UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-5076

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MATTHEW TROY EVANS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. 

(1:05-cr-00259-AMD-1) 

Submitted: December 17, 2009 Decided: January 14, 2010 

Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

W. Warren Hamel, Alexander W. Major, VENABLE LLP, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Jefferson M. Gray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 A jury convicted Matthew Evans of possession of a 

firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime 

punishable by more than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006); possession of body armor after having 

previously been convicted of a crime of violence, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) (2006); and possession of ammunition after 

having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more 

than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The 

district court sentenced Evans to a total of 235 months of 

imprisonment and Evans now appeals. Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

 Evans first challenges the district court’s admission 

of evidence that he possessed scales and cellular phones at the 

time of the commission of the crimes. This court reviews the 

evidentiary rulings of a district court for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2007). An 

abuse of discretion occurs only when “the [district] court acted 

arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting evidence.” United 

States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 732 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Evans argues that the district court erred in 

admitting the evidence because its probative value was 

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. A district 

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court should exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value 

is ‘substantially outweighed’ by the potential for undue 

prejudice, confusion, delay or redundancy.” United States v. 

Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 

403). “Prejudice, as used in Rule 403, refers to evidence that 

has an ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 

commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” Id.

(citations omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the evidence. 

 Evans next challenges the district court’s denial of 

his motion for a continuance after the Government inadvertently 

failed to timely provide the laboratory report of DNA found on 

the body armor. This court reviews a district court’s denial of 

a continuance for abuse of discretion. Williams, 445 F.3d at 

739 (citations omitted). “[E]ven if such an abuse is found, the 

defendant must show that the error specifically prejudiced [his] 

case in order to prevail.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and 

conclude that Evans has failed to demonstrate that the district 

court committed error, let alone that prejudiced his case. 

 Evans next argues that the district court erred in 

refusing to reopen the evidence after a witness who previously 

refused to testify indicated his willingness to take the stand 

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after the close of the evidence. This court reviews a district 

court’s decision on whether to reopen a case for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir. 

2005) (citation omitted). 

When reviewing whether or not the judge abused his 

discretion in not reopening a case, we examine 

(1) whether the party moving to reopen provided a 

reasonable explanation for failing to present the 

evidence in its case-in-chief; (2) whether the 

evidence was relevant, admissible, or helpful to the 

jury; and (3) whether reopening the case would have 

infused the evidence with distorted importance, 

prejudiced the opposing party’s case, or precluded the 

opposing party from meeting the evidence. 

United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir. 1996) 

(citation omitted). Our thorough review of the record persuades 

us that the district court carefully and equitably balanced the 

competing interests at stake in rendering its ruling. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Evans has failed to demonstrate 

that the district court abused its discretion in refusing his 

request to reopen the evidence. 

 Finally, Evans challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence on his convictions for possession of a firearm and 

possession of ammunition. This court reviews a district court’s 

decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of 

acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216-17 

(4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 

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F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be 

sustained “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, the verdict is supported by ‘substantial 

evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted). 

Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of 

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the 

credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the 

evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for 

insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the 

prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

 To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the 

Government was required to prove that: (1) Evans was a convicted 

felon; (2) he knowingly possessed the firearm and ammunition; 

and (3) the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate 

commerce. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th 

Cir. 2001). In order to prove possession under § 922(g), the 

Government need not prove “actual or exclusive possession, 

[rather] constructive or joint possession is sufficient.” Id.

at 136-37 (citation omitted). Moreover, “the Government may 

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prove constructive possession by demonstrating that the 

defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and 

control over the item.” Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Assessed in its entirety, the record 

confirms that the Government presented overwhelming evidence 

from which a rational jury could reasonably conclude that Evans 

possessed the firearm and the ammunition. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED