DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CID TORREZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1277

[April 22, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Lisa M. Porter, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 12-17185CF10A, 

14-010607CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachel Kaiman, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, J.

Cid Lenin Torrez appeals his conviction and sentence for second-degree 

murder. He raises four issues on appeal, but only two merit discussion: 

(1) whether the trial court erred in admitting the cadaver dog evidence; 

and (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to make an independent 

finding of Torrez’s competency to be sentenced.

I. Facts

Torrez was married to the victim, his wife Vilet Patricia Torrez (“Vilet”). 

In September 2011, Torrez moved out of the family home after a domestic 

incident in which he was violent towards Vilet. Although Torrez and Vilet 

were still married, they lived separately from that time on; Vilet stayed in 

the family home with the children and Torrez moved to an apartment.

Surveillance from a security camera showed Vilet in her vehicle 

entering the gate of her neighborhood in the early morning hours on the 

day of her disappearance. A neighbor’s video surveillance camera also 
2

confirmed that Vilet’s vehicle was on the street at that time. This was the 

last time that Vilet was seen or heard from. Records of Vilet’s cell phone 

showed that her last phone calls were made at the same time that morning 

to Torrez’s cellphone. Days later, Torrez called 911 to report Vilet missing. 

Law enforcement determined that Vilet neither conducted any financial 

activity, nor travelled after that date. Crime scene technicians found 

numerous blood stains on the staircase, the wall next to the staircase, and 

the light switch in the children’s bedroom inside Vilet’s home. The DNA 

profiles obtained from the sampled blood from the residence had a mixture 

of two individuals: Vilet and Torrez.

Because of the presence of blood stains in the home, and the suspicion 

they were dealing with a possible homicide, authorities decided to use a 

human remains detection dog or cadaver dog in their search. The 

detection dog named Canine Jewel, handled by Officer Gregory Strickland 

of the City of Miramar Police Department, was solely and extensively 

trained and certified to recognize the odor of human remains. The dog 

alerted several times to a grassy area by the home’s front door and showed 

behavior consistent with detecting the odor of human remains.

The investigation into Vilet’s disappearance proceeded over several 

months. Almost five months after their initial canvas of the suspected 

crime scene and surrounding area, Officer Strickland and Jewel were 

asked to help again. This time they deployed in the rear parking lot of a 

police station where there were several vehicles, including one owned by 

Torrez. Officer Strickland slightly opened the doors and trunks of the 

vehicles and Jewel again showed a behavioral change next to the rear door 

of Torrez’s car consistent with an alert to the odor of human remains. 

When Jewel came to the car’s trunk, she nudged it open further and 

jumped inside. Jewel sniffed between the floor of the trunk and the back 

seat and went into her trained final response, which tells the handler that 

she was as close as possible to the trained odor of human remains. Jewel 

also gave a trained final response to the odor of human remains in the 

backseat of the car.

Officer Strickland removed the carpet that covered the spare tire and 

tire jack inside the trunk. After he did, Jewel again jumped into the trunk, 

put her nose down in the wheel well where the spare tire would be, and 

gave an immediate trained final response as an alert to the odor of human 

remains.

Another search was done by Detective Juliana Martinez who worked as 

a full-time detective and part-time canine handler with the Palm Beach 

County Sheriff’s Office (“PBCSO”). Det. Martinez and Canine Piper 
3

assisted with a search of Torrez’s vehicle independently of the search that 

Officer Strickland and Jewel performed. Piper also alerted, or exhibited a 

change in behavior, to the outside rear door of the vehicle and came to a 

final response at the seam of the rear door. Piper exhibited the same 

change in behavior at the trunk and gave another final response when she 

sniffed the seam of the trunk.

To this date, Vilet’s body has not been located. However, the 

abovementioned evidence, in conjunction with other evidence adduced 

during the investigation, led authorities to charge Torrez for the alleged 

murder of his wife.

A. Cadaver dog evidence.

Before trial, Torrez moved to exclude any testimony of, and any 

evidence related to, the dogs and their handlers. He claimed the evidence 

did not meet the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence. The court 

held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from several witnesses.

1. Officer Gregory Strickland

Officer Strickland testified at the pretrial hearing regarding his 

qualifications as well as the training, certification and reliability of Jewel. 

He testified that he was a detective with the Miramar Police Department 

and had been a canine handler for the City of Miramar since 2006. At the 

end of 2006 or beginning of 2007 he was assigned canine “Jewel.” Jewel 

came from California Task Force 6. She began her training with the 

Federal Emergency Management Association (“FEMA”) and was shipped to 

Florida and issued to him. Jewel’s target odor was human remains. He 

and Jewel went through a canine search specialist course which consisted 

of 400-500 hours of extensive training. They continued this regimen as 

in-the-field training and weekly-maintenance training. They were certified 

in 2007 in human remains detection after approximately a year of training. 

He conducted weekly-maintenance training with Jewel at a minimum of 

sixteen hours per month and applied for recertification once a year. Jewel 

was certified by the North American Police Working Dog Association 

(“NAPWDA”) from 2007 through 2012. She always obtained certification. 

Officer Strickland recalled only one incident throughout this time when 

Jewel gave the final response in the absence of any human remains. This 

occurred when she was deployed in Texas after Hurricane Ike in December 

2008 to identify human remains. Jewel gave a final response to an area 

of debris and after a search of that area was conducted the only thing 

located was a bucket of shrimp. However, human remains were recovered 

near that area several days later. Nevertheless, Officer Strickland 
4

attributed this initial false positive alert to the long and tedious hours they 

had been working and that Jewel wanted to play a little bit. Because of 

this response Jewel was remediated immediately and she would no longer 

show a trained final response to the odor of shrimp. There had been no 

other issues with Jewel since December of 2008. The training records for 

Jewel for 2012 were received in evidence as were Jewel’s certifications from 

2007 to 2012, and certifications from the NAPWDA. Those certifications 

required that Jewel find at least eleven of twelve “hides,” which is 

approximately a ninety-one percent accuracy rate. Jewel has alerted to 

full decomposed bodies and has also alerted to skeletal remains. The 

longest period Officer Strickland was aware of Jewel alerting to the odor of 

human remains after the remains were removed was a week.

2. Detective Juliana Martinez

The court also heard testimony from Det. Martinez of the PBCSO. Det. 

Martinez testified she was a detective and part-time canine handler 

assigned to Canine Piper for nine years. The PBCSO purchased Piper, a 

black Labrador, from a company in California where she had been 

imprinted on the odor of human remains. Det. Martinez flew to California 

and attended a two-week handler course with Piper and then came back 

to Florida and attended a four-month academy with the PBCSO. After the 

academy, Piper was certified in detecting the scent of human remains. 

Piper was trained at least twice a month. Piper’s 2009, 2010, 2011, and 

2012 training records and certifications were received in evidence. Det. 

Martinez testified that in the nine years she had Piper, Piper never failed

to be certified. Det. Martinez also testified about how the Miramar Police 

Department contacted her to assist in a search of a parking lot behind the 

Miramar substation in August 2012. Det. Martinez described that when 

Piper detects the odor of human remains, she snaps her head, sometimes 

closes her mouth, sniffs certain areas, slows down and then sits as a final 

response.

3. Trainer Nick Barbera

The court also heard testimony from Nick Barbera, a trainer and 

handler for the PBCSO canine unit. He has been a handler for twenty 

years and a trainer for almost fifteen years. The PBCSO has forty-eight 

canines, two of which are human remains detection dogs. Barbera trains 

with Det. Martinez and Piper at least twice a month. He testified that in 

his experience, Piper is a reliable human remains detection dog. Barbera 

described the training he did with Piper, using human blood, tissue, 

placenta, bone and teeth. The PBCSO trains with their dogs outdoors 

eighty to ninety percent of the time. Like Det. Martinez, Barbera also 
5

described how Piper responds when she detects the odor of human 

remains. He stated that Piper snaps her head, slows down, and has 

respiratory changes. Barbera had seen Piper change behavior in response 

to animal odors but said that she would not alert and might only show 

interest.

4. Dr. Kenneth Furton

The trial court also heard testimony from Dr. Kenneth Furton, a 

professor of chemistry and biochemistry at Florida International 

University. He is also the Provost, Executive Vice President and Chief 

Operating Officer at the university. He has been a professor since 1988. 

His curriculum vitae was received in evidence. Dr. Furton has studied the 

chemicals that dogs use to locate forensic specimens for over twenty years. 

He has over thirty publications related to dog’s detection of odors. He has 

worked with dogs used for human remains detection for the past ten years. 

He has published papers discussing the specific chemicals given off by 

human remains. His most recent publication examined the volatile 

organic compounds (VOCs) given off by deceased human subjects. During 

his testimony, he described the testing methods he uses to detect these 

compounds by using gauze material to collect the scent from the human 

remains and then analyze it in the laboratory to identify the VOCs in the 

sample. He then tests the dogs to those chemicals in the field to help 

develop training aids that are safe to use.

Dr. Furton reviewed the specifics of this case in terms of the scentdetection searches by Det. Martinez and Officer Strickland and reviewed 

the training and certification records for the officers and their canines. He 

expressed his opinion that the certifications of the canines are the most 

important measure of the reliability of the detection team because testing 

is done in a controlled setting with an outside observer. The training 

records are important to show the regular maintenance of the team. Dr. 

Furton recalled that he has testified as an expert approximately thirty 

times, mostly related to narcotics detection dogs. He has testified as an 

expert for the defense in only one previous case involving canine human 

remains detection. In his opinion, canine Piper and Det. Martinez were a 

reliable team because they had multiple certifications including the 

NAPWDA, which as stated above requires a reliability rating of 

approximately ninety-one percent. It was also his opinion that canine 

Jewel and Officer Strickland were a reliable detection team, based on their 

regular maintenance and annual certifications. Regarding how long a 

scent can be detected, it was his opinion that, depending on the 

concentration of the odor, the odor can remain for a very long period, 

especially in an enclosed area. Even if the area is opened, dogs can still 
6

alert at very low threshold areas, even at levels below detection by 

instruments. Additionally, Dr. Furton testified that the fact the two dogs 

in this case alerted independently of each other increased the reliability of 

the alert.

To Dr. Furton, the fact that a body was not discovered in the trunk did 

not invalidate the alerts. Dr. Furton stated that there were three 

explanations for an alert, or an otherwise non-productive response, in the 

absence of a discovery of remains. First, in a controlled setting where there 

is no target, it can be called a false positive. Second, the material causing 

the alert may be inaccessible. For example, in the case of a vehicle’s trunk, 

the material or odor could have permeated into a crack or seam such that 

it could not be reached. Additionally, if fluids from a body go through 

carpet or down below in a trunk, the odor can permeate into rubber seals 

or other materials that are part of the vehicle. In these situations, it is 

possible to have an odor but no DNA recovery. Third, there could be 

residual odor, which is odor remaining after the target is removed. As 

indicated by his first explanation, Dr. Furton acknowledged that with dogs, 

like humans, there is a possibility of errors.

Following this evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a written order 

denying Torrez’s motion to bar evidence of the cadaver dog searches and 

alerts under both Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In its order, the 

court noted, however, that there were no cases in Florida dealing with the 

admissibility of cadaver dog evidence to guide its decision.

Daubert analysis

In considering the admissibility of cadaver dog evidence under the 

Daubert standard, the trial court’s analysis began with an examination of 

the Florida Evidence Code:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in 

determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 

testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and 

methods; and

(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods 

reliably to the facts of the case.
7

§ 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2017); accord Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. 

As to the first prong under section 90.702, the court found that the 

testimony of the dog handlers was based upon sufficient facts or data. 

Officer Strickland, who worked with canine Jewel for over six years, was 

trained in Jewel’s alert behavior and maintained her records and 

certifications. Jewel was off-lead when she independently alerted to the 

trunk of Torrez’s car. Det. Martinez was also trained in Piper’s behavior, 

maintained Piper’s records, and trained with her every month. Piper 

similarly alerted, off-lead and independent of Jewel, to the trunk of Torrez’s 

car. Neither of the handlers or their canines were aware of the facts of this 

case at the time they participated in the searches.

As to the second prong, the court found that the subject testimony was 

the product of reliable principles and methods. The court considered the 

case of People v. Lane, 862 N.W.2d 446, 457-58 (Mich. App. Ct. 2014), a 

Michigan decision that applied Daubert to conclude that cadaver dog 

evidence was sufficiently reliable and therefore admissible. The Lane court 

articulated the following four-part test that the proponent of cadaver dog 

evidence needed to meet: (1) the handler was qualified to use the dog; (2) 

the dog was trained and accurate in identifying human remains; (3) 

circumstantial evidence corroborates the dog’s identification; and (4) the 

evidence was not so stale or contaminated as to make it beyond the dog’s 

competency to identify it. See Lane, 862 N.W.2d at 457. Applying the 

Lane four-part test for reliability, the trial court made the following 

findings:

(1) The handlers were qualified to use the dogs.

Officer Strickland and Det. Martinez were both qualified to handle their 

dogs. Officer Strickland worked as a canine handler since 2006, 

approximately six years before working on this case, and had worked as a 

FEMA search and rescue canine handler. He began working with Jewel in 

2006 or 2007. Officer Strickland completed 400-500 hours of a Canine 

Search Specialist equivalence course with FEMA. He continued with inthe-field training weekly and maintenance training with Jewel until she 

was certified in 2007. He trained for a minimum of sixteen hours a month 

and received yearly recertification as a canine team with Jewel. Officer 

Strickland was also certified by three separate organizations from 2007 to

2012 as a canine handler with Jewel.

Det. Martinez testified that she had worked as a canine handler with 

Piper for nine years. She initially completed a two-week handler course 
8

with Piper in California, and afterwards went through a four-month 

academy with another trainer at the PBCSO.

(2) The dogs were trained and accurate in identifying human remains.

Both Jewel and Piper are certified solely on the detection of human 

remains through the NAPWDA. Jewel was trained to detecting anything 

from fully decomposed bodies up to skeletal remains. NAPWDA standards 

require, according to Dr. Furton, rigorous testing where the dogs must 

achieve approximately ninety-one percent reliability in controlled testing 

to become certified. Based upon Dr. Furton’s knowledge and experience, 

he found the Officer Strickland/Jewel team and the Det. Martinez/Piper 

team to be reliable for human remains detection. Det. Martinez and Piper 

were certified multiple times as a team and had regular maintenance 

training. Both canines periodically tested under controlled conditions and 

maintained their certifications. Both Officer Strickland and Det. Martinez 

testified that they were able to read their canines’ behavior as a result of 

their extensive training. Each dog had a different alert which their 

handlers were trained to recognize.

Officer Strickland testified that during his entire time working with 

Jewel there was one incident, on a deployment to Texas in 2008 after 

Hurricane Ike, in which she responded to something that was not human 

remains: spoiled shrimp. That behavior was remediated, and she has not 

had any trouble since.

Det. Martinez testified that Piper was deployed once or twice a month. 

Det. Martinez trained with her at least twice a month. In nine years, Piper 

never hit on anything that was not human remains. Both Det. Martinez 

and Piper have also trained with FEMA.

(3) Circumstantial evidence corroborated the dog’s identification.

The court found that there was enough circumstantial evidence to 

corroborate the dogs’ alerts. The trial court also noted that although Vilet 

had not been found, there was ample evidence suggesting that she was 

dead, including that: Vilet was last seen alive on March 31, 2012; she had 

not contacted family or friends since that date; she had not accessed her 

credit cards or savings account; and she left several personal belongings 

behind.

The State also proffered the following circumstantial evidence which 

further suggested that Vilet was deceased and that Torrez was the culprit:
9

• Torrez was involved in a prior domestic battery incident where 

Vilet reported that he had choked her. The two separated after 

this incident and Torrez no longer had access to the family home, 

yet a few days prior to Vilet’s disappearance his access was 

reinstated.

• Torrez was jealous and upset that Vilet was dating a coworker, 

and placed spy software on her phone. Vilet had been with this 

coworker the night before her disappearance.

• Torrez and Vilet’s daughter heard screaming “overlapping” with 

Torrez’s voice from another room in the house on the day of Vilet’s 

disappearance.

• Torrez previously stated that “[i]f [Vilet’s] not with me, she will be 

dead.” He also questioned a friend about the best way to get rid 

of a body.

• Torrez’s whereabouts were unknown for most of March 31 and 

April 1.

• On April 2, after Vilet had not been seen for two days, Torrez 

called 911 – but only after he was encouraged to do so by his 

daughter and a friend.

• Evidence obtained from Vilet’s residence was consistent with 

Torrez backing his car up to the house in such a way that he 

could move Vilet’s body into his trunk or elsewhere inside his car.

(4) The evidence was not so stale or contaminated as to make it beyond 

the dog’s competency to identify it.

The court considered evidence that Vilet was last seen in the early 

morning hours of March 31. The initial alert to the front of Vilet’s 

residence by canine Jewel, who was off-lead, was on April 2.

The second alert by Jewel was four-and-a-half months later in an 

impound yard. Officer Strickland testified that he had no independent 

knowledge about any details of the investigation before the search. Jewel 

was again off-lead and became animated near the passenger side of a white 

Jaguar. She then alerted to the Jaguar’s trunk and gave a trained, sitting 

response. The trunk lid was ajar. Officer Strickland later learned that this 

was Torrez’s vehicle, but did not know this at the time.

Det. Martinez, who worked independently of Officer Strickland, testified 

that Piper came to a final response both outside the Jaguar and inside the 

vehicle by the backseat and trunk. When the car was first searched, the 

doors and trunk were closed and, when the trunk was opened, she sat in 

the trunk. This was her final response. There was no evidence that the 
10

scent in the vehicle was contaminated in the months between Vilet’s 

disappearance and the two dogs’ encounter with it.

Based upon the testimonies of the handlers as well as Dr. Furton, the 

court did not find that the evidence was so stale or contaminated to make 

it beyond the dogs’ competency to identify.

As to the third and final prong under the statute, the trial court found 

that the canine handlers applied the methods and principles reliably to 

the facts of the case. The dogs were shown to be reliable in the past 

through testing, training, and certification. Having heard the testimony of 

canine trainer Barbera, the two handlers, and Dr. Furton, as well as 

having reviewed the training records submitted into evidence, the court 

found the methods and principles used in this case to be reliable.

B. Trial

All the witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing also testified 

at trial and provided essentially the same information as they did pretrial. 

When the canine evidence was admitted during trial, the court granted 

defense counsel’s request to give a specialized jury instruction relating to 

this evidence as well as in the final jury charge.

The jury found Torrez guilty of second-degree murder as a lesser 

included offense of first-degree murder, three charged counts of unlawful 

interception of electronic communications, and one charged count of 

unlawful use of intercepted communications.

C. Sentencing

During Torrez’s initial sentencing hearing, he requested to speak to 

President Trump and stated: “Commander-in-chief, the witch hunt ends 

here. Please come and talk to me.” Torrez also wanted to speak to “the 

First Lady,” and “a monster” called “the Madi Arella.” Based on these and 

other statements Torrez made during his sentencing hearing, defense 

counsel moved for a competency determination pursuant to Florida Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) and requested that sentencing be 

adjourned so that Torrez could be examined by a medical expert. The trial 

court obliged and took a brief recess to give a mental health professional 

the opportunity to examine Torrez. After performing two exams the 

medical expert opined that Torrez suffered from mental issues and 

appeared delusional at times but was nonetheless competent to be 

sentenced. The court reset sentencing to provide time to obtain and review 

a formal report from the expert.
11

After getting that report, the court resumed the process and conducted 

a sentencing hearing whereupon the trial court imposed a sentence of life 

imprisonment on the second-degree murder charge, as well as five years’ 

imprisonment for each of the four electronic communications charges. 

However, the court never made an independent finding on the record that 

Torrez was competent to proceed with sentencing and never entered a 

written order memorializing that finding.

This appeal followed.

II. Admissibility of the cadaver dog evidence.

On appeal, Torrez alleges that the trial court erred by admitting the 

cadaver dog evidence because it was not based on reliable scientific 

evidence or methods. Torrez argues here, as he did before the trial court, 

that the science underlying cadaver dog evidence is not reliable, and thus 

the trial court erred in admitting testimony relating to this evidence.

We recognize, as did the trial judge, that the admission of cadaver dog 

evidence has not yet been considered by the Florida appellate courts. For 

our review of the admissibility of cadaver dog evidence, we consider the 

trial court’s application of Daubert to the facts of this case. Because 

Daubert is procedural, the law applies retroactively to this case. See In re 

Amendments to Fla. Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551, 554 (Fla. 2019); 

Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder, 137 So. 3d 418, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2014). Additionally, “[u]nder Florida’s ‘pipeline rule,’ the ‘disposition of a 

case on appeal should be made in accord with the law in effect at the time 

of the appellate court’s decision rather than the law in effect at the time 

the judgment appealed was rendered.’” Kemp v. State, 280 So. 3d 81, 88 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citation omitted); see also Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., 

Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (applying Daubert

retrospectively and concluding that affirmance was warranted under 

either Frye, the standard considered by the trial court, or Daubert, the 

standard applied on appeal).

“A trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of 

evidence, and, absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s ruling on 

evidentiary matters will not be overturned.” Sajiun v. Hernandez, 226 So. 

3d 875, 877 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Kellner v. David, 140 So. 3d 

1042, 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)).

A trial court is similarly vested with discretion “in determining how to 

perform its gatekeeper function when addressing the admissibility of 
12

expert opinion testimony” under the Daubert standard. Booker v. Sumter 

Cty. Sheriff’s Office/N. Am. Risk Servs., 166 So. 3d 189, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2015). However, “that discretion is limited by the rules of evidence.” 

Michael v. State, 884 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

A. Admissibility under section 90.702

Section 90.702, Florida Statutes codifies the Daubert standard found 

in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and governs the admissibility of expert 

testimony. See Bunin v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1109, 1110 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court 

charged trial courts with assuming the role of gatekeeper and making a 

“preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 

underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 

reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” 

509 U.S. at 592–93. In short, Daubert provides that expert testimony is 

admissible if it is relevant and reliable. See id. at 589. The exception to 

the Daubert analysis is in cases involving evidence of a kind so familiar 

and accepted as to require no foundation to establish the fundamental 

reliability of the system. See Booker, 166 So. 3d at 194.

Torrez argues that under a Daubert analysis the science underlying the 

expert cadaver dog testimony was not sufficiently reliable to be admissible. 

A similar argument, regarding the reliability of dog scent-tracking 

evidence, was rejected by the First District in Gear v. State, 257 So. 3d 

1243, 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In Gear, the defendant argued that the 

State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of dog trailing 

evidence because there was no showing that such evidence was reliable. 

Id. at 1246. The First District rejected this contention and explained that 

other district courts have held dog tracking evidence to be admissible if a 

proper foundation is laid. Id. (citing McCray v. State, 915 So. 2d 239, 241 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). “The foundation requirement pertains to establishing 

the reliability of the dog, which may be accomplished by introducing 

evidence of the dog’s breed, training, past performance, and other indicia 

of reliability.” Id.; accord Toler v. State, 457 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1984); see also Green v. State, 641 So. 2d 391, 394 (Fla. 1994) 

(allowing evidence to be admitted where “the character and dependability 

of the dog were established, the officer who handled the dog was trained, 

and the evidence was relevant”).

In Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court 

opined on the reliability of scent detection dogs. In that case, the 

defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the 

ground that the drug detection dog’s alert had not given the arresting 
13

officer probable cause for a search. Id. at 240. The trial court concluded 

that the officer had probable cause to search the defendant’s truck and so 

denied the motion to suppress. Id. at 242. The Florida Supreme Court 

reversed, holding that the officer lacked probable cause to search the 

defendant’s vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 242-43. To 

assess the reliability of a drug-detection dog, the Court created a strict 

evidentiary checklist, “whose every item the State must tick off.” Id. at 

244. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion 

authored by Justice Kagan, disagreed and held that a trial court’s finding 

of a drug-detection dog’s reliability “cannot depend on the State’s 

satisfaction of multiple, independent evidentiary requirements.” Id. at 

245. The Supreme Court stated that:

[E]vidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification 

or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust 

his alert. If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after 

testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can 

presume, subject to any conflicting evidence offered, that the 

dog’s alert provides probable cause to search. The same is 

true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has 

recently and successfully completed a training program that 

evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.

Id. at 246. The Supreme Court sided with the view taken by Justice 

Canady in his dissent wherein he opined that such “elaborate and 

inflexible evidentiary requirements . . . [were] inconsistent with the proper 

understanding of probable cause as a ‘practical, non-technical conception’ 

that deals with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 

which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Harris v. 

Florida, 71 So. 3d 756, 775 (Fla. 2011) (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting 

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, (2003)); see also Jones v. 

Commonwealth, S.E.2d 727, 733 (Va. 2009) (“The narcotics detection dog’s 

reliability can be established from its training and experience, as well as a 

proven track record of previous alerts to the existence of illegal narcotics.

Specific certifications and the results of field testing are not required to 

establish a sufficient foundation [for the dog’s reliability].”)

The above-cited cases did not hold that the scientific basis for dog 

tracking evidence must be explained before it can be admitted. See Harris, 

568 U.S. at 246; Gear, 257 So. 3d at 1245-46. Rather, they held that dog 

detection evidence must be shown to be reliable from experience. See 

Harris, 568 U.S. at 246; Gear, 257 So. 3d at 1245-46. The showing of 

reliability is met by testimony from the handler establishing that: they 

were qualified to work with the dog and to interpret its responses; the dog 
14

had proved successful and reliable; the dog was a sufficiently trained and 

proven tracker; the track at issue was within the scope of the dog’s training 

and proficiency; and there is additional indicia of reliability or 

corroboration. See Gear, 257 So. 3d at 1245-46. However, the 

corroborative evidence need not be evidence which, standing alone, links 

the defendant to the crime. See Green, 641 So. 2d at 394. Corroborative 

evidence need only support the accuracy of the dog evidence and the 

conclusions implied by it. See id.

We find that the trial court properly admitted the cadaver dog evidence. 

Florida case law involving dog scent evidence accords with the proposition 

that courts need not consider the science underlying testimony relating to 

cadaver dog evidence. See Gear, 257 So. 3d at 1245-46. “[I]t is common 

knowledge that some dogs, when properly trained and handled, can 

discriminate between human odors.” See People v. Brooks, 950 P.2d 649, 

652-53 (Colo. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Roscoe, 700 P.2d 1312, 1319-

20 (Ariz. 1984)). The evidence of the reliability of a dog’s alert is “readily 

understood by a jury.” Id. at 653. Or as Bob Dylan once said, “you don’t 

need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.” BOB DYLAN, 

Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Columbia 

Records 1965); McGraw v. State, 245 So. 3d 760, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) 

(Gross, J., dissenting), vacated, 2019 WL 6333909 (Fla. Nov. 27, 2019).

Florida cases involving dog scent evidence typically hold that trial 

courts only need to determine whether a proper foundation pertaining to 

a dog’s reliability was laid to admit the evidence. See Gear, 257 So. 3d at 

1246. As such, the foundational requirements for admitting other forms 

of dog tracking evidence must similarly be applied to evidence involving 

cadaver dogs. See Lane, 862 N.W.2d at 457 (stating that the use of cadaver 

dogs is “not significantly different from other forms of dog tracking 

evidence”). “Tracking dogs and cadaver dogs both use a precise sense of 

smell to identify scents that are outside the range of human ability to 

detect.” Id. There is no discernible difference in abstract terms of 

reliability between a handler taking a cadaver dog to a house and having 

it alert to the odor of decomposition in a particular area, and a handler 

taking a dog to an area and following a scent trail. Accordingly, we affirm 

on this issue.

Torrez also argues that the cadaver dog expert testimony was 

inadmissible due to its lack of scientific reliability. “A trial judge has the 

discretion to determine if a witness’s qualifications render him or her an 

expert, and this determination will not be overturned absent clear error.” 

See Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006). “A trial court’s 

ruling on the admissibility of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion 
15

standard of review, but the court’s discretion is limited by the rules of 

evidence and the applicable case law.” Horwitz v. State, 189 So. 3d 800, 

802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). To be admissible, expert testimony must “assist 

the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in 

issue.” § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2017); accord Salomon v. State, 267 So. 3d 25, 

31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Expert testimony must concern a subject which 

is “beyond the common understanding of the average person” to be helpful 

to the trier of fact. See State v. Nieto, 761 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2000) (quoting La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336, 339 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 1992)). “[E]xpert testimony should be excluded where the facts 

testified to are of such a nature as not to require any special knowledge or 

experience in order for the jury to form conclusions from the facts.” See 

Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1980).

Challenges to an expert’s measurements, methods and determinations 

do not render inadmissible an expert opinion based on them but goes to 

the weight of the evidence, raising factual questions to be determined by 

the jury. See Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073, 1079–80 (Fla. 2002) 

(“[T]hese differing expert opinions pose no bar to the admissibility of the 

tests or results; the respective credibility of the experts, and the weight 

ultimately ascribed to their testimony, shall be determined by the jury.”). 

Provided that certain foundational requirements are met, Florida courts 

have allowed the admission of expert testimony regarding dog tracking and 

narcotics detection dog evidence. See Gear, 257 So. 3d at 1245-46; 

Blackmon v. State, 570 So. 2d 1074, 1076 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (upholding 

the use of a narcotics dog during a traffic stop to establish probable cause).

The Michigan Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Lane, 

862 N.W.2d at 455-58. In Lane, a case which involved a cadaver dog, the 

Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that cadaver dog evidence 

could not be admitted because chemical evidence could not corroborate 

whether there was human decomposition at the locations identified by the 

dog. Id. at 457. In analyzing this argument under Michigan’s rule of 

evidence regarding the admission of expert opinion testimony on areas of 

specialized knowledge (MRE 702), the Court of Appeals held that a lack of 

scientific verification of the presence of a specific scent was not reason to 

exclude cadaver dog evidence in every case. Id. at 457-48. Instead, the 

Michigan Court of Appeals found that the evidence could be admitted after 

a sufficient foundation was established that: “(1) the handler was qualified 

to use the dog, (2) the dog was trained and accurate in identifying human 

remains, (3) circumstantial evidence corroborates the dog’s identification, 

and (4) the evidence was not so stale or contaminated as to make it beyond 

the dog’s competency to identify it.” Id. at 457.
16

In the context of cadaver dog evidence, we hold, as did Lane, that expert 

testimony relating to a dog’s reaction to the odor of human decomposition 

is admissible after a proper foundation for reliability is laid to show that: 

(1) the handler was qualified to work with the dog and to interpret its 

responses; (2) the dog was sufficiently trained and accurate in the 

detection of human decomposition odor; (3) circumstantial evidence 

corroborates the dog’s scent identification; and (4) the evidence was not so 

stale or contaminated as to make it beyond the dog’s competency to 

identify it. See Lane, 862 N.W.2d at 457. We conclude that these 

foundational requirements for the admission of cadaver dog evidence were 

met in this case.

First, the record contains evidence that Officer Strickland was qualified 

to work with Jewel and to interpret her responses. Officer Strickland 

described his experience working with the dog. He had engaged in 

extensive training with Jewel, was certified with her, and regularly 

conducted training with her. See Harris, 568 U.S. at 246.

Second, Jewel was sufficiently trained and accurate. Jewel’s training 

records reflect that the dog participated in several recertifications showing 

excellent proficiency ratings exceeding ninety-one percent and only had 

one instance of a false positive with no similar incidents since remediation. 

See id.

Third, the record includes evidence corroborating Jewel’s scent 

identification. The search of Vilet’s residence with Jewel was initially 

conducted several days after Vilet was last seen. Prior to the search, 

bloodstain evidence from the residence indicated that a violent crime had 

been committed there. Jewel alerted to an area just outside the front door 

of the home. Because Vilet was not located at the residence, and with 

evidence suggesting that Torrez’s car was at the home on the date of Vilet’s 

disappearance, it was reasonable to suspect that Torrez’s car may have 

been used in connection with her disappearance. Months later, Jewel 

alerted to decomposition odor in various places in Torrez’s car, particularly 

the trunk. Further, another degree of corroboration was provided when a 

second cadaver dog, Piper, and handler for a different police agency 

demonstrated an odor alert to the same vehicle, and in the same places of 

the car. Courts in other states have observed that the use of trained dogs 

as a follow-up investigative technique to partially corroborate information 

received is “a useful, entirely reasonable and permissible procedure.” 

People v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citation 

omitted).
17

Last, Dr. Furton testified that, depending on the concentration of the 

odor, an odor can be detected after a lengthy passage of time, especially in 

enclosed areas. There was nothing to suggest that the detected odors were 

stale or that the evidence was contaminated. See, e.g., People v. Montano, 

N.E.3d 114, 130-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (upholding defendant’s conviction 

for first-degree murder where cadaver dogs alerted to the odor of human 

remains, in a location where the victim’s body had allegedly been buried, 

seventeen years after the victim’s disappearance and presumed death).

The trial court heard evidence as to the qualifications and training of 

the cadaver dog handler, the training of the dog itself, and the 

circumstances surrounding the search, the dog’s scent identification and 

other corroborating facts. This evidence established a proper foundation 

for the admission of the expert cadaver dog evidence. Therefore, we hold 

that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony.

B. Admissibility under § 90.403 

Notwithstanding all of the above, the defense also objected to the 

admission of the evidence under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2017), 

which states: “Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence.” The trial court, having considered the testimony as it relates to 

the facts of this case, found that the evidence was relevant and that its 

probative value was not outweighed by the prejudice. See § 90.403, Fla. 

Stat. We find no error in the admission of the cadaver dog evidence under 

section 90.403. First, admission of this evidence was not unduly 

prejudicial to Torrez in light of the other evidence presented by the State. 

A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude testimony will not be reversed 

absent an abuse of discretion. See Eliakim v. State, 884 So. 2d 57, 60 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2004). Second, defense counsel was able to cross-examine the 

relevant witnesses and elicit testimony about false positives and alert 

errors to impugn the dog’s reliability. Introducing the potential for a false 

alert in this case may have lessened the weight of the evidence but did not 

undermine the foundation. Potential concerns about the fallibility of dog 

scent evidence, or the fear a jury may have been greatly influenced by 

hearing such evidence, did not substantially outweigh the probative value 

of the testimony, especially in light of the cautionary instructions provided 

by the court at defense counsel’s request. Further, such contentions go 

to factual issues involving the weight of the evidence rather than its 

admissibility and as such are for the fact-finder to resolve. See Murray, 

838 So. 2d at 1079–80.
18

C. Conclusion

For cadaver dog evidence to be admissible, each dog’s ability and 

reliability should be shown on a case-by-case basis. Courts should not 

merely assume that any well-trained dog can detect specific odors, but 

instead should understand that a dog’s abilities, whether innate or 

acquired, is a fact which may be proven by evidence like any other fact.

III. Competency

“The issue of ‘[w]hether the circuit court fundamentally erred in failing 

to hold a competency hearing presents a pure question of law subject to 

de novo review.’” Baker v. State, 221 So. 3d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) 

(quoting A.L.Y. v. State, 212 So. 3d 399, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)).

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b):

If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of 

its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or 

for the state, has reasonable ground to believe that the 

defendant is not mentally competent to proceed, the court 

shall immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing 

to determine the defendant’s mental condition[.]

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b).

In Machin v. State, 267 So. 3d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), this 

Court outlined the remedy for a trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing 

or enter an order on competency:

[W]here the circuit court finds reasonable grounds to question 

a defendant’s competency and does not subsequently hold a 

hearing or make a written finding of competency, we will 

temporarily remand the case to the circuit court . . . [to] hold 

a hearing and issue an order determining whether a nunc pro 

tunc competency evaluation is possible.

Machin, 267 So. 3d at 1101 (internal citation omitted). However, Torrez is 

not automatically entitled to a new sentencing hearing. As we have 

previously instructed:

[I]f the [trial] court can make a nunc pro tunc finding as to 

appellant’s competency based upon the existence of 

evaluations performed contemporaneous with trial and 
19

without relying solely on a cold record, and can do so in a 

manner which abides by due process guarantees, then it 

should do so and enter a corresponding written order. 

However, if the court finds, for any reason, that an evaluation 

of appellant’s competency at the time of trial cannot proceed 

in a way that ensures appellant’s due process rights, then the 

[trial] court should adjudicate [his] current competency and, 

if [he] is competent, conduct a new trial on all counts.

Baker, 221 So. 3d at 641-42 (citations omitted).

In this case, defense counsel represented at the sentencing hearing that 

an evaluation had been conducted before trial, and Torrez was found to be 

competent to stand trial.1 Though no competency evaluation report is 

included in the record on appeal, the record does contain confirmation 

that another competency evaluation was performed prior to sentencing 

and that Torrez was deemed competent to be sentenced.

Therefore, we remand the case for the trial court to decide whether it 

can determine Torrez’s competency at sentencing nunc pro tunc in 

accordance with our prior decisions and, if so, enter an appropriate written 

order.

Affirmed, but remanded with instructions.

GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 Although Torrez claims that his competency to stand trial is at issue, this claim 

is not addressed as we find that it has no merit.