NO. 03-14-00726-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXAS SAN MARCOS TREATMENT CENTER, L.P. d/b/a

SAN MARCOS TREATMENT CENTER 

Appellant 

v. 

VERONICA PAYTON 

Appellee 

On Appeal from Hays County, Texas, 

428th Judicial District Court 

Trial Court Case Number: 13-2658 

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF 

Ryan L. Clement

Texas Bar No. 24036371

SERPE JONES ANDREWS

CALLENDER & BELL, PLLC

 2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600 

 Houston, Texas 77019

 Telephone: (713) 452-4400

 Facsimile: (713) 452-4499

Email: rclement@serpejones.com 

 

Attorneys for Appellant, 

Texas San Marcos Treatment Center, 

L.P. d/b/a San Marcos Treatment Center

ORAL ARGUMENT RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00726-CV

4336477

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

3/2/2015 3:26:58 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/2/2015 3:26:58 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF REPLY .........................................................................................1

ARGUMENT IN REPLY .......................................................................................2

 1. Dr. Reid’s Report Provides No Relevant Facts...........................................2

 2. Dr. Reid Fails to Identify The Applicable Standards of Care or

 Alleged Related Breaches..............................................................................6

 3. Dr. Reid’s Causation Opinions are Conclusory and Founded on

 Speculation....................................................................................................11

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER...........................................................................14
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 

46 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. 2001)........................................................................... passim

Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb,

228 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.)........................................9, 13

Baylor All Saints Med. Ctr. v. Martin,

340 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.).....................................11

Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright,

79 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. 2002).......................................................................... 4, 5, 7, 9

Earle v. Ratliff,

998 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1999)...................................................................................4

Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P.,

189 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)..........................9

Hebert v. Hopkins,

395 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)................................. 9, 14, 15

Jelinek v. Casas,

328 S.W. 3d 526 (Tex. 2010)......................................................... 5, 11, 12, 13, 14

Kingwood Pines Hosp., LLC v. Gomez,

362 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)............... 11, 13

Kocurek v. Colby,

No. 03-13-00057-CV, 2014 WL 4179454 –5 

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 22, 2014, no pet.) ........................................................12

Kuykendall v. Dragun,

No. 11-05-00230-CV, 2006 WL 728068 

(Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 23, 2006, pet. denied).................................................5

McKenna Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Quinney,

No. 03-06-00119-CV, 2006 WL 3246524 

(Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2006, pet. denied)....................................................7
iv

Regent Care Ctr. of San Antonio II, Ltd. P'ship v. Hargrave,

300 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied)............................14

Russ v. Titus Hosp. Dist.,

128 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).................................7

Shenoy v. Jean,

No. 01-10-01116-CV, 2011 WL 6938538

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2011 .....................................................4

Smith v. Wilson,

368 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.)..................... 6, 11, 12, 14, 15

Strom v. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys.,

110 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) ...................7

Taylor v. Fossett,

320 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)...............................................4

Texarkana Nursing & Healthcare Center, LLC v. Lyle,

388 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2012, no pet.)..................................7, 11

W.B.M. Mgmt. Co. v. Flores,

No. 07-14-00008-CV, 2014 WL 1691362 –6 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 25, 2014, no pet.) .......................................................4
NO. 03-14-00726-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS

TEXAS SAN MARCOS TREATMENT CENTER, L.P. d/b/a

SAN MARCOS TREATMENT CENTER

Appellant

v.

VERONICA PAYTON

Appellee

On Appeal from Hays County, Texas,

428th Judicial District Court

Trial Court Case Number: 13-2658

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Texas San Marcos Treatment Center, L.P. d/b/a San Marcos 

Treatment Center (“San Marcos Treatment Center” or “Appellant”) files this Reply 

Brief, and in support thereof, would respectfully show the Court the following: 

SUMMARY OF REPLY

Dr. Reid’s report contains no relevant factual information. Instead, Dr. 

Reid’s report relies on vague statements, generalizations, inferences and also 

speculation to address the required statutory elements of an expert report under 
2

Chapter 74. Dr. Reid’s opinions are conclusory, as evidenced by his express 

acknowledgement that he lacks specific factual information central to his opinions 

and his reliance on vague statements, generalizations, inferences and speculation to 

support his conclusions. 

Consequently, Dr. Reid’s report does not satisfy the requirements under 

Chapter 74 or the standards established by Palacios and its progeny because the 

report fails to provide enough information to fulfill the two purposes of an expert 

report under the statute as it fails to inform San Marcos Treatment Center of the 

specific conduct called into question and also failed to provide the trial court with a 

basis to conclude that the claims have merit.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

1. Dr. Reid’s Report Provides No Relevant Facts

On page 5 of Dr. Reid’s report, a “brief narrative” is supplied. This 

paragraph discusses the “facts” upon which Dr. Reid’s various opinions concerning 

the applicable standards of care and alleged breaches rest. The only “facts” 

provided by Dr. Reid in his report concerning events preceding the assault are as 

follows:

At the time of the assault, Veronica Payton (victim) was an aide on 

the boys’ unit (patients apparently about 11 years old and up) of San 

Marcos Treatment Center (SMTC). Leroy Simon (assailant) was a 17 

year-old, “stocky” male patient with a long history of assaultive 

behavior, sex offenses, fights, borderline intellectual function or mild 

mental retardation, and chronic symptoms of intermittent explosive 
3

disorder, lack of impulse control, oppositional defiance disorder, and 

other mental and behavioral problems, most of all of which were 

known to SMTC prior to January 2, 2012. Mr. Simon was housed on 

the boys’ unit to which Ms. Payton was assigned.

During the evening of January 2, 2012, Mr. Simon asked to be 

escorted off the unit to do his laundry. There were two staff, both 

female, assigned to the boys’ unit at the time, including Ms. Payton. 

Ms. Payton agreed to accompany him to the functioning laundry, and 

did so. 

(CR 36). 

Dr. Reid provides no additional facts concerning the events leading up to the 

assault in his report. Dr. Reid provides no facts concerning the facility’s staffing

requirements or the patient-to-staff ratio. Dr. Reid provides no facts concerning 

the education, training, or instruction provided to the facility’s staff in general, or 

Ms. Payton specifically. Dr. Reid provides no facts concerning the information or 

notification provided to staff concerning the patient’s past mental health history. 

Dr. Reid provides no facts concerning the process of the patient’s admission to the 

facility and/or his placement on the unit. Dr. Reid provides no facts concerning the 

care and treatment ordered for this patient (i.e. the observation level and/or any 

limitations or restrictions) by his admitting physician. Dr. Reid provides no facts 

concerning the patient’s admission and care while at San Marcos Treatment Center

and his interactions with patients and/or staff aside from the assault alone. In the 

absence of any relevant facts, Dr. Reid, nonetheless, offers opinions as to the 
4

standards of care and alleged breaches with regard to all the aforementioned 

subject matters. 

An expert, however, must explain the basis for his statements to link his 

conclusions to the facts and not merely state conclusions. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 

890 (Tex. 1999)). 

Appellate courts recognize that an expert’s failure to provide any facts in the 

report to support his or her conclusions on standard of care, breach, and causation 

prevents the trial court from concluding the plaintiff’s claims have merit. See 

Taylor v. Fossett, 320 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (finding 

trial court abused its discretion in denying physician’s motion to dismiss since 

expert report provided only conclusory opinions without supporting facts); W.B.M. 

Mgmt. Co. v. Flores, No. 07-14-00008-CV, 2014 WL 1691362, *5–6 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Apr. 25, 2014, no pet.) (holding that expert report was not a good faith 

effort to provide a fair summary of his opinions and warranted dismissal since 

expert failed to provide facts to support his conclusion); Shenoy v. Jean, No. 01-

10-01116-CV, 2011 WL 6938538, *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 

2011, pet. denied) (holding that “an expert report that merely asserts that a 

defendant physician’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injury without providing a 
5

factual basis does not provide the trial court with the information necessary to 

evaluate the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 

The failure to set forth facts supporting an expert’s opinions on the standard 

of care, breach, and causation is not an argument based on “semantics.” 

Kuykendall v. Dragun, No. 11-05-00230-CV, 2006 WL 728068, *3 (Tex. App.—

Eastland Mar. 23, 2006, pet. denied). Rather, the facts are “vital” in determining 

whether the plaintiff’s claims have merit. Id.

As the Texas Supreme Court held in Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W. 3d 526 

(Tex. 2010), when the report in question lacks any explanation linking the expert’s 

conclusion to the relevant facts, the trial court abuses its discretion in denying the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 540 (citing Bowie Mem’l, 79 S.W.3d at 52).

Appellee’s attempts to draw comparisons between the sufficiency of Dr. 

Reid’s report and those provided in other cases fall short. See Appellee’s Brief at 

36-38. The primary distinction is that there were relevant facts provided in the 

other reports resulting in adequate specificity. However, the report of Dr. Reid

fails to provide any relevant facts or the requisite specificity. 

Because Dr. Reid’s report fails to provide any relevant facts, the opinions 

are purely conclusory and the report does not represent a good faith effort. If an 

expert report contains only conclusions about the statutory elements in section 

74.351, the trial court has “no discretion but to conclude ... that the report does not 
6

represent a good-faith effort” to satisfy the statute. Smith v. Wilson, 368 S.W.3d 

574, 577 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (citing American Transitional Care 

Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877, 880 (Tex. 2001)). 

The trial court abused its discretion in holding that Dr. Reid’s report was 

adequate and in denying San Marcos Treatment Center’s motion to dismiss under 

Chapter 74 because Dr. Reid’s report fails to link relevant facts to his conclusions 

on any of the required elements of a Chapter 74 expert report.

2. Dr. Reid Fails to Identify The Applicable Standards of Care or Alleged 

Related Breaches

On page 1 of his report, under the heading “Duties, Standards and Breaches 

Thereof”, Dr. Reid offers the following conclusory opinions concerning the 

applicable standards of care:

That employer (SMTC), by itself and through its various parts or 

assigns, had duties to its unit employee Ms. Payton, which included, 

but may not have been limited to, (a) adequate staffing and staff 

support in her work environment (sufficient to meet reasonable levels 

of staff safety, as well as patient safety and care), (b) adequate 

training with regard to recognizing and managing situations that 

might arise in which her safety could be compromised, (c) adequate 

notification of work situations or persons in her work environment 

that could reasonably present a danger to her or others, (d) adequate 

care in avoiding or declining admission of patients/clients who are 

inappropriate for the unit on which she worked, and (e) elimination or 

amelioration of reasonably known risks to her and other staff or 

patients created by patients/clients who are admitted to and housed on 

the unit on which she worked. 

(CR 32-33). 
7

As this Court is aware, whether a defendant healthcare provider breached its 

duty cannot be determined absent specific information about what the defendant 

should have done differently. Russ v. Titus Hosp. Dist., 128 S.W.3d 332, 341-42 

(Tex. App. – Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (quoting Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880)). 

In other words, one must be able to determine from the report what was required 

by the standard of care, which requires “specific information about what the 

defendant should have done differently”. Texarkana Nursing & Healthcare 

Center, LLC v. Lyle, 388 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2012, no pet.) 

(quoting Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880)). Identifying the standard of care is critical 

because whether a defendant breached its duty cannot be determined absent 

specific information about what the defendant should have done differently. 

McKenna Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Quinney, No. 03-06-00119-CV, 2006 WL 3246524, 

*4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing to Bowie 

Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Tex. 2002) (per curium); Russ, 128 

S.W.3d at 343). Moreover, the standard of care is defined by what an ordinarily 

prudent health-care provider would have done under the same or similar 

circumstances. See id. (citing to Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880; Strom v. Mem'l 

Hermann Hosp. Sys., 110 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, 

pet. denied)). 
8

Dr. Reid’s opinions concerning the standards of care provide nothing more 

than vague, generalized statements that are wholly reliant on inferences because 

they are devoid of any factual information and lack the specificity required under 

the statute. In summary, Dr. Reid’s opinions provide no information as to what the 

standard of care applicable to San Marcos Treatment Center is in this context and 

under the facts.

Using the first standard of care expressed by Dr. Reid as an example (though 

the others are equally as deficient), Dr. Reid opines that San Marcos Treatment 

Center had a duty to provide “adequate staffing and staff support” and “failed to 

provide adequate staffing to meet the foreseeable needs for patient care and staff 

and patient safety.” (CR 32-33). However, Dr. Reid also openly acknowledges in 

his report that, “Specific staffing data from SMTC is not yet available to me.” (CR 

33). Thus, his statement as to the standard of care for adequate staffing is without 

any factual support and, therefore, because his conclusions are not linked to any 

relevant facts his opinion as to this standard of care is purely conclusory. All of 

Dr. Reid’s opinions concerning the standards of care and breach suffer from the 

same failure to link any relevant factual information to the opinions expressed or 

provide sufficient specificity as to the specific conduct called into question. 

Because there is no link to any relevant factual information, all of the Dr. Reid’s 

opinions concerning the standards of care are expressed in vague, general terms 
9

and lack the specificity required by the statute. None of the standards of care 

and/or alleged breaches offered by Dr. Reid are sufficiently tied to any facts or 

provide any information beyond vague, general statements and, therefore, Appellee 

has failed to provide an adequate expert report supportive of any of her legal 

theories. 

In so far as Dr. Reid makes any attempt to link any “facts” to his 

conclusions, Dr. Reid merely refers to materials listed under “Sources Reviewed 

and/or Relied Upon.” (CR 37-38). However, those materials are neither described 

within his report nor are they attached and incorporated. Thus, Dr. Reid’s opinions 

rely repeatedly on inferences as to the contents of those materials cited and 

whether or not support they support his conclusions. The only information 

relevant to determining whether a report complies with the statute is “within the 

four corners of the document.” Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. This requirement 

precludes a court from filling gaps in a report by drawing inferences or guessing as 

to what the expert likely meant or intended. Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb, 228 

S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (citing Bowie Mem’l, 79 

S.W.3d at 53; Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). This Court declared, “neither the trial court nor 

this Court may infer additional opinions or underlying facts to fill in gaps that the 

report itself leaves open.” Hebert v. Hopkins, 395 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. App.—
10

Austin 2013, no pet.). Because Dr. Reid provides no relevant facts, his report is 

fatally reliant on inferences for any support and naturally requires that gaps be 

filled in to complete and support his conclusions. However, Dr. Reid’s report’s 

reliance on inference is impermissible under the statute and the interpretive legal 

precedent. 

Appellee misunderstands that purpose for which Appellant referred to 

materials outside the four corners of the report. See Appellee’s Brief at 25. The 

materials referenced were not provided for this Court’s consideration of their 

substance or contents, but rather, to provide a description of available materials in 

Ms. Payton’s personnel file as an illustration of Dr. Reid’s reliance on inference 

because he fails to describe or detail what particular contents he reviewed in her

personnel file, what materials he anticipated finding in her personnel file, and how 

the absence of specifically described items support his opinions. Dr. Reid offers

no such description but, instead, merely offers:

Review of Ms. Payton’s SMTC personnel file and relevant portions of 

the SMTC Employee Handbook reveals no indication that Ms. Payton 

received any SMTC training regarding her safety in the workplace, 

and particularly none related to recognizing potentially dangerous 

patients, recognizing potentially assaultive patients, or protection 

herself from patient assault.

 

(CR 33). 

Dr. Reid’s vague statement, which lacks any factual reference to specific 

materials (present or absent), naturally required the trial court to infer as to the 
11

materials that should be present but were not found and to then fill in the gap by 

making assumptions. 

Dr. Reid’s vague, generalized statements concerning the standards of care 

(without any reference to relevant facts) are similar to those found in other reports 

served in assault cases where similar reports were likewise found to be deficient. 

E.g. Lyle, 388 S.W.3d 314; Baylor All Saints Med. Ctr. v. Martin, 340 S.W.3d 529 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Kingwood Pines Hospital, LLC, v. Gomez, 

362 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

Dr. Reid’s report fails to identify the applicable standards of care in 

connection with any factual information or discuss any related alleged breaches 

but, instead, relies on vague, general statements and inferences to reach purely 

conclusory opinions as to these required elements. 

3. Dr. Reid’s Causation Opinions Are Conclusory and Founded on 

Speculation

As this Court recently noted in Smith v. Wilson, an expert must explain, with

supporting facts, how the defendant’s alleged breach in the standard of care caused 

the injury in question. Smith, 368 S.W.3d at 577–78. A conclusory statement on 

causation is wholly insufficient. Id.

Further, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]n expert cannot simply 

opine that the breach caused the injury. ... Instead, the expert must go further and 

explain, to a reasonable degree, how and why the breach caused the injury based 
12

on the facts presented.” Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539–40. (emphasis added). 

Without this explanation, the trial court cannot conclude the claims have merit. Id.; 

see also Smith, 368 S.W.3d at 578 (Austin Court reversing trial court’s denial of 

motion to dismiss after finding report failed to provide facts explaining the causal 

link between alleged breach and the occurrence or injury); Kocurek v. Colby, No. 

03-13-00057-CV, 2014 WL 4179454, *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 22, 2014, no 

pet.).

This Court has also stated that an expert report must explain how taking the 

suggested measures would have prevented the particular injuries complained of. 

Smith, 368 S.W.3d at 577-578.

Appellee’s reliance on UHS of Timberlawn, Inc. is misapplied. See

Appellee’s Brief at 34-36. While assault may not be a medical condition, this does 

not eliminate the required element of causation and how that element must be 

sufficiently addressed within an expert report served pursuant to Chapter 74. As 

discussed later in Appellee’s Brief, causation remains a required element in an 

expert report in assault cases. See id. at 35-36. However, Dr. Reid’s report fails to 

adequately address causation. 

Concerning causation, Dr. Reid opines, “But for one or more of the breaches 

by SMTC, summarized in items 2-6, it is more likely than not that the January 2, 

2012, assault would not have occurred, and thus the above damages to Ms. Payton, 
13

would not have occurred.” (CR 035). However, Dr. Reid’s causation opinion is 

purely conclusory because it fails to explain how and why the alleged failures by 

San Marcos Treatment Center resulted in the assault. Kingwood Pines Hosp., LLC, 

362 S.W.3d at 750. In short, Dr. Reid’s conclusions as to causation amount to 

nothing more than an ipse dixit, which the Supreme Court has consistently 

criticized. Jelinek, 328 S.W. 3d at 539. 

Dr. Reid’s report offers no explanation, with supporting facts, how San 

Marcos Treatment Center’s alleged breach (of an unidentified standard of care) 

caused Ms. Payton’s injuries, or for that matter, caused her to decide to go to the 

laundry room with the patient alone. Dr. Reid offers nothing more than 

speculation and conjecture in his report to support his conclusions as to causation. 

In short, Dr. Reid opines that Ms. Payton would not have escorted the patient alone

on that occasion. (CR 35). In support of this speculative opinion, Dr. Reid refers 

to a statement by Ms. Payton. However, the statement is never described within 

his report and is also not attached is support of his opinion. This again 

demonstrates Dr. Reid’s reliance on inference, which this Court has correctly noted 

is specifically precluded. Austin Heart, P.A., 228 S.W.3d at 279. Additionally, it 

is also pure speculation and conjecture for Dr. Reid to opine as to the state of mind 

of Ms. Payton on January 2, 2012 and what she would or would not have done in 

relation to this patient under varying scenarios. 
14

Conclusory (and speculative) statements on causation, like those offered in 

Dr. Reid’s report, will not satisfy Chapter 74’s expert report requirements. See 

Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875; Regent Care Ctr. of San Antonio II, Ltd. P'ship v. 

Hargrave, 300 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied). 

Since Dr. Reid only offered conclusory opinions concerning the statutory elements 

required of an expert report, the trial court had “no discretion but to conclude ... 

that the report does not represent a good-faith effort” to satisfy the statute. Smith, 

368 S.W.3d at 577. The trial court’s ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion. Id. 

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

To constitute a good faith effort, the report must, at a minimum: (1) inform 

the defendant of the specific conduct called into question; and (2) provide a basis 

for the trial court to conclude the claims have merit. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. 

“A report that merely states the expert’s conclusions about the standard or care, 

breach, and causation does not fulfill the two purposes of a good-faith effort.”

Hebert, 395 S.W.3d at 890 (quoting Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539).

Because Dr. Reid provides absolutely no facts to support his conclusions on 

the applicable standard of care, breach, and causation he also fails to inform San 

Marcos Treatment Center of the specific conduct called into question. Similarly, 

because Dr. Reid fails to link his conclusions on the applicable standard of care, 

breach, and causation to any relevant facts, but instead relies on vague, general 
15

statements, inferences and speculation, his report also fails to provide a basis for 

the trial court to conclude the claims have merit. As such, the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding the report was sufficient. See Smith, 368 S.W.3d at 577.1 As a 

result, San Marcos Treatment Center requests that the Court reverse the trial 

court’s order.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, San Marcos Treatment Center 

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s order denying 

Appellant’s Chapter 74 Motion to Dismiss and remand to the trial court with an 

order that all claims and causes of action asserted by Appellee against San Marcos 

Treatment Center be dismissed with prejudice and that San Marcos Treatment 

Center be awarded its reasonably attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by Chapter 

74 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. San Marcos Treatment Center 

further prays for such other relief that it may be justly entitled.

 1 Also, without the relevant facts, the trial court either misapplied the law regarding the 

sufficiency of expert report or inferred additional underlying facts to fill in gaps that the report 

itself left open. This amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Hebert, 395 S.W.3d at 890. 
16

Respectfully submitted,

SERPE, JONES, ANDREWS, 

CALLENDER & BELL, PLLC

By: /s/ Ryan L. Clement

Ryan L. Clement

Texas Bar No. 24036371

rclement@serpejones.com

America Tower

2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 1600

Houston, Texas 77019

Telephone: (713) 452-4400

Facsimile: (713) 452-4499

Attorneys for Appellant, 

Texas San Marcos Treatment Center, 

L.P. d/b/a San Marcos Treatment Center 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Reply Brief for Appellant is computer 

generated, has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point 

for text and 12-point for footnotes, contains 3,405 words according to word count 

function of the computer program used to prepare this Reply Brief, excluding any 

parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), and otherwise complies with Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4.

/s/ Ryan L. Clement

Ryan L. Clement
17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

instrument has been forwarded to all known counsel of record in accordance with 

the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on this the 2nd day of March, 2015.

Adam S. Ward

Aaron Allison

Keely Allison Ward

Allison & Ward

2001 N. Lamar Blvd.

Austin, Texas 78705-4907

/s/ Ryan L. Clement

Ryan L. Clement