[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11-15792

_____________

D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-00856-CLS

SONJA D. KING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, NORTH ALABAMA, INC.,

 Defendant-Appellee.

______________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

______________

 (December 19, 2012)

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 1 of 17 
2

Sonja D. King (“King”), an African-American female, appeals the district 

court’s order granting summary judgment to Volunteers of America, North 

Alabama, Inc. (“VOA”) on her complaint in which she alleged racial 

discrimination, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a)(1); retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a); and a hostile work environment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). After reviewing 

the record, reading the parties’ briefs, and having the benefit of oral argument, we 

reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A. Facts

In 2002, King began working at VOA, a Christian organization that, among 

other things, operates group homes that serve developmentally-challenged 

individuals in Florence, Alabama. In April 2005, after her return from deployment 

to Iraq as a member of the Alabama National Guard, King was promoted to service 

coordinator, the position she held until her termination on December 4, 2006. 

King reported to Teresa Stephenson (“Stephenson”), the program director for 

operations of VOA in Florence. Stephenson reported to Victor Tucker (“Tucker”), 

the chief executive officer of VOA. 

King alleges that during her employment as a service coordinator, 

Stephenson subjected her and other African-American employees to a near-daily 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 2 of 17 
3

barrage of racial harassment and discrimination, all of which VOA human 

resources and management ignored. Among the many comments directed at King 

and other employees by Stephenson were: “Black people have a nasty attitude; 

they’re nasty; they’re ignorant;” “[I’m n]ot going to hire any black dudes here 

because they are drug dealers and might damage the clients;” “Black clients have 

poop on their asses all of the time;” “Old black women are good for nothing;” “All 

black guys are good for is to be in jail and drug dealers;” “White girls who like 

black guys are ‘Nigger lovers;’” and “All black people are good for is cleaning up 

poop off our client[s’] asses.” [King Aff., R. 43-1 at 11.] King also heard 

Stephenson frequently call African-Americans “nigger” and state that “[b]lack men 

go to white women because black women are nasty, dumb, and ignorant.” [Id. at 

11–12.] Other Caucasian employees allegedly made similar remarks to King and 

other African-American employees.

In addition to the offensive comments, Stephenson allegedly displayed 

favoritism towards Caucasian employees and clients and neglected to properly 

train and supervise African-American employees. Stephenson also forced AfricanAmerican employees to write reports falsely accusing other African-American 

employees of misconduct. On several occasions, Stephenson allegedly directed 

King to falsely report that other African-American employees were committing 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 3 of 17 
4

major infractions, including one of King’s immediate subordinates, Cassandra 

Nichols (“Nichols”). She further expressed to King her belief that AfricanAmericans are inferior to Caucasians and that she wanted only Caucasians in 

supervisory positions at VOA. 

Teresa “Tidwell” Slatton (“Slatton”), Natasha Fuqua (“Fuqua”), former 

VOA employees, as well as Nichols, reported the harassment to Tucker and human 

resources on multiple occasions. While King also asserts she complained to VOA 

management and human resources repeatedly, the first specific evidence of King’s 

complaints about the hostile environment was in March 2006, when she told 

Tucker that “blacks were being discriminated against and racially harassed on the 

job” and said that she heard Stephenson state she was having Slatton fired for 

complaining about it. [King Depo., R. 43-1 at 24–26.] Tucker told King that he 

was unable to discuss her complaints in detail at the moment but asked her to email 

him with a suitable time to discuss it further. He also suggested that if it were 

more convenient, he could meet her at an Applebee’s located approximately 

halfway between the workplace and King’s home. King declined to meet him at 

Applebee’s. She admitted that while she felt uncomfortable meeting Tucker away 

from the office, she never conveyed her discomfort to Tucker, and she never 

emailed him or discussed any of her concerns or complaints with him again. 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 4 of 17 
5

Tucker never initiated an investigation into either King’s or any other employee’s 

complaints. 

On March 29, 2006, after King complained to Tucker, King received her 

first written reprimand for permitting staff to be present while she disciplined 

another staff member and for disclosing confidential information about co-workers 

to other staff members. The reprimand arose after an employee made a complaint 

to Stephenson, which Stephenson then reported to human resources. King denies 

the allegations. She says employees admitted that Stephenson forced them to 

fabricate a complaint against King. King received her second reprimand on July 

24, 2006, for making negative comments and releasing information about a former 

employee in response to an inquiry from a prospective employer. King says she

only stated what Stephenson told her to state and that Stephenson gave her 

permission to release information. 

King again complained to VOA in August or September 2006. At this time, 

King and Nichols met with Robin Bucklin (“Bucklin”) and/or Cordia Bolden 

(“Bolden”) in human resources to report harassment and discrimination. She 

admits that human resources told her to make a statement of her complaint and that 

she failed to do so. King says she did not file a written complaint because at 

various times human resources told her to wait to file it, instructed her that it was 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 5 of 17 
6

not necessary, and told her it would not be needed until Tucker was notified of her 

allegations. Two days after her complaint to human resources, Stephenson warned 

employees, including King, in a staff meeting that they should not report any 

complaints if they wanted to keep their jobs, and that if they did complain, she 

would know about it. On September 10, 2006, Stephenson told another VOA 

employee, April Chandler (“Chandler”), that “she was going to get Sonja D. King 

back” for reporting the harassment and discrimination and forced Chandler to write 

a statement falsely attesting that King engaged in misconduct.1

 [Chandler Aff., R. 

82-2 at 3–4.]

Significantly, Stephenson also told King that “Victor Tucker will rubber 

stamp anything I tell him to” and that “Victor Tucker rubber stamps any decision I 

make in regard to [VOA] employees” at the Florence office. [King Aff., R. 43-1 at 

9.]

King received her final four reprimands on November 16, 2006, 

approximately six weeks after Stephenson told Chandler she would retaliate 

against King for King’s complaints. One reprimand was for failing to address a 

complaint about a broken heater in one of the group homes. King says she 

reported the problem to Stephenson but was told VOA would not replace the heater 

 

1 It is unclear from the record whether Stephenson’s comment to Chandler occurred 

before or after the August or September meeting with Bolden and Bucklin.

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 6 of 17 
7

because the clients were being moved out of the home shortly. Stephenson issued 

the reprimand after another employee complained. Another reprimand was for 

contacting Nichols while she was on administrative leave pending an investigation 

of her alleged misconduct. King does not dispute contacting Nichols but says she 

only did so at the request of Stephenson.2

 

King was placed on administrative leave the same day she received the 

reprimands. Tucker then directed Bolden to investigate the events surrounding the 

reprimands. On December 4, 2006, after Bolden concluded the reprimands were 

properly given, Tucker sent King a letter informing her of her termination. In the 

letter, he stated that he made the decision based on her failure to address the 

defective heating system, her communication with Nichols while Nichols was on 

administrative leave, her permitting Nichols to correct her own timesheet, and her 

other prior violations of VOA policy. 

B. Procedural History

After receiving her right to sue notice, King filed this lawsuit in the Northern 

District of Alabama on May 14, 2008. She alleged three state law claims, as well 

as federal law claims for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work 

 

2 The other two reprimands issued on November 13, 2006, were for allowing Nichols to 

correct her own timesheet and for failing to cooperate fully in the investigation of Nichols’s 

alleged misconduct. Notably, the investigation was inconclusive as to Nichols’s conduct, and 

she was permitted to return to work the same day that King was placed on administrative leave.

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 7 of 17 
8

environment. In July 2009, VOA moved for summary judgment on all of King’s 

state law claims and the discrimination and retaliation claims but not the hostile 

work environment claim. In August 2011, the district court granted VOA’s 

motion. 

At the pretrial conference held on August 26, 2011, King argued she should 

be permitted to amend her complaint to reflect changes in the law due to the 

pronouncements in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) 

and Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). The district 

court granted her request. King subsequently filed an amended complaint, which 

dropped the state law claims and included new allegations related to not only the 

discrimination and retaliation claims but also the hostile work environment claim. 

VOA again moved for summary judgment, this time on the discrimination, 

retaliation, and hostile work environment claims. The district court granted VOA’s 

motion in its entirety, and King timely appealed. 

II.

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing the 

record and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” HR Acquisition I Corp. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 1309, 

1313–14 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 8 of 17 
9

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

III.

Before addressing the merits of King’s claims, we address briefly King’s 

argument that the district court erred in allowing VOA to move for summary 

judgment on her hostile work environment claim after she amended her complaint. 

King contends that instead, the court should have permitted VOA to move for 

summary judgment on only the discrimination and retaliation claims, the claims 

potentially implicated by the holdings in Staub and Lockheed-Martin. King is 

incorrect. Nothing in the district court’s order allowing King to amend her 

complaint and inviting VOA to again move for summary judgment precluded VOA 

from addressing the hostile work environment claim. This is in accordance with 

the district court’s interpretation of its own order, which is entitled to broad 

deference. See Alley v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 590 F.3d 1195, 1202 

(11th Cir. 2009) (stating that a district court’s interpretation of its own orders are 

reviewed for abuse of discretion). King’s argument that the district court 

improperly construed the evidence in violation of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Products, 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000), is also without merit. 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 9 of 17 
10

We now turn to the substance of King’s claims. First, we address whether 

the district court erred when it granted summary judgment against King’s claim of 

racial discrimination. Second, we address whether the district court erred when it 

granted summary judgment against King’s claim of retaliation. Finally, we address 

whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment against King’s 

claim of hostile work environment.

A. Discrimination Claim

King concedes both that she cannot establish her case through direct 

evidence and that she cannot establish a prima facie case under the traditional 

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas because she has no relevant 

comparator, and there is no evidence that she was replaced by a Caucasian 

employee.3

 But, as we have recently explained, “[t]here is more than one way to 

show discriminatory intent using indirect or circumstantial evidence”:

One way is through the burden-shifting framework set out in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 

(1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981). Another way is “present[ing] 

circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the 

employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 

644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). A triable issue of fact exists if 

the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents 

enough circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of 

 

3 See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997); Alvarez v. Royal Atl.

Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 10 of 17 
11

intentional discrimination. See id. If the plaintiff presents enough 

circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference of intentional 

discrimination, her claim will survive summary judgment. Id. 

Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012).

VOA essentially argues that King has failed to produce sufficient evidence 

of a causal link between her termination and Stephenson’s discriminatory animus 

because she has not produced evidence that Tucker, as the ultimate decisionmaker, was Stephenson’s “cat’s paw.”4

 

In Staub, the Supreme Court recently stated “that if a supervisor performs an 

act motivated by . . . animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse 

employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment 

action, then the employer is liable.” __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 (footnote 

omitted). The Court explained:

Animus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be 

attributed to the earlier agent (here, Staub’s supervisors) if the adverse 

action is the intended consequence of that agent’s discriminatory 

conduct. So long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, that 

the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable 

under USERRA. And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise 

of judgment by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s 

action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from 

being the proximate cause of the harm.

 

4 King also argues that there is sufficient evidence that Stephenson, not Tucker, made the 

decision to fire her. However, King has failed to produce any admissible evidence to support her 

assertion. She simply states that she denies Tucker was the one who fired her and that she 

believes Stephenson fired her. Such conclusory allegations are not sufficient to survive summary 

judgment. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 n.6.

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 11 of 17 
12

Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1192.

Notably, the Court also held that an independent investigation by an 

employer does not necessarily immunize the employer from liability. “[I]f the 

employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the 

supervisor’s original biased action . . ., then the employer will not be liable.” Id. at 

__, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. However, “the supervisor’s biased report may remain a 

causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without 

determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor's 

recommendation, entirely justified.” Id.

We believe the evidence that Tucker was Stephenson’s cat’s paw is 

sufficient under Staub to survive summary judgment. Stephenson’s statement to 

Chandler that she would engineer King’s termination and her statement to King 

that Tucker rubber-stamps her recommendations present strong circumstantial 

evidence that she did in fact cause King’s termination. Furthermore, King 

presented evidence that all of the written reprimands were signed by Stephenson 

and some of them were not signed by anyone else, also possibly indicating 

Stephenson was the motivating force behind them. Similarly, it is also alarming 

that several of the reprimands cited in Tucker’s letter informing King of her 

termination occurred only because of some act by Stephenson. That Bolden did 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 12 of 17 
13

some kind of investigation that upheld the validity of the reprimands we conclude 

is not sufficient to negate the causal link between Stephenson’s animus and King’s 

termination; Stephenson engineered at least some of the reprimands that were 

ultimately the basis for King’s termination—the very definition of proximate 

cause.

Similarly, King has produced sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the 

veracity of VOA’s stated reason for its decision—the reprimands. Again, the fact 

that Stephenson stated she was going to get King fired for complaining, coupled 

with her outrageous, daily statements derogating African-American employees, 

creates a material dispute as to whether the stated reason, and not King’s race, was 

the real reason for the termination.

B. Retaliation Claim

We next turn to King’s retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits retaliation 

against an employee “because [she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 

under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation under Title VII, King must show that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily 

protected activity, (2) she suffered a materially adverse action, and (3) there is a 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 13 of 17 
14

causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action. See Hurlbert 

v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006). We 

then employ the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas to review King’s 

claim of retaliation. See Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181–82 

(11th Cir. 2010).

No one disputes that King’s complaints were a statutorily protected activity 

or that she suffered a materially adverse action when she was put on administrative 

leave and subsequently fired. The parties do dispute, however, whether King has 

produced evidence of a causal link between her complaints and her termination.

She has. Again, the record indicates that the decision-maker, Stephenson, 

stated she was engineering King’s termination in retaliation for King’s reporting 

the harassment and discrimination. Just six weeks later, King was placed on 

administrative leave. We conclude this evidence is all that is needed to survive 

summary judgment.

C. Hostile Work Environment Claim

In order to prove a claim for racially hostile work environment, a plaintiff 

must “demonstrate that the actions of the defendant[] altered the condition of the 

workplace, creating an objectively abusive and hostile atmosphere.” Edwards v. 

Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish a hostile 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 14 of 17 
15

work environment claim, King must demonstrate: (1) she belongs to a protected 

class, (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment 

complained of was based on her race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and (5) a basis for 

holding VOA responsible. See Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The district court did not address the elements of the claim, 

finding instead that even if King had established those elements, VOA had 

established the Faragher/Ellerth defense and thus was entitled to summary

judgment. 

To establish the defense, VOA must demonstrate that: (1) it exercised 

reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior, and (2) 

King unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective 

opportunities provided by VOA to avoid harm. See Faragher v. City of Boca 

Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998). 

King has presented evidence creating at least a genuine issue of material fact 

about whether VOA exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any 

harassing behavior. The record contains evidence that numerous VOA employees 

complained to Tucker and human resources about the discrimination and 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 15 of 17 
16

harassment multiple times, and at no point did VOA conduct an investigation. 

From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that VOA did not have an 

adequate system in place to prevent and correct hostile behavior. 

King has also presented evidence creating at least a genuine issue of material 

fact about whether she acted reasonably with respect to her complaint to human 

resources in August or September 2006. At this meeting, she told human resources 

about the harassment. She asked repeatedly if and when she should file a written 

complaint, and she was told repeatedly that it was unnecessary, that it would be 

needed at a later time, or that Tucker had not yet been notified, and it was therefore 

not yet the time to submit a complaint. Based on that evidence, though the formal 

policy evidently required King to file a written complaint, she behaved reasonably

under the circumstances. See Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 

1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that in some circumstances, an employee’s 

noncompliance is reasonable and thus, the defendant will not be entitled to the 

affirmative defense). 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of VOA and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 16 of 17 
17

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Case: 11-15792 Date Filed: 12/19/2012 Page: 17 of 17