RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0888-MR

RON COPLEY AND RHONDA 

COPLEY APPELLANTS 

v. 

APPEAL FROM ELLIOTT CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 16-CI-00007

GREER MINING, INC. AND ELMO 

GREER & SONS, LLC APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND McNEILL, JUDGES.

McNEILL, JUDGE: Appellants, Ron and Rhonda Copley, sustained damage to 

their home on February 10, 2015 as a result of blasting activity conducted as a part 

of improvements being made to Route 7 in Sandy Hook, Kentucky, by Appellees, 

Greer Mining, Inc., and Elmo Greer & Sons, LLC (hereafter “Greer”). On May 

20, 2015, Appellants executed a document (hereafter, the “Release”), releasing 
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Greer and their insurer from liability in exchange for $105,976.10 in 

compensation. More than eight months later, Appellants filed a lawsuit seeking,

inter alia, mental/emotional damages, and punitive damages for trespass to land, 

negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (IIED). After years of litigation, the trial court granted Greer’s 

motion for summary judgment. In so holding, the court determined that Appellants 

failed to present evidence supporting their claims for IIED and NIED, and that 

emotional damages arising from the tort of trespass were not permitted under 

Kentucky law. However, in the final paragraph of its order, the trial court 

provided: 

[E]ven if such damages were to be deemed otherwise 

compensable in a claim for trespass, such “damages”

would appear to be encompassed within the terms of the 

release to the extent they are tied to the claim for

trespass.

As to the issue of punitive damages, the court concluded that they were also 

waived pursuant to the terms of the Release. In so holding, the court observed that 

“[t]he settlement of the property claim is all-inclusive and covers liability for all 

damages stemming from the injury to the property as a result of the occurrence.” 

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Greer’s 

favor. Having considered the record and the law, we disagree. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” CR1 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary 

judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.: 

While it has been recognized that summary

judgment is designed to expedite the disposition of cases 

and avoid unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of 

material fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly 

admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The 

record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all 

doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a 

trial court may believe the party opposing the motion 

may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary

judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial 

judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue 

of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is 

not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we 

have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of 

trial if they have issues to try.

807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). “Because no factual issues 

are involved and only a legal issue is before the court on the motion for summary 

judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our review is de novo.” Univ. of 

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Louisville v. Sharp, 416 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). With 

these standards in mind, we turn to the applicable law and the facts of the present 

case.

ANALYSIS

The trial court engaged in an exhaustive analysis of Kentucky law and 

secondary source material concerning the availability of emotional damages arising 

from the tort of trespass. The court also discussed the Release at length. We 

believe that the Release is dispositive of all present issues. It provides in relevant 

part as follows: 

[The Copleys], being of lawful age and being competent 

to enter into this Release, for sole consideration of $105, 

976.10, to be paid to Ron and Rhonda Copley no later 

than 14 business days from the date Claimant executes 

this Release, does hereby and for my heirs executors, 

administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and 

forever discharge The Travelers Indemnity Company, 

Elmo Greer & Sons Inc. and their agents, servants, 

employees, successors, heirs, executors, administrators 

and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or 

partnerships of and from any and all claims, actions, 

causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, 

statutory interest, loss of service, expenses and 

compensation whatsoever which the Undersigned now 

has or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in 

any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, 

foreseen and unforeseen, property damage and the 

consequences thereof resulting or to result from the 

occurrences on or about 02/10/2015 at or near 6824 Hwy 

7, Sandy Hook, KY 41171. 
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(Emphasis added.) The language employed in the release is all encompassing. See 

Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ruschell, 834 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1992) (citation 

omitted) (“the scope of a release is determined primarily by the intent of the parties 

as expressed in the release instrument”). In that same vein, the Release is a 

contract governed by the basic principles of contract law: 

Where a contract is ambiguous or silent on a vital 

matter, a court may consider parol and extrinsic evidence 

involving the circumstances surrounding execution of the 

contract, the subject matter of the contract, the objects to 

be accomplished, and the conduct of the parties. Absent 

an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’ intentions 

must be discerned from the four corners of the 

instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence. A 

contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find 

it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.

The fact that one party may have intended different 

results, however, is insufficient to construe a contract at 

variance with its plain and unambiguous terms. 

Generally, the interpretation of a contract, including 

determining whether a contract is ambiguous, is a 

question of law for the courts and is subject to de

novo review. However, once a court determines that a 

contract is ambiguous, areas of dispute concerning the 

extrinsic evidence are factual issues and construction of 

the contract become subject to resolution by the factfinder.

Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. App.

2002) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Having considered Appellants’

arguments, they have not cited to any authority or evidence of record that would 

require this Court to look beyond the four corners of the Release in this instance. 
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Therefore, summary judgment in Greer’s favor was appropriate and we need not 

address the merits of whether damages for emotional or mental distress arising 

from the tort of trespass are permitted under Kentucky law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the order of the 

Elliott Circuit Court. 

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

William H. Wilhoit 

Grayson, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

James R. Chadward Kessinger

Sean P. Johnson 

Louisville, Kentucky