GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

August 13, 2003 

The Honorable Curt Weldon 

Chairman 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Issues Facing the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program

In October 1999, the Army announced plans to transform into a more strategically 

responsive force that could more rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all types of 

military operations, whether small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. The 

Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is to provide the suite of weaponry and other 

equipment for the transformed force. The Army plans to develop a family of 18 

systems under the FCS program. Because of its size, the FCS program will dominate 

the Army’s investment accounts over the next decade. 

In July 2002, we began to review the FCS program as the program was approaching a 

decision on whether to start the system development and demonstration (SDD) 

phase—referred to as the milestone B decision. On April 10, 2003, we briefed staff of 

the House Committee on Armed Services on our work and provided a copy of the 

briefing to the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We also briefed Army 

and DOD officials associated with the FCS program. The objectives of the briefing 

were to provide (1) an understanding of the content, approach, and schedule of the 

FCS program; (2) observations on both the positive and challenging features of the 

program; and (3) different approaches to proceeding with FCS that warrant 

consideration. The enclosure contains the briefing slides. 

On May 17, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) approved the Army’s request to begin the SDD phase for the FCS program. 

He directed the Army to perform a full milestone B update in November 2004 to 

obtain authority to continue SDD and to authorize prototype production. He also 

listed 14 actions items to be completed prior to the milestone update. 

We believe the issues raised in our briefing remain relevant as the FCS program 

begins the SDD phase. Because of your committees’ interest in the FCS program, we 
2 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

are enclosing the full briefing with this report and summarizing it in the following 

paragraphs. 

Background 

Under its transformation efforts, the Army plans to change the way it organizes, 

trains, deploys, and equips its forces. It expects the future force to be organized 

around brigade-size units that perform virtually all Army combat functions.1

 The 

Army wants to fully equip these units with FCS, a family of 18 networked, warfighting systems which are intended to be more lethal, survivable, deployable, and 

sustainable than existing heavy combat systems. In order to deploy faster, the FCS 

vehicles are expected to be a fraction of the weight of existing heavy armored 

fighting vehicles. The Army believes that nontraditional fighting tactics coupled with 

an extensive information network will compensate for the loss of size and armor 

mass by utilizing information superiority and synchronized operations to see, engage, 

and destroy the enemy before the enemy detects the future forces. 

The Army has allocated about $22 billion for the FCS program during fiscal years 

2004 through 2009 and several billions more for non-FCS programs that the FCS will 

need to become fully capable. In addition, the Army recently implemented FCS 

schedule changes, which added about 2 years to the SDD phase. 

Features and Challenges of the FCS Concept 

The FCS program has several progressive features, but also faces a number of 

challenges. The FCS concept shows that the Army leadership is thinking innovatively 

to arrive at the best ways to prepare for future Army operations. For example, Army 

leaders decided to include interoperability with other systems in the FCS design and 

design the individual FCS systems to work as part of a networked system-of-systems. 

These features represent an improvement over the past approach of developing 

individual systems first and then attempting to integrate them later, an approach that 

could lead to schedule and cost growth. The system-of-systems approach also allows 

program managers more flexibility to make trade-offs among the individual systems. 

Collectively, the system-of-systems could still provide an effective combat capability 

even if some of the individual system capabilities are lost or degraded. In addition, 

the Army has adopted best practice tools to measure the progress of technology 

development. For example, it is employing technology readiness levels to measure 

the maturity of technologies being considered for FCS components. 

The acquisition strategy for the FCS is aggressive, particularly in light of the 

program’s vast scope. The SDD phase began with more risk present than 

recommended by best practices or DOD guidance. For example, many critical 

technologies were significantly immature and will require further development at the 

same time as product development is conducted. This concurrent development 

 

1

 According to Army planning documents, Special Forces, Rangers, and airborne forces are the only 

combat formations that will continue to perform their current missions and not be replaced in the 

future force. 
3 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

increases the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Since FCS will dominate the 

Army’s investment accounts over the next decade, any cost growth and schedule 

delays could affect the entire Army. 

Even with the recent extension of SDD by about 2 years, the FCS strategy calls for 

developing multiple systems and a network in less time than DOD typically needs to 

develop a single advanced system. In addition, a favorable decision to begin SDD on 

a system-of-systems like FCS poses challenges for the acquisition process such as 

defining and evaluating requirements, analyzing alternatives, estimating and tracking 

costs, conducting test and evaluation, and conducting oversight. 

Options for Proceeding with FCS 

In our briefing, we noted that while proceeding with FCS as planned posed significant 

challenges, doing nothing would not allow the Army to meet its transformation 

objectives. Moreover, if each of the 18 FCS systems and the network were managed 

as traditional, individual programs, it could weaken the architecture and would 

amount to controlled evolution versus transformation. 

We offered three options for proceeding with FCS at lower risk. Each option involves 

trade-offs or consequences, as indicated below. 

Proposed Action Potential Consequences 

Further mature key technologies before 

entering SDD. 

Reduces risk and increases knowledge 

but could delay system integration and 

fielding. 

Use advanced technology 

demonstrations to mature key 

technologies. 

Accelerates development of least 

mature and most complex technologies 

but could delay fielding. 

Approve FCS architecture while 

implementing a knowledge-based 

approach for incorporating individual 

systems into SDD. 

Provides a better fit with the acquisition 

process and more opportunity to 

change course if planned progress is 

not made. Could increase the difficulty 

of maintaining the integrity of the 

system of systems and reduce flexibility 

to make decisions across system lines. 

Agency Comments

In early April 2003, we discussed a draft of the briefing at length with Army and DOD 

officials and revised the briefing as appropriate. We recently provided a draft of this 
4 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

letter and enclosed briefing to DOD for review and comment. In official oral 

comments, DOD officials stated that there were no objections to the content of the 

letter and briefing. 

Scope and Methodology 

We focused our assessment on the Army’s strategy for developing and acquiring FCS 

and compared it with knowledge-based acquisition principles. Specifically, we 

examined (1) the technologies the Army has proposed for FCS and (2) the challenges 

associated with developing a complex system-of-systems. We reviewed relevant 

program documents and interviewed key officials to understand the FCS concept and 

determine the Army’s strategy for developing and acquiring FCS. We met with 

officials from the research and development commands to identify key technologies 

the Army is considering for use in FCS.2

 We conducted our work from July 2002 to 

June 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We plan to provide copies of this report to the Senate Armed Services Committee; the 

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense; and the House 

Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense. We also will provide 

copies to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; 

and the Secretary of the Army. We will make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on 

(202) 512-2811; or Bill Graveline, Assistant Director, on (256) 922-7514. Major 

contributors to this correspondence are John David Anderson, Marcus Ferguson, 

Lawrence Gaston, Thomas Gordon, and William Lipscomb. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosure 

 

2

 On April 28, 2003, the Institute for Defense Analysis issued a draft report of the Independent 

Assessment Panel for Future Combat Systems, called the Welch Report. We could not include 

information from that report in our briefing of April 10, 2003. The report, however, is being considered 

in our ongoing work regarding FCS. 
Enclosure Enclosure 

5 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

1

Future Combat Systems

Briefing by GAO

April 2003
Enclosure Enclosure 

6 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

2

Briefing Structure

• Understanding Future Combat Systems (FCS)

• Criteria For Knowledge-Based Acquisitions

• FCS Technologies

• Schedule for FCS Increment 1 

• FCS Affordability

• FCS Program Review

• Observations

• Options
Enclosure Enclosure 

7 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

3

Army Transformation

• Army is radically transforming its combat capabilities including

culture, doctrine, personnel, training, and weapon systems. This 

transformation is predicated on Army Visions and Concepts, new 

unit designs, etc.

• Army wants a force, called the Objective Force, that is agile, 

flexible, deployable, and mobile, yet as tough as the current heavy 

force. Its basic combat unit will be the Unit of Action.

• The Objective Force means more than different equipment and 

organizations—for example, it means delegating decision-making 

authority to commanders close to the action.

• The FCS acquisition program will provide most of the combat 

systems to equip the Objective Force.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

8 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

4

Transformation Demands of FCS

• To meet the needs of transformation, FCS must be:

• Lethal – equal to the current heavy force.

• Survivable – equal to the current heavy force.

• Deployable – within days, not months.

• Sustainable – immediately and with a small logistical footprint.

• FCS is expected to be a system of systems featuring advanced, 

networked air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver-support, 

and sustainment systems that will include manned and unmanned 

platforms.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

9 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

5

General Description

• The smaller, lighter systems that enhance deployability will 

have to do the work of heavy systems. This requires:

• New technologies that give conventional systems more capability (e.g., armor, munitions, and propulsion).

• New technologies that provide unconventional capabilities (e.g., unmanned sensors, robotics).

• A command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) network that substitutes information superiority and 

synchronized operations for mass and makes for a 

system of systems whose whole is greater than the sum 

of its parts. 

Understanding FCS 
Enclosure Enclosure 

10 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

6

Key Features of FCS

• FCS depends on light systems so they can deploy anywhere in the world 

quickly.

• FCS systems are to roll off combat ready and self-sustaining for 3 to 7 

days.

• Once deployed, the FCS will need to fight in nontraditional ways to be 

successful. 

• The Network will be used to gain informational superiority, locate and 

identify the enemy, and kill at a distance before the enemy can engage the 

manned FCS systems.

• FCS is expected to use advanced signature management and other 

techniques to avoid detection and advanced armors to survive the

engagement if the enemy systems approach within direct fire range.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

11 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

7

FCS Acquisition Strategy

• Eventually replace all the heavy and interim combat 

units with the FCS-equipped objective force units.

• Evolutionary acquisition focused on providing 

warfighters with an initial capability which can be 

delivered sooner than an ultimate capability.

• Incremental or block approach using spiral development 

to reach full requirements.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

12 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

8

FCS Acquisition Strategy (cont.)

• Collaborative effort involving user, developer, testers, and industry 

in Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency lead agency in 

Concept and Technology Development (CTD) phase. Army will be 

the lead agency during the Systems Development and 

Demonstration (SDD) Phase.

• Competitively selected Lead System Integrator (LSI) is responsible 

during CTD for identifying possible FCS technologies, performing

trade studies, and developing a FCS system of systems 

architecture. LSI to continue during SDD.

• Program documents are being concurrently developed for the 

upcoming milestone B decision point (Operational Requirements 

Document, Analysis of Alternatives, Baseline Cost Analysis).

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

13 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

9

FCS Key Performance Parameters

• Operational Requirements Document for FCS increment 1 dated 

January 22, 2003 is under review by Joint Requirements Oversight

Council.

• Operational Requirements Document contains seven Key 

Performance Parameters.

• Joint interoperability

• Networked battle command

• Networked lethality

• Transportability

• Survivability

• Sustainability and reliability

• Training

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

14 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

10

FCS Increment 1 Concept

• Increment 1 of the FCS system of systems includes 18 direct 

systems plus the network.

• FCS platforms will be networked via a joint C4ISR architecture to 

enable levels of situational understanding and synchronized 

operations heretofore unachievable.

• Complementary systems are needed to provide capabilities to the 

Unit of Action and will have to stay synchronized with the FCS 

program.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

15 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

11

Increment 1: 18 Direct FCS Systems

Manned Systems

• Command and Control Vehicle

• Infantry Carrier Vehicle

• Mounted Combat System

• Non Line of Sight - Cannon

• Non Line of Sight - Mortar

• Reconnaissance and 

Surveillance Vehicle

• FCS Recovery and 

Maintenance Vehicle

• Medical Vehicle

Unmanned Systems

• 4 types of Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles classed by size

• 3 types of Unmanned Ground 

Vehicles

• Armed Robotic Vehicle

• Multi-Function Utility/Logistics 

Equipment Vehicle

• Small Unmanned Ground 

Vehicle

• Unattended Ground Sensors

• Intelligent Munition System

• Non-Line of Sight Launch System

A Unit of Action will need 690 direct FCS systems.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

16 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

12

Network Concept

• The Network is envisioned as a voice, data, and video 

communication, command, and intelligence system linking the unit

commander and all levels within the unit of action including the

individual vehicles and dismounted soldiers with:

• All sources of intelligence including unattended ground sensors, dismounted soldiers, ground vehicles, aircraft, and 

space satellites.

• All sources of combat firepower including systems both inside and outside the unit regardless of the services that owns them.

• Members of the Joint, Interagency and/or Multinational Coalition forces.

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

17 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

13

Network Concept (cont.)

The FCS network will require

• Obtaining and fusing imagery and other data from National and commercial assets (e.g. satellites), Army assets both within the unit of action and above the unit of action, and other services 

assets.

• Developing and networking unit of action assets such as unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, unmanned ground 

sensors, dismounted soldiers, and manned FCS vehicles.

• Interoperability with the current Army radios and those of joint and multinational coalitions.

• Access to and management of bandwidth to transfer vast amounts of information.

• Two complementary programs--Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) 

are expected to enable the interoperability and increases in 

bandwidth. 

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

18 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

14

Understanding FCS – The Network

•UE

•Multinational Force •Joint Force •Inter-Agency

•UA

•FCS

JTRS Network

ISR Assets

•JSTARS

ISR Assets

•TES

Fire Assets

•IDM

Fire

Assets

Legacy

Army

•ABCS

Stryker

•ABCS

HSOC

JTF

•ADSI

•JWARN

•JDISS

•DCGS

•GCCS

FTTS

Soldier

+

Med HQ

•TMIP/MC4

Battle

Command

System

RAH-66

•IDM

Manned Platforms

UAVs

Unmanned 

Ground 

Vehicles

WIN-T Network GCSS-A

Host 

Nation

•Air traffic 

control

SOF

•JSOF C2

GIG

•NIPRNET

•SIPRNET

•TIBS

•TRAP

•TRIXS

ISR Assets

•DCGS-A

AH-64

•IDM

Comm Asset

•GIG teleport

•DSN

•DRSN

DoS

Country

teams

C2V

•JWICS

Fire Assets

•HIMARS

•GCCS-M

MV 

Med Co

Comm Assets

•MILSTAR

•IBS/GBS ISR Assets

LW I, II

FCS BCS

Source: U.S. Army.
Enclosure Enclosure 

19 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

15

Examples of Complementary Systems

• Comanche Helicopter

• High Mobility Artillery Rocket 

System

• Engineer Vehicle

• Future Tactical Truck System

• Theater Support Vehicle

• Combined Arms/Psychological 

Operations Vehicle

• Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear 

Response System

• Common Missile

• Aerial Common Sensor

• JTRS

• WIN-T

• Distributed Common Ground 

System – Army

• Army Airborne Command and 

Control System

• Technical Enhancement 

Program

• Prophet (signal intelligence)

• Multi-Mission Radar

• Land Warrior Block II

Understanding FCS
Enclosure Enclosure 

20 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

16

• Separate technology development from product development.

• Match user needs with developer’s resources by milestone B 

(Indicator: Technology readiness).

• Demonstrate design stability by Critical Design Review (CDR) 

(Indicator: percent of drawings releasable to manufacturing).

• Demonstrate production process maturity before manufacturing 

articles are ready for delivery to the customer.

• Endorsed by Defense Acquisition policies.

Criteria For Knowledge-Based Acquisition
Enclosure Enclosure 

21 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

17

• Experience has shown that programs with technologies 

that reach high maturity levels at product launch were 

better able to meet cost, schedule, and performance 

requirements.

• Experience also indicates that programs that proceed 

with immature technologies encounter significant cost 

growth and schedule slippage.

• The acquisition process puts pressure on programs to 

accept immature technologies and to make optimistic 

assumptions about product development.

Criteria For Knowledge-Based Acquisition
Enclosure Enclosure 

22 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

18

FCS Increment 1 Still Being Defined

• Army has defined the system of systems architecture and concept,

but the individual systems are expected to evolve during SDD:

• Complete system definitions have been put off at least until the

preliminary design review scheduled for fiscal year 2005 or 

perhaps until critical design review in fiscal year 2006.

• If some technologies do not work out, the Army plans to work 

with the user community to modify the current requirements, 

and pursue the technology in a later phase of the program.

• The Army plans to continue to mature technologies during SDD and

spiral them into the system of systems when they become mature. 

Thus, the composition of the system of systems and the design of

the individual systems will change throughout SDD.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

23 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

19

Design Concept Must Balance Tensions

• Small and light systems are key to meeting deployability 

requirements but meeting the survivability and lethality 

requirements puts pressure on size and weight of the 

systems.

• Sensors, sensor fusion, relays, and data flow are critical to 

lethality and survivability. System of systems performance 

will be sensitive to degradation in these areas.

• Technical sophistication is needed to deliver performance 

characteristics but has to be balanced with high reliability, 

maintainability, and sustainability.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

24 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

20

Technical Assessment Used Good Processes 

• The Science and Technology IPT identified and assessed 31 

critical FCS technology areas that, if not available, would 

result in significant degradation of Unit of Action 

effectiveness.

• The assessment process:

• Used approved criteria—Technical Readiness Levels 

(TRLs).

• Was transparent.

• Was a clear confrontation of technical challenges.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

25 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

21

Many Key Technologies Not Mature

• The maturity assessment of the 31 critical FCS 

technology areas showed:

• 7 were at TRL 6 (or had funded SDD program)

• 10 were between TRL 5 and 6

• 10 were at TRL 5

• 4 were at less than TRL 5

• 22 required risk mitigation plans

• These scores were based on the assessed maturity of 

underlying technologies and their readiness for FCS 

applications. 

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

26 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

22

Independent Technology Assessment

• Validated the IPT technology maturity assessment.

• Reviewed the FCS program’s risk mitigation plans.

• Concluded that: 

• TRLs support entry into SDD for FCS Increment 1 in May 2003 and 

• Risk mitigation strategies are reasonable.

• Army drew on very senior and experienced individuals to make these 

judgments.

• Although the Army concluded that the TRLs supported entry into SDD, 

most technologies are at TRL levels considered immature by best practice 

standards.

• FCS expected to present a major technology integration challenge.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

27 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

23

MS C

IOC

(Threshold)

DAB IPR

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

MS B

System Development & Demonstration

Concept

and

Technology

Demos

Final 

Prototype

CTD

Award

SoS

CDR

30

SoS 

PDR

DAB IPR

Note: calendar year shown

# Critical Technology 

Number

Low Rate

Initial Production

27

28

11

20

15

16a

12

24

25

29

31

2

7

10

8

6

4

1

19

13

5

23

18

3

26

22

17

21

9

14

CTs 

after 

PDR 30

15

7 18

3 Network Security

Wideband Waveforms

Dual Mode Seeker

Precision Munitions

Manned/Unmanned 

Collaborations

Countermine

15

Army Assessment of FCS Critical Technology Readiness

FCS Technologies

DAB IPR

Source: U.S. Army.
Enclosure Enclosure 

28 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

24

Network Technology Challenges

• Development of these capabilities will require:

• Full time unmanned air vehicle to provide relays.

• Wideband waveform from the JTRS to provide necessary 

bandwidth. (Alternatively, the FCS program is working on 

means to better manage available bandwidth.)

• Availability of FCS version of JTRS in fiscal year 2007. 

• Significant software development effort.

• Sensor/data fusion and other algorithms.

• If the network capability falls below critical mass (yet to be 

defined), the lethality and survivability of the unit of action will 

be reduced.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

29 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

25

Lethality Technology Challenges

• FCS must achieve a high kill-per-round-fired ratio and at greater ranges to 

achieve its lethality goal. The FCS will use networked fires and advanced 

precision weapons to achieve its goal.

• Traditional delivery systems, including cannons and howitzers, mounted on 

16 to 20-ton platforms present physics challenges (i.e. shock impact).

• Lightweight 120 mm cannon development is not yet at TRL 5.

• Advanced precision weapons including Common Missile, Compact Kinetic 

Energy Missile, Loiter and Precision Attack Missiles, precision mortar round 

are not yet mature.

• The FCS lethality goal also depends upon:.

• Network’s ability to locate and identify targets and communicate to the 

shooter in real time. 

• Automatic Target Recognition.

• Sensor-Shooter Algorithms and Fire Control.

• Rapid battle damage assessment.

• Lethality affects the amount of munitions that must be carried by FCS 

which in turn affects FCS’s sustainability and deployability.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

30 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

26

Survivability Technology Challenges

• FCS manned system survivability is dependent on its ability to 

detect and kill the enemy beyond direct combat range, to avoid 

detection if the enemy approaches within direct combat range, and 

to survive the first shot if the enemy engages the FCS system.

• Killing the enemy first depends on achieving the FCS’s lethality as 

discussed on the previous slide.

• Avoiding detection depends on vehicle’s signature management 

and the ability of the network to tell FCS systems precisely where 

the enemy is before the enemy detects FCS.

• Surviving the first shot depends on robust ballistic armor, active 

protection system, electronic armor, and other means.

• Each presents technical challenges and could make reaching 

other goals (like high reliability) more difficult.

FCS Technologies
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31 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

27

Sustainment Technology Challenges

• To achieve its self-sustainment and logistics footprint reduction 

requirements, the FCS will need to:

• Obtain very high levels of reliability and maintainability by:

• Developing robust, simple FCS designs despite high 

complexity of the FCS concept and the use of advanced 

technologies in the designs.

• Achieving advances in embedded prognostics and 

diagnostics systems.

• Emphasize the use of common subsystems and components.

• Achieve its high kill-per-round-fired goals.

• Develop a robust real time battlefield damage assessment 

system.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

32 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

28

Other Technology Challenges 

• Other critical technologies that are not yet mature include:

• High-power density/Fuel efficient propulsion.

• Semi-autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles.

• Water purification and generation.

• Hybrid electric power systems.

FCS Technologies
Enclosure Enclosure 

33 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

29

Program Schedule

FY00-03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15-18

System 

Development

& Demo

Production & Deployment

B C

System 

Integration

System 

Demo Full-Rate Prod 

& Deployment

Systems of 

Systems 

Critical Design

Review

3nd Qtr. 2006

Full Rate 

Production

Decision

Review

3rd Qtr.

2013

Con

&

Tech

Dev

LRIP

System of Systems 

Preliminary Design 

Review

1st Qtr. 2005

56-month SDD schedule driven by FCS Increment 1 Initial and 

Full Operational Capability dates in fiscal years 2011 and 2013.

Schedule for FCS Increment1

Milestone B

May 2003

Milestone C

2nd Qtr.

2008

Initial 

Operational

Capability

1st Qtr. 2011

Full

Operational

Capability

1st Qtr. 2013

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.
Enclosure Enclosure 

34 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

30

SDD Schedule Extended

• Approximately two years added between Milestones B and C.

• First unit equipped date of fiscal year 2008 has been 

dropped.

• Initial operational capability is to be achieved in fiscal year 

2011 with less ambitious FCS unit:

• Includes combination of FCS and legacy units, not a unit of action. 

• Could use “in lieu of” vehicles.

• Full operational capability date extended to fiscal year 2013.

Schedule for FCS Increment 1
Enclosure Enclosure 

35 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

31

Recent Changes Improve SDD Schedule

March 2003 Schedule

• Prototype assembly to start within 3 to 

5 months of start of SDD.

• Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to 

occur within 8 to 9 months of SDD 

start.

• CDR to occur within 21 months of start 

of SDD.

• Long lead item procurement to start 

within 26 months of SDD start—within 

5 months after CDR—and with the 

benefit of only limited prototype 

testing.

• Not all FCS systems will be prototyped 

before production decision.

Schedule for FCS Increment 1

April 2003 Schedule

• Prototype assembly to start within 

28 months of start of SDD.

• Preliminary Design Review to occur 

within 18 months of SDD start.

• CDR to occur within 36 months of 

start of SDD.

• Long lead item procurement to start 

within 45 months of SDD start—

within 12 months after CDR—and 

with the benefit of only limited 

prototype testing.

• Need more information on FCS 

systems to be prototyped.
Enclosure Enclosure 

36 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

32

Revised Schedule More Executable But Still Aggressive

• SDD increased by two years.

• More knowledge demonstrated by PDR and CDR.

• “Offramps” added in form of Defense Acquisition Board in-process 

reviews.

• Smaller initial operational capability unit makes SDD scope more

manageable.

• Completion of technology development, system development and 

integration, network integration, and system of systems integration 

still must occur within five years.

Schedule for FCS Increment 1
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37 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

33

Funding and Affordability

• Army cost estimate is complete and the Cost Analysis Improvement

Group’s independent review is underway.

• Cost estimates need to accurately account for significant scope and unknowns.

• If the FCS cost estimate is not more realistic than estimates for past programs, impact on the Army’s budget could be serious.

• Army has allocated about $22 billion for FCS during fiscal years 2004 to 

2009 and several additional billion for complementary programs.

• Recent schedule changes and program re-scoping were made to address 

near term affordability issues. Army plans to address remaining near term 

affordability issues in budget drills later this year.

• More details needed on Increment 1 content under revised program plans.

• Significant funding increases required in years beyond the current Future 

Years Defense Program period.

FCS Affordability
Enclosure Enclosure 

38 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

34

Welch Panel to Review FCS and Transformation

• Confirm that the currently defined program of the Objective 

Force and FCS components is on course to deliver, in 

successive increments, the needed capability to combatant 

commanders for future operations.

• Confirm that the current and planned management structure 

can begin to deliver the 1st Increment of this force by dates 

planned under recently revised program.

• Study completed and results provided to the Army on

April 28, 2003.

FCS Program Review
Enclosure Enclosure 

39 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

35

• Overall, the FCS concept shows progressive thinking on the part of the 

Army, particularly regarding the architecture, but SDD slated to start with 

more risk than recommended by best practices or DOD guidance. The 

Army’s recent schedule changes improve the program’s executability but 

the acquisition strategy is still aggressive.

Positive features of FCS:

• Army leadership is thinking about the best ways to prepare for future 

conflicts and is thinking unconventionally.

• The architecture FCS provides will leverage individual capabilities and will 

facilitate interoperability and open systems. This is a significant 

improvement over the traditional approach of building superior individual 

weapons that must be netted together after the fact.

• System of systems will give managers flexibility to make tradeoffs across 

traditional program lines for best value.

• FCS is more like a community than an individual, so that a problem in one 

element does not necessarily spell disaster for the community. This gives 

the FCS design an inherent ability for graceful degradation.

Observations
Enclosure Enclosure 

40 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

36

• Good processes were used for the user/developer interface and the 

technology maturity assessments. In particular, the technical challenges 

the Army faces have been clearly delineated by the technology maturity 

assessments.

• Substantial involvement of Science and Technology community should 

significantly facilitate handoff of technologies from technology base to 

program office.

• The Army plans to use good measures like technology readiness levels, 

engineering and manufacturing readiness levels, production readiness 

levels, drawing releases, and statistical process control.

• Many FCS efforts will have residual/transferable benefits for the legacy 

force.

• The Army is willing to make tradeoffs to fund FCS.

• Setting sustainability as a design characteristic equal to lethality and 

survivability is a best practice.

Observations
Enclosure Enclosure 

41 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

37

Concerns About the FCS Approach:

• The FCS strategy challenges performance of past programs and 

best practices. Significant improvements in how technology 

development and system design and integration progress, and 

improvements in cost estimating are necessary for success.

• Many critical technologies will not be mature at Milestone B, thus 

technology development and product development will occur 

concurrently. This increases the risk of experiencing cost growth and 

schedule delays on the order of past programs. The cost of delays in 

SDD could be significant given the scope of FCS.

• Even with a longer schedule, SDD is still a significant challenge for 

such a vast scope—completion of technology development, design 

and demonstration of individual systems, design and demonstration 

of the network, and design and demonstration of the system of 

systems. The SDD strategy calls for developing multiple systems and 

a network within a period of time that DOD typically needs to develop 

a single advanced system.

Observations
Enclosure Enclosure 

42 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

38

• While FCS provides for graceful degradation, increment 1 must 

reach a critical mass to demonstrate a viable capability—it is not 

enough to be more deployable and sustainable than the heavy 

force and more lethal and survivable than the light force. It must be 

as capable as the heavy force. Such critical mass is synergydependent and will not be demonstrated until late in SDD.

• Making a Milestone B decision on a system of systems like FCS 

poses challenges for the acquisition process in terms of the 

magnitude of the decision, defining and evaluating requirements,

analyzing alternatives, conducting test and evaluation, estimating 

and tracking costs, and conducting oversight. 

• If the Milestone B decision on FCS is viewed as a referendum on 

transformation, it will detract from its proper focus as an acquisition 

decision that must be based on a business case.

Observations
Enclosure Enclosure 

43 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

39

Decision makers must decide on how best to proceed.

• Proceeding as planned has significant challenges as noted above.

• Doing nothing is not acceptable in light of the Army’s transformation 

objectives.

• Putting each of the 18 FCS systems plus the network individually

through the current acquisition process could weaken the 

architecture and would amount to controlled evolution versus 

transformation.

Considerations for Proceeding
Enclosure Enclosure 

44 GAO-03-1010R FCS Program Issues

(120258) 

40

The Army’s case for proceeding as planned has compelling arguments, but is it the only 

acceptable way to develop FCS? Are there other ways to facilitate the realization of FCS 

capabilities without taking undue risks? If so, they should be considered and their pros and cons 

weighed. For example,

• Accelerate maturity of key technologies before holding Milestone B.

Pros: Lower technology risk, higher knowledge level at Milestone B.

Cons: SDD system level activities like systems engineering and system integration will be 

delayed, delaying fielding of FCS.

• Use mechanisms like Advance Technology Demonstrations to accelerate the maturation of FCS 

“long poles” like the network before Milestone B. 

Pros: Lower technology and integration risk for network, higher knowledge level at Milestone B.

Cons: Pace of direct systems may be slowed and other SDD system level activities will be 

delayed, delaying fielding of FCS.

• After vetting and approving an FCS architecture, construct a streamlined—but knowledgebased—process for putting the entry of individual systems into SDD. 

Pros: Better fit with the acquisition process without paying the price of 19 separate processes; 

more opportunity for “off ramps” if planned progress is not made.

Cons: Increases the difficulty of maintaining the integrity of the system of systems and could 

reduce flexibility to make decisions across system lines and take advantage of graceful 

degradation.

Considerations for Proceeding
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