Indochina Monographs

Pacification

by

Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho

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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Tho, Tran Dinh.

Pacification.

(Indochina monographs)

Supt. of Docs, no.: D llU.2:Pll

1. Vietnam--Politics and government--19^5-1975

2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975--Underground

movements. 3. Guerrillas—Vietnam. I. Title.

II. Series.

DS556.9-T^8 959.70^*31 79-607913

This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced in

whole or in part without consulting the publisher

First printing 1980
Indochina Monographs

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center

of Military History. They were written by officers who held

responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South

Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General

Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessary support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the

views of their authors—not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or

the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write

definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southeast Asia.

Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a

forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: From Cease-Fire

to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao

Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General

Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent

of Documents.

Taken together these works should provide useful source

materials for serious historians pending publication of the more definitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

in
Preface

Pacification is the military, political, economic, and social

process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive

to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the

provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction

of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion

of political control and involvement of the people in government, and

the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.

Defined as such, pacification is a broad and complex strategic

concept which encompasses many fields of national endeavor. As a

program implemented jointly with the U.S. military effort in South

Vietnam, pacification appears to have involved every American serviceman and civilian who served there, many of whom indeed participated in

conceiving the idea and helping put it to work.

As they and other responsible Vietnamese officials may have

realized, the magnitude and intricacies of pacification problems defy

even the most diligent attempt to analyze and present them as cohesive

subjects within the limited scope of a monograph. To the general

reader, unless he has a comprehensive background of the Vietnam situation, the implementation of pacification through time and space can

also frusträte any effort to arrive at comprehensive generalizations.

The fact is — and I am certain that many will share my opinion — there

exist but a few authorities on pacification as a total subject. However,

there are many Vietnamese and Americans who were highly professional and

effective in their areas of responsibility within the overall program.
In the attempt to present every relevant aspect of the GVN pacification effort, I have mostly relied on my personal experience as

one of the many architects who helped draw part of the blueprint and

oversaw its progress, and complemented it by conducting interviews

with responsible officials and studying available documentation.

Several people have contributed to the completion of this monograph

to whom I feel particularly indebted. I certainly owe a debt of gratitude to General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff and

Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Chief of Staff and Commanding

General of the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF — under whom I served

many years as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations — for their

valuable guidance and suggestions concerning the pacification planning

and coordination process at the GVN level. To Lieutenant General

Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General of I Corps, and Major General

Nguyen Duy Hinh, Commander of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division, I owe

insight and an unbiased viewpoint with regard to the actual implementation of the pacification program at the field level and the many

problems involved. Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, my colleague of many years

as J-2, JGS, has helped me with his always thoughtful critical remarks

and his authoritative knowledge of enemy schemes and actions.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu

Xuan Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army

Attache serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done

a highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart

unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain

in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of

the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in

the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia Tran Dinh Tho

10 October, 1977 Brigadier General, ARVN

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. PACIFICATION STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES 9

The Enemy Threat 9

System Evolution 11

Strategy and Operational Concept 19

Interim Objectives and Priorities 22

The Ultimate National Goals 26

III. OPERATION AND SUPPORT 32

The GVN Organization For Paoifioation 32

Employment of Forces in Support of Pacification .... 40

U'.S. Organization for Pacification Support 56

The Phoenix Program 66

IV. RVN-US COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN PACIFICATION ... 75

The Central Level 75

The Corps Tactical Zone/Military Region Level 81

The Division Tactical Area Level 83

The Province/Sector Level 83

An Evaluation 85

V. PACIFICATION TECHNIQUES AND OPERATIONS 89

Pacification Techniques 91

Coordination in Security Activities 99

Training 104

The Hamlet Evaluation System ' 106

VI. SOCIAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 109

Objectives • 109

The Self-Help Hamlet Development Program 110

Rural Health Ill

The Rural Education Development Program 114

The Relief and Resettlement of Refugees 116

Agricultural Development 122

The Fisheries Program 125

An Evaluation 126

vii
Chapter Page

VII. THE GVN POLITICAL, INFORMATION AND CHIEU HOI EFFORTS . . 132

Information and Propaganda 132

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program 134

Relations with Ethnic Minorities 137

Land Reform and the "Land-To-The-Tiller" Program . . 140

Village and Hamlet Elections 144

People 's Self-Defense Forces 150

An Evaluation 155

VIII. AN ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION: SOME ACHIEVEMENTS,

DIFFICULTIES AND SHORTCOMINGS 160

The Ideological Aspect of Pacification 160

Statistics Versus Achievements 162

The Communist Challenge to Pacification 169

The Problems of Cadres and Territorial Forces .... 175

The Impact of U.S. Policies 180

IX. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 183

Appendix

A. DECREE - MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY . . 196

Territorial Organization 196

Chain of Command 197

Functions 198

Coordination 202

Special Provisions 202

B. DECREE - REORGANIZATION OF VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION 203

Village People's Council 203

The Village Administrative Committee . 209

Hamlet Management Committee 213

General Provisions . 214

GLOSSARY 217

No.

Tables

Casualties Caused by Enemy Anti-Pacification Terrorist

Activities (From 1968 to 1970) 170

Charts

1. Central Revolutionary Development Council, 1968 .... 33

2. GVN Revolutionary Development Councils, 1967-68 .... 34

3. Pacification Councils and U.S. Support Organization

(as of 1970) 36

4. RVNAF Organization for Pacification Support 41

vxn
No. Page

5. Command and Control, Regional and Popular Forces 45

6. Organization, Province Regional and Popular Forces .... 46

7. Organization, National Police 49

8. Expansion of National Police Forces 50

9. Organization, 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadre Group 52

10. Organization, Province RD Cadre Group Headquarters .... 54

• 11. Organization, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff

for CORDS, USMACV 58

12. Organization, CTZ/MR CORDS in 1968 62

13. U.S. Advisory Relationship with ARVN 64

14. Phoenix Operation and Control System 67

15. Organization, Province Phoenix Committee 68

16. Organization, District Phoenix Committee 69

17. US-RVN Relationship in Pacification, before 1971 76

18. Refugee Relief and Resettlement 121

19. Rice Production and Supplementary Crops 130

20. Organization, Village and Hamlet Government 147

21. Village and Hamlet Elections, 1970 149

22. Organization, PSDF 152

23. Organization, PSDF Combat Group 153

24.. Achievements in Population and Hamlet Control, 1971 . . . 165

25. Expansion of PSDF, 1968-1970 168

26. Enemy Anti-Pacification Activities 172

Maps

1. RVN Military Territorial Organization 43

2. Quang Nam Pacification Campaign . . 94

IX
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The war in Vietnam was a continuation of the basic conflict, begun

in 1946, which pitted the Communists against the free, nationalistic

Vietnamese. Punctuated by a short pause following the Geneva Accords,

the Communist-led struggle in the South followed fundamentally consistent

policies and strategies aimed at achieving complete political dominance

over all of Vietnam.

The Viet Cong insurgents operating behind a screen of a national

liberation movement were fronts for the Vietnamese Communist Party whose

Politbureau in Hanoi directed the total war effort. Although the Viet

Cong profited from the Viet Minh experience and knew how to conceal

their true identity, they were unable to make the appeal of their cause

as strong as the feverish desire for independence was for the Viet Minh

in 1949. The Viet Minh had been able to take over the control of the

nationalist and anti-colonial movements and eliminate most of the nationalist contenders in the process. They had enjoyed an undisputed cause

and derived from it great strength and popularity. The Viet Cong also

attempted to revive the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist issue but the

old magic failed to work because South Vietnam, despite its heavy reliance on U.S. aid, had become a truly independent nation.

The regime of the Republic of Vietnam, under Ngo Dinh Diem and

successive military and civilian governments, was thus faced with a

double challenge, that of nation building and the threat of insurgency

and outright invasion from the north. In many respects, the war against

the Viet Cong bore the characteristics of a civil war, although both

sides received aid and were supported with troops from outside sources.
The cells of the Viet Cong infrastructure, aided by and in concert with

local and NVA main forces, acted on the body of South Vietnam like cancerous tumors and sapped the strength of the GVN. The GVN task of

nation building stood little chance of success unless these tumors were

removed, and the GVN military effort was inextricably entwined with

political, social and economic endeavors. Together, they made up the

total effort known as pacification.

Nowhere was this total effort more arduous than in the Vietnamese

countryside, the main battleground of the war and pacification.

The Vietnamese countryside suffered most from destruction and privations and was the feeding ground for social injustice, crimes, oppressions, and all the vices generated by a colonialist and feudalistic

heritage. Land was inequitably distributed; most private land being

in the possession of wealthy landlords. The majority of farmers did

not own the land they cultivated but had to lease it from landlords

who charged exorbitant rents. It was also plagued by debilitating

diseases, lack of medication and sanitation, shortages of food and

clothing, and widespread illiteracy. Because of the lack of schools

and teachers, most rural children were denied an education and forced

at an early age to work as farmhands under harsh and difficult conditions. The prospects for the future looked grim and disheartening.

South Vietnam, before the French-Viet Minh war began in 1946,

ranked as one of the top rice producers among Southeast Asian countries.

About 90% of its population lived on rice farming and depended on agriculture as a principal means of subsistence. Yet during the war South

Vietnam had to import rice in increasing quantities each year. The

escalating war forced the peasants to relinquish their land and farming,

quit breeding cattle and poultry and move to urban areas as refugees.

Unemployment was widespread and became more serious every year. The

national economy deteriorated and functioned only as a result of aid

transfusions. As a result of population growth and increasing imports

through U.S. aid programs, consumption rose, surpassing production by

a five-to-one ratio.
The village and hamlet governmental structure was truly the relic

of a feudalists age. Local leaders, who in most cases inherited their

positions, domineered and exploited the peasants by levying high rents

and taxes. The farm worker led a miserable life, barely subsisting on

what was left of the fruit of his toil after land rents, and going

further into debt with each decade. The undercurrent of discontent among

the rural people was widespread.

In addition to suffering social vices and economic misfortunes,

South Vietnam was also the victim of blatant invasion from Communist

North Vietnam, assisted by the Communist bloc. In the face of this

situation, the government and people of South Vietnam endeavored on the

one hand to defeat the Communist aggressors, and on the other hand to

reform their own society. It was a difficult enterprise because both

tasks demanded equal priority. National resources and manpower were

utilized to the full, augmented by considerable contributions in combat

forces, material resources, and money from the United States and the

Free World.

To our side as well as to the enemy, the rural area of South Vietnam was to be the decisive battlefield. Without it, the enemy would lose

his foothold and the opportunities to protract his war, for the rural area

was his major source of subsistence and manpower. The countryside was

the arena for the ideological struggle between the Free World and Communism. It was where the battle for the hearts and minds of the people

was fought and whoever won their trust, cooperation, and support would

be the final victor. Without the rural area, which in Communist doctrine

included not only the agricultural lands but also the forests, swamps

and mountains, the nation could hardly survive.

To win the battle for the rural area, the enemy conceived the strategy on "encircling the cities with the rural area," while on the RVN side,

"all efforts of the nation were to focus on the rural area." In fact,

one element of the enemy's strategy in attacking the cities and towns

in his general offensive of 1968 was to draw the GVN and allied forces

out of the countryside where they were enjoying considerable success in
pacification. The Communists believed control of the rural area was

the key to success in a people's war.

The importance of the rural area was obvious. Vietnam, like China,

was an agricultural country. Peasants were the largest social group and

compared to other social elements were the most underprivileged. Like

the Chinese peasants, the Vietnamese peasants were used by the Communists as a front for their "revolutionary war." After the Communists

took over control of North Vietnam, one of the first policies they

implemented was land reform which redistributed land among the peasants.

This policy turned peasants into private landowners, which served well

the purpose of winning them over.

In the economic battle, the rural area also played a key role. It

was the source of food supplies, and Communist control would certainly

help them to achieve self-sufficiency and sustain the war effort.

Because of this economic importance, the enemy tried to cut us off

from the rural area with his policy of "encircling the adversary's

economy" and causing economic difficulties in order to make South

Vietnam increasingly dependent on foreign aid.

In the ideological struggle, the rural area was also a fecund

ground for political indoctrination and for fomenting class hatred and

class struggle. The marked inequality between rural life and urban

life existed not only in terms of material comfort and basic necessities but also in the disparity with which law and order were enforced.

In many instances, rural life appeared to be governed by a different

set of laws and regulations. Too frequently, central government directives were interpreted and manipulated by village authorities to suit

their own purposes or merely disregarded in favor of their own rules.

The Communists strove to acquire the inexhaustible manpower of

the rural areas. This dependence of the Communists on the rural area

was in a certain sense similar to the bond that tied the Nationalists

to the cities and urban areas, which were a major source of Nationalist manpower.

The RVN government was fully aware of the Communist dependence on

the rural area, and the national strategy of "Pacification and
Development" was designed to separate the Communists from it. The strategy also sought to establish the GVN presence in less secure, contested

areas with a view of controlling the nation's manpower and resources and

denying them to the enemy. Despite its awareness, the RVN initially

appeared not to be truly cognizant of the full implications of the problem at hand. Its efforts to implement pacification were not pushed hard

enough and sometimes appeared to be devoid of genuine enthusiasm. These

efforts also met with vigorous opposition from the Communists who persistently sought to thwart or offset whatever achievements the RVN happened

to gain.

One of the Communists' first reactions was, characteristically enough, to oppose the establishment of local government at the

village and hamlet level since this was an extension of the prestige,

laws, and political influence of the RVN central government. Unable

to wreck the RVN governmental infrastructure, the Communists resorted

to effective methods of intimidation, repression, and terror. Through

machinations and manipulations, they managed to help into office those

who were considered "middle-of-the-roaders," men who were too weak and

too indifferent to serve in any effective way and obstructed the nomination of local leaders who enjoyed prestige, affection, and respect among

the population. The Communists resorted to kidnapping or outright

assassination if intimidation failed to remove those local officials

whom they considered too devoted or too zealous. Countless officials

at the grass-roots level were reduced to silence or became casualties.

The enemy's goal was to instill fear, disenchantment, and anxiety among

the active GVN cadre and force them into inaction.

In addition to their effort to neutralize or paralyze our local

government structure, the Communists also systematically set about to

undermine and disrupt every program the RVN initiated at the local level.

Such key programs as "Land to the Tiller" and "Farm Credit" met with

vicious slander or outright sabotage. For example, Communist cadres

instigated the peasants to apply in mass for credits in order to overtax the bureaucracy and exhaust the funds; then they urged the peasants

not to make repayments. The fish-breeding program also failed to
interest farmers at first because Communist cadres spread the rumor

that the type of fish that the GVN had imported from the Philippines

would cause leprosy.

The most significant Communist opposition to pacification dated

back to the early days of the First Republic's Strategic Hamlet system

which the Communists vilified as a program designed to "repress the

population" and to "imprison the population behind the hamlet's barrier."

In addition to the vilification campaign, the Communists stepped up

attacks and shellings against Strategic Hamlets.

After their defeat during the 1968 general offensive, Communist

main force units had to withdraw to border base areas leaving much of

the countryside to GVN control. The pacification program subsequently

made remarkable progress across the country. This took the Communist

command in the south by surprise, and it resolved to wreck the GVN's

pacification and development program at all costs. As a matter of

fact, almost all directives issued by COSVN during that period focused

on a determined effort to defeat the GVN pacification program. A

document captured in 1971 admitted that the loss of the rural area

2

would eventually make it impossible for the Communists to gain victory.

To confront the enemy and compete with him in the rural area, the

GVN first sought to place all villages and hamlets across the country

under military control. In addition to protecting the population, the

GVN also strived to regiment it into organizations and arm its ablebodied members. The goal was to turn villages and hamlets into centers

of resistance against the enemy and to make him feel unsafe wherever he

went. Once this was done, development could take place with more chance

of success. Regional and Popular Forces (RF and PF) and People's SelfDefense Forces (PSDF) were employed to defend and protect their own

villages. The tactic was based on a guerrilla warfare precept: if the

enemy force was small, destroy it; if it was sizeable, harass and pin

COSVN: Central Office South Vietnam; the Communist Headquarters

located near the Cambodian border north of Saigon.

2

Enemy document captured in 1971 and confirmed by J-2, JGS.
it down, or withdraw to conserve force and call for regular reinforcements to destroy it. ARVN regular units, meanwhile, would concentrate

on attacking and destroying the enemy's logistical bases and his main

force units, thus denying him the chance to rest, recuperate, 'or reorganize.

To help advance the democratic process and to expand national

authority, the governmental structure was to be consolidated and made

to function effectively. All basic institutions of the regime were to

be founded on popular vote, and the government was to assist the people

and to respond to their aspirations. National laws were to be enforced

so as to eliminate village tyrants who repressed and exploited the

people.

For the success of the pacification effort, the GW deemed it

important to improve the welfare of the entire population. In its view,

pacification would not be complete if it did not lay the foundation for

economic development and social betterment. As a result, several programs related to pacification such as land reform, farm credit, and

farmers' associations were implmented on a large scale in conjunction

with the military and political efforts. Through these programs, the

GVN eventually turned farm tenants and farm workers into land owners

and eradicated the abominable land rent system. At the same time, it

created conditions for agricultural development by teaching farmers

modern techniques, making available seeds, fertilizers, insecticides

and encouraging the breeding of farm animals and the planting of supplementary crops. The economic element of pacification also included

opening roads and waterways and maintaining lines of communication which

were vital to economic and military progress.

In health and education, the effort concentrated on eliminating

illiteracy, making primary and secondary education available to the

rural population, providing free medical care and improving sanitation.

Such programs as the construction of classrooms, dispensaries, maternity

wards, and the recruiting and training of teachers, nurses, technicians,

were undertaken as pacification progressed.
In conclusion, in place of the social disruption caused by deliberate sabotage by the Communists, the government and people of South

Vietnam were determined, with the assistance provided by the United

States and the Free World, to transform South Vietnam into an antiCommunist outpost of the Free World, to heal the social ills inherited

from colonialism and feudalism, and to make their country prosperous.

The efforts of the GVN in pacification could be summed up by the

three national goals that pacification sought to achieve, namely:

(1) to end the war, which implied eliminating Viet Cong infrastructure

(VCI), defeating invasion forces and maintaining security; (2) to

develop democracy, which implied the establishment of elective government and democratic institutions and enlisting the participation of

the people in national life; and (3) to reform society by eliminating

injustice and social vices, and providing every citizen equal opportunities for advancement and equal protection under the law.
CHAPTER II

Pacification Strategy and Objectives

The Enemy Threat

The war was first waged under the cover of a popular uprising

against the South Vietnamese government and not as an outright invasion.

The Communists created the National Liberation Front (NLF) on 20 December 1960 to give the war a political cover. The NLF was in fact just

what its name conveyed, a front. The actual authority for conducting

the war in South Vietnam remained in the hands of the Politbureau in

Hanoi which directed the war in the South through five major commands:

the B5 Front was responsible for the DMZ area, Military Region Tri Thien

Hue (MRTTH) for the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, Military

Region 5 for the coastal provinces from Quang Nam in the north through

Khanh Hoa in the south, B3 Front generally for the highland area in

western GVN MR-2, and COSVN, the Central Office for South Vietnam.

COSVN was responsible for South Vietnam's southern half, a geographical

area corresponding to GVN MR-3, MR-4 and the southern part of MR-2 of

the Republic of Vietnam.

The conflict, according to the Communists, was a "people's war,"

a war waged by all the people in all aspects: military, political,

economic, social, cultural, etc. The enemy used the same strategy it

used with success during the First Indochina war, 1949-1954, a threephased strategy adapted from Mao Tse Tung's theory of protracted war,

which was supposed to progress from strategic defensive to strategic

offensive. Guerrilla warfare was the form during the first phase. Its

purpose was to harass and wear down the opponent. The second phase

involved the beginning of mobile warfare and consisted of attacks

against enemy fortifications with the purpose of attriting the enemy's
military potential and driving him into a strategic defense. The final

phase was an all-out offensive employing mobile warfare combined with

fortification warfare, aimed at complete destruction of enemy forces.

Communist forces in South Vietnam consisted of three principal

components: (1) the infrastructure (political and support) and guerrillas; (2) regional forces; and (3) regular or main forces. There

were two types of guerrillas: the para-military and the full military

or unattached. Guerrilla activities were generally localized and consisted of sabotage, assassination, harassment, which were aimed at

sowing confusion, terror and loss of confidence among the population

and forcing the RVN forces to spread thin and lose mobility. Guerrillas

also constituted a source of manpower for regional forces whose scope

of activities was more extensive and whose combat effectiveness and

armament were better. Regional forces were generally employed in a

supporting role when regular forces were committed and they both used

the tactics of mobile warfare.

Guerrillas were organized into squads and platoons while regional

forces consisted of battalions and regiments. Regular forces were

initially of battalion or regimental size but were gradually upgraded

into divisions and finally army corps.

By 1959, when the enemy began to rekindle war activities in South

Vietnam, Communist forces consisted primarily of Viet Cong elements or

South Vietnamese Communists. Their cadre were mainly former Viet Minh

elements regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954 but re-introduced into the

South after 1959. In 1962, however, North Vietnam began to infiltrate

men into the South to help the Viet Cong build up its multi-level military force and also as replacements for increasing losses. By 1964,

entire NVA regiments were introduced into the South and after US combat

forces entered the war a year later, division-size NVA units were

recorded fighting on southern battlefields. The infiltration of NVA

men and units, together with combat and logistic support assets continued unabated despite heavy US bombardments.. During this period,

intelligence reports indicated a constant movement of NVA divisions in

and out of South Vietnam. At the time of the 1972 invasion, there were

10
14 NVA infantry divisions committed to three main fronts in South Vietnam, supported by one sapper division, one artillery division and one

AAA division. These forces remained in the South until the cease-fire

in January 1973 and constituted a permanent military threat for the RVN.

By this time, 90% of Communist combat units in South Vietnam were NVA

and only one-third of total Communist strength were Viet Cong.

The enemy infrastructure which existed in South Vietnam from the

beginning of the war did not cause grave concern to the GVN until 1967

when its role became prominent in combat support. Despite heavy losses

incurred by enemy main force units, this infrastructure continued its

activities such as tax collection, supply, recruitment, etc., even in

the areas adjacent to cities and US and RVNAF bases. The war in Vietnam

was being fought on two levels: the conspicuous, violent, high level

of combat against Communist armed forces, and the silent, ubiquitous

low-key but no less deadly struggle against the enemy infrastructure.

The elimination of the VCI proved to be a task much more difficult

than the destruction of enemy combat units because of its cellular, welldispersed and well-concealed organization. The VCI was in fact so well

woven into the South Vietnamese social fabric that it was almost invulnerable to detection. Even if one VCI cell was discovered, it would be

difficult to trace it to others because of airtight compartmentalization.

System Evolution

Under the First Republic (1955-1963), the concept of strategic

hamlets took shape in a piecemeal manner in some localities during

1961. It was subsequently expanded and developed into a cohesive,

nation-wide system.

In the beginning, some local authorities merely duplicated the

village defense system as it had been employed with success against

the Viet Minh in Bui Chu and Phat Diem, the two oldest Roman Catholic

diocesan areas in North Vietnam. In Ninh Thuan province, for example,

Lieutenant Colonel Khanh, the province chief, initiated a village defense

11
program by encouraging villagers to plant a special kind of cactus

around their village. Growing rapidly to over a meter in height, the

spiny and thorn-bristled cactus hedge formed a difficult barrier which

discouraged enemy infiltrators from penetrating the village. Male and

female youths were tasked for security and guard duties, using rudimentary weapons such as pointed sticks, lances and spears.

In Darlac Province, Trung Hoa village was fashioned into a North

Vietnam-type village by Father Hoa, a Catholic priest of Chinese origin

who fled North Vietnam in 1954. Father Hoa had brought with him a large

number of Nung people, a North Vietnamese ethnic group, whom he helped

resettle in the village. The Nung resettlement area soon became a

tightly stockaded village whose defense enclosure of wooden stakes was

reinforced by a system of camouflaged trap holes lined with poison-soaked

spikes. The poison would, cause hard-to-heal and sometimes fatal infections. For the defense against Viet Cong attacks, villagers were armed

with crossbows and arrows, lances and spears in addition to a few obsolete rifles.

Despite crude weapons, the defense of the two villages was effective.

This success inspired the Vinh Long province chief, Lieutenant Colonel

Le Van Phuoc, to establish self-defense systems in a number of villages

located along National Route QL-4, patterned after Ninh Thuan and Trung

Hoa. Although experimental, these village defense systems proved successful counters to guerrilla activities.

In order to develop a village defense system for the entire country,

2

Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu developed the concept of Strategic Hamlets. This

concept was an amalgamation of ideas derived from Vietnamese self-defense

villages, British anti-Communist tactics successfully used in Malaya, and

the Israeli Kibbutz defense system. By 1961, Mr. Nhu's concept developed

into a cohesive national policy and its ensuing Strategic Hamlet program,

which he himself directed, was initiated on a nation-wide basis. Designed

Another important Nung resettlement area was established at Nam

Can, a district of An Xuyen Province in the Mekong Delta.

2

Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu was the younger brother of President Ngo Dinh

Diem. In addition to his official position as Political Adviser to the

President, he was also the founder of the Can Lao Party.

12
to transform villages and hamlets into anti-guerrilla bastions, the

basic idea was to oppose the Communists with a ubiquitous resistance and

defense system whose "main and long frontline" was the villages and

hamlets themselves. With each village and hamlet fortified and armed,

the enemy would find it very difficult to select a weak point to attack.

He would find strong resistance everywhere.

According to Mr. Nhu, the enemy enjoyed the advantage of fighting

a frontless war. To offset that advantage, he said, we had to turn the

rural areas into a "crisscrossed line of defense." The regular army

would not be able to spread its troops over this line anyway, so there

was no need to greatly expand it. Instead, the army would be kept at a

reasonable size and improved in combat effectiveness; it would concentrate primarily on enemy base areas and main force units. The people

would become the primary force in the fight against enemy guerrillas.

Toward that end, they would organize the defense of villages and hamlets

by themselves and fight the enemy by employing "people's guerrilla tactics."

The Strategic Hamlet program progressed slowly but proved effective

enough in the face of an insurgency still in its embryonic stage. The

slow progress could be attributed to the fact that the program did not

enjoy such large-scale US support as its successor later did. It was

partly funded by the national budget and partly by the Military Assistance Program. Despite this, by the end of 1962 statistics showed that

out of a total of 11,864 hamlets, 3,235 had been completed and about 34%

of the total population was considered as living under the GVN protec3

txon.

3

A Strategic Hamlet was considered completed when it met the

following criteria:

a. The enemy infrastructure had been neutralized.

b. The population had been organized for hamlet defense.

c. The defense system (barrier, moat, trenches, traps, etc.) had

been physically established.

d. Secret underground shelters for weapons and personnel had been

constructed for the hamlet defense force.

e. The hamlet council and administrative body had been elected

and functioning.

The population of South Vietnam in 1961 was estimated at 14 million.

13
The percentage of population under GVN control was computed on

the basis of reports submitted through the administrative hierarchy,

from village to district to province, and from province to the central

government. This reporting procedure was not as accurate as the Hamlet

Evaluation System (HES) which the US later initiated in 1967. There

was the possibility that Viet Cong infrastructure members were among

the population recorded as living in GVN-controlled hamlets.

To ensure tight population control, some local governments adopted

stringent measures such as a census file for every household, containing

not only names and other particulars of its members but also a group

photograph showing every member of the household. Those households

having members or relatives who had regrouped to North Vietnam or were

active Viet Cong were identified by red dots, one dot for each such

member, painted on a pillar in front of the house. Blue dots were

used for other members of the household. Thus, at a glance, local

government officials could tell which households had members cooperating

with the other side. Naturally, these households were subject to

discreet surveillance by the local government.

In 1963, several political upheavals slowed the accomplishment of

the objectives of the Strategic Hamlet program and eventually, terminated it altogether, but until that year the program was achieving

considerable success in neutralizing the local VCI and in organizing

effective local defenses. The Buddhist opposition movement in 1963

led to a military coup which overthrew the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and

ushered in a period of turmoil and instability. At the same time, the

military situation deteriorated markedly through the escalation of

attacks by the Viet Cong. The Strategic Hamlet program, as a consequence, came to a complete stop. Those cadre who had managed and

directed the program were either arrested or removed for having been

part of the old regime. The few cadre who remained free dissassociated

themselves from the program. Soon after the military junta took over,

its president officially announced the abolition of the Strategic

14
Hamlet program in a proclamation that was widely acclaimed by the

public and secretly enjoyed by the enemy. In some localities, the

gains achieved through two years of hard toil disintegrated almost

overnight. The Military Revolutionary Council had acted out of

political necessity but had not foreseen the detrimental consequences.

The countryside was once again left without governmental

control, and the enemy at once filled this void with his own apparatus. During the months immediately following the overthrow of

President Diem, the overall situation became utterly chaotic with

coups and countercoups, power struggles, and an increased level of

enemy attacks.

In the face of the deteriorating situation, the GVN was in

a dilemna. On the one hand, there was no way to reinstate the

Strategic Hamlet program since it had been linked with the old

regime and officially abolished. On the other hand, the GVN could

not give the enemy free reign over the countryside. As a solution,

the government instituted a new pacification program, the "New Life

Hamlet" program. As a matter of fact, there was nothing that could

distinguish this program from its predecessor, only a change in name.

The New Life program began to move unsteadily forward. At first

it was a loosely controlled, hesitant, unenthusiastic effort. There

were not enough resources to commit to the program, and the new

cadre were reluctant to implement it forcefully for fear of being

identified with the old regime cadre. Furthermore, the leadership

gave it no clear-cut direction and the organizations that were to

operate the program were plagued by ineffectiveness and incompetence.

Very few local authorities knew exactly what to do or how to do it.

The year 1965 came as a miracle that saved South Vietnam from

probable collapse. US combat troops followed by Free World Military

Assistance forces were committed to South Vietnam to ward off an imminent Communist victory and the US poured in material resources to help

15
the RVN regain its military footing. After initial successes that

restored stability and maintained a fair military balance, both the US

and the RVN governments could turn their attention to pacification.

Based on lessons learned through the Strategic Hamlet and the New

Life Hamlet, the GVN initiated the Rural Development program in 1966.

This was followed, in 1967, by the so-called New Model Pacification

program. To give a good start to this effort, centralized planning

was initiated but there was a clear lack of coordination between the

military plan and its civilian counterpart. As a result, the organizational structure for operational control was not effective and there

was little mutual support between the military and the civilian efforts.

Moreover, there was a shortage of cadre at all levels and the training

effort failed to turn them out in sufficient numbers. The ARVN, meanwhile, considered pacification a responsibility of the civilians; it

claimed to have no part in it since its mission was to conduct mobile

operations to destroy the enemy. During this period, the Regional and

Popular Forces were still in their nascent stage; they were not yet

capable of taking up the pacification responsibilities. In order to

provide effective support for the pacification program, the RF and PF

(formerly Civil Guard and People's Militia or Self-Defense Corps,

respectively) required, expansion, reorganization and more intensive

training.

Despite all these constraints, the pacification program seemed to

be well on its way to progress. Its chances of success, however, were

undermined by the enemy's general offensive in 1968. All the forces

that had been committed to the pacification program, regular and territorial alike, had to be redeployed for the defense of provincial capitals and district towns. The countryside was once again left open to

enemy control.

After successively defeating the enemy's attack in 1968, the GVN

and RVNAF followed up their victories by initiating a three-month pacification plan called the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign," from

November 1968 to January 1969. The campaign was designed to enlarge

the extent of GVN control, and this was a most appropriate time for

16
the special pacification effort to succeed since enemy forces had by

then withdrawn to their border base areas for refitting and reorganizing. The RVNAF, with the support of the US and all other allied troops,

enjoyed the initiative on all battlefields. As a result, the pacification effort was crowned with success.

In 1969 and 1970, pacification progressed by leaps and bounds.

The total number of people and the extent of territory under GVN control surpassed all expectations. The enemy was effectively driven back

to his bases over the border, and his units were unable to undertake

any major action, preoccupied as they were with refitting and regrouping. Pursuing their military gains, the RVNAF took the initiative and

struck across the border, first into enemy bases in Cambodia in 1970

and then into lower Laos. As a result, during 1971 the GVN had time

to consolidate the gains achieved during the two previous years without

major confrontations with enemy main-force units. In view of the

markedly improved situation, the GVN found it appropriate to choose

another name for its pacification effort. From 1971 on it was called

"Community Defense and Development," the ultimate goal for which the

GVN was striving.

During this period, the enemy studied the lessons learned from

his military defeat in 1968. Meanwhile, in view of the remarkable

gains achieved by the GVN in its pacification program, the enemy was

in danger of being denied the countryside altogether.

In 1972, the Communists launched a new general offensive,

an offensive which was radically different from the 1968 Tet offensive.

Supported by tanks and artillery, nearly five NVA infantry divisions

crossed the DMZ and invaded Quang Tri. Simultaneously, three divisions

attacked north of Kontum and three others north of Binh Long. This

offensive was aimed at forcing a coalition government on South Vietnam,

defeating the Vietnamization program so that the RVNAF would be unable

to take over the combat role from US forces, and finally, forcing the

RVN to accept terms advantageous to the Communist side at the Paris

talks. The GVN and the RVNAF were determined to defend the countryside at all costs, and the RVNAF had, by this time, improved and

17
matured into a formidable fighting force. Furthermore, despite the

gradual withdrawal of US combat forces from Vietnam, there still

remained in country sizable US strategic and tactical air, naval firepower, and logistical support to assist the RVNAF.

With effective US support, the RVNAF were able to hold out against

the greatly reinforced regular NVA forces and prevent further inroads

into the countryside. Following these military achievements, the GVN

concentrated on consolidating the pacification gains instead of pushing

for further expansion. Rather than renewing another annual effort, the

government looked farther ahead and developed a four-year pacification

plan. This was known as "1972-1975 Community Defense and Local Development" plan which was designed, as the name implied, to consolidate territorial security on the one hand and to develop the nation in all aspects

on the other.

No sooner had the plan been implemented than it was obstructed by

the disadvantages brought about by the Paris Agreement of 28 January

1973. Taking advantage of the Agreement, the enemy increased his

strength in the countryside through infiltrations of weapons, equipment,

and manpower from North Vietnam.

Thus over the long war years, the pacification effort had been

revitalized time and again under several different names: Strategic

Hamlet, New Life Hamlet, Rural or Revolutionary Development, National

Pacification and Development, and finally Community Defense and Local

Development. Despite the various names which changed with each regime

in power, the basic national objectives laid out in each plan remained

essentially the same. The only differences between early and later

plans were some operational procedures, the ever-expanding scale and

extent of the effort, and the increasing contributions in financial

and material resources made by the United States and other friendly

nations.

18
Strategy and Operational Concept

Pacification was designed to achieve three basic objectives: (1)

to end the war and restore peace; (2) to develop democracy; and (3) to

reform society. These were the proclaimed objectives that President

Nguyen Van Thieu reiterated time and again in his public statements.

To achieve the first objective*—end the war and restore peace—it

was paramount in the first place to defeat Communist aggression and to

provide security for the entire national territory, and finally to

extend the influences and services of the government over the population.

In more concrete terms, the objective was to provide protection for the

people against kidnappings, assassinations, and other forms of terrorism

caused by Communist guerrilla activities; to destroy the enemy main

force; and to eliminate the enemy infrastructure. Once the enemy's

presence was removed, the people would be able to enjoy a peaceful life.

The second objective—develop democracy-T.mplied the establishment

of a solid and effective governmental structure in the rural areas and

the active participation of the rural population in national affairs.

Democracy was to be developed at the grass-roots level through village

and hamlet elections in which the people would choose their own representatives to help run their own affairs.

Finally, in order to reform society, the third objective, it would

be necessary to develop the national economy, to stabilize and improve

rural living conditions and to bring about prosperity and welfare for

the people, with the ultimate goal of achieving self-sufficiency and

terminating reliance on foreign aid.

To provide security for pacification, the RVNAF and US forces

adopted the strategic concept of "clear-and-hold." In practice, clearand-hold -operations were designed to destroy the enemy, neutralize his

forces, and drive them away from the area to be pacified. Then by maintaining a permanent ARVN force in the area to ensure security, a local

government could be established, and in time elections could.be held to

institute democracy. When the area reached that stage of development,

19
the enemy would be unable to return to harass and to take revenge on

the people.

"Clear-and-hold" differed greatly from "search-and-destroy" which

was widely employed during the initial stage of active US participation

in the war. For even when Communist units had been effectively defeated

or driven away from a certain area, they were still able to return and

renew their activities if there was no friendly force to secure the

area. An area was considered "cleared" when the enemy's main or local

forces, guerrilla and infrastructure had been destroyed or neutralized.

The principal role in this stage was given to major ARVN units, augmented sometimes by Regional Forces, and often supported and assisted

by US or Free World Military Assistance (FWMA) forces. ARVN forces

were also assisted by National Police (NP) forces who provided information concerning the enemy's infrastructure and helped screen and

interrogate persons detained.

As the term implied, activities during the "securing" stage were

aimed at eliminating remnants of enemy forces or infrastructure, protecting the population and preventing the enemy from reviving his

activities. At the same time, the government tried to establish its

presence in villages and hamlets in order to create the conditions for

developmental projects to flourish. An area was designated totally

secure when the villages and hamlets in it were assigned enough military and police forces to deter all terrorist activities directed

against the population. Police field forces were employed in the

elimination of the VCI or, in coordination with territorial forces,

the maintenance of security in villages and hamlets. ARVN and US forces

meanwhile operated in adjacent areas as a shield to divert the enemy's

regular forces from the area being pacified, and to relieve any pressure

the enemy might exert on it. As soon as the area became secure,

Regional Forces began to take over from ARVN forces, thus releasing

them for new operations.

Another type of local defense force was created to assist territorial forces in local security: the People's Self-Defense Force.

20
Organized and trained locally, the PSDF performed guard duties in hamlets

and sounded the alert when the enemy attacked but were usually unable to

counter an enemy attack without the support of other territorial or

regular forces.

As a continuation of the pacification process, the "development"

stage consolidated the village and hamlet governmental structure and

expanded GVN authority and prestige. An area was considered as developed

when its villages and hamlets had been completely and effectively brought

under GVN control and after local government had been established through

elections and was functioning effectively. Thereafter, security and

order were entrusted to police and people's self-defense forces. Regional

and popular forces were thus released for longer range security operations

to prevent the enemy from re-infiltrating. During this stage, national

cadre teams arrived to initiate developmental programs such as self-help

economic projects, school and classroom building, and public health.

In summary, pacification was a phased process involving the cooperation and coordination of both military and civilian efforts. The military

effort was provided by the RVNAF and US/FWMA forces who conducted searchand-destroy operations in order to foster the security which the civilian

effort required. As pacification was a responsibility shared by military

forces, government cadre and the people, joint planning and supervision

were required at every level. To achieve effectiveness in coordination,

control, and supervision, a Pacification Council, which consisted of

military and civilian representatives, was established at each level,

from the central government down to districts.

The Central Pacification Council, which was chaired in 1970 by the

Prime Minister and consisted of cabinet ministers and the Chairman of

the Joint General Staff as members, directed and controlled overall

policies and plans. Civilian programs were managed and directed by the

Ministry of Rural Development which also supervised implementation at

province and district level.4Other specialized activities were directed

- ~

In 1971, the Ministry of Rural Development was disbanded and its

role was assumed by the newly created Central Pacification and Development Center, directly under control of the Prime Minister.

21
by respective ministries through their own control channels, which reached

down to province level. Military activities were directed and supervised

through the military hierarchy which included the Ministry of Defense,

the Joint General Staff, Military Region Commands, Sectors (provinces),

and Subsectors (districts).

Pacification Councils at the province level were responsible for

detailed planning and execution. Each year, the province chief and his

staff established the province's pacification plan which was reviewed

by the Military Region Pacification Council and finally approved by the

Central Pacification Council. Upon approval, the plan was sent back to

the province chief for execution. Military forces that were required

to support the provincial plan were placed under the operational control

of the province chief/sector commander. Funds, materiel and equipment

were allocated by respective ministries directly to the province.

Interim Objectives and Priorities

While the ultimate national goals to be achieved through pacification remained unchanged, the GVN established yearly programs with specific objectives to be met during the year. For example, the pacification

effort prior to 1968 focused on populated, prosperous urban areas, those

areas bordering on important lines of communication and waterways, and

those villages and hamlets surrounding provincial capitals and district

towns. The strategic concept then, which was labeled "the spreading

oil stain," consisted of consolidating pacified nuclei from which the

pacification effort would spread out in all directions. Since urban

areas were the hubs of the RVN strategy, the enemy chose to strike

directly into them during his general offensive of 1968 although his

ultimate goal remained liberating the rural areas.

As soon as the last enemy attacks were driven back, the GVN immediately set about to restore control of the rural areas through a special,

large-scale, and intensive pacification campaign which lasted three

months, from 1 November 1968 to 31 January 1969. The goal of this

campaign was to retake the hamlets lost to the enemy and to expand the

22
territory under GVN control. This was a departure from the 1968 pacification effort which concentrated on populated areas and urban centers.

The Special Campaign was designed to achieve these major objectives:

(1) to expand the territory under GVN control; (2) to destroy the enemy

infrastructure; (3) to organize and arm the Peoples' Self-Defense Forces;

(4) to establish the local governmental structure wherever it had never

been established.

As a result of the achievements of the Special Campaign, the pacification effort was pushed more vigorously during 1969. Under GVN

directives, those provinces that met all the objectives of the campaign

were to continue adding to the areas under GVN control and consolidating

their gains. On the other hand, if a province had not met the objectives, it was required to achieve them before proceeding with the 1969

plan. In addition, to ensure the maintainance and consolidation of

these gains, new directives were issued by the GVN for the new campaign:

1. The pacification effort had to be closely coordinated with the

development effort.

2. The pacification and development effort was to focus on the

village rather than on the hamlet since the village was the basic administratively organized unit which controlled resources and had a budget

of its own.

3. Pacification and development were continuing, protracted

processes involving many agencies, hence effective coordination was

necessary. In addition, it was most important to enlist the people's

participation. To foster this participation, there had to be close

cooperation and coordination between government authorities and the

population, among governmental agencies, and among the people.

4. The policies and programs were to be realistic and befitting

the local situation. They were to be kept simple to facilitate understanding and execution and to be tailored to the people's needs and

capabilities so that the people could responsibly contribute to the

common national effort.

Since the 1969 pacification concept focused on expanding governmental control into contested areas and on the village as the basic

23
unit instead of the hamlet, the displacement of the local populace from

one hamlet to another for purpose of pacification was deemed unnecessary

and disadvantageous. Displacement of landbound peasants would be an

unpopular act that would have adverse consequences on their daily life.

To implement this overall concept, the GVN laid out objectives to

be achieved by year's end:

1. An increase in percentage of population under GVN control, up

to 90% across the country.

2. To destroy, by all means, at least 23,400 enemy infrastructure

cadre.

3. To build the PSDF to a strength of two million members, and

equip this force with 400,000 individual weapons.

4. To establish local governments for all villages and hamlets

over the entire national territory.

5. To secure the defection of at least 36,000 enemy cadre and

troops.

6. To reduce the total number of war victims and refugees below

the one-million mark; and to resettle or return to their home villages

300,000 people.

7. To step up information and propaganda activities.

8. To encourage the development of the rural economy.

All the objectives that had been set forth for the previous year

were retained in 1970. Like the previous year, the 1970 pacification

objectives focused primarily on the protection of the population against

Communist terrorism and the maximum destruction of the enemy infrastructure. To achieve this, the GVN pushed the buildup of PSDF to four

million, double the 1969 strength and including 1,500,000 combat members

and 2,500,000 support members. At the same time, it made an effort to

train and equip this force in order to turn it into a combat effective

force ready to take over from popular forces when required. To expand

GVN control, it was required that village and hamlet government and

district and provincial councils be established throughout the country.

The Chieu Hoi program, meanwhile, was aimed at the high and middle

echelon enemy cadre: it appealed for their cooperation in the common

24
task of nation building. To alleviate a perennial burden that had

adversely affected the GVN effort, programs were initiated to help war

victims and refugees find opportunities for a better life. Other shortterm projects designed to pave the way for long-range efforts during the

following years were also initiated in agriculture, public health and

sanitation, and education. In addition, emphasis was placed on such

programs as increasing the rural police force, village and hamlet selfhelp, land reform, ethnic minority development, and urban development.

The government set forth priorities for the achievement of the

various objectives and their related programs:

Priority 1: C-class hamlets were to be upgraded to B- or A- class

in order to provide total security and protection to 90% of the national

population.

To meet this goal, the government attempted to bring the popular

forces up to full authorized strength. At the same time, people's selfdefense forces, armed or unarmed, were more formally organized and

received more adequate training. Since the incipient local governments

were still plagued by a shortage of cadre, efforts were made to assign

them additional personnel. An emphasis was placed on their qualifications, efficiency, and willingness to stay permanently in their place

of work, day or night. Finally, an adequate and permanent police force

was required to maintain security and order in villages and hamlets.

Priority 2: To consolidate C-class hamlets and prevent them from

downgrading to D-class.

Before the advent of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), which

American officials instituted in 1967, the GVN only considered three

categories of hamlets and rated them accordingly: A: 100% secure

hamlets or hamlets affording free access day and night; B: semi-secure

hamlets, affording free access during daytime and limited access during

night time; C: insecure hamlets or those under VC control.

Hamlets were classified into seven classes:

A- and B-classes: totally secure, day and night

C-class: relatively secure

D- and E-classes: undergoing pacification

N-class: unevaluated for lack of data

V-class: not under GVN control

25
In summary, all hamlets were to be upgraded to A, B, or C category

and at least 90% of the people would be living in A or B hamlets.

The Ultimate National Goals

The year 1971 ushered in a period of improved security throughout

the nation. The RVNAF held the initiative on all battlefields, crossed

the heretofore inviolable national border and struck destructive blows

on the enemy's logistical bases and sanctuaries. Cross-border operations

conducted by US-RVNAF units into Cambodia in 1970 and the Laos incursion

in 1971, in addition to the closing of Sihanoukville port by the new

Cambodian government in 1970, effectively upset Communist plans for an

early summer offensive against Saigon, a repetition of their 1968 offensive. As a result, the Communists were compelled to reorganize their

bases and replace their battle losses. Almost the entire population of

South Vietnam lived under effective protection of the government and the

armed forces. The situation was so good that the GVN deemed it a most

appropriate time to pass on to the nation-building phase, particularly

economic development and social reform. Pacification was considered an

anachronistic term since its most important objective had been achieved.

The new pacification plan for 1971 was thus redesignated "Community

Defense and Development." It was designed to destroy whatever was left

of the enemy infrastructure, achieve maximum efficiency in the governmental structure, expand and develop the national economy, and push ahead

more vigorously the land reform program. The ARVN regular forces, which

had been partially pinned down by their pacification duties, were to

turn over territorial responsibilities to the RF and PF. The goal was

to release ARVN forces for mobile operations while affording the RF and

PF the opportunity to prove themselves in combating enemy local forces

and guerrillas.

The objectives set forth for the 1971 Community Defense and Development plan were grouped under three basic national goals which remained

the ultimate goals for which the RVN was striving. These were called

the "Three Selves," namely: Self-Defense, SeIf-Management, and SelfSufficiency.

26
Under the goal of Self-Defense, five programs were initiated: (1)

territorial security; (2) people's self-defense forces; (3) national

police; (4) destruction of the enemy infrastructure; and (5)' Chieu Hoi

(Open Arms).

The objectives to be met in territorial security during 1971 were

to upgrade all hamlets into A- or B-class, provide security and protection for 95% of the total population, and remove all V-class hamlets.

These efforts required the RF and PF to step up mobile operations

against enemy local forces while the ARVN infantry divisions were to

be entirely free to concentrate on large-scale search-and-destroy operations against enemy mainforce units.

The PSDF which had been built up to required strength were to be

formally organized into teams and groups and armed with 500,000 individual weapons.

The national police force, whose primary role was to destroy the

enemy infrastructure, was to be increased to 122,000 men by year's end

in order to provide every village with a police force strong enough to

maintain law and order.

To free the local population from Communist terrorism and safeguard

the GVN program against sabotage, an effort was to be made to eliminate

all types of enemy cadre, to include econo-financial cadre (tax collectors

or procurement agents) and commo-liaison cadre (guides or messengers) in

particular, and to destroy every enemy infrastructure organization. In

addition, the local population was encouraged to cooperate with governmental authorities by providing information concerning enemy activities.

The task of appealing for returnees from enemy ranks was not only

undertaken by specialized government cadre but was also performed by

PSDF by appealing to their own relatives or friends who had sided with

the enemy. In addition, armed propaganda teams, which consisted primarily of former returnees, were employed in proselyting activities

aimed at enemy main force units.

The Self-Management goal meant that the government would increase

its efficiency. In the first place, national cadre at all levels including province, district, village and hamlet chiefs, were to be trained.

27
Periodic seminars were to be conducted by mobile training teams to afford

the national cadre an opportunity to exchange views and communicate experiences. Furthermore, the government hoped that by the end of 1971 the

entire local government structure would have been instituted through

elections.

With regard to the local population, an effort was made to instill

in them the spirit and political awareness of struggling against the

Communists. This was conceived as an obligation, a duty that every citizen had to carry as his share toward the "Three Selves" program. To

foster the spirit of democracy and encourage participation, local selfhelp development projects were initiated to which the GVN provided part

of the funds needed but whose implementation relied primarily on the

people's financial contributions and labor. The local population

actively participated in such projects as market place, school and

maternity ward construction, road building and bridge repair. The

final goal was to make every cadre and every serviceman thoroughly conversant with GVN policies and programs and responsive to the aspirations

of the people by acting as eyes and ears for the central government.

The local population was to be rallied into organizations with the

purpose of fostering mutual assistance and mutual affection. If someone became ill or was in distress, he could always expect help and comfort from members of his organization. With regard to youths, a program

of physical education and sports was initiated in both urban and rural

areas in order to encourage physical fitness and competitiveness. This

program was also intended to promote political education among young

people with the view of preparing them for active participation in

future social activities.

Improved security and increased effectiveness of the local government structure and national cadre would allow the GVN to switch more

energy to self-sufficiency,' the task of improving, socially and economically, the living conditions of the population. Toward that end, the

"Land to the Tiller" program, a bold land reform measure which was

initiated late in 1970, had the planned purpose of distributing 400,000

28
hectares of farmland to landless farm workers.7

This was intended both

as an incentive to help boost farm production and as a means to achieve

social justice and win the peasants over to the RVN cause. Other agricultural improvement programs such as forestry, fisheries, and farm

breeding were also pushed vigorously forward. At the same time, the

GVN also undertook an extensive project of irrigation, encouraged the

planting of two or three crops of "miracle rice," and established rural

development banks throughout the country to provide needed credit for

farmers to plant rice or other supplementary crops and to breed cattle

or poultry.

With regard to strengthening the national economy and in keeping wit

long-range plans, the GVN designed short-term programs to encourage

production increase, stem inflation, stabilize consumer prices, and

increase personal income. To meet national requirements and conserve

manpower, the government placed emphasis on the training, assignment,

and employment of technicians and specialists. ARVN engineers and contractors repaired, rebuilt or rehabilitated roads and bridges to provide convenient communication between urban and rural areas, particularly between villages or hamlets and district towns, and to facilitate the

flow of goods and services. Also in support of economic development,

sections of .the railroad system were kept in operation and electric

power production was substantially increased in urban and suburban areas.

This was a step toward the final goal of providing electricity and running water to remote areas of the countryside.

Up to 1971, all local self-help or self-sufficiency programs were

entirely funded and managed by the central government. To set democracy

in motion and to help the local infrastructure develop its own initiatives, these programs were turned over to the local governments and

people who would, from then on, decide what specific projects suited

their own needs and decide how to finance them on their own. The GVN

would thus be able to save sizable funds needed for other programs of

national importance.

Hectare is a unit of area measurement in the metric system, equivalent to 10,000 square meters or approximately 2.47 acres.

29
In 1972, the GVN took a longer view of the future and, to achieve

the ultimate national goals, initiated a four-year Community Defense

and Local Development plan whose implementation was graduated into

yearly programs to be completed by 1975. The plan provided comprehensive guidance for the national efforts in each of the major areas.

Militarily, the GVN contemplated the reduction of its armed forces.

The maintenance of a large, standing military force depended essentially

on the security status, US aid, and existing national resources and

capabilities. If it was possible to reduce strength without endangering or undermining the capabilities to defend the nation against the

enemy within or without, then this would be done. But most importantly,

for future defense purposes, attempts should be made to create a

"peoples' army," if only to alleviate the financial burden presently

imposed on the national budget. Territorial security could be further

improved by military activities directed toward destroying enemy main

force units, enemy base areas and sanctuaries, and eradicating enemy

local guerrillas and infrastructure.

Politically, the goal was to achieve a solid foundation for democracy. Toward that end, the administrative structure at every level

would be made efficient, and the people would be educated to become

fully aware of their civic duties. When this was done, they would

enthusiastically participate in every national activity. To improve

the administration, work procedures would be simplified to the maximum

extent and the national cadre at all levels would be endowed with a

responsible "public service" spirit in addition to professional qualifications.

Economically, it was possible to increase domestic and foreign

investments as the security situation improved. Production and exports

would be boosted in order to earn additional foreign currency and to

reduce inflation. On the other hand, to compete with foreign products

and also to meet domestic demands, agriculture and industry would be

expanded and made increasingly productive. Personal income taxes would

be gradually increased, not only to boost national income but also to

make citizens fully cognizant of their obligation with regard to the

30
national development effort. Although consumer prices would continue to

rise at an annual rate of 10%, efforts were made to cut down on government expenditures, including national defense. In any case, for its own

survival, South Vietnam would have to rely on continued US economic and

financial aid, even if true peace was restored.

In summary, the 1972-1975 Community Defense and Local Development

plan was designed to consolidate security and increase development

efforts in local communities with the view of achieving the three basic

goals of Self-Defense, Self-Management and Self-Sufficiency.

The war the Communists waged was purported to be a people's war.

This was a myth perpetuated by Communist dogmatism and propaganda. The

part played by the South Vietnamese people in prosecuting the war on

the Communist side was minimal and insignificant. In fact, the South

Vietnamese people always chose to flee in the face of Communist incursions.

Winning support, the strategic goal of pacification was paramount

to the RVN cause. Yet the people seemed indifferent to the GVN courtship. If successful, the pacification effort would replace this indifference with a solid commitment on the part of the people; a commitment

that would support the defense of the nation and achieve a just peace.

31
CHAPTER III

Operation and Support

The GVN Organization For Pacification

Beginning in 1966, when pacification became a cohesively organized

effort and was subjected to centralized annual planning, the GVN

established a nation-wide control and monitoring system designed to

coordinate activities of the various organizations and agencies

involved in the program. As far as the civilian government was

concerned, there was always a shortage of qualified personnel required

for key executive positions. Consequently, several high-ranking

military officers were appointed cabinet ministers or to highly

responsible positions in the pacification program.

In 1966 the GVN organization for pacification consisted essentially

of a system of standing committees spanning the entire governmental

hierarchy and reaching down to the district level. At the central

government level, there was established a Central Rural (or Revolutionary)

Development Council chaired by the Prime Minister. {Chart 1) Members

of the Council included, on the civilian side: the Ministers of

Interior, Land Reform, Public Works, Health, Social Welfare, Open

Arms, Ethnic Minorities, the Minister in charge of the Prime Minister's

Office, and the under-secretaries of Education and Youth. On the

military side, there were: the Minister cf Defense, the Chairman

of the Joint General Staff and the four Corps Commanders who participated

in the Council as Government Delegates (or Regional Governors). The

Minister of Rural Development was appointed Secretary General of the

Council. (Chart 2)

32
Chart 1 — Central Revolutionary Development Counci I, 1968

Prime Minister

(Chairman)

Minister of Revolutionary

Development (Secretary General)

Minister of

Defense

Minister of Ethnic

Minorities Development

Minister of

Interior

Minister of

Education

Minister of

Public Work

Minister of the

Prime Minister's Office

Minister of

Land Reform and

Agriculture

Under—Secretary for

Primary, Secondary & Mass

Education

Minister of

Health

Under—Secretary

for Youth

Minister of

Social Welfare and

Refugees

Chairman, Joint

General Staff, RVNAF

Minister of

Chieu Hoi

Corps Commanders,

also Government Delegates

*The Chairman, Joint General Staff, RV MAF has t

33

he rank of a Cabinet Minister.
Chart 2 GVN Revolutionary Development Councils, 1967 - 68

Central RD

Council 1

Permanent RD

Office (Secretary General of

CRDC

CTZ RD

Permanent RD

Office

DTA RD

Council

Permanent RD

Office

Province RD

Council

Permanent RD

Office

District RD

Council

Permanent RD

Office

14 Military

10 Civilian

24 Total

10 Military

2 Civilian

12 Total

9 Military

2 Civilian

11 Total

5 Military

34
The Rural Development (RD) councils at all levels were redesignated

"Pacification and'Development" (PD) councils in 1969. Cabinet

ministers continued to serve as members of the Central Pacification

and Development Council (CPDC) under the chairmanship of the Prime

Minister. In 1970, the chairmanship of CPDC was assumed by the

President of the Republic. At the same time, Corps Commanders were

excluded as Council members since they no longer served as Government

Delegates. The Prime Minister in his new capacity as Secretary General

was assisted by a permanent staff organization called Center for

Coordination of Pacification and Development whose functions were to

monitor, coordinate and supervise pacification programs.

In practice, however, the Prime Minister played the role of the

Chairman as he always had, and the Director of the Center for Coordination, a Lieutenant General, served as Secretary General. (Chart 3)

This gave rise to a redundancy in functions since the Minister of

Rural Development still served as the nominal Secretary General of

the CPDC. The problem was solved in 1971 when the Ministry of Rural

Development was dissolved.

As members of the CPDC, the cabinet ministers were responsible

for recommending pacification policies and operational procedures,

and reviewing and providing support for provincial pacification

programs.

At the Corps Tactical Zone (Military Region after 1970) level,

the same organization existed. The Corps Commander was Chairman of

the Regional Pacification and Development Council (RPDC). He was

assisted in his functions by a Permanent Office, redesignated Regional

Pacification and Development Center in 1970. Members of the RPDC

included: the Corps Deputy Commander for territory, division commanders

province chiefs and representatives of the ministers who made up

the CPDC. These ministerial representatives had the rank

of inspector or director. The director of the RPDC, usually an

Army Colonel, served as Secretary General. Corps commanders were

responsible to the central government for both military and civilian

activities since prior to 1970 they also served as government delegates

in their respective Corps Tactical Zones.

35
Chart 3 — Pacification Councils and US Support

Organization (as of 1970)

The President US Ambassador

Central Pacification

Council

MACV/CORDS

Center for

Coordination

of P&D

Ministries US Embassy

Agencies

Corps and MR Commander Deputy CORDS

Regional

Pacification Council Corps/Military Region

Province Chief

Senior Adviser, Head

Provincial Province CORDS

Pacification Council

District Chief

Senior Adviser, Head

District CORDS

Village — Hamlet

Command

._ Coordination — Advisory

36
In 1970 when Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) became Military Regions (MR),

the GVN abolished the position of government delegate with a view to

making corps commanders more responsive to tactical problems. In his

capacity as Chairman of the RPDC, a corps commander was responsible'

to the central government for all problems concerning territorial

security in the Military Region. His pacification duties included

conducting military operations in support of pacification; determining

priorities for the employment of military forces (regular and

territorial) in support for pacification; reviewing provincial pacification plans; and providing guidance and supervision for the implementation of the military forces (regular and territorial) in support

of pacification.

At the Division Tactical Area (DTA) level, the division commander

was responsible for all matters pertaining to territorial security

and pacification within his area of responsibility which generally

included several provinces. Prior to 1970, at the DTA level, there was

also a DTA Rural Development Committee chaired by the division commander

but with very limited civilian membership. As a result of the abolition

of the DTA in 1970, the DTA Rural Development Committee was also

dissolved, but the division commander was still responsible for territorial security and, to a lesser extent, pacification support in his

area of responsibility. He performed his pacification duties only

when directed by corps commanders. These duties were coordinated

with province chiefs and consisted of providing support, and conducting clear-and-hold operations in areas targeted for pacification.

Whether responsible or not for pacification, division commanders

were usually overburdened by problems concerning territorial security.

Almost 80% of their time was spent solving these problems, and as a

consequence, a division commander had little time left for mobile

operations. After 1970 a significant effort was made to alleviate division commanders' territorial responsibilities and to permit them

to concentrate more on mobile tactical operations since divisions were

to gradually take over combat responsibilities from the departing

US forces. This effort was made by releasing divisional units from

their static pacification support mission and replacing them gradually

37
with Regional Forces. Thus, Sectors or Provinces were made directly

subordinate to the Military Region as far as territorial security and

pacification support were concerned. As of that time, at corps

headquarters, the position of Deputy Corps Commander for Territory

was created and he was placed in charge of territorial security and

pacification support within his Military Region.

The province was the primary level responsible for actually

carrying out the pacification program. As a result, a province chief

usually enjoyed great powers. As Chairman of the Provincial Pacification

and Development Council (PPDC), he was directly responsible to the

corps commander for military affairs and to the central government

for administrative affairs and the management of national resources

committed to the pacification program. Province chiefs were appointed

by presidential decree upon recommendation of the corps commander

and with prior concurrence of the Prime Minister. They were mostly

Army officers, usually with the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel.

Within his province, the province chief was responsible for everything,

tactical operations, administration, and politics.

A province chief was assisted by two deputies: a deputy for

administration, always a civilian, and a deputy for military affairs

who was also called Deputy Sector Commander since the province chief

was the Sector Commander. The deputy sector commander assisted the

province chief in all matters concerning territorial security, tactical

operations, the employment, organization, and control of Regional/

Popular Forces, and the control of para-military forces in the province

(national police, RD cadre, PSDF). The deputy province chief for

administration assisted the province chief in the administration and

management of provincial affairs and directing and controlling the

activities of departmental services. These included: Reconstruction,

Public Works, Agriculture, Taxation, Social Affairs, Finances, Open

Arms, Information, Health, Education and other services which operated

under direct control of the province chiefs but were subordinated to

their respective ministries administratively.

As Chairman of the PPDC, the province chief's pacification duties

consisted of developing the annual provincial pacification plan

38
based on guidelines and policies of the CDPC and specific directives of

the corps commander and directing the coordinated employment of military

and para-military forces in support of his pacification program. The

province chief was at the same time the planner and executor of his own

pacification program and he was held entirely responsible for its

success or failure.

The lowest echelon in the GVN organization for pacification was

the district or subsector. Prior to 1970, there existed at the district

level a District Rural Development Committee but it was dissolved at

the same time as the DTA Rural Development Committees. District chiefs

were for the most part Army officers, usually lieutenant Colonels or

majors, appointed by a ministerial decree of the Minister of Interior,

acting on orders of the Prime Minister and upon recommendation of the

corps commander, often without the province chief's consultation. The

district chief was responsible for all problems concerning territorial

security and pacification in his area of responsibility. His pacification-related duties were to assist the province chief in the preparation and implementation of the provincial pacification and development

plan; direct and supervise subordinate RF and PF units in the support

of pacification; and provide guidance for village chiefs concerning

security and defense plans.

Like the province chief, the district chief was assisted by two

deputies: one for administration, always a civilian, who helped run

the district office and manage district administrative affairs and

the other, the deputy subsector commander. A district chief commanded

and controlled all subordinate or attached RF and PF units, and other

para-military forces of the district. In his major role of pacification

support, a district chief's responsibilities were burdensome. His

staffs, civilian and military alike were small and usually plagued by

ineffectiveness due to the lack of qualified personnel.

Security problems always constituted major headaches for the

district chief and occupied most of his time. The subsector staff

was capable of only routine operation; it had neither the capability

39
nor the assets to direct and control tactical operations, or coordinate

military and civilian activities at village and hamlet level.

In an effort to facilitate district command and control, the GVN

created sub-subsector commands at the village level in 1973. The subsubsector was the lowest military command of the RVN territorial

organization, designed to control and coordinate military and paramilitary forces at the village level. This greatly reduced the control

burden placed on the district chief and made the coordination of

forces more effective for the support of pacification, for which he

was held totally responsible.

Each district was composed of several villages and hamlets which

constituted the very foundation of Vietnamese society. Consequently,

villages and hamlets were the focus of the pacification and development effort. The village was the lowest level of the GVN administrative

structure and village affairs were run by a village council whose

members were popularly elected as was the village chief. Hamlets

were geographical subdivisions of a village and run by administrative

committees whose memebers were also popularly elected.

Employment of Forces in Support of Pacification

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces were responsible for providing military support for the GVN pacification program. The Chairman

of the Joint General Staff (JGS) as a member of the Central PD

Council was assisted by a deputy in charge of pacification who was

also commander of the RF and PF. This position was established

expressly for the purpose of directing and supervising the organization,

training, equipping, and employment of the RF and PF in support of

pacification. (Chart 4)

The RVNAF consisted of three services: the Army, the Air Force,

and the Navy (including Marines). The Army was deployed in the

four Military Regions and most units were placed under the tactical

command of the Corps Headquarters. Infantry was the largest combat

arm of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). It consisted of

infantry divisions, separate infantry units and Regional Force and

40
Chart 4 — RVNAF Organization for Pacification Support

Chairman, JGS

Pacification and

Commander, RF/PF

Chief of Staff

Corps and CTZ

Commander

Deputy Cdr.

for Operations

rfS

SlrrSi

RF/PF Group

Cdr.

RF

Deputy Cdr. for territorial

affairs and Cdr, RF/PF

Division and DTA

Cdr.

Sector Cdr.

(Province Chief)

Deputy Cdr.

also RF/PF Cdr.

Subsector Cdr. also

RF/PF Cdr.

Village

Chief

1

'. •••

PF

Regional

Forces

Regional

Forces

Command

Operational Control

. Command Minus Operational

Control

41
Popular Force units. Other combat arms of importance included the

Airborne and the Rangers. The Airborne Division and the Marine Division

made up the General Reserve while Ranger units (battalions and groups)

operated as corps reserves or reaction forces, in addition to border

defense duties.

Under direct control of the JGS, the four Army Corps Commands

also functioned as Military Region (MR) Commands. Corps/MR commanders

were responsible for all military activities in their respective areas

of responsibility. Regular forces organic to corps included from two

to three infantry divisions depending on the size of the corps area of

responsibility (MR). (Map l) A number of Ranger groups were also

attached to each corps.

Divisional units such as infantry regiments or battalions were

sometimes attached to province/sector commands as reinforcements. In

these instances, the relationship between the province chief/sector

commander and the attached unit commander tended to be one of mutual

support, not of subordination, and this created command difficulties.

As a result, whenever they were attached to sectors, regular force

battalions were placed under operational control of the sector

commander while still administratively subordinated to their regiments.

Ranger forces played a role in the defense of border areas and

in interdicting enemy infiltrations from Cambodia and Laos. As a

result of the merging of Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)

with regular ARVN forces, Ranger forces were greatly expanded in

strength. The majority of Ranger units manned border outposts while

the remaining constituted corps reserve or reaction forces. During

the post ceasefire period, some Ranger groups were placed in general

reserve since the Airborne and Marine divisions were committed to MR-1.

Territorial forces usually made up more than 50% of overall RVNAF

strength. As authorized for FY-73, for example, RF and PF strength

''"Reference: RVN Presidential Decree No. 614a-TT/SL of 1 July 1970,

which establishes the organization, missions, functions and responsibilities

of the RVN Defense and Armed Forces components.

42
DEMARCATION LINE

IQUANG TRI

OaNang

OAO

PHU QUOC

(KIEN GIANG)s

Cam Ranh

CT2

Map 1 - RVN Military Territorial Orginization

43
stood at 530,589 against the regular tri-service strength of 448,953.

During their incipient stage of development, the Regional and

Popular Forces were poorly equipped and under strength. After being

made part of the RVNAF and thus qualifying for US support under the

Military Assistance Program (MAP), RF and PF units expanded considerably in numbers and were equipped with the same types of infantry

weapons as regular forces. In addition, regional and popular troops

enjoyed the same status in pay and special allowances as regular

troops. The only difference was in tactical employment and the size

of units. (Chart 5)

Regional Forces, in their role as provincial and district main

force, were organized into companies. Due to tactical requirements,

RF companies were sometimes assembled into groups. In keeping with

the RVNAF improvement and modernization trends and as required by

the security situation, RF units were subsequently upgraded into

maneuver battalions and, at a later stage, into Regional Mobile Groups

(RMG) with organic artillery support provided by a battery of four

105-mm howitzers. RMG headquarters were activated with the capability

to command and control from 3 to 5 battalions. They were designed to

replace the former Sector Tactical Commands which, due to shortages

of personnel, were ineffective in the exercise of operational control.

The allocation of RF units to each province depended on the local

security situation and provincial manpower resources and recruiting

prospects.

Popular Forces while assuming the role of village and hamlet main

force were organic to districts and placed under the command and control

of village chiefs. Although equipped with the same infantry weapons

as RF units, PF units were confined to platoon size with an authorized

strength of 35 men per platoon. Each village was authorized a PF

platoon, but as a result of significant gains in the pacification

programs, the number of villages under GVN control increased considerably every year and there were not enough platoons to go around.

To offset the shortage, the strength of a PF platoon was reduced to

29, providing extra spaces to be used in activating additional

platoons. (Chart 6)

44
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Chart 6 — Organization, Province Regional and Popular Forces

Province

Chief/Sector

Commander

A&OSL

Company

Mechanized

Platoon

River Boat

Company

Intelligence

Platoon

District

Chief/Sub

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HO In, 11

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> Operational Control

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Squad

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46
The usual area of operation of RF units, when their organization

was still limited to company and company-group size, was within their

province and occasionally in the provincial boundary areas. After

they were upgraded into maneuver battalions and mobile groups, RF

units were employed in areas extending into adjacent provinces as

well, or even far away from their home province, but only for limited

periods of time that never exceeded two months. In MR-4 for example,

RF units organic to the provinces of Go Cong and Vinh Long were deployed

to operate in My Tho and Chuong Thien provinces, respectively. Also,

a number of RF units organic to An Giang province were committed to

operations in far away Kien Giang province. When operating as mobile

tactical units in those instances, RF units often proved as effective

as regular ARVN units.

To provide administrative and logistical support to RF and PF

units, each province was assigned an Administrative and Logistical

Support Company (ALSC) whose size varied depending on the number of

RF and PF units to be supported. These ALSCs were subsequently upgraded

into Administrative and Logistical Support Centers which were

organized into five different standard sizes or classes: A, B, C, D,

and E, in decreasing order. Each center provided support for a

province with the exception of Binh Dinh, Quang Nam and Dinh Tuong

which, because of their unusual concentration of RF and PF units,

were assigned two Administration and Logistic Centers each.

Artillery support for RF and PF units was also greatly enhanced

by the activation of a total of 174 artillery sections across the

country, each section equipped with two 105-mm howitzers. These artillery

sections were assigned to sectors as organic units to provide direct

support to RF and PF. The availability of territorial artillery

units allowed the release of divisional artillery units for mobile

operations. In addition to artillery, each province was also assigned

an armored platoon equipped with V-100 armored reconnaissance vehicles

for the protection of lines of communication," and, in case of

areas such as the Mekong Delta, a river boat section to facilitate

movements on waterways.

Prior to 1966, the role of the National Police was generally

47
confined to maintaining law and order in urban areas, cities, provincial

capitals and district towns; there was no police force in villages and

hamlets. National police forces were subordinated to the Ministry

of Interior and placed under the control of a NP General Directorate.

Over the years, the NP expanded considerably in keeping with its growing

role and finally developed into an authorized 122,000-raan strong

para-military force. NP forces included uniformed police, special

police, combat or field police, and harbor police. (Charts 7 & 8)

In addition to the NP central command, there were four regional

commands, one for each military region, and the Saigon command.

At the province level, there was a NP service, at district level, a

NP section and at village level, a NP subsection.

During the period of intensified pacification effort, the NP

made significant contributions in the destruction of the enemy infrastructure and maintenance of law and order in villages and hamlets.

Police field forces (PFF) were well equipped and organized into

companies. PFF companies were deployed in provinces where they

operated in cooperation and coordination with rural development cadre

groups.

During the pacification process, NP subsections were established

in villages as soon as they became secure. The strength of each

village NP subsection varied according to the size of the village

population. Villages having upwards of 10,000 inhabitants were assigned

one 18-man NP subsection each. Villages having between 5,000 and

10,000 inhabitants were assigned a 12-man NP subsection. A 6-man

NP subsection was assigned to each village with less than 5,000 inhabitants. A village NP subsection had the mission to maintain law and

order in order to protect the lives and properties of villagers;

coordinate activities with military and para-military forces to destroy

or arrest members of the enemy infrastructure; control and screen

the village population; develop and maintain an agent net; investigate

and interrogate Viet Cong suspects; and control village resources.

Police field forces were directly subordinated to the NP central

command. The commander of NP field forces served as an assistant to

the NP commander. While equipped and trained in the same way as

48
Chart 7 — Organization, National Police

Prime Minister

National Police

Central Command

Uniformed

Police

Field Police

National Police

Regional Command

National Police

Province

National Police

District

National Police

Village

49
125

122,000

100

CO

a

z

<<n

3

O

I

I108,000

• (AUTHORIZED)

92,000

116,107

|J FIELD POLICE FORCES

15,389

SPECIAL POLICE & HARBOR POLICE

19,501

2,129

ji;|| UNIFORMED POLICE

Sgi 79,088

. v.. .-.-.-.. . . j

1963 64 65 71

YEAR

Chart 8 — Expansion of National Police Forces

50
other police forces, the PFF specialized in the role of anti-violence

and anti-rebellion and had combat capabilities similar to military

forces. PFF companies were attached to provinces to support pacification but retained their police command channel and were administratively

supported by the NP central command. At each NP regional command there

was a PFF representative whose mission was to coordinate PFF efforts

within a military region. The province chief, however, had full authority in the employment of PFF companies assigned to his province. He

was assisted by a PFF provincial representative.

At the district level, the NP section chief and the PFF company

commander assisted the district chief in determining the employment of

PFF platoons for the support of pacification. When required, PFF platoons were also deployed to operate in villages. A PFF platoon leader

would cooperate with the village chief on the basis of mutual support

and neither was under the control of the other.

Rural Development (RD) cadre were organized into groups of 39 men

each. In the central highlands, RD cadre were called Rural Mountaineers

and organized into groups of 70 men each. RD cadre were recruited in

each province and sent to the Vung Tau RD Training Center for training.

Upon completion of training they were sent back to their provinces of

origin. Each RD group was composed of a group headquarters, a military

2

section and a reconstruction section. (Chart 9) While the organization of the military section was fairly consistent, the composition

of the reconstruction section varied greatly according to local

requirement. Thus specialized members of a RD reconstruction

section were selected on the basis of local activities where they

would serve. If the local population lived on fishing, the RD group

would include specialists in fisheries and the manufacturing of fish

2

As of 1970, the military section was removed from the organization

of RD cadre teams, thus reducing the authorized strength of each team

to 25. This resulted from a marked improvement of the security situation and the sizable expansion of regional and popular forces. In 1971,

following the deactivation of the Ministry of Rural Development, RD

cadre personnel were" reintegrated into various ministries such as

Information/Open Arms, Agriculture, and Public Works.

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sauce. Likewise, in those areas where the local inhabitants were

farmers, the composition of the RD groups would invariably include

specialists in agriculture and farm animal breeding. The need for

those RD specialists was formulated by the provinces and the RD

training center was responsible for their training.

A RD group mission was to study and improve local political,

cultural, social, and economic programs; find out the true aspirations

of the local population; study and recommend local self-help projects;

and encourage the local population in the maintenance of the local

road system. With an authorized strength of 34, the military

section of a RD group planned security measures for the protection

of the group headquarters and the reconstruction section, coordinated

activities with friendly forces, and organized and trained the village

PSDF.

A provincial RD headquarters coordinated RD activities and

helped the province chief control assigned RD groups. (Chart 10)

In addition to its specified mission, a provincial RD headquarters

also cooperated with departmental services to develop programs to

meet the needs of the local population. Other tasks performed by the

provincial RD headquarters included census and classification of the

population; encouraging the population to participate in community

activities; improving education programs and combating illiteracy;

assisting the population in the maintenance of public hygiene such as

house sanitation and the digging of wells; organizing and conducting

political indoctrination sessions; and assisting the population in

the organization of farmers' associations.

During the period from 1965 to 1970, RD cadre groups played key

roles in the pacification and development effort. As of 1971, however,

since the pacification program focused on community defense and community

development, it was directly operated by the specialized cadre of

various ministries. As a result, RD cadre groups were deactivated and

the personnel were absorbed into the ministries, such as Information

and Open Arms, Agriculture, etc., depending on their qualifications.

The pacification effort was also centralized under the Central

Pacification and Development Council and the Ministry of Rural

53
Chart 10 — Organization, Province RD Cadre Group Headquarters

Group Leader

Assistant

Administration

Section

Operation and Technical Section

Psywar

Section

54
Development was dissolved. In its place, a Center for Pacification

and Development was created and subordinated to the Office of the

Prime Minister. The director of the center served as secretary general

for the CPDC.

Although RF units were provincial and district forces, and PF units,

village and hamlet forces, their employment was flexible. To provide

better security, province and district chiefs were free to employ

their forces where, when, and how they deemed best. RF battalions,

because of their independent operational capabilities, were usually

employed in combined operations with regular ARVN forces or as province

reaction forces. Seldom were they broken down into smaller elements

to man static defense positions. The deployment of RF battalions

into other provinces, however, was the prerogative of the Military

Region commander. In the event the MR commander ordered an RF

battalion into another province, he would specify the command

relationships under which the battalion would operate; the duration

of the attachment and arrangements for operational control and combat

support; and logistical and administrative support. In general, a

RF battalion deployed out of its home province continued to be

administratively supported by its home ALSC but received logistical

support from the ALSC in its new area of operation.

The case of RF company groups was somewhat different. Because of

their limited command and control capabilities, RF company groups

were generally employed in well-defined areas of operation and always

confined to the home province. They were mostly employed for local

security missions. RF company groups were best suited for providing

security for limited areas within a district; supervising national

police forces and the people's self-defense forces; and providing

guidance for village and hamlet chiefs in organizing and consolidating

their local defense systems. Separate RF companies which were not

organic to any group or battalion were mostly employed for the protection

of public utility installations, roads and bridges.

Popular force platoons were assigned to villages and operated

according to the village chief's defense plan under the control of his

deputy for security. Depending on the situation, PF platoons might

55
be deployed to operate in village boundary areas or in adjacent

villages. The long-duration deployment of a PF platoon from its home

village was discouraged and subject to approval by the Military Region

Command. When operating away from its home village, a PF platoon

received free rations of rice.

People's Self-Defense Forces were not usually employed in a military capacity. Being an auxiliary force, PSDF members assisted

popular forces in the enforcement of security in the villages and

participated in activities involving the villagers and their families.

In secure areas, PSDFs were also employed to guard roads and bridges

and in mixed patrols with PFs. However, PSDFs were almost never

entrusted the task of manning the defense of important GVN installations

or vital lines of communication.

The great number of military forces employed in support of pacification never seemed to keep up with the requirements occasioned

by the necessity to deploy a permanent occupation force to every

hamlet. The situation was such that when protection forces were

deployed from a certain area considered "secure", that area might

relapse into insecurity and the local population would lose confidence

in the GVN. To ensure a judicious employment of forces, the Central

Pacification and Development Council devised certain principles which

were embodied in the concept of area security. According to this

concept, whenever an area had been pacified and deemed secure, its

military forces would be reduced and partly redeployed to other less

secure areas. This redistribution of forces generally occurred within

a Military Region and was a function of the changing situation and

the MR commander made the decisions affecting the redeployment of

regular ARVN forces and RF battalions.

U.S. Organization for Pacification Support

The Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

Support (CORDS) was organized in May 1967 as an effort designed to

unify US pacification support activities heretofore conducted separately

by such US agencies as United States Agency for International

56
Development (USAID), the CIA, Joint United States Public Affairs

Office (JUSPAO) and the military advisory system. CORDS provided

support to the GVN in all aspects concerning the pacification program.

Placed under the control of the Commander, USMACV (COMUSMACV), it

directed and supervised both military and civilian support activities.

COMUSMACV was assisted by a Deputy for CORDS, a US official with

ambassador's rank, whose functions were to coordinate and supervise

all pacification support activities, military and civilian. In particular, the Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS was responsible for formulating

policies and programs designed to interface with the GVN pacification

effort. (Chart 11)

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural

Development Support (CORDS) was the principal staff assistant to

COMUSMACV and DEPCORDS/MACV on US Civil-Military Support for the GVN

pacification and development program. He had primary general staff

responsibilities for: providing advice on all aspects of US Civil/

Military Support for the Community Defense and Local Development

Program; in conjunction with GVN authorities, developing joint and

combined plans, policies, concepts, and programs concerning US Civil/

Military support for community defense and local development; supervising the execution of plans and programs for US Civil/Military

support for Community Defense and Local Development; providing advice

and assistance to GVN, including the Central Pacification and

Development Council, the various ministries, the RVNAF JGS, and other

GVN agencies on US Civil/Military support for Community Defense and

Local Development; managing and directing US civil assistance to the

autonomous cities in the fields of integral security, political

mobilization, and technical support; serving as the focal point for

local development programs, population and resources control, and for

civic action by US forces; serving as point of contact with sponsoring

US agencies,for the Community Defense and Local Development Programs;

evaluating Civil/Military Community Defense and Local Development

activities and reports on the progress, status, and problems of

community defense and local development support; carrying out US

representation to the GVN Chieu Hoi ministry, recommending basic

57
Chart 11 — Organization, Office of the Assistant

Chief of Staff for CORDS, USMACV

COMUSMACV

Deputy for CORDS

Chief of Staff

ACS for CORDS

Management

Support

Plans, -

Policies

and

Programs

Phung

Hoang

(Phoenix)

Pacification

Study Group

Research

and

Analysis

Territorial

Security

Community

Development

1

War

Victims

Municipal

Development

58
policies, goals and guidelines for planning purpose, and acting on

all Community Defense and Local Development program support policy

matters pertaining to subordinate- echelons.

The principal functions of CORDS Directorates were as follows:

Pacification Study Group

Conducted field studies of community defense and local defense

programs, and other programs to the extent they affected community

defense and local development.

Management Support Directorate

Supervised and coordinated activities in the management and

administrative area, including manpower planning and control, management

analysis, and manpower development, administrative services, general

services and communications; and air operations in support for CORDS

activities.

Plans, Policies, and Programs Directorate

Advised and assisted the GVN Central Pacification and Development

Council and other GVN agencies in the development of community defense

and local development plans, policies and concepts; developed military

political and economic plans, as well as policies and concepts

concerning community defense and local development activities;

contributed to plans and policies developed by other MACV staff

sections, determined MACCORDS piaster requirements; negotiated with

USAID and the GVN on all resource levels; advised the Director for

CORDS on the impact on defense and development of military strategies

and tactics; through senior advisers and regional DEPCORDS, coordinated

with US and GVN field commanders, province senior advisers and province

chiefs regarding implementation of programs; and coordinated CORDS

responses to all audits.

Research and Analysis Directorate

Operated the MACCORDS mamagement information systems; developed

and operated automated data processing systems in support of CORDS and

GVN community defense and development objectives; controlled CORDS

field reporting, analyzed reports to provide quantitatives and qualitative

measurement of community defense and local development progress;

analyzed the dynamics of the community defense and local development

59
process to define problems and recommended solutions; advised and

assisted the GVN central pacification and development council on matters

pertaining to measurement of pacification progress; advised and assisted

the office of the Prime Minister in the establishment of a GVN computer

center; provided staff support services to CORDS directorates

relating to ADP, reports, graphics and briefings.

Phung Hoang Directorate

Advised and assisted the GVN Phung Hoang Division of Headquarters,

National Police Command and recommended and developed Phung Hoang

plans and policies.

Municipal Development Directorate

Advised and assisted the urban committee of the CPDC, the Director

General of Reconstruction and Urban Planning and other GVN agencies in

the formulation of policy, programs and projects for development of the

urban areas of the RVN; coordinated the function of CORDS and other

US mission agencies, as appropriate, in matters relating to the

administration, physical planning, and technical and social development in urban areas; promoted the involvement of the private sector

urban programs and projects. Assisted and advised the Mayor of Saigon

and was responsible for all US assistance to the city of Saigon, to

include personnel, commodities and funding.

War Victims Directorate

Developed policy goals, objectives and guidelines for US assistance

to GVN programs assisting refugees, war veterans, and other people in

need of social and economic help and to the GVN programs of land

development and hamlet building benefiting victims of war; advised the

GVN Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of War Veterans, and the

Directorate General of Land Development and Hamlet Building.

Territorial Security Directorate

Advised and assisted the RVNAF JGS on regional forces and popular

forces, the Ministry of Interior on people's self-defense forces, and

the Director General of Youth and Sports on youth affairs; developed

and recommended policies and programs on the employment and improvement of regional forces/popular forces units.

60
Community Development Directorate

Advised and assisted in implementation of programs under the

auspices of the central pacification and development council, the

Ministry of Rural Development (MORD), the Ministry for the Development

of Ethnic Minorities (MDEM), and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) overall

responsibility within CORDS for advisory efforts aimed at improving

the operation of province and lower levels of government; tasked with

support and technical supervision of regional and provincial advisory

operations in development; served as direct counterpart to MORD

and MDEM; advised appropriate subdivisions of CPDC, MOI and other

ministries, as required, to assist in implementation of specific

programs assigned to the directorate in the GVN pacification programs,

the national fund for local development, the province development

council, the village self-development fund, the rural credit program,

the rural development cadre program, and the Son Thon Rural Development

Cadre (Mountaineer RD) program.

Public Safety Directorate

Served as the principal advisor to the Director CORDS and the

Director, USAID, and developed and recommended basic policy, goals,

objectives, and guideline for US civil military support to the GVN

national police command; developed and recommended basic policy,

priorities, goals, objectives and guidelines for the US public safety

programs supporting these agencies. Assessed the progress and priorities

of law enforcement and related security actions.

At the Corps and Military Region level, the Commander, US Field

Force, in his capacity as senior adviser to the ARVN Corps commander,

was responsible to MACV for all efforts concerning pacification and

security in his area of responsibility. He was assisted by a Deputy

for CORDS, usually a civilian, whose functions were to coordinate

and supervise US activities in support of the pacification program

in the MR. In addition, the Commander, US Field Force was also assisted

by a military deputy, responsible for military activities. (Chart 12)

At the province/sector level, the civilian and military advisory

efforts were integrated under the control of the Province Senior

Advisor who, as Director, Province CORDS, was a civilian or a military

61
Chart 12 - Organization, CTZ/MR CORDS in 1968

Field Force Cdr/Senior Adviser

Deputy Force

Cdr.

Deputy for

CORDS

Chief of Staff

Force

General Staff imiiiiitiiiiiiiiimii

Assistant

Chief of Staff

for CORDS

Mmgt

Support

Plans &

Programs

US Units

IIUIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

Deputy Senior

Adviser

Refugees

»«»ti

""",,,

""">,,,

Province

Advisory Team

»'»»I»

ARVN Div.

Advisory

Team

District

Advisory Team

ARVN Regt.

Advisory

Team

ARVN Bn.

Advisory

Team

iniiiiiii Coordination of Military & CORDS matters

— — Operational Control when unit assigned on

RD direct support mission

62
officer. As director, province CORDS, the province senior adviser

reported to and received directives from the deputy CORDS, US Field

Force. When a regular ARVN battalion was attached to the province,

as reinforcement for pacification support, the battalion's adviser

was placed under the control of the director, province CORDS. In

general, the province senior adviser/CORDS director advised and

assisted the province chief in all areas related to the pacification

program of the province.

At the district level, CORDS also integrated civilian and military

support and advisory activities concerning pacification. The director,

district CORDS, district senior adviser, was responsible for implementing and following up on pacification support activities. The CORDS

district adviser was usually a military officer since his duties as

senior district adviser included mostly military activities.

In addition to the CORDS system, the US placed advisers with

Vietnamese forces, adding to the RVN military effort to support

pacification. Greatly expanded in organization and personnel, the

US advisory system encompassed the entire RVNAF hierarchy and reached

down to the battalion level. Advisory groups and teams advised and

assisted RVNAF units in all areas of operation. They were supported by

a communication system of their own which provided a continuous link

from the central echelon to corps, divisions, regiments and battalions.

At corps level, US Field Force commanders also played the role of

corps senior advisers. (Chart 13)

In conjunction with their combat efforts, US forces also performed

civic action activities which were highly praiseworthy in view of

their effective contributions to the GVN pacification effort. US

civic action programs underwent some changes in emphasis; in 1964,

for example, US civic action efforts were focused on providing health

protection and sanitation for the peasantry in rural areas. They

included such programs as well digging, and anti-malaria operations.

In 1965, however, in view of the massive US -participation, US civic

programs emphasized the necessity to reduce casualties and damage to

the civilian population, foster good rapport between US forces and the

population, and assist the peasants in their farm work, particularly

63
Chart 13 — US Advisory Relationship with ARVN

US ARVN

Commander,

MACV Chairman JGS

Corps Senior

Advisor Corps Commander

Division

Senior Advisor

Division

Commander

Province

Advisor

District

Advisor

Province

-* Ch ief

Dist riet

-> Chief

Regimental

Advisor

Regiment

Commander

Battalion

Adviser ->

Battalion

Commander

-Command

Advisory Relationship

64
in those areas adjacent to US bases. US civic action programs also

helped the local population to repair roads and build bridges, schools,

maternity wards and dispensaries.

Civic action programs implemented by US forces gained popular sympathy and developed excellent rapport between them and the civilian

population. In addition to the building task, US forces took good care

of the civilian population whenever casualties and damage occurred.

Injured civilians were always immediately evacuated for treatment, and

all damages were compensated for with fairness. In this respect, US

forces seldom incurred criticism since they carried out with zeal MACV

directives to "limit to the maximum extent casualties and damages to

the civilian population."

Within the first six months of 1966 alone, US forces built 78

schools, 29 dispensaries, 43 bridges, and repaired 246 miles of rural

road. In addition, a total of 12,860 tons of clothing, food, and medicine donated by the International Catholic Relief Service were distributed

2

to the local population during military operations. Nevertheless, the

most realistically useful civic operation undertaken by US forces was

the Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP). It was widely appreciated

by the rural population since it provided for much-needed medical treatment and medicine.

US civic action operations were also helpful in bringing relief

to the increasing number of war refugees. In this regard, the US effort

was particularly effective during 1968 when thousands of people became victims of heavy fighting. Relief programs of long duration were

undertaken by US forces who assisted the RVN in building resettlement

centers and distributing food, medicine, and clothing to the refugees.

2

General William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam:

1964-1968, Ground Operations, Appendix E, p. 239.

65
The Phoenix Program

The Phoenix program was proposed by US authorities in 1967 as a

means to consolidate and unify intelligence activities aimed at the

destruction of the VCI. Despite GVN concurrence, it was nearly a year

before the government approved Phoenix by executive decree. The delay

stemmed from difficulties in defining terms of reference for the program

and in selecting the agency responsible for its execution.

To implement the program, Phoenix committees were established from

the central government to the districts with the missions of collecting

information on the VCI, and planning for the organizing operations to

neutralize it. (Charts 14, 15, & 16)

Corps commanders, province and district chiefs served as chairmen

of the Phoenix committees at their respective levels. In this organization, the Regional National Police director, the provincial NP chief

and the district NP chief played the role of committee secretary general.

Members of a Phoenix committee included representatives of the police

field force, the special police, the military security service, the

provincial reconnaissance unit (PRU) and Chieu Hoi, RD cadre, Sector

S-2 and other military organizations.

The coordination of intelligence and operations among various military and civilian agencies included the following tasks: (1) to collect,

corroborate and disseminate information pertaining to key cadre, organization, and plans of the VCI; (2) to exploit information gathered in

a timely manner so as to conduct quick reaction military operations;

and (3) to classify, interrogate, and recommend the adjudication of

suspects temporarily detained.

The task of eliminating the VCI was carried out in close coordination with search-and-destroy and pacification operations, making full

use of propaganda and psywar techniques and resources.. The Phoenix

effort was supported by military units in combined operations, closely

coordinated with police forces. The goal was maximum coordination; police

field forces and the PRU joined in the task of eliminating the VCI. RF and

66
CO

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so- ils

E j> c

o a o

U O U

E

-3 E

c o

o I

<ao

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>

CO

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_o

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09

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09

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w

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—•—•—<

67
Chart 15 — Organization, Province PHOENIX Committee

Province and City

Phoenix Committee

Chairman :

Province Chief

Deputy Chairmen

Police Chief

S-2, Sector

Senior Advisor Phoenix Center

Director

Mail Section

Sector

Operations Center

Situation Section

Plans and

Operations Section

Information Screening

Province

Reconnaissance

Unit

— Command

..... Advisory

• — Coordination

68
Chart 16 - Organization, District PHOENIX Committee

District Phoenix Committee

Chairman: District Chief,

also Center Director

1st Deputy:

Dep. Subsector Cdr.

2nd Deputy:

District Police Chief

Political

Security &

Intelligence

RF-PF

Village Phoenix Committee Chairman:

Village Chief Deputy:

Assistant for Security

Secretary

69
PF units participated in operations designed to attack and destroy the

VCI. For example, these units provided the information, held or cordoned the target, and protected searching and screening parties made

up of the special police, police field force, and military security

personnel.

Information on the VCI, collected by intelligence agencies during

military operations, or by the provincial interrogation center, was immediately disseminated to related units or agencies, to the DIOCC, and

to the provincial permanent center for exploitation.

Provincial reconnaissance units (PRU) conducted special operations

to collect or exploit information and participated in combined operations

with other forces. Organized and armed by the US Embassy, PRUs were

placed under the control of and employed by the provincial police chiefs

when the National Police was assigned the responsibility of implementing

the Phoenix program. Together with police field force units, PRUs made

up the main police striking force in the task of eliminating the VCI.

The National Police was the principal active component of the

Phoenix organization. The Special Police were responsible for collecting, corroborating and evaluating information concerning the VCI. The

police field force units were the NP reaction forces who actually conducted police operations designed to destroy the VCI.

RD cadre teams were also given the mission of supporting the elimination of the VCI by providing information leading to the discovery of

the VCI and participating in reaction operations conducted by friendly

forces.

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) cadre, because of their specialized knowledge

of the enemy, were particularly useful in the elimination of the VCI.

They were most effective in appealing for enemy personnel's return and

providing support to intelligence collection activities or reaction

operations. Selected returnees were employed in the interrogation of

VC suspects or to identify VCI personnel among refugees.

The enemy infrastructure usually conveyed the general impression

that its'personnel were a special breed of fanatic Communist cadres.

In fact, a distinction had to be made between those VCI cadre who were

70
truly indoctrinated party members and the sympathizers or common people

who were induced into serving in the VCI. In most cases, the second

category of VCI personnel was made up of ordinary, poor people who cooperated with the enemy either because of his pressure or for profit.

They included smugglers of medicine and other essential' commodities

plying their trade between GVN-controlled and VC areas.

People detained by police and security forces during military operations were first classified into three categories, VC or NVA soldier,

suspected member of the VCI, or undetermined identify. If subsequent

interrogation, documentation, police records check, and possibly possession of weapons proved conclusively that the individual was clearly

an enemy soldier or a VCI operative, he (or she) was sent to the PW camp

(in the first instance) or remanded to trial (if a member of the VCI).

If, on the other hand, no evidence was found to implicate the person

as a VCI member, he was released. Those detainees who were suspected

of being members of the VCI but could not be convicted as such.for lack

of evidence were placed under the jurisdiction of the provincial security

committee which had the authority to either release or detain them temporarily pending investigation. This committee was chaired by the province chief and included the provincial judge or prosecutor, the police

chief, the MSS representative, the sector S-2 and representatives of

operational forces as members. The role of the MSS representative was

particularly significant since the MSS, a counter-intelligence agency,

collected and provided information on the VCI to the PIOCC and DIOCC.

The committee was empowered to release or detain a suspect at the provincial reeducation center (jail) for a period of time ranging from

three months to a maximum of two years. The "trial" of suspects took

place once a month and its procedure began with a presentation of records

by the police chief. If there were no complications, the committee immediately decided on each case.

This procedure was criticized as unconstitutional and undemocratic

because it amounted to a trial without due legal process. However, the

GVN contended that it was simply an administrative, not a judicial act,

hence not determined by national laws. And since it was not a trial

71
process in the legal sense the suspect could not have legal counsel nor

was his presence required when the committee made its decision.

The reason the GVN resorted to this procedure against the VCI was

that it was nearly impossible in most cases to produce enough hard

evidence for indictment, yet the suspect's culpability was certain beyond

reasonable doubt. Thus to stay on the safe side, the official reasoning

went, it was better to detain the suspect than to free the criminal, even

at the expense of incurring some wrath. On the other hand, the GVN authorities were faced with the problem of identifying hard-core VCI members from among the suspects who, for the most part, were just sympa-'

thizers or innocent people induced into the VCI service under persuasion,

coercion or threats of blackmail, or simply to earn a living. To provide

enough time for thorough research and investigation, temporary detention

of the suspects was necessary.

For all the criticism directed against it, the detention power

authorized provincial security committees failed to deter the VCI members still at large since the maximum two years behind bars was not

really too high a price for the hard-core VC. Compared to what had been

done under the First Republic which outlawed the Communists altogether,

detention appeared mild and even democratic. Under President Diem's

secret directives, province chiefs were allowed to "dispose of" VCI

members in whichever way they deemed appropriate including murder, without

legal justification. The VCI members were especially fearful of the

"Central Vietnam Special Task Force" organized and directed by Diem's

brother, Mr. Ngo Dinh Can in the early 60's. The task force members

indiscriminately slaughtered every VCI member they hunted down and this

deterred VCI overt activities for some time.

Under the Second Republic, the spirit of democracy was strong and

pervasive, precluding the use of harsh measures. Against members of

the VCI captured, the strongest measure taken was detention which, to

hard-core elements, could be looked upon as a period of rest pending

release and renewed activities. To the innocent people detained because

of suspicion, however, detention was apt to alienate them from the GVN

cause and, under Communist proselyting influence, could well turn them

into sympathizers and eventually members of the VCI.

72
V

The GVN had no choice than proceed with the program of eliminating

the VCI, which could be equated with a military force in terms of

destructive effectiveness. GVN officials responsible for the program

were fond of saying that eliminating a district or province political

commissar of the VCI was tantamount to putting a whole VC company out

of action. Given the effect of the program on VCI activities, this

was not an inflated statement.

The period from the inception of the Phoenix program up to 1971,

which was considered the best year of the RVN in terms of security and

pacification achievements, saw a marked decline in VCI activities. Out

of an estimated total of 40,000 members recorded by 1971, the VCI suffered 15,603 eliminated or neutralized, broken down into 5,615 killed,

4,391 detained, and 5,597 returnees, or more than one third of its

strength. In 1968 the VCI suffered the biggest loss ever in its ranks,

because it was pushed into overt military activities in support of the

"general offensive-general uprising" campaign.

In retrospect, the Phoenix program can be termed a reasonable

success. This success could have been maintained and furthered as long

as South Vietnam was free from NVA incursions. Like pacification in

general, its achievements could be offset by military reverses. The

momentum of the program came to a standstill in 1972, for example, when

NVA units launched the Easter offensive. The same was true of the postcease-fire period during which pacification and other programs suffered severe setbacks in the face of stepped-up enemy attacks which the

RVNAF alone, thinly spread as they were and with reduced war supplies,

were unable to contain effectively.

The program was also beset by internal problems among which the

most serious was the shortage of capable intelligence personnel at the

province and district levels for effective coordination of activities

against the VCI. Next came the lack of appropriate support and weight

given to the program by province and district -chiefs who, either because

of their overburdened responsibilities or failure to realize the importance of the program and take proper interest in it, placed its execution

squarely into the hands of the national police. Left to its own

73
initiative, the politically-oriented national police was generally

reluctant to take forceful actions and became ineffective against the

VCI.

Then there was the problem of identifying and prosecuting VCI

members operating under cover and living mixed with the population.

Identification was particularly difficult against planted agents in

crowded urban and suburban areas where the mass of working people lived.

Very seldom, if ever, was their presence detected by the national

police.

The problem was even harder in the rural areas where village and

hamlet councilmen operated in constant fear of retaliation which accounted for their lack of enthusiasm or even dereliction in eliminating

the VCI. More often than not, they failed to take action even when

they knew there were enemy agents living in the community, for sometimes these agents turned out to be the relatives of certain councilmen

themselves. The fear of retaliation led to a propensity toward accommodation and finally developed into a philosophy of "live and let

live" which was at the root of passivity and inaction. In a few extreme

cases, some councilmen might turn out to be the very VCI that the

Phoenix effort set out to eliminate.

74
CHAPTER IV

RVN-US Cooperation and Coordination in Pacification

The Central Level

Prior to 1968, during which period the Minister of Revolutionary

Development (RD) served as secretary general of the Central Revolutionary (Rural) Development Council, all pacification plans and programs

were developed by the RD Ministry in cooperation and coordination with

US Embassy agencies and other GVN ministries. When approved and signed

by the Prime Minister, these plans and programs were disseminated to

GVN ministries and the Joint General Staff for implementation.

To develop a pacification plan or program, every year the Central

Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) formulated a set of concepts

and objectives as guidance for the pacification effort during the year.

Before these concepts and objectives were disseminated to the ministries

and the Joint General Staff (JGS) for planning, they were subject to

discussion and agreement between the President of the Republic and the

US Ambassador.

As far as the JGS was concerned, the CPDC concepts and objectives

served as bases for planning the military support requirement which was

formalized by the annual Combined Campaign Plan, a planning effort

jointly made by the JGS and the US Military Assistance Command (USMACV).

To the ministries of the GVN, these pacification concepts and objectives

also constituted guidelines for their own specific plans and programs

which they worked out in coordination with counterpart US agencies.

(Chart 17)

On the military side, the yearly planning process involved the

establishment of a combined staff made up of elements from the JGS and

MACV. It was this combined staff that worked -out the military plan in

support of the GVN pacification effort. The combined JGS-MACV staff

75
Chart 17 — US-RVN Relationship in Pacification,

before 1971

Other Ministries

I

Command

Advisory

-x-x- Operational

Control

Ministry of

*ural Development

IF

Ministry of

National Defense

-4-

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76
was presided over by two co-chairmen, one from the JGS, the other from

MACV, usually general officers. Members of the combined staff on the

JGS side included: the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for J-l, J-2 and J-3,

the commanding generals of the Central Logistic Command and the Training

Command, the director of the General Political Warfare Department, and

the commanders of the Air Force and Navy. The Assistant Chief of Staff,

J-3 served as deputy chairman and secretary general. On the MACV side,

there was the same array of corresponding staff division chiefs. In

addition, the combined staff also included representatives of Free World

Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) fighting in Vietnam, such as the

Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.

As soon as the combined staff was established, the co-chairmen

convened a preliminary meeting during which staff components of each side

were introduced and working procedures determined. After agreement on

working procedures and locations, the co-chairmen proceeded to form combined RVN-US staff subcommittees and assigned specific tasks to each of

them. The mission of each combined staff subcommittee was to draft the

military plan as related to its staff functions and based on the guidelines provided by the CPDC as well as specific complementary directives

as may be issued by the chairman of the JGS and the commander, USMACV.

Staff officers of each combined subcommittee cooperated and coordinated

with each other during the entire planning process.

During the last meeting session, subcommittees finalized their

reports and presented them to the combined staff co-chairmen who sometimes suggested modifications or elaboration before the final draft was

submitted to the chairman of the JGS and the commander, USMACV. The

final draft was always translated into English and made into two copies:

Vietnamese and English. The co-chairmen reviewed the final text of the

copies, then submitted them to the chairman, JGS and the commander,

USMACV, and after their review and comments, might order another session

to make necessary modifications as directed.

The printing of the final text of the plan was usually done by MACV

since the JGS did not have the assets required for the rapid production

of copies. The final step in the process was a formal ceremony in which

77
the chairman, JGS and the commander, USMA.CV signed the documents. Since

the plan involved FWMA forces, the commanders of these forces were also

invited to attend the ceremony and co-sign the document.

The plan was then disseminated by quickest means to ARVN Corps, US

Field Forces, FWMA forces and the services and arms. Upon receipt of

the plan, ARVN corps and US Field Forces proceeded to study and work out

their own plans, based on the concepts and directives contained in the

Combined Campaign Plan. As far as ARVN Corps were concerned, they were

responsible for establishing projects, plans and programs in accordance

with the basic JGS-MA.CV plan and in cooperation with US Field Forces

concerning military activities. Corps plans were then submitted to the

JGS for approval before being implemented. These plans also served as

basic guidelines for province chiefs to establish provincial plans.

Central, corps, and provincial plans were completed before the end

of the year so that they could be implemented as of the beginning of

the new year. To provide effective support for the GVN pacification

effort, and also to follow up on the implementation of the pacification

plan, the JGS and MACV jointly conducted program review trips every

quarter. During these field trips, the chairman, JGS and the commander,

USMACV personally visited each corps headquarters where they reviewed

the progress being made and gave appropriate directives to help solve

problems beyond corps capabilities. These quarterly review meetings

were attended by major unit commanders of all forces operating in the

corps tactical zone, including US, ARVN, and FWMAF and their staffs.

In addition to efforts on the military side, every six months the

President of the Republic, as chairman of CPDC, also made field trips

to corps headquarters to review pacification progress being made in

each corps tactical zone. He was usually accompanied by the entire

cabinet and high-ranking military authorities. At each presidential

review meeting held at corps headquarters, all province chiefs were

present. On the US side, there was also the participation of highranking officials from the US Embassy, CORDS, and other agencies

involved in pacification support.

78
The MACV-JGS quarterly reviews centered on the problem of security

in each corps area and the military effort made by each corps in support

of the GVN pacification program. Of particular interest to the US and

RVN military leaders was the employment of military forces. They were

mostly concerned to see whether this employment was judicious and responsive enough to each corps area pacification requirements, and whether

forces available were appropriately distributed among the four corps

areas for the effort. The presidential reviews, on the other hand,

focused primarily on national development and the progress made by each

province in meeting the pacification criteria set forth by the CPDC.

Apart from periodically scheduled review sessions conducted by the

president and high-ranking military authorities, there were also frequent

field trips by ministerial representatives, JGS staff officers and their

US counterparts. These trips were made to provinces, districts, and

sometimes villages, with the purpose of assessing local problems and

difficulties and helping local authorities to solve them or giving them

additional resources and support, if required.

As was the case with the JGS, every year the various GVN ministries

also received guidance directives from the CPDC to establish their own

plans and programs. Each ministerial plan was drafted by the ministry

staff and signed by the minister himself. These plans became appendices

of the annual overall national pacification plan, called the Pacification

and Development Plan or the Community Defense and Local Development Plan.

The establishment of these individual plans required elaborate coordination among the various ministries, between the ministries and their

US counterpart agencies and between the ministries and the JGS. The

coordination was vital and indispensable since the pacification effort

required substantial US assistance and support in funding and technicians

on the one hand and the guarantee of security provided by military forces

on the other.

The task of coordination among civilian ministries was complex and

difficult to trace with accuracy since a ministerial plan involved many

different elements and required the assistance and support of several

different organizations. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), for example,

79
was responsible for making plans and programs related to the development

of agriculture. In this program, MOA was required to obtain funds for

the purchase of seeds, and for the publication of pamphlets or instructional materials on the use of fertilizers and insecticides for distribution to provinces before the crop season started. It was also necessary

to plan for farm credits through the rural development bank, organize and

conduct seminars in provinces to help farmers acquire better farming

methods, and encourage them to increase the planting of "miracle rice."

Also, it was necessary to keep track of special agricultural projects

and to train all types of specialists for the provinces in order to

guarantee the success of these projects.

To implement this program, MOA had to coordinate and cooperate with

several other ministries or agencies. For example, MOA needed the help

of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to plan for foreign currency funds

for the import of fertilizers, insecticides, and farm equipment. Likewise, the Ministry of Economic Affairs had to coordinate with MOA on

rice import and export policies, agricultural products, and farm breeding.

MOA then needed the assistance of the Ministry of Finance to reduce

tariffs imposed on imported agricultural equipment and machinery. From

the Ministry of Defense, MOA had to request special transfers of drafted

agricultural specialists serving in the RVNAF so that they could help

with programs, help with the clearance of interdicted fishing zones along

the coastline, and to guarantee the security for MOA specialists in rural

areas. The Ministry of Information was also asked to cooperate in disseminating information about MOA projects and programs by radio and television. To help facilitate the movement of local products to consumer

markets across the country, MOA had to coordinate with the Minister of

Public Works for the repair, improvement, and development of the communication system. Finally, MOA coordinated with the Ministry of Education

to help conduct classes for the training of specialists and to promote

the 4T programs in schools, and coordinated with the Ministry of Rural

Development and the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities for the attachment to

MOA of qualified cadre.

The 4T program was similar to American 4-H clubs. The four Ts stand

for: Than (Health), Tri (Head), Tam (Heart), and Thu (Hands).

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The Corps Tactical Zone/Military Region Level

The corps commander, as chairman of the Regional Pacification and

Development Council, was responsible for developing a regional pacification plan. The CTZ pacification plan reflected the regional variances

and was designed to reach the regional objectives set forth by the CPDC.

It was developed in cooperation and coordination with the US Field Force

as far as military or operational support was concerned and with ministerial representatives and the regional CORDS in matters dealing with

civilian programs. As soon as the CTZ pacification plan was approved,

it was disseminated to divisions/DTAs and to provinces for planning.

The DTAs were primarily responsible for planning tactical operations to

support the provinces while the provinces had to plan for every activity

to implement the program. To develop his own pacification plan, the

province chief had to rely on directives contained in the corps plan and

reinforcement support provided by the DTA or CTZ. The provincial pacification plan was reviewed by the corps commander before being submitted to

the CPDC for approval.

As chairman of the regional pacification and development council, it

was the corps commander's prerogative to reject or modify province plans.

In a few cases, he just returned the plan to the province chief for modification. In general, however, the dorps commander seldom exercised his

prerogative and usually transmitted province plans as they were submitted.

The most difficult problem encountered by corps in providing support

for the provinces was the shortage of military forces. There were several

ways corps could solve this problem without asking for additional forces

from the JGS. The corps commander could redistribute territorial force

allocations; request additional authorized strength in territorial forces

and allocate the authorized spaces to'needy provinces; redeploy regular

forces or deploy RF units from one province to another for short durations;

and coordinate with US/FWMA forces for operational support if corps

organic forces had been fully committed and in case the areas to be pacified lay within the US/FWMA areas of responsibility.

81
The redistribution of territorial force allocations was most widely

used since it was within one commander's authority. Several provinces

were plagued by a constant shortage of territorial forces due to exhausted

manpower resources and difficulties in recruiting and replacements. The

1968 general mobilization law, for one thing, authorized only the conscription of male citizens aged 18 and above, while the Viet Cong effectively pre-empted this manpower by abducting teenagers of 17 and 16,

sometimes younger, into their ranks. As a result, territorial units

were constantly under strength and their authorized quotas were never

fulfilled. To solve this problem, a corps commander could transfer the

unfulfilled authorized strength quotas to other provinces that enjoyed

abundant manpower resources and recruiting facilities. This redistribution of allocations would then be administratively adjusted by the JGS.

It was an effective means that permitted the increase of territorial

forces on the one hand and the release of regular ARVN forces for operational purposes on the other.

The primary role of US and FWMA forces was to conduct search-anddestroy operations against enemy main force units and bases. However,

in case an area targeted for pacification lay within the TAOR of a US

or FWMA major unit, coordination with the US Field Force could be made

so that the operational activities of this unit helped in the pacification task. Sometimes search-and-destroy operations conducted by US and

FWMA. forces near pacification areas could be tremendously beneficial,

although indirectly, to the pacification program by keeping enemy forces

away from these areas.

Similarly, the deployment and disposition of ARVN forces to expand

GVN control could be beneficial to US and FWMA areas of tactical responsibility since ARVN forces might interdict the penetration of enemy

forces in the areas. In general, there was an effort to combine or coordinate combat activities between ARVN and US forces to provide the

kind of mutual support that benefited both.

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The division Tactical Area Level

The DTA was responsible for providing military support for the

pacification program through the tactical employment of its regular

forces. Provincial pacification plans were usually worked out with

the assistance of the DTA since they involved sizable military support

by regular forces. During the planning phase, the division commander

usually advised the province chief as to what regular forces would be

available for his support, and the division senior adviser provided

advice and assistance to the ARVN division commander on the coordinated

employment of forces and combat support. When the plan was implemented,

the division senior adviser assisted the DTA commander in requesting US

support. In this regard, the division senior adviser constantly coordinated and exchanged viewpoints with province senior advisers to ensure

adequate support for the provincial effort in pacification.

The employment of forces within a DTA to support provincial pacification programs was subjected to careful consideration and planning.

The primary concern of the DTA commander when planning the employment

of his forces was directed at such questions as: What would happen to

the overall DTA situation once forces had been committed to the province

Was there any reaction force left for the division to be used when

required? Was the relocation of forces to the provinces judiciously

made? Would the provinces be able to employ correctly and judiciously

the attached regular forces? Such worries compelled the DTA commander

to constantly monitor the employment of his forces and to plan for contingencies in close coordination with his adviser. It became the rule

for most DTAs that an infantry division never fully committed all its

forces for pacification support. It always retained a reasonable reaction force for use in emergencies.

The Province/Sector Level

In his role as chairman of the province pacification and development council, the province chief was responsible for establishing the

83

?
provincial pacification plan, in close cooperation and coordination with

the province senior adviser, the ministerial service chiefs of the province, and other civilian and military agencies. The provincial pacification plan was reviewed by Corps/MR, then submitted to the CPDC for

approval. When the plan had been approved, funds and material required

to support it were directly allotted to the province chief. As far as

military support was concerned, it was provided by the DTA upon approval

of the corps commander. Corps could also provide support to the province

by allotting authorized RF/PF spaces for recruiting purposes.

The province chief was not only the planner of the provincial pacification program, he was also its executor. In general, most provincial

shortcomings which usually delayed pacification progress could be traced

to three major shortages: support forces, materiel, and cadre.

With the assistance of his senior adviser, the province chief had

to plan for the effective employment of forces allotted by the DTA or

corps. He had to decide where to employ regular forces, where to employ

territorial forces, and where to replace regular forces by territorial

forces. He had to base such decisions on the particular areas to be

pacified and the province's ability to recruit and train new troops so

that when the pacification program started, he would have adequate and

readily available support forces.

Once funds and materiel were made available to a province, the

corps commander had to maintain the amount of regular forces committed

to its support as required by the province plan. If a transfer of these

forces was contemplated for any reason, the corps commander would have

to ensure that they be replaced by other forces.

There was some rigidity in the way province plans were implemented.

Unless warranted by extremely adverse circumstances, a plan usually

underwent few changes during the course of the year. For one thing,

it was geared to the funds and materiel the province had requested.

In practice, however, the province did not always obtain what it needed

in time, and there were many reasons for this. First, there were not

enough transportation facilities; most of the materiels were import

items and their availability depended on delivery schedules; and finally,

84
materiel was damaged or lost during transportation. Although seemingly

unimportant, the shortage of materiel such as barbed wire, iron posts,

and cement, adversely affected the provincial pacification effort. In

order to provide timely and adequate support to the provinces, US agencies closely monitored the delivery and movement of materiels and took

care not to cause undue obstacles to the provincial pacification programs. Sometimes, to gain time and speed up the delivery of materiel,

ARVN corps obtained temporary loans from US Field Forces for such items

as barbed wire, fence posts, boards, and cement, and distributed them

to provinces as advance issues to be reimbursed when imported materiels

were delivered.

An Evaluation

US assistance played a vital role in the total pacification effort,

beginning with the top level where the GVN ministries, as planners and

supervisors of their own programs, seemed to need it the most. They

were usually plagued by a shortage of personnel required for the various

programs. In addition, there was not always qualified cadre for all

specialized fields. Training and qualifying such specialists in sufficient numbers took a long time and close support from various US agencies. Planning for specialist requirements was also a time-consuming

task since it involved the compilation and review of individual requests

received from all the provinces. Despite these shortcomings, the assistance provided by CORDS and other US agencies usually satisfied every

need in personnel training required by the ministries. This was due

to the very close cooperation and coordination between the GVN agencies

and CORDS and other US agencies. Every plan and program was subject to

careful studies by both sides.

At the CTZ/MR level, however, it seemed that the US side usually

held the initiative in planning. For one thing, at this level there

was always a substantial US staff with a wide variety of specialists

and qualified personnel. Sometimes a plan was subjected to careful

studies by the US staff for five or six months before actually being

85
forwarded for the first time. In general, US Army staffs were made up

of talented and experienced officers who had become experts in their

own right. They were extremely efficient and helpful in assessing and

evaluating pacification results. In particular, they proved to be

unequalled experts in evaluating hamlets, monitoring and assessing the

employment and capabilities of territorial forces, and in monitoring

the implementation of such programs as Phoenix, Chieu Hoi, and war

refugees. Their contributions of opinions, ideas, and suggestions were

always pertinent and valuable for remedying deficiencies; their role in

pacification support was particularly valuable and in many cases indispensable.

On the RVN side, it was admitted that at the field levels, corps

and division, staff officers did not always possess a thorough understanding of the pacification concept and its programs. As a result,

most of the planning was initiated and undertaken by the US side. At

the beginning of the pacification effort, for example, a plan disseminated by the central level to corps was merely duplicated and sent

verbatim to provinces without comments or specific guidance. The corps

staff responsible for pacification usually consisted of inexperienced

officers who were not familiar with planning or studies and often they

were assigned to pacification because they did not fit into any other

staff capability'. As a result, corps were unable to make studies or

plans that could help improve the pacification effort.

By contrast, at the execution level, i.e., province, there were

many talented and experienced province chiefs. Some held their positions

for several years and consequently had a full grasp of provincial problems, the local terrain and the local population. Others had innovative

ideas and achieved spectacular gains in pacification. Province senior

advisers usually stayed in their jobs only one year, or sometimes a

little longer, and as a result they were not entirely knowledgeable

about the province and its pacification problems. Nevertheless, they

played key roles in providing assistance and support for their counterparts. If a province was well supplied with materiel or received adequate military support, it was invariably due to the province senior

86
adviser's active role. His connections and resourcefulness were invaluable assets that made him extremely useful to the province chief. Through

his connections with higher echelon commands, for example, a province

senior adviser could always communicate his counterpart's problems and

obtain immediate response and help. Sometimes a province senior adviser

even used MACV or the US Embassy leverage to get things done quickly

through the ARVN or GVN channel in support of his counterpart; advisers

were effective in cutting through red tape.

The role of the district adviser was particularly a difficult and

demanding one, even more so than that of the province adviser. To be

effective, the district adviser had to assume a dual role: military

and political. He advised and assisted the district chief not only in

military and operational matters but also in the use of national

resources, the supervision of village and hamlet councils, civic actions,

and public relations. In other words, the district adviser had to

double as an administrative and political counselor to help his counterpart manage district affairs. Given the relatively young and inexperienced district staff and the extent of work involved in the management

of a district, the adviser's role was an uphill task indeed. To give

an example, each district managed an average of 30-40 PF platoons, three

to six RF companies, thousands of PSDF, police field force, and the RD

cadre.

But by and large, US district advisers performed extremely well

despite the alien environment. Mostly young army officers at the beginning of their assignment, they usually became inveterate oldtimers of

the Vietnam war, wiser though not older, and extremely adept at handling

counterinsurgency problems by the time their tour of duty was over.

Their contributions to the pacification effort were most significant in

the areas of security and rural development. As a special breed of

politico-military advisers, they were very popular with the local, officials and population.

In summary, US senior advisers at the province and district level

played very important roles in pacification support and made substantial

87
contributions to the provinces and districts where they were assigned.

There were indeed several advisers who were more active and devoted to

pacification than their counterparts. Many were seen making visits to

villages and hamlets if there was a requirement to know more about the

real situation. Finally, there were many who sacrificed their lives

in the pursuit of their advisory duties.

88
CHAPTER V

Pacification Techniques and Operations

The pacification process usually began with a tactical operation

which went through three major phases, each involving the employment

of different forces.

In the initial phase, regular ARVN or territorial forces or both

conducted a securing operation in the area targeted for pacification.

Their objective was to destroy or drive away enemy main or local force

units and guerrillas. Since the area to be pacified was usually populated, the use of firepower was subject to limitations to minimize

casualties and damage. As soon as the enemy units were destroyed or

driven away, friendly forces usually broke down into small elements

for a careful search to destroy the remnants of the enemy or those

enemy who tried to escape by mixing with the populace. At the same

time, psywar and propaganda activities were conducted, first to publicize the victory and secondly to intimidate or proselytize enemy

cadre into surrendering or rallying to the GVN side. At night, small

units conducted and laid ambushes around the village to prevent the

enemy from escaping under the cover of darkness. After a period of

two or three days, they deployed to adjacent areas to pursue the enemy

still in the area or to strike into enemy bases or communication routes

nearby to prevent the enemy from staging a comeback.

During the second phase, while friendly forces shifted their

activities further away to ensure complete protection for the village,

cadre teams and regional forces began to enter the village to take

over control, replacing the operational forces. This was time for

the true pacification effort to begin. By this time, local guerrillas

89
and the VCI in the village had either been destroyed or neutralized,

but there might still be some elements hidden in underground shelters.

The mission of the RF was to provide security and protection for the

national cadre teams and to conduct searches to root out any remaining

enemy. National cadre teams then began the process of separating the

enemy from the people. This process consisted of investigation,

screening, classification, and checking identification papers. This

job was performed by the national police. Other cadre organized an

information and propaganda service, initiated civic action programs,

and conducted meetings during which they explained the purpose and

merits of the pacification program. They also began to organize

village defense systems and the election of village officials who

would make up the village administrative council. Regional forces,

meanwhile, started building watch towers and other fortifications to

consolidate the defense system. The goal was to demonstrate to the

villager the credible presence of security forces who would stay in

the village as long as required to protect them.

The last phase was devoted to developmental works. It began as

soon as the village had become secure and free from enemy interference

or harassment, either by the VCI or guerrillas. National cadre teams

began long-term works such as building a school, a maternity ward,

an information office, a market place and repairing roads, and erecting

bridges. All these efforts had the goal of bringing about security

and prosperity for the villagers and letting them appreciate the

contrast between what the GVN was doing and what the enemy had said

they would do.

The. division of a pacification operation into three separate

phases was purely theoretical and phases were not identified in terms

of time elapsed but rather by actions taken. All three phases could

begin simultaneously if conditions permitted; also, an operation might

never get beyond the initial or securing pahse. The succession of

phases was contingent upon the security situation and counteractions

of enemy forces in the area.

90
Paoifiaation Techniques

First priority in pacification was usually given to populated

and economically prosperous areas, urban centers, and villages and

hamlets bordering on vital lines of communication and waterways. As

soon as these areas were pacified, the effort would shift to adjacent

areas. The idea was to spread out as an "oil stain" from secure areas

into less secure or semi-secure areas, and from there into insecure

areas. Areas targeted for pacification which were termed semi-secure

or insecure were usually selected so that they interconnected with

secure areas by convenient communications.

Cordon-and-search was a technique designed to search for and

destroy the enemy in which a large military force was used to encircle

and seal off an area, usually a village or hamlet. It was usually

conducted by night to obtain the element of surprise. A force conducting a cordon-and-search operation usually consisted of two elements:

a cordon element to encircle and seal off, and a search element which

looked for and destroyed the enemy inside the cordon. The cordon force

stood ready to counteract any enemy effort to deploy his reinforcements

from other areas in order to relieve the elements that had been surrounded, or to face reactions from the enemy being encircled.

After the target area had been sealed off, the search element

would wait until daybreak and only then did its members enter the

area and began searching. This was when, caught by surprise inside

the trap, enemy guerrillas or VCI cadre, or even fugitives such as

draft dodgers, deserters and criminals, attempted to slip out through

the cordon. The cordon force on the outside perimeter then would

arrest them or destroy any enemy element who resisted. The searching

task was planned in minute detail and the target village divided

into several sections; each search party was assigned a specific

section. The search was a painstaking and time-consuming process

91
which required patience and a thorough familiarity with enemy methods

of camouflage and concealment. Enemy underground shelters or weapon

caches were usually well laid out and skillfully camouflaged and

search parties were carefully trained in enemy concealment and

camouflage techniques.

In general, regular ARVN units were employed as the cordon force.

They were sometimes augmented by US or FWMA forces if the objective

area lay within a US or FWMA. TAOR. Search elements were usually made

up of RF and PF units, the national police, and sometimes PSDF. The

success of cordon-and-search operations depended on detailed organization of forces, close coordination, effective control, thorough understanding of the roles to be performed by participating forces and

adequate training in search techniques.

Security patrol activities constituted a technique to search for

and destroy enemy forces. There were several forms of searching and

destroying, each of which utilized a different technique.

Patrols were used against guerrillas and small units. Patrols

were small and lightly equipped, but capable of operating independently.

Their mission was to attack and annihilate the enemy, if he was of

small size, and to locate or follow large enemy units. They then

called on large friendly forces, tactical air or artillery to destroy

them. Troops selected for patrols were good combat soldiers - courageous,

audacious - with high morale. Patrols were deployed far from their base

for periods of from three to five days without support or resupply.

Their activities helped the main force rest and recuperate, and stand

ready to strike when required. This employed the principle of economy

of force.

Another technique used in pacification, especially during the

securing phase, was hunter-killer teamwork. This technique was

designed to hunt down and destroy isolated enemy elements such as VCI

cadre and guerrillas. The hunter-killer team consisted of two

elements: the hunters and the killers. The hunter element was

lightly equipped and highly mobile. Its mission was to track down

enemy forces while maintaining constant touch with the killer element,

which stood ready for action. When contact was made the hunter

92
element notified the killer element which swiftly moved in with

tactical air and artillery support. The killers usually moved into

the target area by the swiftest means, by helicopters in most cases,

to prevent the enemy from breaking contact and escaping.

Terrain transformation was a pacification technique designed to

transform an insecure, enemy-controlled area into GVN-controlled

villages and hamlets. It was employed in all military regions and

with significant success by the ARVN 3d Infantry Division in western

Duy Xuyen district, Quang Nam province.

The security situation in Quang Nam province was poor; the enemy

frequently attacked friendly forces and shelled Da Nang airfield.

Three months before the cease-fire, the 3d Infantry Division was

assigned the mission of restoring security and protecting the Da Nang

airfield in particular. For this mission, the division created a

security zone for Da Nang city out to the range of enemy rockets and

artillery - an anti-rocket and anti-shelling belt. At the same time

it made plans to restore security to the area west of Hoi. An (15 miles

southeast of Da Nang) through an intensive pacification campaign which

encompassed all the villages and hamlets in this area. (Map 2) Nevertheless, a larger part of the province, the flat plain area in

particular, was still under enemy control. This terrain was covered

by lush vegetation and crisscrossed by rivers and streams; it

included many natural obstacles and the enemy had established many

bases which were connected by a trench network and surrounded by mine

fields, booby traps, and extensive defense positions. Up until that

time, operations into this area had met with serious difficulties

and heavy losses.

About three days before the cease-fire became effective, the 3d

Infantry Division clashed violently with the NVA 711th Division and

inflicted serious losses. With the 711th Division nearly paralyzed,

the 3d Division redeployed its forces to hold ground and maintain

control of the population in the area around Da Nang. With the ARVN

3d Division spread out, the enemy renewed his attacks and threatened

to destroy the 3d Division piecemeal.

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With additional support from engineer and armor elements,

however, the division was able to stabilize the situation and regain

the initiative. As the first step in the pacification effort, the

division used bulldozers to clear the densely vegetated areas where

the enemy sought cover. Then it deployed the 57th Infantry Regiment

to occupy Hill 55, the Go Noi area, and the area northwest of Duy Xuyen

district town. The 2d Regiment, with armored reinforcements,

meanwhile crossed the Thu Bon river and reoccupied the Loc Hiep area.

After destroying enemy bases in this area, the 3d Division

maintained its disposition of forces throughout the area, not only

to confront the enemy, but also to demonstrate to the International

Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) that the area was under

effective control.

Terrain transformation operations were also conducted in

several villages and hamlets in the Go Noi area, and others in the

districts of Dien Ban, Dai Loc, Due Due and Duy Xuyen. The villages

and hamlets in this area had not been under GVN control for ten years,

and the enemy had turned this fertile but densely covered area into

a fortified and defended base system. In addition to having the

advantage of the protection provided by natural obstacles and an

elaborate system of fortifications, minefields, and booby traps,

the enemy was thoroughly familiar with the terrain. Most of the local

population had migrated toward other localities, and those remaining

consisted of about 300 households, the majority of which had

connections with or relatives among enemy ranks.

In order to reoccupy this heavily defended guerrilla base

area, which sheltered the enemy 44th Front forces and other local

force units, it was obvious that friendly forces had to be sizable

and adequately supported. The 3d Division made sure that all of its

units were built up to strength before launching the operation.

Its basic maneuver concept was to overrun the enemy positions with an

overpowering force, inflicting on him maximum losses and forcing him

out of the area. Despite heavy casualties to friendly forces, caused

mostly by enemy mines and booby traps, the 3d Division succeeded

in overrunning the area and driving enemy forces away. Then its forces

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held the area and proceeded systematically to eliminate remnants

of enemy forces, not only there but in adjacent areas. Its goal

was to secure the target area and prevent the enemy from coming back.

In order to achieve this, the 3d Division obviously needed more

troops but since reinforcements were hard to obtain, it made use of

the terrain transformation technique. The first requirement was to

destroy all enemy fortifications, trench and shelter system, minefields,

and booby traps. In addition to manpower, artillery firepower and

bulldozers proved highly effective in this task. Within a short time,

the area was effectively cleared of all obstacles and its outlook

was entirely transformed. Then engineer units began to repair roads

and build new ones, and finally devoted themselves to the task of

rebuilding the villages and hamlets without altering their configuration

and boundaries.

The next phase consisted of consolidating the defense system by

the building of outposts and watch towers and by maintaining security.

For this purpose, the division permanently installed one of its

infantry battalions in the area. The battalion established its

operational base at Le Nam and employed its companies in constant

mobile operations in and out of the area. The presence of regular

friendly troops inspired confidence among the local population, who

realized that they could stay in the area indefinitely. This was

entirely different from previous sweeping operations.

To maintain security, 3d Division troops conducted searches,

patrols, and ambushes. These activities gradually eliminated the

enemy infrastructure, rehabilitated roads and buildings, and paved

the way for the next phase of reopening the area. At the same time,

popular force platoons were introduced into the area and they were

deployed to occupy the Chiem Son area and to secure a series of

hillocks connecting it with the Le Nam area. Regular forces, meanwhile,

held the areas of Tra Son and Duong Dong, to the south. Part of the

Go Noi area was taken over by regional forces.

By this time, security had been restored over the entire area

and soldiers were encouraged to grow manioc and vegetables during

their idle hours. To begin resettling the population in the villages

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and hamlets north of Due Due and west of Xuyen Truong, the ARVN

regimental commander and the district chiefs worked out plans to

return those village officials who had fled the area to their original

villages and hamlets in the district of Duy Xuyen and north of

Due Due where they would reestablish local government, with the

assistance of the national police and popular forces; return the people,

the refugees in particular, to their home villages; build watch towers

and village offices; and conduct training and combined ARVN-PF

activities.

These efforts brought about remarkable results. With the help

of ARVN units, the local people gradually moved back. ARVN units

conducted medical civic actions, while competing with one another to

build market places and schools. Encouraged by these ARVN efforts,

people from outlying, insecure areas soon moved into the area, and

even people who had fled and had lived in the province capital for

a long time returned to their villages.

As the security situation improved, the number of people

returning to their villages increased. The village councils began

organizing people's self-defense forces and taking a census of the

population. By the time the provincial and district governments

initiated development programs, all the villages and hamlets in the

area had been resettled and were living in stable, peaceful conditions.

The technique of terrain transformation was first used by US

forces against the enemy's "iron triangle" base area in MR-3. It

involved the use of heavy bulldozers to level bunkers, trees and

destroy underground shelters during a period of several months.

Against another enemy base area, Ho Bo - Bo Loi, US forces also used

napalm bombs to burn down whole stretches of dense jungle. The

purpose of these operations was to deny enemy forces a safe haven to

conduct and support spoiling activities against the GVN pacification

effort in Binh Duong and Hau Nghia provinces which were adjacent to

these base areas. Without these operations, no progress in

pacification was possible in these provinces.

In MR-4, the liquidation of Communist mini-bases, using the

same technique, was conducted on a large-scale from early 1970 to

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early 1972. These were usually swampy and densely covered areas

located along canals and near inhabited hamlets. Heavily mined and

booby-trapped, these mini-bases had been considered impenetrable

despite their close proximity to GVN-controlled hamlets.

Another special pacification technique was the county fair or

village festival - a combination of cordon-and-search, civic action

and intelligence collection. It required the formation of a special

task force which consisted of cordon units, search elements, and a

village festival organization.

While the missions assigned to the cordon units and search

elements were the same as those given to similar elements in a cordonand-search operation, the village festival organization added another

dimension: winning over the hearts and minds of the population by

psychological and civic actions, and at the same time gathering

information on the enemy infrastructure.

The village festival organization consisted of a provincial

element and an ARVN element. The provincial element included

an RD cadre group, the national police, and popular forces. The RD

cadre group was the principal actor in the village festival show.

It usually consisted of several teams: an information team, an

armed propaganda team, a cultural team, an agricultural team, and

a small artist troupe. The information team organized film shows,

distributed propaganda materials and held education sessions for the

villagers to promote the GVN cause and policies while countering enemy

propaganda. The armed propaganda team, which was usually made up of

former enemy ralliers, served as guides and informants to the NP and

popular forces. They pinpointed the families that had members working

with the enemy, families that sympathized with the enemy and whose

members had regrouped to North Vietnam, and finally, enemy weapon

caches, underground shelters, and messenger routes. The agricultural

team provided guidance to the farmers on improved techniques of crop

planting and livestock breeding. The cultural team organized games

and sports, while the artist troupe performed short propagandistic

plays, songs and variety shows.

The National Police element usually included an interrogation

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team, an identification team, and the Special Police. Its mission

was to check identification papers and family records, take photographs

and fingerprints, search suspect areas for enemy documents, organize

an agent net, interrogate suspects, and supply information to friendly

forces. The popular forces conducted a census among village youths

to establish a list of draft-age people and to try to recruit them

into their ranks.

The ARVN element usually consisted of a MEDCAP team and a psywar

team. The MEDCAP team organized sick calls and a dispensary service,

and also distributed candy for the children and clothing for the poor.

The psywar team held political indoctrination sessions to brief the

population on the purpose of pacification and on the reason why GVN

troops came to the village. It also maintained morale among friendly

troops and made appeals to enemy cadre, persuading them to surrender

or rally to the GVIN cause.

The technique of village festival was chiefly employed in those

villages and hamlets where the GVN wanted to maintain permanent control

and presence and the emphasis of the entire effort was on winning

the sympathy of the villagers and gathering information on the enemy.

Coordination in Security Activities

Because the pacification effort involved the conduct of security

activities by a variety of military forces, coordination was vital for

its success. Aside from tactical coordination among operational

forces of different nationalities in case of combined activities,

coordination between operating forces and the local government was the

most important, since military activities in support of pacification

were generally conducted in populated areas. When US forces operated

separately, coordination with the local government was usually made

through the local adviser. One of the major concerns was to minimize

casualties and damage caused to the civilian population. The use of

firepower, whether by tactical air or artillery, on an area targeted

for pacification was, therefore, subjected to elaborate regulations

and directives that both the JGS and MACV agreed to publish in a

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joint Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for ARVN as well as US forces.

Two examples of coordination in security activities are provided

to show how it was actually done.

1. Combined Activities of US Marines and GVN Popular Forces.

This was a valuable experience which was started by US Marines

in the 1st CTZ (MR-1) as soon as they completed their initial deployment

in this area in late 1965. One of their immediate tasks was to initiate

a pilot program of pacification in populated areas near Da Nang,

and after this proved a success, the program was expanded to other

areas around Hue. The key element of this program was the concept of

"combined action" which joined small US Marine elements with popular

forces platoons. This concept was based on the premise that the PF

were the GVN forces that enjoyed the closest relationship with the

population. They were no strangers to the villages; in fact all of

them were relatives of villagers. They knew the local people, the

local enemy, and the local terrain. But at the same time, PF were

loosely trained, poorly equipped, and poorly led. Thus the combined

action concept was also designed to train these forces and make them

combat effective.

The combined action program called for the deployment of US Marine

squads in villages where each of them was integrated with a PF

platoon; they lived and operated together as a single unit. A US

Marine squad was further broken down into teams or cells which teamed

up with PF squads to improve their combativeness, make maximum

use of firepower, and familiarize PF troops with Marine combat techniques.

The presence of US Marines among PF platoons inspired confidence

and boosted morale and combat effectiveness.

A combined action platoon (CAP) was an integrated unit consisting

of one 14-man US Marine squad and a PF platoon whose authorized

strength was 38 men. Their mission was to help maintain law and order

in the villages where they were stationed; to conduct patrol and

ambush activities; and to gather intelligence and perform civic actions.

The US Marine squad leader could call for tactical air and

artillery support and medical evacuation by helicopter. This

capability was the main source of PF morale, although the support was

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seldom needed. To control and supervise the activities of the CAPs,

a combined Marine-PF headquarters was established at the district

command post with the US Marine company commander and the district

chief in command.

CAPs did not always operate separately and individually. When

major operations were conducted by US Marine units in the areas where

*

the CAPs were assigned, CAPs served as guides and provided intelligence.

Conversely, US Marine units were always prepared to relieve or support

the CAPs whenever required. Although their mission involved civic

action, CAPs had very limited capabilities in this regard. Their

civic action efforts were primarily designed to stimulate the local

governments and encourage them to provide more help and assistance

to the villages.

The combined action program brought about many realistic benefits.

The local population, living under permanent protection of these

combined units, developed trust and confidence in the GVN. The

presence of the CAPs also denied the enemy infrastructure freedom

of action. In addition, they also trained the PSDF and were instrumental in more rigorous activities on the part of village officials.

2. Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax.

During 1966 and in early 1967, US forces in the III Corps Tactical

Zone conducted major actions against enemy main force units and bases

such as in Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City. The security

situation in areas surrounding Saigon, and in Gia Dinh province in

particular, had deteriorated but not because of the presence of enemy

main force units - in fact there was no more than one enemy local

force battalion in the area - but because the enemy infrastructure

increased its activities. The VCI in Gia Dinh province was particularly

elaborate and almost had a free hand.

To eliminate the enemy's forces and his infrastructure in the area

around Saigon, a US infantry brigade was assigned the task of helping

in the pacification effort. On the GVN side, forces committed in the

pacification operation included one Ranger group and the provincial

territorial units.

The principle of combined activities in Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax

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was the integration of US and ARVN units. During the initial phase

of the operation, battalions of the ARVN 5th Ranger Group and those of

the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade operated in parallel with each

other and were responsible for one or more districts of Gia Dinh

province, depending on the situation. As the operation progressed,

and with experience gained, both US and ARVN battalions operated

in the boundary area between districts and even beyond the provincial

boundary. This concept of operation differed radically from the US

Marines' combined action program in that it involved the pairing-off

of regular battalions and not lower echelon units such as RF companies

or PF platoons. But the basic principle of combined activities was

practically the same. The ARVN units were more familiar with the

local terrain and environment and could establish good rapport with

the local government and people. US forces, on the contrary, enjoyed

superior resources, had more firepower, especially that provided by

organic artillery - a battery per infantry battalion - and modern

communications. In addition, US forces were supported by tactical air,

helilift, and rapid medical evacuation, and these assets could benefit

ARVN units as well.

During the initial phase, ARVN ranger battalions operated without

artillery support, moved on foot, and were limited to daylight

activities. Lacking helilift support, they were unable to penetrate

outlying enemy base areas. Because of combined operations with US

forces and the sharing of US support assets, these constraints

were no longer problems for ARVN units.

Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax was designed to achieve two basic

objectives: to improve the security situation around Saigon, and

particularly in Gia Dinh province, and to completely pacify this area.

To carry out the latter, US forces conducted training not only for

ARVN regular units but also for all territorial units.

To ensure close cooperation and coordination, US and ARVN units

established an Area Security Coordination Committee and a Combined Intelligence Center. The Area Security Coordination Committee included

US arid ARVN battalion commanders and the district chiefs. These three

commanders met periodically to discuss plans or decide on the efforts

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to be made. The committee was without a chairman or executive authority.

All the decisions were based on mutual agreement or understanding, and

the purpose of each meeting was only to affirm the agreements

arrived at among the leaders before each of them issued orders to, his

own subordinate units. The Combined Intelligence Center was designed

to collect and disseminate in a timely manner all intelligence pertaining

to the enemy so that quick response actions could be taken.

The ARVN ranger battalion, consisting of four companies, was

similar in organization to the US infantry battalion. This organizational

similarity permitted the integration of one ARVN company with one US

company. At lower echelons, platoons and squads were also integrated

so that every activity conducted was effectively an integrated USARVN activity, whether it was a battalion-level operation or a squad

ambush. Sometimes all eight companies participated in operations at

one time; at other times only individual platoon-level activities were

conducted, depending on the situation and the distance from friendly

bases. Movements of penetration into enemy bases were either by

helicopters, by boats, or on foot. In general, daylight combined

activities were no smaller than platoon-size but at night they were

mostly of squad size. Through this method of operation, an infantry

battalion was able to lay up to forty ambushes within the limits of

a district in any one night. On a few special occasions, ARVN and

US battalions also conducted separate company-size activities in

combination with RF or PF units.

In order to improve security in villages, ARVN units once a week

conducted district-wide cordon and search operations at night in cooperation with the national police. These operations contributed to

improving overall security.

After a period of large-scale activities which inflicted heavy

losses to the enemy main force in the Capital Military District,

ARVN and US forces switched to small-unit tactics, focusing on the

destruction of enemy guerrillas. Friendly units were broken down into

small elements which deployed against the enemy supply and infiltration

routes. Another friendly tactic which proved particularly effective

in Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax was the concentration of efforts on

a particular objective area. This type of operation was based on

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reliable intelligence reports and involved repeated bombardments by

tactical air and artillery against adjacent base areas that the enemy

used as staging areas or safe havens. These continuous attacks by

fire flushed the enemy out into the objective area where he would be

destroyed.

Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax succeeded in radically changing the

security situation in the Capital Military District within a short time.

Not designed to be as permanent and as continuous as the Combined

Action Program in the I CTZ, the operation ended in November 1967.

In 1964, well before the success of Operation Rang Dong/Fairfax,

the government began the Hop Tac pacification campaign in the Capital

Military District with the purpose of clearing and securing this area.

The Hop Tac campaign was conducted by III Corps forces and was

operationally controlled by a command post at the CMD headquarters.

The staff in charge of the campaign was a joint, military-civilian

organization which combined III Corps military officers with GVN

ministerial and US embassy representatives.

The Hop Tac campaign failed to achieve its objectives because of

several difficulties. First, there were not enough police to maintain

law and order in all hamlets. Second, there was a shortage of territorial

forces to provide protection and maintain security in those areas

cleared by regular forces. Third, civilian development projects

such as the construction of schools, market places, and maternity

wards, were unable to make any progress due to political instability

in the national capital; this was a period of turmoil during which

several governments succeeded each other within a short time. Finally,

there was a total lack of guidance and direction from the central

government. Without a central pacification control body and specialized

cadre, the campaign was doomed to failure and was suspended in

September 1965.

Training

An inherent weakness of ARVN forces lay in the fact that, being

trained to fight the enemy with conventional tactics, they did not

thoroughly understand the role of pacification support. Hence training

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for this role was required.

In view of the security situation which required the permanent

presence of military forces and because of the inability of schools

and training centers to handle at any one time a large training load,

special emphasis was placed by MACV on the use of combined US-ARVN

mobile training teams (MTT), which were activated in 1967.

In the beginning, MACV initiated the training of fourteen MTTs,

each team consisting of twelve officers, one team for each of the four

corps and ten infantry divisions. Each province would later be assigned

from two to three MTTs depending on its size and the number of its

territorial units. Each of the MTTs earmarked for the ARVN regular

forces was assigned a US adviser and provincial MTTs also had US

members. Training programs conducted by MTTs lasted about two weeks

for regular forces and three weeks for regional forces. This was

followed by the training and formation of forty-four MTTs for

popular forces, each team composed of five members (two officers and

three NCOs). These teams were to provide training for all popular

forces located in 243 districts throughout the country.

US Field Forces at the same time also came up with other mobile

training variants but all were designed to achieve the same goal, that

of improving territorial forces for their pacification support task.

Each team was composed of five US members and two Vietnamese.

These MTTs were placed under the control of province senior advisers

who deployed them to districts to help RF and PF units organize

outpost defense systems and train them in small unit tactics, with

particular emphasis on night ambushes and the use of combat support

such as artillery and tactical air.

There were also Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT) and

Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT) that the US I Field Force

activated in II Corps area. The composition of these teams and the

concept of their employment included some variations but their

mission and purpose remained the same, i.e., improving the combat

effectiveness of territorial forces. However, this regional training

effort was not sustained for long and in the end all CMITs and CMTTs

were reorganized into standardized Mobile Advisory Teams that MACV

had initiated throughout the country.

105
The Hamlet Evaluation System

In January 1967, MACV/CORDS first used the Hamlet Evaluation

System (HES), ä computer based measurement to discern the status of

rural security, the progress of the pacification program, and identify

problem areas. The district senior adviser filled in a questionnaire

on each hamlet. The hamlet data was forwarded through the chain of

command to MACV/CORDS where it was collated and analyzed. The

questionnaire covered two major areas: hamlet security and progress

in civil operations.

To ascertain the extent of security, the questionnaire covered

all enemy disruptive activities in a hamlet or in adjacent areas such

as harassment fire or shelling, terrorist actions, sabotages, propaganda,

proselytizing actions, kidnappings, and assassinations. Other data

concerning friendly activities to provide security and protection for

the local population were also recorded in the form of answers to such

questions as (1) How effective were those activities? (2) Who

actually held the initiative: friendly or enemy forces? (3) Were

friendly forces capable of providing security? (4) What results did

friendly activities achieve? (5) What casualties and damage were

caused to the local population in terms of human lives and property,

both by friendly and by enemy forces?

In addition to security, the HES also measured the progress of

efforts in civil operations. Data for this part included answers to

questions about the maintenance of law and order in the hamlet, the

behavior and attitude of local government officials, the degree of

popular sympathy toward GVN cadre, the elections of village and hamlet

councils, the influence of the GVN and that of the enemy on the local

population, the extent of development in public health and education,

the availability of schools, dispensaries, maternity wards, and the

influence of local political parties.

106
All the questions concerning security and civil operations were

printed on a card. The district senior adviser filled out the appropriate answers on the card and submitted it through channels. The

data provided in the cards were elaborate and scientifically devised.

They were tremendously helpful to higher authorities or field commanders,: who were able at a glance to visualize what happened in a certain

area and to assess correctly the situation. There were, however,

certain shortcomings inherent in the HES, the most readily discernible

of which was the relative time-lag of the reporting system.

Reports submitted by district senior advisers, for example, took

weeks to reach the central echelon, and before MACV/CORDS compiled

and sent them to agencies and major units for exploitation at least

one month had elapsed. There were other data contained in the HES

monthly report, concerning actions to be taken by various agencies for

example, which were no longer effective since by the time the HES

report was published these actions had already been taken. A HES

report recorded, for example, that the PF unit in a certain village was

short of M-79s or M-60s due to combat losses; but in reality these

losses had been replaced during the month it took the district senior

adviser's report to reach MACV/CORDS and get published. A major cause

for the slow reporting system was the delay in the RVNAF postal service

or the lack of mail routing facilities, which became especially serious

after the redeployment of US forces.

The data recorded by district senior advisers were obtained partly

from village and hamlet officials' reports, partly from information

provided by friendly forces or through the advisory channel, and partly

from actual visits to villages and hamlets by the senior adviser and

the district chief. A question arose, however, as to the validity and

reliability of the reports thus obtained; doubts about accuracy and

timeliness. The most reliable way to have accurate data was to make

visits to the villages and hamlets and see for oneself. But the truth

was that even if all the time available were devoted to visits, and

even if road communication and transportation facilities and helicopters

were available at all times, no one could possibly cover all the villages

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and hamlets of a district in a single month.

The HES was subsequently transferred from MACV/CORDS to Vietnamese authorities. The JGS took over the task of evaluating territorial

forces while the Central Pacification and Development Center took

charge of civil operations reporting. The operation of the system

became less efficient, partly because at the district level the GVN

did not have officials as knowledgeable as the advisers to estimate

and record with accuracy HES elements, and partly because of the large

costs involved in supporting the system, which the GVN could scarcely

afford.

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CHAPTER VI

Social Reform and Economic Development

Objectives

South Vietnam subsisted on foreign aid, primarily US aid. Its

consumption far surpassed its production because of the lack of an

extensive industrial base. Due to security improvements after 1970,

the GVN set about to achieve long range goals that can be summarized

in a "three selves" policy. All plans and programs were geared to

and guided by this policy.

Self-Defense meant the people were to defend themselves, their

families and their communities. The PSDF were a means to provide this

kind of self-defense, being organized and manned by the people themselves,

and armed and assisted by the government. The goal to be achieved

gradually was to use PSDF for the defense of villages and hamlets in

place of territorial forces who would take over territorial security

responsibilities from regular ARVN forces. Then the ARVN could be

freed to take over combat responsibilities from US forces.

Self-Management was designed to promote democracy and a democratic

way of life. The people elected representatives to run their own affairs,

administer their own villages, and manage their own budget. The people

also participated in groups, associations designed to develop a mutual

assistance spirit. Village properties and resources were managed by

the people through their representatives with the technical assistance

of the government.

Self-Sufficiency was to be achieved through self-help programs and

projects in which the people contributed their own capital and labor.

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The government provided assistance only when required. Self-help

projects were initiated and managed by the people, from start to finish.

The ultimate goal was not only to bring about a more prosperous life

for the people but also to sustain the war effort for as long as it

was required, without relying too heavily on foreign aid.

The Self-Help Hamlet development Program

The purpose of the Self-Help Hamlet Development Program was to

promote moderate and short-range projects which were of practical

value to the population of the hamlets. It did not require advanced

techniques and was not a duplication of the projects in the permanent

programs supported by various ministries.

Examples of self-help projects were:

1. Irrigation equipment for the production of two crops in a year.

2. Repair of village and communal roads, and construction of

small bridges and of sewage systems.

3. Construction of dams, and digging of drainage ditches to

prevent floods.

4. Digging of ponds for hamlet fish breeding.

5. Construction of pens for pigs, cattle and poultry.

6. Construction of brick-making factories.

7. Digging of wells.

8. Construction or repair of market places.

9. Cultivation of plants for the production of seedling plants.

10. Repair of hospital and maternity dispensaries that involved

no new construction.

11. Repair of schools.

12. Construction of latrines, wells, water tanks, and a flag

pole for the hamlet school.

13. Repair or erection of religious structures.

The programs would lead to success when they reflected the true

aspirations of the population, and would fail if the provincial and district authorities compelled the people to work only according to

officials' desires. All projects were to be deliberated and decided

110
by the population under the guidance of the hamlet managing committees,

and with the assistance of the provincial technical cadres who would

provide advice during discussions.

The efforts of the hamlet population were considered as the main

factor while the support coming from the outside, such as funds and

materiels, was only of secondary importance and used primarily to get

the projects off to a good start. Invitations to bid on the projects

under the self-help hamlet development program were absolutely prohibited.

All projects would be established by a committee composed of the

representatives of the Hamlet Managing Committee, the RF cadre team

operating in the hamlet, the Parents and Teachers' Association, and

the popular associations in the hamlet. A decision was then made by

the province chief to provide funds and materials for the projects.

Each project received the same funding of VN $50,000 without distinction

as to locality. To assist the project, materials such as cement,

iron, and roofing sheets were provided by CORDS.

The provinces were authorized to carry out projects for more or

less than VN $50,000, depending on circumstances but the allotted funds

should be less than the total expenditures and the provinces were not

allowed to spend more than VN $150,000 for three projects. In very

special cases, if the project required more than VN $150,000, it was

subject to prior approval by GVN authorities.

Rural Health

Health service was poor in rural areas. The traditional method

used by peasants to heal wounds and cure diseases was through the

In October 1969, the exchange rate was set at $1 US: VN $285.

As inflation worsened, the VN piaster continued to be devalued every

year. In 1972, the exchange rate was adjusted at $1 US: VN $240 the

$1 US: VN $475 in 1973 and $1 US: VN$560 in 1974. By 1975, it'was

set at $1 US: VN $700.

Ill
administration of medicinal herbs, or Oriental medicine while city

inhabitants relied on modern medicine and there was a critical shortage

of doctors in the rural areas.

There was usually a hospital in each province but its medical

facilities were deficient and medicine was frequently in short supply.

Provincial hospitals had small capacities and could not accomodate an

entire province population, particularly during the periods of heavy

fighting. Each district was equipped with only a dispensary, but it

did not have a resident doctor or registered nurses. It dispensed

first aid in emergency cases but patients were evacuated to the

provincial hospital because the district dispensary did not have

hospitalization facilities. Each village had a rural medicine chest

but its limited supplies were inadequate for the needs of the village

population.

With the active participation of US forces the public health

effort improved in keeping with the pacification program. The GVN

public health program received substantial support and assistance from

the US as well as from international humanitarian organizations. Such

projects as constructing additional provincial hospitals; equipping,

modernizing, and expanding existing hospitals; providing doctors,

nurses, and technicians to work with Vietnamese medical personnel;

and constructing and increasing the equipment of district dispensaries

so as to have limited medical treatment were all undertaken with

American and allied support.

A major goal of the GVN public health program was to improve

rural health service. In each hamlet, for example, a maternity

dispensary and drug station operated by a rural midwife and a laborer

were to be established. The model design included a room for prenatal

care or for delivery of babies; a confinement room; a drug dispensary;

a bedroom; a kitchen; two latrines; and a water well or tank. The

hamlet maternity dispensary and. drug station was constructed with

good, strong, durable materials. A funding of VN $250,000 was allotted

by the Central Rural Development Council to cover construction. Support

provided by CORDS included, for each construction project: 175 bags

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of cement, 153 roofing sheets, and 100 kilos of iron. The cost of

training midwives was covered by a special allocation granted to the

Ministry of Health by the CRDC. With this allocation, the province

was able to purchase training equipment, instructional materials, and

office supplies for the organization of re-training classes for rural

midwives for a period of three months. Rural midwives and laborers were

recruited by the provincial health service, which was also responsible

for conducting training classes for rural midwives.

To make full use of the support provided by the US and other Free

World nations, the RVNAF, in coordination and cooperation- with the

Ministry of Health, initiated a program called "Civil-Military Medical

Cooperation," designed to establish jointly operated medical facilities

for the benefit of both the civilian population and servicemen. A

coordination committee which included representatives of the RVNAF

Medical Service and the Ministry of Health was set up to manage the

program.

During 1968, the Civil-Military Cooperation program operated in

10 out of 26 provincial hospitals and in 86 out of 193 district dispensaries. The Ministry of Health was responsible for additional

construction and for providing medical equipment and medicine supplies

while the RVNAF Medical Service provided medical personnel. These

jointly run medical facilities accommodated wounded servicemen, as

well as civilians, free of charge.

In other hospitals and dispensaries not covered and operated by

the program, the treatment of servicemen was subject to reimbursement

by RVNAF Medical Service for the cost of food during the hospitalization

period.

In addition, other humanitarian organizations such as the West

German and the New Zealand Medical Groups, the Philippine Civil Action

Group (PHILCAG), and, particularly, US charity and relief organizations,

all operated with philanthropic devotion in rural areas. In these

rural areas doctors and nurses treated thousands of peasants and

distributed free medicine to others.

113
US forces also contributed significantly to the GVN rural health

effort through their Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). While

conducting military operations, US forces placed special emphasis

on organizing sick calls and dispensary service for the local civilian

population. US medical evacuation helicopters, while primarily serving

US servicemen, were frequently used to evacuate civilians in emergency

cases, especially casualties caused by the fighting. It was estimated

that about 70% of civilian casualties were evacuated by US MEDEVAC

helicopters and many lives were saved.

Finally, US contributions to the GVN health program also included

the invaluable service rendered by the hospital ship HOPE which twice

called at South Vietnamese ports, each time staying for a period of

several months. This floating medical facility succeeded in saving

the lives of many Vietnamese whose illnesses or diseases could not be

cured by local doctors or with local medical facilities and technology.

The Rural Education Development Program

The rural education development program was designed to provide

educational facilities and opportunities for children. It was an

interim step toward compulsory education at the primary level and

for the construction of hamlet classrooms. For pacified and consolidated hamlets, the maximum number of classrooms allotted to each

hamlet was three which corresponded to the three lower grades — 5, 4

2

and 3 — of an elementary school.

2

Prior to 1973, Vietnamese elementary schools had 5 grades: 5,

4, 3, 2, 1, which corresponded to US grades 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 respectively.

After 1973, the RVN education systems was patterned after the US model:

elementary, 6 grades (from 1 to 6), and secondary, 6 grades (from 7 to

12).

114
Hamlet classrooms were usually built as semi-permanent structures

with brick or cinder block walls and a tin roof. The GVN policy was

to implement the rural education program through community development

or under state supervision just as for the rural health program

Similarly, the construction of classrooms by private contractors was

also unauthorized.

In order to achieve lasting results in the establishment and

protection of schools, the following guidance was provided by the

GVN:

1. An imprest fund was established by the province and cash

was distributed to districts for construction under government

supervision.

2. The hamlet population, especially parents and teachers, were

urged to volunteer their efforts in the construction of classrooms.

All forms of commandeered labor were forbidden. More than any other

program, the rural education program was widely acclaimed by the

people. There was absolutely no coercion of any kind for their

participation.

3. A committee in charge of project management was to be created

that included representatives of the local government and population

xn order to supervise the construction and provide protection for

the school.

Funds and materiels for the construction of rural classrooms

were allocated by the CRDC. For each classroom, VN $60,000 were

allotted for construction and VN $25,000 for furniture (desks, tables

benches, blackboards and bookcases). Construction materials were

provided by the regional CORDS. These included, for each classroom,

75 bags of cement, 80 roofing sheets, and 600 kilos of iron rods.

The province chief was authorized to use funds earmarked for

self-help projects or other special funds at his discretion, to build

school facilities as might be required. In the case of schools built

before 1966, the provincial and municipal RD councils were authorized

115
to use self-help project funds to build such school facilities as

latrines, water tanks or wells, and flag poles. Each site having

from one to three classrooms was allotted VN $25,000 by the GVN and

construction materials by the regional CORDS. The materials included

60 roofing sheets, 45 bags of cement, and 500 kilos of iron for the

construction of two latrines, one water tank and three water jars.

Teachers recuited underwent a three-month training course and

upon graduation and assignment, received a monthly salary of VN $3,500.

The need for hamlet teachers was decided by the provincial and munxcxpal RD councils, upon recommendation by the regional education servxce,

and based on procedures and criteria established by the Ministry of

Education.

Finally, to assist peasant families in supporting their children

in school, a special allowance of VN $300 was granted each family to

cover school supplies.

The Relief and Resettlement of Refugees

Prior to 1965, there was no GVN agency created for the care,

relief, and resettlement of refugees and war victims. As of 1965,

however, with the increasing number of refugees and war victims,

the GVN began to care for them. The responsibility was shared by

differing agencies. The Ministry of Social Welfare, for example,

assumed responsibility for dispensing emergency assistance while

the Ministry of Rural Development made resettlement payments to

people who, because of continued insecurity, acquired a semipermanent refugee status.

in March 1966, a Special Commissariat for Refugees was established to take over full responsibility for refugee assistance and

resettlement. The Commissioner General for refugees was empowered

116
to co-opt both personnel and financial resources from the two

ministries which had previously shared this responsibility. A considerable institutional structure was thus built in a very short

time. At the GVN level, for example, the Special Commissariat for

refugees had over 200 staff members and at the regional level it

was represented by over 800 field personnel who constituted the

staff of 46 provincial and municipal refugee relief services.

The next stage in the evolution of organizational arrangements

to deal with refugee problems came less than two years later when,

in November 1967, the Special Commissariat for Refugees was integrated with the Ministry of Social Welfare to become the Ministry

of Social Welfare and Refugees. At the same time, provincial and

municipal refugee relief services were merged with local social

welfare services.

The final change was the integration of the refugee relief

and resettlement effort into the pacification and development

program. As of January 1969, all provincial and municipal pacification and development councils were required to include plans

for refugee relief and resettlement in their annual pacification

plans, and the Ministry of Social Welfare and Refugees became

the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief. This Ministry

was responsible for keeping a census of resettled and returned

refugees, for disbursing funds and materials, and for providing

personnel and equipment to operate hamlet or village dispensaries

and maternities.

The GVN policy of relief for refugees was a realistic one in

that it sought first to provide emergency help and then to resettle

the refugees in secure areas where they would find opportunities to

make a living by themselves. Depending on the circumstances,

the GVN might in a few instances allow refugees to return to their

home villages. This home-returning effort was particularly strong

during 1969.

117
The relief and resettlement program included three distinct

programs in one, each concerned with one specific phase of the

refugees' reception and care by the responsible authorities.

Initially, the program provided for emergency or temporary

care for a period of thirty days, or in certain cases, up to a

maximum of sixty days. At the end of this time the refugees

should, either with or without government assistance, have been

able to return to their homes or, if security conditions did not

permit, have been resettled in a secure area where some means of

livelihood was obtainable. The alternative to the second phase

or resettlement in a new location, if this was not possible, was

the conversion of the temporary center in which a refugee had

been provided shelter into a permanent resettlement site, the

refugee being eligible for resettlement assistance both in cash

and in kind, and the site receiving priority in government

development programs. The third phase of resettlement was the

"Return to the Village" program.

Due to the difficulties in screening and classifying people

fleeing from the war and from the Communists, it was required

that a refugee meet certain conditions to be entitled to assistance.

By GVN definition, a refugee was a person who had been displaced

from his home village for reasons of insecurity and unwillingness

to submit to Communist control, or a person whose family had been

compelled to evacuate his home village by local authorities or

by friendly operational forces.

Refugees were also classified into two categories: those who

lived in camps and those who lived outside. Refugees who lived in

a temporary refugee center received assistance, protection, and

control from the GVN. Those who lived out of camps were people

who were not under the control of GVN refugee authorities but

made up separate colonies or lived with their relatives.

118
Refugees living in GVN-controlled camps were issued a "green"

card which entitled them to emergency relief during a period not

exceeding 30 days, each day being worth VN $15 in cash or 500 grams of

rice and VN $5 for meat and vegetables, for each person; and temporary

relief during a period which could be classified as "resettled", with

each being allotted a lump sum of VN $7,500 and 10 roofing sheets, and

rice rations for six months on the basis of 15 kilos per person per

month. Montagnard refugees received, additionally, 600 grams of salt

per month for six months.

Even though classified as resettled and having received these

benefits, a refugee might still, at any time, apply for assistance to

return to his home hamlet if it had become secure. If he did, he also

became eligible for aid under the "Return to Village" program,, amounting

to cash payment of VN $5,000 per family for housing, cement, and roofing,

or. cash in lieu, and a six-month rice allowance.

An out-of-camp refugee, because he was in principle outside

government control, had to be accepted for registration and issued a

"white" card before he could claim any of these benefits, and in his

case, the benefits were somewhat reduced. To be accepted for registration,

such a refugee had to meet at least two of the following conditions:

(1) he must have become a refugee since 1964; (2) he must have originated in an insecure village or hamlet and have fled to avoid VC influence or control; and (3) he must be living in controllable groups

of twenty or more families. If he met all three registration criteria,

he was entitled to temporary aid and return-to-village benefits only,

not resettlement allowance. If he satisfied the first two conditions,

then he might claim only return-to-village benefits, forfeiting temporary

and resettlement allowances.

Non-registered refugees forfeited all assistance under the relief

and resettlement program but retained the right to claim return-to-village benefits provided that their home villages had been pacified and

that they had returned to them during the 1968 and 1969 pacification

campaigns.

The last category of refugees were those who had become refugees

119
after 1 January 1969, either by moving voluntarily or by being evacuated

by military authorities from insecure villages. If their villages were

not scheduled for pacification, they were given temporary aid for seven

days only, and then the resettlement allowance at the established rate

during the period they stayed in the reception camp. If, on the other

hand, their villages were scheduled for pacification, they were entitled to seven days emergency aid which, depending on the pacification

progress, might be extended to 30 days, but in no case were they entitled to resettlement benefits. They had to apply to return to their

villages as soon as security conditions permitted, and when they did,

they received a full back-to-village allowance, whether or not their

homes were destroyed by military operations.

The cost of the the refugee relief and resettlement program was

enormous. Food allowances for refugees living in-camp amounted to VN

$526 million in 1967, VN $835 million in 1968, then was reduced to VN

$709 million in 1970 and only VN $236 million in 1971. Resettlement

costs amounted to VN $760 million in 1967, VN $1.2 billion in 1968,

and up to VN $2.2 billion and VN $2.4 billion for 1969 and 1970,

respectively. These expenditures provided relief and assistance for

3.5 million refugees during the war years. (Chart 18)

Refugee resettlement centers or camps were each provided with an

elementary school. The cost of operating these schools, including

teachers' salaries, was supported by the school programs which were

transferred to the Ministry of Education. In addition, each

resettlement center was also provided with a maternity ward and a

dispensary if the refugee population amounted to 10,000. Other selfhelp projects such as sewage, drainage ditches, road repairs, etc.,

were undertaken under the community development program and allotted

VN $50,000 each. On an average, each resettlement center received about

VN $1.5 million for self-help projects.

The refugee relief and resettlement program was a gigantic effort

that succeeded only because of the great financial assistance provided

by the US government and other Free World countries. It was a truly

humanitarian program that helped to heal the wounds caused by the war.

120
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US agencies and some other international organizations played

key roles in contributing to the success of the program. They provided

refugees with medicine, food, and relief necessities. They helped in

vocational training, in developing education, and in caring for orphans

and the sick and the wounded. Altogether, 12 US and international

organizations were involved in the refugee relief and resettlement

program. Some were responsible for distributing relief items donated

by US government or charity organizations. Others, such as the American

Red Cross and the International Red Cross provided personnel and staff

to assist in the operation of refugee camps or resettlement centers.

In addition, these organizations also helped train refugees in farming

techniques, handicraft, construction work, and in cattle and poultry

breeding, and assisted them in the settlement or resettlement process.

The Community Development Foundation, in particular, conducted training

courses in refugee camp operation for personnel of the Ministry of

Health, Social Welfare and Relief. Other vocational training courses

were also organized by charity and non-profit organizations to train

refugees in new occupations.

Agricultural Development

Vietnam is basically an agricultural country. Its production

output was still low because of its conservative techniques. Agricultural reform therefore became a concern and the GVN initiated many

programs to pursue it within the pacification framework. Such programs

as animal husbandry, agricultural affairs, Montagnard agriculture and

animal husbandry, and fisheries were designed to contribute to the

rural development effort and to improve the national agriculture. In

each province, these programs were established and implemented by the

provincial rural development council, with the cooperation of technical

services.

The Animal Husbandry Program

The purposes of this program were to teach farmers modern animal

husbandry methods, to protect livestock with preventive immunization

122
and medical treatment, and to distribute livestock to poor farmers.

In hamlets other than those earmarked for pacification, the scope of

program activities was limited and aimed only at continuing and consolidating the achievements obtained during the previous years. They

included the recovery of the livestock distributed for profit-sharing

in the previous years and its redistribution to farmers living in the

same hamlet, and continuation of preventive immunization and medical

treatment. The GVN also provided additional funds for each province

to purchase more livestock for distribution.

In the New Life Hamlets, the program was more extensive. It

included training farmers and distributing pigs, chickens, and ducks,

and other kinds of livestock. Farmer training taught new animal

husbandry methods, how to build pens and farms, how to choose livestock

breeds, the advantages provided by mixed feed to livestock and how to

cure livestock diseases. The purpose of pig distribution was to popularize the improved breeds of pigs and at the same time to support to

some extent the poor farmers who could not afford animal husbandry.

Each needy family willing to raise livestock was allotted two breeding

pigs, and on an average, each hamlet was allotted 40 pigs.

The distribution of pigs to hamlet households was implemented on

the basis of certain criteria. First, piglets raised for meat should

be crossbred from Yorkshire, Berkshire or Danish breeds, weighing more

than eight kilos. Sows should be almost of pure Yorkshire, Berkshire

or Danish breeds, weighing more than nine kilos. Boars should be of

pure Yorkshire, Berkshire or Danish breeds, weighing more than two

kilos. Then medicine for the elimination of parasites and preventive

shots should be given to the pigs kept for distribution. The procedure

used for distribution determined that sows were allotted on the basis

of the sharing of litters, but boars were allotted free. The animal

husbandry office would take one two-month piglet from the first litter.

Chickens and ducks were only distributed to the hamlets that had

not received an allocation of pigs. However, chickens and pigs could

be distributed simultaneously to those hamlets having a large population and animal husbandry abilities. Each family was allotted 10

123
breeding chickens or from 40 to 50 ducks, all free of charge. For the

province that had requested a distribution of chickens but had not

received it in due time, ducks could be provided in lieu of chickens.

As to other kinds of livestock, depending on the local situation,

the province could provide a distribution of oxen, goats and rabbits

for farmers. This was on the basis of profit-sharing in the case of

cows and goats.

The Agriculture Affairs Program

The agricultural affairs program was designed to provide guidance

to farmers concerning advanced agricultural methods, distribute seeds

and seedlings to poor farmers, protect crops against insects and diseases,

and train Montagnards in agriculture.

For the hamlets that were not targeted for pacification, the scope

of program activities was limited to continuing operations initiated in

previous years, especially the protection of crops and limited distribution of seeds and seedlings to very needy farmers.

In New Life Hamlets, the program was focused on training farmers

in advanced farming methods, particularly in the methods adopted for

new and improved breeds, on distributing seeds and seedlings of new or

improved types, and on helping poor farmers with farming facilities.

The seeds varied according to the region: rice, corn, beans, etc.

Each needy family having farming abilities received an allocation of

from 20 to 40 kilos of seed for the planting of about one hectare of

land.

To protect crops, sprayers and pumps were distributed to each

hamlet as common property of the community, but were placed under the

control of agricultural cadres. Pumps were only provided where such a

need could be justified and for minor farming activities. The distribution of powerful water pumps to carry water to rice fields lay within

the scope of the irrigation program. Insecticides were provided free.

Montagnard Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

In provinces where many Montagnards were settled, a Montagnard

agriculture and animal husbandry center was established with the purpose

of training Montagnards in farming, animal husbandry, and fish culture

124
methods. Guidance was also provided to Montagnards concerning certain

trades, such as blacksmith, carpentry, sewing, etc.

An average Montagnard agriculture and animal husbandry center was

operated by a manager, an assistant manager, two instructors, five

laborers and one clerk. Montagnard RD cadres were also assigned to

each center; their role was to encourage agricultural activities in

Montagnard villages. Each Montagnard undergoing training at the center

received a daily food allowance of VN $50.

The Fisheries Program

The fisheries program was designed to provide guidance to farmers

concerning fresh water fisheries and to fishermen concerning salt water

fisheries, provide support to poor fishermen such as breeding fish and

fishing gear for the development of fisheries, and to improve fisheries

by motorizing fishing boats. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture

also ran a permanent program which provided for activities concerning

salt water fisheries, the survey of lakes arid ponds to determine fishing

suitability, the compilation of fishing statistics, the digging of

fish ponds, and the construction of refrigerating rooms.

At the hamlet level, the program provided training for farmers and

fishermen in fish culture methods, the use of fishing equipment, the

digging of ponds for fish breeding and rearing, the preparation of fish

food, etc. To encourage fish breeding and rearing, breeding fish were

distributed free to the hamlet people who had the abilities for such

activities. Different kinds of fish were provided depending on the

availability of fresh or salt water in the areas. Fish were distributed

on the basis of one fish per square meter of lake or pond.

Outboard motors, boats and fishing gear were provided for by loans

and were to be reimbursed in cash. The terms of payment were one year

for fishing gear, and two years for outboard motors and boats. Fishing

gear worth less than VN $200 were distributed free.

For the construction of fish market places, a fund of VN $250,000

was allotted for each site for the construction work and the digging of

125
drainage ditches. Market places were constructed according to a

standardized plan provided by the Bridges and Highways Program and with

the support of CORDS, which supplied for each construction work 80 roofing

sheets, 1,000 kilos of iron and 200 bags of cement. For fish drying

yards, a fund of VN $20,000 was allotted for each yard. This program

was implemented by the province through self-help projects.

The implementation of the fisheries program as well as other

programs such as agricultural affairs and animal husbandry was handled

by technical offices staffed by technical personnel and cadres.

Depending on requirements, each office was assigned one or two technicians who were selected from engineers, controllers or instructors.

Contract salaries were paid to technical personnel on the basis of

diplomas and according to a pay scale determined by the Ministry of

Agriculture. Salaries included cost of living allowance and family

allowance but no per diem allowance.

Cadres worked in hamlets and received a monthly contract salary

of VN $3,500. They were technically trained in various schools of

agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry prior to assignment. Technical personnel and cadres had to pledge to serve the programs for at

least one year and they were released when the programs were terminated.

An Evaluation

The GVN faced a tremendously difficult task in trying to reform

a rural society as complex and as backward as South Vietnam's. Despite

the trend toward urbanization and the depletion of male population

during the most intensive war years, the countryside remained the major

ground of contest where the GVN emphasis was placed on restoring the

rural economic infrastructure and improving health and education. These

efforts were the mainstay of pacification and development.

The Hamlet Self-Help program was a move in the right direction

since the hamlet was the basic communal unit. The range of projects

embraced by the program reflected its realistic goal of rebuilding the

war-shattered rural infrastructure and bringing about immediate,

126
practical benefits for the peasantry. The GVN also hoped that a rebuilt

rural area could contribute significantly toward developing the national

economy. A key feature which accounted for its initial acceptance by

the local population was the self-help character of the program. Experience, showed that when their own interests were at stake, and when they

had a voice in the management of their own affairs, the people volunteered and willingfully cooperated. In the district of Cu Chi, Hau

Nghia Province, for example, the local population repaired rural roads

and culverts, built market places, and classrooms, all within the space

of one year. In the Mekong Delta, peasants in the Plains of Reeds took

up by themselves the task of dredging and clearing canals of obstacles

because farming and business depended on these waterways. Civic actions

conducted by US and FWMA forces during the period of their commitment,

1965-1972, gave the program great support, particularly in those areas

near operational bases. In addition to providing construction materials,

the allied troops frequently contributed labor and turned the finished

work over to the local population as gifts. Some overzealous local

governments, however, turned the program into a coercive enterprise,

requiring the people to meet arbitrarily established deadlines, often

at the cost of relinquishing their own business. Despite this, the

overall program received wide acceptance by the peasantry.

In health and education, the period from 1969 to 1972 was a period

of vigorous development in terms of efforts committed and results

achieved. The rural education program virtually eradicated illiteracy

among peasant children and youth, and effectively increased the elementary student population multifold. More students went up to high schools

because the majority of villages were provided with a first-level

middle-school (four-year program, equivalent to US 7th, 8th, 9th and

10th grades). This was an unprecedented opportunity for rural students

who during the previous years had to go to the only middle-school at

the district town, sometimes at prohibitive distances from their villages.

The remarkable progress made in rural education was possible due primarily

to aid funds which helped subsidize higher salaries for rural teachers,

build new schools or additional classrooms and provide free textbooks,

127
and not infrequently free school supplies as well, for the under-privileged students. But extensive as it was, the development in rural

education was but part of an outdated educational system, based primarily

on old French methodology and devoid of a new national spirit. The

system belatedly underwent some improvement and modernization in 1974.

Despite the GVN efforts, the benefits the rural population enjoyed

in terms of medical care seemed to derive chiefly from programs sponsored by allied countries, international organizations and, in particular, US forces in Vietnam. The US MEDCAP program was especially

beneficial to the local population living in US areas of operation.

Allied medical teams and international charity organizations were active

in several provinces in the 2d and 3d Military Regions. In the central

highlands, the US Special Forces did a splendid job helping the Montangards fight diseases and improve sanitation. The GVN rural health

program was a laudable effort but it was inefficiently managed and

plagued by problems such as the lack of medical personnel and medicine.

Pilferages and illicit traffic in drugs further aggravated the problem

by enabling the Viet Cong to purchase large quantities of critical

medicine.

By far the heaviest burden the GVN had to shoulder during the war

years was the problem of refugees. The highest figure recorded after

the 1968 Tet offensive was about three million or 1/6 of the total

population. The GVN effort was twofold: providing temporary relief

and helping in resettlement. Despite the availability of aid funds

which provided up to 80% for the refugee resettlement costs and the

humanitarian help of US charity organizations, the task was monumental

and the effort an uphill struggle. From 1969 to 1971, the problem

was alleviated thanks to improved security which allowed most refugees

to return to their villages. There remained, however, about 300,000

refugees living in camps for whom care and resettlement were constantly

needed. Most relief items donated by US charity organizations such as

powdered milk and western clothes usually found their way to local

markets since they were alien to the Vietnamese rural way of life. Part

of them also never reached the refugees but were resold to pad the

greedy camp officials' pocketbooks.

128
The GVN effort to resettle refugees was not very successful since

most resettlement areas were located in insecure areas and became targets

of VC harassments. There was also not enough cultivable land and water

for irrigation. The result was, after a certain time living under

relief, refugees drifted away again and not infrequently ended up in a

refugee camp. Several refugees did this five or six times, all at the

expense of the GVN. But the resettlement effort greatly improved with

Dr. Phan Quang Dan's program of Land Reclamation and Hamlet Resettlement which began in early 1974. This was a large-scale effort, wellplanned and well-supported, which was welcomed not only by refugees but

also by veterans who voluntarily joined the program. The program had

a good chance of resolving the refugee problem when it was thrown in

utter disarray by events in early 1975.

In keeping with the pacification progress, agricultural development projects also brought about rosy achievements during 1969-1971.

This was possible due to the availability of seeds, insecticides, fertilizers and farm machines purchased through the economic aid program.

For a time at least, the rural area took on a prosperous outlook.

Cultivated acreage was expanded and rice production per hectare greatly

increased. The fishing industry also improved and expanded, thanks

to motor boats and refrigeration technology. Increased production in

rice, however, failed to meet consumption demands with the results that

in 1972, the year of greatest expectations, South Vietnam continued to

rely on imports. (Chart 19) This did not make sense, however, because

estimates of actual production indicated at least a level of self-sufficiency. Most province chiefs did testify in effect that there were

no rice shortages, except in the MR-1 provinces. The problem, therefore,

seemed to involve speculation by greedy Chinese businessmen in the

Mekong Delta and purchases made by the Viet Cong who always offered to

buy at high prices. A belated effort made by GVN authorities in 1974

to control the traffic in rice failed to produce any significant results.

The rice problem seemed beyond the GVN capability to solve, this hurt

its efforts at rebuilding the national economy and achieving real progress

in pacification.

129
Chart 19 — Rice Production and Supplementary Crops

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BANANAS: 15,500 HECTARES

SUGAR CANE: 32,000 HECTARES

CORN: 28,000 HECTARES

MIRACLE RICE: UP TO 850,000 HECTARES

SUPPLEMENTARY CROPS

130
For all its efforts, the GVN was still a long way from solving

the social and economic problems that plagued South Vietnam, especially

in the context of a war in which the enemy always held the initiative

and had the capability to wreck any achievements any time he chose.

This happened in 1968 and again in 1972 when a few months of attacks

undid years of hard toil. Unless South Vietnam was free from North

Vietnam's military threat, pacification or any nation-building task

remained a hopeless proposition.

131
CHAPTER VII

The GVN Political, Information and Chieu Hoi Efforts

Information and Propaganda

Information and propaganda were designed to exert a favorable influence on the population by publicizing the government policies and

programs and eliciting popular trust and support for them. When employed

properly, they were sharp-edged tools for the advancement of political

and military goals, shattered the enemy's morale, made him feel disenchanted, and incited him to rally.

As they were practiced in South Vietnam, all information and propaganda activities were conducted and coordinated by the GVN Ministry of

Information through a system that reached down to the village level.

At the province level, there was an information service; at the district

level, an information section; and in villages, an information hall.

Prior to 1965, the GVN information and propaganda facilities were scant.

In each district town there was only a tiny information hall adorned with

outdated pictures and magazines. Information personnel were few because

the entire GVN information service was organized as a general directorate,

and not as a ministry as it was later under the Second Republic.

After the active participation of US forces in the Vietnam War,

however, the GVN information service expanded substantially due to the

considerable assistance and support provided by such US agencies as the

United States Operations Mission (USOM), United States Information Service

(USIS), and Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). Each province information service was provided with movie projectors, a film library, and

a mobile projection unit using Lambretta van-scooters as vehicles for

shows in villages and hamlets. The rural population was given the opportunity to watch film shows at least once a month, a kind of entertainment

132
unavailable to most of them before then. USOM and USIS also provided

funds and information equipment for all provinces and even district

information halls were supplied with domestic and foreign newspapers

and pictures. The GVN Information Ministry, with the support of JUSPAO,

purchased nineteen out of twenty-four daily newspapers published in

Saigon and distributed them to village information halls.

Additional radio stations were built in major cities and, to expand

radio broadcasts into rural areas, a total of 100,000 JUSPAO-supplied

transistorized radios were distributed free to peasant families living

in villages and hamlets. In addition, the GVN also imported great

quantities of inexpensive radio receivers so that the population could

afford to buy them. The voice of the GVN could thus reach the majority

of the population across the country. Even in the central highlands, a

radio transmitting station was built to broadcast programs in several

Montagnard languages. Twelve radio stations eventually operated across

the nation. In outlying areas not covered by the GVN information service,

aircraft were used, again with US support, to drop leaflets or to broadcast messages. These psychological operations were designed both to

inform the population and to call upon enemy cadre to surrender or rally.

South Vietnam did not have a TV broadcasting station until 1966.

At first, JUSPAO made TV broadcasts through an airborne transmitting

station. A TV studio and broadcast station were subsequently built in

Saigon and GVN information personnel were trained by JUSPAO in the

operation of the station and the production of TV programs. The TV network was later expanded through additional transmitting and relay

stations at Hue, Can Tho and Nha Trang.

Aided by the US, the GVN was in command of a vast array of information and propaganda instruments which were more numerous and sophisticated

than those that the enemy possessed. The problem was that the information

cadre did not properly exploit these instruments to produce the desired

effect. Despite his meager resources, the enemy appeared to get more

results out of his propaganda efforts. It seemed that the enemy knew

how to make better use of his propaganda means and, by properly exploiting mass psychology, he was also able to arouse popular sympathy more

successfully.

133
For a short period following the Paris Agreement, some progress was

achieved by the GVN in information and propaganda. It purposefully

built up and exploited the people's hatred toward the Communists. For

the first time a genuine effort was made to put the arts and literature

at the service of propaganda. Songs and plays, for example, no longer

displayed languid lyricism as in the old days. But the most extensively

read news mediums in the country, the daily newspapers, were left unexploited for propaganda purposes. The majority of them were owned and

operated by private entrepreneurs who were more concerned about commercial success than the anti-Communist cause. The GVN was unable to exert

any influence on the daily newspapers, except for the ARVN-owned "Tien

Tuyen" (Front Line). Despite several stringent measures that the GVN

imposed on the free press such as censure, temporary suspension, fines,

revocation of license and legal prosecution, they were all ineffective

in rallying the press to the national cause.

The Chieu Eoi (Open Arms) Program

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms), or Great National Solidarity program was

initiated by the GVN to subvert the morale of enemy cadre and troops

and call upon them to leave their ranks and rally to the national cause.

The basic theme was that both sides were brothers in the same family and,

since both wanted to end the war, the best and least costly way was to

renounce internecine bloodletting, forsake hatred, and cooperate with

each other to rebuild the shattered nation.

During a decade of implementation, from 1963 to 1973, the Chieu Hoi

program produced impressive results; 159,741 enemy troops and cadre

rallied to the GVN cause. Most notorious among the ralliers were some

high-ranking military cadre such as Tarn Ha, Huynh Cu, and Le Xuan Chuyen,

who returned to the GVN side well before the cease fire period, and the

This total breaks down into: 97,696 military cadre and troops;

45,173 political cadre and 16,872 others. These ralliers also surrendered

10,699 individual weapons and 545 crew-served weapons to GVN authorities.

134
political commissar of Lam Dong province and the personal secretary to

the Saigon-Cholon political commissar, both of whom rallied during the

post-cease fire period. The number of ralliers reached an all-time high

during 1969 when 47,087 enemy cadre and troops chose to side with the

GVN, apparently as a result of Communist setbacks during the previous

year.

The Chieu Hoi Ministry controlled a country-wide organization which

consisted of Chieu Hoi services and centers in the provinces, Chieu Hoi

sections at the district level, and Chieu Hoi offices at the village

level. Enemy ralliers were grouped at provincial Chieu Hoi centers or

at centers in Saigon where they underwent reeducation and readjustment

to a free and decent life.

During the period of reeducation and readjustment, ralliers were

well fed and well treated. They were allowed to correspond with their

families and receive visits. They were never roughly treated or compelled

to do hard labor as in enemy-run so-called "reeducation centers". While

living in a Chieu Hoi center, ralliers were free to converse, watch TV,

listen to radio broadcasts, read books, or just relax. Depending on

personal desires, ralliers were given vocational training in such courses

as tailoring, embroidering, handicraft, etc. The GVN policy was to help

each of them acquire a skill to earn a living when he was returned to

normal life. The reeducation period usually lasted from 45 to 60 days,

and upon release from Chieu Hoi centers, ralliers were permitted,

depending on their readjustment and repentance, to apply for public

service jobs, enlist in the armed forces, or seek jobs in private industries. Those who wanted to return to their home villages and live a

quiet, honest life, were given transportation allowances.

Another GVN effort to win over ralliers completely —politically

and psychologically — and also to make the Chieu Hoi effort more meaningful, was to provide the -ralliers with housing facilities once they

were released from reeducation centers. The GVN constructed a total of

42 Chieu Hoi villages, one for each province, consisting of housing units

which were allocated free of charge to ralliers. This was a most welcomed program which really helped the ralliers begin a new life without

hardship.

135
In general, ralliers were more extensively employed by U.S. forces

and U.S. Embassy agencies than the GVN. In MR-1, for example, U.S.

Marine units used ralliers as informants, interrogators or scouts during

operations, especially when U.S. units staged raids against Communist

bases. Because of their intimate knowledge of local terrain, ralliers

were very effective as scouts.

In addition, ralliers were also used in intelligence work against

the VCI by U.S. Embassy agencies. Ralliers made up the bulk of Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), a para-military force organized, armed

and financed by the U.S. Embassy. Later, the PRUs were placed under

the control of provincial police chiefs as a striking force for the

elimination of the VCI. This was done after the National Police was

made responsible for the implementation of the Phoenix program in 1968.

Out of the total ralliers who volunteered for GVN service as of

October 1970, it was calculated that 27.1 percent were employed in civil

servant positions in the GVN or served in regular, territorial, and

para-military forces and in national cadre teams such as RD, armed propaganda and PRUs. Another 20.5 percent was employed by private industries

or businesses and the remaining returned to their home villages and lived

as farmers after being gxven tilling land by the GVN, like other citizens.

All told, the Chieu Hoi program was a meaningful and humanitarian

effort which provided real opportunities for wrongdoers to mend their

ways and begin a new life. The large number of enemy personnel who chose

freedom gave some measure of the effect of the program. The figures

differed from year to year; the higher figures were recorded when the

fighting was more intense. Ralliers generally helped our side know

more about the true situation on the other side, and they sometimes provided invaluable intelligence. It was learned from their stories that

by and large, Communist morale was low and the troops were confused.

Because of protracted fighting, most of them became disenchanted with

the war and longed for reunion with their families. Other ralliers told

of the lack of medical treatment and medicine, spartan living conditions,

unbearable hardships and human losses that sometimes edged entire enemy

units toward despair and to defection attempts. Had it not been for

136
fears of retaliation against their relatives, several complete enemy

units would have chosen to defect after their 1968 defeat.

Because of the potential of the Chieu Hoi program, the enemy made

efforts to counter it. Communist political commissars, for example, told

their troops that ralliers were all killed by the GVN.

For all its merits, the Chieu Hoi program had some shortcomings.

For one thing, the GVN placed no control over those ralliers who had been

released to return to their home villages. The local governments also

failed to keep track of the former ralliers. As a result, there occurred

several cases of false rallying. Upon release, they conducted subversive

activities for awhile and then returned to their base areas. The allocation of free housing for ralliers also caused great animosity and jealousy

among ARVN troops and veterans, many of whom were disabled. The disabled

veterans' grievances soon gave rise to unlawful acts of house squatting

in open defiance of the GVN. They felt that as soldiers who had risked

their lives to fight the Communists, and had become casualties as a

result, they were not treated as well as the ralliers who only recently

had shot at them.

The GVN had pushed the program too far without due consideration for

the sensitivities and welfare of war veterans. In a program such as Chieu

Hoi, the pros and cons of certain benefits should have been carefully

weighed in the context of a war-ravaged society and sounder priorities

should have been established. Despite this, however, the Chieu Hoi program was one of the most effective and least costly ways of

ending the war. After all, the cost of killing an enemy soldier was much

greater than the amount spent to induce him to rally.

Relations with Ethnic Minorities

The Central Highlands of South Vietnam occupied an important strategic position in view of its continuity with Laos, Cambodia, and especially with the enemy North-South infiltration and supply corridor, which

ran along the entire length of South Vietnam's western border. The area

was sparsely populated, mostly inhabited by Montagnards who numbered

137
nearly 1 million and consisted of 29 different tribal groups, each having

2

its own language and customs. These tribal groups usually lived in isolation from the Vietnamese and were generally oblivious to the fact that

there existed a GVN and national laws.

Under the Bao Dai government, the central highlands were decreed a

"territory of the Imperial Court", a kind of government reservation where

homesteaders had to secure a special permit. During the first Indochina

War, from 1949 to 1954, the French paid special attention to the central

highlands, where they set up a separate administrative apparatus. The

Viet Minh were equally interested in the area and made a special effort

to win over the Montagnards to their cause. Some Viet Minh underground

cadre even went as far as filing their front teeth and stretching their

ears to make them look like Montagnards. Some Viet Minh lived with the

Montagnard tribes and some married Montagnard girls and were accepted as

tribe members. After the French withdrew from Indochina in 1956, the

central highlands were virtually forsaken by the GVN.

Beginning in 1961, the GVN took renewed interest in the highlands

and sought to rally the ethnic minorities by making certain overtures

such as forbidding the use of the derogatory appellation Moi (savage)

by Vietnamese and encouraging the use of the newly-coined substitute

"new Vietnamese compatriot" when referring to Montagnards. In addition,

a special education program was initiated which encouraged them to learn

Vietnamese and granted special credits and waivers in all kinds of examinations. Finally, special tribunals were established to provide Montagnards with a fair trial process, based not on Vietnamese laws but on

each tribe's customs and manners.

At the same time, with the concurrence of the GVN, the U.S. Special

Forces began to make inroads into the highlands. They initiated civic

action programs such as dispensary service and the distribution of medicine with the purpose of rallying their support. The Special Forces'

2

Among these tribal groups, the Rhade were relatively more numerous

and more civilized. Some Rhade tribesmen had enlisted in French Union

forces.

138
objective was to shake off the lingering influence of the French and Viet

Minn among the Montagnards and turn them into guerrilla fighters, gradually organizing and arming tribal villages for self defense. The first

of such self-defense villages was Enao in Ban Me Thuot province. Despite

these efforts, the Montagnards were still heavily influenced by the

French and especially by the Viet Minh-instilled idea of an autonomous

state which would replace GVN authority and prohibit Vietnamese homesteaders among them. These feelings were fomented by Montagnards who

made up the FULRO (Unified Front of Struggle for the Oppressed Races)

movement and erupted into open rebellion in 1964 in Ban Me Thuot. The

FULRO, masquerading as representative of all tribal groups, demanded an

autonomous state in the central highlands and equal rights with the

Vietnamese. Some Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), trained by

U.S. Special Forces and led by ARVN officers, joined the rebellion on 20

September 1964, killed their commanders, and took hostages to press for '

their demands.

The rebellion was finally quelled but this was a sobering experience

for the GVN. To deal with the Montagnards' grievances the GVN initiated

a systematic effort designed to improve their political and social standing, beginning in 1965 under the Nguyen Cao Ky administration. The

government created a Ministry of Ethnic Minorities, headed by a Montagnard, whose responsibility was to look after all problems concerning the

development of tribal groups. Provinces of the central highlands, such

as Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku and Kontum were placed under the control of Montagnard province chiefs; the departmental services in these provinces

were also headed by Montagnards. In the ARVN and territorial forces,

Montagnards were also promoted to field-grade officers and given commands

or responsible positions. Elected officials in village, city councils,

and in the Senate and the Lower House also included Montagnards.

Montagnards were given certain privileges such as a specially designed education program, compensatory grades in examinations, and an

increase in draft age so that they could compete in fairness with Vietnamese and pursue their education without interference. A special training program for Montagnard teachers was conducted by the Ministry of

Education to supply adequate teachers for tribal villages.

139
In public health, emphasis was placed by the GVN on teaching

Montagnards body hygiene, public hygiene, house sanitation, and child

care and upbringing. To further Montagnard education and to broaden

Montagnard knowledge of domestic affairs, the GVN constructed local

radio stations in the central highlands that broadcasted in Montagnard

languages. Information cadre employed by the GVN in the area were all

Montagnards. Efforts were also made to publish propaganda pamphlets

and other education and information materials in Montagnards languages.

To operate the pacification program in the central highlands, the

GVN created Montagnard RD cadre groups whose members were trained in a

special RD training center in Pleiku, the Truong Son Training Center,

which was established in early 1967 as a Montagnard counterpart to the

RD Training Center for Vietnamese at Vung Tau. Developmental programs

were also undertaken by the GVN for the benefit of Montagnards without

any hint of racial discrimination. Montagnards were taught new methods

of farming to replace their old slash-and-burn technique, and were

given modern agriculture equipment. At the same time, crop lands reserved for Montagnards were greatly expanded and the conservation of

forest and forest resources were emphasized. In addition, Montagnards

were encouraged to grow fruit plants such as bananas, oranges, and

prunes, to plant tea, coffee and corn, to build reservoirs for irrigation,

and to construct fish ponds.

In general, the GVN strove to improve the Montagnards' lot through

the pacification program. But the rate of progress in the highlands was

somehow slower than elsewhere, perhaps because they were still suspicious

of the GVN goodwill, and probably because the Montagnards were chary

of a newly transplanted culture which was not at all like their way of

life.

Land Reform and The "Land-To-The-Tiller" Program

To the Communists and the GVN alike, the rural area was of strategic

importance and both admitted this fact. The majority of the rural population were peasants who as a class could be rallied to any worthy cause

140
if properly motivated. One of the best incentives for their motivation

was land ownership since for generations the Vietnamese peasants who eked

out a meager living from the land were mostly landless farm workers or

sharecroppers. At the root of the conflict, there were also problems of

social injustice, oppressive landlords, and the class struggle which

could all be attributable to the inequality between the haves and the

have nots.

Land reform became a conscious effort undertaken with variable

degrees of success by successive governments of South Vietnam which felt

they had to beat the Communists at their own game. For, to both sides,

land reform was the indispensable tool to bring about social justice and

a better life.

Under the Bao Dai regime, land reform was initiated through the

distribution of public land to peasants, and by a reduction of land rents

whereby no more than 15% of crop returns were allowed to be levied by

land owners. In addition, no farmer was authorized to own more than

100 hectares of farmland. The maximum amount of farmland then authorized

each owner varied according to the region and his capabilities for production. In North Vietnam, the range was from 12 to 36 hectares per

head of household; in Central Vietnam, from 15 to 45 hectares; and in

South Vietnam (old Cochin-China), from 30 to 100 hectares.

The First Republic of Vietnam aiso decreed, by an ordinance in 1957,

that no landowner was allowed to keep more than 100 hectares for his own

farming effort. All farmlands in excess of this maximum allowance were

confiscated and reimbursed by the government. Reimbursements were made

by a 10% cash advance, the rest to be paid back in 12 years at an annual

interest rate of 3%. The GVN was able to purchase, both from departing

Frenchmen and from Vietnamese landowners, 450,000 hectares, but only

122,000 hectares had been redistributed by the time President Diem was

overthrown. Special measures were taken by the government to help farmers

struck by natural disasters.

The Viet Minn also undertook a land reform program in North Vietnam

after 1954, but their goal was entirely different from what South Vietnam

tried to achieve. The Viet Minh began the program with a campaign of

141
inciting the hatred and enmity of landless peasants toward landowners.

The Viet Minn coaxed the peasants to denounce crimes committed by landowners such as their enriching themselves by the peasant's blood and

sweat and levying excessive land rents. It was true that in some areas,

landowners in North Vietnam took away from the sharecroppers from 34 to

50% of the crop returns and charged interest rates ranging from 57 to

73% on credits extended for farming. As a result, this land reform

program turned into a class struggle movement in which, after being

denounced and indicted by their former sharecroppers and summarily tried

by a people's court, landowners were stripped of all their possessions.

The land.thus confiscated was distributed to the landless peasants who

had worked for the revolutionary government and to disabled veterans.

The true goal of the Communists was obvious enough. Their land reform

was nothing but a way of eliminating the landowner and petite bourgeoise

class and reinforcing what they called the proletariat and peasant class,

and equalizing all differences between these two classes.

Under the Second Republic of Vietnam, there were also attempts at

land reform during the initial years, but not until 1970 were there any

significant and purposeful efforts. Land reform was undertaken on a

scale extensive enough to take on a revolutionary outlook through the

issuance of Presidential Decree No. 3/70 which authorized all peasants

to become small landowners. Each peasant was allocated a fair amount

of land for farming purposes entirely free of charge. The decree also

officially terminated the practice of land rent and determined that the

farmer was entitled to all the fruits of his labor and in fact owned

the piece of land he actually tilled.

Due to the political significance of the "Land-to-the-Tiller"

program, the date of the Presidential Decree that initiated it — 26

March 1970 — was proclaimed as a national holiday. For the rural population, this was truly the greatest and most total revolution ever attempted. For the firs.t time in generations the peasants' aspirations

had been realized and this was indeed the boldest move that any government had ever made in South Vietnam.

142
During 1970 a total of 210,371 hectares of land was distributed,

a figure that surpassed the planned objective by 5%. By April 1973,

the amount of land which had been planned for free distribution to landless farmers during the period from 1970 to 1973, had all been allocated,

a total of one million hectares or 2.47 million acres.

3

The rapid pro- '

gress of the program was made possible by the substantial assistance

provided by the U.S. in terms of experts, automatic data processing

facilities, land surveying aircraft and the enormous fund of 500 million

dollars which had been earmarked for the entire program.

In addition to free distribution of land, the GVN also established

the Rural Development Bank (RDB) to extend credit to farmers. By the

end of 1970, a total of 22 branch offices of the RDB had been established

across the country; the goal was to establish 42 of them, one for each

province. Total credit extended to farmers by the end of 1970 reached

VN.$3.6 billion out of $5.7 billion earmarked.

Other agricultural development projects were also undertaken such

as modernization of farm equipment and machinery, the digging of new

canals and the cleaning of ditches, irrigation, use of herbicides, insecticides, and fertilizers, import of better hybrid seeds of miracle

rice (which could yield up to three crops per year). All of these

projects had the devoted support of the U.S. In addition to agricultural

development, the GVN also sought to improve nutrition for the population

by importing cattle and poultry, increasing meat production and family

income by importing better farm animal feed.

The MLand-to-the-Tiller" program in time became one of the GVN's

major successes. Its achievements by far surpassed whatever previous

governments had obtained. Its success depended primarily on the large

assistance provided by the U.S. in terms of technology and the funds

required to reimburse former land proprietors and to purchase land and

farm machinery.

3

The basic allocation was three hectares per farmer.

143
Politically, the program was also a resounding success. It brought

about prosperity and a decent life for the great mass of the peasants,

eradicated injustice and created a new class of landowner-peasants.

Although the peasants appreciated land reform, the program met with some

adverse reactions on the part of urban people who thought that they had

been forsaken. It was true that urban areas also needed help since

inflation was rampant and unemployment was widespread. To solve these

problems, the GVN initiated programs to develop urban areas, clear

slums, and create jobs for slum-dwelling people.

The impact of the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program was profound and farreaching. Social justice was restored, the GVN prestige grew everyday, and it appeared that it was on the way to win the war. The enemy,

in the meantime, strove hard to wreck these achievements. By devious

means, he incited the people to oppose and undermine the program; for

example, he forbade them to pay back loans owed the GVN, sabotaged the

machinery imported for the farmers, stole farm machines, or took them

away from farmers for ransom.

Village and Eamlet Elections

Traditionally the village is the basic political, social and

economical unit of Vietnam. It has its own territorial boundary, a

population and its own resources, and usually enjoys administrative

autonomy. In the old days, the village was a self-contained microcosm

with its own government and laws, and the village chief was not unlike

a lord who reigned over his tiny kingdom. In most instances, the village customs prevailed over the laws decreed by the imperial court.and

the village was governed by a council of notables which made all the

important decisions for the village chief. This system was perpetuated

over the generations and, with some modification in organization and

name, became what it was in modern times, the village council, with the

exception that its members in modern times were chosen through the

popular vote.

144
Village elections were an effort by the GVN to develop democracy

at the grass-roots level and at the same time to expand GVN control and

authority throughout the nation. In contrast to traditional times,

members of the village council were now elected instead of being appointed. This ensured that only people with prestige and popularity

could hold office, in the place of the rich people who traditionally

bought their way into office and exclusively shared among themselves

the prerogatives of power.

As an administrative unit, the village incorporated several hamlets.

Hamlets were geographic subdivisions of a village and placed under its

administration. Throughout South Vietnam, there were 2,151 villages

with a total of 10,522 hamlets.

The village government consisted of two bodies, the Village

People's Council (VPC), and the Village Administrative Committee (VAC),

which represented the legislative and executive branches, respectively.

In 1966, a GVN decree determined that the Village People's Council was

composed of from six to 12 members elected by the village through

universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. This represented a big

step toward democracy at the grass-roots level as compared to village

elections enacted under the First Republic, since the 1966 decree

instituted a legislative body which had been missing up until then.

During the balloting, the member who won the largest number of

votes became the chairman of the VPC and the member who ranked second

in popular votes, the deputy chairman. After election, the Village

People's Council convened its first session to elect the chairman of

the Village Administrative Committee from among its members.

4

The specific number of village council members to be elected was

determined by the province chief on the basis of village population:

Up to 2,000 inhabitants: 6 members

From 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants: 8 members

From 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants: 10 members

Above 10,000 inhabitants: 12 members

(Reference: Decree No. 199-SL/DUHC, dated 24 December 1966)

145
The Village Administrative Committee was composed of one village

chief, one deputy village chief, and from one to four commissioners to

perform the functions of security, propaganda and civic action, social

welfare and agriculture. The other two important functions, civil

status and economy-finance were assumed by the village chief and his

deputy, respectively. (Chart 20)

The village chief or chairman of the VAC was elected by the

village council from among its members, but he was not authorized to

assume concurrently the functions of chairman, deputy chairman or

secretary general of the village council. If the chairman of the village council happened to be elected village chief, the deputy chairman,

VPC would take over his functions. The term of office of the VAC was

three years. It terminated at the same time as the village council.

The deputy village chief and commissioners were appointed by the village chief with the concurrence of the village council and the ratification of the province chief or district chief.

The village chief was responsible for enforcing laws and regulations, implementing GVN policies, and maintaining order and security

in the village. His commissioner for security was usually the leader

of the popular forces platoon assigned to protect the village.

The hamlet was placed under the administration of a Hamlet Management Committee which was composed of one hamlet chief and two assistants, one for security, one for propaganda and civic action. In

hamlets with a population exceeding 3,000, the hamlet chief was assisted by a deputy. Both the hamlet chief and his deputy were elected

by hamlet people through secret ballot in the same way as the village

council.

People running for public office at the village and hamlet level

were usually selected from among the anti-Communists who had good

records, and frequently included veterans or retired civil servants.

Any village resident could apply to run for office. His application

was submitted to the district, and if his police record was clean, the

application was forwarded to the province. There, the province election

committee which included members of the security committee would screen

146
Chart 20 - Organization, Village and Hamlet Government

Village

People's Council

Village

Administrative Committee

Village Chief

Deputy

(aiso Commissioner for

Civil Status Affairs)

(also Commissioner for

Economy and Finance)

Propaganda

and

Civic Action

Security Social

Welfare

Agricultural

Affairs

Hamlet

Management Committee

Hamlet Chief

Deputy

Security Propaganda and

Civic Action

147
all applications, and make its recommendation to the province chief.

Again, if the applicant's record was clean, he could be placed on the

ballot. In practice, the province election committee exercised control

over who would run for office at the local level. After the first

term, village and hamlet officials might be reelected several times.

With a view to improving the effectiveness of the local government apparatus, the GVN conducted training courses for village and hamlet officials at the National Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau. The purpose

was to consolidate the village and hamlet officials' anti-Communist

spirit and train them in administrative procedures so that they could

serve the people more efficiently. This was also in keeping with the

pacification long-range goals that the GVN had set to achieve: selfdefense, self-management, and self-sufficiency. Since only a solid

infrastructure could bring about the conditions for achieving these

national goals, efforts focused on the village and hamlet officials

who operated and maintained that infrastruetural foundation.

Elections at the village and hamlet level were a political innovation which attempted to institute democracy in a rural society

still heavily influenced by traditions. Held within the context of

a raging war, these elections met with some serious difficulties. In

many villages there were very few youths left and the majority of

their population consisted of elderly people, women and children. As

a result, the GVN had to bring in people from other localities and

even allowed servicemen on active duty to run for office. When elected,

these officials could not function effectively, partly because they

were strangers, and partly because the village population would not

work with those they did not feel were their own people. Thus, despite

their devotedness and hard work, such officials could achieve very

little because they did not enjoy trust and support of the villagers.

Despite difficulties, village and hamlet elections proceeded with

remarkably good results, due to improved security. By 1971, out of a

total of 2,151 villages, 2,053 or 95.5% had elected village councils.

(Chart 21)

148
Chart 21 - Village and Hamlet Elections, 1970

2,053 VILLAGES

2,151 VILLAGES

9,985 HAMLETS

10,522 HAMLETS

VILLAGE OFFICIALS ELECTED

17,305

18,109 95%

HAMLET OFFICIALS ELECTED

47,296

~^T7X-=89% 52,610

149
In 1972, however, the village and hamlet elections program had to

be suspended in the wake of the Communist Easter offensive because of

deteriorating security.

In addition to elections and training of village officials, the

GVN still wanted to move toward total democratization by reforming the

old administrative apparatus. The first step toward complete reform

was the decentralization of authority. Province and district chiefs

were empowered, for example, to solve all problems concerning the local

population's aspirations; the central government would not meddle into

local affairs. The GVN encouraged village and hamlet inhabitants to

participate in various groups and organizations that served their interests such as farmer's associations, 4T clubs, etc. All these groups

and associations were designed to foster a mutual assistance spirit

among the population and to provide them with needed help in case of

illness or disease.

People's Self-defense Forces

The People's Self-Defense Forces (PSDF) was not a political or

military organization or an affiliate of some religion, but a people's

organization. With government assistance in armament and training,

its members were supposed to defend themselves, their families, and

their property against the Communists.

The need for a PSDF organization arose in the wake of the enemy

1968 Tet offensive as a result of the spontaneous demand from the people.

The attacks waged by the Communists during 1968 completely alienated

the people who had incurred heavy losses, not so much because of the

fighting but because of Communist atrocities. Several thousands of

Vietnamese, among them Catholic refugees from North Vietnam, asked the

GVN to give them arms so that they could defend themselves and their

communities. In response to this popular demand, the GVN initiated the

People's Self-Defense program, which was established by the Mobilization

Law of June 1968. The basic objectives of the PSDF program were to

provide the people with the means to defend their families, homes, and

150
hamlets or villages in both rural and urban areas; to assist the

National Police and RVNAF in maintaining security and order; to promote

community development activities for self-help and improvement in both

rural and urban areas, and to assist the police in identifying the enemy.

A National People's Self-Defense Committee, chaired by the Prime

Minister, served as a policy-making body under the operational control

of the Central Pacification and Development Council. The implementation

and operation of the PSD program was the responsibility of the PSDF

Directorate under the Ministry of Interior. The PSDF director's duties

included the detailed direction of the PSDF program, and guidance to

the subordinate echelons on PSDF matters.

At each lower echelon of the administration, save for the corps

tactical zone level, a PSDF committee administered and supervised the

program. Thus there were PSDF committees at provinces, in Saigon and

other autonomous cities, at districts (or precincts), and at village

(wards or quarters) and hamlets. (Chart 22)

Under the Mobilization Law, all able-bodied men in the age groups

of 16-17 and 39-50, except those joining the RVNAF on a voluntary basis,

and males between 18 arid 38 (draft age) deferred from military service

were required to be members of the PSDF; Veterans who had served full

terms of military service, elderly people, and women who were not physically capable to serve as combat PSDF could join support groups.

Combat PSDF were organized into groups with an authorized strength

of 134 and consisted of three inter-teams of 44 members each. Each

inter-teams was further broken down into three 14-member teams. A

team was composed of a team leader, an assistant leader, three cells of

three male members each and one cell of three female members. In case

there were no woman volunteers as combat members, the strength of a

group was reduced to 107. (Chart 23)

The positions of PSDF commanders at the capital, provinces, cities,

and districts were assumed by the deputy mayor, deputy province chiefs,

deputy mayors and deputy district chiefs, respectively. These officials

served as the formal heads of PSDF in their areas but were not expected

to exercise tactical control since PSDF were not designed to fight

151
Chart 22 - Organization, PSDF

National PSDF

Committee

PSDF Directorate

Ministry

of Interior

Prowince

PSDF Committee

Saigon

PSDF Committee

Municipal

PSDF Committee

District

PSDF Committee

District

PSDF Committee

District

PSDF Committee

Village

PSDF Committee

Ward

PSDF Committee

Quarter

PSDF Committee

Hamlet

PSDF Committee

Neighborhood

Committee

Neighborhood

Committee

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large-scale operations. Combat group, inter-team and team leaders

were all elected by PSDF members themselves.

By the end of 1970, the PSDF had grown into a sizable force which

included a total of 1,397,000 combat members out of 1,500,000 planned

and 2,400,156 support members out of a planned 2.5 million. Combat

PSDF members were armed with 463,752 individual weapons of assorted

types. Across the country, 95% of villages and hamlets had their own

PSDF organizations by this time.

People's Self-Defense Forces were employed primarily in villages,

hamlets and urban and suburban neighborhoods against local enemy guerrillas. They generally operated in 3-man cells out of a fixed command

post but frequently changed their guard stations, particularly at night.

The village chief was responsible for the employment of PSDF. His commissioner for security, usually a PF platoon leader, assisted him in

planning and controlling the deployment of PSDF for the village defense.

The PF platoon was usually used as a reaction or back up force, sup- .

porting the PSDF by patrol and ambush activities outside the village.

In city wards and neighborhoods, PSDF cooperated with the National

Police in maintaining law and order, fighting crimes and social vices,

and guarding against enemy sabotage or propaganda activities. Combat

PSDF were supported by support elements who provided such assistance as

first aid, medical evacuation, supply, morale, and comfort.

At this early stage of organization the PSDF were plagued by

several problems, particularly an acute shortage of able leaders. In

several instances,PSDF group leaders turned out to be draft dodgers and

it became difficult to apprehend them for military service without

undermining the PSDF program. The problem was obviously sensitive and

was not solved despite joint efforts by the Directorate of Manpower

and the PSDF Directorate.

In addition, although self-defense duties were a civil obligation,

in big cities many residents sought to avoid PSDF guard duties by hiring

other people as replacements. This practice was widespread among the

rich and the influential people, particularly among wealthy Chinesebusinessmen. The result was that many PSDF members turned into

154
"professional" men for hire, whose sole occupation was to take up

permanent guard duties for a fee.

The PSDF were regarded as a handy source of weapons by the enemy

and he focused on proselyting or intimidating PSDF members. Many weapons

were thus lost to the enemy but the number of weapons captured from him

and lost to him by PSDF members about cancelled out each other. The

loss of weapons to the enemy through PSDF turncoats was particularly

serious in the Mekong Delta. Therefore plans were made by the JGS at

one time -to employ NCOs on active duty or those approaching retirement

age as PSDF group leaders in their home towns or villages. The PSDF

could have turned into a most effective defense force if properly commanded and led.

An Evaluation

The GVN efforts at instituting grass-roots democracy, informing

and educating the people, winning over their support, rallying the

enemy's infrastructure members, and bringing about social and racial

justice achieved only mild, superficial successes, except in the

case of the "Land-To-The-Tiller" program. The truth seemed to indicate

that the political achievements of a regime could never be better than

the regime itself which was built on personal loyalties rather than

popular consent. The "soloist performance" during the presidential

elections in 1971 reflected the true light of a democracy which existed

only for form's sake. Many knowledgeable Vietnamese believed that as

a nation, South Vietnam failed because of bad political leadership.

Through the balloting process, the GVN attempted to institute

democracy at the village and hamlet level. The quantitative results

obtained by 1971 were impressive but failed to convey a true picture

of real political life. The first truth was that the Vietnamese villages could do without elections if people were allowed to manage their

own affairs without interference from the central government. For

generations, the traditional Vietnamese village had been the most

democratic institution even under the most despotic monarchies.

155
Villagers used to manage their own affairs through a council of respected

elders and notables. Village customs defied and always won over the

monarch' laws and the mandarins' authority. And French colonial rule

never affected nor dared touch the autonomous microcosm of the village.

But things began to deteriorate when the village chief was appointed,

not by the council of notables who were installed by popular invitation,

but by executive orders back in 1955; hence, the need for elections to

re-institute a lost popular way of managing village affairs.

But the new generation of elected village councilmen seemed not

to enjoy popularity nor command respect among villagers. Many of them

were young people, introduced and backed by the district government, and

some were not even villagers. The electoral process thus degenerated

into some sort of wholesale appointment under the cover of ballots. As

a result, most village councilmen behaved in a subservient way as if

they were the province chief's appointees, not the people's representatives. They operated under pressure and direction of the provincial

government, always mindful that the province chief was empowered by

law to remove any of them from office any time he found a convenient

pretext for it. The remarkable thing about it all was that elections

were held only where GVN control was tight to give the provincial government effective leverage over village councils. And when this control

was in jeopardy such as in the aftermath of the 1972 Easter offensive,

the opportunity to stop the elective process altogether was too good to

pass over.

Information as a national activity was for some time paired off

with the Chieu Hoi effort. It was hoped in effect that through effective, straightforward information, the people would become more aware

of the GVN achievements, of the free and prosperous way of life under

the RVN regimen as contrasted to coercive and spartan life with the

.Communists and that enlightened elements of the other side would be

attracted by it and come over. This policy worked but the results

were modest. Somehow, the GVN information effort, to include clumsy

attempts at propagandizing, never seemed effective enough despite

advanced techniques and large budgetary outlays. The reason seemed to

156
-derive partly from the blase mood of the educated public, partly from

the fact that the GVN had very little to show for its political cause.

To the rural population, occasional movie shows, propaganda leaflets,

and outdated newspapers were just curious things that seemed far removed

from reality. The case of the neglected hamlet information hall spoke

eloquently, for the GVN always measured success in information in terms

of misleading statistics, never in terms of popular responsiveness.

This perhaps accounted for the modest results achieved through the

Chieu Hoi program. While the statistics appeared impressive — the

number of ralliers was always on the rise -— a closer look usually

revealed that almost all returnees were low level military and cadre or

even stray people who chose to rally to stay away from war hazards, for

family reasons or for a chance to earn a living and seldom because they

were ideologically convinced by the GVN overtures. The most important

catches merely totaled a few relatively high-ranking cadre and most of

them defected in the wake of the 1968 Communist military fiasco. The

reason? They simply believed they could not win militarily.

For all its potential and merits, the Chieu Hoi effort may not

have been fully worth its cost and returns. For one thing, the GVN

was only half-hearted in employing ralliers for any useful purpose,

out of suspicion and fear of its inability to control. This was not

the case with US forces who employed the same people with remarkable

success. For another, the program was costly and caused frustration

among the troops who felt their lot was much worse than a rallier's.

As to the problem of ethnic minorities and the Montagnards in

particular, it was more of a political than a socio-racial issue. The

GVN became more alert to this issue after the FULRO-instilled rebellion

erupted in 1964. The rebel leader, Y Bham, demanded autonomous status

for the Montagnards, which practically amounted to political secession.

This was entirely unpalatable to the GVN and to the Vietnamese in

general. Racially, the Vietnamese always felt superior to the Montagnards whom they condescended to treat as equals only for political

purposes. But the integration process, like other socio-racial problems,

was slow and frustrating, for both sides. It might take generations

157
or it might perhaps remain a problem forever. But the GVN policy and

actions seemed to be consistent with the long-range goal of achieving

national unity.

One of the key pacification objectives for the GVN was to institute self-protection for the people, hence the creation of People's

Self-Defense Forces. This effort fell in line with the overall pacification strategy of employing different forces against different

levels of enemy organization. It was also the least expensive among

the military efforts. But the PSDF idea, like the RD cadre, was not

entirely a GVN invention. It was rather an imitation of Communist

people's war doctrine adapted to the RVN cause. Unfortunately, the

PSDF were neither as well disciplined nor as ideologically indoctrinated as the Communist militia. The initial gung-ho fervor gained in

1968 soon faded and gave way to a tedious routine in which stand-in

guard duties were sometimes performed for a fee. This happened mostly

in urban centers where wealthy people could afford hiring substitutes.

But in insecure hamlets and in certain areas under religious influence,

the PSDF performed much better and were rather well disciplined. In

both cases, they appeared to be genuinely motivated by the need to

protect their communities. The pattern seemed to indicate that voluntary work succeeded only where motivation and self-interest came into

play. In general, the PSDF were plagued by several problems, the most

serious being the lack of direction and supervision. If well motivated

and under good control, the PSDF could have been a formidable force

to contend with.

Among the pacification achievements, only the "Land-To-The-Tiller"

program stood out as a resounding success which might portend considerable political gains in the long range. It might eventually become

the model for social justice in backward agrarian countries if sustained

and capped by a more popular political regime. In the case of Vietnam,

agrarian reform had always been a political instrument. The Viet Minh

did it in 1954 in North Vietnam to hasten the process of conversion to

socialism. Ngo Dinh Diem tried it to bolster his regime but his

half-hearted, small-scale program failed. The success achieved by the

158
Second Republic in 1970 was possible only because of the availability

of American financial and technical aid. It succeeded because it was

the right thing to do at the right moment. But while the peasantry

acclaimed it, it also turned a cool back on the regime that sponsored

it. Nevertheless, the program was a bold step in the right direction.

Its long-range impact, unfortunately, did not have the chance to

materialize.

The political experience gained through pacification thus seemed

to demonstrate that whatever instrument or ploy the GVN used to gain

popular consent and support only worked to the extent of credibility

and popularity of the regime. The results expected could in no way

be better than the regime itself. In fact, they mirrored accurately

the standing of the regime and its acceptance by the citizenship.

159
CHAPTER VIII

An Assessment of Pacification:

Some Achievements, Difficulties and Shortcomings

The Ideological Aspect of Pacification

The war in South Vietnam polarized Vietnamese into Communists and

anti-Communists and brought them onto a head-on collision course. Some

called this war an ideological conflict. This was true but only to

some extent because although opposed to Marx-Leninism, the nationalist

cause hardly showed a doctrinary cohesion worthy of being an ideological

rival. Several Vietnamese intellectuals, therefore, felt the need and

actually searched for a codified, political doctrine capable of providing ideological guidance and motivation to the nationalist cause. Ngo

Dinh Nhu for some time succeeded in selling this syncretistic version of

"personalism" from which he also derived certain cohesive concepts as

the doctrinal basis for his strategic hamlet program. Genuine as his

concern was, the complexity of his philosophy enlightened no one, much

less the peasantry, and served no useful purposes. Other efforts in

general never went beyond "tea room" chats or magazine articles. The

futility with which the search for an ideology met indicated that this

was perhaps a pseudo-problem, which interested only the educated elite

and that the peasantry, faced with the pressing and immediate questions

of livelihood and security, would benefit more from a pragmatic approach

to pacification and nation-building.

The conflict was also termed a civil war, which is probably more

appropriate, since the issues at stake had deep roots in the political,

social and economic fabric of Vietnam. The Communists, Viet Minh or

Viet Cong, were dedicated revolutionaries in the sense that they wanted

to destroy all traditional institutions and values and move toward disciplinarian and collectivized life under socialism. Those who opposed

160
them, by contrast, adhered to a liberal, humanistic way of life sustained

by cultural traditions and economic prosperity. Pacification, therefore,

provided the RVN with the opportunities to preserve and develop this way

of life which most Vietnamese, I believe, if given a free choice, would

certainly prefer over dehumanized, coercive collectivization.

It was in this direction that every GVN effort had moved, regardless

of the regime or the name assigned to it. The strategy of pacification

underwent very little change over the years. The Ngo Dinh Diem government was more ambitious in trying to make its strategic hamlet philosophy

a national doctrine but its Communist-inspired methods were harsh and

self-serving. The five-family group system, for example, despite its

purported goal of "mutual assistance" and protection against Communist

penetration, was a Machiavellian scheme, an instrument for control and

repression. The dominant role of the village youth leader, who was the

sole appointee among elected councilmen and directly responsive to Mr.

Nhu's Republican Youth, was another example of the control techniques

so common in authoritarian states. It was, in the end, the methods that

negated and defeated the doctrine which itself professed to be humanistic.

The next few military governments that succeeded Mr. Diem attempted

to improve on and revitalize the Strategic Hamlet program by adopting a

new attitude toward pacification, symbolized by a new name: New Life.

In essence, the effort amounted to pouring the same old wine into a new

bottle since the center of interest was still the hamlet. It was remarkable not in what it professed to do but in its efforts to avoid treading

the path of abuses and excesses that had led to Mr. Diem's demise. Hesitant and half-hearted, the New Life effort made no new inroads of any

significance.

Pacification was greatly aided by the CORDS arrangement which for

the first time provided cohesive support for the GVN effort under Nguyen

Cao Ky. Also, Ky attempted to cover pacification with an ideological

veneer. He professed that his government was-a "poor man's government"

and made use of revolutionary terminology to suit his good intent. He

called himself "Chairman of the Central Executive Committee" instead of

prime minister and addressed his cabinet ministers as "commissioners."

161
He even coined the term "Revolutionary Development" for the pacification

effort although in Vietnamese, it was never called that. The new pacification czar, Major General Nguyen Due Thang, was his trusted friend,

an energetic, hard-driving, gung-ho type of a leader. To boost the

image of a revolutionary working for the poor man's cause, Thang usually

donned the peasant's black calico pajama chosen as the uniform for his

RD cadre. He even appointed a former Viet Minh battalion commander,

Colonel Nguyen Be, as commandant of the RD Training Center at Vung Tau.

In all respects, Thang was the perfect match for his new US counterpart,

Ambassador Robert Komer, an equally positive leader and hard-driver. The

remarkable thing about it all was the charismatic effect of the new

momentum given to the pacification effort by the Thang-Komer duo. But

all these outward manifestations betrayed an obsessive preoccupation with

appearances which led to the tendency of substituting statistical results

for true achievements.

The only reliable parameter of pacification success was found in

the "hearts and minds" of the people, not in self-serving figures. A

million propaganda leaflets dropped did not even guarantee that a single

soul was won over. This showed to what extent statistical results, even

those backed up by the most advanced techniques, could be misleading.

Statistics Versus Achievements

If we believe official statistics, in 1963 more than ten million

South Vietnamese inhabitants were living in about 9,000 strategic hamlets and in urban centers. Given the total number of hamlets (11,864)

and the population at that time (14.4 million), GVN control was fairly

well established over approximately 70 percent of the nation. As far

as statistics went, that was an encouraging prospect and the Strategic

Hamlet program was anything but a failure. But a quick verification

undertaken in 1964 revealed that only 10 percent of these hamlets were

really defensible and the remaining were either indefensible or penetrated

by the VCI. The lesson here was well learned. It showed how unreliable

the reports were from province chiefs, on which these statistics were

based.

162
\

The scientific measurements used in the Hamlet Evaluation System,

however, increased the accuracy of reports and the validity of statistical

results. The system, however, had its shortcomings. Apart from the time

lag between information gathering and final reports, we were again confronted with the unreliability of the basic data fed by village and hamlet officials. As has been said, the district chief or his adviser had

no way of verifying the accuracy of these data unless he personally made

spot checks, which was something nearly impossible to do often enough

to meet requirements. Thus the final monthly report's reliability was

largely a matter of faith, a matter of whether or not we could trust the

hamlet officials, and to what extent.

The GVN pacification efforts were twofold: hamlet security and

hamlet development. These were measured by statistical results showing

the progress being made in each area. Security was measured in terms of

hamlets and population under GVN control, the amount of protection forces

available for their defense and the maintenance of law and order. Directly

linked with security was the viability of the VCI including guerrillas,

which could be evaluated by the number of its personnel being destroyed

or rallied to the GVN.

On the developmental side, statistics were used to measure progress

in such political, social and economic programs as village and hamlet

elections, land reform, health and education, refugee resettlement and

agricultural development. There were also incidental programs that

contributed indirectly toward the development task such as information,

cadre training, and public works, but they were rather the tools with

which the task was performed.

The lack of adequate data for the entire lifetime of the pacification program, particularly the period after the cease-fire, makes any

attempt at assessment difficult. With the amount of data available, it

is possible, however, to discern certain trends or patterns indicative

of both progress and problems. The most discernible pattern in pacification was that progress depended entirely on security and that it was

generally better than during the Strategic Hamlet period. A less obvious

but still discernible trend showed that pacification progress was a

163
curve with peaks and troughs. 1967 and 1971 were the years when the best

statistical results were gained but 1971 reached a peak never before

attained. Characteristically enough, these peaks were invariably followed

by troughs which were when security was at a lower ebb: 1968 and 1972,

the years of the enemy's big offensives. This pointed toward another

significant pattern: a major enemy spoiling action could always be expected when pacification seemed to attain a reasonable degree of success.

The last major enemy offensive in early 1975 did not run counter to this

pattern. It was attempted at a time when the GVN, despite its difficulties and some territorial losses, seemed to be consolidating its foothold

in the rural area,

But statistical results told only part of the story. In 1971, for

example, the GVN was apparently in firm control in terms of hamlet

security, claiming that 85.3 percent of all hamlets were entirely or

relatively secure, while the enemy controlled a mere 3.6 percent and

about 11 percent were contested. Population control achieved the same

spectacular results; 92.4 percent of South Vietnamese inhabitants were

reported living in secure or reasonably secure hamlets, to include urban

centers. The Viet Cong, meanwhile, controlled only 1.1 percent. Again,

about 11 percent were contested. (Chart 24) These results were obtained

at a time when VCI activities were at their lowest level and when Communists main and local forces were avoiding engagements in preparation for

their next big push. The situation then appeared as if the GVN was left

alone to go about its nation-building task. But it was only the calm

that precedes a big storm.

The security attained was not a guarantee that it would be immune

to enemy spoiling actions and that the trend was irreversible. The

results only reflected the situation at a certain time; they did not

represent the kind of solid, permanent achievements that defied retrogression. Also, to attain these results, the GVN overextended its capabilities and relied heavily on American support. The lesson of 1972

indicated that without the military protective shield, pacification

setbacks could occur anytime the enemy chose to strike in force. By

1974, the GVN had run out of strategic reserves to maintain a reasonable

164
Chart 24 — Achievements in Population and Hamlet Control, 1971

100

50

40

30

20

10

0

B

1. Hamlets under GVN control:

11,346 A-, B-, C-, D-, E-, and

N-class hamlets or 96.4%

V-hamlets: 427 or 3.6%

2. Population under GVN control:

16,560,000 living in A—, B—, and

C-class hamlets or 92.4%

1,081,000 living in D— and E—

class hamlets or 6%

81,000 living in N—class hamlets

or .5%

205,000 living in V—class hamlets

or 1.1%

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Total South Vietnamese Population: 17,928,000

Total Hamlets: 11,173

165
degree of security and control in the face of stepped up enemy attacks.

Its strategic options were limited. It was finally reduced to a simple

matter of how much control it could afford.

GVN efforts at eliminating the VCI and winning over its members at

the same time seemed to be reasonably effective if statistics could be

trusted. In fact, reports gave the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) program credit

for making a sizable dent in the VCI ranks: 15,603 casualties by 1971

or about one fourth of total VCI size, estimated at 63,757. But this

casualty figure included the VCI greatest losses incurred during 1968

when its members surfaced and actively participated in the Tet offensive.

It also included a number of VC killed in local firefights by ARVN forces.

Chieu Hoi results were equally encouraging: by 1971, a total of 159,741

"enemy" personnel had crossed the line to freedom. This included 97,696

military troops and cadres, 45,173 political cadres and 16,872 undefinable "others."

But apart from the low caliber of enemy personnel killed or rallied,

the statistical results included a substantial number of undefinable

"enemy" personnel who were classified as such primarily because they

were either innocents caught under suspicion or inhabitants of the other

side coming over for safety and a decent livelihood. The fact that

several among ralliers switched sides many times over the years was a

clear indication that except for a few enemy agents they were something

besides enemy personnel. One may question that if so many enemy personnel had rallied or had been eliminated, how could the VCI continue to

pose a permanent threat to the pacification effort? Indeed, if statistics

were useful, they strongly indicated the enemy's capability to recruit

and replace surpassed everything we usually atrributed to him.

To ensure security and provide protection for the people living

under GVN control, a military shield was indispensable. While US forces

did not always participate in pacification operations, their powerful

combat support assets and intervention capabilities directly contributed

to the clearing of several pacification areas. Their most significant

effectiveness was the destruction of enemy bases and lines of communication, which indirectly accounted for the improvement of security in rural

166
areas. But the main responsibility for providing the protective shield

remained with the regular and territorial units of the RVNAF. That

shield was indispensable because hamlet security forces — the PF, the

PSDF and the police — could not survive enemy attacks without it. The

interdependence of forces thus became a key feature of the pacification

strategy.

During the period 1967-1972, the RVNAF grew rapidly in strength,

reaching a peak of nearly 1.1 million men. More than half that strength

was composed of territorial forces, an indication of their maturity and

increasing role in pacification. Sheer numerical strength, however,

failed to convey the true picture of combat effectiveness. A conclusion

that one may draw is that the RF and PF failed in areas where enemy

forces were superior and that this failure accounted for the continued

bogdown of ARVN regular divisions in territorial security missions. One

of my constant headaches as J-3, JGS came from requests for reinforcements from field commanders who always asked for more and never seemed

happy to settle for less. This was perhaps another indication of the RF

and PF ineffectiveness. Somehow I got the impression that pacification

support was like a leaking tank. No matter how much more manpower you

put in it, it never seemed to be enough for the task.

Hamlet security forces also increased substantially during this

period. The PSDF, for example, reached a total of nearly 4 million by

1970, of which 1,326,571 were combat members, equipped with a total of

463,752 individual weapons. (Chart 25) Statistics also showed that

95 percent of secure and relatively secure hamlets were defended by PSDF

and each of these hamlets had from one to several teams (11 men each)

depending on its size. What the statistics did not reveal was the high

density of PSDF in cities and urban areas where their role was light

and a much lower distribution in rural areas where the PSDF role was

more critical. This imbalance in distribution reflected the lower male

population in rural areas and was one defect that could never be corrected unless the trend of urbanization was reversed. But even in urban

areas, the nominal strength of PSDF was not indicative of their effectiveness. Their notorious trigger-happy unruliness was particularly

167
Chart 25 - Expansion of PSDF, 1968-1970

z

o

3 2

''''' ' ' I I I I I—L

t' f.fr » * -t:'. 't..' -•<-:. *...*•...*.

3,797,.156

2,661,377

463,752

JASONDJ FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASOND

1969 1970

SUPPORT PSDF COMBATPSDF

168
irritating to the urban people. Some thought that they stood a better

chance of being fired on when stopped by a PSDF than by a Viet Cong.

The expansion of police forces to rural areas was also a significant

effort to combat the VCI, in addition to maintaining law and order. The

modest strength of the police, however, limited its capabilities. There

were no police available at the hamlet level which was the most important

natural subdivision of South Vietnamese rural society.

All in all, the statistical results of pacification showed steady

progress, particularly after the momentum was gained through the 3-month

accelerated program in late 1968. They reached an all-high record in

1971 but suffered some setbacks during the 1972 Easter offensive. Pacification gains were stabilized again after the short, disruptive campaign

of "Land and Population Grab" that the enemy launched without success

immediately after the cease-fire. Despite stepped-up activities during

1974, the Communists seemed to have lost their foothold in the rural

areas. And the pacification gains were being consolidated when North

Vietnam decided to go all-out once again in early 1975. South Vietnam

was lost, not because pacification had failed but because its weakened

military forces, hampered by the flow of panicky refugees, were unable

to hold the entire North Vietnamese Army in check.

The Communist Challenge to Pacification

The ups and downs of pacification illustrate the familiar pattern

of Communist activities designed to spoil the GVN nation-building efforts

and ultimately take over South Vietnam. During the first few years of

the war, 1959-1963, the strategy that dominated Communist thinking was

basically political and social. Their aim was to disrupt and discredit

the newly established republic, create social dissatisfaction and unrest

and move toward either a general uprising or a coalition government.

Communist activities during this period began with and concentrated

on the rural area. They consisted largely of subversive and terrorist

actions against village and other GVN officials at the grass-roots level.

These were conducted by the underground Viet Minh agents, estimated at

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about 10,000, who remained in the South after the Geneva Accords and

were gradually augmented by new recruits and Viet Minh regroupees reinfiltrated from the North. An estimated 61,000 village officials and

GVN civil servants were reported to be assassinated or executed from

1958 to 1966. During the next three-year period, from 1968 to 1970,

casualties caused by the VC to the civilian population more than doubled,

even tripled the yearly rate of the previous period. (Table 1)

Table 1 Casualties Caused by Enemy Anti-Pacification

Terrorist Activities (From 1968 to 1970)

Categories of Casualties

Kidnapped

Wounded

Killed

Totals

1968

10,108

15,918

6,338

32,364

1969

6,096

15,603

6,090

27,790

1970

6,245

11,177

5,298

22,720

The extent of terrorism and sabotage was such that to save the

countryside from Communist control, the GVN initiated the Strategic

Hamlet program in 1962. The program produced good effects despite

inflated reports by province chiefs. Its progress prompted the Viet

Cong in late 1963 to demand the dismantling of these fortified hamlets

which they denounced as "disguised concentration camps." Profiting

from the political unrest and instability in Saigon before and after

Mr. Diem's downfall, the Viet Cong systematically wrecked the program

by penetrations and attacks. They came perilously close to success

with widespread disorder and violence but the general uprising never

came about.

Recognizing the futility of guerrilla warfare as a means of conquest, the Communists decided in early 1964 to shift their strategy

toward military violence and began to infiltrate regular NVA units of

regimental size into the South. This was the beginning of a force

buildup accompanied by the revival or construction of logistical bases

in the border areas. From 1965 to 1967, the war had a predominantly

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military outlook with pitched battles between US and Communist forces

and large scale US search and destroy operations against Viet Cong

base areas. These military actions completely overshadowed the other

war being fought on a lesser scale against the VCI and guerrillas at

the grass-roots level: the war for the control of the rural area for

which the GVN and its forces were primarily responsible.

The Viet Cong sought to wreck the pacification effort by a threepronged strategy based on offensive tactics, political maneuvers and

proselytizing actions aimed at the RVNAF. This came to be known as the

three offensive spearheads: military, political and proselytizing,

which the Viet Cong used selectively or in combination throughout the

war.

The offensive tactics most extensively used by the VC were: ambush,

hit-and-run attack, road interdiction, shelling, and more or less conventional attacks. The GVN recorded these activities as enemy-initiated

incidents. During the period from 1968 to 1970, as an example, a yearly

average of slightly more than 10,000 incidents were reported. (Chart 26)

The ambush was the most important since it served well the Viet Cong

political and psychological purposes. A successful ambush always had

repercussions which affected the GVN credibility and the morale of ARVN

troops. Enemy ambushes were directed against a variety of targets: GVN

officials, ARVN troops, supply convoys etc. but most notoriously, they

were laid against reinforcements. This was one favorite Communist tactic

called cong don d% vien (attack the outpost to smash the reinforcement)

which the Viet Cong used with great success despite ARVN precautions.

With the increasing use of air cover and helicopters, however, largescale ambushes became less efficient, and gradually diminished, especially

since the participation of US combat troops.

Ambushes were frequently used by the VC in conjunction with mines

and roadblocks. During the early part of the war, mines caused extensive civilian casualties while roadblocks, sometimes mere physical

obstacles rigged with booby traps, only caused delays in traffic. Most

sabotage acts against the railway were conducted by mines; canals and

rivers in the Mekong Delta were also frequently blocked or mined and

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22

20

18

16

14

HUNDREDS

00

o

M

6 - \

4

2

0

1968 1969 1970

11,931 INCIDENTS 10,526 INCIDENTS 10,178 INCIDENTS

Chart 26 - Enemy Anti-Pacification Activities

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ambushed. With the construction of modern, surfaced highways, mines

became less and less a hazard. Still, a few key supply routes were

frequent targets for mines or blocking actions. The enemy purpose in

road interdiction was primarily economic, seeking to disrupt the flow

of supplies into cities. When conducted in conjunction with attacks or

other actions, it was used to isolate outposts or even larger targets.

Enemy road interdiction actions accounted for the increased use of airlift and helilift in troop movements and in resupply activities.

Another important VC tactic used against pacification was the hit

and run, or harassment attack. While this was a guerrilla warfare tactic,

it was also used in some large-scale attacks. The enemy's basic tenet

was always to ensure victory in hit-and-run attacks which, therefore,

were carefully planned and swiftly executed. This tactic was primarily

used against isolated outposts, the RF and PF, small ARVN installations

and pacified hamlets. Like most other VC tactics, hit-and-run attacks

caused adverse psychological effects to the GVN besides inflicting casualties and losses to its forces. After the introduction of NVA units

in the south, the enemy became bolder and switched to more conventional

attacks in 1965.

In 1968, the Communists unexpectedly launched their Tet offensive.

Its most serious impact was the temporary disruption of pacification

efforts in the rural areas since ARVN forces were redeployed for the

defense of major cities, provincial capitals and district towns. Despite

this, the enemy infrastructure was unable to exploit the situation

because it was committed to the general offensive effort. A large part

of the VCI was thus destroyed during 1968, which accounted for the success of the accelerated pacification campaign late that year. It was

also during and after this offensive that the enemy began to make extensive use of a new deadly weapon: the 122-mm rocket. Most enemy shellings were conducted against military and air bases but also against

cities and urban areas. The indiscriminate firing of rockets against

urban centers caused extensive civilian casualties and a feeling of

terror among the population. Saigon was most heavily struck by rockets

during May 1968 and this shelling seemed to work against the Viet Cong

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psychologically. To the population it was an indication of their desperation in the face of military defeat.

Pacification also suffered setbacks as a result of the 1972 Easter

offensive. Although the enemy offensive was localized in three major

areas, the deployment of ARVN forces to meet the challenge created some

voids in pacification support. The influx of refugees fleeing the

embattled areas also caused additional burdens to the GVN. The most

serious effect caused by the offensive was the complete absorption of

the RVNAF general reserves in territorial defense and the ARVN seemed

to be immobilized in territorial security missions, gradually losing

tactical mobility.

When the cease-fire was announced, the enemy launched a vicious

campaign designed to wrest more control. This was known as the "Land

and Population Grab" campaign during which enemy forces succeeded in

penetrating more than 400 villages across the country. But the campaign

was short-lived; the enemy's effort met with determined RVNAF counteraction and failed. But while the enemy was unable to grab more control,

the GVN pacification effort also came to a standstill as a result of US

aid cutbacks and a preoccupation for force conservation. The cease-fire

thus ushered in a period during which the GVN strived to hold on to as

much geographical area as possible. The deployment of ARVN combat forces

for territorial security enabled the enemy to prepare extensively for

his ultimate offensive. Border outposts and ranger camps successively

fell into enemy hands. By the end of 1974, while the enemy was assured

of a military advantage through his force buildup, the GVN seemed barely

able to maintain its widely dispersed defensive posture which by now

had become more and more costly. The loss of Phuoc Long followed by

Ban Me Thuot brought to light the strategic weaknesses of the RVN. The

question now was how. long the country could survive in the face of all-out

invasion.

The enemy's capabilities for propaganda and proselyting actions were

always as redoubtable as his military activities throughout the war and

pacification was the primary target. His propaganda apparatus seemed to

be able to exploit the RVN weaknesses. It succeeded, for example, to

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convey the image of strategic hamlets as "disguised concentration camps."

It also thrived on the mistakes committed by GVN officials in pushing too

hard the pacification effort. Self-help, projects which required the

participation of the local population were denounced as forced labor.

The enemy was also adept at inducing the people to voice petty grievances against the GVN, grievances designed to harass and embarrass local

officials and deter their zealousness.

Proselyting actions were mainly directed against the ARVN and the

RF and PF in particular. Their effectiveness on the ARVN was limited

but the RF and PF troopers were less resistant victims. In the Mekong

Delta, the VCI was successful in transforming several RF and PF soldiers

into turncoats. This accounted for the loss of many outposts that

reached a worrisome level in certain provinces such as Chuong Thien and

Kien Hoa. Proselyting actions were usually accompanied by threats,

blackmail or terror whose purpose was to induce fear, loss of confidence

and the lowering of morale. These actions were usually carried out by

planted agents who successfully penetrated into RF and PF ranks.

The enemy's challenge to pacification was multi-faceted and persistent. It was a combined political and military effort which fell in

line with his overall strategy of conquest. But as long as this effort

was made on a local level, the enemy stood no chance of success. He

must have realized this and decided to conquer the south by military

invasion instead. This was no proof, however, that pacification had

failed as a strategy.

The Problems of Cadres and Territorial Forces

Conceived as a revolutionary effort, pacification depended primarily

on the cadres for its implementation. The concept of cadre or can bo

espoused by the GVN, like some other organizational concepts and operational methods, was Communist by origin but adapted by the GVN. Mr.

Ngo Dinh Nhu was in fact the man who pioneered the creation of various

categories of cadres for his Strategic Hamlet program. The "armed propaganda teams" were but one among these categories. Although the Ngos

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were overthrown, their idea was later picked up by pacification authorities and translated into the concept of Rural Development cadre. At a

later stage, in keeping with the GVN effort to reform its administration,

cadre was understood to encompass executives of all management levels,

including the military.

The RD cadre teams, which were activated when the pacification

program was set in motion, initially consisted of volunteers but their

leaders came mostly from wealthy and influential families, including

those seeking refuge from mandatory military service. Although RD cadres

were recruited among the local population and assigned to local governments, they were directly controlled by the RD ministry. RD group leaders were authorized, for example, to report directly to the minister

in Saigon, by-passing the local government channel. This practice

infuriated local officials and other national cadres. The RD cadres

even had the upper hand over PF troops, who were the natives of their

localities. The animosity and competition between RD cadres and PF

troops were such that there was little cooperation or mutual assistance.

During 1966 and 1967, when RD cadres operated in conjunction with RF

troops in villages and hamlets, RF troops were assigned to outposts and

watchtowers while RD cadres conducted activities and lived among the

people. But there were instances in which RF troops ignored requests

for relief by RD cadre teams who were under enemy attack. This rivalry

existed primarily in the provinces of Binh Duong and Bien Hoa where

RD cadre teams suffered significant losses at the hands of the enemy.

It stemmed from the fact that RD cadres considered themselves emissaries

of the central government, hence superior to the RF, the para-military

forces, or other cadres, whom they held in low esteem.

Other categories of civilian cadre, usually called national cadres,

were usually found to be slow-moving, excessively bureaucratic, imperious, but dependent on the military for almost everything. It was as

if they were unable to shake off the influence of French colonialism of

which indigenous civil servants were made a loyal instrument. They

rarely made inspection trips to villages and hamlets to examine and assess

personally the situation. Instead, they depended primarily on reports

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from subordinates, reports which usually did not reflect the true or

complete situation. Sometimes higher level cadres were aware of the

inaccuracy of formal reports but still forwarded these self-serving

reports without adequate investigation or comments.

The success of the pacification program depended in a large measure

on the capability and attitude of the national cadres. Some were genuinely devoted and determined in serving the national cause. However

some, most unfortunately, only thought of themselves and avoiding hardship. As a result, the abuse of power for personal benefit and the

pursuit of worldly pleasures were widespread. Cadres were not always

ideologically motivated; many of them were materially oriented. The

"cadre" concept thus became devoid of significance because by vocation,

a cadre must be the personification of the national ideology and a

representative of the political regime. As originally conceived, cadres

should have been the antidote of the basically lethargic bureaucracy.

As such, cadres would endure hardship, overcome difficulties, and prove

themselves as examples of personal sacrifice for the national cause. It

is generally admitted that one can evaluate the merits of a certain

regime by looking at how its cadre behave and perform. In the context

of the Vietnam conflict, the lack of enthusiasm and determination on the

part of some national cadres was one reason why the GVN was unable to

motivate and rally all the population. The disheartening fact was that

some cadres who enjoyed power and authority only thought of consolidating their positions. Those who were wealthy kept seeking more enrichment, and those who were enterprising sought ways to transfer their

wealth into foreign bank accounts, preparing for an eventual exit, if

and when the opportunity or requirement arose. The sons of wealthy and

influential cadres could avoid the draft. Through bribery, they could

stay free of military service or go overseas to continue their studies.

As for the lower level cadres, they were economically the most underprivileged of all, like the private soldiers. Hard-pressed by soaring

prices and meager salaries, they were usually compelled to make ends

meet through petty corruption or moonlighting. The few who were welloff could always buy their way to desk jobs in secure areas. In the

177
end, no matter how good or significant a plan or program might be, it

could be retarded by the very cadres responsible for its implementation.

This is not to say that all GVN cadres fell into the undesirable

categories depicted above. There were many highly capable individuals

who were truly devoted to the national cause. But the circumstances

were such that they were not always given the chance or the freedom to

prove their talent and devotion. Being frequently a minority among the

cadre ranks, there was little tihey could do to redress the situation.

In the employment of forces, although ARVN regular forces were

committed to support the GVN pacification effort, the Regional and

Popular Forces were the mainstay of pacification. In time, territorial

forces made up 55 percent of total RVNAF strength but due to their rapid

expansion, most RF and PF unit commanders were relatively inexperienced.

RF units served as the provincial main force while PF units were

the village main forces. Both forces were employed as small units,

usually companies and platoons for the maintenance of territorial security. Being thinly spread out and lacking adequate support, they were

extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks. This vulnerability was exploited

to the maximum by enemy forces who usually attacked with a superior force,

inflicting heavy losses on the RF and PF. Nevertheless, this was a

sound concept of force employment in the pacification effort since territorial forces consisted of men who were born and grew up in the very

villages where they were assigned. As a result, the territorial trooper

was well familiar with the local terrain. But despite their authorized

strength, territorial forces suffered constantly from a shortage of

personnel. Some RF battalions participated in operations with only

120 men. The gravest problem that plagued the RF and PF was a high

percentage of absentees who were included on the unit roll calls, and

often on payrolls. These absentees included deserters, AWOLs, hospital

patients, trainees, and those permanently detached to guard and escort

duties of province, and district chiefs and elected officials. There

was also the deplorable phenomenon of "ghost" and "ornamental" soldiers —

those who had died and those Who only occasionally reported for duties

respectively — but whose names were still recorded in roll calls and

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payrolls. In addition, there were losses but no replacements because

of recruiting difficulties, and there were deserters who sought protection from religious or political organizations. These conditions

resulted in most RF and PF units never being at full strength' and it

was almost impossible to remedy this situation.

Despite being plagued with understrength and a shortage of experienced cadres, the RF and PF were employed in a wide variety of capacities.

There were some units which seemed condemned to operational duties year

in and year out without rest, refitting or training. There were others

which permanently manned outposts and watchtowers and guarded bridges,

lines of communication, and government installations. Despite mandatory

training programs designed to improve RF and PF combat effectiveness,

which prescribed the rotation of units to undergo training, very few

province and district chiefs complied with these programs. Village

chiefs managed to justify their non-compliance by various pretexts.

When a RF unit underwent training at some center, its strength usually

included office and general service personnel in order to comply with

the JGS requirements for unit strength. But as soon as the unit completed training, it returned the "borrowed" personnel and found itself

understrength again. Thus the "trained unit" never had the chance to

operate as a unit.

The RF and PF usually suffered from a serious shortage of non-commissioned officers and specialists. Several platoons were commanded by

corporals or corporals first class. Companies were usually commanded

by young second lieutenants fresh out of school. Because of these

shortcomings and weaknesses, the territorial forces never effectively

fulfilled their mission and, as a result, regular ARVN forces were

frequently required to perform the territorial role. When taking over

combat responsibility from departing US forces, ARVN was spread thin in

its attempt to fill in the void where territorial forces were incapable

of maintaining security. The enemy was thus given the chance to infiltrate and resume local activities because many areas were left undefended for lack of forces.

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The RF and PF improvement program as initiated by the JGS was based

on the innovative policy of assigning new recruits and draftees to RF

units, and authorizing recruitment without regard to age limitations,

provided RF and PF units were brought up to authorized strength. In

order to improve command and control, the JGS also adopted certain

special measures and incentives such as accelerated NCO training courses,

battlefield promotions, and promotions for combat worthy cadres without

regard to rank seniority, all with the objective of increasing cadre

strength and effectiveness for the territorial forces. Disciplinary

and replacement measures were also taken against those territorial commanders who neglected to improve and develop their forces. However,

the task of improving the RF and PF demanded more time, more perserverance, and more patience; a military force of such proportions could not

reach desired standards without a long-range program.

The Impact of U.S. Policies

The RVN depended almost entirely on the US for its nation-building

effort and defense against Communist subversion and invasion. American

policies, therefore, could help make or break that effort.

When the Communists rekindled their war of aggression in South

Vietnam, the US came to the relief of its embattled ally by providing

money, equipment, weapons, advisers and even its own air force and combat

troops to fight the war for several years. The varying emphasis of US

policies in South Vietnam always bore a direct consequence on the outcome of the conflict and American military doctrine and strategy affected

the Vietnamese conduct of the war.

During the five years that preceded the outbreak of war, American

military policy sought to train and equip the Vietnamese military as a

conventional force to face an eventual conventional invasion. However,

this invasion first materialized under the unconventional form of subversion sustained by guerrilla warfare. The RVNAF, tailored to the US

Army image, were hard-pressed to fight this kind of war for which they

were ill-prepared. Increased US military aid and the availability of US

180
combat support assets failed to solve the basic problems of the longterm conflict.

On its own initiative, the GVN came up with its Strategic Hamlet

program to counter the subversive war. Instead of providing this program

with adequate material and technical support, the US continued with

regular military aid. Instead of encouraging this new program, American

officials were inclined to find fault with it and criticize its shortcomings. When South Vietnam nearly came apart in late 1964 as a result

of political instability and military setbacks, the US decided to save

it the American way. Perhaps this was the only way at the time, but

having regained the military advantage, the US decided to proceed with

the military war and only showed lukewarm interest in the "other war"

which was left to the GVN to fight.

Four precious years were thus lost before the US renewed any interest in the other war. It seemed as if the US had failed to realize the

dual aspect of the war whose nature was even ignored by some US commanders.

That was a regrettable error of strategic proportions that cost human

lives, political support and time. Only after military emphasis failed

did the US become more conscious of the nature of the total conflict and

make a truly cohesive effort to help the GVN with its other war. But

the years had been lost that could have perhaps radically changed the

outcome of the war for rural control had the Strategic Hamlet program

received the full weight of US support from the start.

The Communists benefited the most from fishing in those troubled

waters during this time. In addition to force buildup, they succeeded

in reestablishing nearly invulnerable bases along the border areas and

even "mini" guerrilla bases in the midst of GVN territory. The VCI was

also provided the opportunity to gain a firm foothold in the rural areas

where it seemed to flourish.

The US insistence on political stability and elective, democratic

government as preconditions to continued aid and support effectively

molded the RVN regime into a Western style democracy that functioned

primarily in form, not in substance. The true nature of the regime

remained intrigue-ridden, dictatorial, and repressive. Perhaps the

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Vietnamese peasantry was not yet ready to cope with ballots and senators.

In any case they were more preoccupied with down-to-earth things such as

a decent living, social justice, and security that hopefully pacification

would bring about. These also happened to be the implied goals of US

aid and support.

But only two years after its first cohesive effort to support pacification, the US already thought of disengagement. While these intensive

two years were enough to inculcate progress and momentum to the pacification effort, the gradual removal of the US military protective shield

began to overtax the RVNAF capabilities to fight two wars at the same

time despite force structure increase and modernization. Still, benefiting from the initial momentum, pacification harvested its most abundant

results during the following three years, 1969-1971, with continued US

support.

The Paris Agreement soon ushered in a most difficult period for

the GVN which had to face with complete US withdrawal, continued enemy

harassment, an eventual resumption of the war and most unfortunately, a

sizable cutback in US aid. All these events reduced the GVN strategic

options to a simple matter of survival; pacification could hardly progress

when the nation's survival was at stake. It was finally the US people

who repudiated even the last flimsy hope of survival and sealed the fate

of South Vietnam as a free nation.

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CHAPTER IX

Observations and Conclusions

After completing my previous chapters and conducting in-depth

discussions with Vietnamese associates, I wish to emphasize several

general observations and conclusions.

Of the strategic alternatives available to the GVN and the US

in South Vietnam, pacification was probably the most sensible option

that not only potentially met the Communist politico-military challenge

but was also basically consistent with American policies and Vietnamese national goals. Given the historical context of the war, perhaps

it was the only sensible strategy.

In fact South Vietnam had very little choice, if any. The war it

fought was first and foremost a legitimate defense occasioned by insurgency and aggression. Otherwise, South Vietnam was perfectly happy

to be left alone with its task of nation-building south of the 17th

parallel. It never bore any aggressive design against North Vietnam and

had little capability for it. Its strategy was and had always been a

strategy of defense and survival.

This strategy did not seek a military victory as an end in itself

because the war was not simply a military war. Even if the conflict had

been reduced to a military showdown, there were chances of its going on

almost indefinitely as long as the insurgents were kept revitalized by

an interminable flow of men and supplies from the north. At the height

of. military gains, some Vietnamese and American leaders talked exuberantly of the war fading away or reverting to brushfire guerrilla warfare.

This only showed how mistaken they were as to the enemy's intentions and

capabilities. The enemy, in fact, enjoyed a wide range of options. The

use of military force, albeit a prominent feature of his strategy, was

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but one among other options. He could switch from one to another

without ever lessening the threat to the GVN. More importantly, he

always seemed to be able to maintain his military pressure on two levels

of warfare, simultaneously or alternately. The absence of one did not

preclude the presence of the other and either one posed a continuous

security problem for the GVN.

The highest level of pacification success from 1969 to 1971 was

possible primarily due to improved security and the military advantage

that the US, RVN and free world forces enjoyed over the Communists.

Indeed, with 1,100,000 men of the RVNAF and over half a million of US

and FWMA troops, and with overwhelming firepower and other combat support assets, we truly held the initiative on the entire South Vietnamese battlefield and caused the enemy severe losses in human lives and

equipment. For sometime, all Communist main forces were effectively

driven away from populated areas and over the national border.

Meanwhile, the United States air and naval bombardments also

brought havoc to North Vietnam, the Communist "rear area" that

sustained the war in South Vietnam, and effectively reduced the flow

of NVA troops and supplies into the South. This was a period during

which North Vietnam, its troops in the South and the Viet Cong suffered severe setbacks and were in real difficulty.

To regain their initiative and restore control over the rural

area, the Communists launched their Tet "General Offensive — General

Uprising" in 1968, but met with determined reactions by the RVNAF and

US/FWMA forces and suffered a resounding military defeat. Over

120,000 Communist troops were either killed or wounded and in excess of

37,000 weapons were captured by our side. More of the rural area, as

a result, progressively came under control of the GVN and friendly forces.

In subsequent actions, the RVN and US forces drove enemy forces

farther away from border areas and repeatedly struck at logistical

bases that the enemy had built during previous years along the Cambodian

and Laotian borders. The Cambodian incursion of 1970, and the cross-border

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operation into lower Laos in early 1971 were victorious examples of

combined RVN-US military effort. The rural areas during this period

were almost free of enemy main force units. Whatever remnant forces

the enemy had inside South Vietnam were merely local forces or guerrilla elements and his considerably weakened infrastructure.

In 1972, the pacification effort began to decrease in effectiveness because there were not enough combat forces to hold the initiative

on the battlefield and provide security for the population at the aame

time. The US and Allied countries had by that time withdrawn 90% of

their ground troops. US combat support in terms of B-52 strikes, tactical air, naval firepower while still available was greatly reduced.

The reduction in combat power was considerable. Whereas the US, other

Allies,and the RVN committed up to 22 divisions at the height of the US

buildup, by 1972 there were only 13 divisions. This represented a reduction of 40% in combat strength. Other reductions in firepower and

support assets were so great that no comparison was possible between

what the US had deployed and what the RVNAF could now muster.

It was estimated that at the time of the cease-fire, Communist

forces in South Vietnam numbered about 293,000 men to include 14 infantry divisions and four combat support divisions,' but excluding the

five general reserve NVA divisions which served as a backup and accounted

for another 50,000 to 60,000 men. The trend was such that while the

enemy nearly doubled in combat strength, our side was reduced by nearly

one half its former strength. Also beginning in 1972, the North Vietnamese Army became more modernized. Its movements were mechanized and its

infantry units fought with a complete array of artillery and armor support. Its modern capabilities and assets were on obvious display during

the 1972 Easter invasion. Over the years of US buildup, the Communist

bloc also responded by escalating its aid to North Vietnam, with the end

result that, after US withdrawal, the RVNAF were to face the increased

Communist might alone.

As a direct result of the US troop withdrawal, and bound by a rigid

strategy of territorial control, the RVN regular forces became overextended. They no longer had adequate mobile combat strength. Search

185
and destroy operations against enemy infiltration along the western

border gradually became impossible to conduct. The RVNAF were finally

incapable of conducting mobile operations and supporting pacification

at the same time, as had been done during the period of US participation.

From 1972 on, the RVNAF gradually lost the initiative and were increasingly on the defensive.

The biggest shortcoming in pacification, aside from the shortage

of forces, was the artificiality of its reporting. Despite impressive

statistics, the figures were often misleading. They frequently served

a political purpose and did not reflect realistic gains. Moreover,

real gains could be easily upset by Communist spoiling actions.

The Paris Agreement in 1973 prescribed a "leopard skin" or

standstill cease-fire which was a disadvantage for the RVN and a blessing for the enemy. No longer impeded by mines and destroyed by bombs,

North Vietnam devoted its energy to rebuilding its shattered economy

on the one hand, and making preparations to invade the South on the

other. Once again, the rural areas of South Vietnam were in turmoil.

The enemy was striving to regain his control by military actions ranging

from limited attacks to all-out offensive. Not only had war been

resumed, it also escalated in terms of forces committed and target size

and culminated in open invasion. But the US protective shield had

been removed; the RVN was left to fend for itself with less and less

assistance. Unenforced warnings by the US in the face of blatant

violations only encouraged the enemy to proceed with his conquest.

Another RVN shortcoming was its total dependence on US aid. Without

this aid it could neither maintain its military force nor continue its

pacification effort. US policies, therefore, always had a decisive effect

on the RVN ability to defend itself and consolidate its national posture.

We have already seen how the US varying emphasis on pacification affected

its progress. In military assistance, this effect was even more conspicuous.

During the period US forces fought in Vietnam, US military aid was substantial and adequately met RVNAF combat needs. However, from nearly

186
$1.5 billion in FY^-73, U.S. military aid suddenly dropped to $1 billion in FY-74 and finally to $700 million in FY-75. This drastic cutback gravely affected not only the RVNAF combat capabilities but also

the morale of their cadres and troops. It was obvious that the RVN ability to defend itself and its chances of survival depended to a large

extent on the amount of US military aid appropriated. As a result of

this huge and unexpected cutback, the RVN was unable to keep its territorial integrity intact and as the RVNAF capability to provide security

diminished the GVN pacification effort also decreased proportionately.

Ever since US support became a unified, cohesive effort in 1967,

the GVN pacification program was given a momentum that sustained its

steady progress, despite occasional setbacks. But from the beginning,

this program was plagued by problems of control and coordination, inadequate supporting forces and cadres and an over-anxious propensity for

immediate results.

From an organizational point of view, the basic weakness of the

system during its first two years, 1966-1967, was the concentration of

too much power into the Ministry of Revolutionary Development which

regarded itself as an all-important super-ministry with overriding authority. RD cadre, consequently, often acted as if they were a breed of

super-cadre with special powers. When other cadres and agencies were

assigned lesser responsibilities, they were hurt because of their unfavored standing. As a result, they were inclined to shun responsibilities

and let the RD cadre do all the work.

The province chief, coordinator of pacification, was usually assigned too much responsibility. It was simply beyond his capacity or

capability to carry out so many tasks at the same time. He was, for

example, the chairman of at least ten committees, in addition to being

a military commander and an administrative chief. One can hardly imagine

how he managed to carry out these duties and at the same time play host

to a constant flow of visitors, senators, representatives, GVN officials,

foreign dignitaries, and military commanders. "Receiving guests and

visitors alone was apt to keep him busy around the clock. Yet, in the

pacification program, it was the province chief who played the primary

role of both planner and executor, and success or failure rested on him,

and on him alone.

187
US agencies were indispensable in their pacification support role.

Adequately staffed with qualified, experienced personnel and experts,

these US agencies were strong in planning and in problem-solving studies.

They not only recommended plans and programs for the GVN agencies to

implement, but also provided realistic advice and suggestions for effective problem-solving. Therefore, when the US presence was drastically

reduced, the void it created was huge and impossible to fill. Despite

a certain familiarity with US methods and procedures which they learned

during the years of cooperation, GVN officials apparently were never

able to function as effectively as with US assistance. The fact was

the GVN did not have adequate experts or specialists for every field

of activity, and was basically weak in research work, planning, and

management. GVN agencies could only do routine work. This does not

mean that the GVN was without initiative or creativity; this simply

recognizes the fact that GVN shortcomings existed and were significant.

The experience of Revolutionary Development indicated that pacification, as a total effort involving equal contributions from several

agencies, could not simply be entrusted to any single ministry, but

should have been made the responsibility of an inter-ministerial council

deriving its authority from the President or the Prime Minister. Also

there should not have been so many different categories of cadres for,

by human nature, they tended to compete with each other, to the detriment of the common effort. However, under existing conditions, cadres

should have been assigned clearly defined responsibilities.and employed

to the maximum extent of their capabilities. It also appeared that US

advisers sometimes overshadowed their Vietnamese counterparts by simply

being too devoted and too eager to get things done. Perhaps a better

approach for advisers would have been to suggest ideas and fully exploit

the good relationship with counterparts, to stimulate them to initiating

their own plans and programs in order to obtain the desired objectives.

The simple fact, which was paramount in pacification work, was that no

one understood the Vietnamese people's aspiration better than the Vietnamese themselves. What should have been avoided was the imposition of

ideas and forcing Vietnamese to do things in ways that they did not consider their own. In the long run, this could make them overly dependent

on advisers.

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Pacification was a vast enterprise which required an efficient administrative machinery and massive resources, not only in terms of

materiel and equipment but also in cadres and supporting forces. Antisubversive experience showed that the ratio of forces between the government and the insurgents was the key to success. The successful antiinsurgent campaign in Malaya required a 12 to 1 personnel ratio while in

the GVN pacification effort, a ratio of 8 to 1 was the most ever achieved.

And when the US withdrew, that force ratio was further reduced to a mere

2 or 3 to 1. The simple fact was in order to achieve security and maintain it continuously for the benefit of pacification, an adequate military

force was required as long as the enemy military threat was there.

A second requirement was the destruction of enemy logistical bases and

sanctuaries to cut off his supplies and prevent his force buildup. As

long as these two requirements were not fully met, pacification gains

stood little chance of being sustained.

As has been said, statistical results reported could provide a

false impression. A village was considered as pacified, for example,

when certain criteria had been met such as the establishment of the village

council, the installation of a village office, an information hall, a

first aid station, etc. But in some cases, the village office was installed

in a PF outpost whose facilities it shared and council members usually commuted from a nearby town or city to work during office hours and almost

never stayed in the village after dark. More often than not, the village

information hall was just a squalid shack or hut covered by a few roofing

sheets and adorned with old newspapers and faded pictures. But on a

report, there was no doubt that the information hall existed and that one

objective had been achieved for the village pacification effort even though

its effectiveness was below desired standards. The same was true of first

aid stations, another important objective to be achieved. Undoubtedly,

there existed such a station for every pacified village, but medicine was

always in short supply, often locked up and the resident nurse not in the

area when patients called. No one knew exactly how much and what types

of medicine the station had. Thus, for all practical purposes, it was

impossible to obtain from a report the true situation.

189
Pacification objectives, as conceived and set forth by the CPDC,

were all sound and reasonable although somewhat arbitrary and mechanical.

The problem seemed to lay with some local governments which tended to

implement them in a perfunctory manner, substituting form for substance,

and reporting token as true and complete achievements. Then there was

the problem of cadres, on whom the success of pacification depended in

a large measure.

The cadres were supposed to serve as a transmission belt between the

central government and the population. Their role was to organize, teach,

persuade and push the people to greater exertions in accepting the GVN

programs and participating in them. In the social context of the Vietnam

war, the cadres were also supposed to fill in the gap and hopefully resolve

the dichotomy between the urban leadership and the rural peasantry. This

was perhaps one of the most crucial and problematic issues that the GVN

had to face in its efforts to rally popular support for its cause. Conceived as such, the cadre's role was indeed burdensome.

Most of the cadres, RD and others, were recruited among villagers

and given special training at Vung Tau before field assignments. Group

and team chiefs, however, were invariably selected from among the educated

urban minority. Cadre training emphasized the need for winning popular

credibility and support and to achieve this, cadres were taught to live

by the Communist formula of the Tarn Cung or "three withs" (eating, living,

and working with the people), and by setting personal examples of selfsacrifice, hard work and political awareness. With regard to relations

with the people, cadres were also taught to abide by certain codified rules

which required them to speak politely, pay for the things they damaged,

and above all to protect the lives of and behave correctly toward the

peasants. These were also the rules that ARVN, RF and PF troops were

taught during special indoctrination courses. The RVNAF political education

effort in fact stressed that each soldier had to behave toward the people

as if he were a political warfare cadre.

The things learned, however, seemed to be far removed from what actually happended when contact was made with the people. But the mischievous

190
acts were mostly committed by unruly troops during the course of

operations. Such practices as petty larceny, failure to return borrowed items, and buying goods at a "favored" price sometimes occurred

in hard-pressed circumstances but they were mostly committed without

the commander's knowledge. There was usually confusion as to who the

culprits were. Since a pacification operation involved a variety of

units and cadre teams, it was almost impossible to ascertain which

troops, regular or territorial, were actually responsible for the misconduct. But the finger was usually pointed at the soldiers since they

were the most numerous. The cadres in general behaved better than the

soldiers not because they were better disciplined but because of their

intensive indoctrination. Still their conduct was not always exemplary.

For all their training, indoctrination, and efforts, the cadres

seemed not to be very effective in their assigned role as the.intermediary

link between the central government and the people. They also failed to

lessen the urban-rural bipolarity and win the peasantry over to the GVN

cause. Some attributed this to war weariness and apathy, but while there

was some truth in it, the problem seemed to be more profound. Also, some

GVN high-ranking officials in their frustration tended to blame the system's

failure to develop an attractive political dynamism on the "lack of dedicated cadres". This was equally true but such lack was more effect than

cause of the failure. For one thing, the Communist-inspired concepts

such as cadres and mass organizations could not simply be transplanted or

adapted in a piecemeal manner with comparable results. The fact was in

addition to ideological motivation, the Communists also used coercion and

terror in a manner unique to totalitarianism. Unfortunately, these methods

were intrinsically alien to such a regime as the GVN's and if mechanically

adapted for any purpose, they invariably worked against the regime that

used them. There was also the social malaise that a long war had produced

and such vices as corruption, graft, and abuse of power were usually the

product not the cause. This was also true of war weariness, apathy, or

divisiveness.

So the cadres and other pacification supporting forces could be the

strength or weakness of the GVN or for that matter of any political regime.

191
The crucial factor was whether or not such a regime could inspire

political awareness or motivation. There was also the danger that the

cadres could become "degenerated", to use Communist terminology, or in

the case of the GVN, simply bureaucratized. This was what actually

happened to the so-called "cadres", RD or others, who by exposure to

the system, acted and behaved as functionaries which they truly were.

As to the general population, hardened and disenchanted as they

were by the long, destructive war, disillusioned and frustrated by an

elusive peace, and ever worried about an uncertain future, many naturally

remained uncommitted to the GVN cause and its efforts. Perhaps this was

the common syndrome of war weariness and social malaise. But to most of

them the crucial and immediate concern was how to subsist materially

and survive war hazards. Everything else, including political awareness,

or even democracy was less significant; and as long as they lived with

privations and hardships-, and insecurity, and uncertainty as to the

future, no one could blame them for lack of commitment or apathy.

But the Vietnamese people were inherently alien to Communism and

always longed for freedom. The million or so North Vietnamese people

who first chose to flee south in 1954 eloquently spoke for their love

of freedom above everything else, including careers and personal properties. The people's insurrection at Quynh Luu in Nghe An Province, North

Vietnam in November 1956 and the subsequent movements of refugees fleeing

the advance of Communists in South Vietnam during the period from 1968

to 1972 and in 1975 indicated that, given a choice, the Vietnamese always

opted for freedom. Even now that South Vietnam has come under Communist

control, refugees still escaping from Vietnam report continuing resistance.

Pacification was a long process that just could not be completed

effectively during a short campaign. To succeed in building outposts,

filling them with qualified defense troops, and completing the election

of village councils within a certain area could not be evaluated as a

successful pacification program. These accomplishments were only interim

objectives. The nature of true pacification success lay in the hearts

and minds of the people and this was a long range proposition which

demanded much more time.

192
The war in Vietnam encompassed many fields of challenge. In the

military effort, RVNAF and Free World Forces succeeded temporarily in

stabilizing the situation but were never able to gain absolute and permanent superiority over the enemy. Due partly to the indecisive military situation, efforts to achieve political cohesion and enlist popular

support were unsuccessful. The conflict, being essentially political

rather than military in nature, could only be resolved if there was

political cohesion and success in rallying the people to support the

GVN cause.

Finally, there was the fundamental question of leadership that

truly lay at the core of all successes and failures. Even if adequate

time could be bought for the processes of pacification to proceed, there

was still doubt that political cohesion would occur and provide effective

leadership at the national and all local levels. The profuse availability

of material assets or even manpower simply furnished the took, not the

motivation to carry the task to ultimate success. To instill motivation

effective leadership was required. Thus the problem seemed to be a

circular one: both pacification and political cohesion were essentially

interdependent.

The basic weakness of South Vietnamese leadership lay in the fact

that GVN officials were all recruited from among the educated urban petty

bourgeoisie and this only served to perpetuate the wide gap between them

and the rural peasantry. In fact, the national leaders, the province and

district chiefs were either military officers or intellectuals who made

up the elite minority of the nation. Mostly Western-oriented and sustained

by interrelated class or clan interests, they were by nature alien to and

unassimilable with the peasantry's cause. Their inability to identify

with the peasantry who made up 80% of the population was perhaps a major

cause for ineffective leadership.

The same could be said of military leadership which affected the pacification effort in a most significant way. While the national leaders were

imbued with revolutionary ideas, they failed to inculcate the same idealistic spirit to some military commanders who behaved as if they existed outside the social mainstream. Political indoctrination also failed to instill

193
that spirit because not only did it sidestep social reform as a major

theme, it also sought to teach exotic, high-strung ideas such as the

theory of the "Six Great Warfares", a Nationalist China adaptation of

Mao's theory of total war. As a result, troops under this unenlightened, uninvolved military leadership, tended to develop a haughty but

false sense of pride not always in full service of the people. This

explained the repulsive syndrome of the vain soldier some of whom considered themselves the guardian angels of the regime. But some unit

commanders seemed to encourage this false sense of pride which accounted

for so many mischievous acts detrimental not only to the prestigious

standing of their units but also to the common cause.

Pacification, in the final analysis, was a revolutionary process

which affected the peasant majority. The fundamental question was, as

had been oftentimes discussed among Vietnamese intellectuals and scholars,

who, as a class, could effectively lead that revolution to success? To

the anti-Communists who repudiated proletarian dictatorship or even

peasantry leadership, this was a question that seemed to have no answer.

Although considerable progress was made, pacification remained a

problematic issue for the GVN which seemed unable to bring it to total

success. Besides political cohesion, the GVN seemed to be lacking the

credibility, the ability and the time required to unify its main efforts.

In particular, the GVN credibility suffered a marked decline since the

day the National Liberation Front was allowed an equal standing at the

Paris talks. It declined further when, despite President's Thieu's vows,

northern Quang Tri remained in enemy hands. The population, therefore,

grew more and more suspicious of the GVN capability to protect them

against the Communists. Pacification also required from the Free World

allies which came to its assistance, patience, perseverance, and more

determination above all since .the time element and will power appeared

to be the key to success.

In conclusion, the amount of assistance contributed by the United

States to help the RVN was tremendous in terms of money, equipment and

manpower. This assistance was greatly appreciated by the people of South

Vietnam. However, as long as North Vietnam could quietly enjoy the option

194
to pursue its aggressive scheme, and as long as the GVN itself could

not overcome its internal difficulties, provide effective leadership,

and achieve a unified, total effort, there was no way pacification

could continue to progress toward its intended goal.

195
Appendix A

Republic of Vietnam

DEC REE 614-TT/SL President's Office

1 July 1970

SUBJECT: Military Organization of the National Territory

The President of The Republic of Vietnam decrees:

Article 1. This Decree defines the military organization of the

national territory based on the following provisions:

SECTION 1

Territorial Organization

Article 2. The National territory is divided into four Military

Regions. The composition of each Military Region is determined as

follows:

1. Military Region I consists of (5) five provinces and two cities:

Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Hue City, Quang Nam and Da Nang City,

Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.

2. Military Region II consists of twelve provinces and two cities:

Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Phu Bon, Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Khanh Hoa

and Cam Ranh City, Quang Due, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong,

Tuyen Due and Dalat City.

3. Military Region III consists of Saigon Capital, Con Son Island,

eleven provinces and one city:

Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Binh Duong, Long Khanh, Binh Tuy, Phuoc

Tuy and Vung Tau City, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Long An,

and Gia Dinh.

4. Military Region IV consists of sixteen provinces:

Kien Tuong, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Sa Dec,

Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, Chau Doc, An Giang, Kien Giang, Phong

Dinh, Chuong Thien, Bac Lieu, An Xuyen, and Ba Xuyen.

196
Article 3. In the new organization, each province will become a

Sector. Each administrative District or each Area under an Administrative Delegate will become a Sub-Sector. Those cities which are far from

province capitals, and vital areas will become Special Sectors. A Special Sector may have several Sub-Sectors. Saigon Capital will have a

special territorial organization which will be specified by a separate

document.

Article 4. Rung Sat Special Sector will comprise two Districts of

Gia Dinh Province, Quang Xuyen and Can Gio, which are within the territory of Military Region III. Con Son Island will retain its present

status as Special Sector.

Article 5. Saigon Capital will become the Special Capital Military

District which includes Saigon Capital, Gia Dinh Sector and Con Son

Special Sector.

Article 6. All Corps Tactical Zones are abolished. Each Infantry

Division will be in charge of a tactical area.The boundaries of these

areas will be determined by JGS/RVNAF depending on local security situation and based on the recommendation of Commanders of Army Corps and

Military Regions.

SECTION 2

Chain of Command

Article 7. The responsibility for each Military Region rests with

an Army Corps.

Army Corps I is responsible for Military Region 1.

Army Corps II is responsible for Military Region 2.

Army Corps III is responsible for Military Region 3.

Army Corps IV is responsible for Military Region 4.

Article 8. Army Corps Headquarters are also Military Region Headquarters. Army Corps Commanders are also Military Region Commanders.

All Army Corps and Military Regions are directly under the command of

JGS/RVNAF.

Article 9. The Special Capital District is subordinate to Military

Region 3.

Article 10. Military Sectors are included in Military Regions.

Mayors and Province Chiefs will be concurrently Sector or Special Sector

Commanders if they are military. If they are civilian, the position of

Sector or Special Sector Commander will be held by a field grade officer.

Article 11. Sub-Sectors are included in Sectors. The District

Chief will be concurrently Sub-Sector Commander if he is military. If

he is civilian, this position will be held by a military officer.

197
SECTION 3

Functions

Article 12. Army Corps and Military Regions have the following

responsibilities:

A. Mobile Operations:

- Plan and conduct search-and-destroy operations against units of

enemy Main Force, Regional Force, Guerrillas and infrastructure.

- Conduct reaction, and relief operations designed to ease enemy

pressure.

- Supervise and support operations conducted by an infantry division

or a sector.

B. Territorial Security:

- Conduct border defense operations against enemy incursions.

- Defend lines of communication, vital points, villages, hamlets,

and all administrative and economic establishments.

- Protect the people and national resources.

- Strengthen the system of outposts, operational bases, and firesupport bases.

C. Pacification and Development:

- Conduct military efforts in support of the Pacification and

Development Program.

- Review Pacification, and Development Plans submitted by siector

commanders and province chiefs.

- Determine priorities for the use of armed forces and their

deployment in support of the Pacification and Development Program.

- Monitor, supervise and control the implementation of the military

plan in support of the Pacification and Development Program.

D. Other functions:

- Civilian defense:

Advise and assist local authorities in organizing people's associations and PSDF.

Advise local authorities in counter-riot action and maintenance

of order.

- Command, train and-administer Territorial Forces, and all attached units.

- Plan and operate a Territorial Intelligence network and an area

communication network.

- Administer national defense resources in personnel and materiels.

- Direct and supervise the administration of manpower and material

resources.

198
- Organize and train home reservists.

- Coordinate logistic activities in support of all agencies and

military units located or operating in Military Regions.

- Political Warfare.

- Accomplish polwar activities in order to win the people's^hearts

and minds.

- Provide care and assistance to military dependents of all mobile

units stationed in military regions.

- Promote and sustain popular support for front-line units.

Article 13. The Special Capital District has the following responsibility:

A. Mobile operations:

- Organize and conduct mobile operations as required or as directed

by the Commander of III Corps and Military Region 3.

- Supervise and support operations organized by subordinate sectors.

B. Territorial Security:

- Defend Saigon Capital, vital points, villages and hamlets and

all administrative and economic establishments.

- Protect the people and national resources in the Special Capital

District.

- Establish and consolidate the system of outposts, operational

bases and fire support bases.

C. Pacification and Development:

- Deploy armed forces and conduct military efforts to support

Pacification and Development Programs in all Sectors.

- Follow up, direct and control the implementation of the military

plan in support of Pacification and Development.

D. Other functions:

- Civilian defense:

Assist local authorities in organizing people's associations

and PSDF.

Assist local authorities in counter-riot action and maintenance

of order.

- Command all attached units.

- Plan and operate a territorial intelligence network.

- Direct and supervise the administration of personnel and materiels.

- Organize and plan military training for home reservists.

- Carry out polwar operations in the Special Capital District.

Article 14. Infantry divisions have the following responsibilities:

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A. Mobile Operations:

- Conduct mobile operations as required or as directed by commanders

of Army Corps and Military Regions. Efforts will be focused on enemy

main force units and bases.

B. Territorial Security:

- Conduct reaction operations at the request of sector headquarters.

Priority for these operations will be decided by commanders of Army Corps

and Military Regions.

- Provide combat units, fire support and other supports to sectors

as ordered by commanders of Army Corps and Military Regions.

- Protect important establishments and open roads and waterways

as directed by commanders of Army Corps and Military Regions.

- Protect important establishments and open roads and waterways

as directed by Commanders of Army Corps and Military Regions.

C. Pacification and Development:

When instructed by commanders of Army Corps and Military Regions,

coordinate activities with sector headquarters to provide effective support for the Pacification and Development Program.

When instructed by commanders of Army Corps and Military Regions,

in conjunction with sector headquarters, launch securing operations in

order to pave the way for the Pacification and Development Programs of

provinces and sectors.

D. Other functions:

- Assist s'ector headquarters in providing military training for

RF and PF when requested.

- Assist local authorities in the control of national resources

and population, restore and maintain order when required.

Article 15. Sectors have the following responsibilities:

A. Territorial Security:

- Plan and conduct search-and-destroy operations against units of

enemy provincial main force, guerrillas and infrastructure.

- Establish äector äecurity p'lans and carry them out after approval

by Army Corps and Military Region Headquarters.

- Recommend to Army Corps and Military Region Headquarters reinforcements required for the maintenance of sector security in case of

shortage of armed forces.

- Direct all activities of RF, PF and other forces in sectors

(National Police, Pacification and Development Cadres, People's SelfDefense Forces).

200
B. Pacification and Development:

- Formulate a military plan in support of the Pacification and

Development Program based on,the policy and guidelines of Army Corps and

Military Region Headquarters.

- Monitor, supervise and control the implementation of military

plan in support of Pacification and Development Program, and be responsible for this to Army Corps and Military Region Headquarters.

C. Other functions:

- Inspect, direct, train and support RF and PF in sectors and

maintain their morale.

- Control the supply and maintenance of weapons distributed to

PSDF members.

- Carry out territorial intelligence tasks.

- Coordinate and install communications systems.

- Control manpower and material resources and administer home

reservits.

Article 16. Sub-Sectors have the following responsibilities:

- Assist sectors in the preparation and implementation of Sector

Security Plans and Pacification and Development Plans.

- Direct RF and other forces (NP, Pacification and Development

cadres, PSDF) belonging to äub-äectors in the support of Village and

Hamlet Defense Plans.

- Direct and supervise subordinate units in the support of Pacification and Development Programs.

- Maintain sub-sector reaction forces to relief Villages and

hamlets under attack.

Recommend to sector headquarters the conduct of operations in

support of Pacification and Development Plans.

- Provide guidance to village chiefs in the establishment of village defense plans and fire support requests.

- Command, and control sub-äector RF and PF units.

Carry out intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks.

- When instructed by sector headquarters, transmit mobilization

order to home reservists, commandeer and control them.

- Issue and check PSDF weapons and ammunitions.

Article 17. Special Sectors are in charge of the following:

Direct search-and-destroy operations against provincial units

of enemy main force, guerrillas and infrastructure.

- Support the Pacification and Development Program in accordance

with the policy and guidelines of Army Corps and Military Region headquarters.

- Protect villages, hamlets, vital points, and all administrative

and economic establishments.

Command and control RF and PF units as well as other assigned

units.

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- Carry out intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks.

- Assist local authorities in the restoration and maintenance of

peace and order.

- Assist local authorities in the organization of people's associations and PSDF.

SECTION 4

Coordination

Article 18. In their responsibilities, Sector Commanders, Special

Sector Commanders and Sub-Sector Commanders will act as soldiers; the

Saigon Mayor, Province Chiefs, Mayors and District Chiefs continue to

retain their political and administrative powers and as far as these

powers are concerned, they remain subordinate to the Ministry of Interior.

Article 19. If in the exercise of duties, there is a disagreement

between military officers and administrative officials, priority will

be given to military actions in emergencies; however, this must be

reported immediately to higher headquarters.

Article 20. In order to effectively defend the Special Capital

District III Corps and Military Region 3 Headquarters must pay special

attention to security conditions in Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia

and Long An Provinces.

SECTION 5

Special Provisions

Article 21. All previous documents and provisions which are

contrary to this Decree, will be abrogated, in particular:

Decree 227/QP, 9 December 1965, and Directive 089/QP, 9 December 1965.

Article 22. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the

Minister of Interior and the Chief Joint General Staff/RVNAF are

responsible for implementing this Decree in keeping with their respective

duties and functions.

This Decree will be published in the Republic of Vietnam Gazette.

Nguyen Van Thieu

(Translation by Translations and Publications Branch, MSD/CORDS,

APO 96243, 10 July 1970)

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Appendix B

Republic of Vietnam

Office of the Chairman

DECREE 198-SL/DUHC Central Executive Committee

24 December 1966

SUBJECT: Reorganization o£ Village and Hamlet Administration

The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee

DECREES:

Article 1. This hereby places the village under the responsibility

of two bodies:

- Village People's Council, and

- Village Administrative Committee

The organization, authority, duties, and functioning of these two

bodies are defined as follows:

CHAPTER I

Village People's Council

Section 1: Organization

Article 2. The Village People's Council is composed of from six

(6) to twelve (12) members elected by the village people through universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. The election procedure

shall be determined by a separate decree.

The member who wins the largest number of votes shall be the

Chairman of the Village People's Council. The member who wins the next

largest number of votes shall be the Deputy Chairman of the Village

People's Council.

In case the Chairman of the Village People's Council is elected

Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee as defined in Article

24, the members who obtained the next highest number of votes in the

election of the Village Council shall hold respectively the positions

of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Village People's Council.

203
In case the deputy chairman of the Village People's Council is

elected Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee, the elected

member who obtained the next largest number of votes shall hold the

position of deputy Chairman of Village People's Council.

In case of a tie, the eldest member is declared elected.'

Article 3. The term of office of the Village People's Council is

three years. Members may be re-elected.

Article 4. Members of the Village People's Council are not authorized to hold any salaried public positions but they may hold another

elected position. Any member of the Village People's Council may be

appointed Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee,but during

such tenure, has no vote in the Council.

Members are not authorized to bid for contracts with the village.

Parents and children, blood brothers and sisters, wives and

husbands may not hold various responsibilities in the same Village

Council.

Article 5. Village Council members may send individual requests

for resignation to the Province Chief through the Village Council Chairman. The resignation shall be effective on the date of receipt of

the decision of the Province Chief, or, if no decision is received

from the Province Chief, the resignation shall be effective one month

after the request for resignation is submitted.

Article 6. Any member of the Village Council shall be declared

automatically resigned by decision of the Province Chief for the following reasons:

a. Violation of the regulation excluding a person from holding

more than one salaried public office or failure to fulfill all the

conditions for eligibility laid down by the Decree fixing the Council

electoral procedures, whether discovered during or after his elections

b. Three consecutive absences during the regular or special sessions, without any just reason recognized as well-founded by the council.

Subject to a two-thirds majority of the Council, the Province

Chief may remove from office any Village Council member who without

justification, fails to fulfill the duties assigned to him by the

council.

Article 7. In case the Village People's Council proves to be

inoperative or there is evidence that activities of more than half of

the Village Council members are pro-Communist or neutralist in favor

of Communism, the Special Commissioner for Administration may sign a

decision to dissolve the Village Council upon the recommendation of a

committee composed of:

204
-The Province Chief or his representative Chairman

-A local Presiding Judge, Court of First

Instance, or Court with Extended Powers

or Justice of Peace Member

-One member of the Provincial Council Member

The Chairman or any member representing the Village People's

Council concerned has the right to plead before the Committee.

Article 8. In case of dissolution of the Village Council, the

election of a new Council will be held within a maximum period of three

months. In addition, a by-election will be held, also within the maximum

period of three months, to replace any members who have resigned, died,

or terminated their responsibilities for whatever reason, provided that:

-The number of missing members is at least one third of the total

membership;

-The members so elected have at least one year to serve prior to

the expiration of the term.

Section 2: Authority

Article 9. Within the limits of current laws, the Village Council

is empowered to discuss and decide on the following matters:

1. Plans of construction and programs of public interest in the

village;

2. Village budget;

3. Miscellaneous taxes, fees, additional percentages, rentals

and all receipts for Village budget;

4. Regulations governing the collection of the income of the

village;

5. Purchase, transfer, exchange, leasing or renting of village

properties and general administration and maintenance work on these

properties;

6. Bids for procurement, supply or transportation for the Village;

7. Receipt of donations and legacies for the village;

8. Concessions for public services;

9. Creation and modification of Village construction plans;

10. Projects for construction of roads, bridges, dams, etc.;

11. Creation, abolition, naming, renaming, modification of

boundaries, and removal of Village,hamlet offices;

12. Loans, subsidies;

13. Organization, management of markets and fairs;

14. Legal proceeding in order to defend village interests, and outof-court settlements subject to approval by the Province Chief;

15. All issues that must be submitted'to the Village Council

for discussion and decision in accordance with regulations in force.

Article 10. The Village Council is empowered to control the

following matters:

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1. Implementation of policies and programs of the Government and

all decisions of the Village Council;

2. Annual report of expenditures in relation to the village budget;

3. Accounting ledgers of villages;

4. Behavior of personnel and cadres at all levels in village,

particularly their attitudes toward serving the people.

The Council is empowered to warn the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and

members of the Village Administrative Committee as well as the Chief

Secretary and assistants if it finds irregularities in the exercise of

their duties.

The Council is empowered, subject to a three-fourths majority of

its total membership, to propose the removal from office of the Village

Administrative Committee Chairman, Deputy Chairman or other members, if

it finds grave faults in the exercise of their duties.

Article 11. The Village Council must be consulted by the Village

Administrative Committee in regard to the following matters:

- Land affairs in the village;

- Problems relative to professional practice by villagers;

- Recruitment of personnel, and

- All questions that must be submitted to the Council for decision

in accordance with regulations.

Article 12. On any problem of general interest to the village,

the Village Council may express opinions, proposals or aspirations to

the local District Chief, Province Chief, Provincial Council, or Special

Commissioner for Administration.

All such ideas, recommendations and suggestions received from the

Council must be considered and resolved within the shortest period of •

time. Results of the consideration must be made known to the Council.

Article 13. Except for the matters prescribed in Articles 14 and

15, all decisions made by the Village Council must be carried out by

the Village Chief within 15 days after transmittal to the Village Administrative Committee.

In case the decisions of the Council cannot be carried out, the

Village Chief shall give explanations to the Council for reconsideration

if necessary.

After reconsideration by the Council, if disagreement still exists,

the Village Council as well as the Village Administrative Committee may

submit the matter directly to the local District Chief or the Province

Chief for solution.

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Article 14. The following decisions must be ratified by the Ministry

involved before implementation:

1. Construction projects, equipment, and programs affecting the

public interest, expenses for which exceed $1,000,000;

2. Village budget, the total of which exceeds $1,000,000;

3. Miscellaneous taxes, fees, receipts for Village budget;

4. Leasing or rental of real estate or properties for a period of

over three years with rental cost exceeding $500,000 per year;

5. Receipt of donations and legacies with additional charges and

conditions;

6. Transfer, purchase and exchange of village properties, the

expenses of which exceed $500,000;

7. Creation, and maintenance of tillage public properties, the

expenses of which exceed $500,000;

8. Creation and modification of Village construction plans;

9. Establishment, naming, abolition, modification of official

boundaries or moving of village offices;

10. Loans, special subsidies;

11. Concessions for public services extending as long as three

years, the estimate for which exceeds $500,000;

12. Establishment of contracts costing over $500,000 which involve

financial responsibility for villages.

Article 15. The following decisions must be ratified by the

Province Chief before implementation:

1. Establishment of Village budget, the total of which amounts to

$1,000,000 or less;

2. Establishment of the percentage rate on any kind of taxes that

the village has been authorized to levy;

3. Leasing or rental of real estate or other properties for a

period of three years or less with the rental cost ranging from $50,000

to $500,000 per year;

4. Receipt of donations and legacies with no additional charges

and conditions;

5. Purchase, transfer and exchange of Village properties, the

expenses for which range from $50,000 to $500,000;

6. Creation or maintenance of Village properties, the expenses

for which range from $50,000 to $500,000;

7. Projects for construction of roads and plazas, alignment of

roads and construction of village roads;

8. Projects for modifying hamlet boundaries;

9. Concession for public services for a period of three years or

less, the cost of which does not exceed $500,000;

10. Establishment of contracts costing $500,000 or less that

require financial responsibility of the village.

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Section 3: Functioning

Article 16. Five days at the latest after the result of the

election is ratified, the Village Council will convene its first session

under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Village Council to elect

the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee and to establish

the Standing Committee of the Council and the internal regulations.

Article 17. The Standing Committee of the Village People's Council

is composed of the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and a Secretary General.

The Secretary General is elected through a single secret ballot and with

simple majority. In case of a tie, the eldest is declared elected.

The result of election and internal regulations of the Council must

be submitted within seven days to the Province Chief through the local

District Chief for approval.

Article 18. The Village Council convened by its Chairman shall

meet in regular sessions at least once a month; its monthly meeting

shall not last more than four days.

In addition, the Council may convene in special session at the

request of the Chairman of the Village Council, the Chairman of the

Village Administrative Committee or one-third of the Council members.

Special sessions shall not last more than two days in a month.

The agenda of regular and special sessions shall be fixed by the

Village Council Chairman after the latter discusses it with the Village

Administrative Committee Chairman and the Standing Committee of the

Council.

Every Council member has the right to suggest one or several

questions to be listed on the agenda. In case such suggestion is not

approved, it must be recorded in the minutes of the meeting and accompanied by an explanatory statement by the Secretary General of the

Council.

Article 19. The Council session and vote shall be valid if more

than one half of the total Council members are present. In case a

meeting is duly convened but the above mentioned quorum cannot be

formed, the Council can reconvene twenty-four hours later and its vote

will be valid irrespective of the number of Council members present.

All decisions made by the Council are considered valid if they are

approved by more than half of the members present unless otherwise

prescribed by this decree.

In case of a tie, the vote of the Chairman shall be decisive.

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Any decisions, ideas, recommendations expressed outside the

regular sessions, against current laws, or outside the authority of the

Council as prescribed in this Decree are automatically void.

Article 20. Meetings of the Village People's Council shall be

public unless otherwise requested by the Chairman of the Village Council,

the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee, or more than one

half of the total Council members.

The chairman, deputy chairman and members of the Village Administrative Committee have the duty to attend sessions of the Village Council and, whenever deemed necessary, have the right to present their

opinions.

On urgent matters arising when the Council is not in session the

Village Council Chairman may consult individual members of the Council.

Article 21. Proceedings of meeting of the Village Council must be

recorded by the Council Secretary General in a separate register which

is kept in the Office of the Village Administrative Committee and a copy

must be submitted to the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee

for action within five days after each meeting.

CHAPTER II

The Village Administrative Committee

Section 1; Composition

Article 22. The Village Administrative Committee is composed of:

-One Village Chief concurrently Commissioner for Civil .Status;

-One Deputy Village Chief concurrently Commissioner for EconomyFinance and;

From one to four Commissioners to assume the following functions:

-Security

-Propaganda and Civic Action

-Social Welfare

-Agricultural Affairs

Article 23. The term of office of the Village Administrative Committee terminates at the same time as that of the Village Council. In

case the Village Council is dissolved before completing its term of

office, the Province Chief, upon recommendation of the District Chief,

can designate a temporary Administrative Committee according to the procedure provided for by Article 44. He may designate the Chairman, the

Deputy Chairman and any other members of the temporary Administrative

Committee from members of the former Village Administrative Committee.

Article 24. The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee

is elected by the Village Council from among its members at the first

209
meeting of the Council as specified in article 16 above. The election

must be held in a public meeting session and through secret ballot,

using an absolute majority. If no member receives the number of votes

required on the first ballot, simple majority is required on the second

ballot.

The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee is not authorized to assume concurrently the functions of Chairman, Deputy Chairman,

or Secretary General of the Village Council.

The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee can be declared

automatically resigned in accordance with procedures specified in Article

6. The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee can be declared

resigned by decision of the Province Chief upon recommendation of the

Village Council in accordance with procedures specified in Article 10,

or he may be removed upon recommendation of the District Chief, with

the agreement of the Village Council, for failure in duty or serious

fault.

In case he is prosecuted before the -court and put in jail, his

functioning will be suspended by decision of the Province Chief.

In case the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee terminates his duty as a result of death, resignation, dismissal, being

declared to have resigned or for any other reason, the Village Council

will elect another Chairman.

Article 25. The Deputy Chairman and Commissioners of the Village

Administrative Committee are appointed and removed from office by

decision of the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee with

the concurrence of the Village Council.

Such appointment must be made in accordance with procedures set

forth by the Province Chief. A copy of the decision Concerning such

appointment must be submitted by the Chairman to the District Chief

of Province Chief concerned for ratification.

The Province Chief, or District Chief upon authorization of the

Province Chief,, has the right to disapprove the appointment of a member

if this member does not meet the prescribed conditions. In this case,

the appointment decision will be returned to the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee with explanatory statement attached.

If no action is taken by the Province Chief or District Chief

within twenty (20) days after receipt of the copy of the appointment

decision, the appointment is considered valid.

Section 2: Duty and Authority

Article 26. The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee

represents the Village administration and is vested with the following

responsibilities:

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- Publishes and enforces laws and regulations and implements

policies of the Government at the village level;

- Sees to maintenance of security and public order in the village;

in this respect he has the right to mobilize the organic forces in the

village and, if required, to request the Popular Forces of the locality

to provide support for security measures;

- Reports to the Province Chief and District Chief any occurrences

in his village, submitting to them reports on special questions as may

be required;

- Certifies documents pertaining to movable and fixed property and

issues administrative certificates (certificate of good character, certificate of residence, etc.);

- Prepares a list of questions to be brought before the Village

Council for discussion and executes decisions made by the Village Council;

- Supervises the Village Administrative Committee and assumes

responsibility for the whole Committee to the Village Council;

- Serves as representative of the village before the law: signs

contracts, takes legal proceedings, etc.

- Oversees the functioning of other governmental agencies at the

village level;

- Provides direction for and operates village administrative

affairs;

- Signs receipts and authorizations within the limit of appropriations covered by the Village budget;

- Serves as conciliator for minor disputes in the village.

The Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee has the

authority to reward or punish subordinate personnel and make recommendations on rewards, punishment of employees and cadres of various

echelons working in the village.

In his capacity as member for Civil Status Affairs, the Chairman is

responsible for maintaining civil status registers and for recording

and issuing birth, marriage and death certificates to the people in

his village. He also presides over wedding ceremonies held in his office.

Article 27. The Deputy Chairman of the Village Administrative

Committee coordinates the activities of members of Village Administrative

Committee in accordance with instructions of the Chairman and replaces

the latter when he is absent or occupied with other duties.

In addition, the Deputy Chairman may be permanently delegated by

the Chairman to sign certain categories of papers dealing with matters

provided for in Article 26 above, except for civil status matters and

expenditure authorizations.

In his capacity of Commissioner for Economy and Finance, the

Deputy Chairman administers finance and village properties and handles

problems concerning village budget, taxation, economy and supply.

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Article 28. The Commissioner for Security handles problems concerning administrative and judicial police, public order, military

draft and military affairs.

He also serves as a judicial police agent.

Article 29. The Commissioner for Propaganda and Civic Action is

in charge of problems pertaining to popular associations, information,

open-arms, civil proselyting, youth, and village postal service.

Article 30. The Commissioner for Social Welfare handles problems

concerning culture, education, social welfare, construction, labor,

public sanitation, and public health.

Article 31. The Commissioner for Agricultural Affairs handles

problems concerning land administration and agriculture. He cooperates

with the Deputy Chairman, concurrently Commissioner for Economy and

Finance, in the administration of village public land and rice fields.

Section 3; Functioning

Article 32. The Deputy Chairman and Commissioners of the Village

Administrative Committee, are subordinate to the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee.

Article 33. The Village Administrative Committee shall meet at

least twice a month under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee to review the work completed and, at the

same time, to work out plans of action for the months to come and to

coordinate with other agencies in the Village.

In addition, the Village Administrative Committee shall meet at

least once a month with the Village Council, upon convocation of the

Village Council Chairman, under the joint chairmanship of the Village

Council Chairman and the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee.

Article 34. There is a secretariat placed at the service of the

Village Administrative Committee. This secretariat is headed by a

Chief Secretary who is assisted by one or two assistants.

The Chief Secretary and Assistants are selected and removed from

office by decision of the Province Chief upon recommendation of the

local District Chief.

Article 35. The Chief Secretary of the Village Administrative

Committee has the following responsibilities:

- To supervise the village secretariat;

- To handle general administrative problems;

- To keep seals, registers and village records;

- To act as the Village Cashier.

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The Assistant to the Chief Secretary is in charge of the Civil

Status Section, assists the latter in the performance of the abovecited duties and replaces him during his absence or when he is busy

with other duties.

CHAPTER III

Hamlet Management Committee

Article 36, The Hamlet is placed under the management of a Hamlet

Management Committee which is composed of:

- One Hamlet Chief

- One Assistant for Security

- One Assistant for Propaganda and Civic Action

In hamlets where the population exceeds three thousand (3,000) the

Hamlet Chief may be assisted by a Deputy Hamlet Chief.

Article 37. The Hamlet Chief and his Deputy are elected by the

people in the hamlet through universal and direct suffrage with secret

ballot. The election procedure will be provided for in a separate

decree.

The term of office of the Hamlet Chief and his Deputy is three

years. They may be re-elected.

The Hamlet Chief and his Deputy are not entitled to enter into

contracts with their village.

Parents and children, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives may

not hold various memberships in the same Hamlet Management Committee.

Article 38. The Hamlet Chief and his Deputy may tender their

resignation, be declared resigned or removed from office in accordance

with the same procedure governing the bodies at village level, but

the term of the Hamlet Chief and Deputy Hamlet Chief has no connection

with the term of these bodies.

In case the Hamlet Chief terminates his duties before completing

his term for any reason, the Deputy Hamlet Chief will perform the

duties of Hamlet Chief and an election will be held within a maximum

period of three months to elect another Deputy Hamlet Chief.

In case there is no Deputy Hamlet Chief or the Hamlet Chief and

Deputy Hamlet Chief both terminate their duties, an election will be

held within a maximum period of three months to fill these positions.

Article 39. The Hamlet Chief represents the Village Chief in his

hamlet and is vested with the following duties:

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- To carry out the laws, policies and regulations of the government and the directives of local administrative authorities;

- To maintain order and security in his hamlet;

- To supervise the Hamlet Management Committee;

- To report to the Village Administrative Committee on the general

situation and activities of his hamlet;

- To represent the hamlet before the Village Administrative Committee;

- To certify routine administrative papers before submitting them

to the Village Administrative Committee;

- To maintain hamlet registers;

- To assist the Village Administrative Committee in the collection

of taxes;

The Deputy Hamlet Chief replaces the Hamlet Chief during his

absence or when he is busy with other duties.

Article 40. The Assistant for Security and the Assistant for

Propaganda and Civic Action are appointed by the Chairman of the Village

Administrative Committee in accordance with the conditions prescribed

by the Province Chief, upon the recommendation of the Hamlet Chief and

with the concurrence of the Village Council. The District Chief may

disapprove such appointments in accordance with the procedure set forth

in Article 25 above.

The Assistant for Security assists the Hamlet Chief in the maintenance of order, security and defense of the hamlet.

The Assistant for Propaganda and Civic Action assists the Hamlet

Chief in problems concerning popular associations, information, openarms, social welfare, youth and public sanitation.

CHAPTER IV

General Provisions

Article 41. In the exercise of their duties, the members of the

Village Council are not entitled to any salary but are granted an allowance computed on the basis of the number of days of attendance at

Council meetings. Members of the Standing Committee of the Village

Council receive a special allowance to be determined later. The special

allowance of the Chairman of the Village Council must be equal to the

monthly compensation received by the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee.

The Chairman and his Deputy and other members of the Village Administrative Committee, the Chief Secretary and his Assistant, the Hamlet

Chief, the Deputy Hamlet Chief and Assistants are granted monthly compensations.

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The allowances and compensations mentioned above are supported by

the village budget in accordance with a rate to be fixed by a decree of

the Special Commissioner for Administration with the concurrence of the

Central Budget Agency.

Article 42. During their period of service, all village and hamlet

officials mentioned in this Decree, together with their spouses and

legitimate children, are entitled to receive second class treatment in

government hospitals. Hospitalization fees will be paid in accordance

with regulations applicable to government officials.

In case a village or hamlet official is fatally wounded or missing

in the course of exercising his duty, his legal beneficiary is entitled

to a compensation equal to twelve times his last month's salary. This

compensation is supported by the village budget. In the case of a member

of the Village Council, the death benefit will be the equivalent of

twelve times his monthly allowance on the basis of 30 days a month.

Article 43. Temporarily during the pacification period, and in

areas where elections cannot be held, local authorities will establish

by decree and upon consultation with representatives of all strata of

people in the village:

- A provisional Village Administrative Committee (at village level)

- A provisional Hamlet Management Committee (at hamlet level)

Article 44. The Provisional Village Administrative Committee is

established by a decree of the Province Chief. Its composition is limited

to the following members:

- One Chairman concurrently Commissioner for Civil Status;

- One Deputy Chairman concurrently Commissioner for Economy,

Finance and Agricultural Affairs;

- One Commissioner for Security;

One Commissioner for Propaganda and Civic Action, concurrently

Commissioner for Social Welfare;

The Provisional Village Administrative Committee assumes the combined responsibilities and holds the authority of both the Village Council

and Village Administrative Committee.

The provisional Village Administrative Committee has a small secretariat appointed by the Province Chief.

Article 45. The Provisional Hamlet Management Committee is created

by Service Order of the District Chief concerned. Its composition can

be limited to one Hamlet Chief and one Assistant.

Article 46. Village and hamlet operating expenditures are ordinarily

covered by the village budget.

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In the pacification period, all organizing and operating expenditures incurred by the Provisional Village Administrative Committee and

the Provisional Hamlet Management Committee are supported by the national

budget.

Article 47. This Decree cancels and supersedes Decree No. 203-d/NV

dated 31 May 1964.

Article 48. The Deputy Chairman of the Central Executive Committee,

the Commissioners General, Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Special

Commissioners and Province Chiefs are charged, each as to that which

concerns him, with the execution of this Decree.

This Decree will be published in the RVN Gazette.

Nguyen Cao Ky

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Glossary

ALSC

ARVN

CAP

CAT

Chieu Hoi

CIDG

CMD

COMUSMACV

CORDS

COSVN

CPDC

CRDC

CSCC

CTZ

DIOCC

DSA

DTA

Administrative and Logistical Support Center

(for RF and PF)

Army of Vietnam. The common term used to refer

to regular army forces to include airborne and

ranger units

Combined Action Platoon

Combined Action Team

The "Open Arms" program for encouraging the VC

defect to the GVN side

Civilian Irregular Defense Group

Capital Military District

Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development

Support. The MACV agency that provided single

manager direction of all US Civil/Military

pacification activities in the RVN

Central Office for South Vietnam (Politbureau)

Central Pacification and Development Council

Central Revolutionary Development Council

Combat Support Coordination Center

Corps Tactical Zone. The geographical area of

responsibility of a Corps, but frequently and

erroneously used to refer to the Corps headquarters itself: e.g. "CTZ will review...",

DTA will submit to CTZ ..." The term "Region"

is sometimes used interchangeably with CTZ since

both areas encompass the same geographical area

District Intelligence and Operations Coordination

Center

District Senior Advisor

Division tactical area. The geographical area of

responsibility of a division (prior to 1970)

217
FULRO

FWMAF

GVN

HES

Hoi Chanh

Hop Tac

JGS

JUSPAO

MACV

MAT

MEDCAP

MR

MTT

NPFF or PFF

PF

PIOCC

PRU

PSDF

RD

RF

RPDC

RVN

RVNAF

Front Unifie pour la Lutte des Races Opprimees

(Unified Front of Struggle for Oppressed Races)

Free World Military Assistance Forces

Government of South Vietnam. Used to refer to

the national government, to the entire governmental structure, or as an apposition to indicate one of its agents or agencies

Hamlet Evaluation System

A returnee coming in under the Chieu Hoi "Open

Arms" program

"Working Together". The program for priority

attention to expanding GVN control in critical

areas. Hop Tac I is a program designed to

expand GVN control in the Saigon - Cholon area

Joint General Staff (RVNAF)

Joint United States Public Affairs Office.

Served US interest as well as adviser

Military Assistance Command Vietnam

Mobile Assistance Team

Medical Civic Action Program

Military Region

Mobile Training Team

National Police Field Force

Popular Forces. Military forces recruited and

and employed within a district, and basically

organized into platoons

Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination

Center

Provincial Reconnaissance Unit

People's Self-Defense Forces

Revolutionary (or Rural) Development

Regional Forces. Military forces recruited and

employed within a province and later within a

military region. Primarily organized into

companies

Regional Pacification and Development Council

Republic of Vietnam

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Refers to all

three services

218
SP

TAOR

USAID

USARV

VC

VCI

VN

VNAF

VNN

VNMC

Special Police

Tactical Area of ResponsibilityUnited States Agency for International Development.

The Section of the US Mission generally responsible

for the civil side of US advice and assistance

with the exception of the information service.

United States Army, Vietnam

Viet Cong. Communist insurgents against the South

Vietnamese Government

Viet Cong Infrastructure

Vietnam, Vietnamese

Vietnamese Air Force

Vietnamese Navy

Vietnamese Marine Corps

219