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THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT: 

ASSESSING THE STATE OF PREPAREDNESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, 

AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 6, 2012 

Serial No. 112–96 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida, Chairman 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Staff Director 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

VACANCY, Minority Professional Staff Member 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications ................................................................ 1 

The Honorable Hansen Clarke, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications ................................................................ 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Timothy W. Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and National 

Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Intergovernmental Relations, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

PANEL II 

Mr. John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management, On Behalf of the National Emergency Management Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

Mr. Mike Sena, Deputy Director, Northern California Regional Intelligence 

Center, On Behalf of the National Fusion Center Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34 

Dr. Georges C. Benjamin, M.D., Executive Director, American Public Health 

Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Letter From the BuildStrong Coalition .............................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Tim Manning ............. 53 

(1) 

THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT: 

ASSESSING THE STATE OF PREPAREDNESS 

Wednesday, June 6, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:07 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bilirakis, Farenthold, Turner, and 

Clarke. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I believe it is afternoon. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the 

state of our Nation’s preparedness. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

At the start of another hurricane season and with no evidence 

that the terrorist threat to the United States will decline, it is important that this subcommittee has an accurate picture of the level 

of preparedness across the country. Anecdotally, we are all aware 

of advancements made in preparedness. One need only look at the 

responses to the tornadoes in Joplin and Hurricane Irene to see 

evidence of enhanced preparedness and response capabilities at the 

State and local levels. However, there is more to the story, and it 

is my hope that the recently released National Preparedness Report will help us gain a better understanding of the work that remains to be done to ensure a prepared and resilient Nation. 

It is important to note that this National Preparedness Report 

has been a long time coming. Section 652 of the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act requires the annual completion of a Federal preparedness report to assess National preparedness. The PPD–8, signed by President Obama in March 2011, further required the completion of a report assessing National preparedness. The first such report was completed in January 2009; 

however, another report was not completed until the National Preparedness Report was released last month. 

There is no doubt that we have made great strides in our level 

of preparedness since September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. However, we must have the ability to measure that preparedness to determine steps still necessary to achieve core capabilities. It is my 

hope that this National Preparedness Report will mark the begin-
2 

ning of an annual assessment, as required by the PKEMRA, one 

that includes validated information received through surveys of 

stakeholders and that truly includes the input of the whole community. 

I am pleased that Deputy Administrator Manning is here today 

to explain the methodology behind the report and how the report’s 

findings, coupled with needed performance measures for the grant 

programs, will help inform efforts going forward to enhance core 

capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels and with our 

nonprofit and private-sector partners. I hope that this will provide 

us with the frank assessment of the shortcomings identified in the 

report and the ways in which FEMA, working with the whole community, plans to address them. 

I am particularly interested in the perspectives on this report of 

our experts on the second panel and from GAO. What are the 

strengths of this report, and how could future iterations be enhanced to provide a better picture of where we stand and where we 

need to go in the future? 

With that, I welcome all our witnesses, and I look forward to 

your testimony on this very important topic. 

Now I will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Hansen Clarke 

from Michigan, for any statement he may like to make. You are 

recognized, sir. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor for me to 

serve with you today as the Ranking Member of this subcommittee 

for this hearing. 

I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing to examine the findings of the National Preparedness Report. It is very important. It is important to me because I represent metropolitan Detroit, and since I have been in Congress the past year and a half, 

I have been a strong advocate for more funding for the Urban 

Areas Security Initiative and also for the Assistance to Firefighters 

Grants. We actually need this type of investment, and that is because our State and our local units of government, they don’t have 

the revenue to be able to provide for the staffing and the equipment that we need to better protect our people. 

Now, I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security 

appropriations bill that we will be voting on soon, this week, in the 

House does contain an additional $400 million in additional funding to State and local grant programs. However, over the past few 

years, there has just been too much money cut out of the Assistance for Firefighters Grant program, and I think we need—in fact, 

I know we have to restore that funding. 

Congress really needs to do much more to better protect our 

State and local communities, and I will tell you why. It is because 

Congress did not adequately regulate and monitor the housing crisis. That is the cause of why the cities and States don’t have the 

revenue right now to help better protect their people. The housing 

crisis forced many families out of their homes, depressed property 

values, and overall dramatically reduced the tax base of many cities and States. So, as a result, they have less money to count on 

right now to better invest in National preparedness for their local 

communities and States. 
3 

I look forward to the testimony of Deputy Administrator Manning and also Mr. Czerwinski, especially your comments and insight, Mr. Czerwinski, on how the recently released National Disaster Recovery Framework could help better prepare communities 

to recover from natural disasters and emergencies, especially small 

businesses that need help reopening or families who are displaced 

when their house is burnt down or blown away, how they can get 

new housing again in a prompt fashion without having to spend 

more money that they have likely lost because of the emergency. 

Also, I am interested to hear from both of you on how we can 

better improve our cybersecurity capabilities. As you are aware, the 

full Committee on Homeland Security recently considered legislation on this issue. I don’t feel that it went far enough to protect 

us from cybersecurity threats. I would like to know how you believe 

that we could strengthen the bill that was reported out of this committee or other committees to better protect us from cybersecurity 

threats. 

Before I yield back my time, I want to again thank Chairman 

Bilirakis for being thoughtful, conscientious. He understands the 

importance of keeping our country strong, investing in National 

preparedness. The fact that he is holding this hearing, again, just 

underscores his insight and why it is really a joy to work with him 

on this subcommittee. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thanks for the nice 

comments. 

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a letter from the 

BuildStrong Coalition. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER FROM THE BUILDSTRONG COALITION

JUNE 6, 2012. 

The Honorable GUS BILIRAKIS, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, H2–176 

Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. 

Dear CHAIRMAN BILIRAKIS: The BuildStrong Coalition would like to thank you, 

Ranking Member Richardson, and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Response, and Communications for holding today’s hearing on preparedness as we 

enter the 2012 Hurricane Season. 

BuildStrong is coalition of National business and consumer organizations, companies, and emergency management officials dedicated to promoting stronger building 

codes to help communities withstand major natural disasters while saving lives and 

taxpayer money at the same time. 

BUILDING CODES SAVE LIVES, PROPERTY, AND TAXPAYER MONEY

Overwhelming evidence exists to demonstrate that the adoption and enforcement 

of State-wide building codes saves lives and greatly reduces property damage and 

the need for Federal assistance resulting from disasters. The Louisiana State University Hurricane Center estimated that stronger building codes would have reduced wind damage from Hurricane Katrina by 80%, saving $8 billion. 

In 2005, FEMA commissioned a study by the National Institute of Building 

Sciences’ Multihazard Mitigation Council. The goal of the study, based on the work 

of more than 50 National experts, was to ‘‘assess the future savings from hazard 

mitigation activities.’’ According to the study, every $1 spent on hazard mitigation 

(actions to reduce disaster losses) provides the Nation with about $4 in future benefits. 
4 

A study done for the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) 

found that losses from Hurricane Andrew, which struck south Florida in 1992 and 

caused more than $20 billion (in today’s dollars) in insured damage, would have 

been reduced by 50 percent for residential property and by 40 percent for commercial property if those structures were built in accordance with Florida’s 2004 Statewide building code. Another IBHS study following Hurricane Charley in 2004 found 

that modern building codes reduced the severity of property losses by 42 percent 

and the frequency of losses by 60 percent. 

More valuable research is currently being conducted by the IBHS at their new lab 

in Richburg, South Carolina. This research already has clearly demonstrated how 

the human and financial costs of natural disasters can be greatly reduced by building stronger homes. With relatively simple upgrades in construction such as strapping to create a continuous load path from the roof, through the walls, and into the 

foundation, thicker roof decking, and textured, rather than smooth nails, test homes 

were built to withstand 110 mile-per-hour winds with little damage. Test homes 

with the same floor plan that were not upgraded, were completely destroyed at wind 

speeds of only 95 mph to 100 mph. Taking steps to prepare in these ways before 

a disaster has a real effect. 

Despite this correlation, most States have not enacted State-wide building codes 

and related inspection and enforcement measures. State standards for construction, 

code-related inspection, and enforcement vary widely across the country. Where 

State-wide codes exist, it is not uncommon to allow individual jurisdictions (e.g., cities of a particular class, or counties) to deviate from the State standards, occasionally resulting in a weakening of the model minimum standards. 

Model building codes govern all aspects of construction and help to protect homes 

and buildings from the devastating effects of natural catastrophes. Uniform, Statewide adoption and enforcement of model building codes by States helps to significantly reduce long-term risks affecting people, property, the environment, and ultimately the economy. The model codes, developed Nationally in the United States by 

a consensus process involving construction experts and local building officials working together, are adopted and enforced at the State level to mitigate effects of natural disaster perils inherent to each State. 

THE SAFE BUILDING CODE INCENTIVE ACT

The BuildStrong Coalition strongly supports H.R. 2069, The Safe Building Code 

Incentive Act, legislation providing States with additional disaster relief funding if 

they enact modern building codes. 

The Safe Building Code Incentive Act would create a financial incentive for States 

that have adopted and enforce State-wide building codes. Under the proposed law, 

States that adopt and enforce Nationally recognized model building codes for residential and commercial structures would qualify for an additional 4 percent of funding available for post-disaster grants. The program would be administered by the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Sixteen States currently enforce building codes that would already qualify for the 

additional 4 percent funding. Another 15 States would qualify with minor changes 

to current laws and regulations. As stated prior, this legislation will not require any 

additional appropriation to FEMA since it draws funds from the existing Disaster 

Relief Fund. In addition, the nature of the incentive does not mandate the adoption 

of State-wide building codes on any States that wish to maintain their current 

patchwork structure. 

The evidence supporting mitigation benefits proves this incentive to be a fiscally 

responsible method of enabling FEMA to assist in natural disaster recovery while 

working to prevent future damage. The Safe Building Code Incentive Act is a forward-thinking, mitigation-focused legislative proposal that will display Congress’s 

leadership in the midst of a heightened natural catastrophe year. 

CONCLUSION

While mitigation will not prevent natural catastrophes, stronger homes and businesses will save private property, Federal funds, environmental damage and insurance claims paid. Further, building codes contribute to the resiliency of a community and the ability of a community to ‘‘bounce back’’ from a hazard event. As a community begins the recovery process, the quicker businesses can return to full operation and citizens can return to their daily lives, the greater ability the local economy has to recover and lessen the burden on assistance providers. Most importantly, 

stronger homes and businesses save lives. 
5 

Again, BuildStrong would like to thank Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member 

Richardson, and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications for holding this important hearing. 

Sincerely, 

JIMI GRANDE, 

Chairman, BuildStrong Coalition. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded 

that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 6, 2012 

Good morning. I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss 

the long-awaited National Preparedness Report. 

Reviewing the report, I was encouraged to learn that State and local governments 

have made significant progress in the areas of all-hazards planning, interoperable 

communications, and public health and medical services. 

This report proved what many of us on this side of the aisle have been saying 

for quite some time: Targeted Homeland Security grants work. 

When we target our resources to address gaps in capabilities, we become more 

prepared. 

That said, having witnessed the suffering Hurricane Katrina brought, I was disturbed to learn that we have made little progress in developing the capabilities necessary to implement robust long-term recovery plans. 

The National Preparedness Report indicates that States are less than half-way to 

achieving their preparedness capability objectives to ensure long-term recovery for 

economic activity, natural and cultural resources, and housing. 

The Report candidly notes that recovery capabilities saw little investment by way 

of Federal grant dollars. 

But funding is only part of the problem. 

Over the past 3 years, the Government Accountability Office has issued a series 

of reports exploring the challenges of long-term recovery projects and identifying lessons learned from previous recovery efforts. 

In particular, the GAO has indicated that confusion among stakeholders and the 

Federal Coordinator regarding their roles and functions during recovery efforts and 

a lack of clarity regarding decision-making authority have historically hindered successful recovery efforts. 

In each report, the GAO has recommended strategies to address gaps in recovery 

capabilities, from facilitating better public-private partnerships to improve economic 

recovery to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Public Assistance Grant 

program. 

I understand that many of GAO’s recommendations are addressed in the National 

Disaster Recovery Framework. 

While it appears that some progress has been made, it is unclear whether additional movement forward is likely. 

I am mindful of NEMA’s report which finds that funding has been relatively flat 

at State and local emergency management agencies. 

In most places, these agencies plan and oversee long-term recovery efforts. 

And given the discussion on long-term recovery, I would be remiss if I did not 

briefly mention the findings in a GAO report released last week on FEMA’s Disaster 

Assistance Workforce. 

It found that FEMA lacks hiring standards for Disaster Assistance Employees, 

who comprise 57 percent of FEMA’s workforce and play a major role in recovery efforts. 

GAO also found that FEMA does not provide DAEs with uniform training. 

Without uniform hiring standards and uniform training, it should come as no surprise that DAEs do not have uniform skill sets. 

Yet, even more troubling is GAO’s finding that FEMA lacks a uniform process for 

monitoring how DAEs implement disaster policies from region to region. 

In light of gaps in recovery capabilities identified in the National Preparedness 

Report, the GAO’s findings regarding DAEs are particularly concerning. 

I will be interested to learn how FEMA intends to address the long-term recovery 

issues. 

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and yield back the balance of my 

time. 
6 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I am pleased to welcome now our first panel of 

witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. Tim Manning. Mr. Manning is FEMA’s 

Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness, a 

position to which he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on May 6, 

2009. Prior to joining FEMA, Administrator Manning served as 

secretary of the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and 

homeland security advisor to Governor Richardson. Mr. Manning 

has served as a firefighter and emergency medical technician. He 

earned his bachelor’s of science degree in geology from Eastern Illinois University and is a graduate of the Executive Leaders Program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the 

Naval Postgraduate School. 

Following Administrator Manning, we will receive testimony 

from Mr. Stanley Czerwinski. Mr. Czerwinski is the director of 

intergovernmental relations at the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. Prior to this position, he served as GAO’s comptroller and 

as the director or assistant director for various issues. Prior to joining GAO, Mr. Czerwinski worked at both the Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office. He has a master’s 

degree in public administration from the University of Massachusetts and a bachelor’s degree from Wesleyan University in Connecticut. 

Welcome. Your entire written statements will appear in the 

record. I ask that you each summarize your testimony for 5 minutes. 

Administrator Manning, you are now recognized. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY W. MANNING, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PROTECTION AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Members of the committee. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Good morning. 

Mr. MANNING. I am Tim Manning, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness. On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, I thank you for the 

invitation to testify today. 

Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have made significant and measurable strides toward improving preparedness for 

all hazards, including terrorism, natural disasters, and technological hazards. This administration arrived recognizing the significant progress that had been made in improving the Nation’s preparedness since September 2001. We also recognized that we 

lacked the measuring systems and, in many cases, the data that 

would allow us to answer definitively the question we are being 

asked by the American people: Are we better prepared? 

We are better prepared. Based on our work, we can better articulate what we are prepared for and where our capabilities lie. For 

example, Federal, State, and local governments have, since 2001, 

built a network of specialized teams capable of interdicting and disrupting a variety of imminent threats. That network includes over 

a thousand hazardous materials response teams, 5,400 SWAT 

teams, and 469 FBI-trained and accredited bomb teams. Prior to 
7 

2001, major population centers in many parts of the country lacked 

advanced structural collapse and urban search and rescue capabilities. Today, 97 percent of the Nation’s population is within a 4-hour 

response drive time of an urban search and rescue team. 

The National Preparedness Report developed pursuant to ‘‘Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness’’ and the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act was recently submitted to the President and provided to Congress. In preparing the 

report, FEMA worked with a wide range of community partners 

and individuals to identify quantitative and qualitative performance and assessment data. Data were integrated from the 2011 

State preparedness reports, and we conducted our own research 

into independent evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data 

related to those core capabilities. 

Key findings and insights on critical preparedness issues were 

identified, including areas of progress and where areas for improvement remain. A number of broad trends emerged. 

First, the Nation has developed areas of National strength in 

several core capabilities, particularly in cross-cutting common capabilities and those that support responses to disasters, including: 

planning; operational coordination; intelligence and information 

sharing; environmental response, health, and safety; mass search 

and rescue operations; operational communications; and public 

health and medical services. 

Second, Federal preparedness assistance programs have helped 

build and enhance State and local, Tribal, and territorial capabilities. Federal grants have clearly contributed to the capability gains 

achieved since 9/11. 

Third, identified areas of National strength align with the investments made using Federal assistance. The most progress has been 

made in capabilities identified as high priorities by our State and 

local partners. Since 2006, Federal grantees have used over $7 billion in preparedness assistance from the Department of Homeland 

Security to support those core capabilities identified as areas of National strength, particularly public health and medical services, 

operational communications and planning. Conversely, some core 

capabilities identified as needing improvement have not historically 

received significant investment by grantees, particularly recoveryfocused and cybersecurity-focused core capabilities. 

Fourth, the Nation has made demonstrable progress in addressing areas for improvement identified after September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. 

The former identified challenges in multidisciplinary operational 

coordination, and, as a result, the National Incident Management 

System, or NIMS, was adopted as the common doctrine for incident 

management across the country, and more than 4 million community partners have received some form of NIMS training. All 

States, Tribes, and territories now report complete compliance with 

NIMS. 

The 9/11 attacks also revealed limited information sharing of actionable intelligence across the Government and within the private 

sector. Development of a National network of fusion centers, joint 

terrorism task forces, and standardized policies and procedures for 
8 

sharing suspicious activity reports have greatly improved our capabilities in this area. 

Both events identified difficulties in communications interoperability within and across jurisdictions. With significant support 

from Congress, high-risk urban areas throughout the Nation have 

built and demonstrated the capability to achieve full-response-level 

interoperable communications within 1 hour of an emergency. 

These examples represent measurable outcomes in our National 

effort toward increased preparedness and have demonstrated their 

value in real-world events. 

The National Preparedness Report represents a step forward in 

our efforts to assess overall National preparedness and serves as 

a baseline evaluation of the progress made toward building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the National Preparedness Goal. Future efforts will focus on developing 

measures and assessment methodologies that will guide the annual 

development of the National Preparedness Report. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, 

and I am happy to answer any questions the committee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Manning follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY W. MANNING

JUNE 6, 2012 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, good morning. I am Timothy 

Manning, deputy administrator for protection and national preparedness at the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, I thank you 

for the invitation to testify today on the state of our Nation’s preparedness. 

We appreciate the committee’s continued interest in and support for National preparedness. We also appreciate your interest in defining and measuring the progress 

we have made over more than a decade of considerable effort. 

Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have made significant and measurable strides toward improving preparedness for the hazards faced by all levels of 

government and all segments of society. We have improved our preparedness for the 

threats posed by those who wish to bring us harm as well as for the myriad natural 

and technological hazards that face our communities face every day. 

This administration came into office recognizing the significant progress that had 

been made in improving the Nation’s preparedness since September 2001 and cognizant of the need to better understand and explain that progress—both qualitatively and quantitatively. As former first responders, local emergency managers 

and State homeland security officials, Administrator Fugate, Deputy Administrator 

Serino and I understood that the investments made by the American people over 

nearly a decade have significantly improved the capabilities and readiness of our police, fire-fighters, emergency medical technicians, public health workers, and other 

first responders. But we also recognized that we lacked the measuring systems and, 

in many cases, the data that would allow us to answer the question we were being 

asked by Congress, by the President, and by the American people: Are we better 

prepared now than we were on September 11, 2001? 

We are better prepared, and based on our work over the past few years we can 

better articulate what we are prepared for and where our capabilities reside. To cite 

just a few examples: 

• In the 4 years between 2006 and 2010, the proportion of States and urban areas 

that were confident in the effectiveness of their emergency operations plans increased from 40 percent to more than 75 percent; 

• Commercial radio broadcasters, in partnership with FEMA, today can deliver 

public warning messages to more than 84 percent of the U.S. population, up 

from 67 percent in 2009. By the end of 2013, coverage is expected to expand 

to more than 90 percent of the population; 

• Since 2001, Federal, State, and local governments have built a network of specialized teams capable of interdicting and disrupting a variety of imminent 
9 

threats. That network includes 1,100 Hazardous Materials Response Teams, 

5,400 SWAT teams, and 469 FBI-trained and accredited bomb squads; 

• Prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, major population centers in many parts 

of the country lacked structural collapse and urban search-and-rescue capabilities. Today, 97 percent of the Nation is within a 4-hour drive of an urban 

search-and-rescue team; and 

• Government agencies at all levels have improved their strategic and tactical 

communications planning and coordination. In 2006, only 42 percent of the Nation’s urban areas had a strategic plan in place to guide interoperable communications. Today, 100 percent of the Nation’s highest-risk urban areas are capable of establishing response-level interoperable communications within 1 hour 

of an event involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. 

But preparedness is not an end-state; it is a process. As the threats and hazards 

we face as a Nation emerge and evolve, so too must the capabilities and resources 

we need to address those threats and hazards. Similarly, we must sustain those capabilities that prepare us for the enduring threats and hazards we face. We increasingly understand where we have additional work to do—and we now have a system 

in place to help us focus on those areas. 

In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 

Preparedness (PPD–8), which describes the Nation’s approach to preparing for the 

threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States. 

This Directive required the establishment of a National Preparedness Goal—an 

overall target that the entire Nation will strive to achieve; the development of a National Preparedness System to provide the processes for achieving the Goal and for 

measuring our collective progress along the way; and an annual National Preparedness Report to summarize progress. 

The National Preparedness Goal delivered to the President in October 2011 describes 31 core capabilities—identified and defined through a collaborative process 

involving Federal departments and agencies, State and local government officials, 

and individuals from across the entire community—that we as a Nation must build 

and sustain in order to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover 

from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the Nation. Those capabilities include activities such as intelligence and information sharing; screening, 

search, and detection; vulnerability reduction; mass care services; housing; and economic recovery, to name just a few. 

The National Preparedness System, described in a report submitted to the President in November 2011, is a process for achieving the National Preparedness Goal. 

It is best described as an on-going cycle which begins with identifying and assessing 

the risks a jurisdiction faces and then proceeds to include an estimating the capabilities needed to address those risks, building or sustaining the required levels of 

capability, developing and implementing plans to deliver those capabilities, validating and monitoring progress, and reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement. 

THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT

The product of that validation and monitoring process is the National Preparedness Report, which we recently submitted to the President and provided to Congress. In preparing the report, FEMA worked with a range of community partners— 

including all levels of government, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, communities, and individuals to identify quantitative and qualitative performance and assessment data for each of the 31 core capabilities described in the 

National Preparedness Goal. In addition, FEMA integrated data from the 2011 

State Preparedness Reports (SPRs), State-wide self-assessments of core capability 

levels submitted by all 56 U.S. States and territories through a standardized survey. 

Finally, FEMA staff conducted their own research to identify recent, independent 

evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data related to those core capabilities. 

Our synthesis, review, and analysis of those data sources resulted in several key 

findings and insights on critical preparedness issues, including areas where the Nation has made progress and where areas for improvement remain. During our analysis of the data on the core capabilities, a number of broad trends in National preparedness emerged: 

First, the Nation has developed areas of National strength in several core capabilities, particularly in cross-cutting, common capabilities and those that support responses to disasters. Preparedness capabilities have improved significantly since 

2001, as a result of concerted effort through planning, organization, equipment, 

training, exercises, and dedicated funding provided by Congress, States, Tribes, territories, and localities. Some areas of strength pre-date the September 11, 2001 
10 

(9/11) terrorist attacks, while others have developed in the years since. Areas of 

overall National strength as identified in the National Preparedness Report include: 

• Planning; 

• Operational Coordination; 

• Intelligence and Information Sharing; 

• Environmental Response/Health and Safety; 

• Mass Search and Rescue Operations; 

• Operational Communications; and, 

• Public Health and Medical Services. 

These strengths involve contributions from across the whole community. State, 

local, Tribal, and territorial partners have built a network of multi-disciplinary capabilities that they use to manage the vast majority of emergencies. When disasters 

strike, Federal partners, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and the public stand ready to augment existing State, local, Tribal, and territorial response capabilities and to help provide many of the essential services outlined in the core capabilities. 

Second, Federal preparedness assistance programs have helped build and enhance 

State, local, Tribal, and territorial capabilities through multi-year grant investments 

across mission areas. Federal preparedness assistance has clearly contributed to the 

capability gains achieved since 9/11, and partner organizations from across the 

whole community rely on Federal preparedness grants from a number of Federal 

Departments and Agencies to build core capabilities. DHS’ Homeland Security 

Grant Program includes a suite of programs designed to support the building and 

maintaining of core capabilities, and Health and Human Services’ preparedness 

grant programs administered by the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) support 

State, local, and territorial jurisdictions in improving public health and health care 

preparedness. 

Third, areas of National strength align with the investments made using Federal 

assistance programs, and the most progress has been made in capabilities identified 

as high priorities. Since 2006, Federal grantees have used more than $7.3 billion 

in preparedness assistance from DHS to support the core capabilities identified in 

the National Preparedness Report as areas of National strength, specifically Public 

Health and Medical Services, Operational Communications, and Planning. 

Conversely, some core capabilities identified as needing improvement have not 

historically received significant investments by grantees via preparedness grants. 

For example, while Federal grant programs have increasingly sought to emphasize 

the importance of cyber preparedness in recent years, State and local grant-funded 

investments aligned with the cybersecurity core capability have been minimal. Similarly, States and local jurisdictions have invested less than 1 percent of DHS nondisaster preparedness assistance from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010 in recovery-focused capabilities. 

The link between investment and improved capability also reflects the priority 

placed on each capability by State and local governments. In the 2011 State Preparedness Report, States were asked to rate each of the core capabilities as being 

a high, medium, or low priority. Operational Communications, Operational Coordination, Public Health, and Medical Services and Planning were four of the top-fivelisted high-priority capabilities and each aligns to National strengths and is an area 

in which States reported relatively more progress toward achieving preparedness 

goals. Similarly, two of the lowest-priority capabilities identified in the State Preparedness Report, Health and Social Services and Natural and Cultural Resources, 

fall within the Recovery mission area and are identified as areas in which States 

reported less progress toward achieving preparedness goals. One interesting finding 

in the State Preparedness Report data is that while approximately two-thirds of 

States identified housing, economic recovery, and cybersecurity as high-priority capabilities, they also reported being the least prepared in those areas. These results 

further underscore that cyber-security and the recovery-focused core capabilities 

should be areas for future emphasis and investment. 

Fourth, the Nation has made demonstrable progress in addressing areas for improvement identified after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Both the 9/11 attacks and 

Hurricane Katrina highlighted gaps in preparedness activities Nation-wide and 

served as catalysts for change. The 9/11 Commission and the White House afteraction review of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina identified dozens of recommendations. For example, the 9/11 attacks identified challenges in conducting 

multi-disciplinary operational coordination on-site at incidents and among operations centers. As a result, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) was 

adopted as the common doctrine for incident management, and more than 4 million 
11 

whole community partners have received some form of NIMS training. All States, 

Tribes, and territories now report compliance with NIMS. 

Hurricane Katrina also revealed significant weaknesses in catastrophic emergency 

planning. As a result, National planning-related guidance was developed and funding was directed to this capability. Subsequent Nation-wide Plan Reviews have demonstrated significant improvements in State and urban area confidence in their catastrophic plans. 

The 9/11 attacks also revealed limited information sharing of actionable intelligence across the Government and with the private sector. Development of a National network of fusion centers, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and standardized 

policies and processes for sharing suspicious activity reports have greatly improved 

this preparedness activity. 

Similarly, both the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina identified difficulties in 

communications interoperability within and across jurisdictions. In ensuing years 

and with significant support from Congress through the Public Safety Interoperable 

Communications and other grant programs, high-risk urban areas throughout the 

Nation have demonstrated the capability to achieve full response-level interoperable 

communications within 1 hour of an emergency. 

Finally, decision-makers in the public and private sectors increasingly are using 

risk analysis to shape and prioritize preparedness activities across mission areas. 

PPD–8 and the Goal emphasize the important role that risk—defined simply as the 

potential for an unwanted outcome—plays in informing preparedness activities. 

Faced with a range of threats and hazards and constrained by available resources, 

whole community partners are increasingly using risk analyses to inform policy and 

programmatic decisions across all five preparedness mission areas. 

For example: 

• Federal interagency partners conducted a Strategic National Risk Assessment 

to help identify potential incidents that pose the greatest threat to the Nation 

and to inform the development of core capabilities and targets in the Goal; • DHS developed an annual National Risk Profile for the Nation’s critical infrastructure, describing risks facing the Nation’s infrastructure sectors and supporting public- and private-sector risk management decisions; • Traditional mitigation planning has broadened to include both natural hazards 

and terrorist threats in order to identify a comprehensive suite of potential mitigation actions; • State and local public health departments are required to use jurisdictional risk 

assessments to prioritize capability enhancements through preparedness assistance from HHS ASPR and CDC; • Risk analysis informs eligibility criteria for preparedness assistance, including 

the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, Port 

Security Grant Program, Transit Security Grant Program, and the CDC Public 

Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement program; 

• On-going efforts to implement the National Preparedness System, as called for 

in PPD–8, further emphasize the importance of risk analyses in driving preparedness activities. The National Preparedness System emphasizes the need to 

identify and assess risks in order to guide efforts to develop, maintain, and assess core capabilities; and 

• States are required to conduct Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) as a condition of receiving most preparedness grant funding 

and set hazard-based targets as the context for their State Preparedness Report 

capability assessments. 

The requirement that States conduct a THIRA as a condition of receiving preparedness grant funding, has become the source of much discussion over the past 

few months. I would like to take a few moments to clarify what THIRAs will—and 

will not—be used for. 

Moving forward, States and territories will be required to conduct Threat and 

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) as a condition for receiving 

homeland security grants. The THIRA process provides a comprehensive approach 

for identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts. It expands on existing 

local, Tribal, territorial, and State Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments 

(HIRAs) and other risk methodologies currently used by broadening the factors considered in the process, incorporating the whole community throughout the process, 

and accounting for important community-specific characteristics. 

The use of risk analysis is a long-standing and important first step in the emergency management community. State and local governments are very familiar with 

the use of Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments to help them drive investments in mitigation activities. The THIRA process is very similar, but adds a terrorism component to account for the possibility of deliberate threats. 
12 

The THIRA process is a step-by-step analysis that can be used by emergency 

management offices in small towns and by large urban areas with access to advanced analytical capabilities. While the level of detail may be greater for an urban 

area than for a rural community, the methodology for both will be similar and both 

will have, as a result, a comparable foundation for informed decision making. Critical to the security and resilience of our communities is knowledge of the level of 

capabilities needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond and recover from 

our greatest risks. Using THIRA results, communities will gain a greater understanding of their risk landscape and can therefore evaluate current capabilities 

against known threats and hazards and identify resources available to meet the 

identified needs. By estimating their resource requirements, jurisdictions can make 

decisions about how they will effectively use their resources to deliver core capabilities toward their community’s greatest risk. The THIRAs and assessments such as 

State Preparedness Reports will identify gaps in preparedness at the State and local 

levels and drive investment towards building and sustaining core capabilities to address those gaps. 

Based on the assessments of what we’ve achieved and what we have yet to accomplish, and in light of the National Preparedness Goal and System, we proposed a 

new National Preparedness Grant Program to re-align existing grant programs to 

focus on sustaining capabilities developed, building new capabilities to fill the identified gaps, preventing terrorism, protecting critical transportation and port infrastructure, and other key resources. We propose to do this by consolidating programs, 

streamlining the application process and better focusing our efforts. 

CONCLUSION

With the October 2011 release of the National Preparedness Goal, the Nation is 

transitioning to a refined set of core capabilities. As a result, whole community partners are updating their efforts to collect, analyze, and report preparedness progress 

according to the core capabilities identified in the Goal. The 2012 National Preparedness Report therefore relies on a range of existing assessment approaches and 

associated quantitative and qualitative data to present the Nation’s preparedness 

progress and to report key findings. Assessment processes, methodologies, and data 

will evolve in future years to align more directly with the Goal and its capabilities. 

Efforts are already underway to refine the Goal’s capabilities and preliminary targets; future efforts will focus on developing agreed-upon measures and assessment 

methodologies that will guide the annual development of the National Preparedness 

Report. 

Since the release of the 2012 National Preparedness Report, we have begun to 

embark on an outreach campaign to engage whole community stakeholders in a discussion of the current findings and solicit input for future reports. We expect to receive substantial feedback from State, local, Tribal, and territorial stakeholders, as 

well as the private and non-profit sectors on the findings from the National Preparedness Report and areas for improvement. To broaden this outreach effort, we 

are using social media including on-line collaboration forums to solicit ideas on 

areas for improvement identified in the NPR. These areas include cybersecurity, recovery-focused core capabilities, access and functional needs, and supply chain interdependencies. 

The National Preparedness Report represents a step forward in efforts to assess 

overall National preparedness. Informed by inputs from across the whole community, the 2012 National Preparedness Report serves as a baseline evaluation of the 

progress made toward building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the Goal. Building on these efforts, the vision for future Reports is to establish a routine, repeatable process that engages whole community partners. 

To achieve the National Preparedness Goal, the Nation must continue to build on 

the significant progress we have made to date and to address areas identified for 

improvement. To do so, we will continue to engage whole community partners as 

we revise and develop the National Preparedness Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operations Plans called for in PPD–8. The components of the National Preparedness System will provide a consistent and reliable approach to support decision-making, resource allocation, and on-going performance assessment. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I am happy to answer any questions 

the committee may have. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Manning. 

Mr. Czerwinski, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
13 

STATEMENT OF STANLEY J. CZERWINSKI, DIRECTOR, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CZERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be 

here today to talk about GAO’s work looking at long-term recovery. 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Congress asked GAO 

to undertake a number of studies, including reviews of the Office 

of Federal Coordinator; HUD’s Community Development Block 

Grant Program, CDBG; and FEMA’s public assistance and longterm recovery efforts. Those reviews went up through 2010. What 

I would like to do is to highlight a few high-level themes and lessons from those today. 

The first one is that there are so many Federal agencies and programs, about 14 Federal agencies, over 60 programs, that have to 

come together for recovery. Sometimes they don’t come together 

quite the way you want. 

For example, in Louisiana, after Katrina, the State had a Road 

Home Program that was geared toward rebuilding housing in the 

State. The plan of this program was to take money from CDBG and 

rebuild the houses and then match that up with money from hazard mitigation out of FEMA to elevate the houses. So the idea 

would be you would build the houses and put them on a safer plain 

for future floods. That never came to pass because of differences in 

the two programs’ rules. That is just one example of how sometimes the Feds have a hard time making things match up. 

As you mentioned in your opening statement, another key player 

is State and local governments. So it is really important that the 

Federal Government work effectively with their State and local 

partners. Sometimes a really simple idea can turn out to work out 

very well. 

We have one for Mississippi, also after Katrina. What happened 

there was that FEMA and the State of Mississippi decided to collocate their staffs in Biloxi. Then the State of Mississippi used a 

grant from FEMA to procure an accounting system. This accounting system provided both the State and the Federal partners with 

real-time on-line accountability data for what was going on with 

their projects. What we found in looking at this is this dramatically 

improved the collaboration and coordination and had better decision-making. 

The third point that I want to talk about is that sometimes it is 

really important just to take a step back from what you are doing 

and ask, is what I am doing accomplishing what I want it to do? 

We have an example from Kobe, Japan, on this. As you might 

recall, in 1995 a massive earthquake struck Kobe, Japan. Kobe is 

in what is called the Hyogo prefecture; that is the equivalent of a 

U.S. county. The idea that the Japanese had—and this was a really 

good idea—was to say, you know, during a disaster and recovery 

from it, we want to put special attention to those populations with 

special needs. Their plan was for the elderly, to take them and put 

them in recovery areas, build units, provide all the services you 

need, self-contained to make it very simple. 

Then the Japanese had a good idea; they said, let’s see how this 

worked. When they looked at it, they had a surprise. Because even 

though on a service level it really worked, it had some unintended 
14 

consequences, and that is, they isolated the elderly population from 

the rest of their families. As you know, in the Japanese culture, the 

extended family is really important. 

The message in this is that sometimes when you take a step back 

and look at how well you did, the next time it helps you do better. 

In that same vein, the U.S. Congress—and you cited this in your 

opening statement, Mr. Chairman—required certain things for 

FEMA and others to do after Katrina so we could avoid future 

problems. One of those was to come up with a strategy for recovering from disasters. That requirement resulted in the National 

Disaster Recovery Framework, the NDRF. 

We have taken a look at the NDRF, and we think it is a really 

good first step, in that it contains all the points that I made. However, I want to emphasize the first step. Because behind that overall strategy, you need to have plans for how it is implemented. The 

contrast that I draw is between the National response framework 

and the National recovery framework. Behind the response framework, you have probably 500 to 1,000 pages of detailed plans for 

what each agency is going to do. We haven’t gotten there yet on 

recovery. 

In addition, even though it is nice to have plans, what you want 

to do then is you want to practice them, because that is how they 

become real, that is how people engage. Then you want to take a 

step back and evaluate them. Then once your evaluation shows you 

something, you say, well, what lesson did I learn? It sort of feeds 

back. 

So my point is that, on recovery, we are at a relatively early 

stage that could be greatly enhanced by further implementation 

plans, further practice, further evaluation, further revision from 

what we learn. If we do that, we believe we have the ability to really improve recovery from disasters in this country. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to respond to any questions that you have. 

[The statement of Mr. Czerwinski follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY J. CZERWINSKI

JUNE 6, 2012 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–12–813T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The many challenges and difficulties experienced in the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina and other catastrophes have led to considerable reflection on what lessons 

might be learned regarding disaster recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving the way our Nation approaches disaster recovery by including 

in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 the requirement 

that FEMA develop a National Disaster Recovery Strategy. The administration has 

also placed a greater focus on recovery, as demonstrated by its development of the 

National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of helping Federal 

agencies and others to more effectively organize in order to promote recovery. 

GAO was asked to testify on themes from its previous work on disaster recovery 

that may assist the subcommittee in its oversight of disaster recovery issues. 
15 

What GAO Recommends 

In multiple reports between 2008 and 2010, we made several recommendations 

to FEMA and others addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, communication, and information sharing, among other topics. The NDRF is directly responsive to several of the recommendations contained in these reports. However, it will 

require the successful implementation of this framework in order to ultimately resolve these issues. 

DISASTER RECOVERY.—SELECTED THEMES FOR EFFECTIVE LONG-TERM RECOVERY

What GAO Found 

From 2008 to 2010, GAO produced a body of work on disaster recovery, including 

reviews of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Long-Term Community Recovery efforts, recovery lessons based on past experiences at home and 

abroad, the use of Community Development Block Grants and Public Assistance 

grants and the operation of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC). Among other things, this work highlighted themes that are important to successful disaster recovery efforts. Three of these key themes are: (1) The 

need for clearly-defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and collaboration among recovery stakeholders; and (3) the 

value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery progress. 

When recovering from a major disaster, having clearly defined and well-understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term recovery 

process. These roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of Government must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be effective. GAO’s previous work provides numerous examples of the challenges that result 

when this does not take place and, conversely, illustrations of benefits that can 

occur when it does. For example, GAO’s 2009 review of the OFC found confusion 

and disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the office’s appropriate scope and function. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making authority on the part of 

OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the resolution of some recovery problems. 

Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an extensive group of participants both across the Federal Government and at the State and 

local level. At least 14 Federal departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active 

participation by State and local government for their implementation. Because these 

parties are dependent on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. GAO’s past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, Federal, 

State, and local officials said that FEMA’s facilitation of regular interagency meetings to coordinate Federal and State partners helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as well as identify coordination problems and other concerns. 

Finally, the collaboration between recovery partners can be enhanced by periodically evaluating and reporting on what worked, what can be improved, and what 

progress is still needed to address long-term recovery goals. This last step will assist 

decision makers, clients, and stakeholders to obtain the feedback needed to improve 

both the policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. For example, after 

a 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe, Japan and the surrounding region held periodic 

external reviews over a span of 10 years on the progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to 

a change in policy. 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today some key themes 

from GAO’s previous work on long-term recovery after disasters. In contrast to the 

response phase, which takes place in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and focuses on essential lifesaving activities, recovery is a much longer process that can 

last years or sometimes decades where attention shifts to restoring both the individual and the community, including the redevelopment of damaged areas. The 

many recovery challenges experienced after Hurricane Katrina affected the Gulf 

Coast in 2005—including difficulties with coordination, communication, and the loss 

of attention and focus—during the long recovery process, have led to considerable 

reflection on what lessons might be learned in how we, as a Nation, approach disaster recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving the way our 

Nation approaches disaster recovery by including in the Post-Katrina Emergency 
16 

1The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). Most provisions of the PostKatrina Act became effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, Under PKEMRA, DHS was required to submit a National Disaster Recovery Strategy no later than 270 days after enactment. 2See GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State and Local 

Governments but Had Some Limitations, GAO–10–404 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2010); Disaster Recovery: Experiences From Past Disasters Offer Insights for Effective Collaboration After 

Catastrophic Events, GAO–09–811 (Washington, DC: July 31, 2009); Gulf Coast Disaster Recovery: Community Development Block Grant Program Guidance to States Needs to Be Improved, 

GAO–09–541 (Washington, DC: June 19, 2009); Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast 

Rebuilding: Perspectives and Observations, GAO–09–411R (Washington, DC: Apr. 10, 2009); Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced Challenges With Gulf 

Coast Rebuilding, GAO–09–129 (Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2008); Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Insights for Recovering From Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural 

Disasters, GAO–08–1120 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008). 

Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) the requirement that the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develop a National Disaster Recovery 

Strategy.1

We also have seen the administration place a greater focus on the issue of recovery, as demonstrated by its development of—for the first time ever—a National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of helping Federal agencies and 

others to more effectively organize in order to promote recovery. This effort represents a welcomed emphasis on thinking seriously about the challenges and possibilities presented by the disaster recovery process, and the NDRF generally represents a step in the right direction. Yet challenges in this area remain. As the recently issued 2012 National Preparedness Report points out, States and territories 

ranked core capabilities related to disaster recovery among the lowest of all the 

areas assessed. 

With this in mind, and as agreed with the subcommittee, my testimony today will 

focus on three themes drawn from our previous work on disaster recovery that may 

prove useful in the subcommittee’s on-going oversight of disaster recovery issues. 

These themes are: (1) The need for clearly-defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and collaboration among recovery 

stakeholders; and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery 

progress. 

My statement is largely based on a body of work that we have developed on the 

topic of disaster recovery that dates from 2008 to 2010. These include our March 

2010 review of FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recovery Branch (LTCR) in providing and coordinating assistance to support long-term recovery; a July 2009 report 

that identified recovery lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad; an 

April 2009 examination of the use Community Development Block Grants on the 

Gulf Coast; an April 2009 overview of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf 

Coast Rebuilding (OFC); as well as our December 2008 examination of FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant program.2 These reports contain multiple recommendations to 

FEMA and others aimed at addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, 

communication, and information sharing, among others. The NDRF is directly responsive to several of the recommendations contained in these reports; however it 

will require the successful implementation of this framework in order to ultimately 

resolve these issues. More complete information on our scope and methodology, findings, and recommendations is available in each published report. 

We conducted these reviews in accordance with generally accepted Government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

CLEARLY DEFINING RECOVERY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IS A CRITICAL FIRST STEP

FOR EFFECTIVE RECOVERY

When recovering from a disaster, having clearly-defined and well-understood roles 

and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term recovery process. 

Roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be 

clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be effective. Our previous 

work provides examples of the challenges that result when this does not take place, 

and conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does, which I describe below. 
17 

3GAO–09–411R. 

4GAO–10–404. 

Our 2009 review of the operations of the Office of the Federal Coordinator (OFC) 

for Gulf Coast Rebuilding found confusion and disagreements among key recovery 

stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the office’s 

appropriate scope and function.3 According to OFC and officials from several State 

and local governments located on the Gulf Coast, one of the functions of the office 

was to work to resolve problems and obstacles in the recovery process by directly 

intervening in program-specific matters such as FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant 

program. However, FEMA believed that such actions were outside the scope of a coordination office, and instead viewed OFC’s proper role as being responsible for 

broad cross-agency concerns, such as alleviating inconsistencies across Federal programs or looking for program gaps. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear 

decision-making authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down 

the resolution of recovery problems in some cases by increasing the number of meetings and the amount of paperwork involved. 

In 2010, we reported that misunderstandings about the role of LTCR and its recovery partners working under National Response Framework’s Long-term Community Recovery Annex (ESF–14) had an adverse effect on the timing of Federal recovery assistance.4 For example, Federal, State, and local officials working in Texas in 

the wake of Hurricane Ike reported that LTCR and ESF–14’s involvement ended before critical long-term recovery coordination and planning needs were addressed. 

Among the reasons cited for this were differing interpretations of FEMA’s mission 

and authorities and varying interpretations of LTCR’s mission by Federal Coordinating Officers. A senior FEMA official told us that, based on his experience, Federal Coordinating Officers generally believe that FEMA’s long-term recovery mission 

is primarily to work with the States immediately after a disaster to develop a longterm recovery plan. Under this view, assisting States and local communities with 

coordinating Federal assistance to implement their recovery plans is not the responsibility of staff working under ESF–14, but rather that of regional staff or other 

FEMA recovery officials who remain in the disaster area. However, FEMA regional 

staff sometimes did not take on this role. As a result, in some cases, such as in 

Texas after Hurricane Ike, State and local officials found that they were left without 

Federal coordination and planning assistance during a critical period in the recovery 

process. 

An effective way to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings regarding the roles and 

responsibilities of the many entities involved in the disaster recovery process is to 

clearly delineate them ahead of time through planning. On the State and local level, 

we found several examples of jurisdictions that used pre-disaster recovery plans to 

do this. For example, in 1987, several years before the Northridge Earthquake hit 

in 1994, the city of Los Angeles created a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan that 

clearly identified the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in recovery. 

Specifically, the plan identified which city departments have responsibility for implementing predetermined activities before and after a disaster in several functional 

categories, including residential, commercial, industrial rehabilitation, and economic 

recovery. To be most helpful, such a plan must be more than simply paper instructions, rather it is a dynamic and inclusive process that is brought to life by periodic 

exercises. Long-term recovery planning exercises held by the city of Los Angeles 

brought police and fire officials together to engage in role-playing exercises in which 

they assumed the responsibilities of recovery officials. For example, a public safety 

officer played the role of a building inspector responsible for issuing building permits after an earthquake. A city official at the time of the earthquake told us that 

such exercises were an important part of developing relationships among stakeholders and ensuring city staff understood their post-disaster roles and responsibilities. According to a Federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts established during the planning process facilitated recovery after the Northridge Earthquake. Communities in other areas including San Francisco, California, and Palm 

Beach, Florida, have taken action to develop recovery plans prior to a disaster that 

identify roles and responsibilities for recovery. 

FEMA has taken steps to more clearly define the roles and responsibilities of Federal, State, and non-Governmental partners in the NDRF that was finalized in September 2011. The NDRF explicitly acknowledges that clearly-defined roles and responsibilities form a foundation for unity of effort among all recovery partners to 

jointly identify opportunities, foster partnerships, and optimize resources. Toward 

this end, the framework has a section devoted to describing the roles and responsibilities for a range of participants in the recovery process including Federal, State, 
18 

5GAO–10–404. 

6GAO–09–411R. 

7GAO–10–404. 

Tribal, and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, as well as individuals and households. 

The NDRF also created the position of Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator 

(FDRC) and established a process for involving this official in coordinating Federal 

recovery assistance during various phases of recovery to help ensure that State and 

local needs are met, including extending this assistance beyond the closeout of Federal disaster response activities. Further, the NDRF provides clearer criteria regarding when and how recovery stakeholders become engaged in the process. It identifies the entities that will be involved in the decision-making process as well as the 

factors or criteria they will consider. In these ways, the NDRF provides the groundwork for addressing challenges identified in our previous work and thus represents 

a positive step forward, but still requires additional details regarding implementation. 

COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION AMONG STAKEHOLDERS FACILITATES SUCCESSFUL

RECOVERY

Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an extensive group of participants both across the Federal Government and at the State and 

local level. At least 14 Federal departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active 

participation by State and local government for their implementation. Because of 

this, and the fact that under Federal law, States and localities have the lead in disaster recovery, the capacity of State and local governments to act effectively directly 

affects how well communities recover after a major disaster. Therefore, effective coordination and collaboration both within the Federal community as well as with 

State and local partners is critical. Our past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. Today, I would like to briefly focus on three of the ways the Federal 

Government has sought to improve coordination and collaboration in order to facilitate disaster recovery. 

First, the Federal Government has worked to foster coordination by bringing Federal and State stakeholders together collectively and by working one-on-one to identify and resolve recovery challenges. For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest 

floods, FEMA’s LTCR branch held biweekly meetings in Iowa with Federal and 

State agencies, such as the Small Business Administration, the Departments of 

Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency; the State counterparts to these 

agencies; State finance offices; and others.5 According to officials we spoke with, 

these meetings provided a forum to identify and leverage Federal and State resources to support disaster recovery, as well as discuss potential coordination challenges such as gaps in funding or other long-term recovery concerns. Similarly, following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, OFC also worked to coordinate across agencies and with State and local partners, and address conflicts.6 Toward this end, OFC 

sponsored ‘‘workout sessions’’ focused on specific recovery topics and invited State 

and local agencies to address coordination challenges, and developed detailed matrices of the agreements reached, tasks to be performed, and stakeholders responsible 

for implementation. 

Second, in addition to coordination at the Federal level, we have previously reported on the Federal Government’s efforts to work with State and local governments to help them take advantage of all available disaster assistance and achieve 

long-term recovery goals.7 For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, 

LTCR provided technical assistance to affected communities by conducting or facilitating recovery assessments to identify the long-term effects of the disaster, providing staff to advise the communities on steps to take as they developed recovery 

plans, creating planning tools that the communities used to guide their planning activities, and hosting workshops to discuss and share recovery-planning lessons, 

among other things. In addition LTCR helped communities to prioritize their potential long-term recovery projects and identify potential sources of funding. 

Third, collaboration between Federal, State, and local recovery partners in jointly 

administering disaster-assistance programs is also improved by effectively sharing 

information. For example, in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, Federal, State, 

and local officials adopted strategies that helped to facilitate the sharing of information on specific Public Assistance Grant projects. Following the disaster, FEMA’s 

Mississippi Transitional Recovery Office and the Mississippi Emergency Manage-
19 

ment Agency were located in the same office complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and officials from these agencies were also positioned together throughout the State. They 

reported that this co-location had multiple benefits for information sharing and exchange, including the timely sharing of critical documents and facilitation of daily 

meetings on project-development issues. In addition to collocating, FEMA and Mississippi State officials used Public Assistance Grant funding to secure an on-line accounting system that made operational documents associated with projects readily 

available to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the State had immediate access to 

key documents that helped them to make project-approval decisions, thereby improving collaboration. 

Improving coordination and collaboration is one of the key objectives of the NDRF, 

and the framework contains several strategies to do so. One of these involves the 

creation of the position of Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC). The 

FDRC is assigned the responsibility and authority to facilitate the coordination of 

information and activities among the Federal agencies whose programs, technical 

assistance, and expertise are relevant to recovery, within the framework of the Recovery Support Strategy. In large-scale disasters and catastrophic incidents, the 

NDRF also states that the FDRC will take over as the lead from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), when the FCO demobilizes, to continue management of Federal recovery resources, for those incidents that require continued significant interagency disaster-recovery coordination. The NDRF also introduces the concept of recovery coordinators at the State/Tribal and local level that will work with the FDRC 

to facilitate coordination across levels of government. Along with establishing the 

position of the FDRC, the NDRF creates six Recovery Support Functions (RSF) to 

facilitate coordination and collaboration among the many different players involved 

in recovery. The NDRF also outlines ways to improve collaboration between Federal, 

State, and local communities in developing recovery plans. The framework states 

that Federal officials should provide timely, accurate, and accessible information to 

the public and manage such expectations in coordination with local, State, Tribal, 

and other stakeholders. However, the NDRF currently does not provide the details 

for how to do this. 

PERIODIC EVALUATION AND REPORTING OF RECOVERY PROGRESS IS KEY

Periodic reporting on organizational activities can help decision makers, clients, 

and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. Although ‘‘after-action reports’’ often are a standard feature of response operations, they are less common in the recovery context. The city 

of Kobe, Japan, and Hyogo prefecture (the larger governmental unit, similar to a 

county, that covers the city’s surrounding region) both provide examples of how 

evaluation and reporting can be effectively incorporated into community and regional recovery. They established a process through which government officials, 

community members, and recovery experts worked together to assess the recovery 

progress and recommend improvements. 

Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe created a system of periodic assessments 

of recovery in the wake of their 1995 earthquake. Both governments designed a twophase approach to evaluating the progress they have made toward recovery, the 

first taking place about 5 years after the earthquake and the second about 10 years 

afterward. This design allowed for both a short- and longer-term assessment of the 

recovery. Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these evaluations, neither prefecture nor city employees were directly involved in conducting these assessments; rather they used external staff to perform the reviews. Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and international disaster-recovery experts to serve on its evaluation 

panels, while the city of Kobe staffed its reviews with members of local community 

groups. 

These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery plans approved 

by the national government 6 months after the earthquake. They enabled policymakers to measure the progress made by various stakeholders in achieving recovery 

goals, identify needed changes to existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters. The panels examined several broad recovery topics—including health, industry, employment, and urban development—which resulted in many recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake. 

For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation, Hyogo prefecture gained insight 

into the unintended consequences of its policies regarding the relocation of victims, 

an insight that subsequently led to policy revisions. After the earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the relocation of elderly victims and grouped them together 

in special-care residences located outside the city. While this policy ensured that 

this vulnerable population received housing quickly, it also had the unintended ef-
20 

fect of isolating the relocated seniors, who were removed from their communities. 

In fact, the verification committee attributed the untimely deaths of some seniors 

to this housing arrangement. After learning of this finding, the prefecture built new 

types of residential housing that offer comprehensive lifestyle support for seniors. 

In addition, for future disasters the prefecture plans to develop a system to track 

displaced populations as they move from temporary to permanent housing to help 

maintain better contact with victims. 

While the NDRF does briefly address the issue of measures and metrics, the document emphasizes neither this concept nor the potential value of regular evaluations 

as the recovery process moves forward. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Disaster recovery can be a long, complex, and expensive process involving a large 

number of Federal, State, and local parties. This makes it especially important to 

have clearly-defined roles that are well understood by all participants. Because 

these parties often depend on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. Experience shows us that successful collaborative relationships are not built overnight. Such coordination requires building 

effective relationships among participants before, during, and after a disaster occurs. Since such collaboration often must continue for years, it can be enhanced by 

periodically looking back to evaluate what worked, what can be improved, and what 

progress is still needed. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities, effective coordination, and evaluation are critical ingredients in going beyond a recovery framework 

to a useful implementation plan. While the creation of the NDRF is a significant 

step, the implementation of this broad framework will be a key to determining its 

ultimate success. 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

I will recognize myself for questions. 

The first question is to Administrator Manning. The National 

Preparedness Report, the NPR, ranked the core capabilities based 

on a fixed percentage that was formulated by the State Preparedness Report survey data. Interestingly, in the self-assessment surveys completed by the States, respondents were only given the option of selecting one of five provided statements, where each successive statement indicates a higher capability. Why is this the case? 

Can you please explain how FEMA translated data from the State 

Preparedness Reports into the overall fixed percentages? 

Second, were other factors like the independent evaluations and 

studies by other Federal agencies used to determine the final 

rankings? How, if at all, did FEMA verify the data provided by 

States to determine that it had provided a complete and accurate 

picture? If FEMA did not verify the data, what plans do you have 

in the future for future reports to include such validations? 

You are recognized. 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The National Preparedness Report included a wide variety of 

data sources and methodologies in our analysis to its conclusions. 

The State Preparedness Report data that you reference actually 

was a very small percentage of the overall data analysis included 

in the report. Only 13 percent of the capability analysis is based 

on the State Preparedness Report data. The ranking of the survey 

results of that data set represents the relative impression that the 

States have in their activity in that regard. 

We did, in fact, validate anomalies in the analysis as we were 

analyzing the State Preparedness Report data. For example, we 

looked for statistical anomalies in the responses and in the data 
21 

sets. One, for example, we identified a State that ranked a volcano 

hazard as very high in a State that had no volcanoes, as an example. But it turned out, on our further review and deeper analysis 

of that particular example, that their concern there was the impact 

from a neighboring State. Another example would be areas where 

they ranked catastrophic disasters across the board above other 

concerns. So, in the course of the analysis of the SPR data, we 

identified a number of places and, on further review, determined 

that in almost all of those cases they were statistically valid data 

sets. 

Across the rest of the National Preparedness Report, we used 

over 800 other documents—State, Federal reports and analysis; 

analyzed over $24 billion worth of Department of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services grant expenditures; quantitative data on what was procured, in what time, for what particular capabilities; and evaluated household survey data that we 

have been conducting for a number of years that represents over 

98 percent of U.S. households. 

As we progress into subsequent years of the National Preparedness Report, we continue to evaluate the data sources, identify new 

sources of capability to be analyzed, gaps in the existing data sets, 

refine our survey tools. For example, in the State Preparedness Report, the State Preparedness Report was based on—the analysis of 

State Preparedness Report was based on a time period that predated PPD–8 and the identification of the 31 core capabilities. As 

we progress with the State Preparedness Report into the future, 

they are realigned into the core capabilities to give us a stronger 

ability to link the activities of our partners to those core capabilities against the goal and be able to measure our preparedness to 

meet that goal. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

This question is regarding, Mr. Manning, CMAS. Administrator 

Manning, the WARN Act required Nation-wide deployment of 

CMAS, which is the Commercial Mobile Alert System, by April 

2012. Yet, according to FEMA, only 24 alert originators have been 

approved at this point. Despite early deployment in the D.C. area, 

the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency 

has yet to be approved as an alert originator. 

What is the status of the CMAS deployment? What is the process 

for authorization of alert originators? When will the many alerting 

authorities awaiting authorization be approved by FEMA? 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CMAS is an important new tool available to the emergency management community to communicate alert and warning to the public. We are very happy to say that we do have seven of the National 

carriers, including all of the major, big carriers across the country, 

cellular phone carriers, are participating and have that capability 

Nation-wide today. We have 18 States that are currently enrolled 

and active as message originators, an additional 46 cities and counties across the country, and a number that are in the process. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked what is involved in becoming an originator and specifically to the District of Columbia. There are steps— 

basically, the steps that are required to become a message originator boil down to, at the local government level, to having taken 
22 

the appropriate training to understand what is required, what are 

the threshold criteria to originate a message and how to go about 

doing that; the acquisition of the software to be able to promulgate 

that message, which is a very simple thing; and an MOU with the 

Department of Homeland Security in order for the technical systems between a State or local government to interface with ours. 

We have been working with the District of Columbia on coming 

into the system. They have met the training, they have met the 

other criteria. The MOU is awaiting signature with the District office of emergency management, D.C. Emergency Management 

Agency. We are doing everything in our power to facilitate that on 

their end. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. But what seems to be the problem, you know, specifically the District of Columbia, but also—you know, there are 

only 24 alert originators. I mean, what is holding it up? This was 

supposed to go on-line, you know, according to the WARN Act, in 

April 2012. What seems to be the problem? 

Mr. MANNING. Well, Mr. Chairman, it appears that the delay on 

the—CMAS is deployed from a technical perspective from FEMA 

and with our partners in the cellular phone industry, with the 

seven major carriers. The delay in getting the message originators—it is a voluntary program, so it requires State and local governments to choose to enroll and become message originators. 

We can today promulgate a message, a Presidential message. 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Weather Service has the ability to promulgate warning 

today—two phones that are enabled over the carriers that are carrying it. The local government—— 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I don’t mean to interrupt, but, I mean, how many 

have chosen to enroll? It is a voluntary program. Approximately 

how many are waiting? You know, if you can give me some specifics on that. 

Mr. MANNING. Mr. Chairman, we have 18 States that are currently active that are enrolled that are approved as message originators. An additional 46 cities and counties are approved as message originators. I believe we have another 20 that are in the process of negotiating the MOUs. 

We are also actively pursuing, at the very least, all 56 States and 

territories to become message originators. A State has the ability 

to promulgate a message to a geographic area within a city or 

county, whether the city or county has chosen to sign up as a message originator. By focusing our efforts on the States, actively focusing our efforts on getting all 56 States and territories to be message originators, we can cover the American population while we 

work with the cities and counties. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

I want to ask Mr. Czerwinski a question, and then I am going 

to yield to my colleagues here. 

Looking over the report, sir, I can see that one of the mission 

areas the Nation needs to continue to develop and sustain is the 

recovery mission. In the NPR, most of the recovery-focused core capabilities received a ranking of 62 percent or lower, and that is unacceptable. 
23 

What recommendations do you have that will help the Nation 

continue to develop and sustain recovery capabilities? 

Mr. CZERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking that question because it matches up perfectly with the point that I was making, and that is, in terms of recovery, we are behind where we are 

in response. 

The point that I made in my opening statement is the one that 

I would reiterate, and that is, we need to come up with the plans 

that implement the framework, we need to practice them. I cannot 

express how more important practice is, because that is how things 

really get learned and done. It is then you have to take a step back 

and evaluate. 

On the response side, we have the concept of after-action studies. 

That is something that would be very useful on the recovery side, 

to do those kind of evaluations and then make those changes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Now I will recognize Mr. Farenthold for 5 minutes, the gentleman from Texas. You are recognized, sir. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Manning, it is my understanding, at least in broad, general 

terms, you have the preparedness, the response, and the recovery 

are kind of the three phases of what we would do. 

We have suffered in Texas quite a few disasters, obviously a hurricane-prone area. Knock on wood, we have dodged anything serious in recent years. But we recently had the fires in Bastrop County. There were some issues during the second—obviously, you 

know, I am not sure how involved FEMA with preparing for those. 

But the early response, we hit a couple of bumps. Now, from what 

I am hearing from the people in the area, FEMA is starting to pull 

out before the recovery is completely finished. 

How far is FEMA set to go on recovery? I mean, where do you 

say, ‘‘All right, we are done, it is time to leave’’? 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you. 

Under the National Disaster Recovery Framework that we promulgated last year, it changes the way we approach recovery. We 

look at recovery as the economic viability of a community; the community is back functioning and back healthy. In the case of the 

Bastrop fires, I will look into that when I return back to the office, 

and the progress that is being made there. 

But, generally, in recovery, we have—we break our recovery activities into two areas. We have public assistance, where we assist 

the local governments in rebuilding the infrastructure, and then 

our individual assistance, where we work with individuals and 

families. 

The NDRF takes a new approach at working with families. We 

prefer to do this as a whole community, with case management and 

ensuring that we work and follow through as individuals that are 

trying to recover from the effects of disasters. We work in support 

of the States and the Governors. We don’t close our disasters or 

leave a community until we all, with the Governor, feel that we 

have reached that point. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. If you have somebody that could visit with my 

office at some point in the future and follow up with me on where 
24 

we are with that, because some of the community leaders, I am 

hearing, are not entirely—let’s go to preparedness for a second. 

One of the things that is facing us in Texas is, you all are 

redoing flood maps for the Federal flood insurance. It has substantial impact both on the Government and in the private sector that 

is going down there. Is anything being—I assume the technology 

has improved for the mapping, and that is one of the reasons we 

are doing it. If there are others, I would like to know about them. 

Does FEMA have any program or help available to local governments that are adversely affected by that or some of the remediation efforts that they have to do to come into compliance with 

some of the new regulations? Or do these maps just result in some 

sort of unfunded mandate for local governments? 

Mr. MANNING. No, sir. We certainly do have the ability and do, 

in many circumstances, work to alleviate or find any problems that 

may have arisen. 

You are absolutely right, the map modernization project, Risk 

MAP, is a reflection of new technology, new ability to have much 

greater detail in our maps and a better understanding of our flood 

insurance rate maps of where areas are at risk. I would be very 

happy to point our Flood Insurance and Mitigation division personnel to work with your office to find who in your community 

needs assistance and put them in touch with our people and, of 

course, in FEMA Region 6 in Texas. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Then I will yield back the remainder 

of my time. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, sir. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino. 

You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

I am sorry, I thought it was Mr. Marino. You look a little like 

him. Okay, Mr. Turner. I am sorry. You are recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I just got 20 years back. 

With the changes to the threat levels against the United States, 

the need for first responders to receive vital intelligence information has become a critical component in the Nation’s ability to prevent and protect against, mitigate the effects of, and respond to 

and recover from terrorist attacks and disasters. 

I believe that, within the National Preparedness System, the 

intelligence- and information-sharing core capability needs to be integrated into all the mission areas and frameworks. I am particularly concerned with the high-rises in New York City, the HAZMAT 

groups and special rescue units within the FDNY. 

What is FEMA doing to ensure that these first responders, particularly in these high-risk areas, are receiving the timely and necessary information across all the mission areas? 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you. That is an extremely important topic. 

We have been very happy over the years to be able to support 

our partners through the development of the network of fusion centers that have been built up across the country in our State and 

urban areas. Some of our colleagues here today and on the next 

panel will talk about that, as well. 

We have a large percentage of the investment that we have made 

over the past 10 years in our Homeland Security Grant Programs 

have gone to support intelligence and information sharing, specifi-
25 

cally in the fusion centers but also across information sharing, the 

technology and the planning, to integrate across the traditionally 

bifurcated response emergency management community and the 

prevention and protection community of law enforcement and the 

intelligence community. 

You mentioned the core capabilities. In the National Preparedness Goal, under Presidential Directive 8, for the first time we 

have a synchronized linking of our capabilities, of all 31 core capabilities. We do categorize them as prevention, protection, response, 

recovery, and mitigation as a way to develop frameworks around 

the sharing across those, but having them linked into one National 

preparedness system. So the activities in information sharing, information and intelligence sharing, and all of the prevention and 

protection activities are seamlessly linked through the National 

Preparedness System with the activities in response and recovery 

of our emergency management community, the traditional fire 

services, the public works agencies that have not always been part 

of that law enforcement community on information sharing. 

I think we have made great strides in those regards. There are 

great examples in the New York metropolitan area in recent years. 

I think we see through the example this week of the National Level 

Exercise 12, NLE 12, part of the National Preparedness System is 

the National Exercise Program, along with our National Training 

and Education System, along with building our core capabilities 

through the National Incident Management System to be able to 

protect the public. The exercise system, the exercise program is 

how we evaluate our plans, how we evaluate how well we have 

planned and how well we work together. 

This year we are doing a cybersecurity exercise, when we were 

working across State and Federal governments to share information and intelligence on the potential nation-state and terrorist actors that are attacking the United States and synchronizing that 

through the response community that is preparing for and responding to the physical manifestation of these cyber attacks in this exercise. I think that is a good example of where we are pulling those 

threats together. 

Mr. TURNER. All right. 

In the days and weeks following 9/11, NYPD was working heroically downtown in a very hazardous environment. There were 

things that were known by some branches of Government that 

seemed not to be known by others. How would that be addressed 

today? 

Mr. MANNING. Specifically in referring to the coordination of information in a response on the streets, we have a vastly different 

structure of organizing how we do both the policy and information 

coordination at the Federal Government level and across the country since 2001. 

Information sharing across Federal agencies is dramatically better than it was in 2001 through the advent of our National security 

staff, a change from looking holistically at National security and 

homeland security issues; the National Counterterrorism Center 

and the work of I&A, Intelligence and Analysis, at Department of 

Homeland Security, being able to pull information from the intelligence community and provide it right to State and local law en-
26 

forcement; things like the ITAG, the threat advisory group, that is 

made up of State and local law enforcement officers, in some case 

fire service officers, working at the National Counterterrorism Center. There is an ability to share information that didn’t exist in 

2001. 

Additionally, on-the-street coordination. One of the things we 

identified in the responses to the 9/11 attacks as needing critical 

attention was operational coordination—how we worked together, 

how multiple governments worked together, cities and States from 

around the country, and how law enforcement and the fire service 

and public works and the public health community, how do we coordinate? 

So President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, which established the National Incident Management System, then passed by Congress in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. We now have—all the States and local governments in the country have reported compliant with the National 

Incident Management System. We now have one National system 

for coordinating multi-jurisdiction, multi-governmental levels of response on the street. We didn’t have that in 2001. We have it 

today, and we have the entire country that has had that training. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, sir. I apologize for calling you Mr. 

Marino, but he is a good guy. I have some vision problems. 

Mr. TURNER. I am flattered. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. So I apologize. 

Okay. Before I dismiss the first panel, I want to ask one question 

of Mr. Manning. 

To what do you attribute the lag of cyber capabilities on the 

State level, as reported in the State Preparedness Report? 

Mr. MANNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think an important first thing to keep in mind is that the National Preparedness Report—this National Preparedness Report 

covers an analysis of the time period between 2001 and 2010. We 

have learned a great deal just in the past 18 months and made 

great strides. 

So cybersecurity we see as a low level of response on the part of 

the States. Over a time period where it was emerging as a homeland security threat, it was an area where many people were identifying emerging threats, both nation-state and nongovernmental 

actors, but unsure of how to focus an effort on building capability. 

This is something we have made great strides on just in the last 

18 months. I mentioned the National Level Exercise this week. We 

also have things like the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, 

the NCIC, the center for coordinating that response. I think we 

have seen an uptick just in the last year of activity on the part of 

the State and local governments in preparing for cyber attacks. 

Another important thing is the purpose of the National Preparedness Report is to identify the areas we are strong in but also to 

identify areas that we need more focused attention. So I think 

identifying areas such as cybersecurity as an activity, as a homeland security activity of State and local governments that needs attention is a success of the report. It draws attention to the fact we 

need to do more, and we are already seeing more in that. It be-
27 

comes a priority for us going forward in how we identify the 

threats and hazards for which we have to prepare. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I would like to continue to track that, so I would 

like to get with you on that and get some more details on the 

progress we are making on the State level. 

Thank you very much. I thank the panel for their testimony. Of 

course, I thank the Members for their questions. 

I want to dismiss you and move on to the second panel. Thank 

you very much again. 

I would like to welcome the second panel. 

Our first witness is Mr. John Madden. Mr. Madden is the director of the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Services—welcome, sir—a position to which he was appointed in 

January 2007. Mr. Madden has served in the U.S. Army and as a 

civilian in many Federal departments and agencies, including the 

Navy, National Weather Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 

and the Transportation Security Administration. Mr. Madden currently serves as the vice president of the National Emergency Management Association. 

Welcome, sir. 

Following Mr. Madden, we will receive testimony from Mr. Mike 

Sena. Mr. Sena is the deputy director of the Northern California 

Regional Intelligence Center and serves as president of the National Fusion Center Association. He has served in law enforcement for nearly 20 years, including with the California Bureau of 

Investigation and Intelligence, the California Bureau of Narcotics 

Enforcement, and the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage 

Control. Mr. Sena received his bachelor of arts in criminal justice 

from California State University—San Bernardino. 

Finally, we will receive testimony from Dr. Georges Benjamin. I 

am sure that is probably not the way to pronounce ‘‘Georges,’’ but 

anyway. Dr. Benjamin is the executive director of the American 

Public Health Association, a position he has held since December 

2002. Prior to this position, he served as a secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Dr. Benjamin is 

a graduate of the Illinois Institute of Technology and the University of Illinois College of Medicine. 

Welcome, all the witnesses. We look forward to your testimony. 

Your entire written statements will appear in the record, and I ask 

that you summarize your testimony for 5 minutes. 

Again, we are expecting votes in about 20 minutes or so, so I 

think we can probably wrap this up. But, you know, I want to 

make sure that we hear all your testimony and we ask as many 

questions as possible. But I appreciate you being here today. 

We will go ahead and begin with Mr. Madden. You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. MADDEN, DIRECTOR, ALASKA DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. MADDEN. Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association. NEMA represents the 
28 

State emergency management directors in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories. 

Emergency management and homeland security officials have 

long been challenged on how best to measure the effectiveness of 

our preparedness efforts. Are we doing the right thing for the right 

outcome? Do our efforts before the disaster improve our actions 

during and after the disaster? 

Much as the Department of Defense once planned and trained for 

the last war, until the last decade we prepared for the last disaster. 

But we learned there is great uncertainty on how, when, and 

where disasters strike and with what motivations and sophistication criminals and terrorists plan, practice, and conduct their attacks. 

We find ourselves today in the midst of a much-needed transformation—a transformation of preparedness from a reaction to a 

discipline, but not a discipline that is rigid and bureaucratic, rather 

a discipline that enables us to turn swiftly to a new adversary, to 

recognize an evolving hazard and recognize an increasing risk, and 

to confront a new emerging threat. 

We consider the first National Preparedness Report a very good 

start. It is well-written, well-documented, but it is still transitional. 

There is no solid linkage yet between the analysis of threats and 

hazards at the State and local level and the broad assessment of 

preparedness across the Nation. This must be our foremost emphasis in future reports. 

Before we will achieve a truly useful National Preparedness Report, we need a completely integrated system of analysis and problem solving, a system for sharing innovations and lessons learned 

between all of our stakeholders, a system that fosters partnerships 

and does not create undue competition with winners and losers. We 

need to identify and address vulnerabilities that exist beyond the 

ability of a city or of a State to resolve. We must document how 

our systems work and what can go wrong; identify potential consequences and what capabilities we need to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover; and, finally, how best to prioritize our 

actions and our resources to close the most critical gaps. 

Our focus must be on our ability to prepare for and respond to 

events of extreme complexity based on size, duration, consequences, 

or concurrent or remote events. FEMA’s approach of the maximum 

of maximums is an interesting thought experiment, but why limit 

ourselves to an assumption of sheltering 100,000 for 30 days? Why 

not 200,000 for 60 days, in winter, during a pandemic? The National Preparedness Report should lend insight in setting priorities 

and investing in capabilities that draw down the risks to the Nation and its vital interests. 

Earlier this year, NEMA released the proposal for a comprehensive preparedness grant structure in which we stated our fundamental principles and values of the States. One is very relevant to 

this discussion on the National Preparedness Report: Build and 

sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation that is well-organized, rigorously trained, vigorously exercised, properly equipped, prepared 

for all hazards, focused on core capabilities, and resourced for both 

the most serious and the most likely threats and hazards. 
29 

Mr. Chairman, these are the hallmarks of a prepared Nation, 

and these are what we should be measuring. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

[The statement of Mr. Madden follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. MADDEN

JUNE 6, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Bilirakis, Representative Richardson, and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to present testimony today on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). NEMA represents the State emergency management directors of all 50 States, the District of 

Columbia, and the U.S. Territories. 

One of the most significant challenges facing State and local emergency management and homeland security officials is assessing the effectiveness of preparedness. 

Are we doing the right things for the right outcome? Do our efforts before the disaster improve our actions during and after the disaster? Such measurement remains 

elusive due to the ever-changing nature of preparedness itself. 

Congress and various administrations have instituted several programs to address 

preparedness. For example, the Emergency Management Performance Grant 

(EMPG) has built a strong State and local baseline capability of emergency management in this Nation. The State Homeland Security Grant Program has enabled significant investment in equipment and capabilities. 

We truly are a more prepared Nation. From neighborhood communities through 

all levels of government, we have acquired resources, achieved collaboration, and 

built systems to mitigate, prevent, prepare for, and respond to natural hazards and 

terrorist threats. 

Today, I will examine the evolution of preparedness in this Nation, the engagement by State officials in this process, and the future direction of preparedness. 

THE EVOLUTION OF PREPAREDNESS IN THIS NATION

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released the National Preparedness Report earlier this year. The document was intended to be one of many 

reports to assess capabilities and help the Nation set priorities in coming years. To 

fully understand the origins of the report, we must first review several seminal 

events that drove changes on how this country approaches preparedness from a Federal, State, and local perspective. 

Until the last decade, most preparedness efforts by the Nation were backwardfacing. In other words, we prepared for the events and disasters of the past. We focused on improving our response to the last disaster. Unfortunately, neither nature 

nor humans are so cooperative as to follow this strategy. The repeated lesson 

learned is great uncertainty in how, when, and where disasters strike and with 

what sophistication criminals and terrorists plan, practice, and conduct their attacks. 

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it became a National priority to 

create and sustain the ability of State and local governments to prevent and respond 

to a broad range of severe homeland security events. Much like the events of 60 

years earlier at Pearl Harbor, September 11 identified gaps in our approach to 

awareness of what is going on and how we prepared for future disasters or attacks. 

September 11 also challenged all our assumptions about preparedness. The focus of 

many new Federal programs was to avoid another surprise by building the necessary capabilities to prevent incidents when possible and respond appropriately 

when the next event occurs. 

The terrorist attacks of 2001 and anthrax attacks later the same year brought 

‘‘Homeland Security’’ from theory into practice. It also forced the reexamination of 

preparedness. The Nation began a transformation in our approach to preparedness—from reaction to discipline. Our goal was not a discipline which is rigid and 

bureaucratic; but rather a discipline enabling us to turn swiftly to a new adversary, 

recognize an evolving hazard, and confront an emerging threat. Two years later, 

then President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8; 

National Preparedness. This document strengthened preparedness by articulating a 

clear and definable goal, and established mechanisms to improve preparedness and 

strengthen capabilities. Unfortunately, HSPD–8 overlooked one key aspect of preparedness—the natural disaster. 
30 

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast and demonstrated a clear lack 

of preparedness for a catastrophic event at practically every level of government. In 

the aftermath of the storm, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Among its many elements, this legislation required 

States to submit an annual State Preparedness Report to FEMA. The most recent 

report submission occurred at the end of last year. 

Finally, last year the President signed Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness, which replaced HSPD–8. PPD–8 called for several new elements, including a National Preparedness Goal and a National Preparedness Report. This report, published on March 30, 2012, was partially built by integrating 

data from the State Preparedness Reports. PPD–8 has not yet been fully implemented or institutionalized. The supporting frameworks are still being refined and 

must be integrated with each other and within the entire preparedness system. 

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND THE STATE REPORTS

We consider the initial National Preparedness Report as transitional. There is no 

solid linkage yet between the analysis of threats and hazards at the State and local 

level and the broad assessment of preparedness across the entire Nation. In assessing preparedness, we must not start at the end but at the beginning. The key element for successful integration is the threat, hazard identification, and risk assessment or ‘‘THIRA.’’ This tool has potential for being the analytical foundation for understanding and setting priorities. The THIRA should be the means by which we 

document how the system operates, what can go wrong, a means to identify potential consequences, and how best to address gaps. By their very nature, all threats 

and hazards are variable. There is no single descriptor of hurricane or of an improvised explosive device. The THIRA enables a problem-solving approach to preparedness. For example, a county with a variable flood hazard may partner with a neighboring county to meet its sheltering needs for a local flood. But if the partner county 

faces the same hazard, shelters may remain unavailable for use requiring a broader, 

regional, or State solution. 

Preparedness is about priorities. There is an old saying that a ship in harbor is 

safe but does not represent why we build ships. This Nation must seek and achieve 

the balance of actions toward preparedness to enhance our economy and not create 

burdens. The removal of such encumbrances will enable the continued movement of 

goods and people without undue restrictions and ensure the continued provision of 

essential services under all conditions. 

Our examination of preparedness must not be abstract, but rather form the basis 

for action. FEMA should improve these reports to enable a greater return on investment to the States and the local governments. The value should be placed on local 

decision-making as much as on National assessment. First, States must fully integrate Core Capabilities into their planning, analysis, and organizations. Even 

though FEMA did not require States to address all the Core Capabilities in the latest report the States seek to integrate them thoughtfully and systematically. 

According to a July 2011 report completed by NEMA, ‘‘In fiscal year 2010, States 

addressed anywhere from one to 25 of these National priorities for each investment. 

The capabilities most often addressed included Planning, Communications, Community Preparedness and Participation, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and On-Site 

Incident Management. Whether a small or large expenditure, or a project impacting 

multiple or just a few capabilities, each of the National Capabilities found representation in at least one justification throughout the country.’’ 

FEMA should increase its collaboration on the implementation of the National 

Preparedness System. Within the States stand countless examples of innovation in 

methods, approaches, and products. Considerable sharing of these innovations can 

be found across the States. The emphasis should be on achieving the ability to prepare for and respond to events of extreme complexity based either on size, duration, 

consequences, or concurrent or remote events. FEMA’s approach of the ‘‘maximum 

of maximums’’ is an interesting thought experiment; however, every claimed maximum can be surpassed and is by definition a compromise. 

The National Preparedness Report should be based on realistic analysis valuing 

qualitative as well as quantitative values. The knowledge base of threats and hazards, levels of preparedness, and how to address gaps is best identified by including 

the broadest possible stakeholder base. But the Nation is not well served by any 

reductionist analysis based on a ‘‘GREEN, YELLOW, RED’’ coding or by assigning 

a value of ‘‘one through five’’ when attempting to manage highly complex and interrelated issues. 

Overall, States agree with some of the findings of the National Preparedness Report. For example, Federal preparedness assistance grants have certainly helped 
31 

build and enhance State, local, Tribal, and territorial capabilities throughout multiyear investment. The entire systems could be improved, however, if the existing disjointed preparedness system could be revamped. 

MOVING PREPAREDNESS FORWARD

Besides these specific suggestions, overall preparedness in this Nation can be 

greatly enhanced by systemic changes in how the Federal Government supports preparedness functions at the State and local levels. Earlier this year, NEMA released 

the Proposal for a Comprehensive Preparedness Grants Structure. This proposal 

looks at preparedness grant funding holistically and brings State, local, and National priorities into alignment with one another. 

The current grants structure is complex and often contradictory. This creates unintended inefficiencies in investments and duplication of efforts. The current and 

continuing fiscal condition of our Nation requires us to invest every dollar more 

wisely than ever before. We want to gain efficiencies in our grants in order to increase the effectiveness of our mission. Within a grants system based on ‘‘flexibility 

with accountability,’’ the States, local governments, and the disciplines charged with 

our safety and security are capable of insight leading to ideas, innovation guiding 

investment, and a system of sharing which ensures we improve both our efficiency 

and effectiveness. 

We must integrate our efforts to improve agility in confronting threats to the 

homeland, whether they are natural, technological, or man-made. This Nation must 

effectively build strengths and capabilities against a range of threats, reduce the 

consequences of many hazards, and thus reduce the risks to our communities. 

From the purchase of basic equipment to such citizen involvement campaigns as 

‘‘See Something, Say Something,’’ and from procuring major communications systems to improving the way State and local governments share information, these 

programs have continued a National effort toward better safeguarding and securing 

our communities. State and local governments use these essential programs to support our neighborhoods across a range of Government programs, faith-based initiatives, regional collaborations, and personal preparedness efforts. 

The Department of Homeland Security does not stand alone in this effort. Many 

other Federal agencies also oversee hundreds of preparedness programs, from the 

Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Education. All programs provide a level of confidence in the ‘‘system’’ so when a major event does 

occur the citizens of this country remain confident the whole of Government and 

community has the skills, resources, and knowledge to effectively save lives and protect property. 

In these tough economic times, the Federal Government does not bear the burden 

of securing our homeland alone. Billions of State and local funds are also invested 

in homeland security activities. Even citizens all across America—some barely able 

to afford the expense—supply themselves with preparedness kits to contribute to 

this truly National effort. 

MITIGATION AS A FUNCTION OF PREPAREDNESS

Emergency management organizations at the Federal and State levels often are 

structured more for execution than for planning. We separate the major functions 

of the profession such as preparedness, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery into easily managed directorates; however, an increasing reliance on the overlap 

occurs between them naturally. While preparedness and mitigation activities can 

differ in their mission and execution, the natural similarities provide the emergency 

management community with opportunities to leverage resources and expertise. 

Mr. David Miller, Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) at FEMA is often quoted as saying, ‘‘Mitigation is the 

thread that permeates the fabric of National preparedness.’’ This sentiment is 

echoed in the working draft of the National Mitigation Framework. Since FEMA 

and its partners began the process of developing frameworks under PPD–8, it has 

become very clear that mitigation cannot exist in a vacuum. Mitigation benefits 

from the whole community approach to disaster preparedness and supports the 

other four mission areas of PPD–8. Frameworks and preparedness goals cannot be 

truly representative or actionable if they promulgate stovepipes. The proliferation 

of preparedness must be achieved by embracing the unique elements of each mission 

while understanding and building off of their shared goal of resiliency and sustainability. 

While the Federal programs geared towards mitigation are crucial to the success 

of many activities around the country, many States have committed millions of dollars to building their own mitigation capabilities and leveraging limited resources 
32 

to accomplish independent preparedness goals. NEMA has always supported mitigation and its critical role in the cycle of preparedness and continues to encourage investments in mitigation activities at the State level. 

Resilient communities are those that take proactive measures to protect investments made across the full range of infrastructure. Many of the messages of preparedness are geared towards dealing with or managing the effects of disasters, but 

mitigation takes preparedness a step further. The actions taken under the name of 

mitigation reduce the impact of the disaster before it happens and can be used to 

rebuild an affected area in a more resilient manner. While neither community members nor emergency managers can stop the next disaster from occurring, every member of the community can play an active role in lessening the consequences from 

those disasters in the future. 

CONCLUSION

The States believe the often-mentioned need to ‘‘measure preparedness’’ is being 

realized all across the country. The commitment made by Congress, State and local 

governments, and Main Street Americans continues each day amidst constantlyevolving threats and hazards... certainly a measured change from the mindset 

of September 10, 2001. 

The National Preparedness System must take the longer view and not the bureaucratic lowest common denominator where the only issue addressed is the one 

currently under consideration. Our view must be extended from being focused on 

the current budget or the latest grant cycle to the distant horizon. The National 

Preparedness Report should contribute to an understanding of what we need to accomplish. Such a document, however, is not the final word or sole measure of our 

efforts. 

Preparedness is an objective rather than a destination. A condition of perfect preparedness cannot be achieved but this should not deter us from our mission to try. 

No single report will complete this critical mission. The National Preparedness System holds the potential of drawing down risks to the Nation and its vital interests. 

Accomplishing such reductions in risk is the true business of the homeland security 

and emergency management enterprise of our Nation. 

In our Proposal for a Comprehensive Preparedness Grants Structure, NEMA stated our fundamental principles and values. One is very relevant to this discussion 

on the National Preparedness Report. ‘‘Build and sustain a skilled cadre across the 

Nation that is well organized, rigorously trained, vigorously exercised, properly 

equipped, prepared for all hazards focused on core capabilities, and resources for 

both the most serious and most likely threats and hazards.’’ 

These are the hallmarks of a prepared Nation. These are what we should measure. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sena, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NORTHERN 

CALIFORNIA REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION 

Mr. SENA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee. On behalf of the National Fusion Center Association, I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity to share our views on 

the National preparedness. 

The NFCA represents the 77 State and major urban area fusion 

centers that comprise the National network of fusion centers, including the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, 

where I serve as the deputy director on detail from the California 

Department of Justice Bureau of Investigation. 

We think the National Preparedness Report can be a helpful assessment of where we stand, but we discovered that the National 

network of fusion centers was not consulted during the development of the NPR. As a pillar of our National preparedness, we recommend that FEMA, in coordination with DHS I&A, consult di-
33 

rectly with the National network of fusion centers in the development of any future reports. 

With that said, we fully agree with the report’s key findings that 

a network of State and major urban area fusion centers and JTTFs 

has significantly improved analytical and information-sharing capabilities among law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence community entities at all levels of government. 

Let me give you an example of what this looks like on the 

ground. My fusion center is collocated with the FBI JTTF Threat 

Squad and the Northern California HIDTA. Our analysts have the 

ability to sit shoulder-to-shoulder with DHS intelligence officers, 

FBI, Federal, State, and local analysts. We have emergency managers, firefighters, EMS and public health workers, cops, and private-sector representatives working together. Subject to strict privacy guidelines, we analyze suspicious activity reporting from the 

public and California’s network of 40,000 trained terrorism liaison 

officers. We share timely information with the FBI, DHS, State, 

and local entities on terrorism and criminal threats to our region. 

This is deep collaboration, and it did not exist before the National 

network of fusion centers was created. 

But we realize that there is still a lot of work to do. I outlined 

several on-going challenges in my written statement, but let me 

mention a few of them. 

We need to harmonize the platforms for secure messaging and 

collaboration across the National network and our Federal partners. We need to continue broadening and deepening fusion center 

relationships with all relevant stakeholders, and that includes our 

States, Governors, our HSAs, our UASI coordinators, our emergency managers, and critical infrastructure owners and operators. 

Fusion center analysts need equal access to classified systems, specifically FBI systems, to ensure top-quality threat analysis. Cleared 

fusion center personnel should have the same access as DHS, I&A, 

and FBI personnel to classified systems. 

On the issue of investment, earlier this year the NFCA conducted an analysis of fusion center budgets, which revealed that 

more than 60 percent of all fusion center funding is provided by 

State and local governments. Less than 40 percent is supported by 

Federal grants. At the Florida fusion center, for example, 10 percent is Federal funding and 90 percent is State and local. Homeland security intelligence and information sharing is a shared responsibility, and our analysis clearly shows that there is a shared 

sacrifice and a deep commitment at the State and local levels. 

We have real concerns about the impact of DHS grant cuts. Fusion centers in some States will lose analytical personnel beginning 

this year. Some may cease operating as fusion centers altogether. 

If these scenarios play out or if the budget sequestration takes effect next year and nondefense discretionary programs like preparedness grants are cut even more, we will lose terrorism prevention capabilities. There is no doubt our National preparedness will 

suffer from this, and Congress should not let that happen. 

Let me close with an example that demonstrates our increased 

preparedness. During riots in the city of Oakland, the California 

Highway Patrol received a 9–1–1 call from a citizen concerned 

about a posting they saw on a popular social networking site. The 
34 

posting indicated that person was headed to the riot location with 

handguns and malicious intent. The Highway Patrol immediate relayed the information to the State Threat Assessment Center, our 

STAC, which is California’s designated primary fusion center. The 

STAC located the web posting, which included photographs of the 

subject with firearms. Analysts at the STAC ran initial database 

checks on the subject and quickly notified my fusion center, the 

NCRIC, on the potential threat. 

The NCRIC had personnel working at the Oakland Emergency 

Operations Center to facilitate information sharing and intelligence 

support during the riots. NCRIC personnel conducted further analysis of the subject and disseminated an officer safety bulletin to 

8,000 fusion center partners in the region. More than 1,000 onscene law enforcement officers from multiple jurisdictions were receiving real-time information on the potential threat. All that happened within hours. 

Days later, the matter was resolved when, thanks to the NCRIC 

alert, a trained terrorism liaison officer identified the subject, who 

happened to be an employee of a secure facility. 

Key elements of National preparedness allowed this rapid sharing of actionable information to happen: Citizen reporting of suspicious activity, advanced analytical capabilities at the fusion center, the network of trained TLOs, and real-time collaboration 

among public safety partners. 

Mr. Chairman, our level of preparedness has increased dramatically in recent years, and we ask for your continued support as we 

work to enhance it even further. On behalf of the NFCA, thank you 

again for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Sena follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA

JUNE 6, 2012 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, Members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA), thank you for inviting 

me to testify today. My name is Mike Sena and I serve as deputy director of the 

Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), the fusion center for the 

San Francisco Bay area. I currently serve as president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA). The NFCA represents the 77 State and local owned and operated fusion centers that comprise the National Network of Fusion Centers. 

It is clear to those of us on the front lines that the state of National preparedness 

with regard to intelligence and information sharing has improved dramatically since 

9/11, with a noticeable acceleration in improvements over the past few years. At the 

same time, we recognize that a range of capabilities must be further developed, and 

we are working with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners through a variety 

of forums to integrate the whole community and improve our state of preparedness 

every day. 

As the National Preparedness Report (NPR) states, ‘‘fusion centers are focal 

points within the State and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, 

and sharing of threat-related information between Federal, State, and local governments and private-sector partners. Fusion centers position law enforcement, public 

safety, emergency management, fire service, public health, critical infrastructure 

protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of 

National intelligence.’’ 

In other words, fusion centers analyze National threat information in a local context, disseminate relevant and actionable information to State and local decision 

makers, and pass critical State and local information up to Federal partners in the 

intelligence community. All of this is done while protecting the privacy, civil rights, 

and civil liberties of American citizens. 
35 

A snapshot of my own fusion center, the NCRIC, gives you a sense of how we can 

collaborate today on intelligence and information sharing. We are collocated with 

the Northern California HIDTA and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

Threat Squad. Our analysts have the ability to sit shoulder-to-shoulder with FBI 

analysts. We have emergency managers, firefighters, EMS workers, public health 

workers, cops, analysts, Federal, State, local, and private-sector representatives 

working at our fusion center. We analyze suspicious activity reporting and share information on terror, crime, and other threats to our region, and we make sure that 

the right organizations and decision makers get the information they need. 

The National Network of Fusion Centers—which includes 49 centers designated 

by State Governors as primary fusion centers, two territorial fusion centers, and 26 

major urban area fusion centers—is maturing at an increasing pace. The overall 

level of information sharing and intelligence analysis Nation-wide has increased as 

well. We fully agree with the NPR’s key finding that ‘‘A network of State and major 

urban area fusion centers and JTTFs [FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces] has significantly improved analytical and information-sharing capabilities among law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence community entities at all levels of government.’’ At the same time, we think it is helpful to review the progress we have made 

and address the primary on-going challenges we are working with our partners to 

solve. 

The National Network of Fusion Centers has played a major role in transforming 

the way Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments share intelligence information 

to protect the homeland. The National Network—together with the full complement 

of Federal partners—embodies what the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 envisioned a decentralized, distributed 

information sharing model to help ‘‘connect the dots’’ and prevent attacks. In fact, 

the National Network has become the central information-sharing point between the 

Federal Government and State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. 

The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States specifically cites fusion 

centers a central element in preventing future acts of terrorism. After investing $40 billion in Federal preparedness grants over the past decade— 

the lion’s share of which has been directed at response and recovery activities—it 

is safe to say we are much better prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from 

terror attacks and other disasters than we were prior to 9/11. 

There is good reason to pat ourselves on the back; but there is much to do, and 

there is also real reason for concern. As the dramatic declines in Federal grant 

funds that have been approved by Congress—more than 50% for SHSP and UASI— 

begin to take effect at the end-user level this year, we will struggle to maintain the 

momentum that has developed over the past decade. Fusion centers in some States 

that rely heavily on Federal grant dollars to support operations will likely lose significant numbers of analytical personnel, and some may cease operating as fusion 

centers altogether. Other centers may turn their focus ‘‘inward’’ to become intelligence support functions within State or local law enforcement agencies. We were 

happy to see last month that both the House and Senate DHS appropriators recommended increases in funding for State and Local Programs at FEMA. But if these 

scenarios I just mentioned become reality, there is no doubt that our National preparedness would suffer greatly. 

That is why we think that DHS preparedness grants going forward should emphasize the intelligence and information-sharing element of our National preparedness. 

This must be prioritized to continue building and sustaining prevention and protection capabilities. That includes the sustainment of a strong National Network of Fusion Centers. Fusion centers are focused on prevention, but a growing number of 

fusion centers support the full range of preparedness activities and partner with the 

emergency management, fire, and public health communities as well as the private 

sector. 

The NFCA fears the consequences of the impending budget sequestration. Nondefense discretionary funding has been cut substantially over the last 3 years. It is 

shocking to us that the some of the hardest-hit programs have been those that support homeland security preparedness. FEMA State and Local Programs have been 

cut by 50% over the last 3 years. We understand the desire to avoid cuts to Defense 

spending under sequestration, but after the 50% cuts we have sustained, we strongly urge Congress to avoid saddling NDD programs—especially preparedness 

grants—with even deeper cuts. Security is Government’s No. 1 responsibility at all 

levels, and that means Congress must take a balanced approach to deficit reduction 

and not hit State and Local Preparedness and other non-defense discretionary programs with further cuts. 

No more effective mechanism exists to coordinate the sharing of multi-source information for diverse stakeholders and facilitate broad collaboration on threat anal-
36 

ysis. Consider the difficulties if the Federal Government had to share information 

directly with the 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies in the United States. Or, 

consider if the Federal Government could only obtain value-added information from 

State and local agencies on a piecemeal basis to support terrorism investigations. 

Relative to the tens of thousands of public safety agencies across the county, the 

National Network of only 77 centers is a very efficient way to leverage the capabilities of an entire Nation to support the analysis and sharing of threat information. 

One common misperception that must be corrected is that fusion centers duplicate 

other joint law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. That is not the case; they 

do not duplicate, they objectively add what others cannot add—complementing with 

vital granular data and analysis the information that others possess—to allow timely action against identified threats. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) play 

the lead role in counterterrorism investigations. Owned and operated by the FBI 

with close cooperation and participation by State and local partners, JTTFs are key 

‘‘customers’’ of fusion center analytical products. 

The National Network of Fusion Centers supports the dissemination of information from JTTFs to the broader public safety community. JTTFs deal primarily with 

terrorism and other criminal matters related to various aspects of the counterterrorism mission. Fusion centers generally take an all-crimes approach and deal with 

criminal, terrorism, and other public safety matters across multiple disciplines. 

JTTFs primarily conduct terrorism investigations and share intelligence with law 

enforcement and homeland security agencies as appropriate. 

By contrast, fusion centers analyze and assess local implications of National 

threat information and produce actionable intelligence for dissemination to public 

safety stakeholders in their area of responsibility and beyond. In short, fusion centers do not duplicate the functions of JTTFs, and JTTFs are not organized to 

achieve the missions of fusion centers. The two programs both have complementary 

and critical missions. Both are essential to effective homeland security information 

sharing and investigations. Congress must ensure that both efforts are fully supported if the outcome sought is seamless, well-informed, effective protection of this 

Nation. 

Most fusion centers today have an ‘‘all-crimes’’ mission—and many also now have 

an ‘‘all-hazards’’ mission—because an exclusive focus on terrorism simply misses the 

point that you cannot separate crime and terrorism. In addition, the analytical and 

sharing capabilities that fusion centers offer are useful in every-day crime-fighting 

efforts. Identifying trends and anomalies, analyzing suspicious activity reporting, 

and providing actionable information to decision makers is just as essential in fighting gangs, home invasions, human trafficking, and on-line child exploitation as in 

preventing terrorist attacks. In short, the ‘‘fusion process’’ is valuable in protecting 

all communities against all threats. 

Most law enforcement officers will tell you that the best intelligence collaboration 

and information sharing happens when relationships among agencies and individuals are built on trust and experience. The right policies, technology, processes, protocols, and funding are essential enablers of effective information sharing, and we’ve 

seen dramatic improvements in these areas since 9/11. But information sharing is 

fundamentally about creating, building, and sustaining RELATIONSHIPS. Legislation and mandates can only get us so far. When it comes to leveraging the full scope 

of the public safety community in the United States for homeland security purposes, 

a constant effort to build relationships and develop trusted mechanisms is how it 

will get done. 

That’s where the NFCA comes in. It is our association’s mission to support the 

development of the National Network of Fusion Centers and improved information 

sharing. Since we formed 3 years ago, we have made a point of fostering relationship development across the network and vertically among Federal, State, local, 

Tribal, territorial, and private-sector stakeholders. We work regularly with these 

stakeholders, and we just approved the addition of a representative from the Major 

Cities Chiefs Intelligence Commanders Group on the NFCA Executive Board. 

Progress does not happen overnight. Those who expect a switch to be flipped and 

have instant and seamless sharing of information on threats across all possible 

stakeholders are bound to be disappointed. The appropriate vision for intelligence 

collaboration and information sharing was laid out by the 9/11 Commission and was 

emphasized in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: A decentralized, distributed network that involves all levels of government and collaborates routinely on information analysis and sharing with Federal intelligence and 

law enforcement partners. 

The thankless business of improving intelligence and information-sharing preparedness is often carried out in efforts coordinated by the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC). The CICC is a strong and trusted mechanism for coordi-
37 

nating all the relevant stakeholders in this mission. The CICC and its research 

arm—the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG)—have been responsible for developing and fostering Nation-wide adoption of standards for sharing criminal intelligence. 

The GIWG and the CICC focus on the development of documents that have the 

force of National policy and are widely adhered to. They have facilitated the development of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, Law Enforcement Analytic Standards, technical data exchange standards, Fusion Center Privacy Policies, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers, and have contributed to the National Strategy for Information Sharing, among other important 

initiatives. This institutionalized collaboration in the development of policy is needed to ensure the continued commitment and building of trust among the greatest 

possible number of stakeholders. It is how improvements in National preparedness 

in this area will continue to be matured. 

Despite our progress, we are concerned that 10 years without a major attack has 

led to a level of apathy. All stakeholders must continue to invest in the long-term 

effort to improve our capacity to share information. If the Federal Government does 

not continue to take steps to ensure the National Network is strengthened and sustained, we will start moving away from the vision of the 9/11 Commission and 

IRTPA, leaving the Nation more vulnerable to successive attacks on public safety— 

large and small—that could have been prevented through a well-supported National 

Network of Fusion Centers. 

We think the National Preparedness Report shows a continued need for focused 

investment in the Network as the core homeland security information sharing and 

intelligence analysis facilitator in partnership with State, local, Federal, and Tribal 

law enforcement, fire, emergency management, and public health agencies. To the 

extent that the NPR is a ‘‘roll-up’’ of individual State preparedness reports, law enforcement entities in many States have not been as integrated into the development 

of the State reports as they should be. In fact, it appears that the methodology used 

to create the NPR is not as analytically rigorous as it should be. The National Network of Fusion Centers was not consulted in a systematic way. If the Network is 

a pillar of our National preparedness, then the report should not be developed without a coordinated process directly with the fusion centers. As future State preparedness reports are generated, the NFCA recommends that Homeland Security Advisors and State Emergency Managers integrate information directly from fusion centers in their States. We are pleased that data was integrated into the NPR from 

the detailed assessment of the National Network of Fusion Centers that is conducted annually by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. But the appropriate 

stage for engagement of the fusion centers in preparedness reports is also at the 

State level. Going forward, the NFCA will encourage direct State-level interactions 

in addition to the use of data collected through the annual fusion center assessment 

process. 

While we agree with the NPR’s key finding on the National Network, we do not 

think the report provides helpful context for the capability percentage ratings it lays 

out. There have been dramatic improvements in recent years, and I would argue 

that these improvements are actually accelerating. We all recognize that the wave 

of a magic wand will not result in an ideal operating situation. When you are in 

the business of developing, shaping, and maintaining an intelligence and information-sharing culture across governmental and jurisdictional lines, you are constantly 

pressing for incremental improvements over time. 

And that is what we’ve seen. From the development and implementation of the 

Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), to the enhanced support 

provided to the National Network by DHS Intelligence & Analysis, to increased FBI/ 

JTTF interactions and collocation with fusion centers, to improvements in analysis 

and sharing technology, to deeper relationships across the National Network and 

within States, our preparedness has gotten steadily more robust. Through our work 

on the CICC, we have had substantial input into the refresh of the National Information Sharing Strategy. I think that strategy will lay out a way ahead that reflects 

both the progress made and the focused investments of energy and resources that 

will be needed over the next decade. 

We can see that a National intelligence enterprise is being created by connecting 

fusion centers, their information sharing and analysis partners, JTTFs, the HIDTA 

Investigative Support Centers, the RISS centers, major city and major county intelligence centers, the Nation-wide SAR Initiative, and the FBI Field Intelligence 

Groups (FIGs). This enterprise has been woven into a protective fabric for our Nation. The enterprise has matured because partners have rolled up their sleeves and 

created solutions that are crossing boundaries efficiently. Strong leadership from the 

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of the Program Manager of the 
38 

Information Sharing Environment, the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the Department of Justice, the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative’s Program 

Management Office (NSI–PMO) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has resulted in the strengthening of governance structures that are intended to lower barriers between Federal, State, and local organizations. 

Of course there is a lot of room for improvement. Intelligence and informationsharing capability gaps that we must continue to address include: • standardized or harmonized platforms for secure messaging across the National 

Network of Fusion Centers and with our Federal partners; • training and retention of high-quality analytical personnel across the National 

Network; • sustainable funding support for the National Network through DHS preparedness grants; • broadening and deepening of fusion center relationships with all relevant stakeholders in our States, including Governors’ homeland security advisors, emergency managers, and critical infrastructure owners and operators; • tighter coordination of information collection, analysis, and sharing with our 

Federal partners; • secure and reliable access to classified systems, specifically FBI systems, and 

reforms that allow cleared fusion center personnel to have the same access as 

DHS I&A and FBI personnel to FBI classified systems; and • recognition of security clearances across agencies and domains to ensure timely 

and efficient access to relevant information. 

One issue that we are currently dealing with provides a good illustration of how 

far we have come in terms of the intelligence and information-sharing element of 

National preparedness, and the challenges that still remain. 

Earlier this year the FBI Terrorist Screening Center halted sharing of ‘‘encounter 

notifications’’ with fusion centers in the manner in which they previously had been 

shared. Briefly, encounter notifications refer to the notices sent by the TSC to fusion 

centers regarding any Governmental agencies’ encounters with individuals on the 

consolidated Terrorist Watchlist in the interior of the country—for example in traffic 

stops. The NFCA discussed the issue directly with TSC leadership and others at the 

FBI. We convened a conference call with the TSC, FBI, DHS, NFCA, International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, National Sheriffs’ Association, Major County Sheriffs’ 

Association, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies, CICC, and the Governors’ Homeland Security Advisory Council to 

address the issue. Just days later we had worked out a way ahead to ensure encounter notifications were available to all fusion centers going forward. Today the 

TSC, DHS, and State, local, and Tribal partners are working to address the issue. 

This kind of broad-based and real-time effort to improve intelligence and information sharing would have been extremely difficult 10 years ago, or even just 5 years 

ago. The process is never easy, but this enhanced coordination—enabled by the fusion centers—ensures that we continue on the path to greater preparedness. 

We cannot have true preparedness without true information sharing. We need to 

continue to work with the FBI and all our Federal partners to improve sharing of 

critical information while maintaining operational security and preserving citizens’ 

privacy and civil liberties. In addition, we have to continue working with our Federal partners to develop secure communications platforms that enable efficient information sharing and analytical collaboration. We continue to see several different information-sharing platforms in use across the 18,000 State and local law enforcement agencies in this country. No single entity is in a position to mandate standardization, but efforts continue to ensure data can be shared and received when needed. 

Event deconfliction is another major area of needed focus. True information sharing 

includes both threat information and event deconfliction. We believe we need a single National deconfliction system. While there are several good examples of event 

deconfliction systems in use by different law enforcement agencies, we need to work 

toward standardization or interoperability of systems. 

Overall, we have made excellent progress, but we are not where we want to be. 

Not a day goes by without conversations among partners that are serving to build 

the trust, confidence, and relationships necessary to realize true information sharing. 

Congress can also play a helpful role. We note that just last week the House 

passed two bills—H.R. 2764, the WMD Intelligence and Information Sharing Act, 

and H.R. 3140, the Mass Transit Intelligence Prioritization Act—that have intelligence analysis and information sharing through the National Network of Fusion 

Centers as a primary purpose. Both pieces of legislation are examples of how Congress can support the incremental improvements we need to make over time to advance our homeland security intelligence- and information-sharing capabilities. 
39 

1 National Fusion Center Association membership survey, March, 2012. Fifty-six out of the 77 

fusion centers responded. Survey responses were not independently audited or verified. 

Another way Congress can support these advances is by ensuring sustained grant 

support for the National Network. This committee shepherded the Implementing 

9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. Section 2006 of that Act mandated 

that 25% of the UASI and SHSGP preparedness grants be allocated by recipients 

to ‘‘Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention (LETP) Activities.’’ This is how many 

States support their primary designated fusion centers with DHS grants. But there 

is no single funding model for fusion centers, and there is no guarantee that the 

LETP portion of DHS grant funds will be sufficient to support an adequate level 

of functionality at every fusion center in every State. A required fusion center investment justification in States’ applications for DHS preparedness grants helps, 

but it does not ensure that allocated funds are sufficient to support a robust fusion 

process in each State. 

Earlier this year the NFCA conducted a survey of its members which revealed 

that more than 60% of all fusion center funding is provided by State or local governments. Less than 40% is supported by Federal grants.1 In addition, since fusion center operating budgets do not include the salaries of ‘‘donated’’ personnel assigned 

by local and State agencies to fusion centers, the contribution ratio of State-to-Federal financial contributions is likely closer to 70/30. This concrete data demonstrates 

that, consistent with the spirit of Presidential Policy Directive/PPD–8, homeland security intelligence and information sharing is a shared responsibility with shared 

benefits, and that all stakeholders are sharing in the required investment. 

The data also help to dispel a myth we often see reported that fusion centers are 

DHS entities. DHS did not create the fusion centers, and they do not operate them. 

No fusion center is funded exclusively with DHS grant dollars. For example, Federal 

funding through SHSGP constituted 10% of the Florida Fusion Center’s $2.7 million 

budget in fiscal year 2011. At the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Los 

Angeles, combined SHSGP and UASI grant funding comprised just over 40% of the 

$12.7 million budget in fiscal year 2011. 

DHS recognizes the value of a robust National Network of Fusion Centers as critical to homeland security intelligence analysis and information sharing, and they 

have focused resources and other support to the centers as an invaluable partner 

to help nurture the National Network. Secretary Napolitano, Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Caryn Wagner, and Deputy Under Secretary for 

I&A Scott McAllister deserve great credit for requiring that States include an investment justification for fusion centers in their applications for UASI and SHSGP 

funding beginning with the fiscal year 2011 grant guidance. We were pleased to see 

this guidance remain in place in fiscal year 2012. This sends a clear signal—the 

right signal—that Federal-State-local partnerships to receive, gather, analyze, and 

share information to prevent terrorism will remain a top priority for DHS investment. 

Grant funds allocated to fusion centers help to build and sustain ‘‘critical operational capabilities’’ or COCs—defined as the ability to receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather information on threats to the homeland. Going forward, NFCA 

strongly supports the continued fusion center investment justification requirement, 

since this will assure that gaps in critical operational capabilities identified in the 

annual fusion center assessments are addressed across the National Network. 

As the threat of homegrown violent extremism (HVE) has risen, the role of State 

and local law enforcement has become indispensable in detecting and preventing 

terror attacks. Efforts are underway through the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative (NSI)—supported by the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Department of Justice—to train State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officers 

to recognize and report behavior-based suspicious activity. The fusion centers are essential in this effort as both training hubs and receivers of suspicious activity reporting. As the newly-published NSI Annual Report for 2011 states, ‘‘fusion centers 

are uniquely situated to provide an analytic context to SAR data, an essential element of NSI’s overall mission.’’ 

The NSI Annual Report indicates that as of March, 2012 68 fusion centers have 

the capability to contribute and share SARs. More than 250,000 front-line law enforcement officers have received NSI Line Officer Training. Training tailored to 

other public safety sectors has also been developed, which will expand the ability 

of those in the best position to notice suspicious activity will know what to do. The 

quality and quantity of SARs have increased over time, especially as implementation of NSI has progressed. As of March, more than 43,000 searches had been conducted by analysts authorized to use the system, and more than 17,000 SAR reports 

were available in the system. 
40 

There is still a lot to be done to fully implement NSI, but the progress has been 

encouraging. Over the past year we have worked closely with the FBI and the NSI 

Program Office to address challenges related to input of SAR information into accessible databases for timely analysis. The NSI recently implemented a technical solution that allows fusion center SAR information to be submitted to the NSI Federated Search system and simultaneously to the FBI’s eGuardian system. In addition, the NFCA signed onto a ‘‘unified message’’ earlier this year with several Federal, State, and local law enforcement organizations regarding suspicious activity reporting that emphasizes collaboration, sharing, and lanes of responsibility, while 

calling for advanced training and strict adherence to the privacy and civil rights 

policies and responsibilities that we are obligated to observe. 

Information sharing and intelligence collaboration efforts continue to develop. We 

are intimately involved in the refresh of the National Information Sharing Strategy. 

We are pleased with the way the intergovernmental discussions have gone over the 

past year, and the quality of ideas put on the table has been good. Kshemendra 

Paul, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, has made 

substantial contributions and has ensured that our perspectives are carefully considered. There is a sense of real commitment to make the revised strategy a document 

that will serve us well and set a clear direction. We believe the strategy should be 

a living document that is updated more frequently and flexes as developments 

occur. 

In addition, the NFCA has begun working with DHS to conduct an exercise later 

this year regarding Critical Operational Capability No. 1—Receive. This is likely to 

involve the entire National Network of Fusion Centers and will help assess progress 

and identify areas for improvement. Fusion centers continue efforts to train ‘‘fusion 

liaison officers’’ or ‘‘FLOs’’. Thousands of State, local, and Tribal law enforcement 

officers have received FLO training and the centers are committed to continue this 

training. Supporting this training is one of the primary reasons that we need to ensure sustained funding is available. 

Another example of our enhanced level of preparedness is the event that I plan 

to attend immediately after this hearing: A secure video teleconference jointly held 

by DHS and FBI along with the National Network of Fusion Centers and Governors’ 

homeland security advisors. The call will outline the current threat environment, 

and will also consider suspicious activity reporting, SAR training, and engagement 

with the public. 

We have made tremendous progress and our level of preparedness has increased 

significantly in recent years. Fusion center directors are committed to continuous 

improvement and are engaging at the operational and strategic levels every day 

across the National Network and with our Federal partners. We continue to push 

for more advances, build trust, and overcome obstacles. I realize that these activities 

rarely rise to the level of Congressional awareness, but the examples I mentioned 

are just a few of the many efforts happening today. As a result of sustained focus 

at all levels, we are better prepared to gather, analyze, and share information and 

intelligence that improves our homeland—and hometown—security. We ask for your 

continued support for these initiatives. 

Thank you again on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association for the opportunity to provide our perspectives. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. 

Now to Dr. Benjamin. I apologize if I mispronounced your first 

name. But you are recognized, sir, for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGES C. BENJAMIN, M.D., EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION 

Dr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, you are right on target. It is 

Georges Benjamin. 

Let me thank you very much for having me, Mr. Chairman and 

Members of the committee, to represent the views of the public 

health community. 

We have certainly had a long and proud history of providing 

emergency preparedness in public health emergencies. As you may 

know, we have really been challenged for many, many years of 

underinvestment in public health, but since September 11, 2001, 

and of course the subsequent anthrax attacks in the years that fol-
41 

lowed, we have really made a substantial investment. I have no 

question that that has improved the health and well-being and preparedness of the Nation. 

However, there are concerns of where we have gone because of 

infrastructure loss and funding loss. I think the report is a good report, that the writers ought to be commended. But I do want to add 

some emphasis on one area of the report where they talk about 

some of the infrastructure loss in the public health system. 

During the anthrax attacks, I actually happened to be the secretary of health in Maryland. In my testimony, we learned several 

lessons, and let me just focus on a couple of them. One was that 

preparedness is everybody’s second job. No matter whether or not 

you are an administrative clerk or an epidemiologist in the maternal/child health program, or whether you do the AIDS programs, 

preparedness is everybody’s secondary job. The second thing, more 

importantly, we were lucky. Had we had another big event that occurred, we would have been really challenged to respond. 

In light of some of those concerns, I would just point out to you 

a big pertussis outbreak that is going on right now in Washington 

State. Pertussis is whooping cough. Most of us have certainly been 

vaccinated as children for pertussis, and yet they have had for the 

last 21 weeks an amazing outbreak that has occurred. They have 

had over 1,900 cases, compared to 154 cases during the same time 

period last year. That outbreak continues to grow. There are lots 

of, probably, reasons for that: Some changes in vaccine formulation, 

people who haven’t gotten vaccinated. But having said that, they 

are very concerned about their inability to respond as effectively as 

they would like to because of staffing shortages that have occurred 

in their State, at least in some parts of their State. 

Also, we have had reductions in some of the public health laboratories in the Nation. An excellent example here is in New Jersey, 

where the number of scientists certified to work on select agents, 

the ones you are most concerned about with terrorism, is down 

from 15 to 5. I think you would agree that that means that their 

surge capacity is greatly impaired. 

As you look at the workforce in public health, we have lost over 

52,000 people since 2008 within the public health workforce. If you 

look at programs, for example, that have been downsized, about 23 

percent of the local health department programs, local health departments in the country, have cuts in their emergency preparedness programs, specifically, in addition to many, many other programmatic cuts. 

Of course, the biggest challenge we have is around funding. I call 

it yo-yo funding, where we put a fair amount of money into something, respond to a crisis, and then just before we really get it all 

taken care of, we begin to then down-cycle the funding. That 

doesn’t build a sustainable, long-term system. I think if we did that 

for defense, we would be in a terrible, terrible shape. 

I think as we—my testimony also talks about our concern about 

many of the cuts. There is not, obviously, enough time to go 

through all of those various concerns about funding. But having 

said this, I think we need to begin looking at a much more sustainable, long-term funding mechanism that helps us integrate public 

health within the rest of emergency preparedness. We have gone 
42 

a long way to doing that. I mean, we are no longer showing up at 

emergencies, like we did before 2001, exchanging business cards. 

That does not occur anymore. Public health folks know the emergency preparedness folks, they know the police and fire and EMS 

folks. They work very, very well together. But the erosion of our 

system, I think, remains a big concern to us, particularly if we 

have something that is catastrophic. 

With that, I thank you very much for your attention and certainly will answer any questions that you have. 

[The statement of Dr. Benjamin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGES C. BENJAMIN

JUNE 6, 2012 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson and Members of the subcommittee, my name is Dr. Georges Benjamin and I am the executive director of 

the American Public Health Association (APHA). Founded in 1872, APHA is the oldest, largest, and most diverse organization of public health professionals in the 

world. The association aims to protect all Americans and their communities from 

preventable, serious health threats and strives to assure community-based health 

promotion and disease prevention activities and preventive health services are universally accessible in the United States. APHA represents a broad array of health 

providers, educators, environmentalists, policy-makers, and health officials at all 

levels working both within and outside Governmental organizations and educational 

institutions. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

state of public health emergency preparedness and thank you for your leadership 

on this important topic. 

The Nation’s public health system has a long and proud history of providing services during public health emergencies by providing a range of services from acute 

infectious disease detection, post-disaster environmental risk assessment, and longterm surveillance for emerging post-disaster threats to health. The public health 

system then works to make us safer by preventing or mitigating these risks to 

health using a variety of clinical and nonclinical interventions. For many years we 

as a Nation had underinvested in public health system emergency preparedness, 

however, since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks later that year, significant investments in public health preparedness 

and response have occurred. There is no question that these investments have 

greatly improved the Nation’s overall ability to prevent, respond to, and recover 

from public health emergencies including bioterrorism, chemical incidents, radiological and nuclear events, infectious disease outbreaks and natural disasters. However, we still have a long way to go to achieve a level of optimal preparedness. In 

fact, we have had significant regression in the infrastructure needed to achieve this 

desired level. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 2012 National Preparedness Report highlights many of the improvements we have seen since 2001 across a wide 

range of preparedness activities and highlights several areas where we have made 

enormous progress. I believe the report authors should be commended for the areas 

where they have focused most intently. There is one area of the report however, that 

does require more detail to give the committee a fuller understanding of the Nation’s level of public health and medical preparedness. That area is found on page 

47 where a key finding of the reports notes ‘‘The Nation has built a highly respected 

public health capability for managing incidents, but recent reductions in public 

health funding and personnel have impacted these capabilities.’’ I would like to give 

a more complete explanation about the impact that current funding and workforce 

reductions have on the ability of the public health system to respond not only to 

public health emergencies, but also to undertake the day-to-day responsibilities that 

keep our communities safe and healthy. 

THE STATE OF PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS

There are core functional capacities you want in a public health preparedness system. You want to know when a disease syndrome first enters a community, the ability to rapidly identify the cause of the disease and how it is contracted, the ability 

to conduct accurate new case findings and tracking, the ability to communicate effectively to a range of stakeholders (including the public) and disease containment 
43 

and treatment ability. In a terror attack the forensic component of these efforts 

magnify the importance of these requirements. Over the past several years we have 

had significant erosion in our core capacity to do many of these things. Let me start 

by putting it in perspective and relate the critical role Federal programs and funding play in State and local public health emergency preparedness and response activities. 

During the anthrax attacks in October 2001, I was the secretary of health for the 

State of Maryland. Baltimore City and all 23 of Maryland’s counties responded in 

order to treat people who had been exposed through the U.S. postal system or in 

the Hart Senate Office Building and to address, State-wide, white powder reports 

which paralyzed the Nation. This experience taught me several important lessons: • A good plan is an essential first step.—Fortunately for Maryland, we had previously developed a public health preparedness plan and had some early capacity because of my interest in preparedness (I am an emergency physician) and 

more importantly, a small grant from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC). We also learned how important it is to actually exercise the 

plan because it had been untested and many lessons were learned from actually 

having to use it. • Disease response does not recognize borders.—The index case in the Washington, 

DC area was a Maryland resident who was exposed in Washington, DC and 

hospitalized in Virginia. Only the Federal Government can build a regional capacity to address this kind of disease exposure. No single jurisdiction could have 

handled this alone. A robust surveillance system, sustained training, and local, 

State, and Federal cooperation is required for an adequate response. • Delivering countermeasures is complex.—The Maryland plan anticipated the 

need to get pharmaceuticals in large amounts quickly and recognized the turnaround time to get the contents of the strategic National stockpile (SNS) was 

longer than we could wait. We had a short-term plan to utilize the pharmacy 

system from our mental health system for pharmaceuticals (Cipro) until the 

SNS was available. This temporary system worked but we recognized the benefits of the SNS as soon as it became available because of the prolonged nature 

of the Nation-wide response to the anthrax letters. We designed an on-the-spot 

distribution system and when the SNS supply arrived we distributed it to local 

health departments all over the State during the night. If the SNS did not exist 

or if we had not owned our own hospitals we would not have had any meaningful capacity to respond. Those exposed would have had anthrax in their systems 

for much longer periods of time and we may have had many other serious cases. • Communication is a big deal.—Anthrax is a rare disease to the general practicing medical community. Over days and weeks our call center was swamped 

with calls from health professionals looking for current diagnostic and therapeutic information about anthrax. We also had numerous calls from the general 

public and the media seeking reliable information. Our ability to utilize a range 

of communication tools from automated telephone responses, our web page, 

press releases, news conferences and live call takers was essential to keeping 

the people informed and calm. The newly instituted Health Alert Network was 

an important enterprise-wide communication tool that provided reliable public 

health information in a timely way on a regular basis. These efforts were coordinated with a range of State, local, and Federal agencies. In those days every 

health department in America did not have ready access to email as we do 

today. Clearly our National capacity to respond is more effective when we have 

a system that can leverage all of the available components. 

• Preparedness is everyone’s secondary job for surge capacity.—Our disease surveillance staffs were superb but we were often challenged to keep up with our 

day-to-day responsibilities before the attacks. When the attacks occurred, we 

utilized many other staff from across the agencies that were in programs unrelated to public health preparedness to use their skills in support of this emergency response. In this way, chronic disease epidemiologists, maternal child 

health epidemiologists, and HIV/AIDS workers were recruited to help. Often 

working 18 to 20 hours a day, sleeping on the floor or on cots in their offices, 

these heroic public servants did what was required to respond to this effort. 

Erosion in other programs unrelated to preparedness has a negative impact on 

the ability of a public health agency to scale up when a disaster occurs. 

• A robust National public health laboratory network is essential.—Maryland is 

fortunate to have had one of the best public health laboratories in the country. 

A public health laboratory is very different from a hospital or clinical laboratory. We served as the reference lab for many lab samples, the prime testing 

lab for many clinical and nonclinical samples and the link to the FBI for forensic samples. Our laboratory was swamped with samples from sources all over 
44 

Maryland and the District (as their laboratory did not have appropriate equipment to do the testing at the time). Over 300 samples a day came into the lab 

for several weeks. All of the positive samples required follow-up with the sender 

and had to follow a chain of custody to be sent to the FBI. This relatively limited and small, but serious incident (five letters), completely inundated our system. It was a massive undertaking for months and a staffing and logistical challenge. The Federally-supported laboratory response network played a critical 

role in our response activities. 

• We were lucky.—Five letters resulted in a Nation-wide event with 17 cases of 

illness, five deaths, more than 33,000 people being placed on antibiotics and 

thousands of emergency responses because of the fear that any white powder 

discovered could be anthrax. In Maryland, an additional naturally-occurring 

outbreak such as a food-borne outbreak at a restaurant, a wedding, or a second 

terror attack with another agent would have been impossible to manage effectively with our existing State infrastructure at the time. 

I have followed the progress of Maryland’s efforts since I left in December 2002 

and have been generally pleased that the State and the agency have continued to 

improve on their preparedness system and have effectively switched to an all-hazards approach, as has most of the Nation. Yet, I remain concerned about erosion 

in capacity of the system when I see what is happening in places like Washington 

State where an outbreak of pertussis continues to grow and response capacity is 

hampered by the deterioration of the local public health infrastructure in particular. 

The State of Washington began experiencing an outbreak of pertussis about 21 

weeks ago. Pertussis is a disease commonly found in childhood that has been greatly 

eliminated because of a safe and effective vaccine given during childhood. As of May 

26, 2012 there have been 1,947 reported cases, 127 under the age of 1 with 30 of 

them hospitalized. As of this reporting there have not been any deaths. This is compared to 154 reported cases during the same time period in 2011. The outbreak continues to grow. While the exact causes of the outbreak are unclear, it may be related 

to children not getting their full series of vaccinations and waning protection in the 

previous vaccine due to changes in the vaccine formulation. 

Responding to this outbreak is believed to be hampered by staffing shortages in 

some parts of the State (as reported in the New York Times on May 12, 2012 and 

in my personal communications with the Washington State Health Officer). My concern is that this is a superb State health department with solid leadership that has 

to contend with dwindling resources particularly at the local level. According to reports mentioned above, local health departments in Washington have experienced 

reductions in funding due to the recession, resulting in diminished staffing levels, 

and as a consequence, affected their ability to respond in a more effective manner. 

I am very concerned that this represents a microcosm of what is awaiting the rest 

of the Nation as our infrastructure further dwindles. If we cannot address a large 

but classic outbreak I have real concerns about our ability to respond effectively to 

a novel or an intentional one. 

Our Nation’s public health laboratories are also facing serious challenges due to 

funding and staffing reductions. According to surveys conducted by the Association 

of Public Health Laboratories, which represents laboratories with a public health 

mission, many public health laboratories have also lost staff and have had to curtail 

other important programs in order to maintain preparedness capabilities. The State 

Public Health Laboratory in California, for instance, had to eliminate a training program intended to produce laboratory workforce leadership in order to maintain adequate preparedness funding. In New Jersey, the number of scientists certified to 

work on select agents (testing on biothreat materials, like anthrax) has been reduced from 15 down to 5, threatening the State’s laboratory surge capacity in the 

event of a public health emergency or disease outbreak. Massachusetts has also 

been forced to reduce other areas of funding in order to maintain its preparedness 

activities, including reductions in laboratory oversight management and quality assurance. 

As a Nation we are facing two major challenges that this committee should be 

aware of as you assess the state of public health emergency preparedness in America: The public health workforce crisis and worsening fiscal support. 

AN ERODING PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE

Our State and local health departments continue to struggle with significant job 

losses and painful budget cuts. Unfortunately, State and local budgets have not recovered from the recession. Since 2008, more than 52,000 public health jobs have 

been lost at local health departments and State and regional health agencies. These 
45 

numbers represent 17 percent of the State and territorial public health workforce 

and 22 percent of the local public health workforce. 

State and territorial health agencies continue to report on-going job losses and 

budget cuts to critical public health programs. According to the most recent survey 

of State health agencies conducted in March 2012 by the Association of State and 

Territorial Health Officials, between July 1 and December 31, 2011, 30 percent reported staff layoffs, 41 percent reported the loss of staff through attrition, 24 percent reported cutting entire programs and 46 percent reported a reduction in services provided. Cumulatively, since 2008, the numbers are even greater with 56 percent reporting layoffs, 62 percent cutting entire programs, and 91 percent reporting 

a reduction in services provided. 

The situation is just as dire among local health departments. According to a January 2012 survey of local health departments conducted by the National Association 

of County and City Health Officials, 57 percent of local health departments reduced 

or eliminated at least one public health program in 2011, with emergency preparedness activities taking the biggest hit. Twenty-three percent of local health departments reported cuts to emergency preparedness programs in 2011. The effects of the 

recession continue to be felt among local health departments with 41 percent of departments reporting that their current year’s budget is less than the previous year 

and 41 percent reporting that they expect additional cuts in the coming fiscal year. 

A PATTERN OF DESTRUCTIVE CYCLIC FUNDING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

Funding for public health programs has a history of ‘‘yo-yo funding.’’ That is, 

funding continues until we get improvements in capacity and improved health outcomes, then the funding cycles downward only to find the problem return often at 

an increased overall cost. This happens at the Federal, State, and local level. An 

unreliable, insufficient, and unsustainable funding pattern erodes system preparedness for all hazards and threats and leaves our Nation at risk. 

Like many domestic programs critical Federal dollars that fund many of the public health emergency preparedness activities that fall to our State and local health 

departments continue to decline. According to the report Ready or Not? Protecting 

the Public from Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism issued by Trust for America’s 

Health in December 2011, from 2005 to 2012, Federal funding for State and local 

preparedness activities has been reduced by more than 38 percent (when adjusted 

for inflation). 

CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program is the foundation 

and bedrock of public health preparedness in the United States. The program provides critical resources, scientific expertise, and coordination to ensure that our 

State and local health departments are prepared to respond to an emergency and 

to ensure that all Americans will be protected. Unfortunately, funding for this critical program has decreased significantly over the past several years. Reductions to 

this funding will certainly limit the ability of our health departments to monitor, 

assess, and respond to public health threats in their communities. These cuts could 

impact the capacity of disease surveillance staff to detect an outbreak or a bioterrorist attack, which would limit the ability of State laboratories to quickly respond 

to the surges in testing that would be needed, and hamper the ability of State and 

local health authorities to respond adequately in order to protect the public from 

exposure or ensure the rapid distribution of life-saving medicine and medical supplies. Unfortunately, the President’s budget request would reduce support for State 

and local preparedness by an additional $8 million in fiscal year 2013. 

Funding for the Strategic National Stockpile is also at risk. As noted earlier the 

SNS is an essential component of the Nation’s ability to ensure an adequate supply 

of critical medicine and equipment to aid State and local public health agencies are 

armed with the tools they need to respond to a National health emergency. Experience has shown how valuable the SNS supplies of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, 

and other life-saving medicines and equipment are when local supplies become depleted during an emergency. CDC’s ability to maintain the SNS and State and local 

government’s ability to implement the distribution are dependent on a well-funded, 

agile, and reliable system. In addition to supplies, it is the strategically coordinated 

distribution plans that Federal, State, and local government have designed and are 

required to exercise regularly that will impact how quickly and thoroughly these 

supplies are distributed. Sustained funding is essential to maintain a sense of readiness for this capacity. 

Unfortunately, funding for the SNS was reduced by $57 million in fiscal year 2012 

and the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request proposes cutting this critical 

funding by an additional $48 million in fiscal year 2013. By cutting this funding, 

we jeopardize efforts to develop initiatives to reduce distribution response times. Re-
46 

ductions in this funding also put the Nation at risk of being unprepared and unable 

to provide needed medication to all persons affected by a public health emergency. 

The SNS supply must be replenished when the shelf life of the medications expire. 

Additionally, the facilities maintained and staff involved in the production of the 

medical countermeasures must be in place to appropriately respond to the changing 

needs of the stockpile. Speed, sufficient supplies and staff who know and have practiced using the plans are all essential to a rapid response and recovery. 

Another key Federal program that provides needed resources to State and local 

health departments to prepare and respond to all hazards is the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) administered by the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Preparedness and Response. Funding provided through this critical program enhances and improves overall medical surge capacity at hospitals and other key components of the health care system in a public health emergency. We have seen the 

value of this program very recently in Joplin, Missouri. After the tornadoes devastated that city last year, roughly 30 percent of the city of Joplin’s infrastructure 

was destroyed including St. John’s Regional Medical Center, which had to evacuate 

all 183 patients from the facility. Equipment funded through the HPP assisted staff 

in evacuating patients down as many as eight flights of stairs and a fully operational 60-bed mobile medical unit was deployed and fully operational within a 

week of the tornado. This program, unfortunately, is also at risk. The President’s 

fiscal year 2013 budget request proposes to reduce funding for HPP by $142 million 

or 36 percent. 

In addition to reductions in funding for State and local preparedness and response 

capabilities, we are also concerned with the declining funds for CDC’s preparedness 

and response activities. While the President’s budget request provides a small $9 

million increase for fiscal year 2013, funding for CDC’s internal capacity has declined by nearly 50 percent since fiscal year 2006. With this funding, CDC operates 

its Emergency Operations Center around the clock and serves a critical role providing rapid logistical support to deploy personnel and transfer supplies and equipment to support State and local authorities on the front lines during public health 

emergencies. The center also plays a central role in activating response operations, 

deploying personnel to disaster zones and investigating health security threats. Continued underfunding of CDC’s preparedness and response activities will undermine 

the agency’s ability to coordinate communications and response activities and to provide scientific, logistical, and personnel support to State and local responders. 

APHA is also very concerned about the additional blow that the pending sequestration would have on funding for public health programs broadly. As you know, the 

Budget Control Act created a process known as sequestration to encourage the socalled ‘‘supercommittee’’ to come up with a viable deficit reduction proposal. Because 

the supercommittee failed to reach agreement on a plan, sequestration, or acrossthe-board cuts to discretionary funding estimated in the range of 8–10 percent, is 

scheduled to take place in January 2013. Cuts of an additional 8–10 percent on top 

of the recent cuts to Federal preparedness programs would be nothing short of devastating. Cuts of this magnitude could eliminate funding for the 10 National Level 

1 chemical labs, shut down CDC’s emergency operations center, and further reduce 

funding for SNS and other State and local preparedness funding. 

CONCLUSION

Public health has historically been asked to do more with less. It is now at a 

breaking point. Unless we start supporting our public health system in a more sustained way, our capacity will continue to erode and our ability to respond quickly 

and competently will evaporate. Funding public health emergencies once the disaster has already occurred is not an effective way to ensure either preparedness or 

accountability. 

We must have a robust public health system with adequate levels of personnel 

who are well-trained and properly equipped to address a variety of public health 

threats. Additionally, the ability to generate immediate surge capacity by using an 

‘‘all hands on deck’’ and ‘‘whole of community’’ approach is essential and requires 

a better recognition of the role other components of the public health system plays 

in preparedness. Funding is tight at all levels of Government but as the economy 

recovers and we begin to make new strategic investments in homeland defense, Congress must make funding the public health system a top priority. Protecting the 

public’s health is a matter of National security. 

Time and again, we have failed to think more strategically about the future of 

our Nation’s public health system, to develop a blueprint for where we want to be 

in the future and how best to fund it. APHA believes that far more significant sustained investments in public health need to occur if we are to prepare the Nation’s 
47 

public health system to protect us from the leading causes of death, and prepare 

us for a rapid response to a range of public health emergencies, whether naturally 

occurring or the result of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about state of the Nation’s preparedness and our ability to deal with public health emergencies. On behalf of the American Public Health Association, I look forward to working with you 

to strengthen all aspects of our Nation’s public health infrastructure to ensure the 

health and safety of the American public. I am happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Doctor. 

I want to thank all of you for your testimony. 

I will go ahead and recognize myself for 5 minutes. First question for Mr. Madden. 

Since the State Preparedness Reports were critical components 

in developing the National Preparedness Report, I am interested in 

learning more about how States develop their annual preparedness 

reports. I am concerned that the self-assessment survey the States 

filled out did not allow for States to accurately portray the current 

State preparedness. 

Can you explain more about the self-assessment surveys that 

States filled out this year? Did this survey allow Alaska, specifically, to accurately report its capacity levels in all 31 core capabilities? 

When Alaska was developing its preparedness report, was your 

office able to solicit input from the local emergency management 

and law enforcement personnel and others for input? In other 

words, was there time allotted, did you have the opportunity to get 

input from the community? 

Mr. MADDEN. Sir, I think that we found ourselves in a position 

of collecting far more information and insight than there was room 

to put into the State Preparedness Report. The format was, I understand, limited so that they could quickly aggregate the 50 

States and get the depth and breadth of the issues. 

We worked very strongly with our local jurisdictions, along with 

the other disciplines of fire, police. We also worked with the private 

sector, with which we have a very powerful—it is a very strong 

public-private partnership. We gained the access that allowed us to 

increase our effectiveness even if there was not room for it inside 

the State Preparedness Report. So it was of value to us to work 

broadly and deeply on these issues. 

But the return, so far, returns back into the State and local for 

us to improve our priorities. It has not yet reached that level of sophistication where that can be immediately brought into the National Preparedness Report. That is why I believe the emphasis has 

to be on that analysis and problem solving that the States are 

using to set our priorities. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Very good. Thank you. Appreciate it. 

Mr. Sena, in recent years, we have seen a dramatic shift in the 

terrorist threat, which now includes plots from homegrown and 

lone-wolf actors in addition to attacks formally directed by alQaeda and other affiliates. We must be prepared to prevent and, 

if necessary, respond to a variety of techniques, as you know, including vehicle-borne IEDs, the potential for secondary attacks to 

target first responders, or, as we read in the recent issue of the al- 
48 

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Inspire magazine, possibly 

even wildfires. 

Given this shift, I believe that first responders like firefighters 

should be more fully integrated into the fusion center network and 

certainly be included as recipients of intelligence information. If 

you can give me some information on that and give me your opinions on that. 

Do fusion centers include local firefighters presently as recipients 

of intelligence bulletins and products? Although many fusion centers in the network include fire services into the analytic ranks 

and/or the liaison programs, many, I understand, do not. In your 

opinion, what is the best way to incorporate first responders into 

the fusion center process? 

Then I have one more question for you, as well. 

Mr. SENA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As far as firefighters and—all disciplines should be incorporated 

into the fusion center process. Information sharing is not a solely 

law enforcement function. It should include emergency managers, 

public health, all of the other disciplines that are available. As far 

as incorporation in fusion centers, those disciplines have a perspective that law enforcement, a person like myself, doesn’t quite understand the needs that they have in the field for their personnel. 

As far as the network and dissemination, fire services are heavily 

involved in that. The Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise was actually worked on with a number of firefighters from New York, Arizona—in fact, one of the firefighters in my own center worked on 

that project—to develop how the fire service would interrelate into 

this intelligence enterprise made up of State, local, urban area fusion center partners. They are very valuable to what we do. They 

are a group of people not acting as agents of the Government for, 

you know, collection of the data, but if they come across information in the course of their duties, they have the ability, if trained 

properly, to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and 

move that suspicious activity forward to fusion centers, where that 

information can be developed and potentially be turned over to the 

Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

As far as the issue regarding the emerging threat of the homegrown violent extremists, traditionally in the intelligence community and our Federal law enforcement partners, the focus has been 

on those external threats. But looking into the threats coming domestically from those folks who have been self-radicalized either 

on-line or by, you know, radicalization from small cells within the 

United States, they had at one point the ability to look beyond, 

using the intelligence community tools. But those tools do not work 

domestically because, you know, they don’t have those resources 

within the United States. It is those police officers, firefighters, 

emergency medical personnel, public health personnel that will 

contact those radicalized individuals. Based on the defined suspicious activity reporting requirements we have, they will be able 

to give us the information we need. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

I am going to ask one last question. In the interest of time, I 

wanted to ask Dr. Benjamin, and maybe we can talk afterwards, 
49 

Mr. Sena, at another time. Then I want to yield to the gentleman 

from New York. 

But, Dr. Benjamin, figures from the National Association of 

County and City Health Officials show that local health departments are continuing to struggle in the face of difficult fiscal times. 

I am sure you agree. These departments self-reported that during 

2011 they continued to struggle. Fifty-seven percent of them reduced or eliminated services in at least one program area. Of 10 

areas in public health, emergency preparedness ranks second-hardest-hit. Your testimony also reflects concern over this decline in 

local resources; you mention that. 

What do you think we might want to ask States in the next preparedness report to perhaps better capture a full picture of the status of public health security in the United States? 

Dr. BENJAMIN. Yeah, I would think that it would be helpful to 

have them report on two or three leading measures about their capacity to respond to an everyday event. You know, if they can’t respond to an outbreak of—a foodborne outbreak or something like 

that, it is going to be very difficult for them to scale up. 

So I think having, you know, us identify two or three measures 

that measure their current capacity to do something routine would, 

I think, give you a better measure of their capacity to do broader 

public health preparedness than us thinking about—because we 

often get hung up in thinking about these big things. When you fill 

out these kinds of measures, you are thinking, okay, I can do the 

small stuff, but I can’t do the big stuff. But if you can’t do the small 

stuff, you will never get there. 

I think that that would be a good way for you to get an early 

indicator, which I think is what your committee wants to do, an 

early indicator as a red flag that we need to focus in on that area. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Good suggestion. Thank you very much, sir. 

Now I will recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, 

for, within reason, as long as he would like. I will give you Mr. 

Marino’s time, too. 

Mr. TURNER. Thirty seconds will be fine. 

New York City has no fusion center. Is that a hole in the fabric 

of the overall system? Is it something that should be addressed or 

corrected? Is it of concern? 

Mr. SENA. As fusion centers were developed, it was left up to the 

decision of the Governors of each State, urban areas, to develop 

their fusion centers. Currently, we have 49 State centers, we have 

2 territorial centers, and 26 urban areas. As far as the determination of where fusion centers should be, I believe it should be left 

up to that region. It is not up to the Federal Government to decide, 

but I believe that those regions should make that decision of 

whether they need a fusion center or not. 

The State of New York has the New York State Intelligence Center, which is the fusion center for the State. They cover a great 

deal of that area. Right across the way is the New Jersey—the regional intelligence center, ‘‘the Rock.’’ 

So, between those two centers, there is a great deal of support. 

But, you know, I would leave it and say that it is up to that area 

of whether they want to develop that attribute. 
50 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. So my fellow New Yorkers are not being unnecessarily problematic, eh? 

Mr. SENA. I would say that, you know, as far as looking at gaps 

in the country, that, you know, bringing fusion centers up to, you 

know, beyond baseline capabilities and beyond core operation capabilities, having that ability to network—saying that everyone needs 

a fusion center is not necessarily something that is a good idea. As 

I found in my own experience, the more operations you may have 

in a very specific area, the more issues you have with collection, 

dissemination of information, and having the proper flow of data. 

Mr. TURNER. Uh-huh. 

Mr. SENA. So it really is up to your city of how they want to 

build it. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Diplomatically handled. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

I have one last question, if you don’t mind. 

Mr. Madden, again, explain and elaborate on how States are getting the private sector involved in preparation in any operations. 

Then if you guys want to elaborate on that issue, I would appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, Alaska decided early on that we 

had a partnership with our private infrastructure. They are essential to the conduct of our missions and our economy. In this partnership, we decided not to go sector-by-sector but to invite the 

members of the key elements and then expand out. We have representatives from tourism, from communications, from transportation, energy. 

In our engagement with them, we look at the things that we 

have in common. We have recently run a very in-depth analysis of 

the effects of a cyber attack on any one of our members, but looking 

for the cascading or escalating effects. When we had our volcanic 

eruptions in 2009, a volcano very close to Anchorage, our largest 

city, what are the effects of this? We worked it through, and we 

worked out the effects on maritime traffic, on public health, on the 

movement of goods and services. 

Our private sector is very, very eager to do this, and we are not 

only sustaining our activities, but we are increasing them across 

the State. We use very much of a market-driven approach, that 

there is a return on the investment of their participation. They get 

not only access to the State so that we can improve our plans, they 

get access to each other so they can support each other on their 

continuity efforts. 

There cannot be a transportation system without energy. There 

cannot be an energy system without communications. All of these 

things put together is our approach to the private sector. I believe 

my approach within Alaska is representative of many areas around 

the country. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Excellent. Thank you. 

Anyone else want to elaborate and talk about that topic? 

Otherwise, I would like to give you a couple minutes, if you 

would like, to briefly discuss another issue. They just called for 

votes, but we have a couple more minutes. I think they will hold 

it open for a while. 
51 

Anyone else want to talk about that particular issue or anything 

else before I—— 

Dr. BENJAMIN. Let me just add that the recent pandemic flu of 

H1N1 really gave the public health community an opportunity to 

work with a broader group than just the health community on continuity plans, the identification of sick people, reporting of disease, 

treating folks, using innovative ways to do disease control. But it 

has really opened up an opportunity to do a dialogue with a much 

broader part of the public health community, which I think will be 

very productive over the next several years. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. 

Anyone else. 

Mr. SENA. Sir? 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, please. 

Mr. SENA. For the prevention and what we do as fusion centers, 

the private sector is critical. They have over 80 percent of what we 

consider critical infrastructure, key resources within the country. 

Having them have the knowledge and ability to basically create 

their own fence and defenses, not in brick structure or, you know, 

building fences physically, but in the ability to identify suspicious 

activity reporting, to pass that information. 

Then, also, to have that confidence that fusion centers in the 

Government, going into their facilities to review their security procedures, evaluate their vulnerabilities to attack, is critical to what 

we do. 

Also, you know, having the ability to share information with 

them, conversely, so that they feel like they are true partners, as 

they should be, that is critical to what we do. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I agree. It is all voluntary. 

Okay. Anyway, if there is nothing else to add, I really appreciate 

it very much that you all are here. The testimony was excellent. 

Of course, I thank the witnesses for their testimony and the Members for their questions. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 

questions for you, and we ask that you respond in writing. The 

hearing record will be open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you again. 

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(53) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN GUS M. BILIRAKIS FOR TIMOTHY W. MANNING

Question 1. The 9/11 Commission wrote that ‘‘The biggest impediment to an allsource analysis—a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systematic resistance to information sharing.’’ 

Why in the drafts of the National Planning Frameworks has the Department of 

Homeland Security limited information and intelligence sharing as a core capability 

for prevention and protection, rather than as a common core capability across all 

frameworks? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. A key finding of the report was that the Federal coordination of medical countermeasure efforts across agencies has greatly improved since 2001, a topic 

on which the subcommittee has focused significant oversight. We have many more 

countermeasures available, and improved capacity to distribute and dispense them. 

Are you confident, however, that this represents a substantial gain in preparedness, such that we could get these countermeasures to all of the people who might 

need them within the 48-hour window required for some of the doses? While I think 

we’re all comfortable that we could do this on a small scale, are you confident that 

we could do it effectively on a mass scale of the kind that we worry about in the 

homeland security context? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. While the Stafford Act exempts certain activities from NEPA requirements, according to Section 301, it does not grant a general authority to waive the 

requirements for Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) or Environmental Assessments (EA). Given that the delays caused by applying for EIS’ and EA’s has been 

an impediment to short- and long-term recovery efforts, has FEMA developed a system to work with the EPA for expedited applications or a waiver process for specific 

activities related to recovery and mitigation? 

Is there an MOU process which covers this issue to allow for short-term construction (housing, temporary public buildings, infrastructure support) to assist with 

quickly bringing critical infrastructure systems back on-line after an event? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. Because most critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, 

there is no public assistance available for rapid restoration. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 

§ 5172, the President has the ability to make contributions to a person that owns 

or operates a structure deemed to be of a ‘‘National, critical nature’’. If the contribution were to be made, it could only happen after the owner/operator had applied for 

and received the full amount of a Small Business Administration loan. 

Has FEMA considered an exception or worked with the White House on the interpretation of the governing regulations to hasten the recovery of critical systems 

post-event without imposing an undue economic or bureaucratic burden on the 

owner/operator by virtue of the Title 50 process? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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