1

Filed 11/9/23 In re A.G. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SARAH K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A168126

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP5995-03)

Sarah K. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court order terminating 

her parental rights as to her daughter A.G. (Minor). She argues that the 

juvenile court erred in concluding that she had not demonstrated that the 

beneficial parental relationship exception (Welfare and Institutions Code, 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied in her case to preclude the 

termination of parental rights.

1 We affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

unless otherwise stated.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties have adopted our previous summary of the factual and 

procedural background of this dependency matter from its beginning through 

Mother’s petition for writ relief from the dependency court’s July 2022 order 

setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. (See Sarah K. v. 

Superior Court (A165607, Jan. 17, 2023) [nonpub. opn.] [denying writ 

petition].) We do not repeat that background here, except to state that Minor 

was 11 months old in September 2019, when the Sonoma County Human 

Services Department (the Department) filed a dependency petition on her 

behalf alleging risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a)) and failure to 

protect (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)). (Sarah K., supra.) Minor has been in foster care 

since September 2020. (Ibid.) 

While Mother’s writ petition was pending, Mother asked the juvenile 

court to authorize a bonding study to evaluate the attachment between 

Mother and Minor to assist her in establishing the applicability of the 

parental benefit exception to the termination of parental rights under the 

guidelines described in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).2

Minor’s counsel filed an opposition to the request. The juvenile court denied 

the request, but permitted Mother’s proposed expert, Dr. Dana Oertel, to 

observe two visits between Mother and Minor, and Dr. Oertel did so.

3 

2 A parent must demonstrate three elements to show that the parental 

benefit exception applies: first, that “the parent has maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625); 

second, “that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to 

the parent” (id. at p. 636); and third, “that terminating that attachment 

would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the 

countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Ibid.)

3 Mother does not argue on appeal that the juvenile court erred in 

denying her request for a bonding study. Also while her writ petition was 
3

On April 28, 2023, our Supreme Court denied Mother’s petition for 

review of our denial of her writ petition (S278324). A contested section 

366.26 hearing took place over two days in May and June 2023. 

A. The Department’s Evidence

1. Reports

In advance of the section 366.26 hearing, the Department filed a 

“366.26 WIC Report” in October 2022 and two addendum reports, one in 

January 2023 and one in February 2023, all of which were admitted into 

evidence. 

The Department recommended that the court terminate parental rights 

and order a permanent plan of adoption. The Department reported that 

Minor had been placed with her concurrent substitute care providers in June 

2021. The foster family had an approved adoption home study, and were 

committed to adopting Minor. 

The Department described Minor as a “bright and active child” who 

was “very outgoing and affectionate” in all settings. She lacked awareness of 

“stranger danger” and would potentially obey anyone who is friendly to her. 

Minor continued to show anxious behaviors and the Department stated that 

her previous exposure to emotional abuse, physical neglect, and substance 

abuse put her at a higher risk for emotional and cognitive impairment, 

adoption of health-risk behaviors, disease, disability, social problems, and 

early death. The Department opined that Minor’s “need for stable 

attachment and permanence is critical and urgent.” 

pending, Mother filed a petition under section 388 asking the court to return 

Minor to Mother’s custody, which was heard and denied at the section 366.26 

hearing. Mother does not present any argument concerning the juvenile 

court’s ruling on her section 388 petition. 
4

The Department addressed at some length the Caden C. factors 

relevant to the parental-benefit exception to the termination of parental 

rights. 

With respect to regular visitation and contact, the Department 

reviewed the history of Mother’s visitation with Minor, stating that Mother 

has good attendance; the visits have been routine with predictable beginnings 

and ends; Mother and Minor play together, and Minor enjoys the one-on-one 

attention; and Mother is “particularly affectionate with [Minor], which 

[Minor] accepts.” 

Under the heading, “Does the Child Benefit from Continuing the 

Relationship?” the Department primarily addressed the question whether 

Minor was “significantly emotionally attached” to Mother, which the 

Department viewed as a first step in determining whether there is benefit. 

The department opined that Minor was not significantly emotionally 

attached to Mother based in part on the fact that Minor was four years old 

and as of October 2022 had lived out of Mother’s care for two years, with the 

first 10 months of that time spent in an emergency foster home and the rest 

in her concurrent foster home. In addition, Minor did not ask about visits 

with Mother in between visits, and was happy to see her foster mother at the 

end of visits, typically jumping into her arms. Minor looked to her foster 

parents “for her basic needs, for comfort and for reassurance.” Minor 

appeared to the social worker to be confused about her family situation, and 

the social worker believed Minor would “respond well to a decision being 

made about her future family.” Minor asked her foster parents “questions 

looking for security and answers about her future,” but they “cannot always 

say yes to her questions” because of the status of the court proceedings. 

Minor was comfortable with Mother, and most of the time she would accept 
5

affectionate touches from Mother or participate in the affection during the 

visits, but Minor was comfortable with other adults as well. Minor saw 

Mother as “ ‘mommy’ and a fun person to visit and play with” but continued 

to thrive without Mother as part of her daily life. The Department observed 

that Minor “seems to enjoy her visitation, which shows there is some benefit 

to her relationship with” Mother. 

Under the heading, “Would Termination of Parental Rights Be 

Detrimental to the Child due to the Relationship?” the Department opined 

that if parental rights were terminated and Minor had no further contact 

with Mother, Minor would not experience detriment. Minor needed security 

and stability, and given Minor’s attachment to her foster family and a 

“comparatively weaker relationship with” Mother, the Department opined 

that Minor “would not only be fine, but . . . would continue to thrive if 

parental rights were terminated.” The Department opined that adoption 

would bring Minor stability and solidify her sense of permanence and wellbeing, and that Minor’s relationship with Mother was “not so strong that it 

would be detrimental to legally remove [Mother’s] parental rights.” The 

Department concluded that although interaction between Mother and Minor 

“could have some incidental benefit, such benefit does not outweigh the 

benefit that will be gained through the permanence of adoption,” and that the 

termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to Minor. 

The Department also addressed Minor’s relationship to the prospective 

adoptive parents and the effect on Minor if parental rights were not 

terminated and she were not adopted. The Department reported that Minor 

“actively seeks connection” to the foster parents, and during a recent home 

visit asked the foster mother to join her on the couch for “cuddles.” The 

Department reported that Minor had been embraced as part of her foster 
6

family, which included two daughters a few years older than Minor; that the 

family has “attended to all her physical and emotional needs” since she was 

placed with them in June 2021; that she appeared happy in the home and

“very settled in the family”; and that she was “developing substantial 

emotional ties” to the foster parents.4 The Department opined that removing 

Minor from the foster parents would be detrimental to her wellbeing. The 

Department also opined that a legal guardianship, as an alternative to 

adoption, would allow “the option for [Minor] to be uprooted once again in the 

future, which would not be in her best interest at this young and vulnerable 

age.” 

2. Social Worker Testimony

Social worker Ashley Kirkland, the author of the three reports that 

were admitted into evidence, was designated without objection as an expert 

in social work, specifically with respect to adoption and permanency 

planning, and testified about her work on Minor’s case since being assigned 

to the matter in August 2022. 

4 Minor’s foster parents filed four Caregiver Information Forms 

(Judicial Council forms JV-290) during the court of the dependency. 

According to their most recent report, filed in October 2022, Minor, then four 

years old, continued to exhibit some behavioral and emotional problems after 

her supervised visits with Mother, including appearing anxious, not listening 

and acting out with her gymnastics teacher, and demonstrating regressive 

behavior. They also informed the court that Minor expressed eagerness to 

attend elementary school with her foster sisters and that Minor’s preschool 

teacher reported that Minor was doing well. They stated that Minor was 

fully integrated into their family, “idolizes her two big sisters,” was close to 

both foster parents, and had “no conscious memory of living with any person 

or family other than ours,” and that they were “eager to be able to provide her 

with real permanency.” 
7

Kirkland testified that she had observed Mother’s monthly visits with 

Minor in February, March, and April 2023, which occurred after her most 

recent written reports had been submitted to the court. There were no 

notable differences between the visits, which lasted from 50 minutes to an 

hour. The visits would start with the foster mother bringing Minor, who was 

usually in her arms. Sometimes Minor was shy at first and did not want to 

get out of the foster mother’s arms, but other days she would jump out of her 

arms. Minor and Mother would then embrace or walk to the visit without 

incident. In all the visits Minor talked about her foster family. And in all the

visits, Mother was appropriate. At the end of the visits, Minor would go to 

the foster mother, jump back in her arms, and would typically have a quick 

goodbye, although sometimes Minor was not engaged in a goodbye—she 

would be moving quickly to be on her way to the foster parent, to go to the car 

and go somewhere else. 

Kirkland testified that between visits, Minor does not ask to see 

Mother or ask for more visitation time with mother. One time, at the end of 

the most recent visit, when Minor was told it was time to clean up, she yelled 

“no,” but then the clean-up proceeded and Minor left without incident. 

Kirkland believed that Minor cried out “no,” because “she was running 

around the room at that time and then in the moment and enjoying herself.” 

Kirkland testified that during visits, Minor and Mother are affectionate 

toward each other, and Minor calls Mother “mommy.” Kirkland testified that 

nothing she observed in the visits caused her to change the opinion stated in 

the written report that there was not a significant emotional attachment 

between Minor and Mother. 

Kirkland testified that she had observed Minor in the foster home 

about seven times, for at least an hour each time. Minor seemed comfortable 
8

in the home and was “part of a threesome” with her two older foster sisters. 

She observed that Minor was very close to the sisters, looked up to them, 

mentioned them frequently when she was not with them, including during 

her visits with Mother, and appeared to be developing her own identity with

them in mind. She observed that Minor was physically affectionate toward 

her foster parents and sought their attention. Kirkland testified that Minor 

frequently mentioned all the members of the foster family when she was not 

with them, and talked about them in a way that suggested to Kirkland that 

Minor was developing a sense of identity through that family. Minor did not 

talk about Mother in the same way. When Minor was shown photographs of 

herself with a former foster family, she did not remember those people or why 

she was with them. 

Kirkland testified that at one point, she asked Minor to draw a picture 

of her family. The picture included Minor’s foster family and Mother, with 

Mother drawn “differently” from the rest of the people. Kirkland testified 

that she had been told that Minor sometimes refers to Mother as her “belly 

mommy”; and that with respect to the drawing, Minor called Mother “the 

belly,” presumably reflecting Minor’s understanding that at some point she 

was in Mother’s belly. 

Kirkland opined that there was not a substantial positive relationship 

between Mother and Minor “as defined by Caden C.,” based on her 

observation that Minor left visits with Mother without crying, went about her 

daily life “without bringing mother up,” and did not ask for more visits. 

Kirkland stated that her opinion concerned the relationship between Mother 

and Minor, regardless of the relationship between Minor and her foster 

parents, and rested on Kirkland’s having come to know Minor and observing 

her in different situations. Kirkland testified that Minor was outgoing and 
9

affectionate in all settings, and did not “have a lot of boundaries with other 

people,” including teachers and friends she had met for the first time with the 

foster family. Minor wanted to sit on people’s laps quickly, and wanted hugs 

and kisses from people she just met. Kirkland testified that Minor was 

affectionate with other adults with whom she was comfortable in the same 

way as she was affectionate with Mother, and thought that Minor viewed 

Mother as a “friendly visitor,” much as she viewed others with whom she was 

comfortable, including her preschool teacher’s aide, her previous social 

worker, visitation supervisors whose names she had learned, and Kirkland 

herself. Kirkland opined that these friendly and affectionate interactions did 

not amount to a significant emotional attachment. 

Kirkland also opined that although Minor enjoyed her visits with 

Mother, if visits between Minor and Mother were to stop, Minor would not 

experience any detriment, because Minor did not ask about Mother between 

visits and all Minor’s needs were being met in her current placement. 

Kirkland further opined that it would be detrimental to remove Minor from 

her foster home, based on Kirkland’s assessment of how Minor sees her life 

and who she is most closely connected to. She felt that disruption of the bond 

between Minor and her foster family would have serious long-term emotional 

consequences for Minor. And Kirkland opined that adoption would be the 

best permanent plan for Minor, because it would be the most stable from a 

legal perspective. Kirkland stated that in her view the disruptions in Minor’s 

life before she was placed with her foster family made it important for Minor 

to have the permanency of adoption. 
10

B. Mother’s Evidence 

1. Documents

Mother offered eight exhibits that were admitted into evidence: Dr. 

Oertel’s notes from observing two visits between Minor and Mother in 

November and December 2022; a photograph of a hair follicle test result from 

March 2023 showing negative results except for THC metabolite; a copy of 

Mother’s December 2022 section 388 petition, including her supporting 

declaration; and five photographs of Minor, most of which showed Minor with 

Mother.

Dr. Oertel observed that Minor transitioned easily from her foster 

mother to Mother and then back again at the end of the visits, without 

engaging in any “goodbyes” with Mother. Mother and Minor were 

affectionate with each other, and engaged physical play and in activities such 

as puzzles, drawing, and coloring. Mother was encouraging and supportive of 

Minor’s efforts, and redirected Minor and set boundaries when Minor 

engaged in mild misbehavior. Minor referred to Mother as “mom” during the 

first visit, and referred to foster Mother as “mommy” and “mom” during the 

second. During the first of the visits, both Minor and Mother initiated 

snuggling and physical affection, with Minor sometimes reciprocating 

Mother’s affection and sometimes indifferent to it; during the second visit 

Mother initiated hugging and kissing, and Minor did not reciprocate as much 

as at the previous visit. 

In her declaration, Mother stated her visits with Minor went well; that 

they played together and were affectionate; that Minor called her “mama”; 

that they had a bond; and that during their visits Minor talked to her about 

things they did on past visits. 
11

2. Mother’s Testimony

Mother testified about her current circumstances, stating that she had 

obtained safe, stable housing; was studying for an associate’s degree; saw a 

psychiatrist once a month and took medication to treat her mental health 

issues; was no longer using methamphetamine; was attending meetings to 

support her sobriety; and that her recent tests were positive for THC because 

she was using cannabis with oversight from her psychiatrist. 

Mother testified that her most recent visit with Minor was fun, and 

that Minor came right to her. Mother testified that sometimes when Minor 

has not seen her for a month, the transition can be more difficult, but things 

go well after the transition. Mother testified that usually during the visits 

they do puzzles or make up a game, and that Minor likes Mother to give her 

piggy-back rides and run around. Mother corrects Minor when she does 

something she shouldn’t, and Minor responds well to that. At the most recent 

visit, Minor did not want the visit to end. 

Mother testified that during the visits, Minor shows affection for her by 

sitting on her lap and asking for nose kisses or back rubs. Minor testified 

that during the visits Minor talks about her foster sisters, foster mother, and 

foster father, and agreed that Minor was close to them. She recognized that 

Minor had “built a bond” with the foster family, and that the foster family 

were “special people to her.” As to her own bond with Minor, Mother testified 

that there was a “substantial bond” between them because “I am her mother. 

She grew in my body. She has my blood flowing through her veins.” Mother 

concluded her testimony by saying that she thought it was in Minor’s best 

interest to be returned to her. 
12

C. Rebuttal Evidence and Argument

On the second day of the hearing, held about three weeks after the first 

day, at which Mother had testified, the Department called social worker 

Kirkland as a rebuttal witness. She testified that she had reviewed Dr. 

Oertel’s notes, which had been introduced into evidence at the previous 

session, and they did not change her opinion. She also testified that Minor 

was not negatively affected when visits with Mother did not occur, although 

she had never directly asked Minor how she feels when visits are cancelled. 

Kirkland described a visit between Mother and Minor that occurred the 

previous week. Mother, Minor, and Kirkland went to a park, where Mother 

and Minor played and then sat at a picnic table and ate. Minor sat on 

Mother’s lap while they were eating. Kirkland observed them to be 

affectionate toward one another, as was typical for them. At the end of the 

visit, as they walked to the parking lot, Minor saw her foster Mother’s car, 

and exclaimed, “that’s my mom’s car,” and began running toward the car. 

She was redirected to the lobby where the foster mother was waiting, greeted 

her foster mother, and the visit ended without any issues. 

After the evidence was presented, the juvenile court heard argument. 

The attorneys representing the Department and Minor argued that the court 

should terminate parental rights and select adoption as the permanent plan.

Mother’s attorney argued that because of the bond between Mother and 

Minor, the parental benefit exception to the statutory preference for adoption 

applied to this case, and therefore, the court should order a guardianship and 

not terminate parental rights. 

D. Findings and Orders

The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was 

likely Minor would be adopted. 
13

The court addressed the parental benefit exception to the statutory 

preference for termination of parental rights and adoption, and concluded 

that Mother had not met her burden to demonstrate the three elements set 

forth in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614.

The court began, “So the issues, then, that I have to address are[,] have 

there been regular consistent visits? Yes. In the last two years there have 

been regular and consistent visits. The visits are good.” 

The court then turned to the second and third elements. The court 

observed that in evaluating whether Minor had “a substantial positive 

emotional attachment to” Mother, the court was conducting the analysis that 

was required by case law, and made clear that a finding of no such 

attachment would not be finding that Minor did not like Mother. The court 

stated that in evaluating Minor’s attachment, it considered Minor’s age, 

which was four years and nine months, and that Minor had been removed 

from Mother’s care at the age of two, in September 2020, and therefore had 

been out of Mother’s care for almost three years. Minor had been in her 

existing, concurrent placement for two years, since June 2021, and had some 

recognition that she had a “belly mom” as well as the foster mother with 

whom she lived. Minor was outgoing and affectionate, including to Mother, 

with whom she had positive visits—Mother and Minor loved each other. The 

court found that Mother was “a friendly, positive part of the household,” 

based on the social worker’s opinion that Minor experienced Mother as a 

friendly visitor or extended family member and based on Minor’s drawing of 

her family that included Mother, the foster parents, and the foster sisters. 

The court found that Minor was attached to Mother and “also is very 

attached to her foster family.” She looked to them to meet her needs, 

transitioned easily back to them after visits, and was emotionally attached to 
14

them. The court concluded that “because of the time that’s elapsed and the 

nature of the relationship that [Minor] has with the foster family . . . it would 

be detrimental to [Minor] to disrupt her attachment” to the foster family. 

The court went on, “[T]aking her away from them would be devastating to 

her, I believe.” 

The court summed up by saying, “I don’t find that the Caden C. factors 

are met. [¶] I don’t find that her relationship . . . with [Mother] . . . is such an 

attached substantial nature that it would be detrimental to terminate 

parental rights. And I think it’s very important for her, at this stage of her 

life and all of the things that she’s been through, . . . only a few of which I’ve 

mentioned right now, but that she needs to have permanence. She needs to 

have her place solidified in the family where she’s securely attached so that 

she can grow up to be a healthy, secure adult. So that’s—I don’t find that the 

parental benefits exception applies.” 

The court terminated the parental rights of Mother and any known or 

unknown fathers, and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.

5

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review 

We summarized the applicable law in In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 

1061 (Eli B.):

“The beneficial relationship test is an exception to the presumptive rule 

of terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed, in order 

5 Minor’s father (Father), whose status was never elevated beyond that 

of a biological father, is not a party to this appeal. At the section 366.26 

hearing, his counsel informed the court that Father supported Mother’s 

opposition to the termination of parental rights. 
15

to free a child for adoption. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852 (J.D.).) 

. . . [T]he Supreme Court has recently explained its scope and proper 

application. (See generally Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614.)

“As clarified by the Supreme Court, ‘ “the parent asserting the parental 

benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three 

things. The parent must show regular visitation and contact with the child, 

taking into account the extent of visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent 

must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to 

the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit 

from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that 

terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when 

balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. When 

the parent has met that burden, the parental-benefit exception applies such 

that it would not be in the best interest of the child to terminate parental 

rights, and the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.” ’ 

(J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852, quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 636-637.)

“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first two elements for 

substantial evidence. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 853.) We review its 

ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its factual 

determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence 

but its ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating 

parental rights for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)” (Eli B., supra, 73 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1067-1068.)

Under the substantial evidence standard “we inquire whether the 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s determination. 

We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all 
16

legitimate inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our 

deductions for those of the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court 

(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 865.) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate 

the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) We uphold the juvenile court’s findings if they 

are “ ‘supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to 

the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different 

result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) In reviewing for abuse of 

discretion, we reverse “only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of 

legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

Although a juvenile court’s statement of its findings or explanation of 

the reasons for its decisions may help in conducting appellate review, there is 

no requirement that the juvenile court, if it finds the parental-benefit 

exception does not apply, must recite specific findings as to “any or all of the 

three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 

1156 (A.L.).) We “ ‘ “indulge in every presumption to uphold a judgment.” ’ ” 

(id. at p. 1161), including that the court “considered all the pertinent matters 

presented to it and ruled in favor of the prevailing party.” (Lydig 

Construction, Inc. v. Martinez Steel Corp. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 937, 945.)

B. Analysis

The first element of the parental benefit exception is not in dispute: 

the trial court found, and the parties agree, that Mother demonstrated that 

she had regular visitation and contact with Minor. (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 632.) 

Mother’s argument on appeal focuses on the second element of the 

Caden C. analysis, which requires the parent to show “a substantial, positive, 
17

emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that 

the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In assessing the relationship, courts must focus on the 

child and may consider “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the 

portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or 

“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s 

particular needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) Mother contends that the Department’s 

report “was silent as to any benefits” to Minor of maintaining a relationship 

with Mother, and argues that the trial court was required to, but did not, 

consider whether Minor would benefit from continuing her relationship with 

Mother before finding that the parental benefit exception did not apply. We 

disagree with Mother’s characterization of the record. 

Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the Department recognized in its report 

that Minor’s enjoyment of her visits with Mother “shows there is some benefit 

to her relationship,” and acknowledged “some incidental benefit” to continued 

interaction between Minor and Mother.6 

6 Mother also contends that the Department’s report “engaged in an 

impermissible comparison of [Minor’s] attachment to her birth mother and 

her foster mother.” She cites no authority to support her contention that 

such a comparison in the Department’s report would be improper. And in 

any event, the Department was required by statute to include in the 

assessment it prepared for the section 366.26 hearing discussion of “[t]he 

relationship of the child to any identified prospective adoptive parent . . ., the 

duration and character of the relationship, [and] the degree of attachment of 

the child to the prospective . . . adoptive parent.” (§ 366.25, subd. (b)(1)(E).) 

Notably, neither the Department nor the court “compar[ed] the parent’s 

attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive 

parent(s),” which would not be an appropriate consideration in weighing 

whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [“the section 366.26 hearing is 

decidedly not a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver”].) 
18

And we see no basis for Mother’s contention that the trial court failed 

to consider whether there was any benefit to Minor of continuing her 

relationship with Mother. The trial court was not required to state on the 

record that there would be some benefit to Minor in continuing her 

relationship with Mother, or make any statement qualifying or quantifying 

any such benefit. (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) The record shows 

that, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the juvenile court considered whether 

Minor would benefit from continuing the relationship: the court impliedly 

recognized some benefit to Minor in continuing the relationship, when it 

concluded that, as the Department had opined, Minor thought of Mother as 

an extended family member, or a friendly, positive part of the household. 

Here, the juvenile court summed up its findings on the second and 

third elements by stating that Minor’s relationship with Mother was not of 

“such an attached substantial nature that it would be detrimental to

terminate parental rights.” The court stated that in light of Minor’s 

experiences, Minor needed permanence and “to have her place solidified in 

the family where she’s securely attached”; that the parental benefit exception 

did not apply; and that adoption would be Minor’s permanent plan. In 

reaching its conclusions, the juvenile court necessarily considered whether 

continuing Mother’s relationship with Minor would benefit Minor to such an 

extent that the relationship should preclude the permanency and stability of 

adoption. Although the juvenile court impliedly found that there would be 

some benefit to Minor in continuing the relationship with Mother, the court 

nevertheless determined that the benefit was outweighed by the benefits to 

Minor of adoption.7 

7 In her opening brief, Mother suggests that under Caden C. a 

conclusion by the juvenile court that the parental benefit exception does not 
19

Mother contends that instead of evaluating Minor’s relationship with 

Mother, the juvenile court’s “primary focus” was on whether Minor would 

benefit from continuing her relationship with the foster family. We disagree. 

It is true that in explaining its ruling, the juvenile court discussed not only 

Minor’s attachment to Mother, but also Minor’s attachment to her foster 

family, and found that although it would not be detrimental to Minor to 

disrupt her attachment to Mother, it would be detrimental to disrupt her 

attachment to the foster family. Discussion of Minor’s attachment to the 

foster family does not negate or undercut the trial court’s conclusion that 

Minor’s relationship with Mother was not of “such an attached substantial 

nature that it would be detrimental to terminate parental rights.” (See 

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640 [in determining whether termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental, “[t]he court must . . . determine, for the 

particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even 

counterbalance those harms” and must “assess[ ]what the child’s life would 

be like in an adoptive home without the parent in his life”].)

At the time of the section 366.26 hearing Minor was almost five years 

old, and she had been out of Mother’s custody for almost three years, since 

she was almost two. There was undisputed evidence that Minor had positive 

visits with Mother, and viewed Mother as a friendly part of her extended 

family. But there was also undisputed evidence that Minor transitioned back 

to her foster family without incident after her monthly visits with Mother,

and that between the visits Minor did not ask to see Mother or ask for more 

visitation time with her. 

apply requires a finding by the juvenile court “that continuation of the 

relationship [with Mother] would not benefit” Minor. That is not the law. 
20

There was undisputed evidence that in light of her past, Minor had a 

need for stable attachment and permanency, which adoption could provide. 

The Department reported that Minor was at risk for “insecure attachment” 

but was nevertheless “open to new attachments, attention and parenting 

from new people,” and “able to develop a secure attachment to her foster 

parents.” And the Department opined that Minor’s “need for stable 

attachment and permanency is critical and urgent.” 

Against this background, Mother points to no evidence that 

terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Minor. In these 

circumstances, Mother has not shown any error in the juvenile court’s 

determination that any benefit to Minor in continuing her relationship with 

Mother was outweighed by the benefit to Minor of the permanence and 

security of a new adoptive home. 

DISPOSITION

The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed. 
21

_________________________

Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Stewart, P.J.

_________________________

Richman, J.

A168126, Sonoma County Human Services Department v. Sarah K.