Office of Inspector General

Audit Report

FAA AND INDUSTRY ARE ADVANCING THE 

AIRLINE SAFETY ACT, BUT CHALLENGES 

REMAIN TO ACHIEVE ITS FULL MEASURE 

Federal Aviation Administration

Report Number: AV-2013-037

Date Issued: January 31, 2013
Memorandum

U.S. Department of

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

The February 12, 2009, crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 highlighted the need for 

improvements in pilot training, hiring and qualification programs, and ensuring 

consistent safety standards between carriers. Congress and the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) took swift action following the crash to address these 

issues, culminating in the August 2010 passage of the Airline Safety and FAA 

Extension Act1

The Ranking Members of the House Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation, joined by the Chairmen and the 

Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation and its Aviation Subcommittee, requested that we conduct a review 

of FAA and industry’s efforts to enhance safety in response to the Colgan 

accident. Accordingly, our objectives were to (1) examine FAA and industry 

progress in implementing elements of the Act and (2) identify any challenges to 

completing these actions.

(the Act). Effectively implementing the Act’s requirements is key 

to improving safety in commercial airline travel by raising standards in pilot 

training and performance, as well as advancing voluntary programs that yield 

critical safety information. 

We conducted this review in accordance with generally accepted Government 

auditing standards. Exhibit A details our scope and methodology.

 1 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-216, August 1, 2010.

Subject: ACTION: FAA and Industry Are Advancing

the Airline Safety Act, but Challenges Remain 

To Achieve Its Full Measure 

Report No. AV-2013-037

Federal Aviation Administration

Date: January 31, 2013

From: Jeffrey B. Guzzetti 

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Aviation and Special Program Audits

Reply to 

Attn. of: 

JA-10

To: Federal Aviation Administrator
3

RESULTS IN BRIEF

While FAA has implemented many elements of the Act, the Agency and industry 

have not yet achieved the full measure of the Act’s intended safety enhancements. 

FAA has made considerable and important progress advancing voluntary safety 

programs, improving pilot rest requirements, and establishing better processes for 

managing safety risks. However, FAA has not provided sufficient management 

attention or assistance to smaller carriers for meeting new safety standards, or 

followed through on its commitment to help these carriers with safety program 

development and support. For example, only 12 percent of small carriers2

FAA faces significant challenges to fully implement the Act, such as meeting 

timelines for rulemaking efforts while balancing competing interests of 

stakeholders involved with controversial safety measures. For example, FAA is 

experiencing lengthy delays and considerable industry opposition in issuing and 

finalizing rules that will enhance pilot qualification standards, revise crew training 

requirements, and establish mentoring and professionalism programs. Further, 

while FAA is on target with the initial development phase of a new, centralized 

electronic pilot records database, it remains uncertain when it will be implemented 

and what level of information it will contain. Three primary challenges exist with 

the new database: retaining and standardizing historical records, transitioning from 

current requirements, and incorporating driving records from the State level. 

Finally, FAA has not provided the level of education, outreach, and guidance 

needed for air carriers to implement new safety programs, such as mentoring, 

leadership, and professional development committees. As a result, industry efforts 

to enhance aviation safety in accordance with the Act are limited.

have 

flight data recording programs that monitor aircraft performance, compared to 

more than 90 percent of large carriers. Until FAA takes a more focused approach 

working with and assisting smaller carriers, the full safety benefits associated with 

these programs will not be realized.

We are making a series of recommendations to FAA to improve its efforts in 

implementing the Act.

BACKGROUND

The 2010 Act included 16 provisions to improve airline safety and pilot training 

with milestones spread over a 3-year period (see exhibit B for further details and 

the current status of FAA’s efforts in each section of the Act).3

 2 Air carriers having 15 or fewer aircraft, as defined by FAA’s ASAP & FOQA Implementation Plan per Section 214 of 

the Act.

In addition to the 

heightened standards for pilots, the Act also required FAA to perform annual, 

3 Sections of the Act pertaining to inspector staffing, pilot fatigue, and code sharing are not included in this audit, as 

they have been addressed by other recently completed or ongoing OIG projects.
4

random, onsite inspections of regional air carriers that contract with other air 

carriers to ensure their continued compliance with safety standards. 

Additionally, the Act also required that FAA develop a rule that would require all 

Part 121 air carriers to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS). The 

system, which is currently voluntary, provides air carriers with a comprehensive 

process for managing safety risks and integrating safety activities into normal, 

day-to-day operations. Additionally, the Act included other important initiatives 

that FAA did not complete during the Agency’s Call to Action on Airline Safety 

and Pilot Training,4 such as developing mentoring and professional development 

programs for pilots, and following up with air carriers on efforts to adopt 

voluntary safety programs. As required by the Act, FAA provided Congress with a 

report on air carrier use of three Voluntary Safety Programs that the Agency 

oversees:5

• Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)—A joint FAA/industry 

program that allows aviation employees to self-report safety violations to 

air carriers and FAA without fear of reprisal through legal or disciplinary 

actions.

• Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA)—A program for the 

routine collection and analysis of digital flight data generated during 

aircraft operations.

• Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)—A voluntary alternative to 

traditional pilot training regulations that replaces programmed hours with 

proficiency-based training, and incorporates data-driven processes enabling 

air carriers to refine training based on identified individual needs.

The Act further required FAA to modify the requirement for an Airline Transport 

Pilot (ATP) certificate6

Finally, this year, as mandated by the Act, FAA updated its flight and duty time 

regulations for Part 121

as well as which pilots are required to hold the ATP. The 

Act also called for the Agency to establish a new Pilot Records Database (PRD) 

that air carriers are expected to access and review qualifications and past 

performance data before hiring pilots. 

7

 4 FAA’s Call to Action Plan, announced on June 24, 2009 in response to the Colgan accident, consisted of 10 short- and 

mid-term initiatives to enhance pilot performance and training, increase air carrier participation in voluntary safety 

programs, and expand pilot records review. FAA also set goals to develop new safety oversight guidance to its 

inspectors, issue rulemakings on pilot fatigue and training, conduct regional safety forums to discuss industry best 

practices, and develop programs addressing pilot professionalism.

air carriers to better ensure pilots are rested when they 

fly—a significant achievement for the Agency given that these updates were the 

5 FAA’s Voluntary Safety Programs report to Congress (Response to P.L. 111-216, Sec. 213, dated January 28, 2011). 6 14 CFR Part 61,Subpart G – Airline Transport Pilot, Section 153, Eligibility Requirements. 7 14 CFR Part 121, Operating Requirements, Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations.
5

first modifications to the regulations since 1985. Unlike the old rules—which 

included different rest requirements for domestic, international, and unscheduled 

flights—the new regulations establish one set of rules for commercial passenger 

carriers that are based on scientific factors, such as the time of day pilots begin 

their first flight, the number of scheduled flight segments, and the number of time 

zones crossed. 

FAA HAS MADE PROGRESS WITH IMPLEMENTING KEY 

ELEMENTS OF THE ACT, BUT SAFETY ADVANCEMENTS AT 

SMALLER AIR CARRIERS HAVE BEEN LIMITED

FAA has successfully promoted use of new voluntary safety programs at larger air 

carriers and has nearly completed its efforts to issue a final rule on SMS. Despite 

this progress, the Agency has not sufficiently targeted assistance to smaller air 

carriers who are furthest behind in developing new programs. FAA’s efforts to 

advance these programs have been hindered by, among other things, the Agency’s 

inability to link its budget to planning the advancement of safety programs and 

address concerns regarding whether these programs would be scalable to carriers 

of all sizes. 

FAA Has Helped To Increase Use of Voluntary Safety Programs, 

but Work Remains To Advance These Programs at Smaller Air 

Carriers 

Overall, FAA and industry have made significant progress in advancing voluntary 

safety programs at mainline and regional air carriers; however, work remains to 

implement these programs to the same extent at smaller carriers. As of January 

2012, FAA data show a continued rise in voluntary safety program use—70 

percent of Part 121 air carriers have at least one program, up from 59 percent

2 years ago. Further, for the same time period, 47 percent of air carriers have 

multiple programs, compared to 36 percent 2 years ago. As shown in figure 1 

below, the highest concentration of new growth for these air carriers has been with 

the ASAP and FOQA programs. 
6

Figure 1. Increase in Voluntary Safety Program Participation

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data 

Despite overall gains at Part 121 air carriers, implementation of voluntary safety 

programs has lagged at smaller air carriers. While all large carriers with more than 

50 aircraft in their fleet have an incident reporting system (ASAP), the system has 

been adopted by only 41 percent of small carriers with 15 or fewer aircraft, as 

shown in table 1. Similarly, just 7 percent of these small carriers have advanced 

qualification programs for pilot training, compared to more than 50 percent of 

large carriers. 

Table 1. Air Carrier Voluntary Safety Program Participation

Program Number of 

Carriers 

Participating

Large 

Carriers 

(more than 50 

aircraft)

Medium 

Carriers 

(16-50 aircraft)

Small 

Carriers 

(15 or fewer 

aircraft)

Aviation Safety 

Action Program

60 of 88 

(68%)

24 of 24

(100%)

19 of 23 

(83%)

17 of 41

(41%)

Flight 

Operational 

Quality 

Assurance

38 of 88

(43%)

22 of 24

(92%)

11 of 23 

(48%)

5 of 41

(12%)

Advanced 

Qualification 

Program

19 of 88

(22%)

13 of 24

(54%)

3 of 23 

(13%)

3 of 41

(7%)

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data as of January 2012

57%

31%

18%

59%

36%

68%

43%

22%

70%

47%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

ASAP FOQA AQP At least one 

voluntary safety 

program

More than one 

voluntary safety 

program

Percent of Part 121 Air Carriers

Dec-09 Jan-12
7

Smaller carriers are particularly challenged with implementing FOQA because the 

program depends upon successful installation of aircraft flight monitoring 

equipment to report safety data back to the air carrier. The technology to collect 

and analyze flight data is not available for all aircraft types and fleets used by Part 

121 air carriers. Even in cases where it is available, it can be very costly for small 

carriers to install the equipment on their aircraft. Three of four air carriers we 

asked that did not already have a FOQA program in place stated that high costs 

was the primary reason for not moving forward with a program—either they could 

not afford to purchase and install flight data equipment for their aircraft, or the 

cost of data analysis was prohibitive. Additionally, while small air carriers with 15 

or fewer aircraft make up the largest group of Part 121 carriers, only 12 percent 

have a FOQA program, as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2. FOQA Use at Part 121 Carriers

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data 

The relative lack of progress at smaller air carriers is also due in part to the fact 

that FAA lacks a focused strategy to assist these carriers, such as providing best 

practices and guidance in implementing voluntary safety programs. The Act 

required FAA to develop a plan to help establish ASAP and FOQA programs at 

smaller air carriers. To carry out this requirement, FAA developed a plan and 

proposed improving existing ASAP tools and guidance, hosting information 

sharing meetings with industry, and potentially conducting an additional FOQA 

demonstration project. However, FAA has not fully implemented this plan and, 

citing a lack of funding, has not been able to carry out the FOQA demonstration 

24 23

41

22

11

5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Large Air Carriers Medium Air Carriers Small Air Carriers

Part 121 Carriers (by fleet size group)

121 Carriers with FOQA (by fleet size group)

92%

48%

12%
8

project that may have illustrated the cost effectiveness and feasibility of this 

program to smaller air carriers. 

FAA Has Assisted Larger Air Carriers in Implementing SMS, but 

Concerns Remain That the Program May Not Fully Align With 

Smaller Air Carrier Operations

FAA fell short of meeting an August 2012 final deadline for issuing the SMS rule, 

but has taken steps to assist air carriers in developing these systems. In 2007, FAA 

initiated an SMS Pilot Project to promote voluntary air carrier adoption of SMS. 

The Pilot Project allows FAA and air carriers to provide input in developing 

guidance, implementation strategies, and share best practices. Currently, 

95 percent of all Part 121 air carriers (80 of 84) are participating in the Pilot 

Project. 

Despite this success, some carriers remain concerned about the current proposed 

rule, especially smaller carriers, who have had the least success implementing 

SMS to date. In fact, 3 of the 4 air carriers that are not yet participating in FAA’s 

SMS Pilot Project are smaller air carriers (15 or fewer aircraft). Industry 

representatives have expressed concerns that the final SMS rule will not be 

scalable for air carriers of varying size and operations, making it more costly and 

difficult for smaller carriers to integrate into their operations. 

Furthermore, NTSB and air carriers are concerned about public disclosure of 

SMS-collected data. Most of these concerns focus on whether the data can be used 

for other purposes, such as litigation, and the current proposed rule does not 

address this issue. NTSB is also concerned that air carrier employees may be 

discouraged from providing important safety information due to a lack of SMS 

data protection.

FAA AND AIR CARRIERS MUST OVERCOME KEY CHALLENGES 

IN MEETING ACT PROVISIONS ON PILOT TRAINING AND 

SAFETY ISSUES 

Significant challenges remain as FAA continues to work towards meeting the 

remaining requirements of the Act. First, FAA has not succeeded in meeting 

milestones for issuing key Act-mandated rules on pilot screening and 

qualifications, training, and mentoring and leadership programs. In addition, the 

Agency lacks a clear long-term strategy with detailed milestones for transitioning 

to a new pilot records database and addressing data privacy concerns. Finally, poor 

communication between FAA and industry is impeding progress on several 

initiatives.
9

FAA Has Faced Difficulties in Issuing Key Rulemakings Within 

the Deadlines Mandated by the Act 

FAA is behind schedule on implementing key rulemaking initiatives to enhance 

pilot qualifications and training standards, and to establish mentoring and 

leadership programs. A key challenge FAA faces in achieving the full measure of 

the Act is to implement mandated rules within the established milestones. 

Rulemaking activities are complex, require extensive public notification and 

comment periods, and can encounter significant industry opposition. In addition to 

notice and comment periods required by law, FAA must also conduct detailed 

analyses of each rule’s economic impact and coordinate with stakeholders. As a 

result, as shown in table 2, FAA efforts to issue Act-mandated rules are delayed.

Table 2. Missed Pilot Training, Qualification, and Mentoring 

Milestones

Act Section Product Deadline Milestone Status

206 Mentoring NPRM 8/1/2011 Overdue & Not Complete

207 Crew Pairing Study 8/1/2011 Completed Late

208 Training Recommendations ARC Report8 11/30/2011 Completed Late

209 Crew Training ARC Formation 9/30/2010 Completed Late

209 Crew Training ARC Report 8/1/2011 Completed Late

209 Crew Training Final Rule 10/1/2011 Overdue & Not Complete

216 Pilot Qualifications NPRM 1/28/2011 Completed Late

216 Pilot Qualifications Final Rule 8/1/2012 Overdue & Not Complete

Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data & Act requirements

FAA is overdue and has not completed three critical rulemaking projects aimed at 

raising pilot standards: (1) pilot qualifications, (2) pilot training, and (3) pilot 

mentoring, leadership, and professional development. Successful implementation 

of such rules depends on FAA’s ability to address air carrier concerns and work 

though the regulatory process in a timely manner, which has presented challenges 

for the Agency. 

Pilot Qualifications. FAA is behind schedule in meeting the Act’s requirement to 

substantially raise airline pilot qualifications. FAA expects to issue a final rule by 

August 2013—1 year after the Act’s deadline. As mandated by the Act, FAA’s 

 8

 FAA formed multiple Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARCs) comprised of aviation experts from FAA and 

industry as required in specified sections of the Act. These ARCs were responsible for issuing reports to FAA and 

Congress.
10

proposed rule (issued in February 2012) would require all Part 121 pilots to hold 

an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate,9

Table 3. Minimum Requirements for First Officers in Part 121 Air 

Carrier Service

which is currently required only for 

Pilots-in-Command (captains). As shown in table 3, first officers would need 

1,500 hours of flight time to obtain an ATP certificate—six times the current 

minimum of 250 hours needed for a commercial pilot’s certificate. 

Pilot Certificate Total Flight Hours Type Rating Age

Current

Requirements Commercial 250* None 18

Proposed 

Requirements

ATP 1500 Yes 23

Restricted ATP

750 with military flight 

experience or 1,000 with 

4-year aviation degree

Yes 21

* This can be reduced to 190 hours if the pilot completes specialized flight training. 

Source: OIG analysis of 14 CFR 61.153, 61.159, 61.129, and Pilot Certification and Qualification 

Requirements NPRM 

To provide some flexibility, FAA’s proposed rule would also allow pilots with a 

4-year aviation degree or military flight experience to obtain a “restricted” ATP 

certificate as an alternative to the 1,500 hour requirement.10

FAA’s delayed rulemaking is a particular concern because, under the terms of the 

Act, the requirement that all pilots possess ATP certificates will automatically take 

effect if FAA cannot issue a final rule by August 2013—without the additional 

flexibility of the restricted ATP certificate option provided in FAA’s proposed 

rule. As a result, air carriers may not have adequate time to make necessary 

adjustments to their pilot training and qualification programs to meet the new 

requirements by the Act’s deadline. 

However, air carrier 

representatives remain opposed to the proposed rule because they feel a pilot’s 

quality and type of flying experience should be weighted more heavily than the 

number of flight hours. 

FAA has also not taken steps to ensure carriers and FAA inspectors are ready to 

transition to these new pilot qualification requirements. For example, at two 

regional air carriers we visited, more than 75 percent of current first officers did 

not have an ATP certificate. Yet, neither carrier had developed a plan to ensure 

 9 An Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Certificate is the highest level of pilot certification. Pilots certified as ATP are 

authorized to act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in commercial airline service. Additional eligibility requirements 

are contained in 14 CFR 61.153.

10 In addition to an ATP or restricted ATP certificate, FAA’s proposed rule would require all first officers to have an 

aircraft type rating, which involves additional training and testing specific to the airplanes they fly.
11

these pilots will meet the enhanced requirements by the deadline, nor had local 

FAA inspectors followed up with these carriers to assess their ability to comply. 

Additionally, FAA inspectors will have an increased workload as they perform 

new ATP certificate examinations for first officers. As the deadline approaches, it 

will be important for FAA to ensure its workforce and carriers can meet the 

impending demand for new certification testing.

While some air carriers have moved forward with new ATP programs for first 

officers, they encountered obstacles in obtaining FAA approval for the program. A 

regional air carrier we visited attempted to establish a program for first officers to 

obtain advanced certification. Although the local FAA office initially approved the 

program, the Agency rescinded the approval 1 day before it was set to launch 

because FAA had not issued national guidance on developing such programs. 

Almost 11 months later, the principal inspector approved the same program and 

the carrier was able to incorporate it into its training manual. 

Finally, while FAA’s pilot qualification proposed rule satisfies most of the Act’s 

requirements to increase the minimum standards needed for commercial pilots, it 

may fall short in ensuring sufficient pre-employment screening. For example, the 

Act states that applicant pilot screening must include an assessment of skills, 

aptitudes, airmanship, and suitability specific to each air carrier’s operations. The 

proposed rule focuses on the requirements for obtaining an enhanced ATP 

certificate. The rule does not, however, specify how carriers should determine 

whether the pilot’s background and experience is appropriate and would allow

them to function effectively in the carrier’s operating environment. 

Pilot Training. FAA is more than 15 months overdue on issuing a final rule 

revising pilot training requirements and efforts have been considerably delayed

due to significant industry opposition. This is an important safety initiative that 

will require pilot training programs to use flight simulators for scenario-based 

training and enhance pilots’ ability to work together during emergencies. 

In January 2009, FAA issued a proposed rule; however, industry opposed that the 

rule imposes overly prescriptive training hours rather than basing pilot training on 

skills most needed to safely perform flight operations. This prompted FAA to 

issue a second proposed rule in May 2011. The revised proposal requires more 

thorough ground and flight training for pilots on how to recognize and recover 

from stalls,

11

 11 Aerodynamic stalls—such as the one experienced by the airplane involved in the Colgan accident—occur when the 

airflow over the wing is disrupted and the aircraft’s lift is quickly reduced.

as well as remedial training for pilots who perform poorly in 

training. This initiative has been significantly delayed, as FAA reviewed 

comments on the revised proposal for more than 8 months before submitting the 

appropriate documents in June 2012 to advance the rulemaking process.
12

Pilot Mentoring, Leadership, and Professional Development. FAA is more 

than 17 months overdue in meeting a mandated timeline to issue a proposed rule 

requiring that air carriers establish pilot mentoring, leadership programs, and 

professional development committees to improve pilot performance.12 FAA 

intends to issue a proposed rule that would reinforce safe flying practices, but the

proposed rule has encountered a lengthy delay, due in part to challenges in 

developing an appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of these 

programs. For example, regional air carrier officials expressed concerns that a 

mentoring program would have to be scaled to their business model and that pilot 

turnover could outweigh the benefits of establishing these programs. 13

FAA’s efforts to issue a proposed rule establishing pilot mentoring and 

professionalism programs at air carriers are behind schedule, and air carriers are 

hesitant to establish these programs. For example, seven of nine carriers we visited 

did not have formal mentoring programs, and none had professional development 

programs for their pilots. Without FAA guidance, air carriers view developing 

programs ahead of final rulemakings as risky and they are reluctant to allocate 

resources to implement these new safety programs. 

FAA has 

been working to address industry comments and resolve cost-benefit balance 

issues. 

FAA Lacks a Clear, Long-Term Strategy for Transitioning to a 

New Centralized Electronic Pilot Records Database

FAA has yet to make long-term implementation decisions on the new electronic 

database for pilot records. These include decisions about how to incorporate data 

from different sources and transition to the new system while ensuring data 

integrity. According to the Act, the database should include records not only from 

FAA, but from air carriers and the National Driver Register (NDR).14

 12 Pilot performance—a longstanding NTSB safety concern—was cited in 7 of the 10 major accidents that occurred 

over the last decade, indicating that the quality of training, professionalism, and mentoring is important to safety. 

Several NTSB reviews of airline accidents (including the Colgan accident) cite poor pilot performance—such as poor 

decision-making, inadequate aircraft control, improper flying techniques, and a disregard for operating procedures—as 

a high-ranking causal factor.

FAA 

achieved an early milestone to begin developing the electronic database for pilot 

screening by October 2010. Additionally, in July 2011 an advisory committee 

provided FAA with recommendations on the database’s design and functionality. 

However, the pilot records database is only in the early stages of development and 

the Act did not establish a milestone for implementation.

13 In 2011, we reported that regional carriers were not pursuing mentoring opportunities for their pilots. OIG Report 

Number AV-2012-027, “New Approaches Are Needed to Strengthen FAA Oversight of Air Carrier Training Programs 

and Pilot Performance,” December 20, 2011.

14 NDR is a central information system that allows States to electronically exchange information on licensed drivers 

through a computerized network.
13

Further, the Agency projects that the launch of the database will not occur before 

2014, and pilots are opposed to many facets of the new records database due to 

concerns over the subjectivity and relevance of potential data. As a result of the 

delayed implementation and industry concerns, it is unclear when the new system 

will achieve the goal of enhancing the screening process of newly hired pilots. To 

meet this goal, FAA must overcome three key challenges.

• First, FAA must define the level of detail to be captured from air carrier 

pilot training records, such as whether recurrent flight training will be 

included. The Act stipulates that comments and evaluations made by the 

check airman15

• Second, the Agency will have to develop a strategy to transition to the new 

database while also ensuring air carriers receive all available data in the 

interim before the Agency issues its final rule and launches the database. 

FAA’s 2009 Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training called on 

carriers to obtain more comprehensive records on pilots prior to hiring. 

However, we reported in December 2011

be included in the database; however, industry is highly 

protective of these data and opposes including them in the new database. 

Consequently, some FAA officials are concerned that carriers may instruct 

pilot examiners not to record comments during evaluations so that they 

would not be included in the database. Additionally, FAA must determine 

how to include historical air carrier pilot training records into its new 

system. Incorporating standardized historical records from various air 

carrier and other sources will be difficult because information varies based 

on differences in air carrier training programs and because record retention 

policies vary from 5 years to indefinitely, depending on the carrier.

16

• Finally, FAA identified multiple challenges in accessing records from the 

NDR and incorporating them into the database. Specifically, FAA must 

decide how to ensure the accuracy of NDR records entered into the 

database because searches are based on names and physical characteristics 

of the pilots (height, age, eye color, etc.) that allow for inaccuracies in 

matching. For example, FAA officials stated that during a 1-week test 

period, FAA requested NDR information on 3,000 pilots and received 

possible matches for approximately 900 of them. However, after obtaining 

that FAA lacks a centralized 

process to receive and respond to carriers’ requests for pilot records. FAA 

may mitigate this problem once the database is launched. Since database 

implementation is years away, we are concerned whether air carriers can 

currently obtain all relevant information on pilots before they are hired.

 15 Pilots who are employed by air carriers to evaluate pilot proficiency. 16 OIG Report Number AV-2012-027, “New Approaches Are Needed to Strengthen FAA Oversight of Air Carrier 

Training Programs and Pilot Performance,” December 20, 2011.
14

the actual records from the States to verify the match, less than 20 of the 

possible 900 matches were valid. Additionally, FAA must assess whether 

the pilot records database requirements to maintain data for the life of the

pilot would conflict with each State’s reporting policies that require the 

records to be expunged after a certain period. 

FAA states that rulemaking will be necessary to fully develop and implement the 

intricacies of this electronic system and is in the preliminary stages of writing a 

proposal. However, major system changes may arise as a result of industry 

comments, making it uncertain what level of detail the database will contain, how 

the database can be used, and ultimately when it will be implemented. 

FAA Has Not Provided the Level of Education, Outreach, and 

Guidance Needed for Industry To Implement New Safety 

Programs 

FAA has not adequately communicated with its own field offices or with industry 

on the status of new rules or provided air carriers with sufficient guidance to 

incorporate new safety requirements. FAA engaged a cross-section of Government 

and industry representatives and created six ARCs to develop recommendations on 

multiple initiatives, such as identifying and promoting best practices in pilot 

training and developing the pilot records database. However, the Agency has not 

informed its field offices or airlines of many of the ARCs’ outcomes, including the 

sharing of best practices and the impact of ARC reports on pending rulemakings, 

or engaged in effective outreach efforts for new safety programs other than SMS. 

For example, none of the nine field offices we visited had received information 

from FAA Headquarters on the Agency’s progress in developing pilot mentoring, 

professional development, and leadership programs. 

Further, FAA did not follow up to ensure air carriers properly implemented the 

guidance it provided. For example, while FAA issued guidance17

FAA also did not provide clear instructions for field inspectors on how to perform 

the random onsite safety inspections of regional airlines as required by the Act. 

While the Agency did issue guidance to local offices,

for retaining and 

submitting pilot training records for the new electronic pilot records database, it 

did not follow up to ensure air carrier compliance. Four of six carriers we visited 

had not clarified their policies to reflect this change. As a result, important details 

concerning pilot training and proficiency may be lost and not available for air 

carriers to use in future hiring decisions. 

18

 17 InFO 11014: Retention of Pilot Records for the Pilot Records Database (PRD)—voluntary guidance from FAA to air 

carriers recommending policies on pilot records retention.

it did not clearly 

18 Notice 8900.137 Flight Standards Service (AFS) Geographic Surveillance Program for 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 –

Phase I.
15

communicate the objectives of the inspections, how to perform them, or the 

intended benefits, leading to inconsistent data collection and varying levels of 

FAA surveillance at air carriers. The guidance required just one random onsite 

inspection to be performed per air carrier,19

Additionally, some air carriers that had moved forward with new voluntary safety 

programs encountered obstacles in obtaining FAA approval. One air carrier we 

visited faced a lengthy delay from its local FAA office in the approval of a new 

incident reporting system (i.e., ASAP). According to air carrier representatives, 

there was almost a 7-month gap between when the air carrier and labor 

organization signed the program approval letter and when FAA inspectors 

provided the final approval for program implementation. Air carrier officials 

identified a lack of local inspector resources and knowledge about the safety 

program as the reasons for the delay. 

and as of June 2012, 1,052 total 

inspections had been completed at 51 air carriers. However, a lack of clear 

instructions resulted in widely differing implementation of these inspections and 

ineffective use of inspection resources. For example, almost half (464) of these 

inspections were completed at 3 air carriers. 

CONCLUSION

FAA plays an integral role in maintaining the excellent safety record of the 

National Airspace System. The Agency acted swiftly to address safety concerns 

highlighted by the 2009 Colgan crash, and FAA and air carriers have made 

commendable progress in meeting new requirements of the Airline Safety Act. 

FAA still faces several challenges, however, in updating pilot training and 

leadership programs, developing screening and qualification standards, and 

ensuring carriers have the data they need to make sound hiring decisions. To 

effectively implement these initiatives in a timely manner, FAA must balance 

industry concerns with a sustained commitment to oversight. Nonetheless, until 

FAA establishes final rules on new safety standards and focuses management 

attention on assisting smaller carriers with establishing new programs, the Agency 

cannot be assured that momentum will be sustained in implementing these 

initiatives.

 19 Only Part 121 air carriers who performed contracted flights with other Part 121 air carriers were subject to these 

inspections.
16

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that FAA:

1. Fully implement the Act-required ASAP and FOQA plan that assists smaller 

carriers in developing these safety programs.

2. Determine how many Part 121 pilots currently do not meet the heightened 

qualification standards required by the Act, and assess the data for the potential 

impact on FAA and air carrier operations.

3. Develop and communicate with key stakeholders the status of major

milestones, including the proposed rule, to improve timeliness and 

accountability for implementing the new Pilot Records Database.

4. Require inspectors to determine if air carriers have modified policies, in 

accordance with the Act, to retain pilot records for the new, centralized 

electronic pilot records database.

5. In developing the Pilot Records Database, require training records for all 

unsatisfactory pilot evaluation events to include written comments from the 

examiner to aid in identifying specific performance deficiencies.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE 

We provided a draft of this report to FAA on October 22, 2012, and received its 

response on December 27, 2012. FAA’s response is included in its entirety as an 

appendix to this report. FAA concurred or partially concurred with all of our 

recommendations. Based on FAA’s response, we consider recommendations 3 and 

4 resolved but open pending completion of planned actions. However, FAA’s 

responses did not meet the full intent of recommendations 1, 2, and 5, as detailed 

below.

FAA requested that we close recommendation 1 based on the high rate of air 

carrier participation in voluntary safety programs and its plans to require that all 

air carriers implement a SMS. While we recognize the significant progress in 

advancing these programs at mainline and regional air carriers, we note that 

implementation at smaller carriers—those with 15 or fewer aircraft —is lagging. 

This is a notable concern given that smaller carriers make up nearly half of all Part 

121 operating airlines. While FAA submitted to Congress a required plan to help 

establish voluntary programs at smaller carriers, the Agency has yet to fully 

implement this plan. Without a more targeted approach that demonstrates the 

benefits of such programs to smaller carriers, the Agency will be hard pressed to 

increase participation for this segment of the industry. Therefore, we ask that the 
17

Agency either implement its plan in its entirety or provide an alternative action 

that would fully meet the intent of our recommendation. 

FAA partially concurred with recommendation 2, but did not agree to gather and 

analyze data on the number of Part 121 pilots that currently do not meet the newer 

and more stringent airman qualification standards. Rather, in its response FAA 

contends that its ongoing communication with industry and its data assessment 

performed during the NPRM comment period is sufficient to meet the intent of our 

recommendation. We recognize that FAA should prioritize the actions needed for 

issuance of the final rule on pilot qualifications before August 1, 2013. However, 

while FAA has provided information to air carriers and inspectors regarding the 

Act’s requirements for revised ATP certification, the Agency has not 

demonstrated that the industry can fully transition to the new pilot requirements by 

that date. Because the uncertainty surrounding this element of the Act continues to 

be of significant concern, we request that FAA reconsider its position and provide 

data regarding the number of Part 121 pilots that currently do not meet the 

heightened qualifications, as well as how many air carriers have not modified their 

training programs to ensure pilots will meet the enhanced requirements by 

August 1, 2013. 

FAA concurred with recommendation 5, but the Agency’s proposed action does 

not meet the full intent of our recommendation. We recommended that FAA 

require that the training records for all unsatisfactory pilot evaluations include 

examiner comments. While FAA plans to require that any comments contained in 

pilot evaluation records be included in the database, this will not address our 

concern that air carriers may not capture examiner comments during the 

evaluation. As we noted in our report, some FAA officials are concerned that air

carriers may be reluctant to create an official record of a pilot’s poor performance 

through written comments. However, without these comments, air carriers and 

FAA may not be able to identify pilots with specific performance deficiencies to 

ensure they get the additional training they need. Accordingly, we consider 

recommendation 5 open and unresolved and request that the Agency propose 

additional actions to meet the intent of our recommendation.

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

FAA’s planned actions for recommendations 3 and 4 are responsive, and we 

consider these recommendations resolved but open pending completion of the 

planned actions. For recommendations 1, 2, and 5, we request that FAA either 

provide additional information or reconsider its position as described above. In 

accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1C, we request that 

FAA provide this additional information within 30 days of this report. 
18

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FAA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at 

(202) 366-0500 or Tina Nysted, Program Director, at (404) 562-3770.

#

cc: DOT Audit Liaison, M-1

FAA Audit Liaison, AAE-100
19

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We conducted our work from June 2011 through October 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To assess FAA and industry progress implementing sections of the Airline Safety 

Act, we met with Flight Standards and other officials at FAA headquarters who 

are responsible for required actions and oversight of Airline Safety Act initiatives. 

We visited nine air carriers representing mainline, regional, supplemental, and 

cargo operators, along with their respective FAA oversight offices, and 

interviewed 31 FAA inspectors. 

The nine air carriers were selected based on the Part 121 and 121/135 carriers 

identified in FAA’s Voluntary Safety Programs report to Congress (Response to 

P.L. 111-216, Sec. 213, dated January 28, 2011). The three air carriers and FAA 

oversight offices we visited in the survey phase of our audit were selected based 

on location and their classification as a Part 121 air carrier and represented two 

types of operations (mainline and regional). For the six carriers we visited during 

the verification phase of our audit, the Office of Inspector General statistician 

developed a sample from the 32 Part 121 air carriers with no voluntary safety 

programs identified in FAA’s January 2011 report to Congress. We also 

interviewed representatives from five industry associations and trade groups who 

represent the interests of major, regional, supplemental, and cargo air carriers and 

airline pilots to obtain their input regarding progress and challenges identified for 

FAA and industry implementing specific sections of the Airline Safety Act.

To determine the progress and specific challenges associated with the 

development of the new, centralized electronic pilot records database, we 

interviewed FAA pilot records branch personnel in Oklahoma City, OK, 

responsible for the storage of these records and for development of related policy. 
20

Exhibit B. Status of Airline Safety Act Milestones

EXHIBIT B. STATUS OF AIRLINE SAFETY ACT MILESTONES

Section Initiative Milestone Deadline Milestone Status

202 NTSB Recommendations 

Report

Report Annual Met, On-Target

203 FAA Pilot Records Database Database 

Development

10/30/2010 Met

Report 2/1/2012 Completed Late – 2/24/12

204 Air Carrier Safety & Pilot 

Training ARC

ARC Report 7/31/2011 Met

ARC Report 7/31/2012 Met

205 FAA Inspector Staffing Start OIG 

Review 

5/1/2011 Met

206 Mentoring, Development, 

and Leadership

NPRM 8/1/2011 Missed & Overdue

Final Rule 8/1/2013 To Be Determined

207 Crew Pairing and CRM Study 8/1/2011 Completed Late – 8/26/2011

208 NTSB Training 

Recommendations

ARC Formation 11/30/2010 Met

NPRM 8/1/2011 Met

ARC report 11/30/2011 Completed Late –3/7/2012

Final Rule 8/1/2013 To Be Determined

209 FAA Rulemaking on 

Training 

ARC Formation 9/30/2010 Completed Late –

11/16/2010

ARC Report 8/1/2011 Completed Late – 9/23/2011

Final Rule 10/1/2011 Missed & Overdue

210 Code Share Ticket 

Disclosure

Amend 49 

U.S.C. § 41712

N/A Met

211 FAA Safety Inspections Perform one per 

year 

Annual Met & On-Target

212 Fatigue & Commuting NPRM 2/1/2011 Met

Final Rule 8/1/2011 Completed Late – 1/4/2012

Risk 

Management 

Plans 

11/1/2010 Met

Start Study 9/30/2010 Met

Preliminary 

Findings

1/30/2011 Met

Report 6/30/2011 Met

213 Voluntary Safety Programs Report 1/28/2011 Completed Late – 3/16/2011

214 ASAP & FOQA 

Implementation

Plans Issued 1/28/2011 Completed Late – 4/14/2011

Plans 

Implemented

8/1/2011 FOQA Portion Overdue

215 Safety Management Systems NPRM 11/1/2010 Met

Final Rule 8/1/2012 Missed & Overdue

216 Screening & Qualifications NPRM 1/28/2011 Completed Late - 2/29/2012

Final Rule 8/1/2012 Missed & Overdue 

ATP 8/1/2013 To Be Determined

217 ATP Certification Final Rule 8/1/2013 To Be Determined
21

Exhibit C. Organizations Visited or Contacted

EXHIBIT C. ORGANIZATIONS VISITED OR CONTACTED

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Headquarters:

Flight Standards Service Washington, DC

Pilot Records Branch Oklahoma City, OK

FAA Certificate Management Offices (CMO):

Phoenix CMO Phoenix, AZ

Portland CMO Hillsboro, OR

South Florida CMO Miramar, FL

United Air Lines CMO Aurora, CO

FAA Certificate Management Units (CMU) at Flight Standards District 

Offices (FSDO):

Cape Air CMU at Boston FSDO Lexington, MA

Comair CMU at Louisville FSDO Louisville, KY

Kalitta Air CMU at Detroit FSDO Belleville, MI

PSA CMU at Cincinnati FSDO Cincinnati, OH 

USA Jet CMU at East Michigan FSDO Belleville, MI

Air Carriers:

Cape Air/Hyannis Air Service Hyannis, MA

Comair Erlanger, KY

Evergreen International Airlines McMinnville, OR

Florida West International Airways Miami, FL

Kalitta Air Ypsilanti, MI

PSA Airlines Vandalia, OH

Sierra Pacific Airlines Tucson, AZ

United Airlines Denver, CO

USA Jet Airlines Belleville, MI

Industry Representatives or Organizations:

Airlines For America (A4A) Washington, DC

Previously known as Air Transport Association (ATA)

Regional Airline Association (RAA) Washington, DC

Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) Washington, DC

National Air Carrier Association (NACA) Washington, DC

Cargo Airline Association (CAA) Washington, DC
22

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT

Name Title

Tina Nysted Program Director

Travis Wiley Project Manager

Stefanie McCans Senior Analyst

Curt Boettcher Senior Analyst

Marshall Anderson Senior Analyst

Aiesha Gillespie Analyst

Audre Azuolas Writer/Editor

Megha Joshipura Statistician
APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 23

Appendix. Agency Comments

Federal Aviation

Administration

Memorandum

Date: December 27, 2012

To: Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special

Program Audits

From: H. Clayton Foushee, Director, Office of Audit and Evaluation, AAE-1

Subject: Response to Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report—Airline Safety Act 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has implemented many elements of the Airline 

Safety and Pilot Training Act of 2010 (the Act), which are key to improving safety in 

commercial airline travel by raising standards in pilot training and performance as well as 

advancing voluntary programs that yield critical safety information. 

The FAA wrote and delivered seven reports to Congress, initiated five rulemaking projects, 

and continued rulemaking efforts for another four final rules as a result of the Act. The FAA 

is continuing to develop rule-making initiatives and policy changes in response to the Act.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESPONSES

Recommendation 1: Fully implement the Act-required ASAP and FOQA plan that assists 

smaller carriers in developing these safety programs.

FAA Response: Concur. In our report to Congress, the FAA noted it had a range of options 

available to promote Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operational Quality 

Assurance (FOQA), depending on budget and resource availability. The FAA has 

implemented this plan by improving the functionality of the Web-Based Access Tool 

(WBAT) and continuing to host ASAP-FOQA Information-Sharing meetings with the 

industry, which have been effective. Participation in FAA’s voluntary programs is at an all 

time high. In September of 2010, 69% of part 121 operators participated in at least one 

voluntary program (ASAP, FOQA, Advanced Qualification Program [AQP), Line Operations 

Safety Audit [LOSA]). Today over 80% participate and virtually 100% of the “mainline” and 

“regional” air carriers participate in at least one voluntary program, and most participate in 

several voluntary programs. As of October 16, 2012, 78% of part 121 air carriers participate 

in ASAP and 48% participate in FOQA. 

Furthermore, the FAA will require each part 121 air carrier to implement a safety 

management system (SMS). A SMS is a comprehensive, process-oriented approach to 
24

Appendix. Agency Comments

managing safety throughout an organization. A SMS includes an organization-wide safety 

policy; formal methods for identifying hazards, controlling, and continually assessing risk; 

and promotion of a safety culture. SMS stresses not only compliance with technical standards 

but also increased emphasis on the overall safety performance of the organization. SMS's 

proactive emphasis on hazard identification and mitigation, and on communication of safety 

issues, provides certificate holders robust tools to improve safety, regardless of the size of the 

operator. The FAA submitted to Congress a copy of the implementation plan required under Section 

214 of the Act. Therefore, the FAA has met the intent of this recommendation and requests that 

it be closed. 

Recommendation 2: Determine how many part 121 pilots currently do not meet the 

heightened qualification standards required by the Act, and assess the data for the potential 

impact on FAA and air carrier operations.

FAA Response: Partially Concur. The FAA has communicated regularly with aviation 

industry stakeholders to facilitate compliance with the requirements of the Act, beginning 

with Information for Operators 10024, Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Certificate Requirement 

for Pilots in Part 121 Operations, and dated 12/15/2010. Additionally, on 4/17/2012, the FAA 

issued Notice 8900.184, Incorporation of ATP Certification into an Air Carrier SIC Training 

Program, to provide guidance to principal operations inspectors (POIs) with oversight 

responsibilities of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 certificate 

holders on incorporating airline transport pilot (ATP) certification into an air carrier secondin-command (SIC) training program. In addition to recurrent training programs, air carriers 

have revised new-hire training to incorporate the new requirements. Through its ongoing 

conversations with industry groups, the FAA considers that industry has qualified nearly half 

of the pilots needing an ATP as of October 2012. Most carriers are aware of the selfenactment date of the regulation and began their mitigation steps early enough to meet the 

August 1, 2013 deadline.

The FAA assessed the data collected during the comment period for the Pilot Certification and 

Qualification notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the number of Part 121 pilots 

that at that time did not meet the heightened qualification standards required by the Act. At 

that time, FAA determined that the workload increased for some inspectors, but the work has 

been spread over such a timeframe that existing resources are available to accommodate the 

additional workload.

Recommendation #3: Develop and communicate with key stakeholders the status of major 

milestones, including the proposed rule, to improve timeliness and accountability for 

implementing the new Pilot Record Database.

FAA Response: Concur. The focus of the FAA to date has been on the development of a 

prototype database system to answer questions on how the paper based Pilot Records 

Improvement Act of 1996 (PRIA) system can be automated. In addition, the implementation 

team has been developing an action plan with a list of activities and dates for the database 

delivery and the associated rulemaking activities. Once the action plan has been approved, 

correspondence will be issued to communicate the milestones for the project to all industry 

stakeholders. 
25

Appendix. Agency Comments

Despite focusing on these priorities, the agency has also issued two documents to 

communicate with operators and others in industry on pilot records. The Flight Standards 

Service (AFS) issued an Information for Operators memorandum (InFO #11014) on August 

15, 2011 to inform operators of their responsibility under the new law to retain records for the 

database. AFS also issued updated guidance (AC 120-68-F) on May 31, 2012 for the PRIA. 

Updates to the paper based PRIA system are currently being implemented to assist with the 

conversion to the Pilot Record Database (PRD) system and should be completed by December 

31, 2013.

Recommendation 4: Require inspectors to determine if air carriers have modified policies, 

in accordance with the Act, to retain pilot records for the new, centralized electronic pilot 

record database.

FAA Response: Concur. InFO #11014, as stated in our response to recommendation 3, was 

issued to inform operators of their responsibility under the new law to retain records for the 

database. The FAA will conduct spot checks in order to examine airline policy guidance to 

ensure carriers have taken steps to comply with the intent of the Act. The FAA has met the 

intent of this recommendation and request that this recommendation be closed. 

Recommendation 5: In developing the Pilot Records Database, require training records for 

all unsatisfactory pilot evaluation events to include written comments from the examiner to 

aid in identifying specific performance deficiencies.

FAA Response: Concur. The database will include a text block for the entry of examiner 

comments as stipulated by the statute. This will allow for the entry of comments that are 

made by an examiner whether the evaluation event was determined to be satisfactory or 

unsatisfactory. The intent is to capture any comments that an examiner deemed important and 

to include these in the pilot's PRD history. Any comment that is recorded as part of an 

evaluation on the paper based form or within an air carrier's automated system will be 

required for entry in the PRD system. The database should be completed by December 31, 

2013.