IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18–0981

Filed February 21, 2020

TERESA L. SLADEK,

Appellant,

vs.

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD and

KELLY SERVICES USA LLC,

Appellees.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. 

Kepros, Judge.

A temporary employee appeals from an order denying her petition to 

review a ruling of the employment appeal board that she voluntarily quit 

her position with a temporary employment firm and was not entitled to 

unemployment insurance benefits. AFFIRMED.

John S. Allen, Clinical Law Professor, University of Iowa College of 

Law, Iowa City, and Majed Alzben, Law Student, for appellant.

Rick Autry, Des Moines, for appellee Employment Appeal Board.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.

I. Introduction.

This is an administrative appeal challenging a final agency action of 

the Employment Appeal Board (EAB) denying unemployment benefits. 

The EAB determined the claimant, a temporary employee, voluntarily quit 

her employment with a temporary employment agency without good cause 

attributable to the employer. The district court upheld the EAB’s action, 

and the court of appeals affirmed. This case now comes to us on further 

review.

Here, the temporary agency informed the temporary employee by 

phone that the workplace where she had been assigned was dissatisfied 

with her work performance and was ending her assignment. The employee 

hung up the phone. The employee did not attempt to resume contact with 

the temporary agency for almost five weeks—after she had already applied 

for unemployment benefits and the temporary agency had contested them. 

Under these circumstances, the EAB denied benefits.

We conclude substantial evidence supports the EAB’s determination 

that the employee voluntarily quit. We also hold that substantial evidence 

supports the EAB’s finding that the employee does not meet the safe 

harbor in Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1), which relates specifically to

temporary employees of temporary employment firms. Under that 

provision, an individual is not disqualified from benefits if “[t]he individual 

is a temporary employee of a temporary employment firm who notifies the 

temporary employment firm of completion of an employment assignment 

and who seeks reassignment.” Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(j)(1) (2018). The 

employee did not seek reassignment in a timely fashion; instead, she hung 

up the phone. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court 

and the decision of the court of appeals.
3

II. Facts and Procedural Background.

Teresa Sladek, the petitioner, applied to work at Kelly Services USA, 

LLC, a temporary employment firm, on December 15, 2015. As a part of 

the application process, Sladek signed an agreement that included an 

“Assignment Information and Employment Termination Policy,” which 

stated,

Within 48 hours of completion of each assignment, I will 

notify Kelly of my availability for work. I understand I am 

responsible for maintaining weekly contact with Kelly; failure 

to contact Kelly may affect my eligibility for unemployment 

benefits. I understand that once 14 days have passed after 

my last day worked, my employment with Kelly will be 

terminated—unless I have been placed on another assignment 

or qualified leave of absence, or if I am on certain customerspecific assignments. I understand that this does not alter 

the at-will nature of my employment, my employment may still 

be terminated at any time, and the terms and conditions of 

my employment may be changed without notice. I also 

understand that I may be eligible for reemployment.

Kelly may offer me assignments for varying lengths of 

time—I retain the right to reject any offer of assignment. 

When an assignment ends, Kelly will attempt to place me on 

another assignment, however there will typically be periods 

during which no offer of assignment of employment is made.

On December 22, Sladek signed an additional document entitled, 

“NOTIFICATION OF POSITION END: IOWA,” which stated,

To qualify for unemployment benefits, you must be 

unemployed through no fault of your own and be actively 

seeking work. “Actively seeking work” is defined as taking 

reasonable efforts to return to the workforce.

Iowa Code Section 96.5-1-j requires that upon 

completion of an assignment with a temporary employment 

firm, the temporary employee must contact the firm within 

three business days to seek reassignment or face 

disqualification for benefits pursuant to the section listed 

above. Failure to contact Kelly Services (“Kelly”) will indicate 

that you have either:

• Voluntarily quit; and/or

• Are not actively seeking work
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This may affect your eligibility for unemployment 

benefits.

I have read the above information and understand 

that failure to contact Kelly within three business days of 

completing an assignment may affect my eligibility for 

unemployment benefits. I also acknowledge receiving a 

copy of this document.

Later, Sladek acknowledged receipt of these policies in her hearing 

testimony.

Sladek began employment with Kelly as a temporary employee on 

January 5, 2016. She was assigned to R. R. Donnelley for her first of three 

jobs. This assignment lasted for approximately three weeks before R. R. 

Donnelley determined that Sladek was not a good fit for the post. Sladek 

received the news through her supervisor at Kelly. At that time, Sladek 

did not explicitly ask Kelly for reassignment. When her first assignment 

ended, Sladek applied for and received unemployment benefits.

Sladek’s second assignment began March 2 with ACT, the testing 

organization. She worked as a document processor until May 22 when her 

assignment ended because there was no more work to be done. Again, 

Sladek did not explicitly ask for reassignment. When this second 

assignment ended, Sladek once more applied for and received 

unemployment benefits.

Sladek’s third and final assignment through Kelly was also at ACT 

but as a customer service representative rather than a document 

processor. She began this assignment on July 11 and continued in this 

role until June 28, 2017.

While working as a customer service representative at ACT, Sladek 

struggled to keep her “handle time” down. Handle time is the amount of 

time a service representative remains on a phone call with a customer. 

ACT’s goal was to keep the phone call to between five and six minutes in 
5

duration, and this was measured by an average at the end of the month. 

Sladek’s averages were often at least twice the target length, and she was 

aware that this was problematic. She expressed to her contact person at 

Kelly, Staci Payne, concerns that she might lose the assignment due to her 

inadequate handle times.

Payne was a Kelly senior account talent manager who worked 

exclusively on the ACT account out of the ACT campus. Payne had 

multiple conversations with Sladek about Sladek’s problems in processing 

calls efficiently. She testified that ACT even moved Sladek’s desk next to 

that of a supervisor to better help her and that supervisors reviewed 

Sladek’s calls. These efforts were to no avail, and Sladek’s handle times 

failed to improve.

On June 28, Payne called Sladek on the telephone and informed her 

that due to ACT not seeing the improvement it was hoping for and 

expecting in Sladek’s average handle times, ACT was releasing Sladek from 

the assignment. Accordingly, Payne instructed Sladek not to return to 

ACT. Sladek became upset and began to cry. She told Payne that the 

termination of the assignment was not fair. When it became clear to 

Sladek that her pleas to keep her ACT job would be unsuccessful, Sladek 

hung up on Payne. She did not ask for another assignment while on the 

call, nor did Payne offer another assignment. Payne did not subsequently 

reach out to Sladek. Later, Payne testified, “After she hung up on me I did 

not contact her because that, you know, she made a pretty bold statement 

there by hanging up on me so that I did not contact her. I waited to hear 

back from her.”

On July 2, Sladek applied for unemployment benefits. Kelly opposed

the request, taking the position that Sladek had voluntarily quit. In its 

response to an Iowa Workforce Development (IWD) questionnaire, Kelly 
6

indicated that Sladek had not maintained contact with Kelly, that Kelly’s

employment agreement required Sladek to notify Kelly of her availability 

for work within forty-eight hours of the completion of each assignment,

that another signed form required Sladek to contact Kelly within three 

business days and seek reassignment or face disqualification for 

unemployment benefits on the basis of having voluntarily quit, and that 

Sladek had not contacted Kelly for reassignment within three working days 

of the last date of work. 

IWD tried to reach Sladek by phone on July 28 after receiving the 

response from Kelly. IWD and Sladek did not connect until July 31. At 

that point, Sladek conceded she had not contacted Payne after June 28. 

She explained that she “was having anxiety issues” and “was afraid to 

contact them. [She] felt bad for hanging up on [Payne].”

Sladek did not get in touch with Kelly again until that same date of 

July 31.1 On a phone call with Payne, Sladek apologized for hanging up 

on Payne and told Payne that she wanted another assignment, as long as 

it was not production work due to her physical limitations. Payne reported 

to Sladek that there were no available assignments at ACT and that Payne 

was not sure if she would be comfortable placing Sladek again due to 

Sladek’s conduct on the June 28 phone call. After more conversation, 

Payne yielded and told Sladek that if something became available, Payne 

would reach out to Sladek, although not if it was another customer service 

assignment with ACT. She also told Sladek to review Kelly’s website for 

assignments other than with ACT.

 1The record does not directly indicate whether Sladek’s call to Payne preceded or 

followed Sladek’s phone call with IWD. Circumstantially, it appears the call with IWD 

came first. Presumably Sladek would not have told IWD on July 31 that she had last 

spoken to Payne on June 28 if she had just talked with Payne earlier that day.
7

Also on July 31, IWD issued a written unemployment insurance 

decision that Sladek received two days later on August 2. The decision 

stated, 

YOU ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE UNEMPLOYMENT 

INSURANCE BENEFITS. . . . 

. . . .

. . . OUR RECORDS INDICATE YOU VOLUNTARILY 

QUIT YOUR EMPLOYMENT ON 06/28/17, WHEN YOU 

FAILED TO NOTIFY THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT FIRM 

WITHIN THREE WORKING DAYS OF THE COMPLETION OF 

YOUR LAST WORK ASSIGNMENT. YOU HAD BEEN TOLD IN 

WRITING OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO NOTIFY THE FIRM.

Sladek appealed the denial to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals 

Bureau. An in-person hearing was held before an administrative law judge

(ALJ) at which both Sladek and Payne testified. On September 29, the ALJ 

affirmed in writing the denial of unemployment benefits, finding that 

Sladek “separated from employment without good cause attributable to 

the employer.” Referencing Iowa Code section 96.5(1) and Iowa 

Administrative Rules 871—24.25(28) and 871—24.26(15), the ALJ entered 

the following conclusions of law:

The purpose of [Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)] is to 

provide notice to the temporary agency employer that the 

claimant is available for and seeking work at the end of the 

temporary assignment. While the administrative law judge 

understands that claimant had never been expected to strictly 

comply with the three-day policy, this separation from 

employment is different from claimant’s previous separations.

During her previous separations from temporary 

assignments, the employer offered to seek additional work for 

her. That was not the case during her separation on June 28. 

At no point during the June 28 conversation did the claimant 

ask for or the employer offer any additional work. Further, 

claimant abruptly ended the conversation by hanging up on 

the employer, and she made no additional contact for 

approximately four weeks. The employer had no reason to 

believe that claimant was seeking an additional assignment.

Rather, the administrative law judge believes that claimant 

hanging up on the employer and ceasing contact for multiple 
8

weeks demonstrates an intent to end her employment 

relationship with the temporary staffing agency.

. . . .

. . . Claimant hung up on the employer and did not 

reach out for multiple weeks to notify the employer if she was 

interested in any additional work. Claimant’s end of 

employment was without good cause attributable to the

employer. Benefits are withheld.

On October 12, Sladek appealed the ALJ decision to the EAB. The 

EAB adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions in whole on November 9.

Sladek petitioned for judicial review in the Iowa District Court for

Johnson County on December 6. The district court upheld the EAB ruling 

on May 16, 2018. Among other things, the court concluded, “The record 

provides substantial evidence for the EAB’s factual finding of voluntary 

quitting, including that Sladek hung up on her supervisor and failed to 

follow up with Kelly for approximately four weeks.”

On June 5, Sladek appealed the district court’s order, and we 

transferred the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals. On May 15, 2019, the 

Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. 

Sladek applied for further review to this court, and we granted her 

application.

III. Standard of Review.

“When reviewing the decision of the district court’s judicial review 

ruling, we determine if we would reach the same result as the district court 

in our application of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act.” Insituform

Techs., Inc. v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 728 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Iowa 2007). We 

generally defer to the EAB’s findings of fact if supported by substantial 

evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). However, in a recent case, we 

made clear that we would not defer to the EAB’s interpretation of various 

legal terms used in Iowa Code section 96.5 including “voluntary.” Irving 
9

v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 883 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Iowa 2016). Accordingly, we 

will review the EAB’s legal interpretations for errors at law. See Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c). We have said that we “construe the provisions of [chapter 

96] liberally to carry out its humane and beneficial purpose.” 

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 570 N.W.2d 85, 96 (Iowa 

1997).

IV. Did Sladek Voluntarily Quit Her Employment Without Good 

Cause Attributable to the Employer?

A. The Controlling Law. Iowa Code section 96.5 provides, in part,

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits, 

regardless of the source of the individual’s wage credits:

1. Voluntary quitting. If the individual has left work 

voluntarily without good cause attributable to the individual’s 

employer, if so found by the department. But the individual 

shall not be disqualified if the department finds that:

. . . .

j. (1) The individual is a temporary employee of a 

temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary 

employment firm of completion of an employment assignment 

and who seeks reassignment. Failure of the individual to 

notify the temporary employment firm of completion of an 

employment assignment within three working days of the 

completion of each employment assignment under a contract 

of hire shall be deemed a voluntary quit unless the individual 

was not advised in writing of the duty to notify the temporary 

employment firm upon completion of an employment 

assignment or the individual had good cause for not 

contacting the temporary employment firm within three 

working days and notified the firm at the first reasonable 

opportunity thereafter.

Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(j)(1).

Thus, the section establishes a general rule that “voluntary quitting” 

disqualifies an individual from unemployment benefits. However, an 

individual is not disqualified if the individual “is a temporary employee of 

a temporary employment firm who notifies the temporary employment firm
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of completion of an employment assignment and who seeks reassignment.” 

Id. Additionally, an individual is deemed to have voluntarily quit if the 

individual fails to notify the temporary employment firm of completion of 

an assignment within three working days (subject to certain 

qualifications). Id.

In other words, as we read it, the statute contains (1) a rule, (2) an 

exception to the rule, and (3) an exception to the exception to the rule.

There is no dispute that Sladek was a temporary employee within 

the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5, and Kelly was a temporary 

employment firm. See id. § 96.5(1)(j)(3) (defining these terms). It is equally 

undisputed that Sladek was advised in writing of the notification 

requirement, and Sladek signed a document indicating her receipt and 

understanding of the policy. See id. § 96.5(1)(j)(2) (discussing these

requirements).

B. Applying the Law Here. To begin, we conclude substantial 

evidence supports the EAB’s finding that Sladek voluntarily quit within 

the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(1). On June 28, 2017, Sladek hung 

up on Payne, her supervisor. She did not reach out again until five weeks 

later, apparently after learning that Kelly was contesting Sladek’s claim for 

unemployment benefits. As the EAB found, 

The employer had no reason to believe that claimant was 

seeking an additional assignment. . . . [C]laimant hanging up 

on the employer and ceasing contact for multiple weeks 

demonstrate[d] an intent to end her employment relationship 

with the temporary staffing agency.

This factual finding is subject to a substantial evidence review, and we 

conclude it is supported by substantial evidence.

Having upheld the finding of a voluntary quit within the meaning of 

Iowa Code section 96.5(1), we now address whether the safe harbor in the 
11

first sentence of section 96.5(1)(j)(1) applies. Did Sladek notify Kelly of her 

completion of the ACT assignment and “seek[] reassignment”? If so, she 

is not disqualified from benefits unless the second sentence of section 

96.5(1)(j)(1) applies.

Here too, the EAB’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. It 

is clear that Sladek did not seek reassignment from Kelly on June 28. To 

the contrary, she hung up on her boss.

Sladek raises two arguments to the contrary. First, she contends 

that Kelly had actual notice her assignment had ended. That ignores the 

second part of the safe harbor’s sentence which reads, “and who seeks 

reassignment.” Id. § 96.5(1)(j)(1). There is no evidence Sladek sought 

reassignment on June 28. Sladek’s argument would render part of the 

statute mere surplusage. See id. § 4.4(2) (setting forth the presumption 

that “[t]he entire statute is intended to be effective”).

Second, Sladek insists that she did seek a new assignment, 

although not until July 31. However, this was over a month later, after 

Sladek had already sought unemployment benefits and after she had 

apparently learned through an IWD phone call that Kelly was contesting 

her benefits. Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1) does not say when the 

temporary employee must seek reassignment, but principles of 

reasonableness apply. See id. § 4.4(3) (setting forth the presumption that 

“[a] just and reasonable result is intended”). Whatever the scope of the 

safe harbor in the first sentence of section 96.5(1)(j)(1), it clearly does not 

encompass such a belated request.

The final issue is whether the exception to the exception in the 

second sentence of Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1) applies. The parties read 

the statute differently. The EAB maintains that Sladek had to affirmatively 

notify Kelly that the ACT assignment was over; Sladek argues it was 
12

enough that Kelly knew the assignment had ended. See id. § 96.5(1)(j)(1). 

But we need not resolve this dispute. Because Sladek voluntarily quit her 

employment with Kelly and failed to request a new assignment within a 

reasonable time, she is already disqualified from benefits.

A Pennsylvania appellate court recently decided a case on similar 

facts. See Thiessen v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 178 A.3d 255 

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018). In Thiessen, the employee signed on with a 

temporary staffing agency, executing an agreement that required him to 

contact the agency within forty-eight hours of the completion of 

assignment and request a new assignment. Id. at 257. The employee was 

assigned to perform work at Veeva. Id. at 257–58. On August 26, the 

temporary agency contacted the employee and informed him his services 

were no longer needed at Veeva. Id. at 258. “When notifying him, 

Employer did not offer Claimant a new assignment.” Id. In December, the 

employee applied for unemployment benefits and was ultimately denied. 

Id. at 258–59.

In upholding this administrative decision, the court reasoned as 

follows:

Employees of temporary staffing agencies who fail to follow the 

employer agency’s policies regarding work availability will be 

considered to have voluntarily quit “work.”

In this case, Employer’s policy specifically provides that 

an employee will be considered “to have voluntarily quit 

employment” should he or she fail to contact Employer within 

48 hours of the completion of an assignment. Claimant 

admits that he signed an agreement with Employer containing 

this provision and that he was aware Employer had such a 

policy, both in his response to the claimant questionnaire and 

at the hearing.

Id. at 261 (citations omitted). The court also rejected the employee’s 

argument that there was no voluntary quit “because he had forgotten 
13

about the policy and Employer failed to remind of it when calling to inform 

him that his assignment with Veeva had ended.” Id.; see also 

Careerxchange, Inc. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 916 So. 2d 68, 70 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“The statute is designed to allow temporary 

employees to preserve their qualification for unemployment by notifying 

their employers at the conclusion of an assignment that they are still 

available for work. If work is available, the employee continues the 

relationship with the temporary employment firm. If no work is available, 

the employee preserves his or her right to unemployment compensation 

benefits.” (Emphasis added.)).

C. Sladek’s Out-of-State Caselaw Is Not on Point. In contrast to 

Thiessen, the out-of-state cases cited by Sladek are easily distinguishable. 

Sladek first refers us to the Minnesota Supreme Court case of Brown v. 

Port of Sunnyside Club, Inc. in support of her assertion that hanging up 

during a telephone call of heightened emotion should not be characterized

as a quit. See 304 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1981). There, the employee 

and his supervisor became engaged in a shouting match. Id. at 878. The 

employee began to walk away, and his supervisor called after him to “keep 

on walking.” Id. The employee “inferred from this statement that he had 

been dismissed from employment.” Id. The court ultimately determined 

that the employee’s “temporary removal of himself from a heated and 

frustrated argument was not an unreasonable act and cannot be viewed 

as a voluntary termination.” Id. at 879. Rather, “the general manager’s 

statement to [the employee] to keep on walking constitutes an involuntary 

termination.” Id. Here, Sladek hung up the phone on her supervisor, and 

unlike the supervisor in Brown, Sladek’s supervisor at Kelly did not 

respond or even get a chance to do so.
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Sladek also relies on Mbong v. New Horizons Nursing, decided by the 

Minnesota Court of Appeals. See 608 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 

There, the court was asked to decide whether an employee of a temporary 

agency who rejected day-to-day assignments in order to search for 

permanent fulltime employment could be found to have quit employment. 

Id. at 893. Invoking the decision of Smith v. Employers’ Overload Co., 314 

N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 1981), the court held “the failure of [a claimant] to 

accept further fill-in assignments from [a temporary employment firm] 

does not constitute a ‘quit’ under” the Minnesota unemployment 

compensation statute. Id. at 894; see also Smith, 314 N.W.2d at 221–22 

(holding that there was not an ongoing employment relationship with a 

temporary employment firm at the completion of a one-day spot labor 

assignment which paid out at the end of each day worked). The court was 

apprehensive that characterizing the relationship between a temporary 

employee and a temporary employment firm as ongoing employment would 

“trap” temporary employees in an unfair relationship in which only the 

employee was obligated to perform. Mbong, 608 N.W.2d at 894. Relying 

on “basic contract principles,” the court elaborated, 

With temporary agencies, an employment relationship arises 

only when each temporary assignment is offered and 

accepted. Once each assignment is completed, the 

employment relationship ends because there is neither a 

guarantee of future assignments nor any employer obligation 

to provide them.

Id. at 895.

Our case presents a different set of circumstances. Sladek hung up 

on her supervisor after being told her assignment at ACT was ending and 

thereafter failed to contact Kelly for nearly five weeks. Kelly does not 

contend Sladek voluntarily quit as the employer did in Mbong because she 
15

declined a proposed assignment. Mbong is factually and legally 

distinguishable.

Sladek relies also on Cintemp, Inc., CTI Personnel v. Unemployment 

Insurance Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce 

Development, decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals. See 717 N.E.2d 

988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Cintemp is distinguishable. There, fifteen 

employees of a temporary agency were placed with companies that could 

elect to permanently hire the individuals after a trial placement, otherwise 

known as a temp-to-hire arrangement. Id. at 990. The client companies 

offered the assignees permanent employment, which they accepted after 

being also told that they probably would not be able to continue as 

temporary assignees. Id. at 990–91. According to the employees’ contract 

with the temp agency, this ended their employment with the temp agency. 

Id. The client companies then laid the workers off. Id. at 990. The 

employees applied for unemployment compensation. Id. at 990–91. It 

became necessary to classify their prior separation of employment from 

the temp agency. Id. at 991. The Indiana Court of Appeals found that the 

separation was neither a quit nor a discharge, so no disqualification from 

benefits would be imposed. Id. at 992–93. Sladek, in contrast, did not 

lose her position with Kelly because she had to accept permanent 

employment with ACT in order to continue working there. Cintemp is 

likewise factually and legally distinguishable.

It is also worth noting, as did our court of appeals, that certain 

provisions of Sladek’s employment contract with Kelly reinforce the 

conclusion she voluntarily quit. Within forty-eight hours of her completion 

of the assignment with ACT, Sladek was supposed to notify Kelly of her 

availability for work. She did not. Sladek was responsible for maintaining 

weekly contact with Kelly and agreed that failure to contact Kelly could 
16

affect her eligibility for unemployment benefits. Yet Sladek allowed nearly 

five weeks to lapse before contacting Kelly.

V. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court and the decision of the court of appeals denying Sladek’s petition for 

judicial review.

AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially.
17

#18–0981, Sladek v. Emp’t Appeal Bd.

APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).

Two issues were raised by temporary employer Kelly Services USA, 

LLC (Kelly) before the administrative law judge and the Employment 

Appeal Board in this case. First, Kelly claimed that Teresa Sladek was not 

entitled to unemployment benefits because she failed to notify Kelly, as 

her employer, within three days of the termination of her employment as 

required by Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1) (2018). Second, Kelly claimed 

that Sladek voluntarily quit her job with Kelly.

On the first issue, I have my doubts. It was undisputed that when 

Sladek was having trouble with her temporary job at ACT, Sladek 

repeatedly told Kelly that she wanted continued employment and that 

Kelly representatives assured her that they would look for other 

employment for her. It is similarly undisputed that Kelly knew that in the 

event Sladek was terminated from her temporary position at ACT, she 

wanted another job. The conversation between Sladek and Sladek’s 

contact person at Kelly, Staci Payne, after Sladek’s job with ACT came to 

an end must be seen in the context of the earlier conversations that 

preceded it. Under the circumstances, I do not think that Kelly can 

credibly argue that it did not know that Sladek desired alternate 

employment through Kelly one way or another. 

So what is the purpose of providing notice duplicative of a fact one 

already knows? Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1) does not require magic 

words in order to protect the veritable fortress of unemployment benefits 

against a claim by a temporary employee who becomes upset when she is 

terminated from her position. A hypertechnical “tell them what you have 

already repeatedly told them” approach would have to be squared with our 

repeated admonition that the provisions of the Iowa Employment Security 
18

Law are to be construed “liberally to carry out its humane and beneficial 

purpose.” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 570 

N.W.2d 85, 96 (Iowa 1997); see, e.g., Irving v. Employment Appeal Bd., 883 

N.W.2d 179, 192 (Iowa 2016); Brumley v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 292 

N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1980); Smith v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm’n, 212 

N.W.2d 471, 472–73 (Iowa 1973). Further, as the district court noted, 

Sladek did not attempt to give an explanation that would fall under the 

good-cause-for-delay requirement of Iowa Code section 96.5(1)(j)(1). As the 

district court noted, “If she had done so, it is highly possible that the result 

would be different . . . .” 

Assuming without deciding that Sladek should not be disqualified 

based on a nonfunctioning, hypertechnical application of the three-daysnotice requirement, I now turn to the question of whether Sladek 

voluntarily quit her employment at Kelly. As recognized by the 

administrative law judge, Iowa Administrative Code rule 871—24.25 

provides that a voluntary quit without cause, “[i]n general, . . . means 

discontinuing the employment because the employee no longer desires to 

remain in the relationship of an employee with the employer from whom 

the employee has separated.” 

Here, the record establishes that Sladek hung up on Payne in 

frustration about losing her job at ACT and did not call Payne back for 

several weeks. Sladek only called Payne after Kelly contested her 

unemployment benefits. Although Sladek insisted that she did not call 

back earlier because she was embarrassed by her behavior, I have 

examined the hearing transcript and find there was sufficient evidence in 

the record to support an inference that Sladek was so frustrated with 

employment through Kelly that she was finished with the agency. Under 

this view of the record, the call back to Payne was too late and may have 
19

been made with the aim of improving her position regarding 

unemployment benefits more than to actually obtain another job through

Kelly.

The record would also support a contrary conclusion. Temporary 

employment was critical to Sladek, and hanging up on Payne could be 

viewed as a deeply felt emotional expression of frustration with her 

predicament. Yet, as the district court rightly observed, we do not review 

administrative findings de novo. Because the agency’s fact-finding on the 

issue of voluntary quit is supported by substantial evidence, I agree with 

the result in this case.