SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3069-16T3

IN THE MATTER OF BETTY 

GENE JOHNSON-TAYLOR.

Submitted December 12, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission, Docket No. 2015-2424.

Betty Gene Johnson-Taylor, appellant pro se.

Law Office of Steven S. Glickman, attorneys for 

respondent City of Paterson (Steven S. Glickman, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission 

(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

Betty Gene Johnson-Taylor appeals the Civil Service Commission 

February 8, 2017 final decision terminating her from employment with the City 

of Paterson. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 26, 2019
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A January 16, 2015 final notice of disciplinary action (FNDA) removed 

Johnson-Taylor from her position as an assistant personnel director for the City 

effective January 16, 2015. The grounds were violations of N.J.A.C. 

4A:2-2.3(a)(6) and (12), conduct unbecoming a public employee and other 

sufficient cause. 

Johnson-Taylor misrepresented her income on an application for the 

Home Paterson Pride Rehabilitation Program (HOME). At the time she filed, 

she was earning $52,811 annually and resided with her nephew. The HOME 

booklet listed the income maximum for a household of two at $53,750. 

On July 13, 2010, Johnson-Taylor's income increased to $80,340 annually 

because she was appointed acting director of personnel. In that capacity, her 

duties included, as the Commission found, "the handling of personnel and 

employee relations problems and [functioning] as a liaison between the 

appointing authority and the Commission in personnel matters, including 

appointments, promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals and disciplinary 

matters." As the Commission also found, her falsification of the loan documents 

made it impossible for the appointing authority "to continue to trust her ability 

to do her job, which involves sensitive and confidential personnel matters." 
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Johnson-Taylor signed an affidavit on December 1, 2010, falsely 

verifying her income at $53,868.12. HOME loan proceeds were disbursed a few 

days later. She was required to verify her income every six months while the 

loan was pending. At no time did she disclose her promotion and the salary 

increase. 

Additional circumstances bear at least brief mention. They did not result 

in formal disciplinary action, only Johnson-Taylor's transfer back or demotion

to assistant personnel director from acting personnel director. In 2011, after 

investigation, the City determined that Johnson-Taylor had authorized overtime 

payments to City employees without proper documentation. She herself 

received such payments, totaling $11,549.12 from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011, 

and $3326.29 from July 1, 2011 to December 15, 2011. 

The Commission adopted the factual findings of the Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ), but did not adopt the ALJ's recommendation that the removal be 

modified to a six-month suspension. The Commission instead upheld the FNDA 

sanction of termination from City employment. 

The Commission did not consider progressive discipline, as defined 

beginning with West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962), to be appropriate 

given the nature of Johnson-Taylor's conduct. Johnson-Taylor signed loan 
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documents with full knowledge of the contents, falsifying an application for loan 

proceeds. The HOME program was administered by her employer and was

intended to assist those with limited income. Therefore the Commission 

concluded the penalty of removal was "appropriate notwithstanding a largely 

unblemished prior record."

The Commission also noted that although the appointing authority itself 

bore some responsibility since it drafted the loan documents, clearly JohnsonTaylor "knew her income exceeded the threshold for the grant." That she was 

not criminally charged because of the incident, and that the conduct did not 

relate directly to her job description was irrelevant. Her role with the appointing 

authority made it impossible for her to continue. Furthermore, she could not 

properly act as the liaison between Paterson and the Commission in personnel 

matters. 

Now on appeal, Johnson-Taylor asserts the following points of error:

1. THE FINAL ACTION OF THE CIVIL 

SERVICE COMMISSION WAS "ARBITRARY, 

CAPRICIOUS OR UNREASONABLE" BASED 

UPON THE FACTS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD.

2. THE FINAL DECISION OF THE CIVIL 

SERVICE COMMISSION IS "SHOCKING" TO 

ONE'S SENSE OF FAIRNESS AS THE 

PUNISHMENT IS DIS[PROPORTIONATE] TO THE 

OFFENSE.
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We consider Johnson-Taylor's arguments to be so lacking in merit as to not 

warrant much discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

In order for us to disturb an agency's final action, it must be found to have 

been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or lack fair support in the record as a 

whole. Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998). A strong 

presumption of reasonableness attaches to final agency decisions. In re Carroll,

339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001). 

In essence, Johnson-Taylor's challenge to the Commission's action is not 

that the falsification of the loan application did not occur—rather, it is that the 

appointing authority was implicated in the process, and that principles of 

progressive discipline should be applied. The Commission's findings are 

supported by the record, however. See In re Galloway Twp. & Bridgeton, 418 

N.J. Super. 94, 103 (App. Div. 2011). The agency's observations regarding the 

sensitivity of Johnson-Taylor's position with the appointing authority, including

interaction with the Commission itself in employee matters, are entitled to great 

deference. An employee in that position cannot continue after the 

misrepresentation of income involved in the falsification of documents. We are 

satisfied that the Commission's findings are not clearly mistaken, nor are they 
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so "plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and 

correction." Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587-88 (2001).

Affirmed.