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80–091 PDF 2013

S. HRG. 110–1218 

IMPROVING CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 

PREPAID CALLING CARD MARKET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Ranking 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 10, 2008 ..................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Hutchison ............................................................................ 1 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 46 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 48 

WITNESSES

Acampora, Hon. Patricia L., Commissioner, Public Service Commission, State 

of New York; Member, Committee on Consumer Affairs, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners .......................................................... 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 36 

Engel, Hon. Eliot L., U.S. Representative from New York .................................. 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Greenberg, Sally, Executive Director, National Consumers League ................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Kovacic, Hon. William E., Chairman, Federal Trade Commission ...................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

O’Brien, Rosemary G., President, Military Marketing LLC ................................ 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

West, Gus K., President and Chairman of the Board, The Hispanic Institute .. 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28 

APPENDIX

Submission of Mark E. Budnitz, J.D., Professor of Law, Georgia State University, Martina Rojo and Julia Marblue, entitled, ‘‘Deceptive Claims for Prepaid Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation,’’ Loyola Consumer 

Law Review, 2006 ................................................................................................. 55 

(1) 

IMPROVING CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE 

PREPAID CALLING CARD MARKET 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SR– 

253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Good morning. The meeting will come to order. 

And as a nod to our distinguished Senator from Texas who has 

another important appointment, I want to yield to her to please 

make an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

I really appreciate your letting me go first, and I just want to 

make a brief statement. 

First of all, I will cosponsor your bill. I think it is very important 

that we have the ability to establish a standard and it is kind of 

a clear, easy bar to clear that whatever is on a card should be on 

a card. And we have had trouble in my home State of Texas and 

the Attorney General has even filed a lawsuit against a company 

that was found not to have produced the correct number of minutes 

for what was promised. And I think it particularly preys on people 

who perhaps do not speak English or elderly people, people who 

use these cards in good faith. 

So I think we need to take action, and I really appreciate the 

leadership that you are showing. And I will look forward to reading 

the testimony from the Chairman and look forward to working 

through this so that there is a standard that Americans or anyone 

buying a card can rely on. 

Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. And I want to thank the Senator from Texas 

for her leadership also with regard to our Space Subcommittee. We 

have a real challenge, as she well knows, in trying to get little old 

NASA back on track. And now with insurgent and resurgent Russia, how can we continue to rely on the Russians to get to the 

International Space Station, which is a national laboratory thanks 

to the Senator from Texas, for a 5- or 6- or 7-year period? 

2 

And this is one of the most mismanaged programs that we have 

ever seen. It has put us in this terrible circumstance of having 

built and paid $100 billion for a national lab that is an International Space Station, and come 2011, we may not even be able 

to get to it. The Russians would have total control of it, and who 

knows, they might decide to form a joint partnership with the Chinese and take advantage of our $100 billion. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to take a 

very strong action because the possibilities I think have been clarified even in the last 2 months that Russia may not be a reliable 

partner for us to use. And I think we should step up the efforts to 

get the Crew Return Vehicle moved up. And then I think we need 

to extend our shuttle missions to finish out the Space Station so 

that it can do the most good for us in energy research, as well as 

the other research that’s being done there. I think that it will take 

a very bold action, and I think we should start that effort right 

now. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I am going to need the Senator from 

Texas’ help because we want to put all of this in the NASA reauthorization bill, but we are having difficulty with a certain Senator 

from South Carolina. And I need the Senator’s help. 

Senator HUTCHISON. I was not aware that we had a problem in 

South Carolina, but I am certainly willing to discuss that. 

So that this wonderful conversation we are having is relevant, 

we all want to have calling cards that can take us to Mars. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. And I thank the Senator. 

Well, let us come back down to Earth. We have got all kinds of 

skullduggery going on here that we need to attack. It has to do 

with prepaid calling cards which are used by millions of folks and 

they buy these cards to stay in touch with their loved ones. It is 

a simple, little card. They buy these and they can call their loved 

ones around the country, around the world. It is particularly helpful to military members, seniors, immigrants, and low income 

Americans. With limited financial resources, these things become a 

lifeline to their family and their friends. 

But what we have seen is a number of unscrupulous providers 

that are now operating in the market. And basically what it is is 

deception. 

Now, most of the calling cards are from large, well-known companies offering these prepaid cards at good rates and conditions that 

are fair and reasonable. That is most of it. But as is the case in 

many things, we have people that are taking advantage of the system, and so that is now spilling over into the good companies that 

are fair and reasonable and their reputation is on the line. 

Unlike a legitimate prepaid calling card, the fly-by-night operators increasingly are not interested in the welfare of the Americans 

buying the calling cards trying to connect with their loved ones. Instead, what they are doing is scamming consumers. And what they 

end up doing is imposing junk fees, exorbitant rates, selling cards 

that expire shortly and, in some cases, start expiring right when 

the consumer starts using the card. 

Now, I want to give you two examples. Here is one. It is two 

bucks. It is marketed to people as if you can use this for $2 worth 

3 

of calling. But you see that little red circle up there? That is what 

is on this card. Now, I could get a magnifying glass and I might 

be able to read this. I can tell you with my eyes, even with my 

magnifiers, it is hard for me to read this. 

Senator NELSON. And would you flip it over to the next chart? 

Let us give you an example of some of the things that are in that 

small type. Now, this is blown up and bolded and underlined so 

that you all can see it. This, obviously, is not in that small little 

writing there. ‘‘Rates and fees vary and are subject to change without prior notice. Advertised minutes and rates are based on a single, non-pay phone call from the contiguous United States.’’ 


910CARD1.eps 910CARD2.eps
4 

Congressman, just have a seat there at the table and we will get 

to you in a second. 

‘‘Succeeding calls are billed at a higher rate. Calls are billed in 

3-minute increments.’’ So if the calling person calls and they get an 

answering machine and they take all of 30 seconds, it is still billed 

at 3 minutes. ‘‘A post-call service fee of 40 percent and a hang-up 

fee of 99 cents apply per call.’’ Now, that’s just that one. 

Flip it over to the next one. Is this on the same card? This is on 

the Africa Card or the Go Card? This is on this one. This is the 

Go Card. 

‘‘A semi-monthly charge of up to 89 cents applies to 24 hours of 

first use. Card expires 180 days after the date of first use. Standard off-peak hours are from 2 a.m. to 4 a.m.—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON.—‘‘weekdays, excluding holidays.’’ 

Can you flip it to the next one? 

Now, this is a card that is aimed at immigrants so that they can 

call their loved ones in Africa. Look down at the bottom. Can you 

lift it up there? Down at the bottom, it is so small on this blowup 

I cannot read it, much less can I read it on that. And that’s the 

card. 


910CARD3.eps
5 

Senator NELSON. And what that says is: ‘‘Call time is deducted 

in 1- to 3-minute increments. Service fees of up to 25 percent apply. 

A disconnect fee up to 98 cents may apply. A weekly maintenance 

fee of 69 cents may apply.’’ This is for a $5 card. ‘‘Card expires 3 

months from first use or 2 years from purchase.’’ 

Senator NELSON. You got any more up there? 


910CARD4.eps 910CARD5.eps
6 

OK. You see the problem. 

So I hope we can hear some testimony on this subject and try 

to expose it. You might think that the language might tell you how 

much it costs to make a domestic or international call, but it does 

not. And instead, we have a bunch of statements telling you how 

the card will not work and listing numerous add-on fees and caveats, all of which we have just gone over and which you cannot read 

on the card. If you can read the King’s English, you better have a 

microscope. Otherwise, you are not going to be able to understand 

what you have just bought for $2 or $5. 

So the bottom line is if you use that card twice, you lose it. You 

lose the value of the card. And you may lose it just by using it once 

with all those add-ons. 

So with that as an intro, I want to call on the Honorable Eliot 

Engel, Congressman from New York, who wants to make a statement. And Congressman, we understand that—was it Delta or the 

US Air Shuttle that was late? 

Representative ENGEL. It was Delta. 

Senator NELSON. OK. Duly noted in the record. 

Representative ENGEL. The truth is US Air probably would have 

been even later, but that is OK. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator NELSON. Give us a quick statement. We have pretty well 

laid it out. Senator Hutchison was here and I have laid it out. We 

want your endorsement and your observation on this. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELIOT L. ENGEL, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK 

Representative ENGEL. Well, thank you, Senator. 

As you have been stating, legislation of this kind should be a nobrainer. I mean, it is just crying out for attention, and it is something that everybody can agree on. 

And I want to thank you and the Ranking Member Hutchison for 

holding today’s hearing and for the invitation to speak. I know, 

Senator, you have done lots of work on this issue. 

I must comment that you have certainly come a long ways since 

we were House colleagues together, and I am always happy to see 

my good friends in the House move on to the Senate and do really 

great work. And that is especially true of the work that you have 

done. I am always pleased to have your cooperation and your 

friendship. 

I am here to discuss my legislation, the Calling Card Consumer 

Protection Act, and the reasons that I introduced this bill. I think 

that you have made it very clear as to why we have introduced 

bills like this and why it is needed. 

Obviously, calling cards are an invaluable resource for people 

who do not have long distance telephone service in their home or 

those who make frequent overseas calls. Common users of these 

cards are students, members of the armed forces, and those whose 

family lives outside of the country. They are also popular among 

people who either choose not to subscribe to long distance telephone service or who simply cannot afford it. They are a necessary 

tool for keeping in touch with friends or family members. Calling 

cards that provide the services that the companies advertise can 

7 

save consumers a great deal of money when they call home. But, 

unfortunately, as you have pointed out, Senator, and we are seeing 

over and over again, many companies fail to keep their advertised 

terms or hide them. 

About 2 years ago, I started hearing from a number of constituents regarding their prepaid calling cards. They were contacting 

me because their calling cards were not providing the number of 

minutes that were advertised. In fact, many were not even close to 

delivering the promised number of minutes. Furthermore, when my 

constituents attempted to contact the calling card company, they 

found it difficult or impossible to reach a customer service line. 

I investigated this myself by purchasing a calling card. I found 

the same problem that my constituents were having. This is when 

I decided to introduce my legislation with Congressman Mike Ferguson of New Jersey to ban these practices. 

In independent tests, as well as those conducted by States Attorneys General—and I know Florida has done a lot in this regard— 

calling cards were shown to provide far fewer minutes than they 

advertised. One study by The Hispanic Institute found that on average the caller only received about 60 percent of the minutes guaranteed by the card. In a $4 billion a year industry, obviously this 

deception is costing consumers and honest companies hundreds of 

millions of dollars every year, and of course, these companies prey 

on minority communities, communities that do not speak English 

well. This is especially prevalent in those communities. 

Companies have also instituted a variety of hidden fees. For example, some cards deduct minutes even if the call is not connected 

or if you get a busy signal. Other cards cut off the call after a few 

minutes so the consumer must redial and again be subjected to the 

connection charge. And the connection charge is obviously on top 

of the regular charge, and so people find that it might take 5 minutes or 10 minutes away just for a connection. Some cards round 

up the number of minutes used in 4-minute increments. Others advertise no connection fees in big letters on a sign, but instead 

charge you a hang-up fee. These fees take considerable money out 

of consumers’ pockets every time they pick up the phone. 

Obviously, calling card fraud harms segments of the population 

who are among the most vulnerable to being victimized by unscrupulous companies only seeking to make a quick profit. These unscrupulous companies are known to target poor, minority, and immigrant populations, and they do not stop there. Even our soldiers 

in Iraq have been preyed upon by deceptive practices of calling 

card companies. 

In a recent article in BusinessWeek magazine, the author detailed 

one example of a company that marketed towards Spanish-speaking consumers, but the fine print that detailed all the various fees 

they would charge the user was in English. The company’s answer 

to this? We are in America, they said. They had the temerity to 

claim that even when they put Spanish language advertisements in 

markets with Spanish-speaking consumers, they can hide all their 

fees in English. 

My legislation, like yours, Senator Nelson, would put a stop to 

a number of deceptive practices employed by these companies. It 

would require an advertisement or packaging to include clear disVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
8 

closure of all terms, conditions, and fees in the language in which 

the calling card is advertised. In addition, it would ensure that the 

Federal Trade Commission has the jurisdiction to pursue enforcement of these rules against companies who are not abiding by 

them. 

Calling cards can be extremely useful for consumers, and I do not 

want to see honest companies punished and there are, obviously, 

a lot of honest companies. But the honest companies are also being 

harmed by these dishonest companies. There is a large enough 

market for a company to live up to its promises and to turn an honest profit. If consumers know that the card they purchase will provide the full amount of calling time that is advertised, this will 

benefit both consumers and the marketplace. 

So I, in conclusion, would strongly encourage the Members of 

this Committee to support S. 2998, Senator Nelson’s legislation to 

protect consumers from calling card fraud. With only a few weeks 

remaining in the 110th Congress, our constituents should not have 

to wait for Congress to reconvene in 2009 for action on this important legislation. 

Once again, Senator, thank you for holding this hearing today 

and allowing me to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Engel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ELIOT L. ENGEL, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Hutchison: 

I want to thank you for holding today’s hearing and for the invitation to speak 

on this important topic. I especially want to thank Senator Bill Nelson for his work 

on this issue. I have collaborated with Senator Nelson in the past, and I am always 

pleased to have his cooperation and his friendship. 

I am here to discuss my legislation, the Calling Card Consumer Protection Act, 

and the reasons that I introduced the bill. 

Calling cards are an invaluable resource for people who don’t have long distance 

telephone service in their home or those who make frequent overseas calls. Common 

users are students, members of the Armed Forces, and those whose family lives outside of the country. They are also popular among people who either choose not to 

subscribe to long distance telephone service, or who cannot afford it. They are a necessary tool for keeping in touch with friends or family members. Calling cards that 

provide the services that the companies advertise can save consumers a great deal 

of money when they call home. 

Unfortunately, as we are seeing over and over again, many companies fail to keep 

their advertised terms. 

About 2 years ago, I began hearing from a number of constituents regarding their 

prepaid calling cards. They were contacting me because their calling cards failed to 

provide the number of minutes that were advertised. In fact, many were not even 

close to delivering the promised number of minutes. Furthermore, when my constituents attempted to contact the calling card company, they found it difficult or 

impossible to reach a customer service line. 

I investigated this myself by purchasing a calling card. I found the same problems 

that my constituents were having. This is when I decided to introduce my legislation, with Congressman Mike Ferguson, to ban these practices. 

In independent tests, as well as those conducted by states’ Attorneys General, 

calling cards were shown to provide far fewer minutes than were advertised. One 

study by The Hispanic Institute found that on average, the caller only received an 

average of 60 percent of the minutes guaranteed by the card. In a $4 billion a year 

industry, this deception is costing consumers and honest companies hundreds of millions of dollars every year. 

Companies have also instituted a variety of hidden fees. For example, some cards 

deduct minutes even if the call is not connected. Other cards cut off the call after 

a few minutes so the consumer must redial and again be subjected to the connection 

charge. Some cards round up the number of minutes used in 4 minute increments. 

9 

1The written statement presents the views of the Federal Trade Commission. Oral statements 

and responses to questions reflect the views of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the Commission or any other Commissioner. 

Others advertise ‘‘no connection fees,’’ in big letters on a sign, but instead charge 

you a hang-up fee. These fees take considerable money out of consumers’ pockets 

every time they pick up the phone. 

Calling card fraud harms segments of the population who are among the most 

vulnerable to being victimized by unscrupulous companies only seeking to make a 

quick profit. These unscrupulous companies are known to target poor, minority, and 

immigrant populations. And they don’t stop there. Even our soldiers in Iraq have 

been preyed upon by deceptive practices of calling card companies. 

In a recent article in BusinessWeek magazine, the author detailed one example 

of a company that marketed toward Spanish-speaking consumers. But the fine print 

that detailed all the various fees they would charge the user was in English. The 

company’s answer to this? ‘‘We’re in America,’’ they said. They had the temerity to 

claim that even when they put Spanish language advertisements in markets with 

Spanish-speaking consumers, they can hide all their fees in English. 

My legislation, like Senator Nelson’s, would put a stop to a number of deceptive 

practices employed by these companies. It would require an advertisement or packaging to include clear disclosure of all terms, conditions, and fees in the language 

in which the calling card is advertised. In addition, it would ensure that the Federal 

Trade Commission has the jurisdiction to pursue enforcement of these rules against 

companies who are not abiding by them. 

Calling cards are a useful product for consumers, and I do not want to see honest 

companies punished. There is absolutely no reason why a company can’t deliver 

what is promised, and still turn an honest profit. If consumers know that the card 

they purchase will provide the full amount of calling time that is advertised, this 

will benefit both consumers and the marketplace. 

I would strongly encourage the Members of this Committee to support S. 2998, 

Senator Nelson’s legislation to protect consumers from calling card fraud. With only 

a few weeks remaining in the 110th Congress, our constituents shouldn’t have to 

wait for Congress to reconvene in 2009 for action on this important legislation. 

Once again, thank you for holding this hearing today, and allowing me to testify. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you. 

You are welcome to stay. You can leave—whatever is your pleasure. We are very grateful to you for having come over here and also 

for having introduced this legislation in the House. 

Representative ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Senator NELSON. So thank you and good luck to you in the 

House. 

We are pleased to have William Kovacic, the Chairman of the 

Federal Trade Commission. What I am going to do to truncate this 

hearing is we are going to take your written testimony and enter 

it into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kovacic follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, CHAIRMAN, 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

I. Introduction 

Chairman Inouye, Ranking Member Hutchison, Members of the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, I am William Kovacic, Chairman of the 

Federal Trade Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’).1 Thank you for giving the 

Commission this opportunity to testify before the Committee about consumer protection issues associated with the sale of prepaid calling cards. 

The Commission appreciates the Committee’s decision to hold a hearing to shed 

light on deceptive practices in the calling card industry. Over the last decade, the 

prepaid calling card industry has grown into a multi-billion dollar a year industry. 

Prepaid calling cards can provide consumers with a convenient and inexpensive way 

to call friends and family at home and abroad. Unfortunately, however, purchasers 

of prepaid calling cards often do not receive the number of calling minutes advertised for the cards they purchase and are charged undisclosed or inadequately-disVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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2See Susan Sachs, Immigrants See Path to Riches in Phone Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, 

available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9800E7D6123AF932A2575BC0A9 

649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2; Talk Isn’t So Cheap on a Phone Card, BUSINESS WEEK, 

July 23, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07l30/b4043 

079.htm; Mark E. Budnitz, Martina Rojo and Julia Marlowe, Deceptive Claims for Prepaid Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2006). 3For example, in FTC v. Alternatel, Inc., G.F.G. Enterprises LLC, also d/b/a Mystic Prepaid, 

Voice Prepaid, Inc., Voice Distributors, Inc., Telecom Express, Inc., Lucas Friedlaender, Moses 

Greenfield, Nickolas Gulakos, and Frank Wendorff, 08–21433–CIV–Jordan/McAliley (S.D. Fla.), 

the FTC has alleged in its complaint that: ‘‘in numerous instances defendants’ posters contain 

vague disclosures about fees in tiny font on the bottom of the poster, stating in relevant part: 

by using this card you agree to the following: Prompted minutes are before applicable charges 

and fees, application of surcharges and fees have an effect of reducing total minutes on cards. 

One or all of the following may apply: (1) A weekly maintenance fee ranging between $.49 and 

$.79. (2) A hang-up fee between $.05 and $1 depending upon length and destination of the call. 

(3) A destination surcharge of between 0 percent and 100 percent.—minutes and/or seconds are 

rounded to multiple minute increments.—International calls made to cellular phones are billed 

at higher rates.—Toll free access numbers are subject to an additional fee of up to 4 cents per 

minute.—Prices are subject to change without notice.—This card has no cash value.—Card expires 3 months after first use or 12 months after activation.’’ 

closed fees and surcharges that reduce the value of the prepaid calling cards they 

purchased. 

As the Nation’s consumer protection agency, the FTC is committed to protecting 

consumers from deceptive marketing of prepaid calling cards. The FTC recently 

brought two cases alleging that distributors of prepaid calling cards had been deceptively marketing such cards. The Commission also has other active prepaid calling 

card investigations. 

This statement provides the Committee with background information about the 

prepaid calling card industry and describes the FTC’s recent law enforcement actions against distributors of prepaid calling cards. It also discusses the FTC’s consumer education and outreach efforts. Additionally, it offers comments on S. 2998, 

the ‘‘Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act of 2008,’’ introduced by Senators Bill Nelson, Olympia Snowe, John Kerry, and Mel Martinez. Finally, the Commission reiterates its support for the provision of the FTC reauthorization bill that 

would amend the FTC Act to repeal the exemption for common carriers subject to 

the Communications Act. Repealing the exemption for telecommunications carriers 

would ensure that the Commission can bring law enforcement actions against all 

participants in the prepaid calling card industry that are engaging in deceptive and 

unfair practices, including those companies that provide the underlying telecommunications services for these cards. 

II. Background 

Calling card providers market their cards for a variety of uses. Some cards are 

marketed primarily for use by consumers making calls within the United States. 

Such cards usually offer consumers the ability to make domestic long distance calls 

for pennies per minute. Other cards are marketed to U.S. consumers who want to 

call the United States when they are traveling or working in other countries. Indeed, many such cards are marketed to members of the United States armed forces 

serving around the world. In addition, a substantial number of prepaid calling cards 

are sold to recent immigrants to the United States who depend on calling cards to 

stay in touch with family and friends abroad.2 Such calling cards, which typically 

retail for between $2 to $10 each, are generally sold in small retail outlets, including 

grocery and convenience stores, gasoline stations, and newsstands. 

To advertise prepaid calling cards directed to consumers making international 

calls from the U.S., companies distribute eye-catching posters that are displayed on 

the walls and windows of the stores where such cards are sold. One hallmark of 

such posters is bold claims, made in large, colorful type, about the number of calling 

minutes the advertised cards provide for calls to particular countries. In stark contrast to the claims about available calling minutes that dominate the posters, the 

bottom of the posters generally contains small print disclaimers about a wide variety of fees and surcharges that reduce the value of the cards. The disclaimers are 

frequently in type so small as to be nearly illegible and in language so vague as 

to be effectively incomprehensible.3

Consumers typically use their prepaid calling cards as follows: the consumer dials 

an ‘‘access number’’ printed on the back of the card. A recorded message then 

prompts the consumer to enter the card’s authorization code or Personal Identification Number (‘‘PIN’’), which is printed on the card. Next, the consumer usually 

hears an announcement of the monetary value of the card. The consumer then enVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
11 

4 Representatives from the following Offices of Attorneys General are members of the task 

force: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 

New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. In addition, the New York State Consumer Protection Board and the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs have participated in the task force. 5 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 6FTC v. PT–1 Comm’cns, Inc., 99–CIV–1432 (S.D.N.Y.) (Stip. Final Order filed Feb. 25, 1999) 

(order requiring monetary relief and barring defendants from misrepresenting the value of its 

prepaid calling cards and from failing to clearly and prominently disclose fees and charges); FTC v. Trans-Asian Comm’cns, Inc., 97–CIV–5764 (S.D.N.Y.) (Stip. Final Order filed Mar. 17, 1998) (order requiring $1 million performance bond before defendants can advertise or sell prepaid 

calling cards and barring future material misrepresentations about prepaid calling cards). 7FTC v. 9131–4740 Quebec, Inc., CV–02242 (N.D. Ohio) (Compl. filed July 25, 2007) (pending); 

FTC v. T2U, Inc., 101–CV–811 (N.D. Ohio) (Stip. Final Order filed Sept. 13, 2001); FTC v. Enhanced Billing Servs., Inc., 101–CV–1060 (D.D.C.) (Stip. Final Order filed Aug. 1, 2001). 8FTC v. Clifton Telecard Alliance One LLC, d/b/a Clifton Telecard Alliance and CTA, Inc., 

and Mustafa Qattous, 2:08–cv–01480–PGS–ES (D.N.J.). 9The FTC has been able to test prepaid calling cards thanks in part to the invaluable assistance of El Salvador’s Defensorı ́a del Consumidor, Colombia’s Superintendencia de Industria y 

Comercio, the Egypt Consumer Protection Authority, Mexico’s Procuradurı ́a Federal del 

Consumidor (PROFECO), Panama’s Autoridad de Proteccio ́n al Consumidor y Defensa de la 

Continued 

ters the phone number he or she is trying to reach and hears an automated ‘‘voice 

prompt’’ announcing the number of minutes of time ostensibly available on the card. 

As discussed in more detail below, the FTC, our state law enforcement colleagues, 

and third parties who have tested a wide variety of prepaid calling cards have found 

that prepaid calling cards offered by a number of industry participants routinely fail 

to deliver the minutes promised in their advertising and voice prompts. As alleged 

in two cases recently brought by the FTC, our testing showed that the defendants’ 

prepaid calling cards delivered about half the number of promised minutes. 

III. Law Enforcement Actions 

The FTC works closely with the offices of State Attorneys General and other state 

agencies. In the fall of 2007, the FTC established a joint Federal-state task force 

concerning deceptive marketing practices in the prepaid calling card industry. The 

task force members include representatives from the offices of more than 35 State 

Attorneys General and other state and local agencies, and the Federal Communications Commission (‘‘FCC’’). Working cooperatively allows us to share information 

and facilitate law enforcement activity in the prepaid calling card area.4

Currently, the Commission is litigating two actions in Federal district court, alleging that the defendants deceptively marketed their prepaid calling cards. In addition, as discussed below, the Attorneys General for the states of Florida and Texas 

recently have taken action against prepaid calling card companies for their allegedly 

deceptive practices. 

A. FTC Enforcement Actions 

Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has authority to bring cases against 

companies and individuals for engaging in deceptive or unfair acts or practices in 

or affecting commerce.5 Since the 1990s, the FTC has used this power to bring enforcement actions against entities for deceptively selling prepaid calling cards. The 

Commission brought its first two prepaid calling card cases against companies that 

the FTC alleged were deceptively marketing prepaid calling cards by, among other 

things, misrepresenting the per-minute rates consumers would be charged when 

using the cards and by failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose connection and 

maintenance fees associated with the cards.6 Since then, the FTC has brought several cases alleging that telemarketers deceptively marketed calling cards to consumers and charged consumers without their authorization.7

This spring, the FTC filed two cases against major distributors of prepaid calling 

cards. On March 25, 2008, the FTC sued Clifton Telecard Alliance, a national distributor of prepaid calling cards based in New Jersey, and the company’s principal.8

The FTC alleged that the defendants, which market their cards chiefly to recent immigrants, engaged in deceptive marketing practices by: (1) misrepresenting the 

number of calling minutes provided by their cards; (2) failing to adequately disclose 

fees and charges associated with their cards; and (3) failing to adequately disclose 

that the value of their cards may be reduced even when a call does not connect. 

In support of its case, the FTC tested 46 of Clifton Telecard Alliance’s calling cards 

purchased at various retail outlets.9 In the FTC’s tests of these cards, none delivVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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Competencia, and Peru’s Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Proteccio ́n de la Propiedad Intelectual (INDECOPI). In this area, as in so many others, international cooperation has proved to be vital to the Commission’s law enforcement actions. 10The results of the FTC testing of the defendants’ cards in the Clifton Telecard Alliance and 

the Alternatel cases are consistent with the testing results of The Hispanic Institute, a nonprofit 

organization that has issued a report on its testing of a wide variety of prepaid calling cards. 

The Hispanic Institute reports that, on average, the cards it tested delivered only 60 percent 

of the minutes promised in voice prompts. See http://www.thehispanicinstitute.net/research/ 

callingcard/qa (visited June 18, 2008). They are also consistent with testing results that have 

been offered in private litigation. See IDT Telecom, Inc. v. CVT Prepaid Solutions, Inc., et al., 

Civil Action No. 07–1076 (D.N.J.) (Pls. Mem. In Supp. of Their Order to Show Cause Why a 

Prelim. Inj. Should Not Issue, at 6–10; Ex. 1 to Suppl. Aff. of Gabi Schechter, dated Mar. 26, 

2007) (alleging the defendants’ calling cards delivered on average only 60 percent of prompted 

minutes); IDT Telecom, Inc. v. Voice Distributors, Inc., d/b/a Voice Prepaid, et al., Civil Action 

No. 07–2465 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Middlesex Cty.) (Compl. ¶ 16) (alleging that the defendants’ calling 

cards delivered on average only 65 percent of prompted minutes); IDT Telecom, Inc. v. Diamond 

Phone Card, Inc., et al., Index No. 3682–08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cty.) (Compl. ¶ 15) (alleging 

that the defendants’ calling cards delivered on average only 59 percent of prompted minutes). 11See McCollum Announces Prepaid Calling Card Settlements, Industry-Wide Reform (June 

11, 2008) available at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/79C6666DB24608 

D785257465004EC901 (visited on August 27, 2008) (announcing settlements with IDT America, 

Inc.; Union Telecom Alliance; Total Call International, Inc.; Blackstone Calling Card, Inc.; CVT 

Prepaid Solutions, Inc.; Dollar Phone Enterprise, Inc.; STi Prepaid, LLC; Alternatel, Inc; and 

Cristel Telecommunications, LLC); Prepaid Calling Company Reaches Settlement with Attorney 

General (July 2, 2008) available at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/1439 

BD5308D470588525747A006423B8 (visited on August 27, 2008) (announcing a settlement with 

Touch-Tel Partners USA, LLC); Attorney General Reaches Settlement with 11th Prepaid Calling 

Card Company (August 21, 2008) available at http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/news 

releases/C410C546EB409C93852574AC006C9499 (visited on August 27, 2008) (announcing settlement with Cinco Telecom Corp. d/b/a Orbitel). 12State of Texas v. Next-G Commnc’n, Inc., Taj Khwaja, 2008CI08149 (Bexar County, TX) 

(Pet. filed May 23, 2008). 

ered the number of calling minutes advertised in posters displayed at the point of 

sale. Three of the 46 cards failed to work at all, and, on average, the remaining 43 

cards delivered only 43 percent of the advertised calling minutes. On April 2, 2008, 

the Federal district court in New Jersey granted the FTC’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order. 

On May 19, 2008, the FTC filed a similar action, FTC v. Alternatel, against several companies alleged to act as a common enterprise in distributing prepaid calling 

cards out of Florida, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. In the Alternatel case, the 

Commission alleged that the defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by misrepresenting the number of calling minutes their cards provide and failing to adequately disclose fees and charges associated with their cards. As in the Clifton 

Telecard Alliance case, the FTC conducted extensive testing of the Alternatel defendants’ prepaid cards and found that the actual number of minutes provided by the 

cards fell far short of the defendants’ advertising claims. In tests of 87 of the defendants’ cards, the cards delivered on average only 50.4 percent of the minutes advertised on posters at the point of sale.10 On May 23, 2008, the Federal district court 

for the Southern District of Florida entered a temporary restraining order in the 

Alternatel matter. 

In both the Clifton and Alternatel actions, the defendants have moved to dismiss 

the FTC’s case on the grounds that the underlying telecommunications carriers are 

necessary parties that the FTC cannot join because of the exemption in the FTC 

Act for common carriers subject to the Communications Act. The FTC has opposed 

defendants’ motions, and is confident that it will win on the merits. As final relief 

in both cases, the FTC seeks a permanent injunction and consumer redress and/or 

disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 

B. State Law Enforcement Actions 

Two states recently brought law enforcement actions against a number of prepaid 

calling card companies. Over the last few months, the Florida Attorney General has 

announced that he has entered into Assurances of Voluntary Compliance (‘‘AVC’’) 

with eleven prepaid calling card companies doing business in Florida.11 These settlements are the culmination of a broad investigation into the prepaid calling card 

industry launched by the Florida Attorney General in July of 2007. Notably, while 

the FTC has brought its lawsuits solely against distributors of prepaid calling cards, 

the Florida Attorney General entered into AVCs with eleven companies that include 

both distributors and telecommunications service providers for prepaid calling cards. 

On May 23, 2008, the Texas Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Next-G 

Communication, Inc., a telecommunications service provider that produces, sells and 

distributes prepaid calling cards.12 The Texas lawsuit alleges that Next-G CommuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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13See Attorney General Abbott Takes Legal Action Against Prepaid Calling Card Company 

(May 23, 2008) available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagNews/release.php?id=2479 (visited 

on August 27, 2008). 14See Buying Time: The Facts About Pre-Paid Phone Cards (2008) available at http:// 

www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro04.pdf (visited on August 27, 2008). 15The bill does not have a parallel knowledge requirement for prepaid calling card service providers. 16 Indeed, under general consumer protection principles and traditional jurisprudence under 

Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, the Commission need not show knowledge or intent 

in order to stop an entity from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices. Notably, however, SecContinued 

nication has marketed and sold prepaid calling cards throughout Texas that fail to 

deliver the number of minutes it advertises to customers and that the defendant has 

failed to disclose fees and charges associated with its calling cards. The Texas Attorney General alleges that Next-G’s prepaid calling cards consistently delivered only 

40 percent of the minutes claimed on the Next-G’s advertising posters and confirmed by Next-G’s voice prompt given at the beginning of each call.13

The FTC applauds the actions of the Florida and Texas Attorneys General and 

is grateful for the participation of all of our law enforcement partners in the joint 

Federal-State calling card task force. 

IV. Consumer Education and Media Outreach 

In addition to bringing enforcement cases, the Commission has made consumer 

education and outreach a high priority. The FTC recently updated its consumer education brochure on calling cards, which is available in both English and Spanish on 

the Commission’s website.14 The Commission also has done extensive outreach 

about prepaid calling cards to media outlets that cater to non-English and English 

speaking consumers. The FTC wants to make sure consumers know that it is unlawful to advertise calling cards that misrepresent the number of minutes that the calling cards provide or to fail to clearly and conspicuously disclose the fees and charges 

that reduce the value of the calling cards. The FTC also wants consumers to know 

that they can and should complain to the FTC if they do not get what they pay for. 

V. The Proposed Legislation 

As described above, the FTC Act’s prohibitions on deceptive and unfair practices 

provide the Commission with a powerful tool to bring enforcement actions against 

the distributors of prepaid calling cards. Senate Bill 2998, the proposed ‘‘Prepaid 

Calling Card Consumer Protection Act,’’ is directed at the conduct of prepaid calling 

card service providers (carriers) as well as distributors, and therefore would implicitly give the FTC jurisdiction over common carriers engaged in the deceptive practices prohibited by the proposed legislation. Consumers would benefit greatly from 

legislation giving the FTC jurisdiction over such practices by telecommunications 

carriers. The legislation also would authorize the FTC to seek civil penalties for violations of the Act or of the rules issued by the FTC pursuant to the Act, thus adding 

an important remedy to those already available to the Commission. 

Generally, S. 2998 requires the FTC to promulgate a rule requiring that, among 

other things, prepaid calling card providers and distributors provide clear and conspicuous disclosures of the number of minutes provided by the calling cards, the 

amount and frequency of all fees assessed for use of the calling cards, and the expiration date of the cards. The bill also prohibits prepaid calling card providers and 

distributors from selling or distributing calling cards that do not provide the advertised number of calling minutes or from assessing inadequately disclosed fees. The 

bill further provides for the FTC to bring suit alleging violations of the Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act as if they were violations of an FTC rule, thus 

enabling the agency to seek civil penalties for violation of the Act and the FTC’s 

rule promulgated pursuant to the Act. 

The FTC supports the goals of S. 2998, and appreciates the implied extension of 

jurisdiction—which will ensure a level playing field by allowing the Commission to 

act to hold violators responsible for deceptive trade practices whether they are providing the telecommunications services or distributing the prepaid calling cards— 

and the proposed authority to seek civil penalties. Two aspects of the bill raise concerns, however. First, the bill creates a knowledge standard for holding prepaid calling card distributors liable if they violate the Act by distributing calling cards that 

provide fewer minutes or a higher per minute rate than advertised, or announced 

on the voice prompt given when a consumer places a call.15 Incorporating a knowledge standard into the law could create an additional—and potentially very challenging—evidentiary burden on the FTC when seeking injunctive relief in a civil 

case.16 Second, the bill explicitly exempts from its coverage prepaid wireless phone 

14 

tion 5(m)(1) of the FTC Act includes a knowledge standard for instances where the FTC is seeking civil penalties for violations of an FTC Rule, as opposed to equitable relief, such as an injunction. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (‘‘The Commission may commence a civil action to recover a civil 

penalty in a district court of the United States against any person, partnership, or corporation 

which violates any rule under this chapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . 

with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances.’’). 

Eliminating the knowledge threshold from the bill would not change the Commission’s elevated 

burden for obtaining monetary relief in civil penalty cases. 17Some participants in the prepaid calling card industry are beginning to offer prepaid wireless services. As the cost of providing cellular phones and calling minutes continues to decrease, 

the incentive to move consumers to prepaid wireless accounts from more traditional prepaid calling cards has increased. 18See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Before the Subcommittee on 

Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate (April 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/P034101 

reauth.pdf; Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Before the Subcommittee on 

Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation U.S. Senate (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/070912 

reauthorizationtestimony.pdf; Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission On FTC Jurisdiction Over Broadband Internet Access Services, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 

Senate (Jun. 14, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/06/broadband.shtm; The Reauthorization of the Federal Trade Commission: Positioning the Commission for the Twenty-First 

Century: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. 

Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (‘‘FTC 2003 Reauthorization Hearing’’) 

(statement of the FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/030611reauthhr.htm; see 

also FTC 2003 Reauthorization Hearing (statement of Thomas B. Leary, FTC Commissioner), 

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/030611learyhr.htm; FTC Reauthorization Hearing: 

Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm. 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sheila F. Anthony, 

FTC Commissioner), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/sfareauthtest.htm. 

services where the consumer has established a relationship with the wireless carrier 

by purchasing a wireless service handset package. The Commission is concerned 

that the bill’s exception for prepaid services based on the purchase of a handset and 

wireless calling services would provide a powerful incentive for the worst actors in 

the prepaid calling card industry to migrate their business practices to prepaid wireless handsets and refill cards, and thereby avoid the mandates of the proposed 

law.17

To enable the Commission to address problems with deceptive conduct involving 

prepaid calling cards more effectively, the Committee might also consider giving the 

Commission authority to bring actions seeking civil penalties in its own right 

against prepaid calling card providers and distributors rather than through the Department of Justice. Giving the FTC authority to bring its own civil penalties cases 

in this area would help ensure that the Commission does not have to forego quick 

relief in order to seek civil penalties. 

The Commission recognizes that the agency and the Committee share the same 

goal: stopping unscrupulous calling card companies from defrauding vulnerable consumers. The Commission looks forward to working with the Committee regarding 

the language of the legislation as the Committee moves forward. 

VI. The Common Carrier Exemption 

On several occasions, the Commission has testified in favor of the repeal of the 

common carrier exemption.18 The Commission continues to endorse its repeal, and 

thanks the Committee for its continued support for this measure. The FTC Act exempts common carriers subject to the Communications Act from its prohibitions on 

unfair and deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition. This exemption originated in an era when telecommunications services were provided by 

highly-regulated monopolies. The Commission believes that the exemption is now 

outdated. In the current marketplace, firms are expected to compete in providing 

telecommunications services. Congress and the FCC have dismantled much of the 

economic regulatory apparatus formerly applicable to the industry. Removing the 

exemption from the FTC Act would not alter the jurisdiction of the FCC, but would 

give the FTC the authority to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive practices by common carriers in the same way that it can protect against unfair and 

deceptive practices by non-common carriers involved in the provision of similar services. 

Prepaid calling cards are a case in point. In contrast to the State Attorneys General, who are able to bring enforcement actions to stop both telecommunications providers and distributors offering prepaid calling cards from engaging in unfair and 

deceptive practices, the FTC has targeted only the deceptive practices of prepaid 

calling card distributors, because of the FTC Act common carrier exemption. FurVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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19For example, the FTC has brought numerous cases involving the cramming of unauthorized 

charges onto consumers phone bills. See, e.g., FTC v. Verity Int’l Ltd., 335 F. Supp. 2d 479 

(S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 443 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 

1868 (2007); FTC v. Audiotex Connection, Inc., C–97 0726 (DRH) (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Int’l 

Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 1–98–CV–1925 (N.D. Ga., 1998); FTC v. Sheinkin, 2–00–363618 (D.S.C., 

2000); FTC v. Mercury Marketing of Delaware, Inc., 00–CV–3281 (E.D. Pa. 2000); FTC v. 

Epixtar Corp., 03–CV–8511 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. 2003); FTC v. Nationwide Connections, Inc., 06– 

80180–CIV–Ryskamp/Vitunack (S.D. Fla. 2006); FTC v. Websource Media, LLC, Civ. No. H–06– 

1980 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 

thermore, even when the Commission has identified and brought enforcement actions against non-common carriers, the common carrier exemption can impose additional litigation costs on the FTC. For example, as noted above, in both the Clifton 

Telecard Alliance and Alternatel cases, which the FTC has brought against distributors of prepaid calling cards, the defendants have moved to dismiss the FTC’s cases 

on the grounds that the FTC has not sued and cannot sue the underlying carriers, 

which defendants allege to be necessary parties. While the Commission is confident 

that it will prevail in its opposition to these motions, the burden of having to respond to such motions is not insubstantial. 

The American public will benefit greatly from S. 2998’s grant to the FTC of jurisdiction over common carriers in the prepaid calling card arena. The FTC respectfully continues to recommend that, rather than take a piecemeal approach to providing the FTC with jurisdiction in this important area of commerce, Congress repeal altogether the FTC Act exemption for common carriers subject to the Communications Act. The FTC has extensive expertise with such areas as advertising, marketing, billing, and collection, areas in which significant problems have emerged in 

the telecommunications industry.19 In addition, the FTC has powerful procedural 

and remedial tools that could be used effectively to address developing problems in 

the telecommunications industry if the FTC were authorized to reach them. 

VII. Conclusion 

The Commission will continue its aggressive law enforcement and consumer outreach and education programs in the prepaid calling card arena. The Commission 

thanks this Committee for focusing attention on this important issue and for the 

opportunity to discuss its law enforcement program. 

Senator NELSON. I am going to start asking questions of you, Mr. 

Chairman, and if you would then feel free to expand as much as 

you want with regard to your answers. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, CHAIRMAN, 

FEDERAL TRADE COMMUNICATION 

Mr. KOVACIC. Great. 

Senator NELSON. I understand that the FTC has taken some actions to rein in some of these bad actors and the costs of entering 

this business are fairly low, and it seems like a lot of these bad actors may be able to get around the injunctions against them and 

consent decrees by reincorporating and moving on to safer regions 

or other states. 

So as these bad actors are trying to avoid the arm of the law, 

what do you need to do at the FTC to address this problem? Give 

us your thoughts as to whether we need to get the criminal justice 

system involved in going after these bad actors. 

Mr. KOVACIC. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Hutchison, for the privilege of speaking about 

this enormously high priority area of concern. 

I would say there are three things that we should focus on in 

considering the phenomenon that you mentioned. 

One is to continue our existing efforts to strengthen our compliance program. Over the past couple of years, we have devoted a lot 

of resources to increasing our ability to follow what happens to our 

existing orders and to identify instances in which people subject to 

16 

our orders have violated them, and to make a point of going after 

recidivists both with our own resources and in cooperation with 

other enforcement agencies. I think we have converted what used 

to be a system of manual retrieval to an electronic database that 

lets us follow these folks along. 

Second, where there are recidivists who violate existing orders, 

I think you put your finger on a key consideration. Increasingly, we 

seek to engage the efforts of Federal and State officials who have 

the capacity to enforce infringements of that type as crimes. And 

it is our view that where the kind of misconduct that you and the 

Congressman have been describing is repeated, the only truly credible sanction is to take their freedom away because in many instances they dissipate assets. They hide them effectively so that 

the sanction that counts is the sanction that involves imprisonment. So greater cooperation through what we call our Criminal Liaison Unit, which is now roughly at its fifth anniversary, but expanded efforts of those types, and with your encouragement and cooperation, we will make that a focal point of what we do. 

Senator NELSON. Now, does that unit work with the U.S. Attorney? 

Mr. KOVACIC. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. And then the U.S. Attorney prosecutes the 

case. 

Mr. KOVACIC. Precisely. The partnership that is developed is 

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office with the Department of Justice, and 

with our state government counterparts. We assist in preparing the 

cases and they deliver them through their own efforts and through 

our cooperation. And I would be happy to share for the record later 

with you and your staff the extraordinary success that this cooperation has had in putting serious offenders in prison. 

Senator NELSON. Do you want to do that in testimony or submit 

it in writing? 

Mr. KOVACIC. If I could submit that in writing to you, I would 

be delighted to do it. But your encouragement to continue on that 

path is very important. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

But there are a couple of ideas the Senate may want to consider including in its 

legislation. First, you can specify that the FTC can freely share and coordinate enforcement activities and complaint information with authorized State officials in affected States; for instance, State Attorneys General, State Commissions, and certain 

categories of statutorily authorized consumer advocates. At a minimum, complaint 

information could be shared with suitable advanced disclosures to the complainant 

specified. (Meaning the FTC should notify complainants—up front—orally or on the 

website—that information about their complaint may be shared with State authorities to facilitate resolution). Second, you can require that the FTC maintain the task 

force initiative. In his testimony, FTC Chairman Kovacic stated the task force was 

formed at his behest and is not statutory required. Should Chairman Kovacic step 

down from his post there is no guarantee that a successor would continue this collaborative effort. Memorializing Chairman Kovacic’s task force innovative in law 

would provide consumers with higher level of protection from fraud and abuse. 

Mr. KOVACIC. The third element I think is to improve our cooperation with our state and local government counterparts. Last 

year, with a number of people quite happily in this room whose efforts you will hear about later today, we formed a joint FederalState task force. What we have come to understand is that in the 

archipelago of public institutions that work in this area, only if we 

17 

link the islands together and work effectively will we be able to 

track and identify offenders no matter where they go within the 

United States. And increasingly, they exploit gaps in cross-border 

enforcement so that the cooperative effort has to involve not simply 

our partners at the state and local level. 

And as you have already heard today, our state counterparts 

have done wonderful things using their own authority. Someone 

you know quite well, Attorney General Bill McCollum in Florida, 

has done a fantastic job as well. 

But to deepen the integration of our efforts with our state counterparts because the sum of our efforts will be much greater if 

those are improved, and by having local authorities and state authorities work with us, sharing the resources we have, both access 

to information about infringements, access to information about existing orders, sharing information, we greatly increase the likelihood that individuals will not evade the force of the law simply by 

moving from one place to another. 

Those would be three key priorities for us. 

Senator NELSON. Tell us about standardized disclosure requirements. Would they help the Commission’s enforcement efforts? 

Mr. KOVACIC. I think the disclosure requirements that are 

spelled out in S. 2998 are an excellent foundation for providing 

standardized disclosures. I think those key ingredients adopted into 

law will be enormously useful. They address precisely the kinds of 

concerns that you identified in reviewing the card examples that 

we have seen today, that assist in overcoming the misleading representations or nonrepresentations that Congressman Engel just 

mentioned a moment ago. And I think S. 2998—simply adopting 

that menu of considerations into law—would be a great step toward providing greater assurance about what is actually associated 

with each of these transactions. 

Senator NELSON. What can the FTC do to collect more accurate 

information regarding the consumer complaints? 

Mr. KOVACIC. We have got, I think, the framework of a superb 

system in place now. It is our Sentinel database through which a 

large number of government and nongovernment organizations 

now, again, owing to efforts that had been encouraged with enormous effectiveness by this committee, by this chamber, and by the 

House—to build Sentinel, which is an electronic database, we obtain information directly through complaints that come into our 

Complaint Center and through our state and local government enforcement counterparts. So we have not only an excellent repository 

now that collects information from a variety of streams—literally 

dozens of partners participate in this—but owing to resources, 

again, that Congress has generously provided us, we now have 

mechanisms for identifying almost in real-time patterns of misconduct. 

An important supplement to that is to increase our consumer 

education efforts, that is, to alert consumers about where to go. 

And this is where the point about economic disadvantage and vulnerability is terribly important. We realize that an increasing focus 

of our work has to be to reach populations that are not likely to 

go to public authorities, immigrant populations that are the victims 

of misconduct, minority individuals in poor communities who may 

18 

have simply despaired at the prospect that public authorities of all 

types will assist them in matters of need. 

We are increasing our efforts through our Hispanic language initiative now, which is about 5 years old, where we are retooling 

many of our brochures that deal with prepaid calling cards to ensure Spanish language speakers inform us and exercise precautions 

on their own. To inform us, we are also developing efforts that we 

are pursuing now to work with a host of different organizations to 

reach populations that might not otherwise alert us to patterns of 

misconduct. So to expand these consumer education efforts, but in 

particular, to reach populations that for a variety of reasons, economic disadvantage, social disadvantage, historical disadvantage of 

all types, may simply not have confidence that public institutions 

at all levels of our government are willing to help out because if 

we can detect the misconduct, we now have the apparatus in place 

to identify problems quickly, to build the cooperative framework 

with our state and local counterparts and our counterparts at the 

Federal level to do something about it promptly. 

Senator NELSON. And are you doing an outreach to our military 

population? 

Mr. KOVACIC. We are indeed. Under our Sentinel program, we 

have a cooperative program with the Department of Defense. One 

of our main partners is the Department of Defense. And a number 

of our projects involving not simply prepaid calling cards but other 

areas of concern involving consumer protection, financial practices, 

and others have our military service people as important focal 

points. And again, these are relationships that we can deepen and 

strengthen over time, but I am happy to report to you that the 

basic infrastructure to do that work is in place and is working now, 

but it can be enhanced. 

Senator NELSON. Describe how you have a mechanism as part of 

the task force for sharing the complaint information with State and 

local governments. 

Mr. KOVACIC. Through the Sentinel system, our law enforcement 

counterparts are able to share and access information in those 

databases. That is a condition of participating. And these are secure systems, and the eligible participants, to obtain that information, are law enforcement authorities, public authorities with law 

enforcement responsibilities. They have access to this information. 

But it is, I think, again something you pointed to before. It is not 

simply the access to the raw information. It is building the personal relationships and the institutional networks that ensure that 

we share information about better practices and techniques about 

what is taking place, patterns we are observing, as well as enforcement techniques that put us in a better position to apprehend 

wrongdoers and sanction them. 

Senator NELSON. Now, some of these charges that they list are 

payments to the Federal Universal Service Fund and the pay 

phone owner compensation. How do you go about determining 

whether these calling card companies have remitted the money to 

these government entities or in the case of pay phone compensation, to the pay phone owners? 

Mr. KOVACIC. Senator, that is an ingredient of the problem that 

we have not focused on. Typically the payments to the Universal 

19 

Service Fund and the fulfillment of obligations have tended to be 

the province of our telecommunications regulators at the state and 

Federal level. That is a level of expertise, a specific concern we 

have not focused on. But we do work actively with our state and 

local counterparts involving telecommunications oversight on the 

other dimensions of the problem. 

Senator NELSON. And that would be in the case of Government 

as well where it might be the Federal Universal Service Fund? 

Mr. KOVACIC. We tend not to focus on fulfillment of those obligations, but we do work actively with the Federal Communications 

Commission in sharing information, what we learn about the operation of the sector itself. 

Senator NELSON. It seems like that is important because that is 

another case of fraud about which a prosecutor needs to know. 

Mr. KOVACIC. No question. 

Senator NELSON. What percentage of the total calling card market would you say constitutes these bad actors? 

Mr. KOVACIC. Very hard to determine, Senator, and I do not 

know that we have attempted a precise calculation. It is about a 

$4 billion-plus a year sector. And as you and your colleagues and 

Congressman Engel have mentioned today, the vast bulk of activity 

in that sector is performed by legitimate enterprises. 

Our concern is that whatever the actual percentage of commerce 

accounted for by illegitimate enterprises is, it has the capacity to 

taint the entire sector. That is, if individuals repeatedly have bad 

experiences, it becomes very difficult for the legitimate enterprise 

to step forward and say you can trust me. ‘‘My representations are 

honest. I am not going to cheat you.’’ So the real hazard here, 

again, whatever the precise calculation is—and for the record, we 

would be glad to take our best stab at giving you our own estimate. 

Whatever it is, it has a unique capacity to taint the entire field, 

and that is the menace that we have to deal with. 

Senator NELSON. Are you getting cooperation from the good actors? 

Mr. KOVACIC. Indeed, we are, sir. Yes. It is the good actors who 

help identify the nature of the problem. They have made suggestions about what to do about it. And I think for the very reason 

that you and Senator Hutchison mentioned originally, their own investments, their own good name is at stake. And if consumers believe that this is a bad commercial neighborhood, they will stay out 

completely and the others will suffer. They are helping us. 

Senator NELSON. A minute ago, you mentioned the activity of the 

states going after these bad actors. And I would like you to comment on what occurs if a state goes after them, the state gets them 

in a scenario that applies just to that state. So the bad actors move 

to another state. So the FTC is going to have to coordinate the activities of those state lawsuits when they raise the violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. Tell us about that. 

Mr. KOVACIC. I think what we will certainly have to do is, first, 

to have a network that ensures that all of us are aware of the activity of each institution so that we have a sense of what the individual pieces of enforcement look like, but also a sense of how to 

develop a collective strategy about the timing and the prosecution 

of matters. 

20 

One thing that increasingly has become part of our portfolio is 

what we call sweeps, where we work in cooperation with our State 

counterparts and sometimes our international counterparts where 

on a single day we will announce the prosecution or completion of 

literally dozens of matters involving a related practice. And these 

sweeps have become an extremely valuable tool to ensure that we 

get broad coverage and from the point of view of raising consciousness, the fact of bringing lots of them at once tends to generate lots 

of attention which ensures that the consequence of prosecution is 

greater deterrence. 

Senator NELSON. Do you want to comment on the controversial 

issue in the Committee on common carrier exemption? 

Mr. KOVACIC. I would like to thank the Committee, to thank Senator Dorgan, to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the possibilities in 

S. 2998 to permit us to operate much more extensively in instances 

in which a potential wrongdoer is a communications service provider that is a common carrier. 

As you know, there are other public institutions that have the capacity in some ways to do what we do, Federal and State. The reason we are keen on eliminating and attenuating these restrictions 

is that there are many instances in which we are dealing with 

firms that are not, we believe, common carriers, but they raise defenses that implicate the common carrier exemption. In the two 

matters that you are aware of, our two cases brought in the spring, 

Clifton Telecard and Alternatel, we are having to spend precious resources to defeat—and we believe we will—arguments that communications firms are necessary parties and must be brought into the 

lawsuit. 

In other instances, we see clear evidence of misconduct by firms 

that are unmistakably communication services providers. We cannot address those directly. We have to hand those off. And that 

handoff can be a source of fumbles, and it is not always clear that 

someone else will inevitably take the ball and run with it. 

We think that given the changes in the sector today, that if we 

have the capacity to deal universally across the country with not 

only the distributors of these cards whom we are dealing with in 

the Clifton and Alternatel cases, but also with telecommunication 

services providers, we have the ability to create a much more effective source of protection. 

And it is not to denigrate the work that other public institutions 

have done in any way. We are simply proud of the experience we 

built. If I can go back to the Delta or US Airways Shuttle example 

before, we have flown these routes in advertising and misleading 

conduct lots of times. And if it is a dark, rainy night on the northern approach coming down the Potomac, which we have done many 

times into National Airport, which has sort of a short runway, and 

you think about who you want in the cockpit, you want someone 

there with a little bit of gray in the temples who has done it a lot, 

who says this is the 2,500th landing I have made at National on 

a dark, rainy night. 

We have flown this route lots of times, and we think we are pretty good pilots when it comes to dealing with deceitful and misleading behavior so that there are other good pilots out there, but 

21 

we think we can fly this route very well if we are given authority 

to fly over this part of the commercial space. 

Senator NELSON. So the bottom line is you support the legislation 

and you think it would be a step in the right direction. 

Mr. KOVACIC. No question, Senator. We have some specific suggestions which we are happy to share with your staff and to continue to discuss with you about areas in which we think the legislation can be improved. There are some technical adjustments we 

would suggest. But we think the legislation is unmistakably a step 

ahead and a crucial element that you and the Committee appreciate quite well. Our regulatory frameworks need upgrades over 

time, and your colleagues, your counterparts in the House, understand this quite well, as Representative Engel just mentioned. And 

we see the adoption of this type of legislation as being the equivalent of getting the upgrades we need to make sure that the enforcement operating system works well over time. 

Senator NELSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And without 

objection, part of the record will be the written material that you 

wanted to insert in the record. 

Mr. KOVACIC. Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. And I thank you, and let me call up the second 

panel. 

Mr. KOVACIC. Thank you very much for the chance to be here 

today. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

We are happy to have Sally Greenberg, Gus West, Patricia 

Acampora, and Rosemary O’Brien. Sally Greenberg is the Executive Director of the National Consumers League. Gus West is the 

President of The Hispanic Institute. Patricia Acampora is Commissioner of the New York State Public Service Commission. Rosemary 

O’Brien is the Director of Marketing of Military Marketing. 

As stated in the previous panel, your written testimony will be 

included as part of the record. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. West and Ms. Greenberg, both of you have 

followed this issue for some period of time, and it seems that in the 

past couple of years, there has been a dramatic spike in the number of complaints against the bad actors in the industry. Can you 

tell us what factor is responsible for this increase in complaints? 

Is it the low cost of entry into this lucrative market? Is it the failure of regulators? What is your opinion? Ms. Greenberg? 

STATEMENT OF SALLY GREENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE 

Ms. GREENBERG. I do believe that the low cost of entry is a contributing factor. It is really easy to get in and out. It is easy to get 

out from under the lens of law enforcement. I have in my written 

statement a quote that I could not resist adding from one episode 

of The Sopranos where Tony Soprano is talking about how he and 

his cronies are in the business of prepaid calling cards and somebody else is left holding the bag. Very easy to get in, very easy to 

take people’s money and run. 

One of the things that we are recommending in our testimony is 

that there be some bond that entrants to the market who are selling prepaid calling cards put up so that if law enforcement finds 

22 

that the cards are not providing the minutes that are promised, 

that we have a place to go to look for and compensate consumers 

who have been ripped off or defrauded as a result of these cards. 

So I think that low barrier to entry is a real problem then. I think 

we could tackle that. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Greenberg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SALLY GREENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE

Introduction 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Sally Greenberg and I am Executive 

Director of the National Consumers League. I appreciate this opportunity to appear 

before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation to discuss 

the need for greater consumer protections in the purchase and use of prepaid calling 

cards. This largely unregulated consumer product is a ‘‘Wild West’’ of sellers and 

merchants who too often prey upon the most vulnerable consumers by promising 

minutes they don’t deliver and loading up on hidden or undisclosed charges and 

fees. In an industry like this, with low barriers to entry and a totally unregulated 

market, you can be sure there will be unscrupulous operators who will take the 

money and run. 

The National Consumers League, whose founding in 1899 makes us the oldest 

consumer organization in the United States, has a longstanding interest in protecting consumers from fraudulent practices and is the only consumer group that 

operates a national fraud center. (The NCL’s Fraud Center is described at 

www.fraud.org). 

I want to commend you, Senator Nelson, for your leadership in offering S. 2998, 

the Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act of 2008. Consumers rely on you, 

an outspoken defender of consumer rights and protections, to look out for their interests. In my testimony, I will address some of the facts and figures describing the 

magnitude of the prepaid calling card industry and the large amounts of money involved. I’ll discuss the fraud and deceptive practices associated with that industry 

and actions taken at the state and Federal levels in response to fraud I’ll discuss 

why NCL supports your bill, S. 2998, and I’ll make some policy recommendations. 

Our written testimony also includes a timeline detailing the growth of the industry 

and the rise in fraud associated with that growth. 

Let’s start with the industry. It is illustrative that the shady practices of the prepaid calling industry were featured prominently on the HBO series, The Sopranos. 

In Episode 26, Tony is discussing the mob’s work with prepaid cards. I’ve deleted 

the obscenities: 

TONY SOPRANO. ‘‘So, telecommunications once again fails to disappoint. What’s 

this thing? Telephone calling cards. You find a front man who can get a line 

of credit, you buy a couple of million units of calling time from a carrier. You 

become ‘acme telephone card company’. ‘Acme’. You’re now in the business of 

selling prepaid calling cards. Immigrants especially, no offense. They’re always 

calling back home to whoever (deleted). And it’s expensive, right? You sell thousands of these cards to the (deleted), cards at a cut rate. But you bought the 

bulk time on credit, remember? The carrier gets stiffed. He cuts off the service 

to the card holders, but you already sold all your cards. That’s (deleted) beautiful! (Laughing) it’s a good one.’’ 

Of course, no one should conclude that the whole prepaid calling card industry 

is controlled by organized crime: we have no such evidence, but this vignette from 

The Sopranos demonstrates how easy it is to get into the industry, rip off consumers, and disappear with no accountability whatsoever. That must change. 

Prepaid Calling Card Facts 

• Prepaid cards are a $4 billion a year industry, responsible for 11 billion calls 

in 2004.1

• The industry is estimated to reach $6.4 billion in revenue in 2008.2

• Examples of fraudulent practices used by the prepaid companies include ‘‘hangup fees,’’ periodic maintenance fees, destination surcharges, and high billing increments.5

• Companies that try to ‘‘play by the rules’’ are often punished by a loss of market 

share due to fraudulent carriers.6

23 

• Only 11 states, including California, Connecticut, Florida, and Illinois, currently 

have laws pertaining to calling card fraud, specifically. Most turn to generic 

consumer protection statutes, but enforcement has been extremely light.7

• Hispanic consumers may be losing up to $1 million per day because of fraudulent phone cards.4

• The average calling card delivers only 60 percent of the minutes promised, according to The Hispanic Institute, a non-profit research group.3

• The FTC’s survey of prepaid calling cards confirms The Hispanic Institute’s 

findings. For instance, one calling card tested by the FTC claimed to offer 360 

minutes to Panama, but only delivered 23 minutes of calling time. The FTC 

said that in 87 tests of the prepaid cards, the cards delivered an average of only 

50 percent of the advertised minutes.8

• The cost-per-minute rates for prepaid phone cards can be up to 87 percent higher than expected. An expected call rate of 15 cents per minute, for example, may 

end up costing 28 cents per minute.9

Customer service representatives for prepaid calling cards are often unavailable 

or not knowledgeable regarding the prepaid phone cards their employers are selling. 

A 2005 University of Georgia study found that in a third of the calls to prepaid calling card customer service lines, callers couldn’t reach a representative. When they 

did make contact, the representative often was unable to answer basic questions 

about fees or rounding up of minutes.10

Why We Need To Protect Users of Prepaid Calling Cards 

The rapid growth of the prepaid calling card industry combined with, until recently, a lax enforcement of consumer protection statues at the state and Federal 

levels, has enabled consumer fraud to flourish. Like so many other scams, the most 

frequent victims of the fraud and deception are the most vulnerable consumers: immigrants and the working poor; and those lower income Americans who often cannot 

afford or obtain regular phone service. These consumers rely on calling cards to stay 

in touch with friends and loved ones in the U.S. and abroad. Sadly, we believe that 

military families are also likely victims of the prepaid card scams and rip-offs. 

Yes, the cards provide these users with an alternative means of calling home, but 

many use false and deceptive practices in the process, and impose unconscionable 

terms. Fraud is fraud—if an automobile is sold with the promise of a sun roof and 

chrome wheels, it better have a sunroof and chrome wheels—if a phone card promises 500 minutes to call El Salvador, it should deliver those 500 minutes. 

Some state attorneys general—notably in your state of Florida, Senator Nelson— 

have done a commendable job in prosecuting fraudulent prepaid card companies. 

The Federal Trade Commission has also conducted investigations and brought important cases against individual prepaid phone card providers. Unfortunately, these 

scattered efforts are insufficient. We need basic Federal protections to stem the tide 

of the many deceptive practices in this industry. 

NCL believes that FTC regulations, as called for S. 2998, would help to level the 

playing field for all phone card providers. Such regulations include requirements 

that prepaid phone card providers and distributors disclose the terms and conditions 

of the cards, and list the per minute rates, preferred international destination rates, 

and any fees or surcharges, in their advertising. 

We need a national floor of minimum requirements stating what industry practices won’t be permitted. We applaud S. 2998’s provisions preserving the rights of 

states to go forward with their own civil cases—as Florida did. The Federal Government should set minimum standards and permit states to go forward with provisions that don’t conflict with the Federal law. That’s a pro-consumer position and 

acknowledges the important role states have played in enacting and enforcing consumer protections. 

NCL believes that both your bill, Senator Nelson, S. 2998, and Congressman Elliot Engel’s bill, H.R. 3402, would go far in addressing the false promises and deception associated with these cards. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the simple threat 

of regulation has already increased pressure on the prepaid calling card industry 

to reform its marketing practices.12 We’ve also seen evidence through the IDT settlement in Florida that if one company is forced to disclose accurately how many 

minutes a card will provide and what the surcharges and fees will be, they will lose 

market share to the other firms who are shading the truth. Therefore, we need to 

create a level playing field where all participants are required to provide accurate 

information. 

24 

Beyond Disclosure: What More Can We Do To Protect Consumers 

While NCL supports your efforts, Senator Nelson, to require full disclosure of 

terms and conditions on these prepaid calling cards, we find that the terms themselves, when they are disclosed, are too often unconscionable. For example, the text in fine print on the back of my $5.00 ‘‘Africa Sky’’ card 

states the following: 

All of the following fees will reduce the number of available minutes and the 

value of the card. Use of a toll free number from a pay phone will incur a $.99 

per call fee. Per minute rate will be $.02 higher for calls placed using toll free 

access numbers. Call time for multiple calls is calculated by rounding the last 

minute up to the closest multiple of 3 and then adding 1 minute except that 

if your call lasts less than 1 minute you will be charged only for a minute. If 

available minutes are not all used up on the first call the following fees will 

apply: (1) the multiple call rate will be 40 percent higher and will apply to all 

calls (see poster for details); (2) a fee per call of $.59 will apply to each call; 

and (3) on midnight after the first call a fee of $.69 will be deducted and then 

weekly thereafter. Card Expires Three Months After First Use . . . Rates and 

Fees are Introductory and are subject to change anytime. . . . 

The same or similar text is found on most of the cards. So, though we have the 

terms disclosed, albeit in fine print, we have a company that is rapidly subtracting 

money from the user’s original purchase. A 40 percent higher rate is imposed after 

the first call; a fee of 59 cents per call will apply to each one after the first call; 

and after midnight of the first call, the fee is 69 cents, which will be deducted weekly thereafter. This is from an original $5.00 card. No wonder users find that two 

or 3 weeks—or sooner—after first use, the card has no credit remaining. Notice the 

card also contains this catch-all phrase ‘‘Rates and Fees are Introductory and are 

subject to change anytime . . .’’ leaving the card distributors the option of changing 

the rules whenever they wish. 

Worse still is the ‘‘Majestic DMV’’ Card I purchased for $2.00: 

(1) A $.99 fee applies on the 1st day of use and every 5 days thereafter; (2) Calls 

made through tollfree access numbers are subject to a fee of up to 4 cents a 

minute; (3) payphone surcharge of $.99; (4) A destination surcharge of between 

20–60 percent of the total call; and/or (5) a fee of $.10–$.99 for connected calls, 

$.15/minute maximum domestic call rate (before applicable charges and fees); 

minutes and/or seconds are billed at a minimum of 1 minute and up to 5 minute 

increments, plus any applicable fees. Card expires 3 months after first use or 

12 months after activation. 

As a consumer advocate, I’ve often found it useful to look at consumer protection 

measures in other countries. I lived in Australia 2 years ago and used prepaid cards 

for calls to the United States. My experience was uniformly positive—the Australian 

prepaid cards tended to deliver the minutes they promised, and they were good for 

multiple uses. Choice Magazine, Australia’s counterpart to our Consumer Reports, 

tested these international calling cards and found that indeed, many delivered good 

value and low rates without connection fees or added charges. When I arrived back 

in the United States and began buying cards here, I found that their value tended 

to disappear after the first call. When I read the fine print, I understood why. 

I also consulted the document Consumer Protection in the European Union—Ten 

Basic Principles—and note that the Fifth Principle is relevant to our discussion of 

prepaid calling cards: 

Contracts Should Be Fair To Consumers 

Have you ever signed a contract without reading all the small print? What if 

the small print says the deposit you just paid is non-refundable—even if the 

company fails to deliver its side of the bargain? What if it says you cannot cancel the contract unless you pay the company an extortionate amount in compensation? EU law says these types of unfair contract terms are prohibited. Irrespective of which EU country you sign such a contract in, EU law protects 

you from these sorts of abuses. 

We could apply the EU’s notion of contract fairness to this issue. NCL supports 

S. 2998’s disclosure requirements and hopes that they will satisfactorily address the 

problem of consumers paying good money for a prepaid calling card that fails to deliver the service. An open marketplace where all prepaid calling card companies are 

providing accurate information may do the trick; the market has a way of working 

very effectively when consumers have accurate information upon which to compare 

rates. 

25 

NCL would like to suggest, however, that after passage of your bill, the FTC 

closely monitor the industry and in a year’s time, report on whether disclosure is 

addressing the problem adequately. 

Diogenes called the market ‘‘a place set apart where men can deceive each other.’’ 

We must impose some limits on that paradigm. If after a year we still see failure 

to accurately disclose rates and unconscionable terms when the rates are disclosed, 

we would urge this Committee to consider stronger regulation of this industry. 

NCL Policy Recommendations Related to Disclosure and S. 2998 

The National Consumers League strongly supports S. 2998 and its provisions to 

give enforcement authority to the Federal Trade Commission under the ‘‘unfair or 

deceptive act or practice,’’ clauses of the Federal Trade Commission Act. While prepaid calling cards generally offer savings on international long distance calling 

versus traditional ‘‘Dial 1,’’ 10–10 dial-around and wireless long distance calling,13

these savings are no excuse for fraud or deception. 

We also support FTC’s call to appoint a monitor to oversee the prepaid calling 

card business,14 and a requirement that the FTC report back to Congress on a periodic basis regarding the status of its efforts to enforce the terms of the proposed 

legislation. 

As a general proposition, we applaud the requirements included in the Florida Attorney General’s June 2008 settlement with prepaid card companies, such as: 

• Ceasing all deceptive advertising. 

• Providing 100 percent of the minutes advertised. 

• Not using hidden fees or misleading minute calculations to increase their profits 

at consumers’ expense. 

• Printing disclosures for a given card in any language used to advertise that 

card. 

• Printing the exact number of minutes available and the card’s expiration date 

(if applicable) on the card. 

• Prohibiting naming of card surcharges to resemble taxes. 

• Requiring one-minute increment billing. 

While S. 2998 requires that the disclosure text on the calling card itself, packaging, or other promotional material (including online) be in same language used 

to advertise the card, we would recommending expanding Sec. 3.(b)(4) of the bill to 

require that prepaid phone card providers provide toll-free customer service lines 

staffed by customer service representatives able to converse in the languages that 

the cards are advertised in. 

Further Recommended Action If Disclosure Requirements Are Not 

Sufficient 

If after 1 year, the FTC reports back to Congress with evidence indicating that 

greater disclosure is not reducing the consumer abuses in the industry, we recommend that further action be considered by this Committee, with the Federal 

Trade Commission given the authority to enforce these provisions: 

• Require all market entrants to be licensed and post a bond before marketing 

cards to consumers. That bond would go into a fund to compensate consumers 

who are victims of fraud. Those companies that market prepaid calling cards 

should also be required to provide a name, address and place of incorporation. 

Right now, the barriers to entry are so low and the penalties for not making 

good on the value of the cards are so minimal that it’s simply open season on 

consumers. We believe requiring a bond will act to keep many bad actors out 

of the industry. 

• Require all market entrants to have a 24 hour, 7 days a week toll free number 

that has a live person on the other end who must be knowledgeable about the 

use of the card. 

• Require that fees and surcharges imposed be related to actual costs. Congress 

has imposed rules on other industries that were charging consumers outrageous 

fees—the moving van industry, payday lenders, and funeral homes, to name a 

few. If, in a year’s time, this Committee finds that disclosure is not easing the 

deception and rip-offs that plague this industry, the Committee should consider 

imposing stronger regulations on prepaid calling card companies and the many 

fees and surcharges they impose on consumers. 

• Require that all cards have an expiration date and that this date be no shorter 

than 1 year after activation. If a seller fails to make a disclosure on expiration, 

the card should be valid indefinitely. 

26 

• Require sellers to list the minimum charge per call and the balance in minutes 

and dollars remaining on the card. 

• Require sellers to inform consumers, via a website or toll-free phone number, 

of any proposed changes in terms and conditions, with consumers given the 

chance to reject these changes and receive a refund on the card with no fee imposed for requesting such a refund within an appropriate grace period of no less 

than 30 days after posting of the proposed change. Prepaid calling card providers should also be required to prominently list a mailing address to which 

customers can direct refund requests and/or a website with a refund form that 

the consumer can access easily. 

• Require uniform terms in all prepaid calling card contracts so that consumers 

can comparison shop. Companies should not be allowed to confuse consumers 

by using a variety of terms for charges such as ‘‘administrative fee’’ or ‘‘service 

fee.’’ 

• The amounts involved in prepaid phone card transactions are too small for any 

one individual to bring a case to court. The only meaningful way to allow consumers to hold prepaid card sellers accountable is through use of the class action process. Consumers need to be guaranteed a private right of action and the 

ability to band together as a class to bring cases against dishonest prepaid 

phone card providers. 

Conclusion 

We strongly support S. 2998 and commend this Committee for holding the hearing 

today. By requiring much better disclosure on prepaid calling cards, this bill will 

help to mitigate the deception and fraud associated with these cards. We also support further monitoring of the industry by the FTC, which will in turn report to the 

Members of this Committee. 

NCL also urges Congress to find a way to require that prepaid calling card companies go beyond simple disclosure of their onerous rates. The most vulnerable consumers—military families, immigrants, low-income families—rely on these cards 

and spend their hard-earned money only to see the value of the cards disappear 

quickly after first use. NCL believes we can do better by consumers. We support 

the disclosure required under this bill and hope that it works. If we need to take 

stronger action, this bill’s requirements will represent an excellent first step. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving the National Consumers League this opportunity to comment on your bill. We commend you for your pro-consumer record and 

look forward to working with you and your staff to see this bill enacted into law. 

Issue Timeline 

We have provided a timeline of enforcement actions and legal settlements pertaining to prepaid calling cards below. 

1986 Prepaid calling cards introduced to the North American market.15

1996 U.S. prepaid card sales reach $1.1 billion.16

April 2001 New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announces settlement with five 

companies accused of deceptively marketing prepaid telephone cards 

throughout upstate New York. This settlement was part of Spitzer’s ongoing efforts to combat illegal marketing practices of prepaid phone card 

companies dating back to 1999.17

2006 Newark, NJ-based IDT Corp., the largest prepaid calling card company in 

the U.S. reports $2.2 billion in total sales.18

2007 U.S. prepaid market reaches $4 billion in revenue. 

January 2007 IDT Corp. settles Federal class action suit brought on behalf of hundreds of 

phone card customers alleging fraudulent and deceptive advertising practices.19

March 2007 IDT files lawsuit against 9 competitors, alleging that they provide 40 percent less time than advertised. Epana Networks, Dollar Phone, and Locus 

Telecommunications quickly reach settlement with IDT, agreeing to cease 

any misleading marketing practices. Six other companies named in the 

suit, including CVT Prepaid Solutions Inc. issue an open letter to the industry, claiming that IDT’s suit is ‘‘nothing but an underhanded ploy to 

regain lost market share by intimidation.’’ 20

27 

July 2007 Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum announces investigation of 10 prepaid calling card companies for fraudulent or deceptive advertising.21

August 2007 Representative Eliot Engel (D–NY) introduces H.R. 3402 ‘‘Calling Card Consumer Protection Act.’’ 22

March 2008 FTC asks U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to halt allegedly 

illegal marketing practices of prepaid card companies CTA Inc., Clifton 

Telecard Alliance One LLC, and Mustafa Qattous.23

May 8, 2008 Senator Bill Nelson (D–FL) introduces S. 2998 ‘‘Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act of 2008.’’ 24

May 23, 2008 Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott announces filing of legal enforcement 

action against prepaid calling card company Next-G Communications, Inc. 

over allegedly deceptive marketing practices employed by the company.25

Endnotes 

1 ‘‘THI Praises FTC for Standing Against Calling Card Fraud,’’ The Hispanic Institute. 2007. 

Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 2 ‘‘Prepaid Calling Cards: Market Dynamics and Forecast 2003–2008,’’ ATLANTIC–ACM. February 2003. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 3 Ibid. 

4 ‘‘Facts and Figures,’’ The Hispanic Institute. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 

5Office of the Attorney General of Florida (June 11, 2008). ‘‘McCollum Announces Prepaid 

Calling Card Settlements, Industry-Wide Reform’’. Press release. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 6 Holden, Diana. ‘‘Calling Out Prepaid Phone Cards,’’ BusinessWeek. July 9, 2008. Retrieved 

July 24, 2008. 7 ‘‘Facts and Figures,’’ The Hispanic Institute. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 

8Dang, Dan Thanh. ‘‘Avoid These Prepaid Calling Cards, FTC says,’’ Baltimore Sun. June 6, 

2008. Retrieved July 24, 2008. 9 Horton, Denise. ‘‘Prepaid Phone Cards: Caller Beware,’’ University of Georgia Research Magazine. Fall 2005. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 10 Ibid. 11 ‘‘Calling Card Questions & Answers,’’ The Hispanic Institute. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 12Marshalian, Jonathan. ‘‘You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby,’’ The Prepaid Press. September 17, 

2007. Retrieved July 25, 2008. 13 ‘‘Facts and Figures,’’ The Hispanic Institute. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 14Federal Trade Commission (March 26, 2008). ‘‘FTC Asks Court to Halt Prepaid Calling 

Card Scam; Alleges Consumers Receive Fewer Calling Minutes Than Advertised and Pay Hidden Fees’’. Press release. Retrieved on July 24, 2008. 15Frost and Sullivan. ‘‘North American Prepaid Calling Cards Market,’’ August 10, 2006. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 16 ‘‘Prepaid Phone Cards: The Facts,’’ State of New York Attorney General. Retrieved on 

July 25, 2008. 17Office of the New York State Attorney General (April 11, 2001). ‘‘Prepaid Phone Card Sweep 

Cleans Up Deceptive Posters’’. Press release. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 18 ‘‘Talk Isn’t So Cheap,’’ BusinessWeek. July 23, 2007. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 19 IDT Corporation (January 25, 2007). ‘‘IDT Reaches a Settlement in Calling Card Class Action Lawsuit’’. Press release. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 20 Hatcher, Monica. ‘‘McCollum probes calling card deceptions,’’ The Miami Herald. July 24, 

2007. 21 Hatcher, Monica. ‘‘McCollum probes calling card deceptions,’’ The Miami Herald. July 24, 

2007. 22 U.S. House. 110th Congress, 1st session. H.R. 3402, Calling Card Consumer Protection Act. 

Online. Thomas.gov. Available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR03402 

:@@@L&summ2=m& [Retrieved on July 25, 2008]. 23Federal Trade Commission (March 26, 2008). ‘‘FTC Asks Court to Halt Prepaid Calling 

Card Scam; Alleges Consumers Receive Fewer Calling Minutes Than Advertised and Pay Hidden Fees’’. Press release. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 24 U.S. Senate. 110th Congress, 2nd session. S. 2998, Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act of 2008. Online. Thomas.gov. Available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 

F?c110:1:./temp/∼ c110YZkszS:e930: [Retrieved on July 25, 2008]. 25 Attorney General of Texas (May 23, 2008). ‘‘Attorney General Abbott Takes Legal Action 

Against Prepaid Calling Card Company’’. Press Release. Retrieved on July 25, 2008. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. West? 

STATEMENT OF GUS K. WEST, PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF 

THE BOARD, THE HISPANIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. WEST. Mr. Chairman, I do not know that we necessarily at 

The Hispanic Institute would want to make it harder to do business. We sort of believe that the problem really lies in the enforceVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
28 

ment. It seems that these fraudulent practices are illegal at the 

Federal, State, and local level already, and it just needs to be enforced. Feedback that we have gotten from a few of the companies 

is that they were not going to change their practice until the enforcement was stepped up, until they were forced to deliver what 

they are promising. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. West follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GUS K. WEST, PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, THE HISPANIC INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators of the Commerce Committee, my name 

is Gus West, President and Board Chair of The Hispanic Institute, a Washington 

D.C. based non-profit. Thank you for inviting us here today to give testimony regarding international prepaid calling cards. These calling cards are an economical 

way to make international phone calls. In the United States, Latinos purchase and 

use these cards more frequently than any other group. The cards are used primarily 

to talk with family, friends, and relations. 

These cards are sold in neighborhood stores/tiendas/bodegas. We all have seen 

posters in the windows of these stores, advertising the cost of a certain number of 

minutes to a particular country. The cards are normally in boxes behind the cashier 

and the customer is able to select the card they wish to purchase. On the back of 

each card is an 800-number and a PIN number assigned to the card. One calls the 

800-number, enters the PIN number, the international phone number desired, and 

then receives a message telling the caller how many minutes he has for a phone 

call. 

We have tested hundreds of these cards and have found that on average these 

cards deliver about half the minutes promised. In an effort to have the most objective analysis we hired a private firm, Washington-based Network Analytics, to conduct testing of international prepaid calling cards sold in the Florida, New York and 

the Washington D.C. markets. I have a copy of our study here today and it is posted 

on our website at www.thehispanicinstitute.net. The conclusions of the independent 

study mirror the results of the internal testing that we conducted at The Hispanic 

Institute. 

I have been using these cards myself, and been cheated out of minutes. In my 

current role as Chairman of The Hispanic Institute, I have often been asked by reporters if we could put them in contact with other victims of this fraud. I ask them 

to go to anyone of these neighborhood stores where these cards are sold, and ask 

anyone you see buying these cards, if they have been cheated out of call minutes. 

You will find that 100 percent of the people who use these cards will tell you that 

they have been cheated out of minutes. The most popular cards, the ones that are purchased most often, are the $2 and $5 cards. While losing money on a $2 or $5 card may seem minimal to some, it can 

be significant to a low wage earning family. For reasons such as language, income, 

and lack of familiarity with regulations the users of these cards have had little recourse to address this fraud by a billion dollar industry. 

This is false advertising and it is illegal under existing Federal, state, and local 

laws. Moreover, we believe that other industries intentionally prey on Hispanics 

when advertising in Spanish as the majority of advertising for prepaid calling cards 

is done. 

THI has been highlighting this issue for well over a year now. While several State 

Attorneys General, State Legislatures, and the Federal Trade Commission have 

begun to take action against calling card fraud we have not seen any measurable 

improvement in this situation. We look forward to the day when consumers in the 

United States can be protected against this kind of fraud. Thank you. 

Hispanic Institute 

CALLING CARD VERIFICATION TEST PLAN

Provided by: Network Analytics Corporation 

Objective 

The purpose of this testing is to determine if calls to certain destinations using 

commercially available prepaid calling cards are providing the amount of minutes 

specified by the card providers. 

29 

Methodology 

Call generators will be used to place the calls via the calling card and complete 

the call to the destination call generators. Every attempt will be made to use all 

the available time in a single call. If this is not successful, most commonly due to 

quality of the line and drops, additional calls will be made to the same destination 

until all the remaining balance in the cards is used. Each call is recorded by the 

units in order to interpret the amount of minutes announced by the calling card 

platform. 

Units 

The testing will be performed using Call Generators (CallWave) in the U.S. 

(Washington, D.C. and New York lines) and terminating to Call Generators 

(CallWave) with Mexico and Guatemala numbers. 

Cards 

The following calling cards will be used: 

Florida ($5)—Telmex Compan ̃ ero, STI Florida, Touch-Tel Honduren ̃ a, Touch-Tel 

Guatemalteca, Touch-Tel Salvadoren ̃ a, Dollar Phone Coffee Time, Dollar Phone 

Rey, MPTA Florida Idol, MPTA Nine, PCI Pilot, PCI Prima and TST Si Pues. 

New York ($2)—Diamond Bingo, Diamond Arenque, SDI I Love NY, Lycatel 

Success, Lycatel Call Me, STI World, RTG Martini, RTG Cocktail and IDT Play 

Ball. 

Washington, D.C. ($2)—IDT Boss 

Toll Free ($5)—GEO Florida 

Two cards of each are provided in order to attempt to test to each destination with 

each card. 

Test Deployment 

The following are the numbers for the lines used: 

Washington Originated calls: (202) 609–9875 and (202) 244–1066 

New York Originated calls: (917) 779–8197 

Mexico Termination: +525585256265 

Guatemala Termination: +50222630419 

Test Scope 

The testing will provide the following data for each call: 

Seq. Number Disconnect Reason 

Date Call Duration Recording (Sec) 

Time Call Duration Trace 

Card Vendor Call Duration Destination carrier CDR (Sec) 

Card Name Call Duration Minutes 

Card Denomination PAMS Score LQ 

Card Code PAMS Score LE 

Originating Number Area 

Code (City) 

Per call Extra Charge (Using Next Call’s announced balance) 

Originating Number Next Call Announced Balance 

Access Number Dialed Card indicated connection fee 

Destination Country Card indicated Rounding Increments 

Destination Number Card indicated maintenance fee 

Destination Cell or 

Landline 

Toll-Free use surcharge 

From Number shown at 

destination 

Calculated p/min charge based on 1st call announcements 

Announced Balance $ CCR 

Announced Balance 

(minutes) 

AVE PDD 

Rate Per Minute AVE Extra Charge 

Minutes Not Provided (If 

call used all balance) 

AVE PAMS LQ 

Recording file name AVE PAMS LE 

End of Dial Time Total Minutes provided 

Call Progress detection 

time 

Completed Calls 

Post Dial Delay Actual p/minute rate experienced 

Call Disposition Total Minutes announced 

Call Answer Time Percentage provided vs. announced 

Call End Time Minutes Not Provided (If call used all balance) 

Warning Provided Percentage provided vs. announced (last call) 

30 

This information is provided from: 

• The originating carrier’s Call Detail Record 

• Terminating Carrier’s Call Detail Record 

• Call Generator (CallWave) Trace files 

• Listening to the Recordings created for each call 

• Terms written on each card 

Results 

• Test calls were placed between November 12 and December 08, 2007. 

• From a total of 45 cards tested, 7 encountered completion rate of 0 percent and 

could never reach the intended destination while another 8 encountered 50 percent or less of CCR. 

• Only 15 cards achieved the goal of utilizing the entire time balance provided 

in a single call. Out of those, only 4 (27 percent) provided the entire balance 

announced to the customer and 6 others (40 percent) provided 50 percent or less 

of the time announced. 

The following chart provides information about the Call Completion Rate provided 

by each of the cards, sorted by highest (better) to lowest (worst). 

Call Completion Rate (CCR%) 


910WEST1.eps
31 

The following chart provides information about the Average Post Dial Delay provided by each of the cards, sorted by lowest (better) to highest (worst). 

Post Dial Delay (PDD Seconds) 

The following chart provides information about the Average Listening Quality 

provided by each of the cards, sorted by highest (better) to lowest (worst). 

PAMS Listening Quality 


910WEST2.eps 910WEST3.eps
32 

The following chart provides information about the Percentage of minutes provided versus minutes announced by each of the cards when all minutes were used 

in a single call, sorted by highest (better) to lowest (worst). 

Percentage Provided vs. Announced (1 call) 

The following chart provides information about the Percentage of minutes provided versus minutes announced by each of the cards when considering only the last 

call placed in which the last remaining announced balance was used, sorted by highest (better) to lowest (worst). 

Percentage Provided vs. Announced (last call) 


910WEST4.eps 910WEST5.eps
33 

Senator NELSON. Ms. O’Brien, you were nodding your head. 

STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY G. O’BRIEN, PRESIDENT, 

MILITARY MARKETING LLC 

Ms. O’BRIEN. Yes, sir. I agree with Mr. West that enforcement 

is key here. You already have lots of legislation and rulemaking 

around this. What is critically important is that the bad actors are 

brought to a competent body to account for their actions. Generally 

speaking, I think the vast majority of the prepaid industry is considerably reputable and makes full disclosure. But I think that 

there are populations that are disproportionately affected by the 

bad actors. And we know where to find them. Let us find them and 

do what we need to do. Enforcement is key. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. O’Brien follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY G. O’BRIEN, PRESIDENT, 

MILITARY MARKETING LLC 

Thank you for your invitation to speak to the Committee about the military and 

the prepaid card industry. My name is Rosemary Grace O’Brien. I have a Military 

Marketing practice located in New York City. 

I would like to briefly summarize my background which qualifies me to speak 

with you today. My professional career is deeply rooted in telecommunications. It 

began back in 1981 with work performed for NY Telephone. It continued uninterrupted with major and on-going assignments from NYNEX, Southern New England 

Telephone, Southwestern Bell, and a handful of telecom start-ups made possible by 

divestiture in 1984. Eventually in 1997 I joined AT&T for a period of 7.5 years. That 

experience is most relevant to your agenda today. 

My work at AT&T was as General Manager of their worldwide Military business. 

To be clear, not mission critical communications, rather my team and I had the responsibility of providing Personal Telecommunications Services—in-room phone 

service in barracks, dedicated public payphones on military installations in 18 counVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE

910WEST6.eps
34 

tries, on larger U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships, and in Forward-Deployed locations, such as Bosnia and Kuwait, and eventually Iraq and Afghanistan. 

My job was to make sure Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen 

were aware of the special plans and programs AT&T built just for the military, how 

they could access them, and the best methods to pay for them. My mission was to 

be sure that servicemembers always had a way to call home, to reach family and 

friends no matter where they lived or served our country. At its peak, the business 

comprised 11 ‘‘platforms’’ with prepaid cards representing just one of them. AT&T 

secured the right and obligation to provide these services through contracts it won 

in several competitive bidding processes conducted by the Military Exchanges. It 

spent millions of dollars of capital building out infrastructure, and millions more 

educating the military community through informative advertising, in-person briefings, and other methods to build awareness of all products and services. 

You probably already know that servicemembers are intense communicators. They 

spend more on communications than the average American. Much more . . . The 

ability to talk to loved ones is a critically important quality of life issue, to their 

sense of well-being and the peace of mind of their families. Let’s face it, military 

life can be lonely, and dangerous. Separations from family and friends are especially 

difficult. So while it is still possible to write letters, and today, to send and receive 

e-mails, there is just no substitute for the human voice. Communications is essential 

and that fact will never change. That’s the key reason why prepaid cards are so essential in the military. 

The second reason, is equally as important, but completely practical. First, think 

back if you can, to when there were no prepaid cards or cell phones, how did you 

pay for a call when you were away from your home or office? Either you deposited 

change into the payphone, or if you were lucky enough to have home phone service, 

you could get a special calling card—a subscriber card—that allowed you to charge 

payphone calls to your home phone bill. If you were desperate or didn’t care what 

it cost, you paid with a credit card. 

Well cash is impractical for long distance calls, especially from foreign countries. 

Credit cards are not an affordable option. Subscriber calling cards are helpful, but 

they come with some limitations. 

First, you need to have a home phone to get one. Soldiers who live in tents, in 

barracks, on ships, or overseas, do not necessarily have a U.S. home phone. 

Second, the cost of aggregating the call data related to your card, so the carrier 

can render and collect a bill, needs to be built into the cost of each call. 

Third, a calling card does not have a mechanism that allows the user to understand how much he is spending, or has already spent this month. 

Prepaid cards became popular in the military, and remain so today, because prepaid cards effectively address all of these issues. Anyone can buy a prepaid card. 

Prepaid cards makes calls cheaper than calling cards. And prepaid cards enable the 

service member to budget himself. 

In the military, service members mostly buy cards at their military exchanges. 

Troops have a fairly sophisticated understanding of how to use the card so that they 

get the most from it. For example, generally speaking, when a card is used to call 

back to the United States from a foreign country, multiple units, or minutes are deducted for each minute of talk time. No surprise, international calls are more expensive. Multiple minutes is a way to recover the true cost of the call. Troops know 

this. Servicemembers recognize that, whenever possible, they should use the Defense Secure Network when calling the U.S. from a foreign country, because this 

enables them to a get a ‘‘free ride’’ back to the U.S., where a domestic operator helps 

them place a call and their minutes are deducted one for one, as if the call originated in the U.S. 

The Military Exchanges recognized the need for prepaid cards and have done an 

excellent job of procuring cards for service members. That’s why the cards that the 

Exchanges sell have the lowest rates from the countries that military people call 

from the most—Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, etc. And their high value 

cards offer a better rate to servicemembers than the big box retailers who dwarf 

them in size. I believe the cost of a payphone call from Iraq to the U.S. is about 

16 cents per minute. I cannot make a call from one side of Manhattan to the other 

for that little money, using a card I bought at Sam’s Club or Wal-Mart, or another 

big box retailer. 

Every retailer, when he buys the prepaid cards that will be sold in his store, considers his customer base; and as prepaid cards are typically custom-built, he builds 

his prepaid cards to satisfy his audience. And he sets the retail price for the cards 

he sells. That is sometimes where the trouble comes in. If a card that is built to 

be optimal (lowest) for calls from the U.S. to Mexico, is used to make a call from 

the U.S. to Korea, chances are good the call to Korea will be unexpectedly expenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
35 

sive. Or when a patriotic-minded American goes to his favorite big box retailer, buys 

a card made by a reputable carrier, and sends it to his grandson in Iraq, it is important to know that card, made by a reputable company will never offer as good a 

deal as the card that the Military Exchange sells to that soldier. And that soldier 

may complain to his wife about how little talk time he received from grandpa’s card 

compared to his Exchange card. And his wife, frustrated at her circumstances and 

missing her husband and the father of her children, may write you a letter complaining about how that reputable carrier is ripping off soldiers. But it is just not 

true . . . because it is likely that the card that grandpa sent was never meant for 

international inbound calls. But that does not stop them from writing their Congressman, or their local newspaper, or tv consumer advocate. I handled many of 

these complaints in my tenure with AT&T. Those kinds of stories should not ordinarily be a cause for overreaction on your part. 

However, I do encourage you to look closely and carefully so you can distinguish 

the needs of the reputable carriers who do an excellent job of making full disclosure, 

from the bottom feeders in the prepaid industry who have the ability to give the 

product or its maker a bad reputation. They prey on ignorance and inexperience, 

by deliberately tricking out their cards with inordinately short expiration dates, or 

come-on rates for one country with very high rates for all others, or very low-advertised rates that come with high, one-time surcharges. Their goal is to produce a 

product that allows them to enjoy very large, gross profits. I, for one, would support 

your carefully constructed plans to reign in prepaid chicanery, but would complain 

strongly about any Band-Aid attempts that do not fully consider the underlying elements of the prepaid business. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Acampora, the joint Federal-State slamming enforcement regime is often mentioned as a good example of 

a Federal-State partnership. Do you think that the model of Federal rules within the joint Federal-State enforcement regime works 

in this prepaid calling card scam? 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICIA L. ACAMPORA, 

COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, STATE OF 

NEW YORK; MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY 

COMMISSIONERS 

Ms. ACAMPORA. I think that, yes, it will work, and your legislation we believe is very well put together—we added some thoughts 

in our testimony that I have given to the Committee on this—but 

your bill allows your constituents to continue to use and exploit existing State enforcement mechanisms. As we know, State Government is a little bit more convenient to relate to rather than the 

Federal Government because of geography and also time changes 

between Washington and the various states. As you know, California usually has a problem with a lot of complaint litigation because of the time differences. 

It also helps, I believe, in times where the economy is so 

stretched. It enables the Federal Government and the State government to leverage scarce resources and join together to be able 

to do that. 

And of course, it is always nice to leave our State ‘‘cops’’ on the 

beat which can only maximize the odds that the bad actors will be 

punished and will be caught expeditiously. And I think that in the 

future, with your bill, the bad actors will face more enforcement— 

because of this state cooperation, and your constituents will get 

their grievances addressed quite quickly. 

And I think that the FCC has and continues to coordinate well 

with our national association of regulators which is called NARUC, 

36 

and the members of NARUC on these issues. And the FCC—I’m 

talking about slamming enforcement—helped coordinate and it 

works with NARUC. It has conference calls. 

And I think in speaking to the Chairman from the FTC, that the 

FTC has set up a similar task force on these issues as was set up 

with slamming with the states at the FCC. This will work quite 

well. And we really do look forward to working with the FTC as 

presently right now, there is more of a coordination with the Attorneys General, and I think it would help and assist if NARUC was 

also reached out to and could participate as a member of that task 

force. 

Senator NELSON. Is that organization something that could help 

us on State registration requirements and bonding requirements? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Well, we certainly would have—we have the staff 

and we have the ability to work with you to let you see what the 

various states have on the books. Right now, we have a few states 

that do have legislation. California has laws. New York certainly 

does, and some other states still do not. So I think it would be important that NARUC provide you with a lot of information that 

would make your job a little bit easier. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICIA L. ACAMPORA, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION, STATE OF NEW YORK; MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER

AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS

Introduction 

Chairman Inouye, Vice Chair Hutchison and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on consumer protection in the prepaid calling 

card market. This is an important piece of legislation for your constituents. I thank 

you for calling this hearing and commend Senator Nelson, the sponsors of the bill, 

and the Members of this Committee for your leadership on this important consumer 

issue. 

My name is Patricia Acampora. I am a Commissioner of the New York State Public Service Commission and a member of the National Association of Regulatory 

Utility Commissioners’ (NARUC) Committee on Consumer Affairs. NARUC represents the State utility commissioners in each of your states and the U.S. territories that have oversight responsibilities over all the critical utility infrastructures—telecommunications, energy, and water. NARUC has not yet established a 

specific position on national standards for prepaid calling card services, but we do 

have well-established positions on specific issues raised by the Prepaid Calling Card 

Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (S. 2998). 

As early as July 31, 2002, the NARUC Board of Directors adopted a resolution 

indicating that ‘‘consumers of all telecommunications services’’ should ‘‘receive clear 

and complete information regarding rates, terms and conditions for services.’’ In 

July, NARUC’s Committee on Consumer Affairs convened a panel on prepaid cards 

at our Summer Meetings in Portland, Oregon, which I moderated. The panel, which 

focused on existing State initiatives, was widely attended. You can expect that 

NARUC and its members will continue to be active on these issues. Shortly before 

that panel discussion, NARUC did an expedited informal survey finding that 18 of 

30 responding NARUC member commissions handle complaints about calling card 

services. State oversight and interest in this industry segment comes at multiple 

levels. 

Several entities are involved in providing these services. Telephone companies are 

responsible for the telephone lines that carry calls. Resellers buy telephone minutes 

from the telephone companies and ‘‘resell’’ them to end-users. Issuers set the card 

rates and provide toll-free customer service and access numbers. Finally, there are 

the distributors and retailers. Companies that fall into one or more of the first three 

categories frequently require certification from many of NARUC’s member commissions. But even where a State commission lacks authority, they frequently attempt 

to resolve complaints informally or cooperate with other State agencies, e.g., the 

State Attorneys General, on enforcement efforts. 

37 

Fraud and Abuse in the Prepaid Calling Card Market 

Many Americans rely on prepaid calling cards to complete intrastate, interstate, 

and international calls. Analysts believe the main victims of abuse in this market 

are minorities, immigrants, the elderly, low-income consumers, members of our 

Armed Services, and others either not inclined or not able to adopt other communications options. It is widely acknowledged that fraud and abuse in this market 

is more prevalent than complaint data indicates. 

My colleagues on the NARUC Consumer Affairs Committee report several issues 

with calling card providers, including: (1) the provider is either not required to seek 

Commission registration or certification or they have chosen to ignore that requirement; (2) the calling time provided is substantially lower than advertised; (3) the 

provider engages in misleading and false advertising by overstating achievable calling time or understating unit cost/rate; (4) the advertised rates expire after short 

‘‘promotional period’’; (5) the provider charges substantial undisclosed surcharges 

and fees; and (6) the card expires within a short period following the completion of 

the initial call. 

Prepaid calling cards present the usual enforcement challenges for State authorities. As mentioned earlier, frequently providers are headquartered in another jurisdiction and fail to register or seek certification from a State commission (in states 

that require such certification) or even register an agent for service of process under 

so-called State long-arm statutes. Moreover, most often, even in states where certification is required, the most easily located entity in the marketing chain—the retail 

store—is not subject to State Commission oversight. 

New York’s Public Service law provides consumer protections which have allowed 

my Commission to help assist customers with calling card complaints. Some of those 

complaints are related to completion fees that deplete the card faster than the consumer could have realized. Another common complaint we receive is from consumers 

who have a defective card that does not allow him or her to complete any calls, and 

want reimbursement from the card provider, or who are trying to contact the service 

provider for general customer service issues. Consumers also frequently complain of 

call completion fees they did not discover until using the card. Both New York’s law 

and S. 2998 require some information to be printed on the calling card, information 

on the rates and fees. This is a logical step; if this information is more readily available, it can stem the tide of customer dissatisfactions caused by inadequate disclosures. But there is a problem. Some disclosures now are often printed on the packaging material—material which is discarded almost immediately by the consumer. 

Although NARUC has no specific position on this problem, I do have some suggestions. In lieu of printing information related to rates and fees on the card packaging, 

I would like to suggest two options. Under the first, the service provider is required 

to include all rates and fees on a piece of card stock included with the calling card 

when sold. This card would the same size as the calling card and would have the 

phrase ‘‘CONSUMER: DO NOT DISCARD’’ printed on both sides in 14pt, boldface 

type. Another option, less useful to those without Internet access and is referenced 

in Section 3(a) of the bill, is to require the service provider to print a web address 

on the calling card which the consumer could access to confirm the rates and terms 

preprinted on the typically discarded packaging. Even if a consumer does not have 

access to the Internet or is not Internet savvy, the consumer could provide the consumer complaint call center with the website which would aid the investigation and 

resolution of a complaint by relevant authorities. 

State Enforcement of Federal Rules Proposed in S. 2998 

The Prepaid Calling Card Consumer Protection Act of 2008 protects consumers 

by requiring the accurate and reasonable disclosure of the terms and conditions of 

prepaid telephone calling cards and services. As previously stated, NARUC has not 

formally taken a position on what Federal standards should be, but we have 

urged—albeit in other contexts—that consumers should receive meaningful disclosures about such services, and that states must be able to enforce any Federal 

standards using existing procedures and penalties. 

There are many circumstances that explain why a consumer may not report a 

complaint. They may not know who to call or where to file a complaint. The value 

of the card may not justify the hassle of trying to get a refund or assistance. Also 

language skills and cultural barriers, particularly for recent immigrants, can make 

it difficult for some consumers to file complaints. There needs to be a proactive outreach effort to ensure consumers know that there are rules that protect them and 

how to seek assistance. 

Many NARUC member commissions actively address calling card abuses. Several 

States, including Texas, California, and my home State of New York have laws 

specifying required disclosures, including notice requirements at the point of sale, 

38 

1Specifically, Section 6(c)(5) should be revised to read: ‘‘to establish or utilize existing administrative procedures or penalties to enforce the provisions of the law of such state.’’ 

verbal disclosures at the beginning of calls, and a required warning 1 minute before 

a card is depleted. As in most consumer service matters, a small number of bad actors create the bulk of the consumer complaints. What troubles me is the negative 

impact those bad actors can have on the industry which is also comprised of many 

service providers that deliver quality service at reasonable prices. The reputable 

providers make up the heart of the industry and should embrace the rules proposed 

in S. 2998. 

The fraud and inadequate disclosure problems which are the focus of this bill cannot be handled by market forces. The partnership established in Sections Six and 

Eight of S. 2998 recognizes that, under State procedures, consumer concerns can be 

addressed promptly, often through informal processes. Also, Section Eight effectively 

incorporates NARUC’s general positions that (a) Federal rules should be ‘‘[a] floor, 

not a ceiling,’’ as ‘‘. . . blanket preemption on consumer affairs will restrict consumer redress in the future,’’ and (b) that ‘‘. . . consumers should not have to wait 

for Federal rulemaking every time a new issue arises.’’ 

S. 2998 recognizes that, even in those instances when minimum Federal consumer 

protection standards are appropriate, states must be allowed to enforce those standards and to adopt more specific standards where needed. This bill also provides 

states with flexibility in the method of enforcement. Section Six of the bill empowers 

a State AG, PUC or other authorized State consumer protection agency to bring civil 

action against a carrier that violates its provisions. This is wholly appropriate. 

States vary on their method of enforcement. In some states consumer complaints 

may go to the Attorney General, in others complaints go to the PUC or another 

agency. The Federal Government should not dictate the agency or procedure for 

State enforcement. Such Federal dictates would require states to waste taxpayer 

dollars to shift resources to different agencies. In addition, such a change could only 

cause consumer confusion by changing the current contact State agency. 

From an enforcement standpoint S. 2998 is a clear win for consumers because it 

not only establishes clear national standards, but it also couples those standards 

with coextensive Federal and State enforcement. NARUC does suggest one minor 

addition to Section 6(c)(5) to make clear that states can use existing administrative 

penalties as well as procedures to ‘‘enforce the provisions of the law of such state.’’ 1

With this very minor change, the bill clearly ensures multiple ‘‘cops on the beat’’ 

protecting consumers from bad actors. 

Conclusion 

NARUC supports the jurisdictional balance struck in The Prepaid Calling Card 

Consumer Protection Act of 2008. As drafted, the bill provides consumers with increased national disclosure requirements and ensures strong enforcement of national standards by allowing states to enforce those standards. It also efficiently preserves existing State options for consumer relief. 

Thanks again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. 

APPENDIX A 

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN BARRY SMITHERMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS

July 30, 2008 

Executive Summary 

On May 23, 2008, the Texas Attorney General filed the state’s first enforcement 

action against a prepaid calling card company, Next-G Communications, Inc. The investigation which led to the enforcement action was done in conjunction with the 

Public Utility Commission of Texas, and determined that Next-G’s calling cards consistently delivered only 40 percent of the minutes on international calls claimed in 

the advertising for the cards. 

The results of the investigation show that Next-G inadequately disclosed the fees 

and charges associated with each call, reducing the number of minutes available for 

calling. The Texas Attorney General filed the enforcement action under the Texas 

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. 

History 

Beginning in 2004, staff from the Consumer Protection Division of the Public Utility Commission of Texas investigated whether calling card companies were following 

the advertising and disclosure requirements under the Public Utility Commission 

39 

Substantive Rule 26.34. The initial investigation revealed that calling card companies were not following the Commission rule related to accurate disclosure of rates 

and charges on the card or at the point of sale. The Commission rule also requires 

that enforcement actions for fraudulent, unfair, misleading, deceptive, or anticompetitive business practices will be coordinated with the Texas Attorney General 

in order to ensure consistent treatment of specific alleged violations. Customer Protection notified the Texas AG’s Office of the issues relating to the accurate disclosure of information to customers, and during the summer and fall of 2007, worked 

with the Texas Attorney General’s Office to test the calling cards from Next-G Communications to determine the number of minutes that the cards provided. 

During the investigation on the Next-G calling cards, Customer Protection staff 

made calls to numbers in Honduras and El Salvador using $5 and $10 calling cards 

purchased in San Antonio, which are typical of the calling cards purchased at convenience and grocery stores. Consumer Protection Staff made several different types 

of calls using different calling cards: ‘‘straight line’’ calls to the target phone numbers, where a call is made until it is terminated by the provider, five-minute calls, 

and 10-minute calls. When calls were made using the calling cards, a voice prompt 

is given at the beginning of each call stating the number of minutes available for 

each call. The minutes stated in the voice prompt were compared to that actual 

number of minutes received or to the minutes stated in a subsequent call using the 

same card. 

The results of the investigation showed that callers often received less than half 

of the minutes advertised. For example, when calls were made to Honduras using 

the $5 calling cards, the voice prompt indicated that there was 35 minutes of calling 

time. Callers received only 12 minutes for these calls. With calls to El Salvador 

using the $5 cards, the first five-minute call would use up 18 minutes of calling 

time, and the first 10-minute call would use 25 minutes of calling time, as indicated 

by comparing the minutes stated on the voice prompt in subsequent calls. 

Based on the results of the investigation, the Texas Attorney General filed a lawsuit asserting that Next-G engaged in false, deceptive and misleading acts and practices, specifically, not providing the minutes offered in the advertisements or voice 

prompt at the beginning of phone calls, and using advertising with vague, misleading, and confusing disclosures about fees and charges. The Attorney General requested that the defendant disgorge all money fraudulently taken from individuals 

and businesses, and requested a temporary and permanent injunction against NextG selling cards that do not give all the minutes advertised or indicated in the voice 

prompt. The lawsuit is currently proceeding in State District Court in San Antonio. 

Conclusion 

Based on the investigation of the Next-G calling cards, it is obvious that some 

calling card companies mislead and confuse customers by including vague disclosures on charges and rates that dramatically alter the number of minutes available 

to a customer. Customers that use calling cards, especially for international calls, 

are generally immigrant or low income individuals attempting to contact families or 

friends. Calling card companies should be required to accurately disclose the fees 

and charges, rather than use incomplete and misleading language. By putting these 

precise terms up front, customers will be aware of what they are paying for, and 

can make better decisions in choosing their telecommunications needs. 

40 

APPENDIX B 


910ACAMP1.eps 910ACAMP2.eps
41 


910ACAMP3.eps 910ACAMP4.eps
42 


910ACAMP5.eps 910ACAMP6.eps
43 


910ACAMP7.eps 910ACAMP8.eps
44 


910ACAMP9.eps 910ACAMP10.eps
45 

Senator NELSON. Senator Pryor? 


910ACAMP11.eps 910ACAMP12.eps
46 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

doing this. 

If I may, I would like to direct my first question to Ms. Greenberg, and that is, out there in the marketplace, out in the field 

right now, if someone has a problem with a calling card, what do 

they do right now? 

Ms. GREENBERG. Well, as has been mentioned, there are State 

regulators. I think I would probably call my state. I would tell consumers, as we do, to call their state Attorney General’s Office or 

whoever runs their consumer protection division in the State. I 

would recommend they report a loss of minutes and money spent 

on these cards to the FTC as well. We know the FTC has been involved. And people do call us about the cards and complain. 

I myself use the cards because I have friends. You know, I lived 

abroad for a period of time and I have friends who are abroad. And 

what I noticed is, when I lived abroad, the calling cards there actually deliver the minutes that are promised. Here the series of cards 

you buy at the five-and-dime typically are shockingly quick to subtract your minutes. 

So I think that there are places that you can call. 

I think there are very good possibilities for enforcement. I do 

think that the low barriers to entry do militate for a kind of bonding system that we need to have and some State legislation calls 

for that kind of thing. 

Senator PRYOR. If someone does complain, say, for example, to 

their state Attorney General, or whoever does their consumer 

work—I think in Florida it is actually the Department of Agriculture—what remedy is available? Does he get his money back, or 

what does he get usually? 

Ms. GREENBERG. Well, I think the satisfaction comes in complaining because the likelihood that you are going to get your 

money back on a $2 card from state regulators at this point really 

has not proven very fruitful. 

There are also class action lawsuits brought by attorneys. That 

is one way to try to distribute some money. But the money is going 

to be pretty negligible. So consumers are really left holding the 

bag. 

Senator PRYOR. Have there been class action lawsuits on these 

cards? 

Ms. GREENBERG. Yes. My understanding is there have been a 

couple of class action lawsuits on prepaid calling cards. 

Senator PRYOR. Commissioner Acampora? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. How many complaints do you all receive in New 

York? Do you track those? I mean, how is that working there? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Well, the complaints that do come in to our office 

we can track. We have an Office Of Consumer Services. But in the 

State of New York, they could be calling the Attorney General’s Office on their own also. They could be calling the Consumer Protection Board. If they are in New York City, they could be using the 

consumer services in New York City. So it would be kind of hard 

to track all the various entities that consumers could use. 

47 

However, when you are dealing with a population that are immigrants and some do not speak English, I think most of the time 

people do not complain. They just suck it up and they lose the cost 

of the card. So it would be hard to estimate how many do not even 

call. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. I am sure that is the case. Given the dollar amounts involved here, I think a lot of people probably simply 

do not call. 

And let me ask all the panelists, if I may, your thoughts on 

whether you believe the Federal Trade Commission is doing 

enough and if you think Congressional action is necessary. Do you 

want to go ahead, Ms. Greenberg? 

Ms. GREENBERG. Yes. We are certainly supportive of your bill, 

Senator Nelson, and Congressman Engel’s bill as well. I think disclosure is critical, and it will be certainly helpful in at least, I 

think, diminishing somewhat the bad actors. 

You know, I would go a few steps further in terms of—I have already talked about I think a bond should be put up. I also think 

there is an unconscionability factor here in the rates because, as 

we saw with your fantastic posters here, there is disclosure. It may 

be fine print, but there is disclosure. It is not always honest in 

terms of what you get. But Black’s Law Dictionary defines 

unconscionability as, ‘‘unconscionability is generally regarded to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to a contract, together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’’ Boy, is this an example of that. 

So I guess I would push for something a little stronger. I have 

talked about that in my written testimony. 

And also, you know, the ability to compare rates. That is a critical tool that consumers use. But these card sellers, the vendors, 

come in and out of the market. It is very hard. You know, you can 

go 1 week to your local store and buy one of these, and then the 

next week, this card is not there anymore. So we do not know who 

is behind these cards. I do not have a good feeling about the reputation of many of these companies. But I think we really have to 

get tough with them and start to learn who they are and allow consumers to compare rates between cards so then they can pick and 

choose and use the marketplace to make their choices. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. West, do you feel like we need legislation? 

Mr. WEST. Yes, sir. We at The Hispanic Institute probably believe that the FTC has not done enough, and we do need legislation, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Commissioner? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Yes, I definitely think so. Your legislation is 

great. In fact, it has made us in New York look at what we already 

have, and I think we need to strengthen that. 

But the legislation is—definitely you need the legislation. As a 

former legislator, I can tell you that. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. O’Brien? 

Ms. O’BRIEN. Yes, sir. With regard to the portion of the market 

that I will call the bottom-feeding portion of the market, I think 

that you do need legislation. I would suggest strongly to you that 

you make clear who has the responsibilities for enforcement. Do 

48 

not put a little piece over here and a little piece over there because 

I think ultimately that will water everything down. 

My own experience, particularly in military, is that frequently, to 

sort of harken back to your previous question a little bit, when people had an issue and they called the customer service line, the company was always very good about trying to resolve it. And frequently we found that a lot of their complaints were, frankly, pure 

misunderstanding on their part, with regard to how the system 

worked or what they were actually getting. They were very quick 

to jump the gun and believe that there was an issue with our company ripping off service members; but that was clearly not the 

case, once we were able to explain it to them. If there was at any 

point an irreconciliable beef, and they felt uncomfortable about it, 

we would either refund their money or give them an additional 

card if that satisfied them. 

I think those kinds of issues are always going to be around. I do 

not think that legislation should in some way, shape, or form 

hinder the companies that are doing a good job, but for the bottom 

feeders, yes, I think legislation is necessary. But again, clear oversight as to who is responsible for enforcement. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding the hearing but also 

for your work on this issue because there really is some bad activity going on out there that we need to address. Thank you for your 

leadership on this issue. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Thune? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too want to 

thank you for holding the hearing today. And I appreciate all the 

witnesses making time to come up and testify. Although I missed 

the earlier panel, I know that Representative Engel in the House 

has a bill, has a great interest in this issue. 

Calling cards are particularly important, I think, for recent immigrants and low income consumers who may not have access to 

other telecommunication services and, at the same time, may not 

have a lot of knowledge of the consumer protection laws, our language in some cases, how to register complaints against providers 

when those laws are violated. And because of this, I believe that 

violations of consumer protection laws in the prepaid calling card 

market are particularly egregious, and I am pleased to see that the 

FTC has recently undertaken actions to enforce those laws. 

And I look forward to supporting proposals that ensure that consumers have the opportunity to acquire the necessary, relevant information when purchasing prepaid calling cards. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and their 

effort to protect our Nation’s consumers. 

And I want to just follow up and maybe drill down a little bit 

from what Senator Pryor asked with regard to legislation. 

First off, I guess I am interested in whether you have seen any 

improvements in the prepaid calling card market after the FTC’s 

recent actions. 

49 

Mr. WEST. We have done testing over the last couple months and 

we really have not seen any improvement in what is being promised and what is being delivered at this point. So we have no evidence of any improvement even though there is stuff going on with 

Attorneys General around the country, State legislatures, and this 

legislation being introduced. We have no scientific data to support 

that. 

Senator THUNE. You talked about perhaps Congress acting in 

this regard. Is that a preferred approach to having states enact 

some sort of legislative framework and accountability at that level 

as opposed to having Federal legislation and oversight and a 

framework for addressing this? I mean, you said many of the states 

are acting—— 

Mr. WEST. Well, like what has happened in Florida where they 

have settled with some companies, the problem is they have only 

settled with 10 companies there. There are many other companies 

doing business there. And then that legislation and those efforts 

are restricted to Florida only. So you have the other 49 states still 

going about their business. So I think that while we welcome what 

is happening in the individual states, it would be a piecemeal effort. 

Senator THUNE. How many states have taken steps in the form 

of a legislative solution? 

Mr. WEST. Somebody here on the panel may have more information on it than I do. 

We know that New Jersey has taken action in the legislature. 

We think the Attorney General Brown in California, Attorney General Cuomo are looking at this now. I know the District of Columbia is looking at legislation now. So we have been in contact with 

the Attorney General in Illinois also. So there is a lot of activity. 

We have recently been contacted by the City of San Francisco. So 

now it seems like some cities are getting involved also. 

Ms. GREENBERG. If I can jump in. I think our preference from a 

consumer standpoint, consumer advocacy standpoint, is to have the 

Federal legislation require some sort of baseline disclosure, as S. 

2998 does, and then allow the states to focus on companies that 

may actually be located there. 

One other suggestion I had is that perhaps the industry needs 

to set some voluntary standards, which members of the industry 

can agree to. We talk about bottom feeders and we could maybe 

cast away some of the worst actors and get the industry to—— 

Senator THUNE. Is there any of that kind of self-policing going 

on today? I mean, does the industry have any sort of baseline voluntary requirements—— 

Ms. GREENBERG. I have not seen any evidence of that, but maybe 

others on the panel know. 

Mr. WEST. I think, Senator, there was one company that ran into 

some trouble, and now they are trying to get everybody else onboard to deliver what they are promising. But I do not think that 

they did it out of altruistic reasons or anything like that. So I do 

not see it happening. 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Senator, to your question about how many states 

are active. NARUC undertook a quick survey of its members on 

this issue; and of 30 respondents, the PUCs in 18 states had rules 

50 

and handled consumer complaints regarding prepaid calling cards. 

Eighteen states have legislation. 

Senator THUNE. OK. And do the states who have enacted legislation—are they similar in terms of—is everybody taking a different 

approach to this? Is there any agreement, I guess, on kind of what 

a formula would be to—— 

Ms. ACAMPORA. I think that is really why the Federal legislation 

would be very helpful, and just going through the legislation, as I 

said previously, what we have set up in New York definitely could 

be strengthened by some of the ideas and some of the mechanics 

set forth in this legislation. 

Senator THUNE. Is it the consensus pretty much of everybody on 

the panel that we do need some sort of Federal legislative action 

on this? Is that fair to say? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. I think so. 

Ms. GREENBERG. From our perspective, yes. Like a baseline, a set 

of sort of minimum standards for disclosure and other issues the 

bill addresses I think would be very helpful. 

Ms. O’BRIEN. If I may, I would also like to add I think some consumer education would be extremely helpful to many people. If we 

make them smarter, they will not make the mistake of buying a 

bottom feeder’s card is what it comes down to. And I am sure there 

has been a lot of that, but speaking for someone who had responsibility for the military for 8 years, we spent millions of dollars educating military consumers. 

And to your question regarding self-policing, we had a standard 

within the company not to produce any form of card for the military consumer that could in any way, shape, or form be conceived 

or construed as deceptive. But nonetheless, when the Iraq War 

broke out, I had literally thousands of complaints that were borne 

out of, frankly, just plain ignorance of how prepaid cards work, 

why the rates are different from card to card, why a card purchased at the U.S. Post Office was different than a card purchased 

at Sam’s Club or Wal-Mart or anywhere else. 

So while enforcement is important, I think that we just cannot 

dismiss this as a bowl of Jello that is easily understood. It takes 

a little understanding. And for that reason, I would strongly recommend consumer education wherever we can. 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Could I just piggyback on that? We recommended in our testimony that the packaging be changed because 

most people take the packaging, rip it up. I am not an expert on 

how you manufacture, but maybe providers could double the size 

of the card but allow it to be folded in half which would make it 

a little bit thicker. But currently holding onto that packaging is 

really key because that is what gives a lot of the information we 

in N.Y. need for enforcement to investigate. And certainly if they 

were buying it also through a website, there needs to be information on that website too, which would be helpful. 

Senator THUNE. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all. 

Senator NELSON. I want to go back to something that one of you 

said about the distribution of the cards through merchants. What 

do we do there? And as distribution technology changes and then 

eventually you are going to have virtual cards available on the 

51 

Internet, it is going to make enforcement harder. Ms. O’Brien, 

what do you think about all this? 

Ms. O’BRIEN. You have virtual cards now. AT&T makes a virtual 

card available, prepaid cards available, to the military community 

through the military exchanges. You need only go to their website 

and plunk down your form of payment, whatever that might be, a 

credit card, military STAR card, and as a result, you will get emailed back to you the virtual PIN number that you need to make 

a call, along with all the terms and conditions that apply to that 

particular card. 

Yes, it will complicate enforcement, to be sure. Again, I would 

come back to the notion of education as being something to help 

overcome some of the issues. 

Senator NELSON. Does anybody else want to comment on that? 

Ms. ACAMPORA. Thank you. I think again that you should include 

in the e-mail the terms and conditions to the customers if they purchased it online. But I think your bill does strike a very good balance, and you have specified disclosures for online services. And 

giving the FTC rulemaking authority with sufficient flexibility to 

address some new attempts to bypass some of those protections— 

I think you have to kind of work on that. 

Senator NELSON. As we were talking and we had those examples 

up here of fine print and information that you really cannot read, 

we need to provide more information for the consumer to beware. 

But what is the practical way to obtain this? 

Now, the language barrier is clearly a problem that we have already unveiled here. But rates and conditions are not printed on 

the card packaging. So some of you have suggested in your testimony either attaching a rate card to the calling card or listing a 

website address or a toll-free number. Talk about this. 

Ms. O’BRIEN. Sir, I could tell you that AT&T cards frequently 

had, depending on the nature of the card and the size of the card 

and how it was going to be sold, and in order to make full disclosure, a separate leaflet inserted that had virtually all the terms 

and conditions on it. And I can tell you if you walked onto any military base, after service members bought those cards, what you 

would see are those leaflets all over the bottom of the phone 

booths. People just would not read them. And so that was when we 

really determined that we needed to educate people as to how to 

use them and how to be smart consumers when buying them. 

I don’t know how you get around that need for education issue 

with the vast majority of Americans. Still today grandpa buys a 

card for his grandson in Iraq, and it does not go the way he expected. And he bought it from the U.S. Post Office when he picked 

up his stamps, and he is angry about it. It is an issue. It is an 

issue honestly I am not quite sure you could address. 

More information, of course, is always better, but it has to be information that is willing to be consumed. It cannot just be a 5- 

pound pile of something; it needs to be better than mice type that 

people are just going to throw on the floor. 

Mr. WEST. Senator? 

Senator NELSON. Mr. West? 

Mr. WEST. One of the things when you buy one of these—we 

were talking earlier about the class action suit, and the thing is 

52 

you throw the card away. So there is no way of really reclaiming 

the money that you have lost. And I think that the Internet activity will—you know, if there are virtual cards and so forth, it will 

be easier to track your loss of money and compensate people who 

have been fraudulently dealt with. 

But one of the issues is that these companies will—you know, if 

a consumer is educated, he will spend 3 months using a card and 

getting all the minutes that they want. And what the company will 

do is suddenly pull the rug out from under them and in the fourth 

month try to recoup a lot of the profits—you know, increase that 

profit margin. So if he thought he was buying a good card for 2 

months, in the third, fourth month, he is not buying a good card. 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Greenberg, in your testimony you say that 

the FTC ought to appoint a monitor to oversee the industry. How 

should that work? 

Ms. GREENBERG. What we suggested is let us look at how well 

disclosure works. Your bill sets out some very good and strong requirements for disclosure. Give it a year. Let us have the FTC 

oversee how the industry is, if it is improving. 

You know, I am concerned about the cards that you go in and 

get at the—I get them at the gas station. This is a $6 billion industry. These cards do not deliver what they say they are going to deliver. The fine print tells you that you are being ripped off. You 

read it. You read it out loud. It is a $2 card and 99 cents comes 

off the card each time you make a call. You do not have any money 

on this card. So we have really got to get a handle on how we are 

going to rein in what I think is really a colossal rip-off for so many 

consumers. 

So what we are recommending is that the FTC come back, take 

a look and see how the disclosure has worked. I think disclosure 

will have a positive impact. Whether it will rein in sort of a level 

of fraud and scamming that is going on, particularly of folks who 

do not speak English, who have relatives overseas, who are not 

going to take any action, not going to take any corrective action— 

they are generally not going to be part of a class action lawsuit. 

They are probably not going to report this to the FTC. These are 

the people that I am most concerned about protecting, and I think 

the FTC could come back in, take a look at where we are in a year, 

and see whether these practices have been reined in. 

Senator NELSON. A couple years ago when I got involved in preventing the fleecing of military members on payday loans with exorbitant interest that was being charged to service members—and 

we were able to pass that legislation—I heard all the way up to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about how military members 

were being hurt. 

Now, I have not heard that commentary, which does not mean 

that it is not there. And I am curious, Ms. O’Brien. Do you think 

the Pentagon is aware of this particular fleecing that is going on 

of the military community? 

Ms. O’BRIEN. Yes, sir. I think that they are. I think the order of 

magnitude of the problem in the military specifically may not be 

as large as you might think it is. Generally speaking, most cards 

that military people buy and use personally are purchased at their 

exchanges. The exchanges do a very good job of educating their 

53 

own consumers about the cards that they buy, why they are better 

than the cards they would buy on the outside, and in point of fact, 

why in the countries where military people use cards the most, 

they are the best cards you can get, bar none. 

I would also add to that, though, that cards that come as gifts, 

of course, there will be some complaints about those cards because 

frequently those cards were never designed to be used in the military. 

Third, I would add that the military is a very tight fraternity, 

and so 1st Sergeants are very, very scrupulous about making sure 

that their charges know exactly how to use cards, exactly what retailers to stay away from, exactly where they should be doing their 

purchasing of cards. But that is not to say that family members of 

military people are not affected by this problem because clearly 

they are. But generally speaking, the military itself—— 

Senator NELSON. You gave the example of a grandpa who wants 

to buy a card for his grandson who is deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Ms. O’BRIEN. Yes. That was based on an actual experience where 

a veteran himself, a retired marine, had bought a card at his local 

post office for a grandson who was in Iraq, and he assumed that 

a card purchased at the post office would be a good card for that 

purpose. Of course, he was retired many years out of the service, 

not familiar with the current state-of-the-art. And actually in his 

time, he was lucky if there were pay phones, much less cards. So 

even though he himself was former military, he did not have the 

level of education that most military people have today. And for 

that reason, he purchased a card that was not well suited for a call 

back to the United States from Iraq. 

Senator NELSON. Does anybody on the staff want to ask any 

more questions? 

OK. Well, this has been most enlightening. Thank you. We are 

going to proceed with this legislation. Thank you. 

And the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

Loyola Consumer Law Review, Vol. 19:1—2006 

DECEPTIVE CLAIMS FOR PREPAID TELEPHONE CARDS AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION

Mark E. Budnitz *, Martina Rojo †1, Julia Marlowe ‡

I. Introduction 

The United States prepaid phone card industry is a multi-billion dollar industry. In 2002, prepaid long distance cards alone generated $3.6 billion and the industry 

is estimated to grow significantly.1 Growth in the market for prepaid phone cards 

is expected to continue, in part because sales are linked to the increasing use of cellular phones.2 Already the bulk of convenience stores’ general merchandise sales are 

for prepaid phone cards.3 In fact, one industry source reports that phone cards are 

the highest profit center in Walgreens stores after prescriptions.4

The cards are often promoted to niche markets consisting of college students, immigrants and certain businesses.5 According to Barry Catmar, Vice President of Operations for Digitac, ‘‘the large number of immigrants who call friends and relatives 

abroad is a perfect market for phone cards.’’ 6 The increase in the immigrant population in the United States, especially Latino consumers, has led to the marketing 

of some cards specifically to the Spanish-speaking consumer.7 As a result, the market for prepaid telephone cards is segmented and some groups of consumers are particularly vulnerable.8 There is evidence that consumers in the United States who 

use cards to call Spanish-speaking countries face much higher prices than expected 

due to hidden fees and confusing, contradictory and inaccurate information.9

In most states, there is little or no regulation of prepaid telephone cards. Thus 

most states do not require phone card companies to disclose essential information 

and substantive rights that ensure consumers receive satisfactory service. Consequently, information provided on the cards and by customer service representatives is often misleading or unavailable.10

Consumers have few rights, and even where consumers do have rights that are 

violated, it is often difficult for them to obtain a remedy. Additionally, because each 

card has a small monetary value, litigation is not always a viable option, especially 

if contracts include arbitration clauses and prohibit class actions.11 For example, 

low-income consumers are likely to purchase cards that sell for less than $10, rendering the apparent cost of using prepaid phone cards insignificant. Because of their 

low income, however, the cumulative cost may be significant.12 Furthermore, many 

immigrants have no alternative if they need the cards in order to communicate by 

phone with their families in another country. 

Given these conditions, the Federal and the state governments should consider 

passing legislation to regulate phone cards. On the Federal level, both the Federal 

Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have 

done little to address the problems other than minimal enforcement of current inadequate regulations. The FTC has addressed few instances of deceptive advertising,13

and the FCC currently enforces the limited area of federally required fees on prepaid phone cards.14 On the state level, consumer protection varies greatly. Legislation is warranted unless (1) the market works and consumers acting reasonably are 

able to make efficient choices and protect themselves, (2) the loss to consumers is 

small and there are few reported consumer problems, and (3) market conditions are 

such that the industry can be counted upon to engage in effective self-regulation. 

This article explores the need for legislation by reviewing a combination of approaches, including an economic analysis of the market for prepaid phone cards, 

findings from an empirical study of Hispanic phone card usage in calling Spanishspeaking countries, and the current law on this issue. The results of this investigation demonstrate a need for national regulation. We recommend that Congress enact 

a statute which mandates a minimum standard of protection and authorizes the 

FTC to issue regulations. Such a Federal statute would also contain disclosures, 

substantive protections, and consumer remedies. Additionally, states should be perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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mitted to enact requirements that provide more protection as long as they are not 

inconsistent with the Federal law. If Congress decides not to pass a Federal statute, 

state legislatures can easily adopt the features of our Model Prepaid Telephone 

Card Act. 

II. Is Regulation Necessary? The Lessons from Economic Theory 

Regulation is not necessary if consumers act reasonably and make efficient 

choices in the marketplace. Consumers can only make efficient choices if they are 

able to obtain the complete and accurate information needed prior to purchase without incurring excessive transaction costs. Such information may be contained in advertisements, in brochures accompanying the sale of the cards, on the packaging, 

or on the cards themselves. Another source of information is experience. Experience 

may come from the consumer’s prior use of cards or from others, such as family and 

friends, who have used the cards. For the consumer to obtain enough information 

through experience, significant information search costs may arise, thereby raising 

the price of the product much like transaction costs. A consumer would incur significant search costs if he repeatedly paid for transportation to a store and spent money 

on a card that did not provide many minutes (though the advertising might state 

otherwise). Each time he must try a different card brand in order to find one that 

is cost-effective. However, he may be forced to try several cards before discovering 

a good card. Even then significant search costs continue if rates on the good card 

have changed.15

Theoretically, prepaid telephone cards come close to fitting the perfect competition 

model. Prepaid telephone cards are a homogenous product (consumers buy minutes), 

and there are many buyers and sellers due to the ease of entry into and exit from 

the market.16 However, in the perfect competition model, consumers have perfect information. Perfect information is rarely present, but consumers can typically search 

for information and make informed purchase decisions for many products. 

The prepaid telephone card market is one where information could be made available to allow consumers to make better informed purchase decisions. Yet, investigations of the market indicate that either consumers cannot obtain information, or the 

information is inaccurate, contradictory or deceptive.17 Moreover, information is 

often not available from customer service, and consumers also may be misled by 

seller misconduct such as card issuers who sell defective cards.18 Consumers retain 

information from past purchase experience, but information from previous experience is likely to become outdated over time as terms and conditions of the cards 

change. 

III. Problems Encountered by Consumers and Information Needed: 

Findings from an Empirical Study 

Even if information is not available prior to purchase and customer service is inadequate, regulation may be unnecessary if prepaid telephone cards are inexpensive. In that situation consumers are able to learn what they need to know in order 

to avoid problems without incurring high costs. However, while each card is inexpensive, the unit price, or cost per minute, may be significant and consumers who 

rely on prepaid phone cards for many of their calls end up paying an excessive 

amount for telephone service. The prepaid phone card market has grown into a 

multi-billion dollar industry, and the cost to consumers as a group is tremendous, 

especially for certain segments of the population. 

A qualitative study of forty-five Latino immigrants’ experiences in an urban market in Georgia found that 78.7 percent of the immigrants complained about prepaid 

telephone cards.19 More specifically, consumers complained that they did not receive 

the number of minutes they expected and that customer service personnel could not 

be reached during available hours and often could not answer consumers’ questions 

even when reached.20 A follow-up study was conducted to verify these complaints.21

The follow-up study investigated the true costs of the cards and the information 

available from customer service.22 Minutes are often deducted for hidden fees, and 

consequently, consumers do not receive the number of minutes they are told are 

available. True cost is calculated by determining cost per minute using an accurate 

amount of minutes received.23 In the study, over 250 prepaid telephone cards costing under eleven dollars were purchased and then used by bilingual data collectors 

to call Spanish-speaking countries from January until May 2004.24

Before placing the calls, each data collector called the customer service number 

and asked a series of questions from a survey designed by the researchers.25 Customer service personnel were asked about (1) the number of minutes the customer 

would have to call a specific city, (2) various kinds of fees that might be charged, 

(3) minute rounding, and (4) hours of customer service availability.26 Data collectors 

then placed a call, using only one-half of the number of minutes that the recorded 

57 

message indicated was on each card.27 This was done to ascertain if maintenance 

fees, hidden charges, or both were present.28 After at least 1 week, a second call 

was placed to the same city.29 The date and time were noted at the beginning and 

end of each call.30 The number of minutes available was also noted.31 Each card was 

used until all minutes had expired.32 Calls were made to cities in Mexico, Colombia, 

Argentina, Peru, Spain, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.33

The researchers computed expected cost by dividing the cost of the card by the 

initial number of minutes the consumer was told he or she had.34 The actual cost 

of the card was computed by dividing the cost of the card by the actual number of 

minutes that a consumer obtained when using the card.35 Cost was therefore computed as a unit price: cost per minute.36 Findings from this research indicate that 

there is wide price dispersion with prepaid telephone cards.37 The average actual 

cost of the cards was 87 percent higher than the average expected cost.38

Data collectors also made three attempts to reach a customer service representative.39 For two-thirds of the cards, it was possible to talk to a customer service representative.40 The customer service representative answered on the first attempt for 

about one-half of the cards. For one-third of the cards, the consumers were not able 

to talk to a customer service representative, either because they were on hold for 

more than 5 minutes, no one answered, or there was only a recording.41 Furthermore, talking with a customer service representative was often not helpful.42 Although some customer service representatives were helpful, many times the customer service representative was not able to answer questions such as whether 

minute usage was rounded up or what fees were charged.43

Subsequently, the researchers conducted an additional investigation of the information available on the cards.44 One problem was that for some cards there was 

very little if any information about fees.45 Another problem was that no standardized wording existed.46 For example, in some instances a ‘‘service’’ fee appeared to 

be assessed per call much like a connection fee and in other instances what was 

called a ‘‘service’’ fee was assessed periodically in the same manner as a maintenance fee.47 Additionally, the wording of some information was vague, such as the 

use of the terms ‘‘as may apply.’’ 48 Stating that a maintenance fee ‘‘may apply’’ provides a warning for the consumer but does not tell the consumer if there is a maintenance fee or not.49 Some maintenance periods are assessed after 2 days and others 

after 30 or 60 days.50 A more serious offense was the use of contradictory or misleading wording.51 Many cards state that there is no connection fee but the fine 

print states that ‘‘connection fees may apply.’’ 52 Some brands of cards have no connection fee but they have a fee at the end of each call, called a ‘‘post-call’’ or ‘‘hangup’’ fee.53 Other information is also unclear and perhaps deceptive, such as information about taxes, pay phone surcharges and warranties.54

More accurate information should be given on the number of minutes available 

when one places a call. When a consumer places a call, he or she is told how many 

minutes are available. However, a consumer typically does not receive all of those 

minutes.55 Minutes are deducted for a variety of reasons such as connection costs 

and minute rounding penalties.56 Determining the true cost per minute is unnecessarily complex because the consumer does not know how many minutes are deducted, and for which fees they are deducted.57 The costs include activation fees, 

connection fees, minute rounding, extra pay phone fees, additional cell phone fees, 

charges even if no connection is made, maintenance fees, and service fees.58 It 

would be helpful if companies provided information on which fees were applicable, 

even if the consumer would not know precise amounts. 

Because of the great variation in the kinds of fees assessed, the difficulty in determining how the fees are assessed, and the lack of standardized wording, meaningful 

comparison shopping is impossible. Uniformity of information, disclosure and standardized names for fees would help consumers, much in the same way that nutritional labeling has provided a mechanism for uniform comparison. In some cases, 

outright consumer fraud may be present. Customer service representatives indicated 

that for some prepaid phone cards there were charges even if there was no connection. This is illegal in some states.59 However, it was not possible to know if the 

consumer was charged for a call that was not connected. 

IV. The Likeliness of Self-Regulation: The Nature of the Prepaid Phone 

Card Market 

The third question addressed is whether the prepaid phone card industry can be 

expected to regulate itself. Self-regulation is probable when there are industry-wide 

standards available, the industry standards adequately protect consumers, and the 

industry is dominated by strong stable companies that are committed to those 

standards and can pressure other companies to comply. 

58 

Self-regulation is likely to occur if there are strict industry-wide standards. The 

industry’s trade association, the International Prepaid Communication Association 

(IPCA) has adopted standards for its members.60 One such standard requires that 

minute rounding be in 1 minute intervals.61 The problem is that there is no enforcement of the industry guidelines and no reason to believe that they are being followed by the majority of prepaid telephone card providers. According to Howard 

Segermark, Executive Director of the IPCA, only about 80 providers of the estimated 500 plus providers are members of the IPCA.62

The IPCA standards are too limited to provide consumers with the protection that 

they need.63 Even if the standards were satisfactory they could not serve as an adequate substitute for legal protections. For example, it is doubtful that the IPCA 

could pressure non-members of the association into complying with the standards 

unless the industry was dominated by stable companies who supported the IPCA 

standards. The prepaid phone card industry involves many different types of businesses such as: carriers, resellers, distributors, card issuers, and retailers. Absent 

rules having the force of law, compliance with voluntary standards is highly doubtful. Even if current businesses agreed to comply, someone would have to assume the 

responsibility to persuade the constant stream of new entrants who are enticed to 

enter the industry because of low start-up costs, and the general lack of compulsory 

registration or bonding, to comply with the standards. Additionally, even if the 

standards were satisfactory, there is no guarantee that they would not be changed 

without any prior notice to or input from consumer representatives. At the very 

least, contracts between issuers and consumers should incorporate the IPCA standards so consumers can sue in court for breach of contract if the issuers do not follow 

the standards. 

Whether the industry can regulate itself hinges upon three factors: whether 

standards are available, whether they protect consumers, and whether the industry 

is dominated by strong stable companies. Although there are industry standards, 

they do not provide adequate protection for consumers because, as the empirical 

study indicates, the standards are not followed.64 For example, information on 

minute rounding was available for less than half of the cards.65 Of those for which 

information was available, slightly over half of the cards used more than 1 minute 

rounding.66 Furthermore, the industry is not dominated by strong stable companies.67 The fact that one can enter the market without incurring great costs means 

there are many providers. There is also evidence that the companies more likely to 

be considered stable, such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint actually cost more per minute 

than the other companies, and they do not give the consumer any better information 

than the lesser-known providers.68 Our conclusion is that the industry cannot be expected to regulate itself. 

Because of the problems consumers face in the marketplace and the dim prospects 

for adequate self-regulation, consumers need legal protection. The laws now on the 

books, however, fail to ensure that consumers receive the information, safeguards 

and remedies they require. 

V. Adequacy of the Current Law 

A review of current law demonstrates it is not adequate. No Federal law governs 

prepaid phone cards except the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).69 It applies generally to all industries subject to FTC jurisdiction.70 The FTC Act simply 

prohibits deceptive and unfair acts or practices.71 It does not require any disclosures 

and is not tailored to the needs of consumers who purchase prepaid phone cards.72

Rather, the Act only protects consumers from the most egregious conduct.73 Because 

there is no private right of action, it protects only the customers of those companies 

against whom the FTC brings an action. 

Most states have no statutes or regulations covering prepaid phone cards. Among 

the states that do regulate the cards, there is a great deal of variation in coverage 

and regulation ranges from minimal to comprehensive. However, no state adequately protects consumers.74 Most states have laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices in general.75 While the laws provide for a private right of 

action,76 many do not allow class actions,77 which are crucial for cases involving 

purchases of inexpensive items. Also, the state laws suffer from the same deficiencies as the FTC Act. 

Consumers may be able to attack the agreement between the seller and the consumer through general contract law avenues. For example, if the card does not 

work, or if there is no access number or authorization code, the consumer can claim 

failure of consideration. If the contract is too one-sided, a court may find it is unconscionable, but the doctrine of unconscionability has limited usefulness.78 Contract 

law is totally inadequate to protect consumers because it only provides a remedy 

for rights that the contract grants to consumers.79 Such contracts, one-sided agreeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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ments presented by the card seller on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, impose few obligations on card sellers.80

VI. Should Phone Cards Be Regulated at the State or Federal Level? 

Strong arguments can be made to support both the position that regulation of 

phone cards should be through Federal law and the contrary position that it should 

be through state law. We recommend a combination of both state and Federal legislation. A consideration of the merits of legislation if it were administered either by 

the states or by Congress illustrates the issues that inform our proposal. 

Despite the fact that most states are not eager to tackle this problem,81 several 

factors indicate that state regulation might be superior to Federal regulation. State 

regulation can be tailored to the needs of that state’s residents. For example, a state 

with a large immigrant population may want to enact more protective rules than 

others. This would be justified because many card sellers specifically target low-income, non-English speaking groups that may be especially vulnerable to unfair practices.82 Such a state may want to enact bilingual disclosure requirements, with special attention given to international calls. That state may also feel a need for strong 

substantive protections, such as rules guaranteeing a right to redeem unused value 

and setting a minimum time to use a card before it expires. Because of the tenuous 

or non-existent legal status of many consumers targeted by those who market phone 

cards, they often refuse to sue companies that engage in illegal practices or to complain to government agencies.83 Special rules tailored to meet the needs of particular immigrant populations would have a better chance of being included in state 

law than in Federal legislation since lawmakers from states without large immigrant groups may not recognize or understand the importance of protecting them. 

In addition, states have administrative agencies with expertise in drafting regulations and enforcing rules related to telecommunications.84 Some states give the 

agencies crucial regulatory roles apart from issuing regulations. For example, in Illinois and Florida, providers of prepaid card services and resellers must receive a certificate of authority from a state agency.85 Retailers selling the cards must have 

proof that the provider or reseller has obtained the certificate.86 It is unlawful for 

companies to fail to comply with these requirements.87

On the other hand, Federal legislation has several advantages over state regulation. The most obvious benefit is complete national coverage.88 Another benefit is 

uniformity.89 Complete and uniform national coverage helps both the industry and 

consumers. Many phone card companies sell cards in many states. Having one set 

of rules greatly lessens their regulatory burden. Furthermore, many companies sell 

cards on the Internet. A uniform set of rules greatly eases their regulatory burden 

since they are selling to consumers nationwide. The phone card industry may mount 

less opposition to a Federal law than to state laws because of the advantages of having to comply with only one law. They may actually support a Federal law in the 

belief it would discourage the majority of states that have not yet regulated phone 

cards from enacting their own laws.90

In addition, uniform disclosures, standardized terms, and the same rights help 

produce educated consumers. This is especially important given the high mobility 

rates of people who live in the United States.91 Most will live in several states during their lifetimes. With a Federal law, they do not have to learn a new set of rules 

and definitions every time they move to a new state. 

A Federal rule may also lead to more effective enforcement than state law. An 

individual state may have great difficulty enforcing its laws against companies operating from different states, especially those selling on the Internet. Jurisdictional 

issues may frustrate enforcement.92 Enforcement by a Federal agency would obviate 

many of these difficulties. 

Lacking a Congressional mandate, no agency of the Federal Government has 

stepped forward to regulate this industry. Prepaid phone cards are payment devices.93 The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has substantial experience regulating 

payment devices, but lacks experience regulating the telecommunications industry.94 Drafting regulations and enforcing them is better suited for an agency familiar with that industry. Prepaid phone cards provide access to telephone service. The 

agency with the most expertise in telecommunications, the FCC, has no experience 

dealing with payment devices. The FCC simply refers consumer complaints to the 

FTC, the Better Business Bureau, and state agencies.95 Moreover, any Federal 

agency to which Congress delegates the responsibility for regulation would not be 

as attuned to local problems as are state agencies. 

Although the FTC does not have a great deal of technical expertise in telecommunications, its Telemarketing Sales Rule indicates it is able to draft effective 

regulations related to telephone use.96 It has brought enforcement actions against 

companies offering prepaid cards.97 If Congress enacts Federal legislation to reguVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
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late prepaid phone cards, we believe the FTC is the most appropriate agency to 

issue regulations and enforce the Act.98

As the above discussion demonstrates, there are substantial benefits to enacting 

legislation, either at the state or the Federal level. As we discuss in Part XI, we 

recommend that Congress enact Federal legislation. The Federal law, however, 

should not completely preempt state law. States would still be permitted to enact 

legislation tailored to the special needs of their consumers as long as that state law 

did not conflict with the Federal statute.99

VII. Analysis of the Nature of Phone Cards and Implications for Drafting 

Applicable Law 

In order to understand current laws regulating phone cards and draft a Model 

Act, it is necessary to determine the nature of phone cards. In part, the card is a 

payment device. It is a type of stored value card like a prepaid gift card.100 But it 

is also a device that accesses a service. In this respect it is analogous to an ATM 

card that is used to access the financial services provided by ATMs.101 The prepaid 

phone card, however, is an integral part of a transaction for the provision of telecommunications services, a very specific type of service.102

The fact that phone cards can be characterized in a variety of ways poses difficulties for evaluating current laws and choosing a body of law that may be appropriate 

for a Model Act. There is no general body of law governing stored value cards. Instead states have enacted laws that are very specific to the type of card regulated 

(gift card, phone card, payroll card), and there is great variation among the statutes 

governing each type of card. The phone card is used to access a service and there 

is no general law governing the sale of services. Those transactions are subject to 

the common law of contracts.103 Therefore, the ‘‘law’’ is determined by what the particular contract provides. Like an ATM card, the phone card accesses a service that 

can result in using the consumer’s funds. Because of that similarity, it may be appropriate to use the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, which governs ATM cards, as 

a model.104 Indeed, the FRB recently has subjected another type of stored value 

card, the payroll card, to the same laws as ATM cards.105 Because phone cards access telecommunications services, some states incorporate selected aspects of their 

rules for those services.106

VIII. Analysis of Current Regulation 

This section analyzes the current regulation of phone cards. The analysis illustrates the wide variety of problems some states have chosen to regulate. It also 

demonstrates that states have not selected any uniform approach to regulating the 

cards. Finally, it shows that they have not used regulation of other devices, such 

as gift cards or ATM cards, as models for their phone card laws. 

There is no uniformity in the state law regulating phone cards. States have taken 

a wide variety of approaches. Some have imposed minimal regulation, while others 

subject the industry to many specific requirements.107 Some have enacted statutes, 

while others have issued agency regulations.108 However, as Part IX discusses, even 

the most comprehensive state laws completely ignore major issues. 

Recent studies 109 demonstrate the need for adequate disclosure and for clearer 

explanations of the costs involved in making calls. Consumers need disclosures before they purchase cards in order to decide whether to buy a card and to compare 

prices among cards. The studies show, however, that cost of the card is a very complex matter. Consequently, consumers need standard terms that have a universal 

meaning and a standard format for presenting information, much like Truth in 

Lending. In addition, these studies show that consumers need access to customer 

service representatives who can answer specific questions and explain costs.110

The first point of consumer contact and often principal marketing effort is advertising. Generally, advertisements do not provide as much information as is already 

available on the cards. Advertisements typically state the number of minutes one 

obtains when calling a specific city, such as Mexico City. However, advertisements 

may also be misleading. For example, they may state that no connection fees are 

charged,111 when in fact, there are many other hidden fees. Despite its importance, 

the Federal Government has not enacted rules regulating advertisements of prepaid 

phone card services.112 Additionally, the FTC has not aggressively enforced violations of the FTC Act in this area.113

Consumer economic literature indicates that information from advertisements is 

often used by consumers in establishing reference prices.114 These reference prices 

are then used at the time of purchase.115 Misleading advertisements may negatively 

affect the consumer’s purchase decisions. The FTC Act and state laws require ads 

to be truthful and not misleading, but consumers need more legal protection than 

merely a law that provides that an advertisement not be misleading. Consequently, 

61 

consumers need advertising provisions similar to those enacted in California, which 

is currently the only state with a statute specifically regulating the advertisement 

of phone cards.116 California law requires that any such advertisement ‘‘include a 

disclosure of any geographic limitation to the advertised price, rate, or unit value, 

as well as a disclosure of any additional surcharges, call setup charges, or fees or 

surcharges applicable to the advertised price, rate, or unit value.’’ 117

On the other hand, a law requiring advertisements to include certain information 

is not sufficient either. Some consumers purchase cards without seeing an advertisement. Others who see ads also need information at the point of purchase. Such consumers may not remember the information in the advertisement, or they may remember it incorrectly. Furthermore, consumers need much more information than 

any advertisement could adequately convey. As a result, many of the states that 

regulate phone cards require disclosures at the point of purchase.118

Most states that regulate phone cards require very specific information to be disclosed on the card itself. One could argue that these laws are much too detailed, 

and that consumer choice in this competitive market should determine what information should be disclosed. However, the information that states require to be disclosed at the point of purchase reflects the problems consumers have encountered 

using the cards. The seller must print the name of the company on the phone 

card.119 Consumers need this information in order to contact the company when 

necessary, to complain about the company to law enforcement and to sue if a dispute cannot be resolved. State laws require the seller to print a toll-free customer 

service number on the card as well.120 As studies show, consumers of this product 

need access to customer service.121 They often have reasonable questions, given the 

nature of the services provided. Because of the low cost of each card, requiring the 

seller to provide a customer service number that is not toll-free would discourage 

consumers from contacting customer service. 

Some state laws also require the card seller to disclose a toll-free network access 

number if such a number is required in order to access service.122 Fundamental fairness requires the seller to inform the consumer of that number. For the seller not 

to disclose it would amount to fraud as the seller would have the consumer’s money, 

but the consumer would not have any service. Requiring the number to be toll-free 

is justified because the access number merely permits the consumer to gain access 

to the system. Charges should not be imposed unless and until the consumer actually makes a call. The card also must disclose the authorization code if it is required 

to access service.123 As with the requirement that the card contain the access number, failure to disclose the authorization code would be fraudulent since the consumer would have paid but would then be unable to make any calls.124 Finally, 

states require the card to include the expiration date or policy, if any.125 In California, Florida, Missouri, and New York, cards that do not include this information 

are considered to be active for at least 1 year from the date of purchase or the date 

of the last recharge.126 In the State of Washington, if an expiration date is not disclosed on the card, it is considered ‘‘unexpired indefinitely.’’ 127

Other disclosures must be made either on the card or the packaging that comes 

with the card. It is necessary to give card sellers this choice because phone cards 

are small and all the required information may not fit. The manner of presentation 

is also important for disclosure to be meaningful. California, for example, requires 

the disclosure to be legible.128 In addition, the required information must be made 

‘‘available clearly and conspicuously in a prominent area immediately proximate to 

the point of sale of the . . . calling services.’’ 129 In Florida, if disclosures are not 

on the card or packaging, they must be displayed ‘‘visibly in a prominent area at 

the point of sale . . . in such a manner that the consumer may make an informed 

decision prior to purchase.’’ 130

In California, the required disclosures on the card or packaging include the ‘‘value 

of the card’’ as well as any surcharges, taxes or fees.131 The California statute provides a list of fees, illustrating the complexity of the product’s pricing, and how sellers use a variety of different terms, all of which amount to additional cost to the 

consumer.132 Further, there are different requirements for disclosing surcharges for 

international calls.133 The seller also must disclose the minimum charge per call, 

the billing decrement, the recharge policy, if any, and the refund policy, if any.134

There is no national uniform format for disclosures on phone cards, unlike disclosure for credit and debit card transactions.135 California, however, has tried to impose some uniformity on cards sold to consumers in its state.136 The statute requires 

the value of the card and the amount of the charges to be disclosed on the card or 

its packaging all in the same format.137 Moreover, if the value of the card is expressed in minutes, those minutes must be designated as either domestic or international.138 Finally, that designation must be printed on the same line as the value 

of the card in minutes or on the line immediately following.139

62 

In addition to written disclosures at the point of sale, Texas requires verbal disclosures at the beginning of each call.140 The consumer must be told the ‘‘domestic 

minutes, billing increments, or dollars remaining’’ on the prepaid account or card.141

In addition, when the balance on the credit card is almost depleted the company 

must provide a verbal announcement of that fact ‘‘at least 1 minute or billing increment before the time expires.’’ 142

California law recognizes that many sellers target specific ethnic groups.143 It requires that if a language other than English is used in the advertising or promotion 

of the card, or is used on the card or packaging (other than for dialing instructions), 

the required information on the card or packaging must also be disclosed in the language used to advertise or promote the card.144 If a language other than English 

is used on the card or packaging to provide dialing instructions for making a call 

or reaching customer service, the additional information required on the card or 

packaging must be disclosed in the language used to provide the dialing instructions 

or to reach customer service.145 Similarly, Texas requires that if a card is marketed 

in a language other than English, certain disclosures must be made in the same language.146 Bilingual cards are permitted as long as all of the required information 

is in both languages.147

Laws which require sellers of prepaid telephone cards to provide a toll-free telephone number for customer service, and which establish requirements for that service are perhaps unique in the law of payment systems. If a person pays for goods 

and services with a check, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) does not require 

banks to provide any kind of customer service despite the importance of the financial services they provide.148 If the consumer pays using a credit card or debit card, 

Federal law imposes certain error resolution procedures, but the seller of such cards 

is not required to provide a phone number for contacting the seller.149 The seller 

is required only to resolve disputes, not provide information.150 Phone cards are a 

type of stored value card. Many states regulate another type of stored value card, 

the gift card, but no gift card laws require sellers to provide consumers access to 

customer service, much less toll-free access.151 Thus, those states having phone card 

laws requiring the seller to provide a toll-free customer service number are going 

beyond what is normally mandated in consumer protection legislation.152

Requiring the seller to disclose a toll-free customer service number does not help 

consumers unless informed customer service representatives are available to answer 

the consumers’ questions. The studies discussed previously illustrate the difficulties 

consumers have obtaining needed information from customer service.153 States vary 

in the degree to which they impose quality standards for customer service. California and New York have the most consumer-friendly requirements. The seller’s 

customer service line must have live operators to answer calls twenty-four hours a 

day, 7 days a week.154 Other states provide that the seller must have a live operator 

available or must record consumer calls and have a live operator return the call 

within a specified period of time.155

In some states, phone card laws go further than what is required in most consumer protection statutes by setting minimum performance standards for the services that customer service must provide. For example, California and New York require the operator to permit consumers to file complaints.156 In addition, the operator must be able to provide consumers with information about rates, surcharges, 

fees, policies on recharging cards, refunds, expiration dates, and the balance of usable minutes still available in the consumer’s account.157

A few states have gone beyond disclosure and customer service by providing substantive protection as well. They impose detailed requirements on charges and 

fees.158 These include mandating rules for rounding up to the next minute and prohibiting sellers from excessive rounding up.159 Some laws provide that the value of 

the card cannot be reduced by more than the charges printed on the card or the 

packaging or display at the point of sale.160

State statutes also impose a wide variety of refund requirements. California and 

New York require sellers to give the consumer a refund if the service fails to operate 

in a ‘‘commercially reasonable manner.’’ 161 Although this is a vague standard, the 

statutes at least establish that consumers are entitled to refunds.162 In Florida, consumers are entitled to a refund if service is ‘‘rendered unusable for reasons beyond 

the consumer’s control.’’ 163 Missouri requires a refund if the company ceases operations 164 or can no longer provide service.165 Alabama requires a refund if service 

is suspended.166 Texas requires a refund if the company fails to provide service at 

the disclosed rates or the service fails to meet technical standards.167 Florida requires companies to have a refund policy.168 At a minimum, such a policy must provide for the consumer to receive a refund if the prepaid calling service is ‘‘unusable 

for reasons beyond the consumer’s control’’ and the services ‘‘have not [exceeded] the 

expiration period.’’ 169 Furthermore, the refund must be for the same amount as the 

63 

value still on the card.170 Alaska requires a refund if the card does not work as represented or the required disclosures are not made to the customer.171 In addition, 

the Regulatory Commission of Alaska can direct that a refund be paid ‘‘for good 

cause.’’ 172 In Florida, a company ‘‘may, but shall not be required to’’ provide a refund for lost or stolen cards.173 States also require that the amount of the refund 

cannot be less than the value remaining on the card.174 The refund must be provided within 60 days from the date the consumer notifies the company.175

Some of the states that have enacted prepaid phone card laws have also imposed 

performance standards such as a minimum level of operational capacity for the service being provided. These requirements are in sharp contrast to the law governing 

other payment devices 176 as well as the laws governing the quality of goods and 

services.177

In California, companies must ‘‘maintain access numbers with sufficient capacity 

to accommodate a reasonably anticipated number of calls without incurring a busy 

signal or undue delay.’’ 178 Apparently, failure to maintain that capacity would trigger California’s requirement that consumers are entitled to a refund if a company 

fails to provide service in a commercially reasonable manner.179 Case law from 

other types of transactions may be useful in further defining what circumstances 

may be commercially unreasonable.180 Florida law formerly required that every 

company ensure that at least 95 percent of all call attempts to the company’s tollfree customer service number be completed.181 Finally, there must be at least 97 

percent accuracy of the length of the conversation. 

Another substantive protection relates to expiration policies. For example, California, Florida, and New York provide that if the card does not state a specific expiration date or policy, a card is considered active for at least 1 year from the date 

of purchase.182 In addition, if the card has been recharged, it must be active for 1 

year from the date of the last recharge.183 Sellers who consider the 1-year minimum 

onerous can easily avoid its imposition simply by providing on the card that it expires within a shorter period of time.184 However, if the seller establishes an expiration date that is too short, for example 1 week, the consumer may be able to convince a court that the expiration date is unconscionable, in bad faith, or commercially unreasonable.185 Statutes do not impose a minimum period before a card expires. 

State statutes and regulations of phone cards do not include specific provisions 

providing that consumers can sue the card companies for violating these laws. Nevertheless, consumers in some states may be able to sue under their ‘‘mini-FTC’’ acts, 

alleging that a violation of the phone card requirements constitutes a deceptive or 

unfair act or practice.186 In other states, consumers may confront substantial barriers.187 A government agency, such as the state’s public service commission, may 

be authorized to impose penalties for violation of the phone card laws,188 but consumers have no assurance they will do so, especially if the commission lacks sufficient resources or strong proof that violations are widespread. 

IX. The Inadequacy of Warranty Law 

The UCC includes provisions on express and implied warranties that may be beneficial to consumers who purchase goods.189 The UCC, however, does not apply to 

the sale of services, which would include the sale of telephone services. The Federal 

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act prohibits the disclaimer of implied warranties once 

a seller provides a written warranty.190 Unfortunately, the Act does not apply to the 

sale of services either.191

Because neither the UCC nor the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies to the 

sale of phone services, general contract law applies. Under contract law, courts will 

enforce express warranties. The seller, however, can avoid that result by carefully 

drafting the contract so it does not include any express warranties regarding the 

quality of the service provided to the consumer. Some courts have held that service 

contracts include implied warranties.192 The cases, however, do not involve provisions of telephone services or comparable services.193 Consequently, it is not at all 

clear how courts would apply those standards to prepaid phone service. Moreover, 

sellers most likely can avoid enforcement of the implied warranties by disclaiming 

them.194

X. Problems Not Addressed in Regulations 

As described above, while most states have not regulated phone cards at all, some 

which have enacted regulations have gone far beyond the protection accorded consumers using other types of payment devices. However, even the states with the 

most comprehensive regulations have failed to do anything to protect consumers 

who confront many serious problems. In order for our Model to accomplish its objective, it was necessary to identify the gaps in current law. 

64 

For example, regulations include many required disclosures,195 but do not require 

sellers to inform consumers of their policy with regard to unilaterally changing the 

terms and conditions of providing service without prior notice to the consumer.196

Statutes do not require disclosure of the seller’s policy on lost, stolen, unauthorized, 

or malfunctioning cards.197 Finally, statutes do not require sellers to inform consumers whether they can redeem unused value on their card, and if they can, how 

it can be redeemed and what charges may be imposed.198

Statutes also fail to provide consumers with any protection if a card is lost or stolen.199 In addition, consumers may lose the piece of paper or other record on which 

they have written their Personal Identification Number (PIN) and may not have 

their PIN memorized.200 Without the PIN, the card cannot be used and the consumer loses the value of the balance remaining on the card.201 State law is deficient 

in not requiring the seller to replace the PIN. At the very least, statutes should require a warning to consumers about the consequences of losing their PIN. If the consumer cannot remember the PIN and the seller refuses to inform the consumer 

what the PIN is, or issue a new PIN, the balance of unused value remaining on the 

card becomes pure profit for the card issuer.202

A card may also be defective. For example, the access number or the PIN may 

not work,203 or the card may have some other defect making it impossible to operate 

as it should.204 Consumers will lose the entire balance on the card if the card issuer 

refuses to replace the card. Statutes do not require card issuers to replace cards. 

Even if the issuer does replace cards, it may charge such a high fee that it is not 

economically advisable for consumers to purchase a replacement. 

Additionally, the card issuer may go out of business.205 The issuer may simply 

close its doors and disappear. Statutes provide purchasers of phone cards with no 

satisfactory remedy when this occurs. Alternatively, the issuer may file for bankruptcy, leaving consumers with unsecured claims that are unlikely to be satisfied. 

States do not regulate the amount of charges and fees. Rather, states require an 

issuer who charges fees for various services, to inform consumers about the fees.206

However, the disclosure requirements of state laws are not adequate. For example, 

states do not require sellers to inform consumers of the extra charges they incur 

if they use their phone card at a pay phone.207

In states that have no laws regulating phone cards, the rights and obligations of 

the parties are governed by the contract between the card issuer and the consumer. 

In states with phone card laws, the many matters not regulated are subject to the 

terms of the contract. The contracts between issuers and consumers are not the result of a negotiated bargain between the parties, and, in fact the consumer never 

even signs the agreement. Rather, the law deems that consumers agree to the terms 

of the take-it-or-leave-it adhesion contracts by paying their money and using the 

card. The cards often include unilateral change of terms provisions under which the 

issuers can modify the contract’s terms without notice to consumers.208 Those 

changes could deprive consumers of important rights they had under the contract 

when they originally bought the card or impose substantial new charges upon them. 

States have not enacted laws specifically governing this problem. 

Finally, even states that have enacted strong phone card laws do not include in 

those statutes provisions granting consumers explicit causes of action and meaningful remedies for violation of the law such as those included in Federal consumer protection statutes.209 This is a serious omission that may make the protections in the 

laws largely illusory. 

The Model Act described in the following section fills the gaps in current law by 

including provisions to deal with the issues identified above, that statutes do not 

address. 

XI. Model Prepaid Telephone Card Act 

Based on the foregoing analysis of the problems consumers of prepaid telephone 

cards encounter, the information they need, the nature of the marketplace, the dismal prospects for self-regulation, and the inadequacy of the states’ responses to 

date, we propose that Congress enact a Federal law to regulate phone cards. As discussed previously,210 a Federal statute provides benefits to both the industry and 

consumers that state laws cannot offer. Matters not included in the Federal statute 

are appropriate for individual states to adopt if they see fit to do so. Our proposal 

breaks very little new ground. Rather we have taken those features of state law that 

offer consumers needed protection and recommend that they be incorporated into a 

Federal law. Most of our suggestions represent approaches that states have already 

adopted. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they pose no significant technological or financial impediments to the prepaid phone card industry. 

Our Model Act covers those matters that should be governed by a Federal statute. 

Some matters are not included in our Model Act because we believe they are best 

65 

left for the states to consider on an individual basis. These matters include licensing 

and registration of companies selling cards, the needs of residents with special 

needs, as well as regulation of rates and fees. If Congress refuses to pass phone card 

legislation, our Model Act should be enacted by each state. 

The Federal statute should establish a basic framework that ensures consumers 

a reasonable level of disclosure and protection. The statute should delegate to the 

FTC the task of issuing detailed regulations pursuant to the statute, filling in the 

details and responding to future changes in technology, marketing, and the marketplace.211 To assist card issuers in complying with the law and to reduce compliance 

costs, the statute should instruct the FTC to draft model disclosure forms for issuers 

to use if they wish.212 States would be permitted to enact their own laws as long 

as they were not inconsistent with the Federal statute.213

The Federal statute should also regulate disclosures in advertising. As previously 

noted,214 advertising is important in inducing consumers to buy a certain brand of 

card. In addition, a Federal law is appropriate because a radio or television commercial or Internet ad can be seen and heard across state borders. The Federal law 

should incorporate the provisions of California’s law that requires phone card advertisements to disclose geographic limits to the advertised price, rate, or unit value, 

as well as to disclose additional surcharges, call setup charges, or fees applicable 

to the advertised price, rate, or unit value.215 The FTC should be authorized to issue 

additional disclosures from time to time if it finds they are needed. This flexibility 

is appropriate given the new advertising avenues that emerging technologies continue to make possible.216

The Federal law should require disclosures that are available to consumers prior 

to purchasing prepaid phone cards. Disclosure plays a crucial role in phone card 

transactions because of the manner in which consumers become bound by the terms 

of the contract. As is evident from the discussion in this article, the purchase and 

use of phone cards involves many elements. Some of the features of this service are 

complex and confusing, such as the calculation of fees and charges. Consumers and 

card issuers do not enter into a formal written contract that includes the terms of 

agreement, with consumers expressing their agreement to be bound in some manner, such as signing the contract. Instead, the card issuer notifies the consumer of 

rights, obligations, restrictions, limitations, and conditions on the card or in the 

packaging, and the consumer purchases the card. Therefore, the consumer does not 

participate in the negotiation of the terms. Courts uphold the enforceability of these 

types of contracts, finding that consumers have accepted and are bound by any 

terms of which they have notice if they use the product after having opportunity 

to discover those terms.217 In order to ensure the fairness and reasonableness of the 

terms that bind the parties, it is essential that the law require certain disclosures 

that become part of the contract. 

The Federal law should require certain disclosures on the card itself. This includes the name of the company issuing the card and a toll-free customer service 

number. The card also should give a toll-free network access number if that is required in order to access service. The card must disclose the authorization code if 

one is required to access service. Most states that have enacted legislation include 

these disclosure requirements. 

The Federal statute should require that all cards have an expiration date, and 

that the date can be no shorter than 1 year after activation. This information is 

vital for the consumer to have. Therefore, there should be significant consequences 

if the card does not include that disclosure. The Federal statute should follow the 

laws enacted in Washington and Texas 218 and provide that if a seller fails to make 

that disclosure, the card is active indefinitely. 

The Federal statute should follow the pattern of state law by requiring other disclosures, but permitting the issuer to make them either on the card or on the packaging that comes with the card. Additionally, the issuer should be required to make 

the disclosures available at the point of sale.219 Disclosures should include all 

charges, taxes, and fees.220 The seller should disclose the minimum charge per call, 

extra charges imposed for calls from pay phones, the billing decrement, the recharge 

policy, if any, and the refund policy.221 The FTC should have the authority to regulate further in this area. For example, phone card issuers may impose new types 

of charges and conditions. The statute should define charges and conditions in general terms so the FTC can issue regulations under its disclosure authority to include 

these new costs. 

Surcharges for international calls deserve special attention. Those making international calls have a special need for clear and accurate information. Therefore, it 

is important that the surcharges for international calls not be buried in with the 

other disclosures. Consequently, the statute should provide that if international 

calls are a significant focus of the issuer’s marketing or if a substantial portion of 

66 

the calls made on its cards are subject to surcharges for international calls, the 

issuer must make the disclosure of those surcharges in a prominent place on the 

card as well as on the packaging and at the point of sale. The statute should delegate to the FTC the responsibility to issue regulations further specifying the circumstances under which the special rules for international calls apply. 

Consumers also need to know the balance remaining on their cards. Otherwise, 

when they have an important call to make, they may mistakenly believe they have 

more time than they actually have to make their call. The Federal law should follow 

Texas’ lead by requiring verbal disclosures at the beginning of each call informing 

the consumer of the minutes, billing increments, or dollars remaining on the 

card.222 When the balance on the card is nearly exhausted, the issuer should be required to inform the consumer verbally that the time is about to expire.223

Furthermore, the Federal statute should require several disclosures not mandated 

by state statutes. Sellers should have to inform consumers of their policy with regard to unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of providing service without 

prior notice to the consumer.224 Even better would be a provision requiring sellers 

to notify consumers beforehand of all proposed changes. Notification could be given 

verbally at the beginning of the consumer’s call using the card.225 The consumer 

should be given the option of refusing to agree to the change. If the consumer refuses, she should be entitled to a refund of the unused value on the card. Sellers 

should be prohibited from charging a fee to obtain the refund. 

Sellers should be required to disclose their policy on lost, stolen, unauthorized, 

and malfunctioning cards.226 In addition, the Federal statute should require sellers 

to inform consumers whether they can redeem unused value on their card, and if 

they can, how it can be redeemed and what charges may be imposed. 

The statute should mandate the use of standard uniform terms that would be defined in the statute. This would enable consumers to comparison shop. Uniform 

terms would have uniform meanings, regardless of the state where the consumer 

purchased the card. In addition to requiring standard terms, certain terms should 

be prohibited to prevent the confusing and contradictory wording that many agreements contain.227 For example, some companies state there is no connection fee, 

leading consumers to believe there are no additional fees.228 This claim is misleading because instead of that fee they impose a fee at the conclusion of each call, 

called a ‘‘post-call’’ or ‘‘hang-up’’ fee. Sellers should be required to use a standard 

term that would apply to all fees imposed per call. Companies impose periodic 

charges for maintenance fees.229 The statute should require companies to use a 

standard term that would apply to all such maintenance fees. Companies should not 

be allowed to confuse consumers by using a variety of terms for such charges such 

as ‘‘administrative fee’’ or ‘‘service fee.’’ The statute should require a standard format for charges imposed for taxes. Standard uniform terms would benefit card 

issuers as well as consumers because the standardization would be easier for issuers 

to comply with than various state laws with differing requirements and definitions. 

The statute should authorize the FTC to develop a standard format for disclosures 

and model forms. 

The Federal statute should require that if the issuer uses a language other than 

English in advertising or promoting the card, or on the card or its packaging, then 

the required disclosures on the card or packaging must also be in that other language.230 If another language is used to provide dialing instructions for making calls 

or calling customer service, the disclosures required to be on the card or its packaging also must be in that other language.231

Disclosure by card companies alone is not sufficient.232 The Federal statute 

should also require dispute resolution procedures and substantive rights and protections. The Federal statute should ensure the effectiveness of customer service or else 

consumers will be at a severe disadvantage in learning essential information and 

seeking solutions for problems that arise. Issuers should be required to provide a 

toll-free telephone number for customer service, with that number clearly disclosed 

on the card itself. The issuer should be required to have an adequate number of 

trained, live operators available at least Monday through Friday, 8 hours each 

day.233 The statute should require that the issuer record all calls made at other 

times, and that the recorded calls be returned no later than the end of the next 

business day.234 Consumers should have the right to file complaints when they call 

customer service,235 and the issuer should be required to investigate within ten 

business days, crediting the consumer’s card or providing a refund if the consumer’s 

complaint is justified.236 Consumers also need information when they call, and the 

issuer’s customer service operators should have the capacity to provide information 

about rates, surcharges, fees, refunds, expiration dates, recharging cards, and the 

available balance.237

67 

The Federal statute should include rules for rounding charges up to the next 

minute and should prohibit excessive upwards rounding.238 Federal law should also 

prohibit the issuer from reducing the value of the card by more than the charges 

printed on the card or the packaging or information displayed at the point of sale.239

Moreover, the seller should be prohibited from imposing a fee if there is no connection made to the party dialed. 

The Federal statute should require the issuer to provide a refund when the issuer 

fails to provide service at the disclosed rates or charges more than disclosed or allowed.240 In addition, the consumer should receive a refund if the phone service fails 

to meet certain technical standards.241 Refunds are warranted if service is suspended, terminated,242 or unusable.243 Consumers should be entitled to a refund if 

the service does not work as represented, the required disclosures are not made,244

or the card is defective. Consumers should also be able to receive a refund of the 

unused balance on their card if they report their card as lost or stolen and the 

issuer has the capacity to block all future use of the card after receiving the consumer’s notice.245

There may be other circumstances under which refunds should be required. 

Therefore, the statute should include more general standards as well. California and 

New York’s models require a refund of at least the value remaining on the card if 

the service fails to operate in a ‘‘commercially reasonable manner.’’ 246 Other examples of general standards are provisions requiring a refund if the issuer fails to exercise ordinary care, acts in bad faith, or uses a contract that includes unconscionable 

terms.247

The Federal statute should impose minimum performance standards. The seller 

should be required to have the capacity to accommodate a reasonably anticipated 

number of calls without consumers encountering a busy signal or unreasonable 

delay.248 The FTC should set requirements for what percentage of calls must be 

completed and the accuracy of the company’s calculation of the conversation time.249

The Federal statute should also include a guaranty stating that both the card and 

the service provided meet minimum standards. Accordingly, it should provide that 

there is an implied warranty of merchantability in every phone card transaction. 

This is the law under the UCC with regard to the sale of goods.250 Unlike the UCC, 

however, the issuer should not be allowed to disclaim that implied warranty.251

The Federal statute should establish a maximum cap on a consumer’s liability as 

long as the card issuer has the ability to block access so the thief cannot continue 

to use the card.252 If the issuer does not have that ability, the law should require 

a prominent disclosure on the card or its packaging that the purchaser will lose the 

entire balance on the card if it is lost, stolen, or used in an unauthorized fashion, 

if that is the issuer’s policy. 

Consumers may lose their PINs rendering the card useless and resulting in the 

loss to the consumer of the value remaining on the card.253 A seller should be required to supply a new PIN if the consumer notifies the seller and the seller has 

the ability to block access to anyone using the lost PIN. If the seller lacks the ability 

to block access and does not want to provide consumers any relief, the Federal statute should require the seller to clearly warn consumers either on the card or its 

packaging that they have no protection if the PIN is lost. 

Additionally, the statute should require sellers to replace defective cards.254 Consumers will lose the entire balance on the card if the card issuer refuses to replace 

it. The law should prohibit sellers from charging more than a reasonable fee for a 

replacement.255 If sellers can charge exorbitant replacement fees, it will be economically inadvisable for the consumer to order a replacement. 

Consumers need meaningful remedies otherwise they have no means for recovering the losses they incur as a result of violations of the law. The Federal statute 

should include the remedies contained in Federal consumer protection laws, providing for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorney’s fees.256 Class actions should be expressly permitted, or else litigation will not be feasible, given the 

small amount of each individual’s damages. Predispute mandatory arbitration 

should be prohibited.257

The recommendations made thus far should be in a Federal statute or accompanying FTC regulations. They involve national problems that are best dealt with 

on a uniform nationwide basis both to ensure that consumers can enjoy a basic level 

of protection wherever they live and to lower compliance costs for the industry. If 

Congress fails to enact a law, however, states should pass their own statutes, using 

the above as a model, and delegating regulatory authority to the appropriate state 

agency. 

Some issues are best dealt with on a state basis rather than through a Federal 

law. Examples of this include the licensing and registration of companies. Some 

states require this already, and the rest should be encouraged to consider it. States 

68 

also should require companies to post a bond so consumers will have a fund from 

which they can be compensated in case a company goes out of business. Some states 

require phone card companies to file tariffs listing all of their rates and fees, with 

a state agency empowered to reject those rates.258 We believe it best to leave that 

decision to the states rather than establish a Federal bureaucracy to oversee rate 

regulation for all sellers. While lawmakers generally are reluctant to regulate fees, 

regulation of phone card fees is warranted because of the low income and vulnerable 

status of many of the consumers who are specifically targeted by the industry. Consequently, states should consider enacting laws prohibiting rates above a certain 

amount, as states already do for consumer credit. There is a great deal of diversity 

in the demographic characteristics of various states. Individual states may find it 

necessary to enact special protections for vulnerable groups within their states, such 

as immigrants. 

Finally, Federal and state laws governing phone cards should prohibit waiver of 

the requirements mandated in the laws. Strong consumer protection laws do not 

benefit consumers if sellers can enforce contractual provisions by which consumers 

agree to waive provisions in those laws intended to benefit and protect them. 

XII. Conclusion 

Empirical studies indicate that consumers have difficulty obtaining necessary information about prepaid telephone cards before purchase. Information is often unavailable, misleading, and confusing. There is no Federal regulation of prepaid 

phone cards. Although numerous states have statutes or administrative regulations, 

they vary widely and many states have no laws regulating phone cards. Both card 

issuers and consumers could be better served with Federal legislation. 

This article presents a case for Federal legislation and a proposed model act 

which would draw upon the best of current state regulations. The Federal Trade 

Commission is the suggested avenue for administrative agency regulations and enforcement of the proposed legislation. The Federal legislation also must provide a 

private right of action for consumers, providing them with meaningful remedies 

when they are injured due to a company’s failure to comply with the law. However, 

a few issues should be left to the states’ discretion. If Congress fails to enact legislation, the states should pass the model act. 

Footnotes 

*Mark E. Budnitz is a Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law. He holds 

a B.A. from Dartmouth College and J.D. from Harvard Law School. Professor Budnitz gratefully 

acknowledges the research assistance of Jodi L. Green, a student at GSU College of Law. †Martina Rojo is a Professor of Law in the School of Law at the Universidad del Salvador, 

Argentina. She holds a J.D. from the Universidad del Salvador, Argentina and L.L.M. from the 

University of Georgia. The author has researched and published in the areas of Consumer Law, 

Comparative Law and Law and Economics. ‡ Julia Marlowe is an Associate Professor in the Department of Housing & Consumer Economics at the University of Georgia. She holds a B.A. from The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, and M.S. and Ph.D. in Consumer Economics from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The author wishes to thank the University of Georgia President’s Venture Fund and the 

Georgia Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs for funding the research. 1Mitch Morrison, Paying Dividends: The Prepaid Category Continues to Grow and it’s Not 

Just Phone Cards Anymore, 39 CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS 48 (2003). 2 Brian Cook, Thomas K. Crowe & Jo Ann Scott Cullen, Experts Predict—Prepaid Forecast 

2002, INTELE-CARD NEWS, Jan. 2001, http://www.intelecard.com/storylhome.asp?StoryID=342 

(last visited Sept. 11, 2006); Richard Gutwillig, Calling on Savvy, 55 SUPERMARKET BUS. MAG. 

89 (2000). 3Michael Browne, Generally Speaking: Selling a Variety of General Merchandise Draws Customers, High Margins, 40 CONVENIENCE STORE NEWS 37, 37 (2004). 4 Howard Segermark, Why Market Phone Cards? 30 NAT’L PETROLEUM NEWS 30, 30 (June 

2002). 5 Cook, Crowe and Cullen, supra note 2, at 14; Gutwillig, supra note 2 (reporting that card 

sellers are targeting home-based businesses and traveling salespersons). Military personnel also 

are major users of prepaid calling cards. FCC Taps Calling Cards for Access, USF Payments, 

TELECOM POL’Y REP., July 10, 2006. 6Gutwillig, supra note 2. Digitac sells computers and computer services. Id. http:// 

www.digitac.com.aa (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 7Mary Louise Pickel, Phoning Mexico . . . for profit, ATL. J.-CONST., June 8, 2006; Cook, 

Crowe and Cullen, supra note 2; Gutwillig, supra note 2. 8 Alan R. Andreasen, Disadvantaged Hispanic Consumers: A Research Perspective and Agenda, 

16 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 46, 48 (1982); Jinkook Lee & Horacia Soberon-Ferrer, Consumer 

Vulnerablity to Fraud: Influencing Factors, 31 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 70, 72 (1997). 9 Julia Marlowe, Investigation of Pre-Purchase Information on Prepaid Telephone Cards, Report to the Georgia Governor’s Office of Consumer Affairs 1 (Sept. 2005); Julia Marlowe and 

Martina Rojo, Consumer Problems With Prepaid Telephone Cards, 51 CONSUMER INTS. ANN. 126, 

128–30 (2005). 

69 

10The Mexico Tri Color card, purchased in 2005, provides an example of misleading information. The card reads ‘‘sin cargo de conexio ́n’’ on the front in large print, but the small print on 

the back reads ‘‘cargos de conexio ́n aplicaran.’’ The statement on the front informs the consumer 

there are no connection charges, but the statement on the back says the opposite. Marlowe and 

Rojo, supra note 9, at 127. Customer service representatives sometimes provide confusing information. For example, one told a consumer the phone card had a ‘‘maintenance fee of $0.50 every 

one or 2 days.’’ Id. 11 AT&T v. Ting, 182 F. Supp.2d 902, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d 319 F.3d 1126 (9th. Cir. 

2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003); see Jean Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration 

Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000). 12 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 37 million people in the United States live in poverty. 

Bradley R. Schiller, Fluid Poverty, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Sept. 24, 2006 (noting that more than 

20 percent of Hispanics in the United States live in poverty). 13See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Marketer of Pre-Paid Cards Agrees to Settle Charges of Failing to Disclose Actual Cost of Using Card; Additional Charges Per Call Added, Some Cards Incurred Monthly Maintenance Fee (Mar. 4, 1999). 14Phone Card Issuers Must Pay Access Fees, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at C9 (reporting that 

the FCC ruled AT&T must make Universal Service Fund payments on its prepaid calling card 

transactions). 15See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. OF POL. ECON. 311, 312 

(1970). 16Segermark, supra note 4, at 30. 17Marlowe, supra note 9, at 4–5; Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 128. 18 Nancy Luna, Phone Card or PhonyCard? ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 20, 2005 (reporting 

experience of consumer who was never able to use her defective card to make a call). 19 Julia Marlowe and Jorge H. Atiles, Consumer Fraud and Latino Immigrant Consumers in 

the United States, 29 INT’L J. OF CONSUMER STUD. 391, 395–96 (2005). 20 Id. at 395–96. 21Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 130–31. 22 Id. at 132–33. 23 Id. at 133. 24 Id. at 130. 25 Id. 26Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 130. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 130. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 132. 34 Id. at 133. 35 Id. 36Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 133. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. at 130. 40 Id. 41Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 130. 42 Id. at 131. 43 Id. 44Marlowe, supra note 9, at 18–19. 45 Id. at 4. 46 Id. 47 Id. at 4–5. 48 Id. at 4. 49 Julia Marlowe and Francisco Diaz, Verification of Advertised Claims for Prepaid Phone 

Cards (Working Paper, 2006). 50Marlowe, supra note 9, at 4. 51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Id. at 5. 55Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 132. 56 Id. 57Marlowe, supra note 9, at 4. 58 Id. at 4–5. 59 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(12) (West 2006) (a customer is not considered connected 

if the customer receives a busy signal or the call is unanswered); AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N RULE

T–18.1(7) (1997) (usage rates can be charged only for connected minutes); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 26.34(e)(2) (2000) (account may be decreased only for completed calls; busy signals and unanswered calls are not considered completed). 60 ITA Phonecard Disclosure Guidelines, The Int’l Telecard Ass’n Standards Comm., June 5, 

2000. 61 Id. 62 Howard Segermark, Executive Director, International Prepaid Communications Association, 

personal interview with Julia Marlowe and Martina Rojo, at the offices of the Association, 904 

70 

Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2004. The International Prepaid Communications Association is the successor organization to the International Telecard Association. 63 Compare ITA Phonecard Disclosure Guidelines, supra note 60, with the Model Act discussed 

infra in Part XI. For example, the IPCA standards do not include any rules on advertising. They 

do not require a minimum period before the card expires or redemption of unused value. Card 

issuers are not required to replace defective cards. 64Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 131. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67Gutwillig, supra note 2. 68Marlowe, supra note 9, at 3. 69 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 70 Id. § 45(a). 71 Id. § 45(a)(1). 72 Id. 73The FTC Act merely declares unfair and deceptive acts to be unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) 

(2006). It does not establish any requirements for disclosure of essential information, levels of 

performance, customer service or error resolution. 74See infra Part X discussing problems not dealt with in any laws. 75MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 160, 559 (Little, Brown 1995). 76 Courts in some states have made it very difficult for consumers to bring actions under these 

laws. See, e.g., Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (imposing a ‘‘public 

interest’’ requirement that is not included in the statute). 77 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10–1–399(a) (2006). 78Most courts require consumers to prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 

Greenfield, supra note 75, at 529–34. To prove procedural unconscionability the consumer must 

show the process under which the consumer entered into the contract was unconscionable. To 

prove substantive unconscionability, the consumer must prove the terms in the contract were 

unconscionable. Some courts allow the doctrine to be raised only as a defense, which means consumers can challenge a contract as unconscionable only if the seller has sued them. They cannot 

use it affirmatively as the basis of their own lawsuit against the seller. Rosboro Lumber Co. 

v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 672 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 

680 P.2d 386 (Or. 1984). 79See generally Official Comment U.C.C. § 1–203 (2005). The Comment provides that ‘‘failure 

to perform or enforce, in good faith, a specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes 

a breach of that contract. . . . [T]he doctrine of good faith merely directs a court toward interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are created, performed and enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be independently breached.’’ 80See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109– 

10 (Cal. 2005) (stating that adhesion contracts are unconscionable, ‘‘at least to the extent they 

operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be imposed under [state] law’’). 81This is in contrast to gift cards. Far more states have enacted laws regulating that type 

of stored value card. MARK BUDNITZ & MARGOT SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING & PAYMENTS

LAW CREDIT, DEBIT & STORED VALUE CARDS, CHECKS, MONEY ORDERS, E-SIGN, ELECTRONIC

BANKING AND BENEFIT PAYMENTS 178–79 (National Consumer Law Center 3rd ed. 2005). 82Prepaid phone cards have been identified as a key problem area for Hispanics. Federal 

Trade Commission, Hispanic Outreach Forum & Law Enforcement Workshop: A Summary of 

the Proceedings, at 8 (Oct. 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hispanicoutreach/hispanic 

outreach.pdf. (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). Fraudulent practices involving the cards are ‘‘likely 

to be targeted to immigrant populations.’’ Id. at 9. ‘‘Hispanics are noted for their trusting nature, which means they maybe easier prey for scam artists.’’ Id. at. 8. See generally Hoover’s 

In-Depth Company Records, Ace Cash Express, Inc. Aug. 24, 2005 (reporting that Ace Cash Express, Inc. targets consumers who do not have bank accounts, selling them prepaid phone cards, 

and controversial products such as payday loans). 83 Hispanic Outreach Forum & Law Enforcement Workshop: A Summary of the Proceedings, 

supra note 82, at 10. ‘‘. . . the concept of the government protecting consumers may be foreign 

to many Hispanics.’’ Id. 84 Administrative agencies in the following states have regulations pertaining to prepaid 

phone cards. AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N RULE T–18.1 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.900– 

935 (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.160–70 (2006); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 26.34(e)(4) (2000). 

85 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2QQ (2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.910 (2006). Some 

states require providers of the service to file tariffs. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.915 (2006); 

16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(e)(1) (2000). 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 ‘‘. . . Federal law applies nationally.’’ Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 

390 F.3d 684, 688 (10th Cir. 2004). 89 ‘‘Because Federal law applies nationally,’’ courts should assume ‘‘that Congress desires national uniformity in the application of its laws.’’ Id. See Laura S. Langley, Sperm, Egg, and a 

Petri Dish, 27 J. LEG. MED. 167, 206 (2006) (proposing Federal legislation because it would create uniformity among the states). 90See, for example, the industry’s response to state laws requiring companies to notify consumers when there is a security breach resulting in the possible exposure of personal information about consumers. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Data Privacy Now Issue for States, 170 AM. BANKVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:23 Mar 26, 2013 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\80091.TXT JACKIE
71 

ER 1, Mar. 28, 2005 (noting how businesses prefer a Federal statute over a patchwork of state 

laws). 91Fourteen percent of the people in the United States, totaling 40 million people, move or 

change their address every year. Stephanie Fiereck, Focus on Class Action, NEW JERSEY LAW., Oct. 31, 2005 (relying on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Geographical Mobility Study 

2002–2003). 92 E.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d. 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002); Gator.com 

Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). 93Prepaid phone cards are analogous to payment devices such as credit cards, that are defined 

as devices for ‘‘the purpose of obtaining . . . property . . . or services.’’ 15 U.S.C. § 1602(k) 

(2006). 94The Federal Communications Commission has authority to regulate interstate telephone 

service. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 384 (1999) 

(clarifying the FCC’s rulemaking authority under the Telecommunications Act). 95FCC, Prepaid Phone Cards: What Consumers Should Know, http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/ 

consumerfacts/prepaidcards.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). 96FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2006). 97FTC v. PT–1 Commc’ns, Inc., Civ. Action No. 99–1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stipulating final 

judgment and order for permanent injunction and consumer redress against defendant PT–1 

Communications, Inc.). 98 As discussed infra in Part XI, we propose that states be allowed to enact their own legislation if it is not inconsistent with the Federal law. State administrative involvement may be 

needed if a state wishes to require sellers to register or follow the example of some states that 

require sellers to obtain a certificate of authority or certificate of public convenience. E.g., AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule T–18.1 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.910 (2006); MO. CODE

REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.150(1) (2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2QQ(b) (2006). 99Other Federal consumer protection laws demonstrate how consumers can get the benefit of 

national coverage as well as protection for special local needs. These laws establish a national 

floor of minimum requirements. Rather than completely preempting state law, they permit 

states to enact laws that provide consumers with greater protection as long as the state’s law 

is not inconsistent with the Federal law. E.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666(j) (2006); 

Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(q) (2006); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1692(n) (2006). 100 Christopher B. Woods, Stored Value Cards, 59 CONS. FIN. QTLY. REP. 211, 211 (2005). One 

commentator suggests that the card issuer has special legal duties that arise from the fact that 

the card is prepaid. ‘‘And a fiduciary responsibility is involved for those who take money prior 

to providing service.’’ Howard Segermark, Ensuring Fair Competition Remains Regulatory Challenge for Prepaid, PHONE PLUS MAG., Mar. 2001, available at: http://www.phoneplusmag.com/ 

articles/131soap.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). Segermark is Executive Director of the International Prepaid Communications Association. 101 ATMs can be used to perform a variety of services including cash deposits, cash withdrawals, balance inquiries, and transfers from one account to another. Candace Heckman, Getting Money Back After ATM Theft Proving To Bank You’re A Victim Is The Hard Part, SEATTLE

POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 9, 2006 (describing thefts involving ATM balance inquiries and ATM 

withdrawals); Citibank Home Page, http://www.citibank.com (describing ATM features enabling 

customers to withdraw cash and make transfers from one account to another) (last visited Sept. 

27, 2006); Bank of America Home Page, http://www.bankofamerica.com (describing ATM features enabling customers to make withdrawals, make transfers from one account to another, 

and make balance inquiries (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 102See e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (prescribing the duties of telecommunications carriers). 103 E.g., Cont’l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 394 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). 104The applicable law is the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. 105 71 Fed. Reg. 51437 (2006) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 205) (Final Rule, effective July 1, 

2007). 106 E.g., in Texas, prepaid calling card services companies are required to register with the 

Public Service Commission. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34 (2000). 107 Compare AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N RULE. T–18.1 (1997) (requiring only the disclosure of essential information), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(1) (West 2006) (covering advertising, disclosures, refunds, and customer service). 108 Id. 109Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 134–35; Marlowe, supra note 9, at 9. 110 Id. 111Marlowe, supra note 9, at 4. 112See Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov, listing all the FTC’s guides and policy 

statements on advertising, none related directly to prepaid phone card services. (last visited 

Sept. 27, 2006). 113 Chester S. Galloway, Herbert Jack Rotfield and Jef I. Richards, Holding Media 

Responsibile for Deceptive Weight-Loss Advertising, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 383 (2005) (stating 

that the FTC does not have the resources to investigate many cases of deceptive advertising). 

The FTC, however, has brought at least one action against a phone card company. See supra 

text at note 97. 114 Edward A. Blair, Judy Harris and Kent B. Monroe, Effects of Shopping Information on 

Consumers’ Responses to Comparative Price Claims, 78 J. OF RETAILING 76 (2002); Larry D. 

Compeau, Dhruv Grewal and Rajesh Chandrashedaran, Comparative Price Advertising: Believe 

it or Not, 36 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 287–88 (2002); Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions 

of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence, 52 J. OF MARKETING 2–3 (1988). 115 Blair, Harris and Monroe, supra note 114, at 76. 

72 

116Truth in Lending imposes requirements for ads that mention specific credit terms. 12 

C.F.R. § 226.24 (2006). 117 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(1) (West 2006). 118States require disclosures on the card itself. See e.g., CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE

§ 17538.9(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). Some states require other disclosures on the card or its packaging. See e.g., Id. § 17538.9(b)(3). 119 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). California law defines ‘‘company’’ 

as ‘‘an entity providing prepaid calling services to the public using its own or a resold telecommunications network.’’ CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE at § 17538.9(a)(1) (West 2006). Other states 

that require the name of the company on the card include the following: Alaska, see ALASKA

ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 52.377(d)(1)(A) (2006); Alabama, see AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule. T–18.1 

(1997); Florida, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(1)(a) (2006); Illinois, see 815 ILL. COMP. 

STAT. 505/2QQ(d)(1)(A) (2006); Missouri, see MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.150(2) (2006); 

New York, see N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(2)(a) (McKinney 2006); Texas, see 16 TEX. ADMIN. 

CODE § 26.34(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2000); and Washington, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE 480–120–264(5)(a)(ii) 

(2006). 120 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(2)(B) (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25– 

24.920(1)(b) (2006); ILL. COMP. STAT. 815 505/2 QQ(d)(1)(B) (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 

4, § 240–32.160(2)(B) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(2)(b) (McKinney 2006); 16 TEX. ADMIN. 

CODE § 26.34(f)(1)(A)(i) (2000). 121Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 134–35; Marlowe, supra note 9, at 9. 122 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(3)(C) (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25– 

24.920(1)(c) (2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 QQ(d)(1)(C) (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 

4, § 240–32.160(2)(C) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(2)(c) (McKinney 2006). 123 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(2)(D) (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25– 

24.920(1)(d); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.160(2)(D) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92– 

f(2)(d) (McKinney 2006). 124The situation is analogous to the person who issues a check drawn on an account that 

doesn’t exist or that contains no funds, providing the payee with an action in deceit. See Greenfield, supra note 75, at 12. 125 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(3)(I) (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25– 

24.920(2)(c) (2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/2 QQ (d)(2)(F) (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 

4, § 240–32.160(1)(C) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(2)(e) (McKinney 2006); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(f)(1)(B)(iv) (2000); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 480–120–264(5)(a)(v) (2006). 126 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(8) (2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(7) 

(2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.170(8) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(6) 

(McKinney 2006). 127WASH. ADMIN. CODE 480–120–264(5)(a)(v) (2006). Texas has the same policy; if the expiration date or policy is not disclosed, on the card, it is considered active ‘‘indefinitely.’’ 16 TEX. 

ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(f)(1)(B)(iv) (2000). 128 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(3) (West 2006). 129 Id. 130FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(2) (2006). 131 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(3) (West 2006). 132Fees include ‘‘monthly or other periodic fees, maintenance fees, per-call access fees, surcharges for calls made on pay telephones, or surcharges for the first minute or other period of 

use. . . .’’ Id. § 17538.9(b)(3)(A). 133 Id. § 17538.9(b)(3)(B). 134 Id. Illinois’ and New York’s requirements on disclosure of fees are similar. 815 ILL. COMP. 

STAT. § 505/2QQ(d)(2) (2005); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(3) (McKinney 2006). 135 12 C.F.R. § 22612 (1994) (regarding credit cards); 12 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2001) (regarding debit 

cards). 136 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(13) (West 2006). 137 Id. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(g)(1) (2000). 141 Id. 142 Id. § 26.34(g)(2) (2000). 143 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(4) (West 2006). 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(f)(1) (2000). 147 Id. 148See U.C.C. § 4–406 (2002) (requiring customers to report check forgeries and alterations to 

the bank, and if timely reported the non-negligent customer is not liable, but the UCC does not 

require any dispute resolution procedure. If the bank refuses to investigate the customer’s claim 

and recredit the customer’s account, the customer’s only recourse is to sue. The bank’s refusal 

to investigate and recredit does not violate the UCC). 149 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1994) (regarding credit cards); 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (2001) (regarding 

debit cards). 150 Id. 151 Budnitz and Saunders, supra note 81, at 178–79. 152 Id. 153Marlowe and Rojo, supra note 9, at 130–31. 154 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(6) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(4) 

(McKinney 2000). 

73 

155See, e.g., AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule T–18.1(5) (2000) (requiring that customer service 

be manned 8 hours per day, 5 days per week); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(4) (2006) 

(requiring live operator 24/7 or electronically recorded and attempt to contact the next business 

day); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.140(4) (2001) (requiring availability 24/7); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(i) (2000) (requiring live operator 24/7 or electronically recorded and attempt to contact the next business day); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 480–120–264(2)(a) (2003) (requiring ability to respond 24/7). 156 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(6)(B) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(4) 

(McKinney 2006). 157 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(4) (McKinney 2006). New York also requires that the operator 

be able to provide information about the ‘‘terms and conditions of service and monthly service 

charges.’’ Id. § 92–f (4)(iv). 158FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(9) (2006); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(7) 

(West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(5) (McKinney 2006). 159FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.920(9) (2006). 160 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(7) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(5) 

(McKinney 2006). 161 Id. 162 Id. 163FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.925(1)(a) (2006). 164MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32–170(5)(B) (2006). 165 Id. § 240–32–170(6)(A). 166 AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule T–18.1(4) (1998). 167 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(j) (2000). 168FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.925(1)(a). 169 Id.; see also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.170(6) (2006) (requiring a company to 

refund the unused value remaining on the card if the ‘‘company is no longer able to provide 

service.’’) 170FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.925(1)(a) (2006). The company can choose whether to 

make the refund in cash or by means of a replacement service. It must be provided within 60 

days of when the consumer notifies the company. Id. r. 25–24.925(1)(b). 171 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 52.377(e) (2006). 172 Id. 173FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.925(2) (2006). Compare the rules for lost and stolen credit cards. Under Federal law, a consumer has a maximum liability of $50. The liability will be less 

if the consumer notifies the card issuer before the thief charges less than $50 prior to the consumer providing the notification. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (2006). 174 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(7) (West 2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25– 

24.925(1)(a) (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240–32.170(6)(A) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW

§ 92–f(5) (McKinney 2006). 

175 Id. 176 Credit card law provides a limited remedy if there is a failure in the goods or services purchased. Consumers can dispute the charges and refuse to pay for those goods or services. 12 

C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (2006). The card issuer will charge the amount back to the merchant and 

leave the consumer and merchant to resolve the dispute on their own. Budnitz & Saunders, 

supra note 81, at 152. Debit card law does not provide any remedy. Id. at 82. 177 In regard to the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code includes rules on express and 

implied warranties, but a merchant can avoid these by disclaiming them in the contract between 

the parties. U.C.C. § 2–316 (2003). The Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides limited 

protection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006). The warranty laws regarding the provision of services 

are even more problematic. See infra at Part IX. 178 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(10) (West 2006). 179 Id. § 17538.9(b)(7). 180Many laws require parties to act in a commercially reasonable manner. See, e.g., U.C.C. 

§§ 3–103(a)(6)–(9) (2002), 9–607(c), 9–608(a)(3), 9–610 (2000). 

181FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.930 (repealed 2005). 182 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(8) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(6) 

(McKinney 2006). 183 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(6) (McKinney 2006). 184 Id. 185See generally Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) 

(upholding a bank’s contract requiring a customer to notify the bank of any unauthorized signature or alteration of a check within 14 days as reasonable, and rejecting the dissent’s view that 

such a short time period was contrary to customers’ reasonable expectations and conduct). 186Greenfield, supra note 75, at 160 (describing how legislation prohibiting deceptive practices 

has been enacted in every state). See also, id. at 559 (most states have prohibited unfair practices). 187See, e.g., Taylor v. Jacques, 292 B.R. 434, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002)(holding that consumer cannot sue under Georgia’s Fair Business Practices Act if the industry is regulated, even 

if the regulations do not address the problem the consumer alleges violates the Act). Consumers 

also face formidable barriers to obtaining judicial relief if a company stops doing business. Alternatively the company may stop doing business in one state, then resume business in another 

state under a different name. See generally, Pickel, supra note 7 (reporting that companies lose 

consumer loyalty with their unfair and deceptive practices, but then market the cards with a 

new brand name, cheating consumers who do not realize it is the same company). 188 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(m) (2000) (explaining that the commission can order the company to take corrective action, impose administrative penalties, and coordinate with the Office 

of the Attorney General). 

74 

189Once a seller makes an express warranty, it cannot disclaim that warranty. U.C.C. § 2– 

316(1) (2003). However, the seller is not required to make any express warranties. Certain implied warranties arise by operation of law, U.C.C. § 2–314 & 2–315 (2003), but the seller can 

easily disclaim these. U.C.C. § 2–316(2) & (3) (2003). 190 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2006). 191 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(h) (2006). Even if the Act did apply, the Act prohibits only the disclaimer 

of implied warranties that are created by state law; the Act itself does not create any implied 

warranties. 192 ‘‘. . . [A] duty is implied in every service, repair or construction contract to perform it skillfully, carefully, diligently, and in a workmanlike manner.’’ Alco Standard Corp. v. Westinghouse 

Elec. Corp., 206 Ga. App. 794, 796, 426 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 193 Id. 194 No cases were found addressing this issue, but since the UCC permits disclaimers of implied warranties for the sale of goods, presumably courts also would allow it for the sale of services. See generally Richard M. Alderman, Warranty Disclaimers and the Texas Deceptive Practices Act, 29 HOUS. LAW. 14, 15 (Jan./Feb. 1992) (discussing express warranty disclaimers in 

service contracts). 195See Budnitz and Saunders, supra note 81, at 177–178. 196 Id. 197 Id. 198 Id. 199See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25–24.925(2) (providing that a company ‘‘may, but shall not 

be required to, provide a refund’’ for lost or stolen phone cards). Compare credit card and debit 

card law that imposes specific caps that limit the consumer’s liability if a thief makes charges 

on a lost or stolen card. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (credit cards); Id. § 1693(g) (debit cards and 

other electronic fund transfers). 200See Cheryl Johnson, Faux Williams makes rounds; Star impersonator leaves trail of angry 

victims, STAR TRIB., Dec. 26, 2004 (reporting consumer’s allegations of unauthorized use of 

phone card after he lost the piece of paper on which he had written his PIN). 201 Id. 202The card issuer may be required to transfer those funds to the state under abandoned 

property or escheat laws. Christopher B. Woods, Stored Value Cards, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 

REP. 211, 219 (2005); Anita Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible Treatment of 

Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New Payment Mechanisms, 57 BUS. LAW. 475, 

480–81 (2001) (stating that North Carolina and Arizona exclude prepaid phone cards from their 

escheat laws). Even where those laws apply to prepaid phone balances, the seller has the use 

of those funds until they are paid to the state. 203Marlowe & Rojo, supra note 9, at 130. 204Luna, supra note 18 (highlighting an instance where a consumer reported that her card 

was cutoff immediately after making her first call, and the card did not work thereafter). The 

New York Attorney General persuaded eighteen retailers to agree to deactivate and reissue 

damaged gift cards. Big Retailers Agree to Replace Gift Cards, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 3, 

2003. 205See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/products/buytime.htm; http://www.fcc.gov/ 

cgb/consumerfacts/prepaidcards.html; see also Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the 

Consumer: The Need for Regulation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1035, n. 54 (1997) (reporting that 

issuers of prepaid phone cards have gone out of business after selling tens of thousands of cards 

which thereafter became worthless). 206See Getting the Best Value from Prepaid Phone Cards, Consumer Action (April 1, 2001), 

available at http://www.consumeraction.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 207 Id. 208 Budnitz and Saunders, supra note 81, at 172–173. See infra text accompanying note 200. 209See, e.g., the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(m) (2006) (providing actual 

damages, statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees). 210See infra Part VI. 211 As discussed above, the FRB and FCC might be appropriate agencies as well. See supra 

text accompanying notes 89–94. The FTC, however, seems best suited. The FRB deals with financial institutions, and sellers of phone cards are not financial institutions. The FCC’s focus 

is on the telecommunications industry, not on payment devices such as phone cards, or the types 

of problems consumers face when they use phone cards. 212 As provided in other statutes, using the agency-approved form would be deemed compliance with the disclosure requirements. Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(m)(d)(2) 

(2006). 213See Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(q) (2006) The Act does not annul, 

alter, or affect state law except to the extent it is inconsistent with the Act. Furthermore, a state 

law is not inconsistent if it affords consumers greater protection than is provided in the Act. 214See supra text accompanying note 108. See also FTC v. Pt–1 Commc’ns, Civ. Action # 99– 

1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stipulated final judgment and order for permanent injunction and consumer redress; permanent injunction in connection with phone card company’s advertising). See 

also Hispanic Outreach Forum & Law Enforcement Workshop: A Summary of the Proceedings, 

supra note 82, at 9 (discussing how phone cards and other various types of media, excluding 

direct mail, are sources of deceptive claims targeted at Hispanics). 215 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(1) (West 2006). 216See Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Business: DotCom Disclosures, available at 

http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom (last visited May 31, 2006). 217See e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th. Cir. 2002) (holding that the consumer 

accepted a contract when using the service after he received agreement). See generally Ronald 

J. Mann, Panel One: Boilerplate In Consumer Contract: ‘‘Contracting’’ For Credit, 104 MICH. L. 

75 

REV. 899, 910 (2006) (discussing the credit card issuer’s use of contract terms providing that 

notice and continued use bind consumers when issuers unilaterally change contract terms). As 

Howard Segermark, the Executive Director of the International Prepaid Communications Association, has commented regarding the special nature of phone card contracts, ‘‘handing over a 

package—a phone card or prepaid cellular—does not provide an opportunity for a formal contract.’’ Segermark, supra note 100. 218 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(f)(1)(B)(iv) (2006); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 480–120– 

264(5)(a)(v). 219 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(3) (West 2006). 220 Examples of fees include ‘‘monthly or other periodic fees, maintenance fees, per-call access 

fees, surcharges for calls made on pay telephones, or surcharges for the first minute or other 

period of use[.]’’ Id. § 17538.9(b)(3)(A). 221 Id.; Illinois’ and New York’s requirements on disclosure of fees are similar. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2QQ(d)(2) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(3) (McKinney 2006). 222 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(g)(1) (2006). 223 Id. § 26.34(g)(2). 224See Budnitz and Saunders, supra note 81 at 172–73. 225 Notification should not create technical problems. Texas requires sellers to inform consumers verbally when their balances are nearly exhausted. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(g)(2) 

(2006). 226See supra text accompanying notes 184–186 discussing the requirements for lost and stolen 

cards that the Federal statute should impose. 227See supra text accompanying notes 46–56. 228Marlowe, supra note 9, at 4. 229 Id. at 4–5. 230 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(4) (West 2006). 231 Id. 232 Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y

REV. 233, 264–65 (2002). ‘‘. . . disclosure statements . . . may not be able to aid most consumers in understanding the terms of their agreement.’’ Id. at 261. 233 California and New York require live operators twenty-four hours a day and 7 days a week. 

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(6)(A) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(4) (McKinney 2006). 234See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 25–24.920(4) (2006); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 240– 

32.160(5) (2006), 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(i) (2000). Alabama requires that the number be 

manned 8 hours per day, 5 days per week. AL PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule 18.1(5) (1997). 235 Consumers in New York and California can file complaints with customer service. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(6)(C) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f(4) (McKinney 

2006). 236This scheme is similar to that in the Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693(f) 

(2006). 237 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f (4) (McKinney 2006). New York also requires that the operator 

be able to provide information about the ‘‘terms and conditions of service and monthly service 

charges.’’ Id. § 92–f (4)(iv). 238FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 25–24.920(3)(c) (2006). 239 CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § 17538.9(b)(1) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f (McKinney 

2006). 240 CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE § 17538.9(b)(7) (2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f (McKinney 

2006). 241 Id. The Federal statute should allow the FTC to describe technical standards because the 

description requires a high level of technical expertise and specificity. Moreover, the standards 

may need to be adjusted as technology advances over time. 242 AL. PUB. SERV. COMM’N Rule T–18.1(4)(1997). 243FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 25–24.925(1)(a) (2006). See also MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, 

§ 240–32.170(6) (2006) (providing that a company must refund the unused value remaining on 

cards when the ‘‘company is no longer able to provide service’’). 244 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 52.3771(e) (2006). 245FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 25–24.925(2) (2006) (permitting, but not requiring, a refund 

for lost or stolen cards). 246 CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 17538.9(b)(7) (West 2006); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 92–f (McKinney 2006). 247 Commercial reasonableness, failure to exercise ordinary care, good faith, and 

unconscionability are all standards included in the Uniform Commercial Code. Consequently, including them in the proposed statute is not a novel approach. See U.C.C. §§ 3–103(a)(6) & (9) 

(2002); U.C.C. § 2–302 (2003); U.C.C. § 9–610(b) (2000). 248 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.9 (b)(7) (West 2006). 249FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 25–24.930 (repealed 2005). 250 U.C.C. § 2–314 (2003). 251 Id. § 2–316 (2003) (allowing sellers to disclaim implied warranties). See, e.g., MD. CODE

ANN., COM. LAW § 2–316.1 (West 2006) (illustrating that some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties in consumer transactions). 252See Budnitz and Saunders, supra note 81, at 7.7.1. 253David Wood, Tips on Using Prepaid Phone Cards, MILITARY MONEY MAG., available at 

http://www.militarymoney.com/lifestyle/1065704890 (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 254 Examples of defects include access numbers or PINs that do not work and other defects 

making it impossible for the card to operate as it should. A lost PIN may never be found. In 

that situation the consumer has paid money for the card and the seller never has to provide 

any more value. The card issuer may be required to transfer those funds to the state under 

76 

abandoned property or escheat laws. Even where those laws apply to prepaid phone balances, 

the seller has the use of those funds until they are paid to the state. See Luna, supra note 18; 

Big Retailers Agree to Replace Gift Cards, supra, note 204. 255The statute should delegate to the FTC the authority to study the actual costs to sellers 

of replacing cards in order to establish more specific guidelines for what would constitute a reasonable fee. 256 E.g., Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006). 257 A comprehensive critique of mandatory predispute arbitration in phone card contracts is 

beyond the scope of this article. See Symposium, Mandatory Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 

PROBS. 1 (2004) (showing that mandatory arbitration agreements are a substantial barrier to 

consumers’ ability to obtain meaningful relief). 258 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.34(e)(4) (2000) (requiring that prepaid calling card service companies register with the Public Service Commission). 

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