Department of Homeland Security
 

US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and 

Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities 

(Redacted) 

OIG-12-111 August 2012
 
MEMORANDUM FOR:

August 13, 2012 

Robert A. Mocny 

Director 

US-VISIT 

FROM: Frank Deffer

Assistant Inspector General

Information Technology Audits 

SUBJECT: Letter Report: US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and

Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities

Attached for your information is our final letter report, US-VISIT Faces Challenges in 

Identifying and Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities. We incorporated the formal

comments from the National Protection and Programs Directorate in the final report. 

The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving US-VISIT. Your office

concurred with both recommendations. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland

Security Directive 077-1, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General

Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please 

provide our office with a written response that includes your 1) agreement or

disagreement, 2) corrective action plan, and 3) target completion date for each 

recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other supporting

documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation.

Until your response is received and evaluated, the recommendations will be considered

open and unresolved.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Major contributors to this report are John Kelly, Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector

General; Tuyet-Quan Thai, Regional Director; Scott Wrightson, Audit Manager; and Josh

Wilshere, Forensic Auditor. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Quan Thai, Regional

Director, at 425-582-7861. 

Attachment 
Background

US-VISIT is a program administered by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s)

National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD). US-VISIT’s goals are to enhance the 

security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the 

integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of visitors. To achieve

these goals, the program processes and maintains biographic and biometric information

collected by other Federal entities such as the State Department and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP).1

 US-VISIT also shares information on the entry and departure 

of foreign visitors who pass through U.S. ports of entry. US-VISIT processes biometric

information such as fingerprints and photographs that, along with other biographic and

biometric information that it shares with other Federal entities, can be used to verify

foreign nationals’ identities, authenticate travel documents, and determine the 

admissibility of visitors, immigrants, and refugees. The biometric identification services

that US-VISIT provides are designed to help decision makers throughout the 

immigration, border management, law enforcement, and intelligence communities to

accurately identify the people they encounter and determine whether those people

pose a risk to the United States.

As the repository of biometric and biographic data, US-VISIT interfaces with numerous

other Federal systems, including the following:

Advance Passenger Information System

Arrival Departure Information System

Automated Biometric Identification System

Computer Linked Application Information Management Systems

Consular Consolidated Database

Image Storage and Retrieval System 

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System

DHS/CBP-011 TECS 

These systems provide biometric and biographic information to US-VISIT for foreign

visitors, visa applicants, and certain criminals. US-VISIT personnel can then analyze this

information and share it with other Federal, State, and local entities.

1 Biographic information may include a person’s name and date of birth. Biometric information may

include a person’s fingerprint image or photograph collected at a port of entry.
According to the US-VISIT program office, for each encounter (i.e., each time an

international traveler passes through a U.S. port of entry), US-VISIT checks the person’s

biometrics against a biometric watch list of more than 6.4 million known or suspected 

terrorists, criminals, and immigration violators identified by U.S. authorities and

Interpol. When a foreign visitor presents an identification document, US-VISIT can 

check the person’s biometrics against other files that could be accessed to ensure that

the document belongs to the person presenting it and not to someone else. Finally,

other Federal law enforcement and Intelligence Community organizations can request 

that US-VISIT provide biographic and biometric information in the course of their

investigations and/or research.

Results of Review 

US-VISIT faces challenges in systematically identifying and flagging potential use of

fraudulent biographic identities. Our analysis of Automated Biometric Identification 

System (IDENT) data found 825,000 instances where the same fingerprints were

associated with different biographic data.2

 These differences ranged from misspelled

names and transposed birth dates to completely different names and birth dates.

According to US-VISIT officials, US-VISIT has instituted programs to identify individuals

who may have overstayed the condition of their visas, and has performed manual

procedures to analyze entry and exit data to associate fingerprints with biographic

information. However, US-VISIT has not developed

This information may

assist CBP officers in identifying aliens using potentially fraudulent information at ports

of entry. 

Although most of the hundreds of thousands of discrepant records involve data integrity

errors likely occurring at the point of collection, we found instances where individuals

may have supplied different names and dates of birth at ports of entry. In some cases,

we found that individuals used different biographic identities at a port of entry after 

they had applied for a visa under a different name or been identified as a recidivist alien. 

2

 The 825,000 records represent 0.2 percent of overall IDENT encounter data we received from US-VISIT. 

Although this is a very small percentage of the total records, the volume of records makes it significant. 3 Other controls during the entry process may help to mitigate some risk of biographic identity fraud. For

example, during the biovisa application process for people from countries who are required to have visas

to enter the United States, State Department personnel are supposed to check a person’s fingerprints

against all previous biographic records for that set of fingerprints to ensure that the person has not

previously used a different set of biographic information to enter the United States. 
The “Data Quality Act”4

 or “Information Quality Act” requires Federal agencies to use

and disseminate accurate information. Inaccurate and inconsistent information related 

to hundreds of thousands of individuals reduces the accuracy of US-VISIT data

monitoring and impedes US-VISIT’s ability to verify that individuals attempting to enter

the United States are providing their true names and dates of birth.

US-VISIT Needs to Improve Procedures That Specifically Target Individuals Using

Multiple Biographic Identities To Enter the United States

US-VISIT has 

to determine if individuals are using multiple 

biographic identities when attempting to enter the United States. We found evidence 

that IDENT data contain entry records for hundreds of thousands of individuals whose

biographic data were different than their biometrics (i.e., individuals with the same 

fingerprints had different names and/or dates of birth recorded for different

encounters). Given that there are hundreds of millions of biometric records in IDENT, if

US-VISIT 

 US-VISIT offers decision makers limited assistance

US-VISIT officials said that US-VISIT regularly compares visa information against entry

and departure data to identify individuals who have overstayed their immigrant or

visitor visas. It regularly provides overstay information to Immigrations and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) to help identify and apprehend overstays. US-VISIT also has

established overstay outlooks so CBP officers and Department of State personnel can be 

warned of potential overstays seeking reentry to the United States. This process

replaced a system where individuals overstaying the terms of their admission to the

United States were identified only on an ad hoc basis as part of contact they had with

law enforcement. In fiscal year 2011, US-VISIT provided ICE with more than 900 visas

overstay leads per week. 

US-VISIT also has an identity resolution process to manually review instances where

differences in biographic data—for the same sets of biometrics—can be attributable to

input and other data errors. To achieve this objective, US-VISIT analysts may determine 

whether records with slightly different biographic information belong to a single

individual, or may have been incorrectly inputted at the point of collection. Analysts

then update the system to reflect that decision. For example, US-VISIT analysts may

view several biographic records associated with the same fingerprint information and 

4

 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-554), 

P. L. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A- 153 to 2763A-154 (2000) (44 U.S.C. § 3516 note). The law is 

referred to as the Data Quality Act or, alternatively, the Information Quality Act. 
determine that one of the biographic records contains a typographical error. These

analysts will then resolve the records in the system as a single individual or multiple

individuals. Through this process, US-VISIT works to refine the reliability of the data it

uses and provides to other Federal agencies.

However, US-VISIT’s current identity resolution effort is not designed to specifically

target individuals who are using multiple identities to enter the United States. US-VISIT

program officials informed us that most of the additional research they perform is based

on identity resolution of people who appear to be the same, but have different

information recorded in US-VISIT data.

5

 According to US-VISIT officials, US-VISIT

manually reviews IDENT encounters with multiple biographic records to identify

potential identity fraud. However, US-VISIT did not provide evidence to document that 

it has determined whether all unresolved discrepancies—arising when distinctly

different biographical information share the same set of fingerprints—indicate that

fraud may have occurred. 

Data Inconsistencies Hinder Effective Use of Biometrics to Identify and Prevent Use of

Fraudulent Identities at U.S. Ports of Entry

The number of records with inconsistent biographic data limits the effectiveness and

efficiency of using biometrics to identify and prevent the use of fraudulent identities at 

U.S. ports of entry. The Data Quality Act requires that information disseminated by

agencies have maximum quality and integrity. However, we found numerous data

integrity errors in IDENT. These errors require US-VISIT to conduct an extensive manual

reconciliation process of biographic information belonging to the same individuals. This

process limits US-VISIT’s ability to quickly identify instances where multiple biographic

data are attributable to fraud rather than data entry errors. Our work identified

examples where individuals may have attempted to enter the country using different

names and birth dates, sometimes after having been flagged within IDENT as having 

derogatory information. These examples emphasize the need to provide CBP officers at 

ports of entry and State Department personnel with information to properly vet

individuals before allowing them to enter the United States.

5 Since 2005, US-VISIT has identified two instances of biographic fraud and referred them to ICE for 

further evaluation. 
US-VISIT Data Contain Hundreds of Thousands of Records With Inconsistent

Biographic Information

We found about 825,000 records in IDENT belonging to 375,000 individuals where key 

biographic data, such as the name and/or date of birth, did not match other records

with the same fingerprint identification number (FIN). 6 These 375,000 individuals had

more than 4.7 million nonenforcement7 records in IDENT data, including encounters at 

ports of entry, applications for visas, and visa extensions. More than 4 million

(85 percent) were encounters at ports of entry. Enforcement data present another 

significant challenge, since they rely heavily on biographic data 

Data Entry Errors and Test Data Pose a Challenge to Effective Analysis of US-VISIT

Biometric Data 

Most of the erroneous records where multiple biographic identities were associated

with the same biometrics appear to be data integrity errors. Specifically, we found that

the biographical data that US-VISIT provided from its production environment contained 

test data submitted by other Federal and law enforcement agencies that are linked to

specific FINs. We also found inconsistencies in recording last and first names, in the 

birth date format used, and in gender-based records, as well as other conditions.

Without ensuring data consistency and identifying instances where different names

arise from the use of different biographic identities, US-VISIT may be unable to provide 

timely information that can prevent the use of fraudulent identities to enter the United 

States.

The Data Quality Act requires Federal agencies to ensure and maximize the quality,

utility, and integrity of the data they disseminate.

9

 Further, the Standards for Internal

Control in the Federal Government,

10 which establishes minimal level of quality

acceptable for internal control in government, requires that transactions and events be 

6 Biographic discrepancies can occur at the point of collection from inaccurate input by hand, unsuccessful 

scan or swipe of a document, or the accidental swap of a document with a traveling companion. They can

also occur from systems parsing biographic information differently from the same document. 7

 Nonenforcement records include encounters such as an individual’s visits to the United States or 

applications for a visa to enter the United States, but do not include encounters such as contacts with U.S.

law enforcement related to immigration violations or criminal activity. 8 

9

The Data Quality Act is operationalized in the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, which 

states that the key data elements of an agency’s transactions must be accurate and represent real 

transactions, as opposed to test transactions. 10GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, November 1999. 
recorded accurately. Inconsistencies in key biographic information between records

belonging to a single individual reduce the ability of US-VISIT to meet the Federal

information system and internal control standards. In addition, these inconsistencies

can make it difficult to distinguish between data entry errors and individuals potentially

committing identity fraud. We found that data integrity issues most likely account for

most of the 450,000 biographic records that did not match other biographic records for

the same fingerprint. Specifically,

US-VISIT collects data from numerous other Federal agencies, each with its own 

data format and collection mechanism. For example, one agency may enter an

individual’s name and date of birth manually while another may collect the 

information automatically from a passport. These differences result in data 

entry errors such as misspellings and transpositions. For example, over a period 

of 5 years, one individual’s name was spelled 17 different ways.

Test data existed in the information that US-VISIT provided to us as encounter

data. For example, in a number of instances, we found records with the same

FIN but with made-up names such as “Mickey Mouse” and “Jarvis Sample.” 

Inconsistent recording of biographic information exists at ports of entry. In one 

example, an individual’s first, middle, and last names were recorded in IDENT in 

different combinations. In another example, an individual had 14 different 

combinations of months, days, and years for the birth date recorded under the 

same name in encounters from 2004 to 2011. 

We found instances where the same fingerprints may have been used when 

processing travelers at a port of entry. In one instance, we found that the same

set of fingerprints was used for seven different individuals who entered the 

country over the course of a few hours.

11 Without isolating these errors,

US-VISIT will face additional difficulty in distinguishing biographic fraud from 

data collection errors.

We also found that gender-based and other conditions may reduce the consistency of

biographic and biometric information within IDENT. For example,

We found that nearly 400,000 records for women have different last names for

the same first name, date of birth, and FIN. According to US-VISIT officials, these

instances are likely women who changed their names after a marriage. 

11 When provided documentation for this example, US-VISIT asserted that the same fingerprints were 

recorded as the result of a fingerprint scanner ghost image.
Names of international travelers were not always captured at ports of entry. For

example, we found that 244,000 individuals (as identified by their unique FIN)

with nearly 1 million encounters at ports of entry did not have specific biographic 

identities. Instead, they were identified in IDENT simply as “frequent traveler.” 

Dates of birth were not always captured or fell outside of a reasonable range. 

Specifically, we found more than 25,000 records where the dates of birth were

not recorded or were outside of normal ranges. For example, we found that

some international travelers entering the United States were recorded as having

dates of birth in the year 2049. Without accurate biographic information,

US-VISIT faces challenges in fulfilling its mission of using biometrics to prevent

identity fraud and deprive criminals and immigration violators of the ability to

cross our borders. 

Examples of Individuals Attempting To Enter the Country Under Multiple Biographic

Identities 

Although most of the biographic data discrepancies in IDENT data can be attributed to 

data entry errors, we identified instances where individuals appeared to have used 

different names and dates of birth to attempt to enter the United States. These

individuals attempted to enter the country multiple times over several years under

different biographic data. In one example, the same set of fingerprints was associated

with nine different names and nine different birth dates in 10 different attempts to

enter the United States. In another example, the same individual (as identified by the

same set of fingerprints) had eight different names and eight different birth dates listed 

in IDENT data for nine attempts to enter the United States.

In addition to individuals who

 the data pointed to a limited

number of instances where an individual with a derogatory record supplied different

biographic information to CBP officers to attempt to enter the United States.

12 For

example:

12 Subsequent to our analysis, we provided US-VISIT with a file containing information on individuals who 

were recorded at ports of entry with different biographic information with the same FINs. US-VISIT then

made available to us information about derogatory information on these individuals. 
A male who used two different names and dates of birth to attempt to enter the

United States in 2008 and 2011 was identified as a repeated criminal (recidivist)

alien.

13 

A male used two different identities to apply for visas from the Department of

State. After being denied entry in 2009 he used yet a third name and date of

birth to attempt to enter the country later in the same year, and was refused 

entry. 

A female who was identified as a recidivist alien in 2008 used different 

biographic data to visit the United States, once in 2009 and twice in 2011.

A female who was identified as a recidivist alien in 2006 attempted to enter the 

country on three visits in 2009, 2010, and 2011 under variations of the same

name.

Conclusion 

Significant inconsistencies exist in the biographic information that US-VISIT maintains on

foreign visitors and aliens entering and exiting the United States. Although most of the

inconsistencies can be attributable to data input issues, US-VISIT is unable to quantify

the extent to which the same individuals provided different biographical data to

circumvent controls and enter the United States improperly. Without this information,

US-VISIT may be hindered in its ability to share information that could help border 

enforcement agencies prevent improper entries into the United States. We will provide

the results of our analysis of multiple biographic identities to US-VISIT for further

research and potential action. 

Recommendation(s) 

We recommend that the Director, US-VISIT:

Recommendation #1: 

Review data inconsistencies that we have provided to the US-VISIT office to determine if

additional examples of biographic fraud exist beyond the two cases that it previously

referred to ICE. 

13 US-VISIT has stated that bulleted examples 1 and 3 are results of incorrectly entered derogatory

information in the system that will require data cleanup.
Recommendation #2:

Provide information on individuals determined to be using multiple biographic identities

to appropriate law enforcement entities for identity fraud resolution and possible

inclusion on the biometric watch list so they are identifiable when entering the United

States.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We obtained written comments on a draft report from the Under Secretary, NPPD. We

have included a copy of the comments in their entirety in appendix B. 

In the comments, the DHS Under Secretary for NPPD concurred with both report 

recommendations and provided comments on specific areas within the report. We have

reviewed management’s comments and provide an evaluation below. 

In response to our first recommendation, the DHS Under Secretary for NPPD requests

that we remove the word “additional” from our recommendation when referring to

examples of biographic fraud. We have changed the report language to refer more 

clearly to the two cases of biographic fraud that NPPD previously referred to ICE. 

In response to our second recommendation, the DHS Under Secretary for NPPD states

that US-VISIT has initiated a proactive review of processes to identify potential fraud

used by individuals attempting to enter the United States or obtain immigration

benefits. This is performed through a review of multiple alien registration numbers. 

NPPD reported that to date, US-VISIT has researched more than 1,200 records and 

added 192 individuals to the Watch List.

We believe that the actions that have been initiated partially satisfy the intent of this

recommendation. However, US-VISIT also needs to expand its analysis to include the 

review of potential identity fraud associated with international travelers, including

travelers from visa waiver countries who did not have alien registration numbers or did

not have to apply for visas from the Department of State. Without a comprehensive

plan to include these travelers, US-VISIT will not be able to identify all individuals who 

may be using multiple biographic identities.

In response to our report, NPPD also stated that US-VISIT provides a layer of defense but 

is not the only line of defense against identity fraud, and that CBP also plays a critical role in 

identifying individuals who use multiple biographic identities to enter the United States. 

We acknowledge that the security infrastructure at U.S. borders is layered, and that the

critical work performed by CBP and the Department of State mitigates some of the security 
risk. However, this report is not intended to be a broad overview of the entire security of 

our borders. Rather this report specifically addresses US-VISIT’s role in safeguarding against 

identity fraud. By taking a greater proactive role in identifying and alerting CBP officers

of potential identity fraud, US-VISIT can provide valuable information to aid in securing

our borders.
Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.

Based on preliminary findings from survey work performed at United States Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, we initiated a review of US-VISIT’s internal controls over

biographic identities. The objectives of the review were to determine whether 

(1) US-VISIT has internal controls and procedures in place to identify individuals who use 

multiple biographic identities to attempt to enter the United States, and (2) indications

exist that individuals sought to enter the United States using different identities.

To determine whether US-VISIT has internal controls and procedures in place to identify 

individuals who use multiple biographic identities to attempt to enter the United States, 

we obtained US-VISIT’s encounter, biographic, and document records from IDENT for

1998 through 2011. We eliminated nonentry encounters, including enforcement and 

data-sharing records, from our analysis. We identified instances where individuals may

have used multiple biographic identities by comparing the names and dates of birth

recorded in US-VISIT records for encounters belonging to a single fingerprint identification

number. In this effort, we utilized the expertise of an outside contractor, Eastport

Analytics, as well as our own analysis. We followed up on the results of our analysis by 

interviewing US-VISIT staff and reviewing documents provided by US-VISIT.

To determine whether indications exist that individuals sought to enter the United 

States using different identities, we analyzed the results of the analysis to test whether 

there was evidence of use of multiple biographic identities. We provided a limited set 

of those results to US-VISIT staff to obtain any derogatory information related to the 

entry encounters of those individuals. Finally, we reviewed encounter, biographic, and 

derogatory records related to some of those individuals. We briefed US-VISIT 

concerning the results of fieldwork and the information summarized in this report.

We conducted this performance audit between September 2011 and March 2012 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions

based upon our audit objectives. 
Appendix B

Management Comments to the Draft Letter Report 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs

Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate 

US-VISIT Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Senate Committee on Appropriations

House Committee on Homeland Security Committee

House Committee on Appropriations Committees
 

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