U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

75–145 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–136] 

CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 

OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 27, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, June 27, 2012, Creation and Implementation of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration ........................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, June 27, 2012 ...................................................................................... 13 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2012 

CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Aloise, Eugene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 4 

Brooks, Amb. Linton F., Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ................................................................................................................. 1 

Kuckuck, Dr. Robert W., Former Principal Deputy Administrator, National 

Nuclear Security Administration, Former Director, Los Alamos National 

Laboratory ............................................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Aloise, Eugene .................................................................................................. 41 

Brooks, Amb. Linton F. .................................................................................... 22 

Kuckuck, Dr. Robert W. ................................................................................... 34 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 20 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 17 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 59 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 88 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 87 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 63 

(1) 

CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 27, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Call to order the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. 

We are going to be under a severe time constraint because votes 

are occurring at approximately around 4:00, and when they do, 

they are going to be a very long series, and then all the Members 

have an obligation after that. So we’re going to do a real short compression; both the ranking member and myself are going to waive 

our opening statements and merely put them into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 17.] 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 20.] 

Mr. TURNER. I want to recognize Ron Barber of Arizona, who is 

our new member. We welcome you. 

And we would like to immediately then turn for opening statements to our panel members with the prospects of maybe doing 

some 2-minute rounds of questions, so as people have things, they 

might be able to get to theirs. So, Ambassador Brooks, we will 

begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF AMB. LINTON F. BROOKS, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of this committee. I have submitted a detailed 

statement, and what I am going to do is make a series of assertions 

which I hope that statement either amplifies or backs up. I am 

going to describe the situation through January 2007 when I left 

the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]. I am not 

qualified to speak in detail about today. 

NNSA was formed in the belief that reforms, especially in security, would be impossible within the Department of Energy bu-
2 

reaucracy as it existed at the time. In standing up NNSA we, or 

at least I, had three broad objectives: first, to streamline the organization, avoid duplication, and clarify roles and responsibilities of 

Federal officials; second, to restore the appropriate division of labor 

between the national labs and their Federal overseers. We believed, 

and I believe today, that the right relationship is for the Government to decide what to do and the laboratories to decide how to do 

it. And, third, to establish the appropriate degree of autonomy 

within the Department of Energy. And we adopted the term ‘‘semiautonomous,’’ which is not what the legislation actually says, to describe what we were seeking. 

We started by trying to correct the organizational inefficiencies 

and clarify responsibilities, and while that is a never-ending process, I think we made significant process—progress, which I have 

detailed in my statement. 

We were much less successful in establishing the proper balance 

in oversight, especially at the national laboratories. In part this 

was because we failed utterly at developing an acceptable common 

understanding with DOE [Department of Energy] on what semi-autonomy meant. And I have provided a fair amount of additional detail on that point in my detailed prepared statement. 

Now, what lessons should the committee draw from our experience? First, I think our broad approach was right then and I think 

it’s right now, but the effectiveness of a semi-autonomous NNSA is 

too dependent on the personalities and preferences of officials outside of the organization. Competent, dedicated people can make 

any organization work, and virtually all NNSA senior officials and 

all DOE senior officials are both dedicated and competent. But the 

present arrangement required, at least in my day, constant effort 

from senior officials, and thus diverted them from focusing on the 

mission. Ultimately, as I said in a statement I submitted for an 

earlier hearing, I believe NNSA will need to be made a stand-alone 

organization. 

Secondly, clear lines of authority and accountability are made 

more difficult by the number of external bodies to whom the administrator is in some sense accountable. Separating NNSA from 

the rest of DOE will solve part of that problem, but it won’t solve 

all of it. There will still be the Defense Board, the Congress, the 

GAO [Government Accountability Office], the White House, somebody’s Inspector General. 

And finally, if the Congress wants, as I believe it should, the relationship between NNSA and the laboratories that I described as 

part of our vision, it has to guard against the tendency when problems arise to ask why Federal overseers didn’t find the problem in 

advance and prevent it through more detailed audits and more detailed inspections. 

The pressure, which in fairness has not primarily come from this 

committee, at least when I was doing this, makes it more difficult 

for us to preserve the important distinction between the Government responsibility to say what is to be done and the laboratory 

leadership responsibility to determine how to do it. 

Thank you, and after you have heard from my colleagues, I look 

forward to your questions. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks can be found in the Appendix on page 22.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT W. KUCKUCK, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FORMER DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me this afternoon. I also have submitted a written statement, and I have a few 

comments to make here, and I will abbreviate them, given the time 

constraint we are under. My comments come from 40 years at the 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under DOE, 2 years helping the 

Ambassador and General Gordon as we laid out NNSA, and then 

returning 5 years later to be the director of Los Alamos to work 

under NNSA. So I have a very dimensioned view of what we have 

been through. 

I was going to talk a little bit about our vision in setting the organization up. I think I will skip over that since it is in written 

material, and you have reports to the Congress prior to this. I 

would only say that I think we did make progress early on, but it 

was very clear even then that this was going to be a project that 

required years of effort, continual leadership, and that was even 

assuming that we were going to be in a semi-autonomous organization, which didn’t happen. 

Let me jump forward to the 2 years I spent at the Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory—excuse me, at the Los Alamos Laboratory 

in 2005 and 2006. When I arrived, it wasn’t long to see that the 

vision that we had in mind had not been achieved. To my disappointment, I found the working environment there to be at least 

as burdensome as it was in my experience at Livermore a decade 

before that and, unfortunately, even more adversarial. 

Tasking was coming from various parts of the Federal Government and from various levels of the Government. Some of it was 

explicit, which of course required unnecessary work and expense 

from my judgment, but much was implicit; and implicit to me were 

taskings that we got because of the site office withholding approval 

documents in a frustrating bring-me-another-rock kind of exercise. 

It was exhausting and costly. There was implicit tasking coming 

from site office members making—Federal employees making comments to the staff at the laboratory, and from the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board who had permanent representatives on site 

at Los Alamos also making comments to the staff, so that the staff 

was sort of being told don’t go there, we are not going to approve 

it when the time comes. 

The implicit tasking embedded inefficiencies and lost opportunities as laboratory employees invented workarounds, compromises 

to avoid conflicts with these overseers. I saw many examples that 

cost millions of dollars and many months and months of delay. I 

am still serving on advisory boards to all three nuclear weapons 

laboratories, and so I have a strong perception that things have not 

improved since I left Los Alamos. 
4 

I have looked at your legislation, H.R. 4310. To me it feels a little 

bit like an attempt to legislate the vision that we indeed had back 

in 2001. Frankly, I think that vision was really management 101, 

with responsibilities clear and so forth. 

Will your bill be enough? I am skeptical. It may be probably necessary, but may be insufficient. I think it is very difficult to legislate the trust, the teamwork, the judgment, the leadership, the balance of risk and mission that is so sorely needed in the endeavor 

we have today. However, I think it is possible to legislate conditions that will facilitate achieving those ideals. 

It has been clear to me in my almost 50 years in this enterprise 

that the DOE laboratory management relationship has been deteriorating for several years now, maybe back to the days of the tiger 

teams; year by year, step by step, rule by rule, contract by contract. 

The creation of NNSA was an attempt to reverse this trend. I 

personally believe it has failed to do so. I also am concerned that 

perhaps we have reached or are nearly reaching the tipping point 

where the solution by partial organization change won’t be possible. 

I thank you. I will be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kuckuck can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Aloise. 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss 

the creation and implementation of NNSA. Today my remarks will 

focus on NNSA’s early experiences, organizing and operating as a 

separately organized agency within DOE, and NNSA’s progress in 

correcting longstanding problems. 

For years before NNSA was established, external studies found 

problems with the organization and operation of what is now 

NNSA’s principal organization, DOE’s Office of Defense Programs. 

These studies cited continuing problems in the areas of overall 

management, organization, priority setting, and maintenance of a 

viable infrastructure and workforce. 

In short, Mr. Chairman, prior to the enactment of Title 32, 

DOE’s organization was a mess, with no clear lines of authority. 

The budget for weapons activities was in two big buckets of money 

that were sent to the labs and plants with little or no transparency 

and accountability for what it was being spent on. Title 32 allowed 

NNSA to step back and come up with something better. 

While we continue to identify problems with NNSA’s budget 

processes, the current budget structure is a vast improvement over 

what existed prior to the enactment of Title 32. Still, in our view, 

NNSA has never been given a chance to work as the Congress intended. After the enactment of Title 32, DOE and NNSA struggled 

to determine how NNSA should operate as a separately organized 

agency within the Department, largely because there were no useful models in Government to follow. 
5 

Another complication was DOE’s January 2000 implementation 

plan which did not define how NNSA would operate within DOE; 

instead, reflecting the opposition of the then-DOE leadership to the 

creation of NNSA, the implementation plan dual-hatted virtually 

every single statutory position in NNSA with DOE officials. This 

practice caused concern about NNSA’s ability to function independently. 

Also the lack of formal agreements between DOE and NNSA in 

a number of key areas, such as budgeting and procurement and 

interpersonal disagreements led to conflicts that prevented effective 

organizations—operations. 

Specifically, in January 2007 we reported on the conflict between 

NNSA and DOE’s counterintelligence offices. In the case of both 

dual-hatting and the counterintelligence dispute, Congress had to 

step in and correct the situation. Since then NNSA has made considerable progress in resolving longstanding management deficiencies and security weaknesses. 

However, major improvements are still needed in NNSA’s management of major projects and contracts, and vigilance is needed in 

the area of security to ensure that improvements are sustained. In 

some areas NNSA is viewed as a success. Importantly, it has continued to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable without underground testing. Nevertheless, NNSA still 

struggles to define itself as a separately organized agency within 

DOE, and the management problems that exist have led to calls to 

increase NNSA’s independence from DOE. 

We continue to believe, as we concluded in our January 2007 report, that while reforms are needed, drastic organizational changes 

are necessary and questioned whether such changes would solve 

the agency’s remaining management problems. Having said that, 

GAO stands ready to assist the Congress and this subcommittee in 

looking for ways to ensure more effective management of NNSA’s 

programs and contractors. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be happy to 

address any questions you or the ranking member or any other 

member of the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I think what we will do is we will do 

one round of 2-minute questions if that is okay with everyone, and 

that way everybody hopefully will get an opportunity to speak. And 

I’ll start. 

In the initial statements, there has been a lot of referencing of 

what the semi-autonomous nature of NNSA was supposed to accomplish. Right-sizing, reinvigorating the staff, reducing burden, 

employee numbers. Employee numbers have gone back to the same 

level that they were prior to NNSA. On the administration side, we 

have not one life extension program that’s on track. 

Mr. Aloise, you said, you know, they have got progress and success. Not one life extension program is on track. The fact that they 

have been able to certify that it is safe and reliable is not because 

of refurbishment and life extension. It has been because, you know, 

obviously some of the legacy work has been done, but not one of 

the life extension programs is on track. 
6 

I was wondering if everyone could speak for a moment about 

semi-autonomy. Ambassador Brooks, you said it should be absolutely independent, but it appears that semi-autonomous failed. 

What was—what—in saying that it failed and we need to go autonomous, why hasn’t semi-autonomous worked? And, Mr. Aloise, 

when you get to your portion, I’d like you to give me that context 

of how we can consider this success when not one life extension 

program is on track. So there are calls for a number of groups, besides just the two gentlemen sitting here, who are independent 

groups who have indicated that perhaps they should be fully autonomous. Speak for a moment about the semi-autonomy and what it 

was to achieve and why it can’t. And then, Mr. Aloise, if you would 

give us the contrast, because you don’t believe that how semi-autonomous could be working when not one life extension program is 

on track. Ambassador Brooks, 2 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. There are two sets of problems, structural and cultural. Structurally, example: the Clinger-Cohen Act and the relationship between having an integrated information system and a 

semi-autonomous NNSA worked out by good people working together, but you can’t have one department directed from two people. 

Example: environmental cleanup at NNSA sites. The responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, 

who lacks the legal authority to direct NNSA sites. I tried to move 

that responsibility to NNSA and was not able to convince the Congress in the first term, and my own Secretary in the second term, 

to support that. So we had a workaround which was Byzantine, 

probably wouldn’t have stood up to a legal——. Example: number 

of duplicating functions—— 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador, I am going to ask you to finish your 

statement for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. TURNER. Doctor and Mr. Aloise, 30 seconds apiece. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Thirty seconds. I won’t be as erudite as my 

learned colleague here, but I believe that it never was given a 

chance to happen. I believe that we never left DOE in the whole 

process. The oversight of rules were all the same, felt the same, 

and I don’t think anybody believed we were going to see something 

different. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Aloise, how can we call it a success when not 

one life extension program is on track? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, my point was that we have a safe, reliable 

stockpile, and that is a success. But you are absolutely right about 

the life extension programs; and there is more than that. There are 

the major projects that are problematic. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good, thank you. Ranking Member. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Aloise, when the NNSA 

was formed, the defense nuclear facilities remained under independent health and safety oversight of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. So based on your experience, was that a good decision at the time? Why or why not? And do you think that the 

NNSA defense nuclear facilities should still remain under independent oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 
7 

or do you think it would be a better decision to place those facilities 

under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, GAO is on record promoting external regulation of DOE facilities. DOE self-regulates itself now. So we believe 

in a strong, independent regulatory function. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I would ask—thank you, Mr. Aloise. And I 

would ask all the witnesses: Has the oversight of the nuclear complex improved as a result of the NNSA, the oversight of the overall? Ambassador? 

Mr. BROOKS. In some areas yes, in some areas no. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you denote very quickly what some might 

be for ‘‘yes’’ and what some might be for ‘‘no’’? 

Mr. BROOKS. Security is clearly better, safety is no worse, but we 

haven’t removed the burden on the labs. Nuclear safety and the 

Defense Board, the relationship is not, was not when I was there, 

working well. That is separate from saying what a better relationship would be on which—but there was too much mission creep 

from the board. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Doctor. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I would say that the board did both. I think in the 

early stages it certainly brought a stronger safety culture to the 

laboratories’ nuclear facilities. Operations are—conduct of operations are much more formal, employees are much safer, ISSM [Integrated Safeguards and Security Management] is embedded, but 

I think it is now past its day and it has become a point of when 

is enough enough. The balance is gone, and I think that the NRC 

[Nuclear Regulatory Commission] would look to me as a more balanced model to then put our nuclear weapons labs under. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. And Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. As I mentioned, we are in favor of external regulatory oversight. That would be a model that we have considered. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. Again, too, because of the 

constraint of time, what we are going to do is we will get to everyone, you will get to ask your question, we will start the clock at 

2 minutes, and then we can submit all the other questions for the 

record. 

Mr. Thornberry, you are next. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Just to follow that for a second. Ambassador, 

and then Doctor, would you describe what you believe the proper 

relationship should be between Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, if any, or if it should be replaced by the NRC as far as this 

independent outside oversight of these NNSA facilities? How 

should that be structured? Because that has been one of the biggest 

issues. 

Mr. BROOKS. My goal when I was administrator was to make us 

completely indifferent to that. I told the Secretary I was working 

so that his successor—because I thought it would take me at least 

4 more years—was able to say the board is no longer necessary, we 

are doing the job well. We didn’t succeed in that. Not clear whether 

we can succeed. 

I think the safety board or some external agency needs to provide 

a check on the operation of the Department. I think it needs to do 

so considering, first, getting the mission done—I mean, you can be 
8 

perfectly safe if you stop working—and avoiding mission creep 

through asking for information. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And let me just interject. That’s the issue. Defense, the board, doesn’t have any responsibility to get anything 

done. And so part of the problem that people complain about is you 

have somebody who can put up a red card and stop everything, but 

they have no accountability for making anything happen. 

Mr. BROOKS. I agree with that, sir, and that was frustrating to 

me. On the other hand, the board was created because the Department was all screwed up, and I am not sure I want to look you in 

the eye and say I had made everything all better. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I would think that relationship should be, should 

start from a clear and reasonable set of requirements that are designed in some collaborative form so that everybody understands 

where they are coming from, but the oversight organization should 

have the authority for the final design of those requirements. I 

think then that the oversight should be done by monitoring performance against those clear standards, and I think that areas of 

nonperformance should be a more collaborative approach to be resolved, but again the oversight has to be authoritative and in place. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Aloise, if you have comments on this, you could 

submit them to the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. TURNER. Turning to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate your testimony today. 

Ambassador Brooks, the PFIAB report found that DOE and 

the—quoting—‘‘the DOE and the weapons laboratories have a 

deeply rooted culture of low regard for and at times hostility to security issues, which has continually frustrated the efforts of its internal and external critics, notably the GAO and the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee. Therefore, a reshuffling of the offices 

and lines of accountability may be a necessary step toward meaningful reform, but it most almost certainly will not be sufficient. 

Even if every aspect of the ongoing cultural structural reforms is 

fully implemented, the most powerful guarantor of security at the 

Nation’s weapons laboratories won’t be laws and regulations or 

management charts; it is going to be the attitudes and the behavior 

of the men and women who are responsible for the operation of the 

labs each day. So these will not change overnight, and they are 

likely to change only in a different cultural environment, one that 

values security, adds a vital and integral part of the day-to-day activities and believes it can coexist with science.’’ 

So with that, can you talk about the, you know, whether or not 

there is sufficient progress on increasing accountability, at least, 

and what challenges remain to improve accountability and cost-effectiveness? 

Mr. BROOKS. At least on the Federal side, I think we have made 

lines of responsibility, and therefore accountability, clear. 

I guess I would push back, sir, on the idea that the laboratories, 

as I knew them, didn’t care about security. The problem—there is 

a cultural problem, but the cultural problem is not about security 

but about security through detailed procedures. The same type of 
9 

problem exists in the safety area. And that would be fine, except 

we know that if you don’t have detailed procedures, things screw 

up. 

So the culture that we are building in slowly, I think there is actually a demonstrable improvement in that, as Dr. Kuckuck mentioned, but I think that I erred in believing that we could change 

that culture more rapidly than we have been able to. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I would agree with the Ambassador. I think the 

attitudes of the laboratory scientists are very much in line with improved safety and procedures to the degree the procedures are appropriate. I think, unfortunately, the attitude now, we are at risk 

of straining this success that we have already achieved because the 

oversight is now so oppressive and past the limit of a good balance 

that I think the attitudes are now turning toward the overseers 

rather than against safety itself. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So let me ask the panel this question: Was NNSA 

a good idea? 

Mr. BROOKS. Somebody has got to answer. Yes. It was worth trying. It may still be worth trying. It hasn’t worked as well as we 

hoped. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Quite agree. 

Mr. ALOISE. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Your time has expired. Turning to Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Doctor, in your opening statement you made reference to deterioration of the lab under DOE, and you thought that it may be beyond the point of redemption. Can you expand on what you meant 

by that? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Yes, sir. I didn’t mean to make the point that you 

heard in that. What I was referring to was the management relationship between the DOE and the laboratory was deteriorating. 

The laboratories were not deteriorating at all. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Kuckuck, your prepared statement references problems 

caused by, quote, implicit tasking resulting from such behaviors as 

withholding the necessary approval documents and frustrating, 

bring-me-another-rock exercises. It kind of sounds to me like there 

are a lot of authorities but none with enough authority to control 

the process. Can you elaborate on your metaphor, give me a better 

idea of what you are trying to explain? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I would almost react to your statement by saying 

I think there is too much authority implicit at all turns of the laboratories’ surrounding oversight space. An extreme example of that 

that I saw while I was at the laboratory, that I will make very 

short, given the time, is the laboratory had a significant amount 

of nuclear material located at a certain place that we were using 

to conduct a program. And as we continued every year to raise the 

bar on security demands, the Department decided—the NNSA decided that they wanted those put in a more secure place. There was 

an amount of material that would take a couple of years to package 

and process and remove, and the new site was going to be the Nevada Test Site. We felt that the 2 years of sitting where it was 
10 

wasn’t appropriate, so we came up with an idea of putting a small 

parking lot inside the PIDAS [Perimeter Intrusion Detection and 

Assessment System] in the nuclear plutonium facility, TA–55, 

move these four SST [Safe Secure Trailers]—certified vehicles for 

carrying the stuff around the Nation every day—move four of those 

in place, put the material in there, and work from them safely 

stored in there for this 18 months or so. That is what we started 

out with for a million dollars. 

The safety board didn’t like that, continued to push back, and a 

year later we ended up with a category 2 nuclear facility, which 

was a pad of cement three foot deep, seismically qualified, with a 

roof over it in case lightning didn’t hit these trucks that had been 

moving around the country, on and on and on, at a result of a $7 

million cost instead of a $1 million cost. And ironically, the entire 

year we sat there doing that, the material sat in the area that was 

considered inappropriate in the first place. 

Dr. FLEMING. So, really, trying to satisfy too many bosses, too 

many authorities. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Exactly. 

Dr. FLEMING. Requiring overlapping authorities that are contradictory in some cases. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. The final decision has to be an approval from the 

site office, but it is clear that direction is coming from all sectors 

and interfering with that process. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS OF ALABAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recurring 

security problems within the Department of Energy were a major 

factor in the creation of the NNSA. 

This is a question for any or all of you to answer. Why was the 

Department of Energy unable to get a handle on these security 

problems without congressional intervention, part one; part two, 

how effective and what has NNSA done to correct these security 

issues? 

Mr. BROOKS. Why the Department couldn’t get a handle on it before I think is demonstrated in the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board report, and there is an organization chart in there 

which will convince you that nobody using that organization chart 

could get a handle on anything. 

We, after some false starts for a variety of reasons, came up with 

the appropriate organizational level and the right people, so that 

at least we had coherent security oversight. 

On physical security I think—of course, the bar got raised considerably after 9/11—that we have made substantial progress. Information security has been harder. We’ve made some progress. We 

have simplified some requirements. I think this security, sir, is 

frankly something you just keep working on. If you believe there 

is a time when you have fixed it, you will find you are wrong. You 

have to just keep working on it. 

I think we have substantially improved security. That is not saying that there are not still problems. 

Mr. BROOKS OF ALABAMA. Do either of the other two witnesses 

have any insight they are able to share? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I could add nothing to that. 
11 

Mr. ALOISE. I would say ineffective Federal oversight and a culture that initially didn’t value security, those two combinations led 

to a lot of the security breaches. Many of them severely impacted 

our national security. We seem to be at a level now where security 

is at a right place as far as we can tell. But Linton is correct, we 

need to be vigilant to make sure those safeguards stay in place. 

Mr. BROOKS OF ALABAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We appreciate that throughout all the 

testimony, and even in your discussion, Mr. Aloise, there is a recognition that the status quo is unacceptable, that there are failures 

in the performance of NNSA. We are grappling with the issue of 

what then is the answer. As we look to questions that we are going 

to be submitting to the record, we look forward to your additional 

information that you might provide us as we try to, you know, offer 

some solutions as to how that may be addressed. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 27, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 27, 2012 

(17) 

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Creation and Implementation of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration 

June 27, 2012 

Good afternoon and welcome to today’s hearing on the ‘‘Creation 

and Implementation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).’’ 

This hearing is part of the subcommittee’s continuing oversight 

of governance and management issues related to NNSA and our 

nuclear security enterprise. As many of you here today undoubtedly know, this subcommittee has spent considerable effort over the 

past year to better understand these problems and determine appropriate remedies. We are gravely concerned about the overwhelming number of studies and reports that have identified the 

same serious problems at NNSA and the Department of Energy— 

including reports that NNSA is ‘‘broken,’’ that ‘‘science and engineering quality is at risk’’ at the nuclear weapons labs, and that 

‘‘it is time to consider fundamental changes’’ to the entire organization and construct. 

As part of the subcommittee’s broader efforts, this hearing will 

take a detailed look at the past. With the help of our witnesses, we 

will explore the history that led up to the creation of the NNSA in 

1999 and 2000, the congressional intent behind creating NNSA, 

and the early years of implementation of the NNSA. Ultimately, we 

hope that the witnesses can help us answer several questions that 

are important for the future: 

• Did implementation of NNSA achieve the vision of a ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ organization with 

significant freedom of action from the Department of Energy 

(DOE)? 

• Can a ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ structure work? 

• What lessons should we learn from the implementation of 

NNSA, and how should we apply those lessons as we look to 

address the continuing problems that sound eerily similar to 

those that NNSA was intended to fix? 

Given their deep experience from many different angles of this 

issue, our witnesses are well-equipped to help us with all of this. 

They are: 

• Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; 
18 

• Dr. Robert W. Kuckuck, Former Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Former Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory; and 

• Mr. Eugene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office. 

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today. 

Reviewing your prepared statements, as well as some information provided by the staff, I was struck by how, at one point in its 

early years, NNSA seemed to be headed in the right direction. At 

the senior levels within NNSA, the intentions and the actions 

seemed to be to implement the intent of the NNSA Act and create 

agile, efficient, and effective operation. 

A case in point is the February 2002 Report to Congress on the 

Organization and Operations of the NNSA. This report contains action plans to streamline and clarify roles and reporting relationships; right-size Federal staff; clarify the nature and operations of 

NNSA’s semi-autonomous nature; and lift administrative burdens 

through streamlining policies, procedures, and staffing. In short, 

this appears to have been a real plan for creating the NNSA that 

was actually intended by the NNSA Act. 

So the question is: Where did it get off track and why? Because 

we have many, many reports by independent groups that it has 

gotten very off track. For instance, the bipartisan 2009 Strategic 

Posture Commission said: 

‘‘Despite some success, the NNSA has failed to meet the 

hopes of its founders. Indeed, it may have become part of the 

problem, adopting the same micromanagement and unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate.’’ 

That same year, a bipartisan report by the Stimson Center said: 

‘‘The implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve the 

intended autonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. The Labs now must operate within a complicated set of 

bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA.’’ 

Looking at the history, it is apparent that the non-NNSA portions of DOE (in his statement, Ambassador Brooks calls it ‘‘Big 

DOE’’) have fought to restrict NNSA’s autonomy from the very beginning. First we saw President Clinton’s signing statement and 

the ‘‘dual-hatting’’ of DOE officers into senior NNSA positions. But 

that particular problem was eventually overcome, thanks to vigorous oversight by the HASC Special Oversight Panel led by Rep. 

Thornberry and Rep. Tauscher. But DOE meddling remained, and 

appears to remain to this day. 

Ambassador Brook’s prepared statement indicates that even if 

senior DOE leaders were on board with the concept of NNSA, many 

DOE staff were decidedly not. The ambassador’s statement gives 

one example: 

‘‘ . . . the then-[DOE] General Counsel objected strongly to my 

approach. As I understood her objections, she believed that 

the NNSA Act provision was inappropriate and that NNSA 

should have no flexibility that was not available to any other 

element of the Department.’’ 
19 

A General Counsel has no authority to decide what law is inappropriate—this is merely defending bureaucratic turf. This is indicative of the larger problem: The DOE bureaucracy fought against 

even limited autonomy for NNSA, despite clear congressional intent with the NNSA Act. More recent evidence indicates this trend 

continues. 

Dr. Kuckuck’s prepared statement highlights what I think is the 

key issue for any solution we pursue: How do we change an entrenched and deeply bureaucratic culture? Dr. Kuckuck says: 

‘‘ . . . change of the magnitude envisioned with the creation of 

the NNSA was obviously a daunting challenge that would involve more than just principled redesign of organizational 

structure and procedures. It would require a fundamental 

change in the underlying culture of the entire enterprise.’’ 

I agree. Changing the culture will require bold action, followed 

by strong and committed leadership for years afterward. Both Dr. 

Kuckuck and Ambassador Brooks suggest that full autonomy is 

needed for NNSA. They seem to suggest—based on their experience 

as senior leaders at NNSA and in the nuclear security enterprise— 

that the semi-autonomy construct will not work. I hope both witnesses will comment on what particular experiences and evidence 

from the early years of NNSA and more recent years makes them 

recommend this course of action. 

Mr. Aloise and GAO have conducted oversight on NNSA since its 

beginning, and noted in a 2007 report that DOE and NNSA have 

struggled to determine how NNSA should operate as a separately 

organized agency. Mr. Aloise’s prepared statement notes that 

NNSA has made considerable progress in some areas, but remains 

sorely deficient in others. But Mr. Aloise also disagrees with the 

testimony of our other two witnesses—as well as the reams of reports from independent groups—on whether NNSA should be made 

fully autonomous from DOE. I hope to explore that judgment during the discussion period. 

We must find a way out of this mess. Our nuclear deterrent requires an effective and efficient steward. In the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act, the House has put forward reasonable and 

prudent solutions that are well founded in the findings of myriad 

experts and commissions. Now we look to others, including the Administration, for their own proposals. A letter that Chairman 

McKeon and I sent to President Obama 6 weeks ago seeking his 

solutions remains unanswered. While we wait, my hope for this 

hearing is that by looking to the past, we can help find a clear way 

forward to the future. 

Thank you again to our witnesses for joining us today—we look 

forward to the discussion. 
20 

Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Creation and Implementation of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration 

June 27, 2012 

Before we turn to the topic of today’s hearing, I would like to extend a warm welcome to Congressman Ron Barber of the eighth 

district of Arizona who has joined the House Armed Services Committee and the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. 

I would like to join Chairman Turner in thanking our witnesses, 

Ambassador Linton Brooks, Dr. Robert Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, 

for being here today. 

Chairman Turner, our Committee members, and I are committed 

to the success of NNSA, the nuclear complex, and its National Security mission. 

As we discuss the reasons for creating the National Nuclear Security Administration, its implementation and the way ahead, I 

would like to emphasize three key points. 

• First, this remains a critical time for NNSA and the nuclear 

weapon laboratories and the production complex. As we examine oversight and management, our priority and focus 

must remain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal and 

urgent nonproliferation efforts. Having in place a cost-effective and robust structure to support the cutting-edge science 

and engineering that underpin these efforts, is paramount. 

Improvements for more effective oversight, stronger accountability measures, clearer lines of authority, and setting clear 

requirements and guidance, remain necessary. These 

changes require strong leadership and an improved culture 

of excellence at NNSA. However, I am concerned that efforts 

to push for a fully independent NNSA at this time may pose 

an unacceptable risk of detracting from the focus and important missions at hand. We cannot risk NNSA losing focus 

from life extension programs, and the construction of billiondollar facilities. We must proceed carefully and deliberately 

in adding value to the process of improving NNSA. 

• Second, I would also like to raise the issue of cost. The Administration is investing—and the Congress has supported— 

unprecedented levels of funding for the nuclear weapons 

complex. The FY 2013 budget request of $7.6 billion represents about a 20% increase over 2010 levels, when many 

other programs are being cut. At a time of fiscal crisis and 

scarce resources, we must put in place robust governance 

and management structures to avoid budget and schedule 

overruns. This is all the more important for billion-dollar 

projects. And we must seek opportunities for improving efficiency within NNSA, DOE, and across the nuclear complex 

to drive down costs. A November 2011 Department of Energy 

Inspector General report on Management Challenges at the 
21 

Department of Energy made some initial recommendations 

on this issue. 

• Third, strong independent oversight, for example by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) and the Department of Energy’s Office of Health Safety and Security, to 

preserve a safe environment for our scientists and workers 

at the facilities, remains crucial. We must have appropriate 

independent oversight in place to avoid the kind of accidents 

that plagued the nuclear complex in the past and for correcting current safety deficiencies. I am concerned about the 

growing tendency to cast unwarranted blame on the DNFSB 

and other independent reviews (including those mandated by 

Congress) that maintain high standards for safety. Accidents 

can and do happen, as illustrated by the tragic events at 

Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon. A nuclear accident, 

even a minor one, would have significant repercussions on 

the future of the nuclear weapons complex. That is a consequence that we would all like to avoid. Creating and maintaining a strong safety culture is key to ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal. 

Thank you for sharing your insights on the creation of the NNSA 

to inform our oversight. In conclusion, as we look ahead I look forward to hearing your thoughts on: 

1) effective oversight, contract structure, governance and management—including transparency, accountability, and clear 

lines of authority; 

2) the need for a process that ensures safety for workers and 

the public; and 

3) whether the structure is set up to incentivize savings, maximize investment in programmatic work, avoid uncontrolled 

cost escalation and schedule delays, set priorities, and enable competition. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 27, 2012 

(59) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe I was able to present the structural problems during my 

testimony and have no examples to add. The cultural problems are more difficult. 

Most Federal civil servants, like most human beings, want to believe that they are 

making a difference. The Department of Energy is fortunate to have an experienced 

and dedicated workforce. It has proven difficult for some of them to accept that 

things that they have done for a lifetime they should now no longer do in the name 

of something called ‘‘semi-autonomy.’’ Many working level officials of the non-NNSA 

parts of the Department tend to believe that it is an error for them to no longer 

be involved with NNSA. This is true even in areas (such as five year budgeting) 

where NNSA was clearly the leader within the department. Perhaps the most striking example of this tendency is in the legal area. Federal lawyers quite properly regard their job as protecting senior officials, especially the Secretary. It is very difficult for them culturally to accept that legal organization (such as the office of 

NNSA’s General Counsel) over which they have no control can be consistently relied 

on to provide appropriate legal services in areas for which they feel responsible. 

The structural problems I observed are almost certainly amenable to solution, although the integrated nature of the Department of Energy information technology 

is particularly challenging. The cultural problems, however, may not be solvable and 

are the strongest argument for greater autonomy for NNSA. [See page 6.] 

Mr. ALOISE. We have not performed an organizational culture assessment of 

NNSA. However, organizational culture experts generally agree that an organization’s beliefs and values affect the behavior of its members. In previous work [GAO: 

Organizational Culture: Techniques Companies Use to Perpetuate or Change Beliefs 

and Values, GAO/NSIAD–92–105, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 1992).], we have 

found that (1) experts agree that an organization’s decision to change its culture is 

generally triggered by a specific event or situation and is a long-term effort that 

takes at least 5 to 10 years to complete and (2) company officials believe that the 

two key techniques for a successful culture change are the top management’s total 

commitment to the change and training that promotes and develops skills related 

to the company’s desired values or beliefs. In addition, the organizations we reviewed indicated that effecting successful cultural change requires a combination of 

many techniques, including (1) distributing a written statement of values and beliefs; (2) creating a management style that reinforces the desired values and beliefs; 

(3) offering rewards, incentives, and promotions to encourage behavior that reinforces those beliefs; (4) holding company gatherings to discuss those beliefs; (5) developing an organizational structure that is compatible with those beliefs; (6) using 

systems, procedures, and processes to support organizational values; and (7) using 

stories, legends, myths, and slogans to communicate those values and beliefs. In our 

view, a dramatic organizational change will be disruptive in the short run. In addition, dramatic organization change that is not supported by the other activities listed above may not be effective in changing organizational culture. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. ALOISE. We recommended in October 2008 that if DOE’s Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security (HSS) does not take appropriate action to meet the criteria for 

independent oversight as defined in our report [GAO, Nuclear Safety: Department 

of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and 

Operations, GAO–09–61 (Washington, D.C. Oct. 28, 2008).], the Congress should 

consider the following: 

• permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of HSS, or 

• shifting DOE to external regulation by: 

Æ providing the resources and authority to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear 

safety rules and directives, or 
60 

Æ providing the resources and authority to NRC to externally regulate all or 

just newly constructed DOE nuclear facilities. 

Appendix V of this report assessed the options for external regulation of DOE’s 

nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility 

for external regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, if they are 

given the necessary authority and resources. We reported that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not expressed a view on expanding its oversight role beyond 

the DOE facilities already subject to its regulation. DOE and the Safety Board have 

taken issue with this option because of concerns about the transition costs versus 

the likely safety benefits of doing so. [See page 8.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 27, 2012 

(63) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. 1) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, does having detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes help or hinder safety? What about security? 

Does having detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes lead to improvements in safety culture or security culture? How does detailed, transaction-level 

oversight impact efforts to improve safety, security, and associated cultures? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe there is considerable evidence that detailed procedures for 

complex operations help improve safety. There is, however, no evidence that attempting to prescribe such procedures from headquarters is useful. Transaction 

level oversight risks descending into micromanagement and shifts the perceived responsibility from those conducting the procedures to those overseeing them. Thus 

I believe that for both safety and security, the appropriate function of oversight is 

to ensure that the local plant or laboratory has provided appropriate procedures and 

has a system to ensure their consistent and effective use. 

Mr. TURNER. 2) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, as mentioned in my prepared opening statement, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress on how it 

would operate and be organized contains many indications that NNSA was headed 

in the right direction—that it was preparing to implement the intent of the NNSA 

Act. The report lists a series of actions it would take to ‘‘lift administrative burdens 

through streamlining policies, procedures, and staffing.’’ This included an ‘‘objective 

of reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by policies, procedures, and 

guidance,’’ and plans to ‘‘reengineer core business practices and right-size and reinvigorate federal staff.’’ 

Æ Do you believe implementation of this February 2002 plan was successful? Why 

or why not? 

Æ Was the objective of ‘‘reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by 

policies, procedures, and guidance’’ achieved? Why or why not? 

Æ Was the Federal staff ‘‘right-sized and reinvigorated’’ as the report indicated? 

— Budget documents indicate that NNSA’s Office of the Administrator started at 

around 1,940 employees in FY2002, was reduced to less than 1,700 by FY2005 

through streamlining initiatives, but is now back at above 1,900. Why did the Federal workforce numbers bounce back to pre-NNSA levels, despite all of the effort at 

streamlining? 

Æ All of the reports we read and experts we talk to seem to say that the administrative bureaucracy has only gotten worse. How and where did we get off track? 

Mr. BROOKS. I lack the detailed knowledge to comment on developments within 

NNSA since I left in 2007. I believe that during my tenure we made substantial 

progress on ‘‘right-sizing and reinvigoration.’’ As detailed in my prepared testimony, 

however, we were never fully successful in establishing NNSA’s autonomy from the 

broader Department of Energy. 

Mr. TURNER. 3) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the Secretary of Energy agreed 

to a streamlined independent oversight process for NNSA. Basically, DOE’s Office 

of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE’s 

oversight of NNSA into a single office. 

Æ Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why not? 

Æ Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in earnest? Is it still 

in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE’s current structural approach to oversight 

of NNSA? 

Mr. BROOKS. The intent of the February 2002 report was to save staff resources 

by not requiring NNSA to establish its own independent oversight organization. In 

principle, this was a good idea, but in hindsight it has had unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. As I indicated in my prepared testimony, NNSA’s practice of 

using Department of Energy-wide organizations (independent oversight, legal, etc.) 

made it more difficult to establish semi-autonomy and thus to reduce excessively 

prescriptive procedures. In theory, the DOE oversight organization could simply 

have used to evaluate how well NNSA policies and procedures were being implemented. In practice, however, the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance 

Assurance became an obstacle to our reducing and streamlining requirements. 
64 

I am not able to comment on current procedures within the Department of Energy 

and recommend the committee seeks that information from DOE and NNSA. 

Mr. TURNER. 4) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was striving to become a true 

‘‘separately organized’’ agency, and that ‘‘where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated . . . the use of the DOE’s staff to address NNSA 

needs, with the proviso that DOE support staff function in accordance with an 

agreement that ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the 

service.’’ Æ Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now ‘‘regret’’ relying on 

DOE staff offices for support because it weakened your ability to establish autonomy—and ‘‘establishing such autonomy became a major problem.’’ 

— Please explain why this form of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ didn’t work. 

— Do you believe this type of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ can work at all, or is full or much 

stronger autonomy necessary? Æ Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of semi-autonomy can 

work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy needed? Æ Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it is currently 

subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules. Does this fit the definition 

of ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ as you understood it during your 

time in the early years of NNSA? 

Mr. BROOKS. Semi-autonomy did not work because organizations that had department-wide responsibilities were unwilling (without substantial and continuing effort 

by senior NNSA officials) to accept the view that they need not exercise supervision 

over NNSA. This was a perfectly understandable reaction from dedicated civil servants who were convinced that they were adding value. Such an attitude, however, 

made it difficult to implement our vision of semi-autonomy. Although we did not 

fully realize it early in my tenure, there actually are no good examples of semi-autonomy within the Federal Government on which we can model an appropriate 

DOE–NNSA relationship. This leads me to conclude that, while good people can 

make any system work to some degree, the structural benefits of an independent 

NNSA are inconsistent with semi-autonomy as it was actually implemented. 

I do not believe that simply counting the number of Department of Energy orders 

and other directives is a particularly useful measure of how well a ‘‘separately organized’’ or ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ organization is functioning. What is important is not 

the number of orders, but their content. For example, when we did the pilot program at the Kansas City Plant, we exempted the plant from a number of departmental regulations. The Inspector General objected to our including a departmental 

order that required cooperation with the Inspector General functions. Whether that 

order did or did not apply to NNSA had very little bearing on our functioning. The 

problem with the large number of DOE orders is not the number per se but the prescriptive detail of many of them. 

Mr. TURNER. 5) Ambassador Brooks, your prepared statement mentions that 

‘‘clear lines of authority and accountability are made more difficult by the number 

of external bodies to whom the Administrator is in some sense accountable.’’ As you 

know, one of the key reasons for the NNSA Act was to clear up confused lines of 

authority and accountability. 

Æ Did implementation of NNSA help clear this up? How? 

Æ Would you please describe all of the oversight that is applied to the nuclear security enterprise, for instance on safety? 

Æ Do you think all of these layers contribute to inefficiency? Do you think they 

add value, or are they duplicative and add minimal benefit? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe implementation of NNSA clarified lines of authority and 

accountability. While there is considerable evidence (including the significant Y–12 

security incident that occurred after the date of this hearing) that there are still 

areas in which clear lines of accountability do not exist, I believe that NNSA had 

made substantial progress compared to the almost incomprehensible situation documented in the 1990s. That said, much of the perceived micromanagement and duplicative oversight was not within the control of the NNSA Administrator and some 

of it was not within the control of the Secretary of Energy. NNSA facilities were 

routinely audited by the Department of Energy Office of Independent Assessment, 

by the Department of Energy Inspector General, by the Government Accountability 

Office and by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. These audits were in 

general not coordinated with one another and often were duplicative. Many required 

detailed, formal corrective action plans which tended to foster detailed transactional 

oversight. 

Routine audits by the Government Accountability Office and the Inspector General are simply a fact of life. I do not believe it is useful for the Congress to consider 
65 

changing NNSA’s vulnerability to such procedures given that both GAO and the Inspector General serve broader purposes. Therefore my efforts—which were not successful—were to reduce oversight and audits from within the Department of Energy 

and to work toward a time when I could recommend to the Congress that the jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board was no longer required. I still 

believe that to be the correct approach. 

Mr. TURNER. 6) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in a recent press article, 

in the Nuclear Weapons Exchange Monitor, Ambassador Brooks is quoted saying ‘‘I 

just think it’s a misunderstanding that the line doesn’t care about safety because 

you can’t do your mission if you have safety problems . . . I think that the idea 

that if the NNSA organization doesn’t have DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security looking over its shoulder [NNSA] will not pay enough attention to safety is 

wrong.’’ Do you think NNSA’s safety program is sufficiently mature without DOE 

staff—but still with independent oversight from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the Inspector General? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. 7) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, we’ve heard 

from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is unsustainable. We’ve 

heard ominous warnings from the National Academies of Science that these governance and management problems are threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear weapons labs. We’ve heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety benefit. And now, with 

this latest budget request, we’re seeing key programs tossed overboard because we 

don’t have enough money to pay for both the bureaucracy and the mission—and apparently the bureaucracy is a higher priority. Æ We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s—that’s why we created 

NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just continue under the current 

status quo? 

Mr. BROOKS. At the time I left NNSA I believed that these problems would be 

mitigated by greater autonomy. At the same time, it is important to recognize that 

structures and procedures can facilitate leadership but not substitute for it. Good 

people can make any system work. The challenge for the Congress and the executive 

branch is to devise an NNSA governance structure that will make it easier to exercise sound leadership. The present path does not appear likely to eliminate the 

problems that you cite. But I am not as certain as I was when I left NNSA that 

greater autonomy alone is an acceptable answer. There are disconcerting examples, 

including the recent Y–12 security incident, that suggest internal NNSA procedures 

may also require review. It is my understanding that such detailed review is in 

progress. 

Mr. TURNER. 8) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as we look to 

address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we learn from the NNSA Act and 

its implementation? What should be the key messages from the past and how might 

they apply to the problems at NNSA and DOE that all of these reports talk about 

today? 

Mr. BROOKS. First, if there is to be change driven by legislation, I believe it will 

be important to focus on people. In particular, I believe significant continuity is required in the office of the Administrator. Further, it will be important that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy understand and support the intent of Congress. 

Second, the intent of the legislation must be clear and strong barriers must be 

established to eliminate the need for constant low-level bureaucratic warfare to implement Congress’s intent. 

While it is possible that a semi-autonomous approach can be made to work, it remains my view—as my testimony indicated—that full separation between NNSA 

and the Department of Energy may be required. 

Mr. TURNER. 9) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, based on your experiences 

in the early NNSA and since then, would you please comment on the reforms to 

NNSA contained in the House-passed FY13 defense authorization bill (H.R.4310)? 

Will it address the well-known and long-standing problems? 

Æ Your testimony indicates you think they may not be aggressive enough—that 

full autonomy is needed for NNSA. Do the reforms in the bill not go far enough? 

Can they be effective without strong leadership from the executive branch? Are 

there gaps we are not addressing? 

Mr. BROOKS. Some of the reforms in the bill attempt to constrain the authority 

of Department of Energy staff elements to interfere with NNSA. Unfortunately, they 

do so by constraining the authority of the Secretary of Energy. This is probably un-
66 

workable. The Secretary must have the authority to oversee NNSA if the intent of 

Congress is to keep NNSA within the Department, while remaining a separately organized entity. 

Whatever the ultimate solution is, it cannot be effective without strong leadership 

from within the executive branch. Organizational changes can facilitate leadership, 

but they cannot substitute for it. 

Mr. TURNER. 10) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, this subcommittee has reviewed the dozens of reports in the 1980s and 1990s that led to creation of NNSA. 

They all offer clear descriptions of the problems at DOE, including recurring security problems and gross mismanagement. Senior DOE leadership even embarked on 

several reform initiatives—but none were effective at fixing the organization. Why 

was senior DOE leadership unable to reform the organization? Why did it require 

Congress to step in and try to fix a problem that was so widely recognized? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do not know why pre-NNSA reforms were not effective. I had no 

experience within the Department of Energy prior to NNSA, and thus have no personal basis for making judgments. I do, however, know some of the individuals who 

were involved in early reform efforts. They are dedicated and competent public servants. I conclude, therefore, that the problem probably lies in the organizational culture of the Department of Energy. 

Mr. TURNER. 11) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in the early days of NNSA 

you were both in senior positions responsible for implementing the NNSA Act. With 

hindsight, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the NNSA Act? 

Æ Was the intent of the ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ nature of 

NNSA clear in the statute? 

Æ Do you believe it was clearly understood within DOE and the new NNSA? 

Æ Do you believe there was agreement from all stakeholders—particularly within 

DOE and NNSA—regarding what these terms meant and intended? 

Æ What problems did you encounter in trying to stand up NNSA? Did you see resistance from leaders and staff at DOE? Ambassador, your prepared statement mentions problems with the DOE General Counsel. Can you elaborate? Are there other 

examples? 

Æ The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA Act, explained 

that this term, ‘‘semi-autonomous,’’ would mean that the agency would be ‘‘strictly 

segregated from the rest of the department’’—which would be ‘‘accomplished by having the agency director report only to the Secretary.’’ Has this definition of the term 

been put into practice? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe now and believed then that the intent of ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ was clear. I discovered, however, that it was not clear 

to all officials in the Department. For example, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony, during the first term of the Bush administration the DOE General Counsel 

took the view that in order to intelligently exercise his oversight, the Secretary 

needed essentially the same information from the rest of the Department to evaluate NNSA that he needed for any other bureau or office. Other officials also had 

difficulty in accepting that their responsibilities did not include supervising NNSA. 

I do not believe the intent of the Rudman Report that NNSA be strictly segregated from the rest of the Department has been implemented. As my testimony 

suggests, I have considerable doubt that it can be implemented under the present 

governance structure. 

Mr. TURNER. 12) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the NNSA Act 

establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government (i.e., not just for DOE). How did this 

‘‘Work For Others’’ (WFO) function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively 

or more efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it entirely 

in NNSA’s hands? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do not have a clear understanding of the functioning of Work for 

Others (WFO) prior to the establishment of NNSA. There have been periodic problems with managing WFO which reportedly make it difficult for other agencies to 

employ the NNSA laboratories. I do not believe that this is primarily a problem of 

the existing governance structure. Rather it is caused by an inappropriate level of 

review from within the existing organization. 

At the time I left NNSA Work for Others was primarily within NNSA’s ability 

to control with the single exception of the area of intelligence where the DOE Office 

of Intelligence controlled the process. 

Mr. TURNER. 13) Dr. Kuckuck, would you please provide some examples of how 

the semi-autonomous model for NNSA has not worked? What factors most directly 

lead you to recommend full autonomy for NNSA? 
67 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe the most substantive examples are those presented by 

Amb. Brooks as to DOE’s contraints upon the Administrator’s ability to establish 

a less burdensome and costly oversight model for the NNSA. Specific examples have 

also been clearly presented in the numerous reviews and critiques by prestigious 

outside review groups. 

Mr. TURNER. 14) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, does having detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes help or hinder safety? What about security? 

Does having detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes lead to improvements in safety culture or security culture? How does detailed, transaction-level 

oversight impact efforts to improve safety, security, and associated cultures? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. The level of detailed procedures and prescriptive processes should 

vary with the specific task being performed. While detailed procedures such as 

checklists may be essential for some highly-complex but repetitive tasks, they can 

also be counterproductive to good safety in others. There is often a tendency for 

workers to begin to believe the paperwork ‘‘makes them safe’’ and to stop thinking 

on their own. In addition, an excess of procedures reduces efficiency and moral. 

Transaction-level oversight as opposed to oversight of performance against broader 

principles and objectives, frequently becomes disconnected from the mission as a 

whole, often tends toward measuring minutia, is an insult to the professional doing 

the job, is extremely costly and inefficient, and destroys morale. 

Mr. TURNER. 15) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, as mentioned in my prepared opening statement, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress on how it 

would operate and be organized contains many indications that NNSA was headed 

in the right direction—that it was preparing to implement the intent of the NNSA 

Act. The report lists a series of actions it would take to ‘‘lift administrative burdens 

through streamlining policies, procedures, and staffing.’’ This included an ‘‘objective 

of reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by policies, procedures, and 

guidance,’’ and plans to ‘‘reengineer core business practices and right-size and reinvigorate federal staff.’’ Æ Do you believe implementation of this February 2002 plan was successful? Why 

or why not? Æ Was the objective of ‘‘reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by 

policies, procedures, and guidance’’ achieved? Why or why not? Æ Was the Federal staff ‘‘right-sized and reinvigorated’’ as the report indicated? 

— Budget documents indicate that NNSA’s Office of the Administrator started at 

around 1,940 employees in FY2002, was reduced to less than 1,700 by FY2005 

through streamlining initiatives, but is now back at above 1,900. Why did the Federal workforce numbers bounce back to pre-NNSA levels, despite all of the effort at 

streamlining? Æ All of the reports we read and experts we talk to seem to say that the administrative bureaucracy has only gotten worse. How and where did we get off track? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I do not believe the February 2002 plan was implemented as designed, neither the reduced administrative workload nor Federal staff levels were 

realized. I believe the NNSA was constrained by bureaucratic barriers within the 

DOE as well as within NNSA itself. I was not at NNSA after 2002, so cannot comment on variations in the Federal workforce after then. As for ‘‘where did we get 

off track,’’ I believe the transformation of NNSA never really got ‘‘on track.’’ 

Mr. TURNER. 16) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the Secretary of Energy agreed 

to a streamlined independent oversight process for NNSA. Basically, DOE’s Office 

of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE’s 

oversight of NNSA into a single office. 

Æ Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why not? 

Æ Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in earnest? Is it still 

in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE’s current structural approach to oversight 

of NNSA? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe the ‘‘Independent DOE oversight’’ model did not work. I 

believe that DOE blocked the NNSA from issuing it’s own directives. I believe that 

senior NNSA officials certainly tried ‘‘in earnest’’ to succeed, but met insurmountable barriers. I am not current on exactly what oversight is in place now, but am 

of the impression is it essentially still DOE’s oversight model. 

Mr. TURNER. 17) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was striving to become a true 

‘‘separately organized’’ agency, and that ‘‘where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated . . . the use of the DOE’s staff to address NNSA 

needs, with the proviso that DOE support staff function in accordance with an 

agreement that ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the 

service.’’ 
68 

Æ Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now ‘‘regret’’ relying on 

DOE staff offices for support because it weakened your ability to establish autonomy—and ‘‘establishing such autonomy became a major problem.’’ 

— Please explain why this form of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ didn’t work. 

— Do you believe this type of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ can work at all, or is full or much 

stronger autonomy necessary? Æ Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of semi-autonomy can 

work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy needed? Æ Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it is currently 

subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules. Does this fit the definition 

of ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ as you understood it during your 

time in the early years of NNSA? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I cannot answer the question of whether or not ‘‘this concept of 

semi-autonomy can work.’’ I believe it is abundantly clear that in the NNSA–DOE 

context it has not worked. There are pros and cons to all models that have been 

proposed, but I personally believe that experience thus far would suggest it is time 

to try other than the current model. I believe that unless the NNSA Administrator 

has chosen to be subject to those 270 DOE orders, this does not constitute ‘‘separately organized,’’ or ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ as I envisioned it in 2000–2002. 

Mr. TURNER. 18) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in a recent press article, 

in the Nuclear Weapons Exchange Monitor, Ambassador Brooks is quoted saying ‘‘I 

just think it’s a misunderstanding that the line doesn’t care about safety because 

you can’t do your mission if you have safety problems . . . I think that the idea 

that if the NNSA organization doesn’t have DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security looking over its shoulder [NNSA] will not pay enough attention to safety is 

wrong.’’ Do you think NNSA’s safety program is sufficiently mature without DOE 

staff—but still with independent oversight from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the Inspector General? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe NNSA’s safety program (AND SAFETY CULTURE) are 

quite mature without DOE staff. But, obviously, there still must be independent 

oversight. I do not believe that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has been 

able to provide a properly balanced oversight function in this role. I am unaware 

of the level of safety expertise that resides in the office of the Inspector General. 

I would believe that the NRC or an NRC-like model might be most appropriate for 

NNSA. 

Mr. TURNER. 19) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, we’ve heard 

from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is unsustainable. We’ve 

heard ominous warnings from the National Academies of Science that these governance and management problems are threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear weapons labs. We’ve heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety benefit. And now, with 

this latest budget request, we’re seeing key programs tossed overboard because we 

don’t have enough money to pay for both the bureaucracy and the mission—and apparently the bureaucracy is a higher priority. 

Æ We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s—that’s why we created 

NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just continue under the current 

status quo? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I tend to agree with the warnings you are receiving from these 

prestigious outside reviewers. 

Mr. TURNER. 20) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as we look 

to address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we learn from the NNSA Act and 

its implementation? What should be the key messages from the past and how might 

they apply to the problems at NNSA and DOE that all of these reports talk about 

today? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I suspect there are many elements that have contributed to the 

less-than-intended outcome of the NNSA Act, including: competing oversight jurisdictions within the Congress; lack of independence from the DOE; bureaucracy within the NNSA itself; too many Federal staff to ‘‘make work;’’ entitlement of outside 

oversight functions to become de-facto regulators without a balanced consideration 

of mission or resources. 

Mr. TURNER. 21) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, based on your experiences 

in the early NNSA and since then, would you please comment on the reforms to 

NNSA contained in the House-passed FY13 defense authorization bill (H.R.4310)? 

Will it address the well-known and long-standing problems? 

Æ Your testimony indicates you think they may not be aggressive enough—that 

full autonomy is needed for NNSA. Do the reforms in the bill not go far enough? 
69 

Can they be effective without strong leadership from the executive branch? Are 

there gaps we are not addressing? 

I believe that H.R.4310 clearly indicates Congressional intent to improve upon the 

current and failing NNSA semi-autonomous model created by the NNSA Act. It is 

a step in the right direction, but may not be enough—necessary, but not sufficient. 

For example, the bill attempts to limit NNSA regulations in non-nuclear health and 

safety to OSHA standards. This allows for NNSA to interpret the OSHA standard 

and issue a separate NNSA regulation. Why have NNSA regulations at all? Why 

not subject NNSA facilities to OSHA oversight and eliminate the NNSA ‘‘middle 

man’’? Much of the burdensome oversight being objected to comes from such middlemen and their interpretations. The bill attempts to force the DNFSB into a more 

collaborative, balanced oversight model. Rather than try to reform the DNFSB, why 

not take positive steps to move nuclear oversight to the NRC? The bill attempts to 

force partnership and communication between the Secretary of Energy and the Laboratory Directors and Plant Managers. Why have this forced relationship, versus allowing relationships to build naturally in a fully independent NNSA? Why encumber the chances of success with the burdens of overcoming the legacy of past failures? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. It is true that the bill cannot legislate leadership, trust, partnership and good judgment, but the bill can definitely legislate an environment that 

will attract, encourage and foster these qualities. It seems to me that there is a 

greater chance of success in this endeavor by starting from a clean sheet of paper 

than by trying to reform embedded bureaucracies. 

Mr. TURNER. 22) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, this subcommittee has reviewed the dozens of reports in the 1980s and 1990s that led to creation of NNSA. 

They all offer clear descriptions of the problems at DOE, including recurring security problems and gross mismanagement. Senior DOE leadership even embarked on 

several reform initiatives—but none were effective at fixing the organization. Why 

was senior DOE leadership unable to reform the organization? Why did it require 

Congress to step in and try to fix a problem that was so widely recognized? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I am not in a position to answer questions pertaining to DOE leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, but observing the barriers to reform that have existed in the last decade I could imagine that many existed then as well. 

Mr. TURNER. 23) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in the early days of NNSA 

you were both in senior positions responsible for implementing the NNSA Act. With 

hindsight, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the NNSA Act? 

Æ Was the intent of the ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ nature of 

NNSA clear in the statute? 

Æ Do you believe it was clearly understood within DOE and the new NNSA? 

Æ Do you believe there was agreement from all stakeholders—particularly within 

DOE and NNSA—regarding what these terms meant and intended? 

Æ What problems did you encounter in trying to stand up NNSA? Did you see resistance from leaders and staff at DOE? Ambassador, your prepared statement mentions problems with the DOE General Counsel. Can you elaborate? Are there other 

examples? 

Æ The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA Act, explained 

that this term, ‘‘semi-autonomous,’’ would mean that the agency would be ‘‘strictly 

segregated from the rest of the department’’—which would be ‘‘accomplished by having the agency director report only to the Secretary.’’ Has this definition of the term 

been put into practice? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe the greatest strength of the NNSA Act, at least in its intent, was some sort of autonomy for NNSA. Clearly, this ‘‘semi autonomous’’ model 

did not work within DOE. There was not agreement by all parties as to what ‘‘semi 

autonomous’’ meant. Amb. Brooks has testified more about this than I am able to 

offer. 

Mr. TURNER. 24) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the NNSA Act 

establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government (i.e., not just for DOE). How did this 

‘‘Work For Others’’ (WFO) function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively 

or more efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it entirely 

in NNSA’s hands? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I have had little direct experience with WFO and can not comment 

on this. 

Mr. TURNER. 25) Mr. Aloise, do you agree with Ambassador Brooks when he says, 

with respect to today’s situation at NNSA compared to before NNSA was created, 

‘‘Security is clearly better, safety is no worse, but we haven’t removed the burden 

on the labs. Nuclear safety and the Defense [Nuclear Facilities Safety] Board, the 
70 

relationship is not—was not when I was there—working well’’? Has security improved? Has safety? Has the burden on the labs and plants been lessened? What 

is your assessment of the relationship between NNSA and the DNFSB and the effectiveness of the DNFSB? 

Mr. ALOISE. As we stated in our June 2012 testimony, NNSA has established an 

effective headquarters security organization, and this organization has made significant progress in resolving many of the security weaknesses we had identified. [GAO, 

Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on the Organization and 

Management of the National Nuclear Security Administration, GAO–12–867T, 

(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2012).] However, in our view, the recent serious security incident at the Y–12 site demonstrates that NNSA faces challenges in sustaining security improvements. 

Our work has also raised questions about the independence of DOE’s oversight 

of safety. Furthermore, the results of DOE’s recent safety reform are unclear because DOE did not determine if the original directives were burdensome, and the 

reform did not fully address safety concerns we and others have identified. [GAO, 

Nuclear Safety: Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and Operations, GAO–09–61 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 

2008) and Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its 

Safety Reform Effort, GAO–12–347 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).] We have not 

assessed the regulatory burden on the labs and plants. 

We also have not formally assessed the relationship between NNSA and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, nor the board’s effectiveness. We stated that 

DOE must decide how to respond to the board recommendations and, to date, the 

agency has generally accepted these recommendations. 

Mr. TURNER. 26) Mr. Aloise, in their prepared statements, Ambassador Brooks 

and Dr. Kuckuck recommend full autonomy for NNSA. We also have many, many 

reports by independent, bipartisan commissions and nonpartisan study groups that 

recommend the same. But you advocate against ‘‘dramatic changes.’’ Why do you 

disagree with all of these other experts? 

Mr. ALOISE. As we said in our June 2012 testimony, we do not believe that dramatic changes are warranted because we are uncertain whether such significant organizational changes to increase NNSA’s independence would produce the desired 

effect. [GAO–12–867T] In our view, few, if any, of NNSA’s problems in the areas 

of safety, security, and project management stem from the organizational relationship between NNSA and DOE. A dramatic organizational change, such as making 

NNSA an independent agency, may be disruptive. Currently, DOE provides NNSA 

with a large number of services, such as personnel and headquarters building security, office space, payroll, and information technology. NNSA would have to devote 

substantially more effort to create and then maintain these overhead functions. 

Mr. TURNER. 27) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the Secretary of Energy agreed 

to a streamlined independent oversight process for NNSA. Basically, DOE’s Office 

of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE’s 

oversight of NNSA into a single office. 

Æ Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why not? 

Æ Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in earnest? Is it still 

in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE’s current structural approach to oversight 

of NNSA? 

Mr. ALOISE. Without performing additional audit work, we cannot determine if 

the oversight model discussed in the 2002 report was fully implemented. The Secretary of Energy created the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) in October 

2006, incorporating most of the responsibilities from the former Office of Environment, Safety, and Health and the Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance. HSS is the only office within DOE that oversees these programs without influence from the program offices, thus avoiding the potential conflict of interest inherent with program office oversight and helping to ensure public confidence in the Department’s ability to self-regulate nuclear safety and security. As we reported in October 2008, HSS has fallen short in providing effective independent oversight of nuclear safety. [GAO–09–61.] For example, the office’s ability to function independently was limited because it has no role in reviewing the technical analysis that 

helps ensure safe design and operation of nuclear facilities. We recommended that 

if DOE does not take appropriate action to meet these criteria for independent oversight, then the Congress should consider the following: 

• permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of HSS, or 

• shifting DOE to external regulation by: 
71 

Æ providing the resources and authority to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety 

rules and directives, or 

Æ providing the resources and authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

to externally regulate all or just newly constructed DOE nuclear facilities. 

DOE and HSS took actions in response to our report’s recommendations, including 

placing an emphasis on assessing the design of new nuclear facilities before they 

are constructed and establishing site leads within HSS responsible for each of 

DOE’s sites. Despite these actions to strengthen independent oversight of nuclear 

safety, we reported in April 2012 that some of these actions may undermine the 

safety culture at DOE nuclear facilities and may weaken HSS oversight responsibilities. [GAO–12–347.] For example, DOE’s reform effort did not fully address safety 

concerns we and others have identified in three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) 

safety culture, and (3) Federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE 

strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying that contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance problems 

persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine against a contractor in 

July 2011 after identifying quality assurance problems in an incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to 

attempt to strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE removed requirements 

for contractors to follow the directives because contractors already had to comply 

with safety management requirements in Federal regulation. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in Federal regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more specific requirements in 

DOE’s directives. Finally, regarding Federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to 

place greater emphasis on having its independent oversight staff review safety design documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are built. 

Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise concerns about the 

oversight staff’s ability to provide a critical review of safety at DOE’s sites that is 

independent from DOE site office and contractor staff. 

Mr. TURNER. 28) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, NNSA’s February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was striving to become a true 

‘‘separately organized’’ agency, and that ‘‘where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated . . . the use of the DOE’s staff to address NNSA 

needs, with the proviso that DOE support staff function in accordance with an 

agreement that ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the 

service.’’ Æ Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now ‘‘regret’’ relying on 

DOE staff offices for support because it weakened your ability to establish autonomy—and ‘‘establishing such autonomy became a major problem.’’ 

— Please explain why this form of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ didn’t work. 

— Do you believe this type of ‘‘semi-autonomy’’ can work at all, or is full or much 

stronger autonomy necessary? 

Æ Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of semi-autonomy can 

work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy needed? 

Æ Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it is currently 

subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules. Does this fit the definition 

of ‘‘separately organized’’ and ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ as you understood it during your 

time in the early years of NNSA? 

Mr. ALOISE. In 2007, we examined the issues that hindered NNSA from functioning as a separately organized agency within DOE. [GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs, GAO–07–36, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).] At the 

time of our 2007 review, we identified several factors contributing to NNSA’s lack 

of autonomy. First, DOE and NNSA did not have a useful model to follow for establishing a separately organized agency in DOE. Second, the January 2000 NNSA implementation plan, required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. As a result, although some 

NNSA programs had set up procedures for interacting with DOE, other programs 

had not, resulting in organizational conflict. Even where formal procedures were developed, interpersonal disagreements had hindered effective cooperation. 

We recommended that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately organized 

agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA, should clearly define 

NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency within the Department. In his 31 

USC Section 720 response to our report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy stated that 
72 

he did not concur with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and the NNSA had executed memorandums of understanding specifying how 

certain departmentwide functions would be performed while respecting the statutory insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the Department would consider issuing circumstance-specific guidance where required to correct 

misperceptions about the effect of the NNSA’s act limitations. Since then, we have 

identified instances that indicate the DOE–NNSA relationship has become less 

clear. For example, DOE recently announced that DOE’s Environmental Management program will begin to report to the NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously 

is an Under Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this recommendation 

open and still believe that further clarification of the NNSA–DOE relationship is 

needed. 

Mr. TURNER. 29) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, we’ve heard 

from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is unsustainable. We’ve 

heard ominous warnings from the National Academies of Science that these governance and management problems are threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear weapons labs. We’ve heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety benefit. And now, with 

this latest budget request, we’re seeing key programs tossed overboard because we 

don’t have enough money to pay for both the bureaucracy and the mission—and apparently the bureaucracy is a higher priority. Æ We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s—that’s why we created 

NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just continue under the current 

status quo? 

Mr. ALOISE. GAO agrees that the status quo is unacceptable. At the same time, 

we believe that the current situation can be improved without separating NNSA 

completely from DOE. In our view, the problems we continue to identify in the nuclear security enterprise are not caused by excessive oversight but instead result 

from ineffective oversight and poor contractor management. We believe that NNSA 

has made progress in improving its management practices, and we will continue to 

monitor NNSA’s efforts to improve performance. 

Mr. TURNER. 30) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as we look 

to address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we learn from the NNSA Act and 

its implementation? What should be the key messages from the past and how might 

they apply to the problems at NNSA and DOE that all of these reports talk about 

today? 

Mr. ALOISE. In our view, a retrospective ‘‘lessons-learned’’ evaluation of the creation of and implementation of NNSA would be valuable, but we have not conducted 

audit work that is sufficient to answer this question. 

Mr. TURNER. 31) Mr. Aloise, a series of GAO reports in the 1990s were highly critical of DOE’s management of the nuclear weapons complex—particularly in the 

areas of security, contract management, and clarity in roles, responsibilities, and 

authorities. For instance, in 1993 GAO said ‘‘DOE has significant management 

problems, as reported by many oversight groups and acknowledged by agency leadership,’’ and ‘‘management of the nuclear weapons complex and the national laboratory system . . . [is] in disarray.’’ The reports contributed to the momentum that 

ultimately resulted in creation of the NNSA in 2000. 

Æ Was it within DOE’s authority to fix these problems? If so, why didn’t it? 

Æ Why did it require Congress to step in and fix a problem that was so widely 

recognized? 

Mr. ALOISE. DOE and NNSA and their predecessor organizations generally have 

the authority to address the issues that our reports identified over the years. We 

have not comprehensively assessed why these agencies have not always done so. It 

is within Congress created NNSA to address management problems, which included 

serious security incidents involving espionage and the potential compromise of highly classified nuclear data. Similarly, in the late 1980s, Congress established the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in response to long-standing safety concerns 

at DOE’s sites. 

Mr. TURNER. 32) Mr. Aloise, in 1998, one year before the NNSA Act was signed 

into law, GAO analyzed DOE’s progress in addressing the dozens of recommendations made by various advisory groups to improve and streamline management of 

DOE’s national laboratories. After analyzing the actions DOE told GAO it was pursuing to implement these recommendations, GAO said that, ‘‘Most of the actions 

DOE reported to us are process oriented, incomplete, or only marginally related to 

past recommendations for change. For example, creating new task forces and 

strengthening old ones may be good for defining problems, but these measures can-
73 

not force decisions or affect change.’’ Generally, how do we get an organization to 

move from these sorts of fuzzy measures and start taking real, active steps to force 

change? 

Mr. ALOISE. Generally speaking, cultural change is needed. We have not performed an organizational culture assessment of NNSA. However, organizational culture experts generally agree that an organization’s beliefs and values affect the behavior of its members. In previous work, we found that (1) experts agree that an 

organization’s decision to change its culture is generally triggered by a specific event 

or situation and is a long-term effort that takes at least 5 to 10 years to complete 

and (2) some corporate officials believe that the two key techniques for a successful 

culture change are the top management’s total commitment to the change and training that promotes and develops skills related to the company’s desired values or beliefs. [GAO: Organizational Culture: Techniques Companies Use to Perpetuate or 

Change Beliefs and Values, GAO/NSIAD–92–105, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 

1992).] 

Mr. TURNER. 33) Mr. Aloise, in its 2007 report, GAO said ‘‘management problems 

continue, in part, because NNSA and DOE have not fully agreed on how NNSA 

should function within the department as a separately organized agency. This lack 

of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective 

operations.’’ Æ What were some of the organizational conflicts? How did they inhibit effective 

operations? Æ What evidence led GAO to make this finding? What did GAO suggest be done 

to resolve it? Æ Has this problem been resolved? Do you believe NNSA and DOE have agreed 

upon—and implemented—a coherent and rational management structure for how 

NNSA should function within DOE as a ‘‘separately organized’’ agency, as required 

by the NNSA Act? Æ The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA Act, explained 

that this term, ‘‘semi-autonomous,’’ would mean that the agency would be ‘‘strictly 

segregated from the rest of the department’’—which would be ‘‘accomplished by having the agency director report only to the Secretary.’’ Has this definition of the term 

been put into practice? 

Mr. ALOISE. Regarding organizational conflict, our January 2007 report provides 

detail on the conflict between DOE and NNSA over the organization and conduct 

of counterintelligence. [GAO–07–36, pp. 39–44.] More specifically, we found a lack 

of formal agreement between DOE and NNSA in a number of key areas—budgeting, 

procurement, information technology, management and administration, and safeguards and security—which resulted in organizational conflicts that inhibited effective operations. Even where formal procedures were developed, interpersonal disagreements hindered effective cooperation. For example, our report described the 

conflict between NNSA and DOE counterintelligence officials who disagreed over (1) 

the scope and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to jointly 

direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program offices, (3) the allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4) counterintelligence policy making, and (5) 

their roles and responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence matters. Subsequently, Congress amended the NNSA Act to consolidate DOE’s and NNSA’s counterintelligence programs under DOE. 

In terms of evidence, we reviewed the NNSA Act as well as two House of Representatives reports in 2000 on the act’s implementation. Because the establishment 

of NNSA as a separately organized agency in DOE was a key provision of the NNSA 

Act, we met with officials from NNSA headquarters; the NNSA Service Center; the 

NNSA site offices; and DOE offices where NNSA and DOE need to interact, including DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (formerly the Office of 

Counterintelligence); Chief Financial Officer; Chief Information Officer; General 

Counsel; and Human Capital Management. To understand how NNSA and DOE 

were intended to interact, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents, such as 

DOE’s January 2000 implementation plan for NNSA. We also interviewed officials 

with the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, and the Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration to 

obtain their views on the reporting relationships that need to be in place for an entity designated as a ‘‘separately organized agency’’ to succeed. We contacted the first 

two agencies cited because they were identified in the Defense Science Board’s June 

1999 report as good models of a separately organized agency. We contacted the latter two agencies cited after consultation with staff in your offices. We also interviewed former NNSA and DOE officials, including the first and second Administrators and the Deputy Secretary of Energy, who helped establish NNSA, to get their 
74 

perspective on the difficulties involved in creating a separately organized agency 

within a department. 

In regard to semi-autonomy, the Secretary of Energy disagreed with our recommendation that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately organized agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA, should clearly define 

NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency within the Department. In his 31 

USC Section 720 response to our report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy stated that 

he did not concur with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and NNSA had executed memorandums of understanding specifying how certain departmentwide functions would be performed while respecting the statutory 

insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the Department will consider 

issuing circumstance-specific guidance where required to correct misperceptions 

about the effect of the NNSA Act’s limitations. Since we received the response, there 

have been instances where the DOE/NNSA relationship has become less clear. For 

example, DOE recently announced that DOE’s Environmental Management program 

will begin to report to the NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously is an Under 

Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this recommendation open and still 

believe that further clarification of the NNSA–DOE relationship is needed. 

Mr. TURNER. 34) Mr. Aloise, GAO had noted long before NNSA was established 

that DOE program managers and Federal employees did not have the technical 

knowledge to effectively oversee the complex programs of the nuclear security labs. 

Did the NNSA Act address this concern effectively? Æ Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, do you agree this is or was a problem? 

Did the NNSA Act help attract top-quality leaders and managers to the Federal 

side? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, we believe the NNSA Act addressed this concern. As we reported 

in April 2012, through the NNSA Act and other actions, DOE and NNSA sought, 

and were granted, authorities by Congress to offer higher pay to staff primarily in 

certain engineering and science fields. [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Strategies and Challenges in Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and Contractor Workforces, GAO–12–468 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).] Specifically, to 

help NNSA retain more experienced competitive service employees with critical 

skills––that is, employees in regular civil service positions—Congress granted exceptions to normal hiring regulations, including salary caps, under three excepted service authorities. First, under the Department of Energy Organization Act the Secretary of Energy is granted special excepted service hiring authorities to hire up to 

200 highly skilled scientific, engineering, professional, and administrative individuals to upgrade the Department’s technical and professional capabilities. NNSA can 

use this authority in some cases to hire senior-level employees from outside the Government or difficult-to-hire administrative staff. According to NNSA officials, the 

agency currently employs about 50 such individuals. Second, under the National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Energy is also granted special excepted 

service hiring authorities to hire up to 200 highly skilled individuals––typically scientists, technicians and engineers with skills related to and necessary for the operation of nuclear facilities. According to NNSA officials, the agency currently employs 

about 100 such individuals. Third, under the National Nuclear Security Administration Act, NNSA may hire up to 300 highly qualified scientists, engineers, and other 

technically skilled workers needed to support the missions of NNSA under similar 

excepted service hiring authorities. According to NNSA officials, NNSA has used 

this authority to employ about 280 highly skilled individuals. NNSA officials told 

us that all of these flexibilities are useful and help NNSA compete with the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission and national laboratories. 

While DOE and NNSA have used these authorities and we have found performance improvements, significant deficiencies remain. We have attributed these ongoing deficiencies to, among other things, inadequate oversight and poor contractor 

management. Some of these deficiencies may also be attributed to not having 

enough technically skilled Federal officials, but we have not conducted a formal 

evaluation of the extent to which DOE and NNSA employees possess adequate technical knowledge. 

Mr. TURNER. 35) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the NNSA Act 

establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government (i.e., not just for DOE). How did this 

‘‘Work For Others’’ (WFO) function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively 

or more efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it entirely 

in NNSA’s hands? 

Mr. ALOISE. We are currently starting a review of the work for others (WFO) program in response to a request from the House Energy and Commerce Committee 

and plan to complete this work in 2013. 
75 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 36) Do you think that it would have been a better decision to place 

NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation? Why or 

why not? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe that such a step should be considered but that the ramifications need careful study. That is why the paper I prepared for the Strategic Posture 

Commission advocated a three year transition. Experience in the United Kingdom 

(which I acknowledge has a different regulatory culture) has shown a civil regulator 

can be effective in regulating military facilities. I believe the existing Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is inherently subject to mission and requirements 

creep. I note that the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility now under construction is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). While this facility has had 

significant problems during construction, I am unaware of any evidence that NRC 

regulation has been the cause. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 37) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors have 

reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However, just in the past 

year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety deficiencies. 

Examples include: 

a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16, 2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL 

b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated December 2, 2011, 

regarding the quality and safety of work at Pantex 

c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29, 2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression systems 

d. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated January 26, 2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources 

e. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated May 21, 2012, regarding 

deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy sources (the lockout/tagout process) 

So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety deficiencies noted in these 

letters, do you believe that NNSA and its contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, 

maintenance and design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need 

the oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what data or 

metrics are you aware of that support your position? 

Mr. BROOKS. I am not able to comment on the details of current actions within 

NNSA. In my experience there will always be safety problems and thus there will 

always be in need for oversight. The examples you cite appear to me to be cases 

where NNSA was exercising that oversight. It is not clear why duplication of oversight by Departmental elements other than NNSA would make the situation better. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 38) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that ‘‘Significant improvement 

is still needed especially in NNSA’s management of its major projects and contracts.’’ 

Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in recent years had a pilot 

program consisting of NNSA contracting directly for the repair of roves across the 

nuclear complex which was a successful effort but was discontinued. 

Mr. BROOKS. The example you cite for repair of roofs was conducted under a ‘‘get 

well’’ program to compensate for neglected maintenance during the 1990s. NNSA 

achieved substantial savings and efficiencies by centrally managing this essentially 

similar work that was conducted at multiple sites. While I am proud of this effort, 

I do not believe it has a direct bearing on the question of major construction projects 

at a single site. 

I do not regard myself as an expert in construction management. Nonetheless, the 

number of problems that have occurred with allowing major construction projects 

to be managed by the operating contractors at plants and laboratories is disturbing. 

I believe that the skills to operate a national laboratory or production plant and the 

skills to oversee a construction project are not the same. Thus I believe it may be 

useful for NNSA to consider contracting separately for construction of major facilities. I do not, however, believe that this is an appropriate subject for legislation 

since NNSA facilities tend to be unique and therefore the circumstances of their 

construction are unique as well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 39) What is the role for independent safety oversight? What is the 

appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear operations? 

Mr. BROOKS. The role of independent safety oversight of hazardous and nuclear 

operations is to protect the public and the workers involved from harm. Independent 
76 

safety oversight can do this only when it is verifying that operations are being conducted safely but is not seeking to remove the basic responsibility for their actions 

from those performing the operations. 

The changes in oversight that I recommended in my testimony and that I sought 

to implement when I was NNSA Administrator were not intended to eliminate oversight but to make it more efficient. In particular, I believe that multiple levels of 

oversight, not all of which are responsive to line management are less likely to 

achieve the safe operations that must be our constant goal. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 40) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be NNSA or 

the labs? 

Mr. BROOKS. Both have an important role. The facilities within NNSA’s National 

Security Enterprise are owned by the Government and thus the ultimate responsibility for balancing risk and mission must reside with Federal officials. At the same 

time, the technical knowledge necessary to make sound decisions is usually found 

in the organizations actually running these facilities. This leads to the notion that 

Federal officials should oversee the balancing of risk and mission with heavy input 

from the laboratories and plants. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 41) Do you believe it’s prudent to remove independent oversight 

from either NNSA or its contractors? 

Mr. BROOKS. No. That is why my efforts as Administrator were directed not at 

limiting independent oversight but at making it more effective and less burdensome. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 42) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the UK, have the authority 

to lose confidence in any contractor employee from the director to lower levels, to 

increase accountability from the laboratories? 

Mr. BROOKS. Yes and I believe existing contracts provide that authority although 

its very existence usually makes it unnecessary to employ. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 43) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-privatization of 

the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the 

mission or performance change depending on the fee level? 

Mr. BROOKS. First, I should note that Sandia National Laboratory has always 

been operated by a for-profit entity. The increased fees we offered in connection with 

the competition to manage the Los Alamos National Laboratory were intended to 

attract operating partners with experience in industrial management of complex 

high hazard facilities. We hoped that the increased fee would be balanced by greater 

efficiency and the elimination of costly problems, thus resulting in a net long term 

savings to the Government. From recent discussions, I believe we are beginning to 

see such a result, although it has taken us substantially longer than we hoped or 

expected. When the Congress directed that NNSA compete the operating contract 

for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we chose a similar approach for 

consistency. 

All three NNSA national laboratories have always been headed by experienced 

scientists, usually with long careers at those laboratories. I do not believe that the 

attitude of such leaders toward mission and performance is dependent on the size 

and structure of the annual fee. My observations during my tenure have convinced 

me that what motivates laboratory directors is a sense of mission and the professional reputation of their laboratories. Thus, the increased fees should properly be 

seen as a tool induce the industrial partners to provide skill sets to assist the laboratory director that would not otherwise be available. This was our philosophy during both the Los Alamos and Livermore competitions. As noted above, we are only 

now beginning to see indications that it was correct. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 44) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise going forward? 

Mr. BROOKS. The most important factor in instilling such a culture is leadership 

by laboratory directors, plant managers, and Federal officials. Congress can facilitate such a leadership by mandating an organizational structure that has clear lines 

of responsibility, authority, and accountability. It can also help by avoiding the tendency to call for more detailed transactional level supervision when problems do 

occur. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 45) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid conflicting directives? 

Mr. BROOKS. I know of no way to do this except by mandating a single chain of 

command and reducing the ability of organizations not responsible to the Administrator to issue directives. I recognize this places a huge responsibility on the Administrator. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 46) There have been a number of changes in the past year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA moving the site manager 
77 

reporting authority to the office of the Administrator. Can you share your insights 

and comment on these management and governance changes? 

Mr. BROOKS. I need to stress that I have only limited knowledge of today’s detailed procedures within the Department of Energy. Based on my understanding, 

both of these changes are for the better. They are almost certainly not, however, 

sufficient. Eliminating duplicative regulations (and even more important, conflicting 

regulations) is important but ultimately it is the content of the remaining regulations and the manner of their implementation that matters. 

I established what I called the ‘‘strong site manager’’ model where the site managers reported directly to the office of the Administrator. I was disappointed when 

the Department directed me to alter these reporting relationships. I am therefore 

obviously pleased to see that they are being reestablished. At the same time, they 

will only improve management if the Site Manager is once again the route into the 

plants and laboratories for all operational direction. The key is that NNSA must 

speak to its contractor partners with one voice. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 47) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down costs 

and ensure efficiencies? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do not believe there is a single simple solution to this problem. 

Further, it is important to recognize that NNSA facilities and programs are often 

complex and one-of-a-kind. In such programs, it is inherently difficult to manage 

costs. The two most important variables appear to me to be strong, well-trained and 

well-qualified managers and predictable funding. The first is fundamentally a responsibility of the Executive branch, while the second is a shared responsibility between the Executive and Congress. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 48) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to reduce the 

number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline management. Could you 

comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the number of FTEs at NNSA. If such 

reductions occur, should we see a proportional number of efficiencies at labs and 

cost savings at the labs? 

Mr. BROOKS. In general I find reducing FTEs in anticipation of streamlined management to be a blunt instrument of questionable utility. There is no assurance that 

the right billets will be eliminated. I do not believe it is possible to predict in advance whether or not the mere fact of an FTE reduction will lead to laboratory efficiencies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 49) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can accomplish 

required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based self-assessments by the contractor 

and NNSA with no transactional oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard nuclear operations? 

Mr. BROOKS. I do not believe that the Federal Government can simply take a 

hands-off approach and depend entirely on contractor self-assessment. At the same 

time, I believe that transactional oversight is exceptionally likely to lead to micromanagement and to shift the presumed responsibility from the contractors. Thus I 

believe in a performance-based approach such as that I was trying to implement 

during my tenure. 

I do not believe that one can answer in the abstract questions about response to 

accidents. The goal is not to have such accidents in the first place. The issue for 

the Congress and NNSA is what procedures are most likely to lead to this result. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 50) What challenges remain to improve accountability and cost effectiveness? 

Mr. BROOKS. As I have noted elsewhere, I lack detailed knowledge of the current 

status of NNSA and thus I believe it is inappropriate for me to attempt to judge 

how far they have come or what the most important remaining challenges are. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 51) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector General issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Management Challenges at the Department of Energy’’ which recommended eliminated duplicative functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe it is more correct to say that the Inspector General recommended studying such a consolidation in order to meet the anticipated funding 

challenges of the coming years. The Inspector General’s report noted the view 

(which it neither endorsed nor refuted) that the separate functions made NNSA 

more efficient. 

The principal benefit of the existing functions is to enhance the ability of NNSA 

to function as a separately organized entity, as the Congress directed. As I indicated 

in my testimony, the more NNSA is required to draw on support from the larger 
78 

Department, the less clear its organizational independence becomes. Thus the specific changes are surrogates for the broad question of whether a separately organized NNSA (either inside or outside of the Department of Energy) remains in the 

national interest. I believe it does. 

The principal costs are only financial in cases where the broader Department decides that it is unwilling to accept NNSA’s independent action and seeks to duplicate it. That this sometimes happens. On the other hand, the amount of effort required to process personnel actions does not change significantly whether those performing such actions are in one organization or two. 

The most significant cost of the present arrangement, however, is the need to coordinate in order that the Department may speak with a consistent voice. One of 

the Secretaries of Energy for whom I worked, was particularly concerned with this 

aspect. I acknowledge that this is in fact a real cost but I believe that the benefits 

of maintaining a separately organized NNSA are worth paying that cost. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 52) Do you think that it would have been a better decision to place 

NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation? Why or 

why not? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. It appears to me that the oversight model of our civilian nuclear 

industry functions in a considerably more balanced manner than does the DOE 

oversight of our nuclear weapons complex. I do not see any added value in the latter, but do see considerable added cost. I believe the NRC or an NRC-like model 

could be preferable for the weapons complex. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 53) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors have 

reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However, just in the past 

year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety deficiencies. 

Examples include: 

a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16, 2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL 

b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated December 2, 2011, 

regarding the quality and safety of work at Pantex 

c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29, 2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression systems 

d. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated January 26, 2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources 

e. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated May 21, 2012, regarding 

deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy sources (the lockout/tagout process) 

So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety deficiencies noted in these 

letters, do you believe that NNSA and its contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, 

maintenance and design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need 

the oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what data or 

metrics are you aware of that support your position? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I no longer have sufficient knowledge of the specifics of day-to-day 

oversight by the Site Managers of the NNSA laboratories and plants to answer this 

question adequately. However, I think a key word in your question would be the 

‘‘significance’’ of the deficiencies. In my experience both in my laboratory career as 

well as my NNSA career, many of those deficiencies cited by the DOE overseers 

were minor and of an administrative nature—in a system of excessive and overwhelming paperwork. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 54) When you were at NNSA, you came to agreement with the Office of Health Safety and Security on implementing safety regulations. Can you provide us more details on this process and its impact? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I was not part of this process or agreement while at NNSA. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 55) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that ‘‘Significant improvement 

is still needed especially in NNSA’s management of its major projects and contracts.’’ 

Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in recent years had a pilot 

program consisting of NNSA contracting directly for the repair of roves across the 

nuclear complex which was a successful effort but was discontinued. 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe there are many underlying factors that complicate construction projects in the NNSA. As in other areas, excessive regulation, either explicit from NNSA (DOE), or implicit from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board, play a major role in the cost and schedule of NNSA facilities. Improving the 
79 

overall NNSA model will aid considerably in improving performance on major construction projects. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 56) What is the role for independent safety oversight? What is the 

appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear operations? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Obviously, the NNSA laboratories and plants should have independent safety oversight. Particular risk levels or standards should be developed in 

a balanced way. I would believe the NRC model and standards might be relevant. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 57) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be NNSA or 

the labs? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Both should have a role, and one would hope a relationship would 

exist that would provide the nation a reasonable balance. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 58) Do you believe it’s prudent to remove independent oversight 

from either NNSA or its contractors? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. No. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 59) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the UK, have the authority 

to lose confidence in any contractor employee from the director to lower levels, to 

increase accountability from the laboratories? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Of course, they have the authority to ‘‘lose confidence’’ in an employee. However, I believe the subsequent consequences of that loss of confidence 

must be addressed in advance by both sides in their contractual agreements. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 60) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-privatization of 

the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the 

mission or performance change depending on the fee level? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. My career at the laboratories was totally during the time they were 

managed by the University of California. There were no fees until my later years 

when fees were forced upon the UC by DOE, and even then the UC turned them 

all back to the laboratories to invest in R&D for the nation. There was no impact 

on performance one way or the other. I am not in a position to comment on what 

role fees play under the new LLC management contracts, but knowing the dedication, commitment and patriotism of the people at our national laboratories, I cannot 

imagine that the award of fees would affect mission performance per se. However, 

I am not cognizant of the extent, if any, to which these fees may be decreasing the 

resources available for mission. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 61) You say in your testimony that ‘‘As Director of the Los Alamos 

National Laboratory in 2005–2006, I was disappointed that the laboratory working 

environment at least as burdensome as I had experienced at Livermore prior to the 

creation of NNSA, and unfortunately, somewhat more adversarial.’’ Why do you 

think the environment became more adversarial after the creation of NNSA? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I cannot be sure if my perceived increase in adversity was due to 

a change in time, place or people, or even me. However, I would suspect that most 

people were optimistic about the improvements that were expected with the creation 

of the NNSA in 2000 and as these improvements did not materialize as the years 

went by, perhaps even worsened, tensions and frustrations, and hence, conflicts invariably grew. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 62) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise going forward? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. This is a difficult question and if there was a simple answer, I 

think we would have achieved it by now. I think such an end state will be based 

on new faces and a fresh start. Hence, beginning with a severance from the past 

is probably a reasonable first step. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 63) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid conflicting directives? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I think the NNSA report of February, 2002 stated an appropriate 

management and oversight model. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 64) There have been a number of changes in the past year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA moving the site manager 

reporting authority to the office of the Administrator. Can you share your insights 

and comment on these management and governance changes? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I have no data upon which to judge the change in reporting of site 

managers. However, I have seen no evidence of streamlined or simplified governance. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 65) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down costs 

and ensure efficiencies? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. Eliminate excessive oversight and trust the expertise embedded in 

our laboratories. Replace current safety oversight with a more balanced, but still 

independent model. 
80 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 66) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to reduce the 

number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline management. Could you 

comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the number of FTEs at NNSA. If such 

reductions occur, should we see a proportional number of efficiencies at labs and 

cost savings at the labs? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe the NNSA would be considerably more efficient with fewer 

Federal employees. I think efficiencies would also result at the laboratories. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 67) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can accomplish 

required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based self-assessments by the contractor 

and NNSA with no transactional oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard nuclear operations? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe that NNSA and their contractors can indeed manage and 

operate high-hazard nuclear operations at a safe level. I believe there should also 

be balanced, independent performance-based (vice transactional) oversight. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 68) What challenges remain to improve accountability and cost effectiveness? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. There will always be challenges to improve accountability and cost 

effectiveness. The specifics will vary in both place and time, but continuous improvement should be a fundamental principle of any endeavor. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 69) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector General issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Management Challenges at the Department of Energy’’ which recommended eliminated duplicative functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. I believe there are no risks with this approach. The benefits would 

be the NNSA having the ability to streamline and reduce the burdens of excessive 

oversight that the DOE currently brings to the table. The costs of separate functions 

would be negligible compared to the savings that would accrue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 70) Do you think that it would have been a better decision to place 

NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation? Why or 

why not? 

Mr. ALOISE. Our October 2008 report addressed the issue of potentially transferring the regulation of DOE nuclear facilities to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

or to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. [GAO–09–61.] Specifically, we assessed the extent to which the DOE office responsible for independent assessments 

of nuclear safety—the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS)—met GAO’s elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight. We found that HSS fell 

short of fully meeting these criteria. For example, the office’s ability to function 

independently is limited because it has no role in reviewing the technical analysis 

that helps ensure safe design and operation of nuclear facilities. Nearly all of the 

shortcomings that we identified were caused, in part, by DOE’s desire to strengthen 

oversight by the program offices that are responsible for carrying out DOE’s various 

missions, with HSS providing assistance. We recommended that if DOE did not take 

the necessary actions to meet the criteria for effective independent oversight, then 

the Congress should consider, among other things, shifting the responsibility for 

regulating nuclear safety to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board or to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. DOE has taken some actions in response to the recommendations made in this report, but we reported in April 2012 that recent revisions to safety requirements may undermine efforts to establish an effective safety 

culture at DOE’s nuclear facilities and weaken independent oversight of nuclear 

safety. [GAO–12–347] We recommended in October 2008 that if DOE does not take 

appropriate action to meet the criteria for independent oversight as defined in our 

report, then the Congress should consider the following: 

• permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of HSS, 

• shifting DOE to external regulation by providing the resources and authority 

to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety rules and directives, or 

• providing the resources and authority to NRC to externally regulate all or just 

newly constructed DOE nuclear facilities. 

Appendix V of our 2007 report assessed the options for the external regulation 

of DOE nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board or 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility for external regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, if 

they are given the necessary authority and resources. We reported that that Nuclear 
81 

Regulatory Commission had not expressed a view on expanding its oversight role 

beyond the DOE facilities already subject to the commission’s regulation. DOE and 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have taken issue with this option because of concerns about the transition costs compared with the likely safety benefits 

of doing so. [GAO–09–61.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 71) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors have 

reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However, just in the past 

year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety deficiencies. 

Examples include: 

a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16, 2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL 

b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated December 2, 2011, 

regarding the quality and safety of work at Pantex 

c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29, 2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression systems 

d. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated January 26, 2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources 

e. Letter from the Y–12 Manager to B&W Y–12 dated May 21, 2012, regarding 

deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy sources (the lockout/tagout process) 

So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety deficiencies noted in these 

letters, do you believe that NNSA and its contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, 

maintenance and design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need 

the oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what data or 

metrics are you aware of that support your position? 

Mr. ALOISE. DOE’s nuclear facilities will always require a degree of oversight and 

regulation. As we reported October 2008 and April 2012, [GAO–09–61, GAO–12– 

347], we have concerns about the extent to which the efforts of DOE’s Office of 

Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) meet the elements of effective oversight. As we 

reported in 2012, DOE has acted to reform its safety practices, including greater 

emphasis on having HSS review safety design documents for facilities at DOE sites 

before their construction, but revisions to nuclear safety requirements may weaken 

HSS’s ability to conduct independent oversight. For example, DOE’s reform effort 

did not fully address safety concerns we and others have identified in three key 

areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3) Federal oversight. Regarding 

quality assurance, DOE strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying 

that contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine 

against a contractor in July 2011 after identifying quality assurance problems in an 

incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with 

plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to attempt to strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE 

removed requirements for contractors to follow the directives because contractors already had to comply with safety management requirements in Federal regulation. 

Defense Nuclear Safety Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in 

Federal regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement 

safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more specific requirements in DOE’s directives. Finally, regarding Federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis on having its independent oversight staff review 

safety design documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are 

built. Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their 

assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise concerns about 

the oversight staff’s ability to provide a critical review of safety at DOE’s sites that 

is independent from DOE site office and contractor staff. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 72) You issued a GAO report in February 2012, Observations on 

NNSA’s Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise (GAO–12– 

473T). The purpose of that report was to explore NNSA’s oversight of safety and 

security in the nuclear security enterprise. Your conclusion in this report was, and 

I quote, ‘‘GAO agrees that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors’ 

activities are not an efficient use of scarce federal resources, but that NNSA’s problems are not caused by excessive oversight but instead result from ineffective departmental oversight.’’ 

Could you please further explain this conclusion? 

Mr. ALOISE. Our previous testimonies have focused on problems NNSA and DOE 

have experienced in terms of safety, security, and project and contract management. 

In our view, we cannot trace these problems to micromanagement nor could DOE’s 
82 

Inspector General establish a causal link too overly burdensome regulation. Addressing NNSA’s ineffective management requires the following: 

• well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field, with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs; 

• contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets; 

• contractor assurance systems that provide detailed information on, among other 

things, achieving performance targets; 

• strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance; and 

• vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 73) In October 2008, GAO issued the report, Department of Energy 

Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and Operations 

(GAO–09–61). One conclusion included in that report was, ‘‘HSS [Office of Health 

Safety and Security] falls short of fully meeting GAO’s elements of effective independent oversight of nuclear safety . . . ’’ Another conclusion was, ‘‘In the absence 

of external regulation, DOE needs HSS to be more involved in nuclear safety oversight because a key objective of independent oversight is to avoid the potential conflicts of interest that are inherent in program office oversight.’’ 

Do you believe that the Department has made any significant improvements in 

oversight since you issued this report in October 2008? 

Do you believe that the oversight model outlined in H.R. 4310 can satisfy the elements of effective independent oversight that GAO used as its standard of comparison in 2008? 

Mr. ALOISE. DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) took a number 

of important steps to implement the recommendations we made in our October 2008 

report. For example, as we reported in April 2012 [GAO–12–347.], HSS is reviewing 

safety design documents for facilities at DOE sites before their construction and establishing site leads within HSS to maintain and assess all aspects of a site’s operations. However, we also reported that recent revisions to safety requirements may 

weaken HSS’s ability to conduct independent oversight. For example, we found that 

HHS must now coordinate its assessment activities with site office management, 

which could compromise the ability of HHS to perform its mission independently. 

Concerning H.R. 4310, we have not formally evaluated the proposed legislation, 

but we observe that any revisions to independent oversight of NNSA should adhere 

to the criteria we used in evaluating the effectiveness of HSS in October 2008. 

These criteria include (1) independence, (2) technical expertise, (3) capability to perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed, (4) enforcement, and (5) public 

access to facility information. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 74) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that ‘‘Significant improvement 

is still needed especially in NNSA’s management of its major projects and contracts.’’ 

Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in recent years had a pilot 

program consisting of NNSA contracting directly for the repair of roves across the 

nuclear complex which was a successful effort but was discontinued. 

Mr. ALOISE. We have not specifically examined whether contractors should subcontract major construction projects or whether NNSA should contract and manage 

these projects directly. However, in our 2011 report on two planned NNSA procurements, [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: The National Nuclear 

Security Administration’s Proposed Acquisition Strategy Needs Further Clarification 

and Assessment, GAO–11–848 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 11).], we noted that the 

agency’s own analysis showed that simply changing contract types and structures 

will produce little effect unless NNSA better manages its contracts. Furthermore, 

we reported that NNSA’s analysis underpinning its procurement decisions also identified 18 better management practices—some of which could be accomplished now 

through existing contracts—such as improving enterprisewide collection and analysis of costs that could lead to greater efficiencies regardless of the contracting 

strategy employed. 

We are also on record as opposing DOE’s use of ‘‘fast-track’’ design-build—where 

design, construction, and technology development occur simultaneously—for designing and constructing one-of-a-kind, complex nuclear facilities. We have found that 

this approach, among other things, increases the risk of encountering problems that 

can increase a project’s cost and delay completion on schedule. [GAO, Hanford 

Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management Problems Have Led to 

Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety Concerns, GAO–06–602T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).] 
83 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 75) What is the role for independent safety oversight? What is the 

appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear operations? 

Mr. ALOISE. As we reported in October 2008, any independent regulatory authority would need to meet the criteria for effective independent oversight: independence, technical expertise, ability to perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed, enforcement, and public access to facility information. [GAO–09–61.] As we 

reported, DOE and/or Congress have the following options they could take to improve independent oversight: • permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of DOE’s Office of Health, 

Safety and Security; • shifting DOE to external regulation by providing the resources and authority 

to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety rules and directives; or • providing the resources and authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 

externally regulate all or just newly constructed DOE nuclear facilities. 

Appendix V of our 2008 report assessed the options for external regulation of DOE 

nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility 

for external regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, given the 

necessary authority and resources. We reported that NRC had not expressed a view 

on expanding its oversight role beyond the DOE facilities already subject to NRC 

regulation. DOE and the Safety Board have taken issue with this option because 

of concerns about the transition costs compared with the likely safety benefits of 

doing so. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 76) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be NNSA or 

the labs? 

Mr. ALOISE. Both NNSA and its contractors share responsibilities in managing 

the risks of day-to-day activities. However, the nuclear enterprise’s sites, including 

facilities and equipment, are Government owned and contractor operated, formal acceptance of risk—balancing mission needs compared with potential risks—is ultimately a Federal responsibility. Some high-security risks require the notification of 

the Secretary of Energy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 77) Do you believe it’s prudent to remove independent oversight 

from either NNSA or its contractors? 

Mr. ALOISE. No. In our view there will always be a need for independent oversight 

for health, safety and security issues. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 78) Do you believe that the DNFSB performs a needed, independent 

oversight function? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes. In our view, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board performs a needed, independent oversight function. In our October 2008 review of 

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security, [GAO–09–61.] we noted that the Safety Board was given responsibilities to (1) review and evaluate the content and implementation of the standards for the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities; (2) investigate any event or practice at these 

facilities that it determines has adversely affected or may adversely affect public 

health and safety; (3) analyze design and operational data, including safety analysis 

reports; (4) review new facility design and monitor construction, recommending any 

changes within a reasonable time period; and (5) make such recommendations to the 

Secretary of Energy, considering the technical and economic feasibility of implementing them. By statute, the Secretary must respond in writing to the Safety 

Board to accept or reject the recommendation and make this public. If the Safety 

Board transmits a recommendation relating to an imminent or severe threat, it is 

to also transmit the recommendation to the President and provide as information 

to the Secretary of Defense. The President is to review DOE’s response and accept 

or reject the Safety Board’s recommendation. The Safety Board does not have the 

authority of a regulator but rather uses both informal interactions and formal communications with DOE to implement its statutory ‘‘action forcing authorities.’’ We 

believe that this range of responsibilities is an important aspect of ensuring the 

safety of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. 

We did note in our report, however, the following limitations with the Safety 

Board’s responsibilities: 

• As of December 2007, the Safety Board did not have responsibility for DOE’s 

51 nondefense high-hazard nuclear facilities. 

• While DOE had been responsive to the Safety Board’s recommendations, a number of past deficiencies remained unresolved, and the pace of closure for many 

other recommendations has been slow. Specifically, it had taken DOE up to 11 

years to obtain closure from the Safety Board for some recommendations, and 

some systemwide recommendations had remained open for a decade or more. 
84 

• A 1995 DOE Advisory Committee report found that the Safety Board was not 

subject to the same checks and balances as Nuclear Regulatory Commission is 

with respect to regulating NRC’s licensees. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 79) Do you think that oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board has helped or hindered the ability of NNSA to carry out its missions? 

Mr. ALOISE. We believe that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has 

helped NNSA to carry out its missions. As described in our response to question 78, 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s primary responsibility is safety. However, we also believe safety and security are fundamental components of DOE and 

NNSA’s missions. Furthermore, we do not believe that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has hindered NNSA’s mission because, according to statute, it is 

a DOE responsibility to accept or reject the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board’s recommendations and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has no 

enforcement authority. In our view, it is the responsibility of DOE and NNSA to 

balance mission needs with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s recommendations. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 80) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the UK, have the authority 

to lose confidence in any contractor employee from the director to lower levels, to 

increase accountability from the laboratories? 

Mr. ALOISE. We are not in a position to address this question because we have 

not examined how NNSA’s Office of Naval Reactors or the Ministry of Defence in 

the United Kingdom manage their contractors. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 81) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-privatization of 

the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the 

mission or performance change depending on the fee level? 

Mr. ALOISE. We are not in a position to address this question because we have 

not systematically examined whether the additional costs of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory contracts have 

been worth the additional fees. A recent National Academy of Sciences study reported that additional costs for the two laboratories total about $210 million annually. These costs include fees, taxes, and personnel issues, such as pension changes. 

We note that this study found little relationship between the nature of the laboratories’ contracts and their scientific and engineering accomplishments and outputs, 

which continue at a high level. NNSA plans to recomplete the Sandia National Laboratory contract in the near future, but we do not know the details of NNSA’s 

planned acquisition strategy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 82) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise going forward? 

Mr. ALOISE. Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects, safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprisewide data, we believe that careful 

and capable Federal oversight is critical to an efficient and effective nuclear weapons program. We support NNSA’s efforts to move to more effective, performancebased oversight. As we testified in February 2012, NNSA’s progress has been mixed. 

[GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA’s Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, GAO–12–473T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2012).] Based on our past and ongoing work, we believe important elements of performance-based oversight include the following: 

• well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field; with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs; 

• contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets; 

• contractor assurance systems that provide detailed information on, among other 

things, achieving performance targets; 

• strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance; and 

• vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 83) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid conflicting directives? 

Mr. ALOISE. The creation of NNSA and its implementation have already largely 

addressed the issue of improving the lines of authority. As we reported in June 

2004, by better delineating lines of authority between NNSA headquarters and its 

field offices, NNSA’s reorganization has addressed past problems, such as communication problems resulting from the overlapping roles and responsibilities of the 

Federal workforce that oversees the nuclear weapons program. [GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and Workforce Planning 

Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO–04–545, (Washington, D.C.: 
85 

June 25, 2004).] For example, according to NNSA site office managers, the streamlined structure has improved vertical communication because communication channels between headquarters and the field do not involve an extra layer of management in the operations offices. In addition, the realignment provides NNSA site office managers with additional authority to manage contractors and assigns them responsibility for the day-to-day security and safety of contractor operations. As a result, the realignment has strengthened the hand of local NNSA site office managers, 

who now have the authority to shut down operations for safety and security reasons. 

We have not systematically examined the issue of conflicting directives, but we 

reported on DOE’s and NNSA’s efforts to streamline directives. [GAO, Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and Benefits of Its Safety Reform Effort, 

GAO–12–347 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).] In addition, NNSA has the authority to develop its own tailored directives through its Policy Letter procedure. [NNSA, 

Policy Letters: NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business Operating 

Procedures, NASD 251.1 (Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2011).] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 84) There have been a number of changes in the past year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA moving the site manager 

reporting authority to the office of the Administrator. Can you share your insights 

and comment on these management and governance changes? 

Mr. ALOISE. As we reported in July 2012, the benefits of DOE’s reform effort announced in a March 2010 memorandum—reducing the number of safety-related directives from 80 to 42 by eliminating or combining requirements the Department 

determined were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive and by encouraging the use 

of industry standards—are not clear for several reasons. [GAO–12–347] Specifically, 

DOE did not (1) determine how the original requirements impaired productivity or 

added costs, (2) assess whether the cost to implement the revised directives would 

exceed the benefits, or (3) develop performance measures in order to assess how the 

reform effort will lead to improved productivity or lower costs. Furthermore, DOE’s 

safety reform effort did not fully address safety concerns we and others identified 

in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and Federal oversight. In fact, 

some of the revisions DOE made to its safety-related directives may actually result 

in weakened independent oversight. For example, while DOE policy notes that independent oversight is integral to help ensure the effectiveness of safety performance, 

DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight staff must now coordinate its assessment activities with NNSA site office management to maximize the use of resources. This 

arrangement potentially raises concerns about whether Office of Independent Oversight staff will be sufficiently independent from site office management. In addition, 

the reform effort gives the NNSA site office, rather than Office of Independent Oversight staff, increased responsibility for managing actions to correct problems identified in independent assessments. Site office determinations of what issues require 

more formal contractor responses may be influenced by the fact that the site offices 

also have responsibility for keeping costs under control and work on schedule. 

We have not examined NNSA’s governance changes, which involved revising the 

agency’s business model to, among other things, place more reliance on contractors’ 

self-oversight through contractor assurance systems to ensure such things as effective safety and security performance. However, in response to the new business 

model, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the DOE Office of Inspector 

General raised concerns about contractor assurance systems. For example, in an 

April 2011 congressional testimony, the chairman of Safety Board stated that contractor assurance systems at defense nuclear facilities have not achieved a degree 

of effectiveness that would warrant a reduction in Federal safety oversight and that 

they are not expected to achieve this effectiveness in the foreseeable future. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 85) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down costs 

and ensure efficiencies? 

Mr. ALOISE. In terms of project and contract and project management, NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has recently taken a number of actions to improve management 

of major projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has updated program and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks, and better 

ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and identify problems early. Although DOE’s responses to our recommendations and its own findings have been 

largely positive, and a number of corrective actions have been taken, problems persist, as demonstrated by a number of our recent reports, which we summarized in 

our February and June 2012 testimonies. However, DOE needs to ensure that 

NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its 

project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective measures. This 
86 

is particularly important as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 86) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to reduce the 

number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline management. Could you 

comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the number of FTEs at NNSA. If such 

reductions occur, should we see a proportional number of efficiencies at labs and 

cost savings at the labs? 

Mr. ALOISE. Based on previous work, reducing the number of NNSA employees 

without completing workforce plans now being developed could have risks. For strategic planning purposes, NNSA is undertaking a comprehensive reassessment and 

analysis of staffing requirements to ascertain future Federal workforce requirements. NNSA-wide workforce plans are not expected to be completed until 2013, according to NNSA officials. [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise, 

Strategies and Challenges in Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and Contractor 

Workforces, GAO–12–468 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).] These plans are critical to effective streamlining of management. As we have reported, when downsizing 

takes place in an unstructured environment, agencies experience significant challenges to deploying people with the right skills, in the right places, at the right 

time, and to performing its missions economically, efficiently, and effectively. For example, in June 2004 we reported that an earlier NNSA reorganization was unlikely 

to ensure that the agency had sufficient staff with the right skills in the right places 

because NNSA chose to downsize its Federal workforce without determining what 

critical skills and capabilities it needed to meet its mission and program goals. 

[GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and 

Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO–04–545, 

(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).] In December 2001, we reported that NNSA did 

not have the coherent human capital and workforce planning strategies it needed 

to develop and maintain a well managed workforce over the long run. [GAO, NNSA 

Management: Progress in the Implementation of Title 32, GAO–02–93R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12, 2001).] Consequently, we recommended that NNSA develop 

a thorough human capital and workforce planning strategy. Instead of developing 

a workforce plan, according to a senior NNSA official, NNSA managers relied on 

their judgment about how much to reduce the Federal staff and where those reductions should occur in carrying out its December 2002 reorganization. NNSA did develop a workforce plan in December 2003 that attempted to establish a framework 

for long-term workforce planning, but this plan is of limited use without current statistics on workforce, positions, and organizational structures. 

We are uncertain what, if any, NNSA Federal workforce reductions would have 

on the contractor workforce. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 87) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can accomplish 

required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based self-assessments by the contractor 

and NNSA with no transactional oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard nuclear operations? 

Mr. ALOISE. We are supportive of NNSA’s moves toward a more performancebased approach to oversight. For example, in our review of security at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, we recommended that the Administrator of NNSA provide 

meaningful financial incentives in future performance evaluation plans for implementation of for laboratory security. [GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: LongTerm Strategies Needed to Improve Security and Management Oversight, GAO–08– 

694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008).] We similarly recommended providing financial incentives to LLNL’s contractor to sustain security performance improvements. 

[GAO, Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained, GAO–09–321 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2009).] However, in our view, effectively evaluating performance, as opposed to ensuring compliance, is likely to be 

more demanding, will require skilled personnel, and needs to be done more than 

once a year. More specifically, our past work has found issues with NNSA’s oversight of security, including staffing shortages at NNSA site offices, inadequate security staff training, and lack of comprehensive security data. These issues have hampered the agency’s understanding of the overall effectiveness of its security program. 

[GAO–07–36.] 

We have made similar findings regarding NNSA’s project management. While noting recent actions, we believe that DOE needs to ensure that NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor and independently validate the effec-
87 

tiveness and sustainability of its corrective measures. This is particularly important 

as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. [GAO–12–473] 

Contractor self-assessments are important but are just one element of a contract 

administration and oversight program. Other elements of equal importance are the 

following: 

• well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field, with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs; 

• contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets; 

• contractor assurance systems that provide detailed information on, among other 

things, achieving performance targets; 

• strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance; and 

• vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 88) What challenges remain to improve accountability and cost effectiveness? 

Mr. ALOISE. In terms of accountability and cost effects in managing projects and 

contracts, NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains vulnerable to fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has recently taken a number of actions to 

improve management of major projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has updated program and project management policies and guidance 

in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project 

risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and identify 

problems early. Although DOE’s responses to our recommendations and its own 

findings have been largely positive, and a number of corrective actions have been 

taken, problems persist, as demonstrated by a number of our recent reports, which 

are summarized in our February and June 2012 testimonies. However, DOE needs 

to ensure that NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources— 

to resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor 

and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective 

measures. This capacity issue is particularly important as NNSA embarks on its 

long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. 

Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects, safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprisewide data, we believe that careful and capable Federal oversight is critical to an efficient and effective nuclear weapons program. We support NNSA’s efforts to move to more effective, performance-based oversight. As our testimony shows, NNSA’s progress has been mixed. [GAO–12–473T.] 

Based on our past and ongoing work, we believe important elements of performance 

based oversight include the following: 

• well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field, with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs; 

• contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets; 

• contractor assurance systems that provide detailed information on, among other 

things, achieving performance targets; 

• strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance; and • vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 89) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector General issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Management Challenges at the Department of Energy’’ which recommended eliminated duplicative functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions? 

Mr. ALOISE. We share the Inspector General’s views that merging these functions 

back into DOE would require amending the NNSA Act, which prohibits the use of 

dual-hatting (i.e., having DOE officials contemporaneously serve in NNSA and DOE 

positions) and specifies NNSA’s separately organized status. Some personnel cost 

savings might result if duplicative positions were eliminated but these savings are 

likely to be small. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 90) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector General issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Management Challenges at the Department of Energy’’ which recommended eliminating duplicative functions at the NNSA, including General Coun-
88 

sel, Chief Information Officer, Human Resources, and Public Affairs. 1. What are 

the benefits of this approach? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. This is the same question as #69, hence, same answer. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 91) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector General issued 

a report entitled ‘‘Management Challenges at the Department of Energy’’ which recommended eliminating duplicative functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information Officer, Human Resources, and Public Affairs. 2. What is the 

cost of having separate functions? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. This is the same question as #69, hence, same answer. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 92) Have the recommendations made by GAO in its 2007 report 

been implemented satisfactorily? 

Mr. ALOISE. DOE and NNSA have responded positively to 20 of the 21 the recommendations we made in our 2007 report. [GAO–07–36.] We continue to monitor 

the agencies’ progress in implementing these recommendations and note general 

progress in improving their security program, but more persistent problems in 

project management. 

DOE, however, disagreed with one of the 2007 report’s recommendation. More 

specifically, we recommended that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately 

organized agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA, should 

clearly define NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency within the Department. In his 31 USC Section 720 response to our report, the Deputy Secretary of 

Energy stated that he did not concur with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and NNSA had executed memorandums of understanding 

specifying how certain departmentwide functions would be performed while respecting the statutory insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the Department 

will consider issuing circumstance-specific guidance where required to correct 

misperceptions about the effect of the NNSA’s act limitations. Since we received the 

letter, there have been instances where the DOE–NNSA relationship has become 

less clear. For example, DOE recently announced that DOE’s Environmental Management program will begin to report to NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously 

is an Under Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this recommendation 

open and still believe further clarification of the NNSA–DOE relationship is needed. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. 93) What efficiencies do you recommend going forward? 

Mr. ALOISE. Generally, our recommendations have focused on improving the effectiveness of NNSA. In our view, focusing unduly on efficiencies may disrupt some of 

the progress NNSA has made over the past 12 years. Our ideas on improving effectiveness follow. DOE has recently taken a number of actions to improve management of major projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has 

updated program and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks, and better 

ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and identify problems early. Nevertheless, problems persist, as we noted in our February and June 2012 testimonies 

that summarized recent reports. [GAO–12–473T.] In particular, we noted that DOE 

needs to ensure that NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program 

to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective measures. This capacity and monitoring program are particularly important 

as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. 94) Based on the testimony, it appears that the keys to success 

are (1) finding the proper balance between oversight and operations, (2) strong leadership at NNSA, and (3) deep partnership between senior NNSA officials and the 

national security lab directors. But it’s hard to legislate balance, leadership and 

good behavior. If you were to have the opportunity to be the NNSA Administrator 

again, what would you want in your tool chest to address each of these three issues? 

Mr. BROOKS. I agree with your conclusion that the three factors you cite are the 

keys to NNSA’s success (or that of almost any other organization). In order to find 

the proper balance between oversight and operations, I would want it to be clear 

that my chain of command and ultimately me personally were the ones responsible 

and that we were not to be second guessed by other entities. I believe this is the 

only one of the three factors you cite that is amenable to legislation. 

With regard to strong leadership at NNSA, I believe existing law gives the Administrator all the authority he or she requires to select the right officials and to 

establish internal procedures to allow them to do their job. I was extremely fortu-
89 

nate during my tenure to have an outstanding group of career civil servants in leadership positions. My attempts to establish a ‘‘strong site manager’’ model (described 

in a previous response) were, I believe, correct. Thus, existing Federal law is adequate in this area. I believe, however, that it is necessary to find a way of giving 

new managers more effective training. From my 30 years in the military and the 

Department of Defense, I am struck by how much more time is spent on training 

the career leadership in those organizations. I do not have specific recommendations 

in this area which is, of course, not an exclusive concern of NNSA. 

Finally, with regard to partnership between senior NNSA officials and the national security laboratory directors, I do not believe there were any tools I needed 

that I did not have. My experience was that, despite the fact that the laboratory 

directors and I all found frequent personal private meetings to be exceptionally useful, such meetings were difficult to arrange given the exceptional workload of both 

laboratory directors and senior Federal officials. Obviously there is no solution to 

this except setting priorities on the part of the Administrator. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 95) Ambassador Brooks, at the end of your written testimony you 

mention that: ‘‘Finally, if the Congress wants—as I believe it should—the type of 

relationship between NNSA and the laboratories that I described as part of our vision, it must be constantly on guard against the tendency, when problems arise, to 

ask why federal overseers did not prevent the problem though more detailed audits 

and inspections.’’ What suggestions would you have for Congress to help improve 

the performance of the NNSA? 

Mr. BROOKS. I believe that Congress needs to spend considerable time ensuring 

that it understands the cause of the current problems at NNSA. The panel established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 may help. 

As I have testified, I believe that the failure of the current semi-autonomous approach to NNSA will require legislation to correct. Given that all change is disruptive, it is important to be as certain as possible that those of us seeking to improve 

the situation are dealing with the real problem and not taking action to solve problems that may have existed in the past but are not current issues. Thus I believe 

the Congress must take all testimony of those of us whose experience is several 

years in the past with some degree of skepticism. 

The other thing that this committee can do is to serve as a champion for NNSA 

on the Hill. I was extremely fortunate during my tenure to have strong and bipartisan support from this committee. I understand that that situation continues. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 96) Based on the testimony, it appears that the keys to success 

are (1) finding the proper balance between oversight and operations, (2) strong leadership at NNSA, and (3) deep partnership between senior NNSA officials and the 

national security lab directors. But it’s hard to legislate balance, leadership and 

good behavior. If you were to have the opportunity to be the NNSA Administrator, 

what would you want in your tool chest to address each of these three issues? 

Dr. KUCKUCK. The Administrator would need a true commitment, and visible support from the Congress and the Administration for a new, balanced NNSA. A convincing commitment from those entities would then allow the enticement of top scientific and management talent to serve as NNSA leadership—a condition that does 

not exist today. The Administrator and his/her strong leadership team could then 

establish the proper balanced oversight model and develop the partnerships that are 

necessary not only with the laboratories, but also across the entire NNSA complex 

and with external partners and customers. This would not be achievable overnight 

even with the best of leadership. 

Æ