BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions 

Needed to Strengthen 

CBP Efforts to 

Mitigate Risk of 

Employee Corruption 

and Misconduct

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2012

GAO-13-59

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-59, a report to 

congressional requesters 

December 2012 

BORDER SECURITY

Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP 

Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and 

Misconduct

Why GAO Did This Study

CBP—a component within the 

Department of Homeland Security— is 

responsible for securing U.S. borders 

and facilitating legal travel and trade. 

Drug-trafficking and other transnational 

criminal organizations are seeking to 

target CBP employees with bribes to 

facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, 

aliens, and other contraband across 

the southwest U.S. border, in 

particular. CBP IA is responsible for 

promoting the integrity of CBP’s 

workforce, programs, and operations; 

and CBP components implement 

integrity initiatives. GAO was asked to 

review CBP’s efforts to ensure the 

integrity of its workforce. This report 

examines (1) data on arrests of and 

allegations against CBP employees for

corruption or misconduct, (2) CBP’s 

implementation of integrity-related 

controls, and (3) CBP’s strategy for its 

integrity programs. GAO analyzed 

arrest and allegation data since fiscal 

year 2005 and 2006, respectively, 

reviewed integrity-related policies and 

procedures, and interviewed CBP 

officials in headquarters and at four 

locations along the southwest border

selected for geographic location, 

among other factors. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP, among 

other things, track and maintain data 

on sources of information used to 

determine which applicants are 

unsuitable for hire, assess the 

feasibility of expanding the polygraph 

program to incumbent officers and 

agents, consistently conduct quality 

assurance reviews, and set timelines 

for completing and implementing a 

comprehensive integrity strategy. DHS

concurred and reported taking steps to 

address the recommendations.

What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP 

employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for 

less than 1 percent of CBP’s entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of 

arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 

reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or 

driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a

total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for 

corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 

125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations 

against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the 

southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the 

negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity.

CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and 

misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph 

examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., 

random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBP’s Office of 

Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on 

which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph 

examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were 

not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal 

control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative 

effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic 

polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully 

assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet 

fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent 

officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, 

or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and 

agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion 

could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal 

of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA 

has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its 

adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that 

adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the 

preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated 

that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could

not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality 

assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which 

deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process. 

CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-

2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a 

strategy, but CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set 

target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he 

stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP 

components in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority for overseeing all integrityrelated activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management 

standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development 

and implementation of an agencywide strategy. 

View GAO-13-59. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Letter 1 

Background 5

The Majority of Arrests Against CBP Employees Are Related to 

Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred At Locations 

Along the Southwest Border 8

CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better 

Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent 

Employees 14

An Agencywide Strategy and Lessons Learned Analyses Could Help 

Guide CBP Integrity-Related Efforts 28

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 39

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables

Table 1: CBP’s Definitions and Examples of Misconduct and 

Corruption 9

Table 2: Number of CBP Employees Arrested or Indicted for 

Corruption-Related Activities, Fiscal Years 2005 through 

2012 10

Table 3: Number of Incidents of Arrests of CBP Employees for 

Misconduct, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012 10

Table 4: Overview of Classes of Allegations of Corruption or 

Misconduct 12

Table 5: Total Allegations Compared with Total Number of CBPOs 

and BPAs, Fiscal Years 2006-2011 13

Table 6: Technical Results of Polygraph Examinations, January 

2008 to August 2012 17

Table 7: Key OFO and USBP Integrity-Related Controls 25

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Figure

Figure 1: CBPO and BPA Workforce Population Data, Fiscal Years 

2006-2011 7

Abbreviations

AMSCO Analytical Management Systems and Control Office 

BI background investigation

BPA U.S. Border Patrol agent

CAD Credibility Assessment Division

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CBPO U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer

DHS Department of Homeland Security

IA Office of Internal Affairs

IPCC Integrity Integrated Planning and Coordination Committee

ISMS Integrated Security Management System

JIC Joint Intake Center

OFO Office of Field Operations

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PSD Personnel Security Division

SSBI single scope background investigation

USBP U.S. Border Patrol

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

December 4, 2012

The Honorable Tom Coburn

Ranking Member, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations have 

increasingly sought to target U.S. law enforcement personnel with bribes 

and other inducements to facilitate their illicit transport of drugs, aliens, 

and other contraband across the U.S. southwest border.1 U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating 

legal travel and trade. Specifically, officers from CBP’s Office of Field 

Operations (OFO)2 are responsible for securing the border at U.S. ports 

of entry, while CBP’s U.S. Border Patrol agents (BPA) are responsible for 

securing the national border between the ports of entry.3

 

1

The southwest U.S. border includes areas within the states of Arizona, California, New 

Mexico, and Texas. 

CBP’s Office of 

Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP’s 

workforce, programs, and operations. For the purposes of our report, 

integrity issues include acts of corruption such as accepting cash bribes 

and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband or inadmissible 

2

OFO, which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner, oversees nearly 28,000 

employees who are responsible for providing security at U.S. ports of entry. A port of entry 

is a location by which individuals and merchandise may seek legal entry into the United 

States. There are 329 air, sea, and land ports in the United States; there are 25 land 

ports, in particular, along the southwest border. 

3

Officers and agents are responsible for apprehending individuals attempting to enter the 

United States illegally and stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other illicit contraband 

across the border, among other things. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

aliens into the country, as well as other criminal activities or misconduct 

such as drug or alcohol abuse.4

DHS officials have testified that CBP’s increased hiring of officers and 

agents since fiscal year 2006 has amplified the incentives and 

opportunities for attempted corruption of the CBP workforce through 

bribery, infiltration, or other means.5

You asked us to review CBP’s efforts to ensure the integrity of its 

workforce, and particularly for CBPOs and BPAs stationed along the 

southwest U.S. border. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and 

allegations against CBP employees accused of corruption or misconductrelated activities, (2) CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls to 

prevent and detect employee corruption and misconduct, and (3) CBP’s 

strategy for implementing its integrity programs.

From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 

the number of CBP officers (CBPOs) and BPAs along the southwest 

border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. Moreover, DHS officials have 

stated that drug-trafficking organizations are attempting to infiltrate the 

CBP workforce through conspired hiring operations and aggressive 

targeting of incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In fiscal year 2012, CBP 

allocated approximately $166 million for integrity programs.

To examine data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees 

accused of corruption or misconduct issues, we analyzed data on 144 

CBP employees arrested or indicted from fiscal years 2005 through fiscal 

year 2012 for alleged corruption activities. We also analyzed data on 

 

4

We developed this definition on the basis of an analysis of data and documentation from 

CBP IA, as well as through interviews with CBP IA and law enforcement officials who 

investigate allegations of employee misconduct and corruption. We also discussed our 

definition with these officials to ensure that it was a reasonable interpretation and 

consistent with CBP policy.

5

See Statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, D.C.: 

June 9, 2011, and Statement of Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, 

Department of Homeland Security, before the Subcommittee on Government 

Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Report, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012.

Statement of James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local and 

Sector Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, Senate. Washington, D.C.:Mar. 11, 2010.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

allegations of corruption and misconduct made against CBP employees 

from fiscal years 2006 through 2011.6

To evaluate CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls to prevent 

and detect employee misconduct and corruption, we analyzed relevant 

laws such as the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010, which requires, by 

January 2013, that all CBPO and BPA applicants receive polygraph 

examinations before they are hired.

For both arrest and allegation data, 

these are the time periods for which the most complete and reliable data 

were available. In particular, we analyzed variations in both sets of data 

across CBP components and geographic regions. To assess the reliability 

of these data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and looked for 

obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed agency 

officials knowledgeable about these data to determine the processes in 

place to ensure their accuracy. In addition, we interviewed CBP officials 

to gain their perspectives on these data. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

7 We also reviewed documentation on 

CBP’s preemployment screening practices and their results—including 

background investigations and polygraph examinations—and relevant 

data and documentation on the random drug testing program and the 

periodic reinvestigation process for incumbent officers and agents. In 

particular, we evaluated CBP IA data on the technical results of polygraph 

examinations from January 2008 through August 2012.8

 

6

These data on allegations include what is available through CBP’s Joint Intake Center 

(JIC), which is a central clearinghouse for allegations of misconduct involving personnel 

and contractors employed by CBP. Allegations reported to the DHS Office of Inspector 

General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement agencies may not 

be represented in JIC’s data. According to CBP IA officials, if they become aware of an 

allegation against a CBP employee from another source, they create a record in JIC for 

tracking purposes.

To assess the 

reliability of these data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and 

looked for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness and (2) 

interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about these data to determine 

the processes in place to ensure their accuracy. We determined that 

these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In 

addition, we examined CBP IA’s quality assurance program for its 

7

Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011).

8

CBP began conducting polygraph examinations for some CBP employees in January 

2008.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Personnel Security Division (PSD),9 including interviewing PSD officials 

who are responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent 

officer or agent is suitable for hire or continued employment.10 We 

compared CBP’s integrity-related controls, as applicable, with standards 

in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government11 and 

standard practices from the Project Management Institute.12 Furthermore, 

we conducted visits to four locations along the southwest U.S. border to 

observe the implementation of various integrity-related controls and 

obtain perspectives from CBP officials at these locations on the 

implementation of integrity-related controls.13 We selected these locations 

on the basis of a variety of factors, including the colocation of CBP IA with 

OFO offices and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) sectors along the southwest 

border and the number of allegations against or arrests of CBP 

employees for corruption or misconduct.14

To evaluate CBP’s integrity strategy, including how the agency 

incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption cases, 

we reviewed CBP strategic planning documents and other policy 

Because we selected a 

nonprobability sample of locations to visit, the information we obtained 

from these visits cannot be generalized to all field locations. However, 

observations obtained from these visits provided us with a greater 

understanding of CBP’s integrity-related initiatives.

 

9

PSD, within CBP IA, manages the personnel security and suitability program by initiating 

and adjudicating preemployment investigations for CBP applicants and contractors. PSD 

also conducts and adjudicates periodic reinvestigations and issues security clearances for 

CBP employees.

10With a favorable suitability determination, an applicant can be hired, if all other 

requirements are met. The suitability determination is a process that subjects applicants’ 

and employees’ personal conduct to evaluation throughout their careers. Title 5, Code of 

Federal Regulations Part 731, establishes factors that are used to make a determination 

of suitability.

11GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

12Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, second edition 

© (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 

13We conducted site visits in El Paso, Texas; Laredo, Texas; San Diego, California; and, 

Tucson, Arizona. 

14Border Patrol sectors are further divided into stations, and each station is responsible for 

operations within a specific area of the sector. There are nine sectors along the southwest 

border.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

statements on integrity initiatives. In particular, we analyzed these 

documents against the requirements set forth in CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-

2014 Strategic Plan.

15

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December 

2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I presents more 

details about our scope and methodology.

In addition, we analyzed all available 

postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies that may have 

enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related activities, 

against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed CBP

officials in Washington, D.C., as well as during our site visits, regarding 

CBP’s integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP is using lessons 

learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to guide changes in 

policies and procedures, as appropriate.

CBP is the largest uniformed law enforcement agency in the United 

States, with approximately 21,400 BPAs patrolling between the nation’s 

ports of entry and more than 20,000 CBPOs stationed at air, land, and 

seaports nationwide at the end of fiscal year 2011.

16

 

15U.S.Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: 

July 2009.

On the U.S. 

southwest border, there are about 5,500 CBPOs and 18,000 BPAs as of 

the end of fiscal year 2011. CBPOs, based within OFO, are responsible 

for processing immigration documentation of passengers and pedestrians 

and inspecting vehicles and cargo at U.S. ports of entry. BPAs are based 

within the USBP and are responsible for enforcing immigration laws 

across the territory in between the ports of entry and at checkpoints 

located inside the U.S. border. Together, CBPOs and BPAs are 

16In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that Border Patrol was to 

maintain an active duty presence of not less than 21,370 agents protecting the border of 

the United States. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 

2011, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011).

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

responsible for detecting and preventing the illegal entry of persons and 

contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, across 

the border.

U.S. citizens interested in becoming CBPOs or BPAs must successfully 

complete all steps of the CBP hiring process, which includes an online 

application, a cognitive exam, fingerprint collection, financial disclosure, a 

structured interview, fitness tests, medical examinations, a polygraph 

examination, a background investigation, and a drug test. CBP IA’s PSD 

manages the personnel security program by initiating and adjudicating 

preemployment investigations for CBP applicants, which aim to ensure 

that the candidates are reliable, trustworthy, and loyal to the United 

States, and therefore suitable for employment. In addition, CBP IA’s 

Credibility Assessment Division (CAD) is responsible for administering the 

polygraph examinations, interviewing applicants, and collecting any 

admissions that an applicant may reveal including past criminal behavior 

or misconduct. Human Resource Management is responsible for making 

the hiring decisions based on the final suitability determination from CBP 

IA (this includes PSD’s overall assessment of the polygraph examination 

and background investigation), as well as the applicant’s successful 

completion of the other steps in the hiring process.

The number of CBP employees increased from 43,545 in fiscal year 2006 

to 60,591 as of August 2012. During this time period, both OFO and 

USBP experienced a hiring surge and received increased appropriations 

to fund additional hiring of CBPOs and BPAs.17

 

17For example, CBP received funds to support 1,000 additional Border Patrol agents in 

fiscal year 2006, 1,500 in fiscal year 2007, 3,000 in fiscal year 2008, and 1,100 in fiscal 

year 2010, among other increases. CBP also received funds for an additional 450 CBP 

officers in fiscal year 2007, 200 in fiscal year 2008, and 859 in fiscal year 2009, among 

other increases. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 41-42 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 

106-699, at 125, 128 (2006) (Conf. Rep.); Explanatory Statement, Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2008, bk. 1, div. E., at 1028 (2008); Explanatory Statement, 

Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, div. 

D, at 627 (2008); H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 110 (2009) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. Rep. No. 111-

298, at 62-63 (2009) (Conf. Rep.); Pub. L. No. 111-230, tit. I, 124 Stat. 2485, 2485 (2010); 

H.R. Rep. No. 112-331, at 956-57 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).

The majority of the newly 

hired CBPOs and BPAs were assigned to the southwest border. In 

particular, during this time period, their total numbers along the southwest 

border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. As of fiscal year 2011, 57 

Hiring Process for CBPOs 

and BPAs
 

Page 7 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

percent of the CBPOs and BPA were stationed along the southwest 

border. Figure 1 provides additional details.

Figure 1: CBPO and BPA Workforce Population Data, Fiscal Years 2006-2011

Allegations against CBP employees for misconduct, corruption, or other 

issues can be reported through various mechanisms. CBP IA, in 

partnership with the Office of Professional Responsibility—an office within 

DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—accepts allegations 

through the Joint Intake Center (JIC). JIC is CBP’s central clearinghouse 

for receiving, processing, and tracking all allegations of misconduct 

involving personnel and contractors employed by CBP. Staffed jointly by 

CBP IA and the Office of Professional Responsibility, JIC is responsible 

for receiving, documenting, and routing misconduct allegations to the 

appropriate investigative entity for review to determine whether the 

allegation can be substantiated. CBP employees or the general public 

may report allegations to JIC’s hotline by e-mail or telephone, to local 

CBP IA field offices, the DHS Office of Inspector General, or the other law 

Process for Reporting 

Allegations against CBP 

Employees
 

Page 8 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

enforcement agencies. Anonymous allegations are also received, 

documented, and subjected to further inquiry.

According to CBP’s data, incidents of arrests of CBP employees from 

fiscal years 2005 through 2012 represent less than 1 percent of the entire 

CBP workforce per fiscal year.18 During this time period, 144 current or 

former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption—the 

majority of which were stationed along the southwest border. In addition, 

there were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct.19

Allegations against CBPOs and BPAs as a percentage of total on-board

personnel remained relatively constant from fiscal years 2006 through 

2011 and ranged from serious offenses such as facilitating drug 

smuggling across the border to administrative delinquencies such as 

losing an official badge. The majority of allegations made against OFO 

and USBP employees during this time period were against officers and 

agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border.

CBP data indicate that from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, the 

majority of arrests since fiscal year 2005 are related to alleged 

misconduct activities. A total of 144 current or former CBP employees 

were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, there were 2,170 

reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. In both cases, each 

represents less than 1 percent of the entire CBP workforce per fiscal 

year. Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, out of 42,409 CBP employees, 27 

were arrested or indicted for corruption. In addition, during this time 

period, there were 190 reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. As of 

August 2012, when CBP’s workforce increased to 60,591, 11 CBP 

employees were arrested or indicted for corruption, and there were 336 

reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. CBP IA defines delinquent 

 

18CBP collects data on incidents of arrests, indictments, citations, and detainments; for 

purposes of brevity, we refer to all four categories as “incidents of arrests.” According to 

CBP IA officials, the term “detainments” refers to instances such as those where 

individuals are intoxicated in public and detained at local facilities until they become sober 

but do not have an arrest on their record.

19CBP does not count the number of employees who have been arrested for misconduct, 

but rather counts the number of incidents of arrests for misconduct (i.e. one employee 

may have multiple incidents of arrests for misconduct). For corruption, we have reported 

the number of employees arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities. Not all 

arrests result in convictions or disciplinary actions. 

The Majority of 

Arrests against CBP 

Employees Are 

Related to 

Misconduct; Majority 

of Allegations 

Occurred at Locations 

along the Southwest 

Border 

The Majority of Arrests of 

CBP Employees since 

Fiscal Year 2005 Are 

Related to Alleged 

Misconduct Activities
 

Page 9 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

activity as either corruption or misconduct. Corruption involves the misuse 

or abuse of the employee’s position, whereas misconduct may not 

necessarily involve delinquent behavior that is related to the execution of 

official duties. CBP further categorizes the delinquent behavior into the 

following categories: (1) non-mission-compromising misconduct, (2) 

mission-related misconduct, (3) corruption, and (4) mission-compromising 

corruption. The first category is the only one that is unrelated to the 

execution of the CBP employee’s official duties or authority, and the 

majority of the incidents of arrests for misconduct (2,153 out of 2,170) 

since fiscal year 2005 fall in this category. Examples include domestic 

violence and driving under the influence while off duty. Table 1 provides 

CBP IA’s definitions of the two types of delinquent activity and examples 

of each category.

Table 1: CBP’s Definitions and Examples of Misconduct and Corruption

Misconduct Corruption

Non-mission-compromising 

misconduct

Delinquency unrelated to the 

execution of official duties or 

one’s official authority as a 

federal law enforcement officer

Mission-related misconduct

Delinquency related to the 

execution of official duties or 

one’s official authority as a 

federal law enforcement 

officer

Corruption

Delinquency for personal gain 

that involved the misuse or 

abuse of the knowledge, access, 

or authority granted by virtue of 

official position

Mission-compromising 

corruption

Delinquency for personal gain

that involved the misuse or 

abuse of the knowledge, 

access, or authority granted by 

virtue of official position which 

also violated or facilitated the 

violation of the laws that CBP 

enforces

• Driving under the 

influence/driving while 

intoxicated

• Domestic violence

• Civil rights violations

• False imprisonment

• Theft of government 

property /funds

• Fraud

• Querying personal 

associates in a government 

database

• Alien harboring

• Allowing loads of 

narcotics through a port of 

entry or checkpoint

• Selling immigration 

documents

Source: GAO analysis of CBP documentation.

From fiscal years 2005 through 2012, a total of 144 employees were 

arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, including the 

smuggling of aliens or drugs, and 125 have been convicted.

20

 

20As of October 2012, 9 were acquitted or had their cases dismissed, 2 were declined for 

prosecution, and 8 cases were pending or in pretrial diversion. Of the 125 convictions, 109 

were the result of guilty pleas.

About 65 

percent (93 of 144 arrests) were employees stationed along the 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

southwest border. Our review of documentation on these cases indicates 

that 103 of the 144 cases were for mission-compromising corruption 

activities, which are the most severe offenses, such as drug or alien 

smuggling, bribery, and allowing illegal cargo into the United States. 

Forty-one of the 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted were charged 

with other corruption-related activities. According to CBP IA, this category 

is less severe than mission-compromising corruption and includes 

offenses such as the theft of government property and querying personal 

associates in a government database for purposes other than official 

business. Table 2 provides a breakdown of these arrests by fiscal year. 

Table 2: Number of CBP Employees Arrested or Indicted for Corruption-Related Activities, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012

Fiscal year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total

Mission-compromising corruption 23 11 8 18 19 8 10 6 103

Corruption 4 3 0 3 10 10 5 6 41

Corruption subtotal 27 14 8 21 29 18 15 12 144

CBP workforce population

(as of August 2012)

42,409 43,545 47,606 52,543 58,600 58,724 59,820 60,591

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data.

Note: Data on CBP employee arrests or indictments are from fiscal year 2005 through 2012. Data on 

the CBP workforce population for fiscal year 2012 are as of August 2012. 

Table 3 outlines the number of incidents of arrests of CBP employees for 

misconduct for fiscal years 2005 through 2012.

Table 3: Number of Incidents of Arrests of CBP Employees for Misconduct, Fiscal Years 2005 through 2012

Fiscal year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total

Mission-related misconduct 2 1 1 1 3 1 6 2 17

Non-mission compromising misconduct 188 227 225 285 290 303 301 334 2,153

Misconduct subtotal 190 228 226 286 293 304 307 336 2,170

CBP workforce population

(as of August 2012)

42,409 43,545 47,606 52,543 58,600 58,724 59,820 60,591

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data.

Note: Data on the number of incidents of arrests of CBP employees are from fiscal year 2005 through 

2012. Data on the CBP workforce population for fiscal year 2012 are as of August 2012. 

Although the total number of corruption convictions (125) is less than 1 

percent when compared with CBP’s workforce population by fiscal year, 

CBP officials stated that they are concerned about the negative impact 

employee corruption cases have on agencywide integrity. For example, 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

the Acting Commissioner of CBP testified that no act of corruption within 

the agency can or will be tolerated and that acts of corruption 

compromise CBP’s ability to achieve its mission to secure America’s 

borders against all threats while facilitating and expediting legal travel and 

trade.21 In particular, there have been a number of cases in which 

individuals, known as infiltrators, pursued employment at CBP solely to 

engage in mission-compromising activity. For example, in 2007, a CBPO 

in El Paso, Texas, was arrested at her duty station at the Paso Del Norte 

Bridge for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States from 

June 2003 to July 2007, and was later convicted and sentenced to 20 

years in prison. OFO reported that she may have sought employment 

with CBP to facilitate drug smuggling. CBP officials view this case as an 

example of the potential impact of corruption—if the officer had 

succeeded in facilitating the importation of 5,000 pounds of marijuana per 

month, this would amount to a total of 240,000 pounds over 4 years with 

a retail value of $288 million dollars. In another case, a former BPA 

previously stationed in Comstock, Texas, was arrested in 2008 for 

conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, more than 1,000 

kilograms of marijuana. The agent was convicted in 2009 and sentenced 

to 15 years in prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. CBP is also 

concerned about employees who may not be infiltrators, but began 

engaging in corruption-related activities after joining the agency. For 

example, CBP IA officials stated that some employees may have 

experienced personal hardships after being hired, such as financial 

challenges, which made them vulnerable to accepting bribes to engage in 

corrupt activity. In addition, some employees arrested for corruption had 

no prior disciplinary actions at the time of their arrests. 

 

21See Statement of David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, before the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and 

Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of 

Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

According to our analysis of CBP data, from fiscal years 2006 through 

2011, a total of 32,290 allegations were made against CBP employees; 

90 percent (29,204) were made against CBPOs and BPAs.22

Table 4: Overview of Classes of Allegations of Corruption or Misconduct

CBP IA 

categorizes allegations of misconduct or corruption by varying levels of 

severity. For example, allegations may range from serious offenses such 

as facilitating drug smuggling across the border to administrative 

delinquencies such as losing a badge. CBP allegations of corruption or 

misconduct are sorted into differing classes depending on the severity of 

the allegation and whether there is potential for federal prosecution. As 

table 4 indicates, class 1 allegations comprise the more severe 

allegations that could lead to federal prosecution, such as drug smuggling 

or bribery, with classes 2, 3, and 4 representing decreasing levels of 

severity.

Classes of allegations

Class 1

Criminal

(potential federal prosecution)

Class 2

Other criminal or

serious misconduct

Class 3

Lesser administrative

violation

Class 4

Information for 

management

Examples:

• Drug smuggling

• Alien smuggling

• Perjury

• Bribery

Examples:

• Conflict of interest-association 

with known criminals/iIllegal aliens

• Detainee/alien abuse (sexual or 

physical)

• Driving under the influence/driving 

while intoxicated

• Domestic violence

Examples:

• Misuse of credentials/ 

position

• Misuse of government 

database (e.g., querying 

personal associates)

Examples:

• Lost badge/credential 

(first offense)

• Arrest/conviction of 

family member

Source: GAO analysis of CBP documentation.

Note: Allegations may be reclassified if new information develops during the review of an allegation 

(e.g., smuggling of a very small amount of drugs may result in a class 2 rather than a class 1 

allegation). 

Information for management may include notifications such as reporting a 

lost badge or an arrest of an employee’s family member. CBP 

management will take this information into consideration but may 

 

22We analyzed allegation data provided by the JIC—CBP’s central clearinghouse for 

receiving, processing, and tracking all allegations of misconduct involving personnel and 

contractors employed by CBP. Allegations reported to the DHS Office of Inspector 

General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement agencies may not 

be represented in the data that ar collected by JIC. 

Allegations against CBPOs 

and BPAs as a Percentage 

of Total Onboard 

Personnel Remained 

Relatively Constant from 

Fiscal Years 2006 through 

2011
 

Page 13 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

determine that the action does not warrant referring the case for further 

disciplinary action.

Table 5 depicts the number of allegations against CBPOs and BPAs from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Allegations made against OFO and BP 

employees as a percentage of the total OFO and USBP workforce 

remained constant from 12 percent to 14 percent over fiscal years 2006 

to 2011.

Table 5: Total Allegations Compared with Total Number of CBPOs and BPAs, Fiscal 

Years 2006-2011

 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Allegations against CBPOs 

and BPAs

3,554 4,343 4,459 5,352 5,746 5,750

CBPOs and BPAs 

onboard

30,380 33,377 37,275 41,458 41,245 42,026

Percentage of allegations 

per number of CBPOs and 

BPAs 

(rounded) 

12 13 12 13 14 14 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data.

Similar to the arrest data, of the total number of allegations made against 

OFO and USBP employees from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011—

29,204 total allegations—the majority of these allegations were made 

against officers and agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border. 

Specifically, there were approximately 19,905 total allegations against 

CBPOs and BPAs stationed on the southwest border—about 68 percent 

of total allegations. Approximately 57 percent of all CBPOs and BPAs are 

stationed along the southwest border. By comparison, during this time 

period, there were 9,299 allegations made against officers and agents 

across the rest of CBP’s ports of entry and sectors. According to a senior 

CBP IA official who is responsible for tracking and maintaining CBP 

allegations data, it is possible that the southwest border region received 

more allegations, in part, because CBP assigned more employees to the 

region, many of whom were new, relatively less experienced agents from 

the hiring increases from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, or were 

employees on detail to the southwest border region. During this same 

period, the number of officers and agents and BPAs along the southwest 

border increased from 15,792 to 24,057. In addition, in each fiscal year 

from 2006 through 2011, more allegations were made against USBP 

employees than OFO employees along the southwest border—
 

Page 14 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

allegations against BPAs were about 32 percent higher, on average, than 

those against CBPOs.

CBP employs integrity-related controls to mitigate the risk of corruption 

and misconduct for both applicants and incumbent officers and agents, 

such as polygraph examinations and random drug testing, respectively. 

However, CBP does not maintain or track data on which screening tools 

provided the information that contributed to applicants being deemed 

unsuitable for hire, making it difficult for CBP to assess the relative 

effectiveness of these screening tools. In addition, an assessment of the 

feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent officers and 

agents, and consistent implementation of its quality assurance review 

program for background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, 

could strengthen CBP’s integrity-related controls. OFO and USBP have 

also implemented controls to help detect and prevent corruption and 

misconduct; however, additional actions could help improve the 

effectiveness of OFO’s integrity officers.

CBP Has 

Implemented 

Integrity-Related 

Controls, but Could 

Better Assess 

Screening Tools for 

Applicants and 

Incumbent Employees
 

Page 15 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

CBP has two key controls to screen applicants for CBPO and BPA 

positions during the hiring process—background investigations and 

polygraph examinations. Background investigations involve, among other 

things, a personal interview; a 10-year background check; and an 

examination of an applicant’s criminal, credit, and financial history, 

according to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations.23

Polygraph examinations consist of a preinterview, the examination, and a 

postexamination interview. The Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 

requires that, as of January 2013, all CBPO and BPA applicants receive 

polygraph examinations before they are hired.24

PSD considers multiple factors, or a combination thereof, to determine 

whether an applicant is suitable for employment. PSD officials stated that 

suitability determinations are based on three adjudication phases: (1) 

after PSD verifies that each applicant’s forms are complete and conducts 

preliminary law enforcement database and credit checks, (2) after CAD 

reports the technical results of the polygraph examinations to PSD, and 

(3) after the completion of the background investigation.

CBP IA officials stated 

that the agency met the mandated polygraph requirement in October 

2012—90 days before the deadline.

25

 

23On the basis of the sensitivity of the position for which an individual is applying, CBP 

IA’s personnel security officials initiate either a single scope background investigation or a 

background investigation. The single scope background investigation is required for 

positions designated as Critical Sensitive National Security. It covers up to 10 years and 

includes a personal interview and review of the following: employment history, education, 

residences, references, local law enforcement records, court records, records of former 

spouse(s), records of spouse or current cohabitant, credit records, and other law 

enforcement and military records, as applicable. The background investigation is a review 

of up to 5 years and consists of a personal interview and an examination of the same 

documents as the single scope background investigation. OPM has delegated authority to 

CBP to conduct background investigations and make employment suitability 

determinations for all CBP applicants, contractors, and employees. OPM derives its 

authority to conduct background investigations from the Executive Order 10450; Executive 

Order 12968; and Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, parts 731, 732, and 736.

PSD is 

responsible for adjudicating the final polygraph examination results, as 

24Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011).

25Historically, CAD initiated the examinations after the background investigations were 

completed. As of June 2012, CBP began administering polygraph examinations to all new 

applicants before background investigations are initiated to help rule out unsuitable 

candidates before expending additional PSD time and resources on costly background 

investigations. According to CBP IA, the average cost of a polygraph examination is $800, 

whereas the average cost of a background investigation is about $3,000. 

CBP Employs Controls to 

Mitigate the Risk of Hiring 

Potentially Corrupt 

Officers and Agents, but 

Does Not Track Data That 

Can Help Determine the 

Relative Effectiveness of 

Screening Tools
 

Page 16 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

well as reviewing any other information that may be used in determining 

whether or not applicants are suitable for employment. If, after the final 

adjudication, there is no derogatory information affecting an applicant’s 

suitability, PSD forwards the final favorable adjudication decision to 

Human Resources Management, which completes the remainder of the 

required steps in the hiring process.

Regarding polygraph examinations, CAD has maintained data on the 

number of polygraph examinations that it administers and the technical 

results of those examinations since January 2008.26 CAD officials stated 

that an applicant technically fails the polygraph examination by receiving 

a “significant response” on the test or using countermeasures to deceive 

the test, which is an indicator of deception and results in PSD making a 

determination that an applicant is unsuitable for hire.27 Alternatively, an 

applicant can technically pass the polygraph examination, but admit to 

past criminal behavior (e.g., admitting to frequent and recent illegal 

narcotics usage) that would likely render the applicant unsuitable for CBP 

employment when PSD adjudicates a complete record of CAD’s 

polygraph examination and associated interviews.28 Table 6 provides our 

analysis of CAD’s data on the 11,149 polygraph examinations 

administered since 2008, and the technical results of those examinations.

 

26CAD administers the polygraph examination program, which includes (1) a preexamination interview with the applicant, (2) the examination itself, and (3) a 

postexamination interview. CAD provides a final polygraph examination report to PSD for 

final adjudication. 

27Polygraph examinations result in a “significant response” when the applicant displays a 

physiological response to a question and is ultimately unable to resolve the issue in spite 

of additional probing during the examination process. 

28CBP IA defines an admission statement to include any one of the following types of 

information provided by an applicant: (1) admitting to behavior outside of his self-interest,

(2) providing information that was not previously known, (3) admitting to behavior that is 

relevant to issues that CBP tests, and/or (4) admitting information that was not relevant to 

determining suitability for employment.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Table 6: Technical Results of Polygraph Examinations, January 2008 to August 2012

Fiscal year

Total tests 

conducted

Failed

testsa Failure rate

Passed 

tests

Passed 

rate Inconclusive

Inconclusive 

rate

2008 (January through September) 505 158 31% 292 58% 55 11%

2009 2,047 733 36% 1,031 50% 283 14%

2010 2,069 975 47% 907 44% 187 9%

2011 2,688 1,361 51% 978 36% 349 13%

2012 (through August 7, 2012) 3,840 1,917 50% 1,255 33% 668 17%

Total 11,149 5,144 46% 4,463 40% 1,542 14%

Source: GAO analysis of CBP IA data.

Note: Of the 11,149 examinations, 859 were retests (i.e., an applicant had to retake the examination 

usually because of an initial inconclusive result.) Retest results were proportionally similar to the 

results for all polygraph examinations. 

a

Failed test refers to a test with a significant response and/or a no opinion or no opinion-counter 

measure. “No opinion” means that no exam was administered or no viable exam could be collected 

(usually because of an applicant not appearing for a scheduled exam). A “no opinion-counter 

measure” represents an attempt by the applicant to deceive the exam. 

In addition to the technical examination results, CAD maintains 

documentation on admissions that applicants reveal during the polygraph 

examination process. Applicants have admitted to a range of criminal 

activity from plans to gain employment with the agency in order to further 

illicit activities, such as drug smuggling to excessive illegal drug use. For 

example, one applicant admitted that his brother-in-law, a known Mexican 

drug smuggler, asked him to use employment with CBP to facilitate 

cocaine smuggling. Another applicant admitted to using marijuana 9,000 

times, including the night before the polygraph examination; cocaine 30 to 

40 times; hallucinogenic mushrooms 15 times; and ecstasy about 50 

times. CBP IA officials stated that admissions such as these highlight the 

importance of the polygraph examination to help identify these types of 

behaviors in applicants before they are hired for CBP employment. CBP 

IA officials stated that the polygraph examination is the key investigative 

tool in the agency’s integrity program because it can help identify whether 

applicants have misled background investigators regarding previous 

criminal histories or misconduct issues.

PSD is responsible for maintaining data on its final suitability 

determinations—whether or not it determines that applicants are suitable 

for hire. However, CBP IA does not have a mechanism to track and 

maintain data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background 

information or polygraph examination) provided the information that PSD 

used to determine that applicants were not suitable for hire, making it 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

difficult for CBP IA to assess the relative effectiveness of its various 

screening tools. For example, if 100 applicants technically pass a 

polygraph examination, but 60 of these applicants are ultimately found 

unsuitable for hire, CBP IA does not have data to indicate if the applicants 

were found unsuitable based on admissions during the polygraph 

examination, derogatory information collected by background 

investigators, a combination of this information, or on the basis of other 

screening tools. PSD officials stated that they do not have the data 

needed to assess the effectiveness of screening tools because of 

limitations in PSD’s information management system, the Integrated 

Security Management System (ISMS), which is not designed to collect 

data on the source of the information (e.g., background information, 

polygraph examination) and the results used to determine whether an 

applicant is deemed suitable for hire.29

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that 

program managers need operational data to determine whether they are 

meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of 

resources. Moreover, the standards state that pertinent information 

should be identified, captured, and distributed in a form and time frame 

that permits managers to perform their duties efficiently. The standards 

also require that all transactions be clearly documented in a manner that 

is complete and accurate in order to be useful for managers and others 

involved in evaluating operations.

CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner 

and other senior staff stated that maintaining these data on an ongoing 

basis would be useful in managing CBP IA’s programs.

30 Maintaining and tracking data on 

which screening tools provide information that contributes to PSD 

determining that an applicant is not suitable for hire could better position 

CBP IA to gauge the effectiveness of each tool and the extent to which 

the tools are meeting their intended goals for screening applicants for 

hire.

 

29PSD uses DHS’s Integrated Security Management System (ISMS) to track data on its 

adjudications. CBP IA began using ISMS, as required by DHS, in fiscal year 2010.

30GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

CBP has two key controls for incumbent employees—random drug 

testing and periodic reinvestigations—to ensure the continued integrity of 

the CBPOs and BPAs. CBP is required to conduct random drug tests on 

an annual basis for at least 10 percent of the employees in designated 

positions,31 including CBPOs and BPAs, to help ensure employees who 

hold positions in the area of law enforcement or public trust refrain from 

the use of illegal drugs while on or off duty.32

In addition, CBP policy states that all CBPOs and BPAs are subject to a 

reinvestigation every 5 years to ensure continued suitability for 

employment.

According to CBP data for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2011, more than 99 percent of the 15,565 

random drug tests conducted on CBP employees were negative. CBP 

officials stated that actions against those with positive results ranged from 

voluntary resignation to removal. In September 2012, Human Resource 

Management officials told us that DHS was in the process of reviewing 

drug-free workplace programs across the department and that CBP was 

coordinating with DHS’s drug-free workforce program. Changes under 

consideration for DHS’s program include eliminating the 2-hour advance 

notice that employees currently receive before they are required to 

provide a urinalysis sample, which human resource officials stated could 

help reduce the possibility of CBP employees potentially engaging in 

efforts to dilute the results of the tests.

33 According to CBP IA officials, reinvestigations are a key 

control for monitoring incumbent officers and agents, particularly for those 

employees who were hired in the past without a polygraph examination.34

 

31Human Resources Management administers the CBP Federal Drug Free Workplace 

Program as is mandated by Executive Order 12564. Tested designated positions include 

sensitive federal positions in the area of law enforcement and public trust such as CBPOs 

and BPAs. 

32CBP also conducts urinalysis tests based on reasonable suspicion or in the aftermath of 

an accident or in other instances. Grounds for reasonable suspicion tests include, among 

other things, observable phenomena, such as direct observation of drug use or 

possession and/or the physical symptoms of being under the influence of a drug, a pattern 

of abnormal conduct or erratic behavior, or an arrest or conviction for a drug-related 

offense. CBP conducted five reasonable suspicion tests from fiscal years 2009 to 2011.

33CBP policies allows for reinvestigations to be initiated outside of the standard 5-year 

cycle. As of July 2012, CBP has not conducted any periodic reinvestigations outside of the 

normal cycle, according to CBP IA officials.

34As of October 2012, CBP requires all incoming CBPO and BPA applicants to receive a 

polygraph examination. However, PSD began screening some applicants with a polygraph 

examination beginning in 2008. 

CBP Has Tools for 

Screening Incumbent 

Officers and Agents
 

Page 20 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

CBP IA officials stated that they conducted few periodic reinvestigations 

during fiscal years 2006 to 2010 because resources were focused on 

meeting mandated hiring goals.35 Thus, CBP IA accumulated a backlog of 

15,197 periodic reinvestigations as of 2010. To help address this backlog, 

the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 required CBP to initiate all 

outstanding periodic reinvestigations within 180 days of the enactment of 

the law, or July 3, 2011.36 As of September 2012, CBP IA had initiated 

100 percent, and had completed 99 percent (15,027 of 15,197) of the 

outstanding reinvestigations from the backlog. According to CBP IA 

officials, 13,968 of the reinvestigations that were completed as of 

September 2012 have been adjudicated favorably, and CBP officials 

stated that they had referred three additional cases to the Office of Labor 

and Employee Relations for possible disciplinary action.37 CBP IA data 

indicate, however, that about 62 percent of the favorably adjudicated 

reinvestigations initially identified some type of issue, such as criminal or 

dishonest conduct or illegal drug use, which required further review during 

the adjudication process. According to CBP IA officials, PSD adjudicators 

mitigated these issues and determined that they did not warrant any 

referrals to labor and employee relations officials for disciplinary actions.

CBP IA officials stated that they are considering implementing a polygraph 

requirement for incumbent employees; however, CBP has not yet 

assessed the feasibility of expanding the program beyond applicants. In 

May 2012, CBP’s Acting Deputy Commissioner testified that the agency is 

considering whether and how to subject incumbent officers and agents to 

polygraph examinations.38

 

35In fiscal years 2011 and 2012, appropriations acts provided that the Border Patrol was to 

maintain an active duty presence of no fewer than 21,370 agents protecting the border of 

the United States. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 

2011, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2012, div. D, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 945-46 (2011).

CBP IA officials and supervisory CBPOs and 

BPAs that we interviewed at all four of the locations we visited expressed 

36Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011).

37The Office of Labor and Employee Relations is the authority within CBP for 

management of labor and employee relations activities.

38Statement of Thomas Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and 

Management, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives. 

Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2012.

CBP Has Not Assessed the 

Feasibility of Expanding 

Its Polygraph Program to 

Incumbent Officers and 

Agents
 

Page 21 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

concerns about the suitability of the officers and agents hired during the 

surges because most of these officers and agents did not take a polygraph 

examination. CBP IA’s Assistant Commissioner also stated that he 

supports a periodic polygraph requirement for incumbent officers because 

of the breadth and volume of derogatory information that applicants have 

provided during the polygraph examinations. The Assistant Commissioner 

and other senior CBP officials stated that they have begun to consider 

various factors related to expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent 

officers and agents in CBP. However, CBP has not yet fully assessed the 

costs and benefits of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent 

officers and agents, as well as other factors that may affect the agency’s 

efforts to expand the program. For example:

• Costs. In September 2012, CBP IA officials told us that they had not 

fully examined the costs associated with different options for 

expanding the polygraph examination requirement to incumbent 

employees. To test 5 percent of current eligible law enforcement 

employees (about 45,000 officer and agents), for example, equates to 

2,250 polygraph examinations annually, according to CBP IA. Testing 

20 percent of eligible employees each year, by comparison, equates 

to 9,000 polygraph examinations annually. CBP IA preliminarily 

identified some costs based on the average cost per polygraph 

examination (about $800); however, it has not completed analyses of 

other costs associated with testing incumbent employees, including 

those associated with mission support specialists, adjudicators, and

supervisors who would need to be hired and trained to conduct the 

examinations. In October 2012, CBP IA officials stated that there 

would be further costs associated with training polygraph examiners—

approximately $250,000 per examiner. CBP has not determined the 

full costs associated with expanding polygraph examinations to 

incumbent employees to help assess the feasibility of various options 

for expansion.

• Authority and ability to polygraph incumbents. According to OPM 

requirements, to conduct polygraph examinations on current 

employees, CBP would need to request and obtain approval from 

OPM. As of September 2012, CBP had not yet sought approval from 

OPM to conduct polygraph examinations on incumbent employees 

because CBP’s senior leadership had not completed internal 

discussions about how and when to seek this approval. In addition, 

CBP officials identified other factors that the agency has not yet 

assessed, which could affect the feasibility of conducting polygraph 

examinations on incumbent employees. These factors include the 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

need to assess how the agency will use the results of incumbent 

employees’ polygraphs and whether these options are subject to 

negotiation with the labor unions that represent CBPOs and BPAs. 

For example, according to CBP officials, it might be necessary to 

negotiate with the unions as to what disciplinary action could be taken 

based on the possible outcomes of the examination, including the test 

results themselves and any admissions of illegal activity or 

misconduct made by the employee during the examination.

• Frequency or number of polygraph examinations to be 

conducted. According to the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner, the 

agency has identified possible options for how frequently to implement 

polygraph examinations for incumbent employees or for what 

population to conduct the examinations. For example, possible 

options include conducting polygraph examinations on a random 

sample of incumbent employees each year (e.g., 5 percent or 20 

percent of eligible employees each year), or conducting the 

examinations based on reasonable suspicion of finding derogatory 

information. CBP IA officials stated that testing incumbent employees 

on a random basis could have a deterrent effect by causing some 

employees to cease their corrupt behavior, and dissuading other 

employees from becoming involved in corrupt behavior. Although CBP 

has identified possible options for how frequently to implement 

polygraph examinations for incumbent employees or for what 

population to conduct the examinations, CBP officials stated that they 

have not assessed the feasibility of implementing these options, 

particularly in light of their relative costs and benefits.

Standard practices for project management call for the feasibility of 

programs to be considered early on.39 Moreover, standard practices for 

project management state that specific desired outcomes or results should 

be conceptualized, defined, and documented as part of a road map.40

CBP has not fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the polygraph 

program to incumbent officers and agents, in accordance with standard 

 

39See GAO, Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in 

Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound 

Containers, GAO-10-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009). 

40Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, second edition© 

(Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

practices for project management, including assessing all of the 

associated costs and benefits, options for how the agency will use the 

results of the examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing 

incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. In October 2012, 

the CBP IA Assistant Commissioner stated that the agency has begun to 

discuss options with senior agency officials for expanding its polygraph 

program. He and other senior CBP IA officials acknowledged that his 

office had not yet fully assessed the various factors that might affect the 

feasibility of expanding the polygraph program and agreed that such an 

assessment would be useful in discussions with CBP senior 

management. Assessing the feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs 

early on in its planning efforts, consistent with standard practices, could 

help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening 

integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs.

A senior PSD official stated that PSD has not implemented a quality 

assurance program at the level desired because it has prioritized its

resources in recent years to address hiring goals and the mandated 

requirements to clear the backlog of reinvestigations.41

 

41CAD adheres to a separate quality assurance program that is administered by the 

National Center for Credibility Assessment, which evaluates CAD’s compliance with 

established policies and procedures for polygraph programs within the federal 

government. 

PSD established a 

quality assurance program in 2008 to help ensure that proper policies and 

procedures are followed during the course of the preemployment

background investigations and incumbent employee reinvestigations. As 

part of this program, PSD is to (1) review, on a monthly basis, no more 

than 5 percent of all completed investigations to ensure the quality and 

timeliness of the investigations and to identify any deficiencies in the 

investigation process, and (2) report the findings or deficiencies in a 

standardized checklist so that corrective action can be taken, if 

necessary. As of September 2012, PSD officials stated that they have not 

consistently completed the monthly checks, as required by the quality 

assurance program, because they have prioritized their resources to 

screen applicants to meet CBP’s hiring goals. PSD officials stated that 

they have performed some of the required checks since 2008. However, 

PSD officials could not provide data on how many checks were 

conducted or when the checks were conducted because they did not 

retain the results of the checks on the required checklists. In addition, 

CBP IA Could Benefit from 

Implementing Its Quality 

Assurance Program for 

Initial Background and 

Periodic Reinvestigations 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

CBP IA officials stated that they had performed 16 quality reviews on an 

ad hoc basis outside of the monthly checks from fiscal years 2008 

through 2010. CBP IA documented the results of these ad hoc checks, 

which did not identify significant deficiencies according to officials.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides 

guidance on the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of controls 

and ensuring that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly 

resolved and evaluated within established time frames so that all actions 

that correct or otherwise resolve the matters have been brought to 

management’s attention. The standards also state that all transactions 

and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the 

documentation should be readily available for examination. Senior CBP 

IA officials stated that a quality assurance program is an integral part of 

their overall applicant screening efforts, and they stated that it is critical 

for CBP IA to identify and leverage resources to ensure that the quality 

assurance program is fully implemented on a consistent basis. Without a 

quality review program that is implemented and documented on a 

consistent basis, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 

deficiencies, if any, exist in the investigation and adjudication process and 

whether individuals that are unsuitable for employment are attempting to 

find employment with CBP. As a result, it is difficult for CBP to provide 

reasonable assurance that cases have been investigated and adjudicated 

properly and that corruption risk to the agency is mitigated accordingly.

In addition to CBP’s screening tools for applicants and incumbent 

employees, OFO and USBP have developed controls to help mitigate the 

risk of potential CBPO and BPA corruption and misconduct (see table 

7).42

 

42OFO and BP have also developed various policies, musters, training courses, and other 

documents outlining officers’ and agents’ integrity-related responsibilities related to 

accessing U.S. government law enforcement systems, inappropriate associations with 

known or suspected criminals, processing of family or close associates, among other 

things.

For example, OFO has been able to use upgraded technology at 

ports of entry to help prevent and detect possible officer misconduct and 

to monitor officers’ activities while on duty. USBP established a policy that 

limits the use of portable electronic devices while on duty to mitigate the 

risks of agents potentially organizing illegal border crossings.

OFO and USBP Have 

Developed IntegrityRelated Controls; OFO 

Could Benefit from 

Clarifying the Roles and 

Responsibilities of Its 

Integrity Officers
 

Page 25 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Table 7: Key OFO and USBP Integrity-Related Controls

OFO USBP

Analytical Management Systems and Control Office 

(AMSCO): AMSCO, established in 2009, analyzes border 

crossing and other system data to help identify normal patterns 

of behavior versus anomalies that may be indicative of integrity 

issues. According to CBP officials, data from AMSCO have 

proved beneficial in ongoing corruption investigations and also 

assist in the development of potential leads against possible 

corrupt CBP employees. In addition, AMSCO has been useful in 

identifying additional training needs or system adjustments for 

CBPOs. 

AMSCO: In 2012, USBP assigned two agents to AMSCO to learn 

from OFO and develop, as feasible, similar testing of available 

USBP data.

Red Flag: Computerized system that sends electronic alerts via 

handheld devices to CBP supervisors at ports of entry if 

individual officers have potentially not followed standard policies. 

As of August 2012, Red Flag technology has been implemented 

at 12 ports of entry along the southwest border, and OFO 

officials stated that they plan to extend the technology to other 

ports in fiscal year 2013.

Portable electronic devices: BPAs are allowed limited use of 

personal electronic devices while on duty if usage does not 

interfere with official business. The policy also prohibits sensitive 

information on personal global positioning systems without 

supervisory approval and discourages the use of wireless 

communications, other than sector communications systems, to 

transmit official business. USBP instituted this policy to help 

mitigate the risks that BPAs alone on patrol could organize illegal 

border crossings or smuggling activities.

Unscheduled lane rotations: During primary inspection at land 

ports, OFO’s first-line supervisors may require CBPOs to change 

lane assignments immediately and without the officers’ prior 

knowledge to help mitigate the risk of officers having previously 

informed drug or human smugglers of the lane in which they 

would be working.

Agent assignment restrictions: USBP trainees are prohibited 

from being initially assigned within a 100-mile radius of their 

preemployment home of record based on a USBP analysis of 

former USBP employees who have been arrested for alleged 

corruption, which concluded that 75 percent of these individuals 

had been assigned near their preemployment home of record and 

therefore placed in an environment where they were more likely to 

face pressure from friends and family to engage in illicit activities 

such as smuggling.

Unscheduled work locations: Advanced details about 

employee work locations are withheld to mitigate risk of officers 

coordinating illegal activity more easily with those individuals who 

are seeking to smuggle illicit goods or aliens into the country.

Source: GAO analysis of OFO and USBP information.

Senior USBP officials stated that its agents operate in an environment 

that does not lend itself to the types of technological controls, such as 

Red Flag, that OFO has implemented at the ports of entry, which are 

more confined and predictable environments than Border Patrol 

environments. For example, BPAs are required to patrol miles of terrain 

that may be inaccessible to radio coverage by supervisors at the sector 

offices. CBPOs operate in more controlled space at U.S. ports of entry as 

opposed to the open terrain across USBP sectors. Nevertheless, USBP 

officials stated that they are working with AMSCO and CBP IA to identify 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

innovative ways that technology might be used to assist USBP in 

mitigating the risk of corruption along the border.

In addition, in 2009, OFO established the integrity officer position to 

provide an additional control within the individual field offices. As of 

August 2012, there were 19 integrity officers across OFO’s 20 field 

offices; there were 5 officers across the 4 field offices on the southwest 

border. Integrity officers monitor integrity-related controls, including the 

Red Flag system and video surveillance cameras. Integrity officers also 

perform data analyses and provide operational support to criminal and 

administrative investigations against OFO employees. However, CBP IA 

officials stated that OFO has not consistently coordinated the integrity 

officer program with CBP IA, which is the designated lead for all integrityrelated matters within CBP. According to a CBP directive, entities within 

CBP, such as OFO, that are engaged in integrity-related activities must 

coordinate with CBP IA to ensure organizational awareness and prevent 

investigative conflicts.43

In August 2012, CBP’s Acting Commissioner testified that integrity 

officers participate in local corruption task forces, committees, and 

working groups, and collaborate with various federal law enforcement 

agencies to provide assistance in operational inquiries, research, and 

analysis to assist in the detection and deterrence of corruption and 

misconduct.

CBP IA officials stated that although they are 

aware of the Integrity Officer program, they expressed concerns that the 

roles and responsibilities of these officers may not be clearly articulated 

and thus could result in potential problems, such as jeopardizing ongoing 

investigations.

44

 

43CBP Directive 2130-016.

OFO’s documentation on integrity officers’ duties does not 

provide specific details about how they are to provide assistance to the 

investigative entities. The documentation states that they are to “assist 

with operational inquiries” and serve as technical experts on matters 

related to “inspections, intelligence, analysis, examination and 

enforcement” activities. However, there are differences in how the 

integrity officers have interpreted OFO’s guidance on their roles and 

44See Statement of David Aguilar, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, before the Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and 

Financial Management, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of 

Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2012.
 

Page 27 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

responsibilities, including the definition of assisting with operational 

inquiries. For example, in our meetings with 4 of the integrity officers 

along the southwest border, we found that 3 defined their role to include 

active participation in investigations of allegations of misconduct and 

corruption against OFO employees. At one location we visited, the 

integrity officer stated that he had created an online social media profile 

under an assumed name to connect with CBP employees at his port of 

entry, one of whom was under investigation—an activity that the OFO 

Program Manager, senior OFO officials, and CBP IA officials 

acknowledged was beyond the scope of the intended role of the integrity 

officer position. Further, one integrity officer indicated that his role 

includes a right to “fully investigate” CBP employees, while another 

interpreted his role to be limited to conducting data analysis.

CBP IA officials stated that integrity officers are not authorized to conduct 

investigations nor are they trained to do so. Differences in integrity 

officers’ activities across field locations could be justified given the 

variances at each port of entry. CBP IA officials expressed concerns, 

however, that the integrity officers may be overstepping their roles by 

inserting themselves into ongoing investigations, which could potentially 

disrupt or jeopardize ongoing investigations because they could 

unknowingly compromise the independence of an investigation or 

interview. OFO’s Acting Assistant Commissioner and the integrity officer 

program manager acknowledged that it would be useful to further clarify 

integrity officers’ duties to avoid any conflicts with ongoing investigations 

and ensure that the officers were approaching their duties more 

consistently. Clear roles and responsibilities for integrity officers 

developed in consultation with key stakeholders such as CBP IA, and a 

mechanism that monitors the implementation of those roles and 

responsibilities, could help OFO ensure that the program is operating 

effectively and, in particular, in coordination with the appropriate 

stakeholders like CBP IA.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

CBP has not developed a comprehensive integrity strategy to encompass 

all CBP components’ initiatives. Further, CBP has not completed some 

postcorruption analyses on employees convicted of corruption since 

October 2004, missing opportunities to gain lessons learned to enhance 

policies, procedures, and controls.

CBP has not completed an integrity strategy that encompasses the 

activities of CBP components that have integrity initiatives under way, 

including CBP IA, OFO, and USBP, as called for in the CBP Fiscal Year 

2009-2014 Strategic Plan.45 Specifically, CBP’s Strategic Plan states that 

it will deploy a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates 

prevention, detection, and investigation. Further, a 2008 CBP directive 

states that CBP IA is responsible for developing and implementing CBP’s 

comprehensive integrity strategy to prevent, detect, and investigate all 

threats to the integrity of CBP.46 We have previously reported that 

developing effective strategies can help ensure successful 

implementation of agencywide undertakings where multiple entities are 

involved, such as CBP integrity-related efforts.47

 

45U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: 

July 2009.

Elements of an effective 

strategy include, among others, (1) identifying the purpose, scope, and 

particular problems and threats the strategy is directed toward; (2) 

establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, priorities, 

timelines, and performance measures; (3) defining costs, benefits, and 

46CBP Directive 2130-016.

47GAO, Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy 

and a Designated Leader, GAO-10-645 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010) and GAO, 

National Capital Region: 2010 Strategic Plan is Generally Consistent with Characteristics

of Effective Strategies, GAO-12-276T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 7, 2011).

An Agencywide 

Strategy and Lessons 

Learned Analyses 

Could Help Guide 

CBP Integrity-Related 

Efforts

CBP Is Developing an 

Integrity Strategy, but Does

Not Have Target Timelines 

for Its Completion and 

Implementation
 

Page 29 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

resource and investment needs; and (4) delineating roles and 

responsibilities.48

CBP has efforts under way to help coordinate the various components’ 

integrity-related initiatives, but these efforts have not fully addressed the 

elements of a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates prevention, 

detection, and investigative initiatives for all CBP components. First, CBP 

IA developed a fiscal year 2010-2015 strategic implementation plan to 

guide its programs that aim to prevent, detect, and respond to corruption 

in CBP’s workforce. While CBP IA’s implementation plan sets goals and 

objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities for CBP IA’s programs, 

it does not address the goals or resources necessary across other 

components. Second, CBP convened the Integrity Integrated Policy 

Coordination Committee (IPCC) in March 2011 to provide a forum to 

discuss integrity-related issues among representative members from CBP 

component agencies and other stakeholders.49

 

48GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism,

IPCC provides 

recommendations to CBP’s Commissioner to improve integrity programs 

and initiatives, but does not have the authority provided to CBP IA in the 

2008 directive to implement an agencywide integrity strategy or assign 

roles and responsibilities nor has it defined resource and investment 

needs for a comprehensive integrity strategy. Last, at the component 

level, USBP established an Integrity Advisory Committee in 2008 to 

disseminate integrity and ethics information throughout the sectors and 

provide recommendations to help combat corruption and promote 

integrity within the workforce. In addition, USBP established local 

GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). Another 

element of effective strategies that we identified was integration and implementation, 

which addresses how a strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and 

activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their plans to implement the 

strategy. We determined that this element was not relevant to the scope of our review, 

which was limited to CBP’s integrity programs and strategy and not its integration with 

integrity activities of other DHS components.

49CBP convened the IPCC in 2011 as a forum to discuss integrity-related issues and 

ideas and to share best practices among the members. IPCC is responsible for facilitating 

integrity-related operations of individual offices within CBP as a deliberative body. In 

particular, IPCC was tasked with making recommendations to address the results of an 

integrity study conducted by the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. The 

IPCC is composed of representatives from CBP IA, OFO, USBP, Human Resources 

Management, and Labor and Employee Relations, among others. See Homeland Security 

Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Workforce Integrity 

Study. Dec. 15, 2011. 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

committees in selected sectors, including along the southwest border, to 

establish training and guidance to help BPAs and reinforce concepts such 

as professional behavior and ethical decision making. OFO established 

an Integrity Committee to review misconduct and corruption data related 

to OFO employees, identify potential trends, and develop integrity 

initiatives to address any concerns. Although CBP IA has a strategic 

implementation plan for its activities and officials told us that these 

integrity coordination committees have been useful as forums for sharing 

information about the components’ respective integrity-related initiatives, 

CBP has not yet developed and deployed an agencywide integrity 

strategy.

During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting an integrity 

strategy for approval by the components and CBP’s senior management, 

in accordance with CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. CBP IA 

officials stated that a comprehensive strategy is important because it 

would help guide CBP integrity efforts and can, in turn, lead to specific 

objectives and activities, better allocation and management of resources, 

and clarification of roles and responsibilities. A 2011 workforce integrity 

study commissioned by CBP recommended that CBP develop a 

comprehensive integrity strategy and concluded that without such a 

strategy, there is potential for inconsistent efforts, conflicting roles and 

responsibilities, and unintended redundancies.50 However, CBP IA’s 

Assistant Commissioner stated that, as of September 2012, his office had 

not developed timelines for completing and implementing the agencywide 

integrity strategy and has not been able to finalize the draft, in 

accordance with the Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. He indicated 

that that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP 

component entities in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority and 

responsibility for overseeing the implementation of all CBP integrityrelated activities. Program management standards state that successful 

execution of any program includes developing plans that include a 

timeline for program deliverables.51

 

50Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Workforce Integrity Study. Dec. 15, 2011.

Without target timelines, it will be 

difficult for CBP to monitor progress made toward the development and 

implementation of an agencywide strategy. Further, it is too soon for us to 

51Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, second edition 

© (Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

determine if the final strategy will meet the key elements of an effective 

strategy that encompasses CBP-wide integrity stakeholders’ goals, 

milestones, performance measures, resource needs, and roles and 

responsibilities. A strategy that includes these elements could help better 

position CBP to provide oversight and coordination of integrity initiatives 

occurring across the agency.

CBP has not completed some analyses of some cases in which CBPOs 

and BPAs were convicted of corruption-related charges. Such analyses 

could provide CBP with information to better identify corruption or 

misconduct risks to the workforce or modify existing policies, procedures, 

and controls to better detect or prevent possible corrupt activities on the 

part of CBPOs and BPAs. In 2007, OFO directed relevant managers to 

complete postcorruption analysis reports for each employee convicted for 

corruption. In 2011, USBP began requiring that these reports be 

completed after the conviction of any USBP employee for corruption. The 

reports are to include information such as how the employee committed 

the corrupt activity, and provide, among other things, recommendations 

on how USBP and OFO could improve policies, procedures, and controls 

to prevent or detect similar corruption in the future. For example, 

according to an OFO Director, several reports stated that the use of 

personal cell phones helped facilitate and coordinate drug smuggling 

efforts. As a result of these analyses, OFO implemented a restriction on 

the use of personal cell phones while on duty.

As of October 2012, OFO has completed about 66 percent of the total 

postcorruption analysis reports on OFO employees convicted since 

October 2004 (47 of 71 total convictions). OFO’s Incident Management 

Division Director stated that OFO had not completed the remaining 

reports because some convictions occurred prior to the 2007 OFO 

directive or because the convictions had not been published on CBP IA’s 

internal website—a point that informs OFO when it has 30 days to 

complete the report.52

 

52CBP’s “Trust Betrayed” internal website lists examples of behavior that CBP states 

betrays the conduct expected of employees, and includes details of criminal prosecutions.

USBP has completed about 4 percent of 

postcorruption anlaysis reports on USBP employees convicted since 

October 2004 (2 of 45 total convictions). USBP was instructed to 

complete postcorruption analysis reports in August 2011, and USBP 

CBP Has Not Yet 

Completed Analyses of 

Prior Cases of Corruption
 

Page 32 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

officials stated that the agency does not have plans to complete analyses 

for convictions before August 2011 because CBP IA is reviewing these 

cases as part of a study to analyze behavioral traits among corrupt 

employees. However, CBP IA’s study does not substitute for 

postcorruption analysis reports because for this study, CBP IA 

researchers are exploring the convicted employees’ thinking and behavior 

to gain insights into the motives behind the betrayal of trust, how the 

activity originated, and how they carried out the illegal activity. The 

postcorruption reports, however, may go beyond this type of analysis and 

also may aim to identify deficiencies in port or sector processes that may 

have fostered or permitted corruption and to produce recommendations 

specific to enhancing USBP policies, procedures, or controls. A USBP 

Deputy Chief acknowledged that completing the remaining reports could 

be beneficial to understanding any trends or patterns of behavior among 

BPAs convicted of corruption. In some cases, OFO and USBP officials 

stated that it may be difficult to complete postcorruption analysis reports 

for older convictions, as witnesses and other information on the 

corruption-related activities may no longer be available.

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides 

guidance on the importance of identifying and analyzing risks, and using 

that information to make decisions.53 These standards address various 

aspects of internal control that should be continuous, built-in components 

of organizational operations. One internal control standard, risk 

assessment, calls for identifying and analyzing risks that agencies face 

from internal and external sources and deciding what actions should be 

taken to manage these risks. The standards indicate that conditions 

governing risk continually change and periodic updates are required to 

ensure that risk information, such as vulnerabilities in the program, 

remains current and relevant. Information collected through periodic 

reviews, as well as daily operations, can inform the analysis and 

assessment of risk. Complete and timely information from postcorruption

analysis reports of all convictions could assist USBP and OFO 

management in obtaining and sharing lessons learned to enhance 

integrity-related policies, procedures, and controls throughout CBP.

 

53GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Data indicate that the overwhelming majority of CBP employees adhere 

to the agency’s integrity standards; however, a small minority have been 

convicted of engaging in corruption due, in part, to the increasing 

pressure from drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal 

organizations that are targeting CBPOs and BPAs, particularly along the 

southwest U.S. border. The Acting Commissioner of CBP testified that no 

act of corruption within the agency can or will be tolerated and that acts of 

corruption compromise CBP’s ability to achieve its mission to secure 

America’s borders against all threats while facilitating and expediting legal 

travel and trade. Strategic and continuous monitoring of operational 

vulnerabilities is important given the shifting tactics of drug-trafficking 

organizations seeking to infiltrate the agency. Therefore, CBP has taken 

steps to mitigate the risk of misconduct and corruption among incoming 

CBPOs and BPAs by implementing controls during the preemployment

screening process. However, tracking and maintaining data on the results 

of its screening tools for applicants, a feasibility assessment for potential 

expansion of polygraph requirements, and a robust quality assurance 

program for background investigations and periodic reinvestigations that 

ensures reviews are consistently conducted and documented could better 

position CBP to mitigate risk of employee corruption. In addition, clear 

roles and responsibilities for OFO’s integrity officers developed in 

coordination with appropriate stakeholders such as CBP IA could help 

CBP ensure that the program is operating effectively. Moreover, 

establishing a target time frame for completing a comprehensive integrity 

strategy could help CBP ensure sufficient progress toward its 

development and implementation. In addition, completed, postcorruption 

analysis reports of former CBP employees who have been arrested for 

corruption could better position CBP to implement any lessons learned 

from these cases.

To enhance CBP’s efforts to mitigate the risk of corruption and 

misconduct among CBPOs and BPAs, we recommend that the CBP 

commissioner take the following seven actions:

• develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on the sources of 

information (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination 

admissions) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are not 

suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its 

applicant screening tools;

• assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to 

incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs and 

benefits, options for how the agency will use the results of the 

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 34 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent 

officers and agents at various frequencies;

• conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA’s adjudications of 

background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, as required 

in PSD’s quality assurance program;

• establish a process to fully document, as required, any deficiencies 

identified through PSD’s quality assurance reviews;

• develop detailed guidance within OFO on the roles and 

responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with appropriate 

stakeholders such as CBP IA;

• set target timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive 

integrity strategy; and,

• complete OFO and USBP postcorruption analysis reports for all 

CBPOs and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related 

activities, to the extent that information is available.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 

DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix 

II. DHS concurred with all seven recommendations and described actions 

under way or plans to address them. DHS also discussed concerns it 

had with periodically polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers.

With regard to our first recommendation, DHS concurred and indicated 

that by March 31, 2013, CBP expects to collect data on the impact of the 

polygraph examination regarding the outcome of CBP applicant suitability 

adjudications and undertake steps to ensure data reliability across 

various CBP personnel security databases. 

With regard to the second recommendation, while DHS concurred, it 

reported possible adverse impacts associated with periodically 

polygraphing incumbent law enforcement officers. Specifically, DHS 

noted that doing so could adversely affect CBP resources without 

additional resources to implement the requirement. While we understand 

DHS’s concerns, we did not recommend that CBP expand its polygraph 

program to incumbent employees; rather, we recommended that CBP 

assess the feasibility of expanding polygraph examinations to incumbent 

CBPOs and BPAs. Thus, concerns such as these could be considered in 

conducting its feasibility assessment. As we reported, assessing the 

feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs early on in its planning efforts 

could help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening 

integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In addition, 

DHS noted that expanding the polygraph program to incumbent 

employees would be contingent on approval from OPM and may 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 35 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

encounter resistance from unions representing CBP’s employees who 

may view it as a potential change to the conditions of their employment. 

As noted in the report, these are important factors CBP could consider in 

assessing the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program. 

With regard to the other five recommendations, DHS concurred and 

indicated that CBP will work to strengthen its current quality assurance 

processes and develop a process to document deficiencies identified 

through quality reviews; develop detailed guidance on the duties, roles, 

and responsibilities of integrity officers; complete a comprehensive 

integrity strategy; and develop postcorruption analysis reports for any 

convictions that do not currently have such reports. DHS estimates that it 

will complete these steps by July 31, 2013. The actions that DHS has 

planned or under way should help address the intent of the 

recommendations. DHS also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 

issue date. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Rebecca Gambler

Acting Director

Homeland Security and Justice 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

To examine data on arrests of and allegations against U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) employees accused of corruption or misconduct 

issues, we analyzed data on 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted

from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012 for corruption activities. We 

also analyzed data on allegations of corruption and misconduct against 

CBP employees from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. For both arrest and 

allegation data, these are the time periods for which the most complete 

data were available. In particular, we analyzed variations in both sets of 

data across CBP components and geographic region. To assess the 

reliability of these data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and 

looked for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2) 

interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about these data to determine 

the processes in place to ensure their accuracy. We determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, 

we interviewed officials from CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA), Office of 

Field Operations (OFO), United States Border Patrol (USBP), and CBP’s 

Human Resource Management, and Labor and Employee Relations, to 

gain their perspectives on these data on CBP employee corruption and 

misconduct.

To evaluate CBP’s implementation of integrity-related controls to prevent 

and detect employee misconduct and corruption, we analyzed relevant 

laws such as the Anti-Corruption Border Act of 2010, which requires, by 

January 2013, that all CBP officer (CBPO) and U.S. Border Patrol Agent 

(BPA) applicants receive polygraph examinations before they are hired.1

 

1

Pub. L. No. 111-376, § 3, 124 Stat. 4104, 4104-05 (2011).

We also reviewed documentation on CBP’s preemployment screening 

practices and their results—including background investigations and 

polygraph examinations—and relevant data and documentation on the 

random drug testing program and the periodic reinvestigation process for 

incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. In particular, we evaluated CBP IA data on 

the technical results of polygraph examinations from January 2008 

through August 2012. To assess the reliability of the technical results of 

the polygraph data, we (1) performed electronic data testing and looked 

for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and (2) interviewed 

agency officials knowledgeable about these data to determine the 

processes in place to ensure their accuracy. We determined that these 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, 

we examined CBP IA’s quality assurance program for its Personnel 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Security Division (PSD),2 including interviewing PSD officials who are 

responsible for deciding whether an applicant or incumbent officer or 

agent is suitable for hire or continued employment.3

We compared CBP’s integrity-related controls, as applicable, against 

recommended controls in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government

We also analyzed 

Human Resource Management’s random drug testing data for fiscal 

years 2009 through 2011, the time period for which the most complete 

data were available, and examined the results of those mandated periodic 

reinvestigations that CBP IA had completed as of September 2012. To 

assess the reliability of these data, we conducted tests for accuracy and 

interviewed officials responsible for managing the drug testing and 

reinvestigation programs and found that the data were sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of our report.

4 and standard practices from the Project Management 

Institute.5

 

2

PSD, within CBP IA, manages the personnel security and suitability program by initiating 

and adjudicating preemployment investigations for CBP applicants and contractors. PSD 

also conducts and adjudicates periodic reinvestigations and issues security clearances for 

CBP employees.

Furthermore, we conducted site visits to four locations along 

the southwest U.S. border to observe the implementation of various 

integrity-related controls and obtain perspectives from CBP IA, OFO, and 

USBP officials at these locations on the implementation of integrityrelated controls. We conducted these visits in El Paso, Texas; Laredo, 

Texas; San Diego, California; and, Tucson, Arizona. We selected these 

locations on the basis of a variety of factors, including the colocation of 

CBP IA with OFO offices and USBP sectors along the southwest border 

and the number of allegations against or arrests of CBP employees for 

corruption or misconduct. Because we selected a nonprobability sample 

of sites, the information we obtained from these interviews and visits 

cannot be generalized to all OFO, USBP, and CBP IA field locations. 

3

With a favorable suitability determination, an applicant can be hired, if all other 

requirements are met. The suitability determination is a process that subjects applicants’ 

and employees’ personal conduct to evaluation throughout their careers. Title 5, Code of 

Federal Regulations Part 731, establishes factors that are used to make a determination 

of suitability.

4

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

5

Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management, second edition © 

(Newton Square, Pa., 2006, updated 2008). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

However, observations obtained from these visits provided us with a 

greater understanding of CBP’s integrity-related initiatives.

To evaluate CBP’s integrity strategy, including how the agency 

incorporates lessons learned from prior misconduct and corruption cases, 

we reviewed documentation on integrity initiatives from CBP IA, OFO, 

and USBP, as well as from the Integrity Integrated Planning and 

Coordination Committee (IPCC), which CBP convened in 2011 as a 

forum to discuss integrity-related issues and ideas and to share standard 

practices among the members. In particular, we analyzed these 

documents against the requirements set forth in the CBP Fiscal Year 

2009-2014 Strategic Plan.

6 In addition, we analyzed all available 

postcorruption analyses reports, which identify deficiencies that may have 

enabled CBP employees to engage in corruption-related activities, 

against OFO and USBP program requirements. We interviewed officials 

in Washington, D.C., from the Office of Policy and Planning, CBP IA, 

USBP, OFO, and IPCC, as well as officials during our site visits, 

regarding CBP’s integrity strategy and the extent to which CBP is using 

lessons learned from prior corruption and misconduct cases to guide 

changes in policies and procedures, as appropriate.7

We conducted this performance audit from December 2011 to December 

2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

6

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Secure Borders, Safe Travel, Legal Trade: U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.: 

July 2009.

7

CBP’s Office of Policy and Planning is headed by an Executive Director and provides 

oversight of CBP policy and aligns policies across the various CBP components. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 39 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 40 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 41 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 42 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-13-59 CBP Integrity Programs

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant 

Director; David Alexander; Nanette J. Barton; Frances Cook; Wendy Dye; 

David Greyer; Jackson Hufnagle; Wendy Johnson; Otis S. Martin; and 

Linda Miller made significant contributions to the work.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(441030)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.