www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 1 

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is one of Africa’s most brutal 

militia forces.1 It has plagued Central Africa, particularly northern 

Uganda, for over two decades. The group’s tactics provide textbook 

examples of war crimes and crimes against humanity. When attacking civilians, the LRA instills fear by selecting random individuals for brutal executions. Children are abducted to serve as porters, sex slaves, and new militia. 

In order to indoctrinate child soldiers, young abductees are routinely forced 

to kill their own family members and other children, or be murdered themselves. Anyone caught trying to escape from the LRA is summarily executed. 

By contrast with other African rebel groups, which occasionally adopt such 

brutal tactics, the LRA has conducted such atrocities on a systematic and 

prolonged basis.

With intelligence and operational planning support from the United States, 

in December 2008, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) launched Operation Lightning Thunder to attack LRA bases in the Garamba National Park 

of northeastern Congo, where the LRA had been located since 2005. The initial 

attack was intended to overwhelm the LRA and decapitate its leadership with a 

combination of airborne assaults and ground troop movements.2

 However, the 

top LRA leadership survived this initial attack, and LRA forces separated into 

small groups of dozens of fighters.

Nearly 2 years later, the LRA’s area of operations has extended deep into the 

eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), southern Sudan, and Sudan’s Darfur region even though the LRA 

is now comprised of only several hundred members using small arms and light 

weapons. While pursued across the region by the UPDF, the LRA avoids direct 

Countering the Lord’s 

Resistance Army in 

Central Africa

by Andre Le Sage

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Andre Le Sage is a Senior 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Led by Joseph Kony since the late 

1980s, the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA) is a brutal militia force that 

survives by massacring civilians, 

looting villages, and abducting 

civilians to serve as fighters, porters, and sex slaves.

◆ LRA operations have spread from 

northern Uganda to cover an 

expansive territory including eastern Congo, the Central African 

Republic, and southern Sudan. 

Much of this territory is outside 

the day-to-day control of governments in the region.

◆ Since 2008, Uganda has pursued 

LRA forces across this expansive 

territory. In 2010, the Obama 

administration developed a U.S. 

strategy to increase support for 

regional and peacekeeping operations against the LRA.

◆ Success depends on the political will 

and military capability of Uganda, 

its African neighbors, and United 

Nations peacekeepers to separate 

LRA units from civilian populations 

and build robust capabilities to 

track and strike LRA positions.

◆ These requirements beg the 

question of whether or not the 

United States will dedicate sufficient resources to overcome 

current shortfalls.

July 2011

Cent

e

r for Strategic ReS

EARCH
2 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

confrontations and has sustained itself by attacking and 

pillaging villages in remote rural areas. 

Working with and prompted by nongovernmental relief and advocacy groups, the U.S. Congress passed 

the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern 

Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, requiring the Obama administration to develop a strategy to “mitigate and eliminate 

the threat to regional stability” posed by the LRA. While 

the LRA does not present a direct threat to the United 

States, its territory, or its citizens, the group’s operations 

have become a recurring concern for U.S. policymakers 

focused on peace-building and regional security in Africa. 

LRA attacks have exacerbated African civil wars, contributed to the enormous humanitarian crisis facing Central 

Africa, fueled tense regional relations, and challenged U.S. 

efforts to promote accountability for human rights abuses.3

On November 24, 2010, President Obama delivered 

his administration’s counter-LRA strategic plan to Congress. The four highlighted objectives are to “(a) increase 

protection of civilians; (b) apprehend or remove from the 

battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders; (c) promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and (d) increase 

humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities.”4

 This strategy is in line with a strong 

international consensus on the way forward to counter the 

LRA. While the United States is not committing its own 

forces to attack the LRA directly, and identifying resources 

to implement the strategy is an ongoing challenge, the extent to which the Obama strategy will improve anti-LRA 

efforts on the ground is not yet clear.

In order to assess the opportunities, challenges, and 

role that U.S. efforts can play in combating the LRA, this 

paper begins with an in-depth analysis of the militia, including its historical development, the inability of past offensives to succeed against it, and the current force disposition of the group. The paper then examines current U.S. 

and international thinking on how expanded efforts to 

counter the LRA could work best in the field. It highlights 

how U.S. strategy makes a range of assumptions that must 

be met in order for counter-LRA operations to succeed. 

The paper concludes that the United States must be willing to make significant investments in support of regional 

and peacekeeping partners in order to defeat the LRA in 

the absence of greater, direct U.S. military engagement.

Understanding the LRA

The LRA is a challenge to categorize. Due to statements by its leaders in support of governing Uganda according to a strict interpretation of the Ten Commandments, the group is most often portrayed as a millenarian 

Christian cult.5 The LRA has certainly been informed by 

its leaders’ understanding of Christianity, particularly as 

it has been mixed with the traditional ethnic cosmology 

of their Acholi tribe. However, the LRA also needs to be 

understood as a product of northern Ugandan grievances 

against southern Ugandan political domination, as a manifestation of proxy struggles between regional powers in 

the Horn of Africa, and as a classic example of unaccountable warlordism in one of Africa’s least governed spaces. 

Each of these narratives has its own truths and limitations, 

and is necessary but insufficient for answering the question, “What is the LRA?” Together, they help to explain 

the LRA’s durability despite worldwide condemnation.

Ugandan Politics. First, the LRA is an outcome of 

Uganda’s internal political history. The LRA’s commanders and the majority of its forces are ethnic Acholi from 

northern Uganda. Despite regularly attacking their own 

tribal community, the LRA has tried to legitimize itself 

by issuing manifestos claiming to represent the Acholi 

and other northern Ugandan interests against the Kampala government. Uganda has long been wracked by a 

north-south political divide that is generally coterminous with national ethnic divisions. During the British 

colonial period, Southerners received better access to 

education, economic investment in agriculture, and civilian posts in government. Northerners, by contrast, were 

deemed suited for military service, and their region was 

seen more as a source of inexpensive labor than as a location for enduring investment. On the one hand, southern leaders asserted their suitability to lead the country’s 

government and were supportive of the constitutional 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 3 

monarchy of the Buganda community. On the other 

hand, the “Acholi in particular had been told by their colonial masters that they were born warriors, effectively 

transforming them into a military ethnocracy.”6

This pattern created enduring ethno-regional resentments and competition. From independence in 1962 until 

today, these tensions have laid the foundation for national 

political struggles, military mobilization, and countermobilization. Uganda became the site of brutal insurgency 

and counterinsurgency campaigns, particularly in the “Luwerua Triangle” area north of Kampala, during northerndominated governments led by Milton Obote, Idi Amin, 

Obote again, and finally Tito Okello. Yoweri Museveni 

and his National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) 

eventually overthrew Okello in 1985 and has led Uganda’s 

government ever since. “For many, the NRA insurgency 

against Obote was merely a continuation of the ethnic 

competition that typified Ugandan politics—a case of 

Bantu-speaking Southerners wanting to remove from 

power Northerners speaking Nilotic languages.”7

 As a result, commanders and soldiers of Obote-led forces, known 

as the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA), 

fled to northern Uganda where they renamed themselves 

the Ugandan People’s Defence Army (UPDA). Once 

the UPDA was defeated, many commanders and soldiers from this group would eventually join the ranks of 

the LRA, giving it a grounding in northern resistance to 

southern political and military domination.

The Holy Spirit Movement. Second, the LRA needs 

to be understood as the successor to the Holy Spirit 

Movement/Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSM/HSMF). 

Alice Auma, a self-proclaimed spiritual medium in northern Uganda, created the HSMF in 1987. Auma, better 

known as Alice Lakwena, declared that a spirit named 

Lakwena came to her as a messenger of the Holy Spirit 

and instructed her to organize a war against evil forces 

Source: Humanitarian Information Unit, Department of State
4 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

that had come to plague the Acholi. The HSMF garnered substantial local support in northern Uganda from 

Acholi and other Nilotic tribes that supported HSMF 

efforts to oppose Museveni, restore stature in northern 

Ugandan politics, and lead a cleansing of Acholi society. Because the HSMF emerged at the precise moment 

when the post-Okello UNLA/UPDF forces had stagnated, Alice Lakwena was able to absorb these northern 

forces into her group. The HSMF launched several successful attacks against the NRM government and was 

able to advance within 100 kilometers of Kampala before 

the group was roundly defeated near Jinja. Lakwena fled 

to neighboring Kenya, where she lived until her death, on 

January 17, 2007, in the Ifo refugee camp near Dadaab.

Joseph Kony forged the LRA and its political program out of the ashes of the HSMF. Before founding the 

LRA, Kony was an altar boy. “[L]ike Alice Lakwena and 

the HSMF, Kony does not function in his own capacity, but 

as loar or messenger of the spirits. Operational orders from 

the spirits are passed by Kony to his military commanders.”8

The most infamous (and ludicrous) of such orders was for 

HSMF and LRA forces to walk openly against their enemy’s attack with nothing but “holy water” to protect them 

from bullets and explosions. At other times, the use of ritual 

and terror served more strategic purposes. They were used 

to instill fear among northern Ugandan and other LRAaffected populations to ensure victims did not resist LRA 

predation or cooperate with the Ugandan government and 

military. Organizationally, the quasi-religious edicts were 

variations of “a traditional practice of Acholi elders to draw 

up a catalogue of prohibitions in times of crisis, the observation of which is supposed to cure a disturbed moral order.”9

When such edicts were not followed, the LRA deemed that 

violent retribution was permissible.

Sudan’s Proxies. Third, the LRA is as a proxy militia that has served the interests of regional powers in the 

Horn of Africa and Central Africa. In 1994, the government of Sudan began providing critical military and logistical support for the LRA. At that point, the LRA had, for 

several years, used parts of southwestern Sudan, particularly Eastern Equatoria Province, as a rear base to escape 

UPDF pursuit. However, in 1994, the Khartoum government decided to engage the LRA as a partner in its struggle against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 

and its struggle for an independent state of South Sudan. 

This made sense on a tit-for-tat basis as the government 

of Uganda was already providing assistance to the SPLA. 

When the LRA moved its base of operations to Eastern 

Equatoria, particularly the Imatong Mountains, it effectively joined efforts with several other militia forces that 

Khartoum had also co-opted against the SPLA, including 

the Southern Sudan Independence Army/Movement led 

by Riek Machar and the Equatorian Defence Force.

Sudan’s support for the LRA continued unabated 

until 2001. At this time, the U.S. Government placed 

the LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List and brought increased pressure to bear on Khartoum to cooperate with 

the U.S.-led war on terror. Sudanese engagement with 

the LRA was suspended and, between 2002 and 2005, 

negotiations between the government of Sudan and the 

SPLA succeeded in crafting the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement to end that country’s civil war. By 2005, the 

LRA had uprooted itself from Sudan and moved en 

masse to Haut-Uele Province in northeastern Congo. 

That same year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) 

issued arrest warrants—the first ever for that organization—for Joseph Kony and four other LRA commanders 

for crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Counter-LRA Limitations

In February 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton stated, “I have been following the Lord’s Resistance Army for more than 15 years. I just don’t understand why we cannot end this scourge.”10 The answer to 

her question lies in the fact that concerned countries in the 

region and outside have not devoted adequate resources 

and commitment to the campaign against the LRA. Operation Lightning Thunder is not the first effort to find a 

military solution to the LRA. In fact, the history of the 

conflict has been punctuated by a series of heavy-handed 

security operations that have failed to capture or kill Joseph Kony and other senior LRA leaders but have had 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 5 

dire humanitarian consequences and led to public distrust 

of the Ugandan government. According to Ronald Atkinson, each effort to deal with the LRA militarily has begun 

“with a period of acute insecurity and violence, followed 

by an interval during which these gradually decline—but, 

until the recent [Juba] peace talks, never to the point of 

real (even if still tentative and fragile) peace. Each new 

phase, with its spikes of violence, followed flawed or failed 

efforts at peaceful solutions to end the conflict.”11

Operation North. In 1991, while the LRA remained 

based in ethnic Acholi areas of northern Uganda, the Ugandan government launched Operation North. The campaign 

was intended to cut off the LRA from any support it was 

receiving from the local population. As part of the offensive, 

local self-defense militia, known as Arrow Boys and Rhino 

Group, were created to defend local communities from 

LRA predation.12 Because of Ugandan government fears 

that the Acholi self-defense militia could use any weapons 

they received to revolt against Kampala, they were outfitted 

with only bows, arrows, and other traditional weapons. The 

result was increased LRA attacks and violence as Kony and 

his commanders retaliated against the local communities.

Operation North nevertheless drove the LRA out of 

northern Uganda, while LRA atrocities demonstrated to 

the Acholi community that the group did not serve local 

interests. At this time, the LRA moved to southern Sudan 

and, by 1994, began receiving substantial military support 

from the Sudanese government in Khartoum. The Ugandan 

government also decided to relocate all northern civilians to 

“protected areas.” This decision resulted in the displacement 

and impoverishment of some 200,000 northern Ugandans, 

who received little aid and still lacked protection from LRA 

attacks. Many Acholis believed that Kampala was simply 

using its war with the LRA as an excuse to steal their land.13

Operation Iron Fist. Uganda launched another offensive in 2002, following the suspension of the government 

of Sudan’s assistance to the LRA. After reaching an agreement with Khartoum for the UPDF to enter southern Sudan, Uganda initiated Operation Iron Fist. Involving some 

10,000 troops, it destroyed several LRA camps, including 

the group’s main base at Lubanga-tek, but did not capture 

or eliminate any senior LRA leaders. Some LRA units retreated farther into Sudan, while others infiltrated northern Uganda and launched new attacks there.14 Over time, 

however, the LRA progressively moved its operations from 

northern Uganda to southern Sudan to eastern Congo.

Failed Peace Efforts. In between military offensives, 

the Ugandan government with international support 

engaged the LRA in a number of aborted peace negotiations. These included mediation efforts in 1993–1994 

and 2004–2005 led by Betty Bigombe, an ethnic Acholi 

minister in Museveni’s government; efforts by the international and local civil society leaders, including the 

Community of Sant’Egidio and the Acholi Religious 

Leaders Peace Initiative; and finally, from July 2006 to 

November 2008, an internationally supported peace process with LRA representatives in Juba, southern Sudan. 

In the so-called Juba process, LRA combatants were 

offered amnesty as well as guarantees for their leaders’ 

welfare and physical security.15 Commitments to development aid, security, and government employment have 

also been given to all northern Ugandan communities.

The commitment of the LRA to finding a peaceful 

solution to the crisis has always been questionable. Kony 

appears to engage in peace talks sporadically as a tactic to 

reduce military pressure on the LRA and garner time and 

space to regroup his forces. For instance, during the Juba 

peace process, the LRA was based in Garamba National 

Park in Congo, and received international aid shipments 

of food and medicine as well as computers and communications equipment with which to engage the international 

community. However, in 2007, Kony reportedly ordered 

the killing of the LRA’s deputy commander, Vincent Otti, 

due to the latter’s support for a negotiated solution as part 

of the Juba peace process. Although the Juba process led 

to a peace agreement that was signed by the government 

of Uganda, Kony never showed up to finalize the deal.16

After repeated extensions to the signing deadline, the talks 

broke down after 2 years in November 2008, leading to 

Uganda’s decision to restart military operations. 

Operation Lightning Thunder. After the failure of the peace talks, Uganda launched Operation 
6 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

Lightning Thunder on December 14, 2008. One particular factor made the military offensive appear a viable 

initiative. Regional political dynamics and diplomatic 

breakthroughs in 2008 made possible regional cooperation between Uganda, DRC, and the Government 

of Southern Sudan.17 Prior to the rapprochement between Ugandan President Museveni and Congolese 

President Joseph Kabila, there would have been no 

authorization for deep and sustained penetration of 

Congo’s territory by the UPDF. Furthermore, with 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ongoing, the cessation of north-south 

hostilities in that country led to the reduction, if not 

elimination, of Khartoum’s support for the LRA and 

to the potential for Southern Sudanese military cooperation with Uganda.

However, the offensive was remarkably ineffectual 

in the opening days and weeks of the campaign. While 

UPDF strategists believed the operation would last only 

1 month, their efforts to defeat the LRA outside Uganda 

have now been ongoing for more than 2 years. Moreover, 

“due to ‘unpredictable’ factors such as weather, the lack of 

roads in the area, wide rivers, and other largely foreseeable logistical difficulties, it took over a month just to 

move all of the forces into place.”18

In addition, commitments to regional cooperation 

and joint operations did little to augment UPDF strike 

capabilities and even less to ensure civilian protection. 

The LRA responded by launching a series of brutal attacks.19 In the 6 months after Operation Lightning Thunder began, the LRA “brutally murdered more than 1,000 

people in northeastern Congo and southern Sudan and 

abducted nearly 250 children. In at least one case in 

northeastern Congo’s Orientale Province an entire village was pillaged and burned to the ground. More than 

180,000 Congolese have been forced from their homes, 

while in southern Sudan, a further 60,000 have been 

displaced.”20 The most notorious attack—the “Christmas Massacre”—took place less than 2 weeks after Operation Lightning Thunder began. Over 400 people were 

killed in several Congolese villages when the LRA either 

hacked them to death or forced them to walk into burning buildings.21

Since Uganda’s military operation began, the UPDF 

has essentially been engaged in a hot-pursuit chase of LRA 

units. Given the weakness of regional militaries from DRC, 

CAR, and Sudan, it has not been possible to implement a 

more appropriate “hammer and anvil” strategy to contain 

fleeing LRA units and then strike them. Unfortunately, 

only a limited number of UPDF forces are available to 

cover an area roughly the size of Iraq. In addition, a lack of 

local human intelligence sources and the UPDF’s limited 

air mobility for rapid response to LRA sightings have prevented successful action.22 Now there is a real danger that 

the LRA may simply outlast the willingness of the UPDF 

to pursue them. Faced with funding shortfalls to continue 

military operations, President Museveni may opt to declare 

victory based on the success Operation Lightning Thunder

has achieved in driving the LRA away from Uganda’s borders. As several LRA units move to northeastern CAR near 

the border with Sudan, there is potential for them to slip 

away from their UPDF pursuers entirely. 

The LRA Today

Despite the difficulty of defeating the group, the LRA 

is not a large, technologically advanced, or well-organized 

enemy today. Until the start of Operation Lightning Thunder, it was possible to describe the overall command and 

control structure of the LRA with some certainty. Joseph 

Kony held the positions of chairman and commander. 

Together with senior officers specializing in intelligence, 

logistics, personnel, training, and religious affairs, the LRA 

high command was known as the “Control Altar.” Below 

the generals were four brigades (the Gilva, Sinia, Stockree, 

and Trinkle Brigades, or simply Brigades 1–4), each containing varying numbers of battalions.23

The LRA is ostensibly the military wing of the broader Lord’s Resistance Movement. However, this political 

structure has never truly evolved any independent identity 

or authority to speak for LRA leaders or to exert influence 

over the LRA.24 Without renewed sponsorship by Sudan 

and without financial or logistical support from any lo-
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 7 

cal or diaspora constituency, the group’s primary means of 

survival is to prey on local villages and civilian populations. 

While many African militias, including other groups operating in DRC and CAR, finance themselves by controlling gemstone and mineral mining, this is not the case for 

the LRA.25 In fact, adopting a fixed base to exploit mining 

operations would pose an operational risk to the LRA by 

enabling the UPDF or other security forces to find and 

fix LRA positions for a military strike.26 Furthermore, no 

substantial relationship or operational/tactical coordination has ever been proven to exist between the LRA and 

other antigovernment movements such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, the Allied Democratic 

Forces, or political opposition groups in Central Africa.

Following Operation Lightning Thunder, the LRA 

fractured and dispersed, and several LRA commanders have 

defected or have been killed. At present, numerous unofficial reports estimate that the overall strength of the LRA 

is only 300–400 combatants. More than half of these are 

believed to be abductees.27 The group’s constituent units are 

separated by difficult terrain and must maintain long operational lines. LRA commanders have stopped using cell 

phones or other means of electronic communication and 

have shifted to the use of couriers for passing messages and 

coordinating their operational strategy. The LRA is thus 

viewed as being highly vulnerable to a decapitation strategy 

that focuses on the elimination of Kony and another dozen 

or so senior LRA commanders. The exact command and 

control structure of the LRA is hard to describe today using a traditional line-and-block chart. Since the LRA has 

dispersed and has no single base of operations, communications between LRA leaders are considered to be limited.

Under these circumstances, the most accurate means 

of describing the LRA’s structure is to identify the geographical locations of its main units. According to Ledio 

Cakaj, “As of January 2011, the majority of the LRA forces 

appear to have gathered in the vast Haut Uélé Province in 

northeast Democratic Republic of Congo.”28 He identifies 

approximately 10 different LRA units, usually comprised 

of 30–40 militia members each. Most of these are in DRC, 

but several operate into southeast CAR and the Western 

Equatoria state in southern Sudan. These latter units are 

under the control of senior LRA commanders including 

Caesar Achellam and Dominic Ongwen. This represents a 

return south by the LRA over the past 6 months since reports of LRA movements and attacks from late 2010 put 

a growing number of their forces in northeastern CAR, 

near the border with the southern Darfur region of Sudan.

Interviews with escaped abductees conducted by 

human rights and advocacy groups have highlighted a 

number of new leadership dynamics. First, the attrition 

of senior leaders from the LRA has reduced the ranks of 

ethnic Acholi Ugandans in the group, and the LRA is now 

increasingly dependent on the motivation of fighters from 

Sudan, DRC, and CAR. Most of the fighters have been 

abducted, and appeals to their Acholi nationalism or demands for justice in Uganda do not resonate.29 Second, 

senior leader attrition has provided the opportunity for 

several junior officers to take on high-profile command 

responsibilities.30 This is certainly the case with Lieutenant 

Colonel Okot Odek, who assumed command of a brigade 

only after his first commander was killed in action and his 

next commander, Charles Arop, decided to surrender. 

The Strategy Consensus

Despite public recriminations about the failure of 

Operation Lightning Thunder to deal a decisive blow 

against the LRA’s leadership and the resulting surge of 

atrocities committed by the LRA against civilians across 

Central Africa, a general sense of agreement now exists on 

the way forward.31 There is a strong desire inside the U.S. 

Government and among its international and nongovernmental partners to forestall further human rights abuses 

and prevent the LRA from regrouping by increasing and 

better coordinating international security efforts in the 

region.32 Even Human Rights Watch—not usually considered to be a group supportive of military action—has 

called for greater efforts against the LRA. Their proposal 

is couched in terms of “apprehending” Kony and other top 

LRA leaders who are subject to ICC arrest warrants.33

The U.S. strategy is centered on shifting anti-LRA 

operations from an open-ended and underresourced 
8 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

chase that has paid too little attention to civilian needs, 

into a more comprehensive, integrated, and supported 

effort involving four major lines of effort:

◆ increase protection of civilians

◆ apprehend or remove from the battlefield Kony 

and senior commanders 

◆ promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters 

◆ increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities.34

Each line of effort requires resources and commitment 

to succeed.

Protection of Civilians. The Obama administration’s 

first commitment is to increase the level of protection afforded to civilian populations in LRA-affected areas of 

Central Africa. Civilian protection is a debated concept 

in both the peacekeeping and humanitarian worlds.35 To 

some, protection requires efforts to guarantee the physical 

security of civilian populations in conflict zones. National 

or multinational security forces may create a defensive 

zone where combatants cannot operate or undertake offensive operations to disarm or defeat potential threats.

To others, the simple provision of humanitarian relief 

to meet the emergency lifesaving needs of war-affected civilians constitutes protection. The direct provision of food, 

water, sanitation, and shelter is a common aid response. Improved communications can also provide protection. When 

civilians have advanced warning, they can avoid or flee their 

would-be attackers. In all cases, however, civilian protection 

requires that security and humanitarian actors are present 

on the ground to provide support to local communities.

Already, a wide array of actors with the potential to 

provide protection services is present in LRA-affected 

areas. Key actors whose roles and actions need to be coordinated and monitored include national police, gendarmes, and military forces from Uganda, DRC, CAR, 

and Sudan; multinational peacekeeping forces; tribal militias and self-defense groups; and foreign aid providers, 

including international donors, United Nations (UN) 

agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

International partners need to establish a clear division of labor between the UPDF and other forces 

in the area of operations. In order for the UPDF to 

track and engage the LRA, it needs to remain a light 

and highly mobile force that can respond to sightings 

of LRA units. Involving the UPDF in the protection 

of civilian populations outside of Uganda’s borders 

impedes this mission. Instead, a mix of national military, police, and gendarmerie forces and multinational 

peacekeeping forces (including both military and civilian police) needs to be deployed to major towns 

and population centers in LRA-affected areas outside 

Uganda. The priority areas can be identified according 

to the location of recent LRA activity and the reported 

trajectory of LRA movements. The operations of all 

of these forces need to be better coordinated, possibly 

through the creation of joint operations centers. Moreover, peacekeeping forces need to have appropriate 

mandates and operational capabilities.

Deploying additional national military and peacekeeping forces could succeed in accomplishing three 

objectives: increasing protection for civilian populations that are vulnerable to LRA attacks; increasing 

information and intelligence collection; and degrading 

the LRA’s room for maneuver. To the extent that these 

forces conduct active daytime and nighttime patrolling 

outside of towns into rural areas and have robust rules 

of engagement should they encounter LRA units, this 

could serve as a platform for the traditional counterinsurgency tactic of quadrillage to block insurgent movements, isolate individual insurgent units from one another, and break the LRA’s interior lines.36

Given the vast area in which the LRA operates, 

there will always be insufficient numbers of forces to protect every town and village from attack. Thus, the ability 

to share and willingness to act on time-sensitive security 

information that can be used to guide security forces to 

patrol near newly identified LRA positions will be critical. The only alternatives are for civilian populations to 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 9 

flee these areas and for relief agencies to provide support 

for communities that have been displaced or attacked.

One challenge is that peacekeeping forces in Central Africa have yet to prioritize anti-LRA efforts. The 

UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is focused 

on eastern DRC and has limited capacity in LRA-affected territories, and the UN Mission in Central Africa 

Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is drawing down 

its forces. The United States will need to work closely 

with the UN and its missions in Central Africa to make 

anti-LRA efforts a greater priority and shift additional 

peacekeeping resources to LRA-affected areas. In addition, French forces, which are already present in CAR, 

could take a direct role against the LRA or support the 

increased presence of CAR security elements in LRAaffected regions.

An alternative is to establish a new peacekeeping mission with its own forces that can be deployed 

on a regional basis across the LRA-affected area. In 

October 2010, an African Union meeting in Bangui 

endorsed plans to create a joint command center to 

manage a regionally constituted military brigade to 

conduct operations against the LRA.37 This initiative, 

however, has not been robustly supported at either the 

African or international levels. Another option would 

be the establishment of a UN-led support operation in 

Central Africa that would provide a dedicated channel for increasing financial contributions and logistical 

support for anti-LRA efforts by existing peacekeeping 

forces in the region.38

Other means are also available to enhance community protection and at the same time gather information and intelligence. National and multinational forces 

should be prepared to field civil affairs teams to conduct 

relief and rehabilitation programs. Translators and community liaison officers should be deployed to improve relations and build trust with local leaders. Providing funding and logistical support for local area experts—ranging 

from academic researchers to the U.S. Africa Command 

(USAFRICOM) Socio-Cultural Research Advisory 

Team—to conduct assessments of protection needs and 

opportunities would also be useful.

In the absence of national or foreign forces that are 

able to provide protection and conduct patrols in remote 

areas, support could be given to local communities to raise 

tribal militias and self-defense units. Already, the Arrow 

Boys in southern Sudan and several spontaneous selfdefense forces have emerged. Without sufficient support, 

they are ill-prepared to take on the LRA and serve little 

value to intelligence collection if they are not prewired 

into anti-LRA communications efforts. There are also 

questions of control and accountability of local forces, as 

well as their inclusion of children, which limits the interest 

of the international community in providing support.

Searching and Striking. The second line of effort 

proposed in the U.S. strategy to confront the LRA is to 

eliminate the threat directly by searching for and striking at LRA positions. It is believed that the capture or 

elimination of Kony and a dozen LRA leaders would 

effectively destroy the group and prevent it from reconstituting. While such a “decapitation strategy” may not 

work against insurgencies with broad popular support 

and leadership redundancies in their command, the LRA 

lacks both of these qualities. Still, searching for and striking at the LRA’s commanders require enhanced efforts 

to collect actionable intelligence on the location of LRA 

units as well as stronger military capabilities to conduct 

decisive operations. At a minimum, the U.S. strategy to 

eliminate the LRA threat should increase ongoing support to the UPDF pursuit effort, as well as building the 

capacity and willingness of peacekeeping and national 

forces to support the UPDF.

The United States could consider supporting 

UPDF efforts with remote intelligence collection efforts, including aerial reconnaissance, communications 

monitoring, and other sensory capabilities. However, 

tracking of LRA units needs both high-tech and lowtech solutions. Signals intelligence against the LRA is 

likely limited since the group abandoned most electronic 

means of communication in favor of couriers. Yet its militia forces are still vulnerable to airborne reconnaissance 
10 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

efforts. Crucially, given the vast forested areas of the region where the LRA can hide, air assets will require thermal imaging capabilities and the ability to loiter in key 

locations at night to identify LRA bed-down locations.

Other than directly locating the position of LRA 

forces through intelligence means, the best source of information on LRA movements is likely to come from 

local communities, which have seen or have been attacked by the LRA. Suitable personnel must be assigned 

to debrief LRA defectors in order to learn as much as 

possible about the location, structure, direction of movement, habits, planning, and decisionmaking of LRA 

commanders and militia. These capabilities need to be 

developed by the UPDF, but also by other national security forces (including police, gendarmes, and the military, 

all of which need to be bolstered with civil affairs capabilities) and peacekeepers. The collection of additional 

information and intelligence by these actors then needs 

to be supported with sufficient personnel and technical 

systems to ensure quality analysis and timely sharing.

While many humanitarian groups are reluctant to cooperate with foreign security forces, they may be willing 

to do so privately if they know their information will be 

used to enhance civilian protection efforts. Such cooperation could become the basis for a UN-led system to feed 

relevant information for civilian early warning and alert 

aid providers to impending LRA attacks. Several groups 

have argued for the need to expand local communications 

capabilities—including access to shortwave radios, GSM 

phones, and satellite phones—through direct distribution 

of equipment and foreign investment in commercial efforts to extend telecommunications to remote areas.39

On the military front, in the absence of commitments by the United States or European partners to 

deploy high-end special operations forces to track and 

engage the LRA, the main requirement is to improve the 

capabilities of the UPDF to track LRA positions and 

to strike rapidly once they are identified. The UPDF 

requires assistance to improve its means of integrating intelligence collection with operations, provide the 

necessary logistical support to sustain its expeditionary 

units, and ensure adequate communications for effective command and control and information-sharing over 

long distances. Access to helicopters for reconnaissance 

and rapid troop deployments and cargo aircraft for resupply missions is an additional urgent need. Finally, the 

simple question of funding for extended UPDF operations needs to be addressed.

UPDF forces operating far from Uganda require additional logistical support. Forward operating bases are 

therefore essential, and foreign-operated or contracted 

air cargo capacity may be required. The extent to which 

existing UN peacekeeping forces in DRC and CAR can 

meet these requirements should be explored. Investments in infrastructure would enhance rapid reaction capacity. This would involve airstrip and road rehabilitation 

projects in areas where anti-LRA forces need to conduct 

patrols or establish bases. Such efforts, if planned correctly with local authorities and development partners, 

could have positive social and economic effects that last 

well beyond short-term military priorities.

The involvement of Western forces in countering the LRA should not be discounted as an option. In 

2003, French forces led the European Union–mandated 

Operation Artemis in Ituri Province in eastern Congo. 

Lasting only 3 months, the operation successfully used 

some 1,800 European forces to restore order until UN 

peacekeeping capabilities were bolstered. A similar deployment of Western forces could be used to increase 

rapidly the search and strike capability against the LRA 

or to bolster blocking and protection efforts. In the case 

of insufficient U.S. interest to deploy its own forces, Human Rights Watch has identified several highly professional militaries, including those of the United Kingdom, 

France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, and South 

Africa, that would be able to undertake anti-LRA operations.40 Each of these countries is a party to the Rome 

Statute of the ICC, and the court could call on them 

to support regional efforts to apprehend Kony and other 

indicted LRA leaders.

Demobilizing the LRA. The third line of effort in 

the Obama administration’s strategic plan is to “promote 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 11 

the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters.” This effort seeks to 

generate additional exit options for LRA combatants to 

leave the battlefield peacefully. It is recognized that many 

LRA leaders will be unwilling to defect from the group 

unless they are under immediate military pressure. Their 

commitment to the LRA’s militant cause and way of life, 

the belief that they cannot return to a normal life after 

years of fighting, lack of knowledge of amnesty and transitional justice plans, and the simple fear that they will be 

killed by more senior LRA leaders for even considering 

dialogue or surrender are among the inhibiting factors.

The majority of LRA militia members are not ICCindicted war criminals. Rather, they were abducted and 

forced to fight for the LRA in order to survive. These individuals, particularly children, are an appropriate focus 

of increased communications efforts to build LRA combatants’ knowledge of their exit options, the provision of 

additional and better coordinated reception opportunities to receive LRA defectors, and further investment in 

efforts to reintegrate former combatants.41

In practical terms, leaflets and radio announcements, 

including interviews with demobilized LRA officers, are 

already being used to encourage defections. These need 

to be increased and distributed more widely as the LRA 

area of operations increases. They must also use local 

languages and graphics that can be understood by nonAcholi speakers and those who cannot read. At the current time, some LRA fighters wishing to defect may fear 

summary justice by fearful communities when they exit 

the bush. Additional reception planning and mobile reception centers are required closer to these LRA areas 

of operations. Humanitarian agencies already recognize 

the need to learn from regional experiences and further 

invest in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

capabilities. These efforts include the challenging and 

time-consuming area of psychosocial rehabilitation of 

former combatants, including child soldiers.

Finally, efforts to encourage disarmament and demobilization will need to be maintained over the medium to long term, and cannot end if or when Joseph 

Kony and other senior LRA leaders are apprehended 

or killed. Even if the LRA itself is disbanded, it is certain that a portion of its militia will flee and continue to 

plague Central Africa. These remnant forces may lack a 

political objective of their own, but are likely to turn to 

armed criminality or agree to serve as mercenaries for 

other armed groups in DRC or CAR.

Humanitarian Assistance. The fourth and final line of 

effort elaborated in the U.S. response is to increase humanitarian assistance to LRA-affected populations. The 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

already is leading these efforts and is planning to increase 

its level of engagement on two fronts: first, the provision 

of immediate, lifesaving assistance, and second, when possible, the promotion of early recovery efforts. A surge in 

humanitarian assistance for LRA-affected areas cannot 

be expected to address the enormous scale of humanitarian and development challenges in Central Africa. Rather, the objectives should be to ameliorate LRA-induced 

emergency conditions in order to establish an acceptable 

regional situation from which standard development objectives can eventually be met, and to reconcile the Acholi 

people to the Ugandan government in a meaningful way.

Even with additional funding, those who provide 

humanitarian assistance in LRA-affected areas are experiencing a number of critical challenges. Successful 

relief operations must overcome the security challenges 

of working in high-risk areas. The affected population is 

also located in remote areas that are difficult to access, 

especially since passable roads are few and far between 

and aviation access is limited. Even if USAID does not 

face funding shortfalls, there are too few reliable operating partners, including both UN agencies and NGOs, 

who have the willingness and capability to work in 

LRA-affected regions. In addition to financial needs, 

these groups must confront staffing, infrastructure, communications, and other logistics limitations. The highly 

mobile nature of LRA units makes it difficult to target 

aid interventions to locations with LRA-induced needs.

Stabilization efforts to bring lasting peace in northern Uganda will require more sustained commitments. 
12 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

For instance, in northern Uganda alone, ethno-regional 

grievances have been well documented by the Juba peace 

process and are consistent with previous findings of international monitors and local civil society advocates. The 

Juba talks concluded with Uganda’s commitment to the 

Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan for Northern 

Uganda (PRDP) and a wide range of transitional justice 

mechanisms. The former commits Uganda to facilitate the 

return of internally displaced persons to their homes; provide essential social services including water, health care, 

and education; rebuild derelict and war-ravaged infrastructure; and encourage greater economic investment for 

agriculture and trade. The latter commits Uganda to the 

creation of specialized courts to hear claims against senior 

LRA commanders, offers of amnesty for lower ranking 

LRA combatants, and empowering traditional justice 

mechanisms (particularly the Acholi Mato Oput process) 

to achieve grassroots reconciliation.

While these commitments exist on paper and in 

political rhetoric, it has been noted that the Ugandan 

government’s implementation has been slow and halfhearted despite significant UN, World Bank, and foreign donor investment.42 Justice, security sector reform, 

and development are critical means of ensuring a lasting 

peace in northern Uganda and the region. In their absence, tensions will rise again and violence will reemerge 

no matter the fate of the LRA. Genuine democratic reforms in Kampala are essential to ensure national cohesion based on legitimacy.

Challenging Assumptions

If all of the lines of effort outlined in this paper 

are robustly implemented by the United States and its 

partners, there is a high probability that the LRA can 

be defeated. Even then, the U.S. strategy to eliminate 

the LRA threat in Central Africa is based on several 

critical assumptions. These include the commitment of 

the government of Uganda to continue its pursuit of 

the LRA, the willingness and ability of peacekeeping 

and national forces to support anti-LRA efforts, and 

the continued presence of LRA leaders in areas that 

are accessible to regional or other foreign forces. Given 

circumstances in the region, none of these conditions 

should be taken for granted.

Uganda’s Commitment. First, there is no guarantee 

that future Ugandan operations against the LRA will 

continue at the same level as today. Although not defeated, the LRA threat has been pushed far enough away 

from Uganda’s borders that it does not pose a short-term 

threat to the country. Uganda’s President Museveni already appears to have reduced the number of UPDF 

soldiers involved in anti-LRA operations. This reduction 

was not surprising when Museveni faced a reelection 

campaign earlier in 2011, but deployments have not increased since then. Uganda has also publicly signaled that 

it cannot sustain the financial costs of the long-distance 

efforts to pursue individual LRA units. Moreover, additional UPDF forces are in short supply as Uganda forms 

the backbone of the African Union Mission in Somalia 

(AMISOM). Finally, with independence looming for 

South Sudan in July 2011 and the lingering potential for 

conflict in this new country, the UPDF may deploy additional forces to protect their northern border against 

the spillover of any crisis.

Limits of Peacekeeping. Second, U.S. strategy must 

confront the limited capability of UN peacekeeping forces 

in the region to confront the LRA challenge. The LRA 

area of operations is located on the margins of several different UN peacekeeping missions in eastern DRC, northeastern CAR, southern Sudan, and Darfur. Although the 

MONUSCO mission in DRC has been mandated to provide assistance to regional forces when requested by the 

local government, none of these missions has been directly 

tasked to counter the LRA. Peacekeepers have generally 

failed to protect civilian populations. They maintain only 

a minimal force presence in LRA-affected areas, if any; 

conduct limited coordination with the UPDF; and are 

not equipped or mandated to pursue the LRA themselves. 

Moreover, international planning for reduced peacekeeping missions in Central Africa is out of sync with the 

growing international commitment to defeat the LRA. 

Decisions by host nations to scale back MONUSCO and 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 13 

to conclude MINURCAT will actually reduce the number of multinational forces in Central Africa. 

Limited Regional Attention. Third, relying on DRC, 

CAR, or SPLA to provide forces to combat the LRA is 

equally problematic despite ongoing U.S. and European 

capacity-building efforts with their security sectors. The 

Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(FARDC) are notorious for their lack of professionalism, war profiteering, and brutality. While the government in Kinshasa has allowed the UPDF to operate on 

DRC territory, it views the LRA as a primarily Ugandan, not Congolese, problem. In CAR, the situation is 

not much different. The southeastern provinces of that 

country enjoy little government presence, and President 

François Bozizé is focused on maintaining control of the 

capital city and containing CAR rebels further to the 

north. There are concerns that the CAR government is 

only interested in supporting the anti-LRA campaign to 

receive foreign materiel and funding for these purposes.

For several years now, the SPLA was focused on 

implementing its peace agreement with Khartoum and 

protecting its position in the lead-up to the January 2011 

referendum on secession. LRA-affected regions of Western Equatoria and, more recently, the farthest reaches of 

Western Bahr el Ghazal have never been critical locations in the north-south confrontation and have only 

limited SPLA troop presence. Even if issues of presence 

and motivation could be resolved, the SPLA would face 

serious challenges building local support, ensuring that 

its units have the mobility to respond to LRA attacks or 

actually pursue LRA units, and developing the fighting 

capability to pursue and engage the enemy.

Sudan’s Uncertain Role. Fourth, there is always potential for the Sudanese government to restart military 

cooperation with Joseph Kony in order for Khartoum 

to use LRA as a proxy force against South Sudan and/

or Uganda in the event of hostilities following South 

Sudan’s independence in July 2011. In late 2010, there 

was concern that the LRA found safe haven in the 

southern Darfur region of Sudan. While meetings apparently took place between LRA leaders and Sudan 

Armed Forces representatives, no support appears to 

have been promised, and the LRA subsequently moved 

back down the CAR–Sudanese border to northeastern 

Congo.43 However, Khartoum’s calculations could always 

change. Negotiations between Khartoum and Juba on 

border demarcation, oil revenue sharing, and other postindependence plans are ongoing, and Khartoum is already accused of arming proxies such as George Athor 

to pressure southern leaders.44 If Sudanese support did 

restart, Kony and other LRA commanders would be able 

to regroup and rebuild their forces.

Diplomatic Requirements. Fifth, it will be critical for 

the United States to gain acceptance of and support for 

its LRA strategy by other major external actors, including the European Union, United Nations, and African 

Union. They will need to devise a common international 

strategy that can be taken to the UN Security Council 

for endorsement, particularly if additional peacekeeping 

forces and new mandates or structures are required. Further transatlantic dialogue will be required to determine 

what resources and assistance France—or other individual 

European partners with substantial influence in Central 

Africa—is able and willing to commit to the problem.

Ultimately, the most diplomatic capital will need to be 

spent mobilizing national partners in the region, including 

Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Sudan, to support the strategy 

with their own blood and treasure. This may require gaining regional acceptance of continued and expanded MONUSCO and MINURCAT deployments, or possibly the 

creation of an entirely new peacekeeping operation dedicated to the anti-LRA campaign. Pressure will need to be 

brought to bear on these partner nations to heed foreign 

strategic and operational planning advice, and especially 

to enhance the roles that their own security forces play 

in civilian protection efforts. This could certainly benefit 

from the deployment of additional U.S. aid workers, military advisors, and diplomats to embed at UN peacekeeping hubs and UPDF forward operating bases to support 

offensive and protection operations. Ensuring that Sudan 

abstains from supporting the LRA will also need to be 

placed on the agenda of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan. 
14 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

In the absence of national support, international strategies 

will wither on the vine. 

Balancing U.S. Interests. Sixth, the United States 

needs to balance its support to counter-LRA security efforts with wider democratization and governance 

concerns in Central Africa.45 Uganda, DRC, CAR, and 

Sudan (both north and south) are countries that need 

to enact significant reforms to level the political playing field between government and opposition parties, 

address internal corruption, conduct security sector reform, ensure respect for human rights and international 

humanitarian law by national security forces, enhance 

delivery of essential social services, and improve overall 

representation of public interests. In addition, the United States is committed to ending patterns of sexual and 

gender-based violence and the exploitation of minerals 

to support conflict. Both combatants and government 

forces in the countries affected by LRA operations have 

been implicated in these practices.

The multiplicity of U.S. concerns in Central Africa 

necessarily leads to caution. First, the United States is wary 

of providing “lethal assistance”—in the form of training, 

equipment, or shared intelligence—that could be used to 

organize or employ violence against illegitimate targets. 

Second, the United States desires to minimize its defense 

footprint on the African continent. The United States does 

not want to end up being the primary responsible foreign 

party for addressing any of the continent’s complex crises. 

This line of thinking is shored up by U.S. respect for African 

concerns that the creation of USAFRICOM represents a 

neocolonial mechanism for U.S. domination of the continent and its interests. African concerns are mirrored by the 

Department of State and many nongovernmental analysts 

that fear that the creation of USAFRICOM represents the 

further militarization of U.S. foreign policy.46

In response, the United States is rightfully concerned that providing military assistance and funding for 

military operations could send the wrong political signals 

about the need for political liberalization, reward regimes 

that are performing poorly, provide resource flows that 

further entrench illegitimate regimes, and build security 

capabilities that could be misused against political opponents or local populations.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the challenge of countering and defeating the LRA is a practical one. It requires the presence of 

an adequate number of forces who are willing and able to 

protect civilian populations, isolate individual LRA units, and 

strike at their remote positions. Diplomatic and aid efforts 

are required to reintegrate combatants and address northern 

Ugandan political grievances. Success depends on two factors: the political and military will of African partner nations, 

and whether the United States and its partners will provide 

sufficient resources and coordinate international efforts.

For the United States, the critical question concerns 

the level of resources that policymakers and Congress is 

willing to expend, as well as the level of additional resources that the United States can expect its international partners to put forth. The LRA does not pose a direct 

threat to U.S. national security interests, which some may 

argue decreases the urgency of U.S. efforts to defeat the 

group. There is no claim that the LRA targets U.S. citizens, assets, or territory, or that the group provides support for transnational terrorist organizations such as al 

Qaeda. However, the LRA is an indirect interest for U.S. 

national security planners in several ways.

First, since its inception, the LRA has targeted 

Uganda, a key U.S. partner nation in Africa, to which 

the United States seeks to demonstrate its political and 

practical support. Second, the LRA represents a threat 

to regional stability in both Central and East Africa. The 

spree of LRA killings and abductions spread initially 

from northern Uganda to southern Sudan, and now has 

moved into DRC and the Central African Republic. 

Moreover, the LRA has at times been supported by the 

Sudanese government, and the group could again become a proxy militia for Khartoum if war reemerges.

Third, the ability of the United States, working in 

partnership with other nations and international organizations, to defeat the LRA may be considered a test case for 

USAFRICOM, created in 2008, and its ability to use U.S. 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 270 15 

military capabilities as a force for peace and stability on the 

continent. Public knowledge of USAFRICOM’s planning 

and intelligence support for Operation Lightning Thunder

has, intentionally or unintentionally, created U.S. equities in 

seeing UPDF offensive operations against the LRA through 

to their conclusion. In addition, efforts to defeat the LRA 

test USAFRICOM’s strategy of confronting African threats 

through security assistance efforts that provide training and 

equipment instead of direct U.S. military action. Finally, the 

way the LRA conducts its guerrilla campaign constitutes 

crimes against humanity and has become a moral abomination, which politicians and activists across the United States 

seek to address. Even if the United States is not itself a party 

to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 

the continued presence of the LRA is an affront to U.S. 

commitments to international criminal justice.

If these considerations are not compelling and the 

United States does not lead its African and European partners to increase and better coordinate their efforts to defeat 

the LRA, the international community will be left to answer 

a series of uncomfortable questions: Why did the United 

States not act with the speed and certainty required to end 

the LRA threat in its moment of weakness? Such opportunities do not come about often in African conflicts, and 

advantage should be taken. Why did the United States and 

its partners allow Joseph Kony and other war criminals to 

escape? This is a question that will ring loudly if the conflict 

in neighboring Sudan restarts and Khartoum rearms the 

LRA as its proxy. And finally, what will the United States 

and its partners do next to counter the LRA if it regroups 

and continues its gruesome attacks on innocent civilians?

If such a situation comes to pass, one key lesson should 

be identified and learned. Before the United States commits to engage in African conflicts, an accurate assessment 

of the operational requirements needs to be made. Given 

the challenges of working through African military partners 

and UN peacekeeping forces, limited U.S. efforts engaged 

in African crises will often be insufficient. If policymakers 

refuse to commit the necessary U.S. resources in the absence 

of direct threats to national security interests, both Congress 

and policymakers need to ensure that their laws and public statements do not write checks for U.S. engagement in 

Africa that they are ultimately unwilling to cash. Without 

backing up commitments with sufficient action, U.S. leadership on conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution in 

Africa will appear fickle, the role of USAFRICOM will 

remain uncertain and contested, and the legitimacy of U.S. 

claims to support African interests will wear thin. 

Notes 1 This paper benefited from presentations and discussions at the 

conference Eliminating the Threat to Civilians and Regional Stability Posed 

by the Lord’s Resistance Army held by the Institute for National Strategic 

Studies at the National Defense University on September 30, 2010.

2 Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Aided Failed Plan 

to Rout Ugandan Rebels,” The New York Times, February 7, 2009. 

Also see John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Official Defends U.S. Role in 

Ugandan Mission,” Stars and Stripes, February 14, 2009.

3 See Human Rights Watch, “Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in 

Northeastern Congo,” March 2010, and Ledio Cakaj, “This Is Our 

Land Now: Lord’s Resistance Army Attacks in Bas Uele, Northeastern Congo,” Enough Project, April 2010.

4 Barack Obama, cover letter, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” to Howard L. Berman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 

November 24, 2010.

5 Mareike Schomerus, “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan: A 

History and Overview” [in Arabic], Sudan Human Security Baseline 

Assessment Working Paper 8, Small Arms Survey, September 2007.

6 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: Understanding 

and Solving the Conflict, Africa Report No. 77, April 14, 2004, 2.

7 Ibid., 2.

8 Frank Van Acker, “Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: 

The New Order No One Ordered,” African Affairs 103, no. 412 

(2004), 348.

9 Ibid., 349. 

10 Statement by Hillary Clinton at U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, quoted by Maghna Raj, “Tough Talk 

from Secretary Clinton, Senator Feingold on LRA,” Enough Project, 

February 27, 2010.

11 Ronald R. Atkinson, “From Uganda to the Congo and 

Beyond: Pursuing the Lord’s Resistance Army,” International Peace 

Institute, December 2009, 6. 

12 Ted Dagne, “Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in 

North Uganda,” Congressional Research Service, January 29, 2010, 6.

13 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda, 14. 

14 Ibid., 15.

15 Acceptance of the amnesty offer from the Ugandan government 

would not, however, have resulted in the cancellation of indictments for 

the senior LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court. This fact 

highlighted tensions between peace-building and stabilization efforts 

and transitional justice requirements, which continue to this day.

16 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, 

With or Without Kony, Africa Report No. 146, December 10, 2008.

17 Julia Spiegel and Noel Atama, “Finishing the Fight Against 

the LRA,” Enough Project, May 12, 2009.
16 SF No. 270 www.ndu.edu/inss

18 Ibid., 4. 

19 Operation Lightning Thunder should not be portrayed as the only 

catalyst for LRA attacks outside of Uganda in recent years. In fact, in the 

final stages of the Juba peace process as early as September and October 

2008, the LRA was already attacking, killing, abducting, and displacing 

civilian populations near Dungo, Congo. See “Kony’s New Front,” Africa 

Confidential 49, no. 22, October 31, 2008. Moreover, the spike in LRA 

killings after Operation Lightning Thunder began was only one of many. 

In 2006, a consortium of local and international NGOs published a study 

indicating that the rate of violent deaths in Acholi internally displaced 

persons camps was 146 killings per week: “Shockingly, this figure is more 

than three times higher than the figure reported for Iraq in the period 

following the Allied invasion in 2003.” See Civil Society Organisations 

for Peace in Northern Uganda, “Counting the Cost: Twenty Years of War 

in Northern Uganda,” March 20, 2006.

20 Spiegel and Atama, 4.

21 BBC News, “Christmas Massacres ‘Killed 400,’” December 

30, 2008.

22 Ledio Cakaj, “On the Heels of Kony: The Untold Tragedy Unfolding in the Central African Republic,” Enough Project, June 2010.

23 Enough Project, “Wanted by the ICC: The LRA’s Leaders: 

Who They Are and What They’ve Done,” available at <www.enoughproject.org/files/pdf/lra_leaders.pdf>.

24 See Sverker Finnstrom, Living with Bad Surroundings: War 

and Existential Uncertainty in Acholiland, Northern Uganda (Uppsala, 

Sweden: Uppsala University Press, 2003), and a summary of key 

points in Schomerus, “The Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan,” 13–17. 

25 See “The Impact of Minerals Smuggling in Central Africa,” 

in The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 

Assessment (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 

2010), 261–266. 

26 There are occasional reports that local tribesmen in LRAaffected areas of the Central African Republic (CAR) and southern 

Sudan, particularly individuals from the Mbororo ethnic group, may 

be providing assistance to the LRA. However, there is no indication 

of a common political agenda. Rather, whatever trade exists between 

the two sides is likely motivated by profit or simply to prevent LRA 

attacks on the Mbororo. See International Crisis Group, LRA: A 

Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, Africa Report No. 157, April 

28, 2010, 11.

27 Ledio Cakaj, “The Lord’s Resistance Army Today,” Enough 

Project, November 2010, 4.

28 Ledio Cakaj, “Lords of Disorder: LRA Resist Regional Power 

for Two Decades,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 17, 2011. 

29 International Crisis Group, LRA: A Regional Strategy, 10.

30 See Cakaj, “The Lord’s Resistance Army Today,” 13.

31 For instance, see “From Promise to Peace: A Blueprint for 

President Obama’s LRA Strategy,” published by the U.S. advocacy 

group Resolve in September 2010. Its blueprint is structured around the 

same four lines of effort as the U.S. strategy published in October 2010.

32 For instance, see United Nations, “Security Council Press 

Statement on Lord’s Resistance Army,” UN/SC/9791, November 17, 

2009; Resolve, “From Promise to Peace”; InterAction, “Lord’s Resistance Army—Affected Areas in Uganda, Southern Sudan, DRC and 

CAR,” policy brief, Washington, DC, January 2011; and International 

Crisis Group, LRA: A Regional Strategy.

33 Human Rights Watch, “US Comprehensive Strategy on the 

Lord’s Resistance Army,” letter to President Barack Obama, July 15, 2010.

34 Barack Obama, cover letter to Howard L. Berman.

35 For details on this debate, see Victoria K. Holt, “The Military 

and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities,” Humanitarian Policy Group Research Briefing 22, Overseas Development 

Institute, March 2006.

36 Quadrillage, sometimes referred to as “quartering” or “gridding,” involves the use of military force to secure an area from insurgent 

presence, use regular patrols to prevent infiltration of that area, and then 

expand outward to secure additional areas. The word is often used to 

describe French counterinsurgency efforts in Algeria in the 1950s.

37 See Ledio Cakaj, “On LRA, African Union Overestimates 

Military Might, Leaves Out Key Actor,” Enough Project, October 27, 

2010.

38 The UN Support Operation for AMISOM could serve as an 

example for this type of effort.

39 See Resolve, “From Promise to Peace,” 20.

40 Human Rights Watch, “US Comprehensive Strategy on the 

Lord’s Resistance Army.”

41 For additional information on efforts to demobilize the LRA, 

see Ledio Cakaj, “Too Far from Home: Demobilizing the Lord’s 

Resistance Army,” Enough Project, February 14, 2011.

42 See International Crisis Group, LRA: A Regional Strategy.

43 Cakaj, “Lords of Disorder,” 2.

44 Mayank Buba, “South Sudan’s Militias,” Enough Project, 

March 3, 2011. 

45 See Johnnie Carson, “U.S. Priorities for sub-Saharan Africa,” 

Diplomacy Briefing Series, U.S. Department of State, June 14, 2010. The 

five stated priorities are conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution; 

strengthening democratic institutions; promoting economic growth and 

reform; improving public health; and addressing transnational challenges.

46 Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests 

and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” Congressional Research 

Service, November 16, 2010.

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS