Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 6, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-01322-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.M.B. AND K.A.B., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-11126

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Pedersen, III, Reichek, and Nowell

Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

In this accelerated appeal involving termination of parental rights, appellant 

complains in his first issue that two judges abused their discretion by denying two 

separate motions to recuse the trial judge.1 Appellant argues in his second issue that 

the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to appellee in the 

final judgment.2 We affirm the judgment.

 

1

See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a), 28.4 (addressing accelerated appeal in parental termination cases). 

2 Appellant’s sole complaint concerning the final judgment is its provision that he pay attorney’s fees to 

appellee. Appellant fails to challenge the final judgment’s termination of his parent-child relationship with 

B.M.B. and K.A.B. He does not challenge the jury’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that he 

engaged in conduct which endangers the emotional well-being of the children. Nor does he challenge the 

jury’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship would be 

in the best interest of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001((b)(1)(E) (providing the court may 
–2–

BACKGROUND3

Appellant and appellee were divorced in proceedings in the 301st District 

Court, Dallas County, in 2012. They had two minor children, B.M.B. and K.A.B., 

when the subsequent orders and judgment challenged in this appeal were signed.

Appellant was the children’s father and appellee their mother.

The parties have litigated numerous post-divorce issues in the trial court and 

in this Court. In 2014, the 301st District Court, Dallas County, rendered an “order in 

suit to modify parent-child relationship.” That order addressed possession of and 

access to the children and also addressed the school district the children would 

attend. 

In 2016, appellee filed a “petition to modify parent-child relationship” in the 

301st District Court. Appellant filed a competing motion. The case was transferred 

to the 302nd District Court, Dallas County. After trial to the court, Judge Jackson 

signed a memorandum ruling, dated May 20, 2020.

 

order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

the parent has engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child). 

3 Documents related to this proceeding are subject to a sealing order. See, e.g., Kartsotis v. Bloch, 503 

S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied). We issue public opinions explaining our decisions 

based on the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.3 (all opinions are open to the public and must be made 

available to public reporting services); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.022(a)(12) (“final opinions, 

including concurring and dissenting opinions, and orders issued in the adjudication of cases” are “public 

information”). We preserve confidentiality of sealed information and avoid references to sealed information 

as much as possible in light of the parties’ arguments. See Masterguard, L.P. v. ECO Techs. Int’l LLC, 441

S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
–3–

On June 2, 2020, appellant filed a twenty-nine page “respondent’s verified 

motion to recuse” Judge Jackson. Appellant attached twenty-five exhibits to the 

motion. Appellant alleged in the motion’s “preliminary statement”:

The Court should grant Respondent’s Verified Motion to Recuse and 

recuse from further involvement with this matter the Honorable Sandra 

Jackson. As fully set forth below, this Motion is brought under Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 18b, and recusal is requested due to lack of impartiality toward 

Father, bias against Father, disparate treatment of Father and Mother 

regarding hearings and interpretation of rulings, continued hindrance of 

Father’s appellate rights, and prejudice against Father and in favor of 

Mother. Specifically, the knowingly disparate denial of Father’s 

possession at a hearing on Father’s Application for Ex Parte 

Temporary Restraining Order on May 29, 2020, showed an obvious 

lack of partiality (sic) and was Father’s last straw in giving the Court 

opportunities to act in an impartial and fair matter.

On July 10, 2020, Judge Levario, a senior retired judge sitting by assignment,

denied appellant’s motion to recuse Judge Jackson. Judge Levario’s order stated, in 

full:

On June 2, 2020, Respondent filed a Verified Motion to Recuse the 

Honorable Sandra Jackson.

Rule 18a(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, states that a 

Motion to Recuse must not be based solely on the judge’s rulings in the 

case.

After a review of Respondent’s Motion, the court finds that 

Respondent’s Motion is based solely on the judge’s rulings in the case.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDRED that Respondent’s Motion to Recuse is 

DENIED without hearing.
–4–

On September 18, 2020, Judge Jackson signed an “order vacating final 

modification order of September 16, 2020, and, entry of amended final modification 

order.” The order recited it was “the final judgment in this case.”

On September 25, 2020, appellant filed a “petition to modify parent-child 

relationship and application for temporary restraining order.” In it, appellant sought 

to modify the September 18, 2020 “amended final order in suit for modification.”

On October 9, 2020, appellee filed her “counter petition to modify parent-child 

relationship.”

Meanwhile, on October 6, 2020, Judge Jackson signed an order of recusal. 

The presiding judge of the First Administrative Judicial Region signed an order, 

dated October 7, 2020, transferring the cases to the 303rd District Court of Dallas 

County, Judge Garcia presiding.

On November 9, 2020, Associate Judge Olvera signed orders concerning 

visitation and related matters. 

On November 11, 2020, Judge Garcia signed an order in which she voluntarily 

recused herself from service in the case. On November 12, 2020, the presiding judge 

of the First Administrative Judicial Region ordered the case transferred to the 330th

District Court of Dallas County, Judge Plumlee presiding.

Also on November 12, 2020, appellant and appellee filed separate requests for 

a de novo hearing of Associate Judge Olvera’s November 9, 2022 report. The 
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requests for de novo hearing were filed in the 303rd District Court—Judge Garcia’s 

court. 

On November 13, 2020—before Judge Plumlee could take any action in the 

case—appellant’s counsel sent an email to the presiding judge of the First 

Administrative Judicial Region. That email stated, in part:

We learned late yesterday that you had issued an order transferring 

Cause Number 11-1126 to the 330th District Court following Judge 

Garcia's unexpected voluntary recusal. . . .

Unfortunately, this case has brought notoriety at the Dallas Courthouse, 

along with a great deal of behind-the-scenes gossip. One of the more 

prevalent issues in the rumor mill also has to do with a party with whom 

Judge Plumlee shares a special relationship going back many years. 

This personal and professional relationship will undoubtedly cause 

Judge Plumlee consternation either way, as it is the announced intention 

of Mother to seek this person's reinstatement into this case. This 

complication is coming strategically at the time that our window of 

opportunity is closing, such as you saw by the recent actions of Judge 

Garcia having the case for a couple of weeks before recusing herself.

Because of this unique circumstance, and because the 330th District 

Court has taken no action in the case whatsoever and amending the 

transfer order would be nothing more than ministerial act at this point, 

we ask that you amend your transfer order Monday for the [appellant’s]

matter to be transferred to one of the Collin County District Courts, or 

alternatively another District Court in Dallas.

The presiding judge of the administrative region did not transfer the case from 

Judge Plumlee’s court.

Consequently, Judge Plumlee presided over the de novo hearing on December 

15, 2020. She signed an order after the de novo hearing on December 17, 2020. The 
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order after de novo review vacated Associate Judge Olvero’s ruling of November 9, 

2020, and denied appellant’s requested relief. 

Appellant filed his verified motion to recuse Judge Plumlee on December 17, 

2020— about one month after the case was transferred to Judge Plumlee’s court and 

on the day of Judge Plumlee’s order after de novo review. On December 22, 2020, 

Judge Plumlee declined to recuse herself and requested the presiding judge of the 

administrative region to assign a judge to hear the motion to recuse. Judge Ginsberg 

was assigned to decide the recusal motion. He heard the motion to recuse Judge 

Plumlee on January 12, 2021. He signed an order denying the motion to recuse and 

denying appellee’s motion for sanctions related to the recusal proceedings on 

January 15, 2021. 

Subsequently, Judge Plumlee signed two orders relevant here. These orders

included a July 26, 2021 order on appellant’s requested relief. That order denied 

appellant’s request for extended summer possession and suspended his visitation. 

An August 17, 2021 interim order clarified matters related to appellee’s rights 

concerning the children’s education. The interim order also ordered injunctive relief 

against appellant related to the children’s education. 

On November 12, 2021, appellee filed a “first amended counter-petition to 

modify parent-child relationship and to terminate [appellant’s] parental rights.” The 

counter-petition sought termination of appellant’s parental rights of B.M.B. and 

K.A.B.
–7–

On August 12, 2022—one month before trial was scheduled to begin—

appellant filed his second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee. Judge Pruitt, who was 

assigned to decide the recusal motion, presided over a hearing on August 29, 2022. 

He denied the motion to recuse and ordered appellant and counsel to pay appellee 

$2,500 in attorney’s and paralegal’s fees. The order provided counsel was jointly 

and severally liable for payment of the fees.

Jury trial began September 12, 2022. After a five-day trial, Judge Plumlee 

signed a judgment, dated November 22, 2022, terminating appellant’s parent-child

relationship with B.M.B. and K.A.B. Judge Plumlee decided the issue of attorney’s 

fees pursuant to agreement. The judgment awarded appellee reasonable and 

necessary attorney’s fees of $565,867.50.

4

This accelerated appeal followed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a), 28.4.

APPELLANT’S ISSUES

Appellant brings two issues on appeal. They are:

1. Did the failure to recuse Judge Plumlee result in an effective denial 

of due process which ultimately culminated in the termination of 

[appellant’s] parental rights?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering [appellant] to pay 

[appellee’s] attorney’s fees?

 

4 Appellee sought $777,150.40 in reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. 

 Appellant sought $2,684,948.00 in reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. 
–8–

APPELLANT’S MOTIONS TO RECUSE JUDGE PLUMLEE

Law And Standard Of Review

We review an order denying a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A); Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex. 1999)

(op. on reh’g); Drake v. Walker, 529 S.W.3d 516, 528 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no 

pet.); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

5

An abuse of discretion exists when a court’s decision is arbitrary or unreasonable.

Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). The test 

for abuse of discretion is not whether in the opinion of the reviewing court the facts 

present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action; rather, it is a question of 

whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See E.I. 

du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). We 

will not reverse the ruling on the motion to recuse if it is within the zone of 

reasonable disagreement. See Echols v. Gullege & Sons LLC, No. 10-13-00419-CV, 

2014 WL 4629056, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

 

5 Appellant’s notice of appeal concerning the orders denying recusal of Judge Plumlee states,

[Appellant] appeals from the Order on [Appellant’s] Tertiary Motion to Recuse, signed on 

August 31, 2022.

[Appellant] appeals from the Order on Motion to Recuse signed on January 15, 2021.

 Appellant complains about the orders denying his motions to recuse Judge Plumlee for numerous reasons. 

The issue before us is whether the assigned judges abused their discretion in denying the motions to recuse. 

See supra. Accordingly, we confine review of the orders denying recusal to appellant’s argument that the 

assigned judges abused their discretion. 
–9–

The movant bears the burden of proving recusal is warranted, and the burden 

is met only through a showing of bias or impartiality to such an extent that the 

movant was deprived of a fair trial. See In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253; see also 

Pettigrew v. Cedar Springs Alexandre’s Bar, L.P., No. 05-16-00269, 2018 WL 

1580776, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The test 

for recusal is “whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the 

facts in the public domain concerning the judge's conduct, would have a reasonable 

doubt that the judge is actually impartial.” Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

346 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Courts evaluate the merits 

of a motion to recuse from “a disinterested observer’s point of view.” Ex Parte Ellis, 

275 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, orig. proceeding).

The movant’s burden to prove recusal is warranted “is only satisfied when the 

movant provides facts demonstrating the presence of bias or partiality ‘of such nature 

and extent as to deny the movant due process of law.’” Id. at 117 (quoting Off. of 

Pub. Util. Counsel v. PUC, 185 S.W.3d 555, 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. 

denied)). Where a party challenges the denial of a recusal motion based on alleged 

bias or impartiality, the party must show that the bias arose from an extrajudicial 

source and not from actions during the pendency of the trial court proceedings unless 

the actions during proceedings indicate a high degree of favoritism or antagonism 

that renders fair judgment impossible. See Parker v. Cain, No. 07–17-00211-CV, 

2018 WL 4997784, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Oct. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. 
–10–

op.) (citing Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1997, no writ) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Conclusory statements, conjecture, or mere assertions of bias will not satisfy the 

burden or overcome the presumption of impartiality. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 

at 117. 

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, a motion to recuse a judge 

“must not be based solely on the judge's rulings in the case” and “must assert one or 

more of the grounds listed in Rule 18b.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(a)(2), (3). Rule 18b 

provides in part that a judge must recuse in any proceeding in which (1) “the judge's 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or (2) “the judge has a personal bias or 

prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b)(1), (2).

Bias by an adjudicator is not lightly established. See In re City of Dallas, 445 

S.W.3d 456, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding). Judges enjoy a 

presumption of impartiality. Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 117. A party seeking 

recusal must satisfy a “high threshold’ before a judge must be recused. See id. 

Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse 

based on bias or partiality. See Dow Chem. Co. v Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 

2001); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Rather, it

must be shown that they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 

make fair judgment “impossible.” See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240. A party's 

remedy for unfair rulings is to assign error regarding the adverse rulings. See In re 
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City of Dallas, 445 S.W.3d at 467; Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 

A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration, even if stern or shorttempered, are immune. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240. Judicial remarks, 

even those that are critical or disapproving of—or even hostile to—parties or their 

cases, do not ordinarily support a bias or partiality challenge. See Hansen, 346 

S.W.3d at 776. 

First Motion To Recuse Judge Plumlee

In his first issue, appellant argues that the first recusal judge, Judge Ginsberg,

abused his discretion by denying appellant’s first motion to recuse Judge Plumlee, 

filed December 17, 2022. He asserts, “Judge Plumlee demonstrated a deep–seated 

antagonism toward [appellant] and favoritism toward [appellee] in her demeanor, in 

her questions to [appellant’s] expert witness, and in her comments to [appellant] and 

his counsel so as to make fair judgment impossible.”

Judge Ginsberg’s order on the first motion to recuse Judge Plumlee recites a 

hearing on the motion was held on January 12, 2021, and that a court reporter 

recorded the hearing. The appellate record contains no reporter’s record of the 

January 12, 2021 hearing.6

 

6 The clerk of this Court contacted the reporter of the trial court and inquired whether there exists a 

reporter’s record of the January 12, 2021 hearing. The reporter replied she had no record of the hearing. 

We note the appellate record contains appellant’s written request that the reporter’s record of the hearing

be included in the appellate record. We also note appellant’s briefing on the first motion to recuse Judge 
–12–

It is appellant’s burden to present a record showing error requiring reversal, 

and when an appellant fails to bring forth a record, a presumption arises that the 

reporter’s record would support the trial court’s judgment. See Rodriguez v. 

Aleskandrany, No. 08-21-00128-CV, 2022 WL 3443643, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

Aug. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). This Court has held that when there is no 

reporter’s record of a recusal hearing, we must presume that the trial court found all 

necessary facts to support the order. See Minor v. Young, No. 05-99-01579-CV, 2000 

WL 1023788, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting 

argument that recusal judge abused his discretion in denying a motion to recuse the 

trial judge) (citing El Chadiac v. Cramer, 756 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1988, writ denied)). 

Because Judge Ginsberg “conducted a hearing on the motion to recuse and 

our record does not contain a reporter’s record from the hearing, we must presume

that the evidence at the hearing supported the judge’s ruling.” Minor, 2000 WL 

1023788, at *2.

 

Plumlee cites to his motion to recuse and to other documents in the appellate record but not to a reporter’s 

record of the hearing. In contrast, appellant’s briefing on the second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee cites 

liberally to the reporter’s record of the hearing before Judge Pruitt on the second motion. Appellant’s brief 

leads us to conclude appellant knowingly briefed his argument concerning the first motion to recuse Judge 

Plumlee without the requisite reporter’s record and nonetheless failed to supplement the appellate record 

with a copy of the reporter’s record of the January 12, 2021 hearing, if one exists. See TEX. R. APP. P.

34.6(d) (if anything relevant is omitted from the reporter’s record, any party may by letter direct the official 

court reporter to prepare, certify, and file in the appellate court a supplemental reporter’s record containing 

the omitted items). 
–13–

Accordingly, we apply this Court’s precedent, see id., and reject appellant’s 

argument that Judge Ginsberg abused his discretion by denying appellant’s first 

motion to recuse Judge Plumlee. See id. 

Second Motion To Recuse Judge Plumlee

In his first issue, appellant also argues the second recusal judge, Judge Pruitt, 

abused his discretion by denying appellant’s second verified motion to recuse Judge

Plumlee. Appellee filed a response. Judge Pruitt presided over a hearing on the 

motion and two days later denied the motion in a written order.

7

Judge Pruitt Did Not Abuse His Discretion: Waiver

Appellee argues Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in denying 

appellant’s second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee because the second motion was 

not timely filed and appellant’s complaint was waived.

“A motion to recuse must be filed as soon as practicable after the movant 

knows of the ground stated in the motion . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(1)(A). 

Complaints that concern recusal can be waived if the party seeking recusal fails to 

 

7 The order was captioned “Order on [appellant’s] Tertiary Motion to Recuse.” The motion was appellant’s 

second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee, but it was the third motion to recuse appellant had filed in this 

case. His first motion to recuse, concerning Judge Jackson, was filed before his two motions to recuse Judge 

Plumlee and was denied. The civil practice and remedies code provides: “‘Tertiary recusal motion’ means 

a third or subsequent motion for recusal or disqualification filed against a district court or statutory county 

court judge by the same party in a case.” TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 30.016(a). “A judge hearing 

a tertiary recusal motion against another judge who denies the motion shall award reasonable and necessary 

attorney’s fees and costs to the party opposing the motion. The party making the motion and the attorney 

for the party are jointly and severally liable for the award of fees and costs.” Id. 30.016(c). Judge Pruitt’s 

order provided appellant’s attorney was jointly and severally liable for payment of appellee’s attorney’s 

fees.
–14–

file an appropriate motion within the time required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 

18a(b)(1). See Amrouni v. Bhakhrani, No. 05-21-00278-CV, 2022 WL 3754539, at 

*4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing PS Royal Servs. 

Grp. LP v. Fisher, No. 05-17–001139, 2019 WL 3543575, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Aug. 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (motion to recuse waived as untimely due to 

nine-week delay)). We have held the procedural requirements for recusal are 

“mandatory” and filing an improper motion will waive the issue on appeal. See id.

(citing Vodicka v. A.H. Belo Corp., No. 05-17-00728-CV, 2018 WL 3301592, at *9

(Tex. App.—Dallas July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

Appellant filed his second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee on August 12, 

2022. Appellant argues Judge Plumlee had previously demonstrated bias and 

prejudice in June 2021, July 2021, August 2021, November 2021, and later. 

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee sometimes evidenced multiple examples of bias or 

prejudice in a single hearing or order. These complained-of incidents occurred after 

Justice Ginsberg denied appellant’s first motion to recuse Judge Plumlee.

Indeed, appellant argues, “Throughout the entirety of this case, Judge 

Plumlee’s opinions and comments have demonstrated such a deep-seated favoritism 

toward [appellee] and antagonism against [appellant] which make her an advocate 

for [appellee], rather than an impartial jurist, and make fair judgment impossible.” 

(Emphases added.) He similarly argues in reply that Judge Plumlee’s “conduct 
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throughout the case had been problematic, and likely justified recusal on its own . . 

. .” (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, he argues, “Although the Interim Order likely justified recusal on 

its own, because Judge Plumlee represented that it was an interim ruling and 

[appellant] would have the opportunity to present additional evidence, [appellant] 

did not file a Motion for Recusal at that time and instead sought to modify the Interim 

Order.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s counsel testified before Judge Pruitt that 

appellant did not file the second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee promptly after the 

interim order “based upon the procedural posture of the case,” that “[i]t was going 

to be a tertiary order,” and that Judge Plumlee had made her comments “pronouncing 

her intentions, but she had not yet necessarily acted upon them.” 

Rule 18a(b)(1)(A) does not tolerate appellant’s wait-and-see approach to 

filing his second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee. See Parker v. Textron Fin. Corp., 

No. 04-12-00564-CV, 2013 WL 979208, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 123 (party possessing 

information potentially requiring recusal cannot sit on the information and wait and 

see how the court rules)).

Judge Plumlee signed the interim order to which appellant refers on August 

17, 2001. Appellant filed his second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee almost a year 

after that on August 12, 2022. As noted, appellant also argues Judge Plumlee 

demonstrated bias and prejudice supporting recusal on several occasions—
–16–

sometimes multiple times on a single day—before entry of the interim order, which 

he concedes “likely justified recusal on its own.”

In sum, appellant filed his second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee more than 

a year after alleged demonstrations of bias and prejudice in the interim order. And 

as noted, appellant argues that Judge Plumlee’s bias and prejudice made fair trial 

“impossible” throughout “the entirety of this case,” with numerous alleged occasions 

alleged to have occurred before entry of the interim judgment.

We note appellant waited to file the second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee 

until a month before trial. See id. (movant waived right to seek recusal when he 

delayed in filing the motion until subsequent rulings provided further evidentiary 

support for his recusal and filed motion approximately one month before bench trial 

was to commence, as appellee did here).

We reject appellant’s remaining arguments that he timely filed the second 

motion to recuse Judge Plumlee. He argues he filed the motion more than ten days 

before trial, citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(b)(1)(B). But that rule allows 

filing within ten days of trial when the movant neither knew nor reasonably should 

have known that (1) the judge whose recusal is sought would preside at the trial or 

hearing or (2) the ground stated in the motion existed. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

18a(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii). Judge Pruitt reasonably could have concluded that appellant 

knew or should have known of the alleged grounds for recusal more than a year 

before Rule 18a’s ten-day period began. Moreover, appellant filed his second motion 
–17–

to recuse Judge Plumlee a month before trial was scheduled to begin, well before 

Rule 18a(b)(1)(B)’s ten-day period. 

Appellant argues Judge Pruitt concluded the motion was timely filed—

otherwise, he would have denied it without holding an oral hearing. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 18(a)(g)(3)(A) (“motion to recuse that does not comply with this rule may be 

denied without an oral hearing.”) (emphasis added). We interpret our rules of civil 

procedure using the same principles we apply when construing statutes. See In re 

City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d 642, 645-46 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding); In re 

Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. 2015) (orig. 

proceeding); In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007) 

(orig. proceeding). Our review is de novo, and our primary objective is to give effect 

to the drafter’s intent as expressed in the rule’s language. In re City of Dickinson, 

568 S.W.3d at 645-46. We look first to the rule’s language and construe it according 

to its plain meaning. See id.; Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 

S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2001); In re Berry, 578 S.W.3d 173,178 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi-Edinberg 2019, orig. proceeding). The plain meaning of “may” is to “have 

permission to” or to “be free to.” May, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 

DICTIONARY (1985). Accordingly, we do not interpret Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 

18a(g)(3)(A) as requiring that a motion to recuse that does not comply with Rule 

18(a) be decided without oral hearing. We reject appellant’s argument that Judge 

Pruitt held the motion to recuse was timely filed simply because he held an oral 
–18–

hearing on motion. See Sapp v. Williams, No. 07-97-0112-CV, 2007 WL 335568, at 

*2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 19, 1997, writ dism’d by agr.) (mem. op.) (it is not 

the function of an intermediate appellate court to rewrite the Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure).

Judge Pruitt could have reasonably concluded appellant failed to file the

second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee “as soon as practicable after the movant

knows of the ground stated in the motion . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 18(b)(1)(A).

Accordingly, we conclude Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in denying 

appellant’s second motion to recuse Judge Plumlee.

Judge Pruitt Did Not Abuse His Discretion: The Merits

But even if appellant had not waived his second motion to recuse Judge 

Plumlee, Judge Pruitt would not have abused his discretion by denying the motion 

on its merits. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A)(“An order denying a motion to recuse 

may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”);

Vickery 999 S.W.2d at 349 (abuse of discretion); Drake, 529 S.W.3d at 528 (same); 

In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (same).

Appellant asserts Judge Plumlee’s conduct warranted recusal for three main

reasons. He argues Judge Plumlee (1) denied his due process rights; (2) considered

extrajudicial sources of information; and (3) demonstrated such a deep-seated

antagonism toward him and favoritism toward appellee so as to make fair judgment

impossible.
–19–

Due process arguments

Appellant argues, “Judge Plumlee repeatedly refused to rule on [appellant’s]

requested relief, both with regard to his possession and access and the issue of his

residence, refused to modify her Interim Order in the face of uncontroverted

evidence that [appellant] no longer resided in HPISD [Highland Park Independent

School District], refused to conclude the evidence, and continued multiple hearings

thus denying [appellant] the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.” See

Tex. Const. art. I, § 19 (“No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,

property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the

due course of the law of the land”); Mosely v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n,

593 S.W.3d 250, 265 (Tex. 2019) (“Due process at a minimum requires notice and

an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”). He

argues that typically, notice of a hearing must be served on all parties not less than

three days before the time specified for the hearing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(b).

A. Pre-judgment without hearing all the evidence

Appellant argues that during a June 23, 2021 hearing he attempted to testify

it was appellee’s responsibility pursuant to the amended final order to enroll the

children in school and to ensure their eligibility to attend. He asserts Judge Plumlee

interrupted him, refused to allow him to testify or his counsel to argue that point,

and refused to consider his argument. He relies on the following exchange:
–20–

Q. What you said to [child] was you should return it because you’re

never going to be a Belle, right?

A: That’s not true. Mother controls the school, where they go to school.

Even if I lived in Highland Park Mother still determines where they go

to school. It’s Mother’s determination, not mine. . . .

THE COURT: I am going to tell you this because it’s true, your

statement is disingenuous at best, sir, and it’s an absolute, outright nontruth. I’m reading the order, sir, and you are a learned man. This was

your request based upon Judge Jackson’s entry of this order that I can

tell by reading the order. . . . But if [appellant] did not live in that school

district, sir, you have to know unequivocally, sir, that you and your

home was the residence which they relied upon, and to say something

different, sir, calls into question for this Court at least, your credibility,

just so you know that . . . .

Q. And which parent has the exclusive right to make decisions about

the children’s education?

A. [Appellee] does.

THE COURT: Okay. Hold on, because I want a clear record. I don’t

know—you’re not trying this to a jury. You’re trying it to a judge that

is sitting here looking at this order who has specifically asked

[appellant] who lived in Highland Park at the time this order was

entered. It is him. So I asked him wasn’t he being relied upon for this

particular provision.

If [appellee] did not live in Highland Park then she made a decision

when this order went into place. Because judges don’t do this, Ms.

Bowman, and you know that. Judge Jackson wouldn’t have done it.

Judge Plumlee wouldn’t have done it. . . . There’s no judge in their right

mind that would have ordered this without it being probably a part of

an agreement because it’s—it’s not doable.

So the fact that [appellant] has indicated that he, in fact, lived in

Highland Park when the order went into place and [appellee] did not,

simply means they had an agreement that the Court ratified and reduced

to an order. Okay. You are not trying this to a jury. Please stop wasting

my time.
–21–

Judge Plumlee explained her understanding of the amended final order. Judge Pruitt

could reasonably have concluded Judge Plumlee’s interpretation was not

unreasonable or the product of bias or prejudice. See Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776 

(the test for recusal is “whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing 

all the facts in the public domain concerning the judge's conduct, would have a 

reasonable doubt that the judge is actually impartial.”); In re Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 

116 (courts evaluate the merits of a motion to recuse from “a disinterested observer’s 

point of view.”). Moreover, Appellant in fact testified that appellee controlled where

the children went to school and that appellee had the exclusive right to make

decisions about the children’s education. Judge Pruitt could reasonably have

concluded Judge Plumlee did not prevent appellant from testifying. He could have

concluded appellant’s argument that Judge Plumlee refused to consider his argument

was conclusory, conjecture, or a mere assertion of bias. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 

S.W.3d at 117. Moreover, he reasonably could have concluded Judge Plumlee did

not demonstrate bias or prejudice or deep-seated antagonism that would make fair

judgment impossible. See H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253.

Appellant complains Judge Plumlee characterized his decision to move his

residence from Highland Park as “absolutely unforgiveable.” Judge Plumlee stated:

And I want you to know that even if we disagree, because reasonable 

people can disagree about the same set of circumstances, I want you to 

know that this court believes that to be just absolutely unforgivable. 

Okay. So stop wasting my time.
–22–

Do you have anything else?

Judge Pruitt could have reasonably concluded Judge Plumlee based her comment on

evidence and the language of the final amended order and that she stated a standard

of reasonableness rather than one of bias or prejudice. Moreover, opinions formed

by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the

current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible. See Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776. Indeed,

Judge Plumlee asked appellant if he had additional testimony to offer. He also notes

Judge Plumlee said, “Please stop wasting my time.” Judicial remarks during the

course of a proceeding that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel,

the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. See

Id. at 776. “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern

and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administrations—remain

immune.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556. Judge Pruitt could have reasonably concluded

Judge Plumlee’s comments did not demonstrate (1) bias or prejudice, (2) that she

decided the issue without hearing all the evidence, or (3) such a deep-seated

animosity to make fair judgment “impossible.”

Appellant argues, “Judge Plumlee also indicated during the June 23, 2021,

hearing that she had already decided the issue of appellant’s request to modify the
–23–

possession schedule without hearing any evidence, telling appellant’s counsel, ‘the

Court can’t get there on that issue [of additional visits].’” The record does not

support appellant’s characterization or argument. Judge Plumlee was hearing

evidence—appellant’s testimony—when she said from the bench:

You're going to have problems getting there, because the children are—

we've already discussed the children are going to be in a—need therapy. 

So I'm just telling you now the Court can't get there on that issue, but 

I'm listening to you, but just know that they've got to have—there has 

to be a therapeutic component to this and those children have to have 

that first. So go ahead.

Judge Plumlee heard testimony on the issue of possession before and after her 

comment. Judge Plumlee expressly allowed continued testimony, stating “go 

ahead.” Judge Pruitt could reasonably have rejected appellant’s assertion that Judge 

Plumlee—due to her comments above—decided Barnes’ request to modify

possession without hearing any evidence. Moreover, Judge Pruitt could reasonably 

have concluded Judge Plumlee presented a rational explanation concerning therapy 

based on past discussions rather than demonstrating evidence of bias or prejudice or 

a deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that made fair judgment impossible. And

Judge Pruitt could have concluded appellant’s argument that Judge Plumlee decided

the issue of appellant’s request to modify the possession schedule without hearing

any evidence was conclusory, conjecture, or a mere assertion of bias. See Ex parte 

Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 117.
–24–

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee decided issues prior to hearing all the 

evidence because proceedings concerning modification of his summer possession 

were continued twice. The trial court’s “Order on Father’s relief” includes a finding 

that after the continuances, “The Court still invited the parties to reset the matter so 

that each of the parties could be heard fully on the issue before the Court.” Appellant

notes he requested a ruling by submission after the continuances. Notably, appellant 

acknowledges Judge Plumlee entered an order on the continued matter after his 

request. Consequently, Judge Pruitt could reasonably have concluded appellant did 

not meet his heavy burden to demonstrate bias or prejudice or a deep-seated 

antagonism making fair judgment impossible. Moreover, a trial court has wide 

discretion in managing its docket. See Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 

1982). A complaint that a trial judge is not timely managing the docket in a 

reasonable time is remediable, when appropriate, by mandamus. See, e.g., In re 

Robinson, No. 05-22-00579-CV, 2022 WL 4306154, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept.

23, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Additionally, a trial court’s rulings rarely

constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality. See Dow 

Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d 237, 240; In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 

U.S. at 555 (1994)).

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee predetermined possession and access issues 

without having heard all the evidence. He argues that Judge Plumlee based her denial 

of his possession and access to the children on his “unforgivable decision” to relocate
–25–

from HPISD. First, we concluded above that Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion 

for denying the motion to recuse despite Judge Plumlee’s use of the word 

“unforgivable.” Second, appellant’s argument is baseless. The July 26, 2021 order 

to which appellant cites does not contain a finding appellant relocated from HPISD.

The order contains other findings that supported denial of appellant’s motion for 

increased summer possession, stating,

Based upon the evidence before the Court, there is clear and convincing 

evidence that any additional visits for the petitioner would endanger the 

emotional development of the children.

There is clear and convincing evidence that the children need an 

appropriate therapeutic outlet untethered by litigation.

There is clear and convincing evidence that continued visitation 

without appropriate therapeutic intervention would endanger the 

physical health and/or emotional development of the children.

Judge Pruitt could reasonably conclude the order denying possession or access was 

not based on appellant’s change of residence, much less on bias, prejudice, or a deepseated animosity making fair judgment impossible. 

Similarly, appellant argues Judge Plumlee pre-determined issues without 

hearing all of the evidence because “although [appellant’s] decision to move served 

as a basis for the order suspending his possession, [appellee’s] Motion for 

Clarification related to that issue was not set to be heard until August 25, 2021.” 

Judge Pruitt could reasonably have concluded the July 26, 2021 order denying 

possession or access was not based on appellant’s change of residence, as addressed
–26–

above, and not on a basis of bias, prejudice, or a deep-seated animosity making fair 

judgment impossible. 

B. Hearings held in appellant’s absence

Appellant argues Justice Plumlee denied him due process related to August

2021 proceedings and an interim order concerning the location of his residency.

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee held two hearings in his absence, in at least one

case without sufficient notice. He complains of evidentiary matters that occurred

during the hearings. He argues the order entered after the hearings resulted in a

deprivation of due process. This Court, in a previous opinion, considered and

rejected appellant’s due process arguments. See In re Barnes, No. 05-21-00807-CV,

2022 WL 1702516 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 27, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

In that previous case, appellant argued the family court clearly abused its discretion

by denying him due process of law by conducting the August 2021 hearings when

he was unavailable. This Court concluded appellant’s due process argument had

become moot because he appeared and presented evidence on the issue of his

residence during a hearing on December 1, 2021. Id. Our previous opinion was 

Exhibit 49 in the recusal proceeding held by Judge Pruitt. Moreover, Judge Pruitt

heard argument at the recusal hearing from appellant’s counsel that Judge Plumlee

“later gave [appellant] his day in court” on the issue of the location of appellant’s

residence. And Judge Plumlee signed an August 24, 2022 order that recited “the

Court finds that the Armstrong address is no longer the residence of [appellant]”—
–27–

the holding appellant had sought to prove up in the August 2021 hearings. Judge

Pruitt could reasonably have concluded appellant was not deprived of due process

rights as a product of bias or prejudice or a deep-seated antagonism that made fair

trial impossible. See Clanton, 639 S.W.2d at 931 (a trial court has wide discretion in 

managing its docket); see also In re Robinson, 2022 WL 4306154, at *1 (a complaint 

that a trial judge is not timely managing the docket in a reasonable time is 

remediable, when appropriate, by mandamus). 

Extrajudicial sources

Appellant argues, “Judge Plumlee considered extrajudicial sources of

information.” He argues Judge Plumlee “repeatedly indicated that her rulings and

opinions, including her critical, disapproving, and hostile statements regarding

[appellant], were based on allegations that preceded the entry of the Amended Final

Order, to which she was not the judge and in no position to judge the credibility of

the witnesses or make findings of fact which were not otherwise made on the

record.” He cites to one judicial opinion in support of this argument, Otto v. Otto,

438 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1969, no writ) (“Generally, proof of

misconduct of a party prior to the rendition of the original judgment is not ordinarily

admissible in a subsequent proceeding brought for change of custody of the

children.”) (emphasis added). Appellant concedes “Judge Plumlee could take 

judicial notice of the case file and record of prior proceedings . . . .” 
–28–

Appellant refers to hearings and orders in his “extrajudicial information” 

argument. He asserts that at a June 23, 2021 hearing, “Judge Plumlee implied an 

agreement which never existed to justify Judge Jackson’s order, support [appellee’s] 

position, and question [appellant’s] position.” We decided, above, that Judge Pruitt 

could have reasonably concluded Judge Plumlee’s interpretation of the amended 

final order—what appellant characterizes as “Judge Plumlee’s impl[ying] an 

agreement which never existed”—was not the product of bias or prejudice. Nor did 

Judge Plumlee abuse his discretion by rejecting appellant’s argument as a mere 

assertion of bias or prejudice. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 117.

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee judged his credibility at the June 23, 2021 

hearing. The trial court in a non-jury proceeding, of course, is the sole judge of the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See In re Y.B., 

No. 05-21-00915-CV, 2023 WL 3451041, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2023, 

no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in rejecting 

appellant’s assertions of bias based on credibility. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 

117.

He argues that at an August 16, 2021 hearing Judge Plumlee erroneously 

admitted hearsay emails and also referred to allegations raised in a prior modification 

proceeding over which she did not preside. Again, judicial rulings alone almost 

never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality. See 

Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (stating the ruling must be shown to display deep-
–29–

seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible); In re 

H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). A party's remedy for 

unfair rulings is to assign error regarding the adverse rulings. See In re City of Dallas, 

445 S.W.3d at 467; Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 41. Appellant fails to demonstrate that 

an impartial person would have a reasonable doubt of whether admitting the 

evidence was due to partiality. See Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776 (the test for recusal is 

“whether a reasonable member of the public at large, knowing all the facts in the 

public domain concerning the judge's conduct, would have a reasonable doubt that 

the judge is actually impartial.”). Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in rejecting 

appellant’s evidentiary argument.

Appellant argues that during the August 16 hearing Judge Plumlee “became 

irate and began to lecture him extensively” based on extrajudicial information. 

Assuming, without deciding, appellant’s characterizations are accurate, a judge’s 

comments that are critical or disapproving of—or even hostile to—parties or their 

cases, do not ordinarily support a bias or partiality challenge. See Hansen, 346 

S.W.3d at 776. Judge Pruitt could have concluded an impartial person would not 

have reasonably doubted Judge Plumlee’s impartiality due to her comments. See id. 

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee “decided that [appellant] impersonated 

[another person] with absolutely no evidence to support such a position, instead 

relying on allegations made in a previous modification proceeding.” In short, he 

complains of a ruling. For reasons stated above concerning evidentiary argument, 
–30–

Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240; In 

re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555); In re City of Dallas, 

445 S.W.3d at 467; Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 41; Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776.

Appellant’s remaining assertions that Judge Plumlee considered 

“extrajudicial information” fail to argue or demonstrate why such consideration, if 

any, supports recusal or demonstrates that Judge Pruitt abused his discretion in 

rejecting these remaining arguments. Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in 

rejecting these remaining arguments. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 117 (mere 

assertions, conjecture, or mere conclusory statements do not support recusal); see 

also Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (judicial rulings alone almost never 

constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality); In re 

H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).

Deep-seated antagonism and favoritism

Appellant argues, “Judge Plumlee demonstrated such a deep-seated

antagonism toward [appellant] and favoritism toward [appellee] as to make fair

judgment impossible.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant argues, “[he] also filed a

judicial complaint against Judge Plumlee, further prejudicing her.”

A. Judge Plumlee’s Orders

Initially, appellant makes arguments related to the December 15, 2020 de

novo hearing. Judge Ginsberg considered matters related to that hearing in denying

appellant’s first motion to recuse Judge Plumlee. We decided those matters, above,
–31–

and held Judge Ginsberg did not abuse his discretion. We do not reconsider them

here.

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee “weaponized the issue of therapy for the

children” in order to forestall his visitation with the children. In support, he notes

Judge Plumlee stated “the children needed therapy before visitation could resume.”

We decided above that Judge Pruitt could have concluded Judge Plumlee

reasonably—without bias or prejudice—explained her position on the issue of

therapy. Judge Pruitt could have decided Judge Plumlee did not indicate a deepseated antagonism or favoritism that made fair judgment “impossible.”

 Appellant argues the order on father’s requested relief removed his

possession “with no basis to do so.” Judge Pruitt presumably applied the law that

Appellant’s remedy was to assign the allegedly unfair order as error rather than to 

move for recusal. See In re City of Dallas, 445 S.W.3d at 467; Sommers, 20 S.W.3d 

at 41; see also Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (judicial rulings alone almost never 

constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on bias or partiality); In re 

H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Judge Pruitt also could 

have concluded that the ruling did not demonstrate fair judgment was impossible.

Appellant argues the order on appellant’s requested relief is factually

inaccurate “and/or” advocates against his interests. He argues a footnote in the order

states, “Petitioner alleges at the close of evidence on March 19th this Court took this

request under advisement. Nothing could be further from the truth.” Counsel
–32–

testified at the hearing on recusal that the statement was inaccurate and that she was

“dumbfounded.” Counsel testified Judge Plumlee has made several statements that

counsel characterizes as inaccurate. Appellant argues the footnote was

“unnecessary.” Justice Pruitt could reasonably have concluded appellant failed to

demonstrate the alleged misstatement evidenced deep-seated antagonism or

favoritism making fair judgment impossible.

Appellant complains the interim order impermissibly granted injunctive relief

concerning his change of residence. He notes this Court partially and conditionally

granted mandamus relief and that Judge Plumlee subsequently vacated the

injunctions. See In re Barnes, 2022 WL 1702516, at *4. Judge Pruitt could have

concluded appellant properly sought and obtained mandamus relief for the

injunctions rather than seeking recusal. See In re City of Dallas, 445 S.W.3d at 467; 

Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 41; and see Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (judicial 

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on 

bias or partiality); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253. Judge Pruitt did not abuse his 

discretion in deciding the interim order did not demonstrate a deep-seated 

antagonism or partiality that made fair judgment impossible. For these reasons, 

Judge Pruitt could also have concluded footnotes to the interim order failed to 

demonstrate deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that made fair judgment 

impossible. See Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776 (critical, disapproving, hostile 

comments made to parties or their cases do not ordinarily demonstrate bias or 
–33–

partiality); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 254 (opinions formed by the judge based on 

facts introduced or events occurring in the course of proceedings do not constitute a 

valid basis for a recusal motion unless “they display a deep-seated favoritism or 

antagonism that would make a fair judgment impossible.”).

B. Judge Plumlee’s Conduct

Appellant argues “Judge Plumlee’s conduct during hearings demonstrates

deep-seated antagonism toward [appellant] and favoritism toward [appellee].”

Appellant argues that at a June 23, 2021 hearing Judge Plumlee unfairly

excluded evidence favorable to his case but unfairly admitted evidence favorable to

appellee’s case. He asserts Judge Plumlee made “very unfriendly” and “belittling”

statements about his laying an evidentiary predicate but “went out of her way” to lay

an evidentiary predicate for appellee. After appellant’s evidentiary objection, Judge

Plumlee explained her ruling on appellee’s evidence and stated the predicate had

been established through previously given testimony. Consequently, Judge Pruitt

would not have abused his discretion by disagreeing that Judge Plumlee went out of

her way to lay the predicate for appellee. Moreover, appellant’s remedy was to assign 

error rather than to move for recusal. See In re City of Dallas, 445 S.W.3d at 467; 

Sommers, 20 S.W.3d at 41; see also Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240 (judicial 

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a motion to recuse based on 

bias or partiality); In re H.M.S., 349 S.W.3d at 253 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555)). 
–34–

Judge Pruitt could have concluded these two evidentiary rulings did not indicate 

bias, prejudice, or deep-seated antagonism that made fair judgment impossible.

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee “argued” with and “lectured” appellant or his

counsel and demonstrated a demeanor, facial expression, and tone of voice that was 

“very antagonistic” at the June 23, 2021 hearing. Judicial remarks, even those that 

are critical or disapproving of—or even hostile to—parties or their cases, do not 

ordinarily support a bias or partiality challenge. See Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 776; 

Drake v. Spriggs, No. 13-03-429-CV, 2006 WL 3627716, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi-Edinburg Dec. 14, 2006) (mem. op.) (judge’s complained-of hostile 

demeanor did not demonstrate bias or partiality). “A judge’s ordinary efforts at

Courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts

at Courtroom administration—remain immune.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556; Echols,

2014 WL 469056, at *6 n.3. Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion by concluding 

appellant failed to meet his heavy burden to demonstrate Judge Plumlee 

demonstrated deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that made fair judgment 

impossible.

Appellant argues that during the June 23, 2021 hearing, Judge Plumlee

objected to a form of a question “and lectured [appellant] and his counsel that the

question misrepresented the Order After De Novo Review.” Judge Plumlee

commented on the contents of the order and stated, “Read your order. It is very

clear.” She based her statements on “[a] plain reading of the Court’s order.” Judge
–35–

Pruitt could have reasonably decided Judge Plumlee did not “lecture” appellant and

his counsel but instead stated in reasonable, unbiased, impartial terms her

understanding of the order, as addressed above. He also could have concluded the

exchange did not evidence deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that made fair 

judgment impossible.

Appellant asserts that at the June 23, 2021 hearing,Judge Plumlee argued with

appellant regarding the summer schedule under the amended final order. Appellant

testified his relationship with the children during a previous summer possession was

“fantastic.” Judge Plumlee commented it could not have been fantastic because

appellant asked for modified summer visitation. Judge Pruitt could have concluded

Judge Plumlee’s comment was accurate and that appellant nonetheless testified—

twice—that his relationship during the previoussummer was fantastic. He also could

have concluded the exchange did not evidence deep-seated antagonism or favoritism

that made fair judgment impossible.

Appellant also argues that during the June 23, 2021 hearing, Judge Plumlee 

argued and tried “to entrap him and manufacture a record to support her erroneous 

rulings and findings.” He bases this allegation on the following exchange:

THE COURT: Okay. And on a scale of 1 to 10 how important are the 

Belles [drill team] to [appellant’s child], would you say?

[APPELLANT]: Again, I haven’t been around her very much in the last 

six months, but I would say it was a 10.
–36–

THE COURT: Okay, well I’ve been around [appellant’s child] a whole 

lot less than you have, and I’m telling you I would put it—on a scale of 

1 to 10, I would put it at 15. . . . Would you agree with that?

[APPELLANT]: You said 1 to 10, so I said 10.

Although not quoted by appellant, the exchange continued:

THE COURT: Oh, I know. But if you were excited about something 

I’m asking you would it be more than 10. Would it be—

[APPELLANT]: Yes. She’s worked very hard for it. No doubt. 

Absolutely.

THE COURT: Okay. So she’s worked for something, correct?

[APPELLANT]: Yes.

Judge Pruitt could have reasonably concluded the above exchange was not an 

attempt to “entrap” appellee and did not demonstrate bias or prejudice, much less a 

deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that makes fair judgment “impossible.”

Appellant argues that during the June 23, 2021 hearing, Judge Plumlee

interrupted his counsel “every time” she “was getting to a critical point.” “A judge’s

ordinary efforts at Courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered

judge’s ordinary efforts at Courtroom administration—remain immune.” Liteky, 510

U.S. at 556; Echols, 2014 WL 4629056, at *6 n.3. After reviewing the record, Judge

Pruitt could have concluded appellant’s counsel was not precluded from eliciting

testimony and that appellant failed to meet the high burden of demonstrating deepseated antagonism or favoritism making fair judgment impossible.
–37–

Appellant asserts arguments based on Judge Plumlee’s demeanor and partial

evidentiary rulings during the August 16, 2021 hearing similar to those he made

about the June 23, 2021 hearing. We decided above that Judge Pruitt did not abuse

his discretion in rejecting appellant’s similar arguments concerning the June 23

hearings. For similar reasons, Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in rejecting

appellant’s arguments concerning the August 16 hearing.

Appellant argues Judge Plumlee erroneously allowed the amicus attorney to

inappropriately use exhibits and make improper closing arguments. We note

appellant citesto the transcript of the trial on the merits. He complains of occurrences

recorded in transcripts of proceedings held on September 15, 2022, and September

16, 2022. These dates are subsequent to the motion, hearing, and order related to

appellant’s second motion to recuse. These matters were not before Judge Pruitt, and

he could not have abused his discretion concerning these subsequent trial matters.

We do not address appellant’s remaining repetitive arguments or his mere

assertions, conclusory statements, or conjecture. See Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d at 

117 (conclusory statements, conjecture, or mere assertions of bias will not satisfy 

the burden or overcome the presumption of impartiality).

C. The Judicial Complaint

Appellant briefly asserts, “[appellant] also filed a judicial complaint against

Judge Plumlee, further prejudicing her.” He does not demonstrate the complaint led

to deep-seated antagonism that makes fair trial impossible or to bias or prejudice.
–38–

He fails to cite to a judicial opinion, statute, or rule providing that filing a judicial

complaint against a judge is a ground for recusal. Appellee cites to Cameron v.

Greenhill, 582 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. 1979) (“To hold that merely naming a judge

as a party would disqualify him would put power in the hands of litigants to frustrate

our judicial system.”). This Court has held recusal is not required simply because a

party seeking to recuse a trial judge was a plaintiff in another pending lawsuit in

which the trial judge was a defendant. See Drake, 529 S.W.3d at 528, 530 (quoting

Cameron, 582 S.W.2d at 776). We conclude the considerations expressed in

Cameron and Drake are relevant here in the context of a judicial complaint. Judge

Pruitt could have reasonably concluded appellant has failed to carry his high burden

to overcome the presumption of Judge Plumlee’s impartiality and to demonstrate

bias, prejudice, or animosity making fair trial impossible.

Judge Pruitt did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant’s second motion 

to recuse Judge Plumlee on the merits.

. . .

We overrule appellant’s first issue.8

 

8 Appellant’s notice of appeal states he desires to appeal from both orders denying recusal of Judge Plumlee 

and “from all portions of the judgment.” Appellant fails to assign error to the final judgment terminating 

parental rights other than to challenge the award of attorney’s fees.

 Appellant brings an additional assertion ostensibly based on the orders denying the motions to recuse 

Judge Plumlee. He argues, “The erroneous denial of [appellant’s] multiple requests for recusal culminated 

in the termination of [appellant’s] parental rights.” We have held the orders are not erroneous. His 

subordinate assertions include: (1) “Judge Plumlee’s unsupported orders and inappropriate commentary 

were given undue weight and credibility”; (2) “Judge Plumlee’s appointment of Dr. Robb and refusal to 
–39–

ATTORNEY’S FEES

In his second issue, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering him to pay appellee’s attorney’s fees. The trial court’s final judgment 

provides that appellee recover $565,876.50 from appellant for reasonable and 

necessary attorney’s fees and post judgment interest. The parties agreed the trial 

court would determine the amount of attorney's fees. 

Appellate courts review a trial court's award of attorney’s fees under an abuse 

of discretion standard. See Oliver v. Rowan, No. 05-19-01433-CV, 2021 WL

2948554, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Mohamed v. Ctr. for Sec. Policy, 554 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018,

pet. denied)). A court abuses its discretion if it rules without reference to guiding 

rules or principles. See id.

Appellant and appellee submitted the question of attorney’s fees based on

affidavit or declaration with attachments of detailed invoices thereto. Three law 

firms—Morales Walker PLLC; Chad Ruback, Attorney at Law; and White & 

Wiggins, LLP—represented appellant in the proceeding below. Appellee’s attorney, 

 

remove him as the supervisor further alienated the children”; and (3) “Judge Plumlee’s appointment of a 

confidential therapist after institutionally alienating the children from [appellant] ensured that her opinion 

was unfavorable to [appellant].” Appellant fails to explain the relevance of these assertions to the 

controlling questions of whether Judge Ginsberg or Judge Pruitt abused their discretion in denying motions 

to recuse Judge Plumlee. We see none. Our holding that neither judge abused his discretion pretermits 

consideration of appellant’s additional assertion of alleged effects of Judge Plumlee’s pretrial orders, 

commentary, or appointments. Accordingly, we do not consider or decide appellant’s additional assertions. 
–40–

Carlos Morales, averred he prepared his affidavit to offer his opinion as an expert 

witness on the issue of appellant’s attorney’s fees.

9 He averred reasonable and 

necessary attorney’s fees were (1) $777,150.40 for his firm, (2) $136.026.00 for 

Chad Ruback’s firm, and (3) $17,200.00 for Wiggins’s firm. He averred to a total 

amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and paralegal fees of

$930,376.40. Three separate sets of invoices are attached to Morales’s affidavit: one

for services provided by Morales Walker PLLC, one for services provided by Chad 

Ruback, Attorney at Law, and one for services provided by White &Wiggins, LLP. 

Morales’s affidavit averred to numerous matters concerning attorney’s fees for each 

of the three firms that represented appellees, including the attorney’s professional 

experience, the complexity of the case, the amount of the hourly rates, the 

reasonableness of the hourly rates, the reasonableness and necessity of the services 

rendered, and the reasonableness and necessity of the attorney’s fees requested. 

The final judgment awards attorney’s fees to appellee in one lump sum 

without specifying amounts awarded separately to Morales Walker PLLC, Ruback, 

Attorney at Law, or Wiggins & White, LLP.

Appellant notes Ruback and Wiggins did not file their own separate affidavits 

with attached invoices in support of their own attorney’s fees. He argues, 

The Affidavit of Carlos Morales attempted to authenticate the invoice 

of Chad Ruback, Attorney at law and White & Wiggins, LLP, in 

 

9 Appellant failed to object to Morales’s qualifications as an expert witness or to offer testimony to 

controvert Morales’s testimony. 
–41–

addition to Morales Walker, PLLC, invoices. However, Morales is not 

a custodian of such records and this the invoices of Chad Ruback and 

White & Wiggins are inadmissible hearsay and do not constitute 

competent evidence sufficient to support an award of such fees to 

[appellee]. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(6) and 902(10).10

Appellant argues a party applying for an award of attorney’s fees bears the burden 

of documenting the hours expended on the litigation and the value of those hours. 

See El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2012) (an applicant for a 

 

10 Rule 803(6) provides:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is 

available as a witness:

(6) A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—

someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified 

witness, or by an affidavit or an unsworn affidavit that complies with Rule 9022(10); 

and

(E) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of information or the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. “Business” as used in 

this paragraph includes every kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for 

profit or not.

TEX. R. EVID. 803(6). 

Rule 902(10) provides, in part:

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of 

authenticity in order to be admitted: . . .

(10) The original or a copy of a record that meets the requirements of 803(6) or (7), if the 

record is accompanied by an affidavit that complies with subparagraph (B) of this rule and 

any other requirements of law, and the record and affidavit are served in accordance with 

subparagraph (A). For good cause shown, the court may order that a business record be 

treated as presumptively authentic even if the proponent fails to comply with subparagraph 

(A).

TEX. R. EVID. 902(10).
–42–

fee under the lodestar method must provide sufficient details of the work, including 

documentation of services performed, who performed them and at what hourly rate, 

when they were performed, and how much time the work required). He argues, 

“Without the invoices of Chad Ruback or White and Wiggins, the affidavit of Carlos 

Morales does not provide sufficient evidence regarding what services were 

performed, when they were performed, or how much time such work required to 

support an award of attorney’s fees to [appellee].”

In response, appellee relies on this Court’s precedent and Texas Rules of 

Evidence 703 and 705(a). See TEX. R. EVID. 703, 705. Rule 703 provides:

An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the 

expert has been made aware of, reviewed, or personally observed. If 

experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of 

facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be 

admissible for the opinion to be admitted.

TEX. R. EVID. 703. Rule 705(a) provides:

If the underlying facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the 

proponent of the opinion may not disclose them to the jury if their 

probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion is outweighed 

by their prejudicial effect. If the court allows the proponent to disclose 

those facts or data the court must, upon timely request, restrict the 

evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.

TEX. R. EVID. 705(a).

Appellee cites to Murco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1990, no writ). In Murco Agency, Inc., this Court upheld an award of 

attorney’s fees based on expert testimony. Id. The expert testimony in Murco relied 
–43–

on an itemized legal bill that was not introduced in evidence. Id. The expert testified

the fees were fair and reasonable. Id. This Court noted no authority was cited that 

required the bill itself be introduced into evidence and that we had not found such 

authority. See id. Appellant argues Murco Agency, Inc. is inapplicable because, he 

asserts, the expert in Murco Agency, Inc. provided specific testimony based on fee 

statements. We find no such distinguishing testimony discussed in Murco Agency, 

Inc. We reject appellant’s sole argument that Murco Agency, Inc. is inapplicable.

Moreover, a sister court upheld a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees over an

objection to expert testimony concerning fees of a deceased attorney on grounds that

“[t]he prior lawyer fee statements are hearsay.” Tijerina v. Wyson, No. 14-15-00188-

CV, 2017 WL 506779, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 7, 2017, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals stated,

[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony. 

“[A]n expert can testify at trial in appropriate circumstances about 

hearsay evidence relied upon in forming an expert opinion if such

evidence reasonably would be relied upon by experts in the field in 

forming opinions or inferences regarding the subject at issue.” Niche 

Oilfield Servs., LLC v. Carter, 331 S.W.3d 563, 574 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see TEX. R. EVID. 703. Here, [the 

expert] reasonably relied upon invoices and billing statements from 

appellee’s former attorney to form an opinion, and these documents 

would typically be relied on to determine the reasonableness of the fees 

charged. See In re Marriage of Bivins, 393 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied) (noting that an expert could rely upon 

invoices containing hearsay to form an opinion about whether the work 

invoiced was reasonable and necessary).
–44–

Id. Appellant asserts Tijerina is inapposite here for the same reasons he asserts 

Murco Agency, Inc. is inapposite. We have rejected that Murco Agnecy, Inc. is 

inapposite and reject appellant’s related argument concerning Tijerina. 

Appellant briefly argues the Morales affidavit is “insufficient” due to lack of

specificity. The only judicial opinion cited in appellant’s brief on attorney’s fees is 

In Apple I, LTD, 370 S.W.3d at 761 (“A party applying for an award of attorney’s 

fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended on the litigation and the 

value of those hours.”). Appellant argues that when applying for a fee under the 

lodestar method, the applicant must provide sufficient details of the work performed, 

including, at a minimum, documentation of the services performed, who performed 

them and at what hourly rate, when they were performed, and how much time the 

work required. See id. The invoices attached to the Morales affidavit do exactly that. 

Notably, appellant fails to argue how, specifically, the Morales affidavit and attached 

invoices of Chad Ruback, Attorney at Law and White & Wiggins, LLP fail to satisfy 

the requirements of El Apple I, LTD. Attached to the Morales affidavit are 131 pages 

of detailed invoices of Morales Walker PLLC; Chad Ruback, Attorney at Law; and 

White & Wiggins, LLP. We reject appellant’s brief and general argument that the 

attached invoices were “insufficient” pursuant to standards announced in El Apple I, 

LTD. 

Appellant argues in reply that the Morales affidavit contains “generalities”

concerning the experience of Ruback and Wiggins and the reasonableness of their 
–45–

hourly rates. In reply, he cites Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 

578 S.W.3d 469, 496-97 (Tex. 2010) (“We have clearly held, however, that 

generalities such as these are not sufficient to support a fee-shifting award under the 

lodestar method, which applies in fee-shifting situations.”) (emphasis added). Id. at 

496. Rohrmoos referred to “generalities” in cases in which “some courts have 

decided that testimony about an attorney’s experience, the total amount of fees, and 

the reasonableness of the fees complies sufficiently with Arthur Andersen to support 

an attorney’s fee award.” Id. The Morales affidavit and attachments do not present

the generalities decried in Rohrmoos. As addressed above, Morales averred to 

specific information, and his affidavit had attached to it 131 pages of detailed 

invoices of Morales Walker, LLC; Chad Ruback, Attorney at Law; and White & 

Wiggins, LLP. Appellant’s quoted language from Rohrmoos fails to support his

argument. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s 

fees to appellant.

We overrule appellant’s second issue.
–46–

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant’s first issue and affirm the orders on both motions to 

recuse Judge Plumlee. We overrule appellant’s second issue and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees.

221322f.p05

/Bill Pedersen, III/

BILL PEDERSEN, III

JUSTICE
–47–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

DAVID BARNES, Appellant

No. 05-22-01322-CV V.

JENNIFER LANCASHIRE, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 330th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-11126.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Pedersen, III. Justices Reichek and 

Nowell participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED; the January 15, 2021 order denying David Barnes’s motion 

to recuse is AFFIRMED; and the August 31, 2022 order denying David Barnes’s 

tertiary motion to recuse is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Jennifer Lancashire recover her costs of this 

appeal from appellant David Barnes.

Judgment entered this 6th day of June, 2023.