UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-5046

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

VINCENT SHAMONT ROGERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(7:08-cr-00216-HFF-2)

Submitted: May 27, 2010 Decided: June 18, 2010

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Chesser, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Vincent Shamont Rogers timely appeals the 730-month 

sentence imposed following a jury trial on three counts of 

robbery and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2006) (Counts 1, 3, and 5), 

and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during, and 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence,

and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (Counts 2, 4, and 6). Counsel filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

questioning whether the district court erred in denying Rogers’s

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (“Rule 29”) motion on 

Counts 5 and 6 and whether Rogers’s 300-month sentence on Count 

6 and overall 730-month sentence violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Rogers has not filed a pro se brief, though he was informed of 

his right to do so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Rogers first argues that the district court erred in 

denying his Rule 29 motion as to Counts 5 and 6 because no 

evidence was presented showing that he participated in the 

robbery charged in Count 5 as a principal or as an aider and 

abettor or that he knew about the gun used in that robbery.

We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 

motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Perkins, 470 

F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict must be upheld 
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“if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Government, to support it.” Id. We consider 

both circumstantial and direct evidence, drawing all reasonable 

inferences from such evidence in the Government’s favor. United 

States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). However, 

we “may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the 

witnesses” because “[t]hose functions are reserved for the 

jury.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 

1997) (internal citation omitted).

In Count 5, Rogers was charged with Hobbs Act robbery 

of a Li’l Cricket store. In Count 6, Rogers was charged with 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of that robbery. Rogers 

was charged in both counts as a principal and an aider and 

abettor. “Whoever commits an offense against the United States 

or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its 

commission, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

Thus, “[s]o long as all of the elements necessary to find [the 

defendant] guilty of the crime, whether as a principal or as 

aider or abetter, were put before the jury, conviction will be 

proper.” United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160, 165 (4th Cir. 

2003). A defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting a crime 

when he: (1) is “aware of the principals’ criminal intent and 

the unlawful nature of their acts”; (2) “knowingly associated 

himself with and participated in the criminal venture”; and 
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(3) “shared in the principals’ criminal intent.” United 

States v. Winstead, 708 F.2d 925, 927 (4th Cir. 1983).

The Hobbs Act proscribes robbery that “obstructs, 

delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or 

commodity in commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Thus, a Hobbs Act 

conviction requires the proof of two elements: “(1) the 

underlying robbery or extortion crime, and (2) an effect on 

interstate commerce.” United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 

353 (4th Cir. 2003).

The evidence is undisputed that a robbery in fact took 

place at the Li’l Cricket. Moreover, it is clear that the Li’l 

Cricket robbery affected interstate commerce. Additionally, 

there was testimony showing that, although Rogers did not enter 

the Li’l Cricket, he remained in the car while two other men

went inside as previously planned. Further, Rogers split the 

proceeds equally with his two companions. We find that, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, 

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that 

Rogers knowingly participated in the robbery and shared the 

others’ criminal intent. Thus, the district court properly 

denied Rogers’s Rule 29 motion with respect to Count 5.

To prove a violation of § 924(c)(1), the Government 

must demonstrate either that the defendant “use[d] or carrie[d] 

a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence,” or
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that the defendant “possesse[d] a firearm” “in furtherance of 

any such crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); United States v. 

Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2007). To be convicted of 

aiding and abetting under § 924(c), only “participation at some 

stage accompanied by knowledge of the result and intent to bring 

about that result” are required. United States v. Wilson, 135 

F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Testimony revealed that the Li’l Cricket robbery was 

the third robbery in which Rogers was involved and, according to 

one of the participants, it was only the first where Rogers was 

not the gunman. When the three arrived at the Li’l Cricket, 

they decided Rogers would stay in the car while the other two 

entered the store. They also decided who would be the gunman 

before going inside. We find that, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to conclude that Rogers knew of the gun 

and intended that it be used during, or possessed in furtherance 

of, the robbery. Thus, the district court properly denied 

Rogers’s Rule 29 motion with respect to Count 6.

Rogers also argues that his 300-month consecutive 

sentence on Count 6 and his overall 730-month sentence 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Rogers argues that the sentence on Count 6 
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violates the Eighth Amendment because the evidence showed he was 

incapacitated and had no knowledge of the crime. Rogers further 

argues that both the sentence on Count 6 and his overall 

sentence violate the Eighth Amendment because of his young age 

and lack of criminal history at the time of the offenses.

The Eighth Amendment “contains a ‘narrow 

proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital 

sentences.’” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) 

(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991)). 

However, we have “held that proportionality review is not 

available for any sentence less than life imprisonment without 

the possibility of parole.” United States v. Ming Hong, 242 

F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Polk, 905 

F.2d 54, 55 (4th Cir. 1990)). Rogers was not in fact sentenced 

to life imprisonment, so the proportionality of his sentence is 

not reviewable on appeal.

In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire 

record and find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED