Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2253 | January 29, 2019 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven E. Ripstra

Ripstra Law Office

Jasper, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of: R.L., L.L., and

A.L. (Minor Children),

and

T.L. (Father) and O.S. (Mother),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-2253

Appeal from the Dubois Circuit

Court

The Honorable Nathan A. 

Verkamp, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

19C01-1805-JT-162

19C01-1805-JT-163

19C01-1805-JT-164
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2253 | January 29, 2019 Page 2 of 13

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] T.L. (“Father”) is the father of R.L., L.L., and A.L. (“the Children”). The 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed the Children from Father’s 

care due to concerns of domestic violence and drug abuse by Father and the 

Children’s mother. The Children were subsequently determined to be children 

in need of services (“CHINS”) and Father was ordered to participate in and 

complete certain services. While Father did participate in some services, he 

failed to consistently participate in or successfully complete any of the services. 

He also failed to abstain from using drugs. Given Father’s failure to abstain 

from using drugs and to successfully complete the court-ordered services, which 

were aimed at helping him address his drug abuse issues and deficiencies in 

providing adequate care for the Children, DCS sought the termination of 

Father’s parental rights in the Children. 

[2] At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, Father requested a thirty-day 

continuance so that he could allegedly enter an in-patient drug-treatment 

program. The juvenile court denied Father’s request and the evidentiary 

hearing proceeded as scheduled. Following the conclusion of the evidentiary 

hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS’s petitions to terminate Father’s 

parental rights in the Children. On appeal, Father contends that the juvenile 

court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by denying his 

request for a continuance. Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father is the biological father of the Children.1 On July 18, 2017, DCS filed 

petitions alleging that the Children were CHINS. In these petitions, DCS 

alleged that the Children were the victims of neglect due to parental domestic 

violence and drug use. Following a limited admission by Father, the juvenile 

court found the Children to be CHINS on August 23, 2017. The juvenile court 

subsequently ordered Father to participate in certain services aimed at 

reunification. Father was required to contact the family case manager (“FCM”)

on a weekly basis; notify the FCM of any changes in address or employment; 

enroll in all programs recommended by the FCM; keep all appointments with 

service providers; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and 

maintain a legal and stable source of income; assist in the formulation and 

implementation of a protection plan for the Children; refrain from using drugs 

or alcohol; complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all 

treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; meet all personal 

medical and mental health needs; and attend all scheduled visitations with the 

Children. 

[4] During a November 20, 2017 review hearing, the juvenile court found that 

Father had not complied with the Children’s case plans and was not 

 

1

 Although Mother’s parental rights were also terminated, she does not participate in this appeal. As such, 

we will limit our discussion to facts pertinent to the juvenile court’s orders terminating Father’s parental 

rights in the Children.
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consistently participating in services. Specifically, Father had not consistently 

participated in parent-aide or home-based counseling sessions, only submitted 

to thirteen of the twenty-six ordered drug screens and had tested positive on

seven of the thirteen screens, and attended seventeen of the twenty-one 

scheduled visitation sessions. Given Father’s inconsistent participation and 

positive drug screens, the juvenile court found that Father had not enhanced his 

ability to fulfill his parental obligations. 

[5] Another review hearing was held on February 20, 2018. During this hearing, 

the juvenile court again found that Father had not complied with the Children’s 

case plans and was not consistently participating in services. Specifically, 

Father did not attend any of the seven scheduled parent-aide sessions or any of 

the three scheduled home-based therapy sessions. He submitted to only six of 

the eighteen scheduled drug screens, and of those six, tested positive on five. 

Father attended only seven of the seventeen scheduled visits with the Children. 

Based on Father’s inconsistent participation and positive drug screens, the 

juvenile court again found that Father had not enhanced his ability to fulfill his 

parental obligations. 

[6] A permanency hearing was held on April 17, 2018. During this hearing, the 

juvenile court again found that Father had not complied with the Children’s 

case plans and was not consistently participating in services. Specifically, 

Father did not attend any of the three scheduled parent-aide sessions. Father 

submitted to only two of the eleven scheduled drug screens and tested positive 

on both. He attended four of the five scheduled visits with the Children. 
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Further, while Father did participate in two therapy sessions scheduled through 

Lifeline, his prior therapy treatment offered through Raintree was closed due to 

Father’s non-compliance. In addition, as of the date of the hearing, Father had 

completed only one half of his court-ordered psychological evaluation. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to 

termination and adoption. 

[7] DCS filed petitions seeking the termination of Father’s parental rights in the 

Children on May 16, 2018. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on 

July 11, 2018. During the evidentiary hearing, Father requested a thirty-day 

continuance. In making this request, Father indicated that he wished to enroll 

in an in-patient drug-treatment program. The juvenile court denied Father’s 

request and the evidentiary hearing continued as scheduled. On July 20, 2018, 

the juvenile court issued orders terminating Father’s parental rights in the 

Children. 

Discussion and Decision

[8] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his child. Bester v. Lake 

Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Although 

parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his 

parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), 

trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be 
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subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental 

rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is 

threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly 

harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently 

impaired before terminating the parent—child relationship. Id.

[9] In considering whether the termination of parental rights is 

appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness 

credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable 

inferences therefrom that support the judgment ... and give due 

regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings 

of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial 

court’s findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. In 

evaluating whether the trial court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to 

determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly 

supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly 

support the judgment. Clear and convincing evidence need not 

reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly 

inadequate for the child’s very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to 

show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional 

and physical development are threatened by the respondent 

parent’s custody.

K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229–

30 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

I. Motion to Continue

[10] In challenging the termination of his parental rights, Father bases his “broad 

assertions not on a failure of the State or the court to comply with the technical 
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terms of the applicable statutes.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. “The gravamen of his 

argument is the court’s refusal to give him a brief continuance to receive inpatient treatment for his addiction.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15.

[11] “Generally speaking, a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to 

continue is subject to abuse of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 

244 (Ind. 2014).

We will reverse the trial court only for an abuse of that 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of 

a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown 

good cause for granting the motion. However, no abuse of 

discretion will be found when the moving party has not 

demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.

Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. 

[12] Father points to our decision in Rowlett in support of his contention that the 

trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for a thirty-day 

continuance. In Rowlett, the father requested a continuance of the upcoming 

evidentiary hearing. 841 N.E.2d at 618. The father, who was scheduled to be 

released from prison approximately six weeks after the scheduled hearing, 

argued that the continuance was necessary to allow him the opportunity to 

complete court-ordered services and work toward reunification with his 

children. Id. at 619. In concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying the request for a continuance, we noted that while incarcerated, the 

father had participated in numerous services and programs offered by the 
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correctional facility aimed toward helping him reach his goal of reunification 

with his children. Id. We further noted that because the children had been in 

the care of their maternal grandmother since they were determined to be 

CHINS and DCS’s plan was for them to be adopted by maternal grandmother, 

under those specific circumstances, “continuation of the dispositional hearing 

until sometime after [the father] was released would have had little immediate 

effect upon the children.” Id. Rowlett, however, is distinguishable from the case 

now before us.

[13] Unlike in Rowlett, Father’s lack of participation was a result of Father’s choices, 

not some other barrier. For instance, Father was not incarcerated or otherwise 

denied the opportunity to complete the court-ordered services. He admitted 

that he was offered services, such as counseling to address his drug-abuse issues, 

but he did not substantially participate in the services offered. Father admitted 

that he continued to use drugs during the underlying CHINS and termination 

proceedings. 

[14] Father asserts that DCS never offered him the opportunity to participate in an 

in-patient drug-treatment program. Father, however, does not indicate that he 

ever communicated any desire to do so prior to the evidentiary hearing. He 

also does not explain why he waited until the evidentiary hearing to 

communicate his alleged desire to participate in an in-patient drug-treatment 

program. 
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[15] “A parent may not sit idly by for such an extended period without asserting a 

need and desire for services and then successfully argue that [he] was denied 

services to assist [him] with [his] parenting.” Jackson v. Madison Cty. Dep’t of 

Family & Children, 690 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. 

Moreover, we reject Father’s suggestion that his failure to achieve and maintain 

sobriety in a timely fashion can be blamed on either the trial court or DCS. As 

we stated in Prince v. Department of Child Services, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007),

[f]rom one parent to the next, the DCS and trial court have no 

way to know whether addictions treatment is failing because the 

treatment is not the most appropriate for the parent or because 

the parent simply does not care enough about reunification to 

maintain sobriety under any form of treatment. Accordingly, we 

will not place a burden on either the DCS or the trial court to 

monitor treatment and to continually modify the requirements 

for drug and alcohol treatment until a parent achieves sobriety. 

Rather, the responsibility to make positive changes will stay 

where it must, on the parent. If the parent feels the services 

ordered by the court are inadequate to facilitate the changes 

required for reunification, then the onus is on the parent to 

request additional assistance from the court or DCS.

[16] This is not a situation where Father actively participated in the services offered 

but nonetheless required additional intensive services to overcome his 

addiction. Instead, the record reveals that Father demonstrated little interest in 

participating in any of the drug-treatment programs offered by DCS. For 

instance, the record reveals that Father attended only one of the fifteen offered 

parent-aide sessions. He only attended one home-based therapy session, even 
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though at least three others were offered. He submitted to only twenty-one of 

the fifty-five scheduled drug screens. Of the twenty-one, he tested positive for 

drugs fourteen times. In addition, Father only completed one half of the courtordered psychological evaluation. Further, while Father did participate in two 

scheduled therapy sessions offered through Lifeline, his previous therapy 

services scheduled through Raintree were closed due to his “non-compliance 

[with] those services.” Ex. p. 95. 

[17] Father admitted that his participation in visitation with the Children was 

inconsistent, blaming his inconsistent attendance on a lack of communication 

and transportation. Specifically, Father stated that he (1) did not have a phone 

and therefore could not call to inform DCS that he would attend a visitation 

session and (2) lacked transportation.2

 Father acknowledged, however, that he 

could have accessed a phone and walked to visitation sessions if he had truly 

been motivated to do so. 

[18] Father also admitted that he was unemployed as of the date of the evidentiary 

hearing. When asked what he does during the day, Father indicated that he 

“mainly sit[s] around” and tries to “think of ways to get help” but will 

ultimately “just shrug it off” and “think of ways to get high.” Tr. p. 53. Father 

 

2

 The requirement that Father call prior to a visitation session was put into place after “multiple occasions 

where [the] kiddos were transported to the [visitation center] and [Father] no-call, no showed.” Tr. p. 77.
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also admitted that he did not have “a residence [he] live[s] at” and was “in 

between places.” Tr. p. 55. 

[19] He further admitted that although he had been offered counseling to address his 

issues stemming from his drug use, he did not substantially participate in the 

counseling. Father blamed his failure to substantially participate in services on 

the removal of the Children from his care, explaining “[i]t’s hard to do anything 

consistent when you don’t have your kids right there to look at.... Now we 

don’t have our kids, we can forget every second.” Tr. pp. 57–58. Father 

acknowledged that he continued to use drugs and that he was currently unable 

to provide the Children with stability. 

[20] While Father admitted that the Children “shouldn’t have to wait” on him to 

progress to the point where he could provide them with stability, he also stated 

“But if I could ask my kids to wait another [thirty-one] days, that would be 

great.” Tr. p. 61. Father acknowledged that he had not yet scheduled an 

appointment with any in-patient treatment facility, but merely suggested that he 

might be able to live drug-free and provide stability for the Children if he 

entered in-patient treatment “for [thirty] days ... maybe [thirty-one] days.” Tr. 

p. 55. Father, however, also indicated that he did not believe that it was 

necessary for children to live in a drug-free home. 

[21] Father’s apparent disinterest in participating in the services offered or in living a 

drug-free lifestyle coupled with the fact that he waited until the day of the 

evidentiary hearing to request the opportunity to complete an in-patient drug-
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treatment program suggests that this request is more of a delay tactic than a true 

desire to get the treatment necessary to help him become an effective parent. 

Further, given Father’s failure to consistently participate in the services that 

were offered, there is nothing in the record to suggest that DCS could have 

reasonably believed that Father would be interested in participating in more 

intensive services, such as an in-patient drug-treatment program. As such, we 

cannot say that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. 

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Father’s motion. See Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619 (providing that no abuse of 

discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he 

was prejudiced by the denial of his request for a continuance).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[22] While Father generally claims that DCS presented insufficient evidence to 

prove that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal from his care 

would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent—child relationship 

posed a threat to the Children, and termination was in the Children’s best 

interests,3 Father’s claims are limited to his contention that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue. Father does not point 

to any alleged deficiencies in DCS’s evidence or allege that any of the juvenile 

 

3

 These factors are the factors alleged in accordance with Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) and (C). 

Father does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove any of the factors alleged under Indiana 

Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A) and (D), namely that the Children have been removed from his care for at 

least six months and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
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court’s findings of fact or conclusions thereon relating to these factors are 

clearly erroneous. Therefore, to the extent that Father raises a separate 

sufficiency challenge, Father has waived any such challenge. See generally, In re 

B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that because the 

parent did not specifically challenge the trial court’s findings or conclusions, 

any argument that the trial court’s findings or conclusions were clearly 

erroneous was waived), trans. denied.

[23] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.