero. 2004, in AVIA 6/16021 Ministry

of Aviation file, PRO, p. 5.

30. Ibid., p. 33.

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Adopting Jet Engines

Jet engines were the first British innovation the Bureau of Aeronautics adopted. Th

a clear case of deliberate technology transfer, and it sparked a revolution in aircra

engine technology in the United States. But the story of what happened after the 

transfer is important and interesting, if only because it called into question BuAe

policy of funding engine development separately from airframe development. Bu

practice had been to finance new engines and then furnish them to the aircraft m

such as Grumman, Douglas, Curtiss, and Vought. However, the engineering chall

that faced the developers of jet turbine engines, combined with BuAer’s policy of 

ing on one or two main engine suppliers, almost derailed the modernization of 

Navy’s carrier air forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s.1

Why the Europeans Developed Effective Turbojets First

In the years before World War II, in the United States, the National Advisory Com

tee on Aeronautics, a federal research and development organization, was an imp

source of innovations for the Navy, Army, and the various aircraft manufacturers

Formed in 1929, NACA had developed a cowling that significantly improved the 

ciency of radial piston engines, which would otherwise have suffered badly from 

drag generated by their large frontal area. NACA also devised standard airfoil (w

sections, much as the British Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough did.

NACA formed a committee to encourage the development of turbojet engines af

British revealed the existence of Frank Whittle’s design in the fall of 1940. Why th

and not earlier? There are four basic reasons. First, prior to Army general Henry 

“Hap” Arnold’s chance introduction to the Whittle engine in early 1941, there wa

American military demand for jet propulsion. Propeller-driven aircraft performe

acceptably, piston engines were reliable, and the commercial aircraft manufactur

knew how to design airplanes around them. In addition, the existence of a great n

ber of World War I–surplus “Liberty” engines—many never used—for sale at a f

of the cost of newer types of power plants stifled research. (For example, it was o

CHAPTER FIVE

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That was because Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia, a World War I veteran and

student of military aviation, inserted a rider into the appropriations act directing the

Army to do so.)2

These factors led to a “lock-in” of piston engines in civilian and military aircraft and created insurmountable obstacles for those who wanted to study and

develop alternative power plants.3

Aircraft engine performance was investigated in

terms of existing speed ranges; most American power-plant engineers accepted propeller

driven aircraft as a given.4

Second, reliance on piston engines was reinforced by studies suggesting that jet propulsion of aircraft was an unrealistic goal. It was not that American engineers were

unaware of the concept of the turbojet. In 1919, years before anyone demonstrated a

practical turbojet, European and American engineers had proposed using them as aircraft engines.5

French and British experimental work in the field was published in the

early 1920s, and in 1922 the U.S. Bureau of Standards investigated the turbojet as a

means of aircraft propulsion. Two years later, Edgar Buckingham, the Bureau of Standards propulsion investigator, concluded that jet propulsion would be impractical for

either civilian or military purposes. He argued that the top speed of a jet-powered aircraft would be only 250 miles per hour, fuel consumption would be four times higher

than in a piston engine with equivalent horsepower, and that the turbojet would be

more complicated than a piston engine.6

Thereafter proposals for jet aircraft cropped up persistently in the United States, but

subsequent studies completed at the Bureau of Standards and NACA confirmed

Buckingham’s 1924 conclusions that low speeds and high fuel consumption made jet

engines impractical. By the mid-1930s, however, some researchers in the aircraft design

community were beginning to question the likelihood of continued progress in

propeller-driven aircraft technology. In 1934, NACA researcher John Stack reported a

practical limit to speeds achievable by propeller-driven aircraft. A different power plan

would have to be employed if aircraft were to fly near or faster than the speed of

sound.7

Meanwhile, several U.S. manufacturers had embraced the turbine engine as a means to

supply pressurized air to railroad diesel engines. In July 1935, for example, the American Locomotive Company (ALCO) was granted a license by a Swiss syndicate to manufacture superchargers for ALCO’s diesels.8

Building reliable turbines as superchargers

posed many design and metallurgical problems for railroad-engine builders, but manu

facturers kept investing in their development because their use promised to lower

engine operating costs while dramatically boosting the amount of power that a diesel

of given weight could provide.9

There was little or no understanding within the

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would in itself provide the forward force needed to propel an airplane.

The turbo-supercharger is interesting technologically because it is just a step awa

a turbojet, at least in its configuration. In a turbo-supercharger, exhaust gas from 

engine spins a turbine. The turbine in turn is connected to a compressor, the out

which enters the engine. In The Jet Pioneers, Glyn Jones describes in some detail 

work of General Electric’s (GE’s) supercharger developer, Dr. Sanford A. Moss. M

may have been the first person to build a successful gas turbine—in 1903, for his 

degree at Cornell University. Moss’s turbine was driven by the combustion of pre

ized air. After receiving his degree, Moss joined a group at GE building low-press

centrifugal compressors—one of the other two elements, after the turbine, of a s

ful gas turbine or jet engine (the third element is a combustion chamber). When 

United States entered World War I, Moss and his GE associates were asked to dev

an engine booster for high-flying aircraft, and Moss chose to work on the turbo

supercharger. It was tested successfully on Pikes Peak in June 1918.10

Jones suggests that the Army Air Corps barely kept Moss’s project alive after Wor

War I. The Army’s desire to field very-high-flying bombers revived the project af

1935, and prototype turbo-superchargers fitted to the engines of an Army bomb

1937 enabled the plane to fly at thirty-seven thousand feet. GE was mass-produc

turbo-superchargers by 1940, having overcome problems of turbine-blade reliab

but Moss himself never took the next step to turn his invention into a jet turbine

The experience of Douglas Aircraft engineer Vladimir Pavlecka further illustrate

difficulties that faced engineers who wanted to develop turbojet engines for aircr

According to Glyn Jones, in 1933 Pavlecka proposed using a gas turbine to drive 

peller.11 Pavlecka was an experienced engineer; he had produced the design for th

surized cabin for the commercial version of the DC-4. His superiors at Douglas

Aircraft forwarded his proposal to Pratt & Whitney, which sent it on to MIT, who

staff concluded that it would be too heavy for use in aircraft. Pavlecka later joine

Northrop, which split from Douglas in 1939, and apparently wrote up a proposa

using public funds to develop what became known as a turboprop engine. He sen

proposal to the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics and to the Army in 1940. Jones con

that the Navy rejected Pavlecka’s proposal because its wooden carrier flight decks 

not withstand the heat of a jet’s exhaust. The Army also rejected the proposal, th

Jones believes that Pavlecka’s proposal to the Army may have supported those wh

favored initial development of the Lockheed L-1000 axial-flow jet engine, first 

in 1940.

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ities and fund a team of researchers that could amass a body of knowledge about jet

propulsion and supersonic flight. There was no appreciation among these officials and

officers of the impact of what they did not know on their evaluations of what could be

In Europe, scientists and engineers who investigated alternatives to propeller-driven

aircraft gathered in 1935 at the Fifth Volta Congress on High Speed Flight, the first

international conference devoted to the science of supersonic flight. Sponsored by the

Italian Academy of Sciences and held in Rome, the Volta Congress brought together th

world’s preeminent aerodynamicists, including the Hungarian-American Theodore von

Kármán. He was impressed with the reported research results on high-speed flight and

concerned about the lack of theoretical work in the United States. American engineers

produced first-rate empirical data regarding the design of subsonic aircraft and pistonengine aircraft, but it was German or German-educated scientists who led the theoretical investigations of high-speed and turbocompressor phenomena. In terms of quality

of theoretical research on high-speed flight, the British were slightly behind the Germans

and the Americans lagged badly.12

Not only were the Europeans doing the best theoretical research, they were building the

research tools to maintain their research lead. While attending the conference, von

Kármán visited the Italian research center at Guidonia and saw an Italian 2,500 mph

wind tunnel that was used to investigate supersonic phenomena. Upon his return to th

United States, von Kármán attempted to persuade Army Air Corps leaders to build a

supersonic wind tunnel, but they rejected his idea, arguing that it would be too expensive, even assuming that any funds at all could be found to construct it. Von Kármán

urged NACA to build such a wind tunnel, but George W. Lewis, NACA’s executive

director, turned him down. Lewis’s argument was that there was no need to build a

wind tunnel capable of speeds greater than the existing NACA 650 mph tunnel, becaus

propellers rapidly lost efficiency at speeds greater than 600 mph. Lewis did not critically examine his own assumption that aircraft would always be driven by engines pow

ering propellers.13

Fourth, neither U.S. aircraft firms, the Army, nor the Navy closely followed European

advances in aeronautics and aerodynamics. Prohibitions in the Neutrality Acts of 1935

1936, and 1937, especially the 1937 law, prevented U.S. firms from dealing with any

belligerent nation except on a “cash and carry” basis. Even those interactions were

blocked by Congress in 1939, when it limited professional contacts between American

civilian aeronautical engineers working for the major manufacturers, such as Douglas,

Grumman, and Curtiss, and their counterparts overseas.

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its largest airplane manufacturers (Boeing, Douglas, and Martin) produced the la

and most advanced airliners. Given this record of achievement, the Army and Na

no reason to imagine that foreign aircraft innovations might revolutionize milita

ation in ways that American designers did not themselves foresee. That view was 

ably reinforced by intense French and British attempts to buy U.S. combat aircra

1938 onward.

In 1938, prompted by a report written by a Navy officer who had seen gas turbin

Europe, the National Academy of Sciences set up a committee on jet propulsion.

following year, according to BuAer’s Ten-Year R&D History, the Navy—mindful o

developments overseas—asked the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate gas 

bines for marine propulsion. It later added a request that they be evaluated for ai

propulsion. The academy’s report, which was printed in the Bureau of Ships’ Tec

Bulletin in January 1941, judged gas turbines far too heavy for aircraft use—susta

the view of NACA regarding gas-turbine technology. Theodore von Kármán, now 

member of the Navy’s board of engineers charged to review the applicability of g

bines to flight, later denied that he had attended the meetings on the subject or h

read the report and regretted affixing his signature to it.15

BuAer’s Ten-Year R&D History reports that the Army and Navy jointly funded a

Northrop turboprop project for a 2,500 hp engine, signing a contract to that effe

30 June 1941, despite the pessimistic assessments of both the National Academy a

NACA. William Green and Roy Cross note that Northrop made its proposal in M

1939, calling its engine “the Turbodyne.” It was not a successful design.16

In a turbojet, the piston engine between compressor and turbine is replaced by a 

bustion chamber, and compression ratio and outlet temperature are considerably

higher. Instead of helping a piston engine turn a propeller, the jet engine uses its

exhaust to push the airplane ahead. In 1939, General Electric was the dominant U

turbocharger manufacturer. Though at that date GE had not yet developed meth

mass-producing reliable turbine blades and for overcoming the disruptive effects 

turbine stall inside its superchargers, the firm was an obvious candidate to build 

jet engine, once the government had decided to enter this field.17

The Hunt for an Effective Jet Engine Begins

In sending the Tizard Mission to the United States in the fall of 1940, Prime Min

Winston Churchill decided to present the Americans, who he expected would eve

ally enter the war, with the fruits of advanced British research. The best-known e

ple was the magnetron, which made short-wave (centimetric) radar possible. Ho

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ment. In its official postwar history, the General Electric Company argues that it was

the first U.S. firm to develop a jet turbine—in response to a request from General

Arnold, as commander of Army Air Forces, in the summer of 1941. But Green and

Cross, in their The Jet Aircraft of the World, suggest that Lockheed had already decided

to develop a jet engine by that time. Lockheed christened its jet engine L-1000, and the

firm hoped to interest the Army Air Forces in a fighter (L-133) powered by its new

engine. Its reasoning paralleled that which had produced the first German engine: a

young German engineer, Hans von Ohain, sold the idea to the Heinkel aircraft company, which produced first a test airplane (the He-176) and then a prototype fighter

(He-280). Lockheed was not nearly so lucky. Its engine never worked well, and the

Army showed no interest in its futuristic fighter.

By early 1941, two events paved the way for the mass production of jet engines. First,

the Whittle engine—using centrifugal flow—was nearing the flight-test stage, the

prototype engine having run long enough to show that it had the necessary endurance

to power a combat aircraft. Second, the Lend-Lease bill, which ended the restrictions

of the 1939 Neutrality Act, came into effect in March, implying that the United States

would produce the weapons the British needed to fight the war. A further implication

for the British was that new technology should be shared. That included the new jet

engine, although it is not clear to what extent it was described to the Americans in

detail.

Accounts of what happened next vary. On 25 February 1941 General Arnold, then still

Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air, asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, who headed the new

National Defense Research Committee, to form a jet-propulsion group. In March a

NACA committee was formed, headed by Professor William F. Durand, who had taugh

Dr. Sanford A. Moss, the developer of U.S. turbochargers, at Cornell. Durand was also a

founding member of NACA. His special committee included representatives of the

Army, the Navy (BuAer), the Bureau of Standards (in effect, the government’s physical

research laboratory), Johns Hopkins University, MIT, and the three major U.S. turbine

makers (Allis-Chalmers, GE, and Westinghouse). General Arnold specifically barred

American piston-engine makers, on the ground that jet development would distract

them from the urgently needed production of masses of piston engines optimized to

fight the coming war.

By the end of June 1941, all three U.S. turbine companies had responded to secret

requests from the Army and Navy that they examine the Whittle engine and simultaneously develop their own concepts.18 Contracts were let in July, and soon GE was

working on the world’s first turboprop engine. According to the BuAer Ten-Year R&D

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a simple turbojet and a ramjet. GE proposed the already mentioned turboprop. A

Chalmers proposed a ducted fan (turbofan). Contracts were negotiated in the fal

1941.19 The Navy decided to back the Westinghouse and Allis-Chalmers projects; 

Army backed GE, whose engine was called the TG-100.20

Allis-Chalmers was asked by the Navy to submit a detailed proposal in Novembe

and Westinghouse that December. Allis-Chalmers received an eighteen-month d

ment contract in January 1942, but at the end of that time its design was dropped 

less promising than existing engines. Westinghouse received its first contract on 

December 1941, for a nineteen-inch-diameter engine (called the Type 19). In 194

became clear that its thrust could be increased considerably by increasing its inle

perature; the resulting Type 19A was the first Navy turbojet. Because it was conce

as a booster, it had none of the usual engine accessories (e.g., a generator). Howe

modified version, the 19B, was equipped with auxiliaries (mounted on the outsid

that it could be used as either a booster or a main power plant. This change was

embodied in a May 1943 contract. Aircraft were first designed around the 19B en

in the summer of 1943.21 A further improved 19XB offered an increase of thrust 

1,680 pounds (1944), up from 1,360 pounds in the 19A and 1,200 in the original 

way of comparison, GE’s I-16 produced 1,600 pounds of thrust (see below).

Once the design was well under way, BuAer became interested in the possibility o

tering smaller engines in place of one or two large ones. Presumably the expected

advantage was that an airplane could gain range by cruising on part of its power 

(later a selling point for the F2H Banshee, which could shut down one of its two

engines on combat air patrol). The result was a 9.5-inch-diameter engine (Type 9

J32), the main application of which was in the Gorgon missile. It was conceived a

ing half the diameter of the 19-series engine, with a quarter of the thrust (becaus

mass flow through the engine, which determines thrust, is proportional to the ar

the air intake).

By 1944 BuAer was interested in gaining more power, so it let a contract to Westi

house for a three-thousand-pound-thrust engine. That required about 1.32 time

diameter (twenty-five inches); improvements in efficiency made it possible for W

tinghouse to offer the desired power in a twenty-four-inch package, the resulting

engine being called the Type 24. The BuAer history associates this engine with th

FR-1 hybrid-power fighter. The twenty-four-inch engine was later redesignated J

scaled-up redesign, offering 4,500 pounds of thrust, was the J46).

General Arnold had visited England in 1941. He was shown the prototype E28/3

craft and was much impressed by British progress. Arnold selected GE as the lead

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experience in centrifugal compressors and supercharger turbines. Details were provided to two American engineers in London on 22 July 1941, and in September an

agreement was made to provide the United States with full details of the British

engines, subject only to secrecy. GE was given plans of the British Whittle (centrifugalflow) engine, and ultimately it also received an example. The company used the term

“Type I supercharger” for this project, so its early engines were numbered in an I series

(e.g., I-16, I-40). The I-40—the designation presumably indicates a goal of four thousand pounds of thrust—powered the first American-production jet fighter, the P-80

(later F-80) Shooting Star. Production of these engines was licensed to Allison in 1944,

and the engines were given J designations (the I-16 became the J31 and the I-40 the

J33). Allison later took over J33 development, ultimately increasing its thrust to 6,350

pounds. Allison also took over development of GE’s axial-flow J35, which was the

precursor to the successful J47.

The Durand committee divided up the development and production effort, the Army

supporting the GE centrifugal-flow engines derived from the British prototypes and

the Navy supporting axial-flow engines. However, the BuAer R&D history (late 1945)

suggests limited Navy interest in jet propulsion, on the ground that it was suited only

to a short-range interceptor, which was hardly what the Navy was after—it wanted

long-endurance aircraft, to occupy combat air patrol stations. In his history of early

Navy jet fighters, Tommy Thomason notes that the FH-1, the first operational jet

fighter, “had twice the internal fuel capacity of the contemporary F8F-1 [Bearcat].” But

“the jet had only 60 to 70 percent of the endurance of the piston engine fighter, even

though it carried twice the fuel.”22 This lack of endurance is why the Navy initially preferred mixed piston-jet aircraft like the Ryan Fireball (FR-1) to all-jet aircraft like the

Phantom (FD-1). However, the BuAer fighter correspondence files associate the Fireball with a special requirement—an escort-carrier fighter, as an alternative to the

Bearcat, proposed before that aircraft—rather than with a general-purpose fleet-carrie

fighter. The Navy did contract with Curtiss for a mixed-power heavy fighter (F15C),

but this airplane was soon discarded. Grumman design files of this period show crude

sketches of both all-jet and mixed-power aircraft, but the company offered only an alljet fighter for the 1944 competition, apparently the first in wartime fighter design.23

The Hunt for an Effective Jet Engine Intensifies

We should discuss the difference between the two types of jet engine, because the choices

made in 1941 had important implications. A centrifugal compressor is simpler than an

axial one, because it has only one or two stages (the latter uses two such compressors

back to back). Centrifugal compressors were incorporated in the superchargers of the

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mass flow, hence thrust, is to increase diameter. Flow can also be increased by maki

compressor run faster, but ultimately the output of such an engine is limited by its 

eter. The engine also loses some power because the air flowing through it must, in 

turn a corner. However, until jet engines approached seven thousand pounds of th

centrifugal flow was quite attractive.

The British and the Germans used centrifugal flow for their first jet engines, but 

Germans soon turned to the theoretically much more attractive axial-flow config

tion. In the axial-flow design, the air moves straight through the engine. Each sta

the compressor (i.e., each ring of blades) adds a degree of compression, so that th

effect of the compressor depends on how many stages it uses—as well as, of cour

its diameter. Ultimately the axial configuration is more efficient and much easier 

scale up. Once engines were producing more than 7,000 to 7,500 pounds of thru

axial flow became universal.

The dominant theme in early British development was centrifugal flow, although 

was early interest in axial-flow engines. Inventor Frank Whittle sold the jet idea t

Royal Air Force and subsisted for years on very limited public funding for it plus 

siderable privately raised money. Only about 1939 did the British government be

funding Whittle on anything like a sufficient scale. Once the war began, the gove

ment enforced cooperation among possible producers, almost all of which develo

variations of Whittle’s basic themes.24 Thus, when Americans bought British eng

though from different manufacturers, they were really buying much the same de

different sizes.

GE began by copying Whittle’s W1 engine, and it then adapted a de Havilland en

(the Goblin) to power the prototype of the first major U.S. jet fighter, the P-80 Sh

ing Star. Meanwhile Rolls-Royce developed a series of engines with “river” names

went, Nene, Tay. Once GE had successfully copied the Goblin (as the I-40), it bec

interested in a more powerful engine (four thousand pounds of thrust). In respo

British designed the Rolls-Royce Nene, more powerful (five-thousand-pound thr

and lighter than the new GE engine, even though at that time the Air Ministry di

envisage a fighter requiring that much power. This development proved fortunat

BuAer, because it made possible a single-engine fighter at a time when it seemed 

the bureau’s engines would not suffice except in pairs.

The Durand committee was intended to coordinate U.S. research (and, probably, 

avoid wasteful duplication), but it was in a position very different from that of th

ish gas-turbine committee: it did not have a central R&D organization (like the R

Aircraft Establishment) the fruits of which could be distributed to manufacturer

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mental work, as they had been in the 1930s. BuAer’s practice was to foster engine

improvements and then offer the newly produced engines to the airframe manufacturers, like Grumman, Douglas, and Curtiss. Axial flow was virgin territory, of which the

British were not supplying any prototypes. It says a great deal for Westinghouse that its

first axial-flow engine (J30) was running successfully at the end of 1943.

Indeed, BuAer’s success in fostering an entirely domestic jet engine in the face of

improved air-cooled piston engines (like the Pratt & Whitney 3,500 hp R-4360) and

opposition from its own engine specialists is surprising. The main problem with all

early jet aircraft, whether they had centrifugal-flow or axial-flow engines, was that they

lacked endurance because of high rates of fuel consumption.25 The cycle of aircraft

operations from carriers was:

• Launch a strike or patrols

• Move any aircraft still on deck forward, so that returning aircraft would have a spac

in which to land

• Recover the aircraft coming back from their flights

• Move the aircraft parked forward back aft so that the carrier could begin launching

aircraft again.

As Thomason pointed out, “the relatively limited endurance of jets forced this cycle to

become significantly shorter and less flexible.” This imposed “a much stricter operating

timetable on flight operations than had previously been the case.”26

Moreover, jet engines were slow to accelerate. According to Thomason, “The Pratt &

Whitney R-2800 piston engine powering the Grumman F8F Bearcat would develop

about 7,000 pounds of thrust with a 13-foot diameter propeller at . . . takeoff power.

The total thrust in the first jets was less than half that, even when the engines were new

and old was measured in tens of hours.”27 This relatively low power and the inability to

accelerate and decelerate quickly made taking off and landing in the early jets a very

different—and more hazardous—proposition than it had been in even heavy, powerful

piston-engine aircraft like the F4U Corsair. Is it any wonder that officers in BuAer’s

Powerplant Division had doubts about turbojets and preferred turboprop engines?28 As

longtime BuAer engineer George A. Spangenberg observed in his oral history, “The

Navy had a very real problem in attempting to get into the jet age.”29

The Westinghouse engine (J34) seems to have been specified for the Navy jet fighter

(specifically, night fighter) competition in 1944, though Spangenberg notes that

Grumman “surprised everyone by submitting a four engine arrangement with [Westinghouse] J30 engines.”30 It is intriguing that sketches in Grumman files appear to

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that the facts of jet engines were disclosed to all major U.S. manufacturers but th

BuAer had no interest in using the engine that the Army was then adopting for it

fighters (the P-59A Airacomet and then the P-80). The use of the phrase “all-Am

(as opposed to British-conceived) in a BuAer Confidential Bulletin account of the 

jet fighters suggests a sense that the U.S. alternative was inherently better.

The Grumman sketches may be explained by the 1943 visit of British engineers w

described the new British Halford H-1 engine (the de Havilland Goblin); it was t

built starting in 1945 as the J36 centrifugal-flow jet engine under license in the U

States by Allis-Chalmers.31 Producing 2,700 pounds of thrust, the J36 was an alte

to the General Electric I-40 installed in the Army’s P-80. It was also considered fo

in the Curtiss F15C. In Britain, de Havilland installed the H-1 Goblin in its Vamp

fighter. The H-1/J36 was superseded by GE’s improved I-40 (J33).

BuAer sponsored two Westinghouse engines, designated according to their diam

nineteen or twenty-four inches. Two nineteen-inch engines powered the first Nav

fighter, the McDonnell FD-1 (later FH-1) Phantom. Single twenty-four-inch eng

were used in the 1944 competition, the winners being the North American Fury 

and the Vought Pirate (F6U). Apparently the FD-1 was considered no more than 

sibility experiment; BuAer’s official position was that it would not be a particular

good carrier fighter, but it was produced in some numbers so that pilots could ga

experience with jet-propelled aircraft.32 At least some of these aircraft went to the

Marines, even though these jets could not possibly operate from the escort carrie

Marines were then using.

Additional fighter orders in 1945 used multiple twenty-four-inch engines, as did 

1946 interceptor, the Vought F7U Cutlass (two engines). All of these engines wer

ited to about four thousand pounds of thrust. As seen at the time, the next step w

Westinghouse to scale up the engine to about 7,500 pounds of thrust, the result b

designated the J40 (Westinghouse Type 40, for its forty-inch diameter). It was sla

power the F3H Demon, which the Navy hoped (unfortunately incorrectly) would 

vide performance equivalent to that of the new land-based fighters. The failure o

engine apparently killed Westinghouse as a jet engine builder. As Thomason put 

“After successfully developing very capable jet engines literally from scratch in th

1940s, Westinghouse lost its touch.”33 Spangenberg, who by 1946 was the assistan

director of BuAer’s design review office, agreed: the J40 was “one of the big powe

busts that the Navy had.”34 Douglas’s Ed Heinemann, who designed the F4D Skyr

apparently suspected that the new engine might fail. He gave the plane’s structur

cient diameter to take an alternative, which proved necessary—the airplane used 

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Allison J71.

GE, the primary competitor to Westinghouse, developed its own axial-flow engines,

first the J35 and then a production version, the J47, which powered such Air Force clas

sics as the F-86 Saberjet and the B-47 Stratojet. These engines do not seem to have held

much attraction for the Navy, and it is not certain why. It is possible that Air Force

orders consumed all of GE’s productive capacity. All general BuAer program documents refer to the steady progression of Westinghouse axial-flow engines; it is not clear

that BuAer was even interested in any other manufacturer in the period immediately

after World War II. However, immediately after World War II there was no engine more

powerful than the twenty-four-inch type (originally called the 24C). At some point in

1946 the British Nene (which was produced under license by Pratt & Whitney) was

added to the list of engines that companies could offer in their proposals.

It also seems that BuAer suddenly realized that the fighters it had chosen in 1944 could

not match current land-based types. It had chosen Grumman to build a four-engine

night fighter, or intruder, the F9F, in a 1945 jet-night-fighter contest (the other aircraft

chosen was the twin-engine Douglas F3D Skyknight). Late in 1945 BuAer canceled the

F9F-1 but left the contract alive. Grumman designed a single-engine day fighter powered by the Nene engine, offering it in August 1946. It is not clear to what extent

Grumman had been encouraged officially or unofficially to develop such a design.35 It

was more powerful than the 1944 fighters but much less sophisticated aerodynamically

than the interceptors of the 1946 competition. In retrospect it seems to have been conceived as an interim fighter, but that is not clear from records now available.

The interesting point here is that BuAer seems to have found in the British centrifugalflow engines a useful alternative to the Westinghouse axial-flow ones. It seems to have

been BuAer’s decision, because at least one company offered a 1946 interceptor powered by a Nene in June 1946, before Grumman offered the proposal for what became

the F9F-2 Panther. The Grumman airplane, in turn, had a fuselage big enough to

accommodate a centrifugal-flow engine and thus became a candidate for any follow-on

British engine. Pratt & Whitney became the U.S. producer of the Nene, collaborating

with the British manufacturer, Rolls-Royce, on the next type, the Tay (U.S. J48). Note

that none of the other BuAer projects could accommodate such bulky engines; the

bureau clearly saw the British engines as a stopgap until better axial-flow turbojets

came along. Again, as during the war, it had no particular reason to consider British

technology superior to American. It is perhaps interesting that the BuAer Confidential

Bulletin, which included a section on engines in every issue, devoted no attention to

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contain articles on Soviet and even Swedish developments.

It mattered that engines like the J40 worked, because they were frequently buried 

fighters’ fuselages. Altering a fighter design to accept an alternative engine with a 

ent diameter was not trivial, because the airplane’s aerodynamics would change q

drastically, as would its weight balance. Any such drastic change equated to subst

delay in an aircraft’s scheduled development.

Some background on the diffusion of engineering knowledge about jet turbines 

the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy may also be relevant. In 1945 the United States c

led the world both in carrier aircraft and in carrier operating techniques. Contac

the Royal Navy had not revealed areas of British equality, let alone superiority, w

sole exception of the armored flight deck—which the U.S. Navy adopted in its la

World War II carriers. The Royal Navy had purchased large numbers of America

supplied Lend-Lease aircraft, but it was not in the position of approaching U.S. i

try hat in hand, desperate for whatever could be provided. C. R. Fairey, head of th

experienced aircraft design and production firm of the same name, spent the yea

1941–45 as the head of the British Air Commission in Washington, and he super

the growth of the commission from a liaison office to a thousand-person staff, m

whose members were resident in U.S. aircraft firms.36 British industry had produ

many outstanding aircraft just before and during World War II. As we showed in 

ican & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, the problem for the RN w

that it had not correctly anticipated the campaigns its carrier force would have to 

out and hence had asked the British Air Ministry for what might be termed “the 

planes.” In addition, the RN never could devote the tremendous manpower and i

trial resources to carrier aviation that the USN did during the war; the gap betwe

sizes and resources of the two carrier forces was dramatically in favor of the latte

In 1945 the victorious Allies scrambled to seize German technology.38 For examp

multivolume Ten-Year R&D History of BuAer R&D, produced in about Novembe

1945, consistently included sections on German developments alongside those d

ing BuAer’s. German advances in engine and aircraft design were a powerful stim

to aircraft designers in Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Cdr. Alfr

Metsger, who had a graduate degree from MIT and became BuAer’s chief fighter 

desk” officer in October 1945, after serving as air group commander on carrier

Saratoga, quickly grasped the importance of both the jet turbine engine and the 

wing aircraft designs prototyped by the Germans during the war. Spangenberg re

years later Metsger’s strong and persistent advocacy of “pure” jets over the “mixe

type like the Ryan FR-1 Fireball and turboprop designs.39 Spangenberg also notes 

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power-plant design branch within BuAer.40 Spangler was well aware of the limitations

of the early jet engines and did not want to gamble on what he saw as an uncertain

future. Westinghouse’s trouble with the J40 seemed to show that scaling up the power

of axial-thrust jet engines would not be as straightforward as the aircraft (as opposed

to the engine) designers expected. Spangenberg points out that tests with a P-80 fighter

flying simulated combat against a Navy F8F Bearcat “educated a lot of the people” in

the advantages of the jet fighter.41 Still, the concerns about the future of axial-flow jet

engines would continue. As Thomason recognized in his study of carrier fighter development, all the major jet engine manufacturers had difficulty during and immediately

after World War II producing reliable, high-output turbine engines.42

Notes

1. Tommy H. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority: Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters,

1943–1962 (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty,

2007).

2. Robert Schlaifer, Development of Aircraft Engines (Boston: Graduate School of Business

Administration, Harvard University, 1950),

p. 160. Also I. B. Holley, Jr., “Jet Lag in the

Army Air Corps,” in Military Planning in the

Twentieth Century, ed. Harry R. Borowski

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 133.

3. For application of the economists’ concept of

“lock-in” to innovation in military innovation, see Mark D. Mandeles, The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case

Study in Organizational Innovation (Maxwell

Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1998),

chap. 3. See also Paul A. David, “Clio and the

Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic

Review 75 (May 1985).

4. Schlaifer, Development of Aircraft Engines,

p. 445.

5. Ibid., p. 440.

6. Holley, “Jet Lag in the Army Air Corps,” pp.

124–25.

7. Ibid., pp. 125–26.

8. J. Parker Lamb, Evolution of the American

Diesel Locomotive (Bloomington: Indiana

Univ. Press, 2007), p. 60.

9. Ibid., pp. 125–26.

10. Moss’s first turbo-supercharger was far mor

efficient than any gear-driven supercharger,

because it was not shaft driven. A brief description of Moss’s work is in John Anderson Miller, Men and Volts at War: The Story

of General Electric in World War II (New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), pp. 72–74.

11. Glyn Jones, The Jet Pioneers: The Birth of Jet

Powered Flight (London: Methuen, 1989),

pp. 184–85.

12. Theodore von Kármán with Lee Edson, The

Wind and Beyond (Boston: Little, Brown,

1967), pp. 216–23; Edward W. Constant II,

The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Balti

more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1980), pp

154–56.

13. Constant, Origins of the Turbojet Revolution,

pp. 156–59; Holley, “Jet Lag in the Army Air

Corps,” p. 126; Alex Roland, Model Research

(Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics

and Space Administration, 1985), vol. 1, pp.

186–87.

14. Roland, Model Research, p. 188.

15. Von Kármán with Edson, Wind and Beyond,

p. 225.

16. William Green and Roy Cross, The Jet Aircraft of the World (New York: Hanover

House, 1956), p. 20.

17. Ibid., pp. 73–74.

18. Ibid., pp. 77–80.

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itary services to negotiate cost contracts with

industry. The prior restrictions on negotiated contracts in favor of “sealed bids” had

been partly removed by Congress. For details, see Irving B. Holley, Buying Aircraft:

Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of

Military History, U.S. Army, 1964), and Robert H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial

Mobilization in World War II (Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951).

20. U.S. Navy Dept., Ten-Year History and Program of Future Research and Development of

Aircraft Power Plants (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Aeronautics, 1945) [hereafter BuAer,

Ten-Year History], vol. 4, pp. 154–59.

21. The aircraft designed around the Westinghouse 19B (or J30) were the McDonnell FD

(Phantom), the Ryan FR-1 (Fireball), and an

Army flying-wing fighter (P-79). The 19B

was also considered as a booster for the

Douglas BTD-1 (Destroyer) and as the main

power plant for a missile canceled in 1944.

Pratt & Whitney later received a production

contract for the 19B engine, designated J30.

22. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority, p. 13.

23. Grumman has always said publicly that the

Bearcat was a private venture conceived by

the firm rather than a response to a BuAer

initiative, but that may not have been quite

true. As Thomason notes, Grumman was a

“preferred BuAer supplier,” and so exchanges

between BuAer and company personnel were

frequent during the war and often difficult

to document. See ibid., p. 57.

24. Note that this meant the British did not pursue mixed piston-and-jet-powered aircraft

like the Ryan FR-1.

25. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority, pp.

12–13.

26. Ibid., p. 13.

27. Ibid., p. 11. Thomason drew on BuAer engineer George A. Spangenberg’s 1997 “Oral

Oral History, 2010, www.georgespang

.com, for this information; see p. 67.

28. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiorit

29. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” p. 66.

30. Ibid., p. 93.

31. BuAer, Ten-Year History.

32. In his memoir, retired vice admiral D

Engen notes that the small number o

postwar jets available for training ke

pilots—even veteran pilots—from ga

the air time necessary to fly them wit

Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warrio

Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997)

33. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiorit

Thomason mentions labor problems 

Westinghouse on p. 57 but does not

elaborate.

34. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” p. 100.

35. In his oral history Spangenberg note

the change in the Grumman contrac

36. H. A. Taylor, Fairey Aircraft since 191

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1974), pp. 24–25.

37. Geoffrey Till, in his Air Power and th

Navy, 1914–1945 (London: Jane’s, 19

makes this point—that by 1945 the U

carrier force was decidedly and dram

larger than the RN’s and that this ha

chological effect. See pp. 109–10.

38. Eric Brown describes his adventures 

many at war’s end in his delightful W

My Sleeve (London: Orion Books–Ph

2007), chaps. 9, 10.

39. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” p. 102.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 103.

42. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiorit

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British and American Prospects after the W

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, . . . it was the sp

hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, w

nothing before us.

CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CI

At the conclusion of World War II, the U.S. Navy contracted “dramatically, the n

of naval personnel alone dropping from over 3 million to less than 1 million by J

1946. The Bureau of Ships canceled over $1 billion in wartime shipbuilding cont

over 7,000 vessels were declared war surplus, and 2,000 more were mothballed.”1

immediate postwar demobilization was followed by a longer-term decline: “The 

reduced aviation forces 80 percent to a total of 10,232 pilots, 56,767 aviation rati

and 20 aircraft carriers of all classes by the end of 1949.”2

Making matters even worse was the war-produced “bulge” of qualified younger n

aviators, who now faced the prospect of slow promotion. As aviator Donald Enge

recalled, “In the late 1940s and early 1950s, many of the more senior naval aviato

two or more opportunities for aviation commands while all officers were virtuall

frozen in their current ranks until the personnel turmoil associated with the end 

war could be dealt with.”3

In many U.S. Navy squadrons, as Adm. James L. Hollow

would recall, “morale was at rock bottom and discipline was nonexistent.”4

For the Royal Navy, the years after World War II were, from the financial point o

even more catastrophic. As naval historian Michael Isenberg notes, “At the time o

Harbor, Great Britain had mounted a navy of 363 combat ships and 300,000 men

the Americans had 339 combatants and 353,000 men—the two fleets were at rou

parity. . . . Ten years after Pearl, the bell had tolled: Korea and anticommunism ha

swollen America’s Navy from its immediate postwar doldrums to 958 combatant

705,000 men. . . . The Royal Navy had only 175 combatants and 150,000 men.”5

CHAPTER SIX

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overseas debts fifteen times their reserves of gold and foreign currency. Their export

trade [in 1946] was one-third the level of that in 1939, and their visible exports could

finance only 10 percent of their overseas requirements.”6

The government of the United

States had not helped matters when it abruptly cut off Lend-Lease aid to Britain within

a month of the end of World War II in the Pacific.

Both postwar navies—the USN and the RN—had suffered in financial and personnel

terms, but the U.S. economy had not suffered the way that the British had. Indeed, the

American economy had actually grown in real terms during the war. This economic

growth meant that the U.S. Navy had more actual and potential financial resources

available to it.

Moreover, aviation within the U.S. Navy had strengthened institutionally, as a result of

its wartime performance. As Vincent Davis documented in his 1962 study of the Navy’s

postwar leadership, naval aviators came out of World War II with the strong support of

the Navy’s civilian leaders. In May 1944, in testimony to a congressional committee

studying postwar defense organization, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemu

Gates argued that “it must be clear to all by now that the naval air force has proved to

be the most important member of the Navy team.”7

A year later, Navy secretary James

Forrestal described to a Senate subcommittee a true transformation in naval warfare:

One of the major purposes of the fast carriers’ interdiction strikes in advance of an invasion is to

knock out or pin down Japanese land-based air power all around our target. These battles of our

carrier-based air power against Japanese land-based air power now comprise one of the great struggle

going on in the Pacific. It really points up the question, Can sea air power cope with land-based air

power? I think the answer is obvious in the fact we are coping with it and we have beaten it.8

Forrestal backed up his endorsement of this new concept of naval aviation’s mission

with action to shift the center of gravity of the Navy from surface ships to aviation. As

the young aviator Donald Engen saw firsthand, there were immediate benefits for the

more senior naval aviators: “In the first major postwar promotion of Regular Navy line

captains to flag rank, fourteen out of the total of eighteen were aviators.”9

In fiscal year

1941, only 12 percent of unrestricted line officers were aviators. In fiscal year 1947, the

proportion had nearly tripled, to 34 percent.10 Funding for the Navy fell dramatically,

and a huge number of trained personnel left the service, but aviation was significantly

stronger within the Navy than it had been before the war.

But what about U.S. Navy aviators’ perception of the Royal Navy’s carrier force? It was

negative; most Fleet Air Arm aircraft by 1944 were U.S. designs, because many British

designs had not been successful. U.S. Navy aviators attributed the lack of effective British carrier aircraft to the two-decades-long control over all British military aircraft

development by the Royal Air Force. The U.S. Navy’s aviators argued that their wartime

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ment, procurement, and training. They did not support the campaign by the Arm

Forces or, later, the U.S. Air Force to incorporate all fixed-wing military aviation 

one service.11

Cooperation between American and British scientists and engineers had been clo

since April 1941, when the British government had set up a special office in Wash

ton to facilitate the exchange of technical information.12 Moreover, the U.S. Navy 

been allowed to place liaison officers on RN carriers in the Mediterranean in the 

of 1940–41, with positive consequences for the USN, and the carrier forces of the 

navies had traded information and insights when they had the opportunity du

the war.13

As Vincent Davis, Jeffrey Barlow, and other researchers have noted, U.S. Navy avi

policy after World War II was most influenced by four developments: the advent 

nuclear weapons; the beginning of the Cold War; the political and bureaucratic c

over service roles and missions; and rapid technological change. We add a fifth fa

the administrative changes that drew the policy-making responsibility out of BuA

and placed it in OPNAV and that weakened the General Board. Perception and su

by senior officers of innovations in carrier aviation had to occur within this high

charged and changing bureaucratic, technological, and administrative environme

Memoirists like retired vice admirals Jerry Miller and John T. Hayward have mad

very clear that the attempt to show that carriers could launch nuclear strikes and 

anxiety and anger that stemmed from the “strategic bomber versus carrier” strug

dominated other issues.14 As Hayward recalled, “From 1946 on, building the carr

based big-bomber force [to carry nuclear weapons] evolved along two parallel, in

tive lines. One focused on hardware; the other, on hiring and training able peopl

both, we were ‘pushing the envelope,’ as pilots say.”15

As we have pointed out, the organization of Navy aviation had also changed duri

war. The authority and role of the Bureau of Aeronautics had been weakened by 

creation of the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air (DCNO [A

August 1943.16 As Rear Adm. Julius A. Furer put it in his book on wartime Navy a

istration, “Broadly speaking, naval aviation planning, training of flying personne

logistics, planning and aviation operations were now responsibilities of DCNO(A

BuAer was responsible for all that related to the aviation materiel of the Navy, in

ing ‘designing, building, fitting out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircra

accessories, equipment, and devices, connected with aircraft.’”17

At first, the separation seemed beneficial. For example, Rear Adm. John S. McCai

served as BuAer chief from October 1942 to mid-August 1943, shifted from the b

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Radford, who had been Director, Training Division, in BuAer, went with McCain to

OPNAV, where he headed several review boards that hammered out a comprehensive

program of aircraft production, maintenance, and pilot training.18 Again, what facilitated the development and implementation of policy was the fact that senior officers

knew one another well. Complementing this familiarity was the fact that younger

officers tended to rotate into and then out of BuAer or OPNAV (and of course into

and out of fleet assignments), so that the shared experience gained from time spent in

both organizations gave midcareer officers a common understanding of the problems

facing naval aviation. But there was also the chance that aviation officers in the postwar

Navy would gradually and quietly settle out into two camps—one focused on making

policy in OPNAV and the other concentrating on relations with aircraft and engine

manufacturers.

The Battle over Service Unification

What Barlow calls “The Fight for Naval Aviation” in the years between the end of

World War II and the start of the Korean War in 1950 was just as challenging and a lot

more psychologically punishing than the effort to create a nuclear strike force for the

Navy. “Unification” in fact covered two issues, and both demanded the time and the

energy of the Navy’s highest-ranking officers. The first was service unification—the

idea that the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. forces could be improved significantly

if all the services were unified under one commander and his staff. The second was the

U.S. Air Force argument that it would be more efficient to place all fixed-wing aviation

in one service than to spread it among the three military departments (Army, Navy, and

Air Force).

The political and bureaucratic struggles over service unification and over service roles

and missions have been studied in detail, and we won’t review all the relevant research

here. But it’s important to get at least a flavor of the intensity of these past disputes. In

December 1947, for example, Adm. Chester Nimitz, retiring as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), argued, “It is improbable that bomber fleets will be capable, for several

years to come[,] of making two-way trips between continents . . . with heavy loads of

bombs. . . . In the event of war . . . , if we are to project our power against vital areas of

an enemy across the ocean before beachheads on enemy territory are captured, it must

be by air-sea power.”19 Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, the first Chief of Staff of the new Air Force,

promptly fired back: “If the Navy is trying to spend hundreds of millions of dollars

building aircraft carriers of a hundred thousand tons to move thirty-six bombers

somewhere close to the hostile shores to deliver devastating attacks, it shows an utter

lack of realization of what the hell strategic air and what air power is.”20

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ations, well knew the challenge that he and other Navy leaders faced. As he told t

CNO in August 1947, “The most serious mistake that we can make in the Navy a

time is to assume that everything insofar as naval aviation is concerned is alright

will take bold and aggressive leadership after careful advance planning to combat 

Air Force arguments and drive.”21

This dramatic confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force would scar the 

ings of personnel in both services and consume much precious time and attentio

effort expended on both sides of the battle is a classic example of a high “opportu

cost.” Senior aviation officers in the U.S. Navy were unavoidably preoccupied by 

urgent efforts to beat back the Air Force arguments for “unification” (in both sen

and by their equally intense—and ultimately successful—campaign to create a ca

based nuclear striking force.

For example, why didn’t the U.S. Navy pioneer the concept of the angled flight de

carriers once it realized that jet aircraft would land on carriers at higher speeds th

had World War II piston-engine planes? Part of the answer has to do with the dif

ways that the U.S. 

and the Royal Nav

planned to use air

carriers after Wor

II. As a retired US

ator, Rear Adm. P

Gillcrist, put it in 

memoir, the Roya

Navy’s postwar ca

concept emphasiz

using fighters to p

convoys from air a

“whereas the U.S. 

emphasized strike 

air defense operat

These differing po

operational conce

to different operating tempos for the carriers of the two navies. The British used 

measured round-the-clock type of operation.” By contrast, U.S. carriers had to p

surges of sorties for major strike operations, which meant that they wanted plent

deck space to line up sizable numbers of attack aircraft prior to strike missions.22

A Grumman F9F Panther jet lands on Essex (CV 9). The athwartship barrier is up, but

from the pilot’s view he’s landing into a deck full of aircraft.

Naval War College

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accepted as normal.

These operational differences meant that the RN could accept an angled deck with a

four-degree offset, while the USN could not. As Gillcrist noted, “When an eight-degree

angled deck was examined, however, much less deck area forward of the landing area

had to be given up, and the obvious operational benefits of the angled deck became

much more attractive.”23 Adm. James S. Russell, then a captain in the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations, also “wasn’t completely sold on” the angled deck until he

“realized its great virtue in handling jets, with which we’d had all sorts of trouble.”24

(See appendix B.)

Immediate Postwar Carrier Concepts

At the end of 1944, Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher, the most successful carrier-force commander in the Pacific in World War II, advocated the creation of an informal board to

recommend a new carrier design to DCNO (Air).25 In effect, he wanted an organization

that would function

much as the General

Board had in the interwar years. As one would

expect of Mitscher, he

had been evaluating the

performance of both his

carriers and the aircraft

flying from them. His

call for a careful assessment of combat experience was echoed in May

1945 by Commander, Ai

Force, Pacific, the “type

commander” of Navy air

forces in the Pacific, who

wrote to the Chief of

Naval Operations to press for the modification of the Essex-class carriers still under

construction. Specifically, he wanted the centerline aircraft elevators in the Essex class

replaced with deck-edge elevators.26 In this he was thinking in tune with BuAer, which

in the same month had returned to earlier studies of the possibility of launching and

recovering large, long-range bombers from new and existing carriers.27

What every pilot feared—missing the arresting gear and vaulting over the barrier. The

F2H-1 is headed for two Skyraiders parked at the forward end of the flight deck of

USS Coral Sea (CV 43). The flight deck crew members are running for their lives.

U.S. Navy, courtesy of Captain Charles T. Creekman, Jr., USN (Ret.)

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were three large (o

forty-five-thousan

displacement) arm

deck carriers whos

design had been ba

earlier experience w

carrier-versus-carr

combat at Midway 

June 1942. These s

would be the first 

carriers constructe

armored flight dec

They would also h

large aircraft comp

ments—over a hu

planes. The questi

whether they wou

satisfy both the “lessons learned” by Mitscher and the demands placed on any ca

by the new and promising jet aircraft.

To come up with some answers, Capt. W. T. Raisseur, who had commanded an es

carrier in World War II and had become head of the Aviation Military Character

office in DCNO (Air) in early 1945, conducted a thorough analysis of war experi

and complemented it by consideration of the impact of newer, heavier aircraft on 

rier design. As his notional aircraft he chose the F7F twin-engine fighter and the 

posed BT3D turboprop attack plane.28 Raisseur’s analysis considered the carrier a

group (fifty-four F7Fs and thirty-six BT3Ds) and the carrier as a single system. W

did that system have to do? It had to generate sorties. To generate enough sorties 

given period of time, it had to be able to launch aircraft from several catapults sim

neously. Those aircraft would need deck space on which to wait their turns at the 

catapults. The need for deck space would require the carrier’s designers to place t

craft elevators at the edges of the flight deck, and one of the aft catapults would h

be canted to port.29

The special board Mitscher wanted within OPNAV, reporting to DCNO (Air)

consider any new carrier designs was in place by June 1945, and Captain Raisseu

mitted his analysis to it at the end of that month. Early in July the members of th

board endorsed his analysis and his concept of a carrier that had “a radically rede

signed flight deck and a new mode of operations.”30 Captain Raisseur’s basic idea

The F2H-1 has collided with the two Skyraiders; it will push both overboard and then

go overboard itself. The driver of the jeep tractor on the centerline is miraculously

alive.

U.S. Navy, courtesy of Captain Charles T. Creekman, Jr., USN (Ret.)

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craft it would carry and how they would be operated—would influence all future carrier designs.

In parallel with the work being done in DCNO (Air), engineers at BuAer’s Naval Air

Development Center in Johnsville, Pennsylvania, were developing characteristics for

carrier aircraft that would be powered by turboprop engines and therefore have longer

range and heavier bomb loads. Their studies led the chief of BuAer, then Rear Adm. H.

B. Sallada, to propose to the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945 that the

Navy procure carrier-based bombers capable of carrying significantly larger bombs. As

Sallada pointed out, “Analysis of bombing results in Germany has revealed that lethal

damage to many targets required 12,000 lb bombs.” As a result, BuAer sought to discover “what extension of range and of bomb size in carrier-based aircraft can be

attained through technological advances in the foreseeable future.” BuAer’s assessment

was that “a definite program be initiated to extend greatly the limiting ranges and

bomb sizes of carrier-based aviation.”31 Sallada also proposed that “serious consideration . . . immediately be given to the development of an additional type” of carrier

“that will accommodate aircraft of about 100,000 lbs with a 2000 mile radius.”32

Sallada’s recommendations that BuAer pursue the development of larger, heavier aircraft with significantly greater bomb loads and that a new carrier be constructed to

launch and recover these planes were endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations at the

end of December. Sallada’s initiative was also supported by Vice Admiral Mitscher, by

then DCNO (Air), in January 1946, as well as by the informal board that Mitscher had

helped create. In February the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. DeWitt Ramsey,

an aviator, ordered the Bureau of Ships to begin studies of a new carrier design.33 As Norman Friedman has discovered, BuShips developed a new design, called “C-2,” in April

1946 and placed its preliminary characteristics before the Ship Characteristics Board,

which reported to the Deputy CNO for Logistics (DCNO [Logistics]) that June.34

But in fact there were two new carrier designs under consideration. The C-2, based on

wartime experience, was an alternative to the new Midway type. A second concept carrier (CVB-X) was developed specifically for the very-long-range and very large attack

aircraft that would be able to carry heavy nuclear weapons like the implosion plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki in August 1945. This second carrier concept, which

eventually became the design of the ill-fated United States, was also submitted to the

Ship Characteristics Board as a potential entry in the fiscal year 1948 ship-construction

budget.35 It is in this second design that the “threads” of the heavy aircraft, the carrier

designed to launch it, and the Navy’s concept of carriers as nuclear weapons systems

come together.

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The prospect that the carrier force could fill the nuclear strike mission led the Ac

Secretary of the Navy in July 1946 to write President Truman that “the high mob

the Naval Carrier Task Force combined with its capacity for making successive an

continuous strikes in almost any part of the world make this force a most suitabl

means of waging atomic bomb warfare.” The president assented to this approach

in November 1946 the CNO “directed the DCNO(Logistics) to modify the three 

[Midways] to permit the operation of AJ Savages carrying atomic bombs.”36 Navy 

ers thought, however, that they needed a new carrier, designed from the first to c

both nuclear weapons and aircraft that could deliver them at long range. As Fried

notes, “In a sense the navy could consider the presidential authorization for carr

project nuclear strikes an authorization for the big strike carrier.”37

However, the trade-offs between the C-2 and the CVB-X caused problems for the 

eral Board. For example, the aviators wanted a flush (i.e., clear, flat, and unobstru

flight deck. The ship designers answered that at least a minimal “island” structur

necessary to carry away the exhaust from the carrier’s fire rooms and to mount e

tronic antennas. The effort to resolve this dispute has obscured the fact that carri

operations in World War II and BuAer’s parallel efforts to work with industry to

develop larger, more powerful, and longer-range carrier aircraft led to two new c

concepts right after the war. We will turn to later developments in the story of wh

became United States after we broaden our view of the problems and promise of 

War II technological innovations.

Two AJ-1 Savages on Hancock in late November 1955. The plane on the starboard catapult is being launched; that on 

catapult is waiting its turn. Note the early-model jet-blast deflectors.

Navy Department, National Archives

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Aviation wasn’t the only area to be changed dramatically by emergency wartime investments in new technology. In 1946, even if one sets aside the implications of nuclear

weapons for the Navy and for amphibious warfare, one thing was clear: the fleet that

had triumphed in World War II was now largely obsolete. Technological advances during the war had produced many types of radars, improved forms of sonar, streamlined

submarines that could stay submerged and run at high speeds by supplying their diesel

with air from snorkels, jet aircraft that flew too fast for existing antiaircraft fire-control

systems to target, homing torpedoes of several types, missiles, more-sophisticated sea

mines, and larger, heavier antisubmarine weapons.

The hundreds of destroyers and destroyer escorts that had fought in World War II were

now too small; the light cruisers produced by the dozen after 1940 could not protect

existing aircraft carriers from attack by jet aircraft; battleships were no longer necessary; aircraft carriers now in service were not large enough to launch and recover new

aircraft like the AJ-1 Savage; and most amphibious ships lacked the speed needed to

converge quickly on a beach and unload their cargoes before an enemy equipped with

high-speed submarines and jet aircraft could mount an effective defense. The postwar

Navy had plenty of active ships and even more in reserve, but most had been designed

before the great advances in technology brought on by the heavy investment in research

and development during the war and were therefore severely limited in capability.

What to do about this consumed much of the time of the members of the General

Board. In an effort to help the secretary and CNO set priorities for investment, the

board reviewed the impact of likely future technological developments in a series of

classified hearings in 1948 and 1949. In the hearings representatives of the Navy’s

material bureaus (its acquisition organizations, such as BuAer), OPNAV, the new Office

of Naval Research, and the Marine Corps offered their views about the direction of

future science and technology and about the implications of that future development

for the Navy.

These hearings give us a window on Navy thinking in this period of rapid, even chaotic

technological progress. In one hearing, held to review the planned 1951–60 long-term

shipbuilding program, a representative of DCNO (Logistics) argued that future ships

should be designed “from the electronics standpoint.” That is, they should be built

around their electronics instead of having the electronics simply placed on board.38 Thi

had dramatic implications for new ships and for older ships that were modified. For

example, more space would be needed for workshops for new electronic systems, as

well as living spaces for the technicians who would maintain the new sensors and communications equipment.39 Recruiting and retaining the technicians would also pose

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“fit” into a ship’s authority structure? And how would the data from the new elec

sensors be analyzed and displayed? These were not trivial issues.

The demand for more electronic equipment would also put its developers on a c

sion course with the Navy’s own naval architects, who were committed to “cleani

the topside structure of ships.” Those who wanted more and larger antennas wer

odds with those who wanted less “clutter.” This was especially true on carriers, w

there was already “insufficient room for proper antennas, both communications 

radar.”40 As one senior officer on the team representing the Deputy Chief of Nava

Operations for Logistics noted, “We have discovered no new basic techniques in 

tronics which would lead us to believe that we can obtain greatly improved perfo

mance over the radars of World War II without a corresponding increase in the s

and weight of radar components.”41

As this same officer observed, “A forward-looking, imaginative outlook is require

which views the ships as a system, really, rather than a combination of systems.”4

implications of this perspective were dramatic for carriers. For example, larger ai

with faster approach speeds required a new carrier-controlled approach (CCA) s

but this new system—then still under development—needed “six clear channels 

communications” and the antennas to support them.43 In addition, “foreseeable a

task groups may require as many as 20 simultaneous transmitting and receiving c

nels aboard a carrier, which means a critical antenna design problem for the carr

Moreover, future carriers would have to have, for safe air navigation, “a minimum 

two special radars, six simultaneous communication channels and an additional 

trol center which will approximate the present” combat information center.44 The

requirements were pushing up carrier size and displacement and presenting the Na

with a problem—which was, to state it simply, continuing pressure on carrier costs

A captain from BuShips had more bad news for the members of the board: “Befo

looking ahead 15 years, let us look back the same number of years and we will fin

surprising fact that communications in the Fleet was in a healthier condition tha

today. . . . Formerly a ship carried communication antennas worthy of the name. 

we find metallic spikes called whips feebly probing the ether, and relegated to loc

where, surrounded by every known enemy of a radiator or collector, they exempl

present day expression that everything on our ships radiates except the antennas

way around this problem was to use the ship’s superstructure as an antenna, but 

approach again set the electronics engineers against the aviators, who wanted a fl

deck carrier large enough to let them safely land their faster jet aircraft—and of c

their nuclear-capable AJ-1 Savages, too.

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for detectors that could alert a crew to the presence of radioactive dust and debris.

Radioactive contamination was a particularly vexing problem for carriers, because of

their large flight decks and their need to recover more and more expensive and sophisticated aircraft as those planes, low on fuel, returned from missions. Carrier flight

decks could be washed down, but building systems to do that into existing and planned

carriers would require more money, consume precious space, and push up overall displacement in and atop carrier hulls that were not designed for such loads.

What about cooperation with the British? Their carrier force faced the same basic

problem of adopting both new aircraft (jets) and new electronics. Was cooperative

development part of the solution to the problems facing both navies? In November

1948, representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in the Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations informed the board that the Royal Navy was studying antiaircraft missiles and was “well advanced in experimentation with a flexible, rubber and

pneumatic landing deck for airplanes . . . to permit employment of very high performance, wheelless [sic], jet fighter aircraft.”46 Two years later, in October 1950, the board

asked Rear Adm. C. F. Coe, DCNO (Air), about this British idea, and Coe’s assistant

noted the response of Rear Adm. A. M. Pride, then chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,

that it was “tough enough to operate planes on a carrier without trying to operate

them in a mattress.”47 This offhand dismissal of British work would not preclude later

trials of the “mattress,” as we shall show, but Pride’s attitude was that of a man beset by

too many problems at the same time—a condition we believe was widespread

throughout the senior ranks of the postwar U.S. Navy.

In 1948, the problems the British faced in finding the resources for research, development, and production were clear to staff of ONI. As an ONI officer told the board,

“While the United States and Britain led the world at the close of World War II [in

radar technology], the British . . . are at present making very little progress, and except

in so far as U.S. equipment is made available to them and unless their present policy

changes, they may well lag considerably behind the United States and even some other

countries by 1960.”48

Yet BuOrd and BuAer maintained close contact with their counterparts in the Royal

Navy. The RN had two officers assigned to BuOrd in Washington, and BuOrd had an

officer “attached to the Naval Attache’s Office” who was an “ex-officio member of the

British Ordnance Board.”49 One goal of this cooperative arrangement was the development of effective close-range air defense for carriers.50 BuAer too worked closely with

the Royal Navy. In fact, the British tried to persuade BuAer to take over funding and

management of their flexible flight deck in 1950, but BuAer turned the offer down. As

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inflated flexible flight deck “doesn’t look like what we need now.”51

But something certainly was needed. As a BuAer officer told the board in Novemb

1948, “the trend in carrier aircraft weight and speed has been upward at an accele

rate for the past 20 years. Fighters of 1927 were 3,000 lbs., those of 1949 nearly 2

lbs., the escort fighter of 1955 will probably be 50,000 lbs. Attack aircraft during 

same period have risen in weight from 5000 to 50,000 lbs., and [one likely future

design will be about 100,000.” Our tables and charts (see appendix B) show how 

rate this linear extrapolation was. This growth in aircraft weight and size require

stronger and heavier carrier decks and elevators, higher hangar decks, and, as the

BuAer representative noted, “more powerful catapulting and arresting machinery

Accordingly, BuAer was developing more powerful catapults. But the hydraulic c

pults were heavy. One capable of launching a 100,000-pound aircraft at 150 knot

“would approach 800 tons.” To get around that, BuAer was banking on the “slott

tube catapult,” weighing “only a third as much.” It was supposed to be ready in 19

1953. Unlike the existing hydraulic catapults, the slotted-tube type required explo

fuel—“approximately 1000 lbs. of powder, or about 150 lbs. liquid-oxygen gasoli

nitromethane, per shot.” BuAer’s representative reassured the board that the slott

tube catapult had been used successfully by Germany in World War II to launch 

missiles. It was not considered exotic technology, though, of course, some of the 

bers of the board knew that rapid-oxidizing catapult fuels did not belong on a ca

likely to be damaged in battle.

Neither did large numbers of jet-assisted takeoff units that had been developed d

World War II. But the heavier aircraft would require larger JATO units or several 

smaller, “standard” ones. Standard units weighed two hundred pounds each, and 

usual fitting was two per plane per takeoff. As BuAer noted, a large carrier with a 

dred aircraft could use upward of six hundred of these units each day, creating “q

an ammunition stowage problem.” Making the JATO units larger would not elim

the risk of storing what were essentially rockets.

Also, of course, the larger aircraft required the development of more powerful arre

gear units and perhaps even a new barrier, “actuated by spaced powder charges u

the wire across the deck.”53 In 1948, BuAer did not see the need for such new dev

either entailing much technical risk or stressing the process of designing new car

or modernizing existing ones. Officially, “The Bureau of Aeronautics feels confid

that it can produce catapults and arresting gear for the period under discussion w

will be adequate for any aircraft it may build, that is, up to [aircraft] sizes permit

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soon change its tune.

Immediate Postwar Cooperation with the British

Relations between the USN and RN during World War II had been close, especially in

technological and scientific areas. That “special relationship” continued after the war,

but not quite at the same level. At the end of May 1946, for example, the British assistant naval attaché informed his boss, Adm. Sir Henry Moore, who served in what

remained of the wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff, that the U.S. Chief of Naval Opera

tions had made it more difficult for him and other military members of the embassy

staff to talk freely with their American counterparts. This did not make sense to the

assistant naval attaché, because “access is much easier for American officers in London

to technical developments than it is for us over here.”55 When told by his U.S. Navy

counterpart that the Bureau of Ships “had given a great deal of information to the

Admiralty without receiving much in return,” he was quite surprised. As he wrote to

Admiral Moore, the American officer had “admitted frankly that in many other directions, the U.S. Navy Department had learned far more from us than they had given in

exchange, but added that many officers in the Bureau of Ships were not in the position

to appreciate this fact.”56

Admiral Moore considered this apparent lapse in cooperation so potentially serious

that he sent a letter making just that point on 3 July to the Secretary of the Admiralty.57

The latter promised, in his reply of 15 July, to take the matter up with the RN’s

Engineer-in-Chief (EIC) and the Director of Naval Construction (DNC). The director

replied first, on 27 July 1946. He observed that the then chief of the Bureau of Ships

had led the U.S. Navy’s technical mission to London even before the United States had

entered the war and that “there is no doubt the Americans had at that time much to

learn from us in respect of nearly every type of ship. Since then although we have continued to supply them with information it is inevitable they do not find much that is

new since all important lessons have been absorbed by them.”58 Moreover, “they are

investing staff and money for naval research much more largely than we are and the

thought naturally follows why should they, by collaboration, finance the research for

the British Navy and incidentally for British Industry.”59 At the same time, he wanted to

make sure that Admiral Moore understood that there was still a “channel for the

steady flow of information in both directions”—that is, from the RN to the USN and

vice versa.60

The EIC responded on 12 August, and he supported the points made by DNC. As he

pointed out, “It is perfectly true that in the high pressure high temperature field [for

steam turbine propulsion] we have received much valuable information from the

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“since then they have been given all machinery information and data for which t

have asked.”61 Yet he also admitted that “it is the paucity of our research and deve

ment facilities and efforts which keeps the U.S. Navy from full collaboration.”62

Despite obstacles and differences, the exchanges—both of information and of de

tions—continued. For example, in November 1948, two members of the Admira

Naval Construction Department visited Washington to study the latest developm

in carrier construction and the use of catapults and arresting gear on carriers. As 

two engineers noted in their trip report, “On every subject dealt with there was a 

full and free discussion, and . . . no information was withheld. We obtained a ma

information, drawings and pamphlets, including the only set of plans of C.V.A. 5

carrier United States] outside America.”63 Their American hosts were indeed cand

They informed their British guests that the United States was a “normal” carrier r

than “a specialised carrier designed for a particular objective” and that “future Fl

carriers must be able to operate the largest types of aircraft of increasing ‘take-of

landing speeds.” This implied that “we shall reach a stage when all aircraft will ha

be catapulted.”64 In addition, the USN officers agreed that “the complete develop

of AEW [airborne early warning]” was “essential.”65

The report of this mission to the United States was an excellent review of the U.S

Navy’s progress and problems in the field of carrier aviation. The British enginee

learned that the USN was developing a slotted-tube catapult—the one described 

General Board by the Bureau of Aeronautics that same year.66 They also were give

maximum aircraft “takeoff ” weights for the existing carriers: sixty-two thousand

pounds for Midway, fifty-two thousand for Oriskany, and twenty-seven thousand 

the unmodified ships of the Essex class.67 Information on the loaded AJ-1 Savage 

also given them, as were the particulars concerning the modifications to Oriskany

They held detailed discussions with their American counterparts in BuShips and 

concerning arresting gear, barriers to capture planes that missed the arresting-ge

wires, and catapults. They even spoke with engineers at BuAer’s Naval Air Materi

Center (NAMC) about arresting-gear hooks for aircraft, discovering that NAMC 

members did not agree with the views expressed by BuAer personnel.69 This was 

“inside” information. But it was an important issue: Could existing arresting gea

hooks and the cables they caught—capture the faster-landing and heavier jets wi

allowing the jets to slide to the left or the right?

Navy officers at the Patuxent Naval Air Station in Maryland showed the British th

est Navy aircraft, including the F9F and the still-experimental F7U-1. As the two 

ralty engineers remarked in their report, “The main particulars of most, if not al

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Ministry of Supply.”70 What the British did not already have, however, were the landing

weights at given speeds for most of these aircraft; as their report noted, “records of

many of these landings were handed to us for our information and are now available.”7

From this information they inferred that “the Americans have a much more effective

control of the landing speeds of their Naval aircraft than we have for our own Naval

aircraft.”72

This mattered, because aircraft models changed faster than carriers and their equipment, which meant that RN carriers not yet built might find it impossible to take

aboard and successfully arrest aircraft then on the drawing boards. It was the by-thenfamiliar problem of finding safe and efficient ways of throwing jets off carriers and

then capturing them as they returned. The Americans were better at it because of their

aircraft, not because their catapults and arresting gear were superior. This ability to

analyze American developments because the Americans were so forthcoming is just

another sign of the continuing and close cooperation between the two navies, especially

in the field of naval aviation.

A Pandora’s Box of Technology

In the spring of 1947, then–lieutenant commander (later rear admiral) James D.

Ramage devoted his Naval War College thesis to the topic “The Atom Bomb and the

Fast Carrier Task Force.”73 Ramage could know little enough about nuclear weapons at

the time, because of the secrecy that covered the nuclear program, but his argument

was clear: with nuclear weapons, Navy carrier task forces could pose a significant threa

to targets on land. He argued, “The use of the atomic bomb not only will multiply the

destructive force of a carrier air group from forty tons of TNT to the twenty thousand

equivalent tons of TNT of the present atomic charge, but will also double the number

of fighters . . . that will be used to protect the force. Thus one of the chief weaknesses o

the task force, that of defense, is strengthened simultaneously with the multiplication

of the offensive power of the force by fifty fold.”74 In short, “The carrier task force

therefore is just entering into the outer fringe of its potential. . . . A small or medium

carrier based attack plane, heavily escorted, and operating from the movable airfields

of the fast carrier task force now has the advantages of destruction formerly held only

by fleets of very heavy bombers with the added advantages of extreme mobility.”75

Ramage, a decorated dive-bomber pilot and squadron leader in World War II, would go

on to play a major role in the maturing of Navy carrier nuclear-attack squadrons, and

he would rise in rank quickly.76 For him, the immediate postwar years were “the best of

times.” For his Royal Navy counterparts, that was not the case. Theirs was “the winter

of despair.” Hopes of a peacetime force of ten large carriers, seventeen light carriers,

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class, ordered in 1945 and based on lessons learned during the war, were never bu

1938, the carrier Ark Royal was considered adequate for aircraft in commission a

under development. It had two hydraulic catapults that could accelerate its sixty 

craft to a launch speed of fifty-six knots, if they did not exceed a weight of twelve 

sand pounds. Ark Royal’s arresting gear could stop an eleven-thousand-pound pl

landing at forty-five knots within forty feet.78 The canceled Maltas would have op

ninety aircraft each, mounted catapults capable of launching thirty-thousand-po

aircraft at 130 knots, and possessed arresting gear able to stop a twenty-thousand

pound aircraft landing at seventy-five knots.79

Our argument is that the innovations picked up by the USN from the RN—the s

catapult, the angled deck, and the mirror landing aid—cannot be appreciated sep

rately from these larger developments, the “threads” that make up the story of po

carrier aviation and the background to it. There’s a “heavy bomber” thread that c

over from World War II, as well as “threads” representing the need of jet aircraft 

catapults to get off the deck and for angled decks to get “home” safely, and the de

over service unification, the unification of all aviation forces, and the optimal wa

deliver nuclear weapons. There’s also a “thread” for financing innovation and an

for the range of the innovations themselves. The latter covers a lot of ground—fr

the introduction of effective jet (and then supersonic) aircraft, to nuclear subma

cruise and ballistic missiles, and even space satellites. World War II had opened a 

dora’s box of technology, and both the USN and the RN struggled to take advant

all the ideas and inventions that had popped out of that box.

But very quickly after the war it became clear to officers and civilians in both nav

that the U.S. Navy had a huge advantage in terms of resources. The disparity in

resources, however, did not cut off close and confidential exchanges between the 

and the USN. The two navies had established communication at multiple levels, 

the contacts persisted, despite the fact that the futures of the carrier forces in the 

navies were beginning to diverge sharply.

Notes

1. Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy,

1942–1991 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole

Books, 1992), p. 291.

2. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My

Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), p. 70.

3. Ibid., p. 77.

4. James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carrie

War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

2007), p. 15.

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vol. 1, 1945–1962 (New York: St. Martin’s,

1993), p. 249.

6. Ibid., p. 132.

7. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the

U.S. Navy, 1943–1946 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of

North Carolina Press, 1962), p. 124.

8. Ibid., p. 148.

9. Ibid., p. 203.

10. Ibid., p. 127, chart 3.

11. Ibid., p. 148. Also see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval

Historical Center, 1994), p. 259.

12. Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy

Department in World War II (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1959), p. 797.

13. Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and

Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999),

chaps. 5–6; Norman Friedman, Networkcentric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight

Smarter through Three World Wars (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp.

58–59.

14. Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft

Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 2001); John T. Hayward and C. W.

Borklund, Bluejacket Admiral: The Navy Career of Chick Hayward (Annapolis, Md., and

Newport, R.I.: Naval Institute Press and Naval War College Foundation, 2000).

15. Hayward and Borklund, Bluejacket Admiral,

pp. 166–67.

16. Secretary of the Navy, Op-01-MD, ser. 71802,

of 18 August 1943 had created DCNO (Air).

Op-01-MD, ser. 71902 (18 August 1943), also

from the secretary, had transferred the Planning, Personnel, Training, and Flight divisions to the new office from BuAer, along

with the Air Information Branch. See Furer,

Administration of the Navy Department in

World War II, p. 392.

17. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department

in World War II, p. 393.

18. Ibid., p. 394.

19. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals, p. 54.

20. Ibid., p. 56.

22. Paul T. Gillcrist, Feet Wet: Reflections of a

Carrier Pilot (New York: Presidio, 1990), pp

137–38.

23. Ibid., p. 138.

24. E. T. Wooldridge, ed., Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Naval Aviation, 1945–

1975 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1995), p. 56.

25. Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An

Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 230.

26. Ibid., p. 227.

27. Ibid., p. 231.

28. Ibid., p. 228.

29. See the drawing in ibid., p. 229.

30. Ibid., p. 204.

31. Ibid., pp. 231–32.

32. Ibid., p. 241.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., pp. 237, 244.

35. Ibid., p. 242.

36. Ibid., p. 244.

37. Ibid.

38. General Board of the Navy, hearings [hereaf

ter Hearings], “Shipbuilding Program, FY

1951–1960,” 15 November 1948, Microfilm

Publication M1493, roll 27, National Archives, p. 659.

39. Ibid., p. 660.

40. Ibid., p. 661.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 663.

43. Ibid., p. 665.

44. Ibid., pp. 698–99.

45. Ibid., p. 670.

46. Hearings, “Shipbuilding Program, FY 1951–

1960,” 19 November 1948, p. 739.

47. Hearings, “Attack Carrier (New Construction),” 24 October 1950, p. 979.

48. Hearings, “Shipbuilding Program, FY 1951–

1960,” 19 November 1948, p. 755. See also

pp. 759, 761.

49. Hearings, “Shipbuilding Program, FY 1951–

1960,” 24 November 1948, p. 770.

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(Project 27A Conversion),” 28 April 1950,

p. 452.

51. Hearings, “Attack Carrier (New Construction),” 24 October 1950, p. 979.

52. Hearings, “Shipbuilding Program, FY 1951–

1960,” 24 November 1948, p. 784.

53. Ibid., p. 785.

54. Ibid., p. 786.

55. Cdr. (E) F. G. Bowring, RN, “Report on Conversation between Commander Bowring, Assistant Naval Attaché and Captain Mumma,

U.S.N., of Bureau of Ships,” 25 May 1946,

folder ADM 1/20/76, Public Records Office

[hereafter PRO], pp. 1–2.

56. Ibid., p. 2.

57. Adm. Sir Henry Moore, RN, Offices of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, letter to Secretary

of the Admiralty, 3 July 1946 (ref. R.P. 768/

46), folder ADM 1/20/76, PRO.

58. Director of Naval Construction, minute, 27

July 1946 (register no. C.W. 46.175), folder

ADM 1/20/76, PRO.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Engineer-in-Chief, minute, 12 August 1946,

folder ADM 1/20/76, PRO.

62. Ibid.

63. “Report of the visit of Mr. J. L. Bartlett & Mr.

D. W. Smithers to the U.S.A., November

1948,” Naval Construction Department (Admiralty, Bath), folder ADM 281/109, PRO,

p. 4.

65. Ibid., p. 8.

66. Ibid., p. 14.

67. Ibid., p. 22.

68. Ibid., pp. 23–24.

69. Ibid., p. 43.

70. Ibid., p. 46.

71. Ibid., p. 48.

72. Ibid., p. 50.

73. James D. Ramage, “The Atom Bomb 

Fast Carrier Task Force” (junior thes

War College, May 1947), record grou

Naval War College Naval Historical

Collection.

74. Ibid., p. 10.

75. Ibid., p. 11.

76. James D. Ramage, “Taking A-Bombs 

Naval History 9, no. 1 (January/Febr

1995), pp. 29–34.

77. Richard Hill, “British Naval Thinking 

Nuclear Age,” in The Development of 

Naval Thinking, ed. Geoffrey Till (Lo

Routledge, 2006), p. 174.

78. David Hobbs, “Naval Aviation, 1930–

in The Royal Navy, 1930–2000: Innov

and Defence, ed. Richard Harding (L

Frank Cass, 2005), p. 73.

79. Ibid., p. 80.

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The Flexdeck

The story of the flexible deck, or what some in Britain called the “carpet deck,” is 

esting, because it was an ingenious but failed innovation that helped move Royal 

aviators toward the angled-deck concept. The idea that led to the flexible deck 

simple enough—to improve the flying performance of jet aircraft by eliminating 

landing gear. An aircraft would be recovered back aboard the carrier by flying it s

into an inflated mattress and catching an arresting-gear wire. Then a winch woul

the plane onto a small dolly, from which the plane would be transferred to a cata

and then, rearmed and refueled, launched for its next flight.

The idea seemed elementary, and it was conceptually attractive, particularly given 

high fuel-use rates and resulting low endurance of early jet engines. In the early j

designers were under great pressure to hold down the weight of the aircraft’s stru

in order to increase aircraft endurance, and the weight of aircraft undercarriages 

be traded for more fuel or ordnance.

The idea was well along in Britain by the early spring of 1945. Official records sh

that the Royal Navy’s offices of the Director of Naval Construction and the Engin

in-Charge had already developed various concepts of what was then called a “spr

deck” for use in existing carriers. The Royal Aircraft Establishment had already tr

out some of these ideas “in model form” and was ready to move ahead with full-

trials.1

The Royal Navy and the RAE sought the support of the Naval Aircraft Sub

mittee of the Aeronautical Research Committee of the Ministry of Aircraft Produ

which would have to fund the trials.

On 18 April 1945, MAP officials sponsored a meeting attended by Royal Navy, Ai

istry, and RAE representatives. Representing the RN’s EIC was Cdr. Colin C. Mitc

who—as we’ve already noted—held patents for the steam catapult. One of the RA

representatives was Lewis Boddington, who years later shared credit for coming u

with the concept of the angled flight deck.2

CHAPTER SEVEN

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apply the concept of jet aircraft operating without landing gear to the RAF as well as to

the RN. As he put it, “This aspect, then, must be kept in the minds of people concerned

with the Naval Application.”3

As we shall show, this insistence on the joint (RAF and

RN) application of the concept was to have a strong influence on future decisions.

The RN representatives did not challenge this statement of policy by their MAP counterparts. The RN was aware that the approach was contingent on successful trials; if the

idea didn’t work, it wouldn’t matter that it had been initially proposed for both the

RAF and the RN. Rear Adm. M. S. Slattery, the Chief of Naval Research (CNR), noted

that “the first approach is to try to find a scheme which could be incorporated in existing carriers. . . . Such a scheme would be an interim measure which, if used with existing jet designs with their undercarriages removed, would teach us a lot and show the

way to the solution of the complete problem.”4

The admiral also asserted that “complete mechanization” of carrier landings and takeoffs was “the ultimate aim” of the

informal consortium (composed of engineers from the Admiralty, the RAE, and the

private firms Vickers and Westland’s) that had been considering the idea.5

Finally, Rear

Admiral Slattery proposed two key measures of effectiveness that needed to be applied

to any development effort: “landing and take-off times at least comparable with those

at present[,] . . . 20 seconds and 30 seconds respectively.”6

Like the MAP decision that

any new concept would have to apply to both the RAF and the RN, this metric would

turn out to have a decisive influence on the assessment of the proposal to operate jet

aircraft without undercarriages.

Mr. J. L. Bartlett, speaking for the Admiralty’s DNC, noted several possible structural

alternatives. One was a “thin metal or steel deck in hinged panels supported by a large

number of low pressure shock absorbing air cylinders.”7

Another was a kind of air

mattress, which had the virtue of being able to absorb the impact of a landing jet without damaging the aircraft’s structure. The key point that Bartlett made was that it

would take time, talent, and funds to narrow the alternatives down to the one that

should be pursued. The RAE did not then have satisfactory concepts for either the

“sprung deck” or the means by which aircraft would be taken from this deck and prepared for launching.8

Commander Mitchell, the catapult specialist, noted to his colleagues that the RAE had

already determined that aircraft-carrier catapults would have to be upgraded if the

“sprung deck” were to be developed. As he observed, “the accelerators” on the RN’s

existing carriers were “capable of about 100 knots (including wind over the deck) and

new construction . . . aimed at a maximum speed of 110 knots (with wind over the

deck).” But the RAE’s engineers had determined that jets without undercarriages would

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“sprung deck” would also entail improvements in catapult technology.9

The April 1945 meeting appears to have been the first interaction between techni

specialists and senior decision makers that focused on the interrelationships amo

new concepts of the steam catapult, the angled deck, and what came to be called 

“flexible deck,” or “flexdeck.” Because the MAP controlled overall wartime aircra

duction, the RN had to persuade it to fund further development of concepts such 

“sprung deck.” The MAP supported the RAF and the RN’s air arm, insisting on a

program that would benefit both services. The RN, unlike the RAF, had “target

metrics, for “undercarriage-less” jets operating from existing and future carriers,

because the RN practiced, as a matter of operational doctrine, rapid takeoffs and 

ings from its carriers.

The stage was set for development and testing. According to Eric Brown, work be

the summer of 1947 on a “carpet deck” at the RAE’s facility at Farnborough.10 On

prototype—“composed of five layers of vulcanized rubber, above three layers of N

hoses, inflated at varying low pressures”—was completed, it was subjected to a se

tests, one of which was to have a Vampire jet manned by Brown dropped on it fro

various heights by a crane.11 By the middle of December of that year, the flexible 

was ready for trials at RAE. Once the weather conditions were right, Brown was r

to land his Vampire on it.

Though Brown 

successfully pra

approaching the 

ble deck, his init

landing was a fa

A ramp was pos

tioned at the for

end of the flexib

deck so that the

tailhook of an a

approaching jus

above the groun

would slide up t

ramp before eng

the arresting gea

pended just abo

flexible deck itse

A Fleet Air Arm Vampire on the “flexible rubber carpet” at RAE Farnborough. Note the airfilled “sausages” that support the flexible rubber deck.

Fleet Air Arm Museum

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tailhook “caught in the ridge and was flung up against the fuselage, and the tail booms

of the Vampire hit the ridge.”12 The tailhook lodged in its housing—something that

should have been impossible—and Brown’s Vampire “pitched nose-down towards the

deck,” scraped over the arresting-gear wire, dug right down into the rubber hoses, and

then “was thrown harshly up again in a nose-up attitude.”13 Brown’s Vampire couldn’t

accelerate enough to get back into the air, crashing into the ground forward of the flexible deck. Brown was not hurt, though the “crash split the cockpit all round me.”14

As Brown noted in his autobiography, “We had full camera coverage of the accident”

and “found that my approach speed had been a little lower than normal but should

have been safe enough”—yet it wasn’t. Further tests revealed the problem: “In the

approach speed range which we had been using any increase in engine power caused a

change in airflow behaviour around the wing-root air intakes which aggravated rather

than improved the lift.”15 It took ten weeks to fix that and other problems, and Brown

made a “perfect” landing on the flexible deck on 17 March 1948. The program was still

not out of the woods, but Brown and others successfully conducted sea trials of the

flexible deck from May to November 1948.16 At the same time, engineers at the RAE

assessed the advantages of “undercarriage-less aircraft” as significant: “With constant

endurance the present weight of armament can be doubled.”17

But there was still the MAP requirement that the new system be applicable to the needs

of the RAF, and that became a sticking point. By the end of September 1950, the RAF

had decided that “the complications of catapults and mats” were “operationally unacceptable” for both Fighter Command and the force of long-range bombers.18 There

indeed were advantages in performance for aircraft without landing gear, but those

advantages did not outweigh the operational “costs.” As Group Captain S. R. Ubee put

it in a memo on 27 September, “I do not think we can contemplate any system that ties

fighter aircraft down to particular airfields.”19 By the end of October, the RAF’s position

was clear: “The Air Staff would be glad to see a demonstration of the complete cycle of

take-off, landing, ground-handling, refuelling and re-arming, and preparation for take

off of a fighter type aircraft, without the use of an undercarriage.”20

British firms (Vickers and Supermarine) still supported the concept of the flexible

deck—even for land-based aircraft—but the RAF would not endorse the program

unless and until it could see a clear demonstration of its operational success on land,

and with numbers of aircraft, and it was not likely to see that, given the program’s fisca

constraints. But the RN stayed with the program, despite the fact that test results could

not meet the standards for landing and takeoff intervals of twenty and thirty seconds,

respectively, set in 1945. A 1953 report of trials with three Vampire aircraft landing in

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that the shortes

ing interval was 

four seconds, th

suggesting that 

interval could b

reduced to twen

four seconds—s

just a bit short.2

In the meantim

however, the co

of the flexible d

had caught the 

tion of both the 

Air Force and th

Navy. In Novem

1952, the classif

Naval Aviation Bulletin reported that officers from BuAer had witnessed a dem

stration of landings on the flexible deck at Farnborough and had “unanimously 

ommend[ed] that a comprehensive flexible-deck development program be begun 

the US, preferably in collaboration with the Air Force and the British Royal Navy

year later, Lt. Cdr. Donald Engen, then detailed to RAE Farnborough to test the R

visual-glide-slope development program, was directed to try out Farnborough’s 6

144-foot flexible deck.

Engen expected to repeat the method pioneered by Brown in 1948. He would app

the flexible deck in a modified Vampire (known as a Sea Vampire) at 105 knots w

the tailhook about eighteen inches above the ground. The hook would catch in th

arresting gear, the plane would plop down on the flexible deck, and then the plan

would be towed off the flexible deck to where a crane would lift it so that the pilo

could lower the landing gear and taxi away. Engen’s first landing went more or 

he had hoped: “The arrestment of the forward motion of the airplane was not 

a normal carrier landing. The cushioning of the rubber bolsters was gentle en

but I was thrown around in the cockpit even though I was wearing a seat belt and

shoulder strap.”23

But his fifth try went awry. As the tailhook caught, Engen “allowed the Sea Vamp

climb very slightly. With upward movement . . . , the Sea Vampire flew out until t

wire stopped it in midair, and I was thrown back down into the flex deck, which

This photo from Farnborough shows how the jet without an undercarriage would be

moved off the rubber deck and onto a trolley.

Fleet Air Arm Museum

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this bouncing on Engen was severe: “My body had literally flailed about the cockpit. . . 

I felt like a wet rag, with the pain bringing sweat to my forehead.”24 But this experience

did not cause Engen to turn thumbs-down on the flexible deck.

The USAF and USN proceeded with their tests. The Air Force was apparently concerned that a surprise attack by Soviet aircraft on its bases in Europe would fatally crip

ple the tactical fighter-bomber force assigned to support U.S. ground forces stationed

there. One way to avoid being caught by surprise was to have fighter-bombers that

could take to the air immediately on warning, and the USAF planned to mount combatloaded F-84G Thunderjets on mobile launchers designed for the large Matador cruise

missile. But these attack aircraft would be more effective if they were stripped of their

landing gear, and so the USAF examined the flexible-deck concept as a means to

recover such “zero-length launch” planes.

The USAF’s version of the RN’s flexible deck was four hundred feet long, but the extra

length (as compared to what the RN was using) did not protect the pilot of the first tes

flight from severe injury. The engineering problem faced by the project team had been

to find a way to retract the F-84G’s flaps, which would be down during the aircraft’s

approach, once the plane’s tailhook had caught. The engineers had feared that bringing

the plane down on the rubber deck with its flaps extended might ruin the deck, and so

they had installed a system to pull the flaps up into the wings as soon as the plane

caught the arresting wire. Unfortunately, on the first attempt this system worked even

though the plane didn’t catch the wire, with the result that the F-84G bounced twice on

the mat and then crashed heavily beyond it. Though a second attempt to land an F-84G

on the mat was successful in December 1954, the pilot was violently thrown around in

the cockpit and badly injured. The USAF then abandoned testing.25

The Navy, proceeding in parallel with the Air Force, first sent two pilots to

Farnborough to gain experience landing on the flexible deck there. BuAer also had

Grumman modify two F9F7 Cougar swept-wing jets for tests planned for early 1955.

Both aircraft retained their landing gear, but both were also equipped with powerful

Pratt & Whitney J-48 engines.26 In an effort to protect its own test pilots and those of

the Navy from injuries of the kind suffered by their Air Force counterparts, Grumman

developed “a rigid torso harness, a formfit helmet with wraparound jaw protector, and

a device for rigidly connecting the helmet to the harness.”27 Though this apparatus successfully protected the spines of the two test pilots who made the initial landings at

Patuxent River, one, Lt. John Moore, USN, made the following observation: “It was calculated that with the harness on and the life jacket inflated (in the event of a water

landing), the buoyancy was slightly negative. . . . [I]n the event of a ditching and

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remove the parachute, remove the protective harness, reinstall the life jacket and 

it. It was expected that this could be accomplished while the pilot was standing o

bottom of Chesapeake Bay.”28 Such sarcasm aside, Moore made a number of succ

landings on the 80-by-570-foot flexible deck.

Like the British flexible deck, the one constructed for use at Patuxent River was c

posed of air-filled rubber “sausages,” or bags, that were eighty feet long and thirt

inches in diameter. The bags were stretched across the deck’s base and topped by 

berized fabric mats” that held them in place. The Navy’s flexible deck, again like i

counterpart in Farnborough, had a front ramp (also composed of air-filled bags) 

single arresting-gear wire. “To provide a slippery surface for landings, a compoun

silicon and water was applied to the deck surface by crewmen with swabs.”29

The first flexdeck landing took place on 18 February 1955, at a speed of 135 knot

last landing took place on 4 August 1955, and “the whole project was terminated 

March 1956.”30 One reason for ending the program was the danger that landing o

flexible deck posed to even the best pilots. Lieutenant Moore, after landing succe

a number of times, pushed the envelope just a bit too far in an effort to find out 

the flexdeck would handle a heavily loaded airplane. He deliberately caught the

arresting-gear wire at the maximum height above the deck, but he also “let the ri

wing drop slightly after hook engagement so that deck contact was made with a b

angle of about five degrees right wing down.” His plane immediately dove into th

deck, pitched back up, rolled to the left, hit the deck again, and rolled to the right

Moore recalled, “The rolling and pitching continued until the Cougar came to a 

which seemed like about four days. It was a wild ride. Black rubber deck marks w

found on the upper surface of the right wing.”31

We have quoted from the reports of U.S. Navy pilots who tested the flexdeck, suc

Engen and Moore, because their reports sounded the death knell of this once

promising innovation. As Moore recalled later, “Pilot skills demanded for succes

landings . . . were stretched close to practical limits and . . . the possibilities of suc

fully deploying a squadron of higher performance sweptwing jets on a Flexdeck a

carrier by our Navy had to be considered unfeasible.”32

Yet the RN’s famous test pilot Eric Brown had not felt that way after his tests of t

flexible deck on HMS Warrior in 1948. In his official report, he argued that

the principle of flexible deck landing for undercarriageless aircraft is fundamentally sound. . . 

experiment is probably ahead of its time in that it apparently does not offer much gain to the c

tional type of jet aircraft in service at the moment, but it should offer a lot to an aircraft specif

designed for flexible-deck operation, provided that arrester gear development can keep pace w

creasing approach speeds. . . . It may even be that future swept-back and delta planform aircra

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landing problems on such aircraft.33

In his memoirs, Brown admitted that going over to the flexdeck would have meant

acquisition of a very different fleet of carrier aircraft, along with the wholesale reconstruction of numerous airfields—to say nothing of changes to existing and planned air

craft carriers. He well knew that the British government could not afford all that.

But assessments of the flexdeck operational trials stimulated work on a major, lasting

innovation—the angled deck. To quote Eric Brown once more:

After the successful flexible deck ship trials on HMS Warrior, a meeting was held [in August 1951] at

the Ministry of Aviation to discuss issues that had been highlighted, one of which was how to land

and catapult aircraft as a simultaneous operation in view of the fact that no crash barrier was envisaged for the flexible deck.

During the meeting . . . , Captain Dennis Cambell was in the chair, and during discussion, made pencil

sketches on a pad in front of him without really appreciating the practical significance of his doodling

ideas. At the meeting was Lewis Boddington, the Head of Naval Aircraft Department at RAE, and his

quick mind saw the potential in the sketch proposals for normal carrier operations. Back at Farnborough he produced a design for ten degrees angled deck to be suitable for a carrier such as Ark

Royal.

34

Cambell’s notes of the meeting, written on 9 August, state that “there was no prospect . . . of a one-type carrier for undercarriageless aircraft only.” The attendees had to

come up with a design that would handle aircraft with wheels and those without.

Moreover, they agreed on two other requirements—that the “aircraft stowage and

operating capacity of the carrier must not be reduced” and that there would be no

“fundamentally different approach technique” with the new carrier design.35 As

Cambell recalled later, he had decided to withhold “my angled idea until it had become

clear to all that the paramount need in accepting the rubber mat idea was to retain the

deck park. When it was coming to be seen that no simple solution was in the offing, I

presented a large sketch . . . showing the mat and the four arresting wires offset 10

degrees to port.” Though, to quote Cambell, “the meeting’s reaction” to his proposal

“was a mixture of apathy and mild derision,” engineer Lewis Boddington took the idea

with him back to his office at RAE Farnborough.36 As we showed in chapter 4, Bodding

ton was one of the conceptual pioneers in the Royal Navy’s efforts to adapt carriers to

jet aircraft. On 28 August 1951, Boddington wrote to both Cambell at the Ministry of

Supply and J. L. Bartlett at the Admiralty with a proposal to offset future carrier landing decks by eight degrees.37

Though most contemporary naval aviators have no knowledge of the flexible deck or o

the role it played in the development of the angled deck, the story of the flexdeck is

important because it shows that the U.S. Navy was willing to follow the RN’s lead

despite the fact that the USN had more financial resources and its own research

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craft operations in the early Cold War years. To overcome that uncertainty, the U

and the USN decided to spend research and development funds to “buy” knowle

realizing that it was cheaper in the long run to try out new ideas by investing in p

types than to make a commitment to an expensive program that might not pan o

This willingness—even eagerness—to experiment is a key to innovation.38

But the issue that most concerns us is the constant desire of senior officials to rea

benefits of innovations without paying the concomitant costs, and among the m

important of these costs are the time, energy, and money invested in innovations 

do not work out as anticipated. The flexdeck was one of these, and the lesson of i

development and testing is that—as we have said before in other publications—d

opers will inevitably “waste” resources on what appear to be promising innovatio

Notes

1. “Undercarriage-less Aircraft, Operation from

Aircraft Carriers—Development,” draft

agenda, “Undercarriageless Aircraft—Operation from Aircraft Carriers,” attached to a

note addressed to the DNC and others, 22

March 1945, folder AIR 2/5785, Public Records Office [hereafter PRO].

2. Minutes of meeting held at MAP on 18 April

1945 (SB61567), folder AIR 2/5785, PRO.

3. Ibid., p. 1.

4. Ibid., p. 2.

5. Ibid., pp. 2–3.

6. Ibid., p. 2.

7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Ibid., p. 8.

9. Ibid., p. 9.

10. Eric Brown, Wings on My Sleeve (London:

Orion Books–Phoenix, 2007), p. 169.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 177.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 178.

15. Ibid.

16. Jan Jacobs, “Follow the Bouncing Cougar:

The Flexdeck Program,” Hook 12, no. 1

(Spring 1984), p. 11. See also Brown, Wings

on My Sleeve, pp. 187–90.

17. T. V. Somerville and A. L. Courtney, 

tages in Performance of Undercarria

Aircraft Operated from a Flexible De

Technical Note AERO 1986, Februar

folder AIR 2/5785, PRO, p. 1.

18. Air Vice Marshal C. B. R. Pelly, mem

dum to the Vice Chief of the Air Staf

September 1950, folder AIR 2/5785, 

19. Group Captain S. R. Ubee, Deputy D

of Operational Research, memorand

the Director of Operational Research

September 1950, folder AIR 2/5785, 

20. Air Vice Marshal C. B. R. Pelly, mem

dum to the Ministry of Supply, 24 O

1950, folder AIR 2/5785, PRO.

21. A. W. Hotson, “Rapid Handling Trial

Vampire Aircraft on a Flexible Deck,

Technical Note NA 259, “Summary,” 

1953, folder AVIA 6/24483, PRO.

22. Naval Aviation Bulletin 2-52 (Novem

1952), p. 2. The bulletins have been d

fied and are available from the Naval 

tion History Office, Washington Nav

Washington, D.C.

23. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warrior

Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997)

151–52.

24. Ibid., p. 152.

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11, 14. See also the excerpt from John

Moore’s “The Wrong Stuff: Flying on the

Edge of Disaster” in From the Flight Deck: An

Anthology of the Best Writing on Carrier Warfare, ed. Peter B. Mersky (Washington, D.C.:

Brassey’s, 2003), p. 182.

26. Jacobs, “Follow the Bouncing Cougar,” p. 14.

27. Ibid., p. 16.

28. Moore, in From the Flight Deck, ed. Mersky,

p. 186.

29. Jacobs, “Follow the Bouncing Cougar,” p. 17.

30. Ibid., p. 19.

31. Moore, in From the Flight Deck, ed. Mersky,

p. 188.

32. Ibid.

33. Brown, Wings on My Sleeve, p. 190.

34. Ibid., p. 191.

on 7.8.51 to discuss the Formulation of a

Staff Requirement for the operational [sic]

Version of the Flexible Deck,” 9 August 1951

ref. 855/4, p. 1, paras. 2, 5, in Dennis R. F.

Cambell folder, collection [coll.] 337, U.S.

Navy Operational Archives, Naval History

and Heritage Command, Washington Navy

Yard, Washington, D.C.

36. Cambell’s memoir is “The Angled Deck

Story” (no date). The memoir, as well as the

drawing to which Cambell refers, is in coll.

337 of the U.S. Navy Operational Archives.

The quotations are from page 2.

37. Lewis Boddington, letter to Capt. D. R. F.

Cambell, RN, 28 August 1951 (Naval/2055-

1/LB/70), coll. 337 of the U.S. Navy Operational Archives.

38. See Mark D. Mandeles, Military Transformation Past and Present (Westport, Conn.:

Praeger Security International, 2007), pp.

91–93.

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Catapults

Choosing an Option under Pressure

After World War II, the USN’s catapult developers in the Naval Air Material Cent

believed that existing hydraulic catapults could be scaled up to cope with jet aircr

the same time, they also examined other alternatives, including the steam catapu

developed by their British counterparts at the RAE. As it turned out, the USN ch

British alternative; it worked when it was needed. However, that choice apparentl

not entirely satisfy the NAMC developers or their colleagues in BuAer, because st

catapults draw their power from a carrier’s boilers, and BuAer engineers did not 

catapult capacity tied so closely to the efficiency of a ship’s steam plant. In 1959, 

example, long after the decision had been made to adopt variations of the British 

catapult, BuAer was still studying a new internal-combustion (C14) catapult desi

specifically for the nuclear carrier Enterprise (CVAN 65).

Introduction

The requirement that carrier aircraft equal the performance of their land-based c

temporaries drove postwar Navy jet aircraft development. The new aircraft, as we 

shown, were larger and heavier than their piston-engine predecessors. This was e

cially true of the bombers, such as the AJ-1 Savage and the A3D Skywarrior, whic

ried nuclear weapons. It was essential to develop catapults that could propel such 

aircraft off a carrier’s deck. As both American and British engineers began to rea

“the operation of wire ropes and pulleys in hydro-pneumatic . . . systems was rea

its limit.”1

The British, lacking the resources required to pursue multiple catapult 

cepts, settled early on steam catapult. The Americans, with more resources and c

dent that incremental improvements to existing technology would be adequate,

adopted the British steam alternative once they saw it demonstrated successfully. 

they knew, failure to develop more powerful catapults was unacceptable; without 

matic increase in catapult power, nearly the entire postwar U.S. naval aircraft pro

faced collapse.

CHAPTER EIGHT

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It took a few years for the problem to bite. To some extent a carrier could make up for

limited catapult performance by running into the wind. This had long been standard

practice. For example, the standard U.S. Navy specification sheets for aircraft postulated takeoff runs into a twenty-five-knot wind over the flight deck. The performance

of existing catapults could also be enhanced. Thus war-built Essex-class carriers successfully operated jet fighters and fighter-bombers off Korea in 1950–53. However, they

could not operate aircraft that were already under test, such as the new jet night fighter

(F3D Skyknight) and the new swept-wing fighters. For such aircraft BuAer could offer

the H8, the ultimate version of its earlier hydraulic catapults, planned for carriers converted specifically for jet operations, beginning with USS Oriskany (CV 34). However,

H8 could not launch the A-3 Skywarrior, the first of the jet bombers envisaged under

BuAer’s postwar aircraft development program.

The Navy’s catapult developers were at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia. A

wartime reorganization in the summer of 1943 made the factory and the associated

Naval Air Experimental Station subordinate to the Naval Air Material Center. BuAer

funded NAMC, and therefore NAMC engineers and test personnel responded to the

direction of BuAer. There were specialists in catapults in both organizations, and they

were supposed to communicate regularly. But the surviving documentation suggested

to us that the NAMC engineers persisted longer than they should have in trying to

improve incrementally the Navy’s well-understood hydraulic catapults.2

Until about 1951, delays in the long-range BuAer catapult program were tolerable, if

disappointing. By 1951, however, aircraft like the A3D (later designated A-3) were

about to enter production. Fortunately, the British steam catapult became demonstrably mature by the spring of 1951, and senior American naval officers chose to acquire

the rights to it a year later. Yet BuAer’s catapult developers were dubious about the projected performance of the steam catapult, as we shall show. Until 1950 they had consistently maintained that their efforts to upgrade existing catapult technology were

succeeding, and it appears that BuAer’s leadership was slow to appreciate just how serious the catapult problem was. The failure to produce a catapult powerful enough for

the new jets—especially the A3D—threatened to derail the Navy’s argument that its

carriers could and should play a strong role in deterring the Soviet Union.

Postwar, BuAer spent most of its money on engines and airframes. In the late 1940s

and early 1950s, the most critical problem must have seemed to be the new J40 engine,

which BuAer wanted to use in its new generation of high-performance airplanes, both

fighters (the F3H Demon and F4D Skyray) and bombers (the A-3). Though it appears

as though catapults were taken for granted at the top level of BuAer, it is more likely

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stage and absorbed the attention and energy of senior aviation officers.

Background

Although carriers had catapults almost from the beginning, they were little used 

World War II. It was simpler and faster for airplanes to roll down a carrier’s fligh

Even the heaviest aircraft launched in combat during the war, Doolittle’s B-25 bo

made unassisted rolling takeoffs. During the war, however, catapults came into th

own. The deck space available for a rolling takeoff under a plane’s own power w

limited by the practice of parking aircraft awaiting takeoff on the flight deck. It b

clear that a catapult could be traded for open deck space. That was particularly o

on board small escort carriers, whose catapults enabled them to operate relativel

heavy bombers, such as TBF Avengers. By the end of the war it was standard prac

for small carriers to launch Army aircraft during amphibious operations, so that 

aircraft could arrive ashore ready to operate. Such launches were generally by

catapult, and even aircraft as large as the B-25 and P-61 night fighter were adapte

catapult launch.

The unstated but obvious implication was that given a powerful enough catapult

rier could launch any airplane whose structure could handle the acceleration inv

Conversely, using strong enough arresting gear, almost any kind of airplane coul

recovered. As we noted in chapter 3, in November 1944 the new carrier Shangri-L

effect proved this point by launching and recovering the Navy’s version of the B-

medium bomber, by far the heaviest aircraft yet to operate from a carrier.

By that time, BuAer was paying McDonnell to develop jet fighters, though not he

carrier bombers. Far more than conventional piston aircraft, jets might need cata

to take off at all in the length of a crowded flight deck. Without propellers to crea

flow over their wings, they needed higher speeds to generate enough lift. It also s

that jet engines might accelerate them relatively slowly.

Postwar Developments

Prior to World War II, Navy catapult developers designed two types of catapult

powder-driven devices for accelerating battleship and cruiser floatplanes and hyd

catapults for carriers. In December 1944, BuAer initiated its postwar catapult pro

by considering new sources of power. That month it issued a draft specification f

new-generation catapult suited to jets.4

Like the British, BuAer saw the German

developed slotted-cylinder catapult as a way to achieve the high power it wanted—

only for various missiles then under development.5

Presumably NAMC personne

became acquainted with this technology when German V-1 launch sites were ove

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powered by the steam produced when hydrogen peroxide decomposed in the presence

of a catalyst.

Ships had long used hydraulics as a way of transmitting power from their engines for

auxiliary purposes. Pumps driven by a ship’s engines drove fluids that in turn could

push pistons or drive turbines where they were needed. In a carrier catapult, the

motion of a piston near the catapult was magnified by wires running over pulleys. A

piston movement of a few feet at low speed translated into a much longer stroke at

higher speed. The power such a catapult could develop was ultimately limited by the

strength of the wire, which could snap under heavy loads. There was also another constraint that applied to catapults—the need to limit the weight of their machinery.

Initially the new catapult program was justified by the trend in aircraft design toward

greater weight and speed. Eventually, however, OPNAV’s Military Requirements Division, responsible for setting the characteristics of new aircraft, realized that development would stop unless more powerful catapults became available. On 11 January 1946

the Military Requirements Division sent the director of the BuAer Engineering Division a note: aircraft weighing over twenty thousand pounds with takeoff stall speeds

over 100 mph could not be catapulted from existing fleet carriers (i.e., of the Essex

class), even with the usual relative wind of twenty-five knots. What limits would

expected catapults impose on future aircraft? Surely the chief of BuAer would want

to know.6

Aircraft designers certainly wanted to know. In June 1946, for example, Douglas

designer Edward Heinemann noted in a letter to BuAer that his firm’s two Navy projects—–the AD Skyraider attack bomber and the F3D Skyknight fighter—could be

launched by an Essex-class carrier using a catapult and wind over the deck, but only

barely. Heinemann and his staff were then working on the design of a new pilotless aircraft designated “P/A V.” This aircraft was expected to weigh fifteen thousand pounds

but to stall at a relatively high speed, about 180 mph, which was significantly greater

than the stall speed of the XF3D, which was 107 mph (or knots—the source uses just

the number). Heinemann was afraid that existing catapults would not be able to accelerate the P/A V enough to get it into the air.7

During World War II the U.S. Navy had experimented with large catapults to launch

heavy seaplanes, the theory being that in this way the seaplanes could carry more than

their usual loads. One such catapult was installed on board a special barge, and in 1941

BuAer was seeking designs for a more powerful follow-on. The latter offered the sort o

performance that the bureau sought postwar but in far too large a package. In effect it

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now suffice.8

BuAer simultaneously supported three primary approaches to the new catapult. 

was to push existing hydraulic-catapult technology to the limit. A second was the 

ted cylinder. A third was an electric catapult, since a modern warship could gene

considerable electric power (the U.S. Navy already had experience with electric r

than hydraulic power in its ships and aircraft). BuAer used both contractors and 

own catapult developers at the Naval Aircraft Factory in the Philadelphia Navy Y

saw the hydraulic approach as insurance against the failure of new technology.9

The hydraulic approach produced the H8 catapult, which entered service on boa

rebuilt carriers after World War II. It sufficed for first-generation jet fighters, and 

limits influenced the design of the first postwar heavy carrier bomber, the AJ-1 S

BuAer seems to have realized that the H8 represented the limit imposed by wire

strength in the size and weight allowable on a carrier.10 When BuAer needed mor

power for the postwar heavy attack carrier, it saw a pair of H8s working together

(under the designation H9) as a fallback solution, but that proved so unsatisfacto

that it was soon abandoned.

As the bureau encountered problems in catapult development, however, it seems 

have relied on the H9 as a form of insurance. Thus the H9 survived longer in BuA

statements to other organizations in the Navy than in reality. The BuAer Confide

Correspondence file in the National Archives mentions that a test installation o

H9 for use at the aircraft flight test center at Patuxent River was ordered in Marc

1948.11 In addition, as of January 1949, the Naval Air Material Center—the catap

developing organization—informed the Navy’s Bureau of Ships that the planned 

rier United States would carry the H9. That same month, however, the chief of Bu

Rear Admiral Pride, noted in a letter to the head of NAMC that slotted-cylinder 

pults would eventually replace the H9.12 The ultimate hydraulic catapult, H9D, a 

ster composed of two H9s, was described by BuAer in 1951 as entirely impractica

was also not powerful enough to launch the A3D heavy attack bomber, which by 

was the standard for new catapult requirements.13

An electric catapult was proposed by Westinghouse in 1943, and it was pursued f

time as the XE-1 Electropult, a prototype of which was set up at the aircraft test c

at Patuxent River. Representatives of BuShips inspected the device on 3 October 

The catapult consisted of an electric “shuttle car” riding along a track. The track, 

feet in length, was the fixed element of what amounted to an electric motor. Pow

supplied by an aircraft engine driving a direct-current generator, which in turn d

flywheel alternating-current motor-generator that supplied the necessary burst o

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suggested instead either two of the host ship’s regular generators, driven by boiler

steam, or a separate generator, or a 7,500 hp gas-turbine unit. As installed at Patuxent

River, the Electropult could launch only one airplane every five minutes.14

A small version of this device was evidently used at NAMC. A similar catapult using a

hydraulic clutch was tested in 1944–45, but scaling up the prototype proved difficult.

The drawback of electric-drive catapults was the time it took between releasing the

energy stored in the flywheel in one launch and building up energy in the flywheel for

the next. But the idea seemed worth studying, and work on it continued into the late

1940s.15 Another contract, for a linear turbine catapult, went to the M. W. Kellogg

Company. Work was stopped in December 1948. The catapult was described as promis

ing for guided-missile launching but as requiring too expensive a launch car, which

would be difficult to recover after firing.16

The slotted cylinder offered the greatest promise, not least for future growth. It was

also the simplest type of catapult. Some power source would drive a piston along the

cylinder, and a hook would be attached to a shuttle connected to the piston. Until

October 1951, BuAer envisaged firing the catapult aft from the bow of a carrier, driving

the shuttle attached to the airplane the other way (forward), presumably by a wire pass

ing over a single pulley. It called this “direct drive,” because there would be no attempt

to amplify mechanically the motion of the piston. But after October 1951, the Naval

Aircraft Factory, then designing the C10 powder (explosive driven) catapult, put the

explosive chamber aft, so that the shuttle would go in the same direction as the piston.1

Power was taken off using a projecting tab emerging from the piston through the slot.1

The larger the cylinder, the more powerful the catapult—apparently almost without

limit, though such a catapult would need to be cooled while it was being used, and the

slot greatly weakened the cylinder, requiring designers to find a means to use the carrier’s structure to support the cylinder.

BuAer’s catapult designers were authorized to go ahead with a slotted cylinder, soon

designated XC1, in November 1945. The Naval Aircraft Factory submitted its preliminary design study on 26 December 1945. By this time the Navy was vitally interested in

surface-to-surface missiles. Like the Germans during the war, it expected to use a catapult to launch them. A missile could be accelerated much more violently than a

manned aircraft. BuAer thus developed a second slotted cylinder, XC2, specifically for

this purpose, to achieve up to supersonic end speeds—for example, for ramjet-powered

surface-to-surface missiles. An XC4 version was intended to launch antiaircraft missile

but was stopped in March 1949 because components required for the envisaged highacceleration launching were not available. XC6 was designed specifically to launch

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were devised for smaller missiles and for targets. Another slotted-cylinder catapu

built to accelerate aircraft on the ground for crash tests (it was installed at the Pa

River Naval Air Test Center).

The great question was the source of power. For BuAer, the alternatives seem to h

been internal combustion (as in a car engine or a diesel), hydrogen peroxide (as i

German catapult), and explosives. BuAer was already familiar with explosively dr

catapults, because they had been used in battleships and cruisers since before Wo

War II. Steam from a ship’s boiler, which is what the British used, seems not to ha

been on the bureau’s list. (In view of later developments, it was ironic that while 

power source was being developed, one of the small slotted cylinders was tested u

steam from a small boiler.) BuAer catapult developers would later argue that it w

impractical to take steam from a ship’s boiler. The ship would be slowed unaccep

presumably because so much steam would be lost through the slot. Later, BuAer 

pult developers also argued that the interval between launches would be excessiv

of these problems also concerned British engineers at RAE.19

In 1947 BuAer chose explosives, with liquid fuel as a backup. It characterized bot

“pressure generators,” so presumably their gas products would be vented into the 

pult cylinder. For initial tests compressed air was used, but it could not provide s

cient power to launch aircraft. BuAer’s focus on explosive catapults was stimulate

the need for a device to launch light loads (five hundred pounds) at unusually hi

acceleration (170g—that is, exerting 170 times the force of gravity), with an end 

of 1,200 ft./sec. (about seven hundred knots). Such a catapult, the XM1, was buil

use at the naval testing ground at Point Mugu, California. It had an expendable p

and launch car, which meant that its designers did not have to brake the piston in 

sonable distance after the end of its stroke.20

Between 1945 and 1948, catapult requirements exploded. In 1944–45 BuAer was 

templating accelerating fifteen-thousand-pound jet fighters to end speeds of 120 

In 1946 BuAer became interested in hundred-thousand-pound bombers (the larg

bought weighed about seventy thousand). Thus in January 1947, BuAer changed 

requirement to a forty-five-thousand-pound airplane at the same speed, but with 

the launching interval. Its catapult designers estimated that a much more massiv

hydraulic catapult—weighing 675,000 pounds—would be needed. That was sim

too heavy.21

In November 1947 the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz

approved the design requirements for a new carrier that would operate fifty-thou

pound fighters and hundred-thousand-pound bombers. That December BuAer

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of a catapult capable of launching hundred-thousand-pound aircraft at a hundred

knots airspeed, including twenty-five knots of wind over deck due to the motion of the

ship. This far exceeded the performance of any earlier or developmental catapult.

BuAer pointed out that using two fifty-thousand-pound and two hundred-thousandpound catapults would save about a hundred tons in flight-deck weight in comparison

to the likely hydraulic design. Although that might not seem like much for what turned

out to be a sixty-five-thousand-ton ship, it was so high in the ship that it could have

considerable impact.22

In January 1948 the bureau further increased desired performance, to a hundred thousand pounds at ninety knots and a maximum speed of 105 knots with a 73,500-pound

airplane. (Note that ninety knots is about 103 mph and that 105 knots is the earlier

maximum of 120 mph.)23 BuAer decided in April 1948 that the limit of hydraulic catapult performance had been reached with the H9 and that all future effort should go

into slotted cylinders. The C1 slotted-cylinder catapult now seemed too small for

future aircraft but too large for experimental work. It was therefore redefined as a test

catapult, suited to but not intended for shipboard installation, with a capacity of eighteen thousand pounds and an end speed of a hundred knots (maximum acceleration

3.5g). For the future, lessons learned in its design would be applied to a catapult capable of launching a two-hundred-thousand-pound airplane at 150 knots. Somewhat

later there were references in BuAer correspondence to three-hundred-thousandpound aircraft.

A revised development schedule produced in January 1948 showed plans to complete

the final design of the XC1 prototype on 1 April 1948 and the final design of the shipboard version on 1 April 1949.24 The Naval Air Material Center on 29 June 1948 submitted its design proposal, which was formally approved for development on 21 July. In

its proposal, NAMC noted that the XC1 was to serve as the basis for a larger catapult,

and its configuration (the shape and size of the braking pit, for example) was modified

so that it could be readily scaled up. There was even the possibility that NAMC could

develop a twin-tube catapult, to double power in the simplest way. However, braking

such a driven-piston device required absorbing 650,000 foot-pounds of energy in

four feet, and so BuOrd suggested firing a second powder charge at the oncoming piston. BuAer rejected the idea because a misfire would badly damage the catapult.25

In September 1948 BuAer placed an order for the XC1 powder chamber with the Naval

Gun Factory at the Washington Navy Yard.26 Powder tests, presumably using only part

of the catapult, began in October 1949.27 As of October 1949 the catapult was

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were reported in January 1950.

Slotted cylinders seemed to free BuAer to pursue designs for long-range superson

bombers. At this time the required payload was the early ten-thousand-pound at

bomb. Given the massive power that supersonic flight seemed to require, any airp

delivering such a weapon had to be enormous. BuAer envisaged a one-way missi

crew escaping in a smaller aircraft that might return to the carrier or else ditch.28 

concept recalled the German wartime Mistel composite aircraft, used to deliver

ultraheavy warheads. The one-way trip made it unnecessary for BuAer to develop

equivalent arresting gear. Two hundred thousand pounds was the maximum take

weight of the big B-47 medium jet bomber the U.S. Air Force was then beginning 

buy. In some documents the limit was set at three hundred thousand pounds; slo

cylinder performance seemed potentially limitless. Such hopes collapsed with the

cancelation of United States in April 1949.

Notwithstanding all this activity, unfortunately, catapult development did not ke

pace with aircraft development. Despite its importance for the BuAer aircraft pro

catapult work seems to have been underfunded, particularly after deep Defense D

ment budget cuts were mandated in 1949. The decision to limit C1 to a prototyp

made sense as part of a protracted development plan, but not if slotted tubes of v

sizes were to equip the carrier United States, scheduled for laying down in 1949. S

sketch designs of the ship showed slotted tubes, it is not clear what would have b

done had the project proceeded.

When the ship was canceled, some of the urgency of heavy catapult development 

lost. On 31 May 1949, about six weeks later, BuAer sent BuShips, via the Chief of 

Operations, a proposal to rebuild the Midways, so as to keep the Navy heavy-atta

program alive. Thus in June 1949 the chief of BuAer, Rear Admiral Pride, wrote N

that in the near future catapults might be needed to accelerate eighty-thousand-p

aircraft to 125 knots. That was roughly the capacity of the H9D catapult then bei

developed—whose weight, however, Rear Admiral Pride now said, was prohibitiv

applied to existing carriers. The H9D could have been accommodated on board t

massive United States, but now high performance would have to be provided for 

ing, but rebuilt, ships of the Essex class, and they could not possibly accommodat

H9.29 The only alternative was a slotted-cylinder catapult.30

The new catapult was designated C7 (in its developmental phase, XC7). By Janua

1950 the projected date for completion of the design was 30 June 1951, and the p

jected date for completion of all XC7 tests (including calibration) was 30 June 19

March 1950, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, wrote BuA

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verted carriers (i.e., including carriers smaller than the Midways), “in order to permit

unrestricted operation of certain aircraft currently programmed, and in order to

remove limitations which are seriously restricting new developments and advances in

aircraft design.”31 It would launch aircraft weighing between 12,500 and 80,000 pounds

at a maximum end speed of 125 knots (average acceleration 3.25g, maximum 3.5g) and

a minimum end speed of sixty knots. Specifications included a launching interval not

to exceed 30 seconds for aircraft weighing up to forty thousand pounds and not to

exceed a minute for those weighing forty to eighty thousand pounds. Apparently the

new A3D Skywarrior heavy (twin-jet, swept-wing) attack bomber was the important

airplane that could not be launched without a C7 catapult. In 1950 the A3D was

expected to enter service within a few years; it was given a particularly high priority.

The XC7, however, had not been included in the fiscal year 1950 budget (drawn up in

1949), which was already very tight; given the program’s high priority, BuAer had to

transfer considerable funds from other projects. For example, work on catapults for

surface-to-surface missiles was canceled on 3 May 1950.

Even at this stage,

BuAer considered an

alternative to the

slotted cylinder, one

that it called the

“solid piston.” Presumably the rod

extending directly

from its piston would

have driven the catapult shuttle its complete length, so that

the catapult as a

whole would have

been twice as long as

the catapult track.

That this alternative

was seriously considered in 1950 suggests that building a

slotted cylinder was

anything but a trivial

USS Forrestal (CVA 59), the first of the new postwar U.S. Navy carriers, with an angled

deck, steam catapults, deck-edge elevators, and a mirror landing aid. Note the large

Douglas A3D Skywarriors.

Thomas C. Hone

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the solid cylinder was soon rejected as impractical.32

The Navy was already modernizing the Essex-class carriers, under a program beg

1946 with the incomplete Oriskany. The program involved the H8 hydraulic cata

but it made sense to replace it with slotted cylinders. Thus in August 1950 BuAer 

for a second type of slotted-cylinder catapult. It would have half the performanc

C7—an end speed of 125 knots for a forty-thousand-pound airplane, with a th

second launch cycle. Heavier airplanes could be launched at lower speeds. The Es

class ships could not accommodate as long a catapult as the C7, so greater accele

was accepted, 5g maximum (4g average).33

Yet development of this catapult proved protracted. Initial powder tests were con

ducted in May 1950, but apparently they applied only to the catapult combustion

chamber. The Naval Air Material Center had to inform BuAer that the catapult w

probably not be ready before 1 April 1951. The contractor could not provide cyli

liners, cylinder link forgings, or the sealing strip (to keep the propelling gas from 

ing through the slot) quickly enough.34 Plans to use the C7 as the modernized-Es

catapult made such delays particularly unfortunate. BuAer’s chief called for com

by 1 November 1950. He also commented that XC1 was very close to what was w

for the Essex class, the main deficiencies being its length, its cooling capacity, and 

zipper used to seal it against cylinder reaction. He wanted all tests completed by 

1951, and the XC1 used as the prototype for the Essex catapult. Design of the new 

pult was scheduled for completion by 31 January 1951. To make this possible, the 

ority of the XC1 project was raised from three to one. According to a handwritte

in the file, by moving up the priority of the XC1 project, “we stand reasonable ch

of providing a very adequate catapult to 27A [Essex] conversions by June 1952. T

action has full endorsement of CNO.”35 The new catapult was designated “C10,” p

haps simply to indicate development from C1. Later documents mention C8 and 

target catapults.

In August 1950, the chief of BuAer summarized the situation in response to an u

oral request (presumably by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, Vice A

John H. Cassady):

New model aircraft are designed to take advantage of all the capabilities of our carriers (deck s

elevator dimensions, arresting capacity, launching capacity, etc.). This procedure is used in th

tation that the carrier construction program and the carrier conversion [i.e., modernization] p

will keep reasonable pace with the aircraft development program as they have done in the past

fortunately, during the last few years the carrier construction program has been nonexistent an

carrier conversion program has only recently been accelerated. This situation has resulted in t

being supplied with aircraft which crowd very seriously the limitations of the operating carrier

thermore, the seriousness of these limitations has been aggravated by the urgent necessity of o

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missions for which the aircraft were designed.36

The H8 catapult, which was considered a bare minimum to handle new jets, had

recently been delivered for installation aboard the first modernized Essex, USS

Oriskany, and it seemed to be developing on schedule. Four more sets were being made

for the next four carriers in the program (Kearsarge, Lake Champlain, Essex, and Wasp)

Further jet-operating carrier modernization had been slowed by pre–Korean War budget cuts, now being reversed. The BuAer chief told DCNO (Air) that, given work

already done on the XC1 catapult, XC10s could be available for further ships by June

1952 “if the project is prosecuted at maximum priority and emergency procurement

methods are used.” That would be possible only if the CNO ordered the other bureaus

involved—Ordnance (for the powder charges), Ships, and Yards and Docks (for shipyard work)—to give the catapult project “overriding priority over conflicting projects.”

As an indication of what scaling up from XC1 meant, each of a hundred C1 charges

weighed 2.5 pounds, but each C7 charge was expected to weigh five hundred pounds,

and each C10 charge 250 pounds.

At this time the most powerful catapult on board unmodernized carriers was the H4-1

aboard the three Midways, weighing 357,000 pounds. It could accelerate a 52,500-

pound airplane to sixty-one knots, or a 23,000-pound airplane to eighty-seven knots.

The H4B on board an unmodernized Essex (weighing three hundred thousand

pounds) could accelerate a thirteen-thousand-pound airplane to eighty-seven knots, or

a seventeen-thousand-pound airplane to seventy-eight knots. The difference in power

could be traced to different track lengths: 239 feet in a Midway versus 170 feet in an

Essex. In the earliest modernized Essex-class carriers, the 245-foot-track H8 (weighing

411,500 pounds) could accelerate a fifteen-thousand-pound airplane, such as a jet

fighter, to 104 knots, or a 52,500-pound airplane to sixty-six knots, a bit over what the

H4-1 on a Midway could do. XC1 had the same track length and similar performance

(eighteen thousand pounds to a hundred knots), but it was far lighter, at 213,000

pounds. At this stage XC7 was expected to use a 360-foot track to accelerate an eightythousand-pound airplane to 125 knots. Its weight would be 550,000 pounds, probably

the upper limit for a flight-deck installation.

Enter the British

By this time the British were well along in developing a steam catapult. The unclassified

BuAer catapult file for 1950 thus includes a cover letter from the British Joint Services

Mission in Washington, dated 8 August 1950, enclosing “Notes on British Steam Catapults” and eight classified Brown Bros. (manufacturing) drawings. In November 1949,

Cdr. R. W. Tunnell and Mr. J. C. Perry from BuAer had visited the United Kingdom,

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return with evidence that sparked interest within BuAer.37

Meanwhile XC1 progress was delayed, so that in September 1950 the projected co

tion date was 15 January 1951, two months later than had been hoped—while th

rier modernization program began to accelerate. However, on 18 January the Nav

Material Center reported additional delays. With one part still not available, it co

promise high-capacity air tests or low-capacity powder shots only beginning abo

January 1951. The progress of the program was considered unacceptable, and in 

February BuAer ordered it accelerated.

About February 1951 Rear Admiral Pride listed catapult alternatives for DCNO (

Vice Admiral Cassady.38 He went through the existing program of powder or liqu

slotted cylinders, but this time he mentioned the British steam catapult, as “the o

other high capacity catapult development,” capable of launching a thirty-thousan

pound aircraft at 126 knots, using 340 pounds of low-pressure steam per shot. “F

available data” the British direct-drive slotted cylinder was about 25 percent heav

than its higher-pressure U.S. counterpart.

Due to the low pressures used . . . its size is sufficiently large to impose a difficult installation p

Latest information indicates that an aircraft will be launched from the catapult during March 

and that consideration is being given to equipping a sister ship of HMS ARK ROYAL with cata

this type. In any event, the excessive steam consumption, which has been roughly calculated to req

steam rate of forty thousand pounds per hour, deserves special study before this catapult can be ser

considered [our emphasis]. A previous study of the advisability of using steam for slotted tube 

pults made by personnel of the Bureau of Ships and of this Bureau [BuAer] led to the conclusi

the use of powder has many important advantages over the use of steam.

An attached note describes the BuAer letter as “an attempt to inject a note of rea

into the program to replace H8s with C10s.” BuAer suggested replacing one rathe

two H8s in near-term Essex conversions. Delivery of the first production C10 wa

scheduled, at the earliest, for June 1952. This unit could go aboard the eighth con

carrier, but it could not be tested fully before that ship was completed in June 19

Thus no ship to be completed before that date could have two C10s. Whether suc

mixed installation made sense was important enough an issue for the Chief of N

Operations to decide. The rest of the letter listed factors that might make it impo

to meet the envisaged schedule. As a further complication, BuAer hoped later to 

from powder to liquid propellant. Although the bureau was not sure how to do t

expected the cost per shot to fall by three-quarters if it could, justifying extensive 

The Perseus (i.e., British steam catapult) file in the BuAer Ships Installation Divis

catapult papers contains an undated (probably early 1952) cost comparison of “C

C7” and “C10-H81” programs. The former would install one C10 in the port side 

Essex (known as 27C) conversions and in the waist positions of the new carriers

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as backups for H81 (presumably meaning H8 Mod. 1) catapults in the 27Cs and as the

only catapult in the new carriers. The C7 project would be abandoned. Adopting the

C10-H81 plan would have saved about seventy million dollars through fiscal year ’57.

Acceleration of the BuAer program proved impossible. On 4 April 1951 the Naval Air

Material Center listed a series of necessary changes that would delay the first powder

launches to 1 May. Apparently there were much worse delays, because a 4 October

BuAer conference on the catapult program heard that XC1 would begin ten firings

(over a two-week period) to “prove out mechanical details of [the] catapult” on 15

October, after which it would fire twenty times (over a week beginning 20 October) to

check its ballistics, after which it would undergo further tests of water-injection cooling. Firings at maximum rate would begin only on 19 November 1951.39

On 17 May 1951, OPNAV approved a BuAer proposal to study a steam catapult, with

the caveat that “an extensive detailed investigation of the relative merits of all the various types of slotted cylinder catapults should be made, however, before selecting steam

as an alternative propellant.” BuAer proposed completing the study during the next fiscal year, but OPNAV wanted it expedited.40 Presumably in support of this effort, on 22

May 1951 the new chief of BuAer, Rear Adm. Thomas S. Combs, asked OPNAV (Op32) to have the naval attaché in London “keep in close touch with the progress of

development of the steam catapult and keep this bureau informed . . . at frequent inter

vals.”41 BuAer did not admit that it was stymied. Rather, it claimed, “great effort is bein

directed toward the development of powder and liquid fuels as propulsion mediums

for slotted cylinder catapults. Present progress in these developments shows promise.

Early British results with the steam slotted cylinder catapult aboard HMS PERSEUS

have also been encouraging.” The bureau merely wanted to “keep pace with all slotted

cylinder developments [so as to] keep programs properly oriented.”

The Steam Catapult

BuAer set up a steam-catapult design program in June 1951, the stated rationale being

that the high cost and complex logistics of powder charges made an alternative source

of power economically attractive. At this time the bureau estimated that each naval aircraft would be catapulted about ten times per month, which meant thousands of

charges.42 The bureau’s catapult-design R&D organization, the Naval Aircraft Factory in

NAMC, was to evaluate steam as a catapult propellant to determine the range of pressures and temperatures most suitable for this purpose; compare the use of the ship’s

boilers to the use of separate flash boilers; and conduct a preliminary design study of a

steam equivalent to the C10 catapult, then under development (launching a fortythousand-pound airplane at 125 knots end speed, maximum acceleration 3.75g).

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response was less than enthusiastic. It assigned the steam catapult priority three, 

the powder C10 (priority one) and H8 (priority two).43

British development of the steam catapult was initially classified, and the secrecy 

rounding the British effort had prevented Royal Navy officers in the British Joint 

vices Mission in Washington, D.C., from sharing information with their counter

in the U.S. Navy.44 However, though the Bureau of Aeronautics became aware of t

Royal Navy’s steam catapult work in 1948, its engineers chose to focus their work 

powder (i.e., explosive-driven) catapults.45 The BuAer file on the British steam ca

includes an 8 August 1950 letter enclosing plans of the Type C (BS.4) version of t

British catapult, to be provided to BuAer “in accordance with verbal instructions

This procedure will be continued unless instructions to the contrary are received

prototype steam catapult (BXS.1) was installed in the aircraft repair ship (ex-car

HMS Perseus, which was reactivated in 1948 specifically for these tests. For simpl

all catapult machinery was installed on top of (rather than within) its flight deck

of which was covered by a false deck.

At Admiralty invitation, two U.S. officers, Capt. H. S. Clarke and Capt. F. H. Horn

ited the ship in Belfast Lough to watch catapulting. By the time of their report, an

ten steam catapults were on order for specific Royal Navy ships, with another ten 

future installation. The prototype had fired 727 times, including thirty-two man

launchings. The report added that on 27 June 1951 the Admiralty offered to send 

ship to the United States the following November for two months of demonstrat

The two captains and the naval air attaché in London, Rear Admiral Apollo Souc

warmly recommended acceptance, as “it is the opinion of this office that the stea

apult has great possibilities.”46 On 14 July CNO extended an invitation. The attac

worked out arrangements, such as payment for fuel (the British supply of dollars 

severely limited). NAMC drew up a test program using deadweights of fifteen, tw

one, and twenty-eight thousand pounds. The Perseus trials in the United Kingdo

ing succeeded, Rear Admiral Soucek in London forwarded Admiralty catapult dr

ings. That BuAer wanted them suggests that whatever had been forwarded earlier 

been lost, since they included a cross section through the catapult cylinder and v

basic system diagrams.

In August 1951, before trials had been run, BuAer asked BuShips to provide stud

installation of direct-drive—as opposed to indirect-drive—catapults in existing a

planned carriers, the results to be ready by July 1952. No such change could be re

until a direct-drive catapult had been proven. In January 1952 BuShips pointed o

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the very first such catapult, BuShips proposed to include it in the study BuAer had

requested. This may not have pleased the NAMC catapult developers, who had already

complained of the steam catapult’s “excessive steam consumption.”47

In October 1951 the CNO, Adm. William M. Fechteler, circulated an announcement

that Perseus was coming (it was actually somewhat delayed). The ship arrived at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in January 1952 and was expected to return to the United King

dom late in February. However, at the U.S. Navy’s request (see below) further trials

were added.

During the Perseus trials, C. C. Mitchell, who had invented the British catapult, made

the startling claim that it could stand up to American steam conditions (550 pounds

per square inch, or psi). Moreover, using such higher-pressure steam it could match

planned C10 performance.48 An anonymous BuAer memorandum writer thought it

wise to take up Mitchell’s offer for tests not contemplated when Perseus had been sent

to the United States. The high-pressure steam could be provided by a USN destroyer

tied up alongside. “If these tests should verify that the British catapult has approximately the capacity predicted, and if BuShips will underwrite putting this catapult in

our ships [with the note, crossed out, “something they have not previously done for

any direct-drive catapult”], the Ships Characteristics Board might well be requested

[“directed” was crossed out] to examine the feasibility of employing British catapults in

our carriers.” Clearly this was a sensitive proposition, because the writer added that “in

making this recommendation, I do not wish to imply that our own catapult development program will not yield thoroughly reliable catapults. In fact, if allowed to continue our own program aggressively, we will produce catapults by about 1956 which ar

greatly superior to any possible extrapolation of the present British low pressure catapult.” But the writer had to admit that the British had been actually firing their catapul

two months before development of the C10 even began. C10 development now was

moving rapidly; after only sixteen months the experimental model was ready, and

delivery of the production version was expected in December 1952. Even so, the British

catapult already existed and worked. The ship’s visit was extended specifically so that it

could run the high-pressure trials.

In January 1952 BuAer circulated a “brief comparison” of the British and U.S. catapult

by Capt. Sheldon W. Brown, head of the Ships Installation Division, the BuAer catapult

branch. “The British may make a determined effort to sell their steam catapult to us fo

use in our carriers. [This] effort could conceivably be motivated by a desire either to

be helpful or to acquire dollars or to do both. The following . . . information . . . may be

useful in the event the British take this anticipated course of action.” The attached

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that the British 

pults did not m

the desired capa

The experiment

BXS.1 aboard H

Perseus had a 20

power stroke, la

ing a thirty-tho

pound aircraft 

knots (not takin

account Mitche

proposal to use 

American steam 

sures). By way o

comparison, th

could launch forty thousand pounds at 125 knots, and C7 could launch eighty th

sand pounds at that speed. Both had 184-foot power strokes. The projected prod

version of the British catapult, BS.1, was rated at only thirty thousand pounds at 

knots using a 144-foot stroke. The British stored boiler steam in an accumulator 

firing. It took the accumulator time to build up sufficient steam pressure, and th

ited the firing rate. BuAer planned to replace powder with hydrogen peroxide (as 

also planned for U.S. submarine propulsion, but later abandoned) or some other 

generator. In contrast to the British, BuAer preferred indirect to direct drive.

The chief advantages of the British catapult were the low cost of its propellant an

fact that it already existed. However, it drained steam from a ship’s power plant. B

estimated that firing every thirty seconds (to provide C10 capability) it would ne

about an eighth of the full steam capacity of an Essex-class carrier. Firing 150 tim

day, it would need 10 percent of the ship’s water capacity. BuAer conceded that st

offered the British catapult a considerable logistical advantage but held that it wo

disappear when the bureau replaced powder with internal combustion or even w

steam from a flash boiler. The direct drive used by the British placed much heavi

weights at flight-deck level and seemed to require a large cut in the flight deck. T

might not matter much in an Essex, but in the new carriers the flight deck was th

strength deck, and its structural integrity needed to be preserved. BuShips was be

asked to look into whether such cuts could be accepted. For Captain Brown, the B

catapult had flaws, and he apparently did not see it, before it was tested in Philad

as other than a backup for NAMC’s product.

A U.S. Navy AD Skyraider attack plane on HMS Perseus.

Naval Aviation History Unit, Navy History and Heritage Command

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deadweight, but no aircraft were launched at higher pressure (acceleration curves were

circulated under an 8 April 1952 cover sheet). Because Perseus was tested at Philadelphia and at Norfolk, senior U.S. operational officers watched—and were impressed.

The BuAer Perseus file includes pointed questions from Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Fleet, and from Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic: When will this catapult be

tested with U.S. aircraft, and when will it go aboard our carriers? The trials were conducted on the highest-priority basis.

The BuAer memo suggests that the problem of flight-deck structure was in its view the

clinching argument against the British catapult. In February 1952 BuShips quashed thi

objection. The BuAer catapults needed much heavier support to handle lateral loads

due to the firing of powder.49 For example, a C7 or C10 powder catapult had to withstand a chamber pressure of 4,000 psi, compared to 600 psi for a steam catapult. The

lateral load on a C7 using indirect drive was 19,500 psi; it was fourteen thousand for an

indirect-drive C10. Direct-drive catapults, whether powder or steam, carried no lateral

loads. A British-type steam catapult with C10 performance (forty thousand pounds at

125 knots) would weigh about 160 tons, about the same as a direct-drive version of

C10 but far less than the 227 tons of the indirect-drive version. Comparable figures for

C7 performance (seventy thousand pounds at 125 knots) were 239 tons for the British

catapult, 243 for a direct-drive C7, and 300 for an indirect-drive C7. Moreover, BuShip

pointed out that the flight decks of the U.S. carriers then planned could be reinforced

around the catapult slot to maintain structural strength. Finally, BuShips argued that

using hydrogen peroxide or liquid oxygen would take “considerably more weight and

space below decks.” BuShips also considered boiler capacity in the new carriers quite

sufficient.50 In short, the steam catapult was quite suitable for all the carrier classes

envisaged.

With the Perseus trials complete, the Naval Aircraft Factory reported details and perfor

mance of the BXS.1 catapult. It suggested that considerable weight could be saved by

redesign. However, it seems clear that it much preferred its own solutions, drawing up 

sketch design of a steam indirect-drive catapult (like the C7 and C10) that, like the C10

could launch a forty-thousand-pound airplane at 125 knots. At this point it still

expected the C10 to enter service as a powder catapult. Work was under way to design

an air plant to replace the current powder propulsion. The main advantages of the Brit

ish catapult were its compact brake (at the end of the catapult stroke), its unique sealing strip (possible because it operated at low pressure), and the fact that it needed no

cooling water. The C10 was lighter. Its forty-nine-foot (rather than five-foot) brake

stroke made it possible to recover the tow bridle after launching (U.S. steam catapults

were later fitted with simple “bridle catchers”). To the U.S. catapult developers,

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schedule, and they would be easy to remedy. Once that was done, the U.S. catapu

would clearly be superior to the British.

Contrary to the expressed hopes of officers like Captain Brown, the U.S. Navy ad

the British steam catapult, testing it successfully in 1952–54 aboard Essex-class ca

The “C7” and “C10” designations were taken over for British-style direct-drive st

turbines. The record of just how these decisions were taken is not clear, not least

because BuAer correspondence files for the period after 1951 have not been decla

as of this writing. Until now, all U.S. carriers have had steam catapults descended 

Mitchell’s BXS.1 prototype rather than from the intense BuAer effort of the late 

and early 1950s.

After World War II, BuAer funded several different catapult technologies through

NAMC. Initially, NAMC engineers believed that incremental improvements in ex

hydraulic catapult technology would meet BuAer’s requirements for power and a

ation. Even before it became clear that those improvements would not be adequa

a loaded A3D Skywarrior, NAMC engineers considered alternative catapult conc

though the engineers’ preference appears to have been to stay with what was kno

versus what was new (and therefore more of a risk). The British engineers at

Farnborough also improved existing hydraulic catapult technology, but they even

ran up against the same physical limits that the Americans had encountered: “Th

greatest single shortcoming of the hydro-pneumatic under-deck gear was that of

increasing weight and inertia of its moving parts, with the unavoidable increase i

demands for power.”51 The catapult engineers at Farnborough, however, had an a

their counterparts at NAMC did not—Colin C. Mitchell, the steam catapult pion

What “saved” the catapult engineers working for both navies was their willingnes

ability to move from the theoretical analysis of the physics of catapult design to a

tests of prototypes. In addition, the engineers were supported by senior officers w

were willing to spend scarce funds on actual experiments, especially those carried 

on board HMS Perseus in the United Kingdom and later in the United States. Bot

navies relied on parallel development efforts, though the range of parallel efforts 

greater for the USN than for the RN, and, as it happened, the most successful par

effort in the United Kingdom was that conducted by Colin Mitchell, who was

something of an “outsider.”

At the same time, the surviving documents in the National Archives suggest that 

was an element of “not invented here” in the minds of BuAer’s catapult experts. O

suspects that they did not believe that their British counterparts could develop an

effective and efficient steam catapult, especially one that would work at the highe

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Admiral Soucek was the USN’s air attaché in London in 1951. He grasped what the

engineers back in the United States did not—that the USN had to gamble on Mitchell’s

steam catapult, because the risk of not doing so outweighed the risk of spending funds

to support Perseus on its journey to the United States and its tests in Philadelphia and

Norfolk.

By the late 1940s the U.S. Navy was not inclined to buy foreign innovations, the main

exception being the radical aircraft and missile technology the Germans had introduced during World War II. Thus, after a very successful demonstration of the new

British Limbo antisubmarine weapon in 1949, the Americans apologized: they knew

that the Bureau of Ordnance would prefer its inferior Weapon Alfa. The British understood. The last foreign innovations that BuOrd had willingly adopted had been Swedish

and Swiss antiaircraft guns immediately before the United States entered World War II

and the German electric torpedo—all answers to very urgent operational problems. In

effect, the steam catapult was the beginning of a short era of adoption of Britishinvented innovations by a grateful U.S. Navy. Besides carrier improvements, these inno

vations included the far less well known method of “rafting” to silence a nuclear submarine—a technique adopted in the face of Adm. Hyman Rickover’s considerable

preference for turboelectric drive, a technology with which he was personally involved.

Finally, catapults were not BuAer’s only way of launching the new heavy aircraft. Solidfuel rockets for jet-assisted takeoff, developed during World War II, represented

another alternative. For missiles, they in effect superseded catapults, to become the

boosters that are now so familiar. Apparently JATO was considerably less acceptable for

carrier aircraft, although it had been used in wartime. In 1949, when it wanted to demonstrate the potential of heavy carrier bombers but had no suitable catapults, the Navy

used JATO to launch three Neptune bombers from Midway-class carriers. These aircraft became the core of an interim Navy nuclear-attack capability. As such they would

have been launched from the same type of carrier in wartime, in the same way. BuAer

interest in solid propellants for catapults could be seen as a way of domesticating JATO

to suit it to regular carrier use.

Notes

1. Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet

Air Arm (Hersham, Surrey, U.K.: Midland,

2008), p. 219.

2. William F. Trimble, Wings for the Navy: A

History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917–

1956 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1990), pp. 294–318.

3. The Naval Aircraft Factory submitted a proposal for a high-capacity hydraulic-ram catapult on 2 February 1945; letter, BuAer

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vol. 5, 1945. NAMC engineers had already

distinguished between lower-speed catapults

for aircraft and much higher-speed catapults

for missiles. A 26 February 1945 letter in this

file notes that the factory was also working

on a slotted-cylinder catapult, which the

head of BuAer’s Ships Installation Division

considered worth patenting.

4. Copies of the letter sent to potential manufacturers are in BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 4, 1945 (new

series; this is not the vol. 4 in the 1922–44

correspondence series). Written on 30 November 1944, they were sent early in December. The requirement was for a catapult that

could accelerate a five-thousand-pound dead

load to 250 mph (not knots, as later specified) in 175 feet, with a maximum acceleration of 14g, or a twenty-thousand-pound

dead load to 125 mph with a maximum acceleration of 3.5g. Launch interval was

twenty seconds.

5. The BuAer Ten-Year History and Program of

Future Research and Development, completed

late in 1945, asserted that slotted tubes had

the greatest potential for high power. The

BuAer 1949 Confidential Correspondence

file (S83-2[C]) includes a note indicating

that BuAer had a copy of the Royal Aircraft

Establishment report (Technical Note NA

182) of the German catapults. The BuAer

S83-2(C) Confidential Correspondence file

for 1945, vol. 5, contains a 17 January 1945

Army Air Corps description of the launching

procedure for the German catapult, using either flash steam or a chemical propellant,

presumably hydrogen peroxide.

6. Letter, BuAer Confidential Correspondence

file S83-2(C), vol. 8, 1946. This is the first

letter in the file, reading from the back.

7. BuAer Confidential Correspondence file

S83-2(C), vol. 8, 1946.

8. A BuAer confidential letter noted that the

standard H4-1 on an Essex carrier weighed

357,000 pounds, while the H8, then under

development, was expected to weigh 400,000

pounds. By way of contrast, the XM1 missilelaunching slotted-tube catapult weighed only

thirty-two thousand pounds and cost far

less to manufacture. The drawback to the

slotted-tube design, however, was cost per

launch. Whereas it cost thirty-five cents each

time the H4-1 was used, it cost $1,200 each

time the XM1 was used, because in the latter

lost. See 31 March 1948, ser. 3136587

Confidential Correspondence file S8

1948–1949, to the BuAer representat

the USAF test center at Wright Patte

Force Base, Dayton, Ohio.

9. Trimble, Wings for the Navy, p. 290.

10. Ibid., p. 318.

11. Letter, April 1948, BuAer Confidenti

respondence file S83-2(C), 1948–194

12. See the Confidential Correspondenc

S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1949. The letter from 

chief of BuAer to NAMC is 14 Janua

13. Chief, BuAer, letter to Op-05, date n

visible but probably February 1951, s

3145432, BuAer Confidential Corres

dence file S83-2(C), vol. 1 (box 155)

14. A 25 February 1947 letter from BuSh

scribed the setup at Patuxent River; s

BuAer Confidential Correspondence 

S83-2(C), 1947.

15. Letter, 20 November 1951, ser. 31383

BuAer Confidential Correspondence 

S83-2(C), vol. 3, 1951.

16. BuAer, letter to Commander, NAMC

cember 1948, BuAer Confidential Co

spondence file S83-2(C), 1948–1949

17. NAMC, letter to BuAer, 17 October 1

BuAer Confidential Correspondence 

S83-2(C), vol. 3, 1951.

18. Naval Aircraft Factory (in NAMC), l

BuAer, 8 October 1951, ser. 0482, Bu

Confidential Correspondence file S8

vol. 3, 1951. The steam-catapult wor

assigned to a private contractor, Stea

erators, Ltd., of Trenton, New Jersey. 

1985, Rear Adm. D. K. Weitzenfeld n

that the NAMC engineers were conc

ing on powder catapults, because the

that the British were working on stea

pults and “we decided not to duplica

work.” See Weitzenfeld’s “Colin Mitc

Steam Catapult: The Heart of Moder

craft Carriers,” Wings of Gold 10 (Sum

1985), p. 42.

19. Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet A

pp. 278–82.

20. A 28 April 1948 letter from BuAer to 

reau of Ordnance in the BuAer 1948

S83-2(C) Confidential Corresponden

ser. 3138868, refers to an earlier BuA

fidential letter (ser. 07497) of 21 Oct

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program to BuOrd (which provided the

explosives).

21. Naval Aircraft Factory, letter to BuAer, 19

September 1946, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 9, 1945–47.

This was apparently in response to a 9 August letter from BuAer authorizing the design of the ill-fated H9.

22. Letter, BuAer Confidential Correspondence

file S83-2(C), vol. 9, 1947 (photographic

copy).

23. BuAer, letter to NAMC, 23 April 1948, ser.

3138638, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 1.

24. 29 January 1948, ser. 3134387, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C). This

revised a 21 October 1947 schedule sent to

BuOrd. Preliminary design of the XC5 was to

be completed by 1 January 1950, and of the

XC6 by 1 June 1949. In neither case did

BuAer estimate a date for completion of the

final designs.

25. Letter, ser. 3146104, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1949.

26. BuOrd, letter to BuAer, 7 September 1948,

BuAer Confidential Correspondence file

S83-2(C), vol. 1. (BuOrd was responsible for

the Naval Gun Factory.) However, a 10 February 1948 BuAer letter to BuOrd mentions

ongoing construction of an XC1 prototype,

as proposed in October 1947. Presumably it

was a pre-prototype, since the February letter mentions adaptation to powder (i.e., explosive) operation and asks BuOrd to

develop the necessary powder charge. The

contemporary XC2 used liquid oxygen and

gasoline to generate its propelling gas; ser.

313244, BuAer Confidential Correspondence

file S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1949.

27. Letter, 25 November 1949, ser. 91128435,

BuAer Confidential Correspondence file

S83-2(C), vol. 2, 1949.

28. See examples in Jared A. Zichek, Secret Aerospace Projects of the U.S. Navy: The Incredible

Attack Aircraft of the USS United States,

1948–1949 (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2009).

29. Letter, 15 June 1949, ser. 3125989, BuAer

Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C),

vol. 2.

30. Letter, 9 June 1949, ser. 3125853, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C),

proposal, which is not enclosed.

31. Letter, 13 March 1950, ser. 3232992, BuAer

Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C),

vol. 1, 1950.

32. Chief, BuAer, letter to Commander, NAMC,

4 May 1950, BuAer Confidential Correspon

dence file S83-2(C), vol. 2.

33. BuAer, letter to NAMC, 8 August 1950, ser.

3147484, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1950. This letter

refers to C7 as an indirect-drive catapult, requiring considerable hangar-deck space,

whereas the unit proposed for the Essex con

versions was a direct-drive type. BuShips

had proposed indirect drive because that

would have less impact on the ship.

34. NAMC, letter to BuAer, 3 August 1950,

BuAer Confidential Correspondence file

S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1950.

35. Chief, BuAer, letter to Commander, NAMC,

5 August 1950, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 1, 1950.

36. Chief, BuAer, letter to the DCNO(Air), 18

August 1950, ser. 0805, BuAer Confidential

Correspondence file S83-2(C).

37. Cover sheet for a report of a 10 November

1949 visit, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), 1948–1949, record

group [hereafter RG] 72, box 146, National

Archives. Only the cover sheet was found.

38. Chief, BuAer, letter to Op-05, date not

visible but probably February 1951, ser.

3145432, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 1 (box 155).

39. BuOrd, letter to BuAer, 31 October 1951, ser

27784, BuAer Confidential Correspondence

file S83-2(C), vol. 3, 1951, enclosure.

40. CNO, letter to BuAer, 17 May 1951, ser.

1051851, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 2, 1951.

41. Chief, BuAer, letter to Op-32, ser. 3132831,

BuAer Correspondence file S83-2, 1951.

(Op-32 was part of OPNAV, the Office of th

Chief of Naval Operations.)

42. BuAer, letter to NAMC, 12 June 1951, ser.

3141490, BuAer Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C), vol. 2, 1951.

43. Naval Aircraft Factory (in NAMC), letter to

BuAer, 8 October 1951, ser. 0482, BuAer

Confidential Correspondence file S83-2(C),

vol. 3, 1951.

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Services Mission, letter to Rear Adm. Felix

Johnson, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, subject “HMS Perseus, visit to the

United States,” 28 August 1951, RG 72, box 3,

entry 133, Perseus folder, National Archives.

45. D. K. Weitzenfeld, “Colin Mitchell’s Steam

Catapult: The Heart of Modern Aircraft Carriers,” Wings of Gold 10 (Summer 1985), p.

42.

46. Undated attaché report in BuAer Ships Installation Division file on Perseus trials. Records of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Project

Records Relating to Catapults, Launchers,

133, National Archives.

47. BuShips memo in BuAer Ships Instal

Division file on Perseus trials, RG 72

entry 133.

48. BuAer Ships Installation Division file 

Perseus trials.

49. Memorandum, 14 February 1952, Sh

stallation Division file on Perseus tria

50. Ibid.

51. Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet A

p. 214.

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Analysis

Our method . . . can be compared with that used by people assem

complicated jigsaw puzzle. We will first put together the pieces of 

corner, then pieces of another corner. Gradually, we will link our 

bled sections.

HONE, FRIEDMAN, AND MANDE

AMERICAN & BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEVELOPMENT, 1919–

In one corner of our complicated jigsaw puzzle are engineer Lewis Boddington a

colleagues in the Naval Aircraft Department at the Royal Aircraft Establishmen

we pointed out in chapter 4, they had accepted as early as February 1945 the con

that future naval fighters would have to be “pure” jets and that therefore launchin

recovering them from carriers would demand significant changes in equipment a

procedures. In June 1945, Boddington and his colleagues had decided to embark 

program to experiment with jets without undercarriages in order to increase the 

limited range of the early jet aircraft. By mid-July Boddington had noted that fut

carrier aircraft would need assisted takeoff and that they would land at higher sp

than propeller-driven planes. By mid-September, he was certain that it would b

if jet aircraft landed with their engines running at 90 percent of full power, and h

knew that having them do so would require somehow separating the landing and 

off decks.

The Individuals: Royal Navy

But there were more people involved in this string of developments than enginee

Lewis Boddington. Test pilot Eric Brown noted in his memoir, Wings on My Sleev

in January 1945 Maj. F. M. Green, whom Brown identified as “the veteran aero-e

inventor,” described in detail to an audience of engineers and test pilots a “carpet 

that would accept jets without undercarriages. The idea clearly caught (or had al

captured) the attention of Boddington, because he ran with it during the summe

fall of 1945. What matters to us is that Boddington, his colleagues, and his super

CHAPTER NINE

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nized that some dramatic changes would have to be made to carriers if they were to

operate jets safely while generating enough sorties to fulfill the required mission.

Boddington continued to be influential in the effort to adapt carriers to jet aircraft. On

7 August 1951, a meeting was held in the Ministry of Aviation to discuss ways of handling aircraft on carriers with “flexible” decks. Capt. Dennis R. F. Cambell of the RN, a

naval aviator and assistant chief naval representative to the ministry, was chair, and

Boddington and others attended. Just before the meeting, eating his lunchtime sandwich, Captain Cambell had been staring at a large model of the carrier Illustrious on hi

desk. As he recalled, “I kept trying to picture how this crazy deck [i.e., the flexdeck]

could be installed to allow a reasonable speed of successive landings. I sketched a few

ideas[,] . . . none of which looked really practicable.”

But then, “right out of the blue it came to me—why not angle the deck about 10

degrees to port?” Later, in the meeting, Captain Cambell waited until “it had become

clear to all that the paramount need in accepting the rubber mat idea was to retain the

deck park. When it was coming to be seen that no simple solution was in the offing, I

presented a large sketch . . . showing the mat and the four arresting wires offset 10

degrees to port. I admit I did this with something of a flourish, and was accordingly

somewhat miffed at not getting the expected gasps of gratifying amazement.” But

Boddington was taken with the idea, and he stayed after the meeting to look carefully a

Cambell’s sketch.

On 28 August 1951, Lewis Boddington sent detailed drawings of an angled deck

applied to the planned carrier Ark Royal to the Deputy Director of Naval Construction

and to Captain Cambell.2

The drawings were sent on to the Board of Admiralty. In Sep

tember, during the semiannual air show at Farnborough, Cambell mentioned his

angled-deck concept to visitors from the U.S. Navy. He remembered “that they

exchanged significant looks.”3

What Cambell apparently didn’t know at the time was

that Brown had taken the idea of the angled deck with him when he was sent to the

Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River.4

As Brown later recalled, the idea of the angled

deck “was seized on eagerly by the Americans.” They were ready for it. In his Nuclear

Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, retired vice admiral Jerry Miller noted that Capt. James

D. Small, who in 1951 was a young engineering officer in the Navy’s Bureau of Ships,

admitted years later that “it is too bad that our naval architects, naval aviators, or

bystanders didn’t see [the angled-deck concept first]—but they didn’t.”5

Yet they

quickly took advantage of it, converting the Essex-class carrier Antietam to the angleddeck configuration by mid-December 1952.6

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Cambell first te

the angled-deck 

cept by directin

painting of a ten

degree-offset la

path on the dec

the carrier Triu

Royal Navy pilo

made touch-and

landings along t

path. As Cambe

would recall, “T

trials were comp

successful, and 

pilots concerne

most enthusiast

it took a visit of and demonstrations by USS Antietam in May 1953 to convince “

Admiralty that retrofit action [on existing RN carriers] should be started forthw

Cambell and his assistant, Cdr. Nicholas Goodhart, polished a scheme of Goodha

replace a carrier’s landing signal officer with “visual indication of the optimum

approach and landing path . . . [using] a steady light source.” According to an art

Naval Aviation News in 1955, Goodhart had served as an exchange pilot at the Pa

Naval Air Test Center in 1948–49, and he had witnessed U.S. Navy efforts to find 

to improve the coordination between landing signal officers (LSOs) and pilots of 

aircraft.8

Engineers at Farnborough had already been working on a mechanical re

ment for LSOs, and Goodhart took his idea to them.9

The first component of his 

tem was a large light placed at the after end of the flight deck. About 150 feet from 

stern, Goodhart and the Farnborough engineers set up the second component—

concave mirror, eventually gyrostabilized, that would reflect the light at an angle 

to the type of aircraft coming in to land. On each side of the mirror would be a r

three green lights. The pilot’s task would be to keep the reflection of the light leve

the green lights.

Cambell’s account of how they tested the idea in the office he shared with Goodh

classic: “We borrowed a small vanity mirror from Miss Montgomery, our secreta

propped it up at a simulated 3 degrees approach angle. . . . [W]e then borrowed

Monty’s lipstick and stood it on end a few feet away. Looking at the lipstick in th

ror, we found it easy to keep it in view while we moved forwards and downwards

An unmodified carrier, USS Leyte (CV 32), on the left and a carrier given an angled deck,

USS Antietam (CV 36), on the right, October 1954. As Vice Adm. Robert Dunn noted to

the authors, the angled deck eliminated the demand from pilots for a flush-deck carrier.

Navy Department, National Archives

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Goodhart realized

that it was “blindingly

obvious that the two

revolutionary inventions [angled deck

and landing mirror]

would be complementary.”11 When this

“visual glide slope

system” was tested

first at Farnborough

and then at sea on

HMS Illustrious in

November 1953, two

U.S. Navy pilots were

part of the test team,

and one, Lt. Cdr. Donald D. Engen, wrote a report to the Chief of Naval Operations

recommending “that the Navy procure the mirror immediately.”12 Engen was at that

time one of two U.S. Navy exchange pilots at the Royal Air Force’s Empire Test Pilots

School at Farnborough.

Eric Brown was involved in more than the development of the angled deck and the

mirror landing aid. He also had a hand in the U.S. Navy’s adoption of the steam catapult. When HMS Perseus, modified but not used for regular fleet operations, arrived at

the Philadelphia Navy Yard in February 1952, Brown was at Patuxent River as an

exchange pilot. He was ordered north to Philadelphia to fly an F9F Panther jet from

Perseus, moored to a dock at the Navy Yard. Brown was probably selected for this task

because, as he noted, he had worked closely with C. C. Mitchell “many times on catapult trials in Britain.”13

On the day of the test, there was no headwind blowing over the flight deck; instead,

there was a five-knot tailwind. As Brown later wrote, “A huddle of frustration gathered

The Americans shook their heads firmly at the idea that a jet could be shot off with the

ship tied up and a tail wind blowing over the catapult.” Developer Mitchell, however,

insisted that the trial launches take place as scheduled. As Brown stood by, the senior

engineer officer on Perseus said, “We’ll risk the British pilot if you’ll risk the aircraft.”

That was it. There was no backing down. Brown, “the innocent in this drama,” climbed

into his cockpit and “was flung off . . . through a maze of dockyard cranes and workshop chimneys.” But he and the other pilots made it, and they repeated their

The mirror landing aid on USS Bennington (CV 20) in August 1955. It is stabilized to remain

steady while the ship rolled and pitched.

Navy Department, National Archives

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Brown an interview with the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William M. Fechte

Brown remembered, the admiral “expressed his gratitude for the way in which 

British had co-operated in handing over the steam-catapult, the angled-deck and 

flexible-deck ideas.”15

The individuals in the Royal Navy who were prominent in the development of th

steam catapult, angled deck, and mirror landing system and in the sharing of the

innovations with individuals in the U.S. Navy left a trail of papers, memorandum

drawings, and recollections. In reviewing this material, we infer that one reason t

British naval officers and civilians were able to come up with their innovative con

was that at least some of them—in particular, Eric Brown, Lewis Boddington, D

R. F. Cambell, and Nicholas Goodhart—had worked together effectively over an

extended period of time. They weren’t strangers to one another, and they were al

strangers to the problems. They appear to have realized in 1945 or soon thereafte

jet aircraft were both the future of naval aviation and also a challenge to launch a

recover safely and quickly from aircraft carriers. They then built on their shared 

edge of the problem—mating the new jet aircraft to a carrier’s flight deck—to fin

ways to recover and launch jet aircraft rapidly.

The Individuals: U.S. Navy

In the U.S. Navy, individuals also mattered, but they worked within a setting that 

very different from that of their counterparts in the RN. In early 1945, while seni

officers in the Royal Navy had already accepted the idea that British carriers wou

to operate jet aircraft, U.S. Navy officers at sea and ashore were thinking about cu

operational problems in their fight against Japan. Could the carrier force fight of

kamikazes? Could its strike aircraft actually succeed in attacking the Japanese ma

land? Could the carriers be constantly supplied with new aircraft, fuel for those p

and enough ordnance?

It wasn’t clear in January or February 1945 that the war against Japan would end 

August, and U.S. Army and Navy ordnance specialists had begun developing new 

ons to attack targets in Japan, including missiles with conventional warheads. Th

was also concerned that the Japanese might develop missiles that their manned a

could launch against any U.S. invasion force, much as Germany had used radio-g

bombs and missiles against Allied forces in the Mediterranean in 1943. In July 19

example, the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance had asked the scientists who had develo

the antiaircraft proximity fuse to evaluate the possibility of using ship-launched 

siles for fleet air defense. In early December 1944, the Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Adm. Ernest J. King, had directed BuOrd to push ahead “on an urgent basis” with 

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to study the postwar implications of wartime missile developments in the Allied and

Axis nations.16

More importantly, the Manhattan Project had developed nuclear weapons. The need to

have a carrier-based bomber that could carry nuclear weapons drove both aircraft and

carrier development after World War II. In January 1946, the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics issued a request for proposals to major aircraft manufacturers that specified a

carrier-based bomber able to carry an eight-thousand-pound weapon. In the interim,

while the new aircraft was being designed and built, the Navy reconfigured P2V Neptune patrol bombers so that these large machines (wingspan one hundred feet, loaded

weight over sixty-one thousand pounds) could actually take off from the large Midway

class carriers.17

The story of the

development of the A

carrier-based attack

plane has been told in

some detail by variou

authors, especially

Vice Adm. Jerry

Miller, USN (Ret.), in

his Nuclear Weapons

and Aircraft Carriers,

published in 2001.18

From our perspective

what matters is how

the development of an

airplane capable of

carrying an earlydesign (and therefore

bulky and heavy) nuclear weapon consumed the attention of some of the finest minds

in the U.S. Navy. After the end of World War II, the Chief of Naval Operations, then

Admiral King, and the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had to decide just

where in the Navy’s organizational hierarchy to put an office for nuclear weapons

and their delivery systems. Rear Adm. William R. Purnell, who had served during the

war on the Military Policy Committee, which had advised President Franklin D. Roose

velt on nuclear weapons issues, apparently favored creating a special office within

OPNAV to be headed by Capt. William S. Parsons, an ordnance expert who had

armed the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and had worked closely with the atomic

A modified Lockheed P2V Neptune patrol bomber takes off from the USS Midway (CV 41)

in April 1949, accelerated to launch speed by JATO units.

Thomas C. Hone

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Ashworth and Horacio Rivero to assist him in fashioning a postwar Navy policy 

ing nuclear weapons. Parsons was apparently able to persuade Purnell to convinc

Admiral King in November 1945 to establish a Deputy Chief of Naval Operatio

Special Weapons, appoint Vice Adm. William H. P. Blandy to the post, and ensur

Captain Parsons and his assistants served under Blandy.19

With Blandy’s support, Parsons prepared a memorandum in March 1946 for the 

uty Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy in which he predicted that re

tions in the size and weight of the “fission bomb,” coupled with advances in the r

and accuracy of long-range surface-to-surface guided missiles, would allow the N

launch nuclear attacks from submarines and surface ships.20 Vice Admiral Miller, 

Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, notes that Commander Ashworth had “st

thinking about mixing carrier aircraft and the atomic bomb not long after he con

cluded his duties with the wartime operations of the atomic weapon program.”21 

sons and Ashworth were supported by Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, who was th

(1946) the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and later (1947–48) the Vice 

of Naval Operations.

The focus on the nuclear mission for aircraft carriers and the resulting conflict b

the Navy and the newly created U.S. Air Force over which service should have con

of nuclear bombardment took the time, energy, and talent of a number of Navy a

tors, especially those with scientific or technical backgrounds. In addition to the 

cers mentioned thus far, there were others, including the war hero Rear Adm. Da

Gallery. Gallery’s antisubmarine group, built around the escort carrier Guadalcan

had captured the German submarine U-505 in June 1944, garnering for the Navy 

first war prize since the war against Great Britain in 1812. Gallery was a colorful 

acter, articulate and outspoken, but he was also a good writer and a specialist in a

tion ordnance, and he waded energetically into the debate over how nuclear weap

should be delivered. His advocacy almost cost him his commission. It apparently 

cost him his third star.22

Navy aviation in World War II had developed a powerful land-attack capability, a

we have shown in an earlier chapter, the Navy had already experimented with the

launching and recovery of large, twin-engine carrier aircraft. After the war, both 

tors and nonaviators (such as Captain Parsons) argued that carriers could serve a

nuclear-strike platforms. In the summer of 1946, President Harry Truman grante

Navy permission to begin “planning to equip its ships and aircraft for atomic op

tions.”23 This meant that much of the Navy’s aviation community would focus on

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could store nuclear weapons and launch the large aircraft that carried those weapons.

An illustration of this focus on nuclear capability is the composition of the Navy’s team

that reviewed North American Aviation’s mock-up of the XAJ (Savage) in October

1946.24 The leader of the BuAer team was Cdr. Roger B. Woodhull, the project officer

for the XAJ. Woodhull had served as a combat aviator during the war and was Design

Branch head for torpedo planes in BuAer’s Engineering Division at war’s end. Also on

the team was Capt. Joseph N. Murphy, who headed the Armament Branch of BuAer’s

Engineering Division. As a young lieutenant before World War II, Murphy had both

studied and taught at the California Institute of Technology. During the war, as a lieutenant commander, he headed the scout bomber branch in BuAer. By 1947, he was

head of BuAer’s Piloted Aircraft Division. Working with Woodhull and Murphy were

civilians William Z. Frisbie and George A. Spangenberg. Frisbie led BuAer’s Design

Coordination Branch and Contract Airplane Design Branch in 1942. Spangenberg

became his deputy during the war. Both were talented engineers.

Acting as an observer was Cdr. John T. Hayward, then, like William Parsons, one of the

more technically astute officers in the Navy.25 Before World War II, Hayward had

worked as a lieutenant at the Naval Aircraft Factory on aircraft navigation instruments

and flight controls. He taught at the Royal Air Force’s navigation school in Canada in

1940 and in 1942 organized the Navy’s first long-range, land-based bomber squadron.

In 1944, he was selected to be the Navy officer in charge of experiments at the new

Naval Ordnance Test Station at Inyokern, California, including work on the trigger

mechanism for a nuclear weapon. Before taking his position there, he developed contacts with the science faculty at the California Institute of Technology and began working on a graduate degree in physics. He studied the effects of the nuclear explosions at

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan right after the war, and then he managed high-speed

photography of the nuclear weapons tests at Bikini in the summer of 1946. By the time

he examined the XAJ mock-up in October 1946, he had a reputation as one of the best

heavy-attack aircraft evaluators in the U.S. Navy. He also knew enough about the early

nuclear weapons to evaluate the XAJ’s capability to carry them.

Not surprisingly, given the haste in developing the XAJ, the airplane turned out to be

less than satisfactory. In 1949, retired Navy test pilot James Pearce, just hired by North

American Aviation, flew the XAJ and wrote this evaluation of the aircraft: “When

everything was working properly—it handled like a fighter. The problem was that

everything was working properly only about five percent of the time; the rest of the

time the pilot was coping with some sort of problem ranging from some minor annoyance to struggling to stay alive. . . . Amongst those of us who tested the AJ, none were

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Hayward notes that he had recommended that the XAJ be rebuilt with jet engine

that Rear Adm. Theodore Lonnquest, assistant chief of BuAer for research and d

ment, rejected Hayward’s recommendation.27 Given the troubles with turbojet en

development described in chapter 5 of this study, Lonnquest—under pressure to 

get the XAJ into the air—was understandably unenthusiastic about reworking th

around jet propulsion.

Individual officers such as Parsons, Hayward, Rivero, and Ashworth knew each o

war’s end and were familiar with one another’s abilities. During World War II, H

had worked for Rear Adm. Mitscher when Mitscher commanded Fleet Air Wing 

Hawaii. In fact, Hayward, by his own account, had first met Mitscher in 1934 and 

worked with him again in 1940, when Mitscher was assistant chief of BuAer. At t

time, the Naval Aircraft Factory was manufacturing models of the Curtiss SO3C

(Seamew) two-seat amphibian. “Chick” Hayward flew one out of the Navy’s air s

at Anacostia, Maryland, and dumped it into the Potomac. In his memoir Haywar

that he promptly went to BuAer headquarters on Constitution Avenue in Washin

“wet flight suit and all,” to tell Mitscher that the SO3C was “a lousy airplane.” Mi

had then christened the SO3C “Chick’s airplane.”28 That was Mitscher. Hayward w

character, but he was also very bright and a good pilot. Mitscher liked him, and A

ral King, whose airplane Hayward had flown, evidently listened to him.

Under the leadership of Admirals Blandy and Radford, officers such as Parsons,

Ashworth, Rivero, and Hayward developed Navy policy regarding nuclear weapo

managed the aircraft and ordnance projects that gave the Navy its nuclear strikin

They were aided by aircraft designers like Douglas Aircraft’s Edward H. Heinema

Heinemann began designing bombing aircraft for the Navy in the 1930s, includin

very versatile and reliable SBD-1 Dauntless dive-bomber. George A. Spangenbe

one of BuAer’s best aircraft design evaluators and eventually something of a lege

his own right, noted years later that “Heinemann’s real strength was a good unde

standing of the entire airplane. He did a superb job of trying to find out what the 

needed and trying to give them what they needed and he also had a superb eng

ing organization.”29

Heinemann also knew the officers and civilian engineers in BuAer. His memoir, E

Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Designer, is peppered with the names of BuAer pers

Heinemann also spent several weeks in the fall of 1944 on carriers in the Pacific, 

he met and talked at length with then–rear admiral Arthur Radford and Capt. Fr

ick M. Trapnell, who was the first Navy pilot to test the Bell Aircraft XP-59A jet p

type (in April 1943). In addition, Heinemann was a member of a delegation of D

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aeronautical research.30 In short, he was an “insider” when it came to the development

of Navy aircraft, especially attack aircraft.

As a consequence, he was one of the first to consider what it would take to create a

nuclear-armed jet bomber that could be flown off a carrier and then recovered after its

mission.31 After watching Navy tests of the Douglas AD-1 attack plane on board the

light carrier Saipan in 1948, Heinemann “went to Washington to visit BuAer.” As he

recalled, “I had seen the CNO’s memorandum regarding weight parameters for the

[successor to the AJ Savage] and was aware that other company representatives had

been in and out of Navy offices getting a feel for what the final requirement figures

would be.” Heinemann learned that BuAer would accept design proposals from the aircraft manufacturers using one of three turbojets—the Westinghouse J40, Pratt & Whitney’s J57, and Curtiss-Wright’s J65.32 He returned to Douglas determined to design a je

bomber weighing the existing upper limit on loads for the Midway-class carriers—

sixty-eight thousand pounds.

With a concept in hand, Heinemann returned to Washington and showed—unofficially—drawings of the proposed Douglas aircraft to Captain Murphy, who had been

one of the BuAer officers involved in developing the AJ Savage. Heinemann’s account

has Murphy reacting with disgust: “You know good and well that you can’t produce an

airplane of that capability for that weight!” Heinemann was furious, but he persuaded

Murphy to keep the drawings and weight estimates. The next day, Heinemann was in

BuAer’s spaces and was accosted by Ivan H. Driggs, the director of BuAer’s Design

Research Division. Driggs was quick to apologize, telling Heinemann that “we have

checked your figures [and] your concept looks valid.”33 According to George Spangenberg, Driggs and his colleagues had assumed that the successor to the AJ Savage would

have to rely on turboprop engines to carry the heavy nuclear weapon (at least eight

thousand pounds) the necessary range and would therefore weigh in at takeoff at abou

a hundred thousand pounds.34

Heinemann had gambled that both the size and weight of nuclear bombs would come

down, and his gamble paid off.35 Douglas got the contract for the follow-on to the AJ

and produced a mock-up in 1949. The airplane was huge—seventy-six feet long, with a

wingspan of over seventy-two feet and a loaded weight of about seventy thousand

pounds. By comparison, the Navy version of the B-25 that had flown off the carrier

Shangri-La in November 1944 had been about fifty-three feet long, with a wingspan

of just over sixty-seven feet and a loaded weight of thirty-five thousand pounds.

Heinemann was not surprised to find Capt. John Hayward on the team inspecting the

mock-up.36 It was the same cast of Navy characters who had been trying to make real

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was the “only game in town,” and it attracted the best Navy and industry designe

engineers.37

Note the difference with the Royal Navy, which did not have the nuclear bombin

sion. We believe that this is important. In effect, the “best and brightest” within t

Navy’s aviation community were focused postwar on using carriers as mobile nu

strike platforms. For that to happen, BuAer and industry technical and technical

sophisticated personnel had to come up with aircraft that could fly from carriers 

carry the early, very heavy and bulky nuclear weapons. In 1946, it was not clear th

effort could succeed. To reduce the chance that it would not, senior Navy leaders 

as Rear Admiral (and then Vice Admiral) Radford supported a cluster of intellige

accomplished subordinate officers and civilians as they labored to do what often

seemed the impossible.

The Organizations: U.S. Navy

We begin an assessment of organizational factors with those of the U.S. Navy, be

we are more familiar with them. There were two key events for the USN. First, th

eral Board, which had been a key integrator of technology and operational conce

the 1920s and 1930s, lost during the war much of its influence and therefore also 

ability to compel developers and fleet operators to review the evidence generated 

their own actions. Second, the Secretary of the Navy created the post of Deputy C

of Naval Operations (Air) in August 1943. Rear Adm. Julius A. Furer, who wrote

Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, summarizes the change 

lows: “Broadly speaking, naval aviation planning, training of flying personnel, lo

planning and aviation operations were now responsibilities of DCNO (Air); BuA

responsible for all that related to aviation materiel of the Navy, including ‘design

building, fitting out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircraft, accessories, 

ment, and devices, connected with aircraft.’”38

The first DCNO (Air) was Vice Adm. John S. McCain. His counterpart at BuAer 

Rear Adm. DeWitt C. Ramsey. In effect, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operatio

would set Navy aviation policy, while BuAer and its subordinate organizations w

provide aircraft, aircraft engines and controls, aircraft maintenance manuals an

training, and the equipment needed by aircraft carriers to launch and recover t

air wings.

In the office of the DCNO (Air), officers such as Arthur Radford, assistant to DC

(Air) in early 1944, worked to tie together all the elements of Navy aviation. This 

no small feat. Before the war, BuAer had begun a program of expanding aircraft

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air operations ashore and afloat.39 This planning, though successful, had not been adequate for the huge surge in the size and missions of the Navy’s air forces during the

war.40 There was a perceived need for reorganization, and the first step was the consolidation of the Naval Aircraft Factory, the Naval Aircraft Modification Unit, the Naval

Air Experimental Station, and the Naval Auxiliary Air Station into the Naval Air Material Center, in July 1943. Before the war, BuAer and its subordinate organizations had

focused on solving problems ranging from how to design an effective tailhook for carrier aircraft to how to maneuver carriers as a group in wartime. Once war began, however, the practice of identifying and solving problems had to compete with the obvious

need to expand naval aviation dramatically. Getting the resources for such an expansion required senior Navy aviators to win the battles of resource allocation that took

place in the offices of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. To do that, the aviators

needed direct access to these individuals—hence the August 1943 reorganization.

But the aviators, along with the rest of the Navy, also needed a substitute for the General Board. In late 1944, for example, Vice Admiral Mitscher argued that the new

DCNO (Air) needed an informal advisory board to capture both the lessons of wartime experience and the future potential of wartime research and development. In May

1945, the type commander for Navy air forces in the Pacific, Vice Adm. George D.

Murray, suggested that the Essex-class carriers still under construction be modified to

carry and launch large bombers. That same month, BuAer began studying the feasibility of large carrier bombers. There was a need to bring the thinking behind these initia

tives together, and, as we have shown, Capt. W. T. Raisseur, working in the new office of

the DCNO (Air), did just that with a paper he wrote at the end of June 1945. That

paper emphasized the heavy-attack mission and noted that a carrier could generate

more sorties if its aircraft elevators were located at the edges of the flight deck, thereby

leaving room for longer, more powerful catapults.

In early July 1945, the informal board that Vice Admiral Mitscher had proposed

approved the concept of carrier operations presented by Raisseur. In October, BuAer

engineers at the newly created NAMC suggested to BuAer headquarters that turboprop

engines might give carrier-launched bombers both increased range and heavier bomb

loads. After reviewing the available evidence, BuAer chief Rear Adm. Harold B.

Sallada endorsed in December the idea that carriers be modified to accept very large

and very-long-range aircraft. That led the Chief of Naval Operations to authorize the

requirement for what became the XAJ Savage on 28 December. In January 1946, the

informal board advising DCNO (Air) suggested that the Navy develop a new carrier

for the much larger aircraft, and the DCNO (Air), Vice Admiral Mitscher (who had

suggested that the informal board be created in the first place), supported Rear

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rier designs in February 1946.41

In short, the new organization seemed to work well when it had the functional 

alent of the General Board. The aviators had a new concept of operations (larg

craft, escorted by long-range fighters, conducting strike operations against land

targets), based on an assessment of wartime experience, and that concept had tri

new designs of both aircraft and aircraft carriers. But somehow the insights that 

emerged from the Royal Navy’s analyses had not come out of the analogous proc

the U.S. Navy. It was obvious that the new, heavier, and larger aircraft would need 

catapulted off any new carrier’s deck, but that conclusion ran into the fact that th

hydraulic catapults then in use had nearly reached the limit of their effectiveness

This collision of an operational imperative with a technological limit was appare

not appreciated in the office of the DCNO (Air), despite the work of Mitscher’s c

mittee. Evidence for this inference is the fact that the new concept of carrier oper

first developed by DCNO (Air)’s Captain Raisseur in June 1945 required a clear f

deck. The aircraft elevators would have to move to the edge of the flight deck so t

two catapults could work sequentially and rapidly. But which catapults? What ca

technology would work best? Answering those questions was left to BuAer, but th

umentary evidence suggests that the effort to develop effective jet aircraft for car

focused BuAer on improving the reliability of jet engines.

In April 1947, for example, Rear Admiral Pride later recalled of the period just be

taking charge of BuAer, “It then dawned on me that I would be up to my neck in 

procurement and that I had better find out a little about them at first hand. Furt

more, since no flag officer seemed to have soloed the things, it seemed appropria

the Chief of the Bureau set the pace.” So Pride drove to the Naval Air Test Center 

Patuxent River and asked to fly one of the new McDonnell XFD-1 Phantom prot

but “the Patuxent boys were not taking any chances with their new pet.” Pride en

flying an Army P-59, which got into the air but had an engine failure, forcing him 

return to the runways at Patuxent.42

As a younger naval aviator in the 1920s and 1930s, Pride had been an innovator. 

August 1921, as a lieutenant, he had developed the first arresting gear system for 

experimental aircraft carrier Langley. As BuAer chief, however, he “had to defend 

naval aviation budget. That took most of [my] time.”43 But the bureaucratic infig

that characterized budget negotiations was not new to Pride. In World War II, fo

example, he had strongly and successfully opposed drone attack aircraft as neithe

ticularly “valuable, nor reliable.”44 Once he took over BuAer, Pride tried to acquir

rights to the Rolls-Royce Nene jet engine and ended up purchasing a number of 

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rejected the concerns of officers in BuAer that jets would not work on carriers. As he

put it in his oral history interview, “There were a lot of people out in the fleet that were

very dubious about getting [jets] back up to revs again after you came in for a landing

and you had to take a waveoff. They were quite convinced that the jet would never be

able to take a waveoff [i.e., to resume normal flight after being ordered to abort a landing attempt just before touching down]. Well, I said, ‘By God, they’ll have to or be

made to, or we might as well go out of business now.’”45

In his championing of jet aircraft Pride did not consider himself a visionary or a radical, but he “liked new ideas.”46 At the same time, he stayed with BuAer’s traditional

practice of having the government provide engines that the aircraft designers could

build their airplanes around. He also ended the Navy’s lighter-than-air program, and

he admitted that the angled flight deck was an ingenious British innovation—and one

that the U.S. Navy had not foreseen.47 He acknowledged that the steam catapult was a

significant innovation, but he did not approve of the British “flexdeck” or “mat deck.”

What is easily forgotten when considering the activities of BuAer under Rear Admiral

Pride’s leadership is the menu of possibilities that wartime expenditures had produced

There were the obvious ones: jet propulsion, rockets, radar for night fighters, airbreathing missiles, and new supersonic-aircraft designs, such as the delta wing. But

there was much more. The BuAer “Research and Development Master Program” for fis

cal year 1947—a document put together early in 1946—contained some breathtaking

proposals. Perhaps the most audacious was Project JUPITER, an “airborne aircraft carrier” that would carry both “parasite” manned fighters and pilotless aircraft. This flying

carrier was to have been “an airplane in the 4–600,000 lb. class, powered by gas turbines, cruising at 35 to 40,000 feet at 400 to 475 MPH, with a radius of action of 2500–

3500 miles.”48 The Army Air Forces analog to this behemoth was the November 1945

general operational requirement for the next generation of heavy bombers. Meeting

this requirement led U.S. Air Force officers to develop a 1948 design of a swept-wing je

aircraft weighing over three hundred thousand pounds, carrying a ten-thousandpound payload to forty-five thousand feet, and flying almost seven thousand miles at a

speed of approximately 450 knots.49

The “Research and Development Master Program” also contained proposals for refining the liquid-fuel and solid-fuel rocket engines for the Gorgon, Super Gorgon, and

Lark missiles, plus money proposed for work on pulse-jet engines for missiles and target drones. What drove BuAer’s investment in both Project JUPITER and missiles was

the need to extend the range of a carrier’s striking power against land targets. A 1947

BuAer memorandum argued that “carrier striking power cannot be limited to a range

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ous situation when compared to the long range bombardment plans of the Army 

Forces.”50 As Malcolm Muir notes in his history of Navy surface warfare after Wo

War II, the Bureaus of Aeronautics and Ordnance “advanced a bewildering varie

missile projects during the immediate postwar period.”51 One of Rear Admiral Pr

more difficult tasks, therefore, was to wade through all the proposals and researc

development efforts and decide which ones really mattered.

But the “Research and Development Master Program” did identify a key short-te

problem: “continuous development of installations aboard ship which will perm

safe arrestation [sic] of any future type of carrier airplanes making normal or ap

mately normal landings.” In the words of the master program, “the shipboard arr

gear programs should be kept ahead of the development of the carrier airplane it

The program also singled out the need to develop a crash barrier that would wor

twin-engine planes with tricycle landing gear (like the F7F). As it observed, “The 

nitude of the problem of arresting heavy twin-engine airplanes, or jet-propelled 

planes, with high stalling speeds, and tricycle landing gear is very great.”53

The master program also proposed “utilizing the slotted cylinder principle” for c

catapults, but admitted that the slotted-cylinder concept was “a considerable dep

from the conventional catapult” and needed careful investigation.54 At the same t

the section of the R&D master program devoted to improving launching techniq

carriers noted that “as the operating speeds of aircraft continue to increase, a dec

launching interval is required to maintain the operating efficiency of the carrier.”

Here were the same hints that had provoked British engineer Lewis Boddington i

summer and fall of 1945 to move away from the axial (straight) carrier deck and

toward an angled deck with a rubber mat. At the same time, these hints were acco

nied—and perhaps overshadowed—by more dramatic concerns, especially the n

strike land targets from great distances at sea by the use of missiles or pilotless ai

launched by a flying aircraft carrier. In effect, what came to be called the “heavy a

mission had become institutionalized—embedded in the planning and thinking 

cers in both OPNAV and BuAer. Moreover, as the 1947 master program pointed 

the need for increasingly powerful catapults appeared to be met by incremental

improvement to existing hydraulic systems—just as in the case of arresting gear, 

older equipment had been superseded by incrementally improved designs.56

One of the most important tasks that leaders of an organization like BuAer have 

undertake is determining the priority of the problems that the organization is su

posed to deal with. To do this effectively, senior personnel must be able to evalua

able evidence about the performance of existing and planned systems in a realist

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carriers to the new jet fighter aircraft, because the postwar mission of the Royal Navy’s

carriers was the protection of seaborne trade from air attack. In the case of the U.S.

Navy, the mission was long-range strike, especially nuclear attack, and that forced the

U.S. Navy to focus on near-term, high-risk programs like the XAJ Savage, long-term

missile programs, and high-performance jet fighters with the range to accompany

carrier-launched bombers. In his oral history, Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, who was

DCNO (Air) from May 1958 until November 1962, praises four postwar BuAer chiefs:

Rear Adms. Alfred M. Pride, Thomas S. Combs, Apollo Soucek, and James S. Russell.57

We think Pirie admired these officers because they set and then imposed sensible prior

ities on BuAer.

We ask readers to place themselves in Rear Admiral Pride’s shoes in June 1947. On the

one hand, demobilization was still taking its toll on Navy aviation. For example, the

number of combat aircraft was dropping—from a high of 29,125 in 1945 to 9,889 in

1948—and the number of Navy pilots was being reduced from a wartime high of

49,819 to 10,861 in 1948.58 At the same time, the advent of jet aircraft and missiles had

made, or would soon make, many Navy aircraft obsolete. The future sketched out in th

1947 “Research and Development Master Program” was both dramatic and expensive.

Moreover, the development of nuclear bombs threatened to make the concept of a con

centrated task force or fleet obsolete. Finally, the bureaucratic and political conflicts

over military service unification and service roles and missions ate up the time and

talent of a number of the Navy’s most experienced and capable officers. Vice Admiral

Miller may have been correct to say that the nuclear mission was the “only game in

town,” but it was a risky game. The potential for error was high, as was the cost to the

Navy if errors were made. Moreover, as Admiral Pride said years later, some of the

more stubborn opponents of change were actually younger officers in BuAer: “I got

more opposition from juniors than I ever did from seniors in trying to get new programs in.”59

Pride may have been exaggerating. There were reasons why some BuAer personnel

thought that jet aircraft—especially jet heavy attack aircraft—might not be suitable for

carriers. As civilian engineer George A. Spangenberg recalled, “The Navy had a very

real problem in attempting to get into the jet age” and therefore, “most of us were kind

of in the middle. The pure jets at the time [1947] couldn’t quite do the job and everybody recognized a composite way to go was [a] poor choice. All of us recognized I

think that you couldn’t get there from here with a turbo prop if the other guy without

carrier constraints was going to be using jets. We would be in trouble.”60 Two things

saved jet aircraft on carriers. The first was the persistence of Cdr. (later rear admiral)

Alfred B. Metsger, a torpedo-plane pilot who became head of the Fighter Design

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Patuxent River in the spring of 1946 that pitted an F8F-1 Bearcat against a Navy 

Shooting Star. The highly maneuverable F8F-1 could turn inside the P-80, but th

report by the F8F-1’s pilot made clear the P-80’s advantage: “The F8F-1 is withou

doubt one of the most outstanding performers in the conventional field. Yet I fel

helpless. . . . I was completely on the defensive with no option but to counter the 

approaches.”62 As George Spangenberg recalled, “The F8F was solely at the mercy 

P-80. You couldn’t get away from it. It should have taught a lot of people a lo

lessons. . . . [I]t educated a lot of the people.”63

The emphasis on testing, along with the funds to conduct tests at fields such as Pat

River, is apparent in photographs from the early postwar years, especially in such 

as Thomason’s U.S. Naval Air Superiority (2007) and Strike from the Sea (2009), a

the many articles published in The Hook over the last generation or so.64 Experim

tion is a valuable tool for deciding among alternatives and in testing assumption

BuAer had been committed to rigorous testing ever since its creation in 1921.

The inferences drawn from many such tests conducted when Rear Admiral Pride 

bureau chief were summed up in a memorandum he wrote to the Chief of Naval 

ations, Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, in December 1949. Pride noted that piston-eng

fighters could not “successfully engage jet fighters, either offensively or defensive

also listed other weaknesses of the piston-engine aircraft: they could not attack je

bombers or “escort attack aircraft of any type in the face of jet fighter opposition

the skies were free of enemy jet fighters, piston-engine attack aircraft, such as the 

Skyraider, could be very effective. Based on exercises, Pride recommended agains

building any turboprop fighters, and he informed Admiral Sherman that “jet airc

should be procured in the necessary numbers for all fighter tasks . . . so as to mod

our fleet air forces as rapidly as possible.”65

Pride was clearly trying to head off criticism that jet fighters were not suitable fo

on carriers. He knew that the U.S. Air Force, the Soviet air arm, and the British h

already flown swept-wing jet fighters, and he knew that the Navy needed equival

craft if its carriers were to continue to be effective strike platforms. He also knew 

Douglas Aircraft was developing the A3D Skywarrior to take the place of the pro

plagued AJ Savage for the nuclear mission; BuAer had awarded Douglas a contra

two prototypes of the new jet bomber at the end of March 1949.

The Organizations: The Royal Navy

We have already mentioned the close contact between the Fleet Air Arm and the U

Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics before World War II, when then–rear admiral John T

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ish Aircraft Commission in the spaces of the USN’s Bureau of Aeronautics. At the same

time, Royal Navy aviators were apparently concerned that the formation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production in their own government would keep them from obtaining

high-performance aircraft suited for use at sea by emphasizing the need for numbers o

good land-based bombers and fighters.66 What met the Royal Navy’s needs was the

quality and quantity of fighters and attack aircraft available from U.S. manufacturers.

What is most interesting, however, is the decision in the summer of 1942 by the RN’s

First Sea Lord, Adm. Dudley Pound, to create a Future Building Committee within the

Admiralty. At the same time, Pound appointed retired admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer to

the post of “Chief of the Naval Air Services.”67 Dreyer, as assistant chief of the Naval

Staff from 1924 to 1927, had opposed the takeover of the RN’s aviation by the Royal Ai

Force, and Pound may have felt the need for an older air advocate in the Admiralty’s

wartime aviation staff. But what matters to us is that the FBC was charged to look

ahead and create a plan for the development of British fleet aviation during and after

the war.

The FBC was chaired by the Deputy First Sea Lord. The deputy chairman was the Assis

tant Chief of the Naval Staff (Weapons). The other permanent members were the Controller (Third Sea Lord); the Director of Plans; the Director, Tactical and Staff Duties

Division (responsible for organizing Admiralty staff requirements); the director of the

Gunnery Division; the Director of Naval Construction; and the Director, Naval Air

Division.68 As Norman Friedman has pointed out, the FBC “tried . . . to re-think the

fleet’s air needs as a coherent whole,” a remarkable task for some of the most senior

officers on the Admiralty staff while war was raging.69

There was no organization like it in the U.S. Navy at the time. The USN’s General Board

had performed a similar function at intervals in the years between World War I and

World War II, but once Congress had approved and funded the “two-ocean Navy,” the

main focus of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had been on fulfilling a plan

for naval aviation, not on developing a new one.

The leaders of the Royal Navy, however, did not have to produce all new aircraft once

its carrier commanders and pilots realized that existing British-made aircraft were

inadequate. The RN’s leaders could devote their attention to assessing war experience

and looking ahead to the implications of new technology. The FBC was an “early proponent of the catapult as the primary means of launching aircraft.”70 It also pressed for

the RN to have the most modern fighter aircraft on its carriers. In February 1943, an

“interim report” insisting that the carrier was the core of the fleet “shaped British nava

aircraft policy for the remainder of the war.”71 In 1943 and 1944, the FBC compared

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ity for naval air), Adm. Denis W. Boyd, became convinced by those studies “that 

rier had to be able to fly off her entire air complement in one continuous operat

This meant that the Royal Navy would have to adopt the “open hangar” commo

U.S. carriers, so that aircraft could be warmed up while still in the hangar, and al

deck-edge elevator, to move aircraft from the hangar to the flight deck.

In 1943, the position of “Director of Airfield and Carrier Requirements” was crea

under the Fifth Sea Lord, and the head of that organization joined the new Naval 

craft Design Committee, which had been a subcommittee of the Future Building 

mittee.73 But this change, and other administrative changes, did not disrupt the w

the FBC. The FBC, along with its aircraft design subcommittee—later a separate 

still allied organization—assumed that jet aircraft represented the future of milit

aviation and that carriers would have to launch and recover them.

In effect, the Royal Navy had had to build a new aviation organization once the F

Air Arm had moved back into the RN from the RAF in 1938. There were many d

that had then to be worked out—matters of training, promotion, personnel, base

the like. This took a great deal of time and energy, as Stephen Roskill notes in his 

ond volume of Naval Policy between the Wars. Moreover, the aviation doctrine th

RN had developed before the war, wherein carriers complemented battleships, ha

turned out to be inadequate, and so the aviation officers in the RN had in some s

to start all over again in 1942–43.

That they could do so was the result of the existence of an effective ally, the USN

effective organization—at the flag-level Future Building Committee inside the A

ralty, and at the Principal Supply Officers Committee, which supported the Com

of Imperial Defence. As G. A. H. Gordon shows in his British Seapower and Procu

ment between the Wars, the RAF and RN fostered an aviation industry in the 193

was both innovative and capable of the sustained serial production of aircraft.74 L

the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy relied on domestic aircraft manufacturers to build 

aircraft. Unlike the U.S. Navy, however, the RN had not been able to foster a Briti

naval aviation industrial base separately from the other military services. Yet the 

had the necessary technical expertise when it needed it—when the Future Buildin

Committee was casting its plans, especially in 1943 and 1944.75

The differences in the approaches to jet aircraft in the USN and RN seem to have 

due to the ways in which the two navies defined the problems they faced. A conse

was reached within the Royal Navy by 1945 that jet aircraft—especially fighters—

would have to operate from British carriers. Once that decision was made, the fo

attention turned toward finding ways to fit RN carriers to jet aircraft. In the U.S. 

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fighters continued into Rear Admiral Pride’s term as the head of BuAer.

By contrast, the U.S. Navy officers who wanted the Navy to embrace the nuclear-attack

mission reached an early consensus on the need to develop aircraft—first a mixedengine design and then an all-jet design—that could carry large nuclear bombs, but

their focus was on showing that a carrier could serve as an adequate launching platform for nuclear-armed bombers. The first aircraft selected by this group to fly off a

carrier with a dummy nuclear bomb was a modified version of the Lockheed P2V Neptune. The bombers were not meant to land back aboard the carriers that had launched

them; in case of war, they were to hit their targets and then ditch in the water when

they got back to their carriers. The experiments with the modified P2Vs were very visible, because the USN wanted to play a role in nuclear deterrence, but the consensus

about that policy choice took time, energy, and resources away from investigations of

catapults, the angled deck, and visual landing aids.

What we see in comparing the two navies is a successful committee system in the RN

and the absence of one in the USN. That does not mean that the RN’s process for dealing with an uncertain future always worked, while the USN’s did not. As we’ve seen, the

engineers at Farnborough, who were responsible for turning the policy of arming carri

ers with high-performance jet fighters into a working system, went down what later

was recognized as a dead end—flying aircraft without undercarriages into rubber

decks. Remember too that the lack of consensus, even within BuAer, about the need to

fly high-performance jets from carriers did not mean that the U.S. Navy lacked a sensible process for making decisions.

An example of effective decision making was the sequence of steps that led up to the

adoption of the steam catapult. The 1947 BuAer R&D master program had provided

for work on improving existing catapult technology and on building and testing slottedtube catapults.76 The Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin for April 1947 confidently

predicted that improved hydraulic catapults would handle jet aircraft, though the short

article admitted that the increased weight of the prototype XH8 was a problem for the

Naval Air Material Center engineers.77 The 1949 BuAer research and development plan

contained funds for new barriers for aircraft that failed to catch an arresting wire; a

system for recovering “wheelless” aircraft, “instrumented tests of full scale dummy

models and aircraft to determine arresting and catapulting characteristics”; development of both hydraulic and slotted-cylinder catapults; development of a “smokeless,

high specific impulse, solid propellant”; and improvement of jet-assisted takeoff

units.78 As we have pointed out in an earlier chapter, catapult development was not, as

had been anticipated in 1947, keeping up with the increasing size and performance of

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Naval Air Material Center).

In 1948, the Royal Navy brought the light carrier HMS Perseus out of mothballs 

built an experimental steam catapult on a platform on the ship’s flight deck. The 

ralty offered to send Perseus to the United States in June 1951. In response, Rear A

Apollo Soucek, the U.S. naval air attaché, sent Capts. Ralph S. Clarke and Peter H

to observe catapult launches on the ship. They reported positively on what they w

nessed. Rear Admiral Soucek then advised the new Chief of Naval Operations, Ad

Fechteler, to accept the Admiralty’s offer, which Fechteler did at the end of Augus

28 August 1951, Royal Navy rear admiral John Stevens, in the British Joint Servic

Mission in Washington, wrote to Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, the Director of Na

Intelligence, saying that the Royal Navy would reduce the security classification o

documentation on the RN’s steam catapult so that the diagrams and performanc

could be examined by civilian engineers at NAMC.80

On 27 September 1951, Rear Adm. Thomas S. Combs, the head of BuAer, notifie

commander of the NAMC that the tests on Perseus were “Priority 1.”81 Preparatio

the trials on Perseus included arranging berths for the British ship, preparing NA

personnel for their participation in the tests, finding funds to cover the costs of t

tests, planning the delivery of fuel for the test aircraft, and drafting a program of 

launches. The Royal Navy officers on the staff of the British Joint Services Missio

arranged to have information provided to the U.S. Navy regarding the steam cata

but also cautioned BuAer that it would take a relatively long time (five minutes) 

charge up the experimental catapult on Perseus between launchings.82 That is, the

experimental steam catapult was not up to sustaining the usual operating tempo 

USN carriers.

On 8 January 1952, with the expected arrival of Perseus less than a week away, Ca

Sheldon W. Brown, director of the Ships Installation Division in BuAer, sent a m

randum to Rear Adm. Lucien M. Grant comparing “British and American Slotted 

inder Catapults.” Brown’s concern was that “the British may make a determined 

to sell their steam catapult to us for use in our carriers.” Captain Brown noted th

Navy’s own C10 powder-driven catapult “has been built and will be installed in a 

ity at the Naval Air Material Center . . . in March 1952” and that “the C10 for the 

HANCOCK is under contract with a delivery schedule to the Puget Sound Naval 

yard of January 1953.” The catch was that the C10 was a powder-driven (not hyd

catapult, and it had not yet been tested with the gas generator that it was suppose

have. Put another way, significant improvements to the hydraulic catapult were b

ing harder and harder to achieve, and now the Navy’s catapult developers had pla

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devices under investigation.” Captain Brown’s assessment of the British steam catapult

was that “the proper attitude to take toward the British catapult is to regard it as a

back-up equipment which can be purchased in case of need.”83

Brown’s cautionary memorandum was not “out of bounds” as the process of bringing

Perseus to the United States moved along. A primary purpose of a staff process is to

reveal and consider options. Brown’s point was that the Royal Navy’s steam catapult

was just one option, and not necessarily the best. However, an undated and unsigned

“Progress Report on the Perseus Program” prepared—perhaps by Brown—at the conclusion of the initial tests on Perseus at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was much more

positive. It said that “at capacities even approximating that expected of the C10, the

British catapult becomes an object of very definite interest, one which we can not

afford to regard any longer as merely a back-up to our own programs.” Moreover, “the

British catapult is a bird in the hand which our own instrumentation tells us really

works, whereas the C10 is a bird in the bush which we have been unable to shoot to

date for lack of a facility.”84 The Naval Aircraft Factory responded on 12 February 1952

by doing its own comparison of the BXS British steam catapult and the C10. Its memo

randum argued that, with improvements, “the C-10 catapult will be, in the opinion of

the Chief Engineer, far superior and more suitable for use in the U.S. Fleet than the

British BS type catapult.”85

But the pressure to adopt the British steam catapult offset the desire on the part of

Naval Aircraft Factory personnel to pursue their own program. One of the witnesses of

the tests conducted on Perseus was a young Navy engineering officer named Daniel K.

Weitzenfeld. Weitzenfeld was working on developing the C10 at the Naval Aircraft Factory. As he would recall years later, Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, then commander of

Navy air forces in the Atlantic, watched the demonstrations of Colin Mitchell’s steam

catapult and insisted that the Navy acquire it.86 Ballentine had had a very impressive

career: first commanding officer of the Essex-class carrier Bunker Hill during World

War II, two years (1947–49) as a carrier-division commander in the Mediterranean

after the war, and then two years (1949–51) as the commander of the Sixth Fleet before

taking his post as the type commander for aviation in the Atlantic. He was a friend of

Rear Admiral Pride, who had been BuAer’s chief from May 1947 to May 1951, and

Ballentine had made it a point to visit Philadelphia to monitor the tests on Perseus.

87

Weitzenfeld, who eventually became the vice commander of the Naval Air Systems

Command (a successor organization to BuAer), believed that the pressure from officer

like Ballentine overcame the commitment of Naval Aircraft Factory engineers to their

own catapult development program.

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British steam catapult. On 14 February 1952, the assistant chief of BuShips infor

the chief of BuAer and the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations that an analysis 

BuShips engineers “has determined that a steam catapult installation of the [Brit

type . . . is technically feasible in the CV 9 Class [Essex] conversions, the CVB 41 

way] Class conversions, and the CVB 59 [Forrestal] Class new construction.”88 Th

of BuShips at once began planning a series of conferences on how best to procur

then install the British steam catapult. On 21 February, the Chief of Naval Opera

approved a further series of tests of the British catapult at Philadelphia. The goal 

these additional tests was to find out whether the BXS.1’s performance could be

improved by simply increasing the steam pressure used.89 It was so improved, and 

U.S. Navy decided in April 1952 to purchase the manufacturing rights for the RN

steam catapult. An American contractor was hard at work developing pilot mode

the USN by March 1953.90 In December 1953, Captain Brown was awarded the N

League Award of Merit for his work as Director, Ships Installation Division, in Bu

Work with the new steam catapults at sea began in the late spring of 1954 and co

ued through the rest of that year on the Essex-class carriers Hancock and Intrepid

We have worked through the story of HMS Perseus and the steam catapult in det

order to highlight how organizational factors—particularly organizational struct

and process—influence innovation and the diffusion of innovation. Organizatio

effective to the degree that their standard operating procedures allow the personn

governed by those procedures to

• Formulate programs of action

• Identify discrepancies between what they anticipate and what they see when t

take action

• Adapt, if necessary, future action to reach the organization’s goals.

When we began our study, we wondered whether the creation of the office of th

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Aviation in 1943 might have inhibited inn

tion in U.S. naval aviation after World War II by separating the makers of aviatio

icy from the officers charged with aviation procurement and with the fitting on c

of equipment that would allow carriers to operate modern jet aircraft effectively. 

clear to us that the leaders of BuAer aggressively pursued high-performance aircr

But did this pursuit—this focus on aircraft power plants and supersonic flight—

BuAer from paying enough attention to shipboard catapults, arresting gear, and 

deck barriers? The answer seems to be no.

Engineers in the organizations that made up the Naval Air Material Center tried 

hard to fit arresting gear, barricades and barriers, and carrier catapults to the new

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speeds were made toward the end of World War II;94 BuShips and BuAer continued tha

planning after the war ended. So why did the USN have to borrow the steam catapult,

the angled flight deck, and the mirror landing aid from the Royal Navy? Was it because

NAMC’s engineers didn’t see the problems associated with mating high-performance

jet aircraft with carriers? It would be tempting to say that the Naval Aircraft Factory

(even NAMC generally) failed as an organization. But a review of the evidence by Prof.

William F. Trimble of Auburn University suggests otherwise.95 Was it because the USN

lacked effective professional contacts with the RN? No. There was often a very intensive

back-and-forth between the two navies.

In 1948, for example, there were several senior Royal Navy staff officers serving as liaison officers in support of Rear Admiral Combs, then the deputy chief of BuAer.96 They

were joined in November of that year by two senior RN civilian engineers. As the engineers later noted in their report of their trip, “We obtained a mass of information,

drawings and pamphlets, including the only set of plans of C.V.A. 58 [the carrier

United States] outside America.”97 BuShips also provided the visitors with the plans for

modernizing the Essex-class carrier Oriskany, which was incomplete at the end of

World War II and was finally completed at the end of 1950 to a postwar standard, with

a strengthened flight deck, stronger catapults, and new antiaircraft guns.98 In their turn

the RN engineers gave the USN information and drawings of the control valve of the

carrier Ark Royal’s arresting gear.99 There were also useful exchanges regarding what

were known as “safety barriers” to the RN engineers, who were surprised, for example,

that the idea for a water brake for steam catapults was “quite new to the Americans.”100

But they were pleased with what their USN counterparts had learned about strengthen

ing aircraft arresting-gear hooks to bear the loads imposed by increasingly heavy aircraft, and they were impressed with the relatively low landing speeds of the McDonnell

F2H Banshee and the North American FJ-1 Fury. As they asserted, “there is no doubt

that the Americans have a much more effective control of the landing speeds of their

Naval aircraft than we have for our own.”101

Exchanges were not always so productive. The quality of the exchange depended a grea

deal on the personalities on both sides, but the cooperation was extensive. In late June

and early July 1953, for example, the “Officer-in-Charge of the [RN’s] School of Aircraft Handling, the Senior Instructor, and a party of twenty senior ratings of the Schoo

of Aircraft Handling” went aboard carrier Antietam to observe operations with the

ship’s new angled deck.102 This delegation was impressed with a number of the aircraft

handling procedures used on Antietam and made a number of recommendations.103

The RN also had a copy of the 5 February 1953 report from Antietam’s commanding

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London by the RN staff serving on the British Joint Services Mission in Washing

If there was extensive sharing of information between the RN and the USN, and 

creation of the DCNO (Air) position within the Office of the Chief of Naval Ope

tions did not isolate BuAer from OPNAV, then what was it, if anything, at the org

tional level that kept the U.S. Navy from developing in parallel with the Royal Na

innovations that made it possible for the USN to adapt carriers to modern jet air

The two navies exchanged pilots and technical and operational information. But 

there something about the RN’s organization that gave it an edge in developing t

innovations? We don’t know. We do know that USN officers almost immediately

grasped the potential of the angled flight deck once they saw drawings of it, bein

already aware of the challenges of operating jet aircraft from an axial deck. They 

ready for a solution to the many problems it created, and the angled-deck innova

caught hold quickly within the USN. As Norman Friedman points out, the contr

the carrier design that became Forrestal (CVA 59) was signed on 12 July 1951, ov

year before Antietam was modified for tests of the angled-deck concept. Forrestal

design was altered while it was being built, in 1953, as soon as OPNAV realized th

experiments with Antietam were a success; the new carrier received both an angle

and steam catapults.105

One organizational factor that worked to the RN’s advantage was the creation of 

cial committee by then–rear admiral Abel Smith, Chief of Naval Air Equipment, 

consider the problems of using jets on carriers. The committee sought out and ev

ated empirical evidence from tests and experiments. The members of this comm

included three RN captains (one was Dennis Cambell) who later attained flag ran

Mr. Lewis Boddington, whose papers in the summer and early fall of 1945 so elo

quently laid out the problems of operating jets from carriers.106 In effect, Rear (la

Vice) Admiral Smith put together a “winning team,” and that team more or less s

together—the sort of advantage that a smaller navy can have over a larger one. M

over, because both Cambell and Boddington “were also ex-officio responsible for 

occasional carrier trial in Triumph,” it was possible to move quickly from the form

of a concept to a test of that concept.107

The Institutional Level of Analysis

The individuals and organizations examined in our study worked within a frame

of rules and expectations set by institutions, the most important of which were t

and the USN. We have noted the very different expectations that applied to the R

the USN after World War II. Specifically, the RN did not have the mission of nuc

strike, or even what the U.S. Navy aviators referred to as “heavy attack.” In a

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Chief of Naval Operations), the head of OPNAV’s strategic plans division, argued to

the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that “the British do not believe in, nor do they

know how to conduct, fast carrier task force operations.”108 In some sense, this was true

and it is a sign of the different expectations that the U.S. Navy had of its aviation arm.

But because of this, the RN may have found it easier to think about jets on carriers.

Eric Brown, the RN’s deservedly famous test pilot, recalled years later that he first flew

a jet airplane in May 1944, at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. After

gaining experience with the early jets, he made suggestions that were acted on in modifying a de Havilland DH-100 Vampire, chosen to be the first jet flown on and off a

Royal Navy carrier. In an article he wrote for Air International many years later, he

commented that there was an air of competition with the U.S. Navy as both services

worked to modify jet aircraft for carrier operations.109 The RN had been very much in

second place behind the USN in terms of carrier operations during World War II, but

the advent of jets meant that both navies were in some sense starting from scratch in

the race to fly a jet from a carrier. As Brown recalled, the RN “won the race to be first to

operate a pure jet aircraft from a carrier, a feat that was not to be emulated by the US

Navy until seven-and-a-half months later.”110

There is a note in his remarks of the poorer but still very professional navy showing off

its talent to its richer and larger ally. But competition will lead nowhere unless there is

talent to sustain a race and rules to decide who has won, and what was common to

both navies was the emphasis on professionalism and on listening to the “real” professionals, who knew what they were doing. In our earlier book, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, we described just such a sense of competition tempered by

professionalism in the late 1920s, when the U.S. Navy was trying to come from second

place and overtake the Royal Navy’s lead in carrier aviation.111 We see the same evidence

of friendly competition in this case, though it was the RN that was pushing the

competition in the ’20s.

The RN may actually have found the competition easier to engage in because of the

smaller size of its air arm. Proximity can facilitate serendipitous creativity. For example

RAE put engineers, pilots, and new jet aircraft side by side. They were all together—for

thinking, debating, working, flying, and testing. In the USN, the testing was done in

one place (Patuxent River), while the thinking tended to be done in Washington (at

BuAer and within OPNAV), and the catapult and barrier development was carried on

in Philadelphia. Just how important geography (defined as physical separation or the

lack of it) was we cannot determine, but the productive interaction among a relatively

small group of pilots and engineers at RAE is striking. What really matters, though, is

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discourage frank discussions among individuals like Boddington, Cambell, and B

What is impressive on the U.S. side is the rapidity with which both the angled de

the mirror landing aid were adopted by the USN. Part of this was due, we are sur

growth of knowledge regarding the problems involved. American naval aviators w

well aware of the hazards of using jets on an axial carrier deck, and they were also 

aware of the problems of communication between pilots and LSOs posed by the 

landing speeds of jets. Having the angled deck and the mirror landing aid—whic

actually aided LSOs—were obvious improvements. That did not mean both coul

incorporated into carrier operations quickly and effortlessly, but a preexisting co

sus that there is a problem can often speed resolution by focusing attention and s

ring remedial action. The availability of resources is also a major facilitating facto

the U.S. Navy, though demobilized, was not as desperately short of funds after W

War II as the RN.

We have commented already on the way in which the issues of nuclear war, milit

service unification, and service roles and missions dominated the agenda of the p

war U.S. Navy. In effect, higher-level issues created what might be thought of as a

“noisy” or “cluttered,” even “distracting,” background to discussions about adapt

to carriers. In our study of RN and USN carrier developments between World W

and II we noted a similar problem affecting the RN before World War II. What w

real danger facing Great Britain then? An attack from a rearmed and hostile Germ

A confrontation with Italy over Italian military operations in Ethiopia? An attack 

Japan in the Far East? The “worst case” for the British then was a war on three fro

and that is exactly what they got, but the British economy could not sustain, in p

time, forces adequate to deter all three dangers simultaneously, and so it was diffi

for the officers leading the RN to plan effectively for future operations.

Something like that affected the USN after World War II. Senior officers had to s

simultaneously with a number of thorny issues. We have mentioned demobilizat

service unification, and the responsibility for nuclear operations, but there was a

what came to be called the Cold War, the creation of the Defense Department, th

war in Korea, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an

deployment of the fighting power of the U.S. fleet to the western Pacific and the 

terranean. One crisis or dramatic change followed another.112 As retired Navy cap

Peter Swartz noted some years ago, “the pace in the U.S. Navy in the first postwar

decade was hectic—even frenetic—operationally, organizationally, and technical

What sustained the U.S. Navy during this time was its commitment to profession

which meant a commitment to fairly and reasonably evaluating the evidence of t

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tions, even if they were developed—as indeed they were in this case—by another navy.

Stephen Roskill put it very well in his discussion of the disagreements within the British government over the issue of transferring naval aviation personnel from the RAF

and to the RN in 1936 and 1937: “How extraordinarily difficult it was to frame sound

policy as long as experience was confined to theoretical argument backed only by the

sometimes dubiously valid experience of peacetime exercises.”114 Both navies in our

story had officers who well understood this. War experience had demonstrated a lot,

yet both navies had to look beyond that immediate experience and make some hard

choices for the futures of their respective air arms. Both could do this difficult task,

because both possessed officers who were seasoned professionals—who had the ability

to evaluate evidence because they could generate evidence through analysis,

demonstrations, experiments, and exercises.

Moreover, the links between the two navies were strong. The end of World War II, and

especially the end of Lend-Lease, did not shut down the many organizational and personal contacts that had grown up during the war. People and ideas went back and

forth. We have mentioned aviation exchanges, but information regarding steam boilers

steam turbines, fuel filters, electrical systems, submarine propulsion, sonobuoys, and

even midget submarines was routinely exchanged and shared.115

There were definitely policy differences between the two governments that affected thei

respective navies, especially when it came to the U.S. government’s efforts to encourage

postwar European rearmament. In 1952, for example, the British service chiefs agreed

that the United Kingdom could not “afford the American technique of building up

large naval forces to support continental land battles,” and that the role of the Royal

Navy was to “keep open communications.”116 But two governments can have policy differences while their respective navies can continue cooperating. Away from the attention of the media, communication and exchanges can and do continue unabated. As

Captain Swartz puts it, after World War II “U.S. Navy leaders appreciated British technological prowess and exploited that strength, even when budget problems prevented

the Royal Navy from doing so.”117

Notes

1. In Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the

Fleet Air Arm (Hersham, Surrey, U.K.: Midland, 2008), p. 232, there is a photograph of

the whole Naval Aircraft Department (NAD)

in November 1951. There were about fifty

people in the NAD. On p. 201, there is a

photograph of those involved in the first

successful test of the flexdeck at

Farnborough. There were thirteen

individuals.

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illustrated in Paul Beaver, The British Aircraft

Carrier (Cambridge, U.K.: Patrick Stephens,

1983), pp. 132–33.

3. See Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, “The

Angled Deck Story (DRFC’s Own Account),”

Rear Admiral Dennis Royle Farquharson

Cambell, C.B., D.S.C., March 2008, pp. 3, 4,

www.denniscambell.org.uk.

4. Eric Brown, Wings on My Sleeve (London:

Orion Books–Phoenix, 2007), p. 220.

5. Jerry Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft

Carriers: How the Bomb Saved Naval Aviation

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 2001), p. 185.

6. Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An

Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 264. See also

Scott MacDonald, “Summing Up: The Turbulent Postwar Years,” in Aircraft Carriers in

Peace and War, ed. Joseph A. Skiera (New

York: Franklin Watts, 1965), pp. 201–204.

7. Cambell, “Angled Deck Story,” p. 4.

8. “It’s Done with Mirrors,” Naval Aviation

News (November 1955), pp. 20–22.

9. Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm,

pp. 207–12.

10. Cambell, “Angled Deck Story,” p. 6.

11. Ibid.

12. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My

Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), p. 150.

13. Brown, Wings on My Sleeve, p. 219.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 224.

16. See “Annotated Bumblebee Initial Report,”

February 1945, repr. Johns Hopkins APL

Technical Digest 3, no. 2 (1982), pp. 171–79.

17. William E. Scarborough, “The North American AJ Savage, Part One: Establishing the

Heavy Attack Mission,” Hook (Fall 1989),

p. 31.

18. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, 2001.

19. Albert B. Christman, Target Hiroshima: Deak

Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1998), pp. 209–11.

20. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, p. 31.

marks on Ashworth’s oral history.

22. For more on the controversy over wh

vice should control nuclear weapons

Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admir

Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 

ington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center

23. Ibid., p. 107.

24. Scarborough, “North American AJ S

pp. 28–43. The mock-up review is de

on p. 33.

25. John T. Hayward and C. W. Borklund

jacket Admiral: The Navy Career of C

Hayward (Annapolis, Md., and Newp

R.I.: Naval Institute Press and Naval 

College Foundation, 2000). Oddly en

for an officer with as distinguished a 

as Hayward’s, some of the details of h

reer (especially dates of promotion) 

ficult to establish. His oral history in 

Naval War College archives does not 

confirm such dates.

26. Scarborough, “North American AJ S

pp. 34–35.

27. Hayward and Borklund, Bluejacket A

p. 168. Hayward and Borklund list R

miral Lonnquest as the chief of BuAe

he was not. This and other small erro

tract from the value of Hayward’s m

28. Ibid., p. 88.

29. George A. Spangenberg, “Oral Histo

August 1997, George Spangenberg Or

tory, 2010, p. 61, www.georgespangen

.com.

30. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario 

Ed Heinemann, Combat Aircraft Desi

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1980), chap. 10 for his trip to the Pac

Fleet, pp. 186–87 for his investigation 

German military aircraft designs.

31. Ibid., pp. 199–200.

32. Ibid., p. 201.

33. Ibid., pp. 202–203.

34. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” p. 105. 

cember 1948, Lt. Gen. Howard A. Cr

senior USAF officer in charge of R&D

thought that reliable turboprop engi

would be developed earlier than turb

As he noted, “The XB-52 is designed 

persede the B-36 as a long range stra

bomber. Its combination of aerodyn

finement and turbo-propeller engine

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achieving characteristics of both long range

and high speed—large improvements in this

class of aircraft will come with radical developments which will require completely new

airframe developments—[u]nless supersonic

propellers become a reality, future [large

bombers] will be powered by turbo-jet engines. However, neither of these developments are sufficiently near at hand that the

turboprop step can be eliminated.” Less than

two weeks after Craig wrote the memorandum, the XB-47 turbojet bomber, powered

by six J35 turbojet engines, made its first

flight. Lt. Gen. H[oward] A[rnold] Craig,

DCS/M, memorandum to Gen. [Lauris]

Norsted, DCS/O, 16 October 1948, subject

“XB-52 Long Range Bombardment Airplane.” See also Mark D. Mandeles, The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A

Case Study in Organizational Innovation

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ.

Press, 1998).

35. Vice Admiral Miller says that there was a security scare when Heinemann estimated that

the newer nuclear weapons would have a diameter of just thirty-two inches and a much

lower weight than the weapon that the AJ

had been built to carry. See Miller, Nuclear

Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, p. 100.

36. But according to Heinemann, Hayward was

not happy with the mock-up’s cockpit layout. Heinemann and Rausa, Ed Heinemann,

Combat Aircraft Designer, p. 205.

37. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Aircraft Carriers, p. 94.

38. Secretary of the Navy, Op-01-MD, ser. 71802,

18 August 1943, created DCNO (Air), and

Secretary of the Navy, Op-01-MD, ser. 71902,

18 August 1943, transferred the planning,

personnel, training, and flight divisions from

BuAer to OPNAV. The quote from Julius A.

Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), is

on p. 393.

39. See Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1991), esp. chaps. 11, 12. During the war, the

Naval Air Technical Training Command produced an illustrated review of its activities

entitled Technicians’ War (Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love, n.d. but probably late 1945). This

magazine-style book is an excellent survey of

during World War II.

40. See Thomas Hone, “Naval Reconstitution,

Surge, and Mobilization,” Naval War College

Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 67–85.

41. See Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, pp.

204–33.

42. Roy A. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1995, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.:

Naval Historical Center, 1997), p. 745.

43. Adm. Alfred M. Pride, “Oral History” no. 84

Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., pp. 171–72.

44. Ibid., p. 175.

45. Ibid., p. 183.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 197.

48. “Research and Development Master Program,” Fiscal Year 1947, Bureau of Aeronautics, “Parasite Fighter Study” section (no

page number). This document was in “Navy

Department, Bureau of Aeronautics,” subhead 4, “Appropria. Aviation, Navy 1947,

1771502.004, Experimental.”

49. See Mandeles, Development of the B-52 and

Jet Propulsion.

50. See Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1982), p. 217.

51. Malcolm Muir, Jr., Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States

Navy, 1945–1975 (Washington, D.C.: Naval

Historical Center, 1996), p. 29. For wartime

developments, see Buford Rowland and Wil

liam Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in

World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy

Dept., Bureau of Ordnance, 1953).

52. “Research and Development Master Program,” Fiscal Year 1947, the section entitled

“Shipboard Arresting Gear.”

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., sections on “Catapults for Shipborne

Aircraft” and “Catapults for Pilotless

Aircraft.”

55. Ibid., section on “Development of Improved

Launching Technique.”

56. Ibid., section on “Shipboard Arresting Gear.

57. Robert B. Pirie, “1958: The Transition

Year,” in Into the Jet Age: Conflict and

Change in Naval Aviation, 1945–1975,

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Institute Press, 1995), p. 68.

58. Grossnick, United States Naval Aviation,

1910–1995, app. 4 (p. 448), app. 10 (p. 593).

59. Pride, “Oral History,” p. 182.

60. Spangenberg, “Oral History,” pp. 102–103.

61. Tommy H. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority: Development of Shipborne Jet Fighters,

1943–1962 (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty,

2007), p. 30. Rear Admiral Metsger wrote an

unpublished autobiography upon which

Thomason drew.

62. Ibid., p. 31.

63. Spangenberg “Oral History,” p. 103.

64. Tommy H. Thomason, Strike from the Sea:

U.S. Navy Attack Aircraft from Skyraider to

Super Hornet, 1948–Present (North Branch,

Minn.: Specialty, 2009).

65. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority, p. 125.

66. Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy,

1914–1945 (London: Jane’s, 1979), p. 135.

67. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the

Wars (New York: Walker, 1968), vol. 1, p.

391, for Admiral Dreyer’s actions as assistant

chief of the Naval Staff. In his Churchill and

the Admirals (London: William Collins,

1977), Captain Roskill notes that Admiral

Pound had made Dreyer “Chief of the Naval

Air Services” without also making him Fifth

Sea Lord and therefore a member of the

Board of Admiralty (p. 231).

68. Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation:

The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft

(London: Conway Maritime, 1988), p. 20.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 272.

71. Ibid., p. 275. Roskill, in his Churchill and the

Admirals (South Yorkshire, U.K.: Pen and

Sword Military Classics, 2004, a reprint of

the 1977 volume published by William Collins, London, cited above), makes the same

point on p. 233.

72. See Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, p.

272.

73. See ibid., p. 268.

74. G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1988).

75. Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914–

1945, p. 136.

Joyner and Walter Horne, “Consider

on a Large Hydraulic Jet Catapult,” N

Advisory Committee for Aeronautic

(NACA), 12 April 1951. This research 

orandum, prepared for BuAer’s Ship

lation Division, reviewed a catapult s

that would have the required capacit

procurement cost, and a relatively lo

ating cost. Project Records Relating t

pults, Launchers, Missiles, 1941–195

record group [hereafter RG] 72, box 

entry 133, National Archives.

77. “Naval Aviation Confidential Bulleti

(April 1947), pp. 46–47.

78. “Research & Development Plan for 1

(Approved Projects), Bureau of Aero

1 February 1948, National Archives.

79. U.S. Naval Attaché, London, Informa

Report, Office of Naval Intelligence, 

51, 27 July 1951, to CNO, subject “Tr

prototype steam catapult in HMS Pe

RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Laun

Missiles,” Perseus folder, National Ar

The response to Rear Admiral Souce

cussed in BuAer Confidential memo

Aer-SI-11, 24 August 1951, to Head, 

pult Branch and Head, SACO Branch

ject “Visit of HMS PERSEUS to the U

States,” RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapul

Launchers & Missiles,” Perseus folder

tional Archives. Adm. Forrest P. Sher

Fechteler’s predecessor as CNO, had 

cepted the Admiralty’s offer to send 

on 14 July, but Admiral Sherman die

week later, and the offer was renewed 

Admiral Fechteler.

80. Rear Adm. John Stevens, RN, letter to 

Adm. Felix Johnson, USN, 28 August 

B.N.S. 923/51-1, in RG 72, box 1, ent

apults, Launchers & Missiles,” Perseu

National Archives.

81. Chief, BuAer, letter to Commander, N

subject “TED NAM SI 330.0—Visit o

PERSEUS to the United States; test p

authorization of,” Aer-SI-34, S83/2, 0

27 September 1951, RG 72, box 1, en

“Catapults, Launchers & Missiles,” Pe

folder, National Archives.

82. Staff Engineer Officer (Air), letter t

of the Bureau of Aeronautics, subjec

of HMS PERSEUS,” 3 December 195

(RNAS-2/8709), RG 72, box 1, entry

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folder, National Archives.

83. Capt. Sheldon W. Brown, memorandum to

Rear Adm. L. M. Grant, subject “Brief Comparison of British and American Slotted Cylinder Catapults,” 8 January 1952 (Aer-SI),

RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Launchers &

Missiles,” Perseus folder, National Archives.

84. “Progress Report on the Perseus Program,”

no signature, n.d., RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Launchers & Missiles,” Perseus folder,

National Archives.

85. Warren W. Ford, Naval Aircraft Factory, letter and memorandum to Capt. Sheldon W.

Brown, BuAer, 12 February 1952, PEWWF:dc, RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapults,

Launchers & Missiles,” Perseus folder, National Archives. The quotation is from p. 5 of

the attached memorandum.

86. D. K. Weitzenfeld, “Colin Mitchell’s Steam

Catapult: The Heart of Modern Aircraft Carriers,” Wings of Gold 10 (Summer 1985),

p. 43.

87. Admiral Ballentine’s papers are in the Naval

Historical Foundation Collection in the Library of Congress. Entries in his personal diary in box 3 for January and February 1952

indicate his interest in the tests on Perseus.

88. Chief, Bureau of Ships, memorandum to

Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, subject “Slotted cylinder catapults, shipboard installation

of,” 14 February 1952 (C-CV/S83 [440]), RG

72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Launchers &

Missiles,” Perseus folder, National Archives.

89. Chief of Naval Operations, letter to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Chief,

Bureau of Aeronautics, and Chief, Bureau of

Ships, subject “Extension of visit of H.M.S.

PERSEUS to the USA to permit additional

catapult tests,” 21 February 1952 (Op-551F/

mgt, ser. 055P551), RG 72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Launchers & Missiles,” Perseus folder,

National Archives.

90. Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, letter to Commander, Naval Air Material Center, subject

“Steam Catapult Operational Films showing

launching aboard HMS PERSEUS (BXS-1);

request for furnish of,” Aer-41-31 (27 March

1953), Catapult Branch, item no. 6, 1952, RG

72, box 1, entry “Catapults, Launchers &

Missiles,” Perseus folder, National Archives.

91. “From David to Brown,” Naval Aviation

News (February 1954), p. 5.

report to Commander Air Force Atlantic

Fleet, subject “Project Steam II Summary

Report,” SI-2 (20 November 1954), RG 69,

box 1, entry A960, National Archives.

93. BuAer did not constrain the imaginations of

aircraft designers, as a recent book (Jared A.

Zichek, Secret Aerospace Projects of the U.S.

Navy: The Incredible Attack Aircraft of the

USS United States, 1948–1949 [Atglen, Pa.:

Schiffer, 2009]) makes clear—quite the

reverse.

94. Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, p. 231.

95. William F. Trimble, Wings for the Navy: A

History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917–

1956 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1990). Trimble documents a number of

technical achievements at the Naval Aircraft

Factory and at the other organizations

within NAMC, including the Aeronautical

Instruments Laboratory’s development of a

autopilot for helicopters and the Naval Aircraft Factory’s design and development of

the famous “Davis Barrier” to capture jet

aircraft that failed to catch a wire when

landing on a carrier.

96. The RN liaison officers are listed in the

BuAer telephone book. The phone books fo

BuAer are in the Naval Aviation History archives, box 88, “BuAer, Directories & Correspondence Designations, 1 February 1946, 1

July 1946, 15 January 1947, 15 April 1947, 1

November 1947,” Washington Navy Yard,

Washington, D.C.

97. “Report of the visit of Mr. J. L. Bartlett & M

D. W. Smithers to the U.S.A., November

1948,” Naval Construction Department,

(Admiralty, Bath), folder ADM 281/109,

Public Records Office [hereafter PRO], p. 4.

98. Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, pp. 288–91

99. “Report of the visit of Mr. J. L. Bartlett & M

D. W. Smithers to the U.S.A., November

1948,” p. 34.

100. Ibid., p. 39; for the reference to catapult

technology, p. 41.

101. Ibid., p. 43 for arresting-gear hook; p. 50 for

comparative landing speeds.

102. “Report by School of Aircraft Handling on

Period Spent on Board of U.S.S. Antietam,”

27 July 1953, attached to Flag Officer,

Ground Training, memorandum to Flag Office Air (Home), folder ADM 1/24536, PRO

p. 1.

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104. Commanding Officer, USS Antietam (CVA

36), report to Commander Air Force, U.S.

Atlantic Fleet, subject “Monthly Report of

Canted Deck Evaluation Number 1, period

12 January 1953 through 31 January 1953,”

CVA-36/15, S1-4, ser. 181, folder ADM 1/

24536, PRO.

105. Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, pp. 257–65.

106. Beaver, British Aircraft Carrier, p. 131.

107. Ibid., p. 133.

108. Op-30, memorandum to Op-09, subject

“Comments on SGM 2538-52,” 15 November

1952 (Op-30/nm), Burke Papers, Personal

File no. 46, Naval Historical Center.

109. Eric Brown, “Dawn of the Carrier Jet,” Air

International 28, no. 1 (January 1985), pp.

31–37.

110. Ibid., p. 34.

111. See Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman,

and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British

Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1999), p. 47.

U.S. Navy and National Security Affa

1945–1955 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 

Press, 2009).

113. Peter M. Swartz, “The U.S. Navy and 

in the First Postwar Decade” (Naval H

cal Center Colloquium on Contemp

History, Seminar 8, 22 September 20

2.

114. Roskill, Naval Policy between the War

p. 398.

115. See, for example, Engineer-in-Chief’

partment, “Report on Mission to Un

States of America, April–May 1951,” 

ADM 265/18, 3 W 382, PRO. See also 

ADM 1/20176, “Review of state of co

ration between staff officers and thei

sponding divisions in the U.S. Navy 

1946, also PRO.

116. Cited in Andrea Ellner, “Carrier Airp

the Royal Navy during the Cold War

International Strategic Context,” Def

Security Analysis 22, no. 1 (March 20

p. 27.

117. Swartz, “U.S. Navy and Europe in th

Postwar Decade,” p. 8.

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Conclusion

The story of the development of the steam catapult, the angled flight deck, and th

mirror landing aid—the innovations that made the modern aircraft carrier possi

after World War II—is usually given little attention in general histories of the U.S

Navy.1

We believe that this relative lack of attention is in fact a sign that senior U

Navy officers were confronted by so many new developments—in technology, str

and operations—after World War II that the Navy as an institution had difficulty 

ing time to deal adequately with them all. The stories behind the three innovatio

we have studied look insignificant when compared to the debates over service res

bilities and unification or the arguments within the U.S. government regarding w

became known as the Cold War. Nobel laureate Herbert Simon argued almost fo

years ago that attention, not information, is the really scarce resource in complex 

nizations. As historians of the U.S. Navy’s actions and policies after World War II 

found, Navy leaders were constantly time pressured.2

Looking at the Evidence

Moreover, the way the Navy was managed changed during World War II. In our e

comparative study of British and American carrier aviation, we identified three o

zations that played the key roles in the development of the U.S. Navy’s carrier arm

Bureau of Aeronautics, the General Board of the Navy, and the Naval War Colleg

the three, only one—BuAer—retained a central role in the development of postw

carrier aviation, and its influence in the process of developing naval aviation poli

much diminished. The primary organizational actor after World War II was the O

of the Chief of Naval Operations. But officers in OPNAV had to develop Navy po

a number of other significant areas as well, including nuclear war and deterrence

vice unification, and when and how Navy task forces would be deployed on a reg

and recurring basis to the western Pacific and the Mediterranean.

The quality of officers assigned to OPNAV somewhat made up for the lack of mu

organizational “actors,” but the Navy nonetheless lacked in 1946 what an earlier g

ation of Navy leaders had possessed in 1926, which was a systematic means of ide

ing conceptual errors and possibilities. In the 1920s, Navy doctrinal development 

at the Naval War College, where existing and possible doctrines for fleet deploym

were tested in rigorous war games. Inferences drawn from the war games were th

tested in the annual “fleet problems,” where the U.S. fleet was divided into two

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results of the fleet problems were funneled back to both the Naval War College and the

Navy’s technical bureaus, such as BuAer. Thus the Navy had a rolling cycle of concept

development, war gaming, tests of concepts at sea in major maneuvers, and post–fleet

problem assessment. Then there were more war games, fleet problems, and postexercise

assessment.5

This rolling cycle was complemented by the way the General Board conducted secret

hearings on ship design and other issues of interest to the senior civilian and military

leaders of the Navy. In the hearings, those called to testify were asked to present evidence to support their claims, and the members of the General Board encouraged thos

present to voice their views and to disagree when they felt the evidence could be interpreted in a different way. In effect, the board’s rules of procedure for its very confidential hearings promoted and sanctioned a give-and-take regarding problems of strategy,

technology, and doctrine. The board kept a stenographic record of its hearings, and

that record was made available to both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Nava

Operations. The combination of the give-and-take at the hearings and the ability of the

CNO and the secretary to monitor that debate gave the Navy an effective organizational tool in Washington to identify problems and then weigh the value of potential

solutions. That organizational tool complemented the institutional tool of the cycle of

war game/fleet problem/maneuver assessment used in the 1920s and 1930s.6

These tools were not available after World War II. Major policy and doctrinal issues

had to be dealt with by officers assigned to OPNAV. Though the quality of these officer

was high, the organizational distance between them and the engineering specialists

charged with, for example, adapting aircraft carriers to jets was great.7

If a particular

issue mattered enough, that distance could be closed. That was clearly the case with the

development of the AJ Savage nuclear-capable bomber, first ordered in June 1946 and

first flown just over two years later. But officers in OPNAV could not deal effectively

with every problem facing the Navy after the war. For example, Captain George B.

Chafee, the director of BuAer’s Ships Installation Division, gave a speech in 1947 in

which he acknowledged that the effort to develop new barriers on existing axial-deck

carriers that would safely handle jet aircraft “has been the No. 1 priority project at the

Naval Air Material Center for nearly 2 years.”8

Chafee also admitted that “designs of

future aircraft are being hampered to a degree by catapult capacity,” though he also

noted that the Naval Air Material Center was working on a slotted-tube device.9

Chafee

informed his listeners that the aircraft elevators of future carriers would need to be “of

the deck-edge type,” and that they would need to be able to lift a 60,000-pound aircraft

Aircraft hangars on carriers would have to be larger to accommodate the bigger planes

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the stowage capacity of carriers.”10

Chafee’s list of new requirements for future carriers suggests the need to design t

rier to the aircraft, yet he also told his audience that the AJ Savage “was designed

around the Midway class characteristics.” The design of this aircraft did not prov

reassessment of the way in which carriers were designed because the Savage “was

conceived as a plane for a special operation with no requirement for entry into 

hangar.”11 Reading this speech in hindsight, we wanted to shout, “You need to red

the whole flight deck! Stop adapting and start innovating!” The signs of a major 

lem are there, from the inability to develop a satisfactory barrier to the limits of

hydraulic catapults, and from the need for dramatically more fuel to the need to 

ways to load new and larger (10,000 and 12,000 lb.) bombs. But Captain Chafee 

it clear that BuAer was constrained both by a lack of funds and by the need to ex

wholly new concepts, including “the submarine aircraft carrier and the airplane 

carrier,” pilotless aircraft, and guided missiles.12 Put another way, there was almos

much on the Naval Air Material Center’s plate.

The engineers and other specialists responsible for the new carriers and for the a

related equipment on the new ships believed that incremental improvements to e

ing technologies would work satisfactorily with the new aircraft being developed

took OPNAV intervention—when Rear Admiral Soucek dealt with CNOs Sherm

Fechteler—to shove the engineers in a new direction.

As we have shown, matters were different in the Royal Navy. Senior RN officers r

nized the deficiencies in their aircraft carrier forces during World War II and the

aside the past and grasped the nature of the future, seeing the necessity for jet air

in their postwar carrier force. As they did this, the engineers in the United Kingd

charged with developing catapults and arresting gear realized that operating jet a

from a carrier meant changing the carrier. The engineers were able to show a log

progression from “Jets are the future” to “The carrier must be suited to jets.” Tha

cal progression led to a set of interrelated problems, including efforts safely to re

the jets, which landed at higher speeds than propeller planes, and the adoption o

steam catapult, which was needed by the jets because they accelerated more slow

propeller-driven aircraft. Because the first jets consumed so much fuel compared 

their propeller-driven predecessors, engineer Lewis Boddington and his colleagu

Farnborough worked to adapt the carrier to jets that lacked landing gear, hoping 

the weight saved by eliminating the landing gear could be devoted to fuel. The im

tive to conserve fuel led to the undercarriage-less airplane, which led to the flexib

deck, which led to the angled deck.

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angled deck was the result of an accident. In some sense, that was a consequence of the

way that Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, RN (Ret.), told the story of its adoption.13

However, as Geoffrey Cooper’s detailed Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm shows,

Boddington and his colleagues had laid the groundwork for the angled-deck idea

through their careful work on the “flexdeck” concept and prototype.14 For that reason,

we choose to consider the angled deck less an accidental discovery than a serendipitous

development. The terms “accidental,” “serendipitous,” and “fortuitous” are near synonyms, but “accidental” suggests finding something by chance, whereas we believe that

“serendipitous” implies the ability to recognize something as new or innovative while try

ing to solve a problem. Our point is that Boddington was prepared to perceive the implications of Cambell’s sketch design because of his earlier extensive work on the flexdeck.

The notion of serendipity also accounts for the speed with which the U.S. Navy’s aviators adopted the angled-deck idea from the British. Its aviators were prepared for the

idea by their experiences landing jets on the existing axial flight decks of the Essex- and

Midway-class carriers. The USN’s carrier aviators in OPNAV were already committed

to modifying a number of Essex-class carriers for jet aircraft operations, and so they

were open to, and even eager for, ideas that they could “borrow.”

Contrast that situation to the initial resistance of BuAer’s catapult engineers to the

British steam catapult. The Americans were strongly committed to an explosive or gasdriven catapult design, because they could not see a workable solution to the seepage o

steam from a slotted-tube catapult. Indeed, when the Navy tested steam catapults on

the Essex-class carrier Hancock (CVA 19) under operational conditions off San Diego,

California, in July

1954, the jet aircraft

being launched were

usually enveloped by

clouds of steam from

the catapults. It took

time for an effective

seal to be developed

that would work with

the higher-pressure

steam generated by

the U.S. carriers’ propulsion plants. As we

have pointed out,

BuAer catapult

The first test of a U.S. Navy steam catapult at sea, July 1954. USS Hancock (CVA 19) is

launching . . . what? The plane is completely obscured by steam leaking from the catapult.

Navy Department, National Archives

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the problem of launching very heavy bombers from carriers.

But the BuAer engineers were not in charge of USN aviation policy. It was aviato

Rear Adm. Apollo Soucek who identified the steam catapult as a viable alternative 

hydraulic systems used in U.S. carriers, and it was apparently a senior aviator—V

Adm. John J. Ballentine, the type commander for aviation in the Atlantic—who

insisted that the steam catapult be adopted. In the case of the mirror landing aid

find a similar pattern. Both navies had been experimenting with new ways of gui

the faster jets safely to carrier flight decks, and hence the U.S. Navy was “ready” t

sider a system that complemented or replaced the landing signal officers then em

on carriers. When Lt. Cdr. Donald Engen tested the British “optical landing syste

HMS Illustrious in November 1953, his recommendation was enough to convinc

senior officers to procure it for use on U.S. carriers. Engen was then one of two U

Navy pilots assigned to the famous Empire Test Pilot school at Farnborough, and 

were directed to test British innovations.15

Our study has examined both innovations and adaptations. At the end of World 

the Royal Navy’s engineers at Farnborough decided that the introduction of jet a

would require an innovation in carrier design—a different kind of carrier suited 

characteristics (landing speed, takeoff speed, fuel consumption rate, etc.) of the n

aircraft. The U.S. Navy’s counterparts to the engineers at Farnborough decided th

their task was to adapt existing carriers and aircraft-handling equipment to the n

aircraft. But the senior aviators in OPNAV were innovators; they wanted to creat

“heavy attack” jet bombers that could carry the large and heavy nuclear weapons 

had been used in World War II. Launching and recovering those bombers require

very different approach to a carrier’s flight deck and its equipment.

The Royal Navy’s aviators and its engineers shared a common vision and also sha

understanding of the obstacles that would have to be overcome to turn that visio

reality. We do not see that same level of shared vision on the U.S. side, except bet

the Navy’s aviators and the aircraft designers in industry. Perhaps one reason for 

apparent gap between aviators in OPNAV and the catapult engineers in BuAer w

the two groups were not in constant contact, as the BuAer aviators were with ind

aircraft designers and engineers. The human, or personal, link between aviator o

in OPNAV and BuAer, on the one side, and BuAer catapult engineers, on the oth

weak—probably too weak for the innovators to challenge and stimulate the engin

who thought their task was to adapt.

In World War II, Adm. Ernest J. King shunted aside the Naval War College and th

General Board. Major decisions about acquisition and the future of the Navy wer

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BuAer had to catch the attention of the senior admirals there in order to be evaluated.

As Friedman has shown, the origins of the Navy’s heavy and large carrier-aircraft attack

program stemmed from a detailed memorandum sent by the BuAer chief, Rear Adm.

Harold B. Sallada, to the CNO in December 1945.16 Adm. Marc Mitscher, then the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, was a strong supporter of Rear Admiral Sallada’s

recommendation and also of a flush-deck carrier concept suited to the new and as yet

undeveloped large carrier bombers.17 The General Board still operated in late 1945,

but it did not play the same analytic role that it had before the war, and therefore

Mitscher’s support was essential if the Navy’s leaders were to endorse the heavy-attack

concept for carrier aircraft.

With the end of the prewar war-game/fleet-problem/problem-assessment cycle, the

process of carrier-concept development was open to influence from officers in OPNAV

BuAer, and the fleet. Disciplining this process was left in the hands of a new organization of bureau representatives called the Ship Characteristics Board (SCB), and major

decisions taken by this board were decided by voting—one vote for each bureau,

including the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.18 In the immediate postwar years, the

members of the SCB, as well as the OPNAV staff, were officers with wartime operational experience. The same went for the chiefs of BuAer. That shared experience gave

the members of the SCB and the staff of OPNAV a shared set of reference points—a

common grounding. But that common grounding did not lead to a carrier design built

around heavy-attack aircraft until serious planning for the “supercarrier” United States

began in June 1946.19 Put another way, the postwar carrier program was more a product of the views of senior officers than it was the result of back-and-forth before the

General Board based on consideration of systematically gathered evidence. And those

senior officers in OPNAV decided after World War II that they would not concede the

nuclear strike mission to the Army (later Air Force) land-based bomber commanders.

It is ironic that BuAer, which had lost its policy-making responsibilities to OPNAV dur

ing the war, nonetheless continued after the war as an organization with major influence within the Navy, because Navy aviation leaders like Admiral Mitscher came out of

the war convinced of the importance of the heavy-attack mission. In effect, the require

ment for a carrier aircraft that could carry large (ten-thousand-pound and more)

bombs merged with the desire of Navy aviators for a carrier-based nuclear bomber. As

Lewis Boddington had decided in the summer of 1945, it was time that the characteristics of the carrier’s aircraft determined the design of the carrier. The result in the U.S.

Navy was the large but canceled United States and the later somewhat smaller but still

very large Forrestal (CVA 59).

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technology and operations, and thus the last wartime British carrier design, for t

never-built Malta class, was inspired by U.S. Navy carrier characteristics, which f

tated the rapid launching and recovery of multiple strike missions. When the RN 

forced by financial limitations to rebuild its existing carriers instead of construct

new ones, it made efforts to incorporate such U.S. Navy features as the deck-edge 

tor, which greatly simplified the flow of aircraft between the hangar and flight de

The two navies diverged, however, when in 1949 the British chiefs of staff rejecte

RN proposal that its carriers be given the nuclear-strike mission.

By that time, the mission of RN carriers was well understood. They would shield 

ping en route from the United States and Canada from attack by Soviet surface w

ships and land-based attack aircraft. RN carrier aircraft could also intercept Sovi

minelaying aircraft trying to close European and British ports. To perform these 

sions RN carrier aircraft had to have the necessary range, hence the strong intere

Lewis Boddington in carrier fighters without landing gear.

The strategic context in which engineers such as Boddington and officers like De

Cambell worked was a classified planning assumption that the Soviet Union wou

be capable of attacking Western Europe until 1957. In British parlance, 1957 beca

the “year of maximum danger.” This assumption mattered, because it allowed tim

the British economy—as well as the Soviet economy—to recover from World Wa

Once the economy was back on its feet, the British assumed, their military servic

would have the funds to purchase quantities of advanced weapons. Until then th

ish would invest in research and development and, they hoped, stay in roughly th

same technological league as the comparatively wealthy Americans. When the So

Union tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, however, the “year of maximum da

seemed much closer. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, milit

leaders on both sides of the Atlantic feared that the Korean conflict might be the 

round of World War III. The United States was already rearming and quickly inc

its spending on research, development, and acquisition. The British government 

not do the same.

The steam catapult, angled flight deck, and optical landing aid made Forrestal an 

tive carrier and a strategic weapon. However, by the mid-1950s (the end point fo

research), the size and weight of nuclear bombs had been dramatically reduced; i

longer took a massive (eighty-two-thousand-pound loaded weight) aircraft like t

Douglas A3D Skywarrior to deliver nuclear weapons. New “tactical” nuclear wea

could be carried by such fighters as the North American FJ-4B Fury, and a lightw

attack plane—the Douglas A4D Skyhawk—was designed specifically for nuclear

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purpose the North American A3J Vigilante was supposed to serve as the successor to

the A3D. However, by the mid-1950s the Navy had another way to deliver strategic

nuclear weapons—the Regulus cruise missile. As Naval Warfare Publication 10, Naval

Warfare, noted in 1954, “Newer submarines have been equipped with missiles and will

provide a tremendous strategic deterrent capability to our Navy.”22

The first Navy Long-Range Objectives Group (Op-96) study, completed in 1955, envisaged a fleet using such missiles for long-range attack, hence no longer requiring heavy

bombers—or heavy carriers.23 In effect, just as the new carriers were entering service, it

seemed, they and their heavy-attack aircraft would soon be unnecessary. But as it

happened, the combination of the large carrier and the heavy-attack bomber had kept

alive the heavy-attack mission itself long enough for the Navy to demonstrate the strategic value of its dispersed nuclear striking force. Within five years, the Navy shifted

from reliance upon heavy-attack aircraft for the nuclear-strike mission to air-breathing

cruise missiles and then to ballistic missile–launching submarines.

But the large carriers survived, because fleet air defense required carriers to operate

large, high-performance fighters, and the newer, heavier fighters were every bit as

demanding of flight-deck equipment as the heavy-attack aircraft. They were probably

even more demanding in terms of landing requirements. The F-14, at a loaded weight

of fifty-five to sixty thousand pounds, was three times as heavy as a loaded Douglas

AD-2 Skyraider and about 70 percent as heavy as a loaded North American RA-5C Vig

ilante. The routine of bringing it back aboard a carrier would not have been possible

without the angled

flight deck and the

optical landing aid.

These innovations,

along with the steam

catapult, made it possible for the large car

rier to continue to

field modern, highperformance aircraft.

Lessons

In his Military Transformation Past and

Present, Mark D.

Mandeles observes

A Regulus-1 air-breathing, long-range missile catapulted from Hancock in 1957. The trolley

holding the missile and pulled by the steam catapult is lost when the missile is launched.

Navy Department, National Archives

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nothing is simple.” Moreover, “risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity are constant com

ions,” and therefore the “key to unlocking the process of innovation is attention 

multiple sets of relationships among individuals, organizations, and multiorgani

tional systems.”24 Our study has followed this plan; we have examined the actions 

individuals, how individuals have influenced the organizations in which they hav

worked, and the interactions of different organizations.

One obvious “lesson learned” from this study is that it is difficult for people wor

a complex organization like the Navy to identify correctly a technical or tactical p

lem unless they have procedures and organizations that facilitate their doing so. T

particularly important when—as was the case for the USN after World War II—a

organization is confronted almost simultaneously with multiple challenges. So w

that BuAer approached the problem of developing effective and efficient jet engi

way it had approached the problem of developing powerful and reliable piston en

in the 1920s and 1930s—by financing engine development. The new jet engines w

provided to the airframe manufacturers as “government furnished equipment.”

OPNAV, which after the war was the center of aviation policy making, did not ob

BuAer’s relying on an established method of engine procurement. OPNAV office

did not object when BuAer proposed testing the RN’s flexdeck. There were establ

reliable procedures for testing new equipment.

On its part, the RN had a system of committees to review wartime experience an

anticipate postwar requirements. Norman Friedman has discovered that the Airc

Design Subcommittee of the RN’s Future Building Committee initiated the study 

aircraft without landing gear and the use of flexible carrier-landing decks.25 Once 

subcommittee had identified that possibility as legitimate, Lewis Boddington c

begin the studies that led to his papers in the summer of 1945 on what modif

tions to carriers would be necessary in order to operate jets from them success

Boddington’s papers did not result from a flash of individual insight. They were 

on a good deal of quantitative analysis conducted over a period of several month

pursuit of a possibility approved by a standing committee of experienced officers

what guided that analysis was a consensus among the relevant military and civili

sonnel that jets were the future and that bringing them on board aircraft carriers 

be difficult and quite dangerous unless a different approach to landing was devel

The subcommittee’s deliberations were essential to developing that consensus.

In the U.S. Navy, by contrast, it took longer for a similar consensus to emerge. 

reason was that there were significant “distractors,” including competing problem

ate up the time and energy of the people charged with making the transition from

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turn carriers into nuclear-strike platforms. Related to this distractor was another—the

larger debate about the proper organization of national defense in the United States

after World War II. There were still others, including the USN’s role in what became

NATO, whether the Navy would have what are now called “forward-deployed forces,”

and, of course, the war in Korea.26

For example, why wasn’t Rear Adm. Alfred Pride, BuAer chief (May 1947–May 1951) in

the critical years after World War II, more concerned about the bureau’s catapult program? When the first jets came in, he went down to the Naval Air Test Center to fly

one, and he stayed actively involved in BuAer’s engine and supersonic-aircraft development efforts. It was under his leadership that BuAer spent scarce funds on some very

innovative and secret carrier-launched nuclear bomber designs.27 Though Rear Admira

Pride had made his mark as a young officer by designing catapults, as BuAer chief his

concern was more effective aircraft. One reason—perhaps the main reason—for that

concern was the need to show that the Navy’s new carrier (the ill-fated United States

program) and even its modified Essex carriers could launch nuclear-weapon-armed

bombers that could rival or exceed the performance of bombers being fielded and

designed by the U.S. Air Force. But another reason for his focus on aircraft was the lack

of what might be called an “integrating mechanism,” an organization like the General

Board that, through its investigations, could look across different areas of technology

and operations.

What else have we learned? We have learned something obvious, something so very

obvious that people usually don’t stop to consider it—the value of experimentation. The

perception of a need to experiment and an imperative to learn from experimentation

are critical to innovation. The classic illustration is the visit of HMS Perseus to the

United States in 1952. The USN spent funds (by 1952 not so scarce as before the

Korean War) to bring the ship to the United States and support it and its crew during

critical experiments in Philadelphia and Norfolk, in an episode we have already

described. What is so impressive is the willingness of all the professionals involved to

accept the results. The USN catapult experts were concerned that the British steam catapult would not work using steam at six-hundred-pound pressure, so the USN supplied steam at that higher pressure, and Colin C. Mitchell’s steam catapult was tested

once more—again successfully. That was it. The steam catapult became the primary

U.S. carrier catapult, from being an alternative to what BuAer’s catapult developers had

been working on. Experiments cost money. They take time. They must be carefully

planned. But they are priceless as tools for learning—and for convincing the stubborn

that something they think little of can actually work.

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ing “track” to take them from one organization or institution to another. In this 

the track was built during World War II, through the close cooperation between 

and the British Mission in Washington, through the Joint Aircraft Committee. M

the credit for this goes, we believe, to then–rear admiral John H. Towers, who wa

BuAer chief.28 But the track was maintained by a whole crowd of military and civ

officials engaged in the war effort. Some of them kept up their contacts after the 

For example, Rear Adm. James S. Russell, who was BuAer chief in 1955, was a goo

friend of Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell, and Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, alre

mentioned as keenly interested in the steam catapult in 1952, made sure that Ant

went to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1953 so that Fleet Air Arm pilots 

get some exposure to landing and taking off from an angled deck.

Maintaining this track, or path, has become harder as innovation has shifted out 

government organizations and into private ones. Recent studies of defense coope

have focused on the policy-making role of government rather than on its role as 

innovator.29 Or they have emphasized the “global context” within which defense 

tries must compete and work.30 Put bluntly, private, even semipublic, manufactur

and research establishments take great risks in communicating innovations with 

present or perhaps future business rivals. Recent policies for “outsourcing” in the

United States have therefore probably reduced the likelihood that multiple tracks 

communicating innovations will exist. After the Cold War, the going assumption 

Washington was that much of Europe’s defense industry would wither for lack o

ing and that therefore there was little need for a clear link with the research and d

opmental organizations of allies. Put another way, the advocates of outsourcing i

United States have assumed that there is little to be learned from even close allies

as the United Kingdom—despite the cases we have described (as well as others,

including the Martin-Baker ejection seat, midair refueling, and the submarinelaunched Harpoon).

In an age when aircraft are flown by software, those who doubt the value of close 

tacts with allies in the development of high-tech sensors, software, and weapons 

be right, though we have our doubts. Software development is still very much a m

of lines of code, and a relatively small number of firms control the production of 

relevant to the operation of manned and unmanned aircraft from aircraft carrier

Indeed, the military may today be doing as good a job as private industry in cont

ing for the production of reliable software for aircraft and carriers. It is very hard 

know for sure. We do know that “military professionalism” in modern navies, as

understood by the professional officers of those navies, includes an emphasis on

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tial to navies in the years right after World War II. We believe that they still are.

At the end of an earlier book, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–

1941, we noted that the U.S. Navy mastered carrier strike aviation as it went along,

using experimentation (including war games at the Naval War College) and fleet exercises to develop, refine, and even sometimes cast off carrier operating concepts. We did

not find the same pattern in postwar U.S. Navy aviation. Postwar, the naval forces of

the United States continued a practice that had been required by war—forward deploy

ment. The agenda, the mission, of U.S. naval aviation changed dramatically—from taking on an enemy carrier force to launching nuclear strikes against the heart of the

Soviet Union. But the way in which the Navy explored problems changed too. Postwar,

there was no longer a concentrated fleet that could divide itself in half to try out new

tactics and operational concepts in exercises that set one half of the fleet against the

other. Postwar, the Naval War College did not resume its role as an “idea generator” or

“idea filter” through the use of extensive and repeated war games. Instead, ideas came

from officers in OPNAV, from the fleet, from test centers (like that at Patuxent,

Maryland), and from industry reacting to “seed money” sowed by BuAer. This was a

confusing and almost disorganized situation, especially given the high level of secrecy

that cloaked information about nuclear weapons. The amazing thing is that this

disorganized, ad hoc process led to a carrier force that was effective throughout the

Cold War.

Why was that? First, both the RN and the USN had some wonderfully talented professionals, from test pilots like Eric Brown to engineers like Lewis Boddington, to aircraft

designers such as Edward Heinemann, and on to naval officers like the relatively junior

Donald Engen and the senior Arthur Radford. Second, both navies had the benefit of

the talent that aircraft manufacturers and their own organizations (such as BuAer) had

trained during the war. Third, both benefited from having test centers, wind tunnels,

and other facilities (to say nothing of the carriers themselves) that had been built with

wartime funds. This “stuff ” is called “infrastructure,” and it matters.

Finally, leadership matters, and at multiple levels. It is difficult to follow all the twists

and turns involved in the development of the modern carrier in the U.S. Navy.

Forrestal, the modern carrier prototype, was developed, and it “worked”—but it was

not a sure thing. There again were multiple and pressing “distractors.” There was even

the possibility that key individuals, like Eric Brown, would be killed or seriously injured

in flying accidents.31 It was impossible to say at the end of 1945 just how things would

come out ten years later. Very different people pushed things along in ways that could

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are preordained is mistaken.

Some of the leaders in our story were relatively easy to identify. There was, for ex

Rear Admiral Soucek’s monitoring of the Royal Navy’s experiments with the stea

apult in 1950 and his subsequent recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operati

Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, that the U.S. Navy pay to bring HMS Perseus to the Un

States for tests. There was also the decision by Admiral Sherman’s successor, Ad

William M. Fechteler, to take up where Sherman (who perished suddenly from h

failure) left off. These are obvious examples of senior officials willing to take som

in order to solve clearly identified problems.

But there is a more subtle form of leadership, one found especially within an org

tion, such as BuAer or the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, and it in

an honest give-and-take between civilian specialists and their uniformed colleagu

the papers of engineer Lewis Boddington, for instance, one sees an intelligent mi

work on a problem—working hard because the work mattered. Behind his work 

assumption that the inferences he drew from studies, analyses, and trials would b

understood and acted on. This assumption is at the heart of a professional organi

Because it is so widespread in truly modern navies, it can easily be taken for gran

assumed, as it were, to exist as an essential element of modern life.

But it is not a given. The willingness (and opportunity) to listen to technical spec

must be sustained in organizations through day-to-day leadership within those o

zations. We have already argued that the sharing of innovations across organizati

and institutional boundaries is not to be assumed, and neither is innovation itsel

the ability to know which innovations to gamble on and which to ignore. The U.

Navy invested in a number of innovative aviation concepts after World War II, in

ing the Convair XFY-1 Pogo (a vertical-takeoff-and-landing turboprop fighter in

to be flown from the decks of cargo ships) and the very beautiful Martin P6M

SeaMaster, designed to be the world’s first supersonic, seaplane, nuclear-capable

bomber.32 In some sense, the 1920s pattern in military aviation was repeated in th

1940s and early 1950s: airplanes showed up everywhere, as designers, engineers, 

Navy officers tried to get the greatest military benefit from the new technologies 

wartime research had spawned.

Yet there is always the danger that funds, even lavish funds, will not produce the 

vations that the funding sources hope for and need. Choices have to be made. A c

case is the Grumman TB2F concept from 1942, which was abandoned in the spri

1944 because it no longer could perform the mission for which it was designed. I

late 1940s and early 1950s, many aircraft designs were rejected at some stage of

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pult designers and developers responsible to BuAer kept to their own approaches to a

catapult for jet aircraft because they thought that just a bit more effort would produce

success. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics researchers were right in that

boat with them.33

Why? It happened because there was no “test” of the available alternatives—no “forcing

function” that could show the BuAer catapult developers that there was another, better

alternative available to them. Indeed, the hydraulic catapults were actually dangerous,

as serious hydraulic fluid fires on both Leyte (CV 32) in late 1953 and Bennington (CV

20) in May 1954 showed.34 Why was that danger not foreseen? We do not know for certain, but we do know from study and experience that it is often not easy for people in

an organization to admit that what they have worked on has failed. It takes a special

kind of leadership—usually exercised through some mechanism such as the General

Board’s pre–World War II hearings—to convince them that they have.

Our last comment echoes one we made in American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941. Flying is exciting. Pilots wanted to fly jets on and off carriers despite

high accident rates in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Eric Brown flew almost everythin

he could climb into, and his memoir, Wings on My Sleeve, is full of accidents, near accidents, and hair-raising aerial adventures. Running through the memoirs and stories

from this period in aeronautical history is a strong sense of adventure, coupled with a

grim determination to adapt jets to carriers and carriers to jets. It worked. Despite

great odds, it worked.

Notes

1. Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U.S. Navy,

1942–1991 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole

Books, 1992), pp. 378–79.

2. Jeffrey G. Barlow, From Hot War to Cold: The

U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs,

1945–1955 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ.

Press, 2009).

3. See Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman,

and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British

Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1999).

4. Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power

(College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,

2007).

5. See Thomas C. Hone and Mark Mandeles,

“Interwar Innovation in Three Navies: U.S.

Navy, Royal Navy, Imperial Japanese Navy,”

Naval War College Review 40, no. 2 (Spring

1987), pp. 63–83.

6. John T. Kuehn, Agents of Innovation: The

General Board and the Design of the Fleet

That Defeated the Japanese Navy (Annapolis

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008). See also

Albert A. Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War:

The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,

2010).

7. See Norman Friedman, U.S. Destroyers: An

Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.:

Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 3.

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ments for Future Aircraft,” “Naval Aviation

Confidential Bulletin” (July 1947), p. 17, in

Aviation History Office, Naval History and

Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard,

Washington, D.C.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 18.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 20.

13. Rear Adm. Dennis R. F. Cambell folder collection, Navy Operational Archives, Navy

History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

14. Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet

Air Arm (Hersham, Surrey, U.K.: Midland,

2008).

15. Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My

Life as a Naval Aviator (Washington, D.C.:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), pp.

138–52.

16. See Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers:

An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis,

Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 231–

33.

17. Ibid., pp. 240, 243.

18. See Friedman, U.S. Destroyers, p. 3.

19. See Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, p. 244.

20. See Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft (London: Conway Maritime, 1988), pp.

272–73.

21. Tommy H. Thomason, Strike from the Sea:

U.S. Navy Attack Aircraft from Skyraider to

Super Hornet, 1948–Present (North Branch,

Minn.: Specialty, 2009), chap. 6.

22. U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Warfare, Naval Warfare Publication 10, through change 4

(Washington, D.C.: 1954), p. 5-13.

23. See Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, pp. 22–

25.

24. See Mark D. Mandeles, Military Transformation Past and Present: Historical Lessons for

the 21st Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger

Security International, 2007), p. 2.

p. 272.

26. See Barlow, From Hot War to Cold.

27. Jared A. Zichek, Secret Aerospace Proj

the U.S. Navy: The Incredible Attack A

of the USS United States, 1948–1949 

Pa.: Schiffer, 2009). At least one of th

turistic designs was supposed to be a

land back aboard an Essex-class carri

p. 139.

28. See Clark G. Reynolds, Admiral John 

Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Su

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Pre

1991), pp. 339–41.

29. An example is David Gompert, Richa

Kugler, and Martin Libicki, Mind the 

Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution 

tary Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Natio

fense Univ. Press, 1999).

30. Neil Latham, Defense Industry in a G

Context: Policy Implications for the U

Kingdom, Whitehall Paper 57 (Londo

RUSI, n.d.).

31. For example, Lt. Cdr. Hugh Wood, th

BuAer project officer for the Dougla

turboprop Skyshark, was killed durin

flight in December 1950. Thomason

from the Sea, p. 62.

32. See the many beautiful photographs 

large airplane in Stan Piet and Al Ra

Martin P6M SeaMaster (Bel Air, Md.

Martineer, 2001).

33. Upshur T. Joyner and Walter B. Horn

“Considerations on a Large Hydraul

Catapult,” NACA Research Memoran

L51B27, 12 April 1951, Langley Aero

Laboratory, Langley Field, Va., Natio

Archives.

34. The fires were apparently caused by 

overheating of petroleum oils in the 

lic cylinders. The danger was elimina

private manufacturer’s development o

glycol fluid as a substitute. See Houg

www.houghtonintl.com (website of

Houghton International Inc.) and “T

Line / Crew Stories,” USS Bennington

www.uss-bennington.org/.

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Appendix A: The Physics of Jet Propulsion

Jets seemed revolutionary because instead of pulling their way through the air lik

pellers, they relied on the airplane’s reaction to a blast of hot gas emitted from th

nozzles. In fact the contrast in principle was not so great, because a propeller can 

seen as a fan accelerating air back over an airplane, creating a backflow just like t

a jet engine. However, the propeller can also be understood as generating a forwa

force by the flow of air over its moving blades, which are like wings turned on th

sides. This way of generating thrust gets an airplane into the air but ultimately lim

the speed of that airplane. This limit was not an issue for designers until military 

test aircraft started to reach very high speeds—above 400 mph.

In a propeller-driven plane, the movement of each propeller blade generates lift i

direction that pushes the airplane forward. When the airplane is moving, this win

moving in a net direction (a combination of the forward motion of the airplane 

the rotary motion of the propeller). For a fixed pitch (propeller inclination to the

direction of the airplane), the faster the airplane the steeper is, in effect, the angle 

the propeller as it is presented to the air. Eventually the propeller, like a wing tilte

steeply, stalls. If it is angled too close to the direction of flight, to avoid stalling, it 

duces too little lift (force) along the direction the airplane is flying. To make mat

worse, if the propeller is lengthened (to absorb more power) it runs the risk that 

area near the blade tips will be moving at supersonic speed, with disruptive effec

the airflow over the rest of the blade. The practical limit for propellers appeared 

about 500 mph, although some turboprop fighters flew considerably faster. It ma

that the 500 mph figure combined possible power outputs from piston engines w

propeller dynamics.

Because the propeller is moving even when the airplane is at rest, the propeller h

considerable effect as soon as the engine is turned on. Even if it is mounted behin

airplane’s wing, the propeller creates an airflow over the wing, which generates li

before the airplane begins to move. (Once it is moving, the airflow created by the 

plane’s forward movement is soon dominant.) A jet engine has less effect when t

plane is at rest, although it maintains its thrust as the engine moves faster and fas

is fair to say, therefore, that there are two ways of understanding the phenomeno

lift. One way is to think about the low pressure generated on top of a wing becau

air flows more quickly there (Bernoulli’s principle). But it is also possible to thin

about the downward thrust created by a wing as it moves through the air (hence 

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ward thrust of air, then you are not too far from seeing a propeller as a generator of

thrust. If you think that an airplane is, in effect, sucked upward, then you probably

view a propeller as a means of carving a screw path through the sky. Hence you might

be more open to the suggestion that a jet turbine can do in a different way just what a

propeller does. But not many engineers thought this way before World War II.

It is also difficult to compare jet and piston engines directly. Power (e.g., horsepower) is force multiplied by speed. For a jet, the conversion factor is that a pound of

thrust equals one horsepower at 375 mph. Thus at that speed an airplane with a fivethousand-pound-thrust engine is developing the equivalent of five thousand horsepower, well beyond what any fighter-grade piston engine could do. On the other hand,

the same thrust is equivalent to far less power at low speeds, and carrier aircraft needed

power at low speeds if they were given “waveoffs” by landing signal officers.

U.S. engine builders, mainly Allison, Pratt & Whitney, and Wright, concentrated on

highly successful piston engines. As abroad, there was no service pressure demanding

speeds so great that such engines could not provide them. The jet pioneers abroad had

to push very hard on closed doors to get official backing, as Britain’s Frank Whittle discovered. Moreover, the main new area of aviation engine development in the United

States in the late 1930s was the turbo-supercharger, which made it possible for piston

engines to function effectively at high altitudes by compressing the “thin” air. The first

such devices were tested during World War I, and their descendants made it possible

for aircraft such as the B-17 to fly at unprecedented altitudes, which seemed to offer

them near immunity to interception by enemy fighters, though during World War II

that did not turn out to be altogether true.

Some aircraft researchers certainly were interested in high-speed flight, but their ideas

were generally rejected as visionary. Historians of the jet revolution remark that by the

1930s some aircraft engineers were noticing that each jump in engine power seemed to

buy a smaller corresponding jump in maximum aircraft speed. Some limit was

approaching. By about 1930, seaplane racers with thin wings and propellers set for very

fine pitch (for efficiency at high speed) were exceeding 400 mph. The speed records set

at the time were not exceeded for at least a decade, suggesting that propeller planes

faced a fundamental limitation in speed. The number of engineers who thought that a

new kind of power plant would make possible much higher speeds is not clear. What is

clear is that they could not find much—if any—financial support for their research.

The push to faster fighters in the 1938 BuAer competition (which produced the powerful piston-engine F4U Corsair) was explained on the basis of higher performance

already being demonstrated in Europe rather than on the abstract value of higher speed

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cially those flying from land bases, but there was no particular standard of perfor

mance they had to meet and hence no pressure to create reliable turbojets.

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Appendix B: The Impact of Jet Aircraft on Carriers

The following table lists the carrier aircraft employed as fighter-bombers or as at

aircraft at the close of World War II and at the beginning of the “jet age.”

The stall speed is an indicator of landing speed because carrier aircraft slowed to 

stall speed as they touched down on their ship’s flight deck. Higher stall speed wa

nificant because the energy generated by the plane on landing is the square of th

ing speed. It’s this energy that the carrier’s arresting gear must absorb. Before Wo

War II, engineers at the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics thought that 60 knots was 

maximum safe landing speed for carrier aircraft. Higher landing speeds, however

the inevitable and unavoidable consequence of adapting jet aircraft to carriers, an

Navy officers procuring jet aircraft knew it. The graph of “stall speed vs. prototyp

year” makes the relationship clear.

AIRCRAFT YEAR PROTOTYPE ORDERED STALL SPEED (KNOT

F4U-4 Corsair 1938 66.9

TBM-3 Avenger 1940 63.4

SB2C-5 Helldiver 1939 66.2

F7F-3 Tigercat 1941 74.2

AD-1 Skyraider 1944 76.0

AJ-1 Savage 1946 72.4

F9F-5 Panther 1946 94.0

F7U-3 Cutlass 1946 96.0

A-3B Skywarrior 1949 99.0

A-4C Skyhawk 1952 90.4

A-5A Vigilante 1956 106.0

Sources: Norman Friedman, Carrier Air Power (New York: Rutledge, 1981), app. 2; Swanborough and Bowers, United S

Aircraft since 1911.

TABLE B-1

Carrier Fighter-Bomber/Attack Aircraft at the End of World War II

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The jets also were heavier than their World War II piston-engine counterparts, as the

following table shows.

Stall Speed vs. Prototype Year

AIRCRAFT YEAR

TAKEOFF WEIGHT

(LBS.)

ROLL AT 25 KNOTS

WIND OVER DECK

MAXIMUM BOMB

LOAD

F4U-4 Corsair 1944 13,597 377 ft. 1,000-lb. bomb

TBM-3 Avenger 1944 16,761 455 ft. 2,000-lb. torpedo

SB2C-5 Helldiver 1945 16,287 584 ft. 2,000-lb. bomb

F7F-3 Tigercat 1945 21,720 495 ft. 2,000-lb. torpedo

AD-1 Skyraider 1945 18,029 455 ft. Three 2,000-lb.

bombs

AJ-1 Savage 1948 49,952 720 ft. Six 1,600-lb.

bombs

F9F-5 Panther 1949 17,766 1,435 ft. Two 1,000-lb.

bombs

F7U-3 Cutlass 1951 28,173 1,650 ft. Two bombs up to

3,500 lbs. or 32

2.75-inch rockets

A-3B Skywarrior 1955 72,000 1,940 ft. 12,800 lbs.

Source: Friedman, Carrier Air Power, app. 2.

TABLE B-2

Weight Comparison

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then of the roll required at 25 knots “wind over deck” [WOD] vs. the year deploy

are based on the numbers in the preceding chart.

It’s true that the first carrier jet fighter—the FH-1 Phantom—was not, at 11,292 

heavier than the World War II F4U Corsair (13,597 lbs.), but the FH-1 did not ca

bombs. It was strictly a fighter, and the only advantage it had over the F4U was sp

The next jet fighter, the F2H Banshee, weighed in at 19,602 lbs., and it was heavie

the F4U largely because it had to carry more fuel for its thirstier engines. As in th

of many new types of aircraft of innovative design, the first models often don’t o

match—or outmatch by much—their predecessors. The proper comparison is be

the F4U-4 and the F9F-5 Panther. Both were fighter-bombers, but the F9F-5 was 

faster than the F4U and able to carry a heavier bomb load.

The table also gives the length of roll required by the aircraft when there was a 25

wind blowing over a carrier’s deck. As Norman Friedman pointed out in the bo

from which this information was taken, the long takeoff roll required by the slow

accelerating jets mandated the use of high-capacity catapults. The roll required b

propeller-driven SB2C-5 of 1945 was 584 feet on a carrier deck that did not quite

stretch to 900 feet. But the 1,435 feet required by the Panther was simply beyond 

wartime or early postwar carrier catapults could provide.

FIGURE B-2

Takeoff Weight vs. Year

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craft. The table that gives the years when BuAer ordered the prototypes shows that the

Navy went into the jet age deliberately. Indeed, the Navy had already chosen to adopt

larger attack aircraft for its carriers. The F7F Tigercat, powered by twin piston engines

and weighing in at over 21,000 lbs., is clear proof of that. The AJ-1, F9F, and F7U were

ordered in 1946—before jet engine technology was reliable. All three were analogs to

existing fighters and attack aircraft. The F9F was a jet-powered F4U. The F7U was a

swept-wing, twin-engine alternative to the F9F. The AJ-1, which was originally

designed as a heavy conventional carrier bomber, was modified and rushed into production to prove that the Navy’s carriers could conduct nuclear strikes using the heavy

and large nuclear implosion weapons.

FIGURE B-3

Roll at 25 Knots WOD vs. Year

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Appendix C: Problem Solving within Bureaucracies

The scholarly literature on organizations assumes that there are certain patterns 

behavior common to all complex professional organizations. If so, organizationa

lems found in one area will probably show up in others. But can the solutions to 

problems be the same, or similar? For example, in 1972, in a study done for RAN

counterinsurgency expert Robert W. Komer identified what he called “the inevita

tendency of bureaucracies to keep doing the familiar and to adapt only slowly an

incrementally” to changed circumstances.1

It might seem inappropriate for us to 

on the rich literature on counterinsurgency for insights into our case, but we don

think it is. Komer was an experienced and extraordinary bureaucrat, a perceptive 

lyst, and a dogged problem solver. As he recognized, “atypical problems demand 

cially tailored solutions, not just the playing out of existing institutional repertoi

Did we see that in our study of USN–RN cooperation after World War II? Yes. In 

the Royal Navy was in the process of reconstructing its air arm even during Worl

War II. Its Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was an institution “under reconstruction” while t

Royal Navy was still fighting a war. As a consequence, it was somewhat simpler th

would have been for the Americans—if very demanding in terms of time and en

for the FAA to start from scratch, so to speak. The RN recognized by 1942 that it

war carrier aviation program was not meeting wartime challenges. It proceeded f

that recognition to positive action with the creation of the Future Building Comm

in 1942. As we have pointed out, the way that the FBC proceeded was rather extr

nary. It defined the Fleet Air Arm’s future problem, changed Royal Navy fleet doc

(placing the aircraft carrier at the fleet’s center), and set out a “way ahead” that

assumed the need for jet aircraft on carriers.

One of Komer’s arguments in his 1972 RAND study was that dealing with “atypi

situations requires “setting up autonomous ad hoc organizations to manage spec

tailored programs which are not in conventional organizational repertoires.”3

Th

Future Building Committee was, we think, just such an organization. So was its o

spring, the Naval Aircraft Design Committee. Moreover, as Komer well knew, inn

tive ideas go nowhere if an organization lacks “flexible and imaginative conflict

managers at all levels,” and this requirement is one that the RN’s officers and eng

seemed to meet—from Lewis Boddington and his associates at the Royal Aircraft

Establishment to the more senior officers on the Future Building Committee and 

postwar successor. This is not to say that the Royal Navy’s approach was perfect. 

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was essential if innovation was to take place: “a capability for thorough evaluation

and analysis.”4

That same capability existed in the U.S. Navy. If it had not, U.S. Navy officers would

not have embraced the angled flight deck and the mirror landing aid so quickly, and

they would have refused to accept HMS Perseus as a test bed for the Royal Navy’s steam

catapult. In the case of the catapult, engineers at the Naval Aircraft Factory thought

that they could do what Komer says people working in a bureaucratic setting always do

which is to do more of the same but better. But the resistance to change or to a new

idea or piece of equipment can be overcome if competing alternatives can be put to the

test. This was done twice in the case of Perseus—first at Philadelphia using lower steam

pressures and then again, later, at Philadelphia using higher steam pressures.

The tests of the steam catapult on Perseus would not have taken place, however, if the

U.S. Navy’s aviation community had not had a history of rigorously testing aircraft and

carrier arresting gear, aircraft crash barriers, and aircraft catapults. We do not think

that it was an accident that the U.S. officer in London who promoted the use of Perseus

as a test platform for the British steam catapult was Rear Adm. Apollo Soucek. Soucek

had been a test pilot in the late 1920s and early ’30s, and in June 1930 he had established an altitude record for military aircraft of over forty-three thousand feet. He was

“air boss” of the carrier Hornet in 1942 and served on a special board in the spring of

1943 to revise the cruising instructions of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The board “exceded

[sic] its instructions to the extent that all existing Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletins and

numerous Fleet confidential letters in effect, were overhauled and included in the new

instructions,” giving the Pacific Fleet as a result the new Tactical Orders and Doctrine

(known as “PAC-10”).5

In short, Soucek was an outstanding officer, and he understood

the need for what Komer called thorough evaluation and analysis. It is no accident that h

did or that he was where he was when a need arose for a new approach to catapulting

aircraft from carriers.

At the end of our previous book we cited a 1946 quotation from Adm. Marc A. Mitscher:

“Aviation was a relatively new weapon and we learned as we went.” After World War II,

jet engines made aviation a new weapon yet again, and a lot of learning was required—

again. For the U.S. Navy, learning about jets was made all the harder because of the

self-imposed requirement to adapt large, nuclear-capable jet bombers to carriers.

Meeting this requirement transformed naval aviation. It was an extraordinary

achievement—yet one understandable in light of what is known about complex professional organizations.

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1. R. W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, RAND Corporation

Report R-967-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, August 1972), p. xii.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Pacific Fleet Board to Revise Cruisin

structions, memorandum to Comma

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, sub

“Revision of Pacific Fleet Cruising In

tions,” 18 May 1943 (A16-3/P/A17), 

ord group 38, “World War Two, Plan

Orders and Related Documents,” bo

(CINCPAC), National Archives.

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Appendix D: Chronology

Sources for U.S. Navy dates are U.S. Navy Dept., United States Naval Aviation, 19

1980, NAVAIR 00-80P-1 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Air Systems Command, 1981)

Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950

(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994); Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircr

Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 198

and Donald D. Engen, Wings and Warriors: My Life as a Naval Aviator (Washingt

D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

Sources for Royal Navy dates are Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (Lo

Conway Maritime, 1988); Eric Brown, Wings on My Sleeve (London: Orion Book

Phoenix, 2007); and Geoffrey Cooper, Farnborough and the Fleet Air Arm (Hersh

Surrey, U.K.: Midland, 2008). RN entries are italicized.

1938 Steam catapult patented in the United Kingdom. In September, th

Royal Aircraft Establishment creates a separate Catapult Section, h

by Lewis Boddington.

Sept. 1940 Tizard Mission to the United States. The mission brings the cavity 

netron and information on Frank Whittle’s jet engine. To further 

tial work of the Tizard Mission, the United States and the United

Kingdom set up scientific liaison offices in Washington and Londo

Feb. 1942 The chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics approves a decision within

BuAer to develop large single-seat attack aircraft.

1942 BuAer contracts with Grumman to build a twin-engine, long-rang

large-bomb-load bomber (XTB2F-1) that can operate from Essex-c

carriers. Its loaded weight is about forty-five thousand pounds.

1942 The Joint Technical Committee (RN and RAF) draws up new recom

dations for naval aircraft. For example, maximum aircraft weight g

from eleven to thirty thousand pounds, and stall speed grows to se

five knots.

Spring 1943 BuAer solicits proposals from industry for large, long-range, single

attack aircraft.

Spring 1943 The RN tests rocket-assisted takeoff gear.

1943 Navy tests first jet-assisted takeoff units.

1943 First landing and takeoff of a twin-engine Mosquito on a carrier t

place. Approval is given to produce a modified Sea Mosquito.

Jan. 1944 Lt. Eric Brown is appointed naval test pilot at Farnborough.

Sept. 1944 Admiral Cunningham requests specially modified Mosquitoes from 

Chief of the Air Staff (RAF) for use on British aircraft carriers; wan

them early in 1945.

Nov. 1944 PBJ-1H bomber is launched from and recovered back aboard USS

Shangri-La.

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Dec. 1944 The Naval Aircraft Factory develops slotted-cylinder catapult to launch

target drones.

Jan. 1945 British test afterburner.

Jan. 11, 1945 Meeting at Farnborough to discuss ways to operate aircraft without

undercarriages from carriers. Maj. F. M. Green proposes a “carpet.”

Spring 1945 British give an American delegation plans of the M.52 supersonic aircraft. (The British government will cancel the M.52 in February 1946.)

Late spring 1945 BuAer begins studying carrier aircraft capable of carrying eight to twelve

thousand pounds of bombs. This is triggered by the results of the U.S.

Strategic Bombing Survey, which showed that the twelve-thousandpound bombs could damage hardened submarine pens.

Summer 1945 Navy’s Bureau of Ships begins studying thirty-five-to-fifty-thousand-ton

carrier designs. Study completed in April 1946. Recommends 39,600-

ton carrier. Ship Characteristics Board created in 1945.

July 1945 SCB recommends a new carrier design with 1945 F7Fs (each weighing

twenty-five thousand pounds at takeoff) and thirty-six BT3Ds (each

weighing approximately fourteen thousand pounds at takeoff).

July 1945 An informal board reporting to DCNO (Air) endorses report by Capt. W.

T. Raisseur that carriers need a radically redesigned flight deck and a

new mode of operations.

Aug. 10, 1945 Hornet, a variant of the Mosquito, lands and takes off from HMS

Ocean.

Sept. 1945 Engineer Lewis Boddington provides conceptual justification for the angled flight deck.

Oct. 1945 Navy Air Development Research organization proposes to BuAer that

BuAer develop turboprop aircraft for bombing from specialized carriers.

Oct. 1945 The Committee to Evaluate the Feasibility of Space Rocketry recommends that the Navy study the possibility of an earth satellite. (BuAer

will respond to this recommendation by contracting with three firms

and one university for studies of possible launch vehicles and their liquid

fuels.)

Dec. 1945 BuAer chief Rear Adm. Harold Sallada tells CNO that carrier aircraft

must carry larger bombs and that BuAer had options for new aircraft

based on combined propeller and jet-turbine propulsion. Sallada recom- mends development of a new bomber with a gross weight of forty-one

thousand pounds and a landing weight of twenty-eight thousand

pounds. (This proposed design will become the AJ-1 Savage.) CNO approves the program.

Dec. 1945 First jet takeoff from and landing on a Royal Navy carrier. This is only a

demonstration. There are no operational RN jet carrier squadrons.

Jan. 1946 Vice Adm. Marc Mitscher, DCNO (Air), recommends that CNO approve

the development of hundred-thousand-pound bombers.

1946 Admiralty decides to adopt slotted-cylinder catapults. (In 1942, the RN

had used catapults that were compatible with USN aircraft being pro- cured through Lend-Lease.)

Feb. 1946 CNO directs DCNO (Air), Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, to begin de- tailed design study of the hundred-thousand-pound bomber. (The

weight and size of this aircraft will drive the Navy away from the first

postwar carrier design and toward a very large ship—what will become

United States.)

Feb. 1946 BuAer technical divisions are aligned into two groups: Research, Devel- opment and Engineering; and Material and Services.

March 1946 The Secretary of the Navy approves converting two submarines into airbreathing guided-missile carriers and launchers.

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March 1946 The Chief of Naval Operations directs BuAer to adopt ground-con

approach equipment for landing aircraft in poor visibility.

Spring 1946 BuShips uses BuAer’s hundred-thousand-pound (gross weight) de

study ADR-42 in working out the characteristics of a new, large c

Study completed in May 1946. (Friedman notes that the prelimina

characteristics were reviewed by the Ship Characteristics Board in 

1946.)

April 1946 Contract issued to Douglas Aircraft for the design and constructio

the night fighter XF3D-1.

June 1946 North American Aviation is given a contract for the design and co

struction of three XAJ-1 aircraft (a long-range bomber able to car

clear weapons).

June 1946 Investigation begins of the suitability of jet aircraft for carrier use 

Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, with the Navy pilots using 

80A.

July 1946 First tests of jets on carriers take place. An FD-1 lands on and take

from carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt on July 21.

July 1946 DCNO (Air) recommends to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations th

new carrier not be included in the 1948 shipbuilding program bu

funded as a design study.

Sept. 1946 DCNO (Air) is organized into four groups—Plans, Personnel, Read

and Air Logistics. An Air Planning Group is also established. This r

nization reflects the shift of aviation policy to the Office of the Ch

Naval Operations.

Oct. 1946 Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, California, is establishe

Oct. 1946 First live test of a pilot ejection seat is conducted.

Oct. 1946 Development of XF9F-1 four-engine night fighter is halted. BuAer 

cides to develop the XF9F-2 instead. (To get this plane, BuAer wil

stitute the Rolls-Royce Nene engine for Westinghouse 24Cs. Late

firms will produce the Nene engine.)

Nov. 1946 Responsibility for guided-missile development is assigned to a new

created Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Guided

Missiles).

Nov. 1946 A P-80A, piloted by a Marine, makes two catapult launches, four 

takeoffs, and five arrested landings on carrier Franklin D. Rooseve

is part of the series of tests run at Patuxent River starting at the e

June 1946.

Feb. 1947 SCB produces first preliminary characteristics for a new carrier.

Feb. 1947 A surfaced submarine fires a Loon guided missile for the first time

March 1947 Serious work on the flexible deck begins at RAE, Farnborough.

June 1947 CNO approves the characteristics for a carrier improvement progr

called “Project 27A.” This is the first modification of the Essex-cla

ships. The modifications are designed to enable the carriers to lau

and recover jets, which requires blast deflectors, more fuel, and je

mixers. Oriskany, the first ship so modernized, begins conversion 

tober 1947.

June 1947 BuAer awards contract to Douglas Aircraft for a study of a delta-w

fighter. (This study will lead to the XF4D-1.)

June 1947 BuAer awards contract to Chance Vought for development and c

struction of three XF7U-1 aircraft. (This plane will later be produc

the Cutlass.)

July 1947 Adm. Robert Carney, senior member of SCB, tells General Board t

Essex-class carriers must be modernized and that the new carrier 

flush deck) must be in the fiscal year (FY) 1949 Navy program. (It 

be.)

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Aug. 1947 BuAer establishes an organization to develop guided missiles and air- craft electronics.

Sept. 18, 1947 Executive Order 9877 defines the roles and missions of the newly created U.S. Air Force. The National Security Act of 1947, which created

the USAF, had been signed by President Truman on July 26, 1947.

Sept. 1947 CNO approves new carrier characteristics.

Oct. 1947 Tests of operational Attacker jet fighter on HMS Illustrious occur.

Dec. 1947 The President’s Air Policy Commission, headed by Thomas Finletter, submits its report.

Dec. 1947 First landing of a jet fighter on the flexible deck at Farnborough takes

place.

1948 British Admiralty adopts a nine-year fleet modernization plan. Plans for

a test unit steam catapult are completed.

March 1948 Test Pilot Training Division is set up at the Naval Air Test Center,

Patuxent River.

March 1948 Carrier suitability of the FJ-1 Fury is tested on carrier Boxer with land- ings and takeoffs.

April 1948 Two P2V-2 Neptunes make JATO takeoffs from the carrier Coral Sea.

May 1948 The Navy establishes first carrier-qualified jet squadron (using FH-1

Phantoms).

May 1948 DCNO (Air) presents new carrier design to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

USAF Chief of Staff objects. The Navy defends new (“6A”) design as a

prototype.

May 1948 The Michelson Laboratory for rocket and guided-missile research at

Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, opens.

June 1948 First landing and takeoff of a twin-jet Meteor on HMS Implacable take

place.

June 1948 Meetings of the Quarterly Air Board (DCNO [Air], BuAer, and the Commanders, Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific) begin.

June 1948 Congress authorizes construction of large (6A) carrier in the FY 1949

program.

June 1948 BuShips initiates development of the TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation)

system for carriers.

July 1948 The first carrier-based AEW squadrons (VAW-1 and VAW-2) are commissioned. (They will organize and train future AEW squadrons.)

July 1948 Construction of carrier United States is approved by President Truman.

Aug. 1948 Aeronautical Board is dissolved.

Sept. 1948 First “navalized” Sea Hawk jet flies. (Deck trials are in May 1949, but no

production aircraft will enter the fleet until the end of 1951.)

Nov. 1948 The Naval Aircraft Factory begins work on the design of the Mark 7

high-energy-absorbing arresting gear (to capture planes weighing up to

fifty thousand pounds and landing at speeds as high as 105 knots).

Nov. 1948 The Office of Naval Intelligence informs General Board that the Royal

Navy is “well advanced” in experimenting with a “flexible, rubber and

pneumatic” flight deck for carriers.

Nov. 1948 First sea trials of flexible deck with a prototype Vampire take place.

Nov. 1948 Representatives of the RN visit BuShips and BuAer in Washington. They

obtain a full set of deck plans for CVA 58 (United States) and detailed

drawings of USS Midway. They also get information on the slotted-tube

catapult for CVA 58 and detailed information about arresting gear being developed by the USN.

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March 1949 A P2V-3C is launched from carrier Coral Sea with a ten-thousand

load. It flies across the country, drops its load, and then returns to

Patuxent River.

April 1949 Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cancels the carrier United Stat

Feb. 1950 A P2V-3C Neptune makes a 5,060-mile flight after being launche

a carrier.

March 1950 The staff of DCNO (Air) informs General Board that the critical fac

the modernization of the Essex-class carriers is the catapult.

April 1950 First carrier takeoff of the AJ-1 occurs, made from Coral Sea by C

T. Hayward.

April 1950 A P2V-3C, weighing 74,668 pounds, takes off from Coral Sea.

July 1950 Navy pilots fly F9F Panthers from the carrier Valley Forge off Kore

1950 NATO navies agree on a standard form of jet fuel.

Aug. 1950 The first squadron of AJ-1 Savage bombers qualifies on Coral Sea

Oct. 1950 DCNO (Air) tells General Board that any new carrier must have a f

deck.

Feb. 1951 The first heavy attack wing is commissioned at Norfolk.

March 1951 First test of ramjet Talos long-range antiaircraft missile is conduct

March 1951 BuAer contracts with Convair for the propeller-driven vertical take

fighter XFY-1. Three weeks later, BuAer orders an alternate desig

Lockheed.

April 1951 First Navy use of a jet fighter as a bomber takes place off Korea.

April 12, 1951 Langley Aeronautical Laboratory recommends “hydraulic jet catap

to BuAer for an aircraft with a gross weight of a hundred thousan

pounds.

June 1951 BuAer issues a contract to Convair for development of delta-wing

hydro-ski seaplane fighter.

June 27, 1951 The Admiralty offers to send HMS Perseus to the United States.

July 1, 1951 The Naval Air Turbine Test Station is established at Trenton, N.J.

July 14, 1951 CNO accepts the Admiralty offer of a visit by HMS Perseus.

July 27, 1951 Rear Admiral Soucek, the naval air attaché, sends memorandum f

London to CNO via Office of Naval Intelligence detailing results of 

to Perseus by two USN captains.

Aug. 1951 Angled-deck concept presented at a Ministry of Supply conferenc

Capt. Dennis Cambell. Lt. Cdr. Nick Goodhart, Cambell’s assistant

ceives of a landing-light system.

Aug. 24, 1951 Preliminary discussions among representatives of BuAer, the Roya

and OPNAV regarding the trip of Perseus to the United States.

Aug. 28, 1951 Adm. Sir Cyril Douglas-Pennant, RN, corresponds with CNO regar

the visit of Perseus.

Sept. 7, 1951 A Terrier surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired from test ship Norton S

intercepts target drone.

Sept. 27, 1951 Chief, BuAer makes Perseus visit a priority one.

Oct. 12, 1951 Work gets under way to accommodate Perseus at Philadelphia Na

Shipyard.

Oct. 15, 1951 The shipyard at Philadelphia conducts catapult tests on the World 

escort carrier Block Island. Because these could conflict with tests 

Perseus, the shipyard decides to put the Perseus tests ahead of th

Block Island. The shipyard promises to have the dead loads read

November 15, 1951.

Dec. 1951 First test assembly of nuclear warheads on a carrier at sea takes p

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Dec. 3, 1951 British Joint Services Mission–Air establishes an office inside the Main

Navy Building on Constitution Avenue. The mission plans tests of

Perseus at both Philadelphia and Norfolk. (Perseus had been launching

jets at five-minute intervals, but the target for launches at Philadelphia

is thirty seconds.)

Dec. 6, 1951 Schedules place Perseus in United States from mid-January to March.

Perseus will visit Philadelphia first and then Norfolk.

End of 1951–

early 1952

Eric Brown promotes idea of angled deck while serving as an exchange

pilot with Flight Test Division at Naval Air Station Patuxent River,

Maryland.

Dec. 13, 1951 A CNO letter establishes responsibilities of “interested commands” for

the Perseus visit.

Jan.–Mar. 1952 A British-developed steam catapult is tested at the Philadelphia Navy

Yard, at Norfolk, and then again (with six-hundred-pound steam) at

Philadelphia. A U.S. aircraft is launched from HMS Perseus.

Jan. 8, 1952 Capt. Sheldon W. Brown of BuAer compares U.S. and RN catapults for

Rear Adm. Lucien M. Grant, USN.

Feb. 1952 CNO approves a modification of the “Project 27A” carrier conversion

program to give each ship more powerful arresting gear, better cata- pults, and a deck-edge elevator in place of its number-three centerline

elevator. (Three Essex-class conversions will be completed in 1954—Project 27C, axial deck).

Feb. 12, 1952 W. W. Ford of the Naval Aircraft Factory/NAMC writes to Ships Installation Division of BuAer (headed by Capt. Sheldon Brown), asking

whether BuAer wants the British steam catapult for the 27C conversion

instead of the U.S.-developed C10 (powered by a powder charge).

Feb. 1952 Eric Brown flies an F9F Panther from anchored Perseus in Philadelphia

Navy Yard.

Feb. 14, 1952 BuShips says steam catapult will work structurally in CV 9 and CVB 41

conversions, and also in CVB 59 (Forrestal).

Feb. 15, 1952 First BuShips steam catapult conference is held.

Feb. 20, 1952 Second BuShips steam catapult conference is held.

Feb. 20, 1952 Tests of Perseus are made part of a program called TED NAM SI 330.0,

established under a BuAer confidential letter of September 27, 1951.

Feb. 21, 1952 DCNO (Air) extends Perseus’s visit schedule to permit additional tests.

1952 HMS Eagle’s arresting gear takes a twenty-thousand-pound aircraft

landing at ninety-two knots. (Compare this with the standard set by the

Joint Technical Committee at the end of 1942.)

March 19, 1952 Chief, BuShips notes successful conclusion of “an extremely high prior- ity Chief of Naval Operations directed project.” This is the test of the

steam catapult on Perseus.

March 26, 1952 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet asks in a letter to CNO whether

the British steam catapult will be installed in USN carriers.

April 1952 The USN announces that the steam catapult will be adopted, with the

first installation on Hancock.

May 1952 Tests of a simulated angled deck on carrier Midway.

June 25, 1952 Capt. Sheldon Brown arranges a July trip to Brown Bros. in Scotland

(the builders of the British steam catapult) and asks for data from the

firm.

July 1952 Keel of carrier Forrestal is laid.

Aug. 8, 1952 U.S. embassy in London asks Brown Bros. to forward catapult drawings

to BuAer directly rather than through NAMC.

Sept. 3, 1952 First test of fully configured Sidewinder air-to-air missile takes place.

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Dec. 1952 An air-breathing Regulus missile is launched successfully from a s

sea and guided to a safe landing ashore.

Jan. 1953 Landing and takeoff tests are conducted on board the first angled

carrier, Antietam.

Mar. 1953 Tunny (SSG 284) is outfitted to launch Regulus surface-to-surface 

siles. (The first successful live firing will be held on July 15, 1953.)

April 1953 The first flight of XF2Y-1 experimental jet seaplane fighter occurs

June 1953 Antietam’s pilots demonstrate angled-deck landings to the RN in 

English Channel. RN jets also participate. (Engen)

Aug. 1953 The first successful shipboard launching of Terrier SAM against a 

drone occurs.

Aug. 1953 The D558-2 Douglas Skyrocket sets a new altitude record.

Sept. 1953 A plan is promulgated officially to covert the Midways to an angle

deck configuration. But they will have modified C11 steam catap

the angled-deck area.

Sept. 1953 The first successful interception of a drone by Sidewinder air-to-a

sile takes place.

Nov. 1953 USN pilots land jets on HMS Illustrious in the United Kingdom.

Dec. 1953 The Steam Catapult Facility at Philadelphia is commissioned.

May 1954 CNO approves Project 125 to install angled decks and enclosed b

on the carriers that had been modernized under Project 27A.

1954 The landing light (or mirror) system is tested on HMS Albion.

June 1954 Initial at-sea tests of C11 steam catapult on carrier Hancock.

June 1954 The Naval Air Development and Material Center is established at

Johnsville, Pennsylvania.

Aug.–Nov. 1954 Tests of the vertical-takeoff-and-landing XFY-1 delta-wing experim

fighter.

July 1955 The P6M SeaMaster jet seaplane bomber makes its first flight.

Aug. 1955 VX-3 successfully tests the mirror landing system on Bennington.

Sept. 1955 Guided Missile groups 1 and 2 are commissioned to train detachm

to launch Regulus missiles from aircraft carriers, cruisers, and

submarines.

Oct. 1955 USS Forrestal (CVA 59) is commissioned.

Nov. 1955 CNO decides to equip each angled-deck carrier with a mirror land

system.

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About the Authors

Dr. Thomas C. Hone is a retired professor at the Center for Naval Warfare Studie

the Naval War College. He is a former senior executive in the Office of the Secret

Defense and was a special assistant to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Comm

His awards include the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal and the U.S. Air 

Exceptional Civilian Service Award. With his son Trent, he wrote Battle Line: The

United States Navy, 1919–1939.

Dr. Norman Friedman has written more than thirty-five books on naval and nati

security subjects, including U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, B

Carrier Aviation, and Carrier Air Power. He was awarded the Westminster Medal 

Royal United Services Institute for his The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy i

Cold War. His most recent books are Network-centric Warfare: How Navies Learn

Fight Smarter through Three World Wars (2009) and Unmanned Combat Air Syste

New Kind of Carrier Aviation (2010). He contributes a monthly column on world 

developments to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and he has written numero

articles for journals worldwide.

Dr. Mark D. Mandeles is founder and president of The J. de Bloch Group, an ind

dent consulting company. He has served as a consultant to the U.S. Joint Forces C

mand (JFCOM), to the director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of t

Secretary of Defense, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and to other D

Department agencies and private industry. He is the author of The Development 

B-52 and Jet Propulsion, The Future of War: Organizations as Weapons, and Milita

Transformation Past and Present: Historical Lessons for the 21st Century.

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Index

Numbers in bold indicate pages with illustrations

A3D/A-3B Skywarrior

catapult capacity to launch, 99, 100, 103,

108

characteristics, 177, 178

on Forrestal, 108

nuclear weapon delivery by, 99, 139, 163–64

priority for production of, 108

A3J/A-5A Vigilante, 164, 177

A4D/A-4C Skyhawk, 163–64, 177

A-20A Havoc, 26, 27

AD-1/AD-2 Skyraider

characteristics, 177, 178

design and development of, 15, 30, 31, 42

effectiveness of, 139

launch and recovery of, 102, 132

nuclear weapon delivery by, 132–33,

152nn35–36

photo of on carrier deck, 74, 75, 115

weight of, 164

aerial strike doctrine, 17

Aeronautical Board, 15–16

airborne aircraft carriers, 136, 158

aircraft

accidents with, 50, 92, 168, 170, 171n31

characteristics of and utility of aircraft carriers, 6

design competitions, 11, 12–15, 17, 18–20,

30

design of around engines, 11, 31–32, 53, 65,

136

design of for specific missions, 169–

development of, 5, 12–15, 100–101, 

exchange of information about, 50–

modifications to existing, 23–25

number of for World War II, 16, 17, 

performance improvement of, 13, 1

21n6

procurement process, 11, 25

production of for allies, 3–4, 57

quantity vs. quality conflict, 23–24, 3

R&D, 16, 23–28, 30–32

simulations and fleet exercises and d

of, 12, 15

supersonic flight capabilities, 7

testing of, 139, 182

unassisted launch of, 101

See also bombers; fighter aircraft; je

craft; piston engines and propeller-d

aircraft

aircraft carriers

aircraft characteristics and utility of

boilers on and steam temperatures a

pressures, 48–49, 114–15, 117–18

carrier battles, lessons learned from

134

carrier-controlled approach (CCA) 

79

carrier forces, size and resources of, 

67n37, 70–71, 84–85

construction program for USN, 2

defense of, 5

demobilization after World War II, 

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design and development of, 74–77, 134–35,

157–64

design responsibilities, 5

exchange of information between USN and

RN about, 50–51, 167

fires aboard, 170, 171n34

future carriers, committee to discuss, 41–42

hangar decks and open hangar configuration, 49, 141, 158–59, 163

jet aircraft, mating of to, 145–46

land-based bombers, use of carriers

against, 45

modernization of RN carriers, 49–50, 141–42

modifications to, 6, 134–35, 158–59

size of, 27, 28

strategic bombing operations from, 40–41, 71

strike potential, 17

technological developments and design of,

78–82

USN as leader in, 163

vulnerability of, 28, 35

weight of aircraft and launch and recovery

capabilities, 27, 33n21

See also angled flight deck; flexible deck/

carpet deck; flight decks

aircraft industry and manufacturers

British aircraft industry, 65, 140, 141

as BuAer suppliers, 11

combat operations, observation of by, 38–39

contacts between BuAer personnel and, 25,

31, 38, 39, 67n23, 161

contract negotiations with industry, 67n19

design competitions, 11, 12–15, 17, 18–20, 30

output cuts from, 4

procurement of aircraft from, 11, 12–15

role of in innovations, 2

superiority of US industry, 65, 140

flexible deck, interest in, 93–94

jet engines for aircraft used by, 64

military aviation, disputes about role and

organization of, 4, 71, 72–73

nuclear weapon delivery by, 41, 129

airlines and airliners, 57

AJ-1 Savage

catapult capacity to launch, 99, 103

characteristics, 177, 178

design and development of, 99, 158–59

launch and recovery of, 78, 79, 83

nuclear weapon delivery by, 77, 99, 128–33

139, 152n35, 180

photo of on carrier deck, 77

replacement of, 139

XAJ mock-up, 130–31, 134, 138

Allis-Chalmers

contract negotiations with industry, 67n19

J-36 engine, 63

jet engine development, 58–59

Allison engines, 60, 64, 174

AM-1 Mauler, 30

American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941, 1, 65, 148, 168, 170

American Locomotive Company (ALCO), 54–

55

Anderson, George, 16

angled flight deck

adoption of, 8, 73–74, 108, 124, 149, 160,

182

conceptual justification for, 47

development and testing of, xiii–xiv, 1, 51,

73–74, 89, 96–97, 124–25, 127, 137, 146–47

160

eight-degree offset, 74, 96

flexible deck and development of, 51, 89,

96–97, 160

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use of aircraft carriers and, 73–74

value of, 8, 74, 136, 147, 164

antiaircraft technology development, 118, 127–

28

Antietam (CV 36), 124, 125, 125, 146–47, 167

antiship missiles, xiii

Ark Royal (RN), 45, 85, 96, 124, 146

armored-flight-deck carriers, 2, 35, 45, 65, 75

Army, U.S.

bombers for, size and weight of, 26–27

bomb-guidance systems development, 41

bombing operations and end of war, 36

cooperation between USN and, 16

jet engine R&D, 17, 58–59, 60

Liberty engines for aircraft, 53–54

turbojet engine development, 55

Army Air Corps, U.S., 55, 56

Army Air Forces, U.S., 58, 71

Arnold, Henry H. “Hap,” 53, 58, 59–60

arresting gear/arresting wire

cooperation between RN and BuAer on,

83–84, 146

development of, 8, 81, 83–84, 135, 137

on flexible decks, 50, 93–94

flight operations pattern, 8

gravitational forces on airplane structures

from, 50–51

missing the wire and safe return to the air,

47

powered and unpowered landings, 19

testing of, 182

Ashworth, Frederick L., 129, 131

attack aircraft/fighter-bombers

combat operation observations and design

of, 38–39

landing gear/undercarriages, aircraft

designed without, 94

list of at close of World War II, 177

long-range aircraft, value of, 35–36, 

long-range and heavy aircraft, devel

ment of, 24–28, 30–31, 105–108, 12

134–35, 137, 161–62, 164

mission requirements, 30

ordnance loads, 38, 178, 179

RN use of, 45–46

single-seat aircraft, 24–25, 28, 30, 38

size of, 35, 132, 180

takeoff roll, 178, 179, 180

weight of, 45–46, 132, 178, 179–80

attention as scarce resource, 157

aviation community, information exch

within, 11

aviators/pilots

cooperation between USN and RN, 

demobilization after World War II, 

Fleet Air Arm pilot training, 3–4

jet aircraft, training for and experie

with, 63, 67n32

number of for World War II, 16, 17

promotion of, 69, 70

training of, 5

B-17 bombers, 174

B-25 Mitchell

carrier launch of, 36, 37–38, 101

characteristics, 26, 27, 132

Doolittle Raid, 35, 42–43n1, 101

B-36 bomber, 151–52n34

B-47 Stratojet, 64, 107

Ballentine, John J., 144, 161

barriers and barricades

concept and function of, 12, 19, 49

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cooperation between RN and BuAer on,

83–84

development of, 51, 81, 154n95, 158–59

tricycle landing gear and, 37, 137

Bartlett, J. L., 90, 96

Bat glider, 40

battleships, 78

Beall, Wellwood E., 25–26

Bennington (CV 20), 126, 170

Blandy, William H. P., 129, 131

Boddington, Lewis

angled deck development and testing, 89,

96, 124–25, 137, 160

catapult development, 47

exchange of information about aircraft carriers, 50–51, 149

flexible deck development and testing, 50,

89, 165

innovation development, role in, 127, 168,

169

jet aircraft, takeoff and landing requirements for, 123–24, 127, 147, 159–60, 162, 163

jet aircraft trials, 46–47

leadership of, 181

Boeing, aircraft design and development by,

25–26, 57

bombers

carrier-based, importance of and requirement for, 41–42

carrier launch of, 35–38

carriers for launch and recovery of, 6

design of, 27–28, 76

fighters as escorts for, 17–18, 37–38

land-based, 41, 45

launch and recovery capabilities and, 27,

33n21

long-range aircraft, development of, 27–28,

76

operational range and firepower, 27–28

ordnance loads, 27, 28, 33n21, 76

range of, 27–28

size of, 26–27

supersonic flight capabilities, 107

underway replenishment, 27–28

weight of, 26–27, 33n21

bombs

German bomb and missile technology, 47–

48, 118, 127

gliders/glider bomb (GLOMB), 39, 40

guidance systems, 40, 41

size of, 76

See also nuclear weapons

Boyd, Denis W., 141

British Air Commission, 65, 140

British Pensacola Veterans, 4

Brown, Eric, 46, 50, 91–92, 95–96, 123, 126–27

148, 149, 168, 170

Brown, Sheldon W., 114, 115, 117, 143–44, 145

BT2D Sky Pirate, 31, 38–39, 42

BT3D aircraft, 75

BTD/BTD-1 Destroyer, 15, 27, 31, 67n21

Buckingham, Edgar, 54

Bunker Hill, 144

bureaucracies, problem solving in, 181–82

Bureau of Aeronautics, U.S. Navy (BuAer)

aircraft design competitions, 11, 12–15, 17

18–20, 30

aircraft designers, constraints on, 154n93

authority and influence of, 5, 6, 7, 71–72,

86n16, 133–34, 157, 162

command of, 11, 12, 15

contacts between industry and, 25, 31, 38,

39, 67n23, 161

contacts between OPNAV and, 161

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exchange of information with British team,

50–51, 167

function and mission of, 5, 11, 133–34,

152n38

funding for, 159

innovation development and organizational factors in, 145–47

modifications to existing aircraft, information sources for, 24–25

Naval Aircraft Factory, responsibility for, 5,

11

organization of, 12, 32, 71–72, 86n16

personnel in, 15–16

R&D responsibility of, 5, 16–17

Ten-Year R&D History, 57

testing, commitment to, 139

Towers as chief of, 3, 15, 139–40, 167

turbojet engine development, 55

war preparations by, 16–17

See also research and development (R&D)

Bureau of Ordnance, U.S. Navy (BuOrd)

antiaircraft technology development and

adoption, 118, 127–28

cooperative relationship with RN, 80–81

foreign innovation, adoption of by, 118

guided weapons development by, 40

Bureau of Ships, U.S. Navy (BuShips), 5, 69–

70, 82

Bureau of Standards, U.S., 54, 58

Burke, Arleigh, 148

Bush, Vannevar, 58

BX-52 bomber, 151–52n34

C-2 carriers, 76–77

Cambell, Dennis R. F.

angled deck development and testing, 96,

124–25, 160

carriers, 149, 167

flexible decks, limitations of, 49–50

innovation development, role in, 12

jet aircraft, takeoff and landing requ

ments for, 127, 147

mirror and lighted landing aid deve

ment and testing, 125–26

Carney, Robert B., 6

carrier aviation

development of, 12, 147, 148, 157–6

nuclear weapons and, 4–5, 6, 41, 42

76–77, 84, 107, 128–33, 142, 152nn3

163–64, 166, 171n27, 180, 182

rocket-assisted takeoff equipment, 4

role and organization of, disputes a

simulations and fleet exercises of ca

ties of, 12

World War II lessons and, 41–42

catapults

aircraft takeoff into wind and, 100

all aircraft, catapult need for, 83, 10

development of, 8, 29, 47–49, 81, 10

118–19n3, 120n24, 120n26, 137, 142

153n76, 158–59, 160–61, 170

direct-drive and indirect-drive type

113–14, 115–17, 120n33

electric-driven types, 103–104

explosive fuel for, 81, 105, 106–107, 

120n26

funding for development, 107

German-built, 48, 81, 101–102, 119

hydraulic-pneumatic types, 29, 48, 8

100, 102–103, 109, 110, 113, 117, 11

19n3, 119n8, 170, 171n34

internal-combustion type, 99, 105

launching aircraft with, 77, 84

linear-turbine type, 104

more-powerful, specifications of, 10

106, 107–108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 11

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popgun types, 48

powder (explosive-driven) types, 104, 106–

107, 111–12, 113, 116–17, 119n18, 120n26,

143–44

requirement for, 46–47

seaplane launch with, 29, 102–103

slotted-cylinder/slotted-tube types, 29, 48,

81, 83, 101–102, 103, 104–10, 111–12,

119n5, 119n8, 120n24, 120n26, 120n33,

137, 142–44, 153n76, 158–59

solid-piston types, 108–109

support for use of, 46

takeoff roll and, 178, 179, 180

testing of, 182

Type K (flywheel), 47, 48

weight of, 116

See also steam catapults

cavity magnetron, 3, 16, 57

Chafee, George B., 158–59

Chance Vought aircraft manufacturing, 50

Churchill, Winston, 57

Clarke, Ralph S., 113, 143

Coe, C. F., 80

combat information center (CIC), 7

combat operations, observation of, 38–39

Combs, Thomas S., 138, 143

communications

antennas for equipment, 79

CCA systems, 79

information exchange and innovation, 167

problems on flight decks, 149

Congress, U.S., 4, 16

convoy escort operations, 73

Cook, Arthur B., 18

Coral Sea (CV 43), 74

Cunningham, Andrew B., 46

Curtiss-Wright J65 engine, 132

CVB-X carriers, 76–77

DC-4 aircraft, 55

death rays, 5

deck landings

experiments with aircraft, 19

landing speeds, 18–19, 20, 45, 49, 83, 84,

146, 177–78

powered landings, 19, 47

separate landing and takeoff decks, 47

unpowered landings, 18–19, 20

See also barriers and barricades

deck park, 12, 19, 47, 49, 51, 101

Defense Aid program, 3

deflectors, jet-blast, 77

de Havilland Goblin engine, 61, 63

Denfeld, Louis E., 106

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air

(DCNO [Air])

carrier design and development, 74–76,

134–35

catapult development, 111

creation of and organization of, 71–72,

86n16, 133, 152n38

innovation development and organizational factors in, 145–47

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (DCNO [Logistics]), 76, 78–79

Devlin, Leo, 25

DH-100 Vampire fighter, 63, 91, 91–93, 148

Diehl, Walter S., 21n6, 25

dive-bomber aircraft, 13–15, 25, 30, 38, 42

Doolittle Raid, 27–28, 35–36, 42–43n1, 101

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aircraft design and development by, 57

aircraft development cycle, 39

contacts between BuAer personnel and, 25,

38, 39

exchange of information with British team

and, 50

turbojet engine development, 55

Dove bomb, 40

Dreyer, Frederic, 140

Driggs, Ivan H., 132

drones and unmanned/pilotless platforms

advances in, xiii

development of, 39–40, 159

number produced, 39–40

opposition to, 135

speed of, 39

target drones, development of, 29, 39

Durand, William F., 58, 60, 61–62

E28/39 aircraft, 58, 59–60

electronics, 7, 79

Electropult (electric-driven catapult), 103–104

elevators, deck-edge, 49, 74, 75, 108, 134, 135,

141, 158–59, 163

Engen, Donald D., 93–94, 126, 161, 168

Engineering Aerodynamics (Diehl), 25

Engineering Division, Bureau of Aeronautics

attack aircraft development, 30

Design Coordination and Contract Airplane Design Section, 16, 130

fighter design, 18–20

function and mission of, 12

personnel in, 30

engine manufacturers, 61–62, 67n19

design of aircraft around, 11, 31–32

136

development of for carrier operatio

Liberty engines, 53–54

suppliers of, 53

turbine engines, 54–55

turbo-superchargers for, 54–55, 57, 

66n10, 174

See also jet propulsion/turbojet eng

piston engines and propeller-driven

aircraft

Enterprise (CVAN 65), 12, 13, 99

escort carriers

aircraft for, 25

catapults for, 29, 101

construction program for USN, 2

jet aircraft for, 63

Essex (CV 9) and Essex-class carriers

aircraft design for launch from, 27, 

171n27

aircraft landing on, 73

aircraft takeoff into wind, 100

aircraft takeoff weight limitations, 8

catapults for, 102, 109, 110, 111–12, 

117, 119n8, 120n33, 145

modifications to, 74–75, 134–35, 16

weight of, 119n8

experimentation, value of, 96–97, 166

F2H/F2H-1 Banshee, 59, 74, 75, 146, 17

F3D Skynight, 64, 100, 102

F3H Demon, 63–64, 100

F4D Skyray, 63–64, 100

F4F Wildcat, 26

F4U Corsair, 26, 28, 62, 174–75, 177, 17

180

F6F Hellcat, 26

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F7F Tigercat, 26, 27, 28, 37, 42, 75, 177, 178,

180

F7U-1/F7U-3 Cutlass, 63, 83–84, 177, 178, 180

F8F/F8F-1 Bearcat, 19, 26, 60, 62, 66, 67n23,

139

F9F-1/F9F-2/F9F-5 Panther, 64, 67n35, 73, 83–

84, 177, 178, 179–80

F9F7 Cougar, 94–95

F-14 fighter, 164

F15C fighter, 60, 63

F-84G Thunderjet, 94

F-86 Saberjet, 64

Fahrney, Delmar S., 39

Fairey, C. R., 65

FD/XFD-1/FD-1/FH-1 Phantom, 60, 63,

67n21, 135, 179

Fechteler, William M., 114, 127, 143, 153n79,

169

fighter aircraft

armament requirements, 20

design competitions, 12–13, 17

design of, 17–20, 65

escort function of, 17–18, 37–38

landing speeds, 18–19, 20, 177–78

modernization of fleet, 139

ordnance loads, 28

performance improvement of, 13, 14, 15,

21n6

powered and unpowered landings, 18–19,

20

range of, 20, 25–26

RN use of, 45–46, 140–42

size of, 26–27, 45–46, 81–82

speed needs, 18, 19–20

strike potential, 17

supercharged fighters, 18–19

84, 179–80

weight of aircraft and launch and recovery

capabilities, 27, 164

FJ-1/FJ-4B Fury, 63, 146, 163–64

Fleet Air Arm (FAA)

aircraft carrier experience for, 167

aircraft for, 70

aviation organization to support, 141

club for U.S.-trained pilots, 4

pilot training for, 3–4

reconstruction of, 181

fleet air defense, radar use for, 3

fleet problems and exercises, 7, 12, 15, 18, 157–

58, 168

flexible deck/carpet deck

angled deck development from, 51, 89, 96–

97, 160

arresting gear/arresting wire on, 50, 93–94

concept behind and construction of, 89, 90

91, 91, 95

development of, 80–81, 89–91, 123–24,

159–60, 165

flight operations pattern, 50, 89, 92–94, 93

landing on, skill needed for, 50, 95

limitations of, 49–50, 51, 80, 124, 136

proposal for, 46, 47

RN offer to BuAer to fund and manage

program for, 80–81

testing and assessment of, 47, 49–50, 91,

91–96, 93, 150n1

USN following RN lead on, 96–97

flight decks

armored-flight-deck carriers, 2, 35, 45, 65,

75

deck-edge elevators, 49, 74, 75, 108, 134,

135, 141, 158–59, 163

flight operations pattern, 12, 47, 49, 50, 51

62, 84, 101, 137, 141

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jet-blast deflectors, 77

separate landing and takeoff decks, 47

sortie volume and deck arrangements, 75

wooden decks and jet engines, 55

See also angled flight deck; flexible deck/

carpet deck

Flight Division, Bureau of Aeronautics, 12

Forrestal (CVA 59) and Forrestal-class (CVB

59) carriers, 108, 112, 145, 147, 162, 163, 168

Forrestal, James, 70, 128

FR-1 Fireball, 59, 60, 65, 67n21, 67n24

France, 3, 57

Frisbie, William Z., 16, 130

Future Building Committee (FBC), 45–46,

140–41, 165, 181

Gallery, Daniel V., 129

Gargoyle missile, 40

Gates, Artemus, 70

General Board, U.S. Navy

aircraft design requirements, 20

authority and influence of, 6–7, 71, 133,

157, 161–62

carrier design and development, 77

function and mission of, 6, 74, 140

hearings on ship design, strategy, and technology, 158

substitute for, 134

technological developments shipbuilding

programs, 78–82

General Electric (GE)

contract negotiations with industry, 67n19

I-16/J31 engine, 59, 60

I-40/J33 engine, 60, 61, 63

J35 engine, 60, 64, 151–52n34

J47 engine, 60, 64

microwave radar development, 16–

TG-100 engine, 59

turbo-supercharger development an

duction, 55, 57, 66n10

Germany

aeronautical research, examination 

131–32

aircraft designs, 65

bomb and missile technology, 47–4

127

catapults built by, 48, 81, 101–102, 1

high-speed flight research, 56

jet engine development, 58, 61, 65

Mistrel aircraft, 107

gliders/glider bomb (GLOMB), 39, 40

Goodhart, Nicholas, 125–26, 127

Gorgon missile, 40, 59, 136

Grant, Lucien M., 143

Great Britain

adoption of innovations from, 118, 

aircraft, purchase of U.S.-made, 3–4

aircraft industry in, 65, 140, 141

bomb development by, 41

collaboration between U.S. and, xiii

financial condition after World War 

70, 163

high-speed flight research, 56

innovation development in, xiii–xiv

118

jet engine development, 57–58, 59–

65, 67n24

special relationship between U.S. an

Green, F. M., 123

Grumman Aircraft Corporation

contacts between BuAer personnel a

67n23

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exchange of information with British team

and, 50

jet aircraft designs, 60

preferred BuAer supplier status, 67n23

Guadalcanal, 7

Guadalcanal, 129

guided weapons, 40, 41, 159

Halford H-1 engine, 63

Halsey, William, 3, 41

Hancock, 77, 143, 145, 160, 160, 164

Hayward, John T. “Chick,” 130–31, 132–33,

151n25, 151n27, 152n36

He-176 aircraft, 58

He-280 aircraft, 58

Heinemann, Edward

attack aircraft development, 38, 131–32,

152nn35–36

catapult capacity, concerns about, 102

combat operations, observation of, 38–39

innovation development, role in, 168

jet engine development, 63–64

opinions about, 25, 131

wartime R&D process, 31

high-speed flight research, 56, 174

Hopkins, F. H. E., 38

Horn, Peter H., 113, 143

Hornet, 27–28, 35–36, 42–43n1, 182

HOTFOOT plan, 40–41

hydrogen peroxide fuel, 48, 102, 105, 115, 116,

119n5, 144

Illustrious (RN), 126, 161

Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), 13, 14, 15, 45

decision making and, 148–49, 181, 182

experimentation and, 96–97, 166

foreign-developed, adoption of, 118

funding for, 159

individuals, role of in, 1–2, 123–33

information exchange and, 167

institutions, role of in, 2, 147–50

organizations, role of in, 1–2, 133–47, 157–

60, 168–70

serendipity and, 160

Intrepid, 145

Italian Academy of Sciences, 56

Japan

bombing operations and end of war with,

36

Imperial Japanese Navy, 13, 14, 15, 45

operational challenges of fight against,

127–28

radar development by, 37

strategic bombing operations against, 40–

41

Tokyo, raid on, 41

jet aircraft

assisted takeoff requirements, 46–47, 49,

101, 123, 135

on carriers, concerns about, 136, 138, 139

carriers, mating to, 145–46

combat operations, simulation of, 139

development of, 46, 49, 138–39, 158–59

landing speeds, 49

launch and recovery methods for, 51, 84,

101, 123–24, 127, 147, 148, 157–60, 162

pilot training for, 63, 67n32

piston-engine aircraft, engagement of by,

139

size of, 99

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takeoff speeds, 47

undercarriages/landing gear, aircraft

designed without, 46, 47, 50, 90–91, 92–93,

93, 96, 123, 159–60, 163

weight of, 99

jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) units, 29–30, 81,

118, 128, 128

jet propulsion/turbojet engines

acceleration of, 62

adoption of, 53

aircraft design to accommodate, 65

axial-flow engines, 59, 60–66

centrifugal-flow engines, 58, 60–64

clustered small engines, 59

development of, xiii, 4, 7, 8, 11–12, 57–66,

151–52n34, 174

development of as focus of BuAer efforts,

100–101

evaluation of applicability of, 57

exchange of information about, 3, 17, 57–

58, 59–60

fuel consumption by, 62

funding for, 16, 53

gas turbines, evaluation of, 57

mixed piston-jet aircraft, 60, 67n24

obstacles to development of, 53–57

physics of, 57, 173–75

pressure to develop, 174–75

reliability of, 135

research into, 17, 57

thrust, 62, 63, 173–74

Johnson, Felix, 143

JUPITER, Project, 136

Kearsarge, 110

King, Ernest J., 6–7, 42, 42–43n1, 127–29, 131,

161–62

Korean Conflict, 163

Kraus, Sidney, 16, 18–19

L-133 fighter, 58

La Guardia, Fiorello H., 54

Lake Champlain, 110

Langley, 12, 135

Lark missile, 136

Lend-Lease Act, 3, 58, 65, 70, 150

Lewis, George W., 56

Lexington, 12–13

Leyte (CV 32), 170

Liberty engines, 53–54

light carriers, 2, 29

Limbo antisubmarine weapon, 118

Lockheed L-1000 jet engine, 55, 58

Long Range Objectives Group (Op-96)

Lonnquest, Theodore, 131, 151n27

magnetron, 3, 16, 57

Malta-class carriers (RN), 85, 163

Marine Corps, U.S.

aircraft and pilots for World War II

jet aircraft for, 63, 136

Martin aircraft manufacturing, 57

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

11, 16, 55, 58

Material Branch, Bureau of Aeronautic

16, 18–19

McCain, John S., 71–72, 133

McDonnell aircraft manufacturing, 50

Metsger, Alfred B., 65–66, 138–39

Midway (CV 41) and Midway-class (CV

carriers

aircraft takeoff weight limitations, 8

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carriers (continued)

catapults for, 107, 108, 110, 145

JATO launch from, 118, 128, 128

jet aircraft development for, 132, 159

Midway battle, 7, 23, 75

military services

contract negotiations with industry, 67n19

demobilization after World War II, 4, 69, 149

military aviation, disputes about role and

organization of, 4, 71, 72–73

Miller, Jerry, 128, 129, 133, 152n35

Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP), 2, 46,

89–91, 92, 140

mirror and light landing aid

adoption of, 108, 126, 149, 161, 182

concept behind, 125–26, 126

development and testing of, 1, 125–26, 127

technological developments and, 85

value of, 164

missiles and rockets

catapult launch of, 104–105

characteristics, 40

cost of, 40

development of, 4, 40, 136–37

engines for, 67n21

German bomb and missile technology, 47–

48, 118, 127

nuclear weapon delivery by, 164, 164

number produced, 40

rocket motors and guided weapons development, 40

Mitchell, Colin C., 48, 89, 90, 114, 115, 117,

118, 126, 144, 166

Mitscher, Marc A.

aircraft development for carrier aviation,

12, 162

BuAer role, 12, 15

fighter design, 18, 21n23

Hayward, relationship with, 131

Hornet and Doolittle Raid, 35, 36, 42–43n1

long-range aircraft, need for, 28

Montgomery, Alfred E., 42

Moore, Henry, 82

Moore, John, 94–95

Moss, Sanford A., 55, 58, 66n10

Murphy, Joseph N., 30–31, 130, 132

Murray, George D., 134

M. W. Kellogg Company, 104

National Academy of Sciences, 57

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

(NACA)

airfoil sections, design of, 53

aviation research by, 11

cowling design for piston engines, 53

fighter design, support for, 19–20

innovation development by, 170

jet-propulsion committee (Durand committee), 58, 60, 61–62

jet propulsion research by, 17, 57

turbojet engines, development of, 53, 54, 56

wind tunnels, 56

National Defense Research Committee

(NDRC), 40, 58

Naval Aircraft Design Committee, 46–47, 141,

181

Naval Aircraft Factory

BuAer responsibility for, 5, 11

catapult development, 29, 100, 104–105,

116, 118–19n3, 143, 144

drones, development of, 39

gliders, development of, 39

innovation development at, 146, 154n95

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reorganization of, 100, 134

Ship Experimental Unit, 29

steam catapult testing, 182

Naval Aircraft Modification Unit, 134

Naval Air Experimental Station, 100, 134

Naval Air Material Center (NAMC)

aircraft testing for carrier landings, 37

arresting gear, capabilities of, 83

catapult development, 99, 100, 103, 104,

109, 111–13, 114, 117, 118–19n3, 119n18,

142–44, 158–59

funding for, 100, 159

innovation development at, 145–46,

154n95

reorganization of, 100, 134

Naval Auxiliary Air Station, 134

naval aviation

aircraft production for allies, 3–4

innovations during World War II, xiii, 4

organizational changes and restructuring,

5, 71–72, 86n16, 168

plan for, fulfillment of, 140

strength of after World War II, 70

Naval War College

authority and influence of, 6, 7, 157, 161–

62, 168

carrier aviation simulations, 12

Navy, U.S. (USN)

adoption of innovations by, 149–50

aerial strike doctrine, 17

aircraft and pilots for World War II, 16, 17

aircraft development by, 70–71

aviation policy, 71, 161

bombing operations and end of war, 36

carrier force, size and resources of, 65,

67n37, 70–71, 84–85

competition between RN and, 1, 14

cooperation between Army and, 16

cooperative relationship with RN, 1

16–17, 50–51, 71, 80–81, 82–85, 127

47, 150, 154n96, 167, 181

decision making and innovation in, 

49, 182

demobilization after World War II, 

138, 149

enlisted personnel statistics, 17, 69

flexible deck, following RN lead on, 

funding for, 70, 134

innovation development and organ

tional factors in, 133–39, 147, 157–5

66

jet engine development, 58–59, 60

jet propulsion research by, 17

Long Range Objectives Group (Op-

164

military aviation, disputes about ro

organization of, 4, 71, 72–73

nuclear weapon delivery by, 41, 129

147–48, 149

operational challenges of fight again

Japan, 127–28

organization and management of, 1

parallels between RN and, 51

policy development, 131, 157–59

professionalism in, 149–50, 167–68

sortie volume, 73–74

spread of innovations to, 2

strength of after World War II, 70

testing of aircraft and equipment, tr

of, 139, 182

Neutrality Act, 56, 58

Nimitz, Chester, 6, 7, 42–43n1, 72, 105

North American Aviation, 50

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Turbodyne project, 57

turbojet engine development, 55

nuclear weapons

carrier aviation and, 4–5, 6, 41, 42, 51, 71,

76–77, 84, 107, 128–33, 142, 152nn35–36,

163–64, 166, 171n27, 180, 182

delivery of by Navy, 41, 129–30, 147–48,

149

interservice rivalries about control of, 41,

129–30

missile delivery of, 164, 164

naval policy on, 131

size and weight of, 4, 132, 152n35, 163

survivability of attacks from, 5

testing of by Soviet Union, 163

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 80

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

(OPNAV)

authority and influence of, 161–62, 168

BuAer restructuring and authority, 5, 72

contacts between BuAer personnel and, 161

naval policy development, 157–59

quality of officers, 157

Okinawa, 28

operational art, 28

operational surprise, 35–36

optical landing aid. See mirror and light landing aid

organizations

adaptability and problem solving in, 181–

82

change, resistance to, 182

leadership in, 169

Navy organizational players, 6–7

professionalism in, 169

support for innovation in, 2, 165–66, 168–

70

Oriskany (CV 34), 83, 100, 109, 110, 146

Ostrander, J. E., 30

P2V Neptune bombers, 118, 128, 128, 142

P6M SeaMaster, 169

P-51 Mustang fighter, 37–38

P-61 fighter, 101

P-79 flying-wing fighter, 67n21

P-80/F-80 Shooting Star, 60, 61, 63, 66, 139

Pacific Fleet, 7, 182

Parsons, William S., 128–29, 130, 131

P/A V aircraft, 102

Pavlecka, Vladimir, 55

PBJ-1 bombers, 37

Pearce, James, 130–31

Pelican glider, 40

Perry, J. C., 110–11

Perseus (RN), 48, 111, 113, 114–16, 115, 117,

118, 126–27, 143–45, 153n79, 166, 169, 182

Pirie, Robert B., 138

piston engines and propeller-driven aircraft

air-cooled piston engines, 62

alternatives to, interest in, 46, 56

development and construction of, 11, 12

limitations of, 139

mixed piston-jet aircraft, 60, 67n24

NACA cowling for, 53

performance improvement of, 13, 14, 15,

21n6

physics of, 173–74

reliance on piston engines, 53–54, 174

speed of, 54

turbo-superchargers for, 54–55, 57, 60–61,

66n10, 174

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18–20, 30

Pound, Dudley, 140

Pratt, William V., 7

Pratt & Whitney

J-48 engines, 94

J57 engine, 64, 132

jet engine development, 55, 64

piston engine development, 174

R-2800 engine, 62

R-4360 engine, 62

Tay/J48 engine, 61, 64

Type 19B/J30 engine, production of, 67n21

Pride, Alfred M., 15, 80, 103, 107, 111, 135–36,

138, 139, 142, 144, 166

Procurement Division, Bureau of Aeronautics,

12, 16

Purnell, William R., 128–29

RA-5C Vigilante, 164

radar

advances in, 80

airborne, development of, 4

air-search, development of, 16, 45

death rays, 5

ground-based, development of, 4

Japanese development of, 37

magnetron and, 3, 16, 57

microwave radar development, 16–17

RN’s defensive use of, 3

surface-search radar, 23

Radford, Arthur W., 38, 72, 73, 129, 131, 133, 168

Raisseur, W. T., 75, 134, 135

Ramage, James D., 84

Ramsey, DeWitt, 16, 28, 37, 76, 133

Ranger, 12–13

Reeves, Joseph M., 18

research and development (R&D)

aircraft development cycle, 14–15, 2

25, 30–31, 38, 39

BuAer responsibility for, 5, 16–17

funding for, 16, 17

improvement of facilities for, 4

peacetime aircraft R&D, 16, 23, 26, 

priority of projects, 137–38

wartime aircraft R&D, 23–28, 30–32

Research and Development Master Pro

136–38, 142

Richardson, Lawrence, 16

Rickover, Hyman, 118

Rivero, Horacio, 129, 131

Rolls-Royce engines

Nene engine, 61, 64, 135–36

Tay/J48 engine, 61, 64

Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE)

catapult development, 47–49

decision making and innovation in, 

49, 181

flexible deck development and testi

92, 93–94, 150n1

jet aircraft trials, 46–47

jet aircraft without landing gear, pro

for, 92–93, 93

jet engine development, coordinatio

61–62

Naval Aircraft Department, 46–47, 

150n1

role of in innovations, 2

Royal Air Force (RAF)

aircraft development by, 70

aviation mission from RN, 140

jet aircraft without landing gear, pro

for, 90–91, 92–93, 93

Whittle jet engine development, 61

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aircraft carriers, modifications to launch

and recover bombers, 6

aviation doctrine of, 141–42

aviation mission to RAF, 140

carrier force, size and resources of, 65,

67n37, 70, 84–85

committee system in, 142, 147, 165

competition between USN and, 1, 148–49

cooperative relationship with BuOrd, 80–81

cooperative relationship with USN, 1, 3–4,

7, 16–17, 50–51, 71, 80–81, 82–85, 127,

146–47, 150, 154n96, 167, 181

decision making and innovation in, 181–82

decline in, 69–70

fighter aircraft performance, 13, 14, 15

fighter aircraft use by, 45–46, 140–42

fleet doctrine, 181

flexible deck, USN following RN lead on,

96–97

government policy on, 150, 167

innovation development and organizational factors in, 139–47, 159–60, 165

jet aircraft, takeoff and landing requirements for, 147, 148, 157–60

jet aircraft without landing gear, proposal

for, 90–91, 92–93, 93, 159

mission of, 73, 138, 147–48, 149, 150, 163

nuclear mission, lack of, 133, 147–48, 163

parallels between USN and, 51

purchase of aircraft by, 65, 140

sortie volume, 73–74

See also Fleet Air Arm

Russell, James S., 74, 138, 167

Sallada, Harold B., 76, 134–35, 162

Saratoga, 12, 13, 112

SB2A Buccaneer, 13

characteristics, 24, 27, 177, 178

design and production of, 13, 24, 32n3

modifications to, 36

strategic bombing operations with, 40

successors to, 24–25, 31

takeoff roll, 179

SBD/SBD-1 Dauntless, 13, 21n6, 31, 131

Sea Hornet fighter, 46

Sea Mosquito fighter, 46

seaplanes, 29, 102–103, 174

Sea Vampire fighter, 93–94

Shangri-La (CV 38), 37, 38, 101, 132

Sherman, Forrest P., 107–108, 139, 153n79,

169

ships

hearings on ship design, strategy, and tech

nology, 158

submarine capabilities and surface ships, 5

Sims, William S., 7

Slattery, M. S., 90

Small, James D., 124

Smith, Abel, 147

SO3C Seamew aircraft, 131

Soucek, Apollo, 35, 113, 118, 138, 143, 152n79

161, 169, 182

Soviet Union

financial condition after World War II, 163

nuclear weapon testing by, 163

sea power use against, 41, 100

threat from, 5, 163

Spaatz, Carl A., 72

Spangenberg, George

aircraft design requirements, 25

aircraft development cycle, 39

aircraft for nuclear weapons delivery,

development of, 130

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F8B aircraft development, 25–26

jet engine and aircraft development, 62, 63,

65–66, 138–39

Spangler, Selden B., 66

speed

fighter aircraft speed needs, 19–20

high-speed flight research, 56, 174

landing speeds, 18–19, 20, 45, 49, 83, 84,

146, 177–78

stall speed, 177–78

takeoff speeds, 47, 83

Stack, John, 54

steam catapults

adoption of, 99, 100, 117–18, 126, 142–45,

160, 160–61

advantages of, 116

BuAer design program, 112–13

capacity of and steam plant on ship, 99,

105, 111, 115

development of, xiii–xiv, 1, 48–49, 99, 100,

105, 110–11, 112–18, 119n18, 127

direct-drive and indirect-drive types, 113–

14, 115–17

launch intervals with, 105

organizational factors and development of,

142–45

steam temperatures and pressures, 48–49,

114–15, 117–18

testing of, 113, 114–17, 126–27, 143–45,

153n79, 166, 182

weight of, 115, 116

Stevens, John, 143

Stevens, Leslie C., 30, 38

submarine aircraft carriers, 158

submarines

Limbo antisubmarine weapon, 118

missile deployment from, 164

rafting nuclear submarines, 118

U-boat capture, 129

U-boat technology, 41, 42

Sullivan, John L., 6

Super Gorgon missile, 136

swept-wing aircraft, 50, 65, 100, 136, 13

Tactical Orders and Doctrine (PAC-10), 

takeoff roll, 178, 179, 180

TB2F aircraft, 36–37, 169–70

TBD Devastator, 13, 14

TBF/TBM Avenger

characteristics, 14, 27, 177, 178

design and production of, 13–14, 24

launch of, 101

strategic bombing operations with, 

XTBF-1 Avenger, 13

technology

advances in after World War II, 78–

development of during World War 

4, 7, 78

exchange of during Tizard Mission, 

17, 57–58

hearings on ship design, strategy, an

nology, 158

innovation developments and, 85

Pandora’s box of, 85

thrust, 62, 63, 173–74

Tizard, Henry, 3, 16–17, 57–58

torpedo planes, 12–14, 27, 30, 36, 38, 42

Towers, John H.

attack aircraft, development of, 30

BuAer command, 3, 15, 139–40, 167

Fleet Air Arm pilot training, 3

R&D funding, attitude toward, 17

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RN, respect for, 4

war preparations by, 16–17

Trapnell, Frederick M., 38, 50, 131

Triumph (RN), 125, 147

Truman, Harry, 6

Tunnell, R. W., 110–11

turbine engines, 54–55

Turbodyne project, 57

turbojet engines. See jet propulsion/turbojet

engines

turboprop engines and aircraft, 46, 55, 57, 58–

59, 62, 75, 76, 132, 134, 139, 151–52n34, 173

Ubee, S. R., 92

United States, 76, 77, 83, 103, 107, 146, 162

United States (U.S.)

collaboration between Great Britain and,

xiii, 1

financial condition after World War II, 70

Navy, policy on, 150, 167

special relationship between Great Britain

and, 4

unmanned/pilotless platforms. See drones and

unmanned/pilotless platforms

V-1 missiles, 47–48, 101–102

Volta Congress on High Speed Flight, 56

von Kármán, Theodore, 56, 57

war gaming, 7, 12, 15, 18, 157–58, 168

Warrior (RN), 49–50, 95–96

Wasp, 110

Weitzenfeld, Daniel K., 119n18, 144

Westinghouse

24C engine, 64

contract negotiations with industry, 67n19

104

failure as engine builder, 63

J46 engine, 59

Type 9.5/J32 engine, 59

Type 19/19A/19B/J30 engines, 59, 62–63,

67n21

Type 24/J34 engine, 59, 62

Type 40/J40 engine, 63, 66, 100, 132

Whittle, Frank, 3, 17, 53, 61, 174

Whittle jet engine, 3, 17, 53, 58, 60, 61, 174

wind tunnels, 56

Wood, Hugh, 171n31

Woodhull, Roger B., 130

World War I, 1, 4, 5

World War II

aircraft and pilots for, 16, 17

carrier battles, lessons learned from, 42

demobilization after, 4, 69–70, 138, 149

financial conditions after, 69–70, 163

lessons from and carrier aviation, 41–42

naval aviation after, 4–5

promotion during, 30

relationship between Great Britain and

U.S., 1, 3–4

strategic bombing operations, 36, 40–41

technological developments during, xiii, 4,

7, 78

Wright engines, 174

XA2D Skyshark, 171n31

XB-47 bomber, 151–52n34

XBT-1 aircraft, 13

XBT2D-1 Sky Pirate, 15, 31

XBTC-1 aircraft, 23

XBTC-2 aircraft, 23, 24, 27

XBTK-1 aircraft, 24–25, 31

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XF4U-1 aircraft, 20

XF5F-1 Skyrocket, 26

XF5U-1 Flying Flapjack, 26

XF8B-1 aircraft, 25–26, 27

XFY-1 Pogo, 169

XP-59A/P59A Airacomet, 38, 63, 131, 135

XSB2A-1 aircraft, 13

XSB2C-1 aircraft, 13

XSB3C-1 aircraft, 14, 24

XTB2D-1 aircraft, 36

XTB2F-1 aircraft, 27, 33n21, 36–37

XTB3F-1 aircraft, 28

XTBU-1 Sea Wolf, 13–14

Yorktown, 3, 12, 13

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The Newport Papers

Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 36

August 2010).

Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, edited by Bruce 

Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg (no. 35, January 2010).

Somalia . . . From the Sea, by Gary Ohls (no. 34, July 2009).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

Peter M. Swartz (no. 33, December 2008).

Major Naval Operations, by Milan Vego (no. 32, September 2008).

Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, edited by Paul D. Tay

(no. 31, August 2008).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

30, September 2007).

Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron (no. 29, September 2

Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, by 

A. Elleman (no. 28, February 2007).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

27, September 2006).

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited b

Carnes Lord (no. 26, February 2006).

The Regulation of International Coercion: Legal Authorities and Political Constrain

James P. Terry (no. 25, October 2005).

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader, edi

Peter Dombrowski (no. 24, July 2005).

The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William

Hopkinson (no. 23, May 2005).

China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S.

Erickson (no. 22, April 2005).

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edited by Paul D. Taylor (no. 21, 2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert Gile (no. 20, 2004).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John Hattendorf

(no. 19, 2004).

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial

Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross (no. 18, 2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs,

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (no. 17, 2003).

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Sub

marines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (no. 16, 2003).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen

(no. 15, December 2000).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (no. 14, August 1998).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, with David G. Freymann (no. 13,

March 1998).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myron H.

Nordquist (no. 12, August 1997).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (no. 11, April 1997).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James,

U.S. Air Force (no. 10, October 1996).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (no. 9

December 1995).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(no. 8, December 1994).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (no. 7, June 1994).

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the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 6, October 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 5, August 1993).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (no. 4, June 199

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B.

Robertson, Jr. (no. 3, October 1992).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for 

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 2, April 1

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombing

Christopher C. Harmon (no. 1, December 1991).

Newport Papers are available online (Acrobat required) at www.usnwc.edu/press

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