### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 22, 200 4 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DEMETRI E OW ENS Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Marshall County No. 15306 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 01454-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 3, 2004

The a ppellant, Demetrie Owens, was found g uilty by a jury on two counts of t heft of property valued betwee n $1,000 and $10,000 and one count of possession of c ontraba nd in a pena l insti tution. The jury found the appellant not g uilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to se ll. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merg ed the two theft convic tions and sentence d the appe llant to three y ear s and four months on the theft and four y ear s and eig ht months on t he drug offe nse. The trial court order ed the se ntence s to run consec utively . On appe al, the appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the evidenc e, the jury

instructions on the char g e of posse ssion of contraband in a pena l insti tution, and his sentenc e. B eca

use the a ppellant fa iled to include his challeng e to the jury instructions in a motion for new tria l, that issue is wa ived. As to the rema ining issues, we de termine that the e vidence
wa s su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in the c on vic tio ns a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d.
J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.
Merrily n Fe irman, Na shville, Tennessee and Andrew J ackson F earing, II I , Shelby ville, Tennesse e, fo r the app e lla nt, De me tr ie Ow e ns
. Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L

. B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Mik e M c Co w e n , D is tric t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; a n d We ak le y E

. B ar n ar d , A s s is tan t D is tric t Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.-2- OP IN ION
Fa ctual B ackg round
On Oc t o b er5 , 2 0 0 2 , Da n n y C ar ri co , t h e o wn ero f awr ec k ers er v i ce i n L ew i s b u rg, T en n essee , planned to take one of his wr ecke rs to near by Fay etteville for service

. Mr. Carrico attempted to g et one of his employ ees, B illy , to follow him to Fay etteville. Mr. Carric o had a 1991 Mazda 626 that he wa nte d B ill y

to dri ve to F a y e tte vil le be hin d th e wr e c ke r. Mr . Ca rric o c ou ld n ot l oc a te B ill y , s o he aske d the appe llant, whom he met throug h Billy , to follow him to Fay etteville. Mr. Carrico eve n of fe re d to pa y

the app e lla nt f

or the tr ip. Th e app e lla nt t oldMr . Ca rric o th a t he ha d a

drive r’ s li c e ns e a ndthe app e lla nt a g re e d to fo llo w Mr . Car ri c o in th e Ma zda . T he tr ip t o F a y e tte vil le wa s u ne ve ntf ul. Mr. Carrico droppe d the wrecke r off, and he and the appe llant then drove ba ck to L ewisburg . Mr. Carric o drove his ca

r bac k to L ewisburg

. Du ri ng the dr ive ba c k, the app e lla nt a sk e d Mr

. Carric o on tw o se pa rate oc c a sio ns if

he c ou ld borrow the Mazda. Mr. Carrico re plied, “No.” After they arrived back in L ewisburg , Mr. Carrico dr op pedthe app e lla nt o ff a t a re sid e nc e on F ou rth Stre e t. T he app e lla nt a g a in a sk e d if he c ou ld borrow the car , and Mr. C arrico re fused f or a third time. The appellant told Mr. Carrico that he wanted to bor

row the c ar to visit a frie nd in Colum bia.

L ater that same day , Mr. C arrico and Billy went to Cornersville to cash a chec k. When they returne d to L ewisburg , Mr. Carrico droppe d off Billy at the same residenc e on Fourth Street wher e he ha d d ro pp e d th e app e lla nt e arl ie r. Mr . Ca rric o p a id the app e lla nt $ 40 .0 0 f or makin g the tr ip t o Fa y etteville.
Th a t e ve nin g , M r. Carric o dro ve to his re sid e nc e on Wes t Co mme rc e Str e e t a ndba c ke d h is
car into the drivewa y . He l ef t t h e doors to the car unloc ked and le ft the key s in the console. At
ar o u n d mi d n ig h t, M r
. Ca

rr ic o s te p p e d o u ts id e to r e trie v e a b a g o f d o g f o o d f r o m th e c ar
. T h e n e xt mornin g , Oc tob e r 6 , b e tw e e n 6 :00 a nd7:3 0 a .m. , w he n M r. Carric o w e nt o ut t o g e t in to the c ar, it was g one.
Mr. Carrico immediately

notifie d th eL e w is b u r g Po li c eDepa rtment. Off

icer Dar ry l Birdsong
arrived within five minutes. Mr. Carrico s uspecte d that the appellant, also known as “Me-me,” had taken the car
. Offic er Birdsong returne d to the police department after taking the re port from Mr. Carric o and ente red the information about the stolen ve hicle into the computer . Offic er Bir dsong learned later that day that the car had been r ecove red in Columbia, Tenne ssee. Mr. Ca rrico took out
a wa rra nt ag ainst t h e appellant char g ing him with theft of the vehicle, w hich was va lued at approximately

$1,70 0

. Offic er B irdsong attempted to serve the war rant on the a

ppellant, but was
unsucce ssful. During the ea

rly morning hours of Oc tober 6, Office r J ere my Hay wood was on duty for the Columbi a Police De partment in Maury County , Tenne ssee. He initiated a traff ic stop of a Ma zda-3-

626 on J ames Campbell Boulevar d for speeding

. The car was heade d in the di rec tion of L ewisburg at the ti me of the s top, but was sti ll approximately 20 miles away from L ewisburg . The a

ppellant was the driver of the Mazda and did not have a driver ’s license or any type of ide ntification. Off icer Hay wood ra n a che ck of the appellant’ s name a nd date of birth and dis cover ed that the appellant had a suspende d license f

or fa ilure to pay

a citation. Offic er Hay wood arrested the appellant and had the
car towed. Of

fice r Ha y wood did not learn until afte r the appellant was release d that the vehicle had been stolen in L ewisburg

. At around 11:00 p.m. on Oc tober 6, Of fice r Steve Mit ch el l o f t he L ewisburg Police De pa rt me nt wa s on ro uti ne pa tr ol wh e n he sa w the app e lla nt ri din g in the ba c k se a t of a c ar o n F if th Av e nu e . O ff

ic e r M itc he ll s top pe d th e c ar andarr e ste d th e app e lla nt o n th e ou tst a nd ing wa rr a nt. There wer e two other

individuals in t he ca

r. Off icer M i tchell ca lled for ba ck-up, a nd Offic er Rebec ca L ambert arrive d on the sce ne to assist him in the stop. Officer Mitchell initi ated a

sear ch of the ve hicle in which he found several rocks of an off- white s ubstance , which later tested positive fo r c oc a ine

. Th e c oc a ine wa s lo c a te d u nd e rn e a th t he drive r andpa sse ng e r s e a ts, bu t w a s o nly vis ibl e from the ba ck seat. T here was a bout $500 on the appellant’ s person a t the time of the ar rest. Ne ither the driver nor the other

passeng er ha d any

money on their per son at the time of the stop.
Of fi c e r L a mbe rt

wa s r e sp on sib le fo r tr a ns po rt ing the app e lla nt to the Ma rs ha ll Co un ty

Jail afte r his arr est. Off

icer L ambert asked the a

ppellant if he ha d any

“substance ” o n h i m , and the appellant sa id, “No.” Prior to e ntering the j ail, Offic er L ambert told the appellant ag ain, “[i] f y ou ha ve a nythi ng on y ou , y ou ne e d to g ive it t o me n ow be c a us e if I take y ou int o th e ja il, I ’m g oin g to char g e y ou with e ntering of contra band into a penal instit ution.” Once at the jail, O ffice r L ambert escorted the appe llant into the booking are a and unhandc uffe d him. Corrections Off icer J eff Hense n beg an to sea

rch the appellant, who had both of his hands on the booking counter “balled up in a

fist.” The a ppellant was a sked seve ral times to open his hands. Ea ch time, the appellant r efuse d. Offic er L a mbe rt a ndOf fi c e r H e ns e n th e n g ra

bb e d e a c h s ide of the app e lla nt’ s han ds a ndpu lle d th e m apa rt

. Two plastic bag s containing rocks of a white substance fell from the appellant’ s left hand onto the counter . Offic er L ambert confiscated the bag s and took them into the office . The substance l ater tested positive for c ocaine and we ighe d 3.3 g rams.
On Octobe r 7, 2002, Mr. C ar ri co wa s notified that his car had bee n impounded in Maury County , Tenne ssee. Mr. Ca rrico ha d to pay

betwee n $130 and $160 to re trieve his ca r.
The a ppellant was indicte d by

the Marsha ll Count y

Gra nd J ury o n t wo counts of thef t of pr op e r t y v a l u e d b e t w e e n $ 1 , 0 0 0 a n d $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , p o s s e s s i o n o f m o r e t h a n
. 5 g r a m s o f

c o c a i n e wi th intent to sell and possession of contra band in a pe nal institut ion.
After a jury trial, the appellant was found g uilty of the two c ounts of theft of pr operty and of possession of contra

band in a pe nal institut ion. The jury found the a

ppellant not g uiltyof possession of coc aine. At se ntencing , the trial court merg ed the two theft co n victions. The appe llant was sentenc ed to three (3) y ear s and four (4) months for the theft convic tion a nd four ( 4) y ear s eig ht (8) months for the drug offe nse. The trial court orde red the sentenc es to run conse cutively

.-4-

The a ppellant filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal c halleng ing the sufficie ncy of the e vidence , the jury instructions on the char g e of posse ssion of contraband in a pena l insti tution and his sentence a s excessive.
Waiver

I nit ia lly we no te that the app e lla nt raise d on ly the fo llo wi ng iss ue s in his mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l: (1) the e vidence was insuffic ien t t o s ustain a convic tion for theft of pr operty over $1,000 a nd possession of contra

band in a penal inst itution; (2) the proof at trial was circumstantial and ther e wa s no “ we b o f p ro of

wo ve n a ro un d th e app e lla nt s uf

fi c ie nt t o e xclu de be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t a ll other possibiliti es save t h at t h e
. . . [appellant] commi tted these a cts;” and ( 3) the sente nce a s excessive. On appeal , t h e ap p ellant cha lleng es the trial c ourt’s jury instruction on the char g e of introduction of contra

band into a pena l insti tution. Bec ause the appellant did not cha lleng e the jury instructions in a motion for new trial, a ny issue reg ardin g jury

instructions has been w aived. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ); se e a lso Sta te v. Ma rt in, 94 0 S. W.2 d 5 67 , 56 9 (T e nn . 1 99 7) (h old ing that a defe ndant re linquishes the rig ht to arg ue on appe al any issues that should ha ve been pr esente d in a motion for new tria l).
Sufficienc y of the Evidenc e
When a defe ndant challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, this Court is oblige d to review that claim ac cording to certain well- s et t l ed principles. A verdic t of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e te sti mony of th e” Sta te ’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in t he testi mony in favor of t he S tate. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, althoug h the accused is originally cloake d with a pre sumption of innocenc e, the jury verdic t of g uilty remove s this presumption “and re place s it with o n e o f

g u il t. ” St a te v
. T u g g le , 6 3 9 S. W. 2 d 9 1 3 , 9 1 4 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 2 )

. H e n c e , o n ap p e a l, the burden of proof

rests with the def

endant to demonstrate the insuffic iency of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uilty of every element of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S .W .2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e as w ell as all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S

. W.2d at 914. As such, this Court i s prec luded from r eweig hing or

rec onsidering the evidenc e whe n evaluating the c onvicting proof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d38 0, 38 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v. Ma tth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d 77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990). Moreove r, we may not substit ute our own “ infere nces f or those dra wn by

the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779.

I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant was cha rg ed with two counts of thef t of property

valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, posse ssion of more than .5 g rams of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of contra band in a pe nal institut ion. The jury found t he appe llant guilty on the two co u n ts o f th e f

t a n d o n th e p o s s e s s io n o f c o n tr ab a n d in a p e n a l in s ti tu ti o n
. O n ap p e a l, the appellant c halleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence . Specifica lly , he conte n d s t h at t here was-5-

insuffi cient proof

both that he “unlaw fully intended” to introduc e contr aband into the pe nal instit ution and that he “intended t o deprive the owner of his car .” The appellant c ontends that the jury should ha ve found him g uilty of joyriding rathe r than thef t. The State ar g ues that the testimony at trial wa s sufficient be y ond a re asonable doubt to support the convictions.

I n order to convict the appellant of theft of property , the S tate was require d to prove that the
app e lla nt vio la te d Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 39 -1 4- 10 3, wh ic h state s, “ [a] pe rs on c omm its theft of pr operty

if, with intent to deprive the owne r of pr operty , the per son knowing ly obtains or exercises c ontrol over the property without the owner ’s eff ective c onsent.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-103. To deprive is to: (A) Wit hhold pr operty

from the owne r permanently or for such a pe riod of time as to substantiallydiminis h the value or enjoy ment of the prope rty to the owner ; (B ) Wi thh oldpr op e rt y

or c a us e it to be withh e ld f or the pu rp os e of

re sto ri ng it o nly upon pay ment of a r ewa

rd or other

compensa tion; or (C) Dispose of property or use it or tra nsfer any interest in it under c ircumstance s that
m ak e i t s r e s t o r a t i o n u n l i k e l y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-106(a )(8)

. Th e pr oo f i ntr od uc e d a t tria l sh ow e d th a t Mr . Carri co own ed a 19 91 Ma zda 62 6 w orth approximately

$1,700. The appellant asked Mr. Carric o three times if he could borrow the c ar a nd
a ll thr e e tim e s Mr . Ca

rric o r e fu se d. On the nig ht o f O c tob e r 5, 200 2, Mr . Ca rric o b a c ke d h is c ar i nto t h e d ri v ew ayat h i s re s i d en ce
. He l ef tt h e ke y s i n t h e c aran d t h e d o o rs u n l o ck ed

. T h e n ex tm o rn i n g, the ca r wa s missi ng . Mr. Carrico notified the police immediately

. The a ppellant was stopped f

or spee ding by

Of fi ce r Hay wood of the Columbia Police Depa rtment while driving Mr. Carric o’s Mazda in the early morning hours of Oc tober 6, 2002. The
car was he aded in the dir ection of Ma rshall County but was approxi mately 20 minutes awa y from L e wi sb ur g a t the tim e of the sto p. Th e app e lla nt w a s a rr e ste d f or drivi ng wi th a

su sp e nd e d li c e ns e and the c ar w as towed. O ffice r Hay wood di d not know at that time that the ca r wa s reported stolen in L ewisburg

. After the appe llant was re lease d from custody in Maury C o u n ty , Offic er B irdsong learned that the Mazda wa s impounded there. H e notified Mr. Car rico of the car ’s wher eabouts. At that time, Mr. Carric o obtained a war rant on the appellant. Mr. Car rico ha d to travel to Columbia to pick up the ca r fr om impound at a wre cker service

. Mr. C arrico s pent between $130 and $160 to retrieve the ca r. The a ppellant was a

rre sted on Octobe r 6, 2002, in L ewisburg

. On appe al, the appe llant challeng es the sufficiency of the c ircumstantial evidenc e of the ft of property , specific ally

reg arding his intent to deprive Mr. C arrico of his car
. Although the appellant’ s intent to deprive wa s not directly p ro v en , an i ntent to deprive a n owner of prope rty

can be established by

circ umstantial evidence . State v. Scates, 524 S.W .2d 929, 931 (Tenn. 1975) . Further,-6-

it i s w e ll e sta

bli sh e d th a t a

“ jury ma y inf e r a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt’ s in te nt f ro m th e su rr ou nd ing fa c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Roberts, 943 S.W .2d 403, 410 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The a ppellant contends th a t a lth o u g h h e w a s d r iv in g th e c ar , h e s h o u ldh a v e o n ly b e e n c o n v ic te d o f

th e le sserincluded off

ense of unauthorized use of automobiles, commonly ref err ed to as joy

riding , beca

use the proof did not show that he ha d an intent to deprive Mr. Carrico of the c ar.
Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 14 -1 06 , w hic h d e fi ne s jo yri din g , s ta te s: [a] pers on commits a Class A Misdemeanor w ho takes a nother’s automobile, airplane , motorcy cle, bicy cle, boat or other vehicle w ithout the consent of the owne r and the pe rson does not have the intent to deprive the owner there of. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-106.
The de finition of “deprive” is found in Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-11-106( 8)(a ), and inc lud e s “ [w]ithh old [ing ] pr op e rt y fr om the ow ne r pe rm a ne ntl y or fo r su c h a s pe ri od of tim e a s to substantially

diminis h the value or enjoy ment of t he property to the owner.” The rec ord indicate s that the jury

hear d testimonywhich im p l i ed a cr i minal intent on the part of the a ppellant. The appellant wa s told not once, not twic e, but thr ee times, tha t he could not borrow Mr . Carric o’s ca r. Further, the tria l judge instructed the jury on the lesser -included offense of joy riding , but the jury conclude d that appellant wa s g uiltyof theft of property over $1,000. B ased upon our revie w of the
rec ord pre sented on a

ppeal, we conclude that the evidenc e is suf ficient to support the conviction for theft of pr operty

over $1,000. Next, the appellant contends that the evidenc e was insufficient to support his conviction for “introduction of c ontraba nd into a penal institution” because he w as under ar re s t at the time and involuntarily

taken to the jail. The ref

ore, he asserts that the evidenc e as insuff icient to show that he acte d with “unlawf

u l i n t ent.” The State arg ues that the a ppellant was c onvicted of posse ssion of contra band while pr esent on a

penal institution rather than introduction of contra band into a pena l ins tituti on so the re wa s n o r e qu ir e me nt o f “ un la wf ul i nte nt” a nd that th e e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt t o sustain the conviction.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-16-201 makes it unlawf ul for any person to: (1) [k]nowingly

and with unlawful int ent t ake, send or ot herw ise cause to be taken into any penal institutio n wher e prisoner s are quarte red or under c ustodial supervision any wea

pons, ammunition, explosives, intoxi cants, leg end drug s, or any controlled substanc es found in cha pter 17, pa

rt 4 of this titl e. (2 ) Kno wi ng ly

po sse ss any

of t he mater ia ls p ro hib ite d in su bd ivi sio n ( a )( 1) wh ile prese nt in any

penal institution where pri s o n er s are quarte red or under c ustodial supervision without the express consent of the chief administrator of the institut ion.-7-

The a ppellant was c onvicted of posse s s i o n o f contra band in a pe nal institut ion under Tenne ssee Code A nn o t at ed s ection 39-16- 201(a) (2) whic h does not requir e an “ unlawful intent.” The e vidence introduced at trial, viewed in a l i gh t m o s t fa vorable to the State, shows that Offic er L ambert tr ansported the appellant to the Marsha ll County J ail afte r his a rre st. Prior to e ntering the jail, Office r L ambert asked the a ppellant if he had any “substance ” on him, and the appe llant said, “No.” She informed the appellant that she would char g e him with entering c ontraba nd into a penal instit ution if he did not tell the truth. W h i le booking the appe llant, Office r He nsen and O ffice r L a mbe rt reco vere d tw o b a g s c on ta ini ng 3. 3 g rams o f c oc a ine in the app e lla nt’ s “ ba lle d u p” fi sts

. B a se d o n the te sti mon y of the of fi c e rs , we de te rm ine that the re wa s a mpl e e vid e nc e fo r the jury to conclude that the appe llant knowingly possessed contra band in a penal institution as required by the
s tatu te

. M o r e over, se e St a te v
. Ra n d y B

. L o n g , N o
. W2 0 0 1

- 0 1 4 6 7

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 2 WL 15 92 71 6, a t *6 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , July 12 , 2 00 2) , p e rm . to app e a l de nie d ( Te nn . Se pt. 19, 2002 ) (dete rmining that voluntary entra nce into a pe nal institut ion is not a require ment of the offe nse of introduc tion of contraba nd into a penal institution). Sentencing
The appellant also arg ues that the sentenc e imposed by the trial court was e x cessive and that he should have rec eived some ty pe of alternative sentenc e in lieu of i ncar cer ation. Specifica lly , he arg ues t hat t he trial court did not g ive enoug h weig ht to each mitig ating fac tor and g ave too much weig ht to the appellant’s prior rec ord in enha ncing his sentence

. Further, the appellant a rg ues that the trial court erre d in ordering the s entenc es t o be served consecutively

. Finally , in a supplemental brief f iled with the permission of this Court, the appe llant arg ues that B lakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), re nders his conse cutive sentences illeg al. Specific ally , he
con te nd s that c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s we re ina pp ro pria te in lig ht of B lake ly be c a us e a jury , no t a judge , must find the underly ing fac tors nece ssary to determine w hether

sentenc es should be ser ved
consec utively . The State a rg ues that the trial c ourt corr ectly s en t en ced the appellant a nd that the appellant wa ived the B lakely issue for f

ailure to raise it in a timely fashion or, in the alternative, that Blakely does not apply

to consec utive sentenc ing.
The Tenne ssee Supreme Court r ece ntly determined that Blakely does not a pply to the decision t o impose consec utive sentenc es. See State v. Robinson, No. W2001-01299-SC-R11-DD, ___ S.W .3d ___, 2004 WL 2158117, at *25 n.14 (Te nn. Sept. 28, 2004) (citing People v. Sykes, 120 Ca l. A pp . 4 13 31 , 1 6 Ca l. R ptr . 3 d 3 17 , 3 27 (2 Di st. 20 04 )) (d ism iss ing de fe nd a nt’ s c ha lle ng e to

th
consec utive sentenc es re ly ing on B lakely and ac knowledg ing that severa l courts have “re jected the de fe nd a nt’ s c on te nti on a ndhe ld tha t B lake ly a ndAp pr e nd i do no t app ly to the de c isi on to i mpo se consec utive sentenc es”) . This arg ument is without m erit.

L oo kin g to the app e lla nt’ s r e ma ini ng c ha lle ng e s to his se nte nc e , th is C ou rt is i ns truc te d to “conduc t a de novo r eview on the rec ord of suc h issues. Such review s h al l b e co n d u ct ed with a presumption that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal i s taken are c orre ct.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “Howe ver, the presumption of cor rec tness which ac companies the t rial court’s action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in t he re cord that the trial court-8-

considere d the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt f acts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). I n conducting our revie w, we must c onsider the de fendant’s potential for r ehabilitation, the trial and se ntencing hearing e vidence , the pre -sentenc e re port, the sentenc ing principles, s entenc ing alterna tive arg uments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the enhanc ing a nd mitigating fac tors, and the de fendant’s statements. T en n . Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bea rs “the bur den of de monstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. Turning more spec ifically to th e fa cts of this case , the appe llant was convic ted of thef t of pr op e rt y ov e r $ 1, 00 0 a ndpo sse ssi on of c on tr aba ndin a

pe na l in sti tut ion

. Th e ft of pr op e rt y is a Cla ss D felony , so the rang e of punishment is two (2) to f our (4) y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -35- 112(a) (4). Possession of cont ra b an d i n a pena l insti tution is a Class C Felony , so the rang e of punishment is three (3) to six (6) y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(3)

. The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppell an t t o three (3) y ear s and four (4) months on the theft offe nse and four (4) y ear s and eig ht (8) months on the drug offe nse and or dere d the sentenc es to be
se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly

fo r a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

e ig ht ( 8) y e ars
. I n impo sin g the app e lla nt’ s se nte nc e , the tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s n ot a favor able c andidate f

or an a lternative se ntenc e an d t h at seve ral mitigating a nd enhanc ing f actor s applied. The trial court de termined that the a ppellant’s sente nce should be mitigated on his thef t offe nse bec ause his conduc t neither c aused nor threa tened se rious bodily harm a lthough the trial court de cided to give this mitigating fac tor littl e we ight. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(1) . The trial court e nhance d the appe llant’s sentenc e base d on his ex tensive prior r ecor d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2).
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

e xpla ine d it s ruli ng a s f

oll ow s:
The de fenda nt is a Rang e I standard of

fende r, and that i s n o t at issue here

.

. . . This Court has commented on various other occa sions whe re the mitigating fac tor that the def

endant’ s conduct ne ither caused nor thre atene d s e rio u s b o d il y

in jury should be applied to off enses that a

re inhe rently

non-violent.

. . . S o if that mit ig a tin g fa c tor

app lie s, it d oe s n ot c arry muc h, if a ny , w e ig ht w ith the Cou rt . So out of an a

bundance of caution, the Court will find t hat if it applies, t hen the Court g ives it lit tle weig ht.

. . . . The Court finds that the defe ndant does have a history of criminal convictions
or criminal behavior , in a ddition to those nece ssary to e stablish the a ppropriate rang e. The Cou rt place s signific ant weig ht upon the fac t that the defe ndant has be en-9-

convicted of

a felony , of the same type of f elony , for whic h the def

endant now sta nds befor e this Court. The Court also plac es sig nificant fa ct that the def endant ha s sever al other convictions involving the posse ssion of drug s. . . .
The Court finds t h at the def endant ha s a history

of fa ilure to abide by conditions of rele ase into the c ommunity

. . . .

. . . . For those rea sons, the Court will set the defendant’s sentenc e at thre e y ear s and four months on the theft ca se, g iving g reater we ight to the e nhancing fac tor that the def endant ha s a history

of criminal conviction or criminal beha vior since he has a similar theft c harg e; and to four y ear s and eig ht months on t he introduction of contra band into the county

fac ility

. Ordinarily , in balancing these c oncerns, a trial court should start at the presumptive sente nce, enhanc e the se ntence within the rang e for exis ting e nhance ment fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e within th e range for e x isting mitiga ting f actor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ). No pa rticular weig ht fo r ea ch fa ct o r i s presc ribed by the statute. See State v. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The weig ht g iven t o eac h fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial court a s lo ng a s i t c omp orts w ith the se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a ndpu rp os e s o f o ur c od e a nda s lo ng a s it s fi nd ing s a re su pp orte d b y

the re c or d. I d. Th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cour t’ s recen t opin ion in Blakely , howeve r, has c alled into question the continuing validity of our c urre nt sentencing scheme

. I n that case , the Court, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jers ey , 5 6 6 U. S

. 466, 490 (2000), str uc k d ow n a

pr ov isi on of

the Was hin g ton se nte nc ing g uid e lin e s th a t pe rm itt e d a tr ia l ju dg e to impose an “exceptional sentenc e” upon the finding of ce rtain statutorily enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. Blakely , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. C t. at 2537-38. The Court obse rved that “the ‘s t at utory ma ximum ’ f

or Ap pr e nd i pu rp os e s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a jud g e ma y imp os e so le ly on the ba sis of the fa c ts r e fl e c te d in the jury ve rd ic t or

a dmi tte d b y

the de fe nd a nt. ” I d. a t 253 6 (em pha sis in orig inal). Fi n al l y , t h e C ourt conc luded that “e very defe ndant has the right to insist that the pr os e c uto r p ro ve to a

jury a ll f a c ts l e g a lly

e sse nti a l to the pu nis hme nt .” I d. at 25 43 (e mph a sis in orig inal).
De sp ite B lake ly , it

do e s n ot a

pp e ar that th e app lic a tio n o f enh a nc e me nt f a c tor (2 ) w ou ld vio la te the ru le e sta

bli sh e d in Ap pr e nd i be c a us e fa c tor (2 ) i s b a se d upo n pri or

c ri min a l c on vic tio ns
. Further, the a

ppellant her ein did not raise a Blakely claim re g arding the trial court’s application of
e n h a n c e m e n tf

a c t o r ( 2 ) i n c o n

j u n c t i o n w i t h h i s B l ak e l y c l a i mo n c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c i n g
. F i n a l l y, the authority

of trial judg es to apply

mitigating fac tors has not be en called into que stion. Theref ore, we de termine that the tria l court prope rly set the l eng th of t he appellant’s s entenc es at thre e (3) y ear s and four (4) months incar cer ation for the the ft offe nse and f our (4) y ear s and eig ht (8) months for the drug offe nse.-10-

The a ppellant furthe r cla ims that the trial court er red by faili n g to gr ant some ty pe of alternative sentenc e. I n reg ards to alternative sentencing , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40- 35- 10 2( 5) pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s:
I n rec og nition that state prison capa cities and the funds t o build and maintain them
are limit ed, convic ted fe lons co m m i t ting the most seve re of fense s, possessing criminal histories evincing a clea r disreg ard f

or the law s and morals of soc iety , and evincing failure of past eff orts at rehabilitation shall be g iven first priority reg arding sentenc ing involving incar cer ation.
A def endant who doe s not fall within this class of of fende rs “a nd who is an es p ec ially mitigated of fe nd e r or sta nd ard of

fe nd e r c on vic te d of a Cla ss C, D, or E f e lon y is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble candidate for alternative sentenc ing in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contra ry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102( 6). Fu rt h er more, unless suff icient evidenc e re buts the presumption, “The trial court must presume that a defe ndant sentenc ed to eig ht y ear s or less is an off ender for whom inca

rce ration
wo uld re su lt in suc c e ssf

ul re ha bil itatio n .
. . .” Sta te v. B yrd , 8 61 S.W. 2d37 7, 37 9- 80 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1993); see also Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-303( a). A s a R ang e I , standard of fende r convic ted of and se ntence d to less than eig ht ( 8) y ear s for e ach of these off enses, the a

ppellant was e ligible f

or probation. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(6); 40-35- 303(a) ; By rd, 861 S.W. 2 d at 379-80. Ho we ve r, a ll o ff

e nd e rs wh o me e t th e c ri te ri a are no t ent itl e d to re lie f; ins te a d, se nte nc ing iss ue s mu st be dete rmined by

the fa cts and c ircumstance s of ea ch case. S ee State v. Tay lor, 744 S.W .2d 919, 922 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p. 1987) (c iting State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986) ). Even if a defe ndant is presumed to be a fa vorable candidate for a lternative se ntencing under Te nnessee Code Annot at ed s ec tion 40-35-102(6), the statutory presumption of an a lternative se ntence may be
ov e rc ome if (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect society

by restra ining a

defe ndant who has
a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nece ssary to a void de prec iating the seriousness of the off ense or c on fi ne me nt is p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to o the rs lik e ly to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Mea sures less re strictive than confinement have fre quently or re cently

been applied unsucc essfully

to the defe ndant . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(C). In choosing among possible sentencing alternatives, the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld a lso c on sid e r T e nn e sse e Cod e Ann ot a te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (5 ), wh ic h s ta te s, in pertinent pa

rt, “[t] he potential or lack of potential for the r ehabilitation or treatment of a de fenda nt sh o u ldb e c o n s id e r e d in d e te r mi n in g th e s e n te n c e a lt e r n a ti v e o r le n g tho f a te r m t o b e imp o s ed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 5); State v. Dowdy , 894 S.W .2d 301, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. The trial c ourt m ay co nsider a de fenda nt’s untruthfulness and lac k of ca ndor as they relate to the potential for r ehabilitation. See State v. Nunley , 22 S.W .3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) ; seeW e no t e t hat i n Stat e v. D avi d Lee B el l am y , E 2 0 0 3

- 0 2 9 3 6 -C C A

- R 3

- C D , 20 0 4 W L 1 9 3 6 3 8 4 , at * 5 (T enn. 1 C ri m
. A p p
. at K no xvi l l e, A ug. 3 1 , 2 0 0 4 ), Jud ge W i t t , i n a co ncurri ng o p i ni o n, co ncl ud ed t hat B l akel y , “ m ay ham p er a t r i al j udge’ s au t hor i t y t o m ake t he f act f i ndi ng s nec es s ar y t o ove r com e t he s t at ut ory pre s umpt i on of f avor abl e c andi dacy f or a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g
. ” H owe v er , i n t h e ca s e h er ei n , t h e appe l l an t , de s pi t e a B l ak el y c l ai m on c on secut i ve se n te n c ing , d o e s n o t ra ise a c la im fo u n d e d o n B la k e ly t o the trial c o u rt’s d e n ia l o f an a lter n a tive se n te n c e
. -11- also State v. Bunc h, 646 S.W .2d 158, 160-61 (Te nn. 1983); State v. Z eolia, 928 S.W.2d 457, 463 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 9 6 ) ; S t a t e v
. W i l l i a m s o n , 9 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9 , 8 4 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 9 5 ) ; D o w d y, 894 S.W .2d at 305-06.

I n the ca se here in, the trial court learned throug h the appe llant’s testimonyat the sente ncing hearing a nd the pre- sentenc e report that the appellant had a long history of criminal conduct. The appellant’ s criminal re cord c ontained convic tions for contempt of c o u r t, thr e ec o n v ic tions for

driving
on a revoke d license, f

ailure to a ppear , three convictions for simple possession/casua l exchang e of
a c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e , dr ivi ng wi th no lic e ns e , s imp le a ssa ult , c ri min a l tr e sp a ssi ng , th e ft of pr op e rt y betwee n $1,000 and $10,000, eva ding a rre st, two convictio n s f

o r re sisting ar

rest involving a

wea pon, driving on a suspende d license, disorde rly conduct a nd g am b ling. The appellant wa s place d on pr ob a tio n a t le a st s ix time s, and pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n w arr a nts we re su sta ine d o n tw o o c c a sio ns
. Further, the appellant was schedule d to be place d on probation for a differ ent offe nse a mere t wo da y s a ft e r thi s of

fe ns e oc c ur

re d. Th e tr ia l c ou rt re c og nize d that the app e lla nt wa s p re su mpt ive ly elig ibl e for pr obation or some other form of a lternative se ntencing , but chose to deny alternative
s en t en ci n g. W e c o n cl u d e t h at t h e r ec o rd s u p p o rt s t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d en i al o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g. 1

T h e ap p el l an t al s o cl ai m s t h at t h e tr i al co u rt erre d b y o rd er i n g co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g. Consecutive sente nces ma y be imposed in the discre tion of the trial court only upon a dete rmination that on e or

mor e of the fo llo wi ng c ri te ri a

e xist: (1 ) T he de fe nd a nt is a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l wh o ha s kn ow ing ly de vo te d h ims e lf

to c ri min a l a c ts a s a

ma jor so ur c e of liv e lih oo d; (2 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s a n o ff e nd e r w ho se re c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is e xten siv e ; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

resul t of

a n in ve sti g a tio n p ri or

to sentenc ing that the defe ndant’s criminal conduct has been char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose behavior indicates li ttle or no re g ard for hu ma n li fe , a ndno he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk

to hu ma n li fe is h ig h; (5) The defe ndant is c onvicted of two (2) or more statutory offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consider ation of the a g g ravating c ircumst ance s arising from the r e lati o n s h ip b e tw e e n th e d e f e n d a n t a n d v ic ti m o r v ic ti ms , th e ti me span of defe ndant’ s u n d e te c te d s e xu a l a c ti v it y , th e n a tu r e a n ds c o p e o f th e s e xu a l a c ts and the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s;-12-

(6 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or a n o ff e ns e c omm itt e d w hil e on pr ob a tio n; (7) The defe ndant is sentence d for c riminal contempt.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b). The le ng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature, must be “justly deser ved in re lation to the seriousness of the offense ,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(1), a nd “no g reater than tha t deser ved” under the circ umstances, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n ordering c onsecutive se rvice of the sentenc es here in, the trial court in this case stated as fo llo ws :
This Court believes that whe re the re i s an ar gument to be made that the de fe nd a nt s ho uldbe c on sid e re d f or c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing , th a t r a the r tha n to se t a sentenc e within the r an g e and then de termine whe ther ther e is consec utive sentenc ing elig ibilit y or not, and then me rely

adding one or more c onvictions toge ther, that the better a pproac h is to first make a determination whether the defendant is elig ible for
consec utive sentenc ing; a nd then if he is, derive a total number of y ear s that serve s the ends of the Criminal Sentenc ing Re form Ac t of 1989. So the Court looks at the State’s ar g ument that the def endant is elig ible for c onsecutive se ntencing

. And the Cou rt fi nd s th a t he is, that hi s r e c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is e xten siv e
. As the Sta te points out, t he def

endant, in a two- y ear

period of time , h as had one f elony alre ady and 16 misdemea nor convic tions. The Court plac es sig nificant - - and I comment the def

endant missed a se cond possibili ty

of being elig ible for c onsecutive se ntencing by only two day s because the defe ndant, had he been pla ced on pr obation two day s ear lier, would have been on probation whe n these off

enses oc curr ed. The signific ance of that is that is goe s to the extensiveness of the def

endant’ s criminal conduc t.
I n ou r vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly de te rm ine d th a t c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing wa s a pp ro pr ia te under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(2)

. The defe ndant, while only twenty -one y ear s o l d , has an e x tensive criminal hist ory . As stated pre viously , acc ording to the prese ntence report, he had prior convictions for c ontempt of court, thre e convic tions fo r d ri ving on a revoke d license, f ailure to a ppear , three convicti ons for simple possession/casua l exchang e of a controlled substance, driving with no license , simple assault, criminal t re s p as sing, the ft of prope rty betwee n $1,000 and $10,000, eva ding a rre st, two convictions for re sisting ar rest involving a

wea pon, driving on a suspende d license, disorderly conduct, and g ambling. The appellant was placed on probation
a t le a st s ix time s, a ndpr ob a tio n viol a tio n warr a nts we re su sta ine d o n tw o o c c a sio ns . U nd e r the se circ umstances, we determine that consec utive service of t he two sentenc es, as directed by the trial court, is appr opriate.-13- Conclusion
For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE