Affirmed as Modified and Op inion Filed November 29, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00772-CR No. 05-20-00773-CR EVERETT GRAY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1571448-I and F-1555801-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia Appellant Everett Gray made open pleas of guilty to two offenses, and the trial judge sentenced him to prison terms of ten and twenty years. In three issues on appeal, he challenges both se ntences and one duplicative assessment of court costs. We delete one asse ssment of court costs and otherwise affirm the judgments. I. Background Appellant was indicted for (1) unlawfu l possession of a firearm by a felon and (2) illegal barter or investment. The illegal-barter indictment included one enhancement paragraph alle ging use of a deadly weapon and a second enhancement–2– paragraph alleging a prior felony conviction for aggrav ated robbery. Appellant waived his right to a jury and made open pl eas of guilty to both indictments. He also pleaded true to the enhancement para graphs in the illegal-barter case. The evidence at appellant’s sentencing tr ial showed that appellant had contact with Dallas Police Department Detective Mario Castanon, who was posing as a drug dealer connected with a Mexican cartel. At first, appellant sought to buy five kilos of cocaine from Castanon. No agreement was reached, but Castanon then pretended to be interested in buying guns for the car tel, and appellant so ld him two guns with the serial numbers filed down. Then a ppellant and Castanon agreed that Castanon would sell appellant one kilo of cocaine. When appellant and another person showed up to complete the transaction, they were arrested while they were sitting in their car. The police found a pistol on the seat be tween the other person’s legs, and they also recovered $13,000 from the car. Appellant’s parole officer testified that she thought appellant was a good parolee and that he deserved another ch ance on probation. On cross-examination, the parole officer testified that appellant had had a previous probation for aggravated robbery revoked when he committed the o ffenses of burglary of a vehicle and possession of marijuana. Appellant was th en sentenced to fifteen years in the penitentiary, was paroled in September 2013, and bega n meeting with Detective Castanon in May 2014.–3– Appellant testified at sentencing and al so called his wife, his mother, and his cousin as character witnesses. He also introduced into evidence some written statements from other character witnesses. Appellant developed evidence that he was working on an internet-based project called “My Senior Year 2k” that was intended to raise money for needy high-school seniors. During closing argument, appellant’s atto rney asked the court to put appellant on probation. The State’s attorney argued against probation and asked the court to sentence appellant to twenty years in pris on. The trial judge sentenced appellant to ten years in prison on the unlawful-possessi on charge and twenty years in prison on the illegal-barter charge. The signed judgme nts reflected these sentences, and each judgment assessed $249 in court costs against appellant. Appellant timely appealed. II. Analysis Appellant’s first two issues on appeal argue that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because th e sentences do not comport with the objectives of the Texas Penal Code. His th ird and final issue argues that the trial court erred by assessing court cost s against him in both judgments.
A. Issues One and Two: Did the trial co urt abuse its discretion by imposing sentences contrary to the obj ectives of the Penal Code? Appellant concedes that his sentences fa ll within the statutory ranges, but he argues nonetheless that the trial court a bused its discretion by sentencing him to prison instead of community supervision be cause imprisoning him runs contrary to–4– the Penal Code’s stated objective of re habilitating those convicted of crimes. See
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. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 1.02(1)(B). The State argue s that appellant failed to preserve error and that his first two issues also fail on the merits. We conclude that appellant’s first two issues were preserved and that they fail on the merits. 1. Error was preserved. Generally, to preserve a complaint for a ppeal a party must make the complaint to the trial court and obtain a ruling. See generally T EX

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. P. 33.1(a). Error preservation is a systemic requirement, and we should not address the merits of unpreserved issues. Ford v. State , 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In determining whether error was preserved, we do not consider arguments in isolation but instead look to the context of the entire record. Douds v. State , 472 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A party need not use magic words or cite a specific statute to preserve an issue as long as the ba sis of his complaint is evident to the trial

court. Bryant v. State , 391 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We have held that § 1.02 arguments like appellant’s must be preserved in the trial court to avoid forfeiture on appeal. See, e.g. , Hicks v. State , No. 05-20-00614-CR, 2021 WL 3042672, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Here, we conclude th at appellant adequate ly preserved error.–5– First, appellant’s evidence raised the i ssue of rehabilitation, which is the focus of his § 1.02 argument. His parole officer testified that appellant deserved a second chance, that he would benef it from a “behavior program, ” and that sh e believed he could succeed on probation. Appellant’s wi fe testified that appellant needed something to help him learn “how to adapt in society.” His mother testified that he needed “some kind of behavioral help.” Appellant testified that he needed to rehabilitate himself. Appellant ’s cousin testified and ur ged that “[t]here is no rehabilitation from prison here .” And a letter fro m appellant’s pastor, which was admitted into evidence, pleaded that appella nt be allowed “to continue his journey of rehabilitation.” Second, although appellant’s attorney did not cite § 1.02 during closing argument at sentencing, he did argue that evidence showed appellant to be a good candidate for deferred adjudica tion and that appellant’s “cr iminal thinking” could be corrected with proper therapy. He also argued that appe llant should be “sent to ISF [1] to get the tools that he needs to finish the race.” We conclude that the fore going was sufficient to alert the trial judge that (1) appellant wanted the judge to order deferred adjudication and (2) appellant contended deferred adjudication was ju stified for rehabilitative purposes. Accordingly, we conclude that error was preserved. See Bryant , 391 S.W.3d at 91–

1 “ISF” means “intermediate sanction facility.” See White v. State , 508 S.W.3d 509, 509 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).–6– 92 (concluding that appellant’s evidence and arguments suffi ced to preserve error in the trial court).
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court has broad discretion in assessing a defendant’s sentence within the statutory range. See Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Appellant concedes that his sentences of ten and twenty years in prison are within the statutory ranges for his offenses. Here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion. As discussed above, appellant presente d some witnesses w ho urged the trial court to be lenient and give appellant a chance to s eek rehabilitation. However, rehabilitation is not the only objective of the Penal Code. Deterrence and prevention of recurring criminal behavior ar e also objectives of the Code. See P ENAL § 1.02(1)(A), (C). Here, the trial court heard evidence that weighed against leniency. For example, when appellant committed the cu rrent offenses, he was on parole from a prison sentence for aggravated robbery. Appellant also admitted that he used marijuana and “abscond[ed]” from proba tion for a prior offense. Moreover, appellant admitted that he wanted to ma ke money by reselling five kilograms of cocaine. Other evidence s howed that he was willing to sell guns to Detective Castanon, ostensibly for use by a Mexican cartel, and that he told Castanon that he–7– was willing to carry cocaine for him while carrying out appellant’s trade as a truck driver. Based on the totality of the circumstan ces and the objectives of the Penal Code, we conclude that th e trial court did not act unreasonably or abuse its broad discretion by sentencing appellant as it did rather than giving him deferred adjudication. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first two issues on appeal. B. Issue Three: Did the trial court err by assessing court costs in both cases? Each judgment assessed $249 in court co sts against appellant. In his third issue, appellant argues that the assessme nt should be deleted from the judgment convicting him of unlawful possession of a firearm. The St ate agrees with appellant’s argument. So do we. 2 The Code of Criminal Procedure provid es, “In a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses . . ., the cour t may assess each court cost or fee only once against the defendant.” T EX

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. A NN . art. 102.073(a). Here, appellant was c onvicted of two offenses in a single criminal action. See Burns v. State , No. 05-19-00905-CR, 2021 WL 791421, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (there was a “single criminal action” where defendant plead ed guilty to two charges,

2 Appellant was not required to preserve this issue in the trial court. See Hurlburt v. State , 506 S.W.3d 199, 204 n.3 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.); see also Johnson v. State , 423 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[W]e hold that Appellant need not have objected at trial to raise a claim challenging the bases of assessed costs on appeal.”).–8– waived his right to jury tr ial, and was convict ed and sentenced by trial court). Thus, the trial court should have a ssessed court costs only once. The Code also provides, “In a criminal action described by Subsection (a), each court cost or fee the amount of which is determin ed according to the category of offense must be assessed using the highe st category of offense that is possible based on the defendant’s convictions.” C RIM

. P ROC . art. 102.073(b). Appellant’s illegal-barter conviction i nvolved the higher category of offense (a first-degree felony), so the trial court erred by asse ssing court costs in the unlawful-possession case (a third-degree felony). We sustain appellant’s third issue. III. Disposition We affirm the trial court’ s judgment in the illegal-ba rter case, trial court case number F15-55801-I. We modify the trial court’s judgment in the unlawfulpossession case, trial court case number F15-71448-I, by de leting the assessment of $249 in court costs, and we affi rm that judgment as modified.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 200772F.U05 /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE–9– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT EVERETT GRAY, Appellant

No. 05-20-00772-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dall as County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1571448-I. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Schenck and Smith participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the judgment of the trial court as follows: The section entitled “Court Costs” is modified to show “$ N/A.”
As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered November 29, 2021.–10– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT EVERETT GRAY, Appellant
No. 05-20-00773-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dall as County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1555801-I. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Schenck and Smith participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered November 29, 2021