1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0604n.06 F iled: August 21, 2007 No. 06-6039 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. RICHARD N ANEZ, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE M ID DL E D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

Be for e : K

EN NE DY , G IBBO NS, and M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Def endant- appellant Richard Na nez challeng es the 24 0- mon th s ent ence impos e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo llo wi nghis c on vic tio ns fo r c on sp ir ingto distribute a controlled substanc e and possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On
a pp e a l, N ane z ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt , in im posin g se nte nc e fo llo wi ngre mand , ( 1) e ng a g e d in improper judicial f

actf inding, ( 2) er

red in c alculatinghis guide lines rang e, and ( 3) fa iled to consider his post-offense reha

bilitation. After re view of the rec ord, we fi n d no err or in the district court’ s decision and a ffirm. I.2

I n J anuar y or F ebrua

ry of 2002, Richar d Be navides approa ched N anez at a ba r in Houston, Texas, a nd inquired about the possibili ty of arr ang ing the purcha se of coca ine. The two discussed the po ssi bil ity of Na

ne z’s pr ov idi ng B e navid e s with thr e e to fi ve kil og ra ms of c oc a ine on

a we e kly b a s i s . A c c o r d i n g t o B e n a v i d e s , N an e z a g r e e d t o s e l l h i m t h r e e t o f

i v e k i l o g r a m s o f

c o c a i n e w e e k l y, but Nanez informed B enavide s that he could only provide a

first installment of two to three kilogr ams. On F ebrua

ry 15, 2002, befor e B enavide s and Na nez rea ched f

inal ag ree ment on price , B e navid e s w a s arr e ste d b y De te c tiv e Mik e Cla

rk of the Na sh vil le Pol ic e De pa rtme nt. F oll ow inghis
arr est, Be navides a g ree d to cooper ate with the a uthorities. On Fe bruar

y 17, 2002, Be navides c ontacted N anez, and they arr ang ed for

the deliver

y of thr e e kil og ra

ms of c oc a ine to B e navid e s in Na sh vil le fo r a

tot a l pr ic e of

$6 3, 00 0. Na

ne z hir e d L

uis Av ila to t ra ns po rt the c oc a ine fr om H ou sto n to N a sh vil le . A t N ane z’s dir e c tio n, Av ila dr ov e to Odessa, T exas, where he met an unide ntified supplier who provide d him wi t h t wo kilogr ams of
coca ine. As direc ted, Avila divided the coca ine into two one-kilog ram pa ckag es and pla ced the m in the g as tank of his vehicle. Avila t hen recruited his girlfr iend, Ara via Gar cia, to assist him in the drive to Na shville. Nanez also trave led t o Nashville to consummate the f irst transac tion and
rec ruited an a ssociate, Ke vin Neal, to drive him from Houston to Nashville in exchang e for $500. Nane z and Neal a

rrived in Na shville on Febr uary 23, 200 2 , an d met with an under cover law enfor ceme nt of

fice r, Detec tive J esse B urchw ell, and B enavide s. On the following day , Avila and Gar cia a rrived in Na shville with the coca ine, and Na nez informed B urchw ell and B enavide s that he
was one kilogr am short of the a g ree d upon three but assured the m he would provide the missing kilogr am. Nane z, Burchw ell, Be navides, Nea l, A vila, and Gar cia then pr ocee ded to an a partmentWhil e riding with B urchw ell and Be navides, Nane z discussed a future tr ansac tion where by 1 B u r c h w e l l w o u l d

c o m e t o H o u s t o nt o p u r c h a s e t e nk i l o g r a m s o f c o c a i n e t h e f

o l l o w i n g T h u r s d a y. 3 set up by the police to ser

ve as a location for the transfe r. After arr iving at th e ap ar t ment, Nane z 1
c on su mmate d th e tw o k ilo g ra m tr ans a c tio n. P ol ic e of fi c e rs mov e d in

and arr e ste d N ane z, N e a l, Gar cia, a nd Avila. A g rand jury issued a two-c ount indictment charg ing N anez with conspiring to distribute five kil og ra ms o r m or e of

a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e in v iol a tio n of 21 U. S.C. § 8 46 and po sse ssi on

wi th intent to dist ribute 500 g rams or more of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). A jury convicted N anez on both counts, and t h e d i s t ri ct cour t sentence d him to 240 mont hs imprisonment followed by five y ear s of super

vised rele ase. N anez appe aled his sentenc e, and a panel of this court vac ated his sentenc e in light of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and
rema nded his ca se for

rese ntencing
. Un ite d S

tat es v . Na ne

z ( Nan e z I ), 168 F. App’x 72, 79 (6th Cir. 2006). Following rema

nd, the district court re imposed the same se ntence imposed initi ally . Nane z timely appea led. II. As a thre shold matter, we must addr ess both parties’ arguments that the s cope of this court’s
rema nd in Nan e

z I compels t he result in this case. Ac cordingto Nanez, bec ause Nan e z I va c a te d h is sentenc e in light of Bo ok

e r and rema

nded for rese ntencing , the district c ourt exceede d the scope of the re mand by

eng ag ing in imprope r judicial fa ctfinding in calculating Na nez’s gu i d elines ra

ng e. I n response, the g overnme nt contends that bec ause Nan e z I r e ma n d e d N a n e z’ s c a s e s o le ly

for
rese ntencingin light of Booke r , Nane z is now pre cluded fr o m raising any objection to the district court’s guidelines computations. Had the Nanez I court found me rit in these objections, ar g ues theTh e pa ne l c ou ld h a ve a dd

re sse d guid e lin e s c omp utatio n is su e s in the pr ior a pp e a l but di d 2 not. 4 g ov e r n me n t, th e p an e l w o u ld h a v e s o s tate d an d in s tr u c te d th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a c c o r d in g ly . As discussed below, e ach of

the par ties’ ar g uments on this point is meritless. Na ne z’s po sit ion

that the Sixth Ame ndme nt p re c lud e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt fr om f ind ingfa c ts bey ond those fac ts found by the j ury or admitted by Nane z finds no support in t he ca se law. Booke r its e lf –in a dd iti on to n ume ro us po st- Bo ok

e r p ro n o u n ce m en t s fr om this court–makes cle ar tha t judicial fac tfinding doe s not offend the Six th Amendment so long as t he guidelines occupy a purely advisory role. Booke r , 5 43 U. S. at 23 3 ( “ I f t he Gu ide lin e s as curr ent ly writte n c ou ld b e re a d a s me re ly
a dv iso ry pr ov isi on s th a t r e c omm e nd e d, rathe r t ha n r e qu ir e d, the se le c tio n o f p art ic ula r s e nte nc e s in
re sp on se to d if

fe ri ngse ts o f f

a c ts, the ir us e wo uld

no t im pli c a te the Sixth A me ndme nt . . . .” ); see als o United States v. Gardiner , 46 3 F .3 d 44 5, 46 1 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6); United States v. Mic kens , 453 F.3 d 6 68 , 6 73 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; United States v. Richardson , 4 3 7 F
. 3 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 5 ( 6 th Cir. 2006); U n it e d S ta tes v. Coffee , 4 34 F .3 d 8 87 , 8 98 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; United States v. Stone , 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005). The g overnme nt’s position is simil arly unsupportable. A pane l’s decision to g rant re lief on the basis of a single , dispositi ve issue has no bear ing on othe r issues ra ised on appe al. The me re f act that this court re manded f or re sentenc ing in lig ht of Bo ok e r in Nan e

z I say s nothing a

bout whether the o th e r o b je c ti o n s r a is e d

b y N an e z i nth a t a

p p e a l w e r e me r it o r io u s . M o r e o v e r , th e p o sition 2 advocated by

the g overnme nt w ould, in eff ect, insulate the district court’s guidelines computations from appe llate re view eve n though N anez has prope rly noted and r aised his obj ections both befor e the district court a

nd here on appea l. Finally , United St ates v. Hay nes , 46 8 F .3 d 42 2, 42 4- 25 (6 th5

Cir. 2006), cited by

the g overnme nt provides no support for its ar g ument. The Ha y ne s court deter mined that the def

endant’ s challeng es to the district court’ s jury instructions and verdict form–issues re lated to the validity of convic tion–were not properly befor e t h e co u rt on appea l beca use the prior

rema nd order was limit ed to resente ncing in light of Booke r . Id. at 425. Hayne s offe rs no support for the proposition that issues re lated to g uidelines deter minations–matters that are inext rica bly linked to the s entenc ing pr ocess–a re not prope rly

befor e the c ourt following a Booke r
rema nd. Havingreje cted the pa rties’ thre s h o l d ar gu m ents reg ardingthe scope of the Nan e z I
rema nd, we must addre ss the merits of Na nez’s challeng e to his sentence
. III
. Nane z presents two principal c halleng es to his sentence . First, he a ll ege s t h at the district court misapplied the g uidelines in calc ulating the sentenc ing r ang e applica ble to his case. Sec ond, Na ne z ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to c on sid e r e vid e nc e of his po st- of

fe ns e c on du ct in de c idi ng to imp os e the same se nte nc e ha nd e d do wn

pr ior to t his c ourt ’s Bo ok

e r rema nd in Nan e

z I
. We addre ss eac h argument in turn. A. Pos t- Booke r , the discre tion of a district cour t in handing dow n a sente nce ha s been e nhance d, and on appea l, w e revie w sentenc es for rea sonablene ss. United States v. J ackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005). Al t h o u g h the g uidelines are no longe r mandatory , the district court, in imposing sentenc e, must consider a proper ly calc ulated guidelines rang e as one of a numbe r of f actor s outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e .g. , Jack son , 4 0 8 F
. 3 d

a t 3 0 4 ( c it in g 1 8 U
. S. C. § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 4 ) )
. We evaluate the district court’s application of the guidelines usi ng our pre - Booke r standards of

revie w.6

United St ates v. Dav idson , 40 9 F .3 d 30 4, 31 0 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; see also United States v . Tudeme , 457 F.3d 577, 582 ( 6th Cir. 2006). 1. Na ne z fi rs t argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

c a lc ula te d th e drug q uan tity

and , a s a result, his base offense level. Upon resentencing , the di strict court reaf firmed its orig inal conclusion as to drugquantity

and found N anez re sponsible fo r a total of fiftee n kilogr ams of coc aine. The
or ig ina l c a lc ulatio n c omp ri se d ( 1) tw o k il og ra ms o f c oc a ine a c tua lly su pp lie d b y Na ne z to B e navid e s, (2 ) t e n k ilo g ra ms o f c oc a ine tha

t N ane z ag re e d to su

pp ly in a con versati on

wi th Bur chwe ll and Benavides on the day of his arr est, and (3) three kilogr ams that was to be de livered the next week pursua

nt to the underlying ag ree ment under which Nane z was to supply to Be navides three t o five kilog rams of c ocaine wee kly . Nane z contends initi ally that the district court wa s prec luded from f

inding a ny quantities in ex cess of

5.5 kilogr ams–the sum of the drugquantities
c on ta ine d in the ind ic tme nt upo n whi c h the jur y re tur ne d its ve rd ic t of g uil ty

–r e lying on

the same judicial fac tfinding a

rg ument reje cted above. Nane z’s remaining arguments challeng e the district court’s spe cific f

actua l findings with re spect to the drugquantity deter mination. “T h i s co u rt re v i ew s fo r c l ea r erro r ‘t h e di s t ri ct co u rt ’s d et er m i n at i o no f t h e q u an t i t y o f d ru gs attributable to [a] defendant f or sentenc ing pur

poses.’” United States v. V a s quez , 352 F.3d 1067, 1 0 7 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g U n it e d S ta te s v. Uk omadu , 236 F.3d 333, 341 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). A finding is clear ly

err oneous if, aft er re v i ew ing the entire r ecor d, the re viewing court is left with a “def inite and firm conviction that a mistake has bee n committed.” Id
. (q u o t i n g Anderson v. City of Be sse me r Ci ty , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). So long as the dist rict court’s “ac count of the e vidence is plausible in light of the re cord vie wed in its entirety , the court of appeals m ay not reve rse it even7

though c onvinced that h ad i t b ee n sitti ng as the trier of fa ct, it would have we ighe d the evidenc e differ ently .” Id . at 1071. Nane z first argues t hat t he dis trict court eng ag ed in improper double counting in computing the drugquantity

attributable to him. Acc ording to Nanez, the neg otiations that r es u l t ed in an
a g re e me nt b y

Na ne z to s up ply

to B e navid e s th re e to f

ive kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine on a

we e kly ba sis
wer e mer ely

preliminary

neg otiations that culminated in his delivery of two kilogr ams of coc aine on the d ay h e w a s ar

r e s te d
. T h u s , w h il e h e d o e s n o t c o n te s t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s a tt r ib u ti o n of two kilogr ams of coc aine, he takes issue with the district court’s findingthat he wa s part of a n ong oing ag ree ment to provide three to five kilog rams of c ocaine o n a we ek l y basis and its conseque nt attribution of an additional thre e kilog rams of coca ine. Howeve r, t he evidence in the re cord pr ovides ample support for

the district court’s c onclusion. Support f or the exis tence of such a

n ag ree ment can be fo un d in

the te sti mony

of bo th Benavide s and

Av ila , N ane z’s ow n te sti mony , a nd state me nts
a ttr ibute d to Na

ne z by oth e rs . T he dis tr ic t cou

rt too k a con se rv a tiv e a

pp ro a c h an d attri bu te d a

sin g le futu r e i n s t a l l m e n t o f t h r e e k i l o g r a m s o f c o c a i n e t o N an e z . N an e z ’ s d o u b l e c o u n t i n g ar g ume nt i s unpersua sive, and on this rec ord, it cannot be said that the district court c lear ly err ed. Na ne z ne xt ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d by inc lud ingin t

he dr ugqu anti ty

a ttr ibuta ble to him the ten kilogra

ms of coca ine he a g ree d to provide to Bur chwe ll and Be navides on the da y of his arre st. Nanez does not dispute that he assented to the transac tion. I nstead, he argues that he w as
me re ly e ng a g ingin p uf

fe ry to s a lva g e a de a l that he fe are d mig ht c oll a ps e be c a us e he fo un d h ims e lf one kilog ram short of the ag ree d upon three on the day of deliver

y . Fur thermore , he conte nds that he neither intended to deliver such a larg e quantity of drugs nor was he rea sonably capa ble of doing8

so. As a re sult, Nanez asserts, the district c ourt should have applied U.S .S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12, and excluded from its drug quantity calc ulation these ten kilog rams of c ocaine
. Application Note 12 of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 instructs the sentenc ing court to “exclude from the offe nse leve l determination the amount of controlled substance that the def endant e stablishes that he or s h e d id n o t in te n d to p r o v id e o r w a s n o t r e a s o n a b ly c a p a b le o f p r o v id in g .” Onc e the g overnme nt has established the e x istence of an ag ree d upon quantity , the def endant be ars the bur den of demonstrating e ither (1) the abse nce of intent to consummate the transac tion or (2) the fa ct that he or she was not re asonably capa ble of providingthe ag ree d upon quantity
. Vasquez , 352 F.3d at 1 0 7 2 (c i t i n g Uni t ed S tates v. Munoz , 233 F.3d 410, 415 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). The Va sq ue z c ourt a lso identified a numbe r of f

actor s that can be relevant i n evaluating the district court’s f indings re g arding the def endant’ s intent a

nd capa bility : ( 1) whe ther the de fenda nt eng ag ed in serious ne g otiations or “idle talk,” ( 2) whe ther the de fenda nt has participa t ed i n simil ar tra nsactions, (3) w hether

the defe ndant hesitated befor e ag ree ing to the transac tion, and (4) whe ther the dr ug quantity

involved is c omp ara

ble to q ua nti tie s of dr

ug s invo lve d in othe r t

ra ns a c tio ns oc c ur

ri ngduri ngthe same tim e period. Id . at 1072-73. Wit h respe ct to intent, the only evidenc e in support of Na nez’s claim consists of his statement at trial that he never intende d to provide such a larg e quantity

of coc aine. How ever , Nane z’s posit ion is somewhat under cut by

his own testimony . After being asked w hether he “w ould have ne ver done that [te n k ilo g ra

m] de a l,” Na

ne z re sp on de d, “ Wel l, I me an if ev e ry thi ng wo uld have wo rk e d r ig ht, Imean I could have probably g otten back a

nd may be done some thing, but . . . my intentions at that time were not to . . . ge t the ten kilogr ams.” Rather than “idle talk,” B urchw ell testified that he a nd Na ne z ne g oti a te d s pe c if

ic de ta ils re la te d to the t e n k ilo g ra m tr ans a c tio n. Na

ne z expl a ine d to9

Bur chwe ll and Be navides whe re his nar cotics supply connec tions wer e located, and after a g ree ment h ad b een r eac hed, Na

nez informed one of

his co-conspira

tors about the planne d ten kilogr am purc ha se . F ina lly , th e re is n o e vid e nc e of any he sit a tio n o n N ane z’s pa rt in a g re e ingto t

his transac tion. This conduct is inconsistent with Na n ez ’s p o rt ray al of himself a s an individual interested only

in salvag ing a deal and is instead consist ent wit h the profile of an individual who saw the opportunity

for a lucrative transac tion and seized it. As to his capability

of providing this quantity of coc aine, Na

nez argues t h at h e wa s not
rea sonably

capa ble of providingsuch a qua ntity of coca ine beca

use he mana g ed to provide only two kilogr ams of coc aine pr ior to his arre st. Howeve r, the district cour t properly found that Nane z had ag ree d to provide three to five kilog rams of c ocaine on a wee kly basis, and witnesses te stified that Nane z st ated his willingne ss to lower the pric e in the eve nt of a purc hase of five kilog rams of
coca ine or more. Give n the quantities at issue in this conspiracy , a sing le transa ction involving ten kil og ra ms o f

c o c a i n e f

a l l s i nl i n e w i t h r e a s o n a

b l e e xp e c t a t i o n s . T h u s , w e f i n d n o d i f f i c u l t y in ag ree ing w ith the district court’s conc lusion that Nanez was re asonably capa ble of providing such a quantity of coc aine. Give n the pre ceding , we c onclude that the district c ourt committed no err or in computing the drug quantity attributable to N anez and ther efor e find no e rror in the district court’s related computation of Na nez’s base of

fense level under

the g uidelines. 2. Nane z also arg ues that the district cour t err ed in failing to apply U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 to g rant a thre e-le vel re duction in his offense le vel f o r acceptanc e of r esponsibility . Be cause “[t] he sentenc ing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a de fenda nt’s acc eptanc e of r esponsibility [,] the d e te r mi n a ti o n o f th e s e n te n c in g ju d g e is e n ti tl e d to g r e a t d e f e r e n c e o n r e v ie w.” Un i ted States v.10

Fa rre lly , 389 F.3d 649 , 6 5 6 (6th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by United States v

. W illiams , 411 F.3d 675, 677 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005)
. Acc ording ly , this c ourt will only disturb the district court’s f inding r eg ardingacc eptance of r esponsibility if that finding is clear ly

err oneous. Id. ; see also United States v. Angel , 355 F.3d 462, 476 (6th Cir. 2004)
. “To qualify for th i s re d u cti on, Def endants [are ] required to show by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that they h a[ v e] acc epted responsibility

for the c rime committed.” Fa rre lly , 3 8 9 F
. 3 d a t 656 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed) (alter ation in orig inal). Na ne z ar g ue s th a t be c a

us e he ha s n e ve r c on tes ted his inv olv e me nt i n a c on sp ir a c y

to s e ll
coca ine and has only

challeng ed the amount involved in the conspiracy , the district court should have g iven hi m a

r e d u c ti o nu n d e r

s e c ti o n3 E 1
. 1
. I np arti c u la r , a c c o r d in g to N an e z, h e a c c e p te d responsibility

for the de livery of t wo ki logr ams of cocaine related to the charg e in count t wo of the indictment, and this adequately demonstrated his a cce ptance of responsibility
. Nane z is corr ect that a defenda n t’ s d e c is io nto g o to tr ia l d o e s n o t r e n d e r h im o r h e r in e li g ib le f

o r ana c c e p ta

n c e of responsibility

reduc tion where , for ex ample, that defe ndant s eeks to pre serve a cha lleng e to issues unrelated to fac tual g uilt such as the constitutionality or applicab i l i t y of a statute. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. Howe ver, “ [t ]hi s adjustment is not int ended to a pply to a def endant who puts the g ov e rnme nt t o it s b ur de n o f pr oo f a t tr ia l by de nyingthe e sse nti a l f

a c tua l e le me nts of

g uil t, i s convicted, a

nd only then admits g uilt and expresses remorse .” Id. As the Fa rre lly court obser

ved, this court has re peate dly noted that the district court doe s not clear ly err in denying a

n acc eptanc e of responsibili ty reduc tion to a def endant who c hooses to contest the e ssential elements of guilt and pu t th e g ov e rnme nt t o it s bur de n of pr oo f. 38 9 F. 3d a t 656- 57 (c iti ng c a se s) . N ane z ch os e to g o to trial to contest the amount of coc aine involved in the c onspiracy char g ed in count one of theNa ne z ci te s United States v. Flee ner , 9 00 F .2 d 9 14 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) , in arguingthat a 3 defe ndant’s claim of entra pment does not pr eclude his or her r ece iving a reduc tion for ac cepta

nce of re sp on sib ili ty
. He c la ims that his c ha lle ng e to the dr ug qu anti ty a ttr ibute d to hi s condu c t–h is principal re ason for g oing trial–is eff ectively a claim of sentenc ing e ntrapment. The re a re a number of problems with his position. First, Fl e e ne r say s nothing a bout the concept of “se ntencing en t rap m en t
. ” E v en as s u m i n g Fle e ne r a pp lie s in this ca se , it do e s n ot require that a district cour t give a red u c ti o nu n d e r

s e c ti o n3 E 1
. 1 w h e r e th e d e f e n d an t h a s r a is e d

a c la im o f e n tr a p me n t. Rather, Fl e e ne r mere ly

held that the entr apment def ense doe s not preclude application of se ction 3E1.1 by the district court. 11 indictment–an essential e lement of guilt on which the g overnme nt bore the bur den of pr oof. Acc ording ly , the district court did not clea rly err in deny in g Na n ez a re d uction for a cce ptance of
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. 3 3. Na ne z ne xt ch a lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e nh anc e me nt o f h is o ffen se leve l pu rs ua nt t o U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a ). B eca use Na nez does not dispute the district court’s finding that he occ upied an org anizatio n al o r lea dership role –bey ond raising his alrea dy -re jected judicia l fac tfinding argument–that finding must stand. Thus, his cha lleng e to the district c ourt’s application of section 3B 1. 1 is c on fi ne d to his c la im that th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

c a lc ulate d th e numbe r o f i nd ivi du a ls involved in the conspirac y . Na n ez t ak es i s s u e w i t h t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n g o f a cr i m i n al a c t i v i t y i n v o l v i n g five or

mo re participa

nts. This court revie ws for c lear err or any fac tual finding s made by

the district court for pur poses of this provision. United States v. Mc Daniel , 398 F.3d 540, 551 n.10 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. He nley , 360 F.3d 509, 516 ( 6th Cir. 2004). The district cour t found that Nane z occupied a le ader ship role in criminal ac tivity involving six participa

nts: Nanez, Nea l, Avila, Gar c ia , B e n a v id e s , an d

th e u n id e n ti f

ie d s u p p li e r f r o m w h o m N an e z d ir e c te d A v il a to o b ta in the
coca ine deliver ed to B enavide s. Nane z arg ues that t he district cour t (1) improper ly

included12

Be navides be cause he w as a g overnme nt informant, (2) imprope rly included Ga

rcia beca use her involvement in the conspirac y was not for esee able to Na nez, and (3) improperl y

included the unknown supplier bec ause A vila was a ctually the supplier of the coca ine. A re vie w of the re c or d de mon str a te s tha t the re wa s n o e rr or in t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s. Although N anez is corr ect that Be n av i d es ultimately decide d to cooper ate with the g overnme nt following his arre st, he bec ame involved in the c riminal activity that g ave r ise to the instant char g es p r io r to h is ar r e s t a n d d e c is io nto c o o p e r a te
. A c c o r d in g ly , u n li k e anu n d e r c o v e r la w e n f o r ceme nt office r, B enavide s was “c riminally responsible,” and it was not e rror for the district court to include Be navides a s a par

ticipant. See U. S.S. G. § 3B 1. 1 c mt. n. 1; s e e als o United St ates v. Dy er , 910 F.2d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejec ting the argument that a gover nment informant could not be included under se ction 3B1.1 a fter notingthat the info rm ant’s involvement with the def endant’ s criminal activity prec eded the decision to coop er at e wi t h the g overnme nt). As to the unknown supplier, Nane z also claimed at trial that ther e wa s no supplie r other than A vila. At his first sentencing he ari ng , the dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d N ane z’s c on te nti on and ins te a d c re dit e d th e te sti mony of Av ila as to the existence of a

n unidentified supplier from whom Avila procur ed the coca ine. The district court’s c redibility

deter minations are a ccor ded g reat defe renc e by this court, see United States v. Esteppe , 4 83 F .3 d 4 47 , 4 52 (6 th Cir . 200 7) , an d Nane z po int s to noth ing in the re c or d– be y on d h is
ow n c on tr ary

te sti mony

–th a t w ou ld c a ll the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ingint o q ue sti on . Wit

h r e sp e c t to Gar cia, the guidelines make no me ntion of a for esee abili t y re q u i re m ent i n order to include an ind ivi du a l un de r s e c tio n 3 B 1. 1. Th e re is n o n e e d to a dd re ss N ane z’s argument on thi s p oin t, ho we ve r, be c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y fo un d th e e xiste nc e of

c ri min a l a c tiv ity

i nv o l v i n g a t le a stI n his brief, Nane z cla ims the district c ourt err ed in deny ing him an of

fense level re duction 4 and re fer ence s U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(7) . I t is clear f rom the re cord and the parties’ briefs, how ever , that Nane z’s claim revolves a round the saf

ety valve pr ovision contained in section 5C1.2. 13 five pa rticipants, whethe r or not Ga rcia was prope rly

included. The ref

ore , the district court committed no error

in its application of section 3B 1.1. 4. I n his final challeng e to the district cour t’s application of the guidelines, Nane z arg ues that the district court erre d in denying him an offense- level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. The 4 g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s th at N ane z ha s w a ive d th is i ssu e by fai ling to r a ise it i n h is f ir st a pp e a l to thi s court. Whether or

not Nanez has wa ived this issue, his fa ilure to r aise a succe ssful challeng e to the district court’s finding that he occ upied a leader ship role in the offe nse cha rg ed pre cludes a

pplication of section 5C1.2 and provides a n independe nt rea son for re jecting his claim of er

ror. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)( 4). Thus, the district cour t did not err in dec lining to apply the safe ty

valve. B. Nane z’s second over arc hing challeng e to his sentence consists of his claim that the district
c ourt fa ile d to c on sid e r h is p os t- of fe ns e e ff or ts at r e ha bil itatio n w he n it

de c ide d to re imp os e the same sentenc e it handed dow n pre- Booke r . Nane z’ s argume nt raises a challeng e to the proc edura l
rea sonablene ss of his sentence beca use it involves a claim that the district cour t failed to consider
r e le v an t e v id e n c e p e rta in in g to th e s e n te n c in g f a c to r s o u tl in e d in 1 8 U
. S. C. § 3 5 5 3(a)
. S ee , e.g. , Un ite d S tat es v . D e

x ta , 470 F.3d 612, 614- 15 (6th Cir. 2006). The gove rnment, rely ing on United States v. W

orley , 453 F.3d 706, 709 ( 6th Cir. 2006), argues that post-off ense c onduct is not releva nt
on rema nd for r esente ncing in light of Booke r . Whil e W orely d o es ap p ea r t o support the g ov e rnme nt’ s p os iti on , N ane z’s argume nt o n a pp e a l f a ils fo r a no the r r e a so n. I t is c le ar f ro m a14

re vie w of the se nte nc ing tr ans c ri pt that the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s awa re of Na ne z’s po st- of

fe ns e c on du c t,
e xplic itl y c on sid e re d th is co nd

uc t in de c lin ingto e xer c ise its dis c re tio n to g o b e low the g uid e lin e s, and ins tead impos ed the same sentenc e imposed pre

- Booke r . Thus , e ve n a ssumin g tha t W orley does not prec lude a district cour t’s consideration of this sort of evidenc e, Nane z’s c laim that the district court in this case failed to do so is not supported by the re cord. Nane z has failed to demonstrate any proce dural defec t in the s entenc e imposed by the district court. To t h e extent that one might construe his arg ument to encompass a challeng e to the substantive leng th of the sentenc e sele cted by the district court, Na

nez offe rs nothing mor e than a conclusory

asser tion that the district court err ed by g iving no we ight to his mitigating evidenc e. The
re c or d r e fl e c ts that th e dis tr ic t court c on sid e re d all of the re le va nt statut or y fa c tor s and

ba lanc e d a ll of the mitigating a

nd ag g ravating e vidence in calculating a n appropr iate sente nce. Under suc h circ umstances, it is not the province of the appe llate cour

t to substitut e it s judgme nt for that of the sentenc ing c ourt. United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 811 (6th Cir. 2006). According ly , we find the sentenc e imposed re asonable
. I V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm.