### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JACKS ON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs O ct obe r 8, 200 8
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E, EX R EL
. , M A R GA R ET V
. HI C KM A N v. RONALD L. DODD

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for G ibson County No. H-3075 G eorge R. Ellis, Ch ancellor

No. W2008-00534-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 21, 2008

This is a Tit le I V-D child support case
. Appellee fathe r executed a voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pater nity and a consent pater

nity order

. After discovering that he was not the ch i l d ’s biologica l fathe r, Appe llee soug ht relief f rom both his retroac tive and future child support obligations. The trial court g rante d Appellee ’s motion on the gr ound that he was not the biologica l f ather

. The State of Tenne ssee se eks re view of the trial court’ s decision. We conclude that the t rial cour t did not have authority to f

org ive Appellee ’s child support arr ear s. Moreove r, Appellee has nei t h er alleg ed sufficie ntly

specific fac ts to challeng e the voluntar y acknow ledg ment of pate rnity as re quired unde r Te nn . Co de . A nn . § 24 -7 -1 13 , n or ha s h e satis fi e d th e ne c e ssa ry re qu ir e me nts of

Te nn . R. Civ. P. 60 .0 2 to g a in r e lie f f

ro m e ith e r the c on se nt pate rn ity or de r, or the or de r o n c hil d s up po rt e nte re d in the cha ncer y court. We re verse and re mand.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
J. S TEVE N S T A FF O RD , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Juan G. Vi lla se ño r, Na sh vil le , T N, fo r A pp e lla nts Robert Kinton, Trenton, TN , for Appe llee Thomas F. B loom, Nashville, TN, for A ppellee
OP IN ION

Appellee Ronald F. Dodd a nd Kelly J une Dodd were marr ied on J une 23, 1990. On No ve mbe r 7 , 1 98 8, wh ic h wa s pri or to he r marr ia g e but dur ing he r re latio ns hip wi th Mr . D od d, Ms. Dodd g ave bir

th to the minor child at issue in this case
. On November 8, 1988, Mr. Dodd executedW e no te th a t th is c a se in v o lve s o rd e rs e n te re d in b o th the j u v e n ile c o u rt a n d th e c h a n c e ry c o u rt. P rio r to J u ly 1 1 , 2 0 0 3 , T en n.C o d e A nn
. § 3 7

- 1

- 1 0 3 (a)(2 ) ga ve t he juv en i l e co urt ex clusive o rigi na l jurisd i cti o n o ve r all p atern i t y case s. E f f ect i ve Jul y 1, 20 03 , t he provi s i on of s ubs ect i on ( a) ( 2) of T enn
. C od e Ann. § 37

- 1- 10 3 es t abl i s hi ng j ur i s di ct i on over pat er ni t y ca s es was del et ed, an d T enn. C o d e A nn
. § 37

- 1- 10 4(f ) was amended t o add t he f ol l owi ng l ang uag e: “N o t wi t hst and i ng any pro vi si o n of l aw t o t he co nt rary , t he juveni l e co urt has co ncurrent juri sdi ct i o n wi t h t he ci rcui t and
c h a n c e ry co u rt o f p ro c e e d ing s to e sta b lish t h e p a te rn ity o f c h ild re n b o rn o u t o f we d lo c k a n d to d e te rm ine a n y c u sto d y, v isitatio n , sup p o rt, e d u c a tio n o r o the r issu e s re g a rd ing the c a re a n d c o n tro l o f ch ild re n b o rn o u t o f we d lo c k .”
-2- a Voluntar

y Acknowle dg ment of Paternity (“V AP”) pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann. §68- 3-305. On Octobe r 1 9, 1991, Mr. Dodd and Ms. Dodd a lso ex ecute d a “Consent Pater nity Orde r” in the J uvenile Court of Gibson County , wher ein Mr. Dodd admits a nd acknow ledg es that he is the natura l fathe r of the c hild. 1

On May 23 , 199 4, the Gi bs on Cou nty Cha nc e ry Court g ra

nte d M s. Do dd

a div or c e by

de fa ult ag a in s t M r
. D o d d

. A s n o te d in th e f in a l d e c r e e o f d iv o r c e , th e mi n o r c h il d w a s in the tempora ry custody of the mate rnal g reat-g randmother , Marg are t H ickman, at the time of the entry of the de cre e. Mr. Dodd wa s order ed to pay $50 per week in child support; Ms. Dodd was order ed to pay $20 per
wee k in support. On May 8, 1995, the trial cour

t gr anted Mr. D odd’s petition to reduce h i s ch i l d support obligation to $ 4 4 p er we ek

. Some ten y ear s later, on August 19, 2005, the Appellant State of Tenne ssee, on behalf of Ms. H ickman, petitioned the c ourt to modify Mr. Dodd’s support oblig ation to comply

with the Tenne ssee Chil d S u pport Guidelines. On Septembe r 25, 2005, the trial c ourt g rante d the State’s petition, incre asing Mr. Dodd’s child support obligation to $430 per month. The court fur ther orde red tha

t Mr. Dodd “c ontinue t o l iquidate the re tro support here in at the rate of $21.65 per month.”
On November 9, 2005, Mr. Dodd filed a “Motion to Ce ase Child S upport.” As g rounds, Mr. Dodd asserts that Ms. Dodd “rece ntly advised [Mr. Dodd] that he [i s] actually not the natura l Fathe r of the minor child....” Mr

. Do d d fu rt h er asser ts that, based upon this information, he obtaine d pare ntag e testing , which ex cluded him as t he child’s fathe r. On M ay 18, 2006, the trial cour t ordere d the par ties to submit to DNA test i n g. T he re sults of that test indicate that Mr. Dodd is not the biologica l father

of the minor child. B ased upon this finding , the t ri al co u rt en t ere d an Or der on Aug ust 11, 2006 relievingMr. Dodd of any child support obligation goingforwa rd. The tr ial court also “for g [a] ve and dismiss[ed] any arr ear s....” The S tate filed a motion to alter or amend this order, which wa s denied by

the cour t on April 24, 2007. The S tate appeals and raises two issues f or re view as stated in its brief:

I . The tria l court e rre d when it re troac tively modified Mr. Dodd’s
su pp or t ob lig a tio n b y

fo rg ivi ngarr e ars ow e d b y him

.O n N ovemb er 30, 200 7, t hi s Co ur t i s s ued a s how ca us e o r der r equi r i ng t he St at e t o ans wer why t he appeal 2

s houl d not be di s mi s s ed becau s e t he order appeal ed was deemed not f i nal

. T he St at e conce ded t hat t he order appeal ed
was not f i nal , an d t hi s Co ur t di s mi s s ed t he ori gi nal ap peal o n D ece mb er 2 7, 2 00 7. In s ubs equen t procee di ng s i n t he t r i al
cour t , t he tri al cour t r ul ed on t he out s t andi ng cl ai ms a nd en t er ed a s econd order on Febr uar y 21, 200 8, wh i ch order p urpo rt ed t o be f

i nal

. U p o n revi ew, t hi s C o urt agai n de t erm i ned that the o rder ap p eal ed w as no t fi nal b ased up o n t he tria l co u rt’s failur e to a sse ss c o sts. O n O c to b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 , w e e n te re d a se c o n d sh o w c a u se o rd e r g ivin g the S ta te ten d a ys wi t h i n w h i ch t o obt ai n a f i n al orde r
. I n r es pon s e, t h e St at e h as s u ppl eme n t ed t h e appe l l at e r ec or d w i t h a n O ct ober 24, 2 0 0 8 ord er. From our revi ew, t he o rder ap p eal ed is n o w f i nal and t hi s C o urt has juri sdi ct i o n t o pro ceed wi t h t he
a d ju d ic a tio n o f t h e a p p e a l.
-3-

I I

. The trial court err ed by cea sing Mr. Dodd’s child s upport ob lig a tio n despi te the e xiste nc e of a va lid a g re e d o rd e r o f p a te rn ity
e nte re d in the Gi bs on

County Juve nil e Court

. 2 The issues presented involve questions of l aw. As such, we revie w the trial c ourt’s dec ision de novo upon the re cord w ith no presumption of correc tness. Tenn. R. App. P . 13(d). Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( f) (1 ) ( 20 05 ) p ro vid e s:

Any order for c hild support shall be a judg ment entitled to be enfor ced a s any

other judg ment of a co u rt o f t his state and shall be entitled to full faith an d cre dit in thi s state and in any other state. S u ch ju d g men t s h a l l n o t b e su b je ct to mod i f i ca ti o n a s to a n y ti me period or any am ounts d ue p rior to the date that an act ion f or m odif ication is f

iled and notice of the action has b ee n mailed to the l ast k now n address of the op posin g parties . I f the full amount of child suppo rt is not paid by the date upon which the orde red support is due, the unpa i d am o unt is in arrea rs and sha ll become a judgme nt for the unpaid amounts and shall ac crue interest fr om the date of the arr e ara g e a t th e ra te of tw e lve pe rc e nt ( 12 %) pe r a nnum. All interest which a ccumulate s on arr ear ag es s h al l be consider ed
c hil d s up po rt . Co mputatio n o f i nte re st s ha ll n ot be the re sp on sib ili ty of the c lerk. (Emphasis adde d).

F u rth e r mo r e , o u r Su

p r e me Co u rt h a s held in Rutl e dgev . Ba rre tt , 802 S.W .2d 604 (Tenn.1991) that, pursuant to the above statute, a c hild support o rd er is not s ubject to re troac tive modification. Id

. a t6 0 5- 60 7; s ee also Alexander v. Alexander , 3 4 S. W.3 d 4 56 , 4 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App.2000) (providing that “a court has no power to alter a child support awa rd as to any

period of time occur

ring prior to the date on which [a pare nt] files his or her petition.”). Acc ording ly , a trial court may not retroa ctively

forg ive a ch i l d s upport arr ear ag e, but may only modify child support obligations back to the date that a petition or motion for modification is f iled and notice is provided to the non-moving party

. Consequently , the trial court lac ked the a uthority to retroa ctively

modify the child support orde r and f org ive Mr. Dodd’ s arr ear ag e.-4-

Ha v i n g d et erm i n ed t h at t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fo rgi v en es s o f M r. Do d d ’s ch i l d s u p p o rt arre ar age was e rror , we now a ddress whe ther the trial cour t erre d in relievingMr. Dodd of his support ob lig a tio n g oin g fo rw ard . M r. Do dd ’s “ Mo tio n to Ce a se Chi ld S up po rt ” ave rs , in pe rt ine nt p art : 2. That [the child] was b o rn during this relationship [ betwee n Mr. Dodd and M s . Dodd] and Ronald L . Dodd was le d to believe he fathe red sa id child.
***
5. That the Mother, Kelly Dodd, of the minor child, rec ently advised Ronald L . Dodd, that he was ac t u al ly not the natura l Fathe r of the minor child...of whom he ha s been suppor ting since [] birth.

Fr om the motion, we cannot determine whether Mr. D odd is procee ding unde r Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.0 2 f o r r e li e f f r o m th e 1 9 9 1 c o n s e n t o r d e r o f p a te r n it y an d /o r th e o r d e r s o n c h il d s u p p o rt, or whether he is seeking relief from the 1988 VAP on the g round of fra ud in the procur ement ther eof. I n order to g ive Mr. Dodd the bene fit of the doubt, we w ill analy ze his mot ion as both a motion for relief from the VA P and as a Tenn. R. Civ. P . 60 motion for relief from the or ders e ntere d in the
c ha nc e ry c ourt

. A V AP s e rv e s a s a

me c ha nis m by wh ic h unm arried

fathe rs may

“ le g a lly e sta bli shthe ir pater nity without the intervention of the c ourt.” State e x rel. Parks v. Parks , No. W 2 0 0 5 -0 0 9 5 7 -C OA -R 3 -J V, 2 0 0 6 W L2 0 3 2 5 6 0 , at * 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. J u l

. 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g In re C.A .F. , 114 S.W .3d 524, 528 (Tenn. Ct. App.2003))

. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 4- 7- 11 3 s tate s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) A volun t ar y acknowledg ment of pate rnity which is completed under the provisions of § 68-3-203( g ), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305( b)
or un de r sim ila

r pr ov isi on s of ano the r state or g ov e rnme nt shall constitute a leg al finding of pate rnity on the individual na

med as the fathe r of the c hild in the acknowledg ment, s u b j ec t to rescission as provided in subsec tion (c). The acknow ledg ment, unless resc inded p u rs u an tt o s u

b s ec t i o n (c ), s h al l b e c o n cl u s i v e o f t h at fa t h er 's pater nity without further or der of

the cour t.

(b)( 1) A voluntary acknow ledg ment of pater nity which is completed under the provisions of § 68-3-203( g ), § 68-3-302, or § 68-3-305( b), or under simil ar pr ovis i o n s of anothe r state or g overnme nt, when
c e rt if ie d b y the state regis tr ar o r o the r g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty mai n t ai ning the rec ord of the a cknowledg ment, or the c opy of the-5- volu n t ary acknow ledg ment completed pur suant to § 68-3-302(e ), shall be a ba sis for establishing a support order without requiringany further proce eding s to establish paternity

.
(2 ) A n a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity e xec ute d a s d e sc ri be d in subdivision (b)(1) s h all be entitled to full faith and c redit in any judicial or administrative proc eedingin this st ate.

(3 ) No jud ic ia l or a dmi nis tr a tiv e pr oc e e din g s are re qu ir e d, no r s ha ll any such procee d i ng s be per mitted, to ratify

an uncha lleng ed acknow ledg ment of paternity in order to cre ate the conclusive status of the a cknowledg ment of pate rnity

.
(c ) Asig nator

y to a vo luntary a c kn ow le dg me nt sh a ll be pe rm itt e d to
re sc ind the vo luntary

a c kn ow le dg me nt a

t th e e arl ie r o f:

(1) The completion and subm ission of a sworn stateme nt refutingthe named f ather on a f o rm provided by

the state re g istrar. This for m mus t be fi le d in

the of fi c e of vit a l r e c or ds of

the de pa rtme nt o f h e a lth t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e f

e e r e qu i r e d b y t h e r e g i s t r ar w i t h i n s i x t y ( 6 0 ) d ays of the date of c ompletion of the ac knowledg ment; or

(2) Wi th in th e s ixt

y - d ay p e r io d f

o ll o w in g c o mp le ti o n o f the acknow ledg ment, at any

judicial or administrative proce edingduring that period at which the sig natory is a p arty

and which pr ocee ding relates to the child, by completion of t he form descr ibed i n subdivision (c)(1) or by the entry of an
or de r by the a dmi nis tr a tiv e or jud ic ia l trib un a l whic h dir e c ts the re sc iss ion of su c h a c kn ow le dg me nt.
* * * ( e ) ( 1 ) I f th e v o lu n ta r y a c kn o w le d g me n t h a s n o t b e e nr e s c inded pursuant to subsection (c ), the a cknowledg ment may only be
c ha lle ng e d o n th e ba sis of

fr a ud , w he the r e xtri ns ic or

i nt ri ns ic , d ur e ss, or mater ial mistake of fa ct.

(2) The challeng er must institut e the p ro ce eding upon notice to the other sig natory and other nece ssary parties including the Title I V-D-6- a g e nc y wi thi n fiv e (5 ) y e ars of

the e xec uti on

of the a c kn ow le dg me nt, and if th e c o u rt f

in d s b a s e d u

p o n th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t the hear ing that there is substantial likelihood that fraud, dur ess, or a materia l m i s t ake of

fac t exi sted in the execution of the
a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity , th en, and on ly the n, the c ourt

sh a ll order pare ntag e tests. S uch ac tion shall not be barre d by the five ( 5) y ear s t at ute of limitations where f raud in the pr ocure ment of the acknow ledg ment by

the mother of the child is alleg ed and where the reque sted relief

will not affec t the interests of the c hild, the state, or any Title I V-D a g ency . Nothing here in shall preclude the cha lleng er from pre senting any

other for m of eviden ce a s a substitute for the pare ntag e tests if it is not possi ble to conduct suc h tests. Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7-113.
The purpose of the VAP statute is to make it possible to decr ee child support order s without fi rs t h av i n g t o go t h ro u gha p at ern i t y p ro ce ed i n g. See Parks , 2 00 6 WL 20 32 56 0, a t *6 ; In reC.E .F. , 114 S.W .3d at 530. Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-113( e) spe cifica lly provides that af

ter sixt y day s from the execution of a V AP, it may only be cha lleng ed on the ba sis of “fr aud, whe ther e x trinsic or intrinsic, dur ess, or materia l mistake of fa ct,” a nd that challeng e must be made within five y ear s of the date the VAP was e x ecute d.. Tenn. Code Ann. § 24- 7-113(e ). Afte r five year s have e lapsed fr om the date of

the VAP execution, the VAP may only be cha lleng ed under

a fr aud theor

y
. Id . In th is
c a se , M r. Do dd

e xec ute d th e a g re e d o rd e r o f p are nta g e on Oc tob e r 1 9, 19 91 . H is pe tit ion to c e a se c hil d s up po rt

wa s f ile d on No ve mbe r 9 , 2 00 5– so me fo ur te e n y e ars a ft e r t

he e xec uti on

of the VA P. As set out above Mr. Dodd states only that he “w as led to believe he fathere d said child,” a nd that Ms. Dodd “re cently

advised [him] that he wa s actua lly not the natura l Fathe r....”

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 9. 02 state s:
I n all aver

ments of fra

ud o r m istake, the c ircumstance s constituting fra ud or mistake shall be state d with particular ity

.... Th e Ad vis or y Com mis sio n Co mme nts to t he Rul e state , in

re le va nt p art :
The re quirement in Rule 9.02--in aver ments of fr aud or mistake the
c ir c ums tanc e s c on sti tu ti ng fr a ud or mis take mus t be se t f

or th w ith pa rt ic ula ri ty

-- is n ot int end ed to re qu ir e le ng thy re c ita l of

de ta il. Rather, the Rule me ans o n l y that g ener al alleg ations of fra ud and mistake are insufficient; the plea der is re quired to par ticu l ar i z e, but by the “short a

nd plain” stateme nt require d by Rule 8.01.-7-

Mr. Dodd’s pe tition t o cea se his support obligatio n d o es not contain the pa rticular “c i rc u m s t an ce s co n s t i tu t i n g fr au d o r m i s t ak e. ” C o n s eq u en t l y , t h e p et i t i o n is insufficient t o ch al l en ge the execution of the VA P.

I n sever al ea

rlier decisions, this c ourt has conside red the issue of whe ther a putative father
may be re lie ve d o f t

he ob lig a tio n to su

pp or t a c hil d w he n b loo d or DN A t e sti ngc on c lus ive ly
es t ab l i shes that the child is not his own. See Tay lor v. Wilson , No. W2004-00275-COA-R3-JV, 20 05 WL51 75 48 (T e nn .Ct .App . M arc h 3 , 2 00 5) ; Richards v. Read, No. 01A01-9708- PB-00450, 19 99 WL 82 08 23 (T e nn .Ct .App . J uly 27 , 1 99 9) ; Harm on v. Harm on , No. 02A01-9709- CH-00212, 19 98 WL83 55 63 (T e nn .Ct .App . De c .3 , 1 99 8) . We have pr e vio us ly state d, “ Te nn e sse e law s tr on g ly favor s requiringbiologica l pare nts to bear responsibilit y for their own children, and that this policy al s o fa v o rs relievingputative fathers of the burden of supporting c hildren who have bee n shown, throug h conclusive evidence such as DNA testing, not to be their natural off spring .” Taylor , 2005 WL 517548, at *1. Howe ver, when a ma n executes a V AP, he ac knowledg es t h at h e acce pts the responsibility

of being a pare nt to the child. The VAP statute specific ally require s an alleg ation of fra ud in the procur ement of the VAP when a challeng e is ma de more than five y ear s after execution of the VA P. I n this case , Mr. Dodd has not alleg ed fraud with sufficie nt specificity to satisfy Tenn. R. C i v
. P

. 9

. 0 2 . I n the abse nce of such spec ificity , we f

ind that the statute of limitations for challeng ing the VAP has ex pired, and the t rial court err ed in rescinding the VAP that was e x ecute d in this case.

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 60 .0 2 s tate s, in r e le va nt p art :
60 .0 2. M ist ake s — Ina dve r te nc e —Ex c u sable Ne gle c t —F r aud, etc . — On motion and upon such terms a s are just, the court may relieve a par

ty or the pa

rty ' s leg al re prese ntat i v e from a final judgme nt, order or proceeding for the following r easons: (1) mistake, inadver tence , surprise or

excusable neg lect; (2) f raud ( whether here tofore de nominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepre sentation, or other misconduct of an adver se party ; ( 3) the judgme nt is void; (4) the judgme n t h a s b e e ns a ti s f ie d , r e le a s e d

o r d is c h ar g e d , o r

a p rior jud g me nt u

po n w hic h it

is b a se d h a s b e e n r e ve rs e d o r o the rw ise
vacated, or it is no longe r equitable that a judg ment should have prospec tive application; or (5) any other re ason justifying r elief f rom the oper ation of the j u d g ment. The motion shall be made w ithin a
rea so n a b le ti me , an d

f o r r e a s o n s ( 1 ) an d

( 2 ) n o t m o r e th ano n e y ear afte r the judg ment, order

or proc eedingwas e ntere d or take n.... Assuming that Mr. D odd’s m otion is one for re lief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, we conclude that any relief there under w ould nece ssarily be based upon Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1), (2), (4), or (5)

. We will address each of these grounds for relief i n turn. We first note t hat relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 is considered “ an exceptional re medy .” Nails v. Aetna I n s. Co. , 834 S.W .2d 289, 294 (Tenn.19 9 2 )

. T h e f

u n c ti o no f

Ru le 6 0

. 0 2 is “ to s tr ik e a p r o p e r b a la n c e b e tw e e nth e c o mp e ting-8-

principles of f

inality and justice.” Jerkins v. McKinn ey , 5 33 S .W .2 d 275, 28 0 ( Te nn .1 97 6) . Ru le 60.02 operates as “an esc ape va lve from possible inequity that might other

wise ar ise from the unrele nting impos ition of t he principle of finality imbedded in our proc edura l rules.” Thom pson v. Firem an's F

und I ns. Co. , 7 98 S.W. 2d

23 5, 23 8 ( Te nn .1 99 0) . H ow e ve r, “ [b]e c a us e of the ‘p ri nc ipl e of finality ,’ the ‘e scape valve’ should not be easily open ed.” Banks v. Dem ent Con str. Co. , 817 S

. W

. 2 d 1 6 , 1 8 (T en n
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Toney v . Mueller Co. , 810 S.W .2d 145, 146 (Tenn.1991) ). To
se t a sid e a

jud g me nt u

nd e r Rule 60 .0 2 the burd e n is up on the mov ant t o p ro ve that he is e nti tle d to relief , and ther e must be proof

of the ba sis on which relief is sought. See Brum low v . Brum low , 729 S.W. 2d 10 3, 106 (T e nn .Ct .App .1 98 6) ; Jeff erson v. Pneum o Servs. Corp. , 699 S.W .2d 181, 186 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). Amotion for relief from a judg ment p u rs u an t to Rule 60.02 addresse s the sound discretion of the tr ial judge . Acc ording ly , the scope of review on appe al is limi ted to whether the trial judge abused his discre tion. See Toney v. Mueller Co. , 810 S.W. 2d 14 5 ( Te nn .1 99 1) ; Trav is
v . Ci ty of Mur fre esb or o , 686 S.W .2d 68, 70 (Tenn.1985)

. As discussed above , Mr. Dodd’s averme nt of fr aud is not sufficiently specific to satisfy

the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P . 9.02. Moreove r, Mr. Dodd’ s motion was not filed within the oney ear time period allowed for relief on the g rounds of either f raud or mistake. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Consequently , the only

subsections of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 upon which Mr. Dodd may g ain re lief from his support obligation are ( 4)–“it is no longe r e quitable that a judg ment should have prospe ctive application,” or

(5)–“ any other re ason justifying r elief f rom the oper ation of judg ment.”
Th e so le ba sis fo r Mr . Dod d’ s pet iti on fo r re lie f is that ge ne tic te sti ng ha s shown that he is not the biologica l father . I n Welch v. Welc h , 195 S.W .3d 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), we discussed the applica

bility of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(4) in case s where pater nity testing ha s shown t h at t he putative father is not the biologic al father:

Our c ase la

w clea rly reje cts a brig ht-line rule that pr operly admitted g e ne t i c t e s t s c o n c l u s i v e l y e xc l u d i n g a

l e g a l f a t h e r f r o mp a t e r n i ty automatically

entitle the leg al father to re lief under Rule 60.02. Sta te ex rel. Ellis v. Hum es , N o
. W2 0 0 4

- 0 0 6 0 2-COA-R3

- JV , 2 0 0 5 WL 562753, at *3 (Te nn.Ct. App. Mar.10, 2005) ( no per m. app. filed ); Richard s v. Read , No. 01A01-9708- PB00450, 1999 WL820823 at * 1 2 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. Ju l y 2 7 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( n o p e r m
. a p p
. f i l e d ) ( C o t t r e l l , J,
concur ring ). Rather , the det er m i n ation of whe ther Rule 60.02 re lief is appropr iate depends on a we ighingof the e quities of the ca se. Elli s , 20 05 WL56 2753 a t *3 . “ [T]he g ra vame n o f R

ule 60 .0 2( 4) re lie f i n th ese ty pes of c ases lies in equity .” Id

. a t* 4

. InRichards v. Read , J udg e Cottrell noted in he r concur ring opinion “ that ever

y fathe r who has voluntarily

acknow ledg ed pate rnity

and w h o is later prove d not to be the child's biolog ical father may be re lieved fr om the pare ntal obligation he previously

undertook .

. . i s not the curr ent state of the law.” Richards , 1999 WL 820823 at *12.-9- ***
A m an w ho vo luntari ly

ha s le g iti mate d a c hil d h a s d e c lare d th a t he is the chi ld 's na

tur a l f a the r. Ac c or din g ly , h e wi ll b e he ld t o th e same duty of support unless his pa

renta l r ights are terminated or the balanc e of equities we ighs in fa

vor of r elea sing him fr om that duty

. Richards
v . Re ad , No

. 01A01-9708-PB 00450, 1999 WL 820823 at *7 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. Jul y

2 7 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( n o p e r

m
. a p p
. f i l e d ) ( C o t t r e l l , J,
co n cu rr i n g)( ci t i n g Ev ans v . Ev ans , 125 Tenn. 112, 1 4 0 S

. W. 745 (1911)) .... “Rule 60.02(4) enable s a court to r elieve a party from an order of leg itimation when it is no longe r equitable that the judg ment should have prospe ctive ef fec t.”
Id . at 76-77. As state d above, Mr . Dodd petitions for relief on the sole g round that DNAtesting ha s excluded his paternity in this case . Howeve r, pursua nt to the above a

uthority , this fact alone does not, ips o fa c to , mandate r elief f rom a pre vious judgment unde r Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(4). In order to g a in r e lie f u

nd e r Te nn . R. Civ. P. 60.0 2( 4) , Mr. Do dd ha s th e burd e n to sh owthat th e e qu iti e s in this matter weig h in his favor. F rom our re view of the rec ord, he ha s not met this burden as he ha s not put forth any

basis other than the g enetic te sting to support his motion. We now t urn to whethe r Mr. Dodd is entitled to relief under Te nn. R. Civ. P . 60.02(5).

De sp ite its br oa d langua g e , Te nn e sse e c ourt s have ve ry na rr ow ly c on str

ue d Te nn
. R. C iv. P. 60.02(5)
. Lethcoe , 1 8 S. W.3 d 6 21 , 6 25 (T e nn .2 00 0) ; Underwood, 854 S.W .2d at 97. The standa rds of Rul e 60 .0 2( 5) are mor e de mand ingtha n th os e a pp lic a ble to the oth e r gro un ds fo r r e lie f u nd e r t his rule. NC NB Na t'l Bank of N. C. v . T hra ilkill , 856 S.W .2d 150, 154 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). Relief
un de r R ule 60 .0 2( 5) is onl y a

pp ro pr iate in ca se s invo lvi nge xtra or din ary c ir c ums tanc e s o r e xtre me hardship. Lethcoe , 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 6 2 4 (c i t i n g Underwood , 854 S.W .2d at 97). Tur ning to the r ecor d, we note that there is neither a tra nscript of the e vidence from th e J u l y 1 2 , 2006 hear ing on Mr

. Dodd’s motion, nor is there a Tenn. R. C i v
. P

. 2 4 s t at ement of the evidenc e. Consequently , our revie w of the tria l court’s re asoning in gr anting Mr. Dodd motion is found in the Aug ust 11, 2006 Or de r, wh ic h s tate s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

2. That the g enetic te st report c oncludes that the alleg ed F ather , Ronald L . Dodd, ca

nnot be the biolog ical F ather o f * * * , since he
and the c hil d d o n ot s ha

re the ne c e ssa

ry pate rn a l mar

ke rs in m ult ipl e g enetic sy stems..., and,
3. Th a t, b a se d o n s aid DNA te sti ng , th e Mo tio n to Ce a se Chi ld Support filed by R onald L . Dodd, and to for g ive and dismiss any
arr e ars is h e re by

g ra nte d b y thi s Co ur t.
The results of gene tic testing alone are not sufficie nt g rounds for relief under the stringe nt-10-

re qu i re m en t s o f T en n
. R

. C i v
. P

. 6 0

. 0 2 (5 ). T h i s fa ct , co u p l ed wi t h t h e la ck o f a n y

s p ec i fi c f i n d i n gs constituting “e x traordina

ry circ umstances or

extreme hardship,” and the a bsence of a tra

nscript or statement of the evidenc e from which thi s Court might make such finding s, leads us to conc lude that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in g rantingrelief in this case.

For the fore g oing r easons, we r ever se the orde r of the tr ial court insofa r as it forg ives Mr. Dodd’s retroa ctive child support obligations, a nd insofar as it f

org ives his child support obligation g oing f orwa rd. We rema

nd the matter f

or such f urther pr ocee dings a s may b e n ec es s ary

and consistent with this opi nion. Costs of t his appea l are assessed ag ainst the Appellee, R onald L . Dodd, f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay e n t e r i f n e c e s s ar y.

J. S T E V E N S T A F F O R D , J.