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The

Letort Papers

In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer 

and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the 

Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was 

a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks 

lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was 

a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure 

point for further exploration. Today, as was the case 

over 2 centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home of 

the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and 

transformation. 

In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled 

the men and women who, like Letort, settled the 

American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press presents The 

Letort Papers. This series allows SSI and USAWC Press 

to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays 

of interest to the defense academic community which 

may not correspond with our mainstream policyoriented publications. 

If you think you may have a subject amenable to 

publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish 

to comment on a particular paper, please contact 

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Studies Institute and USAWC Press, U.S. Army War 

College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

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steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil. We look forward to hearing 

from you.
Strategic Studies Institute 

and 

U.S. Army War College Press

FROM CHAOS TO COHESION: 

A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY, 

STABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT

 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Diane E. Chido

April 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer 

new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of 

furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

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be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013.

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This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College 

External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

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ISBN 1-58487-563-1
iii

FOREWORD

In December 2012, General Carter Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), told 

students at Brown University that recent successes in 

reducing the influence of al-Shabaab and presidential 

elections in Somalia: 

happened because the nations of East Africa collectively, and under the auspices of the African Union, 

decided that they would take action. . . . It was the 

regional states making that decision, crafting a plan 

and then coming, frankly, to the international community and ask[ing] for some support, which the United 

States and many others were able to provide. But it 

was an African-led and-designed effort. 

U.S. policy has long voiced support for the concept of “African solutions for African problems” but 

has implemented plans that proved policymakers believed they knew better how to “fix” Africa. Now the 

United States is beginning to support African solutions 

by increasing partnerships with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) for coordinated security, 

stability, and development efforts across sub-regions.

In this monograph, Diane Chido explores the evolution of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) 

into the present-day African Union (AU) and considers optimal directions for this organization to achieve 

both African and U.S. objectives for the continent in 

the context of past, current, and future AFRICOM 

engagement. Ms. Chido accedes that AFRICOM has 

begun to engage with the RECs for more effective 

and cost-efficient regional security and stability efforts, but recommends that this joint command place 

greater coordinated emphasis on this approach as a 
iv

series of smaller-scale “pilots” in order to form a longterm pan-continental strategy for U.S. engagement 

in Africa. 

Positive engagement in this often misunderstood 

region requires a clear understanding of local decisionmaking environments and the stresses and influences under which such leaders or leaders-to-be may 

be operating. The U.S. Army War College can provide 

strategic research opportunities to identify up-andcoming individuals and groups in countries and counterpart organizations, such as RECs, especially suited 

as partners for enhancing security and stability in 

the region. 

In this continuing age of austerity, discussions in 

the defense arena focus on cost-effective solutions to 

large problems. Regional and ultimately, continental, 

approaches to Africa’s myriad security challenges that 

directly affect U.S. national interests will increasingly 

have a greater impact than single-country, piecemeal 

military-to-military efforts. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph as a contribution to the debate on the future of U.S. Army engagement in Africa and how it can best enhance U.S. 

competitiveness abroad and security at home.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and 

 U.S. Army War College Press
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DIANE E. CHIDO is the President of DC Analytics, 

a research and analysis firm formed in October 2008. 

She has served as a cultural awareness subject matter expert on the Horn of Africa, assisting in creating 

training materials for the U.S. Army and course curricula in cultural intelligence analysis for academic 

and intelligence community agencies. She has also 

performed extensive research on Sub-Saharan African civil-military relations, socio-cultural cleavages, 

and regional security threats and opportunities. In 

December 2008, she completed the U.S. Army Culture 

Center’s train-the-trainer course on Cultural Awareness in the Horn of Africa. Ms. Chido is an adjunct 

professor of intelligence studies with the Institute for 

Intelligence Studies (IIS) at Mercyhurst University 

as well as a graduate of that program. She teaches 

Intelligence Communication, Advanced Intelligence 

Analysis, and Advanced Analytic Techniques, in the 

classroom and online, to graduate students who are 

practicing analysts in the Intelligence Community. 

She also serves as a faculty advisor for student researchers on numerous Department of Defense (DoD) 

contracts with the Center for Intelligence Research, 

Analysis, and Training (CIRAT). Ms. Chido has 20 

years of experience in research including with the International Monetary Fund and with the Brookings 

Institution Foreign Policy Program. She publishes 

widely on intelligence analysis, ethnic conflict, and 

international security topics. Ms. Chido holds an M.S. 

in Applied Intelligence Analysis, an M.A. in Russian 

Language, and a Graduate Certificate in Russian/East 

European Studies. 

vii

SUMMARY

Conflicts and extremism are almost certain to continue to rise in Africa, especially with instability resulting from the cascade of unrest across North Africa 

and the Middle East, the burgeoning youth bulge in 

Sub-Saharan Africa, African mercenaries, rising Islamic extremism, myriad wild, ungoverned spaces, 

and increasing resource shortages resulting from 

human activities and climate change across the Continent. In order to protect our troops while ensuring 

stability in the region, we must develop the capacity 

of a Pan-African force to deal effectively with these 

and other likely problems as they arise. 

Prevention is the key to effective policies in Africa, 

whether the issue is equitable resource exploitation, 

ethnic conflict, infectious diseases, or famine. Beginning now to develop well-trained, disciplined, and 

well-equipped military and police forces that can 

ensure stability in place of our own troops in future 

conflicts and emergencies is a long-range stabilizing 

method certain to pay for itself in the long-term. This 

monograph provides a path toward developing a viable African Union capable of serving as a supranational governing body to drive stability, security, and 

economic development by strengthening the capability of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the 

first step in a longer-term integration process.

Carefully implementing such a pan-continental 

strategy is highly likely to have the net effect over the 

next 20 years of attaining a considerable competitive 

advantage for the U.S. economically, militarily, and 

politically, with a corresponding increase in stability, 

security, and economic opportunity in that region.

1

FROM CHAOS TO COHESION: 

A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY, 

STABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT

 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

It takes many raindrops to form the pool from which 

we all drink.

 Nigerian Proverb

Conflicts and extremism are nearly certain to continue to rise in Africa especially with instability resulting from the cascade of unrest across North Africa and 

the Middle East, the burgeoning youth bulge in SubSaharan Africa, African mercenaries, rising Islamic 

extremism, myriad wild, ungoverned spaces, and 

increasing resource shortages resulting from human 

activities and climate change across the Continent. In 

order to protect our troops while ensuring stability 

in the region, we must develop the capacity of a PanAfrican force to deal effectively with these and other 

likely problems as they arise. 

This monograph recommends a more comprehensive and strategic approach to developing PanAfrican plans for security, governance, and resource 

exploitation, to reduce the need for U.S. and international physical intervention or post-conflict clean-up. 

Beyond current engagement efforts by U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRICOM) a long-term prevention and 

management strategy is likely to reduce the need for 

expensive piecemeal efforts with uncertain outcomes 

and enhance the overall security and capacity of the 

region to develop its own security, stability, gover-
2

nance, and development plans that still ensure a competitive advantage for U.S. interests.

In March 2011, a glaring case developed which illustrated the need for such a comprehensive Pan-African strategy. An increasingly unstable Libya caused 

Western leaders to discuss action, but who should lead 

eclipsed public talk of what measures to take. A robust, U.S.-friendly African Union (AU) would likely 

have been the most advantageous organization to lead 

the Libyan intervention. However, many African government leaders, tribal chiefs and kings, and average 

people had a positive view of Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, due to his infrastructure investments in 

their countries. In fact, the AU itself exists largely due 

to Gaddafi’s contributions, which included paying the 

dues of a number of other member countries. This resulted in a hamstrung AU, which was unable to act 

on behalf of its stated constituents, the African people, 

for fear of taking the wrong side against an autocrat 

who had plundered his country’s wealth for over 40 

years and served as a clear model of the worst kind of 

African leader. Therefore, without an effective African consultative body or force, the United States and 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led 

the airstrikes on Libya with the consequences, good or 

bad, laid squarely on their shoulders. 

The post-Gaddafi era provides an opportunity for 

the United States to carefully guide the process of filling the power vacuum with a sensible pan-continental 

approach to Africa’s problems of resource exploitation, governance, and delivering real political power 

to the African people. However, before any of this 

can take place, the key issues of security and stability 

must be addressed. The April 2011 National Strategic 

Narrative states that the primary U.S. goal in the 21st 
3

century is to “become the strongest competitor and 

most influential player in a deeply interconnected 

global system, which requires that we invest less in 

defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the 

tools of effective global engagement.”1

 Through the 

unique structure of AFRICOM, the U.S. Departments 

of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS) can lead a cooperative initiative to pursue such an engagement strategy.

DISMAL INHERITANCE

Nigerian nationalism was, for me and many of my 

generation, an acquired taste; like cheese or ballroom 

dancing. . . .

 Famed Nigerian novelist, 

 Chinua Achebe, 1998

Africa blames colonialism for its ills. Most countries only achieved independence in the 1960s, which 

often led to civil wars and further dissolution of states 

throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Even in Kenya, once 

a model of multiculturalism, the violence that occurred after the 2008 election sharply illustrates that 

tribal and ethnic cultures—stretching back millennia—are driving the demand for scarce resources and 

demonstrates that these cultural differences are still 

more deeply valued than the national borders, which 

have only been in place for a few short decades. The 

arbitrary dividing of African geography has separated 

historical lands, tribes, and even families into forced 

concepts of “nations” that have not entirely taken 

hold in the post-colonial period. 

Although the AU has been in existence in name 

for over 10 years, it remains a quasi-body, adept at 

pronouncing initiatives to which it agrees but never 
4

ratifies or moves to implement. Even when it decides 

to act, it is often ineffectual. In March 2012, the AU 

announced a 5,000-strong force that would hunt down 

renegade warlord Joseph Kony and his 300 followers, 

who were menacing the borderlands of Chad, the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Uganda. As of August 2012, this force had 

not even been assembled, with 100 U.S. Special Forces 

Soldiers working with mainly Ugandan troops on this 

effort. In the case of Libya, an AU delegation attempted to broker a settlement . . . the day after the NATO 

bombing campaign began.

Ten years later, the question of whether the AU is 

to be a union of equal sovereign states or a union of 

“the African people,” is still unanswered. Today the 

AU’s Pan-African Parliament (PAP), its primary governing authority, is still evolving in its role and composition. The PAP was established in 2002, with only 

“advisory and consultative powers,” but is intended 

to evolve into a “fully functioning legislative body 

elected via full universal adult suffrage.”2

 Will it be 

a system in which each state gets the same number 

of delegates or in which seats are assigned to various 

ethnic groups on the basis of population? The PAP 

structure and election process are critical decisions still 

under advisement, which must be resolved before any 

Pan-African governing can occur. Once the structure 

is finally determined, the next issues concern how the 

representatives will be selected within these sovereign 

states: through direct elections, appointment by heads 

of state or from among sitting parliamentarians? 

The fact is, the optimal AU structure, including the 

PAP makeup and deputy selection process, is inconsequential as long as it is transparent and agreed upon 

within the states. As past efforts suggest, the current 
5

AU is highly unlikely to become a functioning body 

able to implement Africa-wide decisions or policies 

with any transformative effect in the near term. The 

best approach is to start with regional blocs as models for AU development—the AU can dither for the 

next 10 years while the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African 

Development Community (SADC) lead the way to integration and experimentation with models that can 

be applied continent-wide. 

The late Nigerian economist Claude Ake’s 1997 

statement, “Because of the historical legacy and objective conditions of contemporary Africa, a national 

development project in most African countries is not 

a rational undertaking,”3

 lends credence to the need 

for integrated markets and transnational policies 

and projects. Although their names imply a focus on 

economic development, the first priority for these regional economic communities (RECs) is to develop a 

sound regional security structure. 

U.S. Department of Defense/Department of State 

(DoD/DoS) joint efforts should be focused on building the RECs’ capacity to ensure security and stability as the precondition for sustainable economic development. This regional approach gives the U.S. a 

broader and more comprehensive target for furthering AFRICOM’s stated aims than current piecemeal 

efforts in individual countries. While AFRICOM has 

a relationship with ECOWAS and SADC, as well as 

the Economic Community of Central African States 

(ECCAS), and has begun some initiatives, such as the 

2009 ECOWAS conference on security sector reform, 

AFRICOM should focus more directly on this regional 

approach to enable it to streamline its efforts and resources to build capacity in these larger blocs. 
6

While it is true that the same elites will likely attempt to co-opt any new system and that any new approach is likely to engender new problems, a larger, 

continental context can make it more difficult for regional or national elites to gain as much power as they 

have in their current fiefdoms. This approach will 

support the eventual development of an AU structure 

enabling the United States to support, engage with, 

and realize competitive advantage across the entire 

continent into the 22nd century.

REGIONAL COMMUNITIES’ FIRST STEP 

TOWARD A VIABLE AFRICAN UNION

African Sovereign State Instability.

When we look at the surplus of unstable and corrupt states in Sub-Saharan Africa, we often shake our 

heads and wonder, “Why can’t they all just get along?” 

The long-standing competitive and complementary 

relationships that developed over millennia across 

Sub-Saharan Africa to survive climate changes and 

other adversity have evolved into myriad specializations and identities that we call ethnic divides today. 

Throughout the colonial period, Europeans saw Africans as a single, monolithic, sub-human group ripe 

for exploitation and controllable across wide swathes 

of territory, with no concern for existing ties. Richard 

Dowden reminds us that even through the 1960s, as 

the independence movement swept southern Africa: 

In rural areas the kings and chiefs might still hold 

sway but in the swelling towns young nationalist leaders were creating political awareness and building a 

power base. They knew they had to break old loyalties 

to chiefs and kings and replace it with loyalty to themselves and their parties.4
7

In 2008, the African Program and Leadership 

Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center found the 

“uncertain sense of national identity and community 

in multiethnic states that can divide societies” when 

constituent ethnic groups “do not see each other as 

interdependent parts of a single national entity, [but] 

often perceive members of other communities as ‘outsiders’, or, in the extreme, as dehumanized and threatening hostile adversaries.”5

These developing nations have managed to “leapfrog” technological stages, avoiding massive landline 

infrastructure and more effectively implementing 

cellular or other wireless communication strategies. 

Why then can they not “leap over” the statist phase 

of political development? As Francis Fukuyama has 

suggested, our traditional view of sovereign states 

operating under their own individual self-interest is 

evolving, noting that since the early 1980s: 

the trend in world politics has been to weaken states 

. . . the growth of the global economy has tended to 

erode the autonomy of sovereign nation-states by increasing the mobility of information, capital, and, to a 

lesser extent, labor. . . .6

Like the looting of valuable but obsolete copper 

wiring, Sub-Saharan Africa can take some examples 

of effective state-building to create a Pan-African decisionmaking structure without the messy nationalistic 

wrangling that led to the destructive outcomes of two 

world wars in Europe. Africa could also avoid some of 

the violent destruction that the United States underwent during its civil war, and achieve a resulting political federation of independently operating but mutually dependent states with diverse cultures intact. 
8

Harvard’s Steven Pinker provides some evidence 

that such integration reduces competition and violence, whether the associations are Neighborhood 

Watch groups or international governmental organizations (IGOs) as the third side of what he describes as 

a Kantian “triangle of pacifying forces” in which democratization, trade, and membership in cooperative 

organizations significantly reduce the likelihood that 

countries will go to war with each other. Pinker notes:

Nations become stable democracies only when their 

political factions tire of murder as the means of assigning power. They engage in commerce only when 

they put a greater value on mutual prosperity than on 

unilateral glory. And they join intergovernmental organizations only when they are willing to cede a bit of 

sovereignty for a bit of mutual benefit.7

African countries, by and large, have been only 

too willing to cede, if not sovereignty, responsibility 

for good governance in exchange for the largesse of 

many of the organizations they have joined in the last 

60 years. From the International Monetary Fund (the 

Fund), the World Bank (the Bank), and the United 

Nations (UN), many of these countries treated such 

memberships as proof that they were fully functioning independent states or as signs that they were 

equals on the world stage. However, many of these organizations had simply become another avenue of dependence and their mandated expenditures or policy 

requirements in exchange for funds did not engender 

the good governance and opportunities for economic 

development promised. This can be attributed both 

to the IGOs’ lack of enforcement and to the national 

governments’ lack of will to follow prescribed implementation plans and the funds essentially evaporated 

without the anticipated returns appearing.
9

However, real participation in an IGO that has direct relevance to Sub-Saharan African countries’ interests and needs will depend as much on each member 

taking part in developing the policies for the region as 

a whole, rather than having them imposed from without. This would be a new kind of cooperative model 

into which the AU could eventually evolve with the 

RECs beginning to provide a sort of pilot integration. 

EU/NATO Model for Integration?

As the European Union (EU), or at the very least 

the Eurozone, deals with the messy political, economic, and social ramifications of the current financial crisis, “continental” consolidation does not seem to be 

a positive development model for the 21st century. 

However, we must look to Europe not as a model 

made of plaster, but as one made of soft clay, still malleable and which cannot be identically grafted onto 

Africa. We must look for positive lessons for continental integration and clearly understand the very different motivations and processes that created the current 

EU/NATO structure.

First of all, the victorious Allies established NATO 

after World War II as a defensive alliance against the 

perceived international agenda of Communist expansion emanating from the Soviet Union. It was also 

seen as a way to join together the European countries 

that had engaged in brutal conflict twice in one halfcentury with such devastating consequences. Seeing 

the Soviet Union as a shared threat provided simple 

demarcation of who was “in” and who was “out.” 

Similarly, since the 16th century, the greatest 

threats to Africa had also come from external influences in the form of colonial and post-colonial re-
10

source exploitation through the Cold War proxy conflicts that resulted in destructive civil wars. Africa’s 

greatest threats today, however, tend to come from 

within. The continent’s lack of economic development 

relative to the rest of the world has led to a lack of 

education, healthcare, infrastructure, and good governance that hamper future development. Therefore, a 

cooperative transcontinental structure should provide 

stability and cohesion to overcome the lack of governance most of its individual states have shown to date, 

and provide a continent-wide basis for development 

of institutions to more transparently, effectively, and 

equitably resolve critical problems, such as land use 

and distribution, resource exploitation, and trade.

While some suggest applying a type of Marshall 

Plan to Africa, the differences between the two cases 

are stark. In her 2009 book, Dead Aid, Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo points out that Marshall Plan 

funds were intended to be provided to Europe after 

World War II for a specific period of time (5 years) 

without renewal, at which time, recipients were to begin paying them back, as they were loans, not grants. 

Most importantly, they were targeted at rebuilding 

infrastructure, not for any other purpose. The fact that 

the structures and the institutions to effectively manage the funds and the projects were already in place 

in the European beneficiaries, differentiates any potential use of this framework as a model for Africa. 

However, simply waiting until the institutional governance structure in African countries match those 

which developed in Western Europe over centuries is 

also not a tenable prospect. 

Using the Marshall Plan as a model of cross-continental infrastructure building as opposed to past 

piecemeal efforts in preferred countries does have po-
11

tential viability. However, the funds should not be in 

the form of undetermined payback loans nor certainly 

given freely as grants, but should flow as foreign direct 

investment (FDI). This way, as investors are taking the 

risk, the RECs, not individual governments, would be 

the recipients. These entities are better suited to manage interstate activities, such as building robust transportation and power generation structures that can 

serve more than a single country or constituency with 

realistic risk calculations and clear incentives for private investment, than any single constituent country.

United States of Africa? Was Gaddafi Right?

Africa, as a continent, resembles America in the 

fact that it is made up of 54 states, much like the 

United States. When it comes to dealing with culture, 

education, healthcare, law enforcement, and even 

violence, American states’ approaches and outcomes 

vary widely. However, we do not despair that there is 

no hope for the states in which education achievement 

lags or violence is highest, we simply continue to try 

strategies that have worked to bring other states along 

the development continuum.

The optimal economic, political, and social development model for Africa, rather than the EU, therefore, could be the United States. Individual U.S. states 

are responsible for education, healthcare, and providing social services and police to varying degrees as 

mandated by each state’s electorate. American states, 

for instance, are free to engage in their own international trading regimes and support the trading businesses in their jurisdictions, but they can also rely on 

the Federal Government to provide assistance and 

create the environment in which smaller entities can 
12

more effectively operate. The Federal Government 

is primarily responsible for continental defense and 

emergency and natural disaster prevention, planning, 

and response, as well as consistency in administration 

of public land and its use, international trade, and 

energy policy. 

Security First.

The initial phase of an integration process in Africa, however, just as NATO presaged the EU, should be 

focused on developing the security structure and apparati that can be rapidly deployed to prepare for and 

respond to natural and man-made disasters, prevent 

conflict and violence, and provide stability in fragile 

post-conflict states. The RECs of Africa can look to the 

EU for a general security-development model, which 

grew out of post-war European efforts to limit Germany’s ability to make weapons of war and to consolidate trade in the commodities of growth in the period. 

It essentially began in 1951 with the six nations of the 

European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) before 

spreading across the continent by the end of the century. While common security and economic consolidation were the primary aims of Western European 

integration, the current crisis illustrates that perhaps 

common political structures ought to be in place before integrating currency regimes, for instance. In the 

case of Africa, a shared currency is a very long way off 

with the disparity in purchasing power of its states. 

However, shared policymaking on the big issues and 

shared security structures can be the early steps to 

continental integration.

Initial steps toward a Pan-African approach to 

continental security are already being taken. As the 
13

RECs have consolidated their efforts in this area, they 

also increasingly work consultatively to address other 

continent-wide issues. Existing and emerging cooperative structures within the RECs, and even the AU, 

can provide a viable platform upon which to provide 

assistance with needed reforms within and eventually across regions with positive effects on individual 

countries. In this way, leaders from various factions 

within member states can support security and stability efforts without the stigma of propping up the 

national leadership in highly corrupt or failing states. 

Leaders of ethnic groups straddling borders can also 

give their entire population a voice without alienating 

or alarming national governments in a single state. 

The AU was created in 2002 as a successor to the 

Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which had become all but irrelevant by the time of South African 

liberation. From its inception, the new organization 

was torn between its two largest contributors and 

their two larger-than-life leaders: Libya’s Muammar 

Gaddafi and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki: 

Gaddafi’s dream was to see a continental government, 

one African military force, uniform trade and foreign 

policies and one leader representing all the African 

states in dealing with the rest of the world. . . . On the 

other hand, Mbeki’s mission was to create a continent 

ruled by like-minded African democrats who shared 

his goals of competitive markets, technological advancement, progressing economies, and industrious 

populations.8

Neither achieved their goals and, with Gaddafi 

out of the way, now is the time for the United States 

to step in and subtly enable both visions by first developing an African military force that can provide 
14

security and stability and smoothing national trade 

restrictions to develop a continental trade regime, and 

second by identifying and encouraging democratic 

leaders who will entice foreign investors by developing the governance structures to enable prosperity 

and advancement across the region. Such a Pan-African goal is strategic, but in the nearer-term, such goals 

are more attainable at the REC level. This gradual approach will allow a smoother transition to continental-wide policies because they will need only input 

from two or three regional bodies, rather than from 54 

individual states.

The political process has been stalled since 2002 by 

wrangling over the form a functioning AU will take. 

The question of whether the AU is to be a union of 

equal sovereign states or a union of “the African people,” is still unanswered. Will it become a system in 

which each state gets the same number of delegates or 

in which seats are assigned to various ethnic groups 

on the basis of population? The first system will give 

utterly disparate states, such as South Africa and 

Lesotho, the same weight in the legislature and likely 

undermine the entire effort, due to a resulting lack of 

participation by regional anchors, whose influence is 

not fully represented. The second method will continue to marginalize minority ethnic or other groups. A 

possible resolution is a bicameral legislature with upper and lower chambers to balance representational 

issues. Another method would assign seats on the basis of regional blocs, which could increase regionalism 

and ultimately lead to transcontinental cohesion.

Once the structure is finally determined, the next 

issues concern how the deputies will be selected within these sovereign states: through direct elections or 

appointment by heads of state or from among sitting 
15

parliamentarians. Experts have noted that ensuring 

the democratic credentials of the PAP are among the 

key indicators of a functioning and internationally 

recognized AU. African commentators anticipate a 

“democratic dividend,” with regional integration ensuring more democratic processes than are currently 

in place. This is more likely if the RECs are able to 

serve as models and then as the entities that integrate 

to form the full AU.

In 2004, Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies 

Institute of the U.S. Army War College emphasized 

significantly that because of “the great value that 

African culture places on collective action, the most 

tangible gains have come from building on existing 

structures.”9

 A great shortcoming of Western policy 

in Africa, and elsewhere throughout modern history, 

is an assumption that we are working with a blank 

slate upon which we can impose our own plans and 

methods, and a failure to recognize the importance 

of existing cultural values. Regional approaches enable cultural values to coexist with national interest in 

multiethnic areas where broader consensus and more 

collegial decisionmaking are possible than in single 

states where one ethnic group dominates or groups 

are divided by national borders. As Richard Dowden 

pointed out in 2004, “In the end, power in Africa derives not from outside support but from within, from 

old networks and pre-colonial power systems that lie 

beneath.” The regional approach also permits these 

networks to maintain some influence, while avoiding 

the monolithic decisionmaking processes that occur in 

many single-party states.

The AU’s own 2009-12 Strategic Plan articulated 

the publicly espoused shared interests within African states toward greater common governance.10 The 
16

stated mission of the AU's Commission is to become 

an efficient and value-adding institution driving the

African integration and development process in collaboration with African Union member states, the 

Regional Economic Communities [RECs] and African 

citizens.”11

Today’s African Union Security Structure.

Many African states structured their military 

forces as if the most significant threats were likely to 

come from over the new border, although the truly 

significant challenges to stability tend to be internal. 

African governments also often identified threats as 

requiring military intervention, even in cases of dealing with legitimate (from a Western viewpoint) political opposition, thus, “even ordinary governance 

issues were militarized.”12 Any legitimate AU needs 

a standing, unified, well trained and equipped, multinational force to prevent genocide, intervene in civil 

wars and interstate conflicts, prepare for and respond 

to natural and other disasters, as well as oversee and 

provide security for large-scale, interstate infrastructure projects.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) is comprised of 15 member states which are responsible for 

“deployment of peace keeping and quick intervention 

Missions to assist in cases of genocide, war crimes and 

crimes against humanity.”13 In order to enact such deployments, the PSC “could consult a Panel of the Wise 

comprising [sic] of five African personalities so as to 

take action on the distribution of the military on the 

field.”14 Its functions are listed as (a) . . . the promotion 

of peace, security and stability in Africa; (b) preventative diplomacy and the maintenance of peace; and 
17

(c) management of catastrophes and humanitarian actions.15 Therefore, it is entirely within the purview of 

the PSC to ensure that an entity exists to be deployed 

to assist in the cases described, and suggests that such 

an entity should take the form of a military, or at least 

a military-style organization.

The African Stand-by Force (ASF) was established 

under Article 13 of the PSC protocol to enable PSC 

engagement in “Peace support missions and intervention pursuant to the Constitutive Act Article 4(h),” 

which permits action under “grave circumstances, 

namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 

humanity”and 4(j), which grants member states the 

right to “request intervention from the Union in order 

to restore peace and security.”16

Regional Approach to African Security.

In 2004, the AU decided to create five regional brigades as “first responders to emergencies both manmade and natural” that occur on the continent. However, delays have kept the force in the planning stages 

since its public announcement in 2005. The latest mandate for a “validated and exercised” 7,000-strong 

brigade-sized force by January 2010 was not met. Initially, member states were to be responsible for training their personnel along regional stand-by standards 

to ensure interoperability with each other and with 

the UN. While the AU currently endorses and works 

in concert with eight regional economic councils, 

ECOWAS and SADC are currently the most effective, 

ubiquitous, and focused on security. 

Of the RECs initially mandated to develop a standby force, ECOWAS has made the most progress. In 

June 2004, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Com-
18

mittee approved the formation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) envisioning a Task Force (TF) of 2,773 

military, police, and civilian personnel able to deploy 

within 30 days and fully self-sustaining for 90 days, 

and an ESF Main Force (MF) of 3,893 military, police, 

and civilian personnel able to deploy within 90 days 

and be fully self-sustaining for 90 days.

The ESF held its first significant exercises in June 

2009 to evaluate its logistical capability, with 10 

ECOWAS member states to contribute 1,270 military 

personnel for week-long field training in Burkina 

Faso.17 In November 2011, the ESF held a training 

exercise, dubbed Jigui III, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra, Ghana. 

The goal was to test the MF capabilities in strategic 

and operational planning and preparation for multidimensional operations and to exercise command and 

control training.

The SADC Brigade was launched at the 2007 

SADC Summit held in Lusaka, Zambia, through a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by 

southern African leaders to “guarantee peace, security and political stability, which are prerequisites for 

development.” The Brigade is to be comprised of civilian, military, and police components and supported 

through pledged resources from member states. 

The Brigade was envisioned as one of five regional 

brigades comprising the ASF with troops or personnel based in their own countries, deployed as needed 

on an “on call” basis. The Regional Peace Training 

Centre located in Zimbabwe and other national peace 

support training institutions were to play pivotal roles 

in training military commanders, police officers, and 

civilian officials at various levels, while at the same 

time acting as the “clearinghouse” for all peace support operations and training activities in the region. 
19

However, Zimbabwe has since become something of a 

regional embarrassment, and many of its SADC rights 

and responsibilities have been suspended.

The Brigade’s only permanent force structure has a 

Planning Element at the SADC Secretariat in Botswana, consisting of regional military, police, and civilian 

staff on rotation from member states. The Planning 

Element operates daily as part of the SADC Organ 

on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation commanded by the SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence 

Staff and the Committee of SADC Police Chiefs.

SADC member states have also agreed to establish the Main Logistics Depot in Botswana to support 

the operations of the force from a central point. Discussions between the SADC Secretariat and the government of Botswana are said to be “at an advanced 

stage” to enter into an MOU establishing the depot. 

By 2009, the Brigade was renamed the SADC Stand-by 

Force (SADC SF) to indicate that it had its civilian and 

police, and not just military components, in place. The 

SADC SF has also held a variety of training exercises 

in various member countries to meet its obligations.18

AFRICOM in concert with the Canadian government, also developed the Partnership for Integrated 

Logistics Operations and Tactics (PILOT) in 2009 for 

enhancing the ASF capacity for operational logistics 

planning to promote interoperability between the U.S. 

military and the ASF.19 While there were 14 exercises 

scheduled with the U.S. Army across Africa in 2012 

alone, identifying additional opportunities to build 

African capacity and enhance the ubiquity of U.S. tactics and methods through regional blocs, rather than 

simply with individual states, should be a priority of 

AFRICOM’s leadership and planning staff in order to 

ensure the broadest possible U.S. engagement.
20

APPLYING REGIONAL APPROACHES TO KEY 

SECURITY THREATS

Sub-Saharan Africa is the least secure, stable, and 

economically developed geographic region in the 

world, with its long-standing problems exacerbated 

by recent unrest in Northern Africa, the prevalence of 

well-armed African mercenaries, ungoverned spaces 

that are a natural draw for terrorist groups and insurgencies, frequent conflicts over resources, and the 

region’s own demographic disadvantages. Both increasing Islamic extremism and disparities in income 

and opportunity are also found in the governable and 

least governed areas alike. However, today’s threats, 

or perceived threats, may not be eternal but should be 

considered within the historical and political context 

of the region and as outliers in the world’s overall trajectory toward violence reduction. 

While individual countries make varying degrees 

of effort to reduce the impact of these threats within 

their own borders, a regional approach is likely to be 

more effective in most cases. When ethnic groups or 

wild spaces cross borders, more than one government 

is involved. With U.S. support, SADC and ECOWAS 

are striving in various ways, but the emphasis on ensuring the security and stability of Sub-Saharan Africa 

should be in supporting the development of increasingly robust mechanisms for these regional efforts with 

an eye to full regional integration of all of southern 

Africa within a viable AU future framework.
21

North African Unrest and Islamic Extremism.

While this monograph is focused on Sub-Saharan 

Africa, the effects of recent unrest in northern Africa 

cannot be ignored. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 

and most significantly Libya, have undergone dramatic change since the start of 2011. While these “revolutions” have brought varying degrees of change, 

outcomes remain far from certain. Indeed, they all had 

“organic” origins, but saw differing levels of international assistance (or meddling, depending upon your 

perspective), with Libya the extreme case of Western 

involvement. 

A robust and independent AU would have been 

the most appropriate organization to lead an intervention in Libya. However, the AU was one of the 

last organizations willing to act in this case as it was 

fully under the sway of the funding and influence of 

Libya’s Gaddafi. It also focused on the consequences of 

supporting the wrong side in the conflict, rather than 

focusing on the best outcome from Africa’s perspective. Of course, many African government leaders, 

tribal chiefs and kings, as well as average people, had 

a positive view of Gaddafi due to his infrastructure 

investments across Africa. In fact, the AU in its current form exists largely because of Gaddafi’s contributions, which amounted to nearly 15 percent of African 

countries’ share of the total budget. Gaddafi even paid 

the dues of several other member countries.20 Therefore, without an effective African consultative body or 

force, the United States and NATO led the airstrikes 

on Libya with ultimate consequences, good or bad, 

laid squarely on their shoulders. 
22

To avoid the need for UN, U.S., or European 

intervention in all future conflicts and insurgencies, AFRICOM should continue to engage with the 

RECs to enhance security sector reform and civil 

society development programs to enable REC leadership to more effectively manage conflicts in their 

respective regions. 

African Mercenaries and Insurgencies.

 Gaddafi was also responsible for much of the 

development of African mercenary groups later contracted as “third party nationals” to provide security 

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Deploying and 

paying members of potentially restive tribal groups 

to work outside the country was an effective method 

for keeping them from forming an opposition to his 

autocratic rule. Now with the United States out of Iraq 

and its role in Afghanistan winding down, those guns 

for hire will be looking for new hotspots. Many will 

return home to Africa with, as an Eritrean economist 

recently commented, ”no skills other than raping and 

killing.”21

Even as Libyan government forces continued to 

fight, observers voiced concern over the need to secure the massive weapons caches known to be located 

around the country. Despite early efforts, this arsenal 

is making its way around already over-armed SubSaharan Africa, even as the coalition and Libya’s own 

National Transitional Council (NTC) take steps to safeguard what was left. In addition to small arms, tens of 

thousands of landmines and even more sophisticated 

surface-to-air missiles (SAM) have disappeared from 

poorly guarded storage facilities.22
23

Numerous African governments are currently in 

power as a direct result of coups and guerilla wars. 

The “demobilization” phase of post-conflict stability 

development causes many of these former fighters to 

be offered minimal training or payments in transitioning to civilian life. When the Ugandan war ended in 

1986, current President Yoweri Museveni boasted that 

at one time he could call up one million trained fighters, but has an official army of only 65,000 today. If 

true, where have all those combatants gone? 

A February 2011 Foreign Policy article noted, “Recent conflicts in [West Africa] have generated a steady 

supply of unemployed ex-fighters willing to move 

from conflict to conflict for the right price.”23 One estimate places the number of Ugandans working for 

private U.S. contractors as security guards in Iraq at 

15,000,24 with returning U.S. service personnel suggesting the number was likely twice that. Even with 

the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) reporting 

a very low 2010 unemployment rate of 4.2 percent,25

the question for these mercenaries must be, “where 

to next?”

As Ugandan journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo 

commented in November 2011: 

When Africans go into the hired gun business, it increases the potential for intra-continental conflicts as 

is happening in Libya. But it is also as good an indicator of the effect of the hyper-militarization and militarization that happened in Africa in the 1990s. Because 

African mercenaries probably charge less than former 

British SASs or American Marines, the number of African mercenaries and guards will only grow, not decline, over the coming years.26
24

The recent coup in Mali is the result of the return 

from Libya of Tuareg mercenaries, with equipment 

and experience enabling them to outperform the poorly equipped Malian military units that were deployed 

to suppress the Tuareg uprisings. In late 2011, hundreds of such militants returned from Libya armed and 

ready to form the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), which took control of several northern 

towns in 2 months. In March 2012, frustrated Malian 

Army soldiers under Captain Amadou Sanogo staged 

a coup, which led to looting and violent street protests 

in one of Africa’s poorer countries.27 Worse still is the 

imposition of sharia law in this region of Mali and the 

continuing destruction of ancient artifacts considered 

“un-Islamic.”

Hand-in-hand with the experience armed men for 

hire gain in international security contracting is their 

access to small arms and other weapons. Arms proliferation has been a problem contributing to insecurity 

and instability in the region since the 1870s. As John 

Reader reported in his 2007 “biography” of Africa, 

guns were a “popular purchase” of those working in 

the Kimberly (now South Africa) diamond mines: “It 

has been argued that some African leaders sent cohorts of young men to the mines expressly to acquire 

weapons for use in territorial disputes.”28 Due to the 

easy availability of automatic weapons, loosely guarded armories worldwide, and “aid” rendered to client 

states by both sides in the Cold War, mercenaries have 

the capacity to add to this problem by returning home 

with their own private arsenals, better trained and 

equipped than their own national government troops, 

as the situation in Mali attests.

In response to the coup in Mali, ECOWAS placed 

severe economic sanctions on the country, which re-
25

sulted in the junta leader agreeing in early April to 

step down in exchange for amnesty for all coup participants (and a pension and mansion for himself), and 

for permitting the Parliamentary Speaker Dioncounda Traore to serve as Interim President for 2 months 

while elections were prepared. However, on May 20, 

ECOWAS approved Traore’s request to remain in 

power until April 2013, which resulted in mass protests during which members of a mob entered President Traore’s office and physically attacked him. 

Many coup supporters view the extension of Traore’s 

term as “unilateral” interference in Mali’s affairs by 

ECOWAS and as propping up the old regime. Although ECOWAS has agreed to monitor the election preparation process to ensure transparency and 

to provide an opportunity for Tuareg grievances to 

be aired, protestors are in favor of holding elections 

sooner than had been originally planned.29

On the other hand, Niger, which has also had a 

history of Tuareg rebellion, dealt with their heavily 

armed returnees from Libya through a proven postconflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) strategy. The Niger government disarmed 

Tuareg groups as they entered the country and integrated their leaders into the government, including 

the new Tuareg prime minister appointed in April 

2011 and the majority of local officials in Agadez, the 

Tuareg-majority region. The United States is assisting 

these efforts by conducting aerial surveillance of the 

region through its Pan-Sahelian Counter Terrorism 

Initiative.30

Ensuring that demobilized militants are able to 

quickly reintegrate into society and contribute economically so that they are able to support themselves, 

their families, and maintain or increase status in their 
26

communities are critical elements of post-conflict security and stability. However, the Niger government 

rightly fears that if not managed quickly, the unrest in 

Mali could undermine its own fragile peace. 

While the Tuareg situation has encouraging aspects, it is a typically complex situation. It presents 

an opportunity for an African REC to immediately 

respond to a crisis and work productively with all 

sides to resolve it without relying exclusively on external powers, such as the UN, to take the initiative, or 

on individual countries to deal with a problem with 

cross-border implications. This is an excellent test case 

for ECOWAS’ ability to serve in a regional security capacity, building upon its recent success in ending the 

October 2010 post-election violence in Cote d’Ivoire. 

However, at this stage, a single member with U.S. 

assistance is faring better at dealing with the Tuareg 

situation than is the REC. Future efforts should focus 

on developing more effective REC mechanisms for 

managing conflict within its sphere of regional influence. As the RECs become more effective and influential, they will form the base for full integration in the 

entire Sub-Saharan region.

Dangerous Spaces.

When we talk about dangerous spaces, our minds 

first turn to Somalia or other such weak or failing 

states. Such appellations might apply to parts of 

Mexico and to large pockets of the Middle East since 

early 2011. Much of the American “Wild” West and 

Southwest were also essentially “ungoverned” until 

the beginning of the 20th century, but those regions 

have since been “tamed.”
27

These spaces can even exist in the most stable and 

secure states where, as Dr. Phil Williams puts it, there 

are “governance gaps,” such as the roughest, lawless 

parts of America’s big cities. In these urban zones or in 

very remote rural areas, neither side calls 911 or hails 

the friendly policeman on the corner. 

These areas are mainly populated by people Dr. 

Steven Pinker calls “stateless,” those for whom the 

larger justice system is not intended or inclined to 

support. This can be due to ethnic, economic, or other 

demographic circumstances, which the larger society 

tends to ascribe to such individuals. Such “stateless” 

individuals, regardless of where they are located, cannot rely on the state at any level for protection and 

assurances of security. Therefore, they must rely on 

what elites derisively call the “code of the street” or 

“self-help justice,” while the same educated Westerners look approvingly upon the phenomenon, depending upon who is exhibiting it and where, calling it a 

“code of honor” or a “tribal” or “cultural norm,” and 

insisting that it be maintained and respected. Therefore, zones of state failure can exist inside states seen 

to have achieved “success” in terms of security, stability, and prosperity.

Although they once were prevalent in many places in the United States, today these governance gaps 

represent small pockets of the American landscape. 

They have largely been brought under control in the 

past 100 years, and again since the 1980s, when the 

crack cocaine craze seemed poised to tear American 

cities apart. Today, we are now shocked by stories of 

clan violence and feuds in Africa, although they are 

not dissimilar from the lawlessness and violence that 

often wracked the U.S. frontier as the line of settlement continued moving farther west from the original 

colonies through the 1880s.
28

Just because Africa marks time on the same calendar we do, does not mean all the 21st century developments have occurred to bring it to the place where 

we are now. While the United States is now far less 

violent than it was a century ago, it is still three times 

more violent than its northern neighbor or than Western Europe. Pinker argues this is due to the shorter 

time the United States has had since consolidation to 

benefit from civilizing influences. America has had 

over 200 years to become only three times as violent 

as Europe, where violence began to diminish only in 

the mid-1600s as city-states consolidated and Hobbes’ 

leviathan began to develop, while African states have 

only had, in most cases, 30-50 years, and we wonder 

why they have not yet caught up.

Post-colonial Africa unfortunately developed in 

much the same way, at least at the outset, as did postcolonial America, as Pinker points out: 

In Europe, first the state disarmed the people and 

claimed a monopoly on violence, then the people 

took over the apparatus of the state. In America, the 

people took over the state before it had forced them to 

lay down their arms—which, as the Second Amendment famously affirms, they reserve the right to keep 

and bear. In other words, Americans in the South and 

West, never fully signed on to a social contract that 

would vest the government with a monopoly on the 

legitimate use of force. In much of American history, 

legitimate force was also wielded by posses, vigilantes, lynch mobs, company police, detective agencies, 

and Pinkertons, and even more often kept as a prerogative of the individual.31

Since the 1960s, Africa has been rent by interstate 

and intrastate conflict with the Sub-Saharan region 

still home to many of the “dangerous spaces,” where 
29

Dr. Williams notes “the danger flows out from its 

origin or locus in zones characterized by turbulence, 

through various forms of connectivity, to zones of 

order and stability.”32

The key for the RECs, therefore, is to identify and 

prioritize the most lawless or “ungoverned” spaces 

within their respective region, and with U.S. assistance to develop action plans to “tame” these areas 

in order to reduce their attractiveness to destabilizing forces, such as insurgent, extremist, or criminal 

groups that naturally gravitate toward them for bases 

of operation, as is being done in the Sahel. This will 

give the RECs additional influence and capability over 

individual governments that are not effectively dealing with the problems in their own territory and further support the regional integration process.

Demographics.

The issue of developing countries’ burgeoning 

youth bulge is a subject dealt with in depth in many 

other fine research efforts and does not need to be 

dived into headlong here. However, it is certainly a potentially destabilizing factor in regions without clear 

gains in economic development. What are the options 

for the exploding population of young men now aged 

15 to 30 in Sub-Saharan Africa? Like gangs in the lawless sprawling U.S. housing projects, the mercenary or 

criminal life is likely to present an attractive alternative to many of those without other options.

The RECs can play a role in mitigating this problem by coordinating with each other and with the 

countries willing to provide training and education 

to develop the human capital needed to participate 

in existing labor markets. Such efforts are likely to 
30

present opportunities for young men to participate in 

increasingly viable labor markets and enable them to 

support their families, becoming integrated into society, rather than encouraging them toward “outlaw” 

status. Viewing these young men as potential destabilizers and as a problem to prevent instead of eradicate 

after the fact should provide the impetus to develop a 

sort of pre-DDR approach to literacy and vocational 

skills development across the region, once needed 

skills have been identified. 

One of the major issues preventing the growth of 

labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, beyond the failure of governments to require indigenous labor quotas to be met by those intending to invest or operate 

in the region, is the high level of labor protection that 

makes using such indigenous resources highly restrictive. As Scott Taylor reported in 2009:

Across five measures used [by the World Bank] to 

calculate the ease (or difficulty) of employing workers—indices for difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, 

difficulty of firing, rigidity of employment, and firing 

costs (weeks of salary)—sub-Saharan Africa ranks 

substantially lower than every other region of the 

globe. These ancillary costs related to hiring and firing workers render the business climate unattractive, 

particularly to potential new investors, who simply 

choose to take their capital elsewhere.33

The RECs can work together to assess and mitigate 

this problem on a regional level in order to augment 

the value of their collective markets.

The RECs’ enhanced ability to attract FDI can also 

provide the opportunity to set labor requirements for 

investors requiring a given percentage of regionallyindigenous labor in order to receive permits or tax 
31

abatements. Such requirements can only be made 

without undermining FDI flows once the requisite 

skills are made available in the region. One of the major complaints of Africans against Chinese investment 

is the lack of opportunities created for the indigenous 

labor force. The Chinese argument is that this labor 

force lacks the skills and the work ethic to push investment projects forward. 

One example of unrest that has continued for decades is in the Niger Delta, due to the Nigerian government’s disastrous environmental policies in the 

region and its extraction of oil without return remittances or services, as well as a failure to provide employment opportunities for Niger Delta residents in 

the oil industry. This situation can be reversed across 

REC areas with a concentrated effort to develop human capacity, which will enhance the attractiveness 

of investment, reduce the instability caused by unemployment, and raise the level of economic development within the regions in the long term. 

Resource Shortages Resulting in Conflict.

Western studies have increasingly shown the likelihood that change will cause or exacerbate shortages 

of water and other resources over the next 100-plus 

years. Even U.S. military assessments have expressed 

concern for, and discussed prevention of, an anticipated increased violence in already resource-poor 

areas. However, violence over resources may not be 

inevitable. 

In 2008, political scientist Ole Theisen produced a 

regression analysis on armed conflicts between 1980 

and 1992 that indicated an unsurprising correlation 

among poverty, high population, political instability, 
32

and the abundance of oil—conflict was more likely 

in the presence of these factors. More surprisingly, 

drought, water shortages and some land degradation 

had little effect in increasing the likelihood of an outbreak or continuation of violence. 

However, Theisen suggests that poverty and agricultural dependence are likely to have a greater effect 

on lower-level conflicts. He further suggests a need 

for “closer scrutiny of whether it is the scarcity of renewable resources per se or their social distribution 

that is the most important factor in linking conflict to 

scarce resources.”34 John Reader spends hundreds of 

pages describing the historically symbiotic relationships that existed across Africa among very different 

peoples with varying divisions of labor who cooperated in times of environmental pressure to cope with 

changing conditions without resorting to intergroup 

violence.35

It is more likely that the introduction of cash crops 

and valuable resources for export result in wide-scale 

oppression and conflict. As one Kenyan observer 

noted, “All the Kenyans I know pray every night that 

oil will not be discovered in our country, or it will 

tear itself apart in no time.”36 Unfortunately for these 

Kenyans, trouble began in early 2012 with the announcement that oil had indeed been found in their 

country. With the 2008 example of violent conflict over 

which group had the right to plunder the country still 

a fresh memory, this is a case in which a functioning 

AU and its supporters should prepare for the worst 

before the first drop of oil comes out of the ground.

Rather than continuing the current practice of a 

few national elites exploiting natural resources to fill 

their own coffers, RECs can help to develop regional 

approaches to resource exploitation. Botswana has 
33

shown that its diamond revenues can be reinvested 

into health and education for its population so as to 

increase the standard of living and, thus stability and 

security, for continued economic development. In 

2008, the country had the highest level of Gross Capital Formation as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (32.4 percent) in the SADC region, even 

ahead of South Africa (22.8 percent), which is actually 

Botswana’s biggest foreign investor.37

While the countries with the most lucrative extractive industries, such as Angola and Nigeria with 

their known oil reserves and questionable stability, 

will continue to attract the most FDI, instability notwithstanding, in the long term, more sustainable approaches to FDI attraction will need to be formulated 

as these resources disappear. Botswana’s diamonds 

may be mined out one day, but its educated population will maintain its skills and competitiveness in the 

region and beyond. Applying this approach to human capital formation on a regional scale will further 

enhance investment potential to the larger regional 

market and thus opportunities for economic development, reducing dependency on limited resources. 

DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT THROUGH 

REGIONAL MARKETS

Much of the approach to development in Africa 

has been backward, with international organizations 

from the UN to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to the World Bank trying 

for decades to create transparent governing institutions that reduce corruption and encourage foreign 

investment. However, they tend to work with the 

same elites that are gorging themselves at the public 
34

trough. The organic path that Western Europe itself 

followed over centuries to nourish an environment in 

which economic development begins and then, once 

people have something to protect, such as productive 

private land or a small manufacturing facility, they 

themselves spearhead development of the institutions 

needed to protect those assets, is lacking in the African post-colonial experience. Creating the opportunities to develop such assets should be the first step, not 

the last. This means a secure and stable environment 

in which investors will see a greater return than risk.

Africa has thus far failed to develop a robust industrial base to enable it to evolve beyond a commodity 

provider, which keeps export prices low and devalues 

individual African currencies. This in turn, reduces 

interest in investing in African industry beyond commodity extraction, and maintains a lower standard 

of living for the majority of Africans. As Ake noted 

in 1997, “Africa needs to be productive and competitive and to diversify and strive for industrialization 

instead of being fixated on commodity prices. . . .”38

Even with this dependence upon subsistence industries such as agriculture and extraction, the Chicago 

Council on Foreign Affairs estimates that only 4 percent of sub-Saharan farmland is irrigated, and onethird to one-half of its harvest routinely goes to waste 

due to poor storage facilities, outmoded markets, and 

a lack of transportation infrastructure.39

Ralph Olaye, Manager of the New Partnership 

for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Division at the 

African Development Bank (AfDB), noted in January 

2012 that Africa needs $360 billion in infrastructure 

investment to achieve full connectivity with the rest 

of the world by 2040.40 A December 2011 World Bank 

report noted that the SADC region needs $2.1 billion 
35

annually for a decade to complete and maintain its 

required infrastructure and that for southern Africa, 

“[r]egional integration is the only likely way to overcome existing handicaps and to allow the SADC member states to participate in the global economy.”41

With over one billion potential consumers, who 

currently have very little collective purchasing power, 

Africa remains a poor investment risk. However, African industries in which African entrepreneurs can sell 

to African consumers can be based on African purchasing preferences and indigenous inputs. This can 

increase the standard of living and enhance the power 

of individual Africans as consumers, provide more 

jobs of varying skill level and type, and broaden the 

economic power in order to wrest it from a handful 

of national elites who ensure that African economies 

continue to fail to trade with one another.

British economist Barrington Moore stated in 

1967, “[C]ertain historical processes need to develop, 

notably the emergence of a large middle-class, in order to sustain a viable democratic state.”42 The keys 

to creating opportunities for producing that middle 

class include security, stability, and infrastructure, 

not more aid. As former World Bank economist Moyo 

emphasizes: 

Not only is aid easy to steal, as it is usually provided 

directly to African governments, but it also makes control over government worth fighting for . . . Foreign direct investment and rapidly growing exports, not aid, 

have been the key to China’s economic miracle. Africa 

needs to learn from Asia.43

Moyo further notes: 

Africa’s common challenges are real and undeniably 

stark, fortunes and misfortunes are intertwined. Even 
36

where there are pockets of economic success, it is 

worth remembering that in the long term no country 

in Africa can truly exist as an island of prosperity on 

its own.44

Erastus Mwencha, Common Market for Eastern 

and Southern Africa's (COMESA) outgoing SecretaryGeneral, declared in 2008 that: 

Efforts to develop regional infrastructure projects, 

which are especially critical for landlocked states and 

are often beyond national capacities, have been hampered by investor concerns about the financial viability of regional economic communities. Hence, it becomes essential for RECs to develop transparent and 

stable regional frameworks in order to attract greater 

investments. In recent years they have registered some 

successes in this sphere, particularly in promoting regional energy cooperation. They have also made inroads in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.45

To this end, SADC and ECOWAS have steadily increased their credibility even beyond that of relatively 

successful independent states. Aside from its proposed Free Trade Zone, SADC still mainly provides 

information for potential investors on its individual 

member countries; while ECOWAS has begun developing region-wide policies. For instance, ECOWAS 

announced in May 2012 the plan to form an ECOWAS 

Investment Guarantee Agency to support its Common Investment Policy.46 In June 2012, ECOWAS announced its intention to begin using the UN Industrial 

Development Organization’s (UNIDO) new portal for 

data collection in support of the UN’s African Regional Investment Promotion Programme.47
37

The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 

also notes: 

Africa’s fragmentary infrastructure networks isolate 

smaller countries and prevent them from harnessing 

efficient large-scale technologies. Regional integration is essential to reducing Africa’s high infrastructure costs.”48 A 2004 study funded by the EU found 

that market size is the primary determinant of FDI 

inflow level and advocates that the SADC “further 

deepen and harmonize policies within and among 

member states.49

A worthwhile goal for a U.S.-led process would 

be to support the REC's increasing capacity to work 

as individual policymakers and planners, and to service as both recipients and allocators of funds. In this 

vein, REC oversight of infrastructure and other critical development projects is likely to enhance the attractiveness of investment across southern Africa. As 

the RECs continue to prove their value in promoting 

security and good governance, they can begin to work 

in concert and provide a framework for greater SubSaharan integration. 

The U.S. Federal government and the states share 

responsibility for infrastructure development and 

maintenance, but Interstate highways, for instance, 

fall under the purview of Federal mandates, as do 

transcontinental railways. Of course, the concern always arises about corruption in the developing world, 

but as Joseph Lapalombara pointed out in 1994, although the infrastructure development process in the 

United States was a perfect model of corruption, the 

railroads, roads, airports, industrial sectors, etc., are 

now in place to support economic development. So 

how much does a little graft really matter as long as 

they get built?50
38

CONTINUED U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND 

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA

Post-independence U.S. efforts to engage with Africa have concentrated on short-term goals and cozy 

relations with national leaders who have often used 

U.S. patronage to wage war on their neighbors or their 

own people, thus diminishing the average African’s 

faith in American ideals. After the abrupt U.S. disengagement from Africa in 1993, policymakers hesitated 

to re-engage even during the genocide in Rwanda. In 

1994, after the scale of that crisis became apparent, 

U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the African Conflict 

Resolution Act,51 which offered U.S. support to the 

OAU’s Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism, but as the OAU developed closer 

ties to Gaddafi, the United States gradually scaled 

back its support for this and other Africa-centered security initiatives. 

From 1996, the United States began to provide 

some funding and materiel for a number of security 

initiatives in Africa, including the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), followed by the African Crisis 

Response Initiative (ACRI). By this time, U.S. policymakers had realized the key to viable cooperation was 

not in simply providing arms, but in building the capacity of African military institutions to operate effectively on their own, which led to the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, 

the Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP) and 

increased African participation in the existing International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In 2001, the administration of President George 

W. Bush transformed earlier efforts into the African 
39

Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA), which later became part of the multinational Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

By 2005, for instance, the GPOI had trained more 

than 69,000 military personnel from 73 countries, 

more than 48,000 of whom have deployed to 20 operations around the world. These are effectively trained 

and equipped troops able to manage security crises in 

place of U.S. troops. The 5-year mandate for GPOI was 

extended for another 5 years in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 

with, as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 

reported in June 2009, a goal to “shift from direct 

training to building the capacity of foreign nations to 

develop their own peacekeeping infrastructure and 

capabilities.”52

The United States does not do this alone, but in concert with its partners in both the developed and developing world. The Group of Eight (G8) has supported 

peacekeeping preparedness in Africa, with the United 

Kingdom (UK) training over 12,000 peacekeepers 

since 2005 through its support for 13 country-located 

centers. France mainly uses African training centers 

and has trained over 6,800 troops from 27 countries 

in the same period, including nine peacekeeping battalions in 2008 alone. A 2009 G8 Peacekeeping Report 

commended the AU and RECs for their ownership of 

capacity-building efforts for regional missions. The report stated, “We recommend expanded partnerships 

with the AU and with sub-regional organizations to 

reinforce local capacities in all sectors. . . .”53

Despite U.S. support for the security initiatives in 

the intervening period, the United States did not have 

a clear focus on African security until the October 2007 

formation of AFRICOM. As Benedikt Franke argued 

in January 2007:
40

[I]t may be difficult to muster political support for 

further increasing the African regional peacekeeping 

budget(s), however, only by supporting both immediate demands as well as long-term needs will African 

capacity be enhanced in a sustainable manner and 

thus be able to safeguard the growing number of U.S. 

national interests on the continent.54

Robert Berschinski’s 2007 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph on what AFRICOM should not

be is still fully accurate. Commingling of humanitarian and anti-terrorist rhetoric and activities has led to 

a scattershot and uncoordinated effort that has not 

inspired the faith of the African audience, which still 

views AFRICOM’s mission as anti-terrorism first, securing oil reserves for U.S. exploitation second, countering Chinese influence third, and with African interests somewhere down the line.55

Some recent reviews undertaken on AFRICOM’s 

behalf indicate that an improved public affairs campaign is in order. Assessments illustrate that positive 

stories on the very real humanitarian activities AFRICOM has undertaken since its inception, such as 

building schools, providing clean water and medical 

care and repairing places of worship, are not making 

their way into the international or even local press.56

An efficient way to increase AFRICOM's visibility is 

through the public relations capabilities of the regional communities. Identifying the key regional and REC 

leaders and encouraging them to assist in informing 

their constituencies of the positive effects AFRICOM’s 

presence has had in their larger communities is a more 

direct target than approaching leaders in all the individual countries under AFRICOM’s purview. These 

leaders can assist AFRICOM in understanding what 
41

projects are likely to have the most impact across their 

regions and how to gain the support of individual 

groups. This also lets the REC leaders know that AFRICOM officials truly aim to be their partners in the 

future security, stability, and prosperity across the 

larger Sub-Saharan region and throughout the path to 

AU integration and development.

Encouraging Integrative Strategies to Address 

Regional Security Concerns.

As AFRICOM continues to expand its engagement 

in Africa, senior leadership both within and above the 

Command must ensure the most efficient use of limited resources, especially in times of reduced budgets. 

One way to do this is to increase the reach of existing and planned training and other activities not on 

an individual country basis, but on an economies of 

scale model, by revising programs to become “trainthe-trainer” focused and by directing activities to REC 

participation, rather than toward individual countries 

or U.S.-determined country blocs. 

The more interoperable the RECs’ own security 

structures become with each other and with the United States, and AU security apparati, the more likely 

they are to become ingrained to the U.S. “way of doing things” and to prefer U.S. equipment, which will 

further enhance engagement opportunities. Gradually, as more REC-specific trainers can produce more 

effective REC-centered military groupings, the RECs 

themselves will become more integrated. Longer-term 

focus would then be on integrating training and activities among the RECs and ultimately with the AU to 

create security structures across Sub-Saharan Africa.
42

U.S. ARMY ROLE IN AFRICAN SECURITY 

INTEGRATION

Cross-Cultural Training and Synchronizing 

Strategic and Tactical Leadership.

While the U.S. Army and Special Operations community already play a significant role in AFRICOM 

activities, especially logistical support for missions 

across the continent and military-to-military training, 

there is more the Army can do to enhance security 

and stability in Africa, especially through its strategic 

analysis capabilities. While the Army continues its efforts to prepare for smaller conflicts by cross-training 

personnel, it has recognized that the more cross-cultural competency the service can impart before deployment to those on the ground in Africa, the greater 

the chances of operational success. This is clearly 

manifested through the Army’s regional approach to 

using Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), particularly the 

1st Armored Division’s 2nd Brigade dedicated to Africa, which has proven to be successful in working in 

this multicultural environment.

It is not clear that the same understanding is carried 

through to the strategic level. The U.S. Army Culture 

Summit, held every Spring at or near Ft. Huachuca, 

Arizona, from 2005 through 2011, was part of an effort 

to integrate academic, private, and military assets to 

enhance cultural awareness and cross-cultural competency for the warfighter.This effort worked in tandem 

with the Human Terrain System, which was deployed 

in Afghanistan and Iraq beginning in 2007. However, it 

is increasingly critical for success in forward deployed 

operations to have personnel trained to operate with 

more integrated personnel from various contributing 
43

countries in many alien environments and not just in 

“hot” war operations. As the United States expanded 

its interest in Africa, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command's (TRADOC) Culture Center began developing blocs of language and culture training with limited resources for “phase zero” target locations, such 

as Africa and the larger Middle East.

Ft. Huachuca’s previous Commander, General 

John Custer, a U.S. Army War College graduate with a 

background in Russian language and culture, emphasized the importance of this training. However, when 

he retired, the Culture Summit was abandoned, the 

Culture Center disbanded, and its highly skilled trainers moved on base and were absorbed into the civil 

service where, despite years of doing identical work, 

they have no seniority. This has not necessarily been 

the most effective way for the Army to support the 

public emphasis it claims to place on cultural training. The United States is nearly certain to continue to 

engage in Africa and the Middle East for the next 100 

years, and this kind of training should not be closed 

down simply because the “hot” wars are ending. 

While the Army has spent significant funds on 

cross-cultural skills training, such as the Cadet Troop 

Leader Training (CTLT) program, which sends Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC) and West Point 

cadets to foreign countries for leadership and cultural 

training, it mainly prefers to do so either in classrooms 

at U.S. bases like Ft. Huachuca or Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 

or via video games formatted for hand-held mobile 

devices. While there are many African military personnel in the United States studying military science 

and other skills through IMET and other programs, 

U.S. personnel are not encouraged to use these opportunities to interact with African military personnel, 

unless they happen to share a classroom.
44

The U.S. Army War College, as the Army’s “think 

tank,” can provide programs to help strategic planners 

understand and apply the important lessons learned 

from prior failure to take culture into account when 

preparing to deploy forces or engage a new ally or 

adversary. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military 

instituted cultural training because it was a tactical 

necessity. Tactical commanders understand this and 

this tactical necessity must be “synched” with strategic thinkers’ ability to facilitate and enable tactical 

operations. Rather than downsizing on the soft skills 

that will truly enhance military readiness to operate 

in increasingly multicultural environments in smaller 

teams in intimate settings, the U.S. Army War College can be at the forefront of research on how to best 

achieve effective cross-cultural skills training. 

In addition, as Phillip Van Neikerk noted in his 

2009 article, Africa’s Leadership Vacuum, “Africa’s hope 

for leadership is a younger generation that for now 

remains on the margins.”57 The U.S. Army War College can, therefore, provide research opportunities to 

identify up-and-coming individuals in countries and 

counterpart organizations, such as RECs, who are 

especially suited as partners for enhancing security 

and stability in the region. This requires a clear understanding of the local decisionmaking environment and 

the stresses and influences under which such leaders 

or “leaders-to-be” may be operating. Socio-cultural 

and network analysis are invaluable techniques for 

enhancing the Army’s and AFRICOM’s ability to engage in the region and meet their mission goals.
45

ENDNOTES

1. PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 

AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY RELATING TO THE 

PAN-AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, available from www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions

_%20Protocols/protocol-panafrican-parliament.pdf.

2. Ibid.

3. Claude Ake, “Democracy and Development in Africa,” 

Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997, p. 70.

4. Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2009, p. 65.

5. H. Wolpe, and S. McDonald, “Democracy and Peace 

Building: Rethinking the Conventional Wisdom,” The Round Table, Vol. 97, No. 394, 2008, pp. 137-145.

6. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World 

Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

2004, p. 120.

7. Dr. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why 

Violence Has Declined, New York: Penguin Groups Viking, 

2011, p. 291.

8. Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African 

Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance. London, UK: Routledge Press, 2008, p. 33.

9. Dr. Steven Metz, Refining American Strategy in Africa, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2000, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/

pubs/display.cfm?PubID=199.

10. African Union Strategic Plan 2009-2012, available from 

www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Strategic_Plan2009-2012.pdf. 

11. African Union Commission’s Mission Statement, available 

from www.au.int/en/commission.
46

12. Makinda and Okumu, p. 77.

13. African Union Treaty Protocol Relating to the Peace and 

Security Council, Washington, DC, available from www.au.int/en/

organs/psc.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. African Union Constitutive Act, available from www.au.int/

en/about/constitutive_act.

17. Lauren Gelfand, “Regions make slow progress towards 

African Standby Force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2009.

18. The most current open source information from SADC 

notes that the second part of Golfinho III Command Post Exercise was held to general satisfaction in April 2010 in Mozambique. 

“Southern African Development Community,” available from 

www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/488.

19. Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and 

Tactics (PILOT) Fact Sheet available from www.africom.mil/fetch

Binary.asp?pdfID=20091019125255.

20. Barry Malone, “Africa to Miss Gaddafi’s Money, Not 

His Meddling,” Reuters Insight, November 11, 2011, available 

from www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-gaddafi-africa-legacy-id

USTRE7AA27120111111.

21. Author discussion with Dr. Tseggai Isaac, Eritrean political scientist and Culture and Language Advisor at the Maneuver 

Support Center of Excellence in Fort Leonard Wood, MO, at U.S. 

Army Culture Summit V on March 2, 2011, in Sierra Vista, AZ.

22. Andrew Harding, “Libya: Concerns over Missing Weapons,” BBC Africa, September 9, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-africa-14863180.

23. Joshua E. Keating, “How Do You Hire Mercenaries?” Foreign Policy, February 23, 2011, available from www.foreignpolicy.

com/articles/2011/02/23/how_do_you_hire_mercenaries.
47

24. Charles Onyango-Obbo, “The Rise of the African Mercenary,” The Citizen, November 16, 2011, available from www.thecitizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/20-analysis-opinions/17121-the-rise-ofthe-african-mercenary.html.

25. Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Labor Statistics available 

from www.ubos.org/index.php?st=pagerelations2&id=20&p=related

%20pages%202:Labour%20Statistics.

26. Onyango-Obbo. 

27. Thomas Fessy, “Gaddafi’s influence in Mali’s coup,” BBC 

News, March 22, 2012, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-17481114.

28. John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent, New 

York: Vintage Books, 2007, p. 509.

29. “Mali President Traore beaten up by protesters,” BBC 

News Africa, May 21, 2012, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-africa-18142488.

30. Celeste Hicks, “Tuareg rebels make troubled return from 

Libya to Mali,” BBC News Africa, February 29, 2012, available from 

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17192212.

31. Pinker, p. 99.

32. Dr. Phil Williams, “Here Be Dragons: Dangerous 

Spaces and International Security,” Anne L. Clunan and Harold 

A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2010.

33. Scott D. Taylor. “Labor Markets in Africa,” Current 

History, May 2009, pp. 214-20. 

34. Dr. Ole Magnus Theisen, “Blood and Soil? Resource 

Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict Revisited,” Journal of Peace 

Research, Vol. 45, No. 6, 2008, pp. 801–818.

35. Reader, p. 368.
48

36. March 2010 discussion with Kamba Kenyan Stella Kagwange at the U.S. Army Culture Summit in Sierra Vista, AZ.

37. Southern Africa Development Community’s “Foreign Direct Investment in SADC,” available from www.sadc.int/

english/regional-integration/tifi/investment/about-sadc/foreign-directinvestment/. 

38. Ake, p. 112.

39. Roger Thurow, The Last Hunger Season: A Year in an African Farm Community on the Brink of Change, New York, NY: Public 

Affairs, 2012.

40. “NEPAD says private sector “critical” in developing Africa’s infrastructure,” The New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Press Release, July 11, 2012, available from 

www.nepad.org/regionalintegrationandinfrastructure/news/2748/

nepad-says-private-sector-%E2%80%9Ccritical%E2%80%9Ddeveloping-afric. 

41. Rupa Ranganathan, “The SADC’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective,” Policy Research Working Paper 5898, Washington, DC: The World Bank Africa Region Sustainable Development 

Unit, December 2011.

42. Todd J. Moss, “US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: 

The Limits of Liberal Universalism,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, June 1995, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, pp. 189-209. 

43. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How 

There Is a Better Way for Africa, New York: Farrrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009, pp. x-xi.

44. Ibid., p. xvi.

45. “African Regional and Subregional Organizations: Assessing Their Contributions to Economic Integration and Conflict 

Management,” Conference report, Washington, DC: Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 10, 2008.
49

46. “ECOWAS Experts Meet To Examine, Adopt Reports 

On Member States’ Investment Policies,” Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Press Release No. 

139/2012, May 16, 2012, available from news.ecowas.int/presseshow.

php?nb=139&lang=en&annee=2012.

47. “ECOWAS Supports UNIDO’S Tool For Regional Investment Promotion,” ECOWAS Press Release No. 176/2012, 

June 26, 2012, available from news.ecowas.int/presseshow.

php?nb=176&lang=en&annee=2012. 

48. “Transportation infrastructure for regional integration focal points,” The Infrastructure Consortium For Africa, available 

from www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/focal-points/. 

49. Nomathemba Mhlanga, Garrick Blalock, and Ralph Christy, “Understanding Foreign Direct Investment in the Southern 

African Development Community: An Analysis Based on ProjectLevel Data,” Paper Presented at the International Association of 

Agricultural Economists’ Conference in Beijing, China, on August 

16-22, 2009, p. 26.

50. Joseph Lapalombara, “Structural and Institutional 

Aspects of Corruption,” Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1994, 

pp. 325-350.

51. Senate Bill 2475, “African Conflict Resolution Act,” signed 

by President William J. Clinton on January 25, 1994. 

52. Nina Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: 

Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Services Report, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 

June 11, 2009, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32773.pdf.

53. “2009 G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding,” available from www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2009/

index.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=121&view=d.

54. Benedikt Franke, “Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: 

U.S. Military Capacity Building and Africa’s Emerging Security 

Architecture,” Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 1, January 2007, 

available from www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2007/Jan/frankeJan07.html#references.
50

55. Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The “Global 

War on Terrorism,” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the 

Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa, November, 2007, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.

cfm?pubID=827.

56. PHONCON on June 7, 2012, with U.S. Government contractor stationed in Djibouti supporting the assessment described.

57. Phillip Van Neikerk, “Africa’s Leadership Vacuum,” Current History, May 2009, pp. 232-234, EBSO Host, available from 

ejscontent.ebsco.com.ezproxy.mercyhurst.edu/ContentServer.aspx?

target=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.currenthistory.com%2Fpdf_org_

files%2F108_718_232.pdf.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

and 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Ms. Diane E. Chido

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil