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nava l war college press

Newport, Rhode Island

Influence without Boots 

on the Ground

Seaborne Crisis Response

Larissa Forster
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Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies 

Newport Paper Thirty-Nine 

January 2013

President, Naval War College

Rear Adm. John N. Christenson, USN

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord 

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

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Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that 

the Director, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the 

President of the Naval War College consider of particular 

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of 

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 

the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be 

addressed to the Director of the Naval War College Press. 

To request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions 

to the series, please either write the President (Code 32S), 

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Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright 

Act of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. 

This document may be freely reproduced for academic or 

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reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series 

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain 

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial 

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

ISBN 978-1-935352-03-7

This thesis was accepted as a doctoral dissertation by the Faculty of Arts of the 

University of Zurich in the fall semester 2010 on the recommendation of Prof. Dr. 

Albert A. Stahel and Prof. Dr. Peter Dombrowski (U.S. Naval War College).
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Contents

List of Figures v

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ix

Acknowledgments xiii

Foreword, by Peter Dombrowski xv

Introduction: Military Interventions and the Deployment of 

Naval Forces 1

CHAPTER ONE Navies Are Able to Do Things That Armies 

Can’t: The Difference between the U.S. Navy 

and Other U.S. Armed Forces 13

CHAPTER TWO Just Enough Force? A Theoretical 

Framework for Seaborne Crisis 

 Response 57

CHAPTER THREE Uncharted Waters: Data on U.S. Naval 

 Activity Short of War 95

CHAPTER FOUR We Move on the Seas That We Control, 

Part I: Assessing the Empirical Evidence— 

Crisis Characteristics and Actors 125

CHAPTER FIVE We Move on the Seas That We Control, 

Part II: Assessing the Empirical Evidence— 

U.S. Involvement and Crisis Outcomes 149

Conclusion 181 

Appendix A Crisis Summaries (online only)

Appendix B Data (online only)

Bibliography 193
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About the Author 211

The Newport Papers 213
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List of Figures

Figure 1 Major Capstone Documents since 1970 21

Figure 2 Major Documents and Core Missions 22

Figure 3 Crisis Model 1 and 2: Crisis Part of War

and Peace and Crisis Part of Peace 24

Figure 4 Deterrence Capabilities by U.S. Armed 

Forces 45

Figure 5 Armed Suasion 67

Figure 6 Conceptualization of the Theoretical 

Context of Gunboat Diplomacy 73

Figure 7 USN Force Combinations Pyramid 78

Figure 8 CNA III USN Service Combinations 101

Figure 9 Three Naval Combination Variables 111

Figure 10 Naval Involvement Binary and USNUSMC Team & USN with 

Other Forces 113

Figure 11 USN and Other Forces Combinations 114

Figure 12 Naval Strength 114

Figure 13a Time Line of Naval Involvement 115

Figure 13b Time Line of Naval Involvement, 

Servicetype2 115

Figure 14 Geographic Location & Content of U.S. 

Activity 118

Figure 15 Crisis Characteristics Model 1 125

Figure 16 Crisis Characteristics Model 2 126

Figure 17 Crisis Characteristics Frequencies 127

Figure 18 Model Crisis Characteristics 1a: 

Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial 

Regression 128
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Figure 19 Model Crisis Characteristics 1b: 

USNUSMCTeam, Stepwise 

Multinomial Regression 130

Figure 20 Model Crisis Characteristics 2: 

Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial

Regression 134

Figure 21 Crisis Actor Model 1 136

Figure 22 Crisis Actor Model 2 137

Figure 23 Crisis Actor Model 3 137

Figure 24 Crisis Actors Frequencies 137

Figure 25 Model Actor Characteristics 1: 

Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial 

Regression 138

Figure 26 Model Actor Characteristics 2: 

Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial

Regression 140

Figure 27 U.S. Involvement Model 1 149

Figure 28 U.S. Involvement Model 2 150

Figure 29 U.S. Involvement Model 3 150

Figure 30 U.S. Involvement Model 4 150

Figure 31 U.S. Involvement Model 5 150

Figure 32 U.S. Involvement Model 6 150

Figure 33 U.S. Involvement Frequencies 152

Figure 34 Model U.S. Involvement H3b: 

 Effectiveness 153

Figure 35 Model U.S. Involvement H3c: 

Most Effective Activity 155

Figure 36 Model U.S. Involvement H3d: 

Abatement 158

Figure 37 U.S. Involvement H3a: 

Content of Activity 160

Figure 38 U.S. Involvement H3e: 

Actor 162
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Figure 39 Frequency of Number of CVs Deployed 

and USN-USMC Deployments 

per Year 163

Figure 40 Multivariate Regression Outputs 164

Figure 41 Crisis Outcome Model 1 164

Figure 42 Crisis Outcome Model 2 165

Figure 43 Crisis Outcome Model 3 165

Figure 44 Crisis Outcome Model 4 165

Figure 45 Crisis Outcome Frequencies 166

Figure 46 Model Crisis Outcome H4a: Content 167

Figure 47 Model Crisis Outcome H4b: 

 Agreement 169

Figure 48 Model Crisis Outcome H4d: 

 Satisfaction 172

Figure 49 Model Crisis Outcome H4e: Attitude/ 

 Satisfaction Mix 173

Figure 50 Hypotheses Results Overview 182

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A AMP amphibious

AOR area of responsibility

APS Africa Partnership Station 

ARG amphibious ready group

ASBM antiship ballistic missile

ATF amphibious task force

C CNA Center for Naval Analyses

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CONUS continental United States

COW Correlates of War

CS21 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”

CT counterterrorism

CV aircraft carrier

CVBG carrier battle group

CVN aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered

D DoD Department of Defense

DR disaster relief

E ESG expeditionary strike group

F FY fiscal year

G GFS Global Fleet Station

GMP Global Maritime Partnership
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GPS Global Positioning System

GWOT global war on terror

H HA humanitarian assistance

I ICB International Crisis Behavior Project

IMI International Military Interventions

IW irregular warfare 

L LCS littoral combat ship

M MARG Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group

MDA maritime domain awareness

MEU(SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 

MID Militarized Interstate Disputes

MIO maritime intercept operations

MIPS Military Interventions by Powerful States

MOOTW military operations other than war

N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCW network-centric warfare

NECC Naval Expeditionary Combat Command

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NOP Naval Operations Concept

NSS National Security Strategy

O OLS ordinary-least-square

P PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PRC People’s Republic of China
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Q QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

S SEAL Sea-Air-Land [USN special operations forces]

SPS Southern Partnership Station

SSBN ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarine

SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine

U UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USAF U.S. Air Force

USARMY U.S. Army

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USN U.S. Navy

USS United States Ship

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Acknowledgments

Though the following dissertation is an individual work, it would not have been possible 

without the help, support, guidance, and patience of numerous people. My sincere gratitude goes to my principal dissertation adviser, Professor Albert A. Stahel, for his support 

of this project and for his flexibility, which allowed me to undertake the adventure 

of pursuing dissertation research in a new field far from home. Without his interesting courses discussing warfare and strategy I would not have developed my interest in 

military interventions. I have always benefited from Professor Stahel’s encouragement, 

flexibility, advice, and knowledge. Without his support and help this dissertation would 

not have been possible.

I would like also to express my sincere gratitude to my second dissertation adviser, 

Professor Peter Dombrowski, for his commitment and patience in introducing me to the 

world of the U.S. Navy. He always pushed me to think critically and analytically, thereby 

encouraging me to express and establish my own opinions. His very useful comments 

along the way helped me structure this work, and the end results would not have been 

the same without his help.

Coming to the United States left me in uncharted (for me) academic waters; luckily, I 

was able to work with Professor Michael Butler, who patiently helped me navigate some 

of the unknown American academic customs. His guidance and his connection to the 

Naval War College were crucial for the success of this dissertation. I will always be 

grateful for his help and advice and for his effort in introducing me to this new world. 

Clark University gave me the environment I was missing as a graduate student, far from 

my home department. The psychology graduate students integrated me into their circle 

as if I were one of them. My heartfelt gratitude goes out to all their support, in both my 

private and academic lives.

In the early stages of my dissertation my knowledge was limited to military interventions in general; I was not very familiar with the many details of the service branches. 

Dr. Peter Swartz’s help and advice there were invaluable; he provided me with muchneeded literature and helped me understand naval forces. Moreover, he tried to get 

me access to as much information as possible, and was quick to answer any questions. 

Dr. Henry Gaffney greatly helped the structuring of this work by providing advice 

to narrow down my originally unrealistic aspirations. Dr. Eugene Cobble’s previous 

empirical research on naval crisis response provided me with the groundwork I needed. 
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Everybody who has worked with data knows the many moments of frustration and the 

challenges involved. I burdened Katherine Lacasse and Kathrin Raymann with the task 

of verifying my matching of the naval variables. For their help in this time-consuming 

and meticulous work I am lastingly grateful. Further, I need to express my gratitude to 

Dalton Alexander, of the Naval War College Strategic Research Department; Alice Juda

and Wayne Rowe, of the Naval War College Library; and John Greco, of the Operational 

Archives at the Washington Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.

I am also indebted to Dr. Armando Geller for his support in my academic advancement 

and his assistance with the difficulties presented by working in a foreign country. 

Adm. Ben Wachendorf, USN, offered helpful interpretations of my findings and results. 

Jürg Kürsener’s review of my chapter on naval forces offered important insights and 

suggestions from a European perspective. He further encouraged me by pointing out 

that I am not the only Swiss person with an interest in U.S. naval forces. Professor 

Andrew Bacevich provided me with much-appreciated information on the American

use of force. 

Most important, my parents have provided invaluable support during the long years of 

my education. I want to thank them for their love and the opportunity to leave home 

and begin a new adventure in a new country. My partner Ivo and my best friend Louise 

always showed great interest in my work but above all helped me in moments of great 

frustration and tolerated my mood swings—they had to endure the worst of them—that 

are an inevitable part of writing a dissertation. Also, the Kellys and Geisers play a very 

important role in my life, and I am grateful for their friendship and support. Overall,

the best and worst moments of my dissertation journey have been shared with many 

more people not mentioned above. 
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Foreword 

On occasion in Newport and at other venues where scholars of naval and maritime affairs congregate, old-timers lament the relative shortage of scholars, especially younger 

ones, interested in the U.S. Navy. Aside from a handful of naval officers who manage to 

earn their doctorates while on active duty or who return to the university upon retirement to finish their terminal degrees, there are relatively few scholars of the younger 

generations deeply interested in the U.S. Navy. Many of us read the bloggers and op-ed 

writers who write passionately about the latest development regarding the littoral 

combat ship or the impact of so-called strategic-pivot naval deployments. A few of us 

know faculty at the Naval War College or one of the other professional military education institutions who, after cutting their intellectual teeth on other topics, ranging from 

nuclear deterrence to Asian regional security, turn their attention to the U.S. Navy or 

the Marines for professional reasons. And, of course, they have written some very fine 

analyses. But scholars who begin their careers researching Navy issues are few and far 

between. (No, I have not named names in this paragraph, but I could. The risk would 

be to leave out worthy scholars or to mischaracterize someone and thus draw attention 

away from the larger point.)

Further, those who are interested in the Navy—whether serving or retired officers or 

scholars dabbling in naval affairs later in their careers—are often historians studying 

past battles, the evolution of technology, or long-lost doctrinal debates. Few use quantitative methods, concern themselves with testing hypotheses, or address long-standing 

arguments within the disciplines of political science, international relations, or even 

strategic studies.

Many maritime hands might argue, so what? Why is it important for scholars from 

other disciplines to study the Navy? Why not leave the business of studying what the 

Navy does and has done to specialists and members of the community? The answers to 

these questions would require more argumentation than is appropriate here, but two 

points are suggestive. First, skeptics aside, methodologically sound studies can offer 

insights that would be difficult to replicate from traditional historical or case-based 

research. Second, I would also argue that the Navy’s intellectual capital occasionally 

needs replenishment from outside the proverbial lifelines. After all, some of the most 

influential postwar studies of the U.S. Navy, its role in the world, and its contribution to 

U.S. national security have come from scholars not closely associated with the service; 
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Bernard Brodie and the Sprouts, Harold and Margaret, are some of the earliest and most 

famous examples.

It is thus a welcome development to find a young civilian scholar with few ties to the 

Navy who seeks to study that service using the techniques of modern social science. It is 

even more welcome for the young scholar to be a woman, a non-American, and a native 

of a small, landlocked country. But that is exactly what we have here, with the author of 

this Newport Paper—Dr. Larissa Forster.

Dr. Forster came to our attention through a roundabout but classic fashion: hers was 

a story of scholars talking to scholars about who is studying what, why, and where. 

Eventually, she found her way, as a predissertation doctoral student at the University of 

Zurich, to the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, where she was a visiting research fellow. With the encouragement 

of many, ranging from Provost Mary Ann Peters to Dean Robert C. “Barney” Rubel, she

conceived of a dissertation that became, with many revisions and rewrites, the monograph that follows.

I would encourage readers to consider Dr. Forster’s arguments carefully both because 

of her substantive conclusions and, perhaps even more importantly, because of her efforts to build on the work of analysts like Adam Siegel, who in his days at the Center for 

Naval Analyses worked long and hard to build a usable database of naval activities. Like 

Adam and a handful of others, Dr. Forster has labored to increase our analytic capacity 

by collecting data that will be available to analysts and scholars in the future.

In terms of substance, this study explores the political use of naval forces during foreign 

policy crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster uses a statistical model to analyze 

naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and strategists. She outlines the unique 

characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of naval forces; summarizes theoretical 

literature on naval diplomacy and coercion; reviews earlier quantitative research; and 

explains the variables used in her analysis. In the end, the monograph presents an empirical analysis in terms of crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. involvement, and outcomes.

peter dombrowski

Chairman, Strategic Research Department

Naval War College
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Introduction: Military Interventions and the Deployment of Naval Forces

As long as the United States chooses to continue as the leader of the free 

world, sea power is the absolutely vital basis for United States policy, in 

peace or war, anywhere in the world. 

J. C. Wylie 

Mit der Navy sichern die USA im Frieden und im Krieg ihren Einfluss 

und ihre Macht. (The U.S. Navy secures U.S. influence and power in both 

wartime and peacetime.)

Albert a. Stahel 

The use of military force is not restricted to fighting; it can also be employed to shape 

and influence events.1

 During the October Arab-Israeli War of 1973, neither superpower 

was directly engaged in the fighting, but both heavily supported their “client” states. 

The deployment of naval forces sent a strong signal, not only to the direct crisis participants but also to the other superpower. The Soviet navy initiated movements of assets 

into proximity of the crisis a couple of days before hostilities erupted. In direct reaction 

to the outbreak of the conflict on 5 October, the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet 

and also moved vessels closer to the crisis location. 

At the onset of the war, the U.S. Navy (USN) had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and was thus ready to react on the same day. The aircraft carrier USS Independence (CV 62) and three destroyers were ordered almost immediately to proceed to 

Crete and to stand by there. The other carrier, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42), began 

to move east a couple of days later, and a third aircraft carrier was sent to the Mediterranean as a backup. Over the next few weeks, the United States stretched a chain of ships, 

elements of the Sixth Fleet, across the Mediterranean to support U.S. transport aircraft 

and replacement fighter-bombers on their way to Israel. The ships were placed to provide navigational, refueling, and rescue services and if necessary to prevent interdiction 

attempts from North Africa. 

Increased readiness was relaxed on 17 November. The third, backup, aircraft carrier departed the Mediterranean, and the Sixth Fleet resumed its normal operations. While the 

U.S. naval vessels had played no direct role in the fighting, they had contributed greatly 

to the U.S. diplomatic efforts. During the conflict the naval forces never entered the 
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combat zone and faced no direct challenge, but by containing the conflict they helped 

achieve diplomatic success. The presence of a strong force, strategically distributed, 

sent clear signals to both the Soviet Union and the crisis participants and underscored 

U.S. resolve.2

This example shows how naval forces can be used as a political tool to add 

weight to the diplomatic efforts without resorting to full-scale force. 

Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign 

policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events.3

 Many scholars 

have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. 

When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What 

conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors.4

The theoretical literature 

covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action;5

 to emphasis on international trade and economics;6 and 

to domestic politics.7

 Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such 

as democracy and human rights.8

 Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons.9 As 

Ken Booth observes, a combination of motivations is the most common.10 An approach 

mostly neglected in the political science research is to ask why states choose different 

intervention strategies.11 Assuming capacity and will to intervene, policy makers must 

also determine how to pursue their goals.12

From this vast field I have selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946–2006. Within these U.S. activities, I distinguish between crisis 

response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge 

of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to 

a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed. There are various 

studies analyzing why the United States becomes involved in international conflicts, 

crises, or wars.13 One factor nearly absent in the research of this broad topic is in-depth 

analysis of what form and type of force is employed and why. Military interventions 

are responses to a variety of situations, exercised by many states, and carried out by 

different types of military services. As James Meernik and Chelsea Brown observe, 

“While there has been a tremendous amount of research regarding the domestic and 

international factors that influence the decision to use force, far less work has been done 

to analyze the types of operations authorized and their relationship to duration, policy 

success, security, and stability in the affected areas, as well as a host of other concerns. 

Further research is needed in several areas.”14

Full-scale wars have become rare, and the majority of confrontations occur at lower 

intensity levels. Crisis response is an activity short of full-scale war. Some identify it as a 

peacetime activity, and others locate it between peace and war. Most international crises 
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have occurred without an escalation to war, and many have been resolved without even 

resorting to the use of force. Crisis response covers a range of activities, from strictly political uses of force, such as the backing up of diplomacy with the threat of force, to open 

military engagement. While war preparedness is their ultimate raison d’être, armed 

forces are involved in many other international situations short of actual war, a fact that 

allows a broad analysis of naval activities. As a superpower, the United States is in an 

exceptional position to influence global events. The questions of when, where, and why 

the country should employ military force are among the national issues most frequently 

and passionately debated.15

Naval forces possess certain advantages over other military services. “Navies are not 

something you think about,” says Robert Kaplan.16 “They are out there over the horizon. 

But if you look throughout history, navies are often a good indicator of where power is 

going. Navies are able to do things that armies can’t.” The U.S. Navy supports foreign 

policy objectives through a variety of missions, ranging from “showing the flag” to retaliatory attacks against hostile nations. An important asset in crises is the Navy’s ability to act as a persuasive deterrent to war by demonstrating an ability to destroy.17 The 

vast presence of the U.S. Navy around the world at all times allows for fast reaction. Sea 

power can influence nearly every country; very few places have no access to the sea or 

are beyond the reach of the power-projection capabilities of aircraft carriers. The ability

to be present almost anywhere around the world and exert influence without “boots on 

the ground” is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces in deployments short of war and highlights their unique capabilities for political missions during 

peacetime and crises.18 Before World War II, the engagement of the United States in 

world affairs was sporadic. But by the end of the war, it had established its preeminence 

in world politics, finance, and security. Today, the nation’s armed forces, especially the 

U.S. Navy, face no equal competitor.

To date, naval forces as crisis-response tools have not been analyzed sufficiently. Although there are studies researching the involvement of naval power in a particular crisis or war, there is a dearth of empirical analysis and theory on their systemic role. The 

nation’s continuing reliance on the use of military force to influence events throughout 

the world justifies an in-depth inquiry into these events.19

The impetus of this project is to gain a fuller grasp of the U.S. Navy not simply as a 

military fighting force but as a political instrument. In the twentieth century, the Navy 

climbed up into the top ranks of the world’s fleets and became a powerful actor on the 

global stage. Harold and Margaret Sprout identify the end of World War I as the beginning of the U.S. Navy’s worldwide power status and of its evolution from an important 

instrument of national policy into an important element of the foreign policy of the 

United States.20 U.S. naval forces played a prominent role during World War II, from 
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battles like those of Midway and Leyte Gulf to Japan’s official surrender on the deck of 

USS Missouri (BB 63). The end of World War II and the changed international structure 

and politics that emerged favored the use of naval forces as political instruments over 

other types of forces. Not only did the political situation and the general U.S. use of 

force change significantly after World War II, but the U.S. Navy itself was transformed 

dramatically. It was by then the world’s largest and able to exert significant influence, 

with the help of its powerful aircraft carriers. 

Since World War II the Navy has functioned simultaneously as what Charles Pirtle calls 

the “Sword of the State” and the “Shield of the Republic.”

21 The Navy’s crisis-response 

capabilities (assisted by those of the Marine Corps) guaranteed its important position 

as a tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. In the following Cold War, the Navy 

served as a nuclear deterrent and crisis-response force, while preparing for a possible 

global war with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the USN was always ready for 

this eventuality. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s power has been unchallenged. Peacetime presence and focus on regional conflicts have been emphasized.22 The 

USN has regularly responded to international incidents, but it has done so even more 

frequently since the demise of the Soviet Union.23

The specific goals of this study are twofold. First, a new data set will be generated. 

Most popular crisis data sets do not distinguish between the involvements of different 

military service types within an intervention. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 

published studies with basic data about the reactions of naval forces to international 

situations but not in a larger context.24 This exploratory study combines both extensive 

crisis data with naval involvement information by introducing new variables to an established data set. Thus, the first step is the generation of data that will allow examining 

naval crisis response more broadly than is possible with case studies. On the basis of the 

available data and information, different empirical methods will be employed to analyze hypotheses derived from assumed advantages and disadvantages of naval forces. 

Second, the basic empirical results will help to begin answering the many questions 

pertaining to the overarching question that follows. 

What Is the Role of U.S. Naval Forces in Crisis Response?

In order to structure the analysis, the study focuses on four different areas critical for 

understanding crisis response. The first set of questions focuses on the dimensions, 

context, and attributes of the crisis, followed by actor characteristics. The next category 

poses questions in regard to the U.S. involvement, both as third party and direct actor; 

the last part is concerned with the crisis termination. These four categories encompass 

most significant events.
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1. Crisis Characteristics

•	 1.1. In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?

•	 1.2. To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

2. Crisis Actors

•	 2.1. How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?

•	 2.2. What crisis-actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?

•	 2.3. How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

3. U.S. Involvement

•	 3.1. In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?

•	 3.2. How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services? 

•	 3.3. How effective is the U.S. naval involvement?

4. Crisis Outcomes

•	 4.1. How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Defining the Concepts

Military forces can be deployed as reactions to a variety of incidents, such as full-scale 

wars, small wars, civil wars, domestic crises, international crises or conflicts, ethnic 

conflicts, intrastate conflicts, or disasters, to name a few. 

Crises, Conflicts, and Wars

Richard Lebow presents the following justification for focusing on international crises 

in studying the use of force short of war: “Short of war, crises are the most salient and 

visible points of conflict between states.”25 Crisis and conflict, although often conflated, 

are different phenomena. In most cases, a crisis concerns a single event—for example, 

a threat to a political regime—whereas “conflict” emphasizes the time factor. Conflicts 

can stretch over a long period of time and may erupt on multiple occasions with different degrees of intensity. International crises often occur within conflicts or even within 

wars—“intrawar crises.” Crises can also lead to long-lasting conflicts or to the outbreak 

of wars. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld classify war as a subset of crisis.26

Furthermore, all wars are preceded by crises, but not all crises conclude in a war.27

There are many definitions of international crisis. According to Lebow, most classifications have in common certain elements, such as “perception of threat, heightened 

anxieties on the part of the decision-makers, the expectation of possible violence, the 

belief that important far-reaching decisions are required and must be made on the basis 
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of incomplete information in a stressful environment.”28 International crises often represent turning points in international politics and change the perceptions of the crisis 

participants, not only between those involved but also their perceptions of other states. 

“We regard crisis as an occasion for decision. That is, crisis is a situation or an event that 

confronts decision makers with an opportunity for response, either action or inaction.”29

This analysis considers, in accordance with the International Crisis Behavior Project, 

that an international crisis is present when the following conditions are met:30

1. A change in type/or increase of disruptive—that is hostile verbal or physical—interactions 

between two or more states, with a heightened possibility of military hostilities, that, in turn:

2. destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system—global, 

dominant, or subsystem.

An international crisis erupts with a “break-point,” posing a threat to the values of 

states, coupled with time restraint and “a heightened probability of involvement in 

military hostilities.”

International crises are heavily influenced by external parties. Much depends on when, 

how, and why these parties become involved. The involvement of a major power can 

profoundly impact and shape the outcome.

Political Use of Force and (Military) Intervention

Many authors, such as Barry Blechman, point to the great value of military power as 

a political use of force short of actual deployment in war.31 Generally, the political use 

of force means the use of armed forces short of war. In their extensive study on the use 

of armed forces Blechman and Kaplan define the political use of force as follows: “A 

political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more 

components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the 

national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of 

individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”32

The ultimate goal should be a show of military strength that allows a nation to accomplish goals without having to resort to violence. As Clausewitz remarked, “So, too, the 

armed forces—by their very existence as well as by their general character, deployment, 

and day-to-day activities—can be used as an instrument of policy in time of peace. In 

peace, as in war, a prudent statesman will turn to the military not as a replacement or 

substitute for other tools of policy but as an integral part of an admixture . . . of means.”33

Any decision to intervene in an international crisis is risky and challenging. It is often 

difficult to categorize the involvement clearly. Generally war imposes the will of one 

state on another, whereas the political use of force involves a lesser degree of violence (if 

any) and is employed to influence the behavior of foreign actors. Despite this distinction, 
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it is not always clear where to draw the line. Meernik describes the intervention in 

Panama in 1989 as an example.34 That invasion can be viewed as an effort either to 

impose U.S. will on Panama or merely to influence events. The existence of permanent military bases abroad and routine operations, he believes, do not fall under the 

category of political uses of force. While I agree with Meernik on this point, I disagree 

with his statement that covert or paramilitary operations cannot be part of the political 

use of force. This deployment of armed forces too aims at altering and influencing the 

behavior and actions of adversaries and therefore can be said to be political rather than 

specifically military and violent in nature, not synonymous with imposing will and 

employing full-scale force.

By becoming involved in an international crisis, the actors essentially intervene in the 

affairs of a third party, or several parties. For the statistical analyses in this study, no 

classification of intervention is needed. However, the following explanations help in 

understanding the broader picture of involvement in international crises. Intervention 

can be a very extensive concept. James Rosenau points to the difficulty of agreeing on a 

clear definition.35 For Adrian Guelke, intervention can include any event between states, 

while for Bryan Hehir, “intervention means the use of force to address problems within 

boundaries of a sovereign state.”36 Karen Feste describes intervention, in its broadest 

form, as a 

process of overt or covert involvement by an outsider in the internal economic, social, or political 

processes of another society with the aim of determining the direction of trends in the target country’s policies, institutions, or policies. Strategies used to exercise leverage in these situations include 

a range of assistance through military instruments (supplying combat troops or peacekeeping 

observers, weaponry, advisors), economic support or sanctions (financial aid, embargo), and political and diplomatic initiatives (mediation offices, nonrecognition, refugee policies). The intervention 

approach may be passive, providing little beyond words of support or condemnation to the parties 

in the conflict; or active, with physical movement of troops and supplies.37

Some scholars, like Hehir, already include the use of force in their definitions of intervention.38 Elizabeth Saunders provides a detailed account of military interventions, 

adding the “military component” to interventions: 

I thus define military intervention as an overt, short-term deployment of at least 1,000 combatready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an 

interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions. “Short-term” 

may encompass a wide range of time frames, but it excludes conquest or colonialism. Interventions 

into both interstate and intrastate conflicts or crises are included in the universe of cases; both can 

vary in the degree of internal interference.39 

These definitions demonstrate how variously the concept of intervention can be 

interpreted. Thus a deployment of naval forces to reach a foreign-policy objective can 

be classified, depending on goals and forms of deployment, as either an intervention 

or a military intervention. For a detailed analysis of the deployment of the U.S. armed 
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services, it is important to maintain the distinctions between forms of intervention, including between covert/semi-military and direct military, and types of mission. Feste’s 

detailed explanation and very inclusive description of the different characteristics help 

to demonstrate the various aspects the term can encompass.40 The identification of both 

overt and covert activities and of both military and nonmilitary aspects captures important elements of interventions.

Naval Crisis Response: Peacetime or Wartime Activity

The focus on crisis response invites the question where to locate this activity along the 

spectrum of naval operations. The broadest classification of naval functions divides it 

into two categories: the use of force and action short of the use of force. Another possibility is categorization into wartime and peacetime functions. Crisis response, often 

referred to as a peacetime function, can include not only threatened but also actual use 

of force. Therefore, arguably, crisis response should be a separate category, between 

peacetime and wartime. To employ the first distinction—that between the use of force 

and action short of force—crisis response would be situated between these two. While 

the mere demonstration of power without actual employment of force is desirable, it 

might be necessary to resort at least to a limited amount of force to resolve a crisis. 

The second categorization—wartime and peacetime—allows a more nuanced explanation of crisis response. Scholars differ in their interpretations of “peacetime.” For 

Alberto Coll, “peacetime engagement refers to those activities carried out before a crisis 

exists, or at least before it has crossed the threshold into armed violence.”41 Dr. Coll 

refers to operations between war and peace, such as humanitarian interventions or 

peace enforcement, as “chaos management,” accompanied by a heightened possibility 

of force. Other scholars define peacetime more broadly. During the Cold War, Bradford 

Dismukes suggested the following comprehensive definition: “[peacetime] is meant to 

encompass all situations short of major war with the USSR. Operations in peacetime 

can range from routine forward deployments, to crisis augmentations of forces, to actions against a nation other than the USSR, and can even include a local conventional 

exchange between U.S. and Soviet forces in connection with a Third World crisis.”42

At around the same time, Charles Allen distinguished two peacetime deployments for 

naval forces: routine posture, and operations/reactions to increased tensions or crisis.43

Robert Mahoney and Adam Siegel (writing separately) also define crisis response as a 

peacetime activity but offer more general classifications independent of the Cold War.44

The absence of war, defined by the threshold of U.S. casualties lower than one thousand, 

defines the term “peacetime activity.” The U.S. General Accounting Office (as today’s 

Government Accountability Office was then known) and Linton Brooks provided in the 

mid-1990s more detailed characterizations.45 According to the former, “the peacetime 
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role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the 

spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction 

and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.” Similarly, Brooks defines crisis as part of “military 

operations other than war” (MOOTW). In his view, all military peacetime operations 

support one of the three following tasks: 

•	 Preparing for war. Training, operating in areas of potential conflict to get accustomed to 

them, working with allies.

•	 Responding to crises with action. Protecting American citizens, respond to natural disasters, 

solutions for local conflicts, prevent conflicts from spreading, punishing aggression.

•	 Advancing U.S. interests without the use of force. Deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and 

friends, sending signals of U.S. interests, fostering goodwill.46

More recently, in 2007, in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the 

heads of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard highlighted the presence of 

naval forces in the event of crisis. The Navy possesses, it declared, the capability to 

respond even “should peacetime operations transition to war.”47 It is debatable when 

exactly this “transition” occurs, when an operation is considered a wartime, and no 

longer a peacetime, undertaking. International crises per se are confrontations short 

of actual full-scale wars, and therefore I will follow the earlier definition of Mahoney 

and Siegel, considering all responses involving fewer than a thousand U.S. casualties 

“peacetime operations.”48

Plan of the Study

This study is very exploratory in nature. First, a new data set had to be created combining crisis and naval-response information. Second, four subsets of crisis are chosen in 

an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the influence of seaborne forces. The 

idea of the political use of force, short of full-scale warfare, guides the entire analysis. 

Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces 

and providing a detailed account of naval functions. The chapter concludes with the 

most recent developments, as of this writing; an understanding of the unique capabilities of naval forces is important as a basis for theories and hypotheses. The theoretical 

explanations in chapter 2 connect naval capabilities with literature on naval diplomacy 

and coercion, so as to inform the hypotheses. Chapter 3 explains the groundwork of 

my empirical analyses, discussing earlier quantitative research and identifying naval 

variables for international crises, thereby generating a new data set. The various empirical methods will be explained, followed by the presentation of “simple frequencies.” 

The purpose in doing so will be not to develop a complex statistical model but rather 

to find and present naval crisis data. Chapters 4 (crisis characteristics and actors) and 5 
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(U.S. involvement and outcomes) present the results of the empirical analyses. Where 

possible, specific international crises will be briefly summarized to support or question the findings. After each of these two chapters, the results of the models will be 

explained. The last chapter reviews the most important findings, discusses limitations, 

points to future research, and argues that these results are of importance for policy and 

decision makers.

Notes

1. Robert Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in 

International Politics: Enduring Concepts 

and Contemporary Issues, 6th ed., ed. Robert 

Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Longman, 

2003), pp. 247–48. Epigraphs are from J. 

C. Wylie, “Mahan: Then and Now,” in The 

Influence of History on Mahan: The Proceedings of a Conference Marking the Centenary of 

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea 

Power upon History, 1660–1783, ed. John B. 

Hattendorf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College 

Press, 1991), p. 44; and Albert Stahel, Klassiker 

der Strategie—eine Bewertung (Zürich: vdf 

Hochschulverlag, 1997), p. 223.

2. Charles Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime

(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 

pp. 27–29; James Cable, Diplomacy at Sea

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985), 

p. 50; Robert Weinland, Superpower Naval 

Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israel 

War, Professional Paper 221 (Alexandria, 

Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1978); Roger 

Hansen, “The American Airlift to Israel in 

1973: Political and Military Implications” 

(course paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1988), available at www 

.dtic.mil/; Frank Uhlig, Jr., “The Constants of 

Naval Warfare,” Naval War College Review 50, 

no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 92–105.

3.Art, “Fungibility of Force”; James Meernik, 

The Political Use of Military Force in US 

Foreign Policy (Aldershot, Burlington, U.K.: 

Ashgate, 2004); Hans Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs 45, 

no. 3 (1967), pp. 425–36. 

4. Richard Connaughton, Military Interventions 

in the 1990s (New York: Routledge, 1992).

5. Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics 

(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1984); 

Karen Feste, Expanding the Frontiers

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992); Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene.” 

6. Robert Art and Robert Jervis, International 

Politics: Anarchy, Force, Imperialism (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1973); J. R. Kurth, “Testing 

Theories of Economic Imperialism,” in Testing 

Theories of Economic Imperialism, ed. S. J. 

Rosen and J. R. Kurth (Lexington, Mass.: 

Lexington Books, 1974).

7.Karl DeRouen, “The Indirect Link: Politics, 

the Economy, and the Use of Force,” Journal 

of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 4 (1995), 

pp. 671–95; Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet 

Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary 

Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime 

Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis,” 

International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 

(2005), pp. 23–44; Alastair Smith, “International Crises and Domestic Politics,” American 

Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (1998), pp. 

623–38; Kevin Wang, “Presidential Responses 

to Foreign Policy Crises: Rational Choice and 

Domestic Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996), pp. 68–97. 

8. H. W. Brands, “Decisions on American 

Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican 

Republic, and Grenada,” Political Science 

Quarterly 102, no. 4 (1987), pp. 607–24; 

Robert DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. 

Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo

(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 

2002); Jochen Hippler, Nation-Building: ein 

Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung? (Bonn: Dietz, 2004); Robert Keohane, 

introduction to Humanitarian Intervention: 

Ethic, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. 

Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane (Cambridge, 

U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 1–11. 

9. See Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in 

US Foreign Policy.
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10. Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace (New York: 

Basic Books, 2002).

11. James Meernik and Chelsea Brown, “The 

Short Path and the Long Road: Explaining 

the Duration of US Military,” Journal of Peace 

Research 44, no. 1 (2007), pp. 65–80; Elizabeth 

Saunders, “Transformative Choices: Leaders 

and the Origins of Intervention Strategy,” 

International Security 34, no. 2 (2009), p. 126.

12. Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, 

Present, Future (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: 

Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 289–90.

13. See, for example, Meernik, Political Use of 

Military Force in US Foreign Policy.

14. Meernik and Brown, “Short Path and the Long 

Road,” p. 78.

15. Richard Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post–Cold War World

(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 1994), p. 1.

16. Robert Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water 

Grunts: The American Military in the Air, 

at Sea, and on the Ground,” interview, 2007, 

Carnegie Council, www.cceia.org/; cf. 

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of 

Seapower upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1890; repr. Sioux Falls, S.Dak.: 

NuVision, 2007).

17. Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: 

Navies and National Interests (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 82; Stansfield 

Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” Naval 

War College Review 26, no. 5 (March–April 

1974), p. 15.

18. Joseph Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in 

Crises: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction

(PhD dissertation, Stanford Univ., 1989), pp. 

30–31; Barry Blechman, “Naval Diplomacy 

in the Twenty-First Century,” in Strategic 

Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st 

Century, ed. Pelham Boyer and Robert Wood 

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 

1999), pp. 241–53; James Cable, Gunboat 

Diplomacy 1919–1979: Political Applications 

of Limited Naval Force (London: Macmillan, 

1981), p. 29.

19. See Andrew Bacevich, The New American 

Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by 

War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005); 

and Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s 

Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).

20. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise 

of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939).

21. Charles Pirtle, “Military Uses of Ocean 

Space and the Law of the Sea in the New 

Millennium,” Ocean Development & International Law 31, nos. 1–2 (2000), p. 22.

22. George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), 

pp. 446–47.

23. Adam Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure 

in International Crises: The Role of U.S. Naval 

Forces, CRM 94-193 (Alexandria, Va.: Center 

for Naval Analyses, 1995); Carlton Fulford, 

“MTW Planning and Small-Scale Contingencies: Enduring Utility of Naval Forces,” 

in The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century 

Operations, ed. Richard Shultz and Robert 

Pfaltzgraff (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 

2000), p. 165.

24. Robert Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975: Survey of Navy Crisis Operations, CRC322-Vol. I

(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 

1977); Adam Siegel, The Use of Naval Forces in 

the Post-war Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine 

Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946–1990,

CRM 90-246 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1991); Eugene Cobble, Hank 

Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, For the 

Record: All U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, 1970–2000 (with Additions Covering 

2000–2003) (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval 

Analyses, 2005).

25. Richard Lebow, Between Peace and War: The 

Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: 

Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), p. 309.

26. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A 

Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan 

Press, 2003), p. 7.

27. Ibid.; Glenn Snyder, “Crisis Bargaining,” in 

International Crises: Insights from Behavioral 

Research, ed. Charles Hermann (New York: 

Free Press, 1972), p. 218.

28. Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 8–9.

29. James Robinson, “Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories,” in International Crises: 

Insights from Behavioral Research, ed. Charles 

Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 29.

30. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, Study of Crisis, pp. 

3–5. I recognize that following the definition 

of the International Crisis Behavior Project 

(ICB) means that I will exclude some cases. 
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Somalia in 1992 is a good example: while 

the crisis did not qualify as an international 

crisis according to the ICB criteria, the United 

States did deploy military forces in response. 

In the data chapter I will discuss this problem 

further.

31. See Blechman, “Naval Diplomacy in the 

Twenty-First Century,” p. 247.

32. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force 

without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political 

Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 

Institution, 1978), p. 12.

33. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O. J. 

Matthijs Jolles (Washington, D.C.: Infantry 

Journal Press, 1950), p. 596.

34. Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in US 

Foreign Policy, pp. 4–6.

35. James Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific 

Concept,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 13, no. 

2 (1969), p. 154.

36. Adrian Guelke, “Force, Intervention and 

International Conflict,” in The Use of Force 

in International Relations, ed. F. S. Northedge 

(London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 101; 

Bryan Hehir, “The Moral Dimension in the 

Use of Force,” in The Use of Force after the 

Cold War, ed. H. W. Brands (College Station: 

Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2003), p. 27 [emphasis supplied].

37. Karen Feste, Intervention: Shaping the Global 

Order (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), p. 26.

38. Hehir, “Moral Dimension in the Use of Force.”

39. Saunders, “Transformative Choices,” pp. 

122–23.

40. Feste, Expanding the Frontiers. 

41. Alberto Coll, “The Role of Naval Services 

in Operations Other than War: Peacetime 

Engagement and Chaos Management,” in The 

Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, ed. Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), pp. 

86–87.

42. Bradford Dismukes, Expected Demand for the 

U.S. Navy to Serve as an Instrument of U.S. 

Foreign Policy: Thinking about Political and 

Military Environmental Factors, Professional 

Paper 283 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval 

Analyses, 1980), “terms of reference” para.

43. Allen, Uses of Navies in Peacetime, p. 16.

44. Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International 

Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975; Siegel, Use of 

Naval Forces in the Post-war Era.

45. U.S. General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May 

Affect Response to Regional Conflicts, Chapter 

Report, 03/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-51 (Washington, D.C.: 1995); Linton Brooks, Peacetime 

Influence through Forward Naval Presence,

Occasional Paper (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1993).

46. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence.

47. J. T. Conway, G. Roughead, and T. W. Allen, 

“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower,” October 2007, available at www 

.navy.mil/; repr. Naval War College Review 61, 

no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 7–19.

48. Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International 

Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975; Siegel, Use of 

Naval Forces in the Post-war Era.
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chapter one

Navies Are Able to Do Things That Armies Can’t

The Difference between the U.S. Navy and Other U.S. 

Armed Forces

We can do all that because our equipment is flexible and fungible, 

because our forces have a zero land based footprint, and we can 

maneuver because our forces and their equipment are together. When 

we are ordered by the President to meet some challenge on behalf of our 

Nation, we don’t have to negotiate or wait for permission to use someone 

else’s soil. We move on the seas that we control.

Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, 2009

The U.S. Navy enjoys a unique position among the military services. Armies, navies, 

and air forces are not of the same kind.1

 The most obvious difference is in the environments within which they operate—land, sea, and air. The Navy is the only armed force 

that operates on, above, and under the surface of the sea.2

Advantages of Naval Forces

As regulated by international law and convention, naval forces are free to maneuver on 

the world’s oceans as close to any coastline as twelve miles.3

 The vast presence of the 

U.S. Navy around the world at all times enables fast reactions. This ability to be present almost anywhere is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces. 

The U.S. Navy can be employed “overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, actively or 

passively, but almost always effectively, in whatever may at any moment be the national 

interest.” J. C. Wylie further describes “maritime presence” as subtle, benign, and ubiquitous in quality and as the great asset of sea power in times of peace and war.4

 Fleets are 

not only highly effective combat tools; they can also be employed as mediums of diplomacy, advancing U.S. interests without the use of force.5

 Ubiquity, flexibility, mobility, 

limited intrusiveness (“leaving no footprints”), readiness, and independence represent 

the great advantages of navies.6
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Ubiquity, Flexibility, Mobility, and Limited Intrusiveness

The fact that naval forces operate in the neutral medium of the world’s oceans permits 

nations to engage relatively subtly and nonintrusively. Naval forces can be sent to points 

on the sea near crises and there wait for developments. They can be visible without 

invading foreign sovereign territory, but they can also wait close by and yet stay out of 

sight. Such actions will most likely be perceived as less invasive than the movement of 

land forces, and the risks, as well as the political costs, will likely be more acceptable. 

James Cable points out that the U.S. Air Force and Army cannot be deployed without 

evoking the threat of high levels of violence and anxiety.7

 Navies, even if they enter 

foreign territorial waters, are portrayed as “a lesser involvement than a platoon that has 

crossed the frontier or an aircraft that has dropped a bomb.”

The traditional combination of the military and diplomatic roles of naval forces means 

that while potential adversaries view the use of naval forces as representing significant 

national interest and willingness to act on the part of the United States, it also implies 

a lesser threat than do airpower or armies of destruction and war.8

As Adm. Sergei 

Gorshkov, for many years commander in chief of the Soviet navy, once wrote, navies 

can “demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one’s state. Demonstrations by 

the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting 

to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one’s own potential might and 

threatening to start military operations. Thus, the navy has always been an instrument 

of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.”9

 The great mobility and flexibility of naval power allow for the calibration of action to circumstances.10

Should political initiatives and shows of force fail, naval forces can resort to coercion 

and war fighting.11 At any time of the day and under almost any weather conditions, and 

at times and locations of their choosing, naval forces can project offensive power.12

The Navy can hardly be studied without taking account of the U.S. Marine Corps 

(USMC), the “sea portable” ground force. This sea mobility is the Marines’ advantage.13

With the help of the Marine Corps, power can be projected ashore through amphibious 

operations, in addition to naval gunfire, carrier airpower, or cruise missiles. Marines 

embark on USN vessels and are able to change quickly from sea to land combat, often 

with support of naval forces. With amphibious landings, Marines can be deployed to 

the crisis location with little political constraint.14 In most naval crisis responses, USMC 

forces deploy with the USN. Ever since the American Revolution, the two services have 

regularly deployed jointly.15 Sean Cate describes the “Navy–Marine Corps team,” with 

its mobility, sustainability, and power-projection capability, as a “go anywhere, do anything [force].”16
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Independence and Readiness

The Navy and Marine Corps are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and 

have conducted peacetime operations in littoral areas since their respective creations. 

Both forces are designed so that the naval services collectively can maintain forward 

presence and rapidly respond to crises, in addition to their war-fighting requirements.17

Other military forces are more constrained by their needs and by the environment they 

operate in and so cannot deploy as freely. They depend on approval of third parties 

and are restricted by legal, logistical, and political factors. Navies, unlike armies and 

air forces, are not dependent on access to foreign bases or military facilities, permission to use foreign airspace, or rights to refuel in other countries. Their strength lies in 

their freedom of action, their ability to function on their own without depending on 

the goodwill and support of others. According to Dakota Wood, the Navy can stay on 

crisis location and sustain itself for months.18 P. K. Ghosh writes, “A single naval unit is 

self-sufficient on its own. A naval task force is a stand-alone unit that incorporates the 

elements of land, air and sea power into it.”19 Its ability to “wait and see” allows the government to gain time—for reflection, for other preparations, for diplomacy, or for negotiation.20 Naval forces promise a more rapid deployment compared to land-based units 

and are less costly to move.21 Arthur Barber acknowledges the high costs of maintaining 

strong naval forces but argues that “cheapness is relative: the most expensive force for a 

given mission is the one that does not have the flexibility or availability to be used when 

force is needed.”22 Once naval forces arrive at the crisis location, their ships are immediately ready for action—what Pirtle calls “readiness on arrival.”23 Furthermore, the 

withdrawal of navies is less difficult than the withdrawal of land forces.24

Finally, the deployment of naval forces also provokes less criticism or debate within the 

United States. Kaplan observes,

If we want to deploy an extra 30,000 troops somewhere, there is a big national debate about it. But 

you can double the number of warships in the Persian Gulf and nobody in Congress breathes a word 

about it or cares. You can go from one to two to three carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf—a 

carrier strike group is an aircraft carrier with 5,000 seamen onboard, with two cruisers, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines; you are dealing with 10,000 or so sailors—you can just send one 

a few miles off the coast of Iran, and there is nary a word of protest.25

Disadvantages of Naval Forces

Notwithstanding the many valuable characteristics of naval forces, there are also 

disadvantages and limitations. According to Joseph Bouchard, the “irony of naval crisis 

response is that the characteristics of naval forces that make them the preferred type of 

force for use as a political instrument in crisis also tend to make them relatively more 

susceptible to crisis stability problems than other types of forces.”26 Weaknesses include 
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misinterpretation of signals, limitations on endurance, vulnerability, and indecisive 

outcomes.

Misperception, Endurance, and Vulnerability

Signaling by naval forces is prone to misperception. Observing events and showing presence from a distance may have a positive influence on a crisis, but they may also worsen 

the situation. The signal perceived in naval presence can lead to very different interpretations about reasons and intentions. In a crisis situation, potential enemies might fear 

an intervention because of ships’ presence; this perception can lead either to reluctance 

to continue the fighting or resolution to escalate an already tense situation. Another 

problem is the duration of the deployments. Even a carrier group, despite its ability to 

replenish, refuel, and rearm at sea, can sustain itself for only a certain period before it 

needs access to a base, at least for the replenishment ships supporting it; also, replacements on station are required periodically to allow opportunities for major repairs and 

crew rest. While not a problem for short-term crises and conflicts, this becomes an issue 

if the crisis and tensions persist. Naval vessels, particularly aircraft carriers, are also 

very vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, especially to missiles, is one of the aircraft 

carrier’s main weaknesses.27

Decisiveness

“Maritime power is such a flexible instrument that it is inevitably the tool of choice, 

whenever circumstances permit, for the government intending the threat or use of limited force. On the other hand, its value in total war has declined.”28 This quotation from 

Cable dates back many years, but the use of exclusively naval forces in full-scale wars 

has decreased even more since the demise of the Soviet Union. Because the USN faces 

no equal competitor, its role has changed mostly to supporting wars on land. Richard 

Betts even says, “The one unique thing naval combat forces can do is fight other bluewater navies. . . . With the exception of war at sea, naval combat power overlaps with 

the capabilities of the other services and fills few gaps that are completely uncovered.”29

He further claims that naval airpower is too expensive and limited in its effects and is 

therefore justifiable only in situations when there is no access to land airfields.

Many scholars agree that in military confrontations, U.S. naval forces rarely achieve 

decisive results on their own.30 However, Don Inbody argues that neither does airpower, 

when it comes to winning a war.31 While sea power and airpower (as well as space power) will play enabling roles, ground forces are necessary to achieve a decisive victory on 

land. But according to Colin Gray, this naval help is very important and may well “provide a decisive edge in war overall.”32 Most importantly, Norman Friedman argues that 

“in the post–Cold War age . . . we are not fighting for our lives; we rarely seek decisive 
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ends. Almost always we seek some limited outcome, which reduces dangers to ourselves. 

We cannot afford unlimited investment in each conflict to achieve the most favorable 

decisive resolution. Agile, mobile, seapower is well suited to such a world. We can gain 

a satisfactory outcome, and then leave when we want or when we must.”33 Thus while 

naval forces might need support to achieve decisive victories, this is hardly a reason to 

dismiss their importance or ignore their other advantages. Ground troops, for their 

part, rely on naval and air forces to bring them to the operation theater. Thus today, no 

full-scale war is fought by one armed service alone—rather, they deploy jointly.

Era of Jointness

The end of the Cold War marked a growing importance for joint operations. The 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 represented a major change in the organization of defense and promoted joint forces. Brooks states that “a major goal of peacetime operation 

should be to work with other services to foster inter-operability between U.S. forces,

especially the Navy, and the air forces, and to a lesser extent, the ground forces, of 

potential coalition partners.”34 The Navy is equipped to transport other military forces 

to desired destinations and to support land operations. Because naval forces are often 

the first to arrive at a crisis location, they possess the military capabilities to secure the 

environment and prepare for the arrival of other forces.35 Once other military services 

have reached the theater, naval forces can switch to a supporting function.36 While this 

latter role is important, the U.S. Marine Corps and Army are to a certain extent capable 

of sustaining their own land operations and can receive support from the Air Force 

instead of the USN.37 Today important Navy missions such as worldwide presence and 

deployments to support foreign policy are no longer solely naval in character. The Army 

and Air Force have also served as political U.S. foreign-policy tools; despite all their 

advantages, navies are not the only military forces employed in MOOTW.38 Exercising with foreign armed forces, deploying mobile-training or humanitarian-assistance 

teams, and sending logistical aircraft and attachés are only a few of the examples. Especially the Air Force has been more frequently deployed for humanitarian responses, at 

about ten times the rate of the other services.39 While the Navy and the Army are clearly 

distinct services, the Air Force has certain characteristics and capabilities in common 

with naval forces.

Sea and Air

The Navy and the Air Force, ever since the establishment of the latter as a separate service, have been in constant competition. Roy Walker and Larry Ridolfi find that “we no 

longer always need to wait for the power of the U.S. Navy to steam to the area to defend 

our interests in littoral areas which coincidentally place the fleet within range of enemy 
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mines or shore-to-ship weapons. Land based airpower can be anywhere in the world 

in a matter of hours. The historic notion that only ships are needed to extend maritime 

influence has ended.”40 These authors claim the Air Force can perform equally well in 

maritime operations. They list functions ranging from projecting power ashore and 

controlling sea lines of communication to bottling up enemy shipping, attacking and 

sinking enemy ships, and conducting maritime interdiction operations. They come to 

the radical conclusion that the advantages of airpower render the Navy obsolete:

The Revolution in Military Affairs has placed the ship as a weapon of war in the same position 

as a Knight from the Middle Ages. Knights were well trained and armed; expensive to maintain. 

Along came cheap Longbow technology[,] which pierced a Knight’s defenses. European battlefields 

were quickly covered with expensive casualties. The era of Knights came to an end. Navies are well 

armed and expensively manned. Today, we have the potential for a new innovative use of high tech 

airpower and missiles. Should the next battleground be covered with sacrificial ships?41

Not many critics go as far. Inbody locates the main advantages of the Air Force in accuracy, speed, and range.42 Surged from the United States, air forces travel much faster than 

sea forces.43 But they require highly technical support and need prepared airfields, which 

are highly vulnerable to attack. The safety of the sea in comparison to bases ashore; 

independence from the need for access rights by host countries; mobility and endurance; 

and the ability to deliver accurate air strikes, conduct blockades and port-denial attacks, 

interdict commerce, move large numbers of personnel and volumes of matériel, and insert and aid ground forces are the main advantages of naval forces, according to Inbody. 

He identifies the biggest disadvantages of sea power as the challenge of protecting supply 

lines and vulnerability to long-range aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and cruise 

missiles. However, control of the sea and air can minimize these threats. Inbody considers it very important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of both the Navy 

and the Air Force and to employ the two services accordingly. Both can be successful 

in limited wars and interventions, but as mentioned previously, in a full-scale war they 

need the support of ground troops. Overall, Inbody argues that naval forces offer more 

advantages than air forces and in particular are better suited for coercion but that the 

Air Force is more useful for achieving strategic effects. He concludes “that, applied correctly with its full range of capabilities (which includes air, sea, and land components), 

sea power can bring an enemy to its knees while air power cannot.”

It is important to note that despite the competition between these two services, they 

operate jointly and support each other. Good examples are joint pilot training and aerial 

refueling of Navy aircraft by the Air Force.44 This integration of the Navy and Air Force 

in aerial strike warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon in American military experience. 

For more than two centuries the Navy operated independently on the high seas and so 

became accustomed to functioning independently and self-reliantly. The nation’s sea 

service was forward deployed from the beginning of its existence, and throughout most 
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of the Cold War it was, Benjamin Lambeth writes, the only service that was “‘out there,’ 

in and above the maritime commons and ready for action.”45

But the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the Navy that its environment had changed—

the capacity to fight open-ocean battles was no longer relevant. In that conflict the USN 

faced no surface forces or aerial threat.46 Lacking a significant precision-strike capability, naval strike aviation was denied certain targets during Operation Desert Storm, 

targets that were assigned to the Air Force instead. Over the next years, however, the 

several Iraq operations brought the two services closer together. Land-based and seabased fighters jointly enforced the no-fly zones, in what Lambeth calls an “aerial strike 

policing function.”47 After 9/11, the lack of access to land bases in Southwest Asia led to 

the creation of sea bases, with deep-strike capability to project power. The fact is that

for the first time in the history of joint warfare, Operation Enduring Freedom showed real synergies in Air Force and Navy conduct of integrated strike operations. Navy fighters escorted Air 

Force bombers into Afghan airspace until allied air supremacy was established. For its part, the 

Air Force (along with the [United Kingdom’s] RAF [Royal Air Force]) provided roughly 80 percent 

of the tanker support . . . that allowed Navy carrier-based fighters to reach central and northern 

Afghanistan. That support, in turn, enabled sea-based strikes far beyond littoral limits, as well as a 

sustained carrier-based strike-fighter presence over remote target areas for hours if needed for oncall strikes on [time-sensitive targets].48

As can be seen, naval forces show both similarities to and differences from other 

military forces. In order to analyze the role naval forces play in crisis response, it is 

also fundamental to understand general naval functions as defined by national policy. 

Shedding light on the unique capabilities they can offer in the context of crisis management will be important for the theoretical background of seaborne crisis response. We 

have defined naval crisis response as a peacetime activity. The remainder of this chapter 

presents a more general introduction into the functions of naval forces, highlighting 

their important role in activities short of wars and placing them in a historical context.

Functions of the U.S. Navy

There are many ways to categorize and describe naval responsibilities. Booth offers 

a good introductory example, characterizing the functions of navies as the sides of a 

triangle: a diplomatic role (negotiation, manipulation, and prestige), a military role (balance of power and projection of force), and a policing role (coast-guard responsibilities 

and nation building).49

General Naval Functions

The Navy’s diplomatic responsibilities are concerned with most aspects of foreign policy 

short of the use of force. Bargaining, such as occurs in negotiations, aims to persuade a 

target state to act in the desired manner. The military capabilities of countries affect and 
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shape the thinking and choices of their political leaders and policy makers. Manipulation attempts to change the political calculations of the target state by granting or 

withholding rewards. Booth describes military aid as one of the most important tools 

used to influence foreign governments. Prestige is mostly a useful by-product of naval 

activities—for example, port visits, aid, and events hosted on board ship in foreign 

harbors. Balance-of-power functions comprise the peacetime activities of the military 

role. Deterrence (conventional and nuclear), defense, and maintenance of good order at 

sea fall into this category.50

The other aspect of the military role is the use of force. Booth divides the use of force 

at sea into four categories: “General Wars,” “Conventional Wars,” “Limited Wars,” and 

“Guerilla Wars.” The first two categories have not involved naval forces since the end 

of World War II. The U.S. Navy has mostly been concerned with small-scale interventions and limited wars. The deployment of forces to protect interests in conflicts and 

crises has been widely employed. But most Western navies have left the policing role to 

their nations’ coast guards. Policing functions are mainly concerned with extending 

sovereignty as far out as the nation’s maritime frontiers.51 In Ty Waterman’s words, “In 

modeling naval functions as a combination of diplomatic, military, and policing roles, 

generic coast guard functions fall under the policing role.”52

On the basis of these considerations about limited policing and direct war fighting, the 

following sections describe the functions carried out by U.S. naval forces in some detail.

Specific Functions of the U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy has always had wartime and peacetime functions, but the relative emphasis has varied over time. Although wartime combat missions are the main rationale 

for equipping naval forces, the Navy’s strength and uniqueness lie in employment short 

of full-scale wars.53 As Cable has said, “Anyone who denies the peacetime relevance of 

navies will find himself rather short of recent examples of the traditional wartime battle 

between rival fleets.”54 U.S. naval forces have always engaged in MOOTW and small contingencies, in various environments and with changing technologies.55 Over the years a 

succession of documents have been released discussing the missions of the U.S. Navy. In 

them, not only is the term “strategy” widely debated, but there is also no common agreement as to whether to call “missions” by that name or, instead, “functions,” or “capabilities.” The terms have been used interchangeably.56 But if naval and maritime visions, 

concepts, and strategies have shifted over time, core missions have remained constant.

There are many different characterizations of the purposes and contents of the documents. In 2009, Peter Swartz developed a comprehensive report discussing all major 

naval documents released since 1970. Figure 1 shows the capstone documents since 
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1970. Figure 2 lists the most important of these documents and the core capabilities 

defined in them.57

The more than twenty-five “capstone” documents that have been published since 1970 

have made it clear that the global environment and the challenges facing the United 

States have changed and that different functions have gained priority and others are 

no longer regarded as vital. What has remained consistent are what Stansfield Turner 

listed in 1974 as the four missions of the U.S. Navy.58 The “classic four” have proved to 

Figure 1

Major Capstone Documents since 1970 (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 

Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, p. 745)

Name Missions

Project Sixty (1970) 4 categories of USN capabilities (“classic 4”)

Missions of the USN (1974) 4 missions (“classic 4”)

NWP 1 (Rev. A) (1978) 2 functions (sea control, power projection); 3 roles (including strategic 

nuclear deterrence); presence a side benefit

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

The Maritime Strategy (1986) 3 primary missions (sea control, power projection, sealift)

The Way Ahead (1991)

The Navy Policy Book (1992) 20 characteristics of naval operations, including “classic 4,” sealift

. . . From the Sea (1992) 6 capabilities (“classic 4,” crises, sealift)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994) 10 characteristics of “what we do,” including “classic 4”

Forward . . . From the Sea (1994) 5 fundamental and enduring roles (“classic 4” + sealift)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)

Anytime, Anywhere (1997) 4 broad missions (sea control the prerequisite)

NSPG II (1999–2000) 10-part multilevel model, including “classic 4” missions

SP 21 & Global CONOPS (2002) 5 enduring missions (“classic 4” + strategic sealift)

Naval Power 21 (2002)

NOCJO (2003)

Fleet Response Plan (2003)

NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)

NOP 2006 (2006) 13 naval missions, including “classic 4”; no sealift

NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)

Cooperative Strategy (2007) 6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” + MSO, HA/DR); no sealift

NSG ISO PR 11 (2007)

NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1) (2008)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)

NSP ISO POM 12 

NOP 2010
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be enduring and are still relevant today, although new functions have been added. The 

following discussion of U.S. naval missions is based on Turner’s categorization.59

•	 Sea control

•	 Projection of power ashore

•	 Naval presence

•	 Strategic deterrence. 

Figure 2

Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 

Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47)

PROJECT SIXTY (1970) MISSIONS OF THE US NAVY (1974)

4 Capabilities 4 missions/mission areas

l Assured second strike l Strategic deterrence

o Control of sea lines & areas/sea control o Sea control

n Projection of power ashore n Projection of power (ashore)

u Overseas presence in peacetime u Naval presence

NWP 1 (REV A) (1978) THE MARITIME STRATEGY (1986)

2 functions 3 primary missions

o Sea control o Sea control

n Power projection n Power projection

v Sealift

. . . FROM THE SEA (1992) FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA (1994)

6 capabilities 5 fundamental & enduring roles

u Forward deployment/presence n Projection of power from sea to land

l Strategic deterrence o Sea control and maritime supremacy

o Control of the seas l Strategic deterrence

w Crisis response v Strategic sealift

n Project precise power u Forward naval presence

v Sealift

ANYTIME, ANYWHERE (1997) SEA POWER 21 (2002)

4 broad missions 5 enduring missions

o Sea and area control o Sea control

n Power projection n Power projection

u Presence l Strategic deterrence

l Deterrence v Strategic sealift

u Forward presence
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The newest (at this writing) documents—such as A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century

Seapower (CS21), and the Naval Operations Concept—enlarge on the original four core 

missions, notably with the additions of security operations, humanitarian assistance, 

and disaster relief, as well as cyber and space capabilities.60 I will discuss these recent 

developments after analyzing the four core missions. The following models show 

Figure 2

Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 

Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47), continued

NAVAL OPERATIONS CONCEPT (2006) COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY 

SEAPOWER (2007)

13 naval missions 6 expanded core capabilities

u Forward naval presence u Forward presence

w Crisis response l Deterrence

n Expeditionary power projection o Sea Control

t Maritime security operations n Power projection

o Sea control t Maritime security

l Deterrence Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Security cooperation

Civil-military operations

Counterinsurgency

Counterterrorism

Counterproliferation

Air and missile defense

Information operation

NAVAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ISO PR 11 

(2007)

6 core capabilities: 6 additional capabilities

Enabling capabilities Warfare capabilities

l Deterrence l Deterrence

Humanitarian assistance & 

disaster relief

o Sea control

u Forward presence n Power projection

Sea basing t Maritime security

Cyber superiority Maritime BMD

Global awareness Cyber superiority

Space superiority Space superiority

Naval expeditionary 

logistics

n	Power projection o Sea control l Deterrence u Forward presence v Sealift 

t	Maritime security w Crisis response
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alternative permutations of crisis response within the different possibilities, in order to 

situate crisis response and the Navy’s core capabilities. Generally, sea control and power 

projection are categorized as war-fighting capabilities and forward presence and deterrence as peacetime functions. The relationships between the missions themselves are 

not part of the models.

Crisis is located between war and peace, though realistically the three are not completely separate. In a crisis, all four naval functions are important tools. Although most 

important in the categories of war and crisis, sea control facilitates the Navy’s routine 

activities in peace as well. Presence is not necessary in war, but reaction times are 

shorter if ships are already close by at the outbreak. Also, familiarity with the environment greatly helps in any operation. Deterrence pertains only to crisis and peace. If war 

breaks out, deterrence has failed, although it could be argued that further escalation 

might be deterred. Power projection might become necessary in a crisis, but only in a 

limited form. Model 1 (see figure 3) situates crisis in between war and peace but overlapping with both, while Model 2 (again, see figure 3) depicts crisis response as part of 

peacetime and distinct from war. As Bouchard states, “national objectives are achieved 

through political impact, and, if necessary, the direct military impact, of war-fighting 

capabilities brought to bear at the scene of a crisis.”61 Although crisis response includes 

tasks such as power projection, not otherwise employed in peacetime, the two categories 

differ in degree—it is possible to describe the power projection in crisis as a “mild” form 

Power

Projection Presence Presence

Deterrence

Power

Projection

Sea Control Sea Control Deterrence

War Crisis Peace War Crisis Peace

Figure 3

Crisis Model 1 and 2: Crisis Part of War and Peace and Crisis Part of Peace
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of power projection and therefore clearly distinct from wartime. Although it is often 

difficult to draw a clear line between nonwar and war, I argue that the level of intensity 

is lower in crisis response and thus it should be seen as separate from war.

Sea Control. Sea control has been the central mission for naval forces for a long time. In 

1977 the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James L. Holloway III, defined sea control as 

“the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy, . . . [connoting] control of designated air, 

surface, and subsurface areas.”62 It secures free usage of the sea while denying—or, more 

realistically, limiting—the adversary’s use of the sea.63 “Sea control” replaced the expressions “command of the sea” and “control of the sea.” The difference between “control of 

the sea” and “sea control” would seem minor but the change, according to Turner, was a 

deliberate one, meant to reflect the impact of technological innovations on previous notions of control, notably in air and submarine warfare.64 Sea control no longer connotes 

absolute control everywhere and at all times but rather in limited areas and for particular periods of time. “Nowadays force can be used on, over or under the sea to protect 

or to deny a particular use of the sea.”65 But even Alfred Thayer Mahan was not writing 

about absolute but rather working command—absolute command in a certain area at a 

certain time.66

Sea denial, another term closely related to sea control, focuses mostly on denying the 

enemy the use of the sea; it is often the strategy chosen by weaker navies. For Mahan 

and other influential naval strategists, gaining control of the sea was a necessary first 

step in exploiting an advantage.67 The views of these theorists varied as to what forms 

gaining control of the sea might take—for example, commerce protection, interdiction of the sea lines of communication, for guerre de course, or for power projection 

at sea or ashore. In Mahan’s view, control of the sea in war meant the destruction of 

the enemy’s fleet. This, he argued, should be the exclusive focus of the Navy. Gained 

control of the sea would bring economic rewards, maintaining free access to the 

resources of the world while at the same time denying access to the enemy, thereby 

strangling his economy.68

Although navies operate on water, their actions are mostly reactions to events on land. 

The earliest navies only had one mission—command of the sea. It was because of Rome’s 

control over the western Mediterranean during the Second Punic War (218–202 bc) that 

Carthage was unable to reinforce the army under Hannibal that was ravaging the Italian 

Peninsula. Subsequently, control of the sea became vital as well for commerce protection 

and for military expeditions. It was crucial not only to secure free usage of the seas but 

also to deny it to the enemy, for both commercial and military reasons.

According to Turner, there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and 

missions since the 1970s.69 Since World War II, there have been no major battles at sea.70
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This has affected the role of the USN. Its primary missions today focus much more 

on influence from the sea than at sea, a perspective emphasizing power projection 

ashore.71 Nevertheless, as James Ellis says, “Maritime supremacy will provide the ability 

to use the oceans as a bridge to its friends, a barrier to its enemies, a source of bountiful resources, and a bastion from which to wield power.”72 Geoffrey Till calls the sea a 

“strategic highroad.”73 Around three-quarters of the earth is covered by seawater, and 

about the same percentage of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, within two 

hundred miles of the shore. Eighty percent of the world’s capital cities, as well as the 

most important trading centers and states that are military powers, are located within 

this area.74 Around 90 percent of world trade travels by sea. It is therefore not surprising 

that control over the seas always has been afforded a very high value.

Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade of the world 

commands the riches of the World, and consequently the world itself.75

Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in 

the world . . . [and] is the chief among the merely material elements on the power and prosperity of 

nations.76

Although these quotes date back to the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively, they are still valid today.

The following incident highlights the benefits of sea control in a crisis. In May 1958, 

Lebanon experienced a crisis in which riots among political and religious factions 

threatened the government. The Lebanese president requested U.S. help to control the 

situation. Washington was at first hesitant, but a revolt in Iraq in July 1958, triggered 

by an army coup against the Hashemite government in Baghdad, led President Dwight 

D. Eisenhower to approve Operation Blue Bat in Lebanon. All branches of the U.S. 

armed forces were involved. Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in 

Beirut, stabilize the country, and protect American citizens. Deployed U.S. naval forces 

comprised seventy vessels, including the three aircraft carriers USS Saratoga (CV 60),

Wasp (CV 18), and Essex (CV 9), as well as heavy cruiser USS Des Moines (CA 134), the 

guided-missile heavy cruiser Boston (CAG 9), and twenty-eight destroyers. The entire 

Sixth Fleet supported the operation, especially through the landing of the Marines. Its 

tasks included patrol, reconnaissance, and transportation by carrier aviation of Marines 

who needed to be evacuated.

This incident clearly demonstrated the Sixth Fleet’s dominance in the Mediterranean. 

Soviet naval forces in the proximity were capable of challenging neither U.S. influence 

in this crisis nor the Sixth Fleet’s control over the Mediterranean. The Navy’s readiness 

played an important role; in contrast, U.S. Air Force and Army units were unable to 

react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the 

order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to advance from its base in 
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Turkey.77 This example also shows how closely power projection and sea control are 

connected.78 Naturally, most crisis examples “fit” more than just one mission, as they 

are all interlinked.

Projection of Power Ashore. Projection of power ashore is the use of naval forces against 

land forces and targets. In the words of Till “maritime power projection involves the 

use of seaborne military forces directly to influence events on land. Whereas the area 

of sea control is on, under and over the sea, power projection ashore manifests itself 

in the naval influence on events ashore. For Corbett this is the ultimate justification for 

having navies.”79

Turner divides power projection ashore into three categories, Friedman into four, 

as shown in the figure.80 Through his three categories, Turner sees navies attempting to 

achieve the following four objectives: “to secure territory from which a land campaign 

can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure land area from which an air operation 

can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure selected territory or facilities to prevent 

enemy use of them[;] . . . [t]o destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, 

divert his effort, et cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.”81

Tactical air and naval bombardment are employed to influence happenings ashore 

directly. These bombardments can be delivered in support of troops operating near 

the coast or for interdiction and pursuit close to the shore. Tactical air projection aims 

at destroying the enemy’s war-making potential and hinders his movement, while 

facilitating the movement of one’s own troops. Power projection is most efficient when 

the targets are close to the shore or within the radius of carrier-launched aircraft.82 Till 

identifies eight specific goals of maritime power projection:83

Turner (1974) Friedman (2001)

1.Amphibious assault 1. Traditional (control of offshore shipping, 

e.g., embargo)

2.Naval bombardment 2.Discrete strikes (e.g., air raid on Tripoli, 

1986)

3. Tactical air (strikes by carrier-based tactical 

aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles).

3. Sustained air attacks (usually in support of 

other operations, e.g., Kosovo)

4. Landing Marines.

(1) Determining the outcome of a 

conflict

(2) Opening new operational fronts

(3) Direct support of the land forces

(4) Force displacement

(5) Economic warfare

(6) Seizing or attacking naval bases and 

ports

(7) Forcing an inferior adversary to fight

(8) Political coercion.
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In the post–Cold War era, power projection has become more difficult. The increasing 

need to move into the littorals to influence events on land or to support the operations 

of other services ashore poses a great risk of enemy attack on naval forces.84 But Admiral 

Gary Roughead, when Chief of Naval Operations (2007–2011), praised the USN’s forceprojection capabilities in times of war and peace. As his statement shows, even power 

projection is not confined to the use of force:

We project power in a variety of ways. We can do it from our aircraft carriers of which they are 

always deployed. We can do it in the form of missiles that come off of our cruisers and destroyers 

or submarines, but we in the Navy have also another unique relationship in that we project power 

with the United States Marine Corps with our amphibious ships and the Marines that launch either 

on the sea or in the air for whatever operations they need to take part. And that power projection 

doesn’t always mean that it’s a forceful power. Consider for example, in the last couple of weeks a 

Navy and Marine Corps task group, amphibious ready group happened to be operating in the Western Pacific. The range hit the Philippines, the earthquake hit Indonesia, and a tsunami hit Samoa. 

That amphibious ready group was there; they were global, they were forward, they were ready; they 

projected their power in a humanitarian way; and split themselves apart. Some went to the Philippines, some went to Indonesia and then some operated in and around Samoa to render humanitarian assistance.85

American retaliatory strikes in 1998 in response to attacks on U.S. embassies in East 

Africa constitute an exemplary use of forceful power projection ashore. On 7 August 

1998, the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were the targets 

of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded 

more than five thousand. Shortly thereafter, the United States identified al-Qa'ida as 

the primary suspect and accused the Taliban in Afghanistan of allowing Osama Bin 

Laden and al-Qa'ida to operate freely. Although the United States received international 

support in condemning the embassy attacks, the Taliban refused to comply with its 

request to hand over Bin Laden. On 20 August, U.S. forces executed retaliatory air and 

cruise-missile strikes in Operation Infinite Reach against terrorist training grounds 

in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan. Allegedly this pharmaceutical factory, in Sudan’s 

capital, Khartoum, was capable of producing chemical weapons and was collaborating 

with al-Qa'ida. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and involved a number 

of naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Seas.86 The surface combatants and nuclearpowered attack submarine (SSN) that fired the cruise missiles, Tomahawks, had been in 

the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks. Infinite Reach highlights the limited use of 

force to achieve an objective and supports Booth’s observation that killing and fighting 

are not the Navy’s foremost functions: “Military strategy is not the science of military 

victory but the diplomacy of violence.”87

The next two naval functions to be discussed—naval presence and deterrence—are 

primarily political uses of naval forces in which actual force plays only a secondary role. 

As Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense (1993–94), said, “Our naval forces should be 

sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important 
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tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this 

mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence 

and crisis control.”88

Naval Presence. The term “naval presence,” as a mission, was first defined by Turner 

in 1974—the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. Naval 

presence had been exercised before, but its characterization as a separate mission was 

new. In the Maritime Strategy of 1986, the mission of “forward presence” encompassed 

earlier concepts of naval forces as instruments of foreign policy and of “naval presence.” 

Today the Navy states on its website, “The U.S. Navy is engaged. And engaged means 

being there.”89 Forward presence comprises forward-stationed and rotationally deployed 

forces. The former are dependent on the goodwill and permission of friends and allies. 

The latter are homeported on U.S. territory and are deployed as necessary to guarantee 

a continuous presence. Both forms of presence can symbolize U.S. interest or concern 

and demonstrate to friends and enemies alike where U.S. global interests lie. Forward 

presence by U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs), expeditionary strike 

groups (ESGs), and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) helps secure national interests 

overseas. As William Cohen, former secretary of defense (1997–2001), once declared, 

“If you don’t have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a voice, less of an 

influence.”90

Till stresses the difference between presence and “existence”—that is, the simple possession of a fleet. Presence, he argues, can take various forms, from routine operations 

to demonstrate interest or periodic deployments, but in any case deploys forces actively 

around the globe, whereas “existence” does not necessarily imply “forward.”91 Similarly, 

Bud Jones defines the objective of military presence as exerting influence and thus as 

requiring more than “just being present.”92 According to Frank Uhlig, Jr., through naval 

presence a force can pose a threat of the following:

•	 Amphibious assault

•	 Air attack, bombardment

•	 Blockade and exposure through reconnaissance.93

Commander James McNulty identifies seven specific roles for naval forces during a 

presence mission:

1. Supporting U.S. international military commitments, such as the NATO alliance, 

with forward-deployed forces;

2. Confirming on a routine basis U.S. political commitments to other nations, by showing the flag in port visits and holding joint exercises with other navies;
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3. Demonstrating the capability of U.S. naval forces to act in support of national 

interests;

4. Asserting continuing U.S. interest in important areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf;

5. Demonstrating war-fighting capabilities in a tension area to deter potential opponents and serving as an instrument of crisis management, such as by signaling U.S. 

intentions;

6. Providing humanitarian aid; and

7. Coercing an opponent to comply with a preferred course of action.94

As this list shows, the presence mission has been defined as covering the full range of 

naval missions short of wartime actions.95 Such capabilities as showing the flag, signaling, and coercion lie on a continuum from peace to war. As James Miskel states, “naval 

presence is as much a diplomatic as it is a military function.”96 Naval forces have to be 

forward deployed to influence events and to be able to react immediately. Robert Work 

underlines the importance of forward-deployed and -stationed forces to support U.S. 

foreign policy and calls for the establishment of seven “global fleet stations,” in the 

Caribbean/east coast of South America, the west coast of Africa, the east coast of Africa, 

Southwest/South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the western Pacific/Oceania.97 The 

deployment of naval forces overseas is an important part of the U.S. national strategy, 

demonstrating presence year-round, not only during times of hostilities. The presence 

of naval forces of any size can signal concern. Turner emphasized the importance of 

sending the right force at the right time: “Naval Presence can be enormously useful in 

complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but 

firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to 

war.”98 This function of presence provides the link to deterrence. The 2010 Naval Operations Concept (known as NOP 2010) describes the changes of forward presence: “Originally conducted to protect U.S. merchant shipping, promote overseas trade, and support 

diplomacy, over time the basis of our forward presence operations has evolved and 

expanded to include crisis response as well as conventional and nuclear deterrence.”99

An illustration of the benefits of presence (and deterrence) is the crisis in Lebanon of

1982. Israel attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. The rapid progress of the invasion 

deepened the crisis for Syria. Israel and Syria agreed on a cease-fire with the help of 

U.S. mediation, but fighting erupted again on 11 June. The Mediterranean Amphibious 

Ready Group (MARG) was ordered to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean in June, and 

the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for 
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possible evacuation of American and other foreign nationals from Beirut. Kennedy was 

relieved on 17 June by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69). The U.S. embassy, advising 

all American citizens to leave Lebanon, closed on 24 June. U.S. nationals were evacuated and transported to ships of the Sixth Fleet, which took them to Cyprus. In July 

the United States halted military aid to Israel to demonstrate its disapproval of Israel’s 

activities. In August the situation worsened, and the MARG stood ready for deployment as part of a peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from 

Beirut. By September, with the help of U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syria and Israel 

was resolved. On 22 September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon, together with two 

aircraft carriers, to support U.S. Marines ashore. On 2 January 1983 USS America (CV

66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon, where it was relieved by USS Nimitz (CV 68) on 

the 20th. In February the U.S. alert level was lowered, but the United States remained 

actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to Lebanon if necessary. Direct 

talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under American auspices led to a 

peace agreement in May 1983.

The presence of U.S. (and other nations’) naval forces had helped limit the conflict by 

preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also 

supported the diplomatic efforts of the United States, not least by providing helicopter 

transportation for the mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.100

Yet not everybody supports forward presence. Brooks points to the possible negative 

effects of constant U.S. naval presence. The permanent stationing of the U.S. Navy in 

a particular region signals the importance of that region to the United States, but the 

demonstrated resolve may become taken for granted and thus exert only limited influence. Moreover, it may even have a reverse effect—if forces are withdrawn temporarily, 

their absence may be more visible than their extended presence and create the impression that the United States is losing interest.101 Daniel Gouré criticizes the shaping function of forward presence as not well defined and empirically unprovable.102 He even calls 

naval forward presence a “tyranny” overstretching naval capabilities, since the USN 

does not dispose of a sufficient number of ships to meet all the demands.

Deterrence. Sea control, projection of power ashore by amphibious means, and naval 

presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.103 After the war 

two new missions—tactical airpower in support of land campaigns (as an addition to 

projection of power ashore) and strategic deterrence—were added. Deterrence threatens 

the use of force by conditioning forceful actions on the part of the opponent. As Robert 

Art has said, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”104 Naval 

forces are used to persuade the adversary not to do something by demonstrating that 

the likely costs may well outweigh the expected benefits. According to Turner, strategic 
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deterrence missions are employed “to deter all-out attack on the United States or its 

allies; to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat 

of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.”105 Till 

names two forms of deterrence: “The mere existence in an area of a capable naval force 

loitering with intent in international waters near an area of concern may be all that is required. Or naval forces may be ostentatiously surged into the area to bring the prospective adversary to realize the error of his way. Here the naval advantage most of value for 

purposes of deterrence is their speed and strategic mobility.”106

It is important to note that deterrence is based on the potential rather than the actual 

use of force and is highly dependent on the enemy’s reaction. Because deterrence is essentially psychological, the naval forces involved need to have the necessary capabilities 

to convince the adversary. The more powerful the ships (in general), the more successfully deterrence works. Thus the deterrence function is linked with the scale of military 

power, and the deployment of strong naval forces underlines the willingness to use these 

forces if necessary.107 The ability to deter by the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear 

weapons at sea is the most extreme case (nuclear deterrence). Since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, conventional deterrence has supplanted the Cold War focus on nuclear 

deterrence. Michael Gerson distinguishes between deterrence by punishment (mostly 

precision strikes) and the more common form, deterrence by denial.108 The latter frustrates the adversary’s hostile objectives by signaling: “Deterrence is best served when the 

attacker believes that his only alternative is a protracted war: The threat of a war of attrition is the bedrock of conventional deterrence.”109 Gerson emphasizes the importance of 

both strategies:

Some adversaries are more likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and others by the threat 

of denial. For example, some leaders may believe that they can simply withstand or “ride out” whatever punishment the opponent’s conventional forces can inflict. For these regimes, threats to deny 

success may be a more potent deterrent than threats of punishment. On the other hand, some aggressors may convince themselves that US conventional forces will not be able to successfully deny 

their objectives. These leaders may believe that they can achieve their aims in spite of the opposing 

conventional power because they have greater resolve and are willing to fight longer and harder, and 

accept greater casualties. Often, they base this resolve on the belief that they can achieve their goals 

before substantial US conventional power arrives, a fait accompli.

110

“Compellence” is closely related to deterrence. Compellence is the use of threats to 

make a target stop an action it has already undertaken or take an action that the coercer 

wants. Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target believes that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats 

will have a great impact on the target).111 In general, deterrence aims at preventing an 

unwanted action from taking place by showing the costs of those actions, whereas compellence is specific and active, intended to oblige an adversary to act according to the 
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wishes of the “compelling” party, usually to reverse an action already begun.112 Despite 

this distinction, some argue that there are no major differences between the two strategies. According to Edward Luttwak, both belong to the realm of “coercive suasion,” a 

term that underscores the use of the direct threat and suggests an affinity with coercive 

diplomacy.113 “It boils down to the assertion that it is more difficult to compel than it is 

to deter since (1) moves are more difficult to reverse than prevent in that the moves to 

be stopped or reversed may have acquired their own ‘tactical’ and political momentum 

and (2) public compliance with others’ demands would entail additional losses in the 

way of prestige. The underlying working principles and requirement of both strategies 

are the same.”114 However, deterrence is passive and preventive, whereas compellence is 

active and offensive, usually involving the threatened or actual use of force. Compellence offers an alternative crisis response to unforeseen crises that, by definition, cannot 

be deterred.115

It is very difficult to measure the direct impact of deterrence. In the Iraq/Kuwait crisis 

of 1994 the presence of naval forces is said to have exerted a deterrent effect. The crisis 

had its origin in an Iraqi troop deployment toward the Kuwaiti border on 7 October. 

The United States responded within a day, deploying the aircraft carrier Eisenhower,

accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles, to demonstrate resolve and deter Iraq from crossing the border. Air Force and Navy units already in the 

area as part of Operation Southern Watch were now assigned to a new operation, 

Vigilant Warrior. Additional vessels supporting Vigilant Warrior included 

the USS George Washington (CVN 73) battle group, USS Tripoli (LPH 10), an amphibious ready group, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (or 

MEU[SOC]), and Military Sealift Command ships.116 The U.S. commitment to Saudi 

Arabia was reaffirmed, and Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 October. The crisis ended 

on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed a declaration of “Iraq’s recognition of 

the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence.” The United States increased its military strength in the region so as to respond 

quickly to future threats.

As this introduction into the core naval functions demonstrates, all four functions play 

important roles in naval crisis response. The recent past, however, has brought about 

significant changes in the strategic environment. In order to understand the future of 

naval crisis response, it is important to take new realities into account.

Recent Transformations and Challenges

We have gone from a blue-water Navy, which is clearly where we were 

before the [Berlin] Wall came down, to a Navy that has vastly expanded 
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its mission sets in a world that’s much more uncertain, much more 

unpredictable, and in a world that I believe the Navy and the Marine 

Corps have the ability and the maneuverability to be out and about.

Admiral Michael Mullen, 2006, then Chief of Naval Operations

As at the end of the Cold War, the events on 9/11 caused a shift in the strategic environment, leading to a new emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and asymmetric operations.117 The global war on terror (GWOT) and the emergence of new security threats 

have influenced naval responsibilities.

The Twenty-First-Century Navy

In 2007 the National Research Council released a document identifying three roles for 

naval forces to support the GWOT efforts: “forward presence, maritime operations, 

and homeland defense.” These roles require three critical naval capabilities: maritime 

domain awareness (or MDA, which includes increased maritime intelligence), command and control, and naval force protection. In a 2009 report for Congress, Ronald 

O’Rourke presented a more detailed list of actual USN operations in CT missions.118 He 

highlighted the importance of joint operations of the three U.S. sea forces, emphasizing 

homeland defense. Other important points he raised include Tomahawk cruise-missile 

attacks, SEAL operations, and surveillance by naval forces, as well as MDA and protection of forward-deployed naval vessels. The Navy, he argued, is less concerned with 

preventing terrorists from carrying out attacks at sea than with denying them the use of 

the seas. Terrorists resort to the oceans and waterways to move people, resources, and 

money in relative anonymity. As Joshua Lasky says, “attacks at sea have little chance of 

attracting maximum public attention, achieving significant loss of life, and are significantly complicated by reasonably good security measures, thus hold little value. The 

challenge for the U.S. Navy and all U.S. Navy naval forces is to detect, monitor, and 

interdict or facilitate the interdiction of terrorists, or prevent terrorism related use of the 

vast maritime domain.”119 Low-intensity, irregular warfare (IW), and counterterrorism 

are important challenges for the Navy, generally trained as it is in conventional warfare. 

Further, the Navy has responded with sea basing, global partnerships, intensified interservice collaboration, and expansion of expeditionary missions. The service has also 

taken into account new technologies and weapons, and the need to replace ships, as well 

as new challenges—for example, maritime security and the emergence of new maritime 

powers—especially China.

In early 2006, in reaction to the increased demand for expeditionary missions and to 

support the six core missions later put forward in CS21, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was established. NECC “provides a full spectrum of operations, 
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including effective waterborne and ashore antiterrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”120 The 

grouping of forces known as the expeditionary strike group, comprising amphibious 

ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was developed. The nature of expeditionary 

missions allows fast reactions aimed at shaping the world order. The forces employed are 

sea based; they “come from the sea and return to the sea [and are] sustained from the 

sea.”121 Most expeditionary operations are executed in a littoral environment, not on the 

high seas. Expeditionary forces need high-grade equipment and skills that are specific 

to their particular tasks and operational area. The development of littoral combat ships 

(LCSs) and advances in riverine warfare demonstrate that the U.S. Navy is preparing for 

the new challenges, where in the past the Navy was predominantly focused on bluewater operations.122 The ESG broadens the response capabilities of seaborne forces. They 

are capable of operating independently in low-to-medium-threat environments, thereby 

increasing the fleet’s responsiveness and strategic impact, especially when aircraft carriers are scarce. NOP 2010 highlighted the value of naval expeditionary capabilities in enabling and supporting joint force efforts to combat conventional and irregular threats. 

In 2008 the Navy Irregular Warfare Office was established, to “institutionalize current 

ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal 

defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].”123

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the USN has been heavily engaged in the Persian Gulf 

and Arabian Sea in support of the Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Navy personnel are also involved ashore in the two theaters. Robert C. Rubel highlights Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a good example of the use 

of sea basing, as the initial phase of this operation was almost entirely supported by a 

naval task force.124 But the lack of suitable bases had already become apparent in earlier 

conflicts, such as the first Persian Gulf War (1990), Bosnia, and Kosovo.125 Securing access to foreign land bases or permission to maintain naval bases in foreign countries is 

becoming steadily more difficult—most countries do not allow the United States to base 

military personnel on their soil. Additionally, land bases are increasingly vulnerable to 

attack.126

The Navy has responded by shifting to the role “of an offshore weapons platform.”127 Sea 

basing lessens dependence on the support of other countries. The Navy’s “Sea Power 21” 

initiative brought forward three new concepts: “Sea Strike,” the projection of offensive 

power; “Sea Shield,” the projection of defensive power; and “Sea Basing,” the projection of sovereignty.128 The concept of sea basing centers on the use of the ocean to assemble, move, project, support, and sustain forces. In some respects the sea offers many 

advantages over the land. Forces there are less vulnerable to enemy attack, sovereignty 
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concerns and need for access rights can be avoided, and personnel and equipment can 

be transported and withdrawn quickly.129 The need to build logistic stockpiles ashore 

is reduced, sealift is minimized, and joint forces can be positioned forward without 

depending on the goodwill of host nations. Henry Cook highlights too such benefits as 

accelerated deployment times and seaborne positioning.130 Douglas King and John Berry 

point out that sea basing not only functions as a platform but also supports the projection of sea power ashore to influence events.131 Till praises sea-based strategic missiles 

attacks: “Today a fleet operating against the shore is able not only to solve the tasks connected with territorial changes, but directly to influence the course and even outcome 

of a war.”132 Swartz, however, does not view this as a new concept; he points out that the 

Continental Navy landed Marines in the Bahamas, and shore bombardment was used 

against the Barbary States.133 Similarly Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross see Sea 

Power 21 as largely repackaging already existing capabilities.134

While the new terms will advance the technology, then, the underlying ideas are not 

revolutionary. The 9/11 attacks suggested the need to be equipped for long-term operations. The difficulty of executing operations in failed or failing states and the reluctance 

of neutrals or allied countries to allow U.S. military access or overflight rights point 

to the future value of sea basing. The idea of sea basing posits a nonhostile sea environment, and today the USN enjoys broad sea control. Where land-based air support 

is either unavailable (the Falklands, Sierra Leone) or insufficient (Desert Storm, 

Yugoslavia, Afghanistan), fleets can provide fire support (sea-launched cruise missiles, 

carrier-based aviation, and naval gunfire).135 The response to the 2010 earthquake in 

Haiti illustrated this strength. Although the aircraft carrier deployed to Haiti surged 

from the continental United States, it served on arrival as the sea base for an aerial 

rescue mission, most of the infrastructure ashore having been destroyed or badly damaged. Within three days, the carrier was on the scene and ready to act. However, as 

Work says, while sea basing does offer more independence, it is not replacing land bases. 

There are also voices that find the value of sea basing overrated.136 One of the oftenpraised benefits is the reduced dependence on host nations, but Gouré claims that if 

the United States needs land bases, it will find them, and if it meets resistance will 

seize and occupy them.137

The concept of sea basing led to the development of the Global Fleet Station (GFS). In 

October 2007 the Africa Partnership Station (APS) was established in the Gulf of Guinea, where it served as a platform for humanitarian and disaster-relief (HA and DR) operations in the area. The pilot APS mission, which ended in May 2008, laid a foundation 

for conflict prevention. Future deployments were facilitated through the relationships 

the USN built with and between the peoples of the Gulf of Guinea region and by the 

goodwill it created through its HA and DR activities.138 In November 2008 the Southern
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Partnership Station (SPS) mission was established; until April 2009 the USN deployed 

various forces throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. SPS strengthened regional partnerships and maritime security; USN forces conducted training and 

cooperative activities with navies, coast guards, and civilian services.139 Kathi Sohn sees 

this development of sea basing as a broad concept “and its promise and flexibility arise 

from . . . its minimal military footprint ashore and the wide cross-section of professional 

resources that it hosts.”140

Generally, Till notes an increase in coalition operations and a rising concern about the 

maintenance of international security.141 Collaboration between navies is important 

and is much more frequent than land military cooperation. Kaplan attributes that 

to the “brotherhood of the sea.”142 In 2006 Adm. Michael Mullen had announced the 

“Thousand-Ship Navy,” now known as the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), to 

enhance cooperation between the USN and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime 

police forces in identifying common threats and jointly providing security against them, 

as well as in maintaining global maritime security.143 The SPS and APS can be viewed as 

specific measures for promoting global maritime partnership, for supporting U.S. Navy 

engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of security partnership building, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for maritimesecurity operations.

These developments can be traced back to CS21.144 This strategy provided the first 

unified maritime strategy for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, stressing their partnership. To the USN responsibilities for global presence, deterrence, sea 

control, and power projection ashore, this maritime strategy added maritime security, 

humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Another important change is the equal 

priority afforded preventing wars and winning them. According to Wang Baofu, the 

pursuit of absolute military superiority, assuring the defeat of any opponent, has always 

been the core of U.S. military strategy.145 The objective of using military force to prevent 

war has been embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence theory but 

has very rarely been placed at the same level as winning wars in important strategic documents. Nonetheless, Till does not see a major change, since most of the Cold War era 

was spent preventing wars.146 He rather emphasizes the enlarged function of deterrence: 

“The coercive approach of demonstrating denial capabilities against, or promising 

punishment for, prospective wrongdoers has been absorbed into a much wider concept of working against the social, environmental, and economic conditions that make 

wrongdoing more likely.” He also highlights the new profile of HA and DR as a new 

development: “Instead of being something of bonus when the need arises and assets are 

available because there is no decent war to fight elsewhere, the task is accepted as part of 

one of the six strategic imperatives, and the ability to do it has apparently been elevated 
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to equal standing with more traditional core capabilities like forward presence and sea 

control.” Thus the new maritime strategy explicitly emphasizes maritime cooperation 

and naval soft power—a new development, and one viewed very favorably by other nations and navies.

Increased international cooperation is also encouraged by recent operations to protect 

shipping. These maritime security operations aim at securing global commerce and sealanes. Maritime security is now defined as “the creation and maintenance of security 

at sea, which is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, 

weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”147 In the realm of 

maritime security, counterpiracy efforts have become a central focus. In the recent past, 

piracy has seen a stark increase, leading to the launching of multinational antipiracy 

operations in 2008 off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.148 In an impressive 

display of international cooperation, navies from many nations are collaborating to 

protect commercial and other ships from pirate attacks. The European Union, NATO, 

Australia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are among the participants. This collaboration is even more impressive in that some of the involved countries are otherwise 

politically alienated from the United States. Furthering the cooperation with China and 

Russia in the counterpiracy efforts, especially information sharing, is emphasized in the 

“CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Guidance” for 2010.149

New strategic documents, such as the National Security Strategy or the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) for 2010 have defined the larger Indian Ocean region as an area 

of interest to the United States. Tim Sullivan states that “as home to a number of the 

world’s most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a 

region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades, 

America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region’s states 

to flourish politically and economically.”150 Within the Indo-Pacific commons, the two 

rising powers, China and India, are of particular U.S. interest. James Holmes and Toshi 

Yoshihara speak of a strategic triangle in the region, consisting of the United States,

China, and India.151

The rise of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN) is a topic 

of highest priority in Washington. Some believe China’s preoccupation with Taiwan 

is the main reason behind the PLAN buildup, while others emphasize the Chinese 

desire to control sea-lanes, to make manifest its status as a major world power, to secure 

regional interests (such as in disputes over the South China Sea and, in particular, the 

resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands), or generally to oppose U.S. regional military influence.152 China is building defenses (antiaccess forces) against hostile naval 

intervention with the aim of delaying its arrival or reducing its effectiveness. O’Rourke 
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compares the strategy to Soviet sea denial during the Cold War.153 Also, according to 

Kaplan, China is producing or acquiring submarines at five times the rate of the United 

States.154 What makes China’s strategy more dangerous is its possession of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), capable of hitting moving targets at sea. Furthermore the PLA

Navy has been buying naval mines and technology to block Global Positioning System 

(GPS) signals. The PLAN is also striving for a fifth generation of stealth fighters, new 

submarine models, aircraft carriers, and advances in space.155 In August 2011 China 

began sea trials with its first aircraft carrier—an old, retrofitted Soviet vessel formerly 

known as Varyag.156 At some point in the next decade the PLAN will surpass the USN 

in number of warships overall. According to Work, “China is now the largest builder 

of merchant ships in the world, and it has embarked on an impressive buildup of naval 

warfighting capabilities—many of them directly targeting the U.S. Navy fleet.”157 These 

modernization efforts have implications for the USN and affect deliberations about 

forward homeporting, forward basing and shipbuilding, and the advancement of other 

naval capabilities such as improved antisubmarine-warfare systems and antimissile 

defenses to protect ships. More generally, they impact strategic planning for the Pacific 

and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea, as well as future relations with allies and 

non-allies in the region.

In order to become more familiar with the PLAN, cooperation mechanisms should be 

explored. The USN and PLAN have engaged in joint search-and-rescue exercise, but 

to foster mutual understanding, more cooperation is needed. Nontraditional security 

issues like international terrorism offer a good starting point.158 For the United States, 

the establishment of military-to-military relations with China is difficult, in particular 

because of the Taiwan question. The accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy 

in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.S. intelligence aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet 

near Hainan Island in 2001, and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis had serious implications for U.S.–Chinese military relations. Nonetheless, nontraditional security issues 

such as counterpiracy, joint search and rescue, and humanitarian missions offer ways to 

increase interactions and create an environment to foster a relationship. Promoting mutual trust and building consensus are essential preconditions for future Sino-U.S. naval 

security cooperation. A report by the Heritage Foundation argues that misperception 

and misunderstanding are only part of the problem and different goals and incentives 

further explain the difficulties of U.S. Navy–Chinese military relations.159 In May 2011, 

the Chinese counterpart of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (then Admiral 

Mullen) visited Washington, D.C., for talks that both sides described as a positive step 

toward a stronger relationship.160

But above all, the developments themselves must be closely observed and analyzed. The 

United States is striving for a force distribution of sixty–forty between the Pacific and 
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Atlantic.161 Already six out of the eleven aircraft carriers (CVs) are located in the Pacific 

Ocean. In the recent past, incidents between the PLAN and the USN in the western 

Pacific have increased. PLAN vessels have shadowed or even blocked U.S. ships in the 

region.162 The Chinese maritime ambitions are matters of concern not only for U.S. strategy but for that of many regional countries. India, the other major growing power in the 

region, with close ties to the United States, has shown great concern about the rise of the 

Chinese navy, especially in the Indian Ocean, in close proximity to India. That country 

is determined to defend its influence in the surrounding waters, and a stronger PLAN 

presence is likely to trigger Indian maritime countermeasures. Holmes and Yoshihara 

see possibilities in a more rapid buildup of naval forces or an expansion of Indian naval 

presence toward both the South China Sea and Horn of Africa.163

Moreover, innovative technologies and the changing global security environment 

pose serious challenges and greatly affect U.S. defensive and offensive considerations. 

O’Rourke, for example, sees a need to replace the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic-missile 

nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) with twelve next-generation SSBNs and to develop 

LCSs and longer-range carrier aircraft.164 In December 2010, after much negotiation, 

Congress approved the building of twenty LCSs through 2015. To meet the growing 

demand for ballistic-missile defense, the Navy also calls for a large number of Aegisequipped cruisers and destroyers. The former CNO, Admiral Roughead, had promised 

to make ballistic-missile defense a core mission and in April 2009 established the Navy 

Air and Missile Defense Command. A breakthrough in 2011 was the beginning of the 

technology-development phase of the Ohio replacement program—an important step 

toward a shipbuilding contract.165

According to Navy officials, the USN will require a larger fleet to meet its growing 

responsibilities, including sustained forward presence and maritime security, partnership capacity building, and humanitarian relief. As Admiral Roughead commented in 

2008, “even the [planned] 313-ship Navy will not be enough for the missions that we’re 

going to be tasked with in the coming years.”166 The Navy is striving to add fifty new 

battle-force ships by fiscal year (FY) 2015. While the 313-ship Navy could be realized 

in theory, this prospect seems less plausible in light of the current budget crisis. In early 

May 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that “our current plan 

is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 and it’s in the budget. And to be 

sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the 

massive overmatch the United States already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing antiship 

capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 

years when no other country has more than one?”167

While he did not doubt the need for new ships, Gates pointed to the considerable 

increase in costs. Today, submarines and amphibious ships have tripled their building 
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costs compared to the 1980s, while the overall budget has shrunk by 20 percent. But 

Gates also spoke of possibilities offered and challenges presented by new technologies: 

“At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.S. has 

enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding—especially with long-range, accurate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the 

horizon.”168 Work, for his part, argues that it is crucial to focus on the capabilities when 

talking about ship numbers.169 With (at this writing) the aircraft carriers USS Roosevelt

and Lincoln undergoing repair and maintenance and Enterprise scheduled to retire after 

its next deployment in spring 2012 (inactivation ceremony December 2012), the number 

of active CVBGs could temporarily drop to nine.170 Roosevelt should be ready to deploy 

again in December 2012;171 Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015. The 

newest CV, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), is scheduled to be ready for deployment in 

2015, but Raymond Pritchett suggests 2017 as more likely.172

The revolution in technology does not affect shipbuilding and weapon requirements 

alone. As Thomas Mahnken said in 2001, the U.S. Navy must “define its roles in space 

and cyberspace.”173 The importance of intelligence and communication was recognized 

by reestablishing the Tenth Fleet (it had been a specialized antisubmarine force in World 

War II), reactivated in January 2010 as the cyber fleet, without ships or aircraft but 

fitted for joint information and intelligence tasks.174 The fleet’s mission is to combine 

intelligence and communication to support information warfare. Richard Burgess calls 

this an important step compared to the Cold War, when there was a “wall of separation 

between intelligence collection and fleet operations that once was a given—for security 

reasons.”175 In May 2009, Admiral Roughead, as CNO, argued that while within the 

military, cyberspace is often depicted as “a little lightning bolt going up to the satellites 

and running around down to earth[,] [t]hat’s not cyber space. Cyber space is on the bottom of the ocean because 95 percent of what moves in cyber space moves on cables that 

rest on the bottom of the ocean. That’s the maritime domain. That’s the domain of the 

United States Navy.” Therefore the USN has to play a lead role in securing, protecting, 

and defending cyberspace.176

In addition to the cyberspace domain, naval use of space is the subject of an important 

debate today. In the 1990s Gulf War U.S. space-based assets delivered valuable operational 

information.177 Since then other states have been striving to advance in space. Spacebased systems can perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, 

in the air, and on and under the sea. Because of the diverse nature of space, U.S. space 

operations have implications influencing all elements of national power—diplomatic, 

military, economic, technological, and information.178 According to Frank Lacroix and 

Irving Blickstein, this development could influence the naval presence mission and 

maybe one day even replace it.179
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Two aspects of the space discussion are important: command of space and space communication. Space command is the control of space communications for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes. Command of space allows the close study of 

the adversary and the tailoring of capabilities to fight that enemy.180 Command of space 

does not mean that one’s adversary cannot act in space, only that he cannot seriously 

interfere in one’s actions thereby. Space has great value for communications; therefore, 

space warfare must aim at either securing command of space or preventing the enemy 

from securing it. Space communications are used for the movement of trade, matériel, 

supplies, and information.181 Network-centric warfare (NCW) heavily relies on space 

assets.182 NCW focuses on the combination of actions by a fleet, even if not physically 

concentrated. With the help of sensors, valuable information about the adversary’s 

forces is collected and distributed in real time.183 Rear Admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch, 

speaking before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described space systems as providing “essential communication capabilities, 

position, navigation and timing support, missile warning, meteorological data, and 

over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis.”184 

Most space-related issues have been moved to the Air Force, but the Navy has important 

interests in space and must be involved in that realm. According to Steven Whiting, 

space assets offer unique diplomatic advantages: “From peacetime through war, the 

United States can use the varied components of space assets’ diplomatic power directly 

to improve its diplomatic, economic, and military position.”185

The Navy, then, has gone through a number of transformations and now faces many 

challenges. Before turning to the next chapter, the study will discuss developments of 

the peacetime missions—forward presence and deterrence—and also the “enabler” of 

the two, sea control.

Development of Naval Functions

CS21 marked a milestone for cooperation activities and emphasized naval missions that 

are essentially peacetime functions—exercising soft power, nation building, cooperation building, and the “Thousand-Ship Navy,” to name a few. However, traditional naval 

roles have remained relevant.186 The newest strategic document, NOP 2010, lists sea 

control, power projection, deterrence, forward presence, maritime security, and HA/DR

as core capabilities. It builds on CS21 and essentially provides the basis for assessing the 

forces required to implement that document.

A study in 2009 by the Institute for Defense Analysis proposes five core capabilities for 

the USN (adding one new mission to Turner’s list), ranking them as follows: strategic 

deterrence, maritime security/irregular warfare (new), power projection, sea control, and forward deterrence (presence, renamed).187 Its authors see a change since the 
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outbreak of the GWOT, in that adversaries have become less visible and more difficult 

to influence. Because forward presence aims at deterring conventional and irregular 

threats to (regional) stability, and forward forces are immediately ready to deploy in case 

conventional deterrence fails, the study’s authors argue for renaming forward presence 

“forward deterrence/assurance.” They write, “strategic” deterrence “is defined as the 

prevention of nuclear war and aggression or coercion, threatening the vital interests of 

the United States, and/or our national survival.”188

The study also discusses HA and DR, added to core capabilities in 2007. Its authors 

conclude that those two missions, while very important, are by-products of traditional 

naval capabilities and therefore do not need to be categorized as separate core capabilities. However, I believe that this elevation of them is appropriate, as it recognizes the 

important contributions military forces can offer in this arena. Since the relief efforts 

after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the military role in HA and DR missions has 

gained prominence and the U.S. armed forces have conducted several such operations. 

Examples include the responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the tsunami in 

Japan 2011. Also, annual deployments offer humanitarian, medical, dental, and engineering assistance to South and Latin America (under Continuing Promise—the 

hospital ship USNS Comfort or an amphibious vessel, in alternate years) and to Asia (as 

part of the Pacific Partnership program—the hospital ship USNS Mercy or an amphibious ship in alternate years). Overall, the USN has a long tradition of providing medical 

aid and disaster relief.

Since World War II, the USN has enjoyed sea control, though during the Cold War its 

ability to retain it should conflict break out was sometimes challenged. With the demise 

of the Soviet Union, the mission lost its highest priority, but it is still nevertheless important for security and prosperity.189 Sustaining sea control is vital to allow the USN to 

move freely in peacetime and react to crises. The rise of the Chinese navy has the potential to pose a threat to U.S. sea control in the future. James Kraska hypothesizes that by 

2015 American command of the global commons will no longer be taken for granted.190

While the oceans and the airspace above them have been the exclusive domain of the 

U.S. Navy since World War II, this situation could be challenged by then. Although

China is not an enemy of the United States it is becoming a legitimate peer competitor. 

But not only China is augmenting its naval forces; Russia and India are also attempting 

to strengthen their navies. Kaplan surmises that India will soon possess the third-largest 

navy.191 Forces engaged in expeditionary operations depend especially on safe passage 

in both open ocean and coastal waters. As Till observes, “This kind of assured theater 

access, in turn, depends on naval forces securing the degree of sea control necessary 

for them to operate effectively and for the shipping they protect to arrive safely at its 
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destination and operate there according to requirements.”192 Therefore sea control has to 

remain a core function and priority for the USN.

In the first decades after World War II, the Navy emphasized two missions, projection 

of force and nuclear deterrence.193 Both were direct reactions to the environment of the 

Cold War and the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence works 

best when there are constants and certainty in the international system.194 But it has not 

lost its value with the end of the Cold War; deterrence without the Soviet Union has, 

according to Brooks, become even more convincing.195 The focus has largely shifted to 

conventional deterrence. Although it is impossible to measure how much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring any specific adversary, naval operations can help display national power and signal national will, both essential components of deterrence. 

The Navy has to adapt deterrence strategies to the party it wishes to deter; different 

enemies require different types of deterring forces. Today, Gerson argues, “with two ongoing wars already straining the military, concerns about a recalcitrant and militarized 

Russia, Iran’s continued uranium enrichment activities, North Korea’s nascent nuclear 

arsenal, and top-to-bottom military modernization in China, adversary-specific deterrence strategies will likely become a prominent component of national and international 

security in an increasingly multipolar world.”196

But not only naval forces contribute to deterrence. The Army and Air Force argue that 

they are better suited for this task and that forward presence is not a necessary capability. The Army reasons that because deterrence is mostly related to perception, land 

power is more influential and effective. The Air Force, for its part, views deterrence as a 

task that can be fulfilled from a distance. In this view, new technology trumps forward 

presence and will help to stabilize the post–Cold War world order.197 A study by Gerson 

and Daniel Whiteneck lays out in graphic form the functions of the different U.S. armed 

forces in deterrence missions.198

Gerson and Whiteneck cite North Korea as an instance where “U.S. presence on the 

Korean peninsula has apparently deterred North Korean aggression against South 

Korea for over five decades (although . . . we cannot definitively prove that North Korea 

has wanted to attack the South at any time since the Korean War).”199 While land-based 

presence is assumed to be a more effective deterrent, stationing troops on foreign soil 

becomes, as we have noted, increasingly more difficult. Forward naval forces and sea 

basing offer alternatives. Conventional deterrence is closely linked with forward deployment, intended to act as a deterrent or for immediate reaction if deterrence fails, in what 

Jerome Burke and his coauthors rename “forward deterrence.”200

Beginning with a traditional status as a by-product of other naval missions, the presence 

mission has grown to the Navy’s most important contribution to peacetime operations. 
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During the Cold War the Navy identified its principal duties as containing Soviet 

expansion, destroying the Soviet navy in case of war, securing command of the sea, and 

contributing to nuclear deterrence with the help of forward forces. As part of this strategy, the Navy recognized the diplomatic leverage its forces could produce when forward 

deployed. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, it began searching for a new strategy, 

and a resulting white paper, From the Sea, stated that the Navy–Marine Corps team was 

reorienting toward a littoral strategy intended to focus on influencing events ashore.201

As part of this strategy, the Navy stated, the highest peacetime priority was achieving 

diplomatic benefits by the forward presence of naval vessels. Forward presence had 

evolved to a core function of the USN. Today the GWOT relies on and calls for forward 

presence in critical regions. NOP 2010 even states that “forward presence facilitates all 

other naval missions, most importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for 

the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force.”

But the concept and the amount of forward presence are intensely debated. Some argue

it puts an unnecessary strain on forces and diverts combat power from other areas. 

• Regime removal

• Prompt denial/defeat

• Active/passive 

defenses

• Forcible entry

• Rapid response/ 

reinforcement 

from CONUS

• Project and sustain 

power without footprint

• Major combat ops

• Commitments, 

interests, and resolve

• Prompt punishment

• Flexibility/scalability

• Mobility and reach 

within and between 

AORs

MARITIME

(USN & USMC)

AIR

(USAF)

LAND

(USA)

Deterrence:

Total Force View

Figure 4

Deterrence Capabilities by U.S. Armed Forces (adapted from Gerson and 

Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence, p. 61)
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Others argue that forward presence makes the Navy capable of reacting immediately, 

influencing events, or nipping crises in the bud before they can seriously break out or 

escalate. In any case, the justification goes both ways: the Navy needs to be there to 

respond rapidly, and because the Navy is there, it is the first force to arrive on a scene. 

Presence is not risk-free, as, for example, the bombing in 2000 of the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) in Yemen painfully demonstrated. Conversely, events such 

as the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 clearly underscored the value of forward presence. 

The USN was the first military force to arrive and provide crucial help. As Admiral 

Mullen said,

We must be able to continue to react quickly in times of humanitarian crises and with resolve in 

times of conflict. We must deter and dissuade potential adversaries in peacetime through persistent 

forward presence, and respond instantaneously in war by amassing overwhelming and lethal 

combat power. As we learned in Indonesia, and as we are seeing in the international relief efforts in 

earthquake-stricken Pakistan today [a Pakistani zone of Kashmir was, when the admiral wrote in 

2006, recovering with substantial U.S. military assistance from an earthquake that had occurred in 

October 2005], virtual presence is not the answer. You need to be there to make a difference.202

Although acknowledging the great influence of the Navy–Marine Corps teams, exerted 

without leaving footprints, Kaplan argues that the “United States was able to lead the 

relief effort off the coast of Indonesia only because the carrier strike group USS Abraham Lincoln happened to be in the vicinity and not in the Korean Peninsula, where it 

was headed.”203 However, even a deployment from the Korean Peninsula would have 

shortened the reaction time dramatically compared to a surge from the continental 

United States. Kaplan further points out that while this was a humanitarian mission, the 

necessary skills resembled a war situation, with the need for rapid assembly of ships and 

aircraft. During the crisis sea basing proved highly valuable. All land routes had been 

damaged, and supplies could be delivered only by air, but the United States could perform its services independently of land access. Furthermore the geographic conditions 

(an impassable mountain range in the northwest of the affected province, Aceh) favored 

access from the sea.204

Forward presence clearly helps the United States respond rapidly, and it supports not 

only deterrence and power projection but also HA and DR, maritime security, and diplomatic initiatives. Additionally, concepts like sea basing demonstrate the importance 

of forward naval forces for other military services. The capabilities of “being there” and 

influencing without leaving footprints are unique and make naval forces important. 

No other service can replace these advantages. “For example, a U.S. military base in 

Okinawa, Japan, simultaneously provides a forward base to deter North Korea, prevents 

Japan from increasing defense spending and becoming a potential military rival to the 

United States, and provides U.S. Marines an important training area.”205 Notwithstanding the current debate over which types of forces best provide presence, the real question 
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is: Which forces will work successfully across the widest possible spectrum of events to 

influence future international situations?206 Giving up global presence would surrender 

the initiative to adversaries, unless naval forces were deployed preemptively from the 

continental United States. But any preemptive deployment or attack would involve great 

costs, both domestically and internationally. Any policy/decision maker would take 

preemptive action only after much deliberation and with great care.

Dismukes describes forward forces as “immune to this problem.”207 Augmenting already 

deployed forward forces has smaller political costs and “express[es] unambiguous U.S. 

commitment in the most compelling form of political communication: the language 

of action.” Forward forces have the capability to demonstrate American intentions and 

are likely to be more credible than words alone. Further, Dismukes points to the lack of 

experience of forces that have remained in the continental United States with potential crisis locations. Through forward presence they become familiar with conditions, 

environments, and possible partners. Forward-deployed forces frequently engage in 

exercises with foreign navies, enhancing their interoperability with potential allies. 

Cultural awareness is crucial to fostering trust and building relationships. Only frequent 

interaction can create such an environment. Furthermore, cooperation with foreign 

forces is necessary to learn their procedures and prepare for combined military operations. Hans Binnendijk emphasizes as well the benefits of close cooperation for diplomatic initiatives:

Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. 

Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace 

has demonstrated. . . . Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without 

which American influence would rapidly decline. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to 

America’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian 

concerns.208

Additionally, the backing-up of diplomacy with force is more effective when forces are 

in proximity and immediately ready to react; an example would be a suddenly necessary 

evacuation of an embassy. Forces based at home require time and would deploy only 

after a warning of a possible or actual crisis. In 2002 a Center for Strategic Studies study 

researched warning times in crises, distinguishing between “out of the blue” cases (no 

warning time), “peaks in messes” (situations of concern that have slowly arisen until 

a certain event led the United States to deploy forces), “slowly gathering cases” (“no 

particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.S. response. The responses 

became a matter of when the United States found the situation so intolerable that it 

decided to act”), and “those where it was the U.S.’s choice of the time to initiate some 

action” (“that is, warning time was not the problem since a situation existed beforehand 

and there was no precipitating attack or incident that the U.S. was responding to”). The 

study’s author found that even when there is sufficient warning time, sometimes years, 
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the forces actually used are most often already overseas, and thus forward presence 

greatly helps the United States to respond to crises. The most important value of forward forces lies in small-scale crises and when action is required immediately, but even 

for larger interventions familiarity with the environment and closer proximity favor 

them over forces that have remained at home.209

All this argues that as long as the United States continues to have globally distributed 

national interests, those interests will need to be defended, and forward presence helps 

secure them and demonstrate the will and capacity to do so. But as mentioned above, 

budget restrictions threaten the status quo. In a recent CNA study, Whiteneck and 

coauthors concluded that the existing forward strategies based on combat-credible forward presence are unsustainable.210 It is a fact that while the demand remains constant, 

resources are stagnating or even shrinking. In addition, great costs are associated with 

modernization, people, and infrastructure. The Navy’s battle forces have decreased by 

20 percent, while the number of deployments has remained more or less the same. The 

CNA coauthors suggest a “two hub” approach (credible combat power in East Asia and

Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean, with reduction of global forward presence) or one “hub” 

(credible combat power only in East Asia, with global forward presence less than currently but still robust) to preserve sufficient forward presence to reassure allies and deter 

adversaries but not overstrain naval forces. The two-hub option would result in fewer 

resources for lower-end missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, engagement, shaping, and maritime policing. The one-hub scenario means an unbalanced 

fleet, with consequent loss of flexibility, but more resources for small-scale activities.

Alternatives such as reducing combat credibility overall while maintaining the global 

presence or significantly reducing forward presence while focusing more on surging 

naval forces are less attractive. But if the current forward posture is not reconsidered, 

the USN is at risk of losing influence and credibility. In this realm the importance of 

ESGs arises—less costly than carrier strike groups, this type of force presents a viable 

alternative for lower-intensity crises. The emphasis on combat-credible forward forces 

requires those forces to be strong, so that, while rarely engaged in combat alone, they 

might influence by virtue of their combat credibility. The CNA study’s suggestion to 

concentrate on East Asia while keeping smaller forces globally dispersed would leave 

much of the globe with limited combat-credible forward presence.

It is not yet clear whether, for example, deterrence would have the same effect with 

smaller forces. The focus on East Asia, however, is in line with the steadily rising importance of the Indo-Pacific commons. NOP 2010 recognizes the difficulties posed by 

forward presence but nonetheless continues to emphasize its importance: “The challenge is to employ globally distributed, mission-tailored forces across a wide range of 

missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism; while maintaining 
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the capability to regionally concentrate credible combat power to protect vital American

interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces 

and forces surged from the United States, along with those of allies and partners, must 

be sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad spectrum 

of crises.”211 It remains to be seen how this will affect the Navy and its functions in the 

coming years.

Summary

The goal of chapter 1 was twofold. First, it intended to show the importance of seaborne 

crisis response and the need of an approach focusing on the military services separately, 

rather than treating armed forces as a unity. Second, it provided an introduction into 

the different naval core missions, with emphasis on peacetime activities, linking them 

to recent developments. Which military service is best for what purpose is widely debated, and as this study develops it will link naval advantages, disadvantages, and crisis 

response in more detail. Because of the differences between the military services, it is 

important to appreciate the impact of the uniqueness of each part of the armed forces. A

better understanding of why, how, and when naval forces are sent to respond to a crisis 

can enhance crisis-response effectiveness. The influence of latent use of force and the 

frequent employment of the USN as an instrument of foreign policy in times of peace 

point to the importance of a more in-depth inquiry of the influence of uniquely naval 

attributes. The next chapter provides the theoretical background and relevant literature 

for hypotheses explaining naval crisis response.

Notes

1. Ray Mabus, “Remarks by the Honorable Ray 

Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, Naval War College, Current Strategy Forum” (Newport, R.I., 

16 June 2009), available at www.chinfo.navy 

.mil/.

2. Gary Roughead, remarks delivered at Ogilvy 

Public Relations Worldwide “Thought Leaders 

Breakfast,” 30 June 2009, available at www 

.navy.mil/.

3. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert 

Work, Meeting the Anti-access and AreaDenial Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 

2003), p. 29.

4. J. C. Wylie, “The Sixth Fleet and American 

Diplomacy,” Proceedings of the Academy of 

Political Science 29, no. 3 (1969), p. 60.

5. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 6; Edwin Bickford Hooper, 

United States Naval Power in a Changing 

World (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 4.

6. U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Operations Concept 

2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy

(Washington, D.C.: 2010), available at www 

.navy.mil/.

7. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 109.

8. Archer Macy, “Essential Characteristics of 

Naval Littoral Doctrine” (course paper, Naval 

War College, Newport, R.I., 1993), available at 

www.dtic.mil/.

9. Sergei Gorshkov, The Seapower of the State

(Moscow: 1976; repr. London: Pergamon, 

1979), p. 248.
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:03 NP_39 Chapter1.indd January 29, 2013 1:05 PM 

10. Macy, “Essential Characteristics of Naval Littoral Doctrine.”

11. Adm. Sir Jock Slater, “Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations,” Journal of the Royal 

United Services Institute 143, no. 6 (1998), pp. 

20–24.

12. Frank Kelso, Carl Mundy, and Sean O’Keefe, 

From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy 

Dept., 1992), p. 92.

13. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 

Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 

2009), p. 242.

14. Ibid.

15. Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does 

the Marine Corps Go from Here? (Washington, 

D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 4–5.

16. Sean Cate, “Taking the Navy–Marine Corps 

Team into the 21st Century,” CSC 1991, available at www.globalsecurity.org/.

17. U.S. General Accounting Office, Peace 

Operations.

18. Dakota Wood, Strategy for the Long Haul: The 

U.S. Marine Corps—Fleet Marine Forces for the 

21st Century (Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 2008), 

p. 5.

19. P. K. Ghosh, “Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy: 

An Instrument of Threat or Use of Limited 

Naval Force,” Strategic Analysis 24, no. 11 

(2001), pp. 2005–17.

20. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 48.

21. Carlisle Trost, “The Size of the Fleet,” in Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the TwentyFirst Century, ed. James George (Washington, 

D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 

Policy Research, 1981), pp. 330–31.

22. Arthur Barber III, Engagement through 

Deployment: Shaping America’s Future Military

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 27–28.

23. Pirtle, “Military Uses of Ocean Space and the 

Law of the Sea in the New Millennium,” pp. 

22–23.

24. Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in Crises, p. 33; 

Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, p. 26.

25. Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts.”

26. Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in Crises, pp. 

393–94.

27. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 428.

28. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 48.

29. Richard Betts, “Power, Prospects, and Priorities: Choices for Strategic Change,” Naval War 

College Review 50, no. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 20 

[emphasis added].

30. See, for example, Till, Seapower.

31. Don Inbody, Coercive Strategic Effect: Are Air 

Power and Sea Power Comparable in Their 

Abilities to Produce Strategic Effects? (Seminar 

10B, [Texas State University–San Marcos], 

n.d.), available at inbody.net/.

32. Colin Gray, “The Limits of Seapower: Joint 

Warfare and Unity of Conflict,” Joint Force 

Quarterly, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994/1995), 

p. 55.

33. Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, p. 228.

34. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 33.

35. Joseph Strasser, The Navy’s Role in Promoting 

and Defending U.S. National Interests (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, Center for Naval 

Warfare Studies, Strategic Research Dept., 

1994), p. 6; Till, Seapower, p. 251.

36. Slater, “Maritime Contribution to Joint 

Operations.”

37. Peter Swartz, “Classic Roles and Future 

Challenges: The Navy after Next,” in Strategic 

Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st 

Century, ed. Pelham Boyer and Robert Wood 

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 

1999), pp. 297–99.

38. Barber, Engagement through Deployment, p. 20.

39. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record.

40. Roy Walker and Larry Ridolfi, “Airpower’s 

Role in Maritime Operations,” Air & Space 

Power–Chronicles Online Journal (n.d.), www 

.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/. 

41. The authors fail to recognize that the era of 

the knights came to an end not only because 

of longbows but also because of other weapon 

developments.

42. Inbody, Coercive Strategic Effect.

43. Michael Gerson and Daniel Whiteneck, 

Deterrence and Influence: The Navy’s Role in 

Preventing War, CRMD0019315.A4/1Rev. 

(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 

2009), p. 64.

44. Walter Ham IV, “Air Force, Navy Pilots Train 

Together over Okinawa,” U.S. Air Force News,

3 October 2009, available at www.kadena 

.af.mil/; Robert Work, Strategy for the Long 
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Haul: The U.S. Navy—Charting a Course for 

Tomorrow’s Fleet (Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 

2008), p. 17.

45. Benjamin Lambeth, Combat Pair: The Evolution of Air Force–Navy Integration in Strike 

Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), 

p. 28, available at www.netlibrary.com/; Lambeth, “Aerial Partners in Arms,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 49, no. 2 (2008), p. 54.

46. Lambeth, Combat Pair, p. 30.

47. Ibid., p. 35.

48. Ibid., pp. 50–51.

49. Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New 

York: Crane Russak, 1977), pp. 225–33.

50. Ibid., pp. 16–20.

51. Macy, “Essential Characteristics of Naval Littoral Doctrine,” p. 15.

52. Ty Waterman, “Wanted: A Doctrine for the 

U.S. Coast Guard as an Instrument of National 

Security” (course paper, Naval War College, 

Newport, R.I., 1992), p. 5, available at www 

.dtic.mil/.

53.“The mission of the U.S. Navy is to maintain, 

train, and equip combat-ready Naval forces 

capable of winning wars, deterring aggression 

and maintaining freedom of the seas”; U.S. 

Navy Dept., “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” n.d., 

Navy.mil.

54. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 29.

55. Peter Swartz and ED McGrady, A Deep 

Legacy: Smaller-Scale Contingencies and the 

Forces That Shape the Navy, excerpt from 

CRM 98-95.10 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1998).

56. Daniel Kuehl and Charles Miller, “Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, no. 5 (1994), p. 103.

57. Homeland defense is not listed among the 

core capabilities. The U.S. Navy has mostly 

avoided homeland defense, leaving this task 

to the Army or, later, the Coast Guard. After 

1776, the Army and the Marine Cutter Service 

protected the U.S. coasts. Although there was 

a brief episode where the Navy engaged in 

homeland defense—mostly to support the 

Revenue Marine in operations against piracy, 

smuggling, and the slave trade—the Navy 

soon began to focus forward again. The Coast 

Guard has always played key roles in the protection of the U.S. homeland; see Vivien Crea, 

“The U.S. Coast Guard: A Flexible Force for 

National Security,” Naval War College Review

60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), p. 15. The war on terror reemphasized the importance of homeland 

defense and coastal control, but the focus of 

the Navy has remained forward; see Swartz, 

“Classic Roles and Future Challenges,” pp. 

280–81; Swartz, The U.S. Navy and Homeland 

Defense: 1775–2002, PP D0006678.A1 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002). 

As Swartz says in the latter source (p. 13), 

“forward deployment and power projection 

would trump coastal patrol and homeland 

defense every time.”

58. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy.”

59. Ibid.

60. Conway, Roughead, and Allen, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”; U.S. 

Navy Dept., Naval Operations Concept 2006 

(Washington, D.C.: n.d. [2006]), available at 

www.quantico.usmc.mil/.

61. Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in Crises, p. 391.

62. Cited in U.S. Congress, The U.S. Sea Control 

Mission: Forces, Capabilities, and Requirements

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget 

Office, 1977), p. 3.

63. Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, p. 40.

64. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy.”

65. Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 37.

66. Till, Seapower, p. 149.

67. Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, p. 89.

68. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: 

A History of United States Military Strategy 

and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 

1973), p. 175.

69. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy.”

70. The 1982 Falklands War between Argentina 

and Great Britain is sometimes referred to 

as the last naval battle of the recent past; 

see, for example, “Falklands/Malvinas War,” 

GlobalSecurity.org.

71. Till, Seapower.

72. James Ellis, “Traditional Naval Roles,” in The 

Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, ed. Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 

p. 145.

73. Till, Seapower, p. 31; cf. Mahan, Influence of 

Seapower upon History, 1660–1783.

74. Till, Seapower, pp. 219–26.

75. Sir Walter Raleigh, in Suzy Platt, Respectfully 

Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested 
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:03 NP_39 Chapter1.indd January 29, 2013 1:05 PM 

from the Congressional Research Service

(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 

1989).

76. Mahan, Influence of Seapower upon History, 

1660–1783, p. 91.

77. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 

363; “Lesson 14: The US Navy in the Strategy 

of Containment, 1953-1 (2),” University of 

California, Berkeley, n.d., available at navsci 

.berkeley.edu/; Peter Hahn, Crisis and 

Crossfire: The United States and the Middle 

East since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 

Books, 2005), p. 43; Center for International 

Development and Conflict Management, “ICB 

Data Collections,” n.d., www.cidcm.umd.edu/.

78. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power; Bruce 

Powers, The United States Navy, Professional 

Paper 200 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval 

Analyses, 1977); Swartz, “Classic Roles and 

Future Challenges.”

79. Till, Seapower, p. 184.

80. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy”; Friedman, Seapower as Strategy.

81. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” p. 10.

82. Frank Uhlig, Jr., “Fighting at and from the 

Sea: A Second Opinion,” in Naval Power in the 

Twenty-First Century: A Naval War College 

Review Reader, Newport Paper 24, ed. Peter 

Dombrowski (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005), p. 124.

83. Till, Seapower, pp. 186–89.

84. Krepinevich, Watts, and Work, Meeting the 

Anti-access and Area-Denial Challenge, p. 3.

85. Gary Roughead, remarks delivered at Carnegie Mellon University, 21 October 2009, 

available at www.navy.mil/.

86. According to Barton Gellman and Dana 

Priest, “U.S. Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in 

Afghanistan, Factory in Sudan,” Washington 

Post, 21 August 1998, the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was involved.

87. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 251.

88. Cited in Blechman, “Naval Diplomacy in the 

Twenty-First Century,” p. 243.

89. U.S. Navy Dept., “Why the Carriers?” Navy PA 

Resources Website, 2010, www.chinfo.navy 

.mil/.

90. Ibid.

91. Till, Seapower.

92. Bud Jones, “The Objective Is Influence, Not 

Presence, or, It’s Influence (Not Presence), 

Stupid!” Air and Space Power Chronicles (n.d. 

[1995–1998]), available at www.airpower.au 

.af.mil/.

93. Uhlig, “Fighting at and from the Sea,” p. 127.

94. James McNulty, “Naval Presence—the Misunderstood Mission,” Naval War College Review

27 no. 2 (September–October 1974), pp. 21–31.

95. Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in Crises, pp. 

383–84.

96. James Miskel, “Forward from the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 2 

(2001), p. 51.

97. Work, Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 17.

98. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” p. 15.

99. U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Operations Concept 

2010 [emphasis added].

100. Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management, “ICB Data Collections”; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 

1984).

101. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 32.

102. Daniel Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward 

Presence,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 3 

(Summer 2001), pp. 11–24.

103. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” pp. 2–5.

104. Cited in Patrick Bratton, “When Is Coercion 

Successful? And Why Can’t We Agree on It?,” 

Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 

2005), p. 101.

105. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” p. 5.

106. Till, Seapower, p. 274.

107. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence.

108. Michael Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in 

the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters 39, no. 3 

(2009), pp. 32–48.

109. Mearsheimer, cited in ibid., p. 37.

110. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the 

Second Nuclear Age,” p. 38.

111. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful?,” p. 

101.

112. Till, Seapower.

113. Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea 

Power (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. 

Press, 1974), p. 25.

114. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, p. 121.
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115. Richard Shultz, “Crisis Response and Power 

Projection in Nonpermissive Environments 

and Asymmetrical Conflicts,” in The Role of 

Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, ed. 

Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 42.

116. Hank Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S. Forces’ 

Responses to Situations: A Selective Study

(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Strategic Studies, 

2002), p. 5.

117. Geoffrey Till, “‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 

Century Seapower’: A View from Outside,” 

Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (Spring 

2008), p. 28; epigraph from Michael Mullen, 

“Remarks: Government Executive Magazine 

Leadership Breakfast—The National Press 

Club,” Washington, D.C., 24 April 2006, available at www.navy.mil/.

118. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Irregular Warfare and 

Counterterrorism Operations: Background and 

Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress 

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 2009), pp. 6–7.

119. Joshua Lasky, “The U.S. Navy and the Global 

War on Terrorism: Applying the Lessons of 

the War on Drugs” (master’s thesis, Marine 

Corps Univ., Command and Staff College, 

Quantico, Va., 2008).

120. U.S. Navy Dept., “Navy Expeditionary Combatant Command: Fact Sheet,” 2006, Navy 

.mil.

121. Gary Ohls, “Eastern Exit: Rescue 

‘. . . From the Sea,’” Naval War College Review 

61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008), p. 126.

122. Geoffrey Till, Naval Transformation, Ground 

Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The 

Sea-Basing Debate (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2006), pp. 11–12, available at www 

.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/.

123. O’Rourke, Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations, p. 7.

124. Robert Rubel, “The Navy’s Changing Force 

Paradigm,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 2 

(Spring 2009), pp. 15–16.

125. Robert Harkavy, “Thinking about Basing,” in 

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence 

in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Carnes Lord, 

Newport Paper 26 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War 

College Press, 2006), p. 9.

126. Jane Dalton, “Future Navies—Present Issues,” 

Naval War College Review 59, no. 1 (Winter 

2006), p. 18.

127. Michael Ignatieff, “The Challenges of American Imperial Power,” in Naval Power in the 

Twenty-First Century: A Naval War College 

Review Reader, Newport Paper 24, ed. Peter 

Dombrowski (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2005), p. 13.

128. Vern Clark, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings (October 2002), available at Navy 

.mil.

129. Wood, Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 6.

130. Henry Cook, “Sea Basing & the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future),” Military Review 

84, no. 4 (2004), pp. 54–58.

131. Douglas King and John Berry, “Seabasing: 

Expanding Access,” Joint Force Quarterly 50, 

no. 3 (2008), p. 49.

132. Till, Seapower, p. 203.

133. Swartz, U.S. Navy and Homeland Defense.

134. Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross, “Transforming the Navy: Punching a Feather Bed?,” 

Naval War College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 

2003), pp. 107–31.

135. Till, Seapower.

136. Work, Strategy for the Long Haul.

137. Gouré, “Tyranny of Forward Presence,” p. 16.

138. Kathi Sohn, “The Global Fleet Station: A

Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict,” Naval 

War College Review 62, no. 1 (Winter 2009), 

pp. 45–58.

139. “Southern Partnership Station,” United States 

Southern Command, 2009, www.southcom 

.mil/.

140. Sohn, “Global Fleet Station,” p. 45.

141. Till, Seapower.

142. Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts.”

143. Michael Mullen, “Commentary: We Can’t Do 

It Alone,” Honolulu Advertiser, 29 October 

2006, available at www.navy.mil/.

144. Conway, Roughead, and Allen, “A Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”

145. Wang Baofu, “The U.S. Military’s ‘Maritime 

Strategy’ and Future Transformation,” trans. 

Andrew Erickson, Naval War College Review

61, no. 4 (Autumn 2008), p. 63.

146. Till, “‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower’: A View from Outside,” pp. 27–28.

147. Jerome Burke et al., Assessment of Naval 

Core Capabilities, IDA Document D-3713 
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(Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009), pp. 10–11.

148. Roughead, remarks delivered at Carnegie Mellon University.

149. “CNO Guidance for 2010: Executing the 

Maritime Strategy,” September 2009, www 

.navy.mil/.

150. Tim Sullivan, Deter and Assure: Charting a 

Course for America’s Asian Alliance in a New 

Nuclear Age, Working Paper (Washington, 

D.C.: Center for Defense Studies, November 

2010).

151. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China 

and the United States in the Indian Ocean: 

An Emerging Strategic Triangle?,” Naval War 

College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 41.

152. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities— 

Background and Issues for Congress, CRS

Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).

153. Ibid.

154. Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts.”

155. Phil Stewart, “U.S. Warns on China’s Cyber, 

Space Capabilities,” Reuters, 13 January 2011.

156. Michael Wines, “China Begins Sea Trials of 

Its First Aircraft Carrier,” New York Times, 10 

August 2011.

157. Work, Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 53.

158. Zhu Huayou, “Enhancing Sino-U.S. Maritime 

Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” in 

China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea 

Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership, ed. Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, 

and Nan Li (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 

Press, 2010).

159. Dean Cheng, U.S. Must Focus Military Talks 

with China, Web Memo 3261 (Washington, 

D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 17 May 2011), 

thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/.

160. Lisa Daniel, “U.S., China Military Officials 

Call Talks Frank, Fruitful,” American Forces 

Press Service, 18 May 2011.

161. O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization.

162. Mark McDonald, “U.S. Navy Provoked South 

China Sea Incident, China Says,” New York 

Times, 10 March 2009.

163. Holmes and Yoshihara, “China and the United 

States in the Indian Ocean.”

164. O’Rourke, Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations.

165. U.S. Navy Dept., “Ohio-Class Submarine 

Replacement Program Receives ‘Milestone A’ 

Authority,” 2011, Navy.mil/.

166. Cited in Work, Strategy for the Long Haul, pp. 

48–49.

167. Robert Gates, “Remarks as Delivered by 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates” (Navy 

League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Gaylord 

Convention Center, National Harbor, Md., 

3 May 2010), available at www.defense.gov/.

168. Ibid.

169. Work, Strategy for the Long Haul.

170. USS Enterprise Webpage, www.enterprise 

.navy.mil/.

171. “USS Theodore Roosevelt Headed into Midlife Overhaul,” Defense Industry Daily, 29 

March 2012.

172. Raymond Pritchett,“Down to 9,” Information 

Dissemination Blog, 5 August 2011, www 

.informationdissemination.net/.

173. Thomas Mahnken, “Transforming the U.S. 

Armed Forces,” Naval War College Review 54, 

no. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 91.

174. Gary Roughead, “‘Information Dominance’: 

The Navy’s Initiative to Maintain the Competitive Advantage in the Information Age” 

(remarks delivered at Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, D.C., 

1 October 2009), available at www.navy.mil/; 

Roughead, remarks delivered at Carnegie Mellon University.

175. Richard Burgess, “The New Main Battery: The 

Navy Realigns Its Organization toward Information Dominance,” Seapower (December 

2009).

176. Gary Roughead, remarks delivered at Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1 May 2009, available at www 

.navy.mil/.

177. Robert Pfaltzgraff and Stephen Wright, “The 

Spectrum of Conflict: Symmetrical or Asymmetrical Challenge?,” in The Role of Naval 

Forces in 21st Century Operations, ed. Richard 

Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington, 

D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), p. 11.

178. John Klein, “Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime 

Model for Strategic Space Theory,” Naval War 

College Review 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004), p. 60.
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179. Frank Lacroix and Irving Blickstein, Forks 

in the Road for the US Navy (Santa Monica, 

Calif.: RAND, 2003).

180. Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: 

The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” 

International Security 28, no. 1 (2003), p. 43.

181. Klein, “Corbett in Orbit,” p. 67.

182. Karl Ginter, Space Technology and Network 

Centric Warfare: A Strategic Paradox, Strategy 

Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. 

Army War College, 2007).

183. Till, Seapower.

184. Kenneth W. Deutsch, “Statement before the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, Space Hearing, 4 

March 2008,” available at armed-services 

.senate.gov/.

185. Steven Whiting, Policy, Influence, and Diplomacy: Space as a National Power Element (Fort 

Belvoir, Va.: Defense Technical Information 

Center, 2002), p. 81, available at handle 

.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420751.

186. Burke et al., Assessment of Naval Core Capabilities; Ellis, “Traditional Naval Roles”; John 

Redd, “Naval Forces and Joint Vision 2010: 

Traditional and Emerging Roles,” in The Role 

of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, ed. 

Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000).

187. Burke et al., Assessment of Naval Core 

Capabilities.

188. Ibid., p. 14.

189. Ellis, “Traditional Naval Roles,” p. 141.

190. James Kraska, “How the United States Lost the 

Naval War of 2015,” Orbis 48, no. 1 (2009), pp. 

35–45.

191. Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts.”

192. Till, Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, 

and the Expeditionary Impulse, pp. 11–12.

193. Desmond Wilson and Nicholas Brown, 

Warfare at Sea: Threat of the Seventies, Professional Paper 79 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for 

Naval Analyses, 1971), p. 9.

194. Shultz, “Crisis Response and Power Projection 

in Nonpermissive Environments and Asymmetrical Conflicts,” p. 42.

195. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 13.

196. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the 

Second Nuclear Age,” p. 32.

197. Edward Rhodes, “‘. . . From the Sea’ and Back 

Again: Naval Power in National Strategy in 

the Second American Century,” in Strategic 

Transformation and Naval Power in the 21st 

Century, ed. Pelham Boyer and Robert Wood 

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 

1999).

198. Gerson and Whiteneck, Deterrence and 

Influence.

199. Ibid., p. 18.

200. Burke et al., Assessment of Naval Core 

Capabilities.

201. Kelso, Mundy, and O’Keefe, From the Sea.

202. Michael Mullen, “What I Believe: Eight Tenets 

That Guide My Vision for the 21st Century 

Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 

1 (2006), pp. 12–16.

203. Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts,” p. 

278.

204. Bruce Elleman, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s 

Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, Newport Paper 28 (Newport, R.I.: Naval 

War College Press, 2007), pp. 9, 56.

205. Derek S. Reveron, “Military Engagement, 

Strategy, and Policy,” Orbis 53, no. 3 (2009), p. 

494.

206. Jones, “The Objective Is Influence, 

Not Presence.”

207. Bradford Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence: Implications for 

Acquisition and Use of Forces, CRM 93-192 

(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 

1994), p. 39.

208. Hans Binnendijk, “The Case for Forward 

Deployment,” Joint Force Quarterly 8 (Summer 1995), p. 7. The Partnership for Peace is a 

NATO program for bilateral cooperation that 

allows countries involved to choose their priorities for cooperation. See “The Partnership 

for Peace Programme,” North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, www.nato.int/.

209. Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations.

210. Daniel Whiteneck et al., The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?, 

CAB D0022262.A3/Final (Alexandria, Va.: 

Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

211. U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Operations Concept 

2010 [emphasis added].

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Just Enough Force?

A Theoretical Framework for Seaborne Crisis Response

In having a peacetime political function in addition to their combat 

capabilities, naval forces are like all other forms of military power, only 

more so.

Edward Luttwak

There is no single theory directly linking the involvement of the United States in international crises with the use of naval forces.1

 However, there are many theories explaining the motivations of the use of force and assumptions about the advantages as well as 

disadvantages of naval power. The first part of this chapter will briefly summarize the 

history of the American use of force, followed by the three dominant schools of thought 

for justifying intervention decisions: realist, idealist, and diversionary theories. These 

theories will serve as an introduction into the U.S. use of force, but not all directly influence the hypotheses drawn later.

There are a variety of different approaches states can employ in reacting to international 

conflicts and crises. Political leaders can publicly voice disapproval, announce political 

or economic sanctions, engage in negotiations, support mediation attempts, undertake 

diplomatic efforts, or employ violence. This diversity of possible responses suggests the 

many tools at the disposal of the decision makers. As Meernik says, “the United States 

has utilized a vast arsenal of foreign policy carrots and sticks to induce, compel, and 

deter changes in other nations’ foreign policies.”2

Often, especially since the end of the 

Cold War, the United States has relied on military forces to respond to crises.3

 Ideally, 

military force is used as only a last resort, but frequently it not only serves as a backup 

for other forms of engagement but substitutes for them. However, military power can be 

employed in many different ways and forms; it is not confined to war fighting.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the use of naval power and crisis-response 

capabilities. Because naval forces share a number of attributes with ground and landbased air forces, I will attempt to identify any significant circumstances where naval 

chapter two
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capabilities are of unique value, especially for operations short of full-scale war.4 Together with the advantages/disadvantages of seaborne forces, these considerations will 

inform the building of measurable hypotheses. Rather than establishing a single theory 

of naval deployments, I pursue here a general inquiry that encompasses as many factors 

as possible in order to answer four main questions—pertaining to the relations between 

the use of naval forces and crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. activity, and outcomes—to 

determine where future research will be useful.

Explaining the U.S. Use of Force

Up until the twentieth century, as Gerald Astor describes, Americans used force as a 

means of protecting national security or self-defense.5

 The war against the Barbary 

States, the War of 1812, and the Civil War are cited as examples. The war with Mexico 

(1846–48) was fought for territorial gains, and the Spanish-American War (1898) can 

be seen as a demonstration of American power in the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. 

Within the United States, the Sioux wars (between 1854 and 1890) exemplify a fight for 

territory between U.S. and Indian forces.6

Motives behind Intervention Decisions

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has deployed forces overseas for 

many purposes short of war. Prior to World War II, these included protecting commerce 

and trade routes, deterring and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating relations with foreign governments, restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of debts, 

and defending American citizens and interests during regional upheavals.7

Strictly 

speaking, the United States was never truly isolationist. For example, U.S. military 

forces have been committed in East Asia since 1898 and have frequently intervened in 

the Western Hemisphere.8

By the twentieth century, however, the United States had troops almost constantly 

deployed around the world.9

 Feste identifies four moments in American history that 

have shaped intervention policy: World War II, the middle of the Vietnam War, the 

end of the Cold War, and one decade post–Cold War.10 Before World War II, American

military capabilities were limited; real global intervention activism and commitment 

began only after the war.11 The United States was resolved to remain actively involved in 

world affairs and to prevent a unilateral buildup of hostile might. Munich was engraved 

in the minds of American presidents. No longer were the main reasons for using force 

threats to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, its citizens, or—however rarely—

the homeland.

During the Cold War, the use of force centered on the standoff between the two 

superpowers. Protection of the free world, maintenance of the balance of power, and 
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prevention of Soviet gain of territory or the spread of communism dominated U.S. foreign policy. The United States tried to keep the Western Hemisphere, and as many other 

Third World nations as possible, under American control.12 In Vietnam, the United 

States suffered a major defeat and for a while became more reluctant to use force (openly) abroad. But Jeffrey Record interprets the lesson from Vietnam not as an example to 

discredit U.S. use of force but rather as evidence of the mismatch between conventional 

military power and revolutionary forces.13 The two paradigms, Munich and Vietnam,

influence most presidents in their attitudes toward intervention.

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an equal adversary, 

and its military supremacy became unchallenged.14 Escalations with the Soviet Union, 

triggered by involvement in countries located in the Soviet sphere of interest, did not 

influence U.S. intervention decisions any more.15 The danger of a war between the 

superpowers had been eliminated, but conflicts and crises persisted, and military power 

remains essential, rendering the “responsibility of global leadership greater than ever.”16

As many crises and conflicts have occurred since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and 

the demise of the Soviet Union as prior to those momentous events. As Richard Neal 

says, “While the Cold War superpower contest is over, the world may be a more peaceful 

place, but it is not a world at peace.”17 According to Art, military power continues to be 

important because the relations between states remain anarchic.18 Thus military force 

and foreign policy stay closely linked.19

Some even see a rising importance of intervention since the end of the Cold War.20

Humanitarian interventions, for example, have emerged as a new post–Cold War phenomenon.21 Human suffering, brought to the American homes on television, has led to 

interventions mainly undertaken to halt human-rights abuses.22 In general, military operations other than war gained momentum in the post–Cold War era.23 The increase of 

overt intervention after the end of the Cold War, according to Feste, can be attributed to 

a combination of diminished concern about Soviet involvement, the rising importance 

of economic criteria, and reemphasis on idealistic considerations, such as human rights 

and democracy.24 While American intervention policy continues to be strongly oriented 

to national interests, humanitarian concerns—and, since 9/11, antiterrorism—seem to 

have replaced communist containment. The year 2001 brought the global war on terror 

and opened a new chapter in the justification of U.S. use of force—preemptive strikes, 

democratization, and a new (or renewed) moralization of warfare. The communist 

threat from the Cold War had shifted to the terrorist threat, no longer confined to states 

but instead found among individuals and transnational and international organizations. 

But in Paul Atwood’s words the war on terror “is in keeping with the long history of 

American foreign policy.”25 Some even argue that military supremacy has become part 

of the national identity.26
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Thomas Barnett highlights the changes in the U.S. intervention pattern.27 Key targets 

are countries located in what Barnett calls the “gap,” that part of the world excluded 

from the benefits of globalization and therefore outside the “core”: “Simply put, . . . [if a] 

country was losing out to globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, 

there was a far greater chance that the United States would end up sending troops there 

at some point across the 1990s.” The 9/11 attacks triggered another change. Barnett 

speaks of a time of chaos and uncertainty and of the necessity to “defend all against 

all.”28 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, no coherent strategy for when force should 

be used had been established. “Today, America and the world stand at a crossroad similar to the one we faced following World War II. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have provided us all a glimpse of the new form of international crisis that will define our age.”29

The attacks of 2001 represented a milestone in the international security system. States 

were no longer the exclusive actors but gave way to substate and transstate systems.30

During the 1990s, Washington mainly concentrated on individual enemies, whereas the 

Cold War had focused on a hostile order. Rogue states and their leaders, failing states, 

extremists, and terrorists became new targets.31 The war on terrorism focuses mostly on 

individuals or groups and on countries providing them with support and safe havens. 

During the Cold War the West faced a known threat from the Soviet Union and, to a 

lesser extent, China, which had well-known intentions and goals. Today the motives and 

moves are less predictable. In the words of the former American secretary of defense, 

Donald H. Rumsfeld, new military thinking is now required to arm Western societies 

“against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”32

Soft Power?

Feste observes that “the United States is widely perceived as emphasizing military power 

as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other 

forms of soft power.”33 Joseph Nye has frequently warned that the United States has 

lost “soft power”—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the 

values that underlie them.34 The United States both undervalues this form of power and 

underestimates its importance. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment 

that employed soft power along with hard power. After 9/11 the United States pursued a 

unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve all security problems, not only damaging its hard power but also seriously setting back its soft 

power. Damage to hard power can be made good in a relatively short period, whereas 

losses in soft power are long lasting and require fundamental policy changes to address.

The preemption doctrine has removed “the distinction between imminent (immediate) 

and potential future threats. It assumes that grave threats are now always imminent.” 

This thought process leads to the devaluation of diplomacy and negotiation and shifts 
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the emphasis to the use of force as an immediate resource, thereby failing to distinguish 

between short- and long-term threats and different adversaries. The result is a more 

complex security scenario and greater instability.35 The soft-power dilemma has triggered persistent discussions in the U.S. academic community. The Center for Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank in Washington, D.C., held in 

2007 special seminars involving such former government officials and expert as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Armitage, and Joseph Nye.36 The consensus view was the need 

for a new balance on the part of the United States if it was to prolong its hegemony. The 

participants “proposed to use hard and soft power in coordination as ‘rational strength’ 

in order to realize strategic national security goals.”37 Nye had previously defined this 

“combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” as smart power.

Two years later, in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed the following 

approach:

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a 

struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force 

will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over 

the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the 

military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances 

among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of 

quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.38

This statement supports the smart-power commission’s call for a soft-power approach 

linked with military force.39

A policy shift became visible with the release of a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 

2010 and the 2010 QDR. Both strategic documents recognized the importance of soft 

power and emphasized the American interest in focusing on it. If necessary, however, 

soft power can be backed up by hard power, which suggests a combination of the two. 

Naval forces are a uniquely appropriate smart-power tool, because of their global presence, frequent interactions, diplomatic potential, and low intrusiveness. This point is 

reflected in the newest maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower,” and NOP 10.40 The latter explains how naval forces “will blend soft and hard 

power in support of the approach, objectives and enduring national interests articulated 

in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).” According to Bruce Elleman, “during the 

nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very thought that sea powers might 

regularly use naval platforms to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and 

starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century, 

however, national power and prestige are more and more characterized by ‘soft power.’ 
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Unified Assistance [after the tsunami in Southeast Asia] showed that ‘hard power’ 

assets like aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of ‘soft power.’”

41

Realism, Idealism, and Diversionary Theory

Policy and decision makers face the challenge of deciding whether, when, and how to 

use force.42 A large body of literature, with the help of various theoretical approaches, 

has studied how the use of military force has helped to promote U.S. foreign-policy 

goals.43 Three schools of thought—realism, idealism, and diversionary theory—capture 

the main paradigms. Realism remains the most important for studying the use of force 

and international relations.44 In classical realism, sovereign states are the dominant 

actors in the international system, which is characterized by anarchy. Nation-states 

are in a constant state of competition as they seek power, maximization of security, 

and material wealth.45 This struggle shapes the conduct of foreign policy and international relations. Political, military, and economic assets can be used to support power 

and security. In its exercise of foreign policy, the state depends on public support and 

economic resources. However, domestic politics are (for the most part) secondary in the 

formulation of foreign policy in the realist paradigm.46 Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr 

are among the main proponents of classical realism, the roots of which go as far back as 

Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli.47

Unlike classical realism, the reformulated neorealism, or structural realism, downplays 

the importance of the individual and human nature in explaining why states seek power 

and sees the pursuit of power as a derivate of international structure.48 Even without an 

imminent threat, states, treated in the aggregate, as “black boxes,” are considered well 

advised to pursue power sufficient for self-defense. Different forms and interpretations, 

such as defensive and offensive, have emerged.49 Defensive realists argue against the 

maximization of power, because they believe the system will punish states that attempt 

to gain too much power, whereas offensive realists would maximize power to the point 

of hegemony: “The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but 

instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival. 

For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means 

to an end and the ultimate end is survival.”50 National interests are closely linked to 

realist thinking, as they are essential for power and security: “The dominant paradigm 

in world politics—realism—would suggest that interventions take place only when clear 

national interests are at stake.”51

John Ikenberry describes the mainstream of American foreign policy since World War 

II as influenced by either realist or liberalist considerations.52 These two strategies have 

guided American presidents in their foreign-policy orientations. Liberal institutionalism, like idealism, acknowledges the importance of multilateralism, international law, 
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international institutions, and democracy. U.S. power can help to create a more peaceful 

and cooperative world, the vision of Woodrow Wilson. Following this ideal, foreign 

policy should prefer a “carrot” rather than a “stick” approach and downplay the role 

of military force. David Skidmore, analyzing American presidents from Nixon to G. 

W. Bush, identifies Nixon’s foreign policy as most “realist,” whereas he believes Jimmy 

Carter and William Clinton favored a liberal institutionalist approach; Carter was a 

strong advocate of human rights, and Clinton promoted “assertive multilateralism.”53 

But both presidents began shifting their policies toward realism as a result of international events and domestic pressure. He describes Ronald Reagan and (after the 9/11 attacks) Bush as followers of neoconservatism. While the Reagan administration engaged 

in covert operations to topple socialist and communist regimes, the “Bush doctrine” and 

the GWOT endorsed overt regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ikenberry argues 

that the Bush doctrine sets a new precedent of unilateralism, involving less reliance 

on allies and global institutions in the battle against terrorism and rogue states.54 He 

criticizes the U.S. use of military force to refashion the global order and favors more attention to the international community and world stability. Francis Fukuyama cautions 

that “neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with 

concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony. What is 

needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to

relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without illusions about the efficacy of American power and 

hegemony to bring these ends about.”55

Generally, realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the importance of institutions, while liberals value the importance of institutions but are skeptical of the use of power to restructure them. But Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth 

argue that the benefits of international institutions are grounded in realism—that it will 

be more challenging for the United States to advance its national interests if it does not 

invest in those institutions.56 A discussion sparked in April 2010 after remarks by the 

former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel highlighted the difficulties of labeling a president’s orientation in regard to idealism and realism. Rahm told the New York 

Times, “If you had to put him [Barack Obama] in a category, he’s probably more realpolitik, like Bush 41 [that is, G. H. W. Bush]. . . . He knows that personal relationships are 

important, but you’ve got to be cold-blooded about the self-interests of your nation.”57

Several scholars reacted in Foreign Policy to the categorization. Whereas Robert Kagan 

sees Obama’s foreign policy as oriented to idealism, Stephen Walt and Charles Kupchan 

see a tilt into a realist direction. Thus a clear categorization is nearly impossible and 

often depends more on the nature of the decision that needs to be made.58 Similarly Nye 
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points out that Obama should not be categorized as either idealist or realist but rather as 

oriented toward liberal realism.59

To capture this variety, Miskel distinguishes two different types of realists, one with 

a very narrow definition of what constitutes national interests and the other one with 

a more inclusive definition that captures such events as Bosnia and Kosovo.60 He sees 

most American presidents as bracketed between those two. America’s announced conditions for intervention are very broad.61 Vital national interest is a reoccurring theme and 

offers the main rationale for intervention decisions. Glenn Hastedt draws a complex picture of individuals and institutions “competing for positions of prominence in setting 

‘values and priorities’” leading to a variety of different national interests.62

There exists no agreement on the exact definition of national interests. Security and 

power are clearly dominant, whereas humanitarian issues are secondary and normally 

not categorized as vital. For Record, only a direct attack on or threat to the American

territory and its citizens is widely accepted as a prime vital national interest.63 Art lists 

six categories of national interests for the United States, ranked from highest to lowest: prevent an attack on the United States; prevent a war between the major powers in 

Eurasia; preserve access to oil reserves; maintain an open international economic order; 

spread democracy, promote upholding human rights, and prevent genocide and mass 

murder in civil wars; and preserve the global environment.64 The first three are the most 

important ones and largely dominate policy making. Art argues that military power 

can guarantee the first three vital interests but not the next three: “In general, military 

power cannot be efficiently and effectively employed to force states to lower their barriers to trade, to create democracy in states that have never experienced it, or to force others to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Military power can be directly used 

to prevent aggression against the Persian Gulf oil sheikdoms, or to preserve Eurasian 

great-power peace, by deterring would-be adversaries and reassuring America’s greatpower allies.” The fifth in this list is an idealistic goal and by itself largely irrelevant for 

realist intervention decisions. Art proposes a strategy of selective engagement, between 

isolationist, unilateralist, and highly global interventionist. This strategy—what he calls 

“realpolitik plus”—follows both realist and liberalist ideals. Beside power and security, 

the promotion of democracy, human rights, free markets, and international openness 

are important goals of U.S. foreign policy. Military power is fundamental to selective 

engagement, as it furthers both military and nonmilitary goals.65 Many different reasons 

for interventions have been given, but the most powerful and enduring motive has been 

security.66 Feste comes to the conclusion that although intervention to protect human 

rights, spread democracy, or support peacekeeping missions has increased after the 

Cold War, these purposes cannot outweigh national interests.67 Andrew Bacevich makes 

a similar statement: “I am pretty idealistic, but when it comes to American statecraft, 
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despite all our talk about American idealism, ideals matter only when they coincide 

with U.S. interest.”68 Once military operations are under way, the rhetoric shifts to 

idealistic goals rather than realist ones.69 Nevertheless, these commentaries point to the 

overall dominance of national interest for the decision-making process.

Traditionally, “just war” theory is used for moral justification of certain interventions 

and wars by reference to universal values. Unlike pacifism, just war theory does not 

oppose all uses of force but gives clear limitations and offers guidelines as to when it 

is morally legitimate.70 After the Vietnam War the theory gained increased recognition in the United States. Just-war theory comprises two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in 

bello; the former describes the legitimate conditions for intervention, and the latter sets 

rules for the behavior of soldiers and states engaged in a war. Only the first category is 

relevant to the intervention decision. The principles trace back to Augustine in the early 

fifth century and to the work of Thomas Aquinas from 1265 to 1273.71 Aquinas defined 

three main criteria for when a war can be just.72

•	 Just cause (e.g., violent attack)

•	 Right authority (e.g., United Nations)

•	 Right intention (e.g., to end violence).

Other definitions, such as that put forward by the Responsibility to Protect report of 

2001, add last resort, proportionality of means, and reasonable prospect to the list.73

Frequently American presidents have rhetorically employed one or more of the justwar principles to justify decisions and portray the U.S. role as a moral force, especially 

in promoting democracy and human rights. In the prelude to the 2003 war in Iraq, 

just-war principles were evoked to justify actions within “a broader moral, cultural and 

humanistic framework.”74 Thus, as mentioned above, realist decisions can be linked to 

idealist rhetoric to “sell” intervention to the public.

Another school of thought focuses on the importance of domestic politics for foreign 

policy making. The “diversionary” theory assumes a connection between domestic politics and the decision to intervene.75 Factors such as high inflation rates, high 

unemployment, recession or economic stagnation, and low presidential approval rates 

can encourage a diversionary focus on foreign policy. Benjamin Fordham empirically 

supports the assumption that interventions are more likely in times of high unemployment rates and low presidential-popularity ratings.76 Although realists commonly reject 

the impact of domestic politics and considerations on foreign-policy decision making, 

some scholars emphasize it.77 For example, Robert Gilpin acknowledges the importance 

of domestic factors for explaining uses of force.78 In Paul Huth’s words, “state leaders are 

rational foreign policy decision makers who seek to remain in power, but they are also 
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concerned with promoting the international security of their country and are therefore careful to pursue security policies that do not undermine their domestic political 

position. . . . [B]oth domestic political concerns and international power considerations 

determine foreign policy choices.”79

These interpretations illustrate the importance of a combination of theoretical approaches in explaining intervention decisions. Meernik’s 2004 The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy, already cited, is one of the most comprehensive research 

accounts of why the United States employs military force. His empirical analyses include 

realist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest considerations, and his various 

hypotheses integrate different theories in a historical context. His empirical findings 

strongly suggest an orientation to realist goals, such as power and security. The results 

for the realist model are the most convincing and provide the best explanation for decisions to use force.

However, no single model is all-powerful. While the realist model is superior to other 

models, the liberalist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest models also help to 

understand when the United States will use force. This finding supports the observation 

that no president is oriented to any single school of thought. As circumstances dictate, 

different reasons justify their decisions. What remains convincing, however, is the 

dominance of national interest; thus for this study I assume that the greater the threat 

to national interests, the stronger and more forceful the U.S. response will be. In this 

connection it is interesting to see how seaborne responses are influenced by national 

interests and how this affects naval deployments with other forces.

How Can Naval Forces Influence International Crises (Behavior)?

American military power serves as an instrument of foreign policy by its very existence. Without ever having to be used or even referred to, it heightens U.S. prestige 

and lends importance to proposals and expressions of concern. The knowledge that it 

exists influences both how American policy makers approach problems and what positions other states adopt.80 As laid out in the previous chapter, naval forces are characterized by unique capabilities especially valuable for crisis response and the political 

use of force. The power of the use of force short of war is summarized in the following 

words by G. F. Hudson:

In traditional international politics the use of force has not been confined to actual war, but has 

won its greatest success when governments have been intimidated into compliance with the will 

of a stronger (or more determined) power without any clash of arms taking place. War can even be 

regarded as a failure in the application of force, just as the killing of a cashier by a bank robber usually implies that the robber has failed to intimidate by pointing a gun and has had to carry out his 

threat in action.81
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Luttwak’s Suasion

Luttwak describes the political use of sea power as “armed suasion.” He defines the phenomenon as follows: “Armed suasion defines all reactions, political or tactical, elicited 

by all parties—allies, adversaries, or neutrals—to the existence, display, manipulation, 

or symbolic use of any instrument of military power, whether or not such reactions 

reflect any deliberate intent of the deploying party. Naval suasion refers to effects 

evoked by sea-based or sea-related forces.”82 Suasion can be active or latent, coercive or 

supportive, deterrent or positive. What all forms have in common is dependence on the 

reactions of others. Essentially, armed suasion is about threat perception, not the actual 

use of force. Suasion materializes in reactions by other actors taken because of their 

perceptions, not in actions by or intentions of the “suasor.” Yet armed suasion is feasible 

only if resort to force is possible and convincingly plausible.

Active suasion includes any deliberate attempt to induce a specific reaction from the 

target, whether an ally, enemy, or neutral. Latent suasion, exercised through routine 

or undirected naval operations, works best as a deterrent but can also be supportive, 

reminding allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid. Further, 

suasion can manifest itself in signs of support (supportive mode) or can be aimed at 

deterring (deterrence mode) the adversary.83 The coercive aspect of active suasion can 

deter or compel, while the supportive form reassures allies or clients.84 Michael Codner 

illustrates Luttwak’s different modes of suasion with the graph given in figure 5.85

One example given by Luttwak of unintended effects brought about by latent suasion 

involves U.S. naval activity in the Mediterranean in the years following World War II.86 

Negative

Deterrence

Armed Suasion

Latent Suasion

Supportive 

Mode

Supportive 

Reassurance Coercive

Positive

Compellence

Deterrent

Mode

Active Suasion

Figure 5

Armed Suasion (adapted from Codner, “Defining Deterrence,” p. 2)
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While the U.S. Sixth Fleet was consciously deterring Russian and Arab moves against 

American interests, it may also have been giving unintended encouragement to Israeli 

activism in a manner inimical to the interests of the United States. The active version 

of supportive suasion is exemplified by the visit of the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) 

to Istanbul in March 1946, a visit that marked the beginning of the postwar deployment of American naval power in the Mediterranean. The Missouri episode demonstrated the political application of naval power—the use of ships as symbols, rather than 

instruments, of power. The offensive power represented by Missouri was secondary in 

importance to gaining the declared commitment to Turkey. According to Luttwak this 

“symbolic” role is preventive of, rather than reactive to, a confrontation.87 In my view, 

the symbolic power of warships can be influential at any time in a crisis, be it to convince adversaries to desist from hostilities, to encourage the termination of the crisis, or 

to prevent escalation.

Another example is the crisis triggered by tension between Taiwan and China in 1950. 

Elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were deployed between Taiwan and China to dissuade, and if necessary to thwart, any attempt to mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, any potential unintended supportive effects for the Nationalists 

were neutralized by a public declaration that the fleet would also intervene to prevent a 

Nationalist landing on the mainland. In this case, the deterrent effect on the communist 

government was actually reinforced by emphasizing the supportive role of the Seventh 

Fleet: Bejing’s incentive to invade Taiwan was much reduced when the Nationalist threat 

to the mainland was neutralized. This incident again highlights the advantages of naval 

forces, which are flexible in a sense that has no equivalent on land. Overall, since 1945 

the U.S. Navy has exercised different forms of suasion, on many occasions, at all levels 

of intensity, and all around the world. What Luttwak labels “suasion” can more generally be termed “naval diplomacy,” working to influence and persuade minds rather than 

manifesting itself in physical action.88

Naval Diplomacy

During the nineteenth century, “naval diplomacy” was added to the naval vocabulary.89

Over the course of history, naval forces have been used frequently and successfully to 

support political-diplomatic initiatives by influencing behavior and have established 

their role as the predominant military instrument of diplomacy.90

History of Naval Diplomacy. With their capabilities to deploy forward, remain in international waters, stay on station indefinitely, interact with friendly countries, monitor 

crisis spots, withdraw when no longer needed, and respond with military power, naval 

forces have exercised diplomatic power to great effect.91 Sir Julian Corbett regarded 
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the support or obstruction of diplomatic efforts as the central task of naval fleets.92 As 

Deborah Sanders observes, “Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests 

in a particular region, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle reminders of their states’ military might and commitment.”93 John Stuart Mill observed, “our 

diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it.”94 At the lower end of 

the diplomatic spectrum are such measures as demonstrating presence, visiting ports, 

showing the flag, exercises, and other confidence-building activities. “Ship visits can be 

a useful form of diplomatic exchange, help maintain or secure good relations, and win 

popular favour.”95

Sailors frequently help communities on land. Examples that foster goodwill and reassure American support include volunteer work, such as helping to build hospitals and 

schools, or invitations to foreign nationals to visit U.S. Navy ships.96 Naval vessels also 

operate periodically as hospital ships (in addition to actual Navy-operated hospital 

ships) for poor countries and deploy in humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief missions.97 Further traditional diplomatic peacetime activities center on cooperation with 

foreign military forces—military-to-military contacts, exercises with foreign navies, 

officer training, and access agreements—as means of demonstrating and building positive political relationships.98 As Blechman says, these operations “provide the backbone 

of the strategy of global engagement.”99 At the higher end, armed suasion is the most 

forceful aspect of diplomacy.100 The term “naval diplomacy” has been used so broadly 

that it can be defined as encompassing all events, even including violence, that do not 

lead to war.101

The ability of navies to provide diplomatic leverage has long been recognized by nations. 

Bob Davidson locates the origins of naval diplomacy in the heritage of colonial powers.102 These powers would dispatch vessels to foreign locations to boost their prestige 

and reputations and also to influence events. For the majority of the nineteenth century, 

the United States benefited from the gunboat diplomacy of the Royal Navy, and also to 

some extent of the French navy, in Chinese ports.103 At the same time the USN conducted direct American diplomacy, and sailors served as ambassadors. Naval diplomacy today is a continuation of this tradition, aimed at influencing incidents on land 

by controlling the sea or by threatening to project power ashore if necessary. Max Boot 

compares the original tasks of gunboat diplomacy with the ones of the World Trade 

Organization today.104 For Rob McLaughlin, the U.S. Navy is the principal military arm 

of American diplomacy in the post–World War II world.105 Bouchard notes that “observers of naval diplomacy have concluded that changes in the structure and conduct of international politics since the end of World War II have been the primary factors causing 

maritime powers, particularly the United States, to place greater emphasis on the use 

of naval forces as a political instrument relative to land-based air and ground forces.”106
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Likewise, Cable states that “some of the constraints on the use of American military 

power to exert international influence are also such as almost to encourage reliance on 

limited naval force for this purpose.”107 Others suggest domestic political constraints as 

the driving force.

Whereas such authors as Booth and Peter Nailor consider gunboat diplomacy a thing 

of the past and the use of naval forces for diplomacy as obsolescent, Ghosh expresses 

an opposite viewpoint, that reluctance to become involved in full-scale wars increases 

the need for naval diplomacy, which can be employed to achieve national objectives 

without engaging in open warfare. In the latter’s words, “the focus of armed conflict is 

shifting from traditional regular war to the use of military power on the lines of modern 

gunboat coercive diplomacy.”108 Thomas Goodall emphasizes the technological advantages of the United States for conducting gunboat diplomacy.109 He names carrier-based 

aviation, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault as unique capabilities that further its 

effectiveness. Since the USN enjoys unmatched capabilities and worldwide presence, 

coercive diplomacy will remain an important tool for U.S. policy makers.

According to Matthew Scarlett, coercive diplomacy can achieve tangible foreign policy 

objectives; however, it requires a fusion of political, diplomatic, and naval skills for 

success.110 “The great utility of coercive naval diplomacy is made apparent through the 

variety of objectives for which it can be applied. Potential objectives range from general 

expression of foreign policy at one extreme, to the outright expulsion of a foreign government at the other extreme. Often coercive naval diplomacy is used to persuade an 

adversary to change their behavior. Naval forces are also used to enforce peace between 

two adversaries by a third party.”111 The North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 

November 2010 triggered the deployment of a well-armed naval task force, involving the 

carrier George Washington, to the Yellow Sea. Pritchett calls this “a little bit of gunboat 

diplomacy,” with China and North Korea as target states.112 China had warned the United States in the past not to send carriers to the Yellow Sea. With this move the United 

States cautioned North Korea not to escalate the situation and sent a signal to China to 

join the international denunciation of the North Korean aggression. As Pritchett says, 

“Gunboat diplomacy is always distinct to time and place, and even in the twenty-first 

century remains a policy of force intended to deter other nations from exercising the 

violent use of military power.”113

The following passage from Cable summarizes thinking on the usefulness of navies for 

diplomacy:

Curiously enough, the expressive use of coercive diplomacy is sometimes better attempted by actions than by words, by warships rather than by politicians or diplomats. . . . The movement of warships, however, can still convey a sense of menace that is plausible to the victim because it is potent 

yet undefined, but convenient to the aggrieved government, because it is simultaneously impressive 
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to domestic opinion and noncommittal. Warships can always be withdrawn, provided the purpose 

of their movement has been left a little vague: verbal threats become embarrassing if they are neither productive nor implemented.114

The Concept of Naval Diplomacy. The U.S. Navy underscores the areas of interest to 

the United States by maintaining presence and conducting regular or periodic visits. 

But the mere presence of its ships in home ports sends a signal of military readiness. 

The primary objective of signaling is to influence events by shaping the perceptions and 

attitudes of other nations. “The influence military forces can exert in the international 

arena is related to their presence (or capability to be present), their core capabilities, the 

political will to use those forces, and, most importantly, the perception of those who you 

seek to influence.”115 To be successful in changing the other parties’ behavior, the presence and movements of the ships have to seize their attention. Maintaining, augmenting, and withdrawing forces all attract attention. A periodic deployment or sustained 

presence serves as a symbolic use of force and can attract the attention of foreign leaders. In order to signal heightened concern or interest, the naval force must be augmented 

or increase its readiness. Conversely, forces can also be left uncommitted or even sent 

in the opposite direction to indicate a determination not to get involved. While routine 

and presence functions are very similar to crisis management, they are more preventive, whereas the latter is more reactive. The choice of type of force and operation sends 

additional signals.116

While signaling can take place at any stage in a diplomatic crisis, it is most successful 

before a crisis is even reached.117 A show of interest (mere signaling) expresses the lowest 

level of activity. A show of resolve demonstrates intentions more clearly, and a show of 

force is the highest level. According to Allen, the appearance of ships and a public statement of intent are the key variables in the signaling process; the reaction of the target 

country establishes whether the operation is a success or failure.118 He distinguished 

four levels of signaling: routine peacetime presence (e.g., normal port visits); show of 

interest (expressing concern but without committing to any action); show of resolve 

(signal a commitment to a friend or to halt enemy action); and show of force (when the 

use of force in a specific way is threatened to resolve the crisis or influence its resolution 

to our satisfaction). Except for the first level, all can be reactions to international crises, 

because they divert naval forces from their regular employment. Allen states that if it 

is to be signaled that the United States is ready to intervene, an aircraft carrier or an 

amphibious force is required.119

When lower-level diplomatic activity is unsuccessful, actors frequently prefer a policy 

“combining diplomatic efforts with the threat of force”—coercive diplomacy—to achieve 

their goals in world politics.120 If this attempt fails, the crisis escalates to a limited or general war.121 Cable emphasizes that threats are only credible when there is a real readiness 
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to use force.122 This implicit coercion is the “bread and butter of diplomacy.”123 He 

defines this coercive “gunboat” diplomacy as “a resort to specific threats or to injurious 

actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in 

the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the 

territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”124 With the help of coercive diplomacy, 

the employing actor aims at achieving an advantage from another state. If force is used 

for other than a specific advantage, it is no longer a diplomatic action. The same is true 

of inflicting damage after the desired objective has been achieved.125 Cable distinguishes 

four types of coercive diplomacy:126

•	 Definitive: creates a fait accompli, leaves the adversary no choice.

•	 Purposeful: induces the adversary to make a decision to do or stop something, such 

as policy change—success depends on victim.

•	 Catalytic: to influence events but is more manifest in a readiness to respond, such as 

through the presence of a naval force.

•	 Expressive: to emphasize attitudes and underline statements.

In his study on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy, Robert Mandel locates the roots 

of gunboat diplomacy in the theories of bargaining, signaling, deterrence, coercion, and 

force.127 Like Luttwak’s suasion, gunboat diplomacy incorporates many aspects of the 

spectrum of possible reactions. According to Mandel, gunboat diplomacy is the most 

frequently used “show of force” tool.128 Following Blechman and Kaplan, he defines a 

show of force as “when physical actions are undertaken by one or more components of 

the uniformed armed services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in 

another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”129 Mandel’s 

graph (figure 6) shows the different stages from the most general classification of 

gunboat diplomacy, presented by the widest circle, through the very specific, separate 

categorization. 

Often “gunboat diplomacy” and “coercive diplomacy” are used interchangeably. Mandel 

observes that coercion “does seem to be at the core of gunboat diplomacy incidents.”130

Christian Le Mière calls gunboat diplomacy a muscular negotiation that “attempts to 

achieve its goals, which will be either coercive or deterrent, through intimidation. It is, 

therefore, reliant upon a mismatch, or at least a perceived mismatch, between two states’ 

naval capabilities. A weaker navy will struggle to engage in gunboat diplomacy directed 

at a stronger adversary for the simple reason that its bluff may be called.”131 Generally it 

can be argued that gunboat diplomacy is more aggressive, overt, and offensive.132
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Coercion

Diplomacy is closely linked to coercion. Thomas Schelling was the first scholar to 

explore the power of coercion in depth. In his 1966 Arms and Influence he described war 

as “brute force” aimed at destroying the adversary’s capabilities. More promising are the 

coercion and intimidation of the enemy, as the power to hurt is more successful when it 

is latent. Schelling concludes that “the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it 

is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. It is the threat of damage, or of more 

damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can 

influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted or that a 

victim believes can be withheld or inflicted. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.”133 His work clearly links diplomacy and violence. 

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman more generally define coercion as “getting the 

adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force.”134

Once distinguished from brute force, coercion is typically broken down into two subcategories, compellence and deterrence. Stephen Cimbala calls armed coercion “military 

persuasion,” a “psychological strategy intended to influence the decision of other state or 

nonstate actors, without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or society.”135

As these different definitions show, the term can be broadly interpreted, especially in 

regard to the use of force. Bratton criticizes the lack of agreement on definitions and 

success of coercion.136 Often the terms “coercion,” “compellence,” “coercive diplomacy,” 

Bargaining, signaling, and force

Coercive diplomacy, deterrence

Shows of force

Gunboat

diplomacy

Figure 6

Conceptualization of the Theoretical Context of Gunboat Diplomacy (adapted 

from Mandel, “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 61)
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“military coercion,” “coercive military strategy,” and “strategic coercion” are used 

interchangeably. Bratton urges analysis of the effectiveness of coercion in “terms of 

positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or failures.”137 His study provides a 

structured analysis of the most important research on coercion and groups scholars according to their different definitions of coercion characteristics. The figure presents the 

different types of threat involved in coercion.138

A major disagreement revolves around the question whether force can be merely 

threatened or must actually be used. Whereas the deterrence literature does not focus 

on force—because deterrence has failed once force has to be employed—the coercion 

literature has three divisions: “coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of 

force; coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power); 

and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force.”139 The first views the use of force 

as similar to deterrence: except for minor displays, force demonstrates the failure of 

coercion. This school underscores the political-diplomatic nature of coercion: “The 

goal of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the opponent to halt what he is doing, not to 

strike him until his capabilities are so reduced that further resistance is futile. ‘Coercive 

diplomacy, then, calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is 

used at all—to demonstrate one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the 

credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.’”

140 The second division includes “sticks,” such as sanctions or force and threats of coercion, as an addition. 

Coercion occurs simultaneously with the use of force. However, the objective is not the 

destruction of the enemy’s military forces or territorial occupation but the compliance 

of the opposing state. Critics complain that this school of thought often makes fine 

distinctions between coercion and brute force. The third group does not distinguish 

between coercion with force and coercion without force. Coercion involves diplomatic 

and military means, including the use of force. “What distinguishes coercion from brute 

force in this school is that force is used in a measured and controlled way to ‘signal’ to 

the target the threat of further punishment unless it complies. . . . ‘Coercion depends 

more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done.’”141 Table 2-1 

presents advocates for the three different schools. 

Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion is 

different from deterrence)

Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, Robert 

Pape

Both compellent and deterrent threats 

(deterrence and compellence are both types of 

coercion)

Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellisberg, Wallace 

Thies, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, and 

Matthew Waxman

Note: For a detailed account of Robert Pape’s interesting discussion on airpower and coercive diplomacy see Bombing to Win. He 

advocates the denial strategy of coercion and rejects the punishing power of coercive airpower. His denial theory proposes that 

the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the 

probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.
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Thus, crisis coercion and brute force lie on a common continuum, as many different 

levels of force can be employed to coerce.142 While Schelling promotes coercion through 

both diplomacy and force, Alexander George urges the use of nonviolent coercion before force is used.143 He articulates as an alternative to war a detailed coercive-diplomacy 

theory in which he describes the concept of coercive diplomacy as restricted to “efforts 

to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.” 

The offensive version of coercive threats, to persuade the victim aggressively to give up 

something, is referred to as “blackmail strategy.” Deterrence is also different because coercive diplomacy is employed as a response to something already undertaken. Compellence often includes both blackmail and coercive diplomacy. George, however, offers the 

criticism that compellence does not distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of 

coercion and provides less flexibility.144

While coercive diplomacy employs coercive threats, it also includes noncoercive persuasion and accommodation. Coercive diplomacy tries to persuade an actor to cease an 

action and introduces the threat of punishment if he does not. This strategy relies on 

the restricted exemplary use of force. The adversary is given the opportunity to halt his 

action before more force is employed. Signaling, bargaining, and negotiating are important parts of this strategy. The goal is to avoid use of full-scale force and to minimize the 

risk of escalation.145 Excessive use of force might have an effect contrary to that intended, 

by hardening the position of the opposing party, and result in a further escalation of 

tension.146 Such characteristics of naval forces as limited intrusiveness and flexibility 

favor the role of the USN for this strategy. However, U.S. Marines, moving by sea, bring 

capabilities for seizing objectives that have proved especially valuable in threatened or 

actual interventions ashore.

George lists the impact of the following eight contexts on coercive diplomacy:147

•	 Type of provocation. Certain provocations are more difficult to halt or even undo. For 

instance, a fait accompli, such as overrunning a neighboring country, is more challenging to reverse than coercing a state to halt an arms buildup.

•	 Magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests. Very important national interests are 

more complicated to manage and to reach a satisfactory solution for.

Table 2-1

Coercion before the use of force George, Gross Stein

Coercion only through force Pape

Coercion through diplomacy and force Schelling, Thies
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•	 Image of war. The more the parties want to avert an open war, because of the horrible 

consequences, the more restraint they will show in escalating tensions and the more 

amenable they will be to cooperation attempts (as was the case in, e.g., the Cuban 

missile crisis).

•	 Time pressure to achieve objective. Urgency felt by the parties to resolve the crisis 

(for example, because of fear of losing domestic support, the influence of weather on 

military operations, growing strength of the adversary, etc.).

•	 Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy. The more parties, the more difficult it is 

for them to speak with one voice. This loss of unity might outweigh the benefits of 

higher international pressure and greater resources.

•	 Strong leadership. The success of coercive diplomacy may depend on the pressure of 

strong and effective top-level leadership. Such leadership was provided by John F. 

Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis.

•	 The isolation of the adversary. Resolution is more difficult if the adversary is not (like 

Laos in 1961–62) an isolated state but is supported diplomatically and militarily by 

allies.

•	 The preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary. Parties who hope to improve 

the relationship after the termination of the crisis are more amenable to attempts to 

reach mutually acceptable outcomes.

Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly on context. George lists a number of 

conditions that favor coercive diplomacy.148 First is the clarity of the objective of coercive 

diplomacy and what is demanded of the adversary. The second is strength of motivation 

(a necessary but not sufficient condition). The third is asymmetry of motivation—

coercive diplomacy is more likely to be successful if the side employing it is more highly 

motivated by what is at stake in the crisis than its opponent. It is critical in this respect, 

however, that the adversary believe that the coercing power is more determined. The 

fourth is sense of urgency; the fifth, domestic and international support; and sixth, an 

opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation. Finally, the seventh is clarity concerning the 

precise terms of the settlement of the crisis.

The effectiveness of coercive diplomacy can be appraised differently in a variety of contexts. It succeeded during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 but failed for the Gulf War 

in 1990–91.149 Positive incentives or negative, punishing threats can be employed. The 

assurance given to Cuba during the missile crisis was a positive inducement (carrots and 

sticks), while during the early stages of the Gulf War punishment was threatened.150
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The Problem of Effectiveness

As previously stated, naval forces can signal intentions, shape attitudes, and employ 

(coercive) diplomacy. This suggests the question of the effectiveness of naval forces in 

exercising these functions. How successful are naval forces at carrying out the different missions? Measuring effectiveness is complicated. Crises outcomes are often 

characterized by a mixture of success and failure.151 Because naval forces normally do 

not encroach on other nations’ sovereign territory and their presence poses less of a 

threat than that of ground or air forces, their involvement is likely to be more readily 

accepted by crisis actors. At the same time, because naval forces are relatively subtle, 

they may lack the desired efficacy and directness in crises of high importance to the 

United States. Authors disagree as to whether the flexibility of naval forces increases 

or decreases their effectiveness.152 It is often argued that naval power is unlikely to 

be as influential as ground or air forces and that it is rarely decisive on its own. In 

Brooks’s words, “Attempting to use the Navy as the sole—or even the primary—vehicle 

of influence is at best inefficient, and at worst useless. In an era of jointness, the Navy 

should leave the task of influencing other states to the other services.”153 This suggests 

that the biggest disadvantage of naval forces is their lack of decisiveness. Likewise, Till 

claims that naval diplomacy is hardly ever decisive when employed alone.154 Deborah 

Sanders argues that naval diplomacy lacks cultural and historical awareness and suffers 

from inadequate information exchange.155 She draws on the example of Operation Sea

Breeze in 2006 in Ukraine: designed to improve the collaboration between countries, 

the planned exercise “became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev over the formation 

of a new coalition government.”

Edward Rhodes and coauthors conclude that our understanding of how shaping operations during peacetime support desired political outcomes is limited.156 Neither the 

types of military power nor the kinds of successful shaping operations are well known. 

In Rhodes’s study on the effectiveness of naval presence and signaling he comes to 

the following conclusion: “Further, and more germane to the issue of naval forward 

presence as a crisis deterrent tool, there is some evidence that because of the general 

insensitivity of potential aggressors to information, efforts to ‘signal’ resolve through 

measures such as reinforcing or redeploying forces have limited effectiveness. If force 

movements are large enough to foreclose particular military options, they may forestall 

aggression. But as a means of indicating resolve and convincing an aggressor of the 

credibility of deterrent commitments, they do not generally appear to have an impact.”157

But as Brooks says, “Navies, by their very nature, tend to operate on the margins of 

national consciousness. Their influence is likely to be subtle and indirect and not easy to 

discern or to measure.”158 The fact that it is hard to measure influence is an argument for 

better understanding and better methods of measurement. It is not, however, a reason 
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for ignoring the influence of naval forces in seeking to advance U.S. interests.159 I will 

argue that while limited effectiveness poses a problem, the many other advantages of 

naval forces are valuable.

Hypotheses

Signaling, shaping, and coercive diplomacy are all possible reactions to international 

crises. Of course, many other factors contribute to coercive diplomacy, and the hypotheses based on coercion literature merely borrow the idea of a limited use of force in crises 

to achieve U.S. goals. These theoretical ideas, together with the functions and characteristics of navies discussed previously, provide the starting point for formulating exploratory hypotheses, attempting to answer the present research questions pertaining to the 

types of crises the USN responds to, and investigating the way in which other involved 

actors shape the USN involvement, the role naval forces play within U.S. crisis activity, 

and the influence they exert on outcomes. The graph in figure 7 shows the strengths of 

different naval-forces combinations and how they will be analyzed in the hypotheses. 

Table 2-2 summarizes the potential impact of advantages/disadvantages of naval forces 

on the four categories of crises response. As laid out in the previous chapter, ubiquity, 

readiness, mobility, flexibility, independence, and subtleness are the main advantages; 

misperception, limited decisiveness, limited self-sustainment, and vulnerability are the 

Intrusiveness (–), Subtlety,

Mobility, Flexibility, Soft

Power

Strength of Force, Coercion,

Power, Inuence,

Decisiveness, Hard Power

NO

NAVY

USN

USN, (USMC), USAF

USN, (USMC), USAF

USARMY

USMC

Figure 7

USN Force Combinations Pyramid
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main disadvantages. The last two affect other military services even more than they do 

navies and so will thus not be considered for the generation of hypotheses. 

Some of the hypotheses treat the U.S. naval activity as a dependent and others as an 

independent variable, since certain criteria influence the decision to send naval forces 

but once launched, naval forces produce their own cause-and-effect outcomes.

Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses (H1a–H1d)

In the introductory chapter I presented two research questions concerning the crisis 

characteristics:

•	 In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?

•	 To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

The following theoretical ideas and hypotheses will help to answer these questions. 

Crisis characteristics are manifold and include the type of threats and issues, conflictmanagement techniques, levels of intensity, geographic locations, and the importance of 

a crisis, to name a few. The list of advantages and disadvantages of naval forces offers a 

starting point for analyzing the relation between crisis characteristics and seaborne crisis response. Advantages such as ubiquity, readiness, mobility, flexibility, and independence all enable seaborne forces to react immediately to crises. Subtleness and limited 

decisiveness, on the other hand, suggest involvement in “low threat” and “low issue” 

crises and, together with the problem of misperception, render U.S. seaborne activity 

more likely when the threat to American national interests is low. This view is also encouraged by a realist point of view. The problem of decisiveness would further suggest a 

more hesitant involvement in violent crises, while conversely ubiquity/flexibility allows 

immediate response in order to halt violence.

Threat, Stakes, and Violence. Crisis characteristics are important in deciding how to 

respond to and manage a crisis, as they influence severity, duration, management technique, and termination.160 According to Paul Diehl, the issue of a crisis and its salience 

TABLE 2-2

Advantages Disadvantages

Crisis Characteristics Observing events, adapting to changes, 

immediate response, subtle influence Limited influence 

Crisis Actors Subtle influence, less publicity Limited influence, 

misperception

U.S. Involvement

Support of all types of activities, calibration 

of action to circumstances, subtle influence, 

less publicity

Limited or even 

negative influence

Crisis Outcomes Different levels of coercion, subtle influence Limited or even 

negative influence
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are especially crucial to understanding national behavior and the use of military force.161

Depending on the issue and its salience, actors may be more willing to suffer high 

costs, and if so, that makes diplomacy more difficult and less likely to succeed. Highsalience issues are prone to be long lasting and often call for coercion as a management 

technique. Not all of George’s contextual variables affecting coercive diplomacy can be 

applied to this study of international crises, but two assumptions—type of provocation 

and magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests—can be transformed into hypotheses.162 As stated above, George argues that certain types of provocations pose a greater 

challenge and are thus more difficult to resolve. He identifies the invasion of foreign 

territory as an example of these greater challenges, whereas a hostile arms buildup is 

more amenable to coercive diplomacy. Thus, I assume, the lower the threat of the crisis, 

the less difficult its resolution. As a result, very limited uses or displays of force should 

be sufficient. Political crises suggest political/diplomatic means as response tools. In 

general, force is graduated to the severity of the incidents, in such terms as importance, 

difficulty, and risk. The more threatening and grave the crisis, the less likely naval 

forces will be employed alone. The same can be assumed about the issues at stake in a 

crisis. This assumption is based on George’s concept of magnitude and depth, viz., that 

military issues present a greater threat to national interests than economic crises, for 

example, and require a more forceful intervention.

Further analyzing the type of provocation, Paul Senese finds that territorial disputes 

have a high likelihood of escalation and often show higher levels of severity.163 Huth also 

points to the need to intervene as soon as possible: “Given that once territorial disputes 

emerge, domestic political incentives encourage leaders to remain deadlocked in conflict, timely diplomatic intervention is necessary to try and avoid protracted disputes.”164

This suggests that within the category “threat” of a crisis, territorial disputes trigger 

naval responses, because of their capacity to respond immediately.

H1a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low threat” 

international crises. (Based on George’s type of provocation.)

H1b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low issues” 

international crises. (Based on George’s magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests.)

Deterrence theories argue that if violence levels reach full-scale warfare, diplomacy has 

failed, in which case appropriate military force must be called on. Violent crises are 

also said to be more difficult to resolve; thus the limited effectiveness of naval forces 

may suggest more forceful responses. Graduated force can protect against violence or 

control, contain, or even dominate it and thereby persuade the enemy to halt his actions. 

As Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry note, the issue is how much force to apply.165 I 

assume that high levels of violence will typically bring stronger U.S. military responses. 
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Alternatively, however, high levels of violence may increase the need for immediate 

response or the capability to calibrate action to circumstances, or even encourage nonintervention. The so-called Vietnam syndrome, reinforced by the events in Lebanon in

1983 and Somalia in 1993, suggests an unwillingness to accept high casualties. Although

even a single event can be sufficient, as the overall violence level of the crises increases, 

so does the danger of high casualties. As Susan Hannah Allen states, “In fact, the lower 

risk of casualties associated with air power is part of its appeal as a coercive instrument 

for the United States, since lower casualties are associated with lower domestic costs in 

democratic societies.”166 It is thus not clear in which direction the hypotheses will go, but 

following a deterrence point of view I assume the following:

H1c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international 

crises with low levels of violence.

Geostrategic Importance and Geographical Location. Because of their limited decisiveness, naval forces are less likely to be employed in regions and crises of great interest to 

the United States. If the crisis is deemed important and national interests are threatened, the United States will send a more powerful force. According to Meernik and 

Chelsea Brown, “a major military operation will likely signal strong US interest in a 

crisis and, thus, a willingness to use such forces for longer periods of time to attain US

objectives.”167 The commitment of ground troops and the number of troops committed 

signal the level of resolve.168 Similarly, Art concludes that limited uses of force usually 

provide equally limited incentives for targets to change their behavior and are therefore 

not powerful enough when important U.S. interests are at stake.169

H1d (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the threat 

to geostrategic interests posed by the international crisis is low.

Crisis Actors and USN Crisis Response: Crisis Actors Hypotheses (H2a–H2d)

The introductory chapter presented three research questions pertaining to the relation 

between crisis actor characteristics and seaborne crisis response:

•	 How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?

•	 What crisis actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?

•	 How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

Four hypotheses will help to answer these questions. The characteristics of the crisis 

actors and other involved third parties play an important role and influence the crisis 

management technique. The more subtle influence and the likelihood of misperception 

of naval forces suggest more power when there are fewer crisis actors. Because naval 

forces normally do not encroach on other countries’ sovereignty, their involvement is 
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likely to be perceived more favorably. Additionally, all advantages of naval forces favor 

their deployment in crisis with only limited publicity and global scrutiny.

Number of Actors. Some of Mandel’s hypotheses on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy can be modified and applied to naval involvement in crises. According to Glenn 

Snyder and Paul Diesing, where there are several participants, accountability is more 

broadly diffused and hostility less pronounced.170 Yet others claim that negotiations are 

likely to be less efficient and settlements more elusive as the number of participants 

grows.171 I share the latter position, viz., that naval forces are less effective when multiple actors are involved, because it is then more difficult to reach agreements and to 

influence all actors. Similarly, Art finds that a multiplicity of parties on each side of the 

confrontation renders coercive diplomacy more difficult.172 In this analysis there is only 

one coercer (the United States), not multiple coercers, but I hypothesize that the form 

of military deployment chosen by the United States is influenced by the number of coercion targets. Meernik argues that the importance of a crisis to U.S. national interests 

increases with a growing number of actors.173 Because the potential impact of the crisis 

intensifies with the number of actors, so does the need to respond more visibly and 

decisively because of the received attention.

H2a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less likely in international 

crises with multiple actors. (This is a counter-hypothesis to Mandel: that gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the action involves multiple assailants or victims rather than a 

single assailant or victim.)

UN Involvement. The involvement of the United Nations lends a certain legitimacy 

to involvement in a crisis. UN involvement can range from a preliminary discussion 

of the crisis without resolution to authorization to use force. While multilateralism is 

desirable, it slows down intervention decisions; the right moment to intervene might be 

lost.174 Because naval forces are relatively nonintrusive and politically acceptable, they 

might be the instrument of choice in crises without UN engagement, so as to attract 

minimal global attention. The unique attribute of naval as compared to other forms of 

military power in the diplomatic context is its oceanic ubiquity and its independence 

from non-U.S. authorities.175 A study by Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter found that 

when “uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, 

the rally in support of the American president increases significantly.”176 This lends additional support for the likelihood of deployment of naval forces when the UN is 

not involved, as such missions also trigger less debate or criticism within the United 

States. Naval forces can be deployed without attracting much attention in the U.S. 

media, giving the U.S. policy makers the option of influencing events without attracting close scrutiny by the American society. Generally, strong military power is most 
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commonly endorsed by the public when seen as a last resort, which is unlikely in the 

case of low-level UN activity.177

H2b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is more 

likely when there is no or low UN involvement.

Lack of Cohesion. Conflict management works best between well-identified entities. When the government of one of the involved nations faces challenges, such as a 

rebellion or insurgency, it will be more difficult for third parties to support conflict 

resolution. Internal unity is an important source of bargaining strength.178 Disunity 

and lack of cohesion hinder successful conflict management because of the limitations 

they impose on the power and authority of the government.179 Thus, severe political and 

socioeconomic disorder renders coercive diplomacy more difficult and less likely to be 

successful. I hypothesize that stability is related to how receptive the state is to low-level 

influence. In order to exercise more subtle influence it is necessary to have an entity 

to address; thus internal stability is more likely to yield favorable results. Additionally, 

unstable states have less incentive to terminate crises, because they have less to lose; 

naval forces are not influential enough to change their behavior. The hypothesis follows 

Mandel, with the United States in the role of the assailant.180

H2c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the actors 

are politically stable. (Gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the assailant possesses 

equal or higher political stability than does the victim.)

Perception of U.S. Involvement. The flexibility, ubiquity, and limited intrusiveness 

of naval forces establish the ground for the next hypothesis. Participants in a crisis are 

more likely to perceive involvement of naval forces as less threatening than that of other 

military forces and therefore to retain a more positive view of U.S. actions. Once in the 

crisis area, naval forces are more flexible, less disruptive psychologically, and less offensive diplomatically than equivalent land-based forces.181 Additionally, their deployment is 

likely to be viewed with less anxiety and violence. Dov Zakheim and colleagues conducted a survey among senior opinion leaders in the Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East, 

and East Asia.182 The findings were that flexible American presence is perceived as most 

favorable and that maritime presence is the most flexible U.S. military presence. Treating 

naval involvement as an independent variable, I hypothesize the following:

H2d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is 

perceived as more favorable by the crisis actors than a combination with other military 

services.
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U.S. Involvement and USN Crisis Response

The introductory chapter presented three research questions to analyze the role of seaborne forces within U.S. crisis response:

•	 In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?

•	 How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services?

•	 How effective is U.S. naval involvement?

Their ubiquity, readiness, and independence make naval forces an attractive way to 

show concern almost immediately without waiting for a buildup, while their flexibility allows adaptation of the response as necessary. Their quality of subtleness further 

encourages low-level activity. The concerns regarding limited decisiveness and misperception, on the other hand, suggest that naval deployments have less leverage, a factor 

impacting the effectiveness of the contribution of U.S. activity to crisis termination. 

Similarly, when the United States has a larger stake in the crises, naval forces alone 

might not be the response tool of choice.

U.S. Involvement Hypotheses (H3a–H3f)

The level of military force employed signals clearly the U.S. level of commitment to a 

crisis. In turn, the level and choice of force mirror the political, financial, and logistical 

costs the United States is willing to accept.183 Huth explains, “Rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate credibly a defender’s 

resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of 

a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat, 

thereby revealing information about the actual commitment of a state to defend against 

an attack. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat 

and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict.”184

The questions and hypotheses involving U.S. activity include naval-force involvement as 

both a dependent and independent variable.

Level of U.S. Involvement. The use of the seaborne forces, in the absence of ground or 

air forces, should be prevalent in international crises with limited U.S. involvement. 

Most forms of coercive diplomacy assume both limited involvement and limited force in 

a first attempt to influence the adversary. The United States will try to halt and reverse 

the progress of an adversary’s action before resorting to the direct use of armed forces. 

Alternatively, low-level involvement demonstrates a moderate interest in the crisis and 

reluctance to invest in a strong military deployment. In both cases a lower U.S. involvement is assumed to favor naval involvement.
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H3a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international 

crises with lower forms of U.S. involvement.

U.S. Effectiveness. According to Cable, a limited use of naval force is effective if the 

threat alone achieves the objective.185 However, a survey of the Mediterranean region 

reveals that host nations pay the most attention to the actual use of force in crisis, 

especially combat action. Furthermore, the study finds, U.S. military force is perceived 

as most effective when it takes the form of combat action—for example, the air attack on 

Libya in 1986. Before April of that year, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi pursued an active 

program of training, supplying, and sponsoring international terrorists. After the U.S. 

bombing, Libyan-sponsored terrorism dropped sharply and may have ceased entirely.186

Meernik proposes the following hypotheses to measure the effectiveness of the different 

force levels: “The greater the force level deployed, the more likely the United States will 

achieve its objectives in the short and long term.”187 The dispatch of larger and stronger 

forces is more likely perceived as a firmer commitment and thus can more likely lead to 

or enforce an abatement of the crisis.

The following three hypotheses treat naval involvement as an independent variable, 

influencing the effectiveness of the U.S. involvement.

H3b (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less 

effective than the involvement of all forces.

H3c (independent): The U.S. involvement will be most effective if direct military force is 

used.

H3d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less effective in contributing to the termination of the crisis.

United States as a Crisis Actor. If the United States is directly involved as a crisis actor 

and not as a third party, the stakes are higher for, and the outcome is more important 

to, the United States. Thus when the United States is directly involved in the crisis, one 

should expect a correspondingly heavy military commitment.

H3e (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less 

likely if the United States is a direct crisis actor.

Immediate Readiness. Naval forces are forward deployed in and close to regions where 

crises are most likely to develop and U.S. national interests lie. Because U.S. naval forces 

are spread around the world, they are able to react immediately. It is often argued that 

they react to crises because they are “there.” But Carlisle Trost and Arthur Barber, writing separately, underscore the importance of capability as well as availability, qualities 

that are critical in explaining their frequent use.188 Barber stresses that “the political 
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agility and rapid in-theater availability of naval forces, as much as their military capability, have influenced decisions to use them so frequently.” Further, Cable argues that 

some disputes require an immediate response to be effective. I assume that naval-forces 

responses occur very shortly after the crisis breaks out. The state of readiness also depends on the overall overseas number of naval personnel.189

H3f (dependent): Only U.S. naval forces are able to react immediately after the international crisis breaks out.

Crises Outcomes and USN Crisis Response

The last research category presented in the introductory chapter concerns the relation 

between seaborne crisis response and outcomes. 

•	 How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Crises Outcomes Hypotheses (H4a–H4d)

The deployment of naval forces is assumed to affect the outcome of a crisis, treating naval involvement as the independent variable. Although it is impossible to measure how 

much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring a specific adversary, naval operations 

can help to display national power and signal national will—both essential components 

of deterrence.190 According to this view, naval forces can positively influence outcomes 

in an unthreatening fashion, yet flex muscles and subtly support diplomatic efforts.

A part of Blechman and Kaplan’s study analyzed outcomes of the interventions of 

different U.S. armed forces.191 A positive outcome is achieved when the United States 

is satisfied with the behavior of the other participants. Their findings on the effectiveness of the different armed services in producing positive outcomes are that land-based 

combat aircraft is most positively correlated with successful outcomes, followed by 

land-based ground forces. Positive outcomes were more frequent when land-based 

troops are employed, compared to amphibious ground forces, and they are even more 

frequent when both of them deployed together.192 Blechman and Kaplan show that 

positive outcomes of crises and conflicts are associated primarily with the direct use of 

force, although indirect or latent uses of force can be successful in the short run. When 

the objective is to end the use of force by another actor or to precipitate regime change, 

direct use of armed forces is less successful. When the objective is to deter another actor 

from repeated use of force, outcomes are positive.193 The authors also study the influence 

of the levels of force on outcomes and conclude that “outcomes were less often positive 

when greater levels of force were used, unless nuclear-capable forces were used together 

with one or more major conventional components.”194
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Higher levels of force correlate with more complicated situations, which in turn 

negatively influence the chances of a successful outcome. The same study, however, 

concludes that landing U.S. forces on foreign territory is more likely to result in positive 

outcomes than the mere dispatch of naval forces, thus suggesting that a U.S. land commitment positively influences outcomes.195 While the former finding is concerned with 

the level of force, the latter focuses on the type of force. Overall, the findings suggest 

that small land forces (satisfying criteria both for land forces and lower levels of force) 

correlate most strongly with positive outcomes. Further, land-based aircraft rank higher 

than ground troops, and ground troops higher than sea-based Marines; the combination of the Army and Marine troops is optimal. Although the two findings seem contradictory, they are focused on different issues—the type of force and the strength of the 

force. Hastedt finds that generally the firmer the commitment, the more often favorable 

outcomes are achieved.196

The mere threat of intervention can prevent or end conflicts by altering the parties’ 

perceptions of a continuation or cessation of hostilities. It can reduce the rewards of war 

and enhance those of peace. While this can increase the bargaining space and facilitate 

agreements, there remains debate over whether or when threats of intervention have this 

effect. Military forces can threaten to intervene if a party continues to fight or does not 

comply. This threat can also encourage weaker parties to fight in hopes that the stronger 

military force will come to their defense.197

Despite the difficulty in assessing the crisis outcome from the vantage of the United 

States as Blechman and Kaplan did, I assume that definite outcomes are overall more 

positive, because they signify a clear-cut end to the crisis.198 Because naval forces are said 

to be less decisive, I assume a negative relation between the involvement of naval forces 

and definite crisis resolution. Stronger forces, however, are more likely to enforce a 

solution instead of subtly trying to broker a formal agreement. Air and land forces pose 

greater threats than naval forces and raise the odds of compliance. The promotion of an 

agreement can be interpreted as a right intention in the context of just-war theory, while 

an imposed outcome is likely to further the national interests of the imposing party and 

thus implies an ulterior motive.

H4a (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less 

likely to lead to definite outcomes.

H4b (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are more 

likely to lead to a formal agreement.

According to Linton Brooks, the very fact that naval presence can be temporary and 

low-key, rather than dramatic, makes presence potentially useful in easing tension.199

For example, James Tubbs assumes that excessive use of force actually escalates a 
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confrontation.200 It is debatable, however, whether the presence of naval forces plays a decisive role in ending tension. Some aver that it could even heighten it. McNulty identifies 

a possible deterrence effect if naval forces demonstrate their war-fighting capabilities 

in a tense situation.201 This in turn has the potential to exacerbate tension if deterrence 

fails. According to these deliberations the direction of the next hypothesis can go either 

way. For now I assume a positive influence of naval forces on tension.

H4c (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is likely to reduce tensions in 

international crises.

Another important aspect of outcomes is the satisfaction of the crisis actors with results. 

Poor or weak crisis management is likely to influence negatively the overall resolution 

and therefore actor satisfaction. As with arguments made above, the limited power of 

naval forces may not be enough to resolve crises to the satisfaction of the involved parties. This is different from hypothesis 2d, which suggests that these characteristics leave 

the actors with a favorable impression of U.S. intentions, aside from the outcome itself.

H4d (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less 

likely to lead to a satisfactory outcome.

Summary

Chapter 2 began with a very broad introduction into the U.S. uses of force before 

focusing on the theoretical ideas of naval diplomacy and coercion. By combining these 

concepts with the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces discussed in chapter 1 

and other research on crisis management, I attempted to explain the generation of the 

various hypotheses. Before turning to the statistical analyses, chapter 3 describes the 

efforts to find and combine reliable naval-response data.

Notes

1. Epigraph in Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea 

Power, p. 1.

2. James Meernik, U.S. Foreign Policy and Regime 

Stability (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army 

War College, 2008), p. 3.

3. Robert Art, introduction to The United States 

and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and 

Patrick Cronin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003); Bacevich, Washington 

Rules.

4. Dismukes, Expected Demand for the U.S. 

Navy to Serve as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign 

Policy, p. 14.

5. Gerald Astor, Presidents at War: From Truman 

to Bush, the Gathering of Military Power to 

Our Commanders in Chief (Hoboken, N.J.: 

Wiley, 2006), p. 287.

6. Cyrus Townsend Brady, The Sioux Indian 

Wars: From the Powder River to the Little Big 

Horn (New York: Indian Head Books, 1992).

7. David Yost, “The Future of U.S. Overseas 

Presence,” Joint Force Quarterly 2 (1995), pp. 

70–82.

8. Betts, “Power, Prospects, and Priorities.”

9. Astor, Presidents at War, p. 1.
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10. Feste, Intervention, p. 247.

11. Astor, Presidents at War, pp. 4–47.

12. Feste, Expanding the Frontiers, p. 3.

13. Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: 

Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of 

Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 119.

14. Carl Boggs, Masters of War (New York: 

Routledge, 2003), p. 2.

15. Chester Crocker et al., eds., Managing 

Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to 

International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Institute of Peace, 1996), p. xviii.

16. Bacevich, New American Militarism, p. 53; 

Chester Crocker et al., conclusions to Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to 

International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, 

Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 623.

17. Richard Neal, “Planning for Tomorrow’s 

Conflicts: A Recipe for Success,” Naval War 

College Review 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 

9–16.

18. Art, “Fungibility of Force,” pp. 247–48.

19. Art and Jervis, International Politics: Anarchy, 

Force, Imperialism, p. 147; Reveron, “Military 

Engagement, Strategy, and Policy,” pp. 494, 

499.

20. Charles Kegley and Margaret Hermann, “How 

Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected 

Dimension in Studies of the Democratic 

Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 

(1996), p. 310; Haass, Intervention, p. 21; Arnold Kanter and Linton Brooks, U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post–Cold War World: New 

Challenges and New Responses (New York: W. 

W. Norton, 1994), p. 5.

21. Barry Blechman, “Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma,” in Managing Global Chaos: 

Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and 

Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute 

of Peace, 1996), p. 290.

22. Michael Mandelbaum, “The Reluctance to 

Intervene,” Foreign Policy, no. 95 (1994), pp. 

3–18.

23. Record, Making War, Thinking History, p. 140.

24. Feste, Intervention, pp. 60, 105.

25. Paul Atwood, “War Is the American Way of 

Life,” New England Journal of Policy 19, no. 1 

(2003), p. 179.

26. Bacevich, New American Militarism, p. 1.

27. Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: 

War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

(New York: G. P. Putnam, 2004), pp. 4–20.

28. Ibid., p. 245.

29. Ibid.

30. Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: 

Military Theory and the Future of War,” Naval 

War College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 

p. 134.

31. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, p. 93.

32. Cited in Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar,” 

pp. 139–40.

33. Feste, Intervention, p. 18.

34. Joseph Nye, “The Decline of America’s Soft 

Power,” in Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign 

Policy in a Changing World, ed. David 

Skidmore (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007), 

pp. 27–28.

35. Neta Crawford, “Principia Leviathan: The 

Moral Duties of American Hegemony,” Naval 

War College Review 57, no. 3/4 (Summer/ 

Autumn 2004), p. 85.

36. Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, CSIS 

Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More 

Secure America (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 

2007).

37. Wang, “U.S. Military’s ‘Maritime Strategy’ and 

Future Transformation,” pp. 64–65.

38. Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” 

Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (2009), pp. 28–40.

39. Armitage and Nye, CSIS Commission on Smart 

Power.

40. Conway, Roughead, and Allen, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”; U.S. 

Navy Dept., Naval Operations Concept 2010.

41. Quoted in U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Operations 

Concept 2010.

42. Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: 

Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 

1991), p. 70.

43. James Meernik, “A Supply and Demand 

Theory of US Military Policy,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (2008), 

pp. 33–48.

44. Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World 

Politics,” in Theories of International Relations,

vol. 1, Approaches to International Relations: 
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Realism, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn 

Moore (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2006), p. 

201; John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise 

of International Institutions,” in Theories of 

International Relations, vol. 1, Approaches to 

International Relations: Realism, ed. Stephen 

Chan and Cerwyn Moore (Thousand Oaks, 

Calif.: Sage, 2006), p. 287.

45. Michael Mastanduno, David Lake, and John 

Ikenberry, “Toward a Realist Theory of State 

Action,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 

4 (1989), p. 459.

46. Zlatko Isakovic, Introduction to a Theory 

of Political Power in International Relations

(Aldershot, Burlington, U.K.: Ashgate, 2000), 

p. 138; Alan James, “The Realism of Realism: 

The State and the Study of International Relations,” in Theories of International Relations,

vol. 1, Approaches to International Relations: 

Realism, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn 

Moore (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2006), p. 

159.

47. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: 

The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 

Knopf, 1967); Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to 

the Study of International Relations (London: 

Macmillan, 1946).

48. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics

(New York: Random House, 1979).

49. For the defensive, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991); 

and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For 

the offensive, Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to 

Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 

1998); Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of 

International Institutions,” and “Structural 

Realism,” in International Relations Theories: 

Discipline and Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja 

Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 

Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 71–88.

50. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” p. 72.

51. Patrick Regan, “Choosing to Intervene: 

Outside Intervention in Internal Conflicts,” 

Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998), p. 754.

52. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial 

Ambition,” in Paradoxes of Power: U.S. 

Foreign Policy in a Changing World, ed. 

David Skidmore (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 

2007), p. 247.

53. David Skidmore, introduction to Paradoxes 

of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing 

World, ed. David Skidmore (Boulder, Colo.: 

Paradigm, 2007).

54. Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” p. 

249.

55. Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” 

in Paradoxes of Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in a 

Changing World, ed. David Skidmore (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007), p. 127.

56. Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs 88, 

no. 2 (2009), pp. 49–63.

57. Rahm Emanuel, cited in “George H. W. 

Obama?,” Foreign Policy (April 2010).

58.“George H. W. Obama?”

59. Ibid.

60. James Miskel, “National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?,” Naval War College 

Review 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 96–104.

61. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, p. 355.

62. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, p. 409.

63. Record, Making War, Thinking History, p. 131.

64. Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003), p. 7.

65. Robert Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and 

International Politics, 7th ed., ed. Robert Art 

and Kenneth Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman 

& Littlefield, 2009), p. 328.

66. Mandelbaum, “Reluctance to Intervene.”

67. Feste, Intervention, p. 215.

68. Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The 

Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 

2002).

69. Bacevich, New American Militarism, p. 142.

70. Bryan Hehir, “Military Intervention and 

National Sovereignty: Recasting the Relationship,” in Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in 

Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan 

Moore (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 

1998), p. 33; Hehir, “Moral Dimension in the 

Use of Force,” p. 14; Michael Walzer, Just and 

Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 

1977).

71. Augustine, The City of God, trans. G. G. Walsh 

et al. (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1958); 

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. 

and rev. D. J. Sullivan (Chicago: Encyclopedia 

Britannica, 1952).
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72. Patrick Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases

(Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America 

Press, 1996), p. 14.

73. International Commission on Intervention 

and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 

Protect (Ottawa: International Development 

Research Centre, 2001).

74. Richard Falk, “Legality to Legitimacy: The 

Revival of the Just War Framework,” Harvard 

International Review 26, no. 1 (2004).

75. DeRouen, “Indirect Link”; Pickering and 

Kisangani, “Democracy and Diversionary 

Military Intervention”; Smith, “International 

Crises and Domestic Politics”; Wang, “Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises.”

76. Benjamin Fordham, “The Politics of Threat 

Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 

1949–1994,” International Studies Quarterly

42, no. 3 (1998), pp. 567–90; Fordham, “A

Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military 

Capabilities on American Decisions to Use 

Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 

(2004), pp. 632–56.

77. Alex Mintz and David Brule, “Blank Check 

or Marching Orders? Public Opinion and the 

Presidential Use of Force,” in Approaches, Levels, and Methods of Analysis in International 

Politics: Crossing Boundaries, ed. Harvey Starr 

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Patrick James and John O’Neal, “The Influence 

of Domestic and International Politics on the 

President’s Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991), pp. 307–32; Paul 

Huth, “Major Power Interventions in International Crises: 1918–1988,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 42, no. 6 (1998), pp. 744–70; 

Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, “Toward a 

Realist Theory of State Action.”

78. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981).

79. Huth, “Major Power Interventions in International Crises,” p. 746.

80. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, p. 301.

81. G. F. Hudson, “Threats of Force in International Relations,” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 

Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin 

Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 

201–205.

82. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, p. 10.

83. Till, Seapower, p. 255.

84. Ghosh, “Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy.”

85. Michael Codner, “Defining Deterrence: 

Framing Deterrence in the 21st Century” 

(Pre-conference notes, Royal United Services 

Institute, 18–19 May 2009, London), www 

.rusi.org/.

86. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, pp. 13–17.

87. Ibid., pp. 25–37.

88. J. J. Widen, “Naval Diplomacy: A Theoretical 

Approach,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 22, no. 4 

(2011), pp. 715–33.

89. Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy.”

90. Blechman, “Naval Diplomacy in the TwentyFirst Century,” p. 242; Kaplan, “Hog Pilots, 

Blue Water Grunts.”

91. Whiting, Policy, Influence, and Diplomacy,

p. 48.

92. Till, Seapower, p. 253.

93. Deborah Sanders, “U.S. Naval Diplomacy 

in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages,” 

Naval War College Review 60, no. 3 (Summer 

2007), p. 61.

94. Quoted in Till, Seapower, p. 253.

95. Ibid., p. 277.

96. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 6; David Winkler, Amirs, 

Admirals, and Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. 

Navy, and the Arabian Gulf (Annapolis, Md.: 

Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 36.

97. Work, Strategy for the Long Haul.

98. Blechman, “Naval Diplomacy in the TwentyFirst Century,” p. 245.

99. Ibid.

100. Jeremy Stocker, “Nonintervention: Limited 

Operations in the Littoral Environment,” 

Naval War College Review 51, no. 4 (Autumn 

1998), pp. 42–62.

101. Christian Le Mière, “The Return of Gunboat 

Diplomacy,” Survival 53, no. 5 (2011), pp. 

53–68.

102. Bob Davidson, “Modern Naval Diplomacy: A

Practitioner’s View,” Journal of Military and 

Strategic Studies 11, nos. 1–2 (2009), p. 36.

103. Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in US 

Foreign Policy, p. 102.

104. Cited in ibid., p. 112.

105. Rob McLaughlin, “Naval Forces and the Conduct of Peace Support Operations,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 4 (2002), p. 105.
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106. Bouchard, Uses of Naval Force in Crises, p. 34.

107. Cited in ibid., pp. 35–36.

108. Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at 

Sea (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Peter 

Nailor, “A New Environment for Navies?,” 

in Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age, ed. 

Geoffrey Till (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984); 

Ghosh, “Revisiting Gunboat Diplomacy.”

109. Thomas Goodall, “Gunboat Diplomacy: Does 

It Have a Place in the 1990s?” (student paper, 

Marine Corps Univ. Command and Staff College, 1991), available at www.globalsecurity

.org/.

110. Matthew Scarlett, “Coercive Naval Diplomacy” 

(course paper, Naval War College, Newport, 

R.I., 2009), available at www.dtic.mil/; cf. 

Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979.

111. Scarlett, “Coercive Naval Diplomacy.”

112. Raymond Pritchett, “President Responds with 

Modern Day Gunboat Diplomacy,” Information Dissemination Blog, 25 November 2010, 

www.informationdissemination.net/.

113. Ibid.

114. Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, pp. 28–29.

115. Jones, “Objective Is Influence, Not Presence,” 

third para. [emphasis added].

116. Goodall, “Gunboat Diplomacy.”

117. Ibid.

118. Allen, Uses of Navies in Peacetime.

119. Ibid., pp. 21–24.

120. George, Forceful Persuasion, p. ix.

121. Goodall, “Gunboat Diplomacy.”

122. James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (New York: 

Praeger for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 

1971), and Diplomacy at Sea.

123. Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 3.

124. Ibid., p. 18.

125. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 38.

126. Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, pp. 41–83.

127. Robert Mandel, “The Effectiveness of 

Gunboat Diplomacy,” International Studies 

Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1986), pp. 59–76.

128. Ibid., p. 62.

129. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War,

p. 12.

130. Mandel, “Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 63.

131. Le Mière, “Return of Gunboat Diplomacy,” pp. 

56–57.

132. Widen, “Naval Diplomacy.”

133. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New 

Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 2–3.

134. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The 

Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign 

Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 

p. 3.

135. Stephen Cimbala, “Revisiting Military Persuasion and the War on Terror,” in The Psychology 

of Resolving Global Conflicts: From War to 

Peace, vol. 3, Interventions, ed. Mari Fitzduff 

and Chris Stout (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 

2006), p. 267.

136. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful?,” pp. 

99–100.

137. Ibid., p. 114.

138. Ibid., p. 100.

139. Ibid., p. 102.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid., p. 103.

142. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion.

143. George, Forceful Persuasion.

144. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

145. McLaughlin, “Naval Forces and the Conduct 

of Peace Support Operations,” p. 112.

146. James Tubbs, Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: 

Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace 

Enforcement Operations (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1997).

147. George, Forceful Persuasion, pp. 69–72.

148. Ibid., pp. 76–80.

149. Samuel W. Lewis, foreword to ibid., p. ix.

150. George, Forceful Persuasion, pp. 10–11.

151. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, pp. 289–90.

152. See, for example, Blechman and Kaplan, Force 

without War.

153. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 21.

154. Till, Seapower, p. 281.

155. Sanders, “U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black 

Sea,” p. 65.

156. Edward Rhodes et al., “Forward Presence 

and Engagement: Historical Insights into 

the Problem of ‘Shaping,’” Naval War College 

Review 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 25–61.
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157. Rhodes, “‘. . . From the Sea’ and Back Again,” 

pp. 350–51.

158. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 7.

159. Ibid., p. 13.

160. Morton Deutsch, “Constructive Conflict 

Resolution Principles, Training and Research,” 

Journal of Social Issues 50, no. 1 (1994), pp. 

13–32.

161. Paul Diehl, “What Are They Fighting For? 

The Importance of Issues in International 

Conflict Research,” Journal of Peace Research

29, no. 3 (1992), pp. 333–44.

162. George, Forceful Persuasion.

163. Paul D. Senese, “Geographical Proximity and 

Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation 

of Militarized Interstate Conflict,” Conflict 

Management and Peace Science 15 (1996), pp. 

133–62; Paul D. Senese and John A. Vasquez, 

“A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 2 

(2003), pp. 275–98.

164. Paul Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann 

Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 189.

165. Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry, “Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational 

Military Strategy,” Naval War College Review

53, no. 3 (Summer 2000), p. 144.

166. Susan Hannah Allen, “Time Bombs: Estimating the Duration of Coercive Bombing 

Campaigns,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 

no. 1 (2007), pp. 112–33.

167. Meernik and Brown, “Short Path and the Long 

Road,” p. 70.

168. James Meernik, “Force and Influence in International Crises,” Conflict Management and 

Peace Science 17, no. 1 (1999), pp. 103–31.

169. Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do 

We Know?,” in The United States and Coercive 

Diplomacy, ed. Robert Art and Patrick Cronin 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 

2003), p. 364.

170. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict 

among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, 

and System Structure in International Crises

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997), 

p. 438, cited in Mandel, “Effectiveness of 

Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 67.

171. Knut Midgaard and Arild Underdal, cited in 

Mandel, “Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 67.

172. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” p. 367.

173. Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in US 

Foreign Policy.

174. Ekatarina Stepanova, “The Unilateral and 

Multilateral Use of Force by the United States,” 

in Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives, ed. David Malone and 

Yuen Foong Khong (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 

Rienner, 2003), p. 190.

175. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to the 

President and Congress: Report of the Secretary 

of the Navy (Washington, D.C.: 1995).

176. Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter, “The 

United Nations Security Council and the Rally 

’round the Flag Effect,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), pp. 886–909.

177. Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion,

pp. 20, 134.

178. Christer Jönsson, cited in Mandel, “Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 67.

179. Jacob Bercovitch, “Third Parties in Conflict 

Management: The Structure and Conditions 

of Effective Mediation in International Relations,” International Journal 55, no. 4 (1985), 

pp. 736–52.

180. Mandel, “Effectiveness of Gunboat 

Diplomacy.”

181. Trost, “Size of the Fleet,” pp. 330–31.

182. Dov Zakheim et al., Political and Economic 

Implications of Global Naval Presence (Fort 

Belvoir, Va.: Defense Technical Information 

Center, 1996), available at handle.dtic 

.mil/100.2/ADA319809.

183. James Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance 

of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a 

Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994), pp. 236–69.

184. Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International 

Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical 

Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, 

no. 1 (1999), p. 31.

185. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979, p. 18.

186. Dismukes, National Security Strategy and 

Forward Presence, p. 38.

187. Meernik, “Force and Influence in International Crises,” p. 110.

188. Trost, “Size of the Fleet,” pp. 330–31; Barber, 

Engagement through Deployment, pp. 27–28.

189. Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, p. 40.
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190. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 13.

191. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, pp. 

101–102.

192. Ibid.

193. Ibid., pp. 93–94.

194. Ibid. Major Level of Force—naval: two 

or more aircraft carrier task groups; ground: 

More than one battalion; Land-based air: One 

or more combat wings.

Standard Level of Force. Naval: One aircraft 

carrier task group; Ground: No more than 

one battalion, but larger than one company; 

Land-based air: One or more combat squadrons, but less than one wing.

Minor Level of Force. Naval: No aircraft 

carriers; Ground: No more than one company; Land-based air: Less than one combat 

squadron.

195. Ibid., p. 529.

196. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, p. 301.

197. Andrew Kydd, “Rationalist Approaches to 

Conflict Prevention and Resolution,” Annual 

Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2010), 

p. 108.

198. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

199. Brooks, Peacetime Influence through Forward 

Naval Presence, p. 13.

200. Tubbs, Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy.

201. McNulty, “Naval Presence.”
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chapter three

Uncharted Waters

Data on U.S. Naval Activity Short of War

While there is much research on naval activities, there is a dearth of empirical evidence 

of the influence of naval forces. Only very few studies statistically research the deployment of the U.S. Navy in employments short of war. As laid out so far, naval forces offer 

promising vehicles for crisis response, and by looking at different international crises, 

the hypotheses can be used to underline both advantages and disadvantages. This chapter lays the groundwork for the empirical analyses in this study by explaining the data 

collection and the creation of naval variables. The last part presents some frequencies of 

the newly introduced naval variables and introduces the methodology. Prior to a discussion of the data for this project, the most important empirical studies are summarized.

Empirical Literature Review on U.S. Naval Activity

James Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy, first published in 1971 and updated in 1981, 

provides a detailed account of different instances when naval gunboat diplomacy was 

employed, independent of the country and the target, between 1919 and 1979. “Gunboat 

diplomacy” captures events where naval forces either threatened or used limited force, 

short of war, against state actors on their territories. Cable’s data for each of the more 

than two hundred cases provide the dates, the assailant, the victim, and a very brief 

description. It does not account for every single use of gunboat diplomacy but rather 

illustrates the range.

In 1977, Robert Mahoney, Jr., conducted a CNA study on U.S. Navy responses to crises 

over the previous twenty years.1

 Based on the assumption that crisis management is 

among the Navy’s principal missions, the report provides a summary of U.S. naval 

(including Marine Corps) responses to international incidents and crises short of war. 

Only reactions of USN and of USMC forces “immediately prior and during” are included, thereby neglecting a number of activities outside this time frame, such as deterrence operations before a crisis erupts. The focus on USN and USMC activity does not 

account for the possibly important role other service and different policy instruments 
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play. Mahoney urges caution when applying the findings to future research: “The way 

in which the Navy has been employed as an instrument of crisis diplomacy in the past 

has been the result of choices made by the National Command Authorities in conjunction with certain types of foreign events. Different choices may be made in the future in 

response to changing circumstances.” The following criteria were applied to define the 

cases:

•	 Any actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed 

forces (only the Navy and Marine Corps for immediate purposes)

•	 Carried out in conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United 

States

•	 Occurring other than in the course of general or limited war

•	 With the exception of a few categories of responses (to be shown below), such as 

humanitarian relief efforts

•	 Reported at a given level in the political-military policy process.

The mere presence of naval forces is not sufficient for an event to be considered a “response.” Mahoney defines “peacetime” as the absence of war and therefore locates crisis 

management within the peacetime activities. The peacetime category applies to any instance with fewer than a thousand casualties; once this threshold is crossed the incident 

would amount to at least a limited war. Therefore, within his study’s time frame only 

the Vietnam War, beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and ending in 

April 1975, is considered a war. Additionally, the following categories of responses are 

excluded:

•	 Humanitarian operations (e.g., the provision of medical assistance following natural 

disasters abroad)

•	 Intelligence and other special operations (these are not systematically covered in the 

project’s sources, which do not include compartmentalized intelligence information)

•	 Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy (e.g., Navy 

units are customarily alerted during presidential visits to Third World nations)

•	 Incidents at sea that are not specifically related to events taking place ashore (e.g., 

hijackings, rammings, overflights of Navy ships by Soviet aircraft)

•	 Extraregional alerts of Navy forces (during some responses the Navy was placed on 

global alert; while this is noted, where relevant, the principal emphasis in the analysis 

is on forces within the region where the crisis or incident transpired [e.g., the Mediterranean basin]).
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The Mahoney analyses reveal the following:

•	 The Navy responded to ninety-nine international incidents and crises.

•	 More than three-quarters of the responses took place in three regions: the Mediterranean, the Americas (Central and South America plus the Caribbean), and East Asia 

(Korea through Southeast Asia).

•	 In fifty-nine out of the ninety-nine cases, aircraft carriers were present. From 1955 

to 1960 there were twenty operations with, and seven without, carriers; 1961–65, 

twenty-two with carriers and twenty-eight without; and 1966–75, seventeen with 

and five without. The 1961–65 time frame shows the highest frequency of operations 

both with and without carrier deployment. The 1966–75 period was marked by fewer 

carrier operations, but more than 75 percent of the total responses involved carriers.

•	 Amphibious units were deployed in sixty-one out of the ninety-nine naval responses. 

In 1961–65, amphibious forces were used most frequently (twenty-eight operations 

with amphibious forces and twenty-two without them). The earlier and later periods 

were marked by higher percentages of operations involving amphibious forces, but 

overall fewer responses occurred. In 1955–60 occurred eighteen responses with and 

nine without amphibious forces, and in 1966–75, fifteen with and seven without.

Power was projected ashore mostly to influence the following kinds of events:

•	 Evacuation of special weapons and associated personnel

•	 Rescue of endangered Western nationals

•	 Short-term, moderate-scale landing and air-strike operations directed at Third 

World nations

•	 Signals of American intentions and concerns sent during the course of a crisis (e.g., 

the movement of two carrier groups toward the Syrian coast during the final phase of 

the 1967 June War). 

Carrier aviation is most likely in the last two categories of responses, especially when 

overflight or basing rights are restricted or not granted. Mahoney concludes that the 

Navy “has been used as a flexible instrument of crisis diplomacy” and that “it appears 

that the force packages correspond (in at least a general sense) to certain types of crisis 

situations or sets of similar policy problems.”2

Blechman and Kaplan analyzed in 1978 the political use of different U.S. military services and their deployment in responses short of war.3

 They concluded that

•	 The Navy was the armed service most often employed for political uses of force in 

the post–World War II period.
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•	 Air forces, excluding sea air, were involved in about half of the incidents. Combat 

ground troops were the least involved and rarely without naval forces.

•	 Naval forces participated in events worldwide. The results demonstrate that whoever 

else was involved, wherever the incident took place, or whatever the type of incident, 

the Navy was deployed in roughly nine out of ten cases.

•	 Within the instances of use of naval forces, aircraft carriers were involved in more 

than half the cases. The authors found that aircraft carriers were most often deployed 

when the level of violence was high and the Chinese or Soviets either threatened or 

actually used force. The use of amphibious forces does not seem to be influenced by 

the location of the incident, with the exceptions of Southeast Asia (more frequent) 

and East Asia (less frequent). Often the deployment of aircraft carrier and amphibious forces overlapped. 

In regard to the outcome, the following results were presented:4

•	 Most positive outcomes were reached when land-based combat aircraft were 

deployed, followed by ground troops; the deployment of naval forces reduced the 

frequency of positive outcomes.5

•	 Positive outcomes occurred less often when the objective was to reinforce (assure or 

deter) clients rather than to modify (compel or induce) behavior and when greater 

levels of force were used.

•	 Previous U.S. military engagement in the region, withdrawal of forces, and statements issued before the involvement by the president or senior administration 

officials positively influenced outcomes. Both very high and very low levels of presidential popularity were frequently related to positive outcomes.

•	 Involvement of the Soviet Union (as actor and as threatening or actually using force) 

negatively influenced outcomes, while the strategic weapons balance between the 

actors exerted no influence.

•	 Finally, direct American involvement increased the frequency of positive outcomes.

In 1986, Robert Mandel published a study entitled “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy.” Building on Cable’s data, he developed ten hypotheses to examine the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy between 1947 and 1978. The hypotheses were divided into 

three groups, relating to the nature of the event, the relationship between the assailant 

and the victim, and the natures of both assailant and victim. He found that militarily prepared and politically stable parties were more successful in gunboat diplomacy. 

Prior uses of force in the same region and a definitive, deterrent display of force further 

supported success. After 1965 actual uses of force became more successful, comparable 
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to the success of displays of force. The success of gunboat diplomacy was independent of 

the regional identity of the participants or the relative strengths of the assailant and victim. Overall, he praises the strategy of gunboat diplomacy as a viable alternative to war if 

meaningful dialogue between the disputing parties is no longer feasible.

In 1991, Adam Siegel conducted for CNA an empirical study of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis-management responses to international incidents and crises.6

Like 

Mahoney, Siegel focused on reactions immediately prior to and during U.S. involvement. Two hundred seven cases involving the U.S. Navy were identified, excluding 

worldwide everyday, routine activities. Siegel defined “crisis management” as peacetime 

activity, including all actions short of war. A “war” was defined by the threshold of one 

thousand American casualties; for this reason both the Korean and Vietnam Wars were 

excluded—considering the dates of the Korean War as 25 June 1950–27 July 1953 and 

Vietnam as 10 August 1964–31 December 1974, in order that “(a) the long wind down 

of heavy U.S. involvement [in Vietnam] would not be unduly reflected in the study and 

(b) the evacuations of American personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon would be 

included.” The final stages of the report were written in January 1991, before the beginning of the Gulf War of that year. Siegel surmised at the time that this conflict would 

be categorized as a war; however, retrospectively applying the one-thousand-and-overcasualties criterion, it would not.

All instances meeting the following criteria were included in Siegel’s study:

•	 Actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed forces 

(for an action to be included in his study, a Navy surface ship or a Marine Corps unit 

must have been involved)

•	 Actions taken in conjunction with events occurring outside the United States

•	 Actions taken other than in the course of general war (Korea in 1950–53 or Vietnam 

1964–74)

•	 Actions that were reported at a given (senior) level in the political-military policy 

process.

A few categories of responses were not included:

•	 Activities inside the United States (because the focus lies on international events).

•	 Humanitarian missions, such as disaster relief and hospital-ship port calls.

•	 Intelligence operations, for security reasons (because the document is unclassified, 

all responses had to involve surface ships; “Other forces such as submarines, patrol 

aircraft, and SEALs [were] used without surface ship involvement; however, the 

activities of these forces are not well documented in the unclassified literature”).
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•	 Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy. (For 

example, as noted above, U.S. Navy units are often alerted during presidential 

visits overseas, such as during President George H. W. Bush’s February 1990 trip to 

Colombia.)

•	 Law enforcement operations (for example, the Department of Defense involvement 

in drug-interdiction operations).

•	 Incidents at sea, activities not specifically related to events taking place ashore, such 

as incidents (collisions or harassment) between U.S. Navy and Soviet vessels. Some 

types of incidents at sea, specifically terrorist hijackings or seizures of U.S.-flag vessels that prompt a U.S. military response, are included. 

Every entry lists the name of the crisis, the area of responsibility (AOR), the start date 

and duration, and the involvement of USMC, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army, in addition to naval forces. Not counting the involvements in Korea and Vietnam, the periods 1951–55 and 1966–75 showed the lowest U.S. military response frequency. Siegel 

suggests either that military forces were too engaged in the war activities to make more 

resources available for other purposes, or that other military activities are less documented during times of war. Aircraft carriers were employed in 68 percent of the 207 

cases, amphibious force in 54 percent, and the Marine Corps in 55 percent. Additionally, in twenty-one cases USMC aviation units on board carriers were involved, raising 

the total USMC involvement to 57 percent of all cases. In 26 percent and 18 percent of 

the crises, respectively, the Air Force and Army were involved.

In 2005 the Center for Naval Analyses released a report by Eugene Cobble, Hank 

Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, of which the initial goal had been to compare U.S. 

naval forces’ responses with those of other services for the period between 1970 and 

2000.7

 However, it became apparent that there were no major differences between the 

services’ responses. This finding did not surprise the study’s coauthors, as they had 

found an increase in the number of joint and coalition operations. This latest CNA

study is the only one to include responses by other military services without any naval 

involvement. The report divides the type of response into six different categories (a few 

cases are coded differently) and produces the frequencies shown below. 

Combat 22

Show of force 65

Support of peacekeeping and military supply 64

Contingent positioning and reconnaissance 50
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Protection of noncombatants (including evacuations) 83

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) 366

The total cases, including some other categories, numbered 660 responses. For the period 

from November 2000 through June 2003, thirteen more cases (exclusive of HA/DR) were 

added. Out of the additions only one—an evacuation of noncombatants from the Ivory 

Coast in September 2002—did not involve naval forces. Without accounting for the 

last category (HA/DR), naval forces were involved in 54 percent of all responses. While 

Blechman and Kaplan had found a ratio of nine out of ten for political uses of armed 

forces, these numbers suggest a proportion of a little over five out of ten for the five types 

of responses to international incidents.8

 More than half of USN responses included the 

USMC. Very few Marine Corps or Army reactions occurred without naval forces. The 

large majority of cases without the USN were Air Force responses. Figure 8 shows the 

different service-combination percentages for cases with and without naval involvement. 

The CNA study’s data include the involved military services, incident name and location, response type, start/end dates, and duration. Humanitarian responses are listed 

on a separate data sheet. The best way to measure the size and intensity of an operation 

Not sure if yes

No USMC

USMC

USAF

No USAF

No USARMY

USARMY

USMC & USN USAF & USN USARMY & USN

2.40%

51.50

%

46.10

%

54.49

% 45.51

% 27.54

%

72.46

%

Cases with Naval Involvement

No USMC

USMC USAF

No USAF No USARMY

USARMY

USMC without USN USAF without USN USARMY without USN

9.15%

90.85

%

10.56

%

89.44

%

8.45

%

91.55

%

Cases without Naval Involvement (USN)

Figure 8

CNA III USN Service Combinations
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is to take into account the number of units or their strengths; however, neither the 

force strength nor the length of the individual responses is accounted for. The authors 

observe that the cases do not represent world or conflict history. They suggest the need 

for further research on naval activities and their relation to world conflicts and U.S. 

national security priorities.

The three CNA reports offer collectively the most detailed and systematic account of 

naval responses to incidents besides routine deployments. The reminder of this chapter 

discusses the data collection and my new data set.

Data for the Empirical Analyses

I had two choices as to how to research the U.S. naval involvement in international crises: generate a data set on my own or work with an existing one. Creating my own data 

set with multiple variables was not feasible, because of access restrictions and logistical 

limitations. Next, I had to decide if I wanted to add “naval” variables to a data set or 

“crisis” variables to USN data. Because my goal was to include as many crises characteristics as possible, I chose the latter. By focusing on an existing data set I exclude nonroutine naval reactions not meeting the data-set definition of international crises.

Data-Set Selection: International Crisis Behavior Data Set (ICB)

There are many data sets concerning the use of armed force. “Correlates of War” 

(COW), “International Crisis Behavior Project” (ICB), “International Military Interventions” (IMI), “Militarized Interstate Disputes” (MID), “Military Interventions by 

Powerful States” (MIPS), and “Use of Armed Forces” are among the most prominent.9

These various projects differ in many respects, including their time frames and definitional disagreements relating to the use of force, disputes, conflicts, crises, and wars. 

The COW offers data on wars and is therefore not suitable for research on political uses 

of force short of war.10 Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani updated Pearson and 

Baumann’s IMI data for the years 1946–88 for the years from 1988 to 2005.11 The result 

captures all cases where national military personnel were purposefully dispatched into 

other sovereign states and also includes the use of armed forces against nonstate actors. 

Their data set features a variable controlling for the motive of the intervenors, a very 

rare measurement in military-intervention data. The MID is part of the COW collection and provides information about interstate disputes; disputes involving nonstate 

actors are excluded. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver come to the conclusion 

that the MID is not well suited for the analysis of the American use of force, because of 

definition disagreements of the use of force; they point out important incidents missing 

in the data set.12 Sullivan’s MIPS provides data for the five parties of intervention—the 
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United States, Britain, France, Russia/USSR, and China. The data also include a variable 

measuring the level of force used, ranging from a mere display of force to ground combat operations. Like most other databases, the cases cover only instances when military 

interventions were carried out. Blechman and Kaplan’s data originally covered the Cold 

War era but were extended to 1995 by Fordham and Sarver. They thus do not include 

post-1995 incidents. The ICB is exceptional in that it includes cases with and without 

military involvement and thus allows research into different forms of intervention.

Therefore the present analysis is based on the well-established ICB data set for international crises, compiled by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. In addition to the advantages already 

mentioned, the ICB data set is, as Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher note, “rich 

in contextual information.”13 Because I want to conduct a broad analysis of when and 

how naval forces are employed, the ideal data set should encompass many different cases 

and crisis characteristics. The ICB allows me to research a wide variety of international 

crises and offers many variables, such as controlling for the form of American involvement, the effect of that involvement, and attitudes toward it.

Moreover, the ICB provides both system and individual data, including different characteristics, reactions, and perceptions of the individual crisis actors. Although the ICB 

does not include every instance of the American use of force, it presents the best choice 

for the purpose of this project. The ICB was first published in 1975; the newest (ninth) 

version, of January 2009, covers the period 1918 to 2006, with 452 international crises, 

35 protracted conflicts, and 994 crisis actors.14 The ICB defines its goals as

the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge about interstate crises and protracted conflicts; 

the generation and testing of hypotheses about the effects of crisis-induced stress on coping and 

choice by decision makers; the discovery of patterns in key crisis dimensions—onset, actor behavior 

and crisis management, superpower activity, involvement by international organizations, and outcome; and application of the lessons of history to the advancement of international peace and world 

order. . . . Underlying the project are three assumptions: first, that the destabilizing effects of crises, 

as of conflicts and wars, are dangerous to global security; second, that understanding the causes, 

evolution, actor behavior, outcomes, and consequences of crises is possible by systematic investigation; and third, that knowledge can facilitate the effective management of crises so as to minimize 

their adverse effects on world order.15

Expansion of the Data Set: CNA Studies

While the ICB data may be sufficient to analyze general involvement of U.S. armed 

forces, it does not provide information about the type of force used. In order to control 

for the naval involvement, new variables had to be added to the data set. My initial attempt, to examine the naval involvement in every crisis with some form of U.S. involvement, proved to be infeasible. Complete information on where all ships of the U.S. Navy 

have been deployed at any given time is very difficult to find, if not unattainable. There 
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is no uniformity in how information and data are collected; deck logs, command histories, historical reports, and fleet histories differ enormously in detail, focus, and information. While it might be possible to find material in depth about a certain response, 

one cannot gain knowledge as to the day of response and the location or name of ships 

involved for every incident. Furthermore, even historical data often remain classified. 

In the case of the Second Fleet, for example, only five random years between 1946 and 

2006 were available when my research was conducted. Without access to new information I had to take a step back and rely on already existing studies, consolidating sources 

and adding new details where possible.16

Almost all of the data on naval involvement are adapted from the comprehensive account of naval activities as documented in the three CNA reports summarized earlier in 

the chapter. They researched USN responses to international situations in 1946–2003. 

For the years 2004–2006 I collected information about naval interventions from a 

variety of sources.17 Except for Adam Siegel’s study, the CNA reports do not describe 

the incidents themselves in depth but rather provide only their names and the dates of 

the naval responses. Mahoney and Siegel’s data include the types of ship involved in the 

response—the number of aircraft carriers and the employment of amphibious forces. 

Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg give no information about the ships involved but 

control for the involvement of other military forces and categorize the type of response. 

While Siegel’s data include the deployment of other armed forces, they do not categorize the type of mission. These responses had to be correlated with the crises in the ICB 

data set; for example, a crisis in Ethiopia might trigger a naval response off the coast 

of Somalia. Since some international crises have led to multiple naval involvements, I 

worked to match the dates and locations of the responses and crises. In order to validate 

my matching and to control for inter-rater reliability, two graduate students verified my 

data. Both Cohen’s kappa values were higher than 0.8. Kimberley Neuendorf speaks of 

0.80 as the benchmark for satisfactory intercoder reliability; according to Joseph Fleiss, 

a value above κ = .80 is excellent.18 Thus the inter-rater reliability meets the statistical 

requirements.

There are several shortcomings in the CNA reports, including their emphasis on 

“responses.” The fact is that “response” encompasses only a fraction of the total range 

of actions that the Navy undertakes in support of national crisis-management efforts. 

Siegel remarks that his research excludes fleet actions during precrisis periods, which 

are crucial because the presence and deterrent capabilities of naval forces can then have 

a far-reaching impact. Similarly Mahoney states that regular peacetime presence can 

be far from “routine” in its effect on the ways in which events ashore develop. Clearly, 

the optimal solution for many crisis-management problems is to prevent the crisis from 

developing, by taking timely action during the precrisis period to achieve national 
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goals.19 Also, Siegel observes, the number of cases underestimates naval actions since 

it includes only surface movements. For example, SEALs, submarines, and transport 

aircraft can operate independently of ships. Mere alerts are also not part of the selected 

cases but are, according to Siegel, especially important for the U.S. Army: “For the U.S. 

Army, especially, alerts are often used as a crisis response action and, depending on the 

circumstances, alerts can be used as a signal similar to that created by the movement of 

a surface ship.”20

Further, Siegel surmises (in the source cited) that it would be interesting to compare not 

only the deployment of the different services but also the types of forces employed. Unfortunately, none of the three data sets includes these measures. Siegel believes that his 

“research does not provide an adequate basis for comparisons of service-specific activity,” but I have supplemented it with the latest CNA study, and the result is information 

sufficient to research USN force combinations. Finally, the latest CNA study (by Cobble, 

Gaffney, and Gorenburg) aims to compare USN responses with those from the other 

services, but I have preferred to study the comparison between all-forces involvement 

and the USN plus other individual services.

In most of the overlapping cases for the years 1970–90 the two studies (those of Siegel 

and Cobble et al.) agree on the services involved. There were only very few cases where 

the reports differed, either because a response was not listed in all reports for the overlapping years or the service combination was coded differently. Where the two coding values diverge, I followed the results of the most recent study, because its research 

is most up-to-date and the data focus on the activities of all military services. Where 

possible, more information is provided in the case-summary appendix (in the online 

version of this monograph). Siegel excluded humanitarian operations, although he acknowledged that they often are connected with responses to crises, because he discounts 

their conflict potential. Whereas Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg include peace operations in their main data set, they present a separate listing of humanitarian responses 

since the 1970s (defined as “responses that are not into harm’s way—the U.S. units and

personnel involved did not face hostile fire”).21 Typically this type of response consists of 

disaster relief (e.g., after an earthquake) or humanitarian assistance (for example, in the 

form of medical aid or refugee relief—not to be confused with “humanitarian interventions”). The Air Force is primarily in charge of humanitarian responses—by a factor of 

ten, compared with the USN. Siegel points to ambiguity in dating the onset and end of 

a crisis response. Lack of information or uncertainty in the distinction between routine 

activity and contingency response may influence the number of cases.

I tried to address these terminological ambiguities by combining the three research 

papers. None of the documents attempts to answer questions with regard to how these 

deployments influenced the crises (or vice versa), their effectiveness, and why particular 
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services were deployed, to name a few. In contrast, my research aims to advance the 

information provided in the CNA studies. By the strengthening of their data with 

information about the nature of the crisis, the involved actors, the outcomes, and the 

U.S. activity, the USN involvement can be placed in a larger context, thereby allowing 

analysis in greater depth of the deployment of seaborne forces. Before describing the 

new variables in more detail, I shall explain my focus on aircraft carriers and amphibious forces.

Why Aircraft Carriers?

One of the most significant changes in the composition of the major 

navies of the twentieth century was the battleship’s replacement by the 

aircraft carrier as the capital ship. 

Geoffrey Till

The aircraft carrier era began with the successful Pacific campaigns of 1944, in World 

War II.22 Since World War II, carriers have been deployed in over 80 percent of the times 

when the world was faced with the risk of international violence.23 Aircraft carriers form 

the core of a battle group. According to Friedman, carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are the 

most powerful naval formations. They are the dominant element of sea power. Normally 

a CVBG includes a carrier, escorts (generally including a pair of missile cruisers), and a 

station (replenishment) ship fast enough to steam with the group. Often CVBGs deploy 

with one or more nuclear submarines in support. Aircraft carriers offer both offensive 

and defensive firepower. They have room to embark eighty to one hundred aircraft—

they can be described as “floating airfields.”24 The use of aircraft carriers has changed 

over time. In the words of Rebecca Grant, they are “no longer main guardian[s] of the 

sea but rather mobile air base[s].”25

During the 1990s, war fighting was replaced by forward presence as the main task of 

carrier forces. For Booth the aircraft carrier is the “pinnacle of operational flexibility.”26

Freedom of action for policy makers is made possible by the flexibility of the carrier (or 

CV, in generic terms—a specifically nuclear-powered carrier is referred to as a CVN). 

There is hardly any place in the world where the aircraft carriers cannot respond. Till 

describes their functions as independent strike, amphibious support, and protection 

against attack by land-based aircraft.27 Booth emphasizes air defense, surface ship interdiction, submarine pursuit, and on-shore power projection. A RAND study highlights 

unparalleled mobility, power advertisement, and sustained military presence, whereas 

Till additionally singles out independence on the open seas.28 CVs do not have to worry 
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about foreign base access or overflight rights, and they can deploy rapidly, thanks to 

forward basing. According to the USN website, “the Carrier Mission is (1) To provide 

a credible, sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in 

peacetime, (2) To operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary 

forces in times of crisis, and (3) To operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies, 

protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations in war.”29

Thus aircraft carriers are useful not only in times of war but also in action short of war. 

They are the most powerful and visible tool the USN possesses and can influence events 

ashore. Aircraft carriers are symbols of strength and resolve, and they can be sent into 

action quickly.30 Today, aircraft carriers are primarily political instruments. They offer 

numerous options, ranging from discreet withdrawal to full-scale warfare.31 As President William Clinton once said, “When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no 

accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is, where is the nearest carrier?”32 Yet the utility of aircraft carriers has frequently been questioned. Grant’s critique 

focuses on their inferior offensive potential compared with that of the U.S. Air Force.33

Certainly carriers in combat often need the support of land-based air. But where the focus is on peacetime missions, combat effectiveness is not the key criterion; what counts 

then is the ability to observe, influence, and react to situations in international waters. 

Cost and vulnerability are also focuses of criticism. Aircraft carriers are virtually floating cities housing about five thousand Navy personnel. With their high construction 

and maintenance costs, they are the military’s costliest asset.34 What sets the Navy apart, 

then, is its forward presence mission, its extensive observation potential, and its varied 

means of intervention, ranging from suasion to attack. Importantly, aircraft carriers can 

operate where land-based air forces lack access. 

The nation’s current reliance on aircraft carriers for many naval missions is well 

understood by potential enemies, who are striving to find ways to counter them. For 

instance, antiship ballistic missiles pose a formidable threat to carriers. Because of the 

vulnerability of a big floating platform, Rubel suggests more widely distributed missilefiring platforms that are more difficult to find and hit.35 Optimally they would include 

submarines, surface combatants, and guided-missile destroyers. Such a mixture of ships 

instead of one “key ship” offers dispersed targets and could prove valuable in crisis as a 

reliable deterrent. He concludes, “This sea change in the Navy indicates the early stages 

of a paradigm shift away from a force centered on big-deck aviation platforms. Although

assault ships (LHDs) and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) will continue to 

constitute a critical power-projection capability for the United States into the foreseeable 

future, the Navy will increasingly shift to dispersed but integrated surface and subsurface operations to constitute the credible combat power required by its new maritime 

strategy.”36
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Despite the voices calling for a different approach involving a focus on different ship 

types, aircraft carriers remain the center of the naval power. “For the future there might 

be lower cost and less vulnerable alternatives, but for now aircraft carriers will likely to 

continue to be an asset of choice.”37 Increasingly, CVs serve as joint aviation platforms.38

The important concept of sea basing emphasizes the avoidance of overflight rights and 

basing restrictions and, once again, favors aircraft carriers. Recent examples include 

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as the Haiti earthquake of 2010.39 However, as Charles Allen remarks, a single-carrier group can conduct 

combat operations for only a certain amount of time, for personnel reasons; extended 

combat requires more than one carrier group.40 In practice, the average number of 

deployed CVs/CVNs steadily decreased between 1975 and 2005.41 The number dropped 

again in 2007 when USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was decommissioned. O’Rourke 

estimated in 2009 that the number of CVs would drop from eleven to ten in 2012 with 

the decommissioning of Enterprise (CVN 65) and before its replacement by Gerald R. 

Ford (CVN 78), scheduled to be ready in 2015 (though Pritchett suggests 2017 as a more 

likely date).42 With the aircraft carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and Abraham 

Lincoln (CVN 72) undergoing repair and maintenance at this writing, the number of 

active CVBGs could temporarily even drop to nine. Roosevelt should be ready to deploy 

again in February 2013, while Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015.43

Before taking into account the now-impending budget cuts, the Navy projected that the 

force will increase to twelve carriers in FY 2019, when CVN 79 is commissioned.44

Amphibious Operations

Amphibious warfare units, which project combat power ashore from the sea, make 

up one of the naval service’s two principal projection forces.45 Like aircraft carriers, 

amphibious forces play a central role in crisis management because of their ability to 

affect events ashore, either by taking direct action or by establishing a naval presence.46

Since World War II, amphibious landings have usually evoked the picture of assaults on 

heavily defended beaches. The most famous U.S. Army amphibious landing was the invasion of Normandy, and for the USMC the successive seizures of the Pacific islands. In 

the decades after the World War II, the Corps further developed its techniques, greatly 

aided by technological advances.47

An amphibious force consists of a Navy element—a group of ships known as an amphibious task force (ATF)—and a landing force of U.S. Marines (occasionally Army 

troops), in total about five thousand people.48 Amphibious operations include amphibious assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and special operations in support of 

assaults. The aim of amphibious assaults is to land on hostile territory. During an assault, supremacy on the sea, on land, and in the air is essential.49 Amphibious raids aim 
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to achieve a tactical or operational goal, followed by a planned withdrawal. Amphibious 

feints and demonstrations are aimed at tying down the enemy’s forces. Surprise and 

speed are essential to minimize the risk to the attacking forces; defending forces have 

a natural advantage over amphibious forces.50 In most cases, the ATF will be deployed 

under the protection of a CVBG, which provides cover for the ATF and combat support 

to operations ashore. The ships of the ATF are capable of embarking and supporting 

other forces when the mission requires, including Army, special operations forces (SOF), 

or other joint and combined forces. Because they are sea-based and because decisions to 

position and engage amphibious forces are easily reversible, amphibious forces greatly 

expand the range of available response options. They are particularly well suited as 

demonstrations of American commitment to friends and allies, as well as adversaries. 

This type of deployment closely links the Navy and USMC team.

In the ideal scenario, amphibious forces confuse the enemy and force him to guess 

where along the coastline the landing force might be inserted. This limits the defender’s 

ability to concentrate his forces at a single point and thereby favors a wily attacker. This 

idea is encompassed by the concept of sea basing. As Wood remarks, “the entire concept 

of ‘seabasing’ rests on the principle that the ocean can be used to assemble, move, project, support and sustain forces as is done on land.”51

Selecting the Cases and Coding Naval Variables

The cases were selected according to the following criteria:

•	 “Date of Perception of Crisis Breakpoint”: 1946–2006

•	 “Content of U.S. Activity”: “low level, covert/semi-military, or direct military”

•	 Low-level U.S. activity: political activity, including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; economic involvement (e.g., financial aid to, or the withholding of aid from, an actor); and propaganda involvement

•	 U.S. covert or semi-military activity: covert activity (e.g., support for antigovernment forces); military aid or advisers, without participation in actual fighting

•	 U.S. direct military activity: dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets, or naval 

assistance to a party in a war.

The first limitation excludes any crises before World War II, because U.S. naval power 

was less able to influence events ashore than it is today. When the CV replaced the 

battleship as the capital ship, this dramatically changed. Earlier cases can therefore not 

be compared to post–World War II cases.

52

The second limitation was chosen because cases without any U.S. involvement are irrelevant to my analyses.53 Of the 452 international crises, 241 met the criteria for the 
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required time frame and American involvement. Because of my definition of peacetime 

operations and uncertainty in some cases about naval involvement, a small number of 

cases (N = 12) were coded as “missing data.” The international crises taking place in 

connection with the Korean and Vietnam (until 1972) Wars were excluded, because both 

involved full-scale war activity on the part of the United States. After 1972, U.S. naval 

forces were no longer engaged in major combat operations. The Gulf War of 1991 is included, because the crisis resulted in fewer than a thousand American casualties. Moreover, it led to continuing U.S. engagement in Iraq—for example, Operation Southern

Watch, aimed to prevent Iraqi aerial activity, which produced close to no coalition 

casualties. The different crises triggered by Iraqi noncompliance with the United Nations 

Special Commission and by the no-fly zones are listed as separate crises and are included. While Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in their initial 

phases did not exceed the casualty threshold, those two crises are of a different kind. At 

the time of the analyses, Operation Enduring Freedom had not ended yet, and both 

conflicts have far surpassed the critical value of one thousand casualties. Thus these two 

cases are included as naval involvements but not in the statistical analyses.

Besides the engagements during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, I identified three 

international crises for which I was not able to verify naval involvement.54 Because 

these international crises do not meet the selection criteria, they are not included in the 

database. However, because the associated naval activity appears to have had at least 

peripheral relevance to the larger U.S. crisis responses, I have included them in the 

crisis description appendix (available in the online version of this monograph). I also 

excluded several intrawar crises during the Iran-Iraq War. For example, the USN role in 

protecting international commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf (the “tanker war”) was 

a response to secondary events deriving from the war, as distinct from the facet of the 

war itself. Conversely, evacuation operations were direct reactions to the crisis, although 

they had no bearing on its resolution, and are thus included.

“Naval” Variables

In a first step I added a dichotomous variable, “U.S. naval involvement,” simply measuring whether the USN had been involved in an international crisis or not. Naval forces 

rarely reacted on their own; thus the next ten variables control for the involvement of 

other armed forces.55 In a next step I grouped the different service combinations. Because the number of “USN only” cases is very small, I mostly treat the USN and USMC 

as one “team,” the “USN-USMC Team.” (Siegel subtitled his work U.S. Navy and U.S. 

Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity.) I acknowledge the limitation posed by this combination of the U.S. seaborne forces. The addition of the Marine Corps includes the possible or actual landing of U.S. forces on foreign territory and thus represents a greater 
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intrusion. Conversely, it can be argued that the presence of a USMC force increases the 

threat perceived by the enemy and increases the likelihood of a favorable outcome. Also, 

given the limited number of naval responses, I could not distinguish between shows of 

force and actual force projection, or between the mere presence of Marines and actual 

landings. To research each response in detail, case studies, not just statistical analyses, 

are necessary. For a future project, these distinctions could prove very interesting and 

reveal additional information. In the online appendix listing the crises I present more 

comprehensive accounts and when possible describe the activities of the Navy and 

Marine Corps. Where the analyses allowed a distinction, however, I control for “USN 

only” cases.

The following table explains how the different services are grouped. There was only one 

case where the USN, USMC, and Army were involved. In order to qualify for an “all 

forces response” both the Army and the Air Force had to have been involved, representing all three types of forces: sea based, air based, and land based. In two cases the 

Marine Corps did not participate, but because the USN represents the seaborne force 

I counted the two crisis responses as all-forces responses. Because only one case of the 

variable “USN & Other Forces” includes “USARMY,” this variable is nearly congruent 

to seaborne forces and Air Force responses and can be treated as combinations with 

the Air Force. The only case including the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army was a 

noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Congo in 1998. Because of the already 

very low number of cases, I decided not to exclude this incident; that it was a NEO

highlights the noncombat character of the mission. Using the service combination 

numbers, I generated different “naval variables” that will be used as both dependent and 

independent variables.

For each crisis where naval forces were involved, I introduced the following variables:

•	 CV involvement (yes/no)

•	 Number of CVs (metric)

Figure 9

Three Naval Combination Variables

TYPE OF SERVICE 1 

(SERVICETYPE1) (Y1)

0. NO NAVY

1. USN ONLY

2. USN-USMC 

3. USN AND OTHER 

FORCE

4. ALL FORCES (at least one 

seaborne force and USAF 

and USARMY)

TYPE OF SERVICE 2 

(SERVICETYPE2) (Y2)

0. NO NAVY

1. USN-USMC TEAM

2. USN AND OTHER FORCES

3. ALL FORCES (at least one 

seaborne force and USAF 

and USARMY)

USN-USMC-TEAM 

(USNUSMCTEAM) (Y3)

0. NO NAVY

1. USN-USMC TEAM

2. USN AND OTHER FORCES 

(incl. All Forces)
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•	 CV strength (no CV / one CV / two or more CVs)

•	 Amphibious involvement (yes/no)

•	 Type of mission.

The variable “CV involvement” accounts for the deployment of an aircraft carrier. 

The number as well as the capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers has changed over time, 

and it is therefore difficult to compare the quantity of CVs deployed to crises over the 

years.56 However, Blechman and Kaplan distinguish between minor, standard, and high 

components of force.57 For the Navy, a standard force component is a carrier task group; 

two or more carriers are a major component of force; and the absence of aircraft carrier 

incidents defines minor components of force. To have a complete account of CV involvement I introduced another variable measuring the actual number of involved CVs, 

“Number of CVs.” For the years 1990 onward the CNA data did not provide information 

about the number of CVs. When the CV involvement can be confirmed with sufficient 

certainty the variable is included; otherwise it is counted as missing data. The next 

variable measures the involvement of amphibious forces. In all CNA documents this is 

simply measured by a binary variable (yes/no).

The variable “Type of mission” is divided into six categories, following Cobble, Gaffney,

and Gorenburg:

58

•	 Contingent positioning (naval forces are ordered to an area, diverted away from their 

routine schedule but without clear operational intentions)59

•	 Reconnaissance (moving U.S. forces around the world to influence actions of some 

potential adversaries, mostly a naval activity)

•	 Noncombatant evacuation operation

•	 Show of force (similar to contingent positioning and reconnaissance but more direct 

and open, e.g., actually putting boots on the ground, moving weapons systems, moving supplies)

•	 Combat

•	 Peace operations.

Since only the latest CNA study provides this information, in earlier cases I coded the 

variable as missing data. Contingent positioning and reconnaissance responses are 

characterized by diverting naval ships from their schedules to position them closer to 

incipient crises. NEOs are conducted for the protection of American embassies or the 

evacuation of American and other approved personnel. Shows of force are reactions in 

which U.S. naval forces sail into harm’s way, though no shots are fired. In combat actions, actual combat takes place or weapons are fired. Peace operations comprise three 
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different activities: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive 

diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. “Peace operations include traditional 

peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian 

assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and 

denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.”60 Disaster-relief missions are responses to natural disasters or other emergencies that are conducted in otherwise benign environments; they are not included in this 

analysis. Similarly, humanitarian-assistance missions—while likely to be carried out in 

nonpermissive environments and mostly reactions to man-made events—are likely to 

take place only after the initial U.S. reaction to a crisis.

Naval Involvement Frequencies

As an introduction to the main variables, I present some simple frequencies. According 

to the data set, U.S. naval forces were deployed in ninety-three (including Afghanistan 

and Iraq) out of the 229 international crises in which the nation was involved. Twelve 

cases are excluded because they either do not meet the criterion of fewer than a thousand 

American casualties or specifically naval involvement cannot be adequately confirmed. 

Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded from the statistical analysis (because they exceed the 

casualty threshold) but are otherwise treated as cases with naval involvement.

As shown in figure 10, naval forces were deployed in more than 40 percent of all U.S. engagements in international crises. Of the ninety-three cases under study, in thirty-nine 

the USN deployed alone or with the USMC and in fifty-four cases with other forces.

The charts in figure 11 further break down the combinations with other forces in which 

the Navy was deployed. These new variables were introduced to measure the level of 

Missing Data

Naval Involvement

No Naval Involvement

USN & Other

USN-USMC

12

136

93

54

39

USN Involvement USN-USMC Team

Figure 10

Naval Involvement Binary and USN-USMC Team & USN with Other Forces
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joint deployment. A deployment of all forces is a much more substantial involvement 

than the other two categories and must include sea, air, and ground forces.

Figure 12 presents the strength of the naval force, measured in number of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. All cases that included the Marine Corps involved amphibious forces. The stronger the U.S. force, the more likely it was to reach or exceed force 

levels of two CVs. Because the latest CNA study does not provide information on vessels 

involved, the following charts include only cases up to 1990.

The time lines of figures 13a and 13b graphically demonstrate the variation of the 

frequency of U.S. reactions to international crises, controlling for involvements with 

All Forces

USN, USAF, USARMY

USN, USMC, USAF

USN, USAF

USN-USMC

USN only

All Forces

USN & Other

USN-USMC Team

23

16

14 6

1

2

31

39

21

33

USN, USMC, USARMY

Figure 11

USN and Other Forces Combinations

NUMBER OF CVs AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

Count

Count

TYPE OF SERVICE 1

USN ONLY

USN-USMC

USN OTHER

ALL FORCES

USN ONLY

USN-USMC

USN OTHER

ALL FORCES

TYPE OF SERVICE 1

Figure 12

Naval Strength
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and without naval forces. Whereas the first figure distinguishes only between “no naval 

involvement” and “naval involvement,” the second analyzes the different service combinations with which the USN deployed. 

0

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TYPE OF SERVICE 

NO NAVY

NAVY

Figure 13A

Time Line of Naval Involvement

Figure 13b

Time Line of Naval Involvement, Servicetype2
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Figure 13a shows that the peaks and lows of naval responses differed from those of nonnaval ones. Naval responses peaked in 1958 and 1962–63, while declines occurred in the 

early 1950s, late 1980s, early 1990s, and after 2002. A relatively steady response pattern 

is visible between 1966 and 1978 and between 1992 and 1997. In the time frame between 

1977 and 1991, nonnaval American activity peaks occurred on several occasions. The 

second time line, figure 13b, distinguishes among the different service combinations, 

treating maritime forces jointly. The years 1962 to 1964, 1981, and 1984 saw peaks of 

maritime-forces-only responses. After 1986 very few of the military responses occurred 

with only seaborne forces but rather were characterized by joint deployments. This increase in joint operations coincides with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which encouraged 

interservice cooperation.

General Observations of U.S. (Naval) Activity in International Crises

Before statistically analyzing the circumstances in which the United States deploys naval forces, a historical account of the frequency and location of U.S. activity can provide 

answers to crisis-characteristics questions concerning the locations of USN responses. 

As shown in figure 14, the late 1940s were dominated by responses in Europe. This finding is not surprising, since many Eastern European countries were struggling against 

the influence of communism at the end of World War II. In roughly half of the cases, 

naval forces were involved. Somewhat more surprising are the responses in the Middle 

East. In the first years after the end of World War II the United States focused mainly 

on other regions, and an increasing interest in the Middle East occurs only in the early 

1950s.61 However, the following decades were marked by a much higher frequency of 

reactions to international crises in that region. Three responses between 1946 and 1949 

occurred in Asia. The 1950s were clearly dominated by two regions, Asia and the Middle 

East, with slightly more cases without naval involvement. Fewer responses took place in 

Europe, mostly without the support of naval forces. The activity in Central America was 

evenly distributed between no naval involvement and naval involvement, whereas crisis 

response in North Africa occurred without USN deployments. In the 1960s naval forces 

dominated American crisis-response activity in Central America and Europe, while in 

the other major response areas, the Middle East and in Asia, only about half of the cases 

featured USN forces.

The largest concentration of international crises in the 1970s occurred in Africa. During 

this decade many African countries gained independence from former colonial powers. 

Frequently this led to wars between factions or with bordering countries, resulting in 

international crises. Most of the American responses on this continent took place in 

central or southern Africa and did not include naval forces. Again, the majority of naval 

deployments occurred in the Middle East and Asia, with fewer cases in Europe and
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Central America. Africa remained tumultuous in the 1980s, but American responses 

also occurred in North and East Africa. The various crises with Libya are mostly responsible for the involvement in North Africa. In the Middle East, more involvements 

took place without the USN, and no crisis response in Asia included naval forces. Of the 

three reactions to incidents in Europe, two included naval deployments. In the 1990s the 

United States was less active in Africa; however, half of the six responses included naval 

forces.

The Middle East largely dominated the 1990s, but the United States also focused on 

Asia, both with and without naval support. The responses in Europe are largely attributable to the wars resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Few responses show up in 

Central and South America. The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by 

a very small number of involvements. This may be a side effect of the GWOT, which tied 

up U.S. military forces and left little room for other deployments. Only five cases for 

the time span 2000–2006 led to the dispatch of naval forces, including Afghanistan and 

Iraq. No activity occurred in Europe or in Central or South America, but the United 

States reacted to three crises in Eurasia and five in Asia (two Navy, three without). Over 

the years the Middle East; Asia, predominantly Southeast and East Asia; and Central 

America were the main foci of U.S. naval forces.

In the next step, the different types of forces are analyzed in more detail. The “Navy 

only” cases are located in Central and South America, the Middle East, Asia (especially 

Southeast and East Asia), and some in Africa, especially in the north. This is not much 

different from the findings of naval deployments independent of the force combination. 

USN-USMC cases add Europe and South Asia to the regions but also occur in Central 

America, North and East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia. Looking at all crises including the Army and Air Force explains the crisis responses in other 

regions. The distributions now cover most geographic locations, although the focus 

remains on the Middle East, Central America, and Southeast and East Asia.

Table 14 also distinguishes between different levels of U.S. activity. The majority of 

American responses occurred at only a low level of activity. For this type of response 

“no naval involvement” was more frequent than the deployment of naval forces. For 

responses of the next category, semi-military involvement, naval forces are frequently 

deployed. The smallest set of responses involved direct military activity, which often included naval forces. Only in two cases where the U.S. activity was coded as “direct military” were no naval forces involved. The two crises in question are the Congo II crisis 

of 1964 and the Libyan jets crisis of 1988. During the Congo crisis the United States and 

Belgium dispatched paratroops to support a hostage-rescue mission. The shooting down 

of two Libyan MiG-23s by U.S. fighters was coded as direct military involvement in a 

crisis initially triggered by the Pan American airliner crash at Lockerbie in late 1988.
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As previously shown, the majority of responses occurred in the Middle East, Central 

America, and South, Southeast, and East Asia. While in the first region half of the 

responses occurred with naval forces, the other half without, in the latter two regions 

more than 50 percent of the responses involved naval forces. The majority of the various 

responses in East Asia included the dispatch of the USN, while in Africa the larger part 

of U.S. activity took place without naval forces (with the exception of North Africa) and 

also occurred at a low level. After the end of the Cold War, direct military “all forces” 

responses dominated Middle East crisis response, whereas previously only USN-USMC 

forces had been deployed frequently. Central America shows a high level of semimilitary USN-USMC response activity. Overall, since the end of the Cold War U.S. 

direct military crisis-response activity has increased.

Methodology

There are important limitations here. The relatively small number of naval involvements 

and the even more limited data on the response time, specific mission, and strength of 

the deployment pose great challenges to statistical analysis. While I would like to create 

complex models accounting for a variety of different effects, especially also interaction 

effects, this goal is not attainable with the current data. Instead of elaboration on the 

hypotheses and taking into account more variations of naval deployments, the following empirical analyses will be rather basic in nature. Based on the available information 

1944

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YEAR OF TRIGGER

2005

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SOUTH AMERICA

CENTRAL AMERICA

SOUTHERN EUROPE

NORTH EUROPE

WEST EUROPE

CENTRAL EUROPE

EAST EUROPE

EURASIA

CENTRAL AFRICA

SOUTHERN AFRICA

EAST AFRICA

NORTH AFRICA

WEST AFRICA

MIDDLE EAST

SOUTH ASIA

SOUTHEAST ASIA

EAST ASIA

CENTRAL ASIA

CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY

LOW INVOLVEMENT

SEMI-MIL-COVERT

DIRECT MILITARY INV

U.S. NAVAL INVOLVEMENT

NO NAVAL INVOLVEMENT

NAVAL INVOLVEMENT

Figure 14

Geographic Location & Content of U.S. Activity

(the three crises where USN involvement is uncertain are circled by broken line)
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and restrictions posed by statistical requirements, the analyses are necessarily confined 

to simple regression models, in an attempt to provide more information than simple 

frequencies. However, given the exploratory character of this study, even frequencies 

will be an important first step and ideally will encourage future efforts to report naval 

involvements in more detail as to allow deeper analysis of their impact.

Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression

Regression analyses help to understand the relation between one dependent and one or 

more independent variables. The most common regression, linear regression, requires 

the dependent variable to be metrically scaled. Logistic regressions allow us to predict 

dependent variables based on dichotomous, categorical, or continuous independent 

variables. Binary (or binomial) logistic regression is employed when the dependent is a 

dichotomous variable and the independents are of any variable type. Multinomial logistic regression models are applied when the dependent variable has more than two values 

and is categorically scaled. When the dependent variable can be ranked, an ordinal 

logistic regression model is preferred. In all of these three regression types, there can be 

only one dependent variable.

Logistic regression applies maximum-likelihood estimation after converting the 

dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring 

or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring. 

Logistic regression has many analogies to the ordinary-least-square (OLS) methods in 

linear regressions: logit coefficients correspond to b coefficients in the logistic regression equation, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights (b values), 

and a pseudo-R2

 statistic is available to summarize the strength of the relationship. But 

these “pseudo-R2

 statistics” have to be interpreted with care.62 For OLS regressions the 

R2

 value provides information on how much of the variance in the dependent variable is 

explained by the independent variable(s). For regressions with dichotomous or categorical dependent variables, however, R2

 does not serve as a measurement of the variance of 

the dependent variable but rather has to be interpreted as a measurement of the strength 

of association.

Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume that the relationship between dependent and independent variables is linear, and the choice is not restricted 

to normally distributed variables. Further, no homoscedasticity (equality of statistical 

variance) is assumed, and generally the requirements are less stringent. Goodness-of-fit 

tests are available, such as the likelihood ratio test as an indicator of model suitability and the Wald statistic to test the significance of individual independent variables. 

In order to interpret the output, the b values need to be discussed. The b values—

Exp(B)—generate the factor by which the likelihood of the occurrence of “1” values of 
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the dependent variable (0 or 1) increases. All values smaller than 1 signify a negative 

relationship, and no assumption can be made regarding the strength of the negative 

influence. A b value of 1 signifies a neutral indicator, with no influence on the dependent variable.63 Binary logistic regression predicts the “1” value of the dependent, using 

the “0” level as the reference value. Multinomial logistic regression compares each level 

of the dependent with the baseline category for each independent variable. Because 

the hypotheses not only measure the naval involvement as a binary variable but also 

distinguish between the different combinations of the services, both binary logistic and 

multinomial logistic models are appropriate.

For multinomial logistic regression we must select a baseline category for the dependent 

variable. For instance, given the multinomial dependent “naval involvement” with levels 

0 = “No Navy,” 1 = “USN-USMC,” 2 = “USN & Other Forces,” and 3 = “All Forces,” four 

choices can be made for the baseline category. If “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, the 

multinomial logistic output will show, first, the comparison of “No Naval Involvement” 

with “All Forces”; second, the comparison of “USN-USMC” with “All Forces”; and third, 

the comparison of “USN & Other Forces” with “All Forces.” Similarly, for the independent variables a reference category has to be defined. The statistical program SPSS automatically defaults the highest value. If the researcher desires another reference category, 

the variables have to be recoded accordingly. This brings up three considerations. First, 

because the b coefficients for dummy variables will reflect changes in the dependent 

with respect to the reference group (which is the left-out group), it is best if the reference 

group is clearly defined. Thus leaving out the “Other” or “Miscellaneous” category, for 

example, is suboptimal, for the reference comparisons will be unclear. Second, the leftout reference group should have multiple cases if it is to lead to stable reference comparisons. Third, some researchers prefer to leave out a “middle” category when transforming 

ordinal categories into dummy variables, arguing that reference comparisons with 

median groups are preferable to comparisons with extremes. In this study the small 

number of cases often posed a problem in this regard, and I tried to choose the reference 

category as carefully as possible.

Structure of the Regression Analyses

In order to measure how much the independent variable influences the dependent 

variable, simple or stepwise regression models are employed. When the data and the 

theoretical considerations allow, I chose stepwise multiple regression models, thereby 

automatically eliminating independent variables with no significant influence. Stepwise 

regression assumes that the term would have a coefficient of 0 and adds the term only 

when there is sufficient evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Otherwise, 

simple regression analyses were employed to test hypotheses separately and determine 
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which factors change the dependent variable independent of any intercorrelation effects 

between independent variables. In multiple regression models, the influence may be 

altered by intercorrelation effects. Moreover, because the dependent variable varies from 

hypothesis to hypothesis, no general overarching regression model can be calculated. In 

simple regression models the pseudo-R2

values are lower, because usually one variable 

alone is less strongly associated with the dependent variable.64 Again, it is important to 

note that R2

 values have to be interpreted with care in logistic regression models. While 

most regression analyses were run with “servicetype2” (treating USN-USMC as a single

force team) serving as dependent variable, the basic frequencies are presented with 

“servicetype1” (USN and USN-USMC separate categories). To calculate the frequencies 

for the joint seaborne forces, the categories USN only and USN-USMC need only be 

added. The already low number of cases for the different variables and the additional 

decrease in cases when dividing into the different categories often do not allow a further 

distinction between the seaborne forces, especially on the system level. However, when 

statistically possible and when results reveal interesting differences, the more detailed 

regression outputs are discussed.

In a first step, tables with the frequencies for the different forms of American involvement and the variables categories are depicted. In a second step, the results of the regression analysis are presented. In order to simplify the statistical outputs, generally only 

two categories are chosen as baseline and reference categories. The values in the tables 

represent the Exp(B) values with the according significance level. After the statistical 

analyses, if possible, historical examples are described to strengthen the validity of the 

argument and support the empirical results.

Notes

1. Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International 

Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975.

2.Ibid., pp. 32, 35.

3. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

4.Ibid., pp. 107–108, 131–32.

5. A positive outcome is considered reached 

when the United States is satisfied with the 

outcome and has been able to achieve its 

goal(s).

6. Siegel, Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era.

7. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record, p. 93. Because these dates have been 

captured in Siegel’s 1991 work and in Thomas 

Barnett and Linda Lancaster, Answering the 

9-1-1 Call: U.S. Military and Naval Crisis 

Response Activity, 1977–1991, CIM 229 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1992), 

I did not include the data.

8. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

9.Ibid.

10. A “war” must involve sustained combat 

between organized armed forces and result in 

a minimum of a thousand battle-related fatalities among combatants within a twelve-month 

period.

11. Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani, “The 

International Military Intervention Data Set: 

An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars,” 
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Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 4 (2009), pp. 

589–99.

12. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver, 

“Militarized Interstate Disputes and United 

States Use of Force,” International Studies 

Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2001), pp. 463–64.

13. Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher, “Initial Crisis Reaction and Poliheuristic Theory,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 1 (2004), 

p. 60.

14. In July 2010, version 10 of the data set, with 

455 crises and a thousand actors, was released. 

The three new cases all occurred in Africa. 

Two involved Sudan and Chad, respectively 

(low-level U.S. activity), and the third Ethiopia 

and Eritrea (semi-military/covert U.S. activity). By the release date all the statistical analyses for this study had been finalized; however, 

it is very unlikely that these three cases would 

have greatly altered the results.

15. Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management, “ICB Project Information,” www.cidcm.umd.edu.

16. Had I been studying the behavior of sailors 

on land or how many have had to be rescued 

after falling overboard, I would have been 

more successful. I came across many interesting reports about the activities of the sailors 

ashore—from thefts of saltshakers at luxury 

hotels in Italy to fights with taxi drivers 

in Turkey and bargains in the ports of the 

Middle East. The same can be said about 

exercises.

17. Only two international crises with USN 

involvement took place during this time 

frame; both are listed in appendix A (available 

online), sec. A2. The naval involvement could 

be thoroughly confirmed for only one of the 

two crises; therefore, only one is included in 

the statistical analyses.

18. Kimberley Neuendorf, The Content Analysis 

Guidebook (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 

2002); Joseph Fleiss, Statistical Methods for 

Rates and Proportions (New York: Wiley, 

1981).

19. Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International 

Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975.

20. Siegel, Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era.

21. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record, p. 93.

22. Till, Seapower. The epigraph is from p. 125.

23. U.S. Navy Dept., “The Aircraft Carrier,” n.d., 

Navy.mil.

24. Norman Friedman, Aircraft Carriers (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983); 

Friedman, Seapower as Strategy.

25. Rebecca Grant, “The Carrier Myth: The 

Enthusiastic Claims of Some Aircraft Carrier 

Proponents Frequently Defy Reality,” Air Force 

Magazine 82, no. 3 (1999), pp. 26–31.

26. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, p. 182.

27. Till, Seapower.

28. John Gordon IV et al., Leveraging America’s 

Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New 

Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions 

for the U.S. Carrier Fleet (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 2006); Till, Seapower.

29. U.S. Navy Dept., “Fact File: Aircraft Carriers—

CVN,” 2010, Navy.mil.

30. Goodall, “Gunboat Diplomacy.”

31. Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the 

U.S. Fleet, 19th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 

Institute Press, 1981), p. 217.

32. William Clinton, “Remarks to the Crew of the 

U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt,” 12 March 1993, 

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.

33. Grant, “Carrier Myth.”

34. Gordon et al., Leveraging America’s Aircraft 

Carrier Capabilities.

35. Rubel, “Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” pp. 

15–18.

36. Ibid., p. 22.

37. Gordon et al., Leveraging America’s Aircraft 

Carrier Capabilities, p. iii.

38. Lacroix and Blickstein, Forks in the Road for 

the US Navy, p. viii.

39. Christine Fox, Carrier Operations Looking 

toward the Future: Learning from the Past

(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 

2009).

40. Allen, Uses of Navies in Peacetime, pp. 4–5.

41. Fox, Carrier Operations Looking toward the 

Future.

42. Pritchett, “Down to 9.”

43.“USS Theodore Roosevelt Headed into Mid-life 

Overhaul.

44. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and 

Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues 

for Congress, CRS Report for Congress 
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(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 

Service, 2009).

45. Wood, Strategy for the Long Haul.

46. Mahoney, U.S. Navy Responses to International 

Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975.

47. Wood, Strategy for the Long Haul, p. 5.

48. U.S. Navy Dept., “The Amphibious Ready 

Group,” 2009, Navy.mil.

49. Binkin and Record, Where Does the Marine 

Corps Go from Here?, p. 11.

50. Till, Seapower.

51. Wood, Strategy for the Long Haul, pp. 5–6.

52. Hank Gaffney et al., Employment of Amphibious MEUs in National Responses to Situations,

CRM D0015288.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: Center 

for Naval Analyses, 2006). According to 

Gaffney et al., the United States has been 

much less active in this respect since 2001, 

in large part due to its engagements in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. The few responses have 

been mostly humanitarian or peace-support 

operations of short duration. Active combat 

missions have involved Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden.

53. I did, however, take a closer look at the ICB 

cases coded as “No U.S. Involvement” and 

found, almost without exception, no naval 

activity related to the international crises. 

Siegel coded naval involvement during at 

least three crises as “no U.S. activity,” citing the ICB. The first was his number 117, 

“Cuba–Dominican Republic,” 1947, in which 

Cuban-supported anti-Trujillo forces began to 

be perceived as a threat and Dominican forces 

were put on alert. ICB codes no U.S. activity, 

mentioning only prohibition of the purchase 

of U.S. weapons; Siegel reported increased U.S. 

naval operations in the Caribbean as a sign 

of American pressure on Cuba. A few weeks 

later Cuban support ceased. The second was 

number 183, “Kuwait Independence,” 1961.

The crisis triggered the dispatch of five USN 

vessels as a contingency force. Third was his 

number 207, “East African Rebellions,” early 

1964. Rebels overthrew the government in 

Zanzibar, and an armed mutiny in Tanganyika 

soon followed. USS Manley (DD 940) evacuated foreign nationals from Zanzibar and 

returned to stand by for possible evacuations 

from Tanganyika. ICB reports only British 

activity.

54. The naval involvement for three cases 

(numbers 344, 383, and 452) could not be 

confirmed with sufficient certainty. They are 

discussed in appendix A2 (available online).

55. The ten variables are USMC (yes/no); USAF 

(yes/no); USARMY (yes/no); USN ONLY 

(yes/no); USN, USMC (yes/no); USN, USMC, 

USAF (yes/no); USN, USAF (yes/no); USN, 

USMC, USARMY (yes/no); USN, USARMY 

(yes/no); ALL FORCES (yes/no).

56. Friedman, Seapower as Strategy, p. 271.

57. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, pp. 

49–50.

58. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record. In some cases additional categories 

are identified, such as response to terrorism, 

no-fly zone, and security.

59. Till, Seapower.

60. U.S. Army Dept., Peace Operations, Field 

Manual 100-23 (Washington, D.C.: 1994).

61. See, for example, Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire.

62. University of California, Los Angeles, 

Academic Technology Services, “SPSS Data 

Analysis Examples: Logit Regression,” n.d., 

available at www.ats.ucla.edu/.

63. Simon Hug, “3.5. Regressionsanalysen 

und qualitative Daten: Logistische Regression,” documents for the “Lecture Quantitative Methods for Political Science 2, Fall/

Winter Semester 2006/07,” Univ. of Zurich, 

Switzerland.

64. Nagelkerke’s R2

 can reach a maximum value 

of 1 and is a widely used substitute for R2

measures for logistic regressions.

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We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part I

Assessing the Empirical Evidence—Crisis Characteristics 

and Actors

To better understand the influence of different crisis characteristics on seaborne crisis 

response, four hypotheses were generated in chapter 2.1

 The first three are concerned 

with the type of crisis, while the last one analyzes the influence of the crisis on the 

global system. All variables are measured on the system level.

The following three hypotheses are analyzed in a combined stepwise regression model, 

Crisis Characteristics Model 1 (see sidebar 1). Graver threats and higher stakes were assumed to favor “all forces” responses and render the deployment of seaborne responses 

less likely. In regard to higher levels of violence the hypothesis can go either way, either 

increasing or decreasing the likelihood of seaborne responses alone.

Sidebar 1

The variables in the hypotheses can be expressed mathematically as follows.

(1) x1a and x1b = gravity of threat (gravcr, gravcr2, gravcr3).

A low-threat crisis is measured with the variable “gravity of value threatened.” Categories have to be transformed from their original values. The 

variable measures the seriousness of the threat of the crisis for the actors, 

ranging from “low level” fear, such as economic threats, through midrange 

fears, such as threats to “territory” and “influence,” and ultimately to a 

danger to existence (“grave threat”).

chapter four

H1a: Threats

H1b: Stakes

H1b: Violence

x1 = gravity of threat

x2 = issues

x3 = violence

Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

Figure 15

Crisis Characteristics Model 1
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:06 NP_39 Chapter4.indd January 29, 2013 10:13 AM 

(2) x2 = issues (issue, issue2).

A low-politics crisis is measured by the nature and number of issues at 

stake. If a case includes military-security issues the crisis threatens high 

politics. The variable contains three categories: “1–2 issues non-militarysecurity,” “military-security issue alone,” and “2 issues including militarysecurity/3 issues.”

(3) x3 = violence (viol).

The level of violence is identified with the help of the variable “violence,” 

controlling for the highest level of violence in a crisis. “No violence” is the 

lowest level, followed by “minor clashes,” “major clashes,” and the last 

category, “war.”

(4) x4 = geographic location (geogloc, geogloc2), and 

(5) x5 = geostrategic salience (geostr, geostr2).

A crisis of geostrategic interest is measured by its “geostrategic salience” 

and the “geographic location” of the crisis. The variable “geographic location” was converted into a new binary variable. Thomas Barnett and H. H. 

Gaffney define Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Southwest 

Asia (particularly the Persian Gulf region), Japan, Taiwan, and Korea as regions or countries of most importance to the United States.a

 Blechman and 

Kaplan find frequent U.S. involvement in Europe, Southeast and East Asia, 

Middle East, and Central America.b The Persian Gulf region is a subset of 

the Middle East, but clearly the United States has a great interest in the 

latter.c Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are the key nations in East Asia. Therefore 

the ICB variable “geographic location” was converted into a binary variable 

depending on whether an area was or is of interest to the United States following Blechman and Kaplan’s definition. Geostrategic salience identifies 

the level and number of the international systems affected by the crisis. The 

variable was reexamined as a binary variable measuring whether the crisis 

affected “only subsystem(s)” or the “dominant/global system.”

a. Thomas Barnett and H. H. Gaffney, “100 Top Rules of the New American Way 

of War,” British Army Review—London Ministry of Defence, no. 131 (2003), pp. 

40–44.

b. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

c.. See, for example, Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire.

The second model, Crisis Characteristics Model 2 (see sidebar 1), analyzes the hypothesis assuming a negative relation between the deployment of seaborne forces only and 

crises of high geostrategic importance. 

x4 = geographic location

x5 = geostrategic salience

H1d: Geostrategic

Importance

Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

Figure 16

Crisis Characteristics Model 2
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Before turning to the regression analyses, the frequencies of the variables are summarized in figure 17.

Different distributions of the independent variables require adapting the dependent 

variable in order to meet the significance requirements for conducting regression analyses. While the variables “gravity of threat 2” and “issues 2” could be analyzed employing 

“servicetype1”—distinguishing between the seaborne forces—the variable “violence” 

requires the collapse of these categories. Moreover, “gravity of threat 3” calls for “USNUSMC Team” as dependent variable, because of the zero correlations between territorial 

threats and the deployment of all forces.

Regression Analyses Crisis Characteristics 1

The variable “gravity of threat 2” was automatically removed from the regression 

model by the stepwise entry mechanism. The results show that the categories “no navy” 

Figure 17

Crisis Characteristics Frequencies

Crisis Characteristics No Navy USN onlY USN-USMC

USN & 

Other 

FORCES

ALL ForceS

Gravity of threat 2 Low-level threat 54/40.3 9/39.1 9/56.3 5/23.8 10/32.3

Territorial or influence 63/47 9/39.1 3/18.8 7/33.3 12/38.7

Grave threat 17/12.7 5/21.7 4/25 9/42.9 9/29

Gravity of threat 3 Low-level threat 54/40.3 9/39.1 9/56.3 5/23.8 10/32.3

Territorial threat 46/34.3 7/30.4 2/12.5 3/14.3 0/0

Threat to influence 17/12.7 2/8.7 1/6.3 4/19 12/38.7

Grave threat 17/12.7 5/21.7 4/25 9/42.9 9/29

Issues 2 1–2 non-Mil-Sec 23/16.9 3/13.6 3/18.8 2/9.5 9/29

1 Mil-Sec 66/48.5 6/27.3 7/43.8 2/9.5 4/12.9

2 issues incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ 47/34.6 13/59.1 6/37.5 17/81 18/58.1

Violence No violence 33/24.3 6/26.1 5/31.3 4/19 6/19.4

Minor clashes 43/31.6 5/21.7 4/25 4/19 11/35.5

Major clashes 48/35.3 2/8.7 2/12.5 6/28.6 7/22.6

War 12/8.8 10/43.5 5/31.3 7/33.3 7/22.6

Geostrategic salience Subsystem only 118/86.8 17/73.9 11/68.8 14/66.7 9/23.1

Global system 18/13.26 6/26.1 5/31.3 7/33.3 22/71

Geographic location Not important 69/50.7 6/26.1 2/12.5 6/28.6 3/9.7

Important 67/49.3 17/73.9 14/87.5 15/71.4 28/90.3

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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and “USN-USMC Team” are dominant in crises concerning one single military-security 

issue.

The Exp(B) value suggests that the highest category of issues correlates with responses 

involving the Air Force; however, it fails to meet the significance requirements. No 

clear deployment pattern for “All Forces” response is visible. “No Navy” is dominant 

in the first three categories of violence when “war” serves as reference category and 

“All Forces” as baseline. Although not significant, the negative or close-to-1 results 

suggest that all forces are more likely in lower levels of violence than the other service 

combinations. Once the baseline and reference category are reversed, all military forces 

combinations are more likely in a setting marked by a war level of violence than by no 

naval deployment. While the Exp(B) values are fairly similar, the combination with 

the Air Force shows the strongest correlation. This suggests that high levels of violence 

generally encourage all types of U.S. military interventions and that different military 

intervention strategies are better explained by looking at the issues of the crises. Neither 

the gravity of the threat nor the issue of the crisis seems to influence the deployment of 

“All Forces,” suggesting that other considerations, such as the importance of the crisis to 

the United States, determine the strength of the response.

Figure 18

Model Crisis Characteristics 1a: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

Category NO NAVY USN-USMC TEAM USN&OTHER 

FORCES ALL FORCES

1–2 issues 0.802 0.653 0.248 bl

1 Mil-Sec issue 5.577*** 3.446* 0.536 bl

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ rf rf rf bl

No violence 3.522* 1.079 0.982 bl

Minor clashes 2.218 0.428 0.462 bl

Major clashes 3.534* 0.272 1.048 bl

War rf rf rf bl

1–2 issues bl rf rf rf

1 Mil-Sec issue bl 0.760 0.311 0.144***

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ bl 1.229 3.233 0.803

No violence bl rf rf rf

Minor clashes bl 0.630 0.747 1.588

Major clashes bl 0.251** 1.063 0.996

War bl 3.265** 3.586* 3.522*

N = 224 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.233 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
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When the independent “issues 2” is analyzed alone, employing a simple multinomial 

regression model, the correlation between the highest category and naval deployments including the Air Force shows a strong and significant value of 4.250. A model 

testing the variable “violence” alone shows very similar results, but the Exp(B) values 

for war change to more pronounced differences between the services, with “USN & 

Other Forces” displaying the strongest correlation, followed by seaborne forces, and 

“All Forces” having the lowest correlation. Violence and issues correlate significantly, 

although not very high, at r = 0.227. A simple frequency analysis reveals that a war 

level of violence is dominant in crises involving “2 incl. mil/3+ issues,” while crises 

concerning “one mil-sec issue” concurred eighteen times when no violence was present, twenty-six times for minor violence, thirty-one times for major violence, and 

fourteen times for war-level violence. Entries of “1–2 issues” rarely coincide in warlevel violence (twice) but rather take place in nonviolent settings (sixteen) and minor 

clashes (thirteen).

In trying to explain the results, I took a closer look at the type of mission (N = 46) 

and the strength of naval deployment (N = 73) where the information was available. 

Because of the small N values, only frequencies can be presented. For the lowest issues 

category, “1–2 issues,” six responses took place in the form of shows of force and two as 

NEOs. For “mil-sec issues,” three were contingent positioning/reconnaissances, four 

were NEOs, and two were shows of force, while for the highest issue categories, combat 

(five) and show of force (eight) were dominant. In general, a show of force is the most 

frequent type of mission, but given the absence of combat activity in lower-level crises, 

this supports the assumption of a graver threat presented by crises involving multiple 

issues. Looking at the strength of the naval deployment, the two variables increase 

simultaneously. For the lowest issues category, deployments with no CVs are most frequent; conversely, for the highest issue category, deployments with two or more CVs are 

most likely. Blechman and Kaplan had found a correlation between the use of aircraft 

carriers and the importance of violence.2

Examining the “eyeball” correlations (that 

is, those apparent on quick inspection) from the frequencies, aircraft carriers were not 

overwhelmingly more frequent in war levels of violence. The same was observed for the 

involvement of amphibious forces.

While the variable “gravity of threat 2” had been excluded from the previous model, the 

frequency analysis shows that maritime forces are mostly deployed in crises where territory is threatened, while “All Forces” deployed only when a threat to influence is present. This encourages a distinction between the two categories. Surprisingly, territorial 

crises never triggered the deployment of all U.S. military services. Following the separation of cases by the newly introduced distinction (no cases for territorial threats and 
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all forces), no analysis was possible with the variable “servicetype 1” or “servicetype 2.” 

Therefore, the variable “USN-USMC Team” was employed as dependent variable. 

This time, the stepwise regression included all three independent variables. The findings clearly demonstrate the dominance of maritime forces only among the military 

responses in crises posing a “threat to territory.” The likelihood of the deployment of 

naval forces increases with a “territorial threat,” by 7.567, although “no naval involvement” is even more likely, with a factor of 14.915. Thus while the United States overall is 

reluctant to become engaged in territorial threats with military forces, seaborne forces 

are the tool of choice if a military response is decided on. There is a predictable outcome 

Figure 19

Model Crisis Characteristics 1b: USNUSMCTEAM, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

Category NO NAVY USN-USMC TEAM USN&OTHER FORCES 

(incl. all forces)

Low-level threat 3.795** 3.589* bl

Territorial threat 14.915*** 7.567** bl

Threat to influence 0.884 0.475 bl

Grave threat rf rf bl

1–2 issues 1.462 1.105 bl

1 Mil-Sec issue 8.022*** 5.333*** bl

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ rf rf bl

No violence 3.445** 1.094 bl

Minor clashes 2.340 0.452 bl

Major clashes 3.427*** 0.265* bl

War rf rf bl

Low-level threat bl rf rf

Territorial threat bl 0.536 0.254***

Threat to influence bl 0.569 4.294***

Grave threat bl 1.057 3.445**

1–2 issues bl rf rf

1 Mil-Sec issue bl 0.880 0.182***

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ bl 1.323 1.462

No violence bl rf rf

Minor clashes bl 0.609 1.472

Major clashes bl 0.244** 1.005

War bl 3.150** 3.445*

N = 224 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.347 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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associated with the “threat to influence” category. It can be assumed that in such crises 

the United States was the actor coded as perceiving a threat to its influence. In this model, the threat variable also suggests that out of the military forces, seaborne forces are 

more likely to be deployed in low-threat crises, compared to stronger responses including the Air Force and Army.

The second half of the analysis with “no Navy” as baseline does not show significant 

results for seaborne forces, because they are very similar to “no naval involvement,” 

as the first part of the analysis reveals. The inclusion of the threat level in this model 

suggests that this variable is likely to be influenced by seaborne responses and “stronger 

involvements” not distinguishing between the Air Force and Army, in particular for 

low-level threats. Overall, the hypotheses concerning the gravity of threat and the level 

of violence can be partially confirmed—seaborne responses are more likely in crises 

characterized by lower threats but more violence. The hypothesis regarding the issue of 

the crisis has to be rejected for now, since “USN-USMC” responses do not seem to be 

correlated to low-stakes issues.

Case Study 1a: Threat to Influence and All Forces. The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military forces deployment, in this 

instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence over, the Western 

Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first combatready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years.3

A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which 

had deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United 

States was mostly concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American

regime would limit the influence of the United States and hinder its predominance 

while potentially providing the Soviet Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington’s own backyard.4

 But the foremost official justification was the threat to the lives of 

American citizens.

Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of 

citizens of the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500 

Marines—off the Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with 

unarmed helicopters airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens. 

Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and 

a strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved 

to the Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone 
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and a safe corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had 

evacuated a total of three thousand civilians.

The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of communist influence 

in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two thousand 

men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “Act of Dominican Reconciliation” on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a 

moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to 

withdraw until 28 June 1966;5

 Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.6

The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the 

Department of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, 

including Boxer, the tank landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport 

Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and 

the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD 30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in the region by establishing a presence 

and showing determination not to allow a communist takeover.7

Case Study 1b: One Military-Security Issue and Seaborne Forces Only. The Turkish 

straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and demonstrated 

U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling against 

communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet 

activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out 

between Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before 

the outbreak, an important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship 

USS Missouri (BB 63) departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of 

the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board 

which Japan had surrendered at the end of the war; sending it was a clear demonstration 

of American support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to 

Greece. Missouri demonstrated the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force 

and Army. The vessel could be sent to the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly be converted into a military use of force.

The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the 

Soviet Union sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the 

Soviets increased their naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United 

States expanded its own naval activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt

(CV 42) entered the Mediterranean on 8 August. The presence of the world’s largest 

aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to signal concern about increased 
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Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist Soviet expansion. The 

deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the mainland 

through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. This crisis 

shows the value of seaborne forces in a military-security issue crisis.

The advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment while staying 

out of the way in case no direct action was necessary to solve the crisis. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a direct involvement on 

the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and anxiety. At the 

same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. ships in 

the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted 

mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval 

forces. Although the Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval 

buildup, the permanent U.S. presence—announced in September 1946—was important 

to conveying a message of immediate readiness should any country need support against 

communist influence.8

Case Study 1c: No Violence and Seaborne Forces. The Nam Tha crisis of 1962 illustrates the deployment of naval forces in crises not involving violence. In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on the Laotian 

town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. The 

Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a 

Pathet Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already 

in Thailand for exercises to bolster that nation’s defenses against Laotian communists 

should a request be received from Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home 

were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley Forge (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (CV 19) group took position off Da Nang, 

South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted the Pathet Lao initiative 

and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into negotiations. The crisis 

ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, as well as 

between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian 

princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed 

naval forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda 

considers a show of force.9

 This example mirrors the pattern of show-of-force missions 

in nonviolent settings.
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Regression Analysis Crisis Characteristics 2

The hypothesis assumes a stronger American involvement the greater the geostrategic 

importance of the crisis, measured with the two variables “geostrategic salience” (global 

versus subsystem) and “geographic location” (important versus not important). “Eyeball” correlations suggest that the greater the threat to the global system, the more likely 

the United States is to become involved with all categories of military forces, while the 

importance of the geographic location more generally determines whether the United 

States becomes involved at all. 

The regression results confirm the observations from the frequencies, above. If geostrategic salience is low (subsystem only), the United States is more likely to respond with 

lower levels of force, with “no Navy” and “USN only” being the two dominant categories. This finding is consistent with a realist interpretation of U.S. intervention decisions 

and motivations. Geographic location shows a significant result only for “no naval involvement,” although the Exp(B) values suggest that the deployment of the USN and Air 

Force is more likely in crises in regions of relatively low importance to the United States 

than a deployment of all forces. When the baseline and reference category are reversed, 

“USN-USMC” responses show the highest likelihood of deployment, with 6.382, even 

higher than “All Forces.” Geographic location represents U.S. interest in the region, but 

geostrategic salience is a more accurate measure of the potential impact the crisis may 

have on the global system. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed.

A closer look reveals that seventy-eight of the crises posing threats to subsystems occurred in geographic locations of low interest to the United States and ninety-three in 

geographic locations of high interest. Thus a threat to the subsystem is almost as likely 

Figure 20

Model Crisis Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CategorY NO NAVY USN ONLY USN-USMC USN&OTHER

FORCES ALL FORCES

Loc not important 5.362** 2.025 0.861 2.497 bl

Loc important rf rf rf rf bl

Subsystem only 11.319*** 6.203*** 5.485** 4.194** bl

Global system rf rf rf rf bl

Loc not important bl rf rf rf rf

Loc important bl 2.648* 6.382** 2.147 5.362**

Subsystem only bl rf rf rf rf

Global system bl 1.825 2.064 2.699* 11.319***

N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.247 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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to occur in a location of interest as in one of no interest. When the crisis poses a threat 

to the dominant or global system, the distribution is very different, with fifty-seven 

cases in high-importance regions and only eight in less important ones.

Case Study 1d: Threat to Global System and All Forces. The several incidents involving 

Berlin during the Cold War are examples of crises posing threats to the global system 

and of U.S. responses including all military services. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was 

one of the first major escalations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After 

World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones. 

The announcement by the three Western governments that they planned to integrate 

their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called 

Operation Vittles, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft.

The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North 

Atlantic in reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of 

the Air Force. But only in late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in 

order to meet the demand, did the U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers extended over several months until the 

Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under the condition that the United States,

United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions against East Germany. The last 

day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left Germany split into two 

states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

10

Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses Results Summary

Table 4-1 summarizes the findings for the four crisis-characteristics hypotheses. 

Crisis Actor Models

The influence of crisis actor characteristics on seaborne crisis response is analyzed with 

the help of four hypotheses: the number of involved actors, the involvement of the United 

Nations, the stability of the actors, and the attitude toward the American involvement.11

Table 4-1

Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat Mixed results

Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake Not confirmed

Hypothesis 1c: Violence Mixed results

Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest Confirmed
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The models capture variables at both the macro (system) and micro (actor) levels and 

seaborne crisis response serves as both a dependent and an independent variable.

The two hypotheses under Crisis Actor Model 1 assume that on the one hand, a greater 

number of actors leads to a stronger U.S. response, while on the other hand, low or no 

UN involvement triggers deployments by seaborne forces only (see sidebar 2).

SIDEBAR 2

The variables in the hypotheses are expressed as follows.

(6) x6 = number of crisis actors (cractr).

This variable was measured with the number of crisis actors as provided by 

the ICB data. 

(7) x7 = global organization organ most active in crisis (globorg, 

globorg2).

The “globorg” variable from the ICB was transformed into the new variable “globorg2” and is divided into three categories: no UN involvement, 

low-level UN organ (general activity/Secretary-General/General Assembly) 

involvement, and Security Council involvement. 

(8) x8 = stability (stability).

The variable “stability” was created by combining the two ICB2 actor variables “government stability” and “societal unrest.” Possible categories 

include “normal,” when both variables remained stable; “societal instability,” an increase in societal unrest with governmental stability normal; and, 

conversely, “governmental instability,” a decrease in governmental stability 

with no change in societal unrest. Finally, the most unstable category is 

measured by an increase in instability for both variables: “governmental 

and societal instability.”

(9) y4 = attitude to U.S. involvement (usfavr, usfavr2).

This variable measures the crisis actors’ attitudes to U.S. activity, from 

the ICB2 data, with the possible values “unfavorable,” “neutral,” and 

“favorable.”

In Crisis Actor Model 2, greater stability is assumed to favor the deployment of seaborne 

forces only (see sidebar 2).

Figure 21

Crisis Actor Model 1

x7 = UN involvement

H2a: Number of Actors x6 = number of actors

H2b: UN Involvement

Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response
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Crisis Actor Model 3 analyzes the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne crisis 

response forces only will lead to more favorable perceptions of U.S. involvement (see 

sidebar 2). 

The table in figure 24 presents the frequencies for the actor variables, with the exception 

of the metric variable “number of actors.”

The majority of “USN only” responses occurred in crisis settings with no or low-level 

UN involvement, while for all other service combinations, deployments coinciding 

with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) activity are most common. Overall, the 

H2d: Perception of U.S.

Involvement

x = U.S. seaborne 

crisis response

Y4 = attitude to U.S. 

activity

Figure 23

Crisis Actor Model 3

H2c: Stability x8 = stability Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

Figure 22

Crisis Actor Model 2

figure 24

Crisis Actors Frequencies

Actor Characteristics No Navy USN only USN-USMC USN & Other 

Forces ALL FORCES

UN involvement 

(system level)

No UN involvement 49/36 10/43.5 6/40 2/9.5 4/12.9

Low-level UN 

involvement

26/29.5 8/34.8 1/6.7 7/33.3 7/22.6

Security Council 61/63.8 5/21.7 8/53.3 12/57.1 20/64.5

Stability 

(actor level)

Governmental 

instability

18/7.4 4/7 3/8.8 9/13.8 5/5.1

Governmental and 

societal instability

34/13.9 10/17.5 6/17.6 5/7.7 16/16.2

Societal instability 26/10.7 14/24.6 11/32.4 13/20 10/10.1

Both normal 166/68 29/50.9 14/41.2 38/58.5 68/68.7

Attitude toward 

U.S. activity (actor 

level)

Favorable 124/51.9 24/49 17/54.8 25/44.6 42/50.6

Neutral 17/7.1 6/12.2 1/3.2 6/10.7 2/2.4

Unfavorable 98/41 19/38.8 13/41.9 25/44.6 39/47

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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United States seems to be more likely to respond if the crisis actors experience neither 

societal nor governmental unrest. If the United States deploys in crises with societal unrest, seaborne forces are more likely to be deployed alone than in combination with the 

Air Force or Army. The frequencies for the attitudes toward U.S. activity show no clear 

pattern (all cases where the United States was coded as “crisis actor” or as “inactive” 

were treated as missing data). Perceptions of American activity without any military 

service involvement or with just naval forces are slightly more neutral or least likely to 

be unfavorable.

“UN involvement” and the “number of crisis actors” are measured at the system level 

and are combined in a stepwise multinomial regression model. The hypothesis regarding the influence of instability, measured at the actor level, is analyzed in a simple 

regression model. Unfortunately, the dependent variable “attitude towards U.S. activity” 

did not generate any significant results. The attitude of the actors will be further evaluated in the section looking at crisis outcomes with an introduction of a new variable. To 

understand better the impact of the often-claimed limited decisiveness, it will be interesting to see how actors’ satisfaction with the outcome correlates with attitude toward 

U.S. activity.

Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 1

In figure 25, the event “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, and both “no Navy” and 

“USN-USMC” are significantly negatively correlated with the number of actors. “USN 

only” and “USN & Other Forces” suggest the same direction but fail to achieve significant 

results. When “no Navy” functions as baseline, all military service combinations are more 

likely the higher the number of crisis actors, with “USN & Other Forces” and “All Forces” 

Figure 25

Model Actor Characteristics 1: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

Category NO NAVY USN USN-USMC USN&OTHER

FORCES ALL FORCES

Number of actors 0.486*** 0.808 0.493* 0.964 bl

No UN inv 2.755* 8.702*** 2.587 0.812 bl

Low-level UN inv 1.124 4.371** 0.330 1.650 bl

UNSC inv rf rf rf rf bl

Number of actors bl 1.664** 1.015 1.985*** 2.059***

No UN inv bl rf rf rf rf

Low-level UN inv bl 1.232 0.312 4.984* 2.452

UNSC inv bl 0.317* 1.065 3.394 2.755*

N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.215 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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showing the highest correlations. The category “USN-USMC” shows a value close to 1, 

suggesting no influence, but because of the lack of significance this cannot be interpreted.

The most telling outcome of the model is the increase of the probable odds by a factor of 

8.7 for “USN only” responses in crises with “no UN involvement” and 4.371 with “low 

level UN involvement.” There is an even greater likelihood than no naval involvement at 

all compared to “All Forces.” “All Forces” responses, and even more so the combination 

with the Air Force, correlate highly with “Security Council” involvement. While the 

Exp(B) for the Air Force combination does not generate a significant result in the combined model, a simple regression analysis with “UN involvement” as the only independent shows significant values for “USN & Other Forces” and UNSC involvement.

Overall, both hypotheses can be confirmed. The results suggest that the higher the 

number of crisis actors, the stronger the American response. For the UN activity, naval 

forces alone correlate with “no UN involvement” and “low UN involvement,” while “All 

Forces” responses concurred mainly with Security Council involvement.

While low or no UN involvement might suggest that a crisis was of low importance, it 

can also suggest that the United States was hesitant to send a strong force without some 

form of legitimization. Running of cross-tabulation calculations indicated “low level 

threats” occurred thirty times with “no UN involvement,” twenty-three times with “low 

level UN involvement,” and thirty-five times with “UNSC involvement.” As expected, 

“no UN involvement” was least likely in gravely threatening crises, but the UNSC responded to all three threat categories about equally. As for issues, “UNSC involvement” 

is most likely in the highest category, while “no UN involvement” is most frequent in 

crises concerning one security/military issue. But overall, no or low UN involvement is 

not a synonym for low importance. The strength of the USN response does not seem to 

be influenced by UN activity either. “Eyeball” correlation shows that a force strength 

of more than one CV is also frequent with no or low UN involvement. The type of mission is a better predictor. Combat is most common when the UNSC is involved, while 

reconnaissance/contingent positioning coincides with no UN activity. The frequency of 

reconnaissance/contingent positioning lends further support to the idea of expressing 

concern by observing events from a distance without becoming directly involved and 

attracting only limited global attention.

Case Study 2b: Low UN Involvement and USN-Only Response. Trouble in Nicaragua 

and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. naval forces but 

low UN involvement. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by 

exiles and a revolt in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United 

States deployed naval and air surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’ 
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Caribbean coasts and to stand by in case of a possible invasion from mid-November 

until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, USS Shangri-La (CV 38) and Wasp

(CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the naval patrol force. They kept 

outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels heading for the two 

countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from Nicaragua and 

Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both actors.12 This episode serves as a good example of the flexibility, readiness, and subtlety 

of naval forces—short reaction time, ability to wait and see, and effortless withdrawal 

when no longer needed.

Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 2

The next model analyzes the impact of the actors’ stability on seaborne crisis response at 

the actor level.

The suggested frequency distribution is confirmed in the regression analysis. The odds 

of “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other Forces” are increased by a factor of 

3.3, 5.3, and 2.3, respectively, in crises characterized by an increase in societal unrest 

but no change in government conditions, with “All Forces” as baseline. The results for 

“only government instability,” although positive for “no Navy” and the seaborne forces, 

present significant results only for the combination with the Air Force. The results suggest that “All Forces” responses are most likely when both factors remain normal, while 

seaborne forces (and especially the Marine Corps) deploy when an increase in societal 

unrest is present, in combination with the Air Force in case of increased governmental 

instability. The low R2

 value suggests that the association is rather weak and that many 

other factors influencing the dependent variable remain unaccounted for.

Figure 26

Model Actor Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

Category NO NAVY USN USN-USMC USN&OTHER

FORCES ALL FORCES

Gov. instability 1.475 1.876 2.914 3.221** bl

Gov. & soc. 

instability

0.870 1.466 1.821 0.559 bl

Societal instability 1.065 3.283** 5.343*** 2.326* bl

Both normal rf rf rf rf bl

N = 499 Sig. Model = 0.007 Pseudo-R2 = 0.057 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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Overall, the mixed results encourage further analysis, but for now the hypothesis that 

the deployment of seaborne forces only is more likely when there is no decrease in stability cannot be confirmed.

Case Study 2c: Different Forms of Unrest within One Crisis. Because this variable 

is measured at the actor level, different actors within one crisis experience different 

changes. The Congo civil war crisis of 1998 can be cited as an example. Tensions in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 1998 

President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and 

of his chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly 

thereafter fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. 

Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda 

received support from Uganda. The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, 

Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, joined shortly after by the two 

principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, and attempts to hold 

a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 2002, his son 

Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul Kagame 

in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and 

Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged 

negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa. 

According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops 

on both sides.

The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation 

operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS Saipan (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC) 

stood ready in operation Autumn Shelter for a possible evacuation of the American embassy and U.S. citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not 

required and was canceled on 16 August. While for five of the crisis actors—Angola, 

Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—neither a change in political stability nor 

societal unrest was noted, Chad experienced an increase in societal unrest, and Congo 

suffered from both political instability and societal unrest. The USN was engaged in 

operations in Congo, the crisis actor experiencing the most turmoil, not Chad.

Crisis Actor Hypotheses Results

Two out of the four hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analyses (see table 

4-2). The measurement of political stability needs further evaluation and results before 

rejecting the hypothesis.
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Part I Conclusion: Crisis Characteristics

While knowledge of a “trigger” would point to the initial reason for the crisis breakout, 

the gravity of the threat assesses the whole situation. To have a thorough picture for 

assessing the stakes of the crisis, the variable “gravity of threat” was introduced. While 

a violent trigger would suggest a need for immediate action, a crisis posing a grave 

threat, above all else, calls for a strong response. Overall the analyses confirmed that 

a crisis posing a “grave threat” is more likely to trigger force responses stronger than 

the dispatch of seaborne forces. The Air Force dominates crises characterized by the 

most extreme threats. The gravity of the threat captures the more realist component of 

the level of the crisis, since a grave threat has the potential to destabilize and disrupt a 

country and thereby spill over to other countries or affect whole regions. This in turn 

might trigger responses by other actors. Where the gravity of the situation requires a 

firm response and the dispatch of ground troops seems too risky, airpower seems to be 

the best choice. Even in situations where the time factor might not be especially critical, 

the dispatch of ground troops could lose too much time, whereas air forces are capable 

of striking faster.

When a crisis poses a threat to influence, it is deemed important enough to send ground 

troops for, because it can be assumed that in most cases the influence of the superpower 

has been threatened. This finding evokes the realist school of thought in decisions about 

the intensity of engagement. While a grave threat may not threaten U.S. interests, a 

threat to influence most likely does so. Thus, grave threat crises need forceful intervention, but in the form of airpower, while threats to influence trigger the strongest display 

of U.S. force. For the most part “low gravity threats” do not trigger military involvement when compared to no naval involvement, but when assessed against stronger force 

levels, seaborne forces responded more frequently to low-gravity threat crises. Thus the 

U.S. force level is graduated to the gravity of the threat.

Interesting to note is the dominance of seaborne responses to territorial threats within 

military responses generally. Since territorial threats are difficult to resolve, the United 

States might frequently decide to minimize any involvement. But if a military response 

is desired, naval forces can offer advantages. From a coercion-theory perspective, a 

limited level of force is most effective before a threat is carried out, for coercion is 

Table 4-2

Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors Confirmed 

Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement Confirmed

Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability Mixed results

Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity No results
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superfluous if a country has already been overrun. In the case of territorial risk, immediate action is appropriate to deter further escalation.13 Again, the USN is a ready force 

and has the ability to stand by and adapt to developments ashore, should the United 

States choose to send military forces at all. If the deterrence or compellence option fails, 

naval forces can readily switch to a more forceful posture. “Low-level threats” suggest 

susceptibility to deterrence to prevent continued escalation because of the lower magnitude and depth of conflict. The connection between deterrence and “low-level,” or 

“territorial,” threats deserves more exploration.

The second hypothesis assumed frequent seaborne activity in “low-issue” crises. The 

results show USN-USMC forces mostly deployed in crises concerning “one militarysecurity issue,” the highest of the issue categories. However, in crises with more than 

one issue, naval forces are not deployed alone. I had expected the U.S. Navy to be dispatched mostly in crises characterized by a political-diplomatic issue and not in highpolitics situations. Nevertheless, it can be argued that because only one single issue is 

present, albeit one of the highest importance, the crisis is more structured and the issue 

requiring resolution clearer. George finds that the clarity of the objective favors coercive 

diplomacy.14

Alternatively, the explanation of no visible correlation between seaborne forces only and 

low-issue crises may lie with the vast arsenal of tools the United States can choose from 

to react to diplomatic crises besides the military services. Examples include the diplomatic corps, foreign-aid network, and Defense Department civilians, and so on. While 

in the nineteenth century the United States had to rely primarily on naval forces to 

conduct diplomacy, today there are many other sources at the government’s disposal.15

This view is supported by the correlation between “no naval involvement” and different 

issue categories. For crises involving security-military issues, however, the Navy is still 

preferred over the other military response tools.

The time factor is likely to play an important role as well. Military-security issues might 

require immediate responses or long-lasting deployments, both of which seaborne 

forces can offer. The results of this analysis again reveal unexpected findings for the 

ground forces. Together with “no Navy” they correlate positively with “1 to 2 issue” crises exclusive of military-security aspects, suggesting their involvement in “low-politics 

crises.” In high-stakes crises, the “USAF” combination is dominant and the deployment 

of seaborne forces even more likely than “All Forces.” High-salience crises are said to 

be longer lasting and more difficult to resolve; this might explain the reluctance to put 

boots on the ground when no threat to American national interests is present.

The gravity of the threat and the stakes of the crisis do not include information about 

the level of violence. “USN & Other Forces” is most frequent in the highest category of 
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violence when “war-level violence” is experienced. When the independent variable is 

analyzed individually, ground troops show the weakest correlation among all military 

forces for the highest level of violence. In the combined model, the seaborne forces show 

the weakest correlation, but overall the difference between the service combinations is 

not substantial enough to confirm reluctance to put boots on the ground. Nevertheless, 

results also indicate that violence also does not call for a more forceful response. It is 

important to keep in mind that the deployment of ground troops is not a synonym for 

combat actions. For example, military training and providing security are important 

Army functions. All services can offer advantages: the USN can adopt a wait-and-see 

posture, the Air Force can exert more coercion power with minimal risk, and ground 

troops can offer decisiveness. As previously stated, violent crises bear a greater risk of 

third parties becoming directly involved, especially in the form of ground confrontations. Often third parties remain aloof when a crisis has become too violent, as is often 

the case in civil wars or ethnic conflicts. While a certain tendency to prefer airborne 

forces as coercion tool when violence is very high is visible, the results are not as clearcut as anticipated. The positive correlation with seaborne forces and violence can be 

interpreted as an attempt to exert at least some influence by deploying near a crisis location while staying out of the immediate danger zone. After observing the events ashore, 

the wait-and-see approach can quickly be converted to the use of force.

Overall, the first part of the crises characteristics analysis revealed many results counter 

to my previous assumptions. In particular, the high frequency of use of ground forces in 

“low-stakes” crises and the use of seaborne forces for high-violence or territorial threats 

point to interesting research questions. The issues at stake and the gravity of threat are 

of foremost importance for the actors directly involved; thus when the United States 

intervenes as a third party, it is likely that other considerations, such as U.S. national 

interests, will exert a greater influence on the crisis management technique.

The results of the next hypothesis, controlling for geostrategic importance, show more 

clear-cut and predictable results. The realist school of thought and national interests 

suggest that a crisis of greater strategic significance to the United States triggers a 

stronger military response and thus a more robust commitment and signaling of intentions. Crises merely affecting “subsystems” are most positively correlated with “no naval 

involvement” responses, followed by “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other 

Forces,” while “All Forces” dominates in “global system” crises. While this could point 

to the limited decisiveness of naval forces, crises affecting the global system are likely 

to be greater in magnitude and require forceful and dominant interventions. Thus, this 

point does not speak against the usefulness of seaborne forces but rather to the importance of using the right force for the task at hand. “All Forces” also responded frequently 

to crises located in important regions, although “USN-USMC” shows a slightly stronger 
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association to crises in these areas. This could point to the value of the USN-USMC 

team as a “go anywhere, do anything” force. The USN deployment in regions of both 

low and high importance can be supported by the continuous global presence of naval 

forces. While the largest presence will be close to locations of interest to the United 

States, forward presence allows faster reactions anywhere.

Overall, realist considerations seem to govern the decision-making process in choosing 

response tools for crises characterized by geostrategic importance. This is supported by 

Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman’s statement that “for a realist, the location of a 

conflict plays a critical role in determining its importance because it plays a significant 

role in determining the degree of threat the conflict poses to a state’s vital interests. This 

relationship stands in sharp contrast to the humanitarian idealist model in which the 

location of the conflict should be largely irrelevant.”16

Part I Conclusion: Crisis Actors

The next part of the analysis focused on the crisis actors. The results confirmed earlier 

research, concluding that more crisis actors trigger stronger military responses by the 

United States and thus connote more complex crises. According to Meernik, crises 

involving more actors are of greater importance to U.S. national interests.17 Conflict 

resolution is more challenging when multiple actors are involved, because more than 

one party needs to be convinced or coerced and it becomes difficult to find common 

ground for agreement. Nevertheless, the differences between the service combinations 

are not very large.

The most convincing actors’ results regard the influence of UN activity. The results 

show that for the majority of “All Forces” responses the UN involvement had reached 

the Security Council level. Naval forces alone are positively correlated with “no UN 

involvement” or “low-level UN involvement.” I note that “USN only” responses are even 

more likely than “no naval involvement” for these two categories. This result supports 

the advantage of limited intrusiveness and subtlety, while flexing muscles. The dispatch 

of naval forces is more politically acceptable and offers a potentially coercive diplomatic 

tool. The ability to exert influence discreetly attracts less attention and thus less criticism not only from other nations or the UN but also from Congress and the American

public. Noninvolvement of the United Nations could also suggest a less important crisis. 

While there is a low statistical correlation between “no UN involvement” and the “gravity of threat,” there is no linear relationship with UN activity. More convincing are the 

considerations of a careful legitimization of more forceful actions, the support of diplomatic efforts, and the benefits of a wait-and-see approach. The findings also support 

Ekatarina Stepanova’s findings that often waiting for UNSC activity will cause the right 

moment for intervening to be lost.18
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The political-stability analysis revealed interesting yet inconclusive results. Seaborne

forces, especially with Marine Corps elements, dominate in crises with an increase in 

“societal unrest” but not in crises marked by “governmental instability.” The hypotheses argue that lack of unity renders negotiations and thus conflict resolution more 

difficult. Presumably societal unrest need not influence a leadership’s ability to speak 

with one voice, whereas an increase in governmental instability would. “All Forces” 

responses have occurred most frequently either when an increase in both governmental 

and societal unrest was present or when both factors remained stable. To understand 

more fully the dynamics of the different service deployment combinations, it would be 

useful to control for the type of mission. NEOs might be a frequent response to societal 

unrests and explain the dispatch of maritime and airborne forces. Another possibility is 

the naval wait-and-see approach with only limited involvement, in an attempt to calm 

the situation down.19 In such cases, sending “USN-USMC” forces to the crisis location 

to show interest visibly off a coast can be a useful strategy. As previously said, conflict 

management works best between well identified entities. Thus the overall high frequency of all types of American response when the stability remains constant points to 

a reluctance to become involved when conflict management is likely to be difficult and 

challenging.

The analysis regarding the last actor hypotheses did not reveal any significant results. 

The frequencies would suggest that “USN only” responses are most likely viewed as 

“neutral” and least likely to be “unfavorable,” while the category “favorable” is very 

comparable among the different response forms. This would support that limited intrusiveness is viewed favorably but that actors hope for a more forceful response on their 

behalf, though opponents express a less negative attitude toward this limited form of 

U.S. engagement.

The problem of all actor-level analysis is the uniform treatment of the naval variables. 

The USN involvement is coded identically for every involved crisis actor, without controlling exactly for the target country where the United States intervenes or the party 

with which the United States sides. Naval involvement is measured at the system level 

(the crisis as one entity), without accounting for differences at the macro level—within 

the crises and the actors. For example, a crisis can include five crisis actors. Out of the 

five crisis actors the USN might be involved in only one country, in the form of a NEO, 

but the current data treat all involved actors equally. Thus all five actors would be 

coded positively for USN involvement and for a NEO mission. Controlling for the difference between ally and adversary of the United States and the resulting intervention/

nonintervention strategy for each actor could reveal important differences.
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Notes

1. For a detailed description of all variables see 

appendix B, sec. B1, in the online version of 

this monograph. If not mentioned otherwise, 

all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.

2. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

3. Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 

Press, 1972). Case studies are numbered to 

correspond to the related hypotheses.

4.Ibid.; Blechman and Kaplan, Force without 

War, p. 307.

5. Siegel, Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era.

6. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979.

7. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War,

p. 78; Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979;

U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report for Fiscal 

Year 1965 (Annual Report of the Secretary 

of Defense: 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965, 

extract) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1965); Lowenthal, Dominican 

Intervention.

8. David Alvarez, “The Missouri Visit to Turkey: 

An Alternative Perspective on Cold War 

Diplomacy,” Balkan Studies 15 (1974); Baer, 

One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 28–83; 

Guy Cane, The Build-Up of U.S. Naval Forces 

in the Mediterranean as an Instrument of Cold 

War Policy (Washington, D.C.: National War 

College, 1975); Edward Sheehy, “The United 

States Navy in the Mediterranean 1945–1947” 

(PhD dissertation, George Washington Univ., 

Washington, D.C., 1983).

9. Edward Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War 

in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Naval 

Historical Center, 1994).

10. U.S. Navy Dept., “The U.S. Navy’s Participation in the Berlin Airlift,” Naval History & 

Heritage Command, 1998, www.history.navy 

.mil/.

11. For a detailed description of all variables see 

appendix B, sec. B1, in the online version of 

this monograph. If not mentioned otherwise, 

all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.

12. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979.

13. Huth, Standing Your Ground.

14. George, Forceful Persuasion.

15. Capt. Peter Swartz (Ret.), e-mail exchange, 

June 2010.

16. Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, 

“Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?,” International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (2003), pp. 

37–54.

17. Meernik, Political Use of Military Force in US 

Foreign Policy, p. 67.

18. Stepanova, “Unilateral and Multilateral Use of 

Force by the United States.”

19. Swartz, e-mail exchange.

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chapter five

We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part II

Assessing the Empirical Evidence—U.S. Involvement and 

Crisis Outcomes

The correlation between U.S. involvement and seaborne crisis response is measured 

with the help of six hypotheses, analyzing the degree and effect of U.S. activity.1

 

Depending on the hypotheses, seaborne crisis response serves as the dependent or 

independent variable. Because of high intercorrelation between the independent 

variables, all hypotheses will be analyzed in individual simple regression models (see 

sidebar 1).

U.S. Involvement Model 1 tests the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne forces 

only is more likely in lower forms of U.S. involvement. The hypothesis for U.S. Involvement Model 2 assumes that the effectiveness of American activity will be lower when 

only seaborne forces are deployed. U.S. Involvement Model 3 hypothesizes that the 

deployment of seaborne forces only is least likely in crises where U.S. direct military 

activity is the most effective. U.S. Involvement Model 4 analyzes whether in cases the 

United States deploys only seaborne forces, the contribution to the abatement is lower. 

U.S. Involvement Model 5 assumes that in crises where the United States is a direct 

actor, stronger force levels are deployed. Finally, U.S. Involvement Model 6 tests the 

hypothesis assuming that the deployment of seaborne forces only positively influences 

response readiness.

H3a: Form of U.S.

Involvement

x9 = content of

U.S. activity

Y = U.S. seaborne 

crisis response

Figure 27

U.S. Involvement Model 1
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

SIDEBAR 1

The variables in the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.

(1) x9 = content of U.S. activity (usinv, usinv2).

H3b: U.S. Effectiveness x = U.S. seaborne 

crisis response

y5 = effectiveness of 

U.S. activity

Figure 28

U.S. Involvement Model 2

H3c: U.S. Direct

Military Effectiveness

x = U.S. seaborne 

crisis response

y6 = most effective

U.S. activity

Figure 29

U.S. Involvement Model 3

H3d: Termination x = U.S. seaborne 

crisis response

y7 = U.S. contribution

to abatement

Figure 30

U.S. Involvement Model 4

H3e: U.S. Crisis Actor

x10 = U.S. crisis

actor

Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

Figure 31

U.S. Involvement Model 5

x11 = naval reaction

x12 = USN forces

abroad

H3f: U.S. readiness

Y = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

Figure 32

U.S. Involvement Model 6
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM

This variable measures the highest level of U.S. activity in international crises, based on the variable “level of U.S. involvement.” The same criterion 

was already applied to select the cases. 

(2) y5 = effectiveness of U.S. involvement (usefct, usefct2).

This dependent variable is measured with the variable coding the effectiveness of the U.S. activity on crisis abatement, ranging from the categories 

“escalation” to “no contribution to the abatement” and the “single most 

important contributor.” Because of the limited number of cases, some categories had to be collapsed or excluded.

(3) y6 = most effective type of U.S. activity (usefac, usefac2).

The most effective type of U.S. activity (dependent variable) on the crisis 

abatement has four values: “not effective,” “low-level most effective,” 

“semi-/covert military most effective,” and “direct military most effective.”

(4) y7 = U.S. contribution to pace of abatement (uspace, uspace2).

The question of how naval forces influence the termination of a crisis is 

measured with the help of the variable “U.S. contribution to pace of abatement” (dependent variable), thereby specifying whether the United States 

“contributed,” “delayed,” or had “no influence” on the pace of abatement. Unfortunately, the category “no influence on the pace of abatement” showed an insufficient number of cases and had to be excluded. 

(5) x10 = U.S. actor in crisis (usactor).

Whether the United States is a direct crisis actor or is involved as a third 

party is measured with the binary variable “U.S. actor in crisis.”

(6) x11 = naval reaction time (elaps), and

x12 = naval forces abroad (USNabroad).

Next I introduced duration variables, measuring the first and last days of 

the response as well as the total number of days: “start of naval involvement,” “end of naval involvement,” and “duration of naval involvement,” 

adapted from the CNA reports. For cases with multiple naval involvements, 

two time variables were created. Unfortunately, only one response date is 

provided, although the services rarely all deployed at the same time. This 

variable is unable to distinguish the speed of naval force deployment compared to that of the other military services. The readiness of naval forces is 

measured by the elapsed time between the crisis trigger date (from the ICB 

data set) and the start date of naval involvement (CNA), and by the total 

number of active naval personnel deployed outside the United States in 

the year of the crisis trigger date, as provided in U.S. Defense Dept., Active 

Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (Washington, D.C.: n.d.), available at www.defense.gov/.

The table in figure 33 presents the frequencies for the U.S. involvement variables, with 

the exception of the metric variables “response time” and “number of USN personnel 

abroad.” 
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

I will begin with the hypotheses treating naval involvement as the independent variable, 

analyzed in three different models.

Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 1: Seaborne Crisis Response Independent 

Variable

The frequency chart shows a high number of “All Forces” responses and American

interventions contributing to an “escalation” or seen as “important/most important,” 

while seaborne forces responses alone are most likely to coincide with “no or marginal 

contribution” and “important/most important.” Because “USN & Other Forces,” “USNUSMC,” and intervention “escalated” only show a value of one each, the independent 

variable “USN-USMC Team” was chosen. 

Figure 33

U.S. Involvement Frequencies

U.S. Involvement No Navy USN only USN-USMC

USN & 

Other 

Forces

All Forces

Content of U.S. 

activity

Low level 110/80.91 8/34.8 8/50 6/28.6 8/25.8

Semi-military 24/37.7 12/52.2 8/50 13/61.9 6/19.4

Direct military 2/14.4 3/13 0/0 2/9.5 17/54.8

Effectiveness of U.S. 

activity

Intervention 

escalated

5/3.7 4/17.4 1/6.3 1/8 7/22.6

No or marginal 

contribution

87/64.6 11/47.8 6/37.5 6/28.6 2/6.5

Important/most 

important

43/31.9 8/34.8 9/56.3 14/66.7 22/71

U.S. actor in crisis U.S. actor 7/5.1 6/26.1 4/25 10/47.6 25/80.6

U.S. not actor 129/94.9 17/73.9 12/75 11/52.4 6/19.4

Most effective U.S. 

activity

Ineffective 68/50.4 9/39.1 3/18.8 5/23.8 3/9.7

Eff. low level 51/37.8 3/13 6/37.5 6/28.6 10/32.3

Eff. semi-military 14/10.4 8/34.8 7/43.8 8/38.1 4/12.9

Eff. direct military 2/1.5 3/13 0/0 2/9.5 14/45.2

Contribution to pace 

of abatement

Not effective 80/60.2 13/68.4 4/26.7 6/28.6 2/7.7

Effective 53/39.8 6/31.6 11/73.3 15/71.4 24/92.3

Delayed 2/1.5 4/17.4 1/6.3 0/0 5/16.1

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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Effectiveness of U.S. Activity

When “USN & Other incl. all forces” responses serve as the reference category, U.S. 

interventions featuring “no Navy” and “USN-USMC” forces were most likely to “not/

marginally contribute,” although the results fail to meet the significance requirements. 

If the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” responses are most likely 

in crises where U.S. intervention escalates the situation compared to “no/marginal contribution.” The category “important/most important” operates in the same direction, 

although the odds ratio is weaker. “USN-USMC” forces show the same tendency as “All 

Forces” responses, albeit both the correlations with “escalation” and “important/most 

important” are lower. But compared to “no naval involvement,” seaborne forces are also 

Figure 34

Model U.S. Involvement H3b: Effectiveness

Category Escalated Not Contributed/

Marginal

Important/Most

Important

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces) 

rf rf bl

USN-USMC 1.324 4.500 bl

NO NAVY 0.523 9.105 bl

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces)

bl rf rf

USN-USMC bl 0.294* 1.324

NO NAVY bl 5.188** 2.529

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces)

rf bl rf

USN-USMC 0.294* bl 0.212***

NO NAVY 0.057*** bl 0.110***

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces)

1.911 0.110*** bl

USN-USMC 2.529 0.494* bl

NO NAVY rf rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces)

bl 0.057*** 0.523

USN-USMC bl 0.195** 0.395

NO NAVY bl rf rf

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 

all forces)

17.400*** bl 9.105***

USN-USMC 5.118** bl 2.023*

NO NAVY rf bl rf

N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.200 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

more likely when American activity is “important/most important” rather than “not/

marginal contribute.” Overall, whereas the odds of “escalation” are lower for seaborne 

forces, the odds for “important” influence are also weaker. Thus the hypothesis can be 

confirmed.

A closer look at the frequency distribution of the type of mission and force strength 

shows that two cases of escalation coincide with a show of force and three with a NEO, 

while for the category “important/most important” four deployments are combat and 

ten are show-of-force missions. It is unlikely that NEO missions contribute to escalation; 

thus for future analysis it would be interesting to introduce more independent variables. 

The frequencies for the strength of the force show that for the category “important/

most important,” more than one CV was involved in twenty-six, one CV in thirteen 

crises, and none in four. The “eyeball” correlations also reveal that “escalation” coincides with eight operations that included one or more CVs and only two with none. 

When the United States did not contribute, no CV was involved in seven cases, one CV

in nine, and one or more in four. When the United States contributed to an escalation, 

the involvement was more frequent in the form of a direct military activity. When the 

U.S. contribution was important/most important, fifteen operations occurred at a low 

level and an equal number at the level of direct military engagement, while twenty-three 

were semi-military. These numbers further support the correlation with “All Forces” 

responses and escalations.

Case Study 3b: United States Contributed to Escalation. As with all the models where 

USN involvement coincides with an escalation of the crisis, we should not assume that 

USN activities are directly or primarily responsible for the escalation.

In the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, U.S. activity overall was directly responsible for an escalation of tension, yet the USN involvement was said to have contributed 

to the final resolution. The ICB coded the crisis as U.S. activity escalating the crisis, but 

a more in-depth look would have to distinguish between the effects of the various activities. The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s 

reluctance to participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus 

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 

1994, was in a state of high alert. The United States negotiated with North Korea over its 

nuclear program while keeping open the option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty 

Hawk and a second, the name of which could not be determined—were positioned off 

the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was later said that the carriers had 

contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. The crisis ended with 

an agreement in October 1994.2
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Most Effective U.S. Activity

The following simple multinomial regression analysis shows that “USN-USMC” involvement is “most effective in covert/semi military operations,” whereas “All Forces” 

are “most successful in direct military activities.” A large number of naval involvements 

also exercise “no influence.” It is important to note that the majority of “covert/semimilitary interventions” are semi-military and that only very few are covert operations.3

Low-level activities are mostly political in nature but include a small number of economic and propaganda engagements. 

With “All Forces” as reference category and “direct military most effective” as baseline, 

the other three American involvement categories are positively correlated with the categories “ineffective,” “effective low level activity,” and “effective semi-military activity.” 

“No Navy” shows the highest values, especially for the category “ineffective,” because of 

the very few instances in which this type of response occurred when “direct military activity” was most effective. Seaborne forces alone increase the odds for “effective low level 

activity” by a factor of 4.200, the same as “USN & Other Forces,” although the latter fails 

Figure 35

Model U.S. Involvement H3c: Most Effective Activity

Category Ineffective Eff. low level Eff. semi-military Eff. Mil.

ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 11.667** 4.200 14.000*** bl

USN-USMC 18.667*** 4.200* 17.500*** bl

NO NAVY 158.667*** 35.700*** 24.500*** bl

ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.360 1.200 0.086***

USN-USMC bl 0.025* 0.938 0.054***

NO NAVY bl 0.225** 0.154** 0.006***

ALL FORCES 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.041*** bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 0.074** 0.118** 0.571*** bl

USN-USMC 0.118** 0.118** 0.714 bl

NO NAVY rf rf rf bl

ALL FORCES bl 4.444*** 6.476** 158.667***

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 1.600 7.771*** 13.600**

USN-USMC bl 1.000 6.071*** 8.500**

NO NAVY bl rf rf rf

N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.291 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 3:27 PM 

to reach the significance requirements. For effective covert/semi-military operations the 

“USN-USMC Team” shows a higher value of 17.500. “All Forces” correlates highest with 

“effective direct military activities.” The high values for “low-level effective” and “semimilitary effective” are influenced by the low number of cases where “All Forces” were 

involved in crises in which U.S. activity was not effective.

When we examine the “eyeball” correlations with the type of mission, combat displays 

the highest frequency for “direct military most effective,” show of force for the category 

“semi-military most effective,” and show of force and NEO for “low level most effective.” 

CV strength presents the highest percentage of no CVs when “ineffective” and one CV 

when “semi-military effective.” As expected, one-plus (“1+”) CVs is most frequent when 

“direct military” is coded as the most effective activity. This suggests that the presence 

of an aircraft carrier greatly enhances the success of the U.S. activity.

In sum, the results suggest that the dominant influence of “seaborne forces only” lies in 

successful operations short of direct military activity. Since the hypothesis assumes that 

“All Forces” is most successful in direct military activities and naval forces in the lower 

categories of activity, the hypothesis can be confirmed. However, out of all military 

responses seaborne activities are also the ones most highly correlated to ineffectiveness.

Case Studies 3c: Semi-military and Low-Level Involvement. During the Cold War the 

United States was semi-militarily engaged in many crises in Central America. A case 

in point where the semi-military response was the most effective activity is the crisis 

in Guatemala in 1953. The United States saw the growing influence of the communist 

party in Guatemala as inimical to U.S. interests in Latin America.

When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment 

“liberation” movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the 

day the Soviet arms shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission 

in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to 

control shipments to Guatemala. Talks between the parties and the United States were 

not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a “contingency evacuation” force was 

deployed. This operation, code-named Hardrock Baker, was used to implement 

a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included submarines and amphibious 

ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team.4

 With this aggressive configuration of 

naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention. 

On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an 

anticommunist government, the crisis ended. Thus the semi-military activity of the 

USN greatly helped to bring about a termination of the crisis.5
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The 1971 Bangladesh crisis can be described as a demonstration of low-level U.S. 

activity and USN-only deployment. This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West 

Pakistan army on Dacca University in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now 

declared its independence, bringing on armed conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of minor clashes, a formal war 

between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian forces overwhelmed 

the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December 

1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. 

The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, 

the Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting 

of a battle group led by USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was 

deployed to the Indian Ocean to stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. 

An evacuation operation proved unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already 

evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in 

a show of force, monitoring both Indian and Pakistani operations and maritime and 

air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft and vessels, with the goal of 

intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.

The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of 

Bengal, to demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces played 

an important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval 

forces south of the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus 

evidently helped to sway Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of 

continuing the war with an offensive in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened 

U.S. diplomatic efforts.”6

According to Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, this entry of Enterprise

into the Bay of Bengal left a deep impression on Indian policy makers as well as the 

Indian navy for much of the next two decades.7

 Thus this crisis serves as a good example 

of the power of naval forces in combination with diplomatic initiatives.

U.S. Activity and Pace of Abatement

In my examination of the impact of the different American responses on the pace of 

abatement of crises, the frequencies show that out of the military responses, “USN 

only” contributes the least, and stronger military commitments the most. In order to 

run the regression analysis, the category “delayed” had to be recoded into missing data, 

because of the 0 value for “USN & Other Forces” and the low numbers for other service 

combinations. 
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The results confirm the surmise that the stronger the force, the more the United States 

contributes to the pace of abatement. The greatest increase in the probable odds of “no 

contribution” attaches to the category “no Navy.” When “All Forces” is the reference category, all other U.S. involvement variable categories are more likely “not to contribute” 

to the pace of abatement. When the reference category is interchanged with “no Navy,” 

“USN & Other Forces” increases the odds by a factor of 3.774, “All Forces” by 18.113, 

and the “USN-USMC Team” by 1.509. The latter, however, fails to reach the significance 

level. The frequency chart suggests that for the maritime responses, the category “USN 

only” is largely responsible for the lack of contribution to the abatement. A second regression analysis distinguishing between the seaborne forces confirms this assumption. 

“USN-USMC” forces contribute even more to the pace of abatement than the combination with the Air Force. While the statistical analysis finds that naval forces do not 

contribute to the abatement, they do not delay termination either. This was verified by 

running the regression analysis with all three categories for pace of abatement and the 

independent variable “USN-USMC TEAM,” collapsing the categories “All Forces” and 

“USN & Other Forces.” “All Forces” and “USN-USMC” forces responses contribute the 

Figure 36

Model U.S. Involvement H3d: Abatement

Category Not Effective Contributed

ALL FORCES rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 4.800* bl

USN-USMC 12.000*** bl

NO NAVY 18.113*** bl

ALL FORCES bl rf

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.028*

USN-USMC bl 0.083***

NO NAVY bl 0.055***

ALL FORCES 0.055*** bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 0.265** bl

USN-USMC 0.663 bl

NO NAVY rf bl

ALL FORCES bl 18.113***

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 3.774***

USN-USMC bl 1.509

NO NAVY bl rf

N = 214 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.182 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM

most, followed by responses involving the Air Force, yet the hypothesis that naval forces 

alone do not contribute to the pace of the abatement can be confirmed. The different 

findings for naval forces alone and in combination with the USMC demonstrate the 

importance of differentiating between them if possible.

Looking at the “eyeball” correlations, the deployment of no CVs is more frequent when 

U.S. activity did not contribute, while “one-plus CVs” shows a high correlation with 

contribution to abatement of the crisis. Shows of force are more frequent for the category 

“contributed,” while most NEO operations concurred with no contribution. All combat 

operations coincided with a contribution to the abatement. Similarly, when amphibious 

forces were involved, the variable showed a high frequency for contribution. This further supports the importance of the strength of the force employed and the motivation. 

When the United States is engaged only in a NEO activity, the influence on the pace of 

the abatement is likely to be less strong.

Case Study 3d: Delay of Pace of Abatement. I select one of the U.S. crises with Libya 

in the 1980s to exemplify a rare case where the American involvement did delay the 

termination of the crisis. Only the USN was involved in the response. The Sixth Fleet 

announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean and thereby posed 

a crisis for Libya, which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya 

claimed that U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territorial waters in the Gulf of Sirte, 

where the two aircraft carriers—USS Forrestal (CV 59) and USS Nimitz (CV 68)—with 

four cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed openocean missile exercises. The United States had deployed the naval forces to challenge 

Libya’s claim to the Gulf and was holding the maneuvers to demonstrate that “America 

has the muscle to back up its words.” Aircraft from both carriers had to intercept Libyan 

aircraft multiple times. On 19 August USN pilots shot down two Libyan fighters that 

had threatened Nimitz. The United States intended to demonstrate its resolve to protect 

the freedom of the seas. Libya’s ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, threatened to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean should the USN again enter Libyan territorial 

waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981. The crisis centered on the 

maneuvers of U.S. naval vessels, and not on the USN response to the Libyan counterinitiative. Thus the naval activity triggered the crisis but was probably not directly responsible for the delay of the abatement.

After this analysis of American responses as an independent variable the next section 

presents the findings for the hypotheses with U.S. involvement as a dependent variable.
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 2: Seaborne Crisis Response Dependent 

Variable

This analysis measures the level of U.S. activity without accounting for the effectiveness 

of the activity. As expected, no naval involvement was most frequent in “low-level U.S. 

interventions.” Both “USN-USMC” and “USN & Other Forces” were mostly deployed in 

“semi/covert-military,” whereas “All Forces” were typically dispatched as part of “direct 

military interventions.” As mentioned earlier, only two direct military involvements by 

the United States occurred without naval forces. Somewhat surprising is the relatively 

high number of “All Forces” responses in “low-level involvements.” While “All Forces” 

clearly deploy primarily in “direct military interventions,” their dispatch in “low level 

involvements” was not anticipated.

Content of U.S. Activity

With “direct military intervention” as reference category, “low level activity” increases 

the probable odds of “no Navy” by a factor of 116.875, followed by the “USN-USMC 

Team” with 11.333 and “USN & Other Forces” by 6.375. For “semi/covert military 

involvements” the factors change to 34.000, 18.889, and 18.417. Overall, all U.S. naval 

involvement categories are more likely to correlate with direct military interventions 

than no naval involvement.

Figure 37

U.S. Involvement H3a: Content of Activity

Category NO NAVY USN-USMC USN&OTHER FORCES ALL FORCES

Low-level 116.875*** 11.333*** 6.375** bl

Covert/semi-military 34.000*** 18.889*** 18.417*** bl

Direct military rf rf rf bl

Low-level bl 0.097** 0.055*** 0.009***

Covert/semi-military bl 0.556 0.542 0.029***

Direct military bl rf rf rf

Low-level rf rf rf bl

Covert/semi-military 0.291** 1.668 2.889 bl

Direct military 0.009*** 0.088*** 0.157** bl

Low-level bl rf rf rf

Covert/semi-military bl 5.720*** 9.931*** 3.437**

Direct military bl 10.313** 18.333*** 116.875***

N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.363 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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The frequencies from the “eyeball” correlations are confirmed by the more rigorous 

statistical model, and the hypothesis can be confirmed. Seaborne involvement only is 

more likely in lower forms of American involvement. Of all simple regression models, 

this model generated the largest R2 , thus suggesting the strongest association between 

the dependent and independent variables.

Case Study 3a: Low-Level Involvement and All Forces. On careful examination of the 

combination of “All Forces” and “low level U.S. involvement,” one sees that military 

forces often served as a standby resource, as in the Cyprus crisis of 1974–75, and do not 

automatically become involved in combat. I could not find any specific information 

about U.S. Army deployments other than the codings in the CNA reports. On 15 July 

1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet 

regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. The ousted Cypriot government 

requested help from Britain and the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July 

and occupied parts of the island. In an immediate reaction to the coup, the United States 

delayed the return of USS America (CV 66), then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS Independence (CV 62). At the same time 

American and British diplomats began mediation attempts, which led to an unstable 

cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central Mediterranean. Other assignments for 

Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were canceled so that they would 

be ready if needed.

On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado

(LPD 11)—evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut 

from the British base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover.8

In early August the ships’ departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy that resulted in the murder of the American

ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all contingency operations ended 

by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, Archbishop Michael 

Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were deployed 

again for possible evacuation duties. USS Saratoga (CV 60) and amphibious forces were 

released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was

proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended 

for Cyprus and Greece as well.”9

U.S. Crisis Actor

The variable advanced in the next model controls for the U.S. involvement as a direct 

crisis actor or third party. The chart of frequencies shows that seaborne forces most 
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

often deploy alone in crises where the United States is not directly involved. Seventyfour percent of all “USN only” responses occurred when the United States acted as a 

third party, the remaining 26 percent when the United States was a direct crisis actor. 

The numbers for “USN-USMC” forces are almost identical, with 75 and 25 percent, respectively. “USN & Other Forces” show almost a fifty-fifty distribution, and “All Forces” 

are clearly more frequent in “U.S. direct actor” crises, with 81 percent of the total “All 

Forces” responses.

The regression analysis confirms the previous assumptions. If the United States is not 

directly involved, the odds of all categories of U.S. involvement short of “all forces” 

responses increase. All Exp(B) values are significant, and “no naval involvement” and 

“USN-USMC forces” are the most likely responses to crises in which the United States 

acts as a third party. The results support the hypothesis that stronger forces are dispatched if the United States is committed as a direct actor. Crises involving the United 

States as a third party largely triggered responses involving no naval forces or only 

seaborne responses. Similar to the previous model, the R2 is very high, and the binary 

variables “third party” and “direct crisis” actor are very important for the explanation of 

the different types of American responses.

U.S. Readiness

The “number of USN personnel abroad” and the “elapsed time” between the outbreak 

of the crisis and the naval reaction are metric variables. Neither significantly correlates 

with the different service-type combinations. As mentioned previously, the inability 

to distinguish between the naval reaction date and the time elapsed before other forces 

arrive in the theater supports the speculation that were this problem accounted for, the 

Figure 38

U.S. Involvement H3e: Actor

Category NO NAVINV USN-USMC USN&OTHER FORCES ALL FORCES

U.S. not crisis actor 76.786*** 12.083*** 4.583** bl

U.S. crisis actor rf rf rf bl

U.S. not crisis actor bl 0.157*** 0.060*** 0.013***

U.S. crisis actor bl rf rf rf

U.S. not crisis actor 6.355*** bl 0.379* 0.083***

U.S. crisis actor rf* bl rf rf

U.S. not crisis actor 16.753*** 2.636* bl 0.218**

U.S. crisis actor rf rf bl rf

N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.352 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM

results might be different. The Iraq/Lebanon upheaval in 1958 is a good example. The 

Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, 

compared with five days for the Air Force (to advance from its base in Turkey) and even 

longer for the Army (from Germany).

10 Yet no different response dates are provided to 

control for this difference. Similarly, “USN personnel abroad” generated no statistically 

significant results. However, a further examination of the possible influence of the number of USN personnel and the response time revealed some results.

Figure 39 shows how often different CV-strength levels were deployed and to how 

many crises the “USN-USMC Team” responded per year. Once these other dependent 

variables are chosen, alternative findings can be offered. The “number of USN personnel” is positively correlated to both the “number of CVs deployed” in a crisis and the 

“number of USN-USMC responses per year.” This finding supports the assumption that 

the frequency of crisis response is closely tied to the number of personnel the Navy has 

at its disposal and the number of CVs deployed. Conversely, the causation may also run 

the other way. Because of international crises, more naval personnel were sent overseas. 

There is no statistically significant relationship between “elapsed time” and “USN forces 

abroad,” but when direct military activities are excluded the number of USN personnel 

already abroad shortens the naval reaction time. Thus in low-level and semi-military 

U.S. response activity, the number of USN personnel and short reaction times are 

positively correlated. This finding further supports the assumption that the uniform 

treatment of elapsed time for all services negatively influences the measurement of fast 

naval reaction times. Here the R2 values can be used to demonstrate the variance in 

the dependent variable, explained by the independent variables. While all three R2

s are 

Figure 39

Frequency of Number of CVs Deployed and USN-USMC Deployments per Year

Number of CVs Frequency USN-USMC Deployments 

per Year Frequency

0 13 0 107

1 26 1 94

2 21 2 26

3 7 3 10

4 2

6 3

8 1

Total 73 Total 237
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

rather low, a single independent variable is unlikely to explain much of the variance, 

suggesting that additional factors influence the dependent variables.

Even though some results can be presented with the currently available data, the hypothesis cannot be answered correctly and thus has to be rejected in this analysis. However, 

the U.S. involvement hypotheses were mostly confirmed (the exception was H3f).

Crisis Outcome Models

The relation between the crisis outcome and seaborne response is measured with the 

help of four hypotheses analyzing different aspects of the termination of international 

crises.11 All hypotheses treat seaborne crisis response as the independent variable (see 

sidebar 2): Crisis Outcome Model 1, Crisis Outcome Model 2, Crisis Outcome Model 3, 

and Crisis Outcome Model 4.

Table 5-1

Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement Confirmed

Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness Confirmed

Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity Confirmed

Hypothesis 3d: Termination Confirmed

Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor Confirmed

Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness Not confirmed

H4a: Denite Outcome x = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

y8 = content of

outcome

Figure 41

Crisis Outcome Model 1

Figure 40

Multivariate Regression Outputs

Dependent Variable Independent Variable Model R2

Coefficient b Coefficient t

Number of CVsa USN personnel abroad 0.057 0.239*** 3.369***

Annual USN-USMC 

crisis involvements

USN personnel abroad 0.051 0.225*** 3.397***

USN abroadb

Elapsed time 0.049 –0.221* –1.714*

a. Includes only cases up to 1990 because for the later involvements no information about the number of CVs was available.

b. Cases with direct U.S. military activity were excluded from this model.
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SIDEBAR 2

The variables of the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.

(1) y8 = content of outcome (outcome, outcome2).

Whether an outcome was stable was determined with the help of the variable “content of outcome,” with the categories “victory” and “defeat” 

treated as definite and “stalemate” and “compromise” as more ambiguous.

(2) y9 = form of outcome (forout, forout2).

This hypothesis is measured with the variable “form of outcome,” including such categories as “unilateral,” “imposed,” “tacit,” and “formal 

agreement,” to control for the crisis outcome. Certain categories had to 

be collapsed. For example, the different values for unilateral self, ally, and 

adversary are recoded into one category, “unilateral.”

(3) y10 = tension (outesr, outesr2).

The change in tension is measured with the variable “reduction” or “escalation” of tension. The category “recent case” was recoded into missing 

data.

(4) y11a = extent of satisfaction with the outcome (outevl, outevl2).

The satisfaction of the actors is identified with the variable “extent of satisfaction” (outevl). Not all categories showed a large enough number of 

cases, so values had to be collapsed. All cases where at least one of the 

crisis actors was not satisfied were coded as dissatisfied (outevl2).

H4b: Agreement x = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

y9 = form of

outcome

Figure 42

Crisis Outcome Model 2

H4c: Reduction of

Tensions

x = U.S. seaborne

crisis response y10 = tensions

Figure 43

Crisis Outcome Model 3

Figure 44

Crisis Outcome Model 4

H4d: Actor Satisfaction x = U.S. seaborne

crisis response

y11 = extent of

satisfaction
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

(5) y12 = satisfaction/attitude mix.

This variable was generated by the combination of the “extent of satisfaction with the outcome” and the “attitude towards U.S. activity.” Several 

categories were collapsed to establish four new categories: “favorable and 

satisfied” (favorable includes the category neutral), “favorable and dissatisfied,” “not favorable and satisfied,” “not favorable and dissatisfied.”

The following table presents the frequencies for the crisis outcome variables.

Regression Analyses Crisis Outcomes: Content of Outcome

About 44 percent of seaborne interventions ended in a “victory” for a crisis actor, 

compared with 20 percent that ended in “defeat,” suggesting that a little more than half 

terminated with a “definite outcome.”

Sixteen percent were characterized by “compromise” and 20 percent by “stalemate,” a 

total of roughly 36 percent “ambiguous outcomes.” Forty-nine percent of “All Forces” 

responses concurred with “victories” for crisis actors and 26 percent with “defeats.” 

Only 25 percent resulted in “ambiguous outcomes.” Because the frequencies suggest that 

Figure 45

Crisis Outcome Frequencies

Crisis Outcomes No Navy USN ONLY USN-USMC

USN & 

OTHER

FORCES

ALL FORCES

Content of outcome Victory/defeat 125/48.1 28/50 28/77.8 41/62.1 80/74.8

Compromise 61/23.5 7/12.5 7/19.4 19/28.8 17/15.9

Stalemate 74/28.5 21/37.5 1/2.8 6/9.1 10/9.3

Form of outcome Formal agreement 52/25.2 13/28.9 12/42.9 12/20.7 31/32.6

Understanding 58/28.2 5/11.1 2/7.1 17/29.3 15/15.8

Unilateral 91/44.2 26/57.8 10/35.7 25/43.1 31/32.6

Imposed 5/2.4 1/2.2 4/14.3 4/6.9 18/18.9

Tensions Escalation 97/40.8 29/50.9 13/38.2 36/53.7 60/55.6

Reduction 141/59.2 28/49.1 21/61.8 31/46.3 48/44.4

Satisfaction Satisfied 76/29.2 11/20 6/16.7 30/44.8 18/16.7

Not satisfied 184/70.8 44/80 30/83.3 37/55.2 90/83.3

Satisfaction/attitude Fav/satisfied 51/22.6 7/17.1 3/10 13/25.5 7/8.6

Fav/dissatisfied 77/34.1 17/41.5 14/46.7 12/23.5 35/43.2

Not fav/satisfied 46/20.4 10/24.4 3/10 11/21.6 5/6.2

Not fav/dissatisfied 56/23 7/17.1 10/33.3 15/29.4 34/42

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM

largely naval forces alone are deployed in crises resulting in “stalemate” (37.5 percent 

versus 2.8 percent for USN-UMSC), the variable “servicetype1” serves as independent 

variable. Although the expected values of the cross-tabulation meet the requirements, 

one has to be cautious interpreting the values for “USN-USMC” forces, because they 

were only deployed in one crisis resulting in a “stalemate.” However, because the main 

interest lies in “USN only” responses, I chose “servicetype1” as the independent variable, 

in order to highlight the strong influence on “stalemates.”

When “All Forces” serves as the reference category and “defeat” as the baseline, “USN & 

Other Forces” and “no Navy” positively correlate with “compromise,” while the probable 

odds of “stalemate” are increased by “no Navy” and “USN only” responses. “USN only” 

exercises the strongest influence on “stalemate” in the model. Choosing “compromise” 

as baseline leads to a negative relationship between the “definite” categories of the 

Figure 46

Model Crisis Outcome H4a: Content

Category Victory Compromise Stalemate Defeat

ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 1.915 3.447** 1.867 bl

USN-USMC 1.137 1.281 0.311 bl

USN ONLY 1.346 1.441 7.350*** bl

NO NAVY 1.027 2.337** 4.819*** bl

ALL FORCES rf bl rf rf

USN&OTHER FORCES 0.551 bl 0.537 0.288**

USN-USMC 0.887 bl 0.243 0.781

USN ONLY 0.934 bl 5.100*** 0.694

NO NAVY 0.439** bl 2.062* 0.428**

ALL FORCES 0.974 0.428* 0.208*** bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 1.864 1.488 0.387* bl

USN-USMC 1.107 0.548 0.065** bl

USN ONLY 1.311 0.617 1.525 bl

NO NAVY rf rf rf bl

ALL FORCES 2.275** bl 0.485* 2.337**

USN&OTHER FORCES 1.253 bl 0.260*** 0.672

USN-USMC 2.019 bl 0.188** 1.824

USN ONLY 2.125 bl 2.473* 1.621

NO NAVY rf bl rf rf

N = 525 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.111 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

dependent variable and all USN involvements, although not all values are significant. 

“USN only” and “no Navy” remain positively correlated to “stalemate.” Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” the positive relationship between “All Forces” 

responses and “victory” and “defeat” becomes apparent, with “defeat” showing a slightly 

higher correlation. When the baseline is changed to “compromise,” both “victory” and 

“defeat” (stronger) are more likely for “All Forces” responses, while “compromise” is 

more likely than “stalemate.” The high values for “USN-USMC” response and “definite 

outcomes” can be ignored, because of the influence of the low number of “stalemate” 

outcomes for this category. “USN only” responses seem to be more correlated to “defeat” 

and “victory” than to “compromise,” but not significantly. The strong relationship with 

“stalemate” is maintained. The values for the Air Force associate positively with “victory” and “compromise.”

Overall, naval forces show the highest correlation with the ambiguous outcome “stalemates,” while “USN & Other Forces” shows significant values for “victorious” outcomes 

and “compromises” and “All Forces” generally dominates the “definite outcome” categories. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed, because a “stalemate” can be interpreted as 

an even more ambiguous outcome than a “compromise.”

Case Study 4a: Stalemate Outcome and USN Only Involvement. The most recent 

Taiwan Strait crisis, from 1995, serves as an example of a stalemate outcome for all 

involved actors. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at 

loggerheads following the visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit 

to Cornell University. This gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, 

increased the PRC’s fear of growing American support for Taiwanese independence. 

In an attempt to coerce the United States to commit formally to a “one-China policy,” 

the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait beginning in 

July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response until, according to Robert 

Ross, 19 December, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through the Taiwan Strait 

marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976.12 When the Chinese 

activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. 

In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the 

successful conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.

It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, 

the effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré questions 

the contribution of the two CVs, Ross sees their deployments as successful coercive 

diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement 

and confirming American commitment.13
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Agreement

Seaborne forces responses are divided among 36 percent “formal agreement,” 47 percent 

“unilateral,” 8 percent “imposed,” and 9 percent “understanding” outcomes. “All Forces” 

responses frequencies are divided among 33 percent “formal agreement,” 33 percent 

“unilateral,” 19 percent “imposed,” and 16 percent “understanding.” Major differences 

are found in “unilateral” and “imposed” outcomes. Similar to the variable “content of 

the outcome,” naval forces only and “imposed” outcomes concurred only once, but the 

expected frequencies of the cross-tabulation analysis allows “servicetype1” to serve as 

the independent variable.

In a first step, “imposed” serves as the baseline and “All Forces” as reference category. 

“USN only” and “no Navy” show significant odds ratios of 7.548 and 6.039 for the 

Figure 47

Model Crisis Outcome H4b: Agreement

Category Formal 

Agreement Understanding Unilateral Imposed

ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 1.742 5.100** 3.629** bl

USN-USMC 1.742 0.600 1.452 bl

USN ONLY 7.548* 6.000 15.097** bl

NO NAVY 6.039*** 13.920*** 10.568*** bl

ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 2.928** 2.083* 0.574

USN-USMC bl 0.344 0.833 0.574

USN ONLY bl 0.795 2.000 0.132*

NO NAVY bl 2.305** 1.750* 0.166***

ALL FORCES 0.166*** 0.072*** 0.095*** bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 0.288* 0.366 0.343 bl

USN-USMC 0.288* 0.043*** 0.137*** bl

USN ONLY 1.250 0.431 1.429 bl

NO NAVY rf rf rf bl

ALL FORCES bl 0.434** 0.571* 6.039***

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 1.270 1.190 3.467*

USN-USMC bl 0.149** 0.476 3.467*

USN ONLY bl 0.345* 1.143 0.800

NO NAVY bl rf rf rf

N = 432 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.113 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

category “formal agreement.” Compared to “imposed,” naval forces alone show the 

highest correlation with “unilateral acts,” followed by “formal agreements,” while no 

naval involvement shows the highest Exp(B) for “understanding.” The combination with 

the Air Force shows positive associations with the categories “understanding” and “unilateral acts.” When the baseline is changed to “formal agreement,” all categories show a 

negative correlation with “imposed,” but only the values for “no Navy” and “USN only” 

are significant. Overall, naval forces alone are frequently featured in crises with “formal 

agreements” and “unilateral acts,” as previously suggested in the cross-tabulation. Once 

the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” correlates more highly 

with crises characterized by “imposed” outcomes, compared to “formal agreements.” 

Although not significant, “USN only” suggests a negative correlation with “imposed” 

outcomes.

“Naval forces alone” correlates highly with “formal agreements” and “unilateral acts.” 

The same is visible for “all forces” and “imposed” outcomes. Overall, these findings 

point to a positive relationship between naval forces only and “formal agreements.”

Tensions

The next advanced variable is “tension,” measuring the increase or decrease of tension 

following the termination of the crisis.

The “eyeball” correlations suggest that “All Forces” and “USN & Other Forces” responses more likely coincide with an “escalation” of tensions, whereas “USN-USMC” forces 

seem more positively related to a “reduction.” Naval forces alone are distributed almost 

fifty-fifty. The regression analysis employed the variable “servicetype1” as independent 

variable. Unfortunately, the significance of the model does not meet the requirements; 

thus the model cannot be interpreted, and for now the simple frequencies are the only 

results available.

Case Studies 4c: Tension and Seaborne Involvement. The Jordan regime crisis in 

1957 serves as a good example for the possible impact of naval forces on the reduction 

of tensions. On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to 

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt attempted to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan 

but failed. The king feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the coup attempt and 

reacted by dismissing the entire leftist cabinet, triggering demonstrations and riots. The 

United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and deploying 

units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers Forrestal and USS Lake Champlain 

(CV 39), as well as the heavy cruisers USS Salem (CA 139) and USS Des Moines (CA 134), 

to the eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off 

Beirut on 20 April ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while thirty ships of the 
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Sixth Fleet—described as the “most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in 

the Eastern Mediterranean”—carried out air-defense maneuvers in the open sea. The 

task of all these forces was to ensure that the Jordanians maintained their independence 

and withstood the threat of communism. “Once again,” explained Vice Admiral Charles 

Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the scene of the fire.” It 

can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the Middle 

East.”14 Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a state of alert. 

Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led to 

normalization. The departure of the USN force on 3 May signaled the end of the crisis.

In contrast, the U.S. intervention in Grenada serves as a good example of the possibility 

of naval forces increasing tension, because their deployment heightened fear of a potential stronger U.S. backup. Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had 

been placed under house arrest, been freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, 

together with close supporters, murdered. Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in 

the region and to the safety of American citizens in Grenada, the United States showed 

concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization of East Caribbean States,

the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had been en route 

to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to 

Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in anticipation of the developments in Grenada.15 Because of its prior proximity to 

the Caribbean, the naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis 

for Grenada. On 25 October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and 

Army forces invaded Grenada. Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear 

that American students were not in danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the 

restoration of democratic government to Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban 

intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. troops had accomplished their mission, 

and by 4 November Independence finally departed for the Mediterranean.16

Actor Satisfaction

The frequencies suggest that all U.S. responses are more likely in crises with negative 

actors’ satisfaction. “USN & Other Forces” shows the lowest “eyeball” correlation with 

“dissatisfaction,” while “USN-UMSC” and “All Forces” are highest, with equal percentages of 83.3.

When the category “satisfied” is chosen as baseline, “No Navy,” “USN only,” and “USN 

& Other Forces” are more likely to correlate with satisfactory outcomes than “All 

Forces.” However, the value for “USN only” is not significant. “USN & Other Forces” 
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remains positively associated with “satisfaction” even after “no Navy” is chosen as reference category, whereas “All Forces” contributes significantly to “dissatisfaction.” When 

“USN & Other Forces” serves as reference category, all other categories increase the 

probable odds of “dissatisfaction” with the outcome, with “USN-USMC” forces and “All 

Forces” showing equally the highest value.

The combination with the Air Force is most positively correlated to “actor satisfaction,” 

while “All Forces” responses are most negatively correlated. Although the findings suggest that “USN only” responses correlate slightly positively with satisfaction compared 

to “all forces” responses, the results are mixed.

While actors might be dissatisfied with the outcome of a crisis, they might still be satisfied with U.S. involvement, and this point may be of great importance. Unfortunately, 

the original variable “attitude to U.S. involvement” failed to generate significant results. 

Thus for the next variable I combined “attitude to U.S. involvement” with the variable 

“actor satisfaction” (dependent variable y12).

Figure 48

Model Crisis Outcome H4d: Satisfaction

Category Satisfied Not Satisfied

ALL FORCES bl rf

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.247***

USN-USMC bl 1.000

USN ONLY bl 0.800

NO NAVY bl 0.484**

ALL FORCES bl 2.065**

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.509**

USN-USMC bl 2.065

USN ONLY bl 1.652

NO NAVY bl rf

ALL FORCES bl 4.054***

USN&OTHER FORCES bl rf

USN-USMC bl 4.054***

USN ONLY bl 3.243***

NO NAVY bl 1.963**

N = 526 Sig. Model = 0.000, Sig. Step Servicetype1 = 0.000 Pseudo-R2 = 0.055 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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Mix: Satisfaction and Attitude to U.S. Involvement

The simple frequency analyses suggest that out of all military service combinations, 

“USN & Other Forces” were most often associated with crises characterized by “actor 

satisfaction” and “favorable” perception of U.S. involvement, followed by “USN only.” 

With almost the same frequency, “All Forces” and seaborne forces responses rise to the 

top in the next category, “favorable/dissatisfied.” Naval forces alone and in combination 

with the Air Force were most likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors 

but favorable attitudes to American activity, while at the same time “USN only” was

least likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors and “unfavorable” attitudes to U.S. activity. “All Forces” responses dominate in the category “not favorable/

dissatisfied.”

Figure 49

Model Crisis Outcome H4e: Attitude/Satisfaction Mix

Category FaV&Sat Fav&Mix/Diss Not Fav&Sat Not Fav&Mix/Diss

ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 6.422*** 0.835 4.987** bl

USN-USMC 1.545 1.309 1.236 bl

USN ONLY 1.829 2.088* 2.833 bl

NO NAVY 3.365** 1.622* 3.612** bl

ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.130*** 0.800 0.156***

USN-USMC bl 0.800 0.800 0.647

USN ONLY bl 1.500 1.500 0.529

NO NAVY bl 0.482 1.074 0.297**

ALL FORCES 0.297** 0.617* 0.277** bl

USN&OTHER FORCES 1.909 0.515 1.380 bl

USN-USMC 0.459 0.803 0.342 bl

USN ONLY 0.561 1.287 0.784 bl

NO NAVY rf rf rf bl

ALL FORCES bl 2.075 0.913 3.365**

USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.270*** 0.723 0.524

USN-USMC bl 1.747 0.745 2.177

USN ONLY bl 2.293 1.397 1.781

NO NAVY bl rf rf rf

N = 473 Sig. Model = 0.001 Pseudo-R2 = 0.075 

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 

Compared to “All Forces” responses, the categories “USN & Other Forces” and “No 

Navy” are positively correlated with “favorable/satisfied” (particularly the former), with 

“not favorable/dissatisfied” as baseline. However, both categories are also positively 

related to “not favorable/satisfied.” While the odds ratio for “USN & Other Forces” is 

stronger for “favorable/satisfied,” the opposite is true for no naval involvement. “USN 

only” significantly correlates only with “favorable/dissatisfied.” All four response categories suggest a negative correlation with “not favorable/dissatisfied,” but not all meet 

the significance requirements. Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All 

Forces” responses are mostly associated with “unfavorable/dissatisfied.” Seaborne forces 

fail to achieve any significant results, although “USN only” suggests a positive correlation with “favorable/dissatisfied,” while the combination with the Air Force remains 

correlated with “favorable/satisfied.”

The relatively high B values for “All Forces” and “dissatisfied” actors that are both 

“favorable” and “unfavorable” to U.S. activity may be influenced by the decisiveness of “All Forces” responses. This increases the likelihood of a definite outcome, 

leaving at least one crisis actor dissatisfied. Another explanation is that crisis actors 

may be grateful for the strong U.S. commitment and yet dissatisfied with the overall 

outcome. The results do not confirm positive attitudes to solely American maritimeforce responses. Somewhat more expected was the finding that when actors seem to 

be favorable to U.S. seaborne-only activity, they are less satisfied with the outcomes, 

supporting the assumption of lower decisiveness. The low R2

 suggests that many other 

factors influence the attitude and satisfaction. Overall, the regression analysis revealed 

mixed results.

Case Study 4d: Various Actors with Different Attitudes. The Western Somalia Liberation Front invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In 

October, the Somalis came close to victory, having secured most of the Ogaden territory, 

but the USSR reacted by providing weapons and military advisers, and by transporting 

Cuban troops from Angola to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, 

defeating the Somali army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat 

from the Ogaden territory was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, 

ending the crisis. The USN became involved only in February 1978, when following 

the collapse of the Somali army in Ogaden the Kitty Hawk battle group was ordered 

to a holding point north of Singapore in case it should be needed for American citizen 

evacuation and to conduct surveillance operations. The ship was released on 23 March 

1978. In this crisis, both actors were dissatisfied with the crisis outcome; Somalia was 

favorable to U.S. involvement, but Ethiopia was not. The United States provided military 
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aid to Somalia but no troops. This suggests that the military aid to Somalia rather than 

the naval involvement might have been seen as unfavorable.

While the first two hypotheses could be confirmed, no results were generated by the 

regression analysis controlling for tension, and mixed results were found for the variable 

“satisfaction.”

Table 5-2

Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome Confirmed

Hypothesis 4b: Agreement Confirmed

Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions No results

Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction Mixed results

Part II Conclusion: U.S. Involvement

The section of the models featuring the various U.S. variables lends some support to 

claims of critics of the lack of decisiveness of naval forces. However, while seaborne 

forces alone are less important for the crisis abatement, they also correlate less with 

escalation of crises compared to “All Forces” responses. Consequently, the influence 

that “All Forces” reactions exert on the crisis comes at a high price and might worsen the 

situation rather than help bring it to an end. Thus the dispatch of “All Forces” carries 

the risk of strong, unpredictable reactions, whereas seaborne forces overall exert a more 

moderate influence.

The findings also support critics by showing that responses by naval forces alone 

often correlate with crises where the U.S. activity had no influence on the situation. 

The greater intrusiveness associated with ground forces poses a grave threat and thus 

escalates the situation but brings the strength needed to enforce compliance. This supports Robert Pape’s finding that threats of force and demonstrative uses of force are less 

effective than the use of significant amounts of force in coercion.17 Analysis of termination tempo shows that while seaborne forces alone do not seem to contribute to the pace 

of abatement, these results improve when a distinction between “USN only” and the 

“USN-USMC Team” is made. The latter exercises a positive influence on the speed of 

crisis termination—indeed, stronger than a combined “seaborne-airborne” response, 

albeit still weaker than “All Forces.” But does a fast abatement always imply a better or 

more advantageous crisis outcome? It is possible that “All Forces” contribute to the pace 

of abatement at the cost of long-term stability. This suggests that a positive value for this 

variable is not intrinsically desirable and that the relationships are more complex.
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Another analysis focused on the most effective American activity in the crisis. Seaborne forces are frequently deployed when the most effective U.S. activity takes the 

form of semi-military operations. Overall, seaborne forces are more likely correlated 

with all successful U.S. activity levels below the directly military. This supports the 

suggested advantages of subtlety and flexibility. Yet the finding that seaborne forces 

are also more likely to be involved when the American response is “ineffective,” rather 

than when “low-level activity” is successful, was not anticipated. This result would 

argue against the successful backing-up of diplomatic or other political efforts in 

low-level responses by seaborne forces. When only the “form of U.S. involvement” 

is analyzed—that is, without controlling for the “most effective form of involvement”—seaborne forces are mostly deployed in semi-military and low-level operations, 

although in the former only marginally more often than “USN & Other Forces.” “All 

Forces” responses correlate highly with direct military operations. As expected, seaborne forces are more likely to deploy in crises where the United States acts as a third 

party and is not involved as a direct crisis actor. The last finding can again be interpreted in the context of realist considerations in decision making. When the United 

States is directly involved, the crisis is more likely to concern national interests and is 

thus of greater importance to the nation.

The unsatisfactory measurement of response times posed a major problem for statistical analyses. The data set did not allow a distinction between the reaction times of the 

different services, for it provided only single dates for the beginning of responses. It 

would be valuable to examine the effects (if any) of different response times, because 

readiness, speed, and independence are great naval advantages. There are significant 

differences between the military services in regard to immediate reaction capabilities. 

Often, such as in Lebanon in 1958 and in Afghanistan in 2001, both forward-deployed 

and surged maritime forces are the first to be ready for deployment and arrive at the 

theater. Similarly, the coding of the naval personnel variables is also suboptimal. The 

numbers control only generally for all active USN personnel outside the United States,

without taking into account the number of personnel deployed within reaction radius of 

the crisis or from which AOR they were dispatched. Controlling for these different factors might produce insight. The present results suggest that operations below a “direct 

military level” involving the “USN-USMC Team” have faster reaction times. This finding confirms my expectation, since ground troops require the longest preparation time 

before they arrive in the theater. As for the number of USN personnel abroad, positive 

relationships were found with the total number of USN-USMC responses per year and 

the number of deployed aircraft carriers.

Overall, the qualified decisiveness of naval forces was confirmed. Whereas the dispatch 

of “All Forces” is important for the crisis abatement, it also correlates highly with the 
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category “escalation.” This cannot be ignored, for it bears on the ineffectiveness of 

seaborne forces alone. Additionally it would be helpful to see a cost-benefit analysis of 

maritime operations. The USN offers subtleness and rapid response capabilities but 

often does not exert decisive influence. Nevertheless, seaborne forces are of great importance in semi-military operations when ground troops are less useful and thus offer a 

promising alternative tool for crisis engagement below direct military activity.

Part II Conclusion: Crisis Outcomes

In terms of crisis outcomes, seaborne forces correlate positively with ambiguous yet formal outcomes. Termination in “stalemate” is most frequent in crises where the United 

States sent naval forces only, while “victory” and, to a greater extent, “defeat” are associated with “All Forces” responses. “All Forces” also correlate highest with “imposed” 

outcomes, while naval forces are dispatched alone in crises terminating with “formal 

agreements” or “unilateral acts.” One possible explanation is that naval forces are often 

unable to prevent unilateral acts but in successful interventions can shape and promote 

formal agreements. The Navy’s function of backing up diplomacy with limited intrusiveness, signaling U.S. interest and shaping developments, would support its advantage 

in supporting formal agreements. “All Forces” are strong enough to impose outcomes 

or to help the U.S. ally win the crisis. Thus the definite crisis outcomes (victory/defeat) 

are imposed by the scale of force applied (all forces). This in turn can affect the other 

outcome criteria, “satisfaction” and “tension.”

The results for the effects on tension are more ambiguous. Because the overall model 

fit is poor, the results merely suggest that when “USN only” responses are treated as a 

separate category, “USN-USMC” correlates with a reduction of tension, even more than 

“no naval involvement,” whereas the other service combinations are positively correlated 

with an increase in tension. Nevertheless, the direction of the “eyeball” correlations is 

interesting and deserves further inquiry. The assumption that excessive use of force 

can result in escalation is supported by these results, as well as by the earlier analysis 

measuring the American effectiveness. “USN-USMC” forces are a powerful combination but not as threatening as “All Forces” and thus can influence escalation positively, 

whereas the USN alone might not provide a sufficient incentive to change behavior. 

Conversely, naval forces may serve as a prelude to stronger U.S. action, thereby feeding 

fear of escalation. In the event of “All Forces” responses, the actor-level results do not 

support my hypothesis that at least for the U.S. allies, tensions might ease. Where only 

one of several actors is supportive of U.S. intervention, the level of tension may not be 

diminished appreciably.

Outcomes leaving all actors satisfied are most frequent where seaborne forces were 

dispatched in combination with the Air Force, followed by responses with no naval 
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forces. Conversely, “all forces” and “USN-USMC” responses were least likely in crises 

where all crisis actors considered the outcomes satisfactory. The correlation between 

“seaborne-airborne” responses and “actor’s satisfaction” remains strong, regardless 

of the perception of the U.S. involvement. One possible explanation could be that the 

force combination was helpful in promoting a satisfactory outcome for all, but only the 

U.S. ally was satisfied with the American involvement. The direction of this variable 

may also be more dependent on the type of the crisis. Contrary to my expectation, 

naval forces alone were not viewed as significantly more favorable by the crisis actors. 

The mere frequencies suggest that USN forces alone were most often deployed in crises 

characterized by a favorable attitude to U.S. involvement yet dissatisfaction with the 

outcome. However, more robust statistical analyses show that the significance is very 

weak. One possible explanation is the weakness of misperception. Naval signaling 

could be interpreted as a prelude to a stronger American response, a development either 

hoped for or feared. Additionally, in some cases the U.S. ally may have been hoping for 

a more powerful response than was provided by naval forces. “All Forces” responses 

generated the highest correlation with unfavorable attitudes toward U.S. involvement. 

On one hand, this is surprising, since the parties favored by U.S. intervention should 

be more satisfied with a stronger commitment. On the other hand, the finding that not 

all parties were satisfied with the outcome was to have been expected, since the variable 

does not distinguish between allies of the United States and non-allies. This can further 

be influenced by the number of actors. With a large number of crisis actors, the scope 

for individual dissatisfaction is greater. Current data do not allow me to explore this 

distinction.

Importantly, the strength of the response should not be measured only by the type of 

service deployed. Blechman and Kaplan already distinguished between the type and 

the level of force.18 A possible measurement for the level of force within naval responses 

is the dispatch of aircraft carriers. A survey study conducted by Zakheim et al. found 

that there seems to be a general consensus among senior opinion leaders that only 

a U.S. carrier presence will be effective during a major crisis.19 In smaller incidents, 

the opinions differed. While some still preferred carriers, others were more cautious 

and favored displays of smaller naval-strength combinations. This question about the 

optimal type of force is crucial for a variety of reasons. Generally it is important to 

distinguish between the different force levels involved in naval interventions, independent of the service combinations. Blechman and Kaplan analyzed successful outcomes 

from the vantage point of the United States but found negative correlations with higher 

force levels.

Treating definite outcomes as more successful, this analysis reveals different findings. The system-level-data evidence shows that responses without aircraft carrier 
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involvement are more likely to lead to ambiguous outcomes, whereas the stronger the 

CV force, the more likely a definite outcome becomes. Likewise, the absence of CVs (or 

the use of only one) is positively correlated with a formal agreement, whereas more than 

one CV strongly increases the chances of an imposed agreement. Assuming that the 

United States imposes its will on the crisis actors, the Blechman/Kaplan finding can be 

confirmed. Responses without any aircraft carriers concurred most frequently with the 

variable value “all actors satisfied,” whereas there was no “eyeball” correlation for the 

variable “tensions.” The presence of aircraft carriers also indicates the magnitude of the 

crisis, but one should also distinguish between the different force levels within naval 

and other military interventions. Blechman and Kaplan also found a positive influence 

of the commitment of land troops.20 The current data partially confirm this, with the 

strong correlation of all-forces responses and contribution to the pace of abatement, 

followed by USN-USMC deployments. While this does not directly control for success, 

the termination of a crisis can in itself be considered a success, independent of the type 

of outcome.

The dependent variables are influenced by many additional intervening factors—for example, whether tension is more likely to escalate in crises characterized by high levels of 

violence or high-politics issues, or whether the satisfaction is influenced by the type of 

crisis. However, accounting for all these considerations would result in an overly complex model, and the resulting outputs would be very difficult to interpret. For instance, 

in crises where the actors were satisfied with U.S. involvement but dissatisfied with the 

outcome, it is important not only to distinguish between the different service combinations but also to control for the issue of the crisis or the form of the outcome. This would 

include the influence of the type of mission and the question of what constitutes a positive outcome. A combat operation is likely to be perceived more negatively by the crisis 

actors than a NEO mission. In this context, it would be helpful to evaluate the views of 

beneficiaries of the missions. The data suggest that in NEO and contingent positioning 

missions, the U.S. crisis involvement is more likely to be perceived as favorable or neutral, whereas its involvement in combat operations is rated unfavorably. Shows of force 

generate nearly equal results.

Further research would also have to control for the number of crisis actors, since this 

will influence the correlation between attitude and mission. Currently, the same mission type is coded for all involved actors. Noteworthy is the high frequency of more than 

one naval mission within a single crisis. This can be interpreted as a confirmation of the 

naval ability to be flexible. For instance, in a single crisis seaborne forces can immediately react with a show of force, followed by combat operations if necessary, and in the 

aftermath operate in a contingent positioning mission to observe the implementation 

of an agreement, cease-fire, or peace plan. While these are general crisis outcomes, it 
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would also be important to distinguish between what the United States sought to deter 

and whether it succeeded. These goals can be very different from overall crisis characteristics. A comprehensive analysis of positive/negative outcomes should include the 

question of the perspective. Who perceives the outcome as satisfactory? Is a positive 

outcome representative of a peaceful settlement of the crisis terminating in a formal 

agreement, or does it refer to the perception of a crisis actor or of the United States? A

positive outcome for the United States might just as well be an imposed agreement as a 

formal one, independent of such other considerations as the duration of the resolution 

or the disposition of the majority of the crisis actors.

Notes

1. For a detailed description of all variables 

please refer to appendix B, sec. B1. If not 

mentioned otherwise, all variables are adapted 

from the ICB data set.

2. Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S.Forces’ Responses to Situations.

3. On the basis of the actor-level data, a further 

distinction is made distinguishing between 

semi/covert and low-level activity.

4. While Siegel (in To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises) coded the involvement of an aircraft carrier, I was not able to 

identify which one was deployed.

5. Astor, Presidents at War, p. 50; Hippler, 

Nation-Building.

6. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in 

International Crises, pp. 7–8.

7. Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “India-U.S. Naval 

Exercises Bearing Fruit,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 132, no. 7 (2006).

8. For Coronado, J. B. Finkelstein, “Naval and 

Maritime Events, July 1974–December 1974,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 101 (May 

1975).

9. Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management, “ICB Data Collections.”

10. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, p. 363.

11. For a detailed description of all variables, 

refer to appendix B, sec. B1. If not mentioned 

otherwise, all variables are adapted from the 

ICB data set.

12. Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait 

Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the 

Use of Force,” International Security 25, no. 2 

(2000), pp. 87–123. Scarlett, “Coercive Naval 

Diplomacy,” mentions only the deployments 

of the following March.

13. Gouré, “Tyranny of Forward Presence”; Ross, 

“1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation”; Ross, 

“Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, 

Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002), 

pp. 48–85.

14. Mark Evans, Dictionary of American Naval 

Fighting Ships, s.v. “USS Forrestal,” www

.history.navy.mil/.

15. Christopher Wright, “U.S. Naval Operations 

in 1983,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 

(May 1984).

16. Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations, p. 7; Edward Marolda, 

The U.S. Navy in the Cold War Era, 1945–1991

(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 

2000); Waltraud Queiser Morales, “US Intervention and the New World Order: Lessons 

from Cold War and Post–Cold War Cases,” 

Third World Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1994), pp. 

80–81.

17. Cited in Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, “The 

U.S. and Coercive Diplomacy,” in The Use 

of Force: Military Power and International 

Politics, 7th ed., ed. Robert Art and Kenneth 

Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 

2009), pp. 273–74.

18. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

19. Zakheim et al., Political and Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence.

20. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.
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Conclusion

In this study I have sought to weave together different ideas on the usefulness of naval 

forces for U.S. crisis management. I created a new data set, measuring the activities of 

seaborne forces in American responses to international crises, by adding new variables 

to an already existing, well established crisis data project.1

 By means of combining 

different methodological and theoretical approaches, I have tried to shed light on the 

overarching question: “What is the role of U.S. naval forces in crisis response?” There is 

no short and direct answer. Drawing on various theories and assumptions I found that 

maritime forces are a promising response tool for certain types of crises, yet there is no 

unambiguous response to the question posed above. I broke the research down into 

four categories and have used statistical analyses and historical examples to underline 

my findings.

The more specific research questions posed in the introductory chapter were concerned, 

first, with the types of crises and locations to which U.S. naval forces mostly respond 

alone. Seaborne forces deploy in crises characterized by territorial threats and threats 

of low gravity generally and when clearly defined military-security issues are at stake. 

Their involvement is not correlated with crises characterized by low-salience issues. Seaborne deployments in crises with high levels of violence seem just as frequent as higherforce levels. There is no particular location that triggers seaborne deployments, but if 

the crisis location is of great geostrategic interest, naval forces will deploy not alone but 

rather together with ground troops. The research questions regarding the crisis actors 

were concerned with the influence of different actors’ characteristics and how they 

perceived the seaborne crisis response. The presence of fewer crisis actors and little or 

no UN involvement is more likely to favor “seaborne only responses,” while the stability 

of the actors does not seem to promote particular types of military response. No results 

were found to answer the question in regard to the perception of the naval involvement. 

The third set of questions looked at the type of U.S. activity, the deployment with other 

military services, and the effectiveness of seaborne responses. All American response 

activity levels below direct military favor “seaborne only deployments.”

In general, the USN often deploys with the Marine Corps or the Air Force. If the U.S. 

Army is involved, usually most other services participate as well. All results differed 

depending on whether the baseline was set to “All Forces” or to “no Navy” responses. 

When “All Forces” activities were chosen as baseline, “USN-USMC” responses and no 

naval involvement often compared similarly. When “no Navy” was defined as baseline, 
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the results changed to indicate the military character and highlight the adaptability 

of naval forces. In all cases expect for one, “USN & Other Forces” stands for seaborne 

force(s) and “USAF” and was therefore treated as combination with the Air Force.

Navy–Marine Corps–Air Force joint forces proved to represent a highly valuable crisisresponse tool. The question regarding the effectiveness of “seaborne only responses” is 

difficult to answer. While seaborne forces were overall less effective if deployed alone, 

they also show the lowest correlation with an escalation of tension of all military service 

combinations. Thus while seaborne-only responses exert a lower influence, this should 

not be translated as ineffectiveness. The last of the categories, the crisis outcome, was 

concerned with the influence of U.S. naval forces on outcomes. Naval forces correlated 

positively with crises ending with ambiguous outcomes, but also formal agreements, 

suggesting subtle influence that can support diplomatic efforts but not decisively terminate crises. To provide a more detailed overview, figure 50 presents all the hypotheses 

and results after the regression analyses.

Figure 50

Hypotheses Results Overview

Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat Mixed results

Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake Not confirmed

Hypothesis 1c: Violence Mixed results

Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest Confirmed

Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors Confirmed 

Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement Confirmed

Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability Mixed results

Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity No results

Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement Confirmed

Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness Confirmed

Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity Confirmed

Hypothesis 3d: Termination Confirmed

Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor Confirmed

Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness Not confirmed

Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome Confirmed

Hypothesis 4b: Agreement Confirmed

Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions No results

Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction Mixed results
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Both advantages and disadvantages of naval deployments were confirmed. Many findings point to the benefits of naval forces as flexible, subtle, and ready forces. Seaborne

forces, and to some extent the Air Force, have the capability to arrive in the theater 

quickly and respond rapidly but also to stand by, in a wait-and-see posture. They are the 

military response tool of choice in low-level and semi-military U.S. activities. Ground 

forces require much longer transition times and are therefore better suited for longerlasting crises and they signal a stronger American commitment. The findings that 

greater geostrategic interests, more crisis actors, and direct involvement trigger stronger 

responses can be explained with a realist approach. More idealist goals, such as a right 

intention, in the form of promoting a formal agreement, appear to be more likely to be 

supported by maritime forces. The results supporting realist considerations are stronger, 

and it remains to be seen if the idealist tendency can be confirmed in future studies.

Lack of decisiveness should not be overstated; it is not crucial that naval forces be as 

decisive as ground forces. It is more important to implement unique naval capabilities. 

The qualities of naval forces lie in other tasks and advantages that set them apart from 

others and allow different response activities. Fast reaction, limited intrusiveness, and 

the ability to wait and see are great advantages but are not necessarily suitable for all crises types and settings. For example, if the United States wants to speed up the abatement 

decisively, “All Forces” responses are necessary, but when a stronger emphasis is placed 

on minimizing the chances of escalation caused by U.S. activity, the “USN-USMC team” 

presents the better response tool. Similarly, if the United States wants to impose an 

outcome, ground troops are necessary, whereas support for reaching a formal agreement is better undertaken by USN forces alone. Conflict resolution is a central challenge 

of defense management, and many different tools are at the government’s disposal to 

pursue its goals. If the United States wants to intervene successfully in crises, it is crucial 

to study how the characteristics of crises and actors influence naval involvement and 

how, in turn, naval involvement impacts outcomes. American decision makers should 

carefully consider the differences of the service combinations in making their crisis 

response choices. It is thus necessary to analyze the force combinations in more depth, 

further distinguishing between military interventions to improve conflict resolution 

strategies.

This exploratory study presents a variety of promising and interesting results and identifies areas of interest for future research. Why are naval forces not more successful in 

low-level U.S. activities, through supporting political crisis-resolution efforts? Why are 

naval forces predominant in crises focusing on single military-security issues and territorial threats? Why is there no correlation with low-gravity-of-threat crises? How can 

the influence of naval forces on outcomes be interpreted? Why is naval involvement not 

viewed more favorably by crisis actors? Examination of the psychological effects of naval 
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forces on an adversary and how they are perceived would provide more useful information on the questions of subtlety, intrusiveness, and effectiveness. All of this prompts 

the question of how sailors view themselves, as well as their role and function in conflict 

settings. Naval roles change over time and have to adapt to current threats and challenges. For example, the vulnerability of U.S. ships, especially of aircraft carriers to the 

enhanced technological resources of potential adversaries, may lead to changes in the 

American approach to crisis resolution. Yet this research suggests the importance of the 

dispatch of at least one aircraft carrier for decisive intervention. Many results, such as of 

hypotheses controlling for outcomes, point to the benefits of sending an aircraft carrier 

to underline intentions and enhance coercion power. More research is required to analyze when, how, and what type of ship to deploy to achieve the desired outcome.

In the remainder of this conclusion I will discuss the shortcomings of this analysis, 

followed by suggestions for additional data for future research. I will then take a closer 

look at the diplomatic role of naval forces and try to derive lessons from my analyses of 

the role of seaborne forces in crisis response as they pertain to current debates of 

sea power.

Shortcomings

Many of the shortcomings were already mentioned in the discussion of the results, but 

the following paragraphs identify and discuss additional problems.

Small Number of Cases and Generalization

One of the biggest shortcomings is the small number of cases. For further research it 

would be of great interest to expand the latest CNA data set in order to enlarge the number of cases and to extend them beyond international crises. The CNA studies identified 

more naval responses to international incidents than captured in this project. Following the definition of the ICB data project meant that many incidents were excluded. 

But already the definition applied here renders comparisons difficult. The question of 

when responses cross from peacetime to wartime is difficult to answer. By application 

of Siegel’s 1995 definition of a threshold of one thousand casualties, incidents as diverse 

as the Gulf War in 1990, the Six-Day War in 1967, an international crisis in Yemen in 

1979, and minor skirmishes in Latin America in 1959 and 1960 are compared.2

 By the 

addition of more cases, the different types of crises could be better grouped and distinguished. While the current work captures responses only within the time frame of the 

crisis, the inclusion of cases of nonroutine naval involvement before a crisis breaks out 

would allow one to draw more inferences about deterrence capabilities and potentially 

influential reactions taking place in anticipation of the crisis.
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The importance of understanding events before the occurrence of a crisis is illustrated 

by the case of “Liberia–Sierra Leone.” The ICB codes a crisis lasting from 23 March to 

31 October 1991. However, Navy, Marine, and Army elements were engaged in a NEO

in Liberia from April 1990 until January 1991, before the crisis outbreak. Additionally, the NEO took place in Liberia, while the ICB crisis mainly focuses on the crisis in 

Sierra Leone, as a result of the long-lasting civil war in Liberia. It is further important to 

distinguish between different deployments within crises. Often, naval forces respond in 

more than one mission to a crisis, and at other times “USN forces only” either are present before other services join the operations or remain after they depart. For example, 

before and after the Suez nationalization war in 1956–57, the United States sent naval 

patrol forces with Marines on board to the area. During the peak of the crisis, the U.S. 

response was augmented by the Air Force. Since it was always the largest force level that 

was coded, this dispatch of maritime forces only before the peak was not captured in 

the data for statistical analysis. The distinctions between independent naval operations 

would allow us to judge better their respective influence on the crisis and their functions within the U.S. military services. 

The treatment of crises occurring within a larger conflict or even war presents an additional problem. I tried to focus on naval responses to the specific crisis and not on the 

conflict at large, but alternative approaches might be as valid. In a future study, the cases 

where U.S. military, but not naval, forces were dispatched should be included, to control 

for possible differences. The Gorenburg et al. CNA report identifies 167 cases with and 

142 without naval involvement, exclusive of HA/DR operations.3

 It would be rewarding to analyze the type of incidents involving military services exclusive of the naval 

component.

Furthermore, all available CNA data could be enhanced by adding variables including 

controlling for the crisis characteristics, American involvement, actors, and outcomes. 

The inclusion of U.S. intentions and success could also produce useful findings. However, the CNA data only focus on military responses to situations, thereby excluding 

all U.S. involvements short of deploying military services. It would be worthwhile to 

expand the research to include U.S. response to international incidents short of military 

activities. A larger sample would also allow finer distinctions between the maritime 

forces. The type of mission and the type and level of force, whether power was projected 

ashore, how closely the vessels approached the adversary, and the principal naval and 

Marine activities—all these could collectively shed more light on the influence and 

responses of naval forces. There is a fundamental difference between whether Marines 

were just present and whether they landed, and if so, whether in conjunction with a 

NEO or in combat.
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The currently low number of “USN only” cases allows for a limited number of hypotheses differentiating between USN and USN-USMC forces. As shown, this differentiation can produce insight on the variables “geographic location,” “UN involvement,” 

“U.S. contribution to pace of abatement,” “ambiguous outcome,” and “tension.” A larger

number of cases would enable the inclusion of a factor controlling for the level of force 

within the USN activity. Analyses providing results on the influence of the type and 

strength of different ships for successful outcomes could also prove helpful in the current debate about the necessary number and types of ships. Simple frequency distributions have suggested that the force level does play an important role. Overall, it would be 

very helpful if there were a more standardized process to capture “naval data” within the 

Department of the Navy. The lack of consistent and uniform documentation renders the 

data collection very challenging and comparisons difficult.

All these shortcomings present me with the very problem I criticized in other data 

sets—generalization, particularly the generalization of “military interventions.” While 

this project contributes to the understanding of the different functions and capabilities 

of the armed services, thus differentiating between different forms of military interventions, it entailed compromises and generalizations.

Simple Regression Models

Because a wide variety of different variables was included, the analysis is composed of 

many different individual models and is not structured to test different theoretical approaches against each other in one comprehensive model. While its approach provides 

a broad overview of how naval forces are deployed in international crises, it limits depth 

of analysis. The reliance on largely individual models, given their inability to control for 

interactive effects, supports simple correlations with a measurement of association of 

strength to describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 

The stepwise regression models lowered both the Exp(B) values and the number of 

significant results. This is not surprising, since the independent variables intercorrelate 

with unpredictable effects on the dependent variable.

Moreover, it also suggests that certain variables are not as influential as assumed from 

the simple regression outputs. Future models have to determine which factors remain 

important when they are no longer treated separately. As always, the independent variable is just one factor impacting the dependent variable; there are many other influences on both the dependent and independent variables. This is especially true for 

simple models including one independent variable and thus outputting only a low R2

value. This suggests a low strength of association, because many other relevant factors 

impacting the dependent variable are not accounted for. With more data at hand, future 

research should strive to generate more complex models, controlling for interaction 
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effects. Nevertheless, the presentation of frequencies and simple regression analyses 

were sufficient for the purpose of this projects, since a stated goal was to generate a new 

data set, thereby preparing the groundwork for future projects, and to determine which 

factors deserve inquiry in greater depth.

The Maritime Century: The Way Ahead

I will end by focusing on the diplomatic functions of the USN and the usefulness of the 

sea-air team. I believe these results can offer valuable insight when placed in the larger 

context of the role of seaborne forces in the twenty-first century, which many analysts 

have termed the “maritime century,” because of the influence sea power exercises on 

international events.4

As Admiral Roughead said, “Our Navy is very different than the 

larger U.S. navies of the past. And while our Navy is very different, and much smaller, 

we are also facing a new emerging order that I believe requires more naval power.”5

First I will briefly discuss the promising combination of seaborne forces and the U.S. 

Air Force.

AirSea Battle

Since its publication by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in May 

2010, the AirSea Battle concept has garnered significant attention. I do not mean to 

attempt to evaluate the concept but rather to apply my findings to the usefulness of the 

sea-air team. The AirSea Battle concept “rests fundamentally on the tight integration of 

Air Force and Navy operations in the WPTO [Western Pacific Theater of Operations]—

each Service plays a key enabling role for the other in accomplishing critical missions.”6

Many of the results of this study strongly underline the effectiveness of the combination 

of sea and airborne forces. Signaling and coercion power can be enhanced, while much 

of the present flexibility and readiness can be maintained. The influence exerted is similar to a deployment of ground troops and the deterrent effect is significant, but the level 

of commitment is lower and less intrusive. For example, in crises involving multiple 

issues and when governmental instability is high, the combination with the Air Force 

has been the response tool of choice, suggesting its usefulness in complex situations. 

Yet unlike the deployment of ground troops, sea-air forces are more likely deployed in 

U.S. activities below direct military involvements, supporting the arguments of lower 

intrusiveness and greater flexibility.

Additionally, the sea-air team is also viewed as more favorable by the actors and shows a 

high “eyeball” correlation with crises where U.S. activity is important for the abatement; 

only one case coincided with activity responsible for an escalation of the situation. Of 

course, these findings do not directly influence the desired antiaccess and area-denial 

capabilities, but as Jose Carreno and his coauthors say, “The salient question is, to what 
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extent did and does cooperation either make U.S. forces more efficient or create real 

synergy? . . . [I]t is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able then and is 

capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. [The concept] must integrate some unique set 

of capabilities from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither service 

can accomplish individually.”7

 The many positive results of a combination with the Air 

Force found in this study are particularly promising and can help to begin identifying 

situations where a combination of forces is most useful.8

A more careful analysis of these 

dynamics can improve effectiveness, enhance synergies, and inform the implementation 

of AirSea Battle.

Naval Diplomacy

Three results in particular—the frequency of the use of naval forces short of direct military activities, the correlation with low or no UN involvement, and the impact on crisis 

outcomes—underlined the diplomatic potential of naval forces. The Global Strategic 

Assessment of 2009 came to the following conclusion: “The character of war is changing. 

Low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration, whether to interdict traffickers or conduct humanitarian operations, are becoming more necessary.”9

 To support 

diplomatic initiatives—especially in low-level activities—with military strength is an 

important task for naval forces. The results of this study distinguish the Navy from the 

other services, especially short of direct military involvement; still, the statistics are not 

as supportive as I had expected. Seaborne forces alone dominate lower-level U.S. deployments, but the overall number of responses was rather small, and the effectiveness of 

the activity not what would be hoped for. Although the previous paragraph points to 

the effectiveness of a sea-air combination, naval forces acting alone do possess critical 

advantages that make them particularly suited for diplomatic tasks.

The study also provides very encouraging results supporting the importance of naval 

forces with respect to their diplomatic potential and their subtleness. The strong and 

positive relation between no or low-level UN involvement and “USN only” responses 

highlights the diplomatic rather than the offensive military role of naval forces. Furthermore, the positive correlation between formal agreements and naval forces suggests a 

subtle positive influence on the solution-finding process and the form of outcome. Over 

the years there has been a clear decline in operations carried out by maritime forces 

alone, as the United States seems to place emphasis on deploying forces jointly. This 

development has been observed in many other studies since the end of the 1980s.10 The 

data confirm that after 1985, joint operations dominate American crisis response, the 

change coinciding with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

While joint operations have proved themselves, this very success undermines the 

Navy’s ability to exploit its diplomatic potential to the fullest. Since 1990 only four of 
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the international crises featured a maritime response only. In 1994, during the second 

North Korean nuclear crisis, naval vessels were displayed in a show of force, and again 

during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 the United States deployed two aircraft carriers in a show of force. The presence of naval forces, it is said, played an important role in 

both cases. In the former they contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations.11 During the latter, the naval deployments were a successful coercive diplomacy 

effort to guarantee stability during the Taiwanese elections by deterring the Chinese.12

The two other crises involving the USN-USMC team came in the form of two NEOs: in 

1998 in the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis (although the mission was ultimately canceled) and 

Lebanon in 2006.

Naval diplomacy also has a crucial preventive role before crisis breaks out, an important 

aspect not captured in this analysis. Because every crisis is treated in the data as one 

unit, I have not accounted for the different responses within one crisis, such as changing 

missions or different levels of coercive diplomacy, or for the timing of the deployment 

of other military services. For example, the data do not distinguish between “sticks” 

employed after “carrots” have failed to solve the crisis and the two used simultaneously. 

During the Bosnia crisis, for instance, the United States remained reluctant to approve 

air strikes, but naval forces arrived in the theater in the very early stages. Because the 

response is coded at the highest service-combination level, the Bosnia case does not 

account for USN involvement only. Especially in the beginning, the naval involvement 

was largely meant to establish a blockade, which it successfully did. Analysis in greater 

depth of the timing could provide more insight into these dynamics and report such 

effective outcomes as this.

But most importantly, naval diplomacy is a central task for the USN on a daily basis and 

is not restricted to crisis response. Port visits and joint exercises also serve diplomatic 

functions, and the United States has employed its naval forces to coerce and deter on 

many occasions during routine deployments. The recent U.S. attempt to highlight the 

role of soft power inevitably portends an increased emphasis on diplomacy. As the 

QDR states,

As a global power, the United States has a broad range of tools for advancing its national interests 

described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplomacy, economic development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas and values. When 

absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies have shown the willingness and ability to resort 

to force in defense of our interests and the common good.13

With the steadily increasing criticality of the Indo-Pacific commons, the use of naval diplomacy will become even more important. This strategy is not confined to the United 

States; many nations have turned to their naval forces to demonstrate interest and 

intention. The results in this study suggest that naval forces as a diplomatic tool in crises 
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are underutilized and that the Navy would have much to offer. This observation is also 

supported by a 2009 Naval Institute Proceedings article calling for the reintroduction of 

naval diplomacy, described as one of the most valuable national resources.14 The 2007 

maritime strategy emphasizes soft power and low-level USN activities. In contrast, as 

Pritchett points out, no special chapter is devoted to naval diplomacy in the NOP 2010.15

He urges that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief be integrated as part of, and 

within, the broader frame of naval diplomacy. HA and DR were excluded in the present 

analysis, but they offer promising ways of exercising soft power and thus diplomatic 

influence. Polls revealed that disaster relief delivered in response to the Indian Ocean 

tsunami in 2004–2005 or the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 resulted in a more positive 

attitude toward the United States.16 Humanitarian assistance missions can improve the 

image of the United States, especially through the annual deployments of Operations 

Continuing Promise and Pacific Partnership. Yet it is crucial to understand 

better the impact and the actual benefits of HA and DR, as well as the forms of naval 

diplomacy captured in this study, to U.S. interests.

This study presents some preliminary findings, but it will be necessary to find better 

measures of the influence that naval diplomacy exerts, especially in a time of “low-level 

uses of force and greater civil-military integration.”17 Cable concludes that “gunboat diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular screw. It is not a hammer that will 

bang home any old nail.”18 This statement explains the importance of understanding 

possibilities and limitations of the impact and success of naval diplomacy. Naval forces 

alone will not decisively impose outcomes in large-scale international crises, as the 

results have confirmed. If doing so is the U.S. goal, other means should be chosen. The 

tasks assigned the USN should be more specific and limited, such as to deter a certain 

move by one of the actors or to support political efforts. Thus, before any conclusions 

are drawn in regard to the limited decisiveness of naval forces in this context, one has to 

take such considerations into account. Depending on the crisis and American objectives, naval forces alone may or may not be sufficient. Luttwak finds that the influence 

of naval diplomacy is largely determined by the reaction of others, rather than by the 

intentions of the employing actor.19

This could prove interesting in the context of the increasing tensions with China in the 

western Pacific. J. J. Widen summarizes Luttwak’s thought process as follows: “A latent

and unintended application of naval diplomacy—routine fleet movements—could be 

more effective and considered more threatening than an active and planned threat using naval forces, which could sometimes be completely ignored.”20 This aspect of naval 

diplomacy—in light of the continuous U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific commons—is 

of the highest interest, and understanding this dynamic can provide useful guidance. 

Luttwak offers more lessons that remain relevant today, especially in regard to the 
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discussion of the number of ships and their types, and above all the need for aircraft 

carriers. For naval diplomacy, he argued, it is often more important to be visible than 

to be viable for combat. He had in mind the Soviet Union, which built ships not only 

for combat but also to impress other actors. While one particular ship might not offer 

decisive combat power, it can still serve as a symbol for the might of the country, with 

backup readily available. “The dominating framework of armed suasion is thus the 

domestic, international and local political context, which in combination will determine 

the absolute feasibility, and degree of success, of its exercise.”21

Such ideas should inform forward presence, exercises, port visits, and other such considerations, as these lessons can be applied to today’s geopolitical situation, especially in 

the Indo-Pacific. Again, it depends on the type of influence the United States wishes to 

exert. For influencing outcomes decisively, this study suggests the importance of more 

powerful forces, including aircraft carriers. This might not be necessary for lower-level, 

diplomatic missions.

Overall, it is important to collect more data to confirm the usefulness of naval forces 

in low-level activities. The practicalities of measurement are very challenging, but this 

study provides a first step that can be built on in the future to evaluate how to employ 

naval diplomacy effectively and when this tool is appropriate. In 2009 Michael Quigley 

wrote, “A wide range of naval options—from sending a small escort ship sailing within 

sight from a foreign port to parking an entire carrier group off the coast—can provide a 

multitude of diplomatic options. Gunboat diplomacy can prevent or even resolve international crisis situations.”22 In the current debates regarding the future of the U.S. Navy, 

such considerations should be given more weight, especially in this maritime century.

Notes

1. Center for International Development and 

Conflict Management, “ICB Data Collections.”

2. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in 

International Crises.

3. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record.

4. Patrick Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 

2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing 

World (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

Univ. Press for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009).

5. Gary Roughead, remarks delivered at Current 

Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, 

R.I., 8 June 2010, available at www.navy.mil/.

6. Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept (Washington, 

D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 2010).

7. Jose Carreno et al., “What’s New about the 

AirSea Battle Concept?,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings 136, no. 8 (2010), pp. 52–59.

8. Also in regard to possible threats to sea 

control, a combination of the U.S. Navy and 

Air Force assets can prove helpful. John 

Bosone (“Airpower and the Establishment of 

Sea Control in an Anti-access Environment” 

[course paper, Naval War College, Newport, 

R.I., 2008], available at www.dtic.mil/) argues 

that land-based airpower can effectively help 
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to maintain sea control in an antiaccess 

environment.

9. Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 2009, p. 

472.

10. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, For the 

Record.

11. Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations.

12. Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation”; Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait.”

13. U.S. Defense Dept., Quadrennial Defense Report (Washington, D.C.: 2010), p. 10, available 

at www.defense.gov/.

14. Chuck Nygaard, “Reengaging the Navy, at 

Home and Abroad,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135, no. 4 (2009), pp. 58–62.

15. Raymond Pritchett, “Naval Diplomacy, 

Strategic Communication, and the NOC,” 

Information Dissemination Blog, 26 May 2010, 

www.informationdissemination.net/.

16.“Humanitarian Assistance Key to Favorable 

Public Opinion in World’s Three Most 

Populous Muslim Countries: Results from 

New Polls of Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan,” Terror Free Tomorrow, 2006, www 

.terrorfreetomorrow.org/.

17. Cronin, Global Strategic Assessment 2009, p. 

472.

18. James Cable, “Gunboat Diplomacy’s Future,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 

1986), p. 39.

19. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power.

20. Widen, “Naval Diplomacy.”

21. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, p. 54.

22. Michael J. Quigley, “Ships of State,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 135, no. 7 (July 2009), 

p. 58.
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About the Author

Larissa Forster is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Ford School of Public Policy, University 

of Michigan, and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at ARTIS Research and Risk Modeling. From October 2010 to August 2011 she was a Visiting Research Scholar, Strategic 

Research Department, at the Naval War College. She has also been Visiting Research

Scholar in the Department of International Relations at Boston University (August 

2009–August 2010) and the Department of Government and International Relations at 

Clark University (May 2008–August 2009). She earned a master’s degree in 2007 and 

defended her dissertation at the University of Zurich in 2010. She is the author or coauthor of a number of articles and reviews. A book, entitled A Global Force for Good: The 

U.S. Navy’s Role in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, with Professor Albert 

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meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:yy-NP_39 About author.indd January 17, 2013 4:33 PM
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THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

A

IBUS M RI VICTORIA
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

1

Appendix A: Crises Summaries 

A.1. Crisis Listing 

# ICB Crisis # Start Year Name Crisis Actors

1. 110 1946 Communism in Poland USSR

2. 111 1946 Turkish Straits Turkey, US

3. 112 1946 Greek Civil War Greece

4. 113 1947 Communism in Hungary Hungary, USSR

5. 114 1947 Truman Doctrine Greece, Turkey, US

6. 115 1947 Marshall Plan Czechoslovakia, Russia

7. 116 1947 Indonesia Independence II Netherlands, Indonesia

8. 120 1947 Palestine Partition/Israel Independence Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

9. 121 1948 Communism in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, USSR

10. 123 1948 Berlin Blockade France, UK, US, USSR

11. 125 1948 China Civil War China, US

12. 126 1948 Costa Rica-Nicaragua I Costa Rica

13. 127 1948 Indonesia Independence Iii Indonesia, Netherlands

14. 128 1948 Sinai Incursion Egypt, Israel, UK

15. 131 1949 Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia Yugoslavia

16. 132 1950 Korean War I China, South Korea, Taiwan, US

17. 133 1950 Korean War II North Korea, People's Republic of China, South 

Korea, US, USSR

18. 134 1951 Hula Drainage Greece, Italy

19. 135 1951 Punjab War Scare I India, Pakistan

20. 136 1951 Suez Canal Egypt, UK

21. 137 1952 Catalina Affair Sweden

22. 138 1953 Burma Infiltration Burma

23. 139 1953 Invasion of Laos I France, Laos

24. 140 1953 Korean War III China, North Korea, South Korea; US

25. 141 1953 East German Uprising Russia

26. 142 1953 Trieste II Italy, Yugoslavia

27. 143 1953 Qibya Jordan

28. 144 1953 Guatemala Guatemala, Honduras

29. 145 1954 Dien Bien Phu France, UK, US

30. 146 1954 Taiwan Strait I China, Taiwan, US

31. 147 1955 Costa Rica-Nicaragua II Costa Rica, Nicaragua

32. 148 1955 Baghdad Pact Egypt

33. 149 1956 Gaza Raid-Czechoslovakia Arms Egypt, Israel

34. 152 1956 Suez Nationalization-War Egypt, France, Israel, UK, US, USSR

35. 153 1956 Qalailya Israel, Jordan 

36. 154 1956 Poland Liberalization Poland, USSR

37. 155 1956 Hungarian Uprising Hungary, USSR

38. 156 1957 Mocoron Incident Honduras, Nicaragua

39. 157 1957 Jordan Regime Jordan

40. 158 1957 France-Tunisia Tunisia

41. 159 1957 Syria-Turkey Confrontation Syria, Turkey, US

42. 160 1957 IFNI Spain

43. 161 1957 West Irian I Netherlands

44. 164 1958 Abortive Coup Indonesia Indonesia

45. 165 1958 Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval Jordan, Lebanon, UK, US

46. 166 1958 Taiwan Strait II People's Republic of China, Taiwan, US

47. 168 1958 Berlin Deadline France, German Democratic Republic, German 

Federal Republic, UK, US, USSR

48. 170 1959 Central America-Cuba I Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama

49. 171 1959 China-India Border I China, India

50. 172 1959 Shatt-Al-Arab I Iran, Iraq

51. 175 1960 Failed Assassination-Venezuela Dominican Republic, Venezuela

52. 176 1960 Congo I-Katanga Belgium, Congo

53. 178 1960 Central America-Cuba II Guatemala, Nicaragua
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

2

54. 180 1961 Pathet Lao Offensive Thailand, US

55. 181 1961 Bay of Pigs Cuba, US

56. 182 1961 Pushtunistan III Afghanistan, Pakistan

57. 185 1961 Berlin Wall DDR, France, UK, US, USSR, West Germany

58. 186 1961 Vietcong Attack South Vietnam, US

59. 187 1961 West Iraian II Indonesia, Netherlands

60. 190 1961 Goa II Portugal

61. 192 1962 Taiwan Strait III China

62. 193 1962 Nam Tha Thailand, US

63. 194 1962 China-India Border II China, India

64. 195 1962 Yemen War I Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

65. 196 1962 Cuban Missiles Cuba, Soviet Union, US

66. 197 1963 Malysia Federation Indonesia, Malaysia

67. 198 1963 Dominican Republic-Haiti II Dominican Republic, Haiti

68. 200 1963 Cuba-Venezuela Venezuela

69. 202 1963 Cyprus I Cyprus, Greece, Turkey

70. 203 1963 Jordan Waters Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

71. 206 1964 Panama Flag Panama, US

72. 208 1964 Ogaden I Ethiopia, Somalia

73. 210 1964 Gulf of Tonkin North Vietnam, US

74. 211 1964 Congo II Belgium, Congo, US, USSR

75. 212 1964 Yemen War III Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

76. 213 1965 Pleiku South Vietnam, North Vietnam, US

77. 214 1965 Rann of Kutch India, Pakistan

78. 215 1965 Dominican Intervention US

79. 216 1965 Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation India, Pakistan

80. 218 1965 Rhodesia's Udi Zambia

81. 219 1966 Yemen War IV Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

82. 220 1966 El Samu Israel, Jordan

83. 221 1967 Che Guevara-Bolivia Bolivia

84. 222 1967 Six Day War Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, US, USSR

85. 223 1967 Cyprus III Cyprus, Greece, Turkey

86. 224 1968 Pueblo South Korea, North Korea, US

87. 225 1968 TET Offensive South Vietnam, US

88. 226 1968 Karameh Israel, Jordan

89. 227 1968 Prague Spring Offensive Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic 

Republic, Hungary, Poland, USSR

90. 228 1968 Essequibo I Guyana

91. 229 1968 Beirut Airport Lebanon

92. 230 1969 Vietnam Spring Offensive South Vietnam, US

93. 231 1969 Ussuri River China, USSR

94. 232 1969 War of Attrition Egypt, Israel, USSR

95. 233 1969 EC-121 Spy Plane US

96. 235 1969 Football War El Salvador, Honduras

97. 236 1969 Cairo Agreement-PLO Lebanon

98. 237 1970 Invasion of Cambodia Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US

99. 238 1970 Black September Israel, Jordan, Syria, US

100. 239 1970 Cienfuegos Submarine Base US

101. 240 1970 Conakry Raid Guinea

102. 241 1971 Invasion of Laos II Laos, North Vietnam

103. 242 1971 Bangladesh Bangladesh, India, Pakistan

104. 246 1972 Vietnam Port Mining North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US

105. 249 1972 Christmas Bombing North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US

106. 254 1973 Cod War I Iceland, UK

107. 255 1973 October-Yom Kippur War Egypt, Israel, Soviet Union, Syria, US

108. 256 1973 Oman- South Yemen Oman

109. 257 1974 Cyprus III Cyprus, Greece, Turkey

110. 258 1974 Final North Vietnam Offensive Cambodia, US

111. 259 1975 Mayaguez Cambodia, US

112. 260 1975 War in Angola Angola, Cuba, South Africa, Soviet Union, US, 

Zaire, Zambia

113. 261 1975 Moroccan March Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Spain

114. 263 1975 Cod War Iceland, UK

115. 265 1976 Lebanon Civil War Syria

116. 267 1976 Operation Thrasher Mozambique, Zimbabwe
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

3

117. 272 1976 Aegean Sea I Greece, Turkey

118. 273 1976 Nagomia Raid Mozambique

119. 274 1976 Poplar Tree North Korea, US

120. 275 1976 Syria Mobilization Israel

121. 277 1977 Shaba I Angola, Congo

122. 278 1977 Mapai Seizure Mozambique

123. 279 1977 Belize II Iceland, UK

124. 281 1977 Egypt-Libya Clashes Egypt, Libya

125. 282 1977 Ogaden II Ethiopia, Somalia

126. 283 1977 Rhodesia Raid Zambia

127. 286 1977 Chimoio-Tembue Raids Mozambique

128. 287 1977 Beagle Channel I Argentina, Chile

129. 289 1978 Litani Operation Lebanon

130. 291 1978 Cassinga Incident Angola, South Africa

131. 292 1978 Shaba II Angola, Belgium, France, US, Zaire

132. 293 1978 Air Rhodesia Incident Zimbabwe, Zambia

133. 294 1978 Nicaragua Civil War II Costa Rica, Nicaragua

134. 295 1978 Beagle Channel II Argentina, Chile

135. 296 1978 Fall of Amin Libya, Tanzania, Uganda

136. 298 1978 Sino-Vietnam War China, North Vietnam

137. 301 1979 North-South Yemen II North Yemen, South Yemen

138. 303 1979 Afghanistan Invasion Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, US

139. 306 1979 Soviet Threat Pakistan Pakistan

140. 307 1979 Rhodesia Settlement Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe

141. 309 1979 US Hostages in Iran Iran, US

142. 310 1979 Colombia-Nicaragua Colombia, Nicaragua

143. 311 1980 Raid on Gafsa Libya, Tunisia

144. 315 1980 Solidarity Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, 

Poland, USSR

145. 317 1980 Onset Iran- Iraq War Iran, Iraq

146. 319 1980 Jordan- Syria Confrontation Jordan

147. 321 1981 Chad-Libya V France, Libya

148. 322 1981 Ecuador-Peru Border III Ecuador, Peru

149. 324 1981 Iraq Nuclear Reactor Iraq, Israel

150. 327 1981 Al-Biby Missiles I Israel, Syria

151. 329 1981 Coup Attempt in the Gambia Senegal

152. 330 1981 Gulf of Syrte I Libya

153. 331 1981 Operation Protea Angola

154. 332 1981 Galtat Zemmouri I Morocco

155. 335 1982 Khorramsahr Iraq

156. 336 1982 Falkland/Malvinas Argentina, UK

157. 337 1982 War in Lebanon Israel, Lebanon, Syria

158. 338 1982 Ogaden III Ethiopia, Somalia

159. 339 1982 Lesotho Raid Lesotho

160. 340 1983 Libya Threat to Sudan Egypt, Libya, Sudan

161. 342 1983 Chad- Libya VI Chad, France, Libya

162. 343 1983 Invasion of Grenada Grenada, US

163. 344 1983 Able Archer Russia

164. 347 1983 Operation Askari Angola

165. 348 1984 Basra- Kharg Island Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

166. 350 1984 Omdurman Bombing Egypt, Libya, Sudan

167. 351 1984 Vietnam Incursion into Thailand Thailand

168. 352 1984 Sino-Vietnam Clashes China, North Vietnam

169. 354 1984 Nicaragua MIG-21S Nicaragua, US

170. 355 1985 Botswana Raid Botswana

171. 356 1985 Expulsion of Tunisians Tunisia

172. 357 1985 Al-Biqa Missiles II Israel, Syria

173. 358 1985 Egypt Air Hijacking Egypt, Libya

174. 360 1985 South Africa Raid on Lesotho Lesotho

175. 361 1986 Capture of Al-Faw Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia

176. 362 1986 Chad- Libya VII Chad, France, Libya

177. 363 1986 Gulf of Syrte II Libya, USA

178. 365 1986 South Africa Cross Border Raid Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe

179. 369 1986 Contras II Honduras, Nicaragua

180. 370 1986 Chad-Libya VIII Chad, Libya
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

4

181. 373 1987 Todghere incident Somalia

182. 376 1987 Aegean Sea III Greece, Turkey

183. 379 1987 Mecca Pilgrimage Iran, Saudi Arabia

184. 380 1987 South Africa Intervention in Angola Angola, South Africa

185. 383 1988 Contras III Honduras, Nicaragua

186. 385 1988 Iraq Recapture of Al-Faw Iran, Iraq

187. 386 1988 Libyan Jets Libya, US

188. 388 1989 Cambodia Peace Conference Cambodia, North Vietnam

189. 391 1989 Invasion of Panama Panama, US

190. 392 1990 Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation India, Pakistan

191. 393 1990 Gulf War Bahrain,Egypt,France,Iraq,Israel,Kuwait,Oman,Qat

ar,Saudi Arabia,Syria,UAE,UK,US

192. 394 1990 Rwanda-Uganda Rwanda

193. 395 1991 Liberia-Sierra Leone Sierra Leone

194. 397 1991 Yugoslavia I: Croatia-Slovenia Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia

195. 398 1991 Bubiyan Kuwait

196. 399 1991 Foreign Intervention in Zaire Belgium, Congo, France

197. 400 1991 Ecuador-Peru Border IV Ecuador, Peru

198. 401 1991 Nagorny-Karabakh Armenia, Azerbaijan

199. 403 1992 Yugoslavia II: Bosnia Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia

200. 406 1992 Iraq No-Fly Zone Iraq

201. 408 1993 North Korean Nuclear North Korea, South Korea, US

202. 409 1993 Operation Accountability Israel, Lebanon

203. 411 1994 Haiti Military Regime Haiti, US

204. 412 1994 Iraq Droop Deployment- Kuwait Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, US

205. 413 1995 Ecuador-Peru V Ecuador, Peru

206. 415 1995 Taiwan Strait IV China, Taiwan

207. 416 1995 Red Sea Islands Eritrea, Yemen

208. 417 1996 Aegean Sea IV Greece, Turkey

209. 418 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath Israel, Lebanon

210. 419 1996 Desert Strike Iraq, US

211. 420 1996 North Korean Submarine North Korea

212. 421 1996 Zaire Civil War Rwanda, Zaire

213. 422 1997 UNSCOM I Iraq, US

214. 423 1998 Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis Cyprus, Turkey

215. 424 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea Eritrea, Ethiopia

216. 425 1998 Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Tests India, Pakistan

217. 426 1998 DRC Civil War Angola, Chad, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, 

Zimbabwe

218. 427 1998 US Embassy Bombings Afghanistan, Sudan, US

219. 428 1998 Syria-Turkey Syria

220. 429 1998 UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox Iraq, UK, US

221. 430 1999 Kosovo Albania,Belgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Net

herlands,Portugal,Spain,UK,US,Yugoslavia 

(Serbia)

222. 431 1999 Kashmir IV Kargil India, Pakistan

223. 432 1999 East Timor II Australia, Indonesia

224. 433 2001 Caspian Sea Azerbaijan

225. 434 2001 Afghanistan- USA Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK, US

226. 436 2001 Indian Parliament Attack India, Pakistan

227. 437 2002 Kaluchak India, Pakistan

228. 438 2002 Parsley Island Spain, Morocco

229. 439 2002 Pankisi Gorge Russia, Georgia

230. 440 2002 Iraq Regime Change Iraq, UK, USA

231. 441 2002 North Korea Nuclear II USA, North Korea

232. 442 2003 Iran Nuclear I France, Germany, UK, Iran

233. 443 2003 Haifa Suicide Bombing Israel, Syria

234. 444 2004 DRC - Rwanda Congo, Rwanda

235. 445 2004 South Ossetia - Abkhazia Georgia, Russia

236. 446 2005 Ethiopia – Eritrea II Ethiopia, Eritrea

237. 448 2006 Iran Nuclear II France, USA, UK, Iran

238. 449 2006 Chad-Sudan II Chad, Sudan

239. 450 2006 North Korean Nuclear III USA, North Korea

240. 451 2006 Israel Lebanon War II Israel, Lebanon

241. 452 2006 Ethiopia Invasion Somalia Ethiopia
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

5

A.2. International Crises with USN Involvement 

The following appendix A.2 summarizes the crises in which the U.S. Navy was involved. It is 

not meant to be a comprehensive account of the international crises as such is already provided 

by the ICB. All cases are structured in the same order. For each crisis, a short summary of the 

ICB crisis description, including additional information about the USN involvement is provided. 

Information was collected from USN ship histories and available materials at the operational 

archives, such as command histories and reports by the CNO. Any additional sources are 

referenced. The reference Proceedings refers to the United States Naval Institutes Proceedings 

May issue (since 1970) published in the year following the crisis. Because of the enormous 

differences in the amount of information available for the cases, the crises descriptions vary 

greatly in length and detail. Each case includes the ICB crisis number and the codings from all 

applicable datasets: ICB, CNA I (Siegel), CNA II (Mahoney) and CNA III (Cobble, Gaffney, 

and Goreburg) for the variables name, start and end date and form of U.S. involvement. 96 cases 

are described, including Afghanistan, Iraq and the three cases where naval involvement could not 

be confirmed sufficiently to qualify for the statistical analyses. 

1. # 111 Turkish Straits; 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81 

The Turkish straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and 

demonstrated U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling 

against communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet 

activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out between 

Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before the outbreak, an 

important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) 

departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador 

to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board which Japan had surrendered at the end of 

the war (Blechmand and Kaplan 1978, 1); sending it was a clear demonstration of American 

support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting 

Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to Greece. Missouri demonstrated 

the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force and Army. The vessel could be sent to 

the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly 

be converted into a military use of force. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

6

The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the Soviet Union 

sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the Soviets increased their 

naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United States expanded its own naval 

activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) entered the Mediterranean 

on 8 August. The presence of the world’s largest aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the 

American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to 

signal concern about in-creased Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not 

visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist Soviet 

expansion. The deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the 

mainland through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. The 

advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. 

The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment yet stay out of the way if no direct 

action was necessary. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a 

direct involvement on the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and 

anxiety. At the same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. 

ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted 

mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded 

after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable 

environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval forces. Although the 

Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval buildup, the permanent U.S. 

presence—announced in September 1946—was important to conveying a message of immediate 

readiness should any country need support against communist influence. Another purpose of the 

deployment was to show support for the government in Greece in its battle against the 

Communists (see case #112). 

(The CNA I study combines Turkey and Greece as one crisis: Siegel describes increased naval 

activity in the Mediterranean) 

Additional Sources: Alvarez 1974; Baer 1994, 282 – 283, Cane 1975; Sheehy 1983 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Turkish Straits 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81 3

CNA I Turkey/Greece 8/16/1946, 148 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

7

2. # 112 Greek Civil War; 11/13/1946 – 2/28/1947, 108 

Greek guerillas and the Greek government were embroiled in an ongoing conflict. On 13 

November 1946 the guerillas, supported by the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, launched a 

serious attack on Greece culminating in a crisis. The Greek army responded with military 

operations on 18 November. In addition, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council, and in 

January 1947 the UNSC authorized a fact-finding mission. The mission confirmed infiltrations 

across Greece's borders. On the day the U.S. government encouraged Greece to draft a request of 

aid from the United States, the crisis is said to have ended. The request led President Truman to 

seek Congressional approval for economic and military assistance (see Case #114). Although the 

immediate crisis ended, the conflict continued over the next two years. 

During this crisis U.S. naval forces were still in the Mediterranean because of their deployment 

in the Turkish Strait crisis. The USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (CV 42) visit prior to the 

outbreak of this crisis was part of the demonstration of U.S. support for the Greek government. 

The Mediterranean deployment lasted until early 1947. 

Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Sheehy 1983 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Greek Civil War 11/13/1946–2/28/1947, 108 2

CNA I Turkey/Greece 8/16/1946, 148 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp

3. # 114 Truman Doctrine; 2/21/1947 – 5/22/1947, 91 

On 21 February 1946 the government of the United Kingdom declared that it was no longer 

capable of supporting Greece and Turkey. This announcement triggered a crisis for Greece, 

Turkey and the United States. Turkey and Greece both turned to the U.S. for help. The United 

States was now faced with a difficult decision: a refusal to provide aid to the two countries 

would signal lack of interest in Eastern Europe and encourage Soviet hegemony. Truman 

decided to become engaged. The U.S. would grant Greece and Turkey economic and military aid 

in their struggle against the Communists, ending the crisis for all three actors. With the support 

of Congress the Truman doctrine had been born. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

8

In the spring of 1947 a US naval squadron, consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Leyte (CV 32)

and the cruisers USS Providence (CL 82) and USS Dayton (CL 105) and six destroyers visited 

Piraeus, Suda Bay (Crete), and Istanbul during a cruise to a number of Mediterranean ports. 

During this period of time the Congress was still debating the request for aid. The squadron 

entered Greek waters in April and visited Istanbul in early May. U.S. ships would stay in the 

region for months to come. 

(CNA I: Two of CNA I’s responses cover this crisis period: the Greek Civil War and Security of 

Turkey. Both were part of the Leyte tour in Spring 1947) 

Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Keesing’s, Sheehy 1983 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Truman Doctrine 2/21/1947-5/22/1947, 91 2

CNA I Greece Civil War 4/16/1947, 412 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp

CNA I Security of Turkey 5/2/1947, 386 USN 1 CV & Amp

4. # 120 Palestine Partition / Israel Independence; 11/29/1947 – 7/20/1949, 589 

Ever since the partition of Palestine in November 1947 into two states, tensions had been high in 

the region. The UN General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, calling for the partition 

of Palestine into two independent states, one Arab, the other predominantly Jewish, triggered a 

crisis for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For those five Arab nations this loss of Arab 

territory posed a serious threat. When Israel proclaimed the State of Israel in May 1948 the 

precarious situation escalated and they reacted with an invasion on 15 May 1948. The United 

Nations were heavily involved, trying to broker an agreement between the warring parties. 

Already in early January 1948, the Sixth Fleet began patrol operations in the Eastern 

Mediterranean in response to the deteriorating situation in Palestine. On 18 June a Marine Force 

was detached from the USS Kearsarge (CV 33). One day later on 19 June the United States sent 

the three destroyers, USS Putnam (DD 757), USS Henley (DD 762) and USS Owen (DD 776) to 

patrol the Palestinian coast to secure the implementation of the truce conditions, previously 

agreed on. No ground troops were dispatched to enforce the ceasefire. The destroyers were 

deployed to back-up the UN mediator in attempting to maintain peace between Arab and Israeli 

forces. When the truce temporarily broke down, the USS Putnam evacuated the UN team from 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

9

the port in Haifa on 23 July. She was thus the first U.S. Navy ship to fly the UN flag. The crisis 

had different outcomes and ended at different times for each crisis actor, for some with defeat, 

and for some with agreements, although not long-lasting. The ICB end date marked the signing 

of the last peace agreement between Israel and Syria. 

Additional Sources: Hahn 2005

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Palestine 

Partition/Israel 

Independence

11/29/1947–7/20/1949, 589 2

CNA I Arab-Israel War 1/5/1948, 466 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp

5. # 123 Berlin Blockade; 6/24/1948 – 5/12/1949, 323 

The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was one of the first major escalations between the United States 

and the Soviet Union. After World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, 

French, and Soviet zones. The announcement by the three Western governments that they 

planned to integrate their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a 

Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East 

Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called 

Operation VITTLES, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft. 

The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North Atlantic in 

reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. 

From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of the Air Force. But only in 

late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in order to meet the demand, did the 

U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western 

powers extended over several months until the Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under 

the condition that the United States, United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions 

against East Germany. The last day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left 

Germany split into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 

Republic. 

Additional Sources: United States Navy 1998 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

10

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Berlin Blockade 6/24/1948–5/12/1949, 323 4

CNA I Security of Berlin 4/26/1948, 401 USN, USMC, 

USAF, 

USARMY

1 CV & Amp

6. # 125 China Civil War; 9/23/1948 – 12/8/1949, 4421

On 23 September 1948 the Chinese Communists inflicted a major defeat on the Nationalists, an 

event which triggered a crisis within the United States who feared for their loss of influence over 

China. By fall 1948 the northeast of China had fallen into Communist hands and in the following 

month the Communist forces took control over the Chinese mainland. The Nationalists fled to 

Taiwan. When in late October 1948 the United States decided not to provide the Nationalists 

with military aid, the crisis ended for them. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese Communists 

announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PCR), followed by the proclamation 

by the Nationalists of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan on 8 December 1949. This action 

implied an unofficial acceptance of the PCR and ended the crisis. The subsequent Taiwan crises 

are a direct consequence of these events (#146, #166, and #192). 

U.S. Marines were the first U.S. forces to arrive in the theater. As early as 1945 several thousand 

Marines were dispatched to Vietnam. During the entire Civil War, Marines supported the 

Nationalists with different force levels (Buhite 1978) and since 1946, USN forces maneuvered in 

the waters around China. In early November 1948, the U.S. cruisers Helena (CA 75) and St. Paul 

(CA 73) reached the port of Shanghai. USS Helena arrived from Californian waters where she 

had held training sessions. Throughout the summer and fall of 1948, she operated in the Yellow, 

East China, and South China Seas, before returning to Long Beach in December 1948. On 25 

April 1949 the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that the American cruiser St. Paul and Manchester

would proceed to Chinese waters from Pearl Harbor. According to CNA I, the cruiser USS 

Belfast (PF 35) was ordered from Shanghai to Hong Kong and the cruiser USS Jamaica2 to the 

Far East from Bermuda. Multiple carriers operated in and around Chinese waters at different 

times. It was not possible to obtain exact information about the number and names of the 

 

1

 This crisis coding is a little problematic since it was not possible to definitely determine the U.S. military activity 

during the ICB crisis period. However the U.S. involvement during the entire Civil War suggests a positive coding. 

2

 ship history says Jamaica was sold 1946 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

11

involved carriers. For example the aircraft carrier USS Antietam (CV 36) arrived in Chinese 

waters on 2 September 1945 and remained in the Far East for more than three years. The Yellow 

Sea constituted her primary theater of operations while her air group provided support for the 

Allied occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Surveillance operations were part of 

the mission’s tasks. During the assignment the CV did leave the theater for short visits to Japan, 

the Philippines, Okinawa, and the Marianas. Early in 1949, USS Antietam concluded her mission 

in the Orient and headed back to the United States for deactivation. 

Additional Sources: Buhite 1978; Keesing’s 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB China Civil War 9/23/1948 –

12/8/1949, 442

2

CNA I China Civil War April 46, 1038 USN, USMC, USAF, 

USARMY

? CV & Amp

7. # 131 Soviet Bloc – Yugoslavia; 8/19/1949 – 11/99/1951, 89 

Tensions in the Balkans rose with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform3 in the 

summer of 1948. The crisis was triggered by a Soviet ultimatum. Yugoslavia feared USSR 

intervention and reacted with a military build-up. In March 1951, Tito filed a complaint with the 

UN that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were mobilizing troops along 

Yugoslavia's border. The UN in turn acknowledged Yugoslavia’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution 

of the dispute. The United States supported Yugoslavia with economic aid and in mid-March, a 

reinforced Marine Corps battalion arrived in the area. Later in March the relief force for the 

Sixth Fleet arrived about 6 weeks ahead of schedule due to the tense situation in Yugoslavia. The 

aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV 43) arrived in the Mediterranean on 20 March 1951. At the 

end of May, the Fleet was augmented with another aircraft carrier4

. The crisis faded in 

November 1951. 

 

3

 The abbreviation stands for Information Bureau of the Communists and Worker Parties. It was the first official 

forum of the international communist movement. The intended purpose of Cominform was to coordinate actions 

between Communist parties under Soviet direction. 

4

 After the end of the crisis - according to the ICB - the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Tito was welcomed aboard the 

Coral Sea for a one-day cruise. This visit in September 1952 demonstrated the U.S. support of Yugoslavia.
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

12

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Soviet Bloc–Yugoslavia 8/19/1949–11/99/1951, 89 2

CNA I Security of Yugoslavia 3/15/1951, 869 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp

8. #132 Korean War I; 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950 

On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, serving as the border between 

North and South Korea since the end of World War II, triggering a crisis for both South Korea 

and the United States. Two days later the President of the United States announced military 

support for the South and ordered the Seventh Fleet to install a blockade in the Taiwan Strait in 

reaction to the tense situation. This action triggered a crisis for the two Chinas. While the crisis 

between the PRC and the U.S. faded in July 1950, USN forces were sent to the Taiwan Straits 

on multiple occasions during the Korean War to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the 

Nationalists and prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan. According to Siegel aircraft from the USS 

Valley Forge (CV 45) flew over Taipei early in the war und in April 1951 a task force (TF 77) 

was sent to the Taiwan Straits. While this episode does not mark the first Taiwan Straits crisis it 

is a prelude to the events of later coming years. Only the naval reaction to the Formosa Straits is 

included in the analysis. All other reactions to the Korean War are excluded.

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Korean War 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950 4

CNA I Korean War, 

Formosa Straits

6/27/1950, 951 USN 1 CV & NO 

Amp

9. # 144 Guatemala; 12/12/1953 – 6/29/1954, 200 

When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment “liberation” 

movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the day the Soviet arms 

shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission in the Gulf of Honduras to 

protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to control shipments to Guatemala. Talks 

between the parties and the United States were not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States 

airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a 

“contingency evacuation” force was deployed. This operation, code-named HARDROCK 

BAKER, was used to implement a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

13

submarines and amphibious ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team. With this aggressive 

configuration of naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, 

underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention. 

On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an 

anticommunist government, the crisis ended. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006: 50; Hippler 1984, Solantamity 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Guatemala 12/12/1953–6/29/1954, 200 3

CNA I Honduras-Guatemala 5/20/54, 14 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp

10. # 145 Dien Bien Phu; 3/13/1954 – 7/21/1954, 131 

In spring 1954, tensions between the French military and the Viet Minh peaked when they 

launched their first major assault on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu (13 March 1954). On 

19 March, USN forces in the region, including the carriers USS Wasp (CV 18) and USS Essex 

(CV 9) were put on alert. Responding to pleas from the French, who were fighting in the 

mountains of Tonkin, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed an aircraft 

carrier task force and supporting units to the South China Sea. On 22 March the carrier task 

group steamed towards the coast of Indochina. At various times the USS Wasp, the USS Essex, 

the USS Boxer (CV 21) (replaced USS Wasp), and the USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) steamed off 

the Indochinese Peninsula prepared to launch their aircraft against Communist forces besieging 

the French base. Awaiting a possible order from Washington to enter the conflict, the USN 

dispatched carrier reconnaissance planes to fly over the area around Dien Bien Phu. The aircraft 

gathered intelligence on Viet Minh troop movements and logistic buildup. The Seventh Fleet 

recommended Operation VULTURE to rescue the French forces, but President Eisenhower 

decided against unilateral action and the idea was rejected. When Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May 

and a formal cease-fire began, the crisis ended for the U.S. Two months later, the signing of a 

final declaration ended the crisis for all actors. 

Additional Sources: Marolda 1994, Solantamity 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

14

ICB Dien Bien Phu 3/13/1954–7/21/1954, 131 2

CNA I Dien Bien Phu 3/13/1954, 90 USN 2 CV & NO Amp

11. # 146 Taiwan Strait I; 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266 

In the summer of 1954, tensions increased over the Tachen islands in the Formosa Straits. The 

crisis centered on the Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen island groups, held by Chiang Kai-shek’s 

Nationalists. The Chinese Communists planned to overwhelm the Chinese Nationalists, 

beginning with a bombardment of Quemoy Island, followed by an invasion of Taiwan. On 12 

September the U.S. decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the area with the orders to protect 

Taiwan against any attacks from the Chinese mainland. Since the United States did consider the 

Tachen Islands vital for the defense of Taiwan, American officials acceded to an evacuation after 

a sudden buildup of Communist Chinese on the island group. Over one week in early February, 

the USN evacuated 15,000 civilians and 11,000 military5

 personnel form the Tachen Islands 

without opposition. 

Multiple USN ships supported the evacuation operation. From November 1954 to June 1955 the 

USS Essex (CV 9) engaged in training exercises for part of the time with the 7th Fleet and 

assisted in the Tachen Islands evacuation. The USS Wasp (CV 18) provided air cover for the 

evacuation mission. While operating with the Seventh Fleet, the carrier USS Kearsarge (CV 33)

was in an alert position to assist in the evacuation of Nationalist Chinese from the Tachen 

Islands. In January of 1955 the USS Yorktown (CV 10) was called upon to help the operation. In 

December 1954, the USS Midway (CV 41) departed Norfolk on a world cruise, which culminated 

in her transfer to the Pacific Fleet and joining of the Seventh Fleet off Taiwan in February 1955. 

Not long after her arrival the carrier participated in the evacuation operation. She remained in the 

area patrolling the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea until June. When Mao realized that the 

United States was placing great military emphasis on the area, he halted the shelling and 

suspended the campaign against Taiwan until all U.S. ships and aircraft had departed. In this 

instance the U.S. military deterrence was successful, the attack was delayed. Although the U.S. 

was determined to support Taiwan, Mao had drawn the conclusion that the United States would 

not interfere in an operation against the Tachen Islands because the Mutual Defense Treaty 

 

5

 Numbers vary from report to report 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

15

between the U.S. and the Republic of China only covered Taiwan and the Pescadores. This 

misinterpretation clearly demonstrates the importance of the opponent’s perception in deterrence 

operations (Siegel 1995, 9). According to the ICB, the crisis for Taiwan ended with the 

fortification of Quemoy and Matsu, supported by the United States. President Eisenhower 

deemed the survival of the two islands very important and feared their loss to be a first step to 

the loss of Taiwan, and a demoralization for the Nationalists. The crisis between China and the 

United States wound down when during the Bandung Conference on 23 April the Chinese 

Communists announced their willingness to begin negotiations. By then end of the month an 

unofficial cease-fire for the Formosa Straits was in place. 

Additional Source: Baer 1994, Keesing’s, Marolda 2000, Rushkoff 1981, Siegel 1995 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Taiwan Strait I 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266 3

CNA I Tachen Island 2/8/1955, 6 USN, USMC, 

USAF

6 CV’s & Amp

CNA II Tachen Island 2/1955 6 CV’s & Amp

12. # 152 Suez Nationalization War; 7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230 

The international Suez crisis was triggered by the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and 

France. Nasser, the president of Egypt, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as a 

symbol of rising Egyptian influence in the Middle East. Britain and France viewed the 

nationalization of the Suez as a challenge to their authority and as a threat to shipping through 

the canal. Their invasion, following a provocation by Israel was supposedly intended to separate 

these two warring parties. Eisenhower strongly rejected the unilateral actions of his European 

allies. In February 1956 CNA I describes the formation of USN destroyer patrols in the Red Sea 

in reaction to the growing tension in the region. The events around the Suez Nationalization War 

are divided into three different phases and cases: Pre-Suez, Suez War, and Post-Suez. In reaction 

to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the two aircraft carriers USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and USS 

Randolph (CV 15) and an amphibious force group were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean. 

When tensions seemed to cool off in mid-September the force was dispersed. The United States 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

16

was monitoring the situation via U-2 reconnaissance flights out of Turkey in what Kalley (2001) 

calls a preemptive move. Following the Israeli attack in October which triggered the war, major 

portions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including three aircraft carriers were moved to the Eastern 

Mediterranean again. In October 1956 the Sixth Fleet landed Marines at Alexandria and other 

points in the Middle East to protect the evacuation of 2,000 Americans and other foreign 

nationals. After receiving reports that the USSR was funneling ships through the Black Sea to the 

Mediterranean, the CNO ordered a three-carrier task force to sail from the U.S. to the Western 

Pacific and a two-carrier task force to sail to the vicinity of the Azores. Surveillance in the 

eastern Mediterranean was intensified. On 13 December the alert status was lifted. The USS 

Coral Sea evacuated American citizens from the troubled area, and stood by off Egypt until 

November before returning to Norfolk in February 1957. In response to the October 1956 attack, 

the USS Randolph was operating near the Suez Canal. Aircraft aboard Randolph provided air 

cover and surface and air reconnaissance for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Alexandria. 

The carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) (Lake Champlain 

(CVA-39) later replaced USS Franklin D. Roosevelt), and USS Antietam (CV 36) and additional 

ships were involved. The carriers conducted air operations while maintaining readiness to enter 

the Mediterranean should their services be needed. The United States’ naval involvement 

signaled U.S. interest in the region and the resolve to defend victims of aggression. On 5 

November, both Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire and declared their intention to 

withdrawal from the Canal Zone. 12 March 1957 marked the final end of the episode with the 

completion of the Israeli withdrawal. 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Kalley 2001, 34 – 35 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Suez 

Nationalization 

War

7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230 2

CNA I Red Sea Patrols 2/6/1956, 138 USN 0 CV & no Amp

CNA I Pre Suez 8/1956, 69 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp

CNA I Suez War 10/4/1956, 8 USN, USMC, 

USAF

3 CV & Amp

CNA I Post-Suez 11/6/1956, 38 USN, USMC 3 CV & Amp

CNA II Red Sea 2 – 8/ 1955 0 CV & Amp
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

17

13. # 157 Jordan Regime; 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957 

On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to Nasser attempted to 

overthrow King Hussein of Jordan but failed. The King feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement 

in the coup attempt and reacted by laying off the entire leftist cabinet triggering demonstrations 

and riots. The United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and 

deploying units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS 

Lake Champlain (CV 39), and heavy cruisers USS Salem (CA 139) and USS Des Moines (CA 

134) to the Eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off Beirut 

on 20 April to stand ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while 30 ships of the Sixth Fleet 

described as the "most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in the Eastern 

Mediterranean", carried out air defense maneuvers in the open sea. Their task was to ensure that 

the Jordanians maintain their independence and withstand the threat of Communism. “Once 

again” explained VADM Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the 

scene of the fire”. It can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the 

Middle East” (cited in Evans 2007). Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was 

needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a 

state of alert. Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led 

to a normalization of the force status. The departure of the USN on 3 May signaled the end of the 

crisis. 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Hahn 2005, Keesing’s, USS Forestall Ship History (Evans 

2007) 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Jordan Regime 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957 3

CNA I Jordan Unrest 4/25/1957, 9 USN, USMC 2 CVS & Amp

CNA II Jordan 4-5/1957 2 CVS & Amp

14. # 159 Syria-Turkey Confrontation; 8/18/1957 – 19/29/1957, 73 

The election of a pro-Soviet Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces triggered a crisis for 

Turkey and the United States. Turkey held meetings with its nearby neighbors Iraq, Jordan, 

Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and deployed troops along its Syrian borders. The United States, 

worrying that the Soviet Union could significantly expand their influence, emphasized the 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

18

Eisenhower Doctrine again, confirming that the U.S. will render assistance to any country in the 

Middle East if subject to communist threat. The Soviets and Syria accused Turkey several times 

of planning an attack on Syria. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet were moved to the Eastern 

Mediterranean, and aircraft were redeployed from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey - another 

sign of U.S. support. One aircraft carrier involved was the USS Randolph (CV 15)6 which was 

deployed off the Syrian coast and patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis came to an 

end when the Soviet Premier Khrushchev made an appearance at the Turkish Embassy in the 

Soviet Union. The ICB describes the U.S. involvement as mainly political-diplomatic, supported 

by speeches reaffirming commitments to Turkey. However the presence of four aircraft carriers 

suggests a larger U.S. involvement. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Syria – Turkey 

Confrontation

8/18/1957 – 10/29/1957, 73 3

CNA I Syria 8/21/1957, 118 USN, USMC, 

USAF

4 CV’s & Amp

CNA Syria 8-12/1957 4 CV’s & Amp

15. # 164 Abortive Coup Indonesia; 2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958 

Indonesia’s denunciation of foreign influence and the popularity of the Indonesian Communist 

Party had been of concern to the West for some time. The rebel headquarters was located in the 

southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the 

Northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia. The crisis was triggered by the accusation 

that the Indonesian rebels were instruments of the West and the military reaction by President 

Sukarno to defeat the rebels. The U.S. and Britain covertly supported this rebellion in its early 

phase, ideally wanting to see Sukarno overthrown. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet off the 

shore of Indonesia had a marked impact, and the Indonesian government sought to minimize any 

further U.S. involvement. Moreover, the U.S. remained reluctant to become officially involved 

and publicly declared this matter a strictly internal Indonesian affair. Many sources point to U.S. 

support of the rebels before the crisis broke out, but when their defeat seemed imminent, the U.S. 

 

6

 I was not able to identify the names of the other aircraft carriers
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

19

government tried to improve relations with the Indonesian government. Over the next several 

weeks the two states slowly resumed talks and the crisis terminated. In early March the United 

States had deployed USMC forces, one aircraft carrier, two destroyers and one heavy cruiser in 

the proximity of Indonesia. A contingency evacuation force operated north of Sumatra for most 

of this period. According to Brichoux and Gerner (2002) then CNO Admiral Burke sent the 

Chief of Naval Intelligence Admiral Frost to Jakarta where he worked closely with the U.S. 

ambassador and the Indonesian naval chiefs. The official declaration on 20 May stating no U.S. 

involvement in this internal affair triggered the abatement of the crisis. 

Additional Sources: Brichoux & Gerner 2002; 6; Curtis 2004; Fletcher Prouty 1976

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Abortive Coup 

Indonesia

2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958 3

CNA I Indonesia 12/10/57, 174 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp

CNA II Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958 2 CV & Amp

16. # 165: Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval; 5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958 

In May 1958 Lebanon experienced a crisis when riots among political and religious factions 

threatened the government. The President of Lebanon requested U.S. help to control the 

situation. In July 1958 the Iraqi army staged a coup against the Hashemite government in 

Baghdad. While first hesitant, the revolt in Baghdad led President Eisenhower to approve 

Operation BLUE BAT. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army were all involved. 

Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in Beirut, to stabilize the country and to 

protect the American citizens in the country. The deployed U.S. naval forces totaled 70 vessels, 

including the three aircraft carriers USS Saratoga (CV 60), Wasp (CV 18) and Essex (CV 9) (as 

well as heavy cruiser USS Des Moines (CA 134), guided missile heavy cruise Boston (CV 69), 

and 28 destroyers. The entire Sixth Fleet supported the operation especially through the landing 

of the Marines. Their tasks included patrol missions, reconnaissance missions and transportation 

of Marines who needed to be evacuated by carrier aviation. This incident clearly demonstrated 

the Sixth Fleet’s dominance over the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces in the proximity were 

neither capable of challenging U.S. influence in this crisis nor their control over the 

Mediterranean. While the Navy played an important immediate role, U.S. Air Force units and 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

20

U.S. Army units were both unable to react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of 

Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to 

advance from its base in Turkey. 

Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 363; Berkeley University; Hahn 2005, 43; Keesing’s 

Dataset Name Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Iraq-Lebanon 

Upheaval

5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958 4

CNA I Lebanon 5/15/1958, 48 USN, USMC 3 CVS & Amp

CNA I Lebanon July 1958, 93 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

3 CVS & Amp

CNA I Jordan-Iraq 7/17/1958, 138 USN 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA II Lebanon 5/1958 3 CVS & Amp

CNA II Lebanon 6-10/1958 3 CVS & Amp

CNA II Jordan-Iraq 7-12/1958 0 CV & NO Amp

17. # 166: Taiwan Strait II; 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99 

In the second Taiwan crisis the Chinese Communists attacked the islands Quemoy and Matsu by 

air. The United States deployed an impressive naval flotilla in response. The Chinese 

Communists tried to cut the islands off from outside supplies and support. A reinforced Seventh 

Fleet with a total of six aircraft carriers, a Marine Amphibious Ready Group and additional three 

USMC fighter squadrons that had moved from Japan to Taiwan, made up the naval force heading 

toward Chinese waters. China reacted by claiming extension of its territorial water line, 

effectively blocking off any access to Quemoy and Matsu. The New York Times called the USN 

and USAF deployment "the most powerful air-naval fighting force in history” (cited in the USS 

Essex ship history). Aircraft carriers involved included the USS Essex (CV 9), the USS Lexington 

(CV 16), the USS Hancock (CV 19), the USS Yorktown (CV 10) and the USS Bennington (CV 

20). The USS Yorktown and the USS Bennington earned the expeditionary medal for participation 

in an American show of strength in the Taiwan Strait. The carriers escorted Chinese Nationalist 

ships resupplying the islands. The U.S. involvement also included diplomatic efforts to resolve 

the crisis. This clear demonstration of U.S. commitment together with no signs of involvement 

by the Soviet Union led to the abatement of the crisis and no further escalations. 

Additional Sources: Halperin 1966; Marolda 2000 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

21

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Taiwan Strait II 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99 3

CNA I Quemoy Aug 58, 1967 USN, USMC, 

USAF

6 CVS & Amp

CNA II Quemoy 6-12/1958 6 CVS & Amp

18. # 168: Berlin Deadline; 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293 

On 27 November 1958 the Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded in an ultimatum the 

withdrawal of the United States, Great Britain and France from Berlin and a transformation into 

a free, demilitarized city within six month. The Western Powers rejected the ultimatum and 

declared their determination to stay in West Berlin. As a reaction to the ultimatum the U.S. 

began to reinforce its combat and support units in Europe and U.S. transport planes prepared for 

an airlift. U.S. aircraft carriers7

 with nuclear weapons aboard were redeployed to the 

Mediterranean and Marines alerted for a possible deployment to Berlin. For the months May 

through September naval forces worldwide were on general alert. A carrier force deployed to the 

Mediterranean was put on high alert and demonstrated readiness. In 1959 the Soviet Union 

agreed to annul the ultimatum and to meet with the Western powers. Although the talks did not 

result in an agreement they did open the door for further dialogue. Only in early August did the 

powers sign an interim agreement after President Eisenhower paid Khrushchev a visit in 

Moscow on 3 August 1959. When the Soviet returned the visit, a formal agreement was signed 

on 15 September, terminating the crisis for all the participants. The parties had agreed on a ban 

of nuclear weapons and missiles from Berlin and the reduction of local Western military forces. 

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Berlin Deadline 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293 2

CNA I Berlin Crisis May 1959, 145 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CVs & Amp

CNA II Berlin Crisis 5 – 9/ 1959

 

7

 I could not determine which aircraft carriers were dispatched. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

22

19. # 170: Central America – Cuba I; 4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251 

Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rico, and Haiti experienced crises because of invasions by Cuban 

supported rebels. The crisis for the first actor, Panama, was triggered by the landing of a boat 

carrying foreign invaders. A complaint to the OAS led to the supply of arms and the 

authorization of naval and aerial patrols off the Panama coast. The Cuban-backed invaders 

surrendered. With the termination of the patrols the Panama crisis ended. 

On 1 June a small number of Nicaraguan exiles based in Costa Rica marched into Nicaragua. 

Again the OAS conferred and decided on a fact-finding mission. Although Nicaragua did not 

feel threatened by Costa Rica, which declared its neutrality, it accused Castro of being involved 

in supporting the exiles. A brief military action by Nicaraguan forces ended the rebellion and the 

crisis ended. 

After the Nicaraguan crisis, the Dominican Republic experienced a crisis, triggered by a small 

invasion backed by Cuba. The invasion was repelled and the crisis terminated towards the end of 

the year after months of high tensions. 

Haiti was the last country to be invaded during these years of high internal instability. Again the 

invaders suspected of Cuban origin, surrendered. 

The United States sent a small naval surveillance patrol force to Caribbean waters, off the coast 

of Panama, in the early phase of the crisis, to deter further landings. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Central America –

Cuba I

4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251 3

CNA I Panama 4/30/59, 5 USN 0 CVs & NO Amp

CNA I Panama Aug 59, 93 USN 0 CVs & NO Amp

CNA II Panama 3-5/1959

20. # 176: Congo I – Katanga; 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962 

Congo won its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. When on 5 July 1960 Congolese 

soldiers mutinied and assaulted Belgium and European nationals in Congo, Belgium sent 

military forces reinforcements. Congo reacted with appeals to the United States and the UN. U.S. 

help was not forthcoming, although the UN decided to dispatch military forces and called for the 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

23

withdrawal of Belgian troops. In mid-July 1960 the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV 18) with 

Marines aboard was deployed to the Congo in reaction to the civil strife and to support the 

evacuation of Western nationals. For the rest of the year USN ships (the carrier Wasp returned to 

the United States) supported U.N. forces in Congo and provided sealift assistance. In early 

February 1961 two amphibious ships and two destroyers supported the lift of U.N. forces into the 

Congo. But this did not end the internal division raging in the country and the crisis continued. 

Only with the ratification of a cease-fire agreement and the termination of the secession attempts 

of the Katanga province on 15 February 1962 did the crisis terminate. 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Congo I - Katanga 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962 2

CNA I Congo 7/1/60, 124 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

1 CV's & Amp

CNA I Gulf of GuineaCongo2/2/61 USN, USMC 0 CV's & NO amp

CNA II Congo 7-11/1960 1 CV & Amp

CNA II Gulf of 

Guinea/Congo

2-3/1961 0 CV & Amp 

21. # 178: Central America – Cuba II; 11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29 

Trouble in Nicaragua and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. 

naval forces. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by exiles and a revolt 

in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United States deployed naval and air 

surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’ Caribbean coasts and to stand by in 

case of a possible invasion from mid-November until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, 

USS Shangri-La (CV 38) and Wasp (CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the 

naval patrol force. They kept outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels 

heading for the two countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from 

Nicaragua and Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both 

actors. 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

24

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Central America –

Cuba II

11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29 3

CNA I Guatemala 11/14/1960, 272 USN 2 CVs & NO Amp

CNA II GuatemalaNicaragua11-12/1960 2 CVs & NO Amp

22. # 180: Pathet Laos Offensive; 3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69 

Fighting between Pathet Laos and Laotian government troops lead to a retreat of the latter, 

threatening the accession of communist and neutralist troops. This triggered a crisis for the U.S. 

on 9 March 1961. In reaction to the deteriorating situation in Laos, ships from the Seventh Fleet, 

including the aircraft carriers USS Lexington (CV 16), USS Coral Sea (CV 34), USS Bennington 

(CV 20) and amphibious forces were ordered to deploy to the South China in January 1961. The 

naval forces were assigned to act as a deterrent force to prevent further attacks by Communist 

guerillas and to demonstrate U.S. support for the Laotian government. USN aircraft also 

conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. In spring 1961 the situation deteriorated further 

and almost the entire Seventh Fleet was moved into the area. The three carriers, Coral Sea (CV 

43), Midway (CV 41) and Kearsarge (CV 33), one helicopter carrier, three groups of amphibious 

ships, two submarines, and three Marine battalion landing teams formed the U.S. force. In 

addition forces were put on alert in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Despite Kennedy’s decision 

not to launch a military offensive, the Chinese Communists ended the intervention and declared 

their willingness to negotiate. A cease fire was agreed upon on 8 May 1961 

(CNA I listed the deployment in January as well, but since the ICB crisis only starts in March, 

only the second CNA I crisis coding is listed although the previous one is described above as 

prelude to the spring crisis). 

Additional Source: George 1991, Marolda 1994 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Pathet Laos 

Offensive

3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69 3

CNA I Laos 3/21/61, 34 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

3 CV's & Amp

CNA II Laos 3-6/1961 3 CV's & Amp
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

25

23. # 181: Bay of Pigs, 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24 

Naval, Marines and Air Force personnel supported the invasion of Cuba by exiles. On 15 April 

1961 the invaders, flying U.S. aircraft, bombed locations in Cuba. On the same day, Cuba 

accused the United States of complicity during a UN General Assembly meeting. Two days later 

Cuba announced a state of national alert, ordering Cubans to fight the exiles. On the 18, the day 

of the invasion, escort ships and naval frogmen provided by the USN attempted to land on the 

beaches to facilitate the invasion. According to Astor however, reefs hindered the landing of the 

ships. A carrier task force and at least one Marine battalion team stood by during the invasion 

attempt. The forces aimed to hide any sign of U.S. involvement and the destroyers were ordered 

not to move closer than 20 miles to Cuban territory and not to open fire unless fired upon first. 

Local militias detected the invaders immediately. USN units remained in the vicinity as the U.S. 

attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban government and tried 

to negotiate terms for their release. Air cover was received from the USS Essex (CV 9) to 

intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war and not to seek air 

combat nor attack ground targets. A note from the USSR to the U.S. on 18 April warned of a 

possible chain reaction to all parts of the globe arising from the invasion and reasserted Soviet 

support for Cuba in repelling the attack. The U.S. responded through President Kennedy's 

answer to the Soviets: Kennedy emphasized that the U.S. "intends no military intervention" in 

Cuba, but would act to protect the hemisphere in case of military intervention by an outside 

force. Late on 19 April, the destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray

(code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate the remaining retreating invaders. 

From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties and reconnaissance flights were flown to obtain 

visual intelligence over combat areas. It is reported that the USS Shangri-La (CV 38) was part of 

the task force stationed off the Cayman Islands. 

The crisis ended for Cuba already on 19 April when it defeated the invaders who were unable to 

escape to the mountains. It ended for the U.S. on the 24 when - reversing earlier disclaimers of 

U.S. involvement - the White House issued a statement by Kennedy assuming direct 

responsibility for the events leading to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 67 – 68; National Security Archives 2001 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

26

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Bay of Pigs 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24 3

CNA I Bay of Pigs Apr 1961, 62 USN, USMC, 

USAF

2 CV's & Amp

CNA II Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961 2 CV's & Amp

24. # 185: Berlin Wall; 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89 

Before the outbreak of the crisis the Soviet Union had threatened to sign a separate peace treaty 

with East Germany if by the end of 1961 no German peace treaty was agreed upon. Following a 

period of increased flows of refugees from East Germany into West Germany, the Soviet Union 

encouraged East Germany to build a wall along the border of the two sectors of Berlin. This 

triggered a crisis for France, the U.K., the U.S. and Western Europe. In response, the U.S. sent 

reinforcements to the Berlin brigade. A rapid build-up of forward deployed forces started. Prior 

to this, in response to the mounting Soviet pressure, USN forces were augmented with more than 

30 ships and naval reserve personnel. The Sixth Fleet8 was put on alert and its strength was 

increased by one aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier group was moved to the Northeast Atlantic. 

According to Blechman and Kaplan (1978), U.S. force demonstration deterred the Soviet Union 

from carrying out various threats previously announced, such as the signing of a unilateral peace 

treaty. For France, the U.K. and West Germany the crisis ended with the withdrawal of the 

Soviet deadline. The crisis for the two superpowers ended only later with a tacit agreement on 28 

October. 

Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Friedman 1983, 24 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Berlin Wall 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89 4

CNA I Berlin Crisis July 1961, 102 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

3 CV's & Amp

CNA II Berlin Crisis 8/1961 - 5/1962 3 CV’s

 

8

 I was not able to confirm the names of the involved aircraft carriers, The USS Independence, Shangri-La and 

Saratoga were all deployed to the Mediterranean at around this time. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

27

25. # 193: Nam Tha; 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38 

In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on 

the Laotian town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. 

The Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a Pathet 

Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the 

Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already in Thailand for exercises 

to bolster that nation’s defenses against Laotian communists should a request be received from 

Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley 

Forge (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (CV 19) 

group took position off Da Nang, South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted 

the Pathet Lao initiative and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into 

negotiations. The crisis ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, 

as well as between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian 

princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed naval 

forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda (1994) considers 

a show of force 

Additional Sources: George 1991; Marolda 1994 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Nam Tha 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38 3

CNA I Thailand 5/10/1962, 90. USN, USMC 2 CV's & Amp

CNA II Thailand 5-8/ 1962 2 CV's & Amp

26. # 194: China-India Border; 9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138 

The Sino-Indian border dispute had been ongoing but escalated in 1962. This crisis was triggered 

by a Chinese troop movement that threatened India’s territorial integrity. India reacted by 

planning the eviction of the Chinese troops. By 4 October India was ready to carry out the 

operation, triggering a crisis for China. On 20 October China launched massive attacks in the 

disputed border area. Later that day Indian Prime Minister Nehru made an urgent and open 

appeal to the United States for armed intervention against the Chinese. He asked for bomber and 

fighter squadrons to begin air strikes if PRC troops further advance into Indian territory. India 

rejected the Chinese suggestion for mutual withdrawal and decided to react with military force. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

28

The U.S. offered military aid to India. A U.S. aircraft carrier9 was dispatched from its base in the 

Pacific to the Bay of Bengal, but returned before reaching Indian waters when the crisis suddenly 

ended (21 November) with China’s declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and its planned 

withdrawal. In January 1963 following mediation efforts and the completed Chinese withdrawal, 

the crisis ended for India. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB China-India 

Border

9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138 3

CNA I Sino-Indian War 11/19/62, 2 USN 1 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA II Sino-Indian War 10-12/1962 1 CV

27. # 195: Yemen War I, 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202 

On 26 September a revolution brought to an end the Yemen monarchy triggering a crisis for 

Jordan and Saudi Arabia which feared a spillover of anti-monarchy movements. In turn both 

countries supplied the Yemeni Royalists with arms, which triggered a crisis for Egypt and the 

YAR (Yemen Arab Republic). Egypt sent in troops and at the end of October a civil war erupted 

between Royalist and Republican forces. The United States recognized the Republican 

government on 19 December 1962, three month after the coup. The various participants 

interpreted U.S. recognition as they saw fit, some accusing the United States of seeking to 

protect its interests in Saudi Arabia, others viewing it as a response to potential communist 

influence. The United States did send a warship to Jeddah but was firm in not granting military 

aid to Yemen. Its intent was to reassure Saudi Arabia and demonstrate U.S. interest in the 

stability of Saudi Arabia so as to deter Egyptian and Soviet involvement. “To that end, a US Air 

Force squadron was dispatched to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was augmented, and a small 

over-the-horizon naval presence was maintained” (Prados 2005). The United States with help 

from the United Nations achieved the signing of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt 

on 10 April 1963. A few days later Jordan officially recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and 

ended its involvement. The two Yemen agreed on a ceasefire ending this crisis in the first phase 

of the Yemen War. 

 

9

 I was not able to identify the name of the aircraft carrier. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

29

Additional Sources: Youssef 2004; Prados 2005 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Yemen War I 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202 3

CNA I No data

CNA II Yemen Civil War 

/ Saudi Arabia

1-7/1963 0 CV & NO Amp

28. # 196: Cuban Missiles; 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36 

During the Cuban Missile crisis the two superpowers came as close as they ever would to a 

nuclear war. In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes operated by the CIA revealed the 

construction of bases in Cuba, capable of launching Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 

Simultaneously with the gathering of additional information, naval forces in collaboration with 

other U.S. forces were ordered to the Atlantic and Caribbean to prepare for eventual 

contingencies. U.S. armed forces all around the world were put on an alerted status. The aircraft 

carrier groups Enterprise (CV 65) and Independence (CV 62) were dispatched together with six 

Polaris submarines based in Holy Loch, Scotland. Naval aerial reconnaissance units assisted in 

the effort to collect information about the situation in Cuba. Footage from naval aircraft 

confirmed the construction of a nuclear-armed redoubt. On 22 October, President Kennedy 

shared U.S. intelligence with the world and announced the deployment of quarantine force, 

including Task Force 135 and Task Force 136, to interdict Cuba-bound shipping. These naval 

forces consisted of antisubmarine carriers, cruisers, and close to 30 destroyers and guided missile 

frigates. In addition Navy shore-based patrol planes observed Soviet submarine movement and 

merchant ships heading toward Cuba. To demonstrate the resolute resolve to blockade all ships 

steaming towards Cuba the two destroyers USS John R. Pierce (DD-753) and USS Joseph P. 

Kennedy (DD-850) stopped and searched the Marucla on 26 October. The Lebanese-flagged 

vessel with Soviet goods aboard was heading for Cuba. Without military equipment aboard the 

ship was allowed to continue. Many other Soviet ships turned around before reaching the 

blockade line. The United States armed forces were visibly superior but were not aggressively 

arrayed. This allowed the Soviet Premier Khrushchev to agree to withdraw Soviet offensive 

weapons from Cuba without losing his face. In return the U.S. would not invade Cuba and would 

remove its missiles from Turkey, a step already agreed on before the crisis. By the end of 

November, U.S. naval forces confirmed the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba and their 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

30

return to the Soviet Union. “The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the 

critical importance of naval forces to the national defense. The Navy's operations were in 

keeping with its strategic doctrine, which is as valid today as it was in late 1962. The Navy, in 

cooperation with the other U.S. armed forces and with America's allies, employed military power 

in such a way that the president did not have to resort to war to protect vital Western interests. 

Khrushchev realized that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's powerful 

Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines and the Air Force's land-based nuclear delivery 

systems once these American arms became fully operational” (Utz 1993). In the end the Soviet 

Union was compelled to withdraw the missiles. The Cuban Missile crisis is often cited as a good 

example for a successful resolution through coercive diplomacy where instead of relying on 

military force President Kennedy chose coercive diplomacy to convince Khrushev to remove the 

missiles. He also employed a carrots and sticks approach, setting an ultimatum while offering 

incentives in the form of the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet 

compliance. The extraordinary war risk further persuaded both governments to resolve the crisis 

peacefully. 

Approximately 180 USN ships and a 60-ship amphibious force were involved in this crisis. A 

total of eight U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed as part of the force: the Enterprise (CV 65), 

Independence (CV-62), Essex (CV 9), Lake Champlain (CV 39), Lexington (CV 16), Randolph 

(CV 15), Saratoga (CV 60) and Wasp (CV 18) 10

Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Utz 1993; George 1991; Marolda 2000 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cuban Missiles 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36 4

CNA I Cuban Missiles 

Crisis

10/14/62, 38 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

8 CV's & Amp

CNA II Cuban Missile 

Crisis

10-11/1962 8 CV's & Amp

29. # 197: Malaysia Federation; 2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910 

President Sukarno made a statement expressing Indonesia’s opposition to the formation of 

Malaysia on 11 February 1962. This speech triggered a crisis for Malaysia. The UK was 

 

10 For a detailed listing of all USN ships involved see http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-3.htm#anchor156376
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

31

involved immediately and arranged talks between Brunei, Malaysia, Sabah (British Borneo), 

Sarawak, and Singapore to agree on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. The resulting 

agreement triggered a crisis for Indonesia. The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16 

September 1962. The United States demonstrated an interest in the crisis and from 29 November 

through 17 December 1962 the seaplane carrier USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13) stopped for a port 

visit in Singapore. Further talks and even the involvement of the UN did not change Indonesia’s 

position. When Indonesia called back its ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, the U.S. reacted by 

halting economic aid to Indonesia. Attorney General Robert Kennedy tried to mediate but the 

agreed cease-fire was never implemented. The crisis gradually faded. “Singapore seceded from 

Malaysia on 9 August 1965, an event that Indonesia viewed as the beginning of the breakup of 

the Federation, a "face-saver." Malaya, too, perceived a victory because Indonesia's 

confrontation policy ended without destroying the Federation” (ICB, Malaysia Federation Crisis 

Summary). 

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Malaysia 

Federation

2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910 2

CNA I IndonesiaMalaysiaOctober 1963, 78 USN 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA II Indonesia –

Malaysia

9-12/1963 1 CV & NO Amp

30. # 198: Dominican Republic – Haiti II; 4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963 

A crisis for the Dominican Republic was triggered on 26 April 1963 when Haitian policemen 

“forcibly entered the Dominican Republic embassy and arrested opponents of Haiti's regime” 

(ICB, Dominican Republic – Haiti II Crisis Summary). On 27 April, U.S. fearing for the lives of 

American citizens in Haiti sent a naval task force, including the carrier USS Boxer (CV 21) and 

2,000 Marines. On 8 May Navy ships evacuated 2,279 civilians. The United Kingdom and 

France deployed ships as well. When the OAS fact-finding mission came to the conclusion that 

no further actions against Haiti should be undertaken and relations between Haiti and the 

Dominican Republic had normalized, the naval forces were withdrawn on 3 June. Cable 

describes the naval forces’ involvement as a positive gunboat diplomacy action. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

32

Additional Sources: Cable 1981; Solantamity 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Dominican 

Republic – Haiti II

4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963 3

CNA I Haitian Unrest 4/29/1963 34 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp

CNA II Haiti 4-6/1963 1 CV & Amp 

31. # 200 Cuba – Venezuela; 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31 

A crisis for Venezuela was triggered on 1 November 1963 with the discovery of an arms cache 

on a deserted beach and the uncovering of plans to hinder the elections in December and overrun 

Caracas. Later that month it was confirmed that the arms were provided by Cuba. When on 1 

December the Venezuelan elections were held without hindrance the crisis ended. 

According to Captain Roth, U.S. naval aircraft were searching for a ship suspected of carrying 

insurgents in November 1963. After the ship was located the Venezuelan Navy was notified. 

Additional Sources: Roth 2001 and email exchange 2009. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cuba – Venezuela 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31 2

CNA I NO DATA

CNA II VenezuelaColombia11/1963 O CV & NO Amp

32. # 202: Cyprus I; 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256 

A proposal by the President of the Cypriot Republic for a new constitution, which would change 

Cyprus into a unitary state with guarantees for the Turkish minority, triggered a crisis for 

Turkey. Turkey’s opposition to the changes and the threat of intervention then broadened the 

crisis to include Cyprus and Greece. A series of cease-fire talks were held, which helped to 

defuse the situation but tensions remained (December 1993). A UN Peacekeeping Force was 

formed on 27 March further easing the tension. Yet in 1964 the crisis escalated between May and 

August, with the U.K., the U.S., the NATO and the United Nations trying to broker an 

agreement. The United States showed presence by sending elements of Sixth Fleet to the vicinity 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

33

of Cyprus to conduct patrols. An aircraft carrier11 was stationed off Cyprus for most of March, 

early June, and from 8 August – 2 September 1964. A direct threat by the United States to halt 

all military aid to Turkey and to stand aside if the Soviets became involved, led Turkey to 

abandon its intervention plans. In August the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution, 

which Cyprus and Turkey accepted the next day, ending the crisis on 10 August 1964. “The UN 

was the most active mediator during the crisis, but it is likely that the U.S. -- through Johnson’s 

pleas to all actors and warning to Turkey that it would no longer automatically be under U.S. 

protection if it should invade Cyprus -- was the most effective mediator” (ICB). 

The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (1997, 51) states that: 

“Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to 

avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to 

remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest 

broker”. 

Additional Sources: National Defense University 1997, 51 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cyprus I 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256 2

CNA I Cyprus 1/22/1964, 269 USN, USMC, 

USAF

1 CV & Amp

CNA II Cyprus 1-10/1964 1 CV & Amp

33. # 206: Panama Flag; 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4 

This short crisis between Panama and the United States was triggered by U.S. students raising 

the American flag at a high school in the Canal Zone. In reaction, Panamanian students marched 

into the Canal Zone with their flag. Serious riots followed and the U.S. responded with force. 

Panama accused the U.S. of aggression and suspended diplomatic relations on 9 January until 3 

April. Following the riots an Amphibious Ready Squadron was stationed off Panama’s East 

coast. A week after diplomatic relations were restored the U.S. naval amphibious force stationed 

in the region was withdrawn. 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Panama Canal Riots, Roth email exchange 2009

 

11 I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

34

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Panama Flag 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4 2

CNA I Panama January 64, 101 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

0 CV & Amp

CNA II Panama 1-4/1964 0 CV & Amp

34. # 210: Gulf of Tonkin; 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9 

The crisis began with an attack on North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin by South 

Vietnam. In retaliation the U.S. destroyer Maddox (DD-731), operating in international waters, 

was hit by North Vietnamese Navy on 2 August. Immediately after attack the USS Ticonderoga 

(CV 14) rushed to assist Maddox. Two days later Turner Joy (DD 951) requested support 

alleging a new torpedo attack. President Johnson decided to react to the unprovoked attacks (the 

real circumstance around the Gulf of Tonkin affair are highly debated and many disagree that the 

attacks on the U.S. destroyers were unprovoked. According to the North Vietnamese their 

sovereignty extends five miles, according to the U.S. only three). On 5 August the United States 

retaliated with strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland. The aircraft carriers Ticonderoga

and Constellation (CV 64) were part of the force. In reaction to the events, U.S. Congress passed 

the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing all necessary means to protect U.S. armed forces on 7 

August, ending this crisis but ushering the Vietnam War escalation. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 112 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Gulf of Tonkin 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9 4

CNA I Gulf of Tonkin 8/2/64, 9 USN 2 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA II Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964 2 CV's & NO 

Amp

35. # 212: Yemen War III; 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266 

During the lengthy Yemen War, a Royalist assault on Republican territory, with Saudi support, 

triggered this crisis for Yemen and Egypt. United States surface combatants from the Middle 

East Force (MIDEASTFOR) carried out surveillance and presence missions during the critical 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

35

period of July and August 1965. After negotiations, an agreement between the two parties lead to 

the abatement of the crisis but the war continued. 

Additional Sources: Solantamity 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Yemen War III 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266 2

CNA I Yemen July 1965, 32 USN 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA II Yemen 7/1965 - 11/1967 0 CV & NO Amp

36. # 215: Dominican Intervention; 4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130 

The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military 

forces deployment, in this instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence 

over, the Western Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first 

combat-ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years. 

A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which had 

deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution 

wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United States was mostly 

concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American regime would limit the 

influence of the United States and hinder its predominance while potentially providing the Soviet 

Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington’s own backyard. But the foremost official 

justification was the threat to the lives of American citizens. 

Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of citizens of 

the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task 

force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500 Marines—off the 

Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with unarmed helicopters 

airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens. 

Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and a 

strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved to the 

Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone and a safe 

corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had evacuated a total of 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

36

three thousand civilians. The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of 

communist influence in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two 

thousand men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “Act of Dominican 

Reconciliation” on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a 

moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to withdraw 

until 28 June 1966; Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966. 

The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the Department 

of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, including Boxer, the tank 

landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo 

ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD 

30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in 

the region by establishing a presence and showing determination not to allow a communist 

takeover. 

Additional Sources: All Hands 1965, 2 -5, Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Cable 1981; Department 

of Defense 1965; Loewenthal 1972. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Dominican 

Intervention

4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130 4

CNA I Dominican 

Republic

4/25/1965, 515 USN; USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CV'S & Amp

CNA II Dominican 

Republic

4/1965 - 9/1966 2 CV'S & Amp

37. # 216: Kashmir II; 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159

The infiltration of Pakistani fighters into Kashmir caused a crisis for India. In reaction, Indian 

military forces crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line, prompting the Pakistani armed forces to 

respond. On 5 September India invaded West Pakistan. The crisis led the United Nations to 

appeal for a cease-fire. Since the lives of American citizens were endangered, the U.S. decided to 

deploy a contingency evacuation force, to halt military aid to both parties (8 September 1965) 

and not to extend further economic assistance. On 11 September two ships from MIDEASTFOR 

left Bahrain for Karachi. Four days later U.S citizens were evacuated from West Pakistan with 

the support of USAF planes. China sided with Pakistan and accused India of provocation. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

37

Chinese involvement and the fear of their intervention led the Western Powers to push for an 

immediate solution to the crisis. The UN resolution of 17 September did not yet end the crisis 

since both parties still deployed their armed forces in Kashmir; only further talks concluding 

with the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966 brought the crisis to an end. 

Additional Sources: Solantamity 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Kashmir II 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159 2

CNA I Indo-Pakistani 

War

9/11/1965, 25 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA II Indio-Pak War 10-11/1965 0 CV & NO Amp

38. # 219: Yemen War IV; 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348 

A further crisis in Yemen began with air attacks on Royalist territory and Saudi villages. The 

expectation of Royalist retaliation then triggered a crisis for Egypt and Yemen. The latter 

engaged in renewed attacks. After months of fighting reconciliation was reached in April 1966. 

The situation changed with the beginning of the Six Day War. At the end of August the Prime 

Minister of Sudan successfully proposed a new peace plan. With the final Egyptian withdrawal 

from Yemen the crisis ended on 26 September 1967. Since 1965 U.S. naval forces had been on 

station in the area to observe the developments. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Yemen War IV 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348 2

CNA I NO DATA

CNA II Yemen 7/1965 - 11/1967 USN O CV & NO Amp

39. # 222: Six Day War; 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26 

An Egyptian overflight of Israel’s nuclear research center and increased Egyptian presence in the 

Sinai precipitated a crisis between the two countries. Israel felt compelled to protect its rights of 

freedom of navigation when Egyptian President Nasser closed off the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli 

shipping. Preemptive strikes by Israel against Egypt forced Egypt and Jordan to react with 

military force. On 5 June the crisis escalated with an Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force and 

the occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai. On 9 June the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

38

drew Syria and the Soviet Union into the crisis. Egypt and Syria fought with Soviet weapons, 

employed by Soviet advisors, but were defeated by a numerically inferior Israeli Army. Syria’s 

acceptance of the cease-fire ended the crisis on 10 June 1967 and Israel emerged with new 

borders and additional territory. The United States was heavily involved. After initial hesitancy 

the United States deployed their Sixth Fleet with about 50 warships, including the two aircraft 

carriers USS America (CV 66) and USS Saratoga (CV 60) and a Marines battalion landing team 

on 6 June. One of the first actions was to reduce the 100- mile territorial water claim of Syria to a 

50-mile, and to send a carrier towards Syria to reinforce diplomatic efforts to reach a cease-fire 

agreement. The U.S. naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean showed its opposition to any 

Soviet intervention, and played a major role in determining the Six Day War. During the crisis 

the Arab combatants accused the United States of providing air cover to Israeli ground forces 

from its aircraft carriers, an allegation that was contradicted by the aircraft carrier’s flight plans. 

The Sixth Fleet also warned to Israel to stand down and avoid escalation. 

Additional Sources: Hahn 2005, 52 – 53; Kalley 2001 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Six Day War 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26 2

CNA I Six 

Day War

6/6/1967, 6 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CV's & Amp

CNA II Middle East War 5-6/1967, 2 2 CV's & Amp

40. # 223: Cyprus II; 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20 

The second Cyprus crisis was triggered by assaults on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, which led to 

the Turkish decision to dispatch military force in reaction. Turkey also requested the removal of 

the chief of the Greek forces in Cyprus. In combination these events triggered a crisis for Cyprus 

and Greece. The United Nations became involved and Cyprus Vance, the former U.S. Deputy 

Secretary of Defense acted as mediator in a shuttle diplomacy effort. On 1 December an 

agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece and three days later with Cyprus which 

ended the crisis. Cyrus Vance’s intensive shuttle diplomacy helped to resolve this crisis. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

39

Although the United States deployed a contingency force from its Sixth Fleet12 to stand by for a 

possible evacuation of U.S. citizens, the evacuations took place with commercial aircraft. 

Additional Sources: Slengesol 2000, 99 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cyprus II 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20 2

CNA I Cyprus 11/15/1967, 24 USN, USMC 1 CV's & Amp

CNA II Cyprus 11-12/1967 1 CV's & Amp

41. # 224: Pueblo; 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338 

North Korean forces seized the USS Pueblo on 22 January 1968. The USS Pueblo had been 

operating in international waters off the coast of Korea, gathering intelligence information. This 

incident happened one day after North Korea had tried to assassinate the South Korean President. 

Since the War of 1812 no U.S. warship had surrendered to foreign forces. The surviving crew 

members were held hostage for eleven months, accused of spying in Korean territorial waters. 

The U.S. reacted by deploying Air Force and Navy forces. Naval vessels, including the aircraft 

carrier USS Enterprise (CV 65), escorting destroyers and support ships, were dispatched to the 

Sea of Japan off the North Korean coast. On 6 February the Enterprise began to withdraw as a 

sign of goodwill from the United States. To secure their release the United States had to 

apologize and admit (falsely) that the USS Pueblo had entered Korean territorial waters at the 

time of the attack. The imposed agreement was reached on 23 December 1968 and subsequently 

the crew was released while the ship was never recovered. Different carriers were part of the 

U.S. response at different times and included the USS Ranger (CV 61), Yorktown (CV 10), Coral 

Sea (CV 43), and Kearsarge (CV 33). Because the safety of the held crew members was 

paramount the U.S. decided against a blockade, the seizure of North Korean shipping, or the 

dispatch of bombers against North Korean territory. 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Pueblo 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338 3

CNA I Pueblo 1/24/1968, 59 USN, USAF 3 CV's & NO 

Amp

 

12 I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

40

CNA II Pueblo 1-3/1968 3 CV's & NO 

Amp

42. # 233: EC-121 Spy Plane; 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12 

North Korean aircraft shot down a USN reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, accusing it 

of having entered Korean airspace. A Sea Air Rescue (SAR) mission began immediately after 

the shoot down. The United States rejected the claim and dispatched a formidable naval force to 

the Sea of Japan, including four aircraft carriers. The crisis ended on 26 April when the U.S. 

naval task force was reduced to a one carrier battle group and the other naval forces were moved 

from the Sea of Japan into the Yellow Sea. 

The naval force included the carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), Hornet (CV 12), Ranger (CV 61)

and Ticonderoga (CV 14) and the battleship New Jersey (BB 62). 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB EC-121 Spy Plane 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12 4

CNA I EC-121 

Shootdown

4/15/1969, 26 USN, USAF, 

USARMY

4 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA II EC-121 4/1969 4 CV's & NO 

Amp

43. # 236: Cairo Agreement – PLO; 10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13 

The PLO announcement of heavy fighting between the PLO and Lebanese government forces on 

22 October 1969 drew Lebanon into the crisis. Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported the resulting 

negotiations. On 3 October the crisis ended with the “Cairo” agreement, which allowed the PLO 

to “operate as a "state within a state" in Lebanon”. During 26 – 30 October the United States 

deployed a contingency force, consisting of two aircraft carrier forces, USS Saratoga (CV 60) &

USS Independence (CV 62), and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) to the 

region. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cairo Agreement 

– PLO

10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13 2

CNA I Lebanon-Libya 10/26/69, 5 USN, USMC 2 CV's & Amp
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

41

Ops

CNA II NO DATA

44. # 238: Black September; 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15 

On 11 June the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV 59) was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean 

to stand by should air cover for evacuation from Jordan become necessary. When tensions 

deescalated the carrier was ordered back to Italy (21 June), but once again (3 September) the 

Sixth Fleet was brought into play due to increasing tensions. Three days later the two aircraft 

carriers Saratoga (CV 60) and Independence (CV 62) as well as the MARG were positioned in 

the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis actually peaked on 15 September with the shuffling of the 

Jordan cabinet, which demonstrated its resolve to fight the PLO influence. The king was no 

longer willing to tolerate PLO raids from Jordanian territory. This caused a crisis for Syria and 

the United States. Whereas the U.S. feared the loss of its ally the king of Jordan, Syria remained 

committed to support the PLO and to maintain its influence in the region and invaded Jordan on 

19 September. In reaction to the Syrian invasion, the U.S. deployed an additional aircraft carrier, 

the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) (departing from the East Coast of the U.S.) and elements of 

the 8th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Jordan resisted the invasion militarily while Israel 

declared its determination to prevent a PLO victory in Jordan. When Syrian forces withdrew 

from Jordan, PLO forces moved to Southern Lebanon. After mediation efforts, Jordan and Syria 

agreed on a cease-fire on 27 September which was put into effect two days later. Only one 

aircraft carrier then remained in the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS John F. Kennedy returned 

to Souda Bay on 8 October. In addition to naval forces, the U.S. had alerted troops in Germany 

while Soviet naval forces were closely monitoring U.S. naval activities during the crisis. Former 

Sixth Fleet commander Admiral Isaac Kidd observed that the eastern Mediterranean looked like 

“an international boat show” (cited in Baer 1994, 401). 

Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 401, Cable 1981 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Black September 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15 3

CNA I Jordan 9/2/1970, 60 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

3 CV's & Amp

CNA II Jordan 9-10/1970 3 CV's & Amp

CNA Jordan Civil War 9/2/1970 - 11/1/1970, 61 Turkey, Show of 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

42

IIII Force, USN, 

USMC, USAF, 

USARMY

45. # 239: Cienfuegos Submarine Base; 9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38 

U.S. intelligence flights disclosed the construction of a Soviet submarine base on the Southern 

coast of Cuba, triggering a crisis for the U.S. The Soviet Union rejected the accusation, claiming 

that no agreements had been violated and no prohibited weapons had been stored at Cienfuegos. 

Intelligence showed the halt of the construction and Soviet naval forces left the base. This ended 

the crisis for the United States, yet disagreements persisted until spring 1971. According to CNA 

II, U.S. naval forces operated in the area in reaction to the crisis. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cienfuegos 

Submarine Base

9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38 2

CNA I NO DATA

CNA II Cienfuegos 9/1970 - 6/1971 USN 0 CV & NO Amp

46. # 242: Bangladesh; 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268 

This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West Pakistan army on Dacca University in 

Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East 

Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now declared its independence, bringing on armed 

conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of 

minor clashes, a formal war between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian 

forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 

December 1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. 

The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, the 

Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian 

troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting of a battle group led by 

USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to 

stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. An evacuation operation proved 

unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, 

the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in a show of force, monitoring both Indian and 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

43

Pakistani operations and maritime and air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft 

and vessels, with the goal of intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan. 

The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal, to 

demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel (1995, 7 - 8), U.S. naval forces played an 

important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval forces south of 

the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus evidently helped to sway 

Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of continuing the war with an offensive 

in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened U.S. diplomatic efforts.” According to 

Mrityunjoy Mazumdar (2006), this entry of Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal left a deep 

impression on Indian policy makers as well as the Indian navy for much of the next two decades 

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Siegel 1995 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Bangladesh 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268 3

CNA I Indo-Pakistani 

War

12/10/1971, 30 USN 1 CV & Amp

CNA II Indio-Pak War 12/1971 - 1/1972 1 CV & Amp

CNA 

IIII

Indo-Pac-War 12/10/1971 - 1/8/1972, 30 Bangladesh, NEO 

(plans only), USN, 

USMC

47. # 255: October-Yom Kippur War; 10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239 

Egyptian forces moved towards the Suez Canal on 5 October 1973, triggering a crisis with Israel. 

One day later, Egyptian and Syrian forces carried out a surprise attack against Israel, marking the 

onset of war. In the following months , talks and negotiations were held, mediation efforts 

attempted, agreements proposed, and cease-fire agreements broken until a final agreement was 

reached on 29 May 1974. The signing 2 days later ended the crisis. The United States and the 

Soviet Union played important roles in reaching the agreement and both deployed naval forces to 

the Eastern Mediterranean. In reaction to the outbreak of the war, U.S. forces around the world 

were put on alert and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced. The Sixth Fleet’s mission was the 

protection of U.S. transport planes delivering weapons and ammunition to Israel. The two 

aircraft carriers USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and an amphibious force 

were on a high level of alert in reaction to the crisis. During October the two carriers and 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

44

amphibious forces stood ready for a possible evacuation contingency operation. The aircraft 

carrier John F. Kennedy (CV 67), together with amphibious forces, joined the U.S Sixth Fleet in 

the Eastern Mediterranean on 25 October. With the reduction of tensions on 17 November, the 

Sixth Fleet’s alert status was scaled down to a normal DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition). 

In April 1974 the USS Forrestal (CV 59) operated in the Central Mediterranean and was 

available to support U.S. efforts. Besides the involved carriers, CNA II lists two Marine 

Battalion Landing Teams and the vessels Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and Iwo Jima (LPH 2). 

U.S. naval forces played an important role in the 1973 Middle East crisis. The United States 

Navy with the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy, with the Fifth Eskadra both had a peacetime 

naval presence in the Mediterranean. In an immediate reaction to the outbreak of the war on 6 

October 1973, the aircraft carrier USS Independence was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to 

demonstrate U.S. concern. The aircraft carriers USS Franklin D. Roosevelt and USS John F. 

Kennedy remained in European ports, until 10 October when they deployed alongside the U.S. 

air supply route to Israel, out of concern that Libya or Algeria might try to interdict the supply 

route. The Soviet Fifth Eskadra responded in turn to the Sixth Fleet’s show of force and to 

demonstrate support for its ally Egypt. In a tit for tat the United States put its forces on yet a 

higher state of alert. The USS Independence returned to Greece only when the cease-fire 

agreement seemed certain to hold and after the end of the U.S. – Soviet naval confrontation 

(Allen 1980, 27 – 29). 

Additional Sources: Allen 1980; Cable 1981; Keesing’s; Marolda 2000 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB October Yom 

Kippur War

10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239 3

CNA I Middle East War 10/6/1973, 48 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

3 CV’s & Amp

CNA I Middle East Force 10/24/1973, 22 USN 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA II Middle East War 10 – 11/1973 3 CV’s & Amp

CNA 

IIII

Middle East War 10/6/1973 – 11/22/1973, 48 Syria, Cont. Pos.

USN, USMC, 

USAF
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

45

48. # 256: Oman – South Yemen; 11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846 

The crisis was triggered when Oman announced an aerial assault carried out by South Yemen on 

a military post and South Yemeni involvement in fighting between rebels and government forces 

in Oman. Oman successfully defeated the rebels, chasing them over the border into South Yemen 

by the end of 1975. On 11 March 1976 Oman and South Yemen signed a cease-fire agreement, 

reached with the help of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, finally ending the crisis. U.S. naval forces 

were operating off Yemen in a show of force during the early crisis period. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Oman – South 

Yemen

11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846 3

CNA I NO DATA

CNA II NO DATA

CNA 

III

Middle East Force 10/24/1973 - 11/13/1974, 

386.

Yemen, Show of 

Force, USN

49. # 257: Cyprus III; 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225 

On 15 July 1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet 

regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. Cyprus requested help from Britain and 

the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July and occupied parts of the island. In an 

immediate reaction to the coup, the United States delayed the return of USS America (CV 66), 

then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS 

Independence (CV 62). At the same time American and British diplomats began mediation 

attempts, which led to an unstable cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central 

Mediterranean. Other assignments for Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were 

canceled so that they would be ready if needed. 

On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado (LPD 11)—

evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut from the British 

base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover. In early August the ships’ 

departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy 

that resulted in the murder of the American ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all 

contingency operations ended by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, 

Archbishop Michael Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

46

deployed again for possible evacuation duties. USS Saratoga (CV 60) and amphibious forces 

were released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was 

proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, 

ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended for Cyprus and 

Greece as well.” (ICB). 

Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings, Slengesol 2000 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Cyprus III 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225 2

CNA I Cyprus 7/15/74, 39 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CV's & Amp

CNA I Cyprus Unrest 1/18/75, 4 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp

CNA II Cyprus 7-8/1974 2 CV's & Amp

CNA II Cyprus 1/1975 1 CV & Amp

CNA 

III 

Cyprus Coup 7/22/1974 - 7/25/1974, 4 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY, 

Cyprus, NEO

CNA 

III

Cyprus Unrest 1/18/1975 - 1/21/1975, 3 USN, USMC, 

Cyprus, NEO 

(plans only)

50. # 258: Final North Vietnam Offensive; 12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138 

On 14 December North Vietnam launched an offensive and on 1 January 1975 the Khmer Rouge 

followed their example in Cambodia. Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces both fought back 

and the latter requested U.S. aid. The rebels took control over the Cambodian capital on 17 April, 

ending for Cambodia the last Vietnam War crisis. Meanwhile North Vietnam advanced its 

offensive. With the fall of Saigon and the capitulation of South Vietnam (30 April 1975), the 

crisis ended. At the outset the U.S. provided aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia which 

Congress continuously reduced. Toward the end of the crisis, U.S. activity was limited to 

evacuating U.S. citizens. The carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), USS 

Hancock (CV 19), USS Midway (CV 41), and the assault ship Okinawa (LPH 3) received orders 

to proceed to the Vietnamese water and stand ready for possible contingency operations in 

March. The USS Hancock served as a helicopter platform for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and 

other foreign nationals from Cambodia to Okinawa as part of Operation EAGLE PULL. On 29 

April 1975 the Enterprise together with Coral Sea executed Operation FREQUENT WIND, an 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

47

evacuation contingency operation to rescue foreign nationals from Vietnam, by covering 

evacuation helicopters. The USS Midway and Okinawa also assisted in the evacuation operations. 

Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Final North 

Vietnam 

Offensive

12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138 2

CNA I NO DATA

CNA 

III

Eagle Pull 

Cambodia

2/1/1975 - 4/12/1975, 71 Cambodia, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

CNA 

III

Frequent Wind 4/4/1975 - 4/30/ 1975, 27 Vietnam, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF

51. # 259: Mayaguez; 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3 

On 12 May 1975 Khmer Rouge forces seized the merchant vessel USS Mayaguez off the 

Cambodian coast, claiming the vessel had entered Cambodian territorial waters. The situation 

recalled the Pueblo affair and President Ford ordered an immediate military rescue mission. The 

U.S. had seaborne forces on location and in Thailand, who responded on the very same day. U.S. 

Marines recovered the empty USS Mayaguez while other Marines, flown by Air Force 

helicopters, attempted to rescue the captured seamen, protected by naval air and surface forces. 

USN, USMC and USAF forces were directly involved in the rescue attempt. Upon landing at 

Tang Island the Marines did not find the Mayaguez crew who had been moved to a fishing boat. 

On 14 May Cambodia announced the release of the captives and crew and vessel were retrieved 

by U.S. forces. The naval response involved two aircraft carriers the USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and 

the USS Hancock (CV 19). The latter was only alerted. According to CNA II the USMC 

dispatched Elements of Third Marine Division while the USNI Proceedings mentions companies 

from the 4th ad 9th Marines on USAF aircraft. With the termination of U.S. military activity the 

crisis ended for Cambodia on 15 May. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 175 – 180; Gaffney 2002, 5, Grossnick 1997, Proceedings
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

48

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Mayaguez 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3 4

CNA I Mayaguez 5/13/1975, 3 USN, USMC, 

USAF

2 CV’S & Amp

CNA II Mayaguez 5/1975 1 CV & Amp

CNA 

IIII

Mayaguez Rescue 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 4 Cambodia, 

Combat, USN, 

USMC, USAF

52. # 261 Moroccan March; 10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181 

The King of Morocco declared his intention to “march” into Western Sahara on the same day the 

World Court had decided that neither Mauritania nor Morocco had any sovereignty rights over 

the Western Sahara. By this action Morocco triggered a crisis for Spain which brought the matter 

before the Security Council. Spain and Algeria were resolved to oppose the Moroccan March 

militarily. The King of Morocco reversed the incursion (6 November) after 5 days when Spain 

agreed to exclude Algeria from the negotiation. Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain signed an 

agreement on 14 November, dividing the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco 

whereas Spain was granted a “share in the valuable Bu Craa phosphate mines” (ICB). Although 

the crisis ended for Spain, Algeria came into conflict with the Polisario Rebels. In December the 

rebels fought with Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. A further agreement between 

Morocco and Mauritania ended the crisis (14 March 1976), during which the United States 

provided military aid to Morocco, whereas the Soviet Union supported the Polisario Rebels. The 

USN vessels made three highly publicized visits to Morocco ports in January 1976 to 

demonstrate U.S. support in response to the USSR involvement. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Moroccan March 10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181 3

CNA I Polisario Rebels 1/5/1976, 18 USN 0 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA 

III

Polisario Rebels 1/5/1976 - 1/22/1976, 18 Morocco, Show of 

Force, USN

53. # 265: Lebanon Civil War; 1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298 

Lebanese Christian forces attacked three towns, mostly inhabited by Moslems. Syria sent troops 

to support the Moslems and tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis, then to impose a 

resolution. By late September, Lebanese opposition against Syrian influence had ended but 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

49

unrest persisted until the Arab League authorized the stationing of Syrian soldiers in Beirut. 

“Shortly thereafter, Syria reverted to its traditional pro-Palestinian stance after tension and 

clashes between Syrian and Christian forces, supporting the PLO against the Israeli-backed 

Christian militias” (ICB). The United States expressed its concern over Syrian behavior. Already 

in August 1975 USN forces had been in the vicinity in case an evacuation operation became 

necessary. By the end of March 1976, vessels from the Sixth Fleet, within 20 hours distance to 

Lebanon were re-alerted for a possible evacuation. On 3 May 1976, the USS America (CV 66)

was deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Operation FLUID DRIVE, a 

contingency operation for a possible evacuation mission of U.S. citizens and other foreign 

nationals. A state of readiness persisted for next three months. For its part, the Soviet 

Mediterranean fleet monitored events closely, as it had during the Yom-Kippur crisis. The 

evacuation began on 20 June 1976 after the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon. 

USMC with the help of USN forces evacuated 263 Americans and other foreign nationals from 

Beirut to the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32) which brought them to Greece. After the successful 

operation the carrier departed for Italy on 2 August. On 28 July 308 more U.S. and foreign 

nationals were evacuated from Beirut via the USS Coronado (LPD-11) to Greece. The crisis 

involved one aircraft carrier the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), later replaced with the USS 

Independence (CV 62). 

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Lebanon Civil 

War

1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298 2

CNA I Lebanon August 1975, 367 USN, USMC 1 CV'S & Amp

CNA 

IIII

Lebanon Civil 

War

8/1/1975 - 7/28/1976, 363 Lebanon, NEO 

(plans only)

USN, USMC

CNA 

IIII

Lebanon 6/20/1976- 6/21/1976, 2 Lebanon, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF

CNA 

IIII

Lebanon 7/27/1976 - 7/27/1976, 1 Lebanon, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

50

54. # 274: Poplar Tree; 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31 

Two U.S. Army soldiers were killed in Korea while trying to cut down a poplar tree in the 

demilitarized zone of Korea, triggering a crisis for the United States. The U.S. responded by 

deploying a squadron of 20 F-111s and a navy task force to South Korea. In addition all U.S. 

forces were put on DEFCON 3. The naval task force included the aircraft carrier Midway (CV 

41) (this deployment force was comparable to that of the 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis-war 

and only slightly lower than that of the Cuban Missile crisis). The U.S. was determined to show 

its resolve and to underscore its influence worldwide. This U.S. reaction triggered a crisis for 

North Korea, which put its armed forces on alert. Operation PAUL BUNYAN consisted of 

cutting down the tree in a sign of U.S. determination, an action that was protected from the air. 

No violence was used. The ICB call this “the most dramatic show of U.S. force in Korea since 

the Korean War” (ICB). The cutting of the tree, and North Korea’s statement recognizing the 17 

August killings as a regretful incident, deescalated the tensions. The USS Midway carrier battle 

group remained in the area of the Korea Strait until 8 September. The United States and North 

Korea signed a new joint security area (JSA) agreement in early September which ended the 

crisis (16 September). 

Additional Sources: Proceedings 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Poplar Tree 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31 3

CNA I Korean Tree 

Incident

8/19/76, 21 USN, USAF, 

USARMY

1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

IIII

Paul Bunyan 8/18/1976 - 8/21/1976, 4 South Korea, Show 

of Force USN, 

USAF, USARMY

55. # 282 Ogaden II; 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236 

The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack 

triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In October, Somalia came close to victory, having secured most of 

the Ogaden territory, but the USSR reacted by providing weapons, military advisers, and Cuban 

troops from Angola, to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, defeating the 

Somali Army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat from the Ogaden territory 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

51

was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, ending the crisis. The USN became 

involved only in February 1978. Following the collapse of the Somali Army in Ogaden, the USS

Kitty Hawk (CV 63) battle group was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore in February, 

in case the CVBG should be needed for U.S. citizen evacuation and to conduct surveillance 

operations to monitor the situation. The ship was released on 23 March 1978. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Ogaden II 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236 3

CNA I Ogaden War February 1978, 51 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

Ogaden War 2/1/1978 - 3/23/1978, 51 Somalia, Cont. 

Posit.

USN

56. # 294: Nicaragua Civil War; 9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311 

Guerillas invaded Nicaragua from Costa Rica on 10 September 1978. Nicaragua, fearing the 

threatened overthrow of its government launched a counterattack. Because Costa Rica did not 

have an official army, it signed a mutual aid agreement with Venezuela and received weapons 

from Panama. Nicaragua overwhelmed the guerillas on 25 September and on the same day 

agreed to the U.S. mediation offer. By mid-January it had become evident that the mediation 

efforts were not progressing and in early February the U.S. ended military support for Nicaragua. 

The OAS and the UN Assembly both condemned Nicaragua for repressing its citizens and 

endangering its neighbors. The crisis continued with occasional clashes until 27 May 1979 when 

a further guerilla infiltration from Costa Rica was defeated by Nicaragua. The Somoza 

government had become isolated and on 4 June the OAS agreed on a resolution requesting a 

democratic regime for Nicaragua. In mid-July the OAS approved the installation of a left-wing 

revolutionary junta and when President Somoza fled on 17 July the crisis ended. 

USN surface ships from the Atlantic Fleet were engaged in surveillance operations off the West 

coast of Nicaragua. The Washington Star had reported in July that the amphibious ship USS 

Saipan (LHA 2) was in position off the coast off Nicaragua in case U.S. citizens needed 

evacuation following the fall of the Somoza government 

Additional Sources: Proceedings
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

52

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Nicaragua Civil 

War

9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311 3

CNA I Nicaragua 9/16/1978, 16 USN, USAF O CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

Nicaragua Civil 

Strife

9/16/1978 - 9/30/1978, 15 Nicaragua, Cont. 

Posit.

USN

CNA 

III

Nicaragua Civil 

War

06/12/1979 – 08/31/1979, 81 Nicaragua, NEO 

USN, USMC, 

USAF,

57. # 298: Sino-Vietnam War; 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81 

China was drawn into a crisis when Vietnam crossed the Cambodian border on 25 December 

1978 and reacted with a counter-invasion of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. After more clashes, 

justified as punishment for Vietnamese aggression, China withdrew on 15 March. This ended the 

crisis. The U.S. sent six USN ships into the South China Sea, including the USS Constellation 

(CV 64) battle group, to observe the development of the crisis in a contingent positioning 

operation. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Sino-Vietnam War 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81 2

CNA I China-Vietnam 2/25/1979, 6 USN 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

China Invasion of 

Vietnam

2/25/1979 - 3/3/1979, 7 China, Cont. Posit

USN

58. # 301: North-South Yemen II; 2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35 

The lingering border conflict between the two Yemens worsened. This crisis was triggered when 

North Yemen accused South Yemen of attacking Northern territory and forwarded a complaint 

to the U.S. Ambassador, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN on 24 February 1979. 

North Yemen retaliated with a counterattack. Saudi Arabia tried to maintain their good relations 

with the North and to improve them with South Yemen, but alerted its troops as a precautionary 

measure. The U.S. supplied the YAR with Saudi-financed weapons; while the Soviet Union 

provided arms to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR). The LAS supported the 

mediation effort and brought about a cease-fire agreement, consequently broken by both parties. 

After a second cease-fire agreement the Yemeni troops began to withdraw on 18 March. On 30 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

53

March the two countries agreed to unite as one country. With this action the crisis ended. As a 

result of the Yemen crisis, the U.S. planned to send military equipment to Saudi Arabia to 

reimburse what the latter had given to North Yemen. In early March 1979 the United States sent 

the USS Constellation (CV 64) and two escorts from Subic Bay to the Arabian Sea for 

observation. CNA I assumes the naval force was also deployed to reassure Saudi Arabia and 

underscore its intent to remain in the region, despite the revolution in Iran. The crisis abated after 

some weeks. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB North-South 

Yemen

2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35 3

CNA I Yemen 3/6/79, 93 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III 

NO DATA

59. # 303: Afghanistan Invasion; 3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351 

The Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States were involved in this crisis. After 

the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan, a revolutionary council of three leaders - politically left 

oriented with ties to the Soviet Union - took power. The leader of the People's Democratic Party 

of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the new President. In March 1979 Afghan Muslims rebelled 

against the regime in the so called Herat Uprising. The Soviet Union, determined to defend the 

communist forces in Afghanistan, faced a crisis. The Afghan regime replaced the leader of the 

PDPA with Amin, in a move that affronted the Soviet Union and deepened the crisis for 

Afghanistan which feared Soviet interference. In December 1979 Soviet forces invaded 

Afghanistan. The new PDPA leader was killed in late December and the crisis as it affected 

Afghanistan and the Soviet Union abased. Yet events extended the crisis to the United States and 

Pakistan, the former stopped exports to the Soviet Union, boycotted the Olympic Games in 

Moscow and supplied the anti-soviet rebels with weapons. These actions blunted the crisis for 

the United States. For Pakistan the crisis ended with U.S. reassurance of support and military aid. 

The events in the Middle East brought strategic changes for the U.S. Navy. Towards the end of 

1979, in light of the Iran hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet troops, US naval 

concentrations were deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea including the USS 

Midway (CV 41) (late October) and one month later the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) (late 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

54

November), bringing the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean to two aircraft carrier battle 

groups. Because of the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, the United States decided to maintain this 

level of presence. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 187 – 189 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Afghanistan 

Invasion

3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351 3

CNA I Afghan/Iran 

Hostages

10/9/79, 472 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CV's & Amp

CNA Afghan/Iran 

Hostages

10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472 Iran, Afghanistan, 

Show of Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

60. # 309: U.S. Hostages in Iran; 11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443 

On 4 November 1979 radical Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 

everybody hostage. The leader of the Revolution, which had overthrown the pro-Western Shah 

regime, Ayatollah Khomeini gave his tacit approval. The students demanded unsuccessfully the 

surrender of the Shah, who at that time was in the United States for medical treatment. Three 

hostages were released from captivity on 19 November, and ten more on 20 November. After 

months of negotiation and fruitless mediation, the United States committed to a secret rescue 

mission Operation EAGLE CLAW/EVENING LIGHT in an attempt to free the hostages (24 

April 1980). The eight helicopters in the rescue mission departed from the deck of the USS 

Nimitz (CV 68). Unfortunately the operation was not successful and had to be aborted. All 

hostages remained in captivity. Only after the inauguration of the new President Ronald Reagan 

did Iran agree to release the remaining fifty-three hostages on 20 January 1981, after being held 

captive for 444 days. 

As mentioned previously (Afghanistan Invasion crisis) the USN augmented its presence in the 

region by permanently deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and 

Arabian Sea. The USS Midway (CV 41) was moved to the region in late October, followed by the 

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), who extended its cruise in late November 1979. This was the first time 

since World War II that the U.S. Navy had two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean in 

response to crises. On 21 December 1979, the Defense Department announced a three-ship 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

55

nuclear-powered carrier battle group from the Sixth Fleet would deploy to the Indian Ocean to 

relieve the Seventh Fleet carrier battle group led by Kitty Hawk. The USS Nimitz arrived in the 

Arabian Sea on 22 January 1980. At the end of 1979 the USS Forestall (CV 59) had relieved 

Nimitz in Italy so the nuclear-powered carrier could move to the Middle East in response to the 

hostage crisis. Forestall remained the only aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The Midway 

was relieved by the Coral Sea (CV 43) on 5 February 1980 which remained in the Indian Ocean 

until 30 April when she was succeeded by the USS Constellation (CV 64). In the beginning of 

May the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69), coming from Norfolk, VA, relieved the USS 

Nimitz. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB US Hostages in 

Iran

11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443 4

CNA I Afghan/Iran 

Hostages

10/9/1979, 472 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

2 CV's & Amp

CNA Afghan/Iran 

Hostages

10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472 Iran, Afghanistan, 

Show of Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

CNA Desert One 4/24/1980 - 4/26/1980 Iran, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF

61. # 315: Solidarity; 8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486 

A crisis developed between Poland and the Soviet Union when a large number of Polish ship 

builders went on strike on 14 August 1980 in Gdansk. The workers demanded labor reforms and 

greater civil rights. The strike led to the creation of Solidarity, the free national trade union. 

While the Polish government denounced the strike and the demands posed by the workers an 

agreement was reached at the end of August. Subsequently East Germany and Czechoslovakia 

were thrown into crisis by the apparent political concessions made to the striking workers by the 

so-called “Gdanks Accords”. The Communist countries demanded a harder line by Polish 

government in handling the matter. In December 1981 Poland arrested almost the entire 

leadership of Solidarity, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and enacted martial law, thereby 

terminating the crisis for the four communist crisis actors. The United States provided AWACS 

aircraft to the NATO to monitor the border situation and expressed its overall concern. “In 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

56

December 1980, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron crews on temporary duty at Keflavik 

Naval Air Station, Iceland, redeployed to Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, in response to 

heightening tensions in Poland. Linking up with NATO groundbased radar sites, the operation, 

called Exercise Creek Sentry, monitored East European air activity during the crisis” 

(globalsecurity). 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Creek Sentry 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB 8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486 2

CNA I Poland 12/9/1980, 24 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

Creek Sentry 10/1/80 - 5/1/81, 144 Poland, 

Reconnaissance

USN, USAF

62. # 317 Onset Iran-Iraq War; 9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75 

When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, U.S. support was mostly directed towards Saudi Arabia and its 

safety, provided in the form of air defense. Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz against the 

possibility of Iranian mining was another concern. Saddam Hussein’s announcement of Iraqi 

sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab triggered the first intrawar crisis for Iran on 17 September 

1980. A few days later Iraq occupied a large part of the border area, virtually closing off Iranian 

access to its main oil refinery in Abadan. Additionally Iraqi forces launched air attacks on 

Iranian air and army bases, which precipitated counter strikes. Simultaneously Iraqi forces 

invaded Iranian territory in the region of its main oil facilities. The next weeks were marked by 

constant attacks and counterattacks. The crisis for Iran ended when Iran’s president declared the 

successful expulsion of Iraqi troops. Iraq unofficially accepted the stalemate on 30 November. 

Officially the U.S. adopted a position of ostensible neutrality but in the light of the threat to the 

oil facilities and to oil supplies to the Western world, the U.S., U.K., France and Australia 

deployed warships to the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 October MIDEASTFOR was reinforced and 

by mid-October about 60 warships of the four countries were in the region to avert a disruption 

of the oil supplies. In late September, 4 USAF AWACS aircraft had been deployed to Saudi 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

57

Arabia. By February 1981 the United States had decided to augment its naval forces in the Indian 

Ocean and to maintain a two aircraft carrier battle group13 strength. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Onset Iran – Iraq 

War

9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75 3

CNA I Iran – Iraq War 9/30/1980, 125 USN, USAF 2 CV’s & Amp

CNA 

III

Iran – Iraq War 9/30/1980, 125 Iraq, Show of Force

USN

63. # 327: Al-Biqa Missiles I; 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88 

The crisis began when Israeli forces shot down two helicopters on their route to supply Syrian 

troops on 28 April 1981. The Syrian retaliation on Christian militias in Lebanon prompted Israel 

to destroy the Syrian missile bases. “Both Israel and Syria accused each other of violating the 

1976 Red Line agreement: by the use of Syrian air power against any party to the civil war and 

the introduction of missiles into Lebanon; and by Israel's intervention in the civil war with air 

power far north of the Israel/Lebanon border” (ICB, Al-Biqa Missiles I, Crisis Summary). The 

United States was actively involved and sent Philip Habib as main mediator to settle the dispute 

on 5 May. Two days earlier the U.S. deployed the USS Forrestal (CV 59) battle group and the 

Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS Independence 

(CV 62) carrier group, transiting from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal, was kept in the 

Eastern Mediterranean (until 26 May) to support U.S. crisis resolution efforts. To demonstrate its 

disapproval of the continuing bombing, the U.S. halted the delivery of F-16 planes to Israel. 

They were released after the cease-fire. The mediation and U.S. pressure greatly contributed to 

the establishment of the cease-fire. With the cease-fire in effect the crisis over the Al-Biqa valley 

ended for Israel and Syria (24 July). The USS Forrestal was released after 53 day whereas the 

amphibious forces were on alert until 14 September when it became apparent that evacuation 

operations would not be necessary. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Al-Biby Missiles I 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88 2

 

13 I was not able to determine the names of the involved aircraft carriers 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

58

CNA I Syria 5/3/1981, 135 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp

CNA 

III

Syria 5/3/1981 – 9/14/1981, 135 Syria, Contingent 

Positioning

USN, USMC

64. # 330: Gulf of Syrte I; 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21 

The Sixth Fleet announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean, and posed a 

crisis for Libya which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya claimed 

U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territory by the Gulf of Syrte, where the two aircraft 

carriers USS Forestall (CV 59) and USS Nimitz (CV 68), four cruiser, four destroyers, four 

frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open ocean missile exercises. The U.S. had 

deployed the naval forces to challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Syrte and the maneuvers 

were held to demonstrate that ”America has the muscle to back up its words”. U.S. aircraft from 

both carriers had to intercept Libyan aircraft multiple times. On 19 August, USN pilots shot 

down two Libyan fighters who had threatened the USS Nimitz. Libya’s ruler Qaddahfi threatened 

to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean were the USN again to enter Libyan 

territorial waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Gulf of Syrte I 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21 4

CNA I Libya 8/1/1981, 20 USN 2 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA 

III

Libya 8/1/1981 - 8/20/1981, 20 Libya, Cont. Posit

USN

65. # 337: War in Lebanon; 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347 

Israel attacked the PLO in South Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. This 

rapid progression of the invasion deepened the crisis for Syria. Although Israel and Syrian had 

agreed on a cease-fire with the help of U.S. mediation, fighting erupted again on 11 June. The 

MARG was ordered to deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean in June and the aircraft USS John F. 

Kennedy (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for possible evacuation operations of U.S. 

and other foreign nationals from Beirut. The ship remained on station until relieved on 17 June 

by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69). The U.S. Embassy advised all U.S. citizens to leave 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

59

Lebanon and closed the embassy on 24 June. U.S. citizens were evacuated and transported to 

ships of the Sixth Fleet which brought them to Cyprus. In July the U.S. halted military aid 

deliveries to Israel to demonstrate their disapproval of Israel’s activities. In August the situation 

worsened and the MARG had to stand ready in case of the deployment as part of the 

peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut. With the help of 

U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syrian and Israel was resolved by September. On 22 

September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon together with 2 aircraft carriers to support U.S. 

Marines ashore. The USS America (CV 66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon on 2 January and 

was relieved by the USS Nimitz (CV 68) on 20 January 1983. In February the alert level was 

lowered again. The United States was actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to 

Lebanon if necessary. Direct talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under U.S. 

auspices led to a peace agreement in May 1983. 

The presence of U.S. (and other nations’) naval forces helped to limit the conflict in Beirut by 

preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also 

supported the diplomatic efforts by the United States besides providing helicopter transportation 

for the U.S. mediators during their shuttle diplomacy. 

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB War in Lebanon 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347 2

CNA I Israel Invasion 6/8/1982, 45 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp

CNA I Peacekeeping 

Force

8/10/1982, 30 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp

CNA I Palestine 

Massacre

9/22/1982, 143 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp

CNA 

III

Israel Invasion of 

Lebanon

6/8/1982 - 7/22/1982, 45 Lebanon, NEO

USN, USMC

CNA 

III

Evac. of PLO-Leb. 8/10/1982 - 9/9/1982, 31 Lebanon, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF

CNA 

III

Palestine 

Massacre

9/22/1982 - 2/28/1984, 515 Lebanon, Show of 

Force

USN, USMC
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

60

66. # 340: Libya Threat to Sudan; 2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12 

Signs of an increase of military forces in Libya threatened crises in Sudan and Egypt. Sudan 

feared a Libyan attempt to remove the Numeiri regime and filed a complaint with the UN while 

alerting its armed forces. Egypt and Sudan had been part of a mutual defense agreement since 

1976 and had signed a Charter of Integration in October 1982. Egypt placed forces along its 

Syrian borders in case they needed to be deployed to Sudan. The United States became involved 

militarily on 17 February. The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CV 68) was deployed to the Red Sea 

to monitor the crisis off the coasts of Sudan and Egypt and delivered four multipurpose AWACS 

reconnaissance planes to Egypt. This U.S. reaction prompted a military expansion in Libya. The 

meeting of the Presidents of Sudan and Egypt on 22 February reduced tensions and ended the 

crisis for all actors. The U.S. asserted its interest through a show of force mission but without 

needing to assemble ground troops. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Libya Threat to 

Sudan

2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12 3

CNA I Libya-Sudan 2/14/1983, 11 USN 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

Early Call/Libya 2/14/1983 - 2/28/1973, 15 Egypt, Show of 

Force

USN, USAF

67. # 342: Chad – Libya VI; 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536 

Continued fighting between separatists and Libyan invaders in Chad and Sudan resulted in 

another crisis in June 1983. On 24 June Libyan-backed forces occupied a city in Northern Chad. 

France warned that it would not stand idle in the face of Libyan aggression. Together with Zaire, 

it supplied weapons for Chad. Chad renewed its accusations of Libyan intrusion and the OAS 

demanded a cease-fire, a Libyan retreat from Chad, and negotiations. Parallel to diplomatic 

efforts, Chad launched a counteroffensive on 9 July that brought on Libyan air strikes. In turn, 

French troops were deployed to Chad in Operation MANTA. Peace talks and reconciliation 

efforts by the OAU were unrewarding. At the end of April, Qaddhafi proposed a withdrawal 

plan, which France accepted. Five months later the proposal was put into effect and by 12 

November the crisis had ended. The United States had reacted by increasing military aid to Chad 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

61

and by placing the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D Eisenhower (CV 69) in a state of alert in the 

Gulf of Syrte. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Chad – Libya IV 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536 3

CNA I Libya-Chad 8/1/1983, 16 USN 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

IIII

Libya/Chad 7/25/1983 - 12/31/1983, 160 Chad, Peace Op -

Military Supply

USN, USAF

68. # 343: Invasion of Grenada; 10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10 

Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had been placed under house arrest, been 

freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, together with close supporters, murdered. 

Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in the region and to the safety of American citizens in 

Grenada, the United States showed concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization 

of East Caribbean States, the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the 

aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had 

been en route to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to 

Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in 

anticipation of the developments in Grenada. Because of its prior proximity to the Caribbean, the 

naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis for Grenada. On 25 

October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and Army forces invaded Grenada. 

Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear that American students were not in 

danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the restoration of democratic government to 

Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. 

troops had accomplished their mission, and by 4 November Independence finally departed for 

the Mediterranean. 

As Gaffney observed: “The U.S. had been watching the island anxiously as the Soviets built an 

airfield, using Cuban labor, ostensibly to bring in tourists, but which the U.S. thought was to be a 

Soviet airbase threatening the approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. seized upon an 

incident—a Marxist coup, using the excuse of protecting and evacuating American medical 

students—to invade 6 days after the coup. Grenada was a convenient distance from CONUS. The 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

62

U.S. had plenty of warning; the surprise was how ill-planned the invasion turned out to be” 

(Gaffney 2002, 7). 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 7, Marolda 2000, Morales 1994, 80 - 81

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Invasion of 

Grenada

10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10 4

CNA I Grenada 10/20/1983,23 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

1 CV & NO Amp

CNA Urgent Fury 10/20/1983 - 12/14/1983, 55 Grenada, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

69. # 344: Able Archer; 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 914

On 2 November 1983 the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 which had flown 

through Soviet airspace, killing all 269 crew members and passengers. The Soviets could not 

identify the plane and chose to destroy the aircraft. Immediately after the downing, USN vessels 

from the Seventh Fleet, USAF aircraft and ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency were 

deployed to the area looking for debris and demonstrating U.S. presence. The Able Archer crisis 

occurred only on 2 November with the start of NATO military exercises but it is often linked 

with the downing of KAL 007. “Able Archer” refers to the test of “nuclear release mechanisms 

in case of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet bloc” (ICB, Able Archer, Crisis Summary). The 

Soviet Union however perceived the exercise as a prelude of an actual attack and put its nuclear 

fighters on alert. The United States and other NATO members claimed to be surprised by the 

Soviet misinterpretation and reaction. The exercise ended on 11 November without any military 

confrontations and the associated tensions subsided. The mentioned naval deployment was 

triggered by the downing of the KAL 007 and naval forces remained in the region in a show of 

force after the search and rescue operation ended on 5 September. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Able Archer 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 9 4

CNA I KAL 007 9/1/1983, 66 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp

CNA KAL 007 Shot 9/1/1983 - 11/6/1983, 67 Soviet Union, 

 

14 Because Able Archer and the KAL 007 Shot Down are not the same crisis this case is excluded from the statistical 

analysis. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

63

III Down Show of Force

USN, USAF

70. # 348: Basra-Kharg Island; 2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141 

During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pulled into the conflict in a series of 

minor incidents between 21 February 1984 and 11 July 1984. In February 1984, Iran captured 

the oil drilling facility on Majnoon Island in Southern Iraq, and then attempted to intercept the 

Basra-Baghdad road. Iraqi forces counterattacked on Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island. Over 

the next week Iraq recaptured the positions held by Iranian forces ending the crisis for Iraq on 18 

March. When a Kuwaiti oil tanker was hit near Bahrain, Kuwait was drawn into the crisis (13 

May) with its claim that Iran was responsible. In turn, Iran threatened the safe passage of all 

shipping in the Gulf if Iranian access to Kharg Island was not guaranteed. This declaration set in 

motion the tanker war. When a Saudi ship was attacked within Saudi territorial waters by Iranian 

aircraft, Saudi Arabia was then implicated in the confrontation. Kuwait sought U.S. Stinger 

antiaircraft missiles and U.S. naval escorts for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The Saudi 

response was more forceful. On 5 June, with the help of U.S. advanced early-warning (AWACS) 

reconnaissance planes, Saudi forces shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter. For Iran, the crisis ended 

with the signing of an agreement with Iraq precluding the shelling of civilian areas. Saudi Arabia 

for its part formed an air defense zone, and Kuwaiti signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. 

The crisis led to a renewed U.S. commitment of a continuous aircraft carrier presence in the 

North Arabian Sea. In late May, MIDEASTFOR ships began to escort U.S. merchant ships 

because of the escalating violence in the region and the USS Enterprise (CV 68) was dispatched 

as a show of U.S. resolve. 

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. military forces remained forward deployed in the Persian 

Gulf. The intensity of the commitment varied. In general naval forces protected shipping and 

cleared mines. But especially this intra-war crisis enlarged USN involvement. Future naval 

operations such as the Earnest Will escort operations of 1987-1988, played an important role in 

preventing the spread of the war into other states of the region, but were not in direct reaction to 

an intra-war crisis and are therefore excluded. 

Additional Sources: Proceedings
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

64

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Basra-Kharg 

Island

2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141 3

CNA I Persian Gulf April 1984, 245 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA Persian Gulf 04/01/1984 – 11/30/1984, 

244

USN, Show of 

Force, Iraq

71. # 354: Nicaragua MIG-21S; 11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7 

On the day Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States, intelligence identified a 

Soviet vessel en route to Nicaragua with MIG-21s destined for the Sandinistas and some 

members of the new government feared a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. U.S. military 

exercises in Honduras were immediately intensified and the U.S. Navy increased its presence 

operations in the Central America region as a show of force and to deter Nicaraguan aggression. 

With the Soviet Union confirmation that no jet fighter aircraft were aboard the vessel, and the 

official United States acknowledgment that it had no plans to intervene in Nicaragua, the crisis 

ended. (Even earlier, U.S. naval presence had been intensified during the election period in El 

Salvador and to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Central America. The operation starting in 

March 1984 included the CVBG America (CV 66).) 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Nicaragua MIG21S11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7 3

CNA I Central America 3/13/1984, 264 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp

CNA 

III 

Central America 

CV Presence

5/13/84 – 11/26/84, 259 Nicaragua, Show of 

Force

USN

72. # 358: Egypt Air Hijacking; 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11 

On 23 November 1985 an Egypt Air flight bound for Athens was hijacked. The terrorists were 

members of the “Egypt Revolution”, a group opposed to President Mubarak and supposedly part 

of the anti-Arafat “Al-Fatah Revolutionary Command”. Libyan involvement was suspected. 

Egypt’s forces were deployed along the Libyan border in a state of high alert. The hijacked 

plane, running out of fuel, landed in Malta. Refused refueling led the terrorists to segregate the 

passengers by nationality. They then shot into a group of Western European, North American, 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

65

Australian, and Israeli passport holders killing one hostage. Egypt sent elite troops to Malta on 

24 November in a force that included three U.S. officers to storm the airplane. During the assault 

on the terrorists 60 people died. Egypt did not retaliate against Libya and the crisis subsided (3 

December”. In a contingency operation USN vessels, including the USS Coral Sea (CV 43), were 

deployed to the waters off Malta during the stand-off. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Egypt Air 

Hijacking

11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11 3

CNA I Egypt Air 

Hijacking

11/23/1985, 3 USN 1 CV & NO Amp

CNA 

III

Egypt Air 

Hijacking

11/23/1985 - 11/25/1985, 3 Malta, Response to 

Terrorism

USN

73. # 363: Gulf of Syrte II; 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21 

At the end of December 1985 two major terrorist attacks took place in the airports of Rome and 

Vienna. Libya was accused of funding the attacks, and all U.S. citizens were advised to leave 

Libya in January 1986. All exchange between the two governments was cancelled. The United 

States decided to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. Operations near 

Libya began at the end of January and again in February without any incidents. On 24 March 

1986 the aircraft carriers USS America (CV 66), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), and USS Saratoga (CV 

60) advanced into the Gulf of Syrte, ostensibly to engage in freedom of navigation exercises. 

Libya claimed the Gulf as Libyan territory in 1973 and U.S. naval aircraft came under fire 

although without suffering any damage. The U.S. retaliated by sinking two Libyan patrol boats. 

The last two days of the exercise "Attain Document III" ended on 27 March without further 

incidents. When an explosion occurred on board a TWA flight from Rome to Athens on 2 April, 

tensions returned. The U.S. assumed Libyan involvement, Libya denied the charges. On 5 April 

1986 a bomb exploded in the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. Two U.S. soldiers and one 

Turkish woman died and many others were injured. Libya never publicly admitted its role but 

intelligence suggested Libyan involvement. Fearing U.S. retaliation, Libya threatened to kill 

Americans indiscriminately and to take all foreigners in Libya hostage. The U.S. was 

unsuccessful in dissuading Libya from the path of terrorism. Given the evidence of the West 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

66

Berlin bomb involvement, the United States decided to launch military strikes against terroristrelated sites in Libya. On 14 April 1986 Operation EL DORADO CANYON was executed. The 

USAF with the help of aircraft from the USS America and USS Coral Sea carried out air strikes 

against Libya. This action terminated the crisis for the United States. A declaration of the UN 

Security Council condemning the U.S. strikes on 21 April was vetoed by the U.S. and the U.K. 

Operation EL DORADO CANYON had two goals; first, to compel Libyan support of terrorism 

and second, to deter Gaddafi from resuming any form of support in the future. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5, Till 2009, 265 – 266

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Gulf of Syrte II 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21 4

CNA I OVL-FON Ops January 1986, 85 USN 3 CV & NO Amp

CNA I La Belle Disco, 

Libya

4/10/1986, 6 USN, USAF 2 CV's & NO 

Amp

CNA 

III

OVL-FON Ops 1/26/86 - 4/28/86, 93 Libya, Response to 

terrorism

USN

CNA 

III

El Dorado Canyon 4/9/1986 - 4/19/1986, 11 Libya, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF

74. # 383: Contras III; 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 2315

On 6 March 1988 Nicaragua attacked Contra camps on Honduran territory. Nicaragua denied the 

Honduran allegation and sought a UN and OAS investigation, although no observers were 

dispatched. Honduras asked the United States for support which was granted by dispatching 

troops and arms. Nicaraguan troops near the border were attacked by Honduran fighter planes, 

threatening further fighting should Nicaragua not withdraw. With the withdrawal of Nicaraguan 

forces on 17 March, the crisis began to fade and was terminated once all U.S. troops left the 

region on 28 March. 

In the operation JITTERY PROP the U.S. conducted electronic surveillance operations off 

Central America throughout the 1980 to interdict possible arms smuggling by the Nicaragua 

Sandinistas to rebels in El Salvador. According to Roth an involvement of JITTERY PROP in 

the crisis is possible but not confirmed. The USS Sphinx spent most of its time during 1985-1987 

 

15 Because it USN involvement in this crisis cannot be confirmed with sufficient certainty this case is excluded from 

the statistical analyses. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

67

in the Gulf of Fonseca off the coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador intercepting military and 

guerrilla communications. The vessel monitored suspected shipping, intercepted communications 

and encrypted messages, and probed the shore surveillance and air-to-air defense capabilities of 

the other nations. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney (Email exchange), Roth (Email exchange) 

Dataset Name Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Contras III 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 23 3

CNA I NO DATA

CNA Jittery Prop 1/8/88 - 12/14/88, 342 El Salvador, Cont. 

Posit

USN

75. # 391: Invasion of Panama; 12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26 

Tensions between Panama and the United States had been increasing for some time over the 

revised Panama Canal treaties and General Noriega. The installation of Noriega as the new head 

of government in Panama on 15 December 1989 brought matters to a head. Random harassments 

of U.S. personnel culminated in the killing of a Marine officer and the abuse of the wife of a 

navy officer and a declaration of a state of war by Panama. 

Displays of U.S. military strength, U.S. economic sanctions, mediation attempts by other 

countries and an attempted coup failed to oust Noriega from power. Thus on 17 December the 

United States invaded Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE to protect the lives of U.S. citizens, to 

uphold democracy, to capture Noriega, and to safeguard the Panama Canal treaties. The U.S. 

overthrew the Noriega Regime, who stood down on 3 January and a new regime was installed. 

All military services were deployed to support the operation. U.S. naval involvement included a 

ship held in a MODLOC (Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations) off the coast of 

Panama. The U.S. deployment of Special Forces (4’000 amongst them many Navy SEALs) was 

the largest since the Vietnam War. Morales (1994) describes “the Panamanian intervention (...) 

as an important transition from 'Monroe militarism' and Reagan's 'containment militarism' to 

Bush's 'New World Order militarism'. Panama invokes the new model of post-Cold War military 

policing actions”. 

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 222 – 223, Morales 1994 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

68

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Invasion of 

Panama

12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26 4

CNA I Panama Elections 5/11/1989, 52 USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

1 CV & Amp

CNA I Panama 12/20/89 34 USN, USMC, 

USAF,USARMY

0 CV& NO Amp

CNA 

III 

Nimrod Dancer 3/18/1988 – 12/20/1989, 643 Panama, Show of 

Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

76. # 393: Gulf War; 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254 

The Gulf War crisis erupted on 2 August 1990 with Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United 

States as the principal participants (Bahrain, Egypt, France, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United 

Arab Emirates (UAE), the U.K., and the USSR were also involved). On 28 May Saddam Hussein 

accused Kuwait and the UAE of launching an economic war against Iraq and Kuwait of stealing 

Iraqi oil from the disputed oil field of Rumaila. Kuwait put its armed forces on alert and denied 

the Iraqi allegation. On 23 July Iraqi forces were deployed to the Saudi Arabian border. 

Mediation efforts between Iraq and Kuwait were unsuccessful and Iraq then mobilized forces 

along the Kuwaiti border before invading the nation on 2 August. Four days later troops were 

dispatched to the Saudi Arabian border. The U.S. responded to the threat to Kuwait and its oil 

sources with a build-up of U.S. forces in the region, demanding that Iraq complies with the UN 

resolution and withdraws from Kuwait. Iraq’s response was to formally announce the annexing 

of Kuwait. Over the next weeks several UN resolutions were passed. In late October the U.S. 

began unilateral air and naval strikes and more troops were sent to the Gulf region over the next 

weeks. On 29 November the UN Security Council resolution 678 authorized “the use (of) all 

necessary mean” to coerce Iraq to comply with earlier resolutions, by no later than 15 January 

1991. When the deadline had passed, a coalition of states participated in operation DESERT 

STORM, launched on 24 February to free Kuwait with military force. On 8 April the Iraqi forces 

were thrown out of Kuwait. A formal cease-fire was in effect as of 12 April. 

Even before the outbreak of the crisis U.S. naval forces were active in the region. In response to 

Iraqi’s growing pressure on Kuwait, Middle East Force ships engaged in an exercise with the 

United Arab Emirates, involving five MEF ships and three USAF aircraft (24 July 1990). The 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

69

forces remained in theater on higher alert during the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 

But despite the combined U.S.-U.A.E. exercise, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During 

this crisis and war the U.S. Navy played an important role in deciding the outcome. The USN 

also received assistance from the British, Royal Saudi, and Kuwaiti Navy. When the crisis began 

the USN was already on station with six ships of its Joint Task Force Middle East, which had 

operated in the Persian Gulf since 1949. In the initial deployment phase the role of the USN was 

critical. In a matter of days the USS Independence (CV 62) CVBG sailed from the Indian Ocean 

to the Gulf area shortly followed by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69) CVBG departing 

from the Mediterranean and the Saratoga (CV 60) CVBG from CONUS in Florida. The 

Independence and Eisenhower were the first U.S. forces in the theater when operation DESERT 

SHIELD began. The ships were joined in the Gulf one week later by Marines who had been at a 

prepositioning station in the Indian Ocean, ready to support the airlifted elements of Marine 

Expeditionary force. According to Baer (1994, 448) this impressive display of readiness was 

made possible by the forward deployment of Navy and Marine Corps units. In addition an 

Atlantic battle group led by the battleship Wisconsin (BB 64) was ordered to the region. Saudi 

Arabian approval to insert U.S. forces was granted in about a week (Gaffney 2002, 5). Siegel 

(1995, 17 – 18) hypothesizes that the display of U.S. military power, underlined by the presence 

of two aircraft carrier battle groups, might have played a role in King Fahd's acceptance of U.S. 

forces into Saudi Arabia. This force signaled U.S. willingness to defend Saudi Arabia even with 

forces from CONUS still on their way. Navy forces (both U.S. and allied) also played a crucial 

role in interdiction operations, enforcing Iraqi compliance with UN economic sanctions. Naval 

vessels were actively patrolling and boarded vessels, suspected of breaking the sanctions. The 

naval patrols largely guaranteed the compliance with the sanctions at sea. Dismukes (1994, 40) 

points out the advantages of forward presences and notes “in some cases, where geography and 

politics combine against the U.S., forces forward are necessary to make the deployment of forces 

from CONUS possible. In the Gulf War, if Saddam had seized the ports or had attacked when 

U.S. forces were still small, the result would have been difficult and costly for the U.S. As it 

happened, the U.S. had forward forces at sea that provided an answer to those threats. The 

employability and thus the credibility of CONUS-based forces can depend on forces already 

overseas”. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

70

The first U.S. Air Force and Army units arrived at the crisis location a few days after receiving 

the order to move to Saudi Arabia on 8 August. This was the first time since the Vietnam War 

that the U.S. had deployed such a high number of troops, with 210’000 military personnel in 

theater at the end of October 1990 and more than 400’000 in early January. On 7 August, 

President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia after King Fahd 

approved the deployment of a multinational force to defend his country against a possible Iraqi 

invasion. On 15 September the USS John F. Kennedy joined the Saratoga. The two carriers 

operated together for the next two days before the former assumed the watch in the Red Sea 

while the USS Saratoga moved to the Mediterranean. Aircraft took off nearly every day from the 

carriers and conducted training sorties over Saudi Arabia. On 27 October, John F. Kennedy held 

a turnover with Saratoga and headed back to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. In early 

November the decision was made to reinforce and double the current number of CVBGs. To 

meet the new force level, the USS America (CV 66), Ranger (CV 61), and Roosevelt (CV 71)

were sent to the region to support USS John F. Kennedy, Midway (CV 41) and Saratoga. During 

the days before the beginning of the war the USS Forrestal (CV 59) received orders twice to 

deploy but both were cancelled. The total strength at the launch of DESERT STRIKE included 

six battle groups, two battleships, and a 31-ship amphibious task force totaling in over 100 ships 

and submarines, 75’000 Sailors and 85’000 Marines afloat and ashore. 

Although the Gulf War is often seen as a victory for the Air Force and Army they needed bases, 

while the Navy did not. The Navy, controlling the seas, delivered most of the equipment (Baer 

2003, 450). Till remarks that the “widespread notions that large surface ships, especially carriers, 

would be too vulnerable in narrow waters when confronted by swarms of missile-armed fast 

attack craft were comprehensively disproved in this conflict” (Till 2009, 172). 

Additional Sources: Baer 1994; Dismukes 1994; Gaffney 2002; Siegel 1995; Till 2009

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Gulf War 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254 4

CNA I Iraqi Pressure on 

Kuwait

7/24/1990, 9 O CV & NO Amp

CNA I Operation Desert 

Shield

8/2/1990, 166 6 CV & Amp

CNA 

IIII

Desert Shield 8/7/1990 – 1/15/1991, 162 Saudi Arabia, 

Show of Force

USN
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

71

CNA 

IIII

Iraq MIO 8/7/1990 – 12/31/1999, 3424 Iraq, MIO

USN

CNA 

IIII

Desert Storm 1/17/1991 – 4/5/1991, 79 Iraq, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

77. # 403: Yugoslavia II: Bosnia; 3/3/1992 – 11/21/199516

After the passing of a referendum for an autonomous Bosnia the crisis was triggered by the 

Bosnian independence declaration on 3 March 1992. First, the Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim 

leaders agreed to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic regions during talks in Lisbon. 

But when they returned the Muslim President of Bosnia spoke out against a division, accusing 

Serbia and Croatia of trying to annex Bosnian territory. As of 6 April 1992 Bosnia was 

recognized by the European Union. The United States and other states followed soon thereafter. 

In a reaction to the EU recognition Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, proclaimed a Serbian 

Republic of Bosnia. Intense fighting broke out between the different ethnic groups. The situation 

was especially bad in Sarajevo, the capital. The UN sent peacekeeper through the United Nations 

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to alleviate the suffering of the civilians and create “safe areas. 

The NATO supported UNPROFOR with limited military involvement mainly through symbolic 

airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S. intervened as part of the NATO implementation. 

The U.S. spoke out for tighter sanctions against Serbia and the adoption of a UN Security 

Council resolution to enforce the no-fly zones. The crisis was marked by different policies 

towards Bosnia. While the European Union remained hesitant and favored a diplomatic solution 

the United States was more outspoken in condemning Serbian aggression. The U.S. did not send 

troops to support UNPROFOR but actively participated in the NATO air strikes. The longer the 

crisis persisted the more involved the United States became. After the shelling of the Markela 

Marketplace on 5 November the NATO finally engaged in offensive air power operations. On 21 

November 1995 all parties signed the so called Dayton Accord agreement, ending the Bosnian 

crisis. ICB lists the following four decisions the parties agreed on: (1) a division of territory 

between the Bosnian-Croat Federation (51 percent) and the autonomous Serb entity, the republic 

of Srpska (49 percent); (2) a constitution comprising a central government for Bosnia as a whole 

with a three-person group presidency, a two-house legislature, a court, and a central bank; and 

 

16 The crises resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia are very complex and involve many different actors and 

strategies. The following is only a very brief description, mostly focused on the U.S. naval involvement 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

72

separate presidencies, legislatures, and armies for each of the two entities within Bosnia; (3) the 

mutual withdrawal of forces by both entities behind agreed cease-fire lines; and (4) the dispatch 

of a peacekeeping NATO force of 60,000 under U.S. command to monitor the cease-fire and 

control the airspace over Bosnia. 

The United States Navy supported operations MARITIME GUARD, SHARP GUARD, 

DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, DENY FLIGHT, DECISIVE EDGE, DECISIVE GUARD and 

DELIBERATE FORGE17. 

The first three operations were launched to establish a blockade in the Adriatic Sea. NATO 

maritime forces began operating in the Adriatic on 22 November 1992 to enforce the UN 

embargoes in former Yugoslavia. Together with Western European Union (WEU) forces, NATO 

maritime forces patrolled the waters and contacted a total of 12,367 merchant vessels, inspected 

1,032 and found 9 in violation of the UN embargoes. The operation ended with the 

commencement of operation SHARP EDGE on 15 June 1993. SHARP GUARD was established 

to enforce the economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Serbia-Montenegro. U.S. naval 

forces including surface combatants, intelligence-gathering attack submarines, and active and 

reserve maritime patrol aircraft operated with NATO and WEU forces. The U.S. participation in 

SHARP GUARD had to be restricted after U.S. Congress passed a legislation demanding a 

limitation in November 1994. The operation lasted more than three years and helped to provide 

the necessary conditions for a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the operation no 

ships were reported in violation of the embargoes. In December 1995 SHARP GUARD was 

replaced by Operation DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, lasting until December 1996. 

No-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina were established after the adoption of Security Council 

Resolution 816. To ensure the enforcement operation DENY FLIGHT began on 12 April 1993. 

DENY FLIGHT proposed to neutralize Serbian aircraft that were supporting their ground forces 

in Bosnia. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to 

over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in 

the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and 

supporting aircraft. On 28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-

 

17 Provide Promise, joint operation with the U.S. Air Force, involving both naval carrier aircraft and land-based air, 

protected humanitarian relief efforts in the besieged cities of the former Yugoslavia, lasted from July 1992 to March 

1996. This operation is not include in the summary because it constitutes a humanitarian operation and involved air 

transport and air drops of relief supplies to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

73

Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was the first military engagement ever 

undertaken by the Alliance. 

On 24 November 1994, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO air power could be used, 

under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 958 and after agreement 

with Croatian authorities, against aircraft flying in Croatian air space, which have engaged in 

attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas. 

NATO's DENY FLIGHT operation, enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, terminated on 

December 20, 1995, when the implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for the 

airspace over Bosnia. DENY FLIGHT transitioned to DECISIVE EDGE in support of the IFOR 

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Carrier and shore-based squadrons continued flight operations 

in support of joint and combined enforcement of a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone in the airspace 

over the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation DECISIVE EDGE then transitioned to 

DELIBERATE GUARD in support of the stabilization force (SFOR) Operation JOINT GUARD. 

Throughout 1997, Italy-based Marine F/A-18D and EA-6B aircraft provided suppression of 

enemy air defense and close air support and electronic warfare to Navy maritime patrol aircraft. 

Additionally it brought real-time, still and full-motion video imagery to the ground commanders. 

DELIBERATE GUARD transited to Operation DELIBERATE FORGE. Forces from the United 

States European Command participated in, and directly supported, Operation DELIBERATE 

FORGER, the NATO air operation in support of SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (20 

June 1998 marked the transition from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to a slightly 

smaller force). 

The U.S. CVBG’s played an important role in the overall operations. Their flexibility and 

capability to respond rapidly contributed to the success. NATO airpower was strengthen by naval 

aircraft and also served as a deterrent force. For example the continuous presence of carrier 

based aircraft in the Adriatic and NATO land-based aircraft in Europe permitted attacks far 

inland. 

Several carrier battle groups supported the operations. Among them were the USS John F. 

Kennedy (CV 67), USS America (CV 66), USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and USS Eisenhower (CV 69). 

Shortly after Christmas 1992 the USS John F. Kennedy was ordered to the Adriatic Sea to 

support a possible U.S. intervention (the carrier remained in Marseille). A year later (25 

February 1993) the carrier was called upon to monitor airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

74

conjunction with Operation PROVIDE PROMISE until 25 March when she was relieved by the 

USS Roosevelt. Between 15 March 1994 and 31 December 1994 the USS Eisenhower

participated in the different operations DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD and PROVIDE 

PROMISE in reaction to the tense situations in former Yugoslavia. During DENY FLIGHT from 

12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) assumed 

responsibilities for the military aspects of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite 

enemy resistance including heavy and accurate ground fire, combined with logistics and bad 

weather problems during more than 100,000 sorties over DENY FLIGHT’s 983 days, the 

campaign prevented Serbia from effectively using its air power. Prior to the ship’s arrival the 

Bosnian-Serbs fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles against reconnaissance 

aircraft, prompting NATO commanders to assign escorts to such flights. The USS America

participated in operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORGE. 

Burg (2003, 57) concludes that “the use of coercive diplomacy [as of late 1994] in Bosnia by the 

United States, in cooperation with its NATO partners and local actors, succeeded in bringing the 

fighting in that country to an end and in persuading all sides to enter into a negotiated settlement 

of the war”. 

Additional Sources: Burg 2003; Global Security (various); Grimmett 2010

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Yugoslavia II: 

Bosnia

3/3/1992 – 11/21/1995

CNA 

III

Maritime A4455 

Guard/Sharp 

Guard/Decisive 

Enhancement

11/1/1992 - 12/18/1996, 1509 FRY, Show of 

Force

CNA 

III

Deny 

Flight/Decisive 

Edge/Deliberate 

Guard/Deliberate 

Forge

4/12/1993 - 7/18/1998, 1924 Yugoslavia

78. # 406: Iraq No-Fly Zone; 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22 

In March 1991 a no-fly zone over northern Iraq was established. On 18 August 1992 France, 

U.K. and the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone below the 32nd Parallel to safeguard the 

Shia population from Saddam’s forces. The U.K. sent six Tornado jets to support the Southern 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

75

Watch mission. These two activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Although the no-fly zone went 

into effect in late August, attacks against the Shia rebels in the South increased. But Iraq seemed 

reluctant to cross the no-fly zone and on 8 September officially declared its non-interference with 

the no-fly zone, ending the crisis. 

The Southern Watch mission lasted until the end of 1999 and different naval vessels were 

deployed in support of the operations. The USS Independence (CV 62) was deployed to the 

Arabian Gulf as of mid-1992 and was part of the beginning of the Southern Watch mission. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Iraq No-Fly Zone 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22 4

CNA Southern Watch 8/19/1992 - 12/31/1999, 2691 Iraq, No Fly Zone

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

79. # 408: North Korean Nuclear; 3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600 

The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s reluctance to 

participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), 

operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 1994, was in a state of high alert. 

The United States negotiated with North Korea over its nuclear program while keeping open the 

option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty Hawk and a second, the name of which could not 

be determined—were positioned off the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was 

later said that the carriers had contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. 

The crisis ended with an agreement in October 1994. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB North Korean 

Nuclear

3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600 2

CNA 

IIII

Korea tensions 6/1/94 - 7/31/94, 61 North Korea, Show 

of Force

USN
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

76

80. # 411: Haiti Military Regime; 7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77 

In 1991, the President of Haiti, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military junta 

barely one year after being elected. The resulting crisis produced a large flow of refugees fleeing 

from the deteriorating situation in Haiti to the United States. The refugees were perceived as a 

threat to domestic stability. The U.S. appeared unable to restore democratic order on the 

tumultuous island. On 31 July the UN Security council passed a resolution authorizing the 

member states to “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 

leadership”. As a result the Clinton administration intervened on 15 September 1994 despite 

public and Congressional reluctance, traceable to the previous Somalia disaster. The U.S. 

represented by former President Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 

Powell, and Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee began unofficial 

mediation. They persuaded the junta to sign an agreement to resolve the crisis without violence 

and to leave Haiti. The former president would then be brought back to head the government. 

Successful mediation owned much to the U.S. threat of military force if necessary. As part of the 

agreement, the U.S. dispatched 20,000 troops to guarantee a safe transition and Aristide returned 

on 15 October 1994. 

The U.S. military services followed up with the operations SUPPORT DEMOCRACY and 

UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY in which the carriers USS Eisenhower (CV 69) and 

America (CV 66) and the amphibious ship Wasp (LHD 1) participated in a multinational force 

from 14 September 1994 – 24 September 1994. This intervention led to a historic Army-Navy 

collaboration in which the two services prepared for Army air assaults launched from USN 

aircraft carriers. The force not only included forces from the Army’s airborne corps but also a 

Joint Special Operations Task Force (including SEALs, Army Rangers, and the 16th USAF 

Special Operations Wing among others). The Marines aboard were prepared for combat search 

and rescue missions. Because the U.S. forces were able to land peacefully, combat was 

unnecessary. On 31 March 1995 U.S. forces’ peacekeeping operations were taken over by 

international forces. 

Additional Sources: Girard 2004 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Haiti Military 

Regime

7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77 4
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

77

CNA Support 

Democracy

9/1/1993 - 10/18/1994, 413 Haiti, Show of 

Force

USN, USMC

CNA 

III

Uphold/Restore 

Democracy

9/8/94 - 4/17/95, 222 Haiti, Show of 

Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY 

81. # 412: Iraq Troop Deployment Kuwait; 10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35 

This crisis had its origin in the Iraqi troop deployment and involved Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 

the United States on 7 October 1994. The U.S. responded within a day and deployed the aircraft 

carrier Eisenhower (CV 69), accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles to 

demonstrate resolve. Air Force and Navy units already in the area as part of the operation 

SOUTHERN WATCH, formed forces in operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The U.S. 

commitment to Saudi Arabia was reaffirmed. Although Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 

October, the U.S. increased its military strength in the region so as to respond quickly to future 

threats. The crisis ended on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed the declaration of 

"Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political 

independence". 

Additional vessels supporting VIGILANT WARRIOR included the USS George Washington

(CVN 73) battle group, the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), Amphibious Ready Group, 15th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (SOC), and Military Sealift Command ships. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Iraq Troop 

Deployment 

Kuwait

10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35 3

CNA 

III

Vigilant Warrior 10/7/1994 - 12/31/1994, 86 Kuwait, Show of 

Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

78

82. # 415: Taiwan Strait IV; 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307 

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at loggerheads following the 

visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit to Cornell University. This 

gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, increased the PRC’s fear of growing 

American support for Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to coerce the United States to 

commit formally to a “one-China policy,” the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in 

the Taiwan Strait beginning in July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response 

until, according to Robert Ross, 19 December18, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through 

the Taiwan Strait marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976. When the 

Chinese activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. 

In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the successful 

conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended. 

It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, the 

effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which 

action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré (2001) questions the 

contribution of the two CVs, Ross (2000; 2002) sees their deployments as successful coercive 

diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement and 

confirming American commitment. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 8, Gouré 2001, Ross 2000 and 2002, Scarlett 2009 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Taiwan Strait IV 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307 3

CNA 

III 

Taiwan Flexible 

Deterrence

3/1/1996 - 4/17/1996, 48 China, Show of 

Force

USN

83. # 419: Desert Strike; 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15 

On 31 August 1996 Iraqi forces entered in the Kurdish civil war on behalf of the Kurdish 

Democratic Party (KDP). Because the Iraqi troops crossed the 36h Parallel, violating the safe 

zone agreement, their mobilization brought them into conflict with the United States. Air sorties 

 

18 Scarlett (2009) only mentions the deployments the following March.
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

79

over Iraq were increased, followed by operation DESERT STRIKE, bombing Iraqi targets on 3 

and 4 September. President Clinton announced he would not tolerate any violation of the 

agreement and would react with force. Additionally the safe zone in the South was increased 

from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. The U.S. attempt to convince the UN to adopt a resolution 

condemning the Iraqi violation was unsuccessful. Iraq tried to oppose the increase of the 

exclusion zones but after U.S. forces destroyed the air defense system, Iraq agreed to the new 

zones and declared not to interfere with U.S. patrols anymore. This declaration terminated the 

crisis for Iraq and the United States. 

The CVBG Carl Vinson (CV 70) was part of DESERT STRIKE, together with the USS Laboon 

(DDG 58) and Shiloh (CG 67). USN forces fired 14 of the total of 26 cruise missiles. The 

remaining 13 were fired by Air Force B-52s, escorted by F-14s from Carl Vinson. On the second 

day, strikes were fired from the destroyers Russell (DDG 59), Hewitt (DD 966), Laboon and the 

nuclear-powered attack submarine Jefferson City (SSN 759). The USS Enterprise (CV 65) who 

had been operating in the Mediterranean was ordered to the Persian Gulf and arrived in the 

theater two days after receiving the order to augment the displayed force. 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Desert Strike

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Desert Strike 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15 4

CNA 

III 

Desert Strike 9/3/1996 - 9/4/1997, 367 Iraq, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

84. # 421: Zaire Civil War; 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221 

In response to the threat by the government of Zaire (on 8 October 1996) to treat the 

Banyamulenge as rebels if they did not leave the country within 6 days, they launched attacks 

against the Zairian army and refugee camps. Around 1,000,000 Hutu refugees from neighboring 

Rwanda and Burundi fled from their camps in Zaire in reaction to the unrest. These 

developments triggered a crisis for Zaire and Rwanda. Zaire accused Rwanda and Burundi of 

training and arming the rebels. Both rejected the accusations. When Zairian forces shelled a 

Rwandan town on 29 October, Rwanda dispatched troops to Eastern Zaire. The Banyamulenge 

together with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL) 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

80

carried out successful attacks in Eastern Zaire, creating a buffer zone between Rwanda and the 

rest of Zaire. Because the Zairian president was abroad and the Zairian army was incapable of 

halting the adversary, the political stability of the country was endangered through a threatened 

army coup. Parliament reacted by demanding the departure of all Tutsis from Zaire on 1 

November. The following day the ADFL with the help of the Rwandan army, brought East Zaire 

under their control. This resulted in mass demonstrations demanding war against Rwanda and 

Burundi and lead to attacks on Tutsi properties. More than 1,000,000 Rwandan and over 100,000 

Burundian Hutu had fled from the violence in Eastern Zaire. Alarmed by these high numbers the 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for immediate international intervention 

to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis. The ADFL announced a cease fire during which refugees 

might return to Rwanda, and approved the UN request for supplying humanitarian aid. U.S., 

Canada, U.K., South Africa and other African states approved the dispatch of UN-sponsored 

forces to eastern Zaire. Additionally the U.S. agreed to send 1,000 American troops. The 

multinational military force was ready on 14 November but the return of refugees seemed to 

make such intervention unnecessary. After the termination of the cease fire fighting resumed and 

on 20 January 1997 and Zaire declared war against the rebels. In February the UN Security 

Council adopted a peace plan and in March, following further escalations, a multinational force 

was deployed to Congo to stand by for possible evacuations of foreign nationals. When president 

Mobutu of Zaire returned on 21 March he urged the parties to agree on a cease fire and to 

assume talks. During the peace-talks, led by the President of South Africa, Mobutu agreed to step 

down after new elections whereas Kabila, the head of the ADFL demanded an immediate 

handover of power to his forces. Mobutu’s resignation on 16 May ended the crisis and Kabila 

assumed power as the head of the new Democratic Republic of Congo. 

The confused developments in Zaire led the U.S. to prepare19 for the possible evacuation of U.S. 

citizens. In November 1996, the USS Nassau (LHA 4) left port with the Mediterranean 

Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 97-1) to participate in operation SILVER WAKE off 

Albania. During this assignment Nassau was redeployed in support of Operation GUARDIAN 

RETRIEVAL in Zaire. Together with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 

Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) on board, the USN vessel steamed to the coast of Zaire. 

President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of 

 

19 Joint Task Force Headquarters for the US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

81

U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for American 

private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be 

available for evacuation if necessary. Nassau’s deployment lasted about one month before the 

USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) relieved the vessel20. 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Guardian Retrieval, Grimmett 2010

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Zaire Civil War 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221 3

CNA 

III

Guardian 

Retrieval

3/22/1997 - 6/5/1997, 76 Zaire, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USAF

85. # 422: UNSCOM I; 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102 

UNSCOM was established to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons 

programs while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focused on the nuclear 

program. The Iraqi eviction of all U.S. UNSCOM personnel on 13 November 1997 brought an 

immediate U.S. response - the next day U.S. forces in the area were mobilized and (CENTCOM) 

responded with a land, sea, and air strike force of more than 35,000 U.S. and coalition forces. 

These activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Tensions reached a high point when Iraq interfered in 

the inspection of a UNSCOM team accusing the American leader of espionage and expelling him 

from the country. The UN Security Council was deeply divided on an appropriate response. 

During the first two months of 1998 the U.S. advocated military strikes against Iraq while other 

members (with the exception of the UK) favored a diplomatic solution of the crisis. On 20 

February the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in Baghdad and defused the immediate 

crisis. With U.S. approval, an agreement was signed, reaffirming the authorities of UNSCOM. 

However President Clinton made it clear that U.S. forces would remain on alert until Iraq 

conformed to the new agreement. 

 

20 Globalsecurity points to a difficulty in operations in Africa: “The vast continent of Africa provides some real 

challenges to a military planner as well as fuel suppliers. Re-supply for remote facilities can take several days to 

transport jet fuel one way, in extremely difficult terrain. Limited bridger support (truck-transport) and small storage 

tanks are commonplace. During Operation Guardian Retrieval, the Air Force planned missions through Libreville, 

Gabon, expecting a certain amount of fuel based on contractor stated capabilities. Their capability was no where 

near this quantity, and the airport even ran out of fuel at one point”. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

82

As part of the mobilization effort the USS George Washington (CV 73) was sent to the Persian 

Gulf to join the Nimitz (CV 68) battle group. To maintain the two carrier battle group presence, 

the USS Independence (CV 62) relieved Nimitz on station a few months later. USN vessels and 

allied/coalition ships made up a force of 50 ships and submarines and 200 naval aircraft to flex 

muscles and support the diplomatic initiatives. The deployment of the USS George Washington

was followed by the dispatch of military aircraft on 20 November. Naval and Air forces were 

both prepared to launch airstrikes. Force, however did not become necessary and in early June 

the USS Independence returned to Japan. This was the largest multinational mobilization since 

the Gulf War and this demonstration of force deterred Iraqi aggression and coerced compliance 

with UNSCOM. 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB UNSCOM I 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102 3

CNA 

III 

Desert Thunder 10/1/1997 - 5/28/1998, 239 Iraq, Show of Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF

86. # 424: Ethiopia – Eritrea; 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950 

6 May saw violent confrontations between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Each government 

accused the other with invasion. Mediation attempts by regional and international leaders were 

unsuccessful and by late May each had mobilized additional forces leading to a full-scale war 

between the two nations. A peace plan, drafted by the U.S. and Rwanda and supported by the 

OAU, was conditionally approved by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea. Ethiopia demanded 

Eritrean withdrawal from Ethiopian territory which Eritrea claimed for itself. Fighting resumed 

until both parties reluctantly agreed on an OAU peace plan, which eased tensions for eight 

months before fighting broke out again (23 February 2000). Again, each blamed the other for 

initiating the violence. The violence ended on 12 December when both countries signed a peace 

agreement drafted with the help of the OAU. 

The U.S. was engaged unsuccessfully as a mediator, and provided evacuation operations. 

Seaborne forces supported Operation SAFE DEPARTURE and evacuated 105 Americans and 67 

third country nationals. Elements from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 

Capable) evacuated the foreign citizens on 6 June 1998 as a precautionary measure. Marine 

aircraft transported the evacuees to Amman in Jordan. The 11th MEU(SOC) was on a six-month 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

83

deployment aboard the ships of the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) Amphibious Ready Group, which 

includes USS Tarawa, USS Denver (LPD 9), and USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39). 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Safe Departure

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Ethiopia – Eritrea 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950 2

CNA 

III 

Safe Departure 6/6/1998 - 6/17/1998, 12 Eritrea, NEO

USN, USMC

CNA 

III

Eritrea 11/3/98 - 11/19/98, 17 Eritrea, NEO

USN

87. # 426: DRC Civil War; 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002 

Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 

1998 President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and of his 

chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly thereafter 

fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. Angola, Namibia, 

Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda received support from Uganda. 

The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and 

Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, 

joined shortly after by the two principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, 

and attempts to hold a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 

2002, his son Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul 

Kagame in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and 

Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged 

negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa. 

According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops on both 

sides. The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation 

operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS Saipan (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC) stood 

ready in Operation AUTUMN SHELTER for a possible evacuation of the American embassy 

and U.S citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not required and was 

canceled on 16 August. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

84

Additional Sources: Pritchett (Galrahn) 2009, Global Security: 22nd MEU Assumes Operational 

Control Its Major Subordinate Elements 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB DCR Civil War 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002 3

CNA 

III 

Autumn Shelter 8/10/98 - 8/16/98, 7 Zaire, NEO

USN, USMC, 

USARMY

88. # 427: US Embassy Bombings; 8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13 

On 7 August 1998 the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salam, Tanzania were the 

targets of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded

more than 5,000 others. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. identified Al Qaeda as the primary suspect. 

The U.S. accused the Taliban of allowing Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to operate freely in 

Afghanistan. While the U.S. received international support in condemning the embassy-attacks, 

the Taliban refused to comply with the U.S. request to hand over bin Laden. On 20 August the 

U.S. forces executed retaliatory air strikes over terrorist training grounds in Afghanistan and a 

factory in Sudan. Allegedly a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan’s capital Khartoum, capable of 

producing chemical weapons, was collaborating with Al Qaeda. With the launch of the air strikes 

the crisis ended for all actors. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and included 

assorted naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Sea21. The surface combatants and SSN that fired 

the Tomahawks were already in the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks. 

Additionally, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) sent one Marine Corps Fleet AntiTerrorism Security Team (FAST) each to Kenya and to Tanzania. The teams were charged with 

augmenting the security personnel. Naval Forces Central Command was asked to set up a Joint 

Task Force in Nairobi. Furthermore, the USN dispatched a 30-person SEABEE unit to Kenya 

from Guam to assist in Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE and to locate survivors in the 

buildings, treat the injured and organize repatriation of the American who had died. Marines 

were responsible for external security at the temporary U.S. Embassy location. A Platoon of 

Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed to 

Nairobi, Kenya just weeks before they were scheduled for a routine six month deployment to the 

 

21 According to a Washington Post (Gellman and Priest 1998) article, CVN Abraham Lincoln was involved. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

85

Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf Region. The Marines of 3rd Platoon, Golf 

Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th MEU(SOC) replaced the Fleet Anti-Terrorist 

Security Team of Norfolk VA who had been in Kenya since 9 August. 

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB U.S. Embassy 

Bombings

8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13 4

CNA 

III

Resolute Response 8/7/1998 - 10/18/1998, 73 Kenya/Tanzania, 

security

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

CNA 

III

Sudan/Afghanista

n Strikes

8/20/1998, 1 Sudan/Afghanistan, 

Combat

USN

89. # 429: UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox; 10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50

On 31 October 1998 Iraq refused further collaboration with UNSCOM and demanded that the 

UN reviewed its sanctions and replace Richard Butler as UNSCOM chair as a condition for 

resumed inspections. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding the immediate 

return of UNSCOM to Iraq on 5 November but disagreed about the means for resolving the 

crisis. Only the U.K. and the U.S. voted for the use of military force versus diplomacy. U.K. and 

U.S. forces in the Gulf region were increased unilaterally with the prospect of new military 

strikes. On 14 October Saddam Hussein indicated through diplomatic channels Iraqi’s 

acceptance of UNSCOM inspectors, even as U.S. aircraft was en route to Iraq, yet no further 

steps were taken to cooperate with UNSCOM. U.S. and U.K. forces began operation DESERT 

FOX and airstrikes lasted until 20 December. Although unauthorized by the UN, the U.S. 

claimed prior UN authority threatening severe consequences in case of Iraqi non-compliance 

with UNSCOM. With the termination of DESERT FOX the crisis ended for all actors. No 

resolution had been found in regard to a resumption of UNSCOM activities. 

The main battlegroup supporting the operation was the USS Enterprise (CV 65) which crossed 

the Atlantic in four days and transited the Strait of Gibraltar on 14 November 1998. It entered the 

Strait of Hormuz on 23 November after taking over from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 

69). During DESERT FOX the USN-USMC team launched more than 70 strike and strike-
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

86

support aircraft and in 70 hours of operations the USS Enterprise launched 297 combat sorties. 

The carrier USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) was diverted from her original schedule to Hong Kong and 

Singapore but arrived in the theater only during the last night of operation DESERT FOX. 

Nevertheless, the arrival of the carrier undermined U.S. resolve and relieved USS Enterprise. 

The following USN vessels were involved in operation DESERT FOX: CVBG: USS Enterprise 

(CV 65) and USS Carl Vinson (CV 70), USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), USS Gettysburg (CG 64), 

USS Stout (DDG 55), USS Nicholson (DD 982), USS Hayler (DD 997), USS Klakring (FFG 42), 

USS Miami (SSN 775), USS Hampton (SSN 76), USS Detroit (AOE 4)]; Amphibious Ready 

Group: USS Belleau Wood (LHD 2), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Germantown (LSP 42); Mine 

Countermeasure Squadron: USS Ardent (MCM 12), USS Dextrous (MCM 13). 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB UNSCOM II 

Operation Desert 

Fox

10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50 4

CNA 

III

Desert Viper 11/4/1998 - 11/19/1998, 16 Iraq, Cont. Posit

USN, USMC

CNA 

III

Desert Fox 12/16/1998 - 12/20/1998, 5 Iraq, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

90. # 430: Kosovo; 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109 

Kosovo, with a population compromised of 90% Albanians, became part of Serbia in 1913. 

Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo sought independence. During the fighting 

between Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanian Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) in early 

1998, NATO tried to mediate an agreement. In 23 February 1999, a tentative agreement for 

Kosovo’ autonomy was drafted but the FRY was unwilling to endorse a lasting peace agreement. 

NATO forces bombarded Serbian military targets in operation ALLIED FORCE in a mission 

(March 24, 1999) designed to compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 

and to pull Serbian forces out of the disputed province. NATO hoped to coerce Serbia to 

negotiate. Although initially expected to last only a few days, the operation continued for 78 

days (June 10, 1999) until Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms. Although available, ground troops 

were not deployed. One day after Serbia and NATO signed an agreement, the withdrawal of 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

87

FRY forces from Kosovo began. The UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, to observe the 

implementation of the agreements. 

Operation NOBLE ANVIL was the U.S. component of operation ALLIED FORCE. The USS 

Enterprise (CV 65) was deployed to the Adriatic Sea on 19 February and supported the buildup 

to the operation during 22 – 26 February 1999. The aircraft carriers Enterprise and Theodore 

Roosevelt (CV 71) supported by land-based squadrons and detachments, proved key to the 

resolution of the fighting in Kosovo. The Kearsarge (LHD 3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 

operated together with the USS Roosevelt. 

Murphy (1999) concluded: “The Navy contribution to ... the air campaign in Kosovo, although 

low profile, was nonetheless very significant. The Tomahawk shooters, in and of themselves, 

destroyed nearly 50 percent [of the] fixed target list in key categories such as the Serb army and 

police headquarters. ... We were able to keep nine Tomahawk shooters in-theater. Those nine 

sustained the air campaign in the first couple of weeks when the laser-guided bomb droppers 

could not find targets because of bad weather. And if it hadn't been for those nine, we would 

have stalled."The [carrier] Theodore Roosevelt arrived 14 days after the start [of hostilities]. 

Nonetheless, with only 8 percent of the total dedicated aircraft [deployed by NATO], [it was] 

credited with 30 percent of the validated kills against fielded forces in Kosovo". 

Burg (2003, 70) describes Kosovo as a failure of coercive diplomacy.”The singular emphasis on 

airpower in Kosovo, and the belief among some senior U.S. policymakers that all it would take 

would be a few days of bombing, appears to have been based on a faulty interpretation of the 

events surrounding the endgame in Bosnia. This conviction, as well as concerns about the 

domestic political costs of committing ground troops, led U.S. policymakers to take even the 

possibility of deploying ground forces “off the table” and thus to weaken the coercive threat they 

were attempting to construct”. 

Additional Sources: Baker and Evans 2001, 18, Burg 2003, 70; Murphy 1999, Rand 2001 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Kosovo 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109 4

CNA 

III

Noble Anvil 2/20/1999 - 7/2/1999, 133 Kosovo, Combat

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

88

CNA 

III

Joint Guardian 6/4/1999 - 7/20/1999, 47 Kosovo, 

Peacekeeping

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

91. # 432: East Timor II; 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 

On 4 November elections in East Timor resulted in a majority vote for independence from 

Indonesia who had controlled East Timor since 1975. This vote resulted in an outbreak of 

violence in East Timor where Indonesian army forces supported pro-Indonesian militias. A crisis 

was experienced by Australia and Indonesia. Australia, worried by the outbreak of violence and 

instability in relative close proximity, was committed to a peaceful settlement in contrast to 

Indonesia. The United Nations authorized a peace-keeping force (INTERFET) led by Australia 

to restore peace and security, protect refugees and provide humanitarian aid. Indonesia accepted 

the UN troops but remained highly critical of the Australian involvement. When on 19 October 

Indonesia’s parliament approved East Timor’s vote for independence the crisis ended. 

Subsequently UN troops took over the peacekeeping mission. 

On 8 October the United States announced the deployment of U.S. forces, including the USS 

Belleau Wood (LHA 3) and personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, to support 

INTERFET. The U.S. forces provided helicopter airlifts and search and rescue missions until the 

peacekeeping operation was transferred from Australia to the UN. After the crisis had ended, the 

U.S. announced the deployment of U.S. military personnel to support of the United Nations 

Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to guarantee law and order and protect 

humanitarian assistance activities. 

One of the lessons of the East Timor operations was the way in which naval units could conduct 

many different activities concurrently and for extended periods. “In a typical day in theatre, a 

single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat 

readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance 

picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling 

platform for maritime and land helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxations for land 

component personnel, provide communication facilities and support logistics over the shore” 

(Scott Richard quoted in Ryan 2000b, 80-81). McLaughlin (2002, 112) describes the strike 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

89

capability of naval forces as a “protective umbrella” shielding the ground forces so they could 

focus their attention on their peacekeeping mission without hindrance. 

Additional Sources: Grimmett 2010; McLaughlin 2002; Ryan 2000b 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB East Timor II 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 3

CNA 

III 

Stabilize 9/10/1999 - 3/1/2000, 174 Indonesia, Peace 

Ops

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

92. # 434: Afghanistan – USA; 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001 

The crisis was triggered by the Al Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 

11 September 2001. The United States accused Afghanistan of hosting the terrorists. Pakistan 

was implicated because of its ties to the Taliban and offered help by trying to persuade the 

Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. President George W. Bush declared to carry the fight to 

the attackers and its network of allies, especially the Taliban. Initially the world community 

supported the United States in its acts of self-defense. On 7 October military operations against 

Afghanistan began with cruise missile attacks and bombing raids. Both air and ground forces 

were involved. By 23 November Kabul, the capital was under U.S. control. After mediation 

efforts Hamid Karzai became the head of the interim government and was installed on 5 

December. 2 days later Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, fell to U.S. forces. Although this 

brought an end to the immediate crisis, the conflict is unsettled and after 11 years Afghanistan 

remains critically unstable. 

Naval forces played a crucial role. Within hours after the attack on the United States, naval 

vessels were on their way to the Arabian Gulf. One carrier was already stationed in the Indian 

Ocean and was soon joined by another CVBG group. Gaffney (2002, 1 – 2) calculated that it 

took about one month “to prepare [the U.S.] retaliatory plans, assemble the forces, and secure 

some initial bases as well as using existing bases in the Gulf area and Diego Garcia”. Only 5 

days after the attacks the USS Enterprise (CV 65) and the USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) were in the 

Southwest and South Asia region. The USS Vinson had already departed towards the Persian 

Gulf in July 2001 to participate in operation SOUTHERN WATCH. After the attacks the carrier 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

90

changed route and steamed to the North Arabian Sea. When the call for action was announced on 

7 October the USS Vinson launched the first strikes of ENDURING FREEDOM. The carrier 

remained in the Arabian Sea for 72 days, conducting more than 4,200 combat sorties, until midDecember. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CV 42) moved her scheduled deployment date forward 

to 19 September. After traversing the Suez Canal on 13 October 2001 the Roosevelt carrier battle 

group arrived in the Arabian Sea on 15 October 2001. After a record breaking 159 consecutive 

days at sea, the carrier was relieved on 27 March 2002. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV 73) left port at 

the Yokosuka naval base for the Arabian Sea on 1 October 2001 until 23 December 2001 and 

flew more than 600 missions over Afghanistan, including more than 100 combat sorties. The 

USS John Stennis (CV 74) was sent to support ENDURING FREEDOM from 12 November 

2001 to 28 May 2002. 

An average of 200 sorties was flown per day with the same efficiency compared to 3,000 sorties 

a day during DESERT STORM. Whereas 10 aircraft were needed during DESERT STORM for 

one target, one aircraft could hit two targets during ENDURING FREEDOM. In the most intense 

period from 7 October to 23 December 2001, U.S. strike missions totaled in 6,500. USN carrierbased planes conducted 75% (4,900) of the strike-missions, and the Air Force 25%. Additionally 

the USN delivered 12,900 weapons (>70% of the total). 

Additional Sources: CNN 2001; Gaffney 2002; Global Security (various); Keesing’s

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Afghanistan-USA 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001, 88 4

CNA 

III 

Enduring Freedom 09/16/2001 - Combat Operations

93. #440: Iraq Regime; 09/12/2002 – 05/01/2003 

After 9/11, the Bush administration identified Iraq as the greatest threat to U.S. security, 

accusing Saddam Hussein of controlling weapons of mass destruction. On 12 August 2002 

President Bush declared before the UN General Assembly that the United States insisted on the 

destruction of Iraq’s weapons and termination of its weapons program. Saddam Hussein agreed 

to the unconditional return of the weapons inspectors. Over the next months the United States 

tried to gain world support for an invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq 

on 18 November. As part of the inspections agreement, Iraq had to provide a complete 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

91

declaration of their weapons capabilities. Iraq delivered the report but it contained, according to 

UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, very little new information since 1998. On 19 December 

the U.S. reacted and announced a breach of UN 1441, claiming that the lack of new information 

was a sufficient reason to invade. The United States tried to form a coalition of states supporting 

a military intervention. Although peaceful resolutions were still discussed, the United States 

viewed the inspections as a failure and strongly endorsed a military resolution. U.S. diplomatic 

efforts to garner support for an intervention failed, as too many nations spoke out against military 

action. Only the U.K. and Spain strongly supported the U.S. initiative. Yet the UN weapons 

inspectors continued their work in Iraq and remarked an improvement of Iraqi collaboration. On 

4 March Powell stated U.S. determination to intervene in Iraq unilaterally and in mid March it 

had became apparent that a new UN Security Council Resolution would not pass. Following an 

emergency summit, the U.S., U.K., and Spain issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his 

sons: if they would not leave Iraq within 48 hours U.S military forces would invade. Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM was launched on 20 March with the aim of overrunning Baghdad (“shock 

and awe”), removing Saddam Hussein from power, and finding the weapons of mass destruction. 

On 9 April the coalition forces seized Baghdad. The campaign took longer and the forces met 

more resistance than anticipated but on 1 May President Bush declared victory on board the USS 

Abraham Lincoln (CV 72), although Saddam Hussein had not been captured. In the following 

months the violence in Iraq escalated leading to an insurgency that persisted for several years. 

Only at the end of 2011 did the last U.S. troops leave a still unstable Iraq. 

According to Keesing’s and Fox, seven carrier battle groups were deployed in support of the Iraq 

invasion, five in the Gulf and two in the Mediterranean. In addition there were 3 amphibious 

assault ships, 10 destroyers/frigates, 2 command ships and 1 submarine in the Red Sea/Golf of 

Aden region. In Iraq USN personnel are also active on land. The following words by CNO 

Admiral Roughead describe USN activity in the Middle East. “But I think many are surprised 

that as we deploy our Navy around the world, we have about 24,000 Sailors in the Middle East. 

And they are not all on ships. In fact, we have more Sailors on the ground in Iraq and 

Afghanistan-13,600 to be exact who are there and I call them sand Sailors because we have been 

in that fight with the Army and Marine Corps and the other services for some time. So we have 

over 13,000 Sailors on the ground, some are deployed in regular units, but many are there as 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

92

individual augmentees on the ground and they bring some skills, talent and competence that the 

other services don’t have or don’t have in the numbers that they need”. 

Additional Sources: Global Security (various); Fox 2009, Keesing’s, Roughead 2009b 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Iraq Regime 

Change

9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 3

CNA 

III

OEF-Iraq 11/1/2002/3/19/2003 Show of Force

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

CNA 

III

OIF 03/20/2003 Combat 

Operations

USN, USMC, 

USAF, USARMY

94. #441: North Korean Nuclear III; 10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004 

In 2002 the U.S. concluded that North Korea was running a secret enrichment program and was 

in possession of the necessary technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. On 4 October a U.S. 

delegation, led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James 

Kelly, visited North Korea and confronted them with the U.S. findings. While first denying the 

claims, North Korea later explained its action as a necessity because the U.S. branded them as 

part of the axis of evil, although the secret program had been discovered before 2001. North 

Korea withdrew for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), after the IAEA did not comply 

with the North Korean demands of removing seals and cameras from their nuclear facilities. 

Initially the U.S. refused to directly negotiate with North Korea before the nuclear program was 

destroyed. It reversed its position when it was clear that this furthered North Korea’s 

intransigence. In late August 2003 first talks were held between the U.S., China, Japan, South 

Korea, Russia and North Korea. The first round resulted in a vague agreement to find a solution 

and to continue the talks. On 6 January 2004 North Korea agreed not to test or produce nuclear 

weapons. 

In early February 2003 the United States alerted bombers in the Pacific to reinforce U.S. 

deterrence against any possible North Korean military action. By the end of May 2003 most of 

the B-1Bs and B-52s that had been sent to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam had returned to the 

United States. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

93

Additional Sources: Global Security (various), Wolfowitz 2003 

Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB North Korean 

Nuclear III; 

10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004 2

CNA 

III

North Korean 

Crisis

02/06/2003 – 05/17/2003, 

102

North Korea, Show 

of Force, USN, 

USMC, USAF, 

USARMY

95. # 451: Israel – Lebanon War II; 07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006 

The crisis was triggered on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah troops invaded Lebanese territory and 

attacked an Israeli army patrol. Three Israeli soldiers were killed and two taken hostage and 

rockets were launched on Israel. Israel imposed a naval and air blockade and attacked targets in 

Southern Lebanon (Operation JUST REWARD). Hezbollah justified the attack on the soldiers as 

means of drawing attention to the Arabs, Palestinians and Lebanese held in Israeli prisons. 

Further Israeli attacks in Lebanon, led to a high number of civilian casualties and the evacuation 

of thousands of Lebanese citizens. The international community encouraged both parties to reach 

a cease-fire. The mediation efforts of Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, were 

unsuccessful. The U.S., UN, EU, and the World Bank met to discuss ways of ending the crisis 

and the League of Arab Nations appealed to the UN to protect Lebanon. The fighting however 

continued and the violence escalated. Only when the parties agreed to the UN Security Council 

Resolution 1701 did a cease fire become possible. On 14 August the hostilities officially 

terminated when the cease fire came into effect but de facto some minor clashes continued until 

late August. Lebanon did not join the military conflict but focused on mediation and negotiation. 

On 8 September the Israeli sea and air blockades were lifted, marking end of the crisis. The U.S. 

supplied Israel with precision-guided bombs and evacuated U.S. citizens from Lebanon. 

U.S. evacuation operations began on 16 July 2006. Naval and Marine Corps forces evacuated 

U.S. citizens to Cyprus. A smaller number of people were evacuated by Marine helicopters. On 

17 July the U.S. announced the chartering of the cruise ship Orient Queen to evacuate U.S. 

citizens. The ship left Beirut on 19 July with 900 people aboard. The cruise ship, heading to 

Cyprus, was being escorted by the USS Gonzalez (DDG 66). Additionally U.S. sailors and 

marines from the Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

94

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with the ships Iwo Jima, USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Whidbey 

Island (LSD 41), USS Trenton (LPD 14) and High Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) supported the 

operation. With the deployment of the USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), 

USS Big Horn (T-AO 198), and USS Wasp (LHD 1) more vessels arrived in the theater. On 26 

July final NEO operations were carried out by U.S. military forces. A total of almost 14,000 U.S. 

citizens had been evacuated by sea. The NOC (2006) comes to the following conclusion after the 

Lebanon evacuation operation: “Our command and control capability, both afloat and ashore, as 

well as our ability to operate in and from the world’s oceans, will continue to make our forces 

well suited for global crisis response in the future”. 

Additional Sources: Global Security: Lebanon Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) 

2006; NOC 2006 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Israel – Lebanon 

War II

07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006 3

Lebanon NEO 

Operation 2006

07/16/2006 – 07/26/2006, 10 Lebanon, NEO, 

USN, USMC

0 CV & AMP

96. # 452: Ethiopia Invasion Somalia; 10/09/2006 – 01/02/200722

The crisis broke out when Somali soldiers, supported by Ethiopian forces, temporarily took over 

a strategic town in the South of Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), in control of 

Mogadishu and most of South Somalia issued a fatah declaring war on Ethiopia. Meanwhile 

fighting between the UIC and the transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia continued. 

When the UIC announced the capture of an Ethiopian officer, Ethiopia confessed the deployment 

of military advisers to Somalia. Despite mediation attempts by Sudan, fighting between Islamic 

forces and Ethiopian forces erupted in northern Somalia in early November. On 6 December the 

UN Security Council passed a U.S. backed resolution authorizing regional peacekeeping forces. 

The arms embargo in effect against Somalia was weakened as a result. The African Union also 

sought a resolution to the crisis, but hostilities continued and tensions escalated. In midDecember Yemen tried to mediate between the parties to no avail. Ethiopia refused to withdraw 

from Somalia. The United States supported Ethiopia’s right of self defense. On 2 January 

 

22 Because I was not able to determine with sufficient certainty whether USN involvement occurred during the ICB 

crisis period this case was excluded from the statistical analyses. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix A. Crises Summaries

95

Ethiopia achieved victory through the defeat of the UIC, and it announced the withdrawal of the 

troops. The United States had supported Ethiopia with military aid and equipment. Reuters 

reported that according to diplomats United States had provided Ethiopia with surveillance and 

intelligence information. According to Axe (2008), “U.S. Army advisers from the Guam 

National Guard trained Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian aircraft flew with U.S.-funded parts. And 

American warplanes targeted suspected terrorists at the same time that the Ethiopian army and its 

allies in the Baidoa-based transitional government forces routed Islamic Courts fighters that 

Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi said had been on the cusp of "Talibanizing" Somalia”. 

The Associate Press (2007) printed the following information: “U.S. Defense Department 

officials said last month that a Navy strike group being sent to the Persian Gulf region as a show 

of force to Iran, at odds with the United States over its nuclear program and over Iraq, also would 

be available to help off Somalia. A U.S. Navy officer in the Gulf said Friday that the only U.S. 

aircraft carrier in the region, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, out of Norfolk, Virginia, was not being 

deployed to the Somali coast. The officer said he could not discuss the possibility of other 

carriers moving into the zone. However, the officer, noting media reports about another aircraft 

carrier, the USS John Stennis, said it as of yesterday had not been ordered to move to the region. 

The officer asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue”. In the New York 

Times Gettleman (2007) wrote “Islamists were widely believed to have been sheltering several 

wanted terrorists, and American officials said they were hoping to use the swift collapse of the 

Islamist forces as an opportunity to capture men they have been chasing for years. Ships from the 

Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy, based in Bahrain, have increased patrols off Somalia’s 

coast to prevent any suspects from escaping. “Yes, we have a presence out there,” said Lt. 

Denise Garcia, a spokeswoman for the Fifth Fleet”23

. 

Additional Sources: Associated Press 2007, Axe 2008, Gettleman 2007, Reuters 2007 

Dataset Dates U.S. Response Ships involved

ICB Ethiopia Invasion 

Somalia

10/09/2006 – 01/02/2007 3

? ? ? ?

 

23 The engagement of the USN in Somalia can also be attributed to the growing piracy concerns. While in late 2007 

the number of incidents had not reached their peak yet, pirates were active in the region. However, the counterpiracy Combined Task Force 151 was only established in January 2009 (United States Navy 2009d). 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

96

Appendix B: Data 

B.1. Variable Codebook24

B.1.1. Dependent Variables 

Y1 – Y3 refers to all the different service type combination variables: servicetype1, servicetype2 

and USNUSMCTEAM. All three variations are explained in detail in Chapter 3. 

ATTITUDE TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT (y4) 

Based on the ICB2 variable usfavr, this variable was transformed into usfavr2.

usfavr usfavr2 (y4) 

(1) U.S. activity viewed favorably (1) U.S. activity viewed favorably 

(2) U.S. activity viewed neutrally (2) U.S. activity viewed neutrally 

(3) U.S. activity viewed unfavorably (3) U.S. activity viewed unfavorably 

(4) U.S. inactivity viewed favorable (9) MD

(5) U.S. inactivity viewed neutrally (9) MD

(6) U.S. inactivity viewed unfavorably (9) MD

(8) U.S. crisis actor (9) MD

(9) MD (9) MD

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y5) 

This variable was adapted from the ICB1 variable usefct. The value “U.S. not active” was 

eliminated by the case selection. 

usefct usefct2 (y5) 

(1) No U.S. activity (9) No U.S. activity 

(2) U.S. activity escalated the crisis (1) U.S. activity escalated the crisis 

(3) U.S. activity did not contribute to (2) No contribution / 

crisis abatement Marginal contribution 

(4) U.S. activity contributed marginally (2) No contribution / 

to crisis abatement Marginal contribution 

(5) U.S. activity had an important (3) Important/Most important impact 

 

24 For a more detailed description of the categories please refer to the ICB1 and ICB2 codebooks online at 

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

97

 impact on the crisis abatement 

(6) U.S. activity was the single most important (3) Important/Most important impact 

contributor to crisis abatement 

(9) MD (9) MD

MOST EFFECTIVE TYPE OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y6) 

The most effective type of U.S. activity is adapted from the same ICB1 variable without any 

modifications. The value “U.S. not involved” has already been eliminated by the case selection. 

usefac usefac2 (y6) 

(1) U.S. not involved (9) MD

(2) U.S. ineffective (1) U.S. ineffective 

(3) Effective low-level U.S. activity (2) Effective low-level U.S. activity 

(4) Effective U.S. military activity (3) Effective U.S. military activity 

(9) MD (9) MD

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO PACE OF ABATEMENT (y7) 

This variable was modified from the ICB1 uspace variable. The values “U.S. not active” and 

“U.S. activity delayed termination” were excluded. The former has already been eliminated by 

the case selection and the latter did not show enough frequencies. 

uspace uspace2 (y7) 

(1) No U.S. activity (9) MD

(2) U.S. activity delayed termination (9) MD

(3) U.S. activity had no effect on the timing (1) U.S. activity had no effect on the 

 of termination timing of termination 

(4) U.S. activity contributed to more rapid (2) U.S. activity contributed to more 

 termination rapid termination 

(9) MD (9) MD

DEFINITE OUTCOME (y8) 

The outcome variable was adapted from the ICB2 variable content of outcome.
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

98

outcome outcome2 (y8) 

(1) Victory (1) Victory 

(2) Compromise (2) Compromise 

(3) Stalemate (3) Stalemate 

(4) Defeat (4) Defeat 

(5) Other (9) MD

(9) MD (9) MD

AGREEMENT (y9) 

This variable is adapted from the ICB2 variable form of outcome. 

outfor outfor2 (y9) 

(1) Formal agreement (1) Formal agreement 

(2) Semi-formal agreement (2) Understanding 

(3) Tacit understanding (2) Understanding 

(4) Unilateral – self (3) Unilateral 

(5) Unilateral – ally (3) Unilateral 

(6) Unilateral – adversary (3) Unilateral 

(7) Compliance (2) Understanding 

(8) Imposed – imposer (4) Imposed 

(9) Imposed – impose (4) Imposed 

(10) Spillover (9) MD

(11) Other – glob. org. intervention (9) MD

(12) Other – ally (9) MD

(13) Other – internal or non-state actor (9) MD

(14) Other – misc. (9) MD

(15) Faded (9) MD

(99) MD (9) MD

TENSION (y10) 

This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scale. 

outesr outesr2 (y10) 

(1) Tension escalation (1) Tension escalation 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

99

(2) Tension reduction (2) Tension reduction 

(3) Recent case (3) MD

(9) MD (9) MD

SATISFACTION (y11) 

This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scaled variable. 

outevl outevl2 (y11) 

(1) All parties satisfied with content (1) All parties satisfied 

 of outcome 

(2) Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries (2) At least one party not satisfied 

 dissatisfied 

(3) Adversaries satisfied, crisis actor (2) At least one party not satisfied 

 dissatisfied 

(4) All parties dissatisfied (2) At least one party not satisfied 

(9) MD (9) MD

SATISFACTION-ATTITUDE MIX (y12) 

In a next step the variable actor satisfaction (y11) was combined with attitude towards U.S. 

activity (y4) 

Satisfaction-attitude mix (y12) 

(1) Not favorable and not all satisfied 

(2) Not favorable and all satisfied 

(3) Favorable/neutral and not all satisfied 

(4) Favorable/neutral and all satisfied 

(9) MD
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

100

B.1.2. Independent Variables 

GRAVITY OF VALUE THREAT (x1) 

The variable gravity of threat was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into gravcr2 

and gravcr3 by collapsing categories. 

gravcr gravcr2 (x1a) gravcr3(x1b)

(1) Economic threat (1) Low level threat (1) Low level threat 

(2) Limited military damage (1) Low level threat (1) Low level threat 

(3) Territorial threat (2) Territory or influence (2) Territory 

(4) Threat to influence (2) Territory or influence (3) Influence 

(5) Threat of grave damage (3) Grave threat (4) Grave threat 

(6) Threat to existence (3) Grave threat (4) Grave threat 

(9) MD (9) MD (9) MD 

ISSUES (x2) 

Possible issues for the crisis actors are in the area of military-security, political-diplomatic, 

economic-developmental or cultural-status (ICB2). The variable issue2 was adapted from the 

ICB1 variable issues, collapsing several categories. 

issue issue2 (x2) 

(1) One issues other than military-security (1) 1 -2 issues non military-security 

(2) Two issues other than military-security (1) 1 –2 issues non military security 

(3) Military-security issue alone (2) Military-security issue alone 

(4) Two issues, including military-security (3) 2 -4 issues 

(5) Three or more issues (3) 2 -4 issues 

(9) MD (9) MD

VIOLENCE (x3) 

The variable violence was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any modifications. 

violence (x3) 

(1) No violence 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

101

(2) Minor clashes 

(3) Serious clashes 

(4) Full scale war 

(9) MD 

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (x4) 

The variable geographic location was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a 

binary variable geogloc2 employing the categorization for strategic locations by Blechman and 

Kaplan 1978. 

geogloc geogloc2 (x4) 

(9) Central Asia (0) Not strategic location 

(11) East Asia (1) Strategic location 

(12) South-east Asia (1) Strategic location 

(13) South Asia (0) Not strategic location 

(15) Middle East (1) Strategic location 

(20) West Africa (0) Not strategic location 

(21) North Africa (0) Not strategic location 

(22) East Africa (0) Not strategic location 

(23) Southern Africa (0) Not strategic location 

(24) Central Africa (0) Not strategic location 

(30) Euro-Asia (0) Not strategic location 

(31) East Europe (1) Strategic location 

(32) Central Europe (1) Strategic location 

(33) West Europe (1) Strategic location 

(34) North Europe (1) Strategic location 

(35) Southern Europe (1) Strategic location 

(41) North America (9) Missing data 

(42) Central America (1) Strategic location 

(43) South America (0) Not strategic location 

(51) Australasia (0) Not strategic location 

(99) MD (9) MD

GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE (x5) 

The variable geostrategic salience was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a 

binary variable geostr2. 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

102

geostr geostr2 (x5) 

(1) One subsystem (1) Subsystem 

(2) More than one subsystem (1) Subsystem 

(3) Dominant system and one subsystem (2) Dominant/Global system 

(4) Dominant system and more than one subsystem (2) Dominant/Global system 

(5) Global system (2) Dominant/Global system 

(9) MD (9) MD

NUMBER OF ACTORS (x6) 

The variables crisis actors was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes. 

cractr (x6) 

Metric: Total number of crisis actors. 

UN INVOLVEMENT (x7) 

This variable was transformed from the ICB1 variable global organization organ most active in 

crisis (globorg). 

globorg globorg2 (x7) 

(1) GO not in existence (1918 – 10 Jan. 1920) (9) MD

(2) No global organization activity (1) No UN activity 

(3) General/other global organization activity (2) Low level UN activity 

(4) (General) Assembly (2) Low level UN activity 

(5) (Security) Council (3) Security Council 

(9) MD (9) MD

STABILITY (x8) 

This variable was generated by combining the ICB2 variables government stability (gvinst) and 

societal unrest (socunr). 

Gvinst 
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

103

(1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(4) Newly independent state, government in exile 

(9) MD

socunr 

(1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis 

(4) Newly independent state, government in exile 

(9) MD

For each variable values 3 and 4 were recoded into missing data. The new binary variables were 

combined as follows: 

stability (x8)

(1) Significant increase in governmental instability but normal level of societal unrest 

(2) Significant increase in both governmental instability and societal unrest 

(3) Normal level of government stability but significant increase in societal unrest 

(4) Both normal level 

(9) MD

CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY (x9) 

The variable content of U.S. activity was adapted from the ICB1 dataset. Except for the value 

U.S. not active all other categories were maintained. The category U.S. not active has already 

been eliminated by the case selection. 

usinv usinv2 (x9) 

(1) U.S. not active (9) MD

(2) Low-level U.S. activity (2) Low-level U.S. activity 

(3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity (3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity 

(4) U.S. direct military activity (4) U.S. direct military activity 

(9) MD (9) MD
Seaborne Crisis Response Appendix B. Data

104

 U.S. ACTOR IN CRISIS (x10) 

The variable U.S. actor in crisis was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes. 

usactor (x10) 

(1) U.S. not an actor in crisis 

(2) U.S. actor in crisis 

(9) MD

NAVAL REACTION TIME (x11) 

elaps (x11) 

Metric: Elapsed time between crisis trigger date and naval response start measured in numbers. 

USN FORCES ABROAD (x12) 

USNabroad (x12) 

Metric: Number of USN personnel abroad per year. Data retrieved from Department of Defense, 

Deployment of Military Personnel by Country. Data is available as of 1950, for the years prior 

the variable was coded as missing data.