alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1****Certification of Periodic Financial Reports**     I, Paul A. Lang, President of Arch Western Resources, LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:     (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2006 (the“Periodic Report”) which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and     (2) information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of Arch Western Resources, LLC.       /s/ Paul A. Lang         Paul A. Lang    President       Date: November 14, 2006
Exhibit 11.1


 Code of Ethics for the Chief Executive Officer and Senior Financial Officers

i-CABLE has developed and adopted a Code of Ethical Standards to uphold the
high standard of business ethics and personal conduct of its employees,
including our Chief Executive Officer and senior financial officers.

In addition to the Code of Ethical Standards, we have adopted the following
Code of Ethics specifically for our Chief Executive Officer and senior
financial officers:

1.  The Chief Executive Officer and senior financial officers shall at all
    times conduct themselves in an honest and ethical manner, including the
    ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between
    personal and professional relationships.

2.  The Chief Executive Officer and senior financial officers, in carrying out
    their duties, are responsible for full, fair, accurate, timely and
    understandable disclosure in (a) the reports and documents that the
    Company files with, or submits to, the SEC and (b) the Company's other
    communications with the public.

3.  The Chief Executive Officer and senior financial officers shall endeaver
    to cause the Company to comply with all applicable laws, rules and
    regulations both in letter and spirit.

4.  Each senior financial officer shall promptly bring the evidence or
    information on any material non-compliance with this Code of Ethics to the
    attention of his or her immediate supervisor. If any senior financial
    officer, after reporting on any non-compliance to his or her immediate
    supervisor, has reason to believe the non-compliance is not being or has
    not been adequately addressed by the Company, he or she shall report such
    matter to the CEO. If such senior financial officer has reason to believe
    the non-compliance involves the CEO, he or she shall bring such matter to
    the attention of the Audit Committee. The CEO shall endeaver to delegate
    appropriate persons to evaluate, make investigation, if necessary, and
    resolve any material non-compliance reported to him or her. The CEO shall
    report any significant non-compliance that remains unresolved at his or
    her level to the Audit Committee.

5.  The Company intends to prevent the occurrence of conduct not in compliance
    with this Code of Ethics and to halt any such conduct that may occur as
    soon as reasonably possible after its discovery. Allegations of
    non-compliance will be investigated whenever necessary and evaluated at
    the proper level(s). Those found to be in violation of this Code of Ethics
    are subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including
    termination of employment. Criminal misconduct may be referred to the
    appropriate legal authorities for prosecution.
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATION**I, John R. Judd, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Compellent Technologies, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:November 20, 2007     /s/John R. Judd    John R. Judd  Chief Financial Officer
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 459 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide enhanced penalties for 

convicted murderers who kill or target America’s public safety officers. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 15, 2023 

Mr. BRAUN (for himself, Mr. CRUZ, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. 

LANKFORD, Mr. SCHMITT, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. HOEVEN, Mr. 

KENNEDY, Mr. BOOZMAN, and Mr. BUDD) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide enhanced 

penalties for convicted murderers who kill or target 

America’s public safety officers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Thin Blue Line Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. AGGRAVATING FACTORS FOR DEATH PENALTY. 

6 Section 3592(c) of title 18, United States Code, is 

7 amended by inserting after paragraph (16) the following: 

8 ‘‘(17) KILLING OR TARGETING OF LAW EN9 FORCEMENT OFFICERS.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 459 IS

1 ‘‘(A) The defendant killed or attempted to 

2 kill, in a circumstance described in subpara3 graph (B), a person who is authorized by law— 

4 ‘‘(i) to engage in or supervise the pre5 vention, detention, investigation, or pros6 ecution of, or the incarceration of any per7 son for, any criminal violation of law; 

8 ‘‘(ii) to apprehend, arrest, or pros9 ecute an individual for any criminal viola10 tion of law; or 

11 ‘‘(iii) to be a firefighter or other first 

12 responder. 

13 ‘‘(B) A circumstance referred to in sub14 paragraph (A) is that the person was killed or 

15 targeted— 

16 ‘‘(i) while he or she was engaged in 

17 the performance of his or her official du18 ties; 

19 ‘‘(ii) because of the performance of his 

20 or her official duties; or 

21 ‘‘(iii) because of his or her status as 

22 a public official or employee.’’. 

Æ 


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United States District Court

Eastern District of California

Patrick R. Holley, Sr.,

Plaintiff, Civ. No. S 04-2006 MCE PAN P

vs. Order on Request for Counsel

California Department

of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in a civil rights action. Plaintiff moved for

appointment of counsel on October 14, 2005. 

In proceedings that do not threaten a litigant with loss of

physical liberty, there presumptively is no right to appointed

counsel. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18,

26-27 (1981). Section 1915(e)(1) of Title 28 confers discretion

upon the court to request counsel represent an indigent civil 

Case 2:04-cv-02006-MCE -EFB Document 26 Filed 10/25/05 Page 1 of 3
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litigant. Mallard v. District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

In deciding whether to appoint counsel the court exercises

discretion governed by a number of factors, including the

likelihood of success on the merits and the applicant’s ability

to present his claims in light of their complexity. Weygandt v.

Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983); see also, LaMere v.

Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987). Ordinarily the

presumption of regularity in the state’s procedures for confining

prisoners suggests a lack of likely success and counsels against

appointment of counsel. See Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887

(7th Cir. 1981). As a general rule, the court will not appoint

counsel unless the applicant shows his claim has merit in fact

and law. Id. Even if the applicant overcomes this hurdle, the

court will not appoint counsel if the law is settled and the

material facts are within the plaintiff’s possession, viz., they

do not require investigation outside the prison walls. Id. at

887-88. 

Here, plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were

violated when defendants punished him for refusing to comply with

the grooming standards. The law governing this issue familiar to

the court and investigation outside the prison walls is

unnecessary to discover material facts. There is, on the record

before the court, no reason to believe appointment of counsel

would be of significant benefit. 

///

///

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Plaintiff’s October 14, 2005, request for the appointment of

counsel therefore is denied.

So ordered.

Dated: October 25, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

Case 2:04-cv-02006-MCE -EFB Document 26 Filed 10/25/05 Page 3 of 3
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v EDWARD L. ROSENBLATT, Airman Basic, U. S. Air Force, Appellant

13 USCMA 28, 32 CMR 28

No. 15,525

April 6, 1962

*29
      *Colonel Joseph E. Krysakowski*argued the cause for Appellant, Accused. With him on the brief were *Colonel Daniel E. Henderson, Jr.,*and *Captain Hugh J. Dolan.*

*Major John C. Wiley*argued the cause for Appellee, United States. With him on the brief was *Colonel Merlin W. Baker.*

Opinion of the Court

Quinn, Chief Judge:

The accused was stopped by the Mississippi highway patrol for driving a motorcycle without a license tag. Investigation disclosed the cycle had been taken by the accused, earlier that evening, from a parking lot near Gate 2, Keesler Air Force Base. He was charged with larceny by the civilian authorities and freed on bond. Several weeks later his case came up for trial in the circuit court of Harris County. He pleaded guilty to “a reduced charge of trespass less than larceny,” and was fined $500.00. Shortly thereafter, and notwithstanding the civilian prosecution, the accused was charged with wrongful appropriation of the motorcycle. He was convicted and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for two months, forfeiture of $55.00 per month for a like period, and to be discharged with a bad-conduct discharge.

At trial, no mention was made of the accused’s prosecution and punishment by the civilian authorities. Appellate defense counsel maintain that prior punishment is so substantially mitigating in nature that the court-martial’s ignorance of it made the sentence it imposed unrealistic and unjust. See United States v Huff, 11 USCMA 397, 29 CMR 213. Accordingly, they urge that we set aside the sentence and direct a rehearing.

We have no disposition to review the professional soundness of every exercise of judgment by a lawyer in the trial of a case. United States v Hunter, 2 USCMA 37, 6 CMR 37. However, an accused is entitled to a fair hearing. To that end his counsel is bound to present such evidence as is known and is available to him, which would manifestly and materially affect the outcome of the case. United States v Allen, 8 USCMA 504, 25 CMR 8; United States v Parker, 6 USCMA 75, 19 CMR 201. Previous conviction and punishment for the same offense by state authorities is a major circumstance meriting serious consideration in the court-martial’s determination of an appropriate sentence. When such civilian punishment has been imposed, but the fact is kept from the court-martial, the sentence it adjudges may be unrealistic. In justice to the accused, he should have a rehearing on his sentence.

The decision of the board of review as to the sentence is set aside. A rehearing may be ordered.

Judges FERGUSON and Kilday concur.
Exhibit 32.1 - Chief Executive Officer Certification (Section 906)

                        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                         AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
             SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Neighborhood Connections, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report").
I, Ruth Selmon, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief:

               (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of
                     section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
                     of 1934; and

               (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                     in all material respects, the financial condition and
                     result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Ruth Selmon
---------------------------
    Ruth Selmon
    Chief Executive Officer
    Chief Financial Officer

Date  May 12, 2005
      ------------

<PAGE>
(Reap. Dec. 10765)

#### Kurt Orban Company, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 919, etc.

(Decided June 3, 1964)

*Sharretts, Paley & Garter*for the plaintiff.

*John W. Douglas,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

Tbe appeals for a reappraisement enumerated in the schedule A, attached to and made a part of the decision herein, present the question of the proper dutiable value of certain wire Strand, imported from Japan.

The parties hereto have stipulated and agreed as follows:

> That the merchandise covered by the 'appeals to reappraisement enumerated in Schedule “A,” attached hereto and made part hereof, consist of wire strand exported from Japan during the period beginning October 1, 1960 and ending April 15, 1961; that wire strand is not identified in the Einal List published by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, T.D. 54521, effective February 27, 1958; that on or immediately preceding the date of exportation of each shipment of wire strand covered by each of the •appeals to reappraisement enumerated on Schedule “A,” the prices at which wire strand, such as (or similar to the wire strand described on the invoices covered by the instant appeals to reappraisement were freely sold, or in the •absence of sales, offered for sale in the principal market of Japan, in the usual wholesale quantity 'and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever .nature and all other expenses incidental to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, was $249. per metric ton for wire strand of % inch diameter and $245. per metric ton for wire strand of ‘%6 inch diameter (United States funds).

Upon the agreed facts of record, I find and hold that export value, .as that value is defined in section 402(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, *581as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956 (19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)), is the proper basis of value for the wire strand in issue and that said value is $249 per metric ton for wire strand of %-inch diameter and $245 per metric ton for wire strand of %6-inch diameter (United States funds).

Judgment will issue accordingly.
Before the Third Division,

February 16, 1944

No. 49205.

#### Petition 6395-R of Scientific Glass Apparatus Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

The merchandise in question was entered at the invoiced values after an attempt was made to secure information from the appraiser as to any other values. The evidence disclosed that this type of English micro cover glasses was invoiced at prices comparable with prices charged this importer by an American concern for the same type of English glasses; that this was the first purchase made by the importer from a Canadian concern, and that the quantities were not unusually large. The collector appealed to reappraisement. Counsel finally agreed on a statement with prices higher than those as invoiced and entered. The court found that the entry at values below those found on final appraisement was made without intention to defraud the Government or to cbn-ceal the facts. The petition -was therefore granted.
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NOS. WR-86,886-01 and -02

EX P ARTE JES SE S COTT S HOBE RT, Appl icant

ON AP P LICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NOS. CR11-0567-01; C R11-0771-01 IN THE 415th DISTRICT COURT F ROM P ARK

ER COUNTY

Per curiam . O R D E R Pursuant to the provisi o n s o f Ar t icle 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of t he trial court tr ansm itted to this Court these applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of ag g ravated assault with a deadly wea p o n an d possession of cer tain chemica ls with intent to manufa cture methamphetamine a

nd sentenc ed to t wenty

y ear s’ imprisonment in each c ause. The Eig hth Court of Appea ls aff

irmed his ag g ravated assault conviction. Shobert v. State , No. 08-12-00043- CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 19, 2013) (not desig nated for publ icat ion). No appeal was taken in the ot her conviction. Applicant contends, among other things, that h is p le a s wer e involuntary due to the ineffe ctive2

assistance of his counsel. Specifica lly , Applicant alleg es his counsel err oneously promised him that, if he went to the jury for sentenc ing, he could convince the jury to g rant Applicant shock probation in both cases. Applicant has alleg ed fac ts that, if true, might entitle him to relief

. In these circ umstances, additional fac ts are ne eded. A s we he ld in Ex parte Rodriguez , 334 S.W .2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the appropr iate forum for finding s of fac t. The trial court may use any means set out in T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07, § 3(d) . In the appr opriate c ase, the trial court may rely on its personal re collection. Id

. I f the trial court elec ts to hold a he aring , it shall determine whe ther Applica nt is indi g ent. I f Applicant i s i ndige nt and wishes to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an attorney to repre sent Applicant at the hear ing. T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 26.04. The trial court shall make finding s of fac t a nd conclusions of law in reg ard to Applicant’s claim that his pleas wer e involuntary due to the ineffe ctive assistance of his counsel. The trial court shall also make any other finding s of fac t and conclusions of law that it d eems rele vant and appropr iate to the disposition of Applicant’s cla im for habe as cor pus relief

. These applications will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fac t issues. The issues shall be resolved within 90 day s of this orde r. A supplemental transcript c ontaining all aff idavits and int err og atories or the t ransc ription of t he court repor ter’s notes from any hearing or deposition, along with the trial court’ s supplemental finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, shall be for war ded to this Court withi n 120 day s of the date of t his order

. Any extensions of ti me must be re quested by

the trial cour

t and shall be obtaine d from this Court.3

Filed: Jul y

26, 2017 Do not publish
Motion Granted; Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 1 , 20 12

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 12

- 00 091

- CR

____________ BERNARD MARIO CLARK , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 06

- DCR

- 044740A



### MEMORANDUM OP IN ION
Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from the trial court’s Findings of F act and
C onclusions of Law, Recommendation, and O rder on appellant’s application for post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. 1 An article 11.07 writ of habeas corpus is returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals , and the convicting court’s order may not be ap pealed to this court

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, §3. Thus, o nly the Court of Criminal Appeals has

1 Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and this court affirmed his conviction in 2008. See Clark v. State, No. 14

- 08

- 00025

- CR, 2008 WL 5441877 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 30, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for pub lication).2

jurisdiction to review post

- conviction habeas corpus proceedings. Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals , 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991 ); B oard of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for Eighth Dist ., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that a rticle 11.07 provides the exclusive means to challenge a final felony conviction). The trial court ordered its findings , conclusions, recommendation and order to be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
On February 7, 2012, the State filed a moti on to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. On February 17, 2012, appellant filed a pro se document in which he argued
the merits of his claims but did not address this court’s jurisdiction.
This court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the order on appellant’s post

- conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we gr ant the State’s
motion and order the ap peal dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Christopher

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 4 7.2(b)

.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: NOMINATION PETITION OF 

ROB BOWERS AS CANDIDATE FOR 

MEMBER OF DEM EXECUTIVE 

COMMITTEE WARD 36 DIVISION 4

PETITION OF: ROB BOWERS

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 154 EAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2018, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.