97-066

 No. 97-066

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

RICHARD R. SAMSON, et al.,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

STATE OF MONTANA, et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

 The Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellants:

 Philip E. Roy, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

 For Respondents:

 David W. Woodgerd and Brendan R. Beatty; Special Assistant

 Attorneys General; Office of Legal Affairs; Department of Revenue;

 Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: August 7, 1997

 Decided: November 4, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 In July 1996, plaintiff and appellant Richard Samson and several other Montana

property owners and taxpayers (collectively referred to herein as "Taxpayers") filed 

a

declaratory judgment action with the First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark

County, against the State of Montana, its Department of Revenue and Attorney General,

and all fifty-six Montana Counties (collectively referred to herein as 

"Department"). The

Taxpayers request class certification and seek various forms of relief, including a 

courtordered reduction of certain real property appraisals, as well as a partial refund 

of their

1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992 real property taxes. The Department subsequently moved

to dismiss the Taxpayers' first amended complaint on the grounds that each of their

claims is barred by the statute of limitations and on the basis that the complaint 

fails to

state a claim for which relief may be granted. On December 6, 1996, the District 

Court

issued an order granting the Department's motion to dismiss. It is from that order 

that

the Taxpayers now appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting 

the

Department's motion to dismiss. 

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 In 1989, the Montana Legislature modified the State's real property appraisal

system and enacted the stratified sales assessment ratio (SSAR) valuation adjustment,

codified at õ 15-7-111, MCA. Subsequently, in Department of Revenue v. Barron

(1990), 245 Mont. 100, 114-15, 799 P.2d 533, 542, this Court held the SSAR appraisal

method, pursuant to which assessments were derived from ratios comparing actual sales

prices with existing appraised values, was unconstitutional as applied to residential

property in downtown Great Falls. Specifically, we held application of the SSAR

violated the Equal Protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, and Article II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution. 

Barron, 245

Mont. at 115, 799 P.2d at 542. We additionally held application of the SSAR violated

the Due Process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution and Article II, Sections 17 and 29, of the Montana Constitution. 

Barron, 245 Mont. at 115, 799 P.2d at 542.

 This Court delayed the effect of its decision in Barron, applying it 

prospectively

after December 31, 1990, and additionally denied relief to those taxpayers who had 

not

administratively appealed their property taxes prior to October 12, 1990. Barron, 

245

Mont. at 115, 799 P.2d at 542; Woith v. Cascade County Treasurer (1993), 262 Mont.

170, 172, 864 P.2d 752, 753. In Woith, we clarified that our decision in Barron did 

not

preclude taxpayers who had not filed timely administrative appeals from seeking 

refunds

pursuant to alternative statutory remedies. Woith, 262 Mont. at 172, 864 P.2d at 

753. 

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 In 1991, in response to this Court's decision in Barron, the Montana Legislature

passed Senate Bill 412, by which it again amended õ 15-7-111, MCA, and thereby 

altered

the SSAR appraisal method and provided a right to appeal adjusted values. See

Department of Revenue v. Sheehy (1993), 262 Mont. 104, 106, 862 P.2d 1181, 1183. 

In Sheehy, however, we held that the provisions of Senate Bill 412 failed to rid the 

SSAR

appraisal system of the constitutional defects identified in Barron. Sheehy, 262 

Mont.

at 107, 862 P.2d at 1183.

 In the instant case, the Taxpayers brought suit on July 3, 1996, alleging they 

paid

real property taxes based on the unconstitutional SSAR method of assessment, but have

since received no tax refunds or other relief. The Taxpayers filed their first 

amended

complaint on July 19, 1996, seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to various 

Montana

statutes. Specifically, the Taxpayers challenge the legality of their property 

taxes and

seek declaratory relief pursuant to õõ 15-1-406 and 27-8-101 through -313, MCA. They

additionally attempt to challenge their property tax assessments pursuant to õ 15-2-

307,

MCA (repealed in 1993), and the validity of certain administrative rules pursuant to 

õ 2-

4-506, MCA. 

 The Department responded to the Taxpayers' amended complaint on August 9,

1996, by way of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b), M.R.Civ.P. In a

December 6, 1996, order, the District Court granted the Department's motion to 

dismiss,

concluding that each of the Taxpayers' claims is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations or otherwise fails as a matter of law.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. Gerber v. Commissioner of Ins. of State of Montana (1990),

242 Mont. 369, 370, 786 P.2d 1199, 1200. This Court reviews an appeal from a 

district

court's order granting a motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of the 

complaint. 

Busch v. Kammerer (1982), 200 Mont. 130, 132, 649 P.2d 1339, 1340 (citing Conley v.

Gibson (1957), 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 84). 

 In Willson v. Taylor (1981), 194 Mont. 123, 634 P.2d 1180, we recognized that

 [a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it

 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

 of his claim which would entitle him to relief. A motion to dismiss under

 Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all well-pleaded

 allegations in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint is

 construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of

 fact contained therein are taken as true. 

Willson, 194 Mont. at 126, 634 P.2d at 1182 (citations omitted). 

 Thus, "[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss, we construe the complaint in the 

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light

most favorable to the plaintiff and take the allegations of the complaint as true." 

HKM

Associates v. Northwest Pipe Fittings, Inc. (1995), 272 Mont. 187, 191, 900 P.2d 302,

304 (citing Goodman Realty, Inc. v. Monson (1994), 267 Mont. 228, 231, 883 P.2d 121,

123). 

 Pursuant to this standard of review, this Court will affirm the district court's

dismissal only if we "determine that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any 

set of facts

which could be proven in support of the claim." Grove v. Montana Army Nat'l Guard

(1994), 264 Mont. 498, 501, 872 P.2d 791, 793 (citing King v. State (1993), 259 Mont.

393, 396, 856 P.2d 954, 955). 

 The District Court's determination that the Taxpayers' complaint failed to 

state a

claim is a conclusion of law. See Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408,

884 P.2d 761, 762. This Court's standard of review of a district court's conclusion 

of

law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Boreen, 267 Mont. 

at 408,

884 P.2d at 762 (citing Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470,

474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603).

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err in granting the Department's motion to dismiss?

 Although the Taxpayers identify no fewer than seventeen claims, and seek eleven

forms of relief in their first amended complaint, their central argument is that, 

for tax

years 1989 through 1992, they paid property taxes which were illegally collected, but

have yet to receive any refunds or other relief pursuant to our decisions in Barron,

Sheehy, and Woith. 

The Taxpayers seek declaratory relief pursuant to several Montana statutes, including

õõ 15-1-406, 27-8-101, 15-2-307, and 2-4-506, MCA. In its December 6, 1996, order,

the District Court addressed, and in turn dismissed, each of the Taxpayers' claims,

concluding the claims were either barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or

otherwise deficient as a matter of law. 

A. Declaratory judgment pursuant to õ 15-1-406, MCA.

 On July 3, 1996, the Taxpayers filed suit pursuant to õ 15-1-406, MCA, which

provides the method by which an aggrieved taxpayer may seek a declaratory judgment. 

 

 The statute pursuant to which the Taxpayers seek declaratory relief specifically

states that:

An aggrieved taxpayer may bring a declaratory judgment action in the

district court seeking a declaration that:

 (a) an administrative rule or method or procedure of assessment

or imposition of tax adopted or used by the department of revenue is illegal

or improper; or

 (b) a tax authorized by the state or one of its subdivisions was

illegally or unlawfully imposed or exceeded the taxing authority of the

entity imposing that tax.

Section 15-1-406(1), MCA.

 In the present case, the Taxpayers have sought to avail themselves of this 

statute

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and thereby challenge the legality of real property taxes assessed against them in 

1989,

1990, 1991, and 1992. Section 15-1-406(2), MCA, however, contains an express

limitations period by which a party must initiate such a declaratory judgment 

action. 

Specifically, the statute requires that 

 [t]he action must be brought within 90 days of the date the notice of the tax

 due was sent to the taxpayer or, in the case of an assessment covered by the

 uniform tax review procedure set forth in 15-1-211, within 90 days of the

 date of the department director's final decision. 

Section 15-1-406(2), MCA.

 The present version of õ 15-1-406(3), MCA, additionally requires that the taxes

subject to challenge "be paid under protest when due as a condition of continuing the

action."

 Upon consideration of the Department's motion to dismiss, the District Court

concluded that the Taxpayers had neither brought their action within the applicable

ninety-day limitations period, nor paid the challenged taxes under protest. The 

court thus

held the Taxpayers had met neither of the conditions precedent necessary to maintain 

a

declaratory judgment action pursuant to õ 15-1-406, MCA, and ordered that claim

dismissed.

 On appeal, the Taxpayers first assert the District Court erred in applying the

present version of õ 15-1-406, MCA, rather than its 1991 predecessor. Section 15-1-

406,

MCA, as it existed in 1991, did not require that taxpayers seeking to avail 

themselves of

the statute's remedial provisions pay disputed taxes under protest. Not until 1995 

did the

Montana Legislature add that portion of õ 15-1-406, MCA, which requires the payment

of taxes under protest. See õ 15-1-406(3), MCA. 

 Because they challenge the legality of taxes imposed upon them from 1989 through

1992, the Taxpayers assert the 1991 version of õ 15-1-406, MCA, governs their claim. 

They accordingly contend the fact that they did not pay the property taxes in 

question

under protest does not preclude them from seeking a declaratory judgment. 

 Although the 1991 statute did not require payment under protest, it did contain 

a

limitations period similar to that included in the current statute. Specifically, õ 

15-1-

406(2), MCA (1991), required a party challenging the legality of a tax to bring a

declaratory judgment action "within 90 days of the imposition of the tax." 

 In analyzing the Department's motion to dismiss, the District Court first 

applied

the current version of õ 15-1-406, MCA, but additionally concluded that, even were 

the

1991 statute controlling, the Taxpayers had clearly failed to initiate their 

declaratory

judgment action "within 90 days of the imposition of the tax." 

 As noted above, the Taxpayers seek to challenge the legality of property taxes

assessed against them in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992, but they did not initiate the 

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present

action until several years later, in July 1996. Whether the present or former 

version of

õ 15-1-406, MCA, controls is immaterial to the extent that, pursuant to either 

statute, the

taxpayers had to bring their action within ninety days of "the imposition of the 

tax" or

"the date the notice of the tax due was sent to the taxpayer." Clearly, the 

Taxpayers did

not initiate the present action until substantially more than ninety days had elapsed

following either the imposition of the challenged taxes or the date the notice those 

taxes

were due was sent. Thus, unless properly tolled, the limitations period codified in 

either

the 1991 or 1995 version of õ 15-1-406, MCA, effectively bars the Taxpayers' present

challenge.

 Indeed, in an attempt to circumvent this obstacle, the Taxpayers argue the 

statute's

ninety-day limitations period should be tolled in the present case. First, the 

Taxpayers

contend the Department, in collecting and holding their tax money, acted as their

fiduciary, thereby tolling the statute of limitations until they received actual 

knowledge

of their right to bring this action. In a related argument, the Taxpayers next 

assert the

limitations period should be tolled because their alleged fiduciary, the 

Department, failed

to notify them of the Barron, Sheehy, and Woith decisions, or to explain the impact 

of

those decisions. Accordingly, they assert the statute of limitations should be 

tolled until

they acquired actual knowledge of their right to bring the present action.

 The Taxpayers first argue the Department is their fiduciary, and the statute of

limitations codified at õ 15-1-406, MCA, is thereby tolled until they received actual

knowledge of their right to bring this action. In so arguing, the Taxpayers cite 

to a

string of cases in which various courts have recognized that the existence of a 

fiduciary

or trust relationship may toll the running of an applicable statute of limitations 

under

certain circumstances. See, i.e., Town of Haxtun v. Wangnild (Colo. 1942), 127 P.2d

328, 330 (holding town a trustee of special assessment funds and statute of 

limitations

thus did not begin to run until repudiation of trust); MacMullan v. Kelly (Cal. App.

1912), 124 P. 93, 95 (recognizing "statute of limitations does not begin to run in 

favor

of a defendant chargeable as the trustee of an express trust during the life of the 

trust"). 

Although the existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship may toll the running of 

an

applicable statute of limitations period, the District Court concluded that no such

relationship exists in the present case. 

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 In its order dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint, the District Court concluded 

the

Department does not act as a fiduciary of Montana's taxpayers and, therefore, held 

the

ninety-day statute of limitations codified at õ 15-1-406, MCA, presents a valid bar 

to the

present suit. The Taxpayers contend the court erred in so holding, and cite to a 

number

of readily distinguishable cases in support of their proposition that the 

Department, in

collecting and holding tax money, acts as a fiduciary or trustee of Montana's 

taxpayers. 

 For example, the Taxpayers cite to Usibelli Coal Mine v. State of Alaska (Alaska

1996), 921 P.2d 1134, in which a coal lessee appealed a ruling by the Department of

Natural Resources that the lessee owed back royalties to the state under 

noncompetitive

coal leases. Usibelli, 921 P.2d at 1138-39. Once in its statement of facts, and 

once in

a subsequent footnote, the court notes that Alaska's Attorney General advised the

Department of Natural Resources that, "pursuant to the state's fiduciary 

responsibility

under" a "Mental Health Settlement," it could not forgive certain back royalties 

owed. 

Usibelli, 921 P.2d at 1141 and 1150. In Usibelli, the court's passing reference to 

a

fiduciary responsibility arising from an apparent "Mental Health Settlement" simply 

does

not stand for the Taxpayers' proposition that the Department in this case, in 

collecting

and holding real property taxes, was acting as a fiduciary or trustee of Montana's

taxpayers. 

 Having reviewed the cases cited by the Taxpayers, but without embarking on an

exhaustive discussion of each one, we conclude that neither Usibelli nor any of the

remaining cases relied upon by the Taxpayers offers compelling authority 

establishing a

trust relationship between the State and its taxpayers. Rather, these cases differ

substantially from the present case and involve discussion of such varying topics as

special improvement districts, municipal bonds, and statutorily prescribed fiduciary

duties. See, i.e., In re City of Columbia Falls (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992), 143 B.R. 

750,

762 (recognizing special improvement district funds are trust funds); State ex rel. 

Clark

v. Bailey (1935), 99 Mont. 484, 497, 44 P.2d 740, 744 (holding "fund derived from a

special levy or one created for a specific purpose is in the hands of municipal 

officials

in trust"); Blackford v. City of Libby (1936), 103 Mont. 272, 282, 62 P.2d 216, 217-

18

(holding city becomes trustee on behalf of warrant holders of special improvement

district). 

 Further, as the District Court recognized, the Department may assume an

adversarial role against individual taxpayers, contravening the notion that it acts 

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as their

fiduciary agent. See, i.e., õ 15-8-115, MCA (directing the Department to defend

property tax appeals). Thus, having reviewed the record, we hold the District Court

correctly concluded the Department, in collecting the taxes at issue, was not acting 

as the

Taxpayers' fiduciary, and the ninety-day limitations period included in õ 15-1-406, 

MCA,

thus expressly precludes their present claim.

 Concomitant with the Taxpayers' assertion that the Department is their fiduciary

is their contention that the Department failed to fulfill the obligations of that 

alleged

fiduciary relationship by failing to notify them of the Barron, Sheehy, and Woith

decisions or to explain any potential impact those decisions might have had on the

Taxpayers' rights. Accordingly, the Taxpayers contend, the statute of limitations 

should

be tolled until they acquired actual knowledge of their right to bring the present 

action. 

In light of our holding that the Department is not in a fiduciary relationship with 

the

taxpayers, we need not address the second prong of the Taxpayers' argument to the 

extent

it presupposes the existence of such a fiduciary relationship. 

 To the extent the Taxpayers assert the statute of limitations should be tolled 

until

they acquired actual knowledge of their claim, regardless of any fiduciary 

relationship,

their argument similarly fails. The general rule in Montana is that the statute of

limitations begins to run when a party's claim accrues. Section 27-2-102(2), MCA. 

Section 27-2-102(1), MCA, explains accrual as follows:

 For the purposes of statutes relating to the time within which an action must

 be commenced:

 (a) a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the

 claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the

 claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to

 accept jurisdiction of the action;

 (b) an action is commenced when the complaint is filed.

Section 27-2-102(1), MCA.

 Section 27-2-102(2), MCA, expressly provides that "[l]ack of knowledge of the

claim or cause of action, or of its accrual, by the party to whom it has accrued 

does not

postpone the beginning of the period of limitation." Even were this Court to 

determine

that the Taxpayers' claims in the present case accrued as late as 1993 following our

decisions in Barron, Sheehy, and Woith, the ninety-day limitations period codified 

at õ

15-1-406, MCA, would present a clear bar to the present action. 

 Thus, even construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

Taxpayers,

and taking as true all allegations of fact, we hold the District Court did not err in

concluding the statute of limitations included in õ 15-1-406, MCA, bars the 

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Taxpayers'

claim.

B. Declaratory judgment pursuant to õ 27-8-101, MCA.

 The Taxpayers additionally seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Uniform

Declaratory Judgments Act, codified at õ 27-8-101, MCA, and thereby attempt to

challenge certain statutes and administrative rules. The Department moved to 

dismiss the

Taxpayers' claims brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act on the basis

that õ 15-1-406, MCA, specifically precludes use of the Act in actions such as this.

 In its December 6, 1996, order, the District Court granted the Department's

motion, concluding that neither this Court's decision in Woith v. Cascade County

Treasurer (1993), 262 Mont. 170, 864 P.2d 752, nor the statutory framework of õ 15-1-

406, MCA, permits the Taxpayers to proceed under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act in the present case.

 Section 15-1-406, MCA, pursuant to which the Taxpayers seek declaratory relief,

explicitly provides that "[t]he remedy authorized by this section supersedes the 

Uniform

Declaratory Judgments Act established in Title 27, chapter 8," thereby precluding 

its use

in an action such as this. Section 15-1-406(5), MCA. Nevertheless, the Taxpayers 

assert

they are entitled to seek relief pursuant to the Act. 

 The Taxpayers argue that this Court's decision in Woith authorizes them to 

proceed

pursuant to õ 27-8-101, MCA. In Woith, we recognized that taxpayers may contest 

taxes

pursuant to alternative statutory remedies. Woith, 262 Mont. at 172, 864 P.2d at 

753. 

Specifically, we held that taxpayers were not prohibited by our decision in Barron 

from

contesting certain tax assessments through the alternative statutory remedies 

provided for

by õõ 15-1-406 through - 408 and 15-2-307 through - 310, MCA (repealed 1993). 

Although we held in Woith that taxpayers may contest taxes by way of alternative

statutory remedies, we did not dispense with the requirement that they do so in

accordance with the requirements contained in those alternative statutes.

 As noted above, õ 15-1-406, MCA, which governs cases such as this one,

specifically supersedes and, therefore, precludes use of the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act. Section 15-1-406(5), MCA. Thus, the Taxpayers cannot proceed

independently under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. However, the Taxpayers

argue they are nevertheless entitled to rely on the Act, because, pursuant to our 

decision

in Woith, they may avail themselves of õ 15-1-407, MCA, which statute in turn

contemplates use of õ 27-8-101, MCA. The Taxpayers point to that portion of õ 15-1-

407, MCA, which provides that "an action pursuant to õ 15-1-406 is subject to the

provisions of Title 27, chapter 8." 

 Although õ 15-1-407, MCA, provides that an action under õ 15-1-406, MCA, is

subject to the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, it does not 

provide

for an unlimited time within which to bring that action. Here, the Taxpayers missed 

the

ninety-day statutory deadline for initiating their action, and they are accordingly 

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precluded

from availing themselves, by way of õ 15-1-407, MCA, of the remedial provisions

contained in õ 27-8-101, MCA. 

 Based on the foregoing, we hold the District Court did not err in concluding 

Woith

did not authorize the taxpayers to proceed independently under õ 27-8-101, MCA, as an

alternative statutory remedy in this case. We additionally hold the court correctly

concluded that õ 15-1-406, MCA, similarly prohibits the Taxpayers from seeking

declaratory relief pursuant to the Act. Therefore, the District Court properly 

dismissed

the Taxpayers' claims brought pursuant to õ 27-8-101, MCA.

C. Declaratory judgment pursuant to õ 15-2-307, MCA.

 The Taxpayers additionally attempt to bring this action for declaratory judgment

pursuant to õ 15-2-307 through -310, MCA (repealed in 1993). Even assuming the

Taxpayers properly assert the present action pursuant to these repealed statutes, we

conclude their claims otherwise fail as a matter of law. 

 Section 15-2-307, MCA, permitted a taxpayer to bring a declaratory judgment

action to challenge assessment methods or procedures, and provided no statute of

limitations within which such an action had to be commenced. However, the remedy

provided for pursuant to õ 15-2-309(2), MCA, applied only to those taxes imposed 

during

or after the year of a challenge brought under õ 15-2-307, MCA. Section 15-2-309(2),

MCA, specifically provided that:

 The remedy directed by the district court may apply only to taxes imposed

 during or after the year the rule or procedure is challenged. The remedy

 may not apply to the application or implementation of the rule or procedure

 as it applies to taxes imposed in years prior to the challenge under 15-2-

 307. 

 In the present case, the Taxpayers brought suit in 1996 to challenge assessment

procedures and the imposition of property taxes in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992. Thus,

we conclude, as did the District Court below, that õ 15-2-309, MCA, clearly 

prohibited

the retroactive relief sought by the Taxpayers in this case. Accordingly, we hold 

the

District Court did not err in dismissing the Taxpayers' claims for relief brought 

pursuant

to õ 15-2-307, MCA. 

D. Declaratory judgment pursuant to õ 2-4-506, MCA.

 Finally, the Taxpayers bring their amended complaint pursuant to õ 2-4-506,

MCA, which provides for declaratory judgments on the validity or application of

administrative rules. Section 2-4-506(1), MCA, specifically provides that:

 A rule may be declared invalid or inapplicable in an action for declaratory

 judgment if it is found that the rule or its threatened application interferes

 with or impairs or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or

 privileges of the plaintiff. 

 Upon consideration of the Department's motion to dismiss, and following

evaluation of the Taxpayers' complaint, the District Court noted that the Taxpayers 

refer

to administrative rules only three times in their complaint, and "at no time do 

[they]

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contend that any of the aforementioned rules are invalid or inapplicable." Instead, 

the

court observed, "the reference to the aforementioned administrative rules seems to be

nothing more than a passing reference."

 Following review of the record, we similarly conclude that neither the facts nor

the allegations contained in the Taxpayers' first amended complaint provide a basis 

for

application of this statute. Accordingly, we hold the District Court did not err in

dismissing their complaint insofar as it was premised on õ 2-4-506, MCA. 

E. Class certification.

 The Taxpayers additionally seek to bring this suit as a class action, and 

accordingly

request class certification. Having held, however, that the District Court did not 

err in

dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint, we need not address the question of whether the

Taxpayers are entitled to certification as a class.

 Based on the foregoing, we hold the District Court did not err in granting the

Department's motion to dismiss on the basis that the Taxpayers' claims were either 

barred

by the applicable statutes of limitations, or otherwise deficient as a matter of law.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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