NO. 81-224 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982

STATE OF XONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent,

VS. WESTLEY F. DEITCHLER, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: DistrictCourt of the SixteenthJudicial Inand for theCounty of Rosebud Honorable AlfredB. Coate, Judse presidinq. Counsel of Record: For A.ppellant: lilestley F. Deitchler, Pro Se, Forsyth, Jqontana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana JohnMaynard arqued, AssistantAttorney General,

Helena, Montana John S. Forsythe, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana S. Charles Sprinkle arqued, Deputy County Attorney,

Forsyth, Montana

Submitted.: SepSe~ber 8I 1982 Decided: October 7, 1982

### Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. 

### Haswell delivered the Opinion of theCourt. On August 4, 

### 1980, the defendant was 

### stopped by a highway patrolman and issued citations for wasting natural

resources and for failing to display a Montana driver's license on demand. He was convicted of thetwomisdemeanors following a jury trial in the Justice Court of Rosebud County. He 

### appealed tothe District 

### Court and, following a trial witnout a jury, was again convicted of the two offenses. This appeal follows. Two issuesarepresented on appeal: 1. 

### Whether section 61-5-116, MCA, 

### requiring that a driver's license be carried by the operator of a motor vehicle and that it 

### be exhibited on demand, is 

### constitutional; and, 2. 

### Whether section 61-8-304, MCA, declaring that speed limits 

### should be 

### set by the attorney general in conformance with limits

### imposed by federallaw, is

### constitutional. Appellant challenges both statutes on a due process basis. He 

### premises his argument upon the theory that the

use of publichighways by individuals in their vehicles and with their gasoline 

### is a right. He 

### contends thatthe police power of the state may not be exercised to regulate an individual's use and control of his property in an attempt toprovide for thegeneralwelfare and safetyof thepeople of the state. Rather, he argues that only when an individualhas infactharmed another through irresponsibleuse of hispropertymay the stateexercise its

### policepower. Appellant'sargument is

### withoutmerit. The United States Supreme Court in 1837 recognizedthat state and local governments possess an inherent power to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the public. Charles River Bridge 

### v. Warren Bridge Co. (1837), 36 U.S. (11Pet.) 420. This Court has also recognized that such a police power exists even though the regulation may frequently be an infringement of individualrights. State

### v. Rathbone (1940), 110Mont. 225, 241, 100 P.2d 86, 92. See also, Statev. Penny (1910), 42 Mont. 118, 111 P. 727. Regulations that are formulated within the state's police power willbe presumed reasonable absent a clear showing to the contrary. Bettey v. City of Sidney (1927), 79Mont. 314, 319, 257 P. 1007, 1009. Appellanthas not

### methisburden of making such 

### a showing. Whether use of public highways has been held tobe 

### a right or a privilege, courts have consistently impliedly or expressly acknowledged the power of the state to require licensing procedures to be followed prior to use of the highways and have acknowledged the state'spower toproperly regulate trafficon thehighways. Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321; Dixon v. Love (1977),431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172; Bellv. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90; Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department (1973), 211 Kan. 763, 508 P.2d 991; Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester (Okla. 1972), 501 P.2d 1099; Campbell v. State Dept. of Rev., Div. of Motor Vehicles (1971), 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385, 60 kLK3d 419; Statev. Shak (1970), 51Haw. 612, 680, 466 P.2d 422, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 190; Adams v. City of Pocatello (1966), 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d 46. See also, Annot., 6 ALR3d 506; Annot., 86 ALR3d

### We nave previously recognized the power of the state to regulate licensing of drivers in the interests of public safety. Sedlacek

### v. Ahrens (1974), 165Mont. 479, 483, 530 P.2d 

### 424, 426. We have also recognized that the state's exercise of police power in setting speed limits is in the best interestsof the state's economy and is in keeping with the national goals of conservation of gasoline and oil and of improved safety, Lee 

### v. State (1981), Mont

# . I 

### 635

### P.2d 1282, 1287, 39 

### St.Rep. 1729,cert. denied, U.S.



### Appellant's contentions fail. Affirmed. 

# R44-4, 

# @&&a Chief Justice

We concur: