F-35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER

Current Outlook Is 

Improved, but LongTerm Affordability Is a 

Major Concern

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2013

GAO-13-309

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-309, a report to 

congressional committees

March 2013

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term 

Affordability Is a Major Concern

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike 

Fighter, is DOD’s most costly and 

ambitious aircraft acquisition. The 

program is developing and fielding

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is 

critical to long-term recapitalization 

plans as it is intended to replace 

hundreds of existing aircraft. This will 

require a long-term sustained funding 

commitment. Total U.S. investment is 

nearing $400 billion to develop and 

procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. 

Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered 

through 2012. The F-35 program has 

been extensively restructured over the 

last 3 years to address prior cost,

schedule, and performance problems. 

GAO’s prior reviews of the F-35 made 

numerous recommendations to 

improve outcomes, such as increasing 

test resources and reducing annual 

procurement quantities. 

This report, prepared in response to 

the National Defense Authorization Act 

for 2010, addresses (1) F-35 program 

performance during 2012, including 

testing, technical risks, and software;

(2) manufacturing performance

indicators, production results, and 

design changes; and (3) acquisition 

and sustainment costs going forward. 

GAO’s work included analyses of a 

wide range of program documents and 

interviews with defense and contractor 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this report. DOD’s restructuring of 

the F-35 program and other actions are 

responsive to many prior 

recommendations. DOD agreed with 

GAO’s report findings and conclusions. 

What GAO Found

The F-35 program achieved 7 of 10 key management objectives for 2012 and 

made substantial progress on one other. Two objectives on aircraft deliveries and 

a corrective management plan were not met. Also in 2012, the program

conducted more developmental flight tests than planned and made considerable 

progress in addressing critical technical risks, such as the helmet-mounted 

display. With about one-third of development flight testing completed, much 

testing remains to demonstrate and verify F-35 performance. Software 

management practices are improved, but with significant challenges ahead as

software integration and testing continue to lag behind plans. 

Manufacturing and supply processes are also improving—indicators such as 

factory throughput, labor efficiency, and quality measures are all positive. While 

initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest 

data shows labor hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating. The program is 

working through the continuing effects from its concurrent acquisition strategy

that overlapped testing and manufacturing activities. For example, the program is 

continuing to incur substantial costs for rework to fix deficiencies discovered in 

testing, but the amount of rework needed on each aircraft is dropping.

Going forward, ensuring affordability—the ability to acquire aircraft in quantity 

and to sustain them over the life cycle—is of paramount concern. With more 

austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition funding requirements average $12.6 

billion annually through 2037 (see below). The new F-35 acquisition baseline 

incorporates the Department of Defense’s (DOD) positive restructuring actions

taken since 2010, including more time and funding for development and deferred

procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future years. These actions place the F35 program on firmer footing, although aircraft will cost more and deliveries to 

warfighters will take longer. The program continues to incur financial risk from its 

plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before completing development flight 

testing. Meanwhile, the services are spending about $8 billion to extend the life of 

existing aircraft and to buy new ones to mitigate shortfalls due to F-35 delays.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Funding Requirements 

View GAO-13-309. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Letter 1 

Background 3

Program Made Progress in 2012, but Majority of Testing Still Ahead 5

After a Slow Start, Aircraft Manufacturing and Deliveries Are 

Beginning to Catch Up to Plans 15

Costs and Funding for Acquisition and Sustainment Remain Very 

Challenging Moving Forward 23

Concluding Observations 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Prior GAO Reports and DOD Responses 30

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 33

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment 36

Related GAO Products 37

Tables

Table 1: Changes in Reported F-35 Program Quantity, Cost, and 

Deliveries, 2001-2012 5

Table 2: F-35 Program Results for 2012 Objectives 7

Table 3: Procurement Contract Costs as of September 2012 18

Table 4: F-35 Procurement Investments and Flight Test Progress 23

Figures

Figure 1: F-35 Flight Test Points Progress in 2012 9

Figure 2: Percent of Sensor Fusion Development in Each Software 

Block 14

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 3: F-35 Deliveries Compared to Contract Dates 19

Figure 4: F-35 Engineering Design Changes 21

Figure 5: Mean Flying Hours between Failures 22

Figure 6: F-35 Program Budgeted Development and Procurement 

Funding Requirements, Fiscal Years 2013-2037 24

Abbreviations

ALIS Autonomic Logistics Information System

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CDR critical design review

CTOL conventional takeoff and landing

CV carrier variant 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

DT development testing

DT&E Development Test and Evaluation

EVMS Earned Value Management System

IOC initial operational capability

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

LRIP low rate initial production

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SDD system development and demonstration

STOVL short takeoff and vertical landing

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 11, 2013

Congressional Committees

At a cost approaching $400 billion, the F-35 Lightning II—also known as 

the Joint Strike Fighter—is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most 

costly and ambitious acquisition program. The program is developing and 

fielding three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

and eight international partners. The F-35 is the linchpin of U.S. and 

partner plans to replace existing fighters and support future combat 

operations. In a time of more austere federal budgets, the F-35 program 

as planned will require long-term sustained funding in the billions of 

dollars while, at the same time, competing against other expensive 

defense items. Over the last 3 years, DOD has extensively restructured 

the program to address relatively poor cost, schedule, and performance 

outcomes.

We have reported on F-35 issues for a number of years.1 While a 

program as complex and technically challenging as the F-35 would be 

expected to have setbacks, we have reported that the magnitude and 

persistence of the program’s cost and schedule problems can be largely 

traced to (1) a highly concurrent acquisition strategy that significantly 

overlapped development, testing, and manufacturing activities; and (2) 

decisions at key junctures made without adequate product knowledge.2

 

1

See related GAO products at the end of this report.

We have made numerous recommendations in our prior reports aimed at 

reducing risks and improving chances for successful outcomes. DOD has 

taken actions on these recommendations to varying degrees. Our June 

2012 report concluded that the department’s recent, extensive 

restructuring actions were positive improvements that should lead to more 

achievable and predictable outcomes, albeit at higher costs and extended 

2

We have an extensive body of work looking at knowledge-based best practices in 

successful private and public acquisitions of new technology. Defense policy and the 

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 incorporate elements of the knowledgebased approach. For an overview of the best practices criteria and methodologies, and 

how current defense programs including the F-35 fared, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12-400SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

29, 2012). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

times to test and deliver capabilities to warfighters.3

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires 

GAO to review the F-35 acquisition program annually for 6 years. This is 

the 4th report under this mandate, and in it, we address (1) program 

performance during 2012, including testing results, software, and 

technical risks; (2) manufacturing and supply performance indicators, 

production results, and design changes; and (3) acquisition and 

sustainment costs going forward. To conduct this work, we reviewed 

program status reports and briefings, management objectives, test plans 

and results, and internal DOD analyses with a focus on accomplishments 

in calendar year 2012 compared to original plans for that year. We 

obtained manufacturing data and cumulative outputs from the start of 

production in 2007 through the end of 2012, discussed development and 

production issues and results to date, future expansion plans, and 

improvement efforts with DOD, F-35 program, and contractor officials. We 

toured the aircraft manufacturing plant, obtained production and supply 

performance indicators, identified cumulative and projected engineering 

changes, and discussed factory improvements and management controls 

with members of the contractor’s work force and DOD plant 

representatives. We evaluated DOD’s restructuring actions and impacts 

on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes from program start to 

the new baseline, and determined factors driving the changes. We 

obtained current projections of acquisition funding needs through 2037 

and ongoing efforts to project life cycle sustainment funding requirements. 

Appendix II contains a more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology.

Given likely future 

budget constraints and pressures, we recommended that DOD analyze 

cost and program impacts from potentially reduced future funding levels. 

We also recommended that DOD assess the capability and challenges 

facing the F-35’s global supply chain that will be critical to supporting 

efficient and quality production at higher annual rates expected in the 

future. Our June 2012 and prior reports, recommendations, and DOD 

actions are summarized in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 

3

GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance Restructuring and 

Address Affordability Risks, GAO-12-437 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is a joint, multinational acquisition 

intended to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of next 

generation strike fighter aircraft for the United States Air Force, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and eight international partners.4

DOD began the Joint Strike Fighter program in October 2001 with a 

highly concurrent, aggressive acquisition strategy with substantial overlap 

between development, testing, and production. The program was 

rebaselined in 2004 following weight and performance problems and 

rebaselined again in 2007 because of additional cost growth and 

schedule slips. Following an extensive department-wide review, the 

Secretary of Defense in February 2010 announced a major restructuring 

of the program due to poor cost and schedule outcomes and continuing 

problems. DOD added time and money for development, provided 

additional resources for testing, and reduced the number of aircraft to be 

procured in the near-term. In March 2010, the department declared that 

The F-35 is a single-seat, 

single-engine aircraft incorporating low-observable (stealth) technologies, 

defensive avionics, advanced sensor fusion, internal and external 

weapons, and advanced prognostic maintenance capability. There are 

three variants. The conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant, 

designated the F-35A, will be an multi-role, stealthy strike aircraft 

replacement for the Air Force’s F-16 Falcon and the A-10 Thunderbolt II 

aircraft, and will complement the F-22A Raptor. The short takeoff and 

vertical landing (STOVL) variant, the F-35B, will be a multi-role stealthy 

strike fighter to replace the Marine Corps’ F/A-18C/D Hornet and AV-8B 

Harrier aircraft. The carrier-suitable variant (CV), the F-35C, will provide 

the Department of Navy a multi-role, stealthy strike aircraft to complement 

the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. Lockheed Martin is the aircraft contractor 

and Pratt & Whitney is the engine contractor.

 

4

The international partners are the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, 

Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway. These nations contributed funds for system 

development and signed agreements to procure aircraft. In addition, Israel and Japan 

have signed on as foreign military sales customers.

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

the program exceeded critical cost growth thresholds established by 

statute—a condition known as a Nunn-McCurdy breach—and 

subsequently certified to the Congress in June 2010 that the F-35 

program should continue.5

In March 2012, DOD established a new acquisition program baseline for 

the F-35 program that incorporated the numerous positive and more 

realistic restructuring actions taken since 2010. Officials also reauthorized 

continuation of system development, approved continuation of low rate 

initial procurement, divided the program for reporting purposes into 

aircraft and engine subprograms, and took other actions required due to 

the Nunn-McCurdy cost breach. The March 2012 baseline is the F-35’s 

fourth, including the original estimate at the start of development in 

October 2001. Table 1 shows changes in cost, quantity, and major 

schedules associated with each baseline and also a June 2010 interim 

estimate at the time of Nunn-McCurdy breach. The causes of cost growth 

and schedule delays from 2001 to 2012 are documented in past GAO 

reports (see appendix l and Related Products).

Due to the cost breach, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics rescinded the 

program’s approval to enter system development and DOD began efforts 

to establish a new acquisition program baseline. The department 

continued restructuring actions during 2011 and 2012 that added more 

cost, extended schedules, and further reduced aircraft procurement 

quantities in the near-term. The quantity of F-35 aircraft to be procured in 

total was not changed, but restructured plans have deferred to future 

years the procurement of 410 aircraft originally planned to be procured 

through 2017 based on the 2007 revised baseline. Through the end of 

calendar year 2012, the contractor has delivered a total of 52 aircraft–14 

test and 38 production aircraft. 

 

5

Commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy, 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement 

for DOD to submit unit cost reports on major defense acquisition programs or designated 

major subprograms. Procurement and acquisition unit costs are tracked against the 

current and original baseline estimates for a program. Increases in unit costs over certain 

thresholds constitute breaches in unit cost growth and, when the critical cost growth 

threshold is breached, DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. §2433a to take certain steps to 

explain and justify continuation of the program. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Table 1: Changes in Reported F-35 Program Quantity, Cost, and Deliveries, 2001-2012

October 2001 

(system 

development 

start) 

December 2003 

(approved 

baseline) 

March 2007

(approved 

baseline)

June 2010 

(NunnMcCurdy)

March 2012

(approved 

baseline)

Expected quantities

Development quantities 14 14 15 14 14

Procurement quantities 

(U.S. only)

2,852 2,443 2,443 2,443 2,443

Total quantities 2,866 2,457 2,458 2,457 2,457

Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions)

Development $34.4 $44.8 $44.8 $51.8 $55.2

Procurement 196.6 199.8 231.7 325.1 335.7

Military construction 2.0 0.2 2.0 5.6 4.8

Total program acquisition $233.0 $244.8 $278.5 $382.5 $395.7

Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in 

millions)

Program acquisition $81 $100 $113 $156 $161

Average procurement 69 82 95 133 137

Estimated delivery and production dates

First production aircraft delivery 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011

Initial operational capability 2010-2012 2012-2013 2012-2015 TBD TBD

Full-rate production 2012 2013 2013 2016 2019

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: TBD means to be determined.

The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts. The program 

met or substantially met most of its key management objectives 

established for the year. Also, development flight testing exceeded the 

planned number of flights by a good margin for 2012, but did not quite 

accomplish the planned number of test points.6

 

6

Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight plans that are need to verify 

aircraft design and performance.

The program made 

considerable progress in addressing significant technical risks needing 

resolution, such as the helmet mounted display. Furthermore, software 

management practices improved, but this area continued to require more 

time and effort than planned. While the F-35 program made progress in 

Program Made 

Progress in 2012, but 

Majority of Testing 

Still Ahead
 

Page 6 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

2012, the bulk of development testing and evaluation is ahead, is planned 

to continue into 2016, and is expected to identify additional deficiencies 

impacting aircraft design and performance. To date, slightly more than 11 

percent of development contract performance specifications have been 

verified as met and the development flight test program has cumulatively 

accomplished just over one-third of the test points and test flights 

planned. The operational test community raised concerns about the F-35 

readiness for training, development test plans and results, and the 

schedule and resources for starting initial operational testing in 2017.

The F-35 program office annually establishes major management 

objectives it wants to achieve in the upcoming year. The program 

achieved 7 of the 10 primary objectives (70 percent) it established for 

2012 and made substantial progress on one other. Table 2 summarizes 

the 2012 objectives and accomplishments.

F-35 Program Met Most of 

Its 2012 Key Management 

Objectives
 

Page 7 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Table 2: F-35 Program Results for 2012 Objectives

Objective Was objective met? Accomplishments

Test Complete Block 1A and 1B 

Development Test and Evaluation 

(DT&E) 

Yes Block 1A DT&E was completed in January 2012 and 

Block 1B in March 2012.

Complete Block 3 Critical Design 

Review (CDR) #1

No Block 3 preliminary design review closed in November 

2012. Block 3 CDR #1 was conducted in late January 

2013.

Begin Lab Testing of Dual Path 

Helmet Mounted Display Systems

Yes Both helmets are undergoing extensive testing. 

Training Begin F-35A and F-35B Pilot 

Training at Eglin Integrated 

Training Center

Yes F-35A first flight at Eglin in March and F-35B in May. 

Operational utility evaluations completed by November 

2012. Maintenance training also under way. The Air 

Force declared ‘Ready for Training’ in December 2012.

Contract Conduct Defense Acquisition Board 

to recertify the start of system 

development

Yes Defense Acquisition Board met in February and 

recertified the F-35 program in a March 2012 acquisition 

decision memorandum.

Complete Restructured 

Development Contract Negotiations

Yes Contract negotiations were completed in December 

2012.

Cost/ 

Schedule

Improve F-35 Production Cost 

Performance

Yes Cost indices improved for lot 4 compared to previous 

lots. Labor hours also decreasing. 

Deliver 40 F-35 Aircraft during 2012 No Due to manufacturing delays, labor strike, and other 

reasons, the contractor delivered 30 aircraft during 2012.

Successful Completion of Defense 

Contracting Management Agency 

(DCMA) Earned Value 

Management System (EVMS) Audit

No DCMA rejected the aircraft contractor’s EVMS corrective 

action plan in November for lack of progress. Contractor 

resubmitted its plan in January 2013 and DCMA is 

currently assessing it. 

Mature F-35 Supplier Network Yes Performance measures such as parts shortages, out of 

station work, and scrap rates are improving.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Blocks refer to increments of software capability. There are 3 major software blocks.

In addition to the 7 objectives met, the F-35 program substantially met 

one more–the block 3 critical design review was completed in late 

January 2013 following the preliminary design review in November 2012.

The remaining two objectives that were not met: (1) the contractor 

delivered 30 production aircraft compared to the program goal of 40 and

(2) its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) corrective action plan 

was not approved. EVMS compliance is a long-standing issue and 

concerns all Lockheed Martin aircraft produced for DOD, not just the F35. In 2007, the Defense Contract Management Agency, the agency 

responsible for auditing defense contractors’ systems, found Lockheed 

Martin’s process did not meet 19 of 32 required guidelines and, in 

October 2010, withdrew the determination of compliance. While 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

acknowledging that Lockheed Martin has made improvements, DCMA in 

2012 found the company still deficient on 13 guidelines. EVMS is an 

important, established tool for tracking costs, controlling schedule, 

identifying problems early, and providing accurate product status reports. 

DOD requires its use by major defense suppliers to facilitate good insight 

and oversight of the expenditure of government dollars.

The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 

expectations with some revisions to original plans. The program 

exceeded its planned number of flights by 18 percent, although it fell short 

of its plan in terms of test points flown by about 3 percent, suggesting that 

the flights flown were not as productive as expected.7

 

7

Cumulatively since the start of F-35 developmental flight testing in December 2009, the 

program is ahead of plans by 12 percent for the number of flights and 4 percent for test 

points flown. 

Test officials had to 

make several adjustments to plans during the year due to aircraft 

operating and performance limitations and late releases of software to 

test. As a result, none of the three variants completed all the 2012 

baseline points as originally planned. However, the test team was able to 

add and complete some test points that had been planned for future 

years. In this manner, the program was actually able to accomplish more 

test points in total than planned. Figure 1 compares the total baseline 

flight test points accomplished in 2012 against the initial plan for each test 

vehicle.

Development Flight Test 

Program Made Progress
 

Page 9 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 1: F-35 Flight Test Points Progress in 2012

Notes: This compares baseline points accomplished and planned. It does not include added points 

from future year plans. CV = carrier-suitable variant, STOVL = short takeoff and vertical landing, and 

CTOL = conventional takeoff and landing.

Results from flight testing in 2012 included the following:

• Aircraft dedicated to testing mission systems exceeded the number of 

planned flights and fell just short of accomplishing the total test points 

planned. Testing supported development of software providing 

training and initial warfighting capability as well as baseline signature 

testing. Overall progress in verifying and fielding enhanced 

capabilities was limited, largely because of late and incomplete 

software.

• The Navy’s F-35C carrier-suitable variant exceeded its number of 

planned flights and planned test points for 2012. Testing verified the 

basic flight envelope (demonstrating ranges of speed and altitude), 

flight with external weapons, and prepared the aircraft for simulated 

carrier landings. The program also accomplished shore-based tests of 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

a redesigned arresting hook (the hook engages the landing wires on 

aircraft carriers).

• The Marine Corp’s F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing variant 

exceeded the number of flights and test points. It successfully 

completed the first weapons release, engine air start tests, fuel dump 

operations, expanded flight envelope with weapons loaded, and radar 

signature testing. It also tested re-designed air inlet doors in vertical 

lift operations.

• The Air Force’s F-35A conventional takeoff and landing variant 

accomplished high angle of attack testing, initial weapons separation, 

and engine air start. It also evaluated flying qualities with internal and 

external weapons, and expanded the envelope for airspeed and 

altitude. This variant did not accomplish as many flights as planned 

and fell short of planned test points by about 15 percent. Operating

restrictions and deficiencies in the air refueling system were the main 

constraints.

Flight, ground, and lab testing has identified significant technical and 

structural concerns that, if not addressed, would substantially degrade the 

F-35’s capabilities and mission effectiveness. The F-35 program made 

considerable progress in 2012 to address these major technical risks:

• The helmet mounted display (which provides flight data, targeting, and

other sensor data to the pilot) is integral to the mission systems 

architecture, to reduce pilot workload, and to achieve the F-35’s 

concept of operations. The original helmet mounted display 

encountered significant technical deficiencies and did not meet

warfighter requirements. The program is pursuing a dual path by 

developing a second, less capable helmet while working to fix the first 

helmet design. Both helmets are being evaluated and program and 

contractor officials told us that they have increased confidence that 

the helmet deficiencies will be fixed. DOD may make a decision as to 

which helmet to procure in 2013, but the selected helmet is not 

expected to be integrated into the baseline aircraft until 2015.

• The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) is an important 

tool to predict and diagnose maintenance and supply issues, 

automating logistics support processes and providing decision aids 

aimed at reducing life cycle sustainment costs and improving force 

readiness. ALIS is developed and fielded in increments. Limited 

capability ALIS systems are in use at training and testing locations. 

More capable versions are being developed and program and 

contractor officials told us that the program is on track to fix identified 

shortcomings and field the fully capable system in 2015. Limited 

F-35 Program Made 

Progress Addressing 

Significant Technical Risks
 

Page 11 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

progress was made in 2012 on developing a smaller, transportable 

version needed to support unit level deployments to operating 

locations.

• During 2012, the carrier variant Arresting Hook System was 

redesigned after the original hook was found to be deficient, which 

prevented active carrier trials. During shore-based tests, the program 

accomplished risk reduction testing of a redesigned hook point to 

inform this new design. The preliminary design review was conducted 

in August 2012 and the critical design review in February 2013. Flight 

testing of the redesigned system is slated for late 2013.

• Ground testing also made continued progress in 2012, including 

structural and durability testing to verify that all three variants can 

achieve expected life and identify life-limited parts. Over time, testing 

has discovered bulkhead and rib cracks. The program is testing some 

redesigned structures and planning other modifications. Officials plan 

to retrofit test and production aircraft already built and make changes 

to the production line for subsequent aircraft. Current projections 

show the aircraft and modifications remain within weight targets.

The F-35 software development effort is one of the largest and most 

complex in DOD history. It is essential to achieve capabilities such as 

sensor fusion, weapons and fire control, maintenance diagnostics, and 

propulsion. Recent management actions to refocus software development 

activities and to implement improvement initiatives appear to be yielding 

benefits, but software will continue to be a very challenging and high risk 

undertaking for this program, especially for mission systems. Over time, 

software requirements have grown in size and complexity and the 

contractor has taken more time and effort than expected to write 

computer code, integrate it on aircraft and subsystems, conduct lab and 

flight tests to verify it works, and to correct defects found in testing.

The aircraft contractor and F-35 program office have recently taken steps 

to improve software management and output. In addition to completing 

most work on the first major software block, other significant management 

actions should enhance future software and mission system outcomes. 

These actions include:

• starting up and operating a second system integration lab, adding 

substantial testing and development capability;

• prioritizing and focusing resources on the next block of software and 

decreasing concurrent work on multiple blocks;

• implementing improvement initiatives recommended by an 

independent software review; and

While Software 

Development Continues to 

Provide Significant 

Challenges, Software

Management Has 

Improved
 

Page 12 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

• evaluating the possible deferral of some capabilities, either to later 

blocks or moving them outside the current F-35 program to follow on 

development efforts.

Our April 2011 report discussed the need for several of these actions. For 

instance, we recommended that DOD undertake an independent software 

review.8

These recent management actions are positive and encouraging, but 

overall, software development activities in 2012 lagged behind plans. 

Most software code has been developed, but a substantial amount of 

integration and test work remains before the program can demonstrate 

full warfighting capability. Software capabilities are developed, tested and 

delivered in three major blocks and two increments—initial and final—

within each block. The status of the three blocks is described below:

Subsequently, an independent review was conducted and 

contractor software managers implemented several improvement 

initiatives recommended by that review. These are yielding benefits. For 

example, program officials reported that the time span to fix defects has 

decreased from180 days to 55 days, allowing the program to keep better 

pace even though the number of defects has increased. In addition, the 

time taken to build and release software to testing has decreased from 

187 hours to 30 hours due to new automated processes. Contractor

officials currently plan to broaden the assessment’s initiatives to other 

software development efforts, including logistics and training. Our 2011 

report also discussed the need to reduce concurrent block work and to 

evaluate the possible deferral of the most advanced capabilities to future 

increments; program officials are actively pursuing these areas as 

discussed above.

• Block 1.0, providing initial training capability, was largely completed in 

2012, although some final development and testing will continue. 

Also, the capability delivered did not fully meet expected requirements 

relating to the helmet, ALIS, and instrument landing capabilities.

• Block 2.0, providing initial warfighting capabilities and limited 

weapons, fell behind due to integration challenges and the 

reallocation of resources to fix block 1.0 defects. The initial increment, 

block 2A, delivered late and was incomplete. Full release of the final 

increment, block 2B, has been delayed until November 2013 and 

 

8

GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but Progress 

Still Lags, GAO-11-325 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2011).
 

Page 13 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

won’t be complete until late 2015. The Marine Corps is requiring an 

operational flight clearance from the Naval Air Systems Command 

before it can declare an initial operational capability (IOC) for its F35B force. IOC is the target date each service establishes for fielding 

an initial combat capable force.

• Block 3.0 providing full warfighting capability, to include sensor fusion 

and additional weapons, is the capability required by the Navy and Air 

Force for declaring their respective IOC dates. Thus far, the program 

has made little progress on block 3.0 software. The program intends 

initial block 3.0 to enter flight test in 2013, which will be conducted 

concurrently with the final 15 months of block 2B flight tests. Delivery 

of final block 3.0 capability is intended to begin nearly 3 years of 

developmental flight tests in 2014. This is rated as one of the 

program’s highest risks because of its complexity.

In particular, the development and testing of software-intensive mission 

systems are lagging, with the most challenging work ahead.9

 

9

Mission systems are critical enablers of F-35’s combat effectiveness employing next 

generation sensors with fused information from on-board and off-board systems (i.e. 

electronic warfare, communication navigation identification, electro-optical target system, 

electro-optical distributed aperture system, radar, and data links).

About 12 

percent of mission systems capabilities are validated at this time, up from 

4 percent about 1 year ago. Progress on mission systems was limited by 

contractor delays in software delivery, limited capability in the software 

when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software 

versions. Further development and integration of the most complex 

elements—sensor fusion and helmet mounted display—lie ahead. Sensor 

fusion integrates data from critical subsystems and displays the 

information to the pilot. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of sensor fusion 

work associated with each software block. About 36 percent of the sensor 

fusion work was completed in software block 1. Final verification and 

closure of remaining fusion requirements through block 3 will not be 

completed until 2016.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 2: Percent of Sensor Fusion Development in Each Software Block

The critical work to test and verify aircraft design and operational 

performance for the F-35 program is far from complete. Cumulatively 

since the start of developmental flight testing, the program has flown 

2,595 of 7,727 planned flights (34 percent) and accomplished 20,495 of 

59,585 test points (34 percent). For development testing as a whole, the 

program has verified 11.3 percent of the F-35 development contract 

specifications (349 of 3,094 specifications) through November 2012. 

Contract specifications include specific design parameters and operating 

requirements such as speed and range that the F-35 aircraft are expected 

to meet. Three-fourths of the total contract specifications cannot be fully 

evaluated, verified, and approved until the final increment of software is 

released and fully tested. Testing of the final increment is expected to 

begin in 2014 and continue through 2016.

Initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is scheduled to begin in 

2017. This date is dependent on successful completion of development 

test and evaluation. IOT&E evaluates the combat effectiveness and 

suitability of the aircraft in an operationally realistic environment. Its 

successful completion is a prerequisite for DOD’s plans to approve the F35 for full rate production in 2019. Operational testers have raised 

concerns about F-35’s current operational capabilities and suitability, 

The Bulk of Testing, 

Demonstration, and 

Verification of F-35 

Performance Is Ahead
 

Page 15 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

readiness for training activities, and the progress of developmental 

testing. Further, the testing offices in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) have not approved the latest revision to the test and 

evaluation master plan because of concerns about the timing and 

resources available for IOT&E and unacceptable overlap of development 

with the start of IOT&E. We will continue to monitor the concerns and 

progress of operational testing during future F-35 reviews.

Achieving key performance parameters are critical to the F-35 meeting 

the warfighter’s operational requirements. They include measures such 

as range, weapons carriage, mission reliability, and sortie rates. These 

parameters also cannot be fully verified until the end of IOT&E in 2019. 

Based on limited information, DOD is currently projecting that the F-35 

program is either meeting or close to meeting at least threshold 

(minimum) performance requirements.

While initial F-35 production overran target costs and delivered late, there 

are several encouraging signs indicating better outcomes in the coming 

years. Overall, manufacturing and supply operations are improving with 

the latest data showing labor hours to build the aircraft decreasing, 

deliveries accelerating, quality measures improving, and parts shortages 

declining. That said, the program is working through the continuing effects 

from the F-35’s highly concurrent acquisition strategy. For example, the 

program is continuing to incur substantial costs for rework to fix 

deficiencies discovered in testing, but the amount per aircraft is dropping. 

Nevertheless, continuing discoveries in testing will likely drive additional 

changes to design and manufacturing processes at the same time 

production rates increase. DOD’s substantial reductions in near-term 

procurement quantities have decreased–but not eliminated– the risk from 

investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft before testing proves

the aircraft design and verifies that its performance and reliability meet 

requirements.

Analyses of labor, parts, and quality data, observations on the 

manufacturing floor, and discussions with defense and contracting 

officials provide signs that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes are 

improving. The aircraft contractor is moving down a steep learning curve, 

which is a measure that the work force is gaining important experience 

and that processes are maturing as more aircraft are built. Other 

indicators of improvement include the following:

After a Slow Start, 

Aircraft 

Manufacturing and 

Deliveries Are 

Beginning to Catch 

Up to Plans

Manufacturing Is 

Becoming More Efficient
 

Page 16 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

• The decrease in labor hours needed to complete aircraft at the prime 

contractor’s plant as the labor force gains experience. For example, 

the first Air Force production jet was delivered in May 2011 and 

required about 149,000 labor hours at the prime’s plant to build, while 

an Air Force jet delivered in December 2012 only required about 

94,000 labor hours. Overall, the contractor reported a 37 percent 

reduction in direct labor during 2012.

• The improvement in the contractor’s labor efficiency rate, a measure 

of how long it is taking to complete certain work tasks against 

engineering standards. Labor efficiency on the first production aircraft 

was 6 percent and improved to 13 percent for the 31st production 

aircraft. While still low, Defense Contract Management Agency 

officials stated that the rate should continue to improve with increased 

production due to work force learning and factory line enhancements.

• The decrease in span times—the number of calendar days to 

manufacture aircraft in total and in specific work staging areas. The 

aircraft contractor is altering assembly line processes to streamline 

factory flow. As a result, for example, span time in the final assembly 

area declined by about one-third in 2012 compared to 2011.

• The increase in factory throughput as the contractor delivered 30 

production aircraft in 2012 compared to 9 in 2011. During our plant 

visit in 2012, we observed an increased level of activity on the 

manufacturing floor as compared to 2011. The contractor had more 

tooling in place, had altered and streamlined processes, and had 

factory expansion plans underway.

• The decrease in traveled work (work done out of sequence or 

incomplete items moving to the next work station), parts shortages on 

the line, and product defects. For example, traveled work declined 90 

percent and the defect rate declined almost 80 percent in 2012 

compared to 2011. Other quality indicators such as scrap rates and 

non-conformances also improved from prior years and are trending in 

a positive direction. These have all been major contributors to past 

cost increases and schedule delays.

• The accomplishment of a schedule risk analysis to improve the 

contractor’s master schedule and related schedules. A schedule risk 

analysis is a comprehensive evaluation that uses statistical 

techniques to examine the fidelity of schedule estimates and the 

likelihood of accomplishing work as scheduled. It provides better and 

timelier insight into program performance to help identify and resolve 

schedule roadblocks.

• The improvement in aircraft contractor manufacturing processes, 

although not fully mature compared to best practice standards. The 

aircraft contractor is using statistical process control to bring critical 

manufacturing processes under control so they are repeatable, 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

sustainable, and consistently producing parts within quality tolerances 

and standards. The best practice standard is to have all critical 

manufacturing processes in control by the start of production. Just 

over one-third of manufacturing processes are currently judged to be 

capable of consistently producing quality parts at the best practice 

standard. The contractor has a plan in place to achieve the best 

practice standard by the start of full-rate production in 2019. We have 

observed this quality practice on only a few DOD programs.

Going forward, effective management of the global supply chain is vital to 

boost production rates to planned levels, to control costs, and maintain 

quality. The aircraft contractor is developing a global supply chain of more 

than 1,500 suppliers. Effective supplier management will be critical to 

efficient and quality manufacturing at higher annual rates. Currently, a 

relatively small number of suppliers provide most of the material, but that 

is expected to change in the future, especially as international firms get 

more of the business. Management of international supplier base 

presents unique challenges, including (1) differing U.S. and foreign 

government policies, (2) differences in business practices, and (3) foreign 

currency exchange rates. These can complicate relationships and hinder 

effective supply chain integration.

The aircraft contractor is implementing stringent supplier quality 

management practices. For example, Lockheed Martin officials assess 

the overall performance of key component suppliers against program 

goals for production affordability, contract cost growth, delivery times, part 

shortage occurrences, and field performance, as well as the number of 

corrective action reports filed against the supplier. In total, key component 

suppliers are assessed and rated across 23 measures, as applicable and 

the contractor works with suppliers to improve performance.

As discussed earlier, aircraft labor hours to build aircraft are decreasing 

with more experience and the program is moving down the learning curve 

as projected. The fifth annual low rate initial production (LRIP) contract 

was recently negotiated with cost targets reflecting additional gains in 

efficiency. DOD and contractor officials also expressed confidence that 

contracts for the 6th and 7th annual buys will be negotiated by this 

summer and reflect similar performance. The first four LRIP contracts, 

however, over-ran their target costs, in total by $1.2 billion. According to 

program documentation, the government’s share of the total overrun is 

about $756 million under the sharing incentive provisions in these 

contracts. Cost increases range from 6.5 percent to 16.1 percent more 

Production Costs Are 

Trending Toward Targets 

and Aircraft Deliveries Are 

Accelerating
 

Page 18 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

than negotiated costs. LRIP 4, the largest by dollar and number of 

aircraft, had the smallest percent increase in cost, indicating better 

performance. Contract costs and increases are summarized in table 3.

Table 3: Procurement Contract Costs as of September 2012 

Dollars in millions

Contract

Number of 

aircraft

Contract cost 

at award

Current 

contract cost 

estimate

Cost 

increase

Percent 

increase

LRIP 1 2 $511.7 $561.6 $49.9 9.7

LRIP 2 12 2,349.6 2,671.6 322.0 13.7

LRIP 3 17 3,178.7 3,691.0 512.3 16.1

LRIP 4 32 5,035.9 5,362.5 326.6 6.5

Total 63 $11,075.9 $12,286.7 $1,210.8 10.9

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Total aircraft includes 58 for the United States and 5 for international partners.

The contractor has delivered 39 aircraft under LRIP contracts through the 

end of December 2012–nine in 2011 and 30 in 2012. Figure 3 tracks 

actual delivery dates against the dates specified in the contracts. 

Deliveries were late an average of 11 months compared to the contracted 

dates, but the data shows that the delivery rate has improved 

considerably. For example, the first two production aircraft were late 16 

and 15 months, respectively, whereas the last two delivered were each 2 

months late. Fluctuations in some deliveries during mid-2012 are impacts 

from the labor strike last summer that the contractor does not expect to 

continue. Other factors contributing to late deliveries include design 

changes to the aircraft; traveled work; scrap, repair, and rework hours; 

and parts shortages.
 

Page 19 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 3: F-35 Deliveries Compared to Contract Dates

Note: The numbered aircraft are in order of delivery. AF= U.S. Air Force F-35A, BF = U.S. Marine 

Corps F-35B, CF = U.S. Department of the Navy F-35C; and BK = United Kingdom F-35B.

In addition to contract cost overruns, the program is incurring substantial 

costs to retrofit (rework) produced aircraft needed to fix deficiencies 

discovered in testing. These costs are largely attributable to the 

substantial concurrency, or overlap, between testing and manufacturing 

activities. The F-35 program office projects rework costs of about $900 

million to fix the aircraft procured on the first four annual procurement 

contracts. On average, rework adds about $15.5 million to the price of 

each of the 58 U.S. aircraft under these contracts.

Substantial rework costs are forecast to continue through the 10th annual 

contract (fiscal year 2016 procurement), but at decreasing amounts 

annually and on each aircraft. The program office projects about $827 

million more to rework aircraft procured under the next 6 annual 

contracts. Government liability for these costs depends on share ratios to 

be negotiated. The government and Lockheed Martin reached agreement 

under the LRIP 5 contract that costs for known changes due to 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

concurrency will be shared 50/50. Other cost overruns under this 

contract will be shared 55/45 until the contract ceiling is reached, at which 

point the contractor assumes total responsibility for overruns. The lagging 

cost and schedule performance on the first four production contracts and 

the high costs of rework can be largely attributed to the continuing effects 

of the F-35’s highly concurrent acquisition strategy. The program started 

manufacturing aircraft before designs were stable, before establishing 

mature manufacturing processes, and before sufficiently testing the 

design and aircraft performance. A November 2011 report on 

concurrency by senior level DOD officials confirms these observations. 

The report states that F-35 testing continues to find technical issues with 

significant design and production impacts and requiring rework on 

produced aircraft. It expresses a lack of confidence in the design stability 

that was lower than expected given the quantities of aircraft procured and 

potential for more rework costs.10

Even with the positive trends in manufacturing, cost, and schedule 

discussed above, the government continues to incur risk by procuring 

large quantities of aircraft with the majority of testing still ahead. The 

contractor continues to make major design and tooling changes and alter 

manufacturing processes concurrent with development testing. 

Engineering design changes from discoveries during manufacturing and 

testing are declining in number, but are still substantial and higher than 

expected from a program this far into production. With extensive testing 

ahead, discoveries in testing will drive more design changes, possibly 

impacting manufacturing processes and the supplier base. Figure 4 

graphically depicts monthly engineering change “traffic.” The forecast 

indicates that about one-third of projected design changes in total are to 

come and will hover around 200 per month through the end of system 

development, initial operational testing, and start of full rate production in 

2019.

 

10F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review, Office of the Undersecretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, November 29, 2011.

Aircraft Design Changes 

Continue to Impact 

Efficiency and Add to Risk
 

Page 21 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Figure 4: F-35 Engineering Design Changes

Demonstrating the reliability of a system is another indicator that the 

design is stable and ready for production. During system acquisition, 

reliability growth improvements should occur over time as problems are 

identified, tested, and fixed, usually through design changes and 

manufacturing process improvements. We have reported in the past that 

it is important to demonstrate that the system reliability is on track to meet 

goals before production begins as changes after production commences 

can be inefficient and costly.11

 

11GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves 

Acquisition Outcomes, 

One key indicator of F-35 reliability is the 

mean flying hours between failures, that is, the average time an aircraft 

can fly before a maintenance action is required to repair a component or 

system that is not performing as designed. Figure 5 projects F-35

performance on this indicator compared to 2012 plans and eventual 

GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
 

Page 22 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

goals. Compared to data from one year ago, each variant demonstrated 

some reliability growth in 2012, but each is lagging behind its plan. The 

Marine Corps’ STOVL demonstrated the biggest increase–from 0.5 hours 

in 2011 to 1.4 hours currently—but it is also the furthest behind plans. We 

also note that the rates planned by October 2012 were little changed from 

those established for October 2011.12

Figure 5: Mean Flying Hours between Failures

DOD is investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft before the 

design is stable, testing proves that it works and is reliable, and 

manufacturing processes mature to where aircraft can be produced in 

quantity to cost and schedule targets. The department’s substantial 

reductions in procurement quantities in the past few years lowered this 

 

12GAO-12-437. 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

risk, but did not eliminate it.13

Table 4: F-35 Procurement Investments and Flight Test Progress

DOD has already invested about $28 billion 

in procuring 121 aircraft through the 2012 buy (the 6th annual 

procurement lot). According to the new acquisition baseline and flight test 

schedule, DOD will procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before the end of 

developmental flight testing (see table 4).

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Cumulative procurement (thenyear dollars in billions)$0.8 $3.5 $7.1 $14.3 $21.3 $27.6 $33.8 $40.1 $47.9 $57.8 $69.0 

Cumulative aircraft procured 2 14 28 58 90 121 150 179 223 289 365

Percent total flight test points 

completed 

- <1% <1% 2% 9% 22% 34% 54% 74% 91% 100%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: Years listed denote fiscal years. Flight test data reflects the percentage of total flight test 

points completed in time to inform the next year’s procurement decision. For example above, the F-35 

program accomplished about 22 percent of total planned flight test points through the end of calendar 

year 2011 that could help inform the fiscal year 2012 procurement decision. The program intends to 

complete developmental flight test points in 2016 and would be in a position to fully support the 2017 

procurement buy.

Ensuring that the acquisition costs of the F-35 are affordable so that 

aircraft can be bought in the quantities and time required by the warfighter 

will be of paramount concern to the Congress, U.S. military, and 

international partners. Annual acquisition funding requirements for the 

United States currently average $12.6 billion per year through 2037. Once 

acquired, the current forecasts of life cycle sustainment costs for the F-35 

fleet are considered unaffordable by defense officials. Efforts are under 

way to try and lower annual operating and support costs. Uncertainties 

and delays in the F-35 program are forcing new plans for recapitalizing 

fighter forces and the military services are incurring increased costs to 

buy, modify, and sustain legacy fighters.

 

13Since 2005, a recurring theme in our body of work on the F-35 has been a concern 

about this substantial concurrency and the risks it poses to achieving good program 

outcomes. We previously recommended in several reports that annual procurement 

quantities be reduced to provide more time for testing to verify aircraft design and 

performance (refer to Appendix I). 

Costs and Funding for 

Acquisition and 

Sustainment Remain 

Very Challenging 

Moving Forward
 

Page 24 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

The March 2012 acquisition program baseline incorporates the 

department’s positive restructuring actions since 2010. These actions 

place the F-35 program on firmer footing, but aircraft are expected to cost 

more and deliveries to warfighters will take longer than in previous 

baselines. In terms of acquisition funding requirements, the new baseline 

projects total development and procurement budget requirements of $316

billion from 2013 through 2037. Figure 6 shows these budget projections. 

The rebaselined program will require an average of $12.6 billion annually 

through 2037, an unprecedented demand on the defense procurement 

budget. Maintaining this level of sustained funding will be difficult in a 

period of declining or flat defense budgets and competition with other “big 

ticket items” such as the KC-46 tanker and a new bomber program.

Figure 6: F-35 Program Budgeted Development and Procurement Funding Requirements, Fiscal Years 2013-2037

Note: Development and procurement of the Marine Corps variant is included in the Department of the 

Navy budget accounts.

When approving the new 2012 program baseline, the acting 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Dollars (then-year in billions)

Fiscal year

Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation

Air Force procurement

Navy research, development, test, and evaluation

Navy procurement

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037

$12.6 billion average

Acquiring F-35 Aircraft at 

Required Annual 

Quantities Will Be 

Expensive 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

established affordability unit cost targets for each variant to be met by the 

start of full-rate production in 2019.14

Some international partners are also expressing concern about F-35 

prices and schedule delays. Besides the consequences for international 

cooperation and fighter force commonality, there are at least two other 

important financial impacts. First, U.S. future budgets assume the 

financial quantity benefits of partners purchasing at least 697 aircraft. 

Second, the current procurement profile for the F-35 projects a rapid 

buildup in partner buys—195 aircraft through 2017 that comprise about 

half the total production during the 5-year period 2013 through 2017. If 

fewer aircraft are procured in total or in smaller annual quantities, unit 

costs paid by the U.S. and partners will likely rise.

To meet these targets, the program 

will have to reduce unit costs by about 26 percent (STOVL), 35 percent 

(CTOL), and 39 percent (CV) from the unit costs in the fiscal year 2012 

budget request. Our analysis indicates that these targets are achievable if 

the future year prices and quantities used to construct the new baseline 

are accurate.

To better understand the potential impacts on prices from changes in 

quantities, OSD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) 

office did a sensitivity analysis to forecast impacts on F-35 average 

procurement unit costs assuming various quantities purchased by the 

United States and international partners. For example, if the United 

States bought its full quantity of 2,443 aircraft and the partners did not 

buy any aircraft, CAPE calculated that the average unit cost would 

increase by 6 percent. If the United States bought 1,500 aircraft and the 

partners bought their expected quantity of 697, unit costs would rise by 9 

percent. If the United States bought 1,500 and the partners 0, unit costs 

would rise 19 percent.

In addition to the costs for acquiring aircraft, significant concerns and 

questions persist regarding the cost to operate and sustain F-35 fleets 

over the coming decades. The current sustainment cost projection by 

CAPE for all U.S. aircraft, based on an estimated 30 year service life, 

 

14Affordability targets were established for the unit recurring flyaway costs. These are 

budgeted procurement costs associated with buying the aircraft itself, including the 

airframe, engine, electronics, and armament. Targets do not include procurement of nonrecurring production items, ancillary ground support equipment, and spares. 

Controlling Sustainment 

Costs Is a Major Concern
 

Page 26 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

exceeds $1 trillion. This raises long-term affordability concerns for the 

military services and international partners. F-35 operating and support 

costs (O&S) are currently projected to be 60 percent higher than those of 

the existing aircraft it will replace. Using current program assumptions of 

aircraft inventory and flight hours, CAPE recently estimated annual O&S 

costs of $18.2 billion for all F-35 variants compared to $11.1 billion spent 

in 2010 to operate and sustain the legacy aircraft. DOD officials have 

declared that O&S costs of this magnitude are unaffordable and are 

actively engaged in evaluating opportunities to reduce F-35 life-cycle 

sustainment costs, such as basing and infrastructure reductions, 

competitive sourcing, and reliability improvements.

IOC dates are critical milestones for the F-35 program because these are 

the target dates for fielding initial combat capable forces as required by 

the warfighters when justifying the need for the new weapon system. As 

shown earlier in table 1, these dates have slipped over time and have not 

been reset in the new baseline. The military services have been 

reassessing their needs for several years and have deferred setting new 

target dates for acquiring warfighting capabilities until operational test 

plans are better understood. Based on service criteria espoused earlier in 

the program, it would appear that the earliest possible IOC dates are now 

2015 for the Marine Corps and 2017 for the Air Force and Navy.

Because of F-35 delays and uncertainties, the military services are 

extending the service life of legacy aircraft to bridge the gap in F-35

deliveries and mitigate projected shortfalls in fighter aircraft force 

requirements. In November 2012, we reported current cost estimates of 

almost $5 billion (in 2013 dollars) to extend the service life of 300 Air 

Force F-16s and 150 Navy F/A-18s, with additional quantities possible if 

needed to maintain inventory levels.15

 

15GAO, Fighter Aircraft: Better Cost Estimates Needed for Extending the Service Life of 

Selected F-16s and F-18s, 

At the Congress’s behest, the Navy 

is also buying 41 new F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets at a budgeted cost of 

about $3.1 billion (then-year dollars). The services will incur additional 

future sustainment costs to support these new and extended-life aircraft.

F-35 delays and uncertainties continue to make it difficult for the services 

to establish and implement retirement schedules for existing fleets and to 

GAO-13-51 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2012). 

F-35 Delays Have 

Increased Recapitalization 

Costs for Existing Fighters
 

Page 27 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

develop firm basing and manpower plans for housing and supporting 

future forces.

Overall, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is now moving in the right 

direction after a long, expensive, and arduous learning process. It still has 

tremendous challenges ahead. The program must fully validate design 

and operational performance against warfighter requirements, while, at 

the same time, making the system affordable so that the United States 

and partners can acquire new capabilities in the quantity needed and can 

then sustain the force over its life cycle. Recent restructuring actions have 

improved the F-35’s prospects for success, albeit at greater costs and 

further delays. Many of the restructuring actions—more time and 

resources for development flight testing, reduced annual procurements, 

the recognition of concurrency risks, independent cost and software 

assessments, and others—are responsive to our past recommendations. 

Recent management initiatives, including the schedule risk analysis and 

the software assessment, also respond to prior recommendations. As a 

result, we are not making new recommendations in this report. DOD and 

the contractor now need to demonstrate that the F-35 program can 

effectively perform against cost and schedule targets in the new baseline 

and deliver on promises. Until then, it will continue to be difficult for the 

United States and international partners to confidently plan, prioritize, and 

budget for the future; retire aging aircraft; and establish basing plans with 

a support infrastructure. Achieving affordability in annual funding 

requirements, aircraft unit prices, and life-cycle operating and support 

costs will in large part determine how many aircraft the warfighter can 

ultimately acquire, sustain, and have available for combat.

DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in 

appendix III. DOD concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director 

of the Office of Management and Budget. The report is available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 28 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at ((202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to 

this report are listed in Appendix IV.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 29 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD 

Responses

Page 30 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2001

GAO-02-39

$34.4 Billion

10 years

$69 Million

Start of system development 

and demonstration approved.

Critical technologies needed for 

key aircraft performance 

elements not mature. Program 

should delay start of system 

development until critical 

technologies mature to 

acceptable levels.

DOD did not delay start of 

system development and 

demonstration stating 

technologies were at acceptable 

maturity levels and will manage 

risks in development.

2005

GAO-05-271

$44.8 Billion

12 years

$82 Million

The program undergoes replan to address higher than 

expected design weight, which 

added $7 billion and 18 

months to development 

schedule.

We recommended that the 

program reduce risks and 

establish executable business 

case that is knowledge-based 

with an evolutionary acquisition 

strategy.

DOD partially concurred but did 

not adjust strategy, believing 

that its approach is balanced 

between cost, schedule and 

technical risk.

2006

GAO-06-356

$45.7 Billion

12 years

$86 Million

Program sets in motion plan to 

enter production in 2007 

shortly after first flight of the 

non-production representative 

aircraft. 

The program planned to enter 

production with less than 1 

percent of testing complete. We 

recommended program delay 

investing in production until 

flight testing shows that F-35

performs as expected.

DOD partially concurred but did 

not delay start of production 

because it believed the risk level 

was appropriate.

2007

GAO-07-360

$44.5 Billion

12 years

$104 Million

Congress reduced funding for 

first two low-rate production 

buys thereby slowing the ramp 

up of production.

Progress was being made but 

concerns remained about undue 

overlap in testing and 

production. We recommended 

limits to annual production 

quantities to 24 a year until 

flying quantities are 

demonstrated.

DOD non-concurred and felt that 

the program had an acceptable 

level of concurrency and an 

appropriate acquisition strategy.

2008

GAO-08-388

$44.2 Billion

12 years

$104 Million

DOD implemented a MidCourse Risk Reduction Plan to 

replenish management 

reserves from about $400 

million to about $1 billion by 

reducing test resources.

We believed new plan 

increased risks and DOD should 

revise it to address testing, 

management reserves, and 

manufacturing concerns. We 

determined that the cost 

estimate was not reliable and 

that a new cost estimate and 

schedule risk assessment is 

needed.

DOD did not revise risk plan or 

restore testing resources, stating 

that it will monitor the new plan 

and adjust it if necessary. 

Consistent with a report 

recommendation, a new cost 

estimate was eventually 

prepared, but DOD refused to 

do a risk and uncertainty 

analysis.

Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD 

Responses 
Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD 

Responses

Page 31 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2009

GAO-09-303

$44.4 Billion

13 years

$104 Million

The program increased the 

cost estimate and adds a year 

to development but 

accelerated the production 

ramp up. Independent DOD 

cost estimate (JET I) projects 

even higher costs and further 

delays.

Moving forward with an 

accelerated procurement plan 

and use of cost reimbursement 

contracts is very risky. We 

recommended the program 

report on the risks and 

mitigation strategy for this 

approach.

DOD agreed to report its 

contracting strategy and plans to 

Congress and conduct a 

schedule risk analysis. The 

program completed the first 

schedule risk assessment with 

plans to update semi-annually. 

The Department announced a 

major restructuring reducing 

procurement and moving to 

fixed-price contracts.

2010

GAO-10-382

$49.3 Billion

15 years

$112 Million

The program was restructured 

to reflect findings of recent 

independent cost team (JET 

II) and independent 

manufacturing review team. 

As a result, development 

funds increased, test aircraft 

were added, the schedule was 

extended, and the early 

production rate decreased.

Costs and schedule delays 

inhibit the program’s ability to 

meet needs on time. We 

recommended the program 

complete a full comprehensive 

cost estimate and assess 

warfighter and IOC 

requirements. We suggest that 

Congress require DOD to tie 

annual procurement requests to 

demonstrated progress.

DOD continued restructuring, 

increasing test resources and 

lowering the production rate. 

Independent review teams 

evaluated aircraft and engine 

manufacturing processes. Cost 

increases later resulted in a 

Nunn-McCurdy breach. Military 

services are currently reviewing 

capability requirements as we 

recommended.

2011

GAO-11-325

$51.8 Billion

16 years

$133 Million

Restructuring continued with 

additional development cost 

increases; schedule growth; 

further reduction in near-term 

procurement quantities; and 

decreased the rate of increase 

for future production. The 

Secretary of Defense placed 

the STOVL variant on a 2 year 

probation; decoupled STOVL 

from the other variants; and 

reduced STOVL production 

plans for fiscal years 2011 to 

2013.

The restructuring actions are 

positive and if implemented 

properly, should lead to more 

achievable and predictable 

outcomes. Concurrency of 

development, test, and 

production is substantial and 

provides risk to the program. 

We recommended the program 

maintain funding levels as 

budgeted; establish criteria for 

STOVL probation; and conduct 

an independent review of 

software development, 

integration, and test processes.

DOD concurred with all three of 

the recommendations. DOD 

lifted STOVL probation, citing 

improved performance. 

Subsequently, DOD further 

reduced procurement quantities, 

decreasing funding 

requirements through 2016. The 

initial independent software 

assessment began in and 

ongoing reviews are planned 

through 2012.
Appendix I: Prior GAO Reports and DOD 

Responses

Page 32 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

GAO report

Est. dev. costs 

dev. length 

aircraft unit cost Key program event Primary GAO message DOD response and actions

2012

GAO-12-437

$55.2 Billion

18 years

$137 Million

The program established a 

new acquisition program 

baseline and approved the 

continuation of system 

development, increasing costs 

for development and 

procurements and extending 

the period of planned 

procurements by 2 years.

Extensive restructuring places 

the program on a more 

achievable course. Most of the 

program’s instability continues 

to be concurrency of 

development, test, and 

production. We recommend the 

Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation office conduct an 

analysis on the impact of lower 

annual funding levels; F-35

program office conducts an 

assessment of the supply chain 

and transportation network.

DOD partially concurred with 

conducting an analysis on the 

impact of lower annual funding 

levels and concurred with 

assessing the supply chain and 

transportation network.

Source: GAO.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

To evaluate F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program performance during 

calendar year 2012, we compared key management objectives on testing, 

training, contracting, cost and schedule activities to progress made during 

the year on each objective. On development flight testing, we interviewed 

F-35 program office, the aircraft contractor, and the office of the Director 

of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) officials on development test 

plans and results against expectations. We obtained and analyzed data 

on flights and test points, both planned and accomplished during 2012, 

and also compared progress against the total plans to complete. We 

obtained officials’ comments and reports on technical risks. We evaluated 

progress made and work to complete on major technical risks, including 

the helmet, logistics system, carrier arresting hook, and structural cracks. 

We reviewed status of software development and integration, contractor 

management improvement initiatives, issues on data fusion, and the 

impacts of late releases of software on the test program. We reviewed 

key documents related to this objective, including DOT&E’s annual F-35 

assessment, the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Test Team Report, and 

the Independent Software Assessment. 

To assess manufacturing and supply performance indicators, production 

results, and design changes, we obtained and analyzed manufacturing 

contract cost, aircraft delivery, and work performance data through the 

end of calendar year 2012 to assess progress against plans. We 

reviewed data and briefings provided by the program office, aircraft 

contractor, and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) in 

order to identify issues and assess impacts on supplier performance, 

costs of rework, manufacturing labor and quality data, and maturity of 

design and manufacturing process controls. We also determined reasons 

for manufacturing cost overruns and delivery delays, discussed program 

and contractor plans to improve, and projected the impact on 

development and operational tests. We interviewed contractor and DCMA 

officials to discuss the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) and 

Lockheed’s progress in improving its system. We did not conduct our 

own analysis of EVMS since the system has not yet been re-validated by 

DCMA. We also reviewed the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s F-35 

Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review. 

To determine acquisition and sustainment costs going forward, we 

received briefings by program and contractor officials and reviewed 

financial management reports, budget briefings annual Selected 

Acquisition Reports, monthly status reports, performance indicators, and 

other data through the end of calendar year 2012. We identified changes 

in cost and schedule, and obtained officials’ reasons for these changes. 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

We reviewed total program funding requirements in the Selected 

Acquisition Reports since the program’s inception and analyzed fiscal 

year 2013 President’s Budget data. We used this data to project annual 

funding requirements through the expected end of the F-35 acquisition in 

2037. We obtained and discussed the life cycle operating and support 

cost projections made by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

office and discussed future plans of the Department to try and reduce life 

cycle sustainment costs. 

In performing our work, we obtained financial data, programmatic 

information, and interviewed officials from the F-35 Joint Program Office, 

Arlington, Virginia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, Texas; 

Defense Contract Management Agency, Fort Worth, Texas; and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and the Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation office, all organizations within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D.C. 

We assessed the reliability of DOD and Contractor data by: reviewing 

existing information about the data, and interviewing agency officials 

knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted this 

performance audit from August 2012 to March 2013 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 36 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Michael Sullivan (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Marvin 

Bonner; Dr. W. Kendal Roberts; Erin Stockdale; Jungin Park; Megan 

Porter and John Lack.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 37 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance 

Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks. GAO-12-437. 

Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-12-400SP. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, 

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 20, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Implications of Program Restructuring and Other 

Recent Developments on Key Aspects of DOD’s Prior Alternate Engine 

Analyses. GAO-11-903R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Is Still Lagging. GAO-11-677T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 

2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but 

Progress Is Still Lagging Overall. GAO-11-450T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2011.

Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Force Structure Reports Generally 

Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and 

Guidance, and Limited Analyses. GAO-11-323R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 24, 2011.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective 

Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD’s Funding Projection for the 

F136 Alternate Engine. GAO-10-1020R. Washington, D.C.: September 

15, 2010.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements is Uncertain, 

with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions. 

GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 38 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead. 

GAO-10-478T. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting 

Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.: 

March 19, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges Remain as DOD Restructures 

Program. GAO-10-520T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program 

Enters Most Challenging Phase. GAO-09-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 

20, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-09-326SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009.

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk. GAO-09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require 

Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition 

Environment. GAO-08-782T. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2008.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-08-467SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks. 

GAO-08-569T. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks. 

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy. 

GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.

Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine 

Program. GAO-07-656T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 39 GAO-13-309 Joint Strike Fighter

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. 

GAO-07-360. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate 

Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis. 

GAO-06-717R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience 

Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons 

Systems Investments. GAO-06-585T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006.

Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by 

Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. GAO-06-487T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2006.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2006.

Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process. 

GAO-06-364. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006.

Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications for 

Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-519T. Washington, D.C: April 6, 

2005.

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005.

(121080)
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