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u.s. Department of Justice 

National Institute of Justice 

tot 31 }f 

Evaluation of the 

Differential .Police 

Response Field Test 

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U.S. DCJ,lortmcnt of Justicc 

National Institute of Justice 

Evaluation of the Differential 

Police Response Field Test 

J. Thomas McEwen 

Edward F. Connors III 

Marcia I. Cohen 

May 1986 U.S. Oeparlment of Juallce 

Nallonatlnatltute of JUllllce 

101378 

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Further reproduction outside of the NL;JRS system raqulro!! permission 01 tho c~t owner. 

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National Institute of Justice 

James K. Stewart 

Dirtctor 

This project was supported by 81-IJ-CX-K020, 

awarded to Research Management Associntes, 

Inc., by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. 

Department of Justice, under the Omnibus Crime 

Control nnd Safe Streets Act of 1986, as 

amended. Points of view or opinions stated in 

this document arc those of the outhors and do 

not necessarily represent the official position or 

policies of the U.S, Department of Justice. 

Research Management Associates,lnc., reserves 

the right (0 reproduce, publish, translate or otherwise use and to authorize others to publish and 

use all or any part of the copyrighted material 

contained in this publication. 

Copyright 1986 by Research Management 

Associates, Inc. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This document provides a summary of the National Institute of Justice 

Differential Police Response Field Test. It includes brief descriptions of 

the test objectives, planning and implementation processes, evaluation 

approach and results, and major conclusions. The summary also highlights special considerations and future implications of particular interest to 

police planners and decisionmakers who wish to introduce a comprehensive DPR system, or to improve the effectiveness of existing alternative services. 

PROBLEM STATEMENT 

Reductions in police department budgets have occurred in many cities 

at the same time that citizen demand for police service has increased. 

Police departments have been under pressure to maintain or improve their 

quality of serVice, reduce response times to urgent calls, and develop new 

strategies for crime prevention; yet it is often no longer possible to hire 

more officers to handle increasing workloads. 

Many departments have attempted to cope with these problems by diverting a number of non-emergency calls from immediate mobile response units to 

alternative responses such as telephone report units and delayed mobile 

responses. However, most departments did not carefully and systematically plan for a comprehensive system to handle all calls for service -- a system which included call classification, intake processing and alternative service delivery. The optimal use of a wide range of possible alternatives 

needed to be demonstrated, tested, evaluated, and ultimately accepted by both police personnel and the public. A comprehensive field test was 

needed to determine the best way to (1) develop and match appropriate alternative responses with various types of calls for service; (2) implement procedures and training that encouraged the effective use of these 

alternatives; (3) assess the impact of the alternatives on police patrol practices; and (4) offer a model that could be successfully replicated by police departments throughout the country. 

THE DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE FIELD TEST: OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH 

In order to test the utility of a comprehensive police response system for managing calls for service, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) designed the Differential Police Response (DPR) Field Test Program in October 

1980. The test was subsequently implemented in the cities of Garden Grove, 

California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio under controlled, experimental conditions. The field test was coordinated by NIJ, with program design and implementation directed by the Office of Development, Testing and Dissemination; and the evaluation design and management under 

the Office of Program Evaluation. 

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As with other NIJ field tests, the overall purposes of the OPR test 

were to (1) develop information on the effectiveness of specific criminal 

justice practices; (2) add to the knowledge base of law enforcement; and 

(3) contribute to improved policy decisionmaking. 

The most outstanding tribute to the success of the OPR project is that 

the police departments in all three cities have fully institutionalized the 

changes made during the test, and have gone on to develop new programs to 

make best use of the time and resources saved as a result of adopting effective alternatives to immediate mobile respons~. 

Evaluation Approach for the DPR Test 

Research Management Associates, Inc. (RMA) was selected in June 1981 

as the national evaluator for the DPR study. The evaluation grant was 

awarded prior to the selection 9f the test sites, which provided positive long-range benefits for the evaluation by enabling RMA to use an approach which was more formati ve ("hands-on") than summati ve (lihands-offll). Thus, the evaluators were engaged to participate in the actual design of the 

project. 

Intensive activities by the evaluation team during the planning phase increased the success of subsequent interventions in the project, and 

assured that a valid and complete evaluation could be conducted during the 

project's test phase. Involvement in the planning phase of any project, of 

course, can create the potential for the evaluators to become advocates in 

program activities. However, the RMA team viewed its primary role as one 

of providing information to program managers for their consideration as 

they designed or changed their activities. The evaluation team remained as 

objective as possible throughout the project, endeavoring to provide information in an unbiased manner so that activities could be evaluated to give results with a high degree of confidence. 

A unique characteristic of the DPR Field Test was its design as a twophase process. The first, or planning phase, lasted ~ight months and 

included the development and implementation of new call classification 

systems. The second, or test phase, took place over a ten-month period and 

involved the introduction of alternative responses. Because of this twophase approach, one evaluation was conducted of the changes in the police communications centers, and a separate evaluation was conducted for the 

implementation of the response alternatives. 

Objectives of the DPR Test 

The two overall objectives of the DPR test were (1) to increase the 

efficiency of the management of calls for service; and (2) to maintain or 

improve citizen satisfaction. 

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The first objective involved the following underlying expectations, or 

subobjectives: 

• Reduce the number of non-emergency calls for service 

handled by immediate mobile response; 

• Increase the number of non-emergency calls for service 

handled by a telephone report unit, by delayed mobile 

responses, or by other alternative responses; 

o Decrease the amount of time patrol units spent answering calls for service, and increase the amount 

of time available for crime prevention or other 

activities; and 

• Increase the availability of patrol units to respond rapidly to emergency calls. 

The second objective addressed the need to determine how many and what 

types of calls could be handled by alternative responses without adversely affecting citizen satisfaction with pOlice service. It was hypothesized that if calls were carefully screened, if citizens were informed of poten- tial delays, and if alternatives were a,ppropriate and timely, citizen 

satisfaction might not decrease. Thus, the second objective included the 

fo 11 owi ng subobjecti ves: 

• Provide satisfactory explanations to citizens at 

call intake on the nature of the police response 

to their calls; and 

• Provide satisfactory responses to citizens for 

resolving their calls for service. 

Evaluation Objectives 

The major objectives of the evaluation were as follows: 

• Assess the impact of the differential response 

system on police practices; 

• Assess the impact of the differential response 

system on citizens; and 

• Assess the transferability of the program. 

With regard to accomplishment of the evaluation objectives, determi~­

ing the effect of the differential response system on the role of the 

te 1 ecommun i cator was cons i dered to be of parti cu 1 ar importance. Ca 1 1 taker 

and dispatcher understanding and acceptance of the new call classification 

systems, and of the philosophy behind providing alternative services, would 

be key to both productive intra-departmental relations and favorable public perception of the services. For this reason, the NIJ test design document 

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recognized that the greatest emphasis should be placed on the changes in 

the communications centers. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITIES 

Demographic Characteristics 

One consideration in the evaluation design was the demographic differences across the three sites. While many of the same alternative responses 

were implemented in all three cities, the evaluation did not attempt to 

make extensive compa'risons of results across sites, but instead hi~hlighted 

how a OPR approach can actually operate in three different environments. 

The city of Tol'edo is an older, industrial and "blue collarl! city. It 

has a population of 354,600. Of the three sites, Toledo has the most 

significant number of older residents who have lived in Toledo most of 

their 1 ives. Garden Grove is the "newest" of the three site cities, 

incorporated in 1956 with the police department formed in 1957. With a 

population of 123,300 in 17.4 square miles, Garden Grove is the most 

developed and densely populated of the three sites. Greensboro is a blend 

of urban, rural, and suburban. The second largest city in North Carolina, Greensboro has a population of 155,600. In contrast to Garden Grove which 

has 3.2 persons per housing unit, Greensboro has only 2.5 persons per housing unit. 

Several other factors are of particular interest because of their 

direct impact on the police departments and the project. 

Toledo's economy suffered more than the other two cities during the 

nation's recent recession. Because of its heavy dependence on the automobile industry, unemployment reached 12 percent during the project. The 

city layed off 200 employees, including 30 civilian police personnel (two thirds of its civilian staff). Also, sworn personnel in Toledo were 13 

percent below authorized strength at the beginning of the project, and none 

of the police departments had increased staffing in several years. Garden 

Grove had a policy of rigid fiscal restraint due to the advent of Proposi- tion 13; Greensboro also had a policy of keeping the tax rate low. 

Police Department and Communications Center Characteristics 

With regard to the ratio of officers to citizens, Garden Grove (156 

sworn personnel), with the fewest sworn personnel, had one officer for 

every 814 residents, \'1hile Toledo (634 sworn personnel), with the greatest contingent of sworn personnel, had one officer for every 559 residents. 

Greensboro (367 sworn personnel), had a rate of one officer for every 423 

residents. In terms of crime rate, the three sites were very close, with 

Garden Grove having a rate of about 83 Part I offenses committed per 1,000 population, Greensboro with a rate of about 81 offenses, and Toledo with a 

rate of about 87 offenses. 

The Garden Grove Police Oepartmert differed from the other two sites 

in that the patrol personnel were deployed according to a team policing 

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model. All field services were essentially self-contained in the three 

teams which geographically subdivided the city. 

The police personnel in the three sites also had somewhat different 

characteristics. In Toledo and Greensboro, personnel tended to be older 

and more tenured. It was not unusual to meet patrol officers having ten or 

twelve years with the department. By way of contrast, in Garden Grove, 

many officers had been with the department for less that five years as 

reflected by the department's turnover rate of more than 40 percent a 

figure consistent with other police departments in Southern Califor~ia due 

to the favorable job market for experienced officers. 

Of particular interest to the OPR evaluation were the following differences among the three sites in communications center staffing and operation: 

• Toledo's communications center was staffed entirely by sworn personnel. All dispatch positions were 

reserved for sergeants; call taker positions were 

filled by patrol officers. 

• The Greensboro and Garden Grove communications 

centers were staffed entirely by civilians. 

• Toledo operated a manual call for service processing system, while both Greensboro and Garden Grove used 

computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems. 

• Calls for service into all three communications 

centers were at record levels. 

• Annual workloads for calls for service dispatched to 

the field ranged from 280 calls per officer in Garden 

Grove to 382 in Greensboro, and 503 in Toledo. 

• Prior to OPR, Toledo and Greensboro handled only a 

limited number of calls for service for minor property offenses over the telephone, and Garden Grove had never 

taken incident reports over the telephone. 

PHASE I: PRE-IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING AND DEVELGPMENT 

New Call Classification Systems 

Prior to OPR, the three sites, like most police departments, operated with traditional "10 code" call cl assification systems. When must calls 

receive an immediate mobile dispatch. these systems are adequat~. However, in order to respond to calls for service with appropriate cost-effective 

alternatives. a new system was needed. 

Each department developed its own internal planning committee, and thr~e cluster conferences were held during the course of several months to 

deslgn a call classification model. 

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In terms of degree of implementation, the objective of introducing a 

new call classification system was achieved by all three sites. Together, the three departments designed a generic model that included call event 

categories; and call descriptors, such as time of occurrence, likelihood of 

apprehension and availability of witnesses. The three departments then 

tailored the'model to meet their local needs, requirements, and capabili- ties. Although the final systems were not identical, the important point is that the principles were the same and the variations were minor. 

Call Classification Codes 

The next step in the process was to develop call classification codes 

which summarized the types of calls, descrip~ive elements, and selec~ed 

responses. All three sites successfully deslgned a call classificat,on code, although they differed in their, approach to the problem and reached 

different conclusions on the comp1exlty needed. 

The call codes allowed call takers to match call information with the 

appropriate police response. The' codes were numeric characters that aided 

in rapid designation of characteristics. The numeric codes were also help- ful in recordkeeping, further analysis of the classification systems, and 

monitoring by supervisors. In Garden Grove, for example, a four-digit call 

code was implemented, which provided the general type of call as the first 

character, the time of occurrence information as the second character, the 

injury information as the third character, and the selected response as the 

fourth character. 

Call Intake Procedures 

Intake Processing. In order to classify calls appropriately under the 

DPR system, call intake operators were required to obtain much mor~ information from callers than with the "10 code" system. The departments were 

expected to take steps to improve the intake and processing of calls to 

ensure that te1ecommunicators were adequately trained and prepared. 

In line with this objective, each department developed the following products: 

• Written guidelines on the new classification 

systems and procedures; 

• A set of standardized questions, tailored to 

each site, to facilitate the classification 

of calls; 

• Standardized explanations for informing citizens of the appropriate responses; and 

• New call intake forms. 

In order to assist with the revision of call intake procedures, Greensboro and Garden Grove initiated task forces which consisted of sworn 

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and civilian personnel representing all key divisions, particularly patrol and comnunications. These task forces worked effectively in both 

departments and helped increase the project's acceptability throughout the 

departments. 

Monitoring. One of the most critical methodolgical steps prior to 

implementation of the alternative response phase was to review actual phone conversations between citizens and call takers. These reviews enabled the 

departments to assess current information obtained and determine how much 

additional information was required. Supervisory review of telephone conversations between citizens and call takers was also part of the new telecommunicator evaluation procedures developed by each site. 

Training and Testing 

Each department devoted an extensive amount of planning time to prepare for training of personn~l in the new call classification system and 

procedures. The degree of implementation for this training component was 

excellent at all three sites. Among the most successful training methods 

were the use of easy-to-use manuals and flip charts, and various simulation 

and role play techniques. All three sites also developed training and 

orientation programs for other personnel including field officers, members 

of other departments, and city administrators. 

The next major step in the process was to pre-test the call classification systems and review intake procedures. During this four-month period, call takers used the new system to query citizens, and selected appropriate 

responses, but did not dispa~ch the alternatives selected. Again, all 

telecommunicators were closely monitored by communications supervisors, project staff, and the evaluation team. 

Telecommunicators were surveyed at the beginning of the project and at 

the end of the call classification development phase. A thiru telecommunicator survey was conducted toward the end of the full implementation test. 

These surveys included questions on call intake policies and procedures, trai~ing, job satisfaction, and other DPR changes. Patrol officers were 

also surveyed on two occasions. 

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FROM PHASE I ," .. 

The experience of the three sites in regard to call classification and 

call intake processing can be summarized as follows: 

8 The OPR Field Test sites successfully developed a generic model for 

call classification systems which can be modified by any police department to meet local needs. 

• The three sites successfully tested and implemented new call 

classification systems which resulted from this generic model. 

• Successful call classification systems may be simple or complex. A 

more complex system may be desirable when (1) there are more alternatives 

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advantages offered the strongest possible evaluation design for the OPR 

Field Test. 

Implementation of Alternatives 

Each site used a different method to achieve randomization and implement alternative responses. In Toledo, this was accomplished by having one 

call taker position designated as experimental. In Garden Grove, the CAD 

system automatically alternated calls for service between traditional dispatching and experimental alternatives. The design in Greensboro was more 

elaborate, and involved dividing four shifts of call takers into two 

groups. The first group of call takers dispatched calls in the traditional, 

pre-OPR manner for four days in a row to constitute a control group. The 

second, or experimental group, dispatched calls using the new OPR criteria. 

The expertmints were monitored by on-site personnel from the evaluati on team. Subsequent ana 1 ys; s showed that the des i C]il was carri ed out as 

planned, and the control and experimental groups pr0ved comparable. 

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICE PRACTICES 

The first evaluation objective was to assess the impact of the differential response system on police practices. Major conclusions from this 

assessment are as follows: 

I In all three sites there was a sizable reduction in the number of non~emergency calls handled by immediate dispatch of mobile units. 

On non-experimental days in Greensboro, for example, only 10.4 percent of dispatched calls were handled by alternative responses. The use of 

a 'lternat i ves was a 1 mos t doub 1 ed on experi menta 1 d ays--19.5 percent of all 

calls were handled by non-patrol responses, primarily the telephone report unit. Larceny reports constituted the major type of calls taken by the 

telephone report units; however, there were increases in the burglary 

category, public nuisance, and over thirty other call types not handled by telephone on control days. In addition, 26.9 percent of all calls on 

experimental days were classified as eligible for the a.lternative of a 

delayed mobile response. Thus, a total of 46.4 percent of all calls could 

have received an alternative response. Similar benefits were experienced in Toledo and Garden Grove. 

I The objective to increase the amount of time available for patrol units to devote to crime prevention, directed patrol, and other activities 

was achieved at all three sites. 

For example, in Garden Grove there was a 40 percent increase in the 

number of field-initiated reports taken as a result of OPR. A special study in Toledo found that patrol units were on calls for service 19.6 

percent of the time during the test phase. If these alternatives had not 

been available in Toledo, patrol units would have handled about 6,325 more 

calls, increasing unit utilization to 22.8 percent. In a large police department such as Toledo, a three percent reduction in patrol unit utili10 

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zation is important and would have been difficult t~ achieve without the 

OPR project. If the department had desired to respond to all calls without 

alternatives but reduce unit utilization to 19.6 percent by adding patrol. units, about two more units per shift would have been necessary. Staffinr 

two units per shift would have required at least ten additional officers, which is considerably more than the four assigned to the telephone report 

unit. 

I Proper screening under the new call classification systems allowed 

call takers and patrol officers to respond quickly when needed. However, travel time to emergency calls was not significantly reduced at all three 

sites. 

I Particular attention needs to be given to the impact of the OPR 

system on te1ecommunicators. The conclusions from an analysis of the role 

of the te1ecomrnunicators in the DPR project can be summarized as follows: . I The use of civilian call takers and dispatchers had 

many more advantages than disadvantages. Civili~n 

call takers were better educated, had higher retention rates, and were hired at lower costs, than sworn 

personnel. 

I Patrol officer satisfaction with telecommunicators at 

all three sites improved as a result of the OPR 

project. 

I Improvements made in environmental working conditions 

at all three communications centers resulted 'ln posi- tive changes in th~ job satisfaction and morale of 

many te1ecommunicators. 

I A DPR project imposes standards, uniformity and consistency on te1ecommunicators which may initially be 

resisted. Such resistance should be anticipated and 

te1ecommunicators should be included extensively in 

the planning and design of the project and in develop- ing and delivering the DPR training. 

I Monitoring was a very useful tool for communications 

center managers to assess call takers. This proce- dure ca 11 ed for frequent samp 1 i ng of the ca 11 s and a 

formal assessment of how well the call takers handled 

them. 

I The telecommunicdtors at all three sites lacked a 

comprehens i ve career deve 1 opment plan. Ca 1 1 taker 

and dispatcher positions need to be upgraded; the 

promotional picture needs to be improved; subsequently, selection standards need to be upgraded. 

I The findings show that the alternatives are less costly than the 

traditional respon~e of sending out a mobile unit to all calls for service. 

MoreOver, the productivity levels are much higher for personnel using the 

alternatives, such as TRU, in comparison to traditional mobile patrol. 

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, The use of evidence technicians in Greensboro was highly successful. 

These technicians, who were non-sworn personnel, were dispatched (as an 

alternative to using a sworn police unit) to handle the initial calls, write the crime reports, and gather evidence. They were able to handle 

over 18 percent of non-mobile responses, primarily for burglary, vandalism, and 1 arceny ca 11 s. 

, Mail-in reports were not found to be successful. The volume at 

which they were used was very low over the test period, and they were not 

well distributed throughout the cities. 

,Elimination of service was one additional successful alternative. 

In Greensboro, prior to the test phase, escort services averaged 100 ~er 

week. The department made the decision to eliminate these services as much 

as possible, and reduced them to 20 per week during the DPR test phase. 

, The task force approach was successful. The Response Advisory Board 

in Greensboro achieved good policy and operational procedures for the 

alternatives and aided the institutionalization of the project within the polic~ department. Disadvantages to this approach were that it delayed 

test implementation, and reached decisions which made for a more conservative approach to the test. 

CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH THE DPR SYSTEM 

Methodology 

The second primary evaluation objective was to assess the impact of 

the differential response system on citizens. To assess this impact, 

surveys were conducted throughout the project at all three sites of citizens who had received some type of service for a non-emergency incident. 

During the baseline period, the primary aim of the surveys was to determine 

the level of citizen satisfaction with the call takers, and to estimate 

what percentage would have been willing to accept some type of alternative 

to the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit. In Greensboro and Toledo, 

where telephone report units were already taking some minor reports over 

the phone, a sample of citizens was surveyed to determine their satisfaction levels with this telephone service. 

During the field tests, the citizen surveys were aimed at determining the levels of satisfaction with the variety of service alternatives that 

were implemented. Opinions of citizens in the experimental group receiving the alternative services were compared to opinions of citizens in the 

control group receiving immediate mobile responses. In addition, some 

comparisons were made with the surveys conducted during the baseline period. 

The dispatch records were the source documents for selecting the citizens to be surveyed. In Toledo, the selection process was manual; at the 

other two sites, daily lists of calls from the CAD system served as the 

sampling frame. In all, over 11,930 citizens were surveyed at all three 

sites. 

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CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO CITIZEN SATISFACTION 

Pre-Implementation Surveys 

• The most significant findings from the baseline data were that 

citizens expressed an overall high willingness to accept alternatives other 

than the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit to non-emergency calls. Citizens were asked whether they would have been willing to accept the 

alternatives of telephone reports, arranging an appointment, mailing in a 

report, or coming to the department to file a report in person. In Garden 

Grove, 61.8 percent reported that at least one alternative was acceptable. In Greensboro, 42.4 percent, and in Toledo 29.2 percent said that at least 

one alternative was acceptable. 

• At all sites, the most acceptable alternative was setting an 

appointment, and the least acceptable was mailing in a report. 

• Many citizens stated they would have been wil ling to wait longer for 

a response in a number of situations. Nearly half the respondents in 

Garden Grove were willing to wait more than an hour longer. 

• Citizens were more willing to accept an alternative on a propertyre 1 ated call (burgl ary, 1 arceny) rather than a ca 11 i nvo 1 vi ng a person 

event or potenti a 1 threat (assau It, domest; ,=). 

Citizen Survey During Test Period 

• During the test phase, citizen satisfaction with the alternatives 

remained high. Satisfaction exceeded over 90 percent for all options 

except for the walk-in response in Garden Grove, which had an 88 percent 

satisfaction level. 

• Satisfaction levels are directly related to whether the caller was 

informed that a delay might occur. 

• Communicator style was an important factor in citizen satisfaction 

with the telephone report unit alternative. A special study in Greensboro 

showed that the most important attributes were being precise, friendly, non-argumentative and attentive. 

• There was a high citizen satisfaction level with mobile responses by 

cadets in Garden Grove. 

TRANSFERABILITY OF THE DPR PROJECT: MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 

AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 

Key Factors in the Success of the Field Test 

The third broad evaluation objective was to assess the transferability of the DPR program. The major evaluation results presented in this summary 

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clearly support the conclusion that the DPR model can be successfully adapted to meet the needs of police departments in a wide range of environ- ments. 

The evaluators have selected the fol lowing pOints as key to the 

success of DPR at the three sites: 

• The original Test Design document was very clear and 

readable. This is a credit to the NIJ staff who 

worked on the development of the project. 

• The planning, execution, and staffing of the projects 

at all.three sites, and the support and commitment of 

the ch1efs, was excellent. 

• There were no other major programs introduced at the 

three sites during the project which could have 

diluted the attention of the chiefs and staff from 

DPR. 

• There was no turnover of chiefs or project staff at 

any of the three sites during the project. 

• The~e.were no threats from internal (unions, elected 

off1clals) or external (citizens, media) sources at 

the three sites during the project. 

Managing a OPR System 

. T~o important concepts with regard to managing a DPR syst.em should be ~mphas1z~d: (l) t~ere needs to be a logical, sequential plan for develop- 1 ng and lmP 1 ementl ng the s~stem; and (2) other po 1 ice department programs a~d components must be cons1der:ed and 1nclude.d simu.ltaneously in the plan- n1ng effort. One of the most lmportant conslderatlons in this regard is 

how to make ~he best use of the patrol time which becomes available when calls are d1verted to alternatives. 

.A plan for ,implementing a system of alternative responses to calls for 

serVlce should lnclude the following components as the framework: 

! Call cla~sification and alternative response process. This component 1S the basls for all other components. First, sound policies must be 

developed for call screening, call classification and call prioritizing in 

order to select a1ternatives which meet citizen demand. Second, the full 

range of alternat1ve responses needs to be developed. This will enable emerg~ncy calls to receive rapid attention while non-emergencies are handled 1n a manner that meets both police department and citizen needs. 

• Patrol allocation plan. This plan needs to keep in mind important fact~rs suc~ aS,minimizing \esponse time to urgent calls; equalizing workload, reduclng 1nter-beat dlspatches; and reducing unnecessary backup coverage. 

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• Criminal investigations support. The degree to which patrol officers are involved in crime scene investigation and reporting needs to be 

considered. Allowances must be made in the allocation plan for the greater 

average service time spent on calls requiring patrol officer investigation. 

• Crime analysis support of patrol operations. The degree to which 

this type of support is present is a key component in directing patrol activity. 

• Directed patrol activity. It is possible to structure the other 

components so that as much as 50 to 60 percent of all officers' time can be 

devoted to directed patrol. Some police chiefs are concerned that city administrators will view this as an opportunity to reduce authorized per- sonnel. However, worthwhile and effective directed patrol programs, when 

planned and proposed as part of DPR, can counteract this possibility. 

• Monitoring. "Monitoring" is used in a broad sense to include 

review and evaluation. These activities are essential to determine whether 

communications personnel and patrol resources are being used according to 

the comprehensive plan. 

Future Implications 

The greatest implications for police departments resulting from the 

DPR research are in the area of policy and personnel development. The 

major trends perceived by the evaluation team are summarized below: 

• There is a need to reduce the total volume of calls coming in to 

emergency cal' takers. At all three test sites, nearly half the calls to 

the communications centers were for information only. Departments may need 

to mount a public education program to help the public distinguish betwden 

the various police assistance telephone numbers. Call screening systems and policies could divert all information only calls from telecommunicators 

to less skilled, lower-cost positions. 

• One of the most significant implications of DPR for the future is 

the control it affords management over the traditionally autonomous telecommunicators. As a result, communications centers will be able to achieve 

greater uniformity, standardization, and accountability. 

• In the event of a city-wide crisis, a OPR system can enable the 

majority of officers to contain a volatile situation while all but 

emergency calls are diverted to alternative responses. 

• Significant personnel development implications can be derived from 

the evaluation results, which indicate many advantages to using civilian 

telecommunicators. 

• Better qualified personnel can be attracted to communications center 

work with the advent of sophisticated computer technology for call taking and '/ispatching, improvements in pay and career development opportunities, and improved work environments. 

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• OPR has interesting legal implications. With regard to police negligence, historical caselaw indicates that the police are not negligent for not responding to citizens in general. Thus, diverting calls to alternatives is permissibl~t in addition, OPR diverts only non-emergency calls. 

But if a dispatcher promises a unit and one does not respond, this situation, unlike OPR, could result in a negligence finding and in some 

circumstances, vicarious liability to the department and the city. The OPR 

model advocates informing all callers of any potential delay whether by a 

patrol unit or an alternative. 

• Because the OPR call classification system can provide more accurate 

descriptions of situations to patrol officers, the management and control 

of patrol backups may be improved. Such backups are often used without the 

dispatcher's knowledge, and clearly have cost implications. 

• Another implication for patrol officers is that when a significant number of calls are diverted to alternatives, the officers and their super- visors will have more freedom for self-initiated activities. A new breed 

of recruit who is more resourceful than regimental may be attracted to police work as a result. 

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EVAlUATION 

Summary of Key Findings 

• Police departments can achieve a sizeable reduction in the number of 

non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch, without sacrificing citizen satisfaction. The field test demonstrated that up 

to 46.4 percent of all calls could have received alternative responses. 

• The DPR model can be successfully adapted to meet the needs of 

police departments in a wide range of environments. All three sites 

decided to institutionalize tha changes made as a result of the field test. 

• The generic model for call classification systems developed during the field test can be modified by any police department to meet local 

needs. The model is comprised of (1) a set of call event categories covering virtually all types of citizen calls, and (2) a list of key call 

characteristics needed to determine the most appropriate police response. 

• A successful call classification system can be simple, as in Garden 

Grove, or more complex, as in Greensboro. A more complex system may be desirable when (1) there are more alternative responses available; and 

(2) there are more types of calls and characteristics which the department wants considered when selecting alternatives. 

• The results of the baseline citizen surveys showed an overall high public willingness to accept alternatives to immediate dispatch of a patrol unit for non-emergency calls. When asked about the alternatives of 

arranging an apPointment, having a report taken by telephone, coming to the 

department to report an incident or mailing in a report, 61.8 percent in 

Garden Grove, 42.4 percent in Greensboro, and 29.2 percent in Toledo 

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indicated a willingness to accept at least one alternative: ~l.though the 

percentage was somewhat lower in Toledo, it represents a sl~nlflcant volume 

of calls and the difference may be due to demographic varlables. The most 

acceptabie alternatives were appointments and telephone reports. 

• The baseline surveys also showed th~t thr~e out of four ~allers were 

willing to accept delays of up to an hour 1n offlcer response tlme to nonemergency ca 11 s. 

• Citizens indicated a greater willingness to accept alternatives for 

property-related calls (e.g., burglary, larceny) and assistance calls than 

for calls involving potential danger or threats to the person, such as 

assaults or domestic disputes. 

• During the test phase citizen satisfaction with initial conversations with call takers was v~ry high. Satisfaction with call takers among citizens in the experimental groups receiving mobile responses exceeded 95 

percent at all three sites; for those receiving delayed mobile responses, satisfaction with call takers was 92.1 percent in Greensboro, 99.0 percent in Garden Grove, and 97.4 percent in Toledo. Citizens receiving t~lephone 

report unit (TRU) responses in Greensboro and Toledo expressed satlsfaction 

levels for initial call taker conversations of 95.8 and 96.5 percent, respectively' and 97.3 percent of Garden Grove callers who recelved an 

expeditor unit response indicated satisfaction with call takers. 

• Citizen satisfaction with the alternative services provided,was also 

very high. An average of 95.4 percent at all three sit

7s were satlsfied 

with mobile responses during the test phase. Satisfactlon wlth the delayed mobile response alternative averaged 94.4 percent; and an average of 94.2 

percent expressed satisfaction with telephone report and expeditor unit 

services received. 

• The tradeoffs among various alternative responses in terms o~ 

citizen satisfaction appear to be in the intensity of the sa~isfactlo~ 

levels In Greensboro for example, 69.8 percent of the moblle exp~rlmental 'group said they'were livery satisfied" with the services provlded, 

as compared to 60.4 percent for the TRU and 57.1 percent for the delayed mobil e response. 

• Alternative responses are less costly than traditional mobi1e 

responses and productivity levels are much higher for personnel uSlng alternatives. In a city like Toledo, the number of calls,that could be 

handled by a four-person telephone report unit would requlre ten officers 

to handle by immediate mobile response. 

• The advantages of civilianizing call taker and dispatch posi~ions 

outweigh the disadvantages. Civilians usually can be hired and tralned at 

lower costs, have higher retention rates, and are better educated. 

• Implementing new call classification systems and intake procedures for DPR including the training of telecommunicators, development of 

written' guidelines, and monitoring by supervisors, can achieve the 

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following results: 

• Increase the amount of useful information obtained 

from ca 1 1 erSt 

• Better prepare officers on what to expect at the 

scene, and reduce unnecessary backups. 

• Maintain or improve citizen satisfaction by pre- paring callers for the type of response to expect. 

• Increase uniformity of procedures, and improve the 

accountability of telecommunications personnel,~ 

• Increase patrol officer satisfaction with call 

takers and di spatchers. 

• The importance of the role of telecommunicator in police operations frequently has been underestimated. The DPR field test confirms similar 

conclusions supported by previous research (Tien, 1977; Cahn and Tien, 

1980; Kansas City Po 1 ice Department Directed Patro 1 Project, 1980; McEwen, 

1982) that increased attention to call taker training and other needs must 

be addressed to achieve maximum use of alternative responses. 

• In addition to providing thorough training in the use of new call 

classification systems, upgrading the role of the telecommunicator needs to 

include involving telecommunicators in project planning and the training of 

others, improving promotional and career development opportunities, improv- ing the working environment, and upgrading selection standards. 

Supplementary Findings 

• The use of civilian evidence technicians to handle initial calls 

for certain property crimes can be a highly successful alternative. 

Evidence technicians in Greensboro were able to process 18 percent of all non-mobile responses. 

• Travel time to emergency calls was n~t significantly reduced as a 

result of DPR; however, the new call classification systems did enable 

patrol officers to respond quickly when needed for true emergency calls. 

• The use of mail-in reports did not prove to be a successful alternative response. Communications call-back procedures, where the call taker 

telephones the offending party with a warning, can be an effective alternative in "barking dog", "noisy party" and similar situations. 

Implications for Police Policy 

• A comprehensive plan for DPR needs to address how to make the best 

use of the increased patrol time that becomes available when calls are 

directed to alter~atives. Opportunities to use this time for directed 

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patrol or increased crime prevention efforts can be created as a result of 

OPR. 

• Formal experimental designs are possible in a police department and 

should be used more often to test changes prior to full implementation. 

• Changes in the role and activities of the patrol officer will occur 

as a resu 1 t of OPR. The amount of time patro 1 offi cers spend answeri ng tri v i a 1 ca" s will be reduced, a hi gher percentage of ca 11 s answered will 

be true emergencies, and more officer time will become available for other 

programs such as directed patrol and crime prevention. 

• Personnel issues which need to be addressed include: 

• The advantages and cost savings possible by using civilians in positions such as call takers, dispatchers, evidence technicians and other support positions • 

• The need to elevate the status of call takers and 

dispatchers in the organizational structure. 

Suggestions for Implementation Planning 

• Gain the commitment of the police chief to OPR as a departmental 

priority. 

• Develop a comprehensive plan that anticipates the impact of OPR on 

other departments and programs, and its effect on the overall patrol allocation plan. 

• Include telecommunicators on the internal planning committee, as 

well as civil ians and officers from all key divisions, especially patrol and communications; and involve project evaluators in the planning phase. 

• Allow sufficient time for the development and testing of the new 

call classification codes and intake procedures, and include a full range 

of alternative reponses. 

• Provide thorough training for telecommunicators in the new system and involve them in the training of others. Clearly written manuals, 

flipcharts, and simulation and role play exercises are recommended 

techniques. 

• Pre-test the new system for two or three months by having call 

takers code and select alternatives but not dispatch the alternatives. 

Monitor call taker/citizen conversations a~d address areas where co~mu­ nication style needs improvement. Review lntake procedures and reVlse as 

needed. 

• Consider the importance of the length of commitment possible when 

selecting a DPR project supervisor, At all three sites there was no turnover in key project staff, which greatly aided implementation of the OPR 

systems. 

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• Anticipate the need to deal with possible internal (union) and 

external (media, citizen) pressures. Consider forming a broad-based 

advisory board, which can foster acceptance of the OPR system within the department and in the community. 

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Other National Institute of Justice Publications of Note 

from the Research ill Brief series 

A vailnblc Ji'I'CC 

Assessing Crlmhllli Justice Needs NCJ 940"/2 

Corrections nnd the I)rivute Sector NCJ 94071 

Crime lllld Mentlll Disorder NCJ 94074 ' 

Crlmlnnl Justice Response to Victim Hllrm NCJ 1)3664 

D,'ug lIse und Pretriul Crime in the DIstrict nf Colmnblll NCJ 94073 

EXI)llnding Sentencing Options: A Governor's Perspective NCJ 963.15 

Forensic lise of Hypnosis NCJ 9Cl.U6 

Growlnp, Role of Pl'ivnte Security NCJ 9470.1 

InclllmciUltlng Crlmlnllls: Recent Resenrch Findings NC'J 92644 

Interviewing Victims lind Witnesses of Crime NCJ t)IX)61 

Julling Drunk Drivers: Impllct on the Crlmlnlll ,Justice System NCJ 95437 

Prlvnte Sector lind Prison Industries NC'J 96525 

l'rolmtiol1 Ilnd • .'clcmy Offenders NC'J 97349 

Probing the Links netweell l>rugs nnd Crime NC'J 1J666H 

I'rosecution of Child Sexuul Abuse: Innovlltlons In Pructlce NCJ 99J t 7 

Use of Forfeiture SlIl1ctlons In Drug Cuses NC'J 9H259 

Vlolencc In Schools NC'J 9264.l 

The 1oI~IV~ 11Iill'''N "hllldhl~ III no (hURt h~ 'll:mhnl.l )Ilur n."Il~.loIIlllr~", amI 

11I1111001111n III 

AIIIIW "11ll, w~ck, hlf ~h\'~ry I'llI' \Ir~fwll\lllN Ih.lI\ H) 1:01)lc~. I.hal hIli free 

IlIXI N~ I"'~II ('OIl1er,," Ihe WoI,htn!!III»,!> (', "Nil ,hllulI.I ~1111 Jot ~251. 55(X) 

NoIlIlIllill In'"IUI~ III JU'II~~ N(,J~S 

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BIll!. (!lXX) 

Rud.'t.lle. MI> :!lIg~() 

JlLEASl; NOT!: 'fill: N(,J Nl'MIll:R WIII:N OIU>ERIN(l TIIESE TITLES 

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