_______________________________ 

 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly Opinion Clifford W. Taylor 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 20, 2004 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

MICHIGAN 

 Plaintiff -Appellant, 

v No. 123537 

RODNEY WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

CORRIGAN, C.J. 

We granted leave to appeal to determine whether the 

trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to read his 

preliminary examination transcript during a waiver-ofcounsel proceeding violated the requirements of People v 

Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), and MCR 

6.005(D).1 The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s 

waiver proceeding did not comply with the requirements of 

1

 468 Mich 945 (2003). 
 

 

Anderson and reversed defendant’s conviction on that basis.2 

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying defendant’s request and that defendant’s waiver 

of counsel was unequivocal, knowing, and voluntary. 

Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and 

remand for consideration of defendant’s remaining claims. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder,3 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 

(felony firearm),4

 and armed robbery.5 The trial court 

appointed counsel for defendant, but following defendant’s 

preliminary examination, counsel withdrew because of a 

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The trial 

court provided defendant with a replacement court-appointed 

attorney. 

During the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, defendant 

became unhappy with his attorney’s cross-examination of two 

prosecution witnesses. Defendant informed the court that 

he wished to represent himself: 

2

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 28,

2003 (Docket No. 232827). 

3

 MCL 750.316(1)(b). 

4

 MCL 750.227b. 

5

 MCL 750.529. 

2
 
 

I do not wish to adjourn the proceeding,

because I know this has been going on all along.

But I would like to represent myself, in proper

person. . . . 

* * * 

[O]nly if this Court would agree orally, and

a written consent, please, that [two prosecution

witnesses] may be brought back to court, and

allow me to recross-examine [them]. 

The trial court explained to defendant the risks he 

faced in defending himself, including defendant’s lack of 

familiarity with the Michigan rules of criminal procedure. 

Defendant answered that he understood the risks involved. 

He stated that he wished to “confront [his accusers] and 

question them” as was his “right by the United States 

Constitution.” 

The trial court again asked defendant whether he 

wished to represent himself; again, defendant answered, 

“Yes, ma’am.” The trial court advised defendant that he 

would not later be permitted to appeal a conviction on the 

basis of his own ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Defendant answered, “Yes I read that.” 

The trial court then asked defendant, “Are you making 

this request knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily?” 

Defendant answered, “Yes, ma’am.” The trial court informed 

defendant that he would not be permitted to disrupt the 

courtroom, and that if he did, his attorney would be 

brought back to represent defendant. Defendant answered, 

3
 
 

 

 

“Yes ma’am. I would not disrespect this Court, or do 

anything that’s unconduct of a gentleman [sic].” 

The trial court then advised defendant of the sentence 

he would face if convicted. Defendant said that he 

understood. Defendant again stated that he wished to 

reexamine two excused prosecution witnesses: 

 The Defendant: Ma’am, is it also on the

record, and it will probably be written down,

that I will have an opportunity to recrossexamine the prosecution’s first two witnesses

. . . . 

 The Court: No, we’re not bringing in those

other witnesses, we’re continuing with the trial.

It’s the Court’s opinion that you had proper

representation. . . . You can still have [your

court-appointed attorney] if you want, or you can

continue and represent yourself, but you are 

taking serious risks. . . . Do you understand

that? 

Defendant insisted that at his preliminary examination 

one of the prosecution’s witnesses had testified that he 

was “only fifty percent sure” that defendant was the 

perpetrator. Defendant was dissatisfied with his attorney 

because he did not cross-examine the witness on this 

alleged testimony. The prosecutor objected to defendant’s 

characterization of the witness’s testimony: 

And there is nothing in that exam transcript

[preliminary examination] that indicates that 

[the witness is] only fifty percent sure. What 

[defendant]’s saying he’s taking out of context.

And if [defendant] reads the whole thing, I think

he’ll understand why [defendant’s attorney] 

4
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

didn’t elaborate with further questioning of the

witness. 

Defendant requested time to read the written 

preliminary examination testimony. The trial court denied 

defendant’s request: 

No. I’m going to ask you one more time. Do 

you want to represent yourself? Because we’re 

bringing in the jury. 

The Defendant: Your Honor, with all due

respect. . . . 

The Court: I asked you one question. 

* * * 

The Court: Answer my question. 

The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: All right. Let’s bring in the

jury. 

The trial court once again informed defendant that if 

he disrupted the proceedings, his court-appointed attorney 

would be brought back to represent him. Defendant stated 

that he understood. 

Defendant’s court-appointed attorney remained as 

standby counsel. He advised defendant throughout the 

trial, took part in sidebar discussions, helped defendant 

prepare his closing argument, and argued to the court 

regarding jury instructions and the form of the verdict. 

5
 
 

Defendant was ultimately convicted6 and appealed by 

right. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed 

defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The 

majority held that defendant’s waiver of counsel was not 

unequivocal because defendant might not have elected selfrepresentation had the trial court allowed him to read the 

preliminary examination transcript. The majority opined: 

[The trial court’s] cursory handling of 

defendant’s request violated defendant’s right to

have the proceeding conducted so as to ensure

“that he knows what he is doing and his choice is

made with eyes open.” [Slip op at 1 (citations

omitted).] 

The Court of Appeals dissent would have held that the 

trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to read the 

preliminary examination transcript occurred after the court 

had already concluded the waiver of counsel procedure, and 

related solely to how the trial would proceed from that 

point forward. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The inquiry regarding waivers of Sixth Amendment 

rights mirrors the inquiry of whether a defendant has 

validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights: In each 

instance, the question is whether the defendant gave a 

6

The trial court vacated defendant’s conviction for 

armed robbery on a double jeopardy ground. 

6
 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. See Patterson 

v Illinois, 487 US 285, 297-298; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 

261 (1988) (waiver of Sixth Amendment rights is not more 

difficult to effectuate than waiver of Fifth Amendment 

rights). 

Accordingly, we adopt the standard of review that has 

been used for trial court decisions regarding waivers of 

Fifth Amendment rights, finding it equally applicable to 

decisions regarding waivers of Sixth Amendment rights: 

“Although engaging in a de novo review of

the entire record . . ., this Court does not

disturb a trial court’s factual findings

regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of

[Sixth Amendment] rights “unless that ruling is

found to be clearly erroneous.” [People v 

Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983).]

Credibility is crucial in determining a 

defendant’s level of comprehension, and the trial

judge is in the best position to make this 

assessment.” 

Although we review for clear error the trial

court’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s

knowing and intelligent waiver of [Sixth

Amendment] rights, . . . the meaning of “knowing

and intelligent” is a question of law. We review 

questions of law de novo. [People v Daoud, 462

Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152 (2000), quoting

People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 335

(1996).] 

Thus, the reviewing court is not free to simply substitute 

its view for that of the trial court, but must be careful 

7
 
 

 

to respect the trial court’s role in determining factual 

issues and issues of credibility.7 

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 

A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 

The Sixth Amendment safeguards the right to counsel at 

all critical stages of the criminal process for an accused 

who faces incarceration. Maine v Moulton, 474 US 159, 170; 

106 S Ct 477 ; 88 L Ed 2d 481 (1985). The Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel is applicable to the states through the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v 

Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963). 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that courts 

should “‘indulge every reasonable presumption against 

waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.’” Johnson v 

Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938), 

quoting Aetna Ins Co v Kennedy, 301 US 389, 393; 57 S Ct 

809; 81 L Ed 1177 (1937). 

The United States Constitution does not, however, 

force a lawyer upon a defendant; a criminal defendant may 

7

 To clarify, to the extent that People v Adkins (After

Remand), 452 Mich 702, 721 n 16; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), can

be read to say that trial court decisions regarding Sixth

Amendment waivers are only reviewed for abuse of 

discretion, it is erroneous. We believe the correct 

standard is that set forth above. 

8
 
 

 

 

choose to waive representation and represent himself. Iowa 

v Tovar, 541 US ___; 124 S Ct 1379, 1387; 158 L Ed 2d 209 

(2004). “Waiver of the right to counsel . . . must be a 

‘knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness 

of the relevant circumstances.’" Id. at 1383, quoting Brady 

v United States, 397 US 742, 748, 90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 

747 (1970). A waiver is sufficient if the defendant “knows 

what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” 

Adams v United States ex rel McCann, 317 US 269, 279; 63 S 

Ct 236; 87 L Ed 268 (1942); Godinez v Moran, 509 US 389, 

401 n 12; 113 S Ct 2680; 125 L Ed 2d 321 (1993). 

B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MICHIGAN LAW 

The right of self-representation under Michigan law 

is secured by Const 1963, art 1, § 138

 and by statute, MCL 

763.1.9 In Anderson, supra at 367-368, this Court held that 

a trial court must make three findings before granting a 

defendant’s waiver request. First, the waiver request must 

8

 “A suitor in any court of this state has the right to 

prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper

person or by an attorney.” 

9

 “On the trial of every indictment or other criminal

accusation, the party accused shall be allowed to be heard

by counsel and may defend himself, and he shall have a

right to produce witnesses and proofs in his favor, and

meet the witnesses who are produced against him face to

face.” 

9
 
 

 

be unequivocal. Second, the trial court must be satisfied 

that the waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made. To this end, the trial court should 

inform the defendant of potential risks. Third, the trial 

court must be satisfied that the defendant will not 

disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court or the 

administration of court business. 

Consistent with Anderson, MCR 6.005(D)(1) governs 

procedures concerning a defendant’s waiver of the right to 

an attorney. It prohibits a court from granting a 

defendant’s waiver request without first 

advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum

possible prison sentence for the offense, any

mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and

the risk involved in self-representation . . . . 

[MCR 6.005(D)(1).] 

C. APPLICATION 

1. DEFENDANT’S WAIVER WAS UNEQUIVOCAL 

Initially, defendant conditioned his waiver of the 

right to counsel on the trial court’s granting of his 

request to recall for cross-examination two excused 

witnesses. A defendant who elects to proceed in propria 

persona after proceedings are underway, however, is not 

entitled to retry the case. The decision whether to recall 

a witness is left to the sound discretion of the trial 

court. MRE 611(a); People v Fedderson, 327 Mich 213, 220; 

10
 
41 NW2d 527 (1950); Potts v Shepard Maine Constr Co, 151 

Mich App 19, 26; 391 NW2d 357 (1986). 

In this case, during the waiver of counsel proceeding, 

the trial court explicitly informed defendant that he would 

not be permitted to recall any excused witnesses. The 

court told him, “No, we’re not bringing in those other 

witnesses, we’re continuing with the trial.” The court had 

previously and repeatedly asked defendant if he still 

wished to represent himself given this ruling. Defendant 

unequivocally answered, “Yes, ma’am.” 

We believe the record reflects that the trial court 

exercised admirable patience in dealing with a defendant 

who wished to represent himself according to his own rules. 

The court advised defendant very clearly that he would not 

be permitted to recall the excused witnesses, regardless of 

what they had said during their preliminary examination 

testimony. 

The dissent may well be correct that defendant was 

“listening” without “hearing” what the court was saying. 

Post at 14. Defendant’s subjective understanding, however, 

can only be gleaned by reference to what he said on the 

record. The record shows that after the court ruled that 

his insistence on being allowed to recall excused witnesses 

would not be indulged, defendant answered affirmatively 

11
 
that he, nevertheless, wished to invoke his right of selfrepresentation. Defendant’s unrealistic “hopes of 

introducing evidence” in contravention of the court’s 

explicit ruling do not render invalid defendant’s 

unequivocal invocation of his right to self-representation. 

Post at 15. 

The Court of Appeals misread the colloquy between the 

trial court and defendant. The record reveals that 

defendant was dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling 

that he could not recall an excused witness. Defendant 

argued with that ruling by claiming his attorney did not 

adequately cross-examine the excused witness on the basis 

of the witness’s preliminary examination testimony. 

Whatever was contained in the preliminary examination 

transcript, however, was irrelevant at that point because 

the trial court had already ruled that the witnesses could 

not be recalled by defendant. The trial court was not 

required to permit defendant to read transcript testimony 

when the content was immaterial and the jury was assembled 

and waiting. Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly 

held that the trial court erred in refusing to honor 

defendant’s request to read the preliminary examination 

transcript. The requirement under Anderson that a 

12
 
 

 

defendant unequivocally assert his right to waive counsel 

was therefore satisfied in this case. 

2. DEFENDANT’S WAIVER WAS KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY 

As indicated from the portions of the record quoted 

above, the trial court methodically complied with the 

remainder of the requirements of Anderson. Defendant was 

fully apprised of the risks he faced by choosing to 

represent himself and he knowingly and voluntarily chose to 

accept them. He may not now be heard to complain about his 

choice. In Adkins, supra at 725, we quoted with approval 

language ultimately from People v Morton, 175 Mich App 1, 

8-9; 437 NW2d 284 (1989), that applies equally here: 

“‘To permit a defendant in a criminal case

to indulge in the charade of insisting on a right

to act as his own attorney and then on appeal to

use the very permission to defend himself in pro

per as a basis for reversal of conviction and a

grant of another trial is to make a mockery of

the criminal justice system and the 

constitutional rights sought to be protected.’” 

The trial court determined on the record that 

defendant’s motion to proceed in propria persona was made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court 

complied with the Anderson requirements. 

3. MCR 6.005 REQUIREMENTS WERE SATISFIED 

Contrary to the dissent, we believe the trial court 

followed the letter, and not just the spirit, of MCR 

13
 
6.005(D). The trial court advised defendant of “the 

charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the 

offense, [and] any mandatory minimum sentence required by 

law”: 

 The Court: And let me first inform you,

then, and I have to do this on the record, what

the max—the minimum and maximum sentences are, so

that if you are found guilty, you know what’s

ahead of you. For the homicide felony murder,

the maximum is life. For the armed robbery, the

sentence is life or any term of years, unless

aggravated assault or serious injury is involved,

and then it’s not less than two years. And for 

the felony firearm, that’s two years, which would

be. . . in addition to, and preceding, before,

any term of imprisonment imposed for the felony

or attempted felony conviction. Do you understand

all that? 

 The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

* * * 

The Court: Mr. Williams, I want you to

fully understand that if you are found guilty of

homicide felony murder which alleges that you

did, while in the perpetration attempted

perpetration of a robbery, murder one Jerry

Jones, that is a mandatory life sentence. Life 

is the minimum and life is the maximum. Do you

understand that? 

 The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

The court further explicitly complied with MCR 

6.005(D)(1) by advising defendant of “the risk involved in 

self-representation:” 

 The Court: Now, sir, as I mentioned before,

there are great risks that you are taking on in

representing yourself. Do you understand that? 

14
 
 

 

 The Defendant: Well, your Honor. I know 

ya’ all could possibly get me another attorney,

but it would be another court-appointed attorney. 

 The Court: No, that’s not an option. We’re 

in the middle of trial. 

 The Defendant: Well, good. 

The trial court complied with the requirement of MCR 

6.005(D)(2) by providing defendant his court-appointed 

attorney as an advisor: 

 The Court: He’s going to be here during the

trial so that you can ask him any questions and

he can give you any counsel that you might need. 

 The Defendant: Thank you, your Honor. 

The record reflects that the trial court 

conscientiously complied with every requirement of MCR 

6.005(D), exceeding the “substantial compliance” required 

under Adkins, supra at 706. We do not agree with the 

dissent that 6.005(D) requires that a court “indicate 

whether it believe[s] defendant’s request [is] contingent 

on other factors.” Post at 13. The trial court satisfied 

all of the waiver-of-counsel procedure required under MCR 

6.005(D) and did not err in granting defendant’s request to 

waive counsel and allowing defendant to proceed in propria 

persona. 

15
III. CONCLUSION
 

Although defendant appeared to condition his initial 

waiver of counsel on the trial court’s agreement to allow 

him to recall and cross-examine two excused witnesses, he 

subsequently made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary 

waiver of his right to counsel after the trial court 

rejected defendant’s request to recall and cross-examine 

the witnesses. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial. 

We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and remand to the 

Court of Appeals to consider defendant’s remaining claims. 

Maura D. Corrigan

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

16
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 123537 

RODNEY WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

In People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 

857 (1976), this Court held that basic requirements must be 

satisfied before a defendant’s request to waive counsel and 

proceed in propria persona may be granted. Michigan law 

additionally requires a trial court to follow the mandates 

of MCR 6.005(D) before granting such a request. Here, the 

Court of Appeals found that the trial court provided the 

disclosures required by MCR 6.005(D). However, the panel 

ultimately concluded that defendant’s waiver of his right 

to counsel was not unequivocal, fully knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary as required by Anderson. Because I agree 

with the Court of Appeals assessment of the proceedings, I 

must respectfully dissent from today’s decision. 
 

I. Discussion 

The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states by 

the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “a person brought 

to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the 

right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly 

convicted and punished by imprisonment.” Faretta 

California, 422 US 806, 807; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 

(1975); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 340-344; 83 S Ct 

792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963). Concomitantly, the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel also implies a “correlative 

right to dispense with a lawyer’s help.” Adams v United 

States, 317 US 269, 279; 63 S Ct 236; 87 L Ed 268 (1942). 

Under Michigan law, the right to self-representation is 

expressly protected by Const 1963, art 1, § 13 and by 

statute, MCL 763.1. At times, however, the right to 

counsel and the right to self-representation may appear to 

be at odds.1 

1

 “There can be no blinking the fact that the right of 

an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against

the grain of this Court’s decisions holding that the 

Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and

imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the

assistance of counsel.” Faretta, supra at 832. “This 

Court, however, has found that a defendant has either a

right to counsel or a right to proceed in propria persona,

but not both. . . . Consequently, there is unavoidable

tension created between two constitutional rights when a

(continued...) 

2
 

v 
 

In order to preserve the delicate balance between 

these two rights, the United States Supreme Court has held 

that any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 

464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938). Moreover, the 

waiver must be made with “sufficient awareness of the 

relevant circumstances” and the defendant “must be warned 

specifically of the hazards ahead.” Iowa v Tovar, 541 US 

__; 124 S Ct 1379; 158 L Ed 2d 209 (2004). Finally, a 

court must “indulge every reasonable presumption against 

waiver . . . .” Johnson, supra at 464. 

This Court has likewise determined that specific 

requirements must be satisfied and express disclosures must 

be made before a trial court may grant a defendant’s 

request to waive counsel. First, the defendant’s request 

to waive the right to counsel must be unequivocal. 

Anderson, supra at 367. “Second, once the defendant has 

unequivocally declared his desire to proceed pro se the 

trial court must determine whether defendant is asserting 

his right knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. . . . 

The trial court must make the pro se defendant aware of the 

(...continued)

defendant chooses self-representation.” People v Adkins

(After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 720; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). 

3
 
 

 

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that 

the record will establish that he knows what he is doing 

and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. at 368. 

Third, the trial court must determine that the defendant 

will not disrupt or unduly inconvenience the proceedings. 

Id. Fourth, the trial court must give the necessary 

disclosures set forth under MCR 6.005(D).2 Adkins, supra at 

722-723. 

Thus, in order to determine whether the instant 

defendant “kn[e]w what he [was] doing and his choice [was] 

made with eyes open,” Adams, supra at 279, a thorough 

examination of the trial court proceedings is required. 

Indeed, the existence of a valid waiver “must depend in 

each case upon the particular facts and circumstances 

2

 MCR 6.005(D) provides in pertinent part: 

The court may not permit the defendant to 

make an initial waiver of the right to be 

represented by a lawyer without first 

(1) advising the defendant of the charge,

the maximum possible prison sentence for the 

offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required

by law, and the risk involved in selfrepresentation, and 

(2) offering the defendant the opportunity

to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the

defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult

with an appointed lawyer. 

4
 
surrounding that case . . . .” Anderson, supra at 370; see 

also People v McKinley, 383 Mich 529, 536; 176 NW2d 406 

(1970). Because the majority’s recitation of the facts and 

proceedings omits large portions of the exchange between 

defendant and the trial court, I find it necessary to fill 

in the blanks left by the majority’s opinion. 

II. Trial Court Proceedings 

During its case-in-chief, the prosecution called 

Florian Mager as a witness. At the end of defense 

counsel’s recross-examination, the following exchange took 

place: 

Mr. Cook (defense counsel): I have no 

further questions of this witness. 

The Court: Thank you, sir. You can step

down. 

Mr. King (prosecutor): The People call as

their next witness, your Honor, Tracey Jo 

Williams. 

The Court: All right. If there are any

people in the . . . 

Mr. Cook: (Interposing) Your Honor, there is

one more question that I would ask. 

The Court: All right. Sir, can you come

back to the stand? . . . You’re still under oath 

to tell the truth, sir. 

The Deputy: Mr. Williams? Mr. Williams? 

Mr. Cook: No, your Honor, no more questions. 

The Court: Thank you, sir. You can step

down. 

(Witness excused) 

Mr. King: Once again, your Honor, the People

call, as their next witness, Tracey Jo Williams. 

5
 
Your Honor, may this witness be excused? He 

is working at this time. 

The Court: Any objection? Mr. Cook, any

objection to . . . 

Mr. Cook: (Interposing) I’m sorry, your

Honor? 

The Court: Any objection to this witness

being excused? 

Mr. Cook: No, your Honor. 

The Defendant: Yes. Wait. 

The Court: He’s excused. Mr. Williams. 

The Deputy: Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams. 

The Defendant: Could we get a recess for

five minutes, please, your Honor? 

The Deputy: No, you don’t talk to your

Honor, you talk to your attorney. 

Mr. Cook: Your Honor, may I have just a few

minutes with my client? 

The Court: All right. We’ll excuse the 

jury for a few minutes. 

For nearly one half-hour, the trial court was in 

recess. Once the parties reconvened, the following 

exchange ensued: 

The Court: Are we ready to bring in the

jury? 

Mr. King: Yes, your Honor. 

Mr. Cook: Yes, your Honor. 

The Court: Back on the record on case number 

4026—hold off—the People versus Rodney Williams,

out of the presence of the jury. 

Mr. Williams, I’m going to inform you, right

now, that if you act up, again, you are going to

be taken out of the courtroom. And I didn’t want 

to say that in front of the jury, but that’s

what’s going to happen. 

The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

6
 
The prosecutor called the next witness, Tracey Jo 

Williams. After defense counsel’s second recrossexamination, the trial court instructed Ms. Williams to 

step down and the court broke for lunch. The parties 

reconvened after the break and the following occurred 

outside the presence of the jury: 

Mr. Cook: For the record, your Honor, my

name is Donald Cook, appearing on behalf of Mr.

Williams. 

Your Honor, I believe he wants to address

the Court. And I think we probably need to get

it out of the way before we have the jury here. 

The Court: All right. Out of the presence

of the jury. What would you like to say, Mr.

Williams? 

The Defendant: Good morning [sic], your

Honor. 

Your Honor, due to circumstances, I would

like to terminate my representation of my

attorney, Mr. Donald A. Cook, due to the fact

that Mr. Cook has failed to represent me,

appropriately. He has allowed the prosecution

witnesses to testify. And he has failed to ask 

them pertinent questions that’s pertaining to my

life. Also, he has allowed the first witness to

be excused from this courtroom. And I am 

entitled, I hope, to a proper, fair 

representation, and also a fair trial. 

And, also, if the Court deems proper, with

all honor and due respect, I would like to have—

I do not wish to adjourn this proceeding, because

I know this has been going on all along. But I 

would like to represent myself, in proper person.

And, also, if . . . 

The Deputy: (Interposing) Quiet in the 

courtroom. 

The Defendant: (Continuing) -- if, only if

this Court would agree orally, and a written 

7
 
 

consent, please, that Mr. Florian Mager be 

brought back to court, and allow me to recrossexamine him, as well as Ms. Tracey Jo Williams.

This is for my life. And I accept and I 

appreciate all that Mr. Donald Cook has done, but

these records have facts here, statements that

cannot be denied, reports from the Detroit police

officers, a Mr. Jerry Jones, making statements,

himself, and Mr. Florian Mager, that have not

been brought out. And I can do that. [Emphasis

added.] 

The trial court then gave defense counsel an 

opportunity to place comments on the record. Defense 

counsel indicated that he appropriately cross-examined the 

witnesses in question and that he believed those witnesses 

had been excused. The trial court then informed defendant 

that the court must abide by the rules of evidence and that 

certain things that defendant believed may be introduced 

may not actually be admissible. At this point, the trial 

court asked defendant if he realized the risk he was taking 

by representing himself. The prosecutor then weighed in, 

stating: 

Mr. King: I was just going to indicate, your

Honor, that the People would strenuously object

to this, especially in this stage of the 

proceedings. I agree with Mr. Cook that he’s

done all that he can do in this case. And you

can only play with the hand that you’re dealt.

And Mr. Cook has represented Mr. Williams, I

think, in the best possible light that someone 

can represent someone. He hasn’t done anything—

or left anything out, that I can see, at least at

this point. . . . 

8
 
The trial court attempted to further inform defendant 

of the great risks involved with self-representation. For 

example, the trial court noted that another attorney would 

not be appointed, defendant could not later claim he was 

ineffective as his own counsel, defendant had not attended 

law school, and defendant was not trained in the rules of 

evidence. Further, the trial court warned that if 

defendant disrupted the proceedings, Mr. Cook would take 

over defendant’s representation. The trial court also 

posed the following question: 

The Court: Are you making this request

knowinging [sic], intelligently, and voluntarily? 

The Defendant: Yes ma’am. 

The trial court also informed defendant of the charges 

against him and the possible penalties he faced. Despite 

this exchange, the following colloquy then took place: 

The Court: . . . Do you understand all that? 

The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: Okay. 

The Defendant: Your Honor? 

The Court: Yes? 

The Defendant: Ma’am, is it also on the

record, and it will probably [be] written down,

that I will have an opportunity to recrossexamine the prosecutor’s first two witnesses,

Florian Mager and --

The Court: (Interposing) No, we’re not 

bringing in those other witnesses, we’re 

continuing with the trial. It’s the Court’s 

opinion that you had proper representation. Mr. 

Cook is an excellent attorney. And we are not 

9
 
starting the trial over, we are continuing with

the trial. You can still have Mr. Cook, if you

want, or you can continue and represent yourself

. . . . 

Notwithstanding the trial court’s best efforts, 

defendant continued to articulate his reasons for wanting 

to recall the first witness. Apparently, defendant 

remained under the impression that the first witness’s 

preliminary examination testimony conflicted with his trial 

testimony. 

The Defendant: But the jury have heard Mr.

Mager only state that at the lineup he was not

sure. That’s one not sure. And if, at the

preliminary exam, if Mr. Mager is not sure,

again, then this man has no—he’s not sure if it

was me, or not. . . . 

The prosecutor then indicated that if defendant was 

permitted to look at the preliminary examination, his 

concerns would disappear. While the majority includes some 

portions of this exchange, I believe that the proceedings 

at this particular stage should be viewed in more detail. 

Mr. King: And I only stand, your Honor, not

to entertain the defendant, but that is a gross

misrepresentation of the preliminary examination

transcript. . . . What he’s saying he’s taking

out of context. And if he reads the whole thing,

I think he’ll understand why Mr. Cook didn’t

elaborate with further questioning of the 

witness. 

The Court: All right. I’m going to . . . 

The Defendant: (Interposing) May I read it? 

The Court: No. I’m going to ask you one more

time. Do you want to represent yourself?

Because we’re bringing in the jury. 

10
 
The Defendant: Your Honor, with all due 

respect . . . 

The Court: (Interposing) I asked you one

question. 

The Defendant: Your Honor, this is my life. 

The Court: Do you want to represent

yourself? 

The Defendant: Your Honor? Please. I’m 

pleadin’ with you, your Honor. 

The Court: Answer my question. 

The Defendant: What’s a little minute in my

life? Please. 

The Court: Answer my question. 

The Defendant: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: All right. Let’s bring in the

jury. 

After this colloquy, defendant nevertheless attempted 

to recall the second witness because he was under the 

impression that the witness had not been excused. 

III. Analysis 

In Adkins, this Court concluded that proper compliance 

with waiver of counsel procedures requires that the trial 

court “engage, on the record, in a methodical assessment of 

the wisdom of self-representation by the defendant.” 

Adkins, supra at 721 (emphasis added). Moreover, this 

Court abides by the general principle that a trial court 

“should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver 

. . . .” Id., quoting Johnson, supra at 464. “The right to 

counsel, as guarantor of a fair trial, is a fundamental 

right that should not be deemed waived unless the record 

11
 
 

clearly and unequivocally evidences such waiver, a record 

that must be made by the trial judge’s diligent inquiry 

into the relevant factors.” Adkins, supra at 740-741 

(CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

Because the record indicates that defendant did not 

unequivocally, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

waive his right to counsel, defendant’s attempted waiver 

was invalid. 

A. Defendant’s Waiver Was Not Unequivocal 

While the trial court followed the spirit of MCR 

6.005(D) and asked defendant if his waiver was made 

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,” the trial 

court did not make an express finding on the record that 

defendant unequivocally waived his constitutional right to 

counsel. In Adkins, this Court held that trial courts must 

substantially comply with the requirements of Anderson and 

MCR 6.005(D).3 Thus, Adkins directs a trial court to 

indicate on the record whether the attempted waiver is 

3

 In Adkins, I agreed that “substantial compliance”

with the requirements of Anderson and MCR 6.005(D)

adequately protects a defendant’s rights. Adkins, supra at 

737-738 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part). However, I remain committed to the view that strict

compliance with these requirements better protects a 

defendant’s rights, as well as ensures that an appellate

parachute is not created. People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412,

456-458; 519 NW2d 128 (1994) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). 

12
 
unequivocal. Id. at 721-722. Even under a substantial 

compliance analysis, however, the trial court in this case 

wholly failed to indicate whether it believed defendant’s 

request was contingent on other factors—namely, recalling 

the prosecution’s witnesses and examining the preliminary 

examination transcripts—or whether the request was 

unequivocal. 

In any event, the record more than adequately 

demonstrates that defendant’s choice was not unequivocal. 

The majority states that “[i]nitially, defendant 

conditioned his waiver of the right to counsel on the trial 

court’s granting of his request to recross-examine two 

excused witnesses.” Ante at 8. An evenhanded reading of 

the trial transcripts, however, reveals that despite the 

trial court’s best efforts, defendant’s waiver was 

conditional throughout the proceeding. The trial court 

informed defendant that he would not be able to recall the 

excused witnesses and then repeatedly asked defendant if he 

wished to represent himself. In spite of this line of 

questioning, defendant still expressed his desire to recall 

the witnesses and review the preliminary examination 

transcript. As such, a balanced evaluation of the record 

indicates that although defendant was listening to the 

13
 
trial court, defendant was not hearing what the trial court 

had to say. 

This Court has previously noted that “the 

effectiveness of an attempted waiver does not depend on 

what the court says, but rather, what the defendant 

understands.” Adkins, supra at 723. Under the 

circumstances of this case, it is clear that defendant did 

not fully comprehend the trial court’s warnings and 

defendant wavered in his request throughout the proceeding. 

When the record is objectively viewed, one is left with the 

distinct impression that defendant eventually surrendered 

to the trial court’s questioning in the hopes of 

introducing evidence that he believed favorable to his 

case. Thus, defendant’s attempted waiver was invalid. 

Further, I am puzzled by the majority’s conclusion 

that defendant’s “unrealistic” hopes did not render 

defendant’s attempted waiver invalid. Ante at 12. The 

majority acknowledges that defendant was not truly hearing 

what the trial court was saying. Further, the majority 

appropriately notes that defendant’s understanding “can 

only be gleaned by reference to what he said on the 

record.” Ante at 10. Upon its review of the record, the 

majority effortlessly concludes that defendant’s hopes were 

“unrealistic.” However, defendant nevertheless harbored 

14
 
 

these hopes and the trial court should have similarly 

recognized that these “unrealistic” hopes were preventing 

defendant from hearing what the trial court was saying. 

Adkins could not be more clear that the effectiveness of 

the attempted waiver depends on what the defendant 

understands. 

Finally, although the trial court may not have been 

under any obligation to permit defendant to view the 

transcripts or recall the witnesses, the trial court erred 

when it failed to recognize that defendant’s attempted 

waiver was equivocal. The overarching rule of this Court’s 

decision in Adkins, as well as the United States Supreme 

Court’s decision in Johnson, is that if there is any doubt 

about the unequivocal nature of a defendant’s attempted 

waiver of counsel, then the trial court should deny the 

defendant’s request and defendant should proceed with 

counsel.4 

4

 It has often been said that “[a]n indigent defendant,

entitled to the appointment of a lawyer at public expense,

is not entitled to choose his lawyer. He may, however,

become entitled to have his assigned lawyer replaced upon a

showing of adequate cause for a change in lawyers.” People

v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Here,

the trial court found that defense counsel provided proper

representation. Moreover, defendant did not assert a 

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Under these 

particular circumstances, the trial court, and defendant

(continued...) 

15
 
 

B. Defendant’s Waiver Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, 

and Voluntary 

For essentially the same reasons as detailed above, I 

cannot lightly assume defendant possessed the requisite 

state of mind under the facts of this case. Specifically, 

the record evidences that defendant’s attempted waiver was 

not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Even though the 

trial court followed the spirit of Anderson and its 

progeny, the record indicates defendant was fixated on his 

ability to recall the excused witnesses and view the 

preliminary examination transcripts. As the hearing was 

drawing to a close and the trial court was understandably 

losing its patience, defendant kept pleading for his life. 

Nevertheless, the trial court continued its questioning and 

defendant eventually answered affirmatively to the question 

repeatedly posed. When the record is reviewed fairly, I 

believe it is apparent defendant’s waiver was not knowing, 

intelligent, or voluntary. 

(...continued)

for that matter, may have been better served by reliance on

the general presumption against waiver. “Where a 

defendant, for whatever reason, has not unequivocally

stated a desire for self-representation, the trial court 

should inform the defendant that present counsel will 

continue to represent him.” Adkins, supra 722 n 18 

(emphasis added). 

16
 
IV. Conclusion 

In sum, I agree with the Court of Appeals assessment 

of the proceedings. Defendant’s attempted waiver was 

conditional throughout the proceedings. Further, despite 

the trial court’s best efforts, it was evident that 

defendant did not fully understand the nature of the trial 

court’s admonishments. Thus, defendant’s attempted waiver 

was not unequivocal, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly 

17