2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-13-2002

Jackson v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-4251

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Recommended Citation

"Jackson v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 356.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 _______________ 

 

 No. 01-4251 

 _______________ 

 

 JOYCE R. JACKSON, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 _______________ 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 

 

 (D.C. No. 00-cv-03203) 

 District Judge: Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. 

 _______________ 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 June 7, 2002 

 

 BEFORE: NYGAARD, BARRY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges. 

 (Opinion Filed June 13, 2002) 

 ______________ 

 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 ______________ 

MAGILL, Circuit Judge. 

 Joyce Jackson seeks review of the District Court’s determination that the 

Administrative Law Judge’s ("ALJ") ruling was supported by substantial evidence when 

he found that Jackson was not disabled in accordance with the Social Security Act. 

Jackson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 18, 1993, and alleges 

that she became disabled in February 1993 due to a severe fracture of the scapula. 

 Our role as a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the 

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation and citation omitted); see 

also 42 U.S.C. 405(g), 1383(c)(3). We are bound by the ALJ’s findings of fact if they 

are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 

427 (3d Cir. 1999). 

 Jackson challenges the ALJ’s decision on essentially two grounds. We have 

carefully considered Jackson’s arguments and find that they lack merit. In particular, we 

agree with the District Court that the ALJ does not bear the burden of establishing that 

Jackson’s past relevant work is "substantial gainful activity" or that she performed the job 

for a significant period of time. See Wallace v. Sec’y of HHS, 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d 

Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Further, it is well within the discretion of the ALJ to discount 

the opinion of Dr. Mylod, who did not examine Jackson, in relation to the testimony of 

Dr. Ahamed and Dr. Schwartz, both of whom did examine Jackson and reached the same 
conclusion, i.e., that Jackson was capable of performing her past relevant work. See 20 

C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(1). 

 For the reasons substantially stated in the well-reasoned and thorough opinion of 

the District Court, we find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 

and we therefore affirm. 

 _________________ 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 

 /s/ Frank Magill 

 United States Circuit Judg