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21-1477-cv

Henderson v. Greenville Central School District

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 22nd day of June, two thousand twenty-two.

PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN,

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges.

RACHEL HENDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 21-1477-cv

v.

GREENVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,

GREENVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION, JENNIFER 

HOWARD, as a Member of the Greenville Board of 

Education, PATRICIA MACKO, as a Member of the 

Greenville Board of Education, DUNCAN 

MACPHERSON, as a Member of the Greenville Board 

of Education, MICHAEL MCANENY, as a Member of 

the Greenville Board of Education, TRACY YOUNG, 

as a Member of the Greenville Board of Education, 

RAYMOND ALBIN, as a Member of the Greenville 

Board of Education, TAMMY J. SUTHERLAND, as 

Superintendent of Schools of Greenville Central 

School District, 
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Defendants-Appellees.

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ASHLYNN R. SAVARESE (Kevin A. 

Luibrand, on the brief), Luibrand Law Firm 

PLLC, Latham, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: GIANCARLO FACCIPONTE (Charles C. 

Spagnoli, on the brief), The Law Firm of 

Frank W. Miller PLLC, East Syracuse, 

NY.

Appeal from an order and judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order and judgment of the District Court be and hereby 

are AFFIRMED.

Rachel Henderson alleges that Greenville Central School District (“Greenville”) fired her 

from her job as an aide/monitor in retaliation for her inquiries about a potentially dangerous student 

at Greenville High School in violation of the United States Constitution, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; U.S. 

Const. amend. I, and the New York Constitution, N.Y. Const. art. I, § 8. The District Court granted 

summary judgment for Greenville, concluding that Henderson’s inquiries were not speech on a 

matter of public concern, and therefore were not constitutionally protected. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. See Centro de la Comunidad 

Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2017). To establish that her 

speech was protected, Henderson must demonstrate that it “addressed a matter of public concern.” 

Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “Whether speech is 

on a matter of public concern is a question of law, and is to be answered by the court after 

examining the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” 

Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 399 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

In determining whether Henderson’s speech was a matter of public concern, we “focus on 

the motive of the speaker and attempt to determine whether the speech was calculated to redress 

personal grievances or whether it had a broader public purpose.” Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 163–

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 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
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64 (2d Cir. 1999). With respect to this context inquiry, Henderson argues that she was “concerned 

about a dangerous person in the school.” Appellant’s App’x 149. But the undisputed record 

evidence shows that Henderson’s safety concern centered on that person’s relationship to her son. 

For example, she “want[ed] to check and make sure that [the student in question was] not near [her] 

kids,” Appellees’ App’x 35, described her “fear[] for the safety and well[-]being of [her] son,” id. at

681, and expressed concern that her son “was smaller in stature” than the student in question, id. at 

565. Such “speech that principally focuses on an issue that is personal in nature and generally 

related to the speaker’s own situation . . . —even if touching on a matter of general importance—

does not qualify for First Amendment protection.” Agosto, 982 F.3d at 95 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Of course Henderson’s motivation is not dispositive, as this “would mean that only those 

persons with the least amount of firsthand knowledge about the subject matter could utter speech 

without fear of government reprisal.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 

167 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). But it is undisputed that the content of Henderson’s speech

suggested a lack of such firsthand knowledge. Henderson testified that she “knew nothing” about 

the student, Appellees’ App’x 76, including his “first name,” id. at 45, and sought only to “gather 

information,” id. at 655. And she felt compelled to inquire a second time because “as a parent, [she] 

wanted to get some advice from somebody that [she] . . . kn[e]w.” Id. at 38. Her search for personal 

comfort—“to get to the bottom of this . . . situation”—may be “understandable,” but it does not 

suggest that her fact-gathering inquiries should be “elevated . . . to a matter of public concern.” 

Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2011). 

Finally, while it is not dispositive, see Montero, 890 F.3d at 401, there is no evidence materially 

disputing that the form of Henderson’s inquiries suggests that they did not relate to a matter of 

public concern, see Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 398 (2011). Rather than follow 

Greenville’s policy requiring that safety concerns be reported to building administrators—which 

Henderson’s testimony about “how you handle issues” does not materially dispute, Appellees’ App’x 

46—Henderson spoke privately with her colleagues. These private inquiries “suggest[] the absence 

of a matter of public concern.” Agosto, 982 F.3d at 95. 

We have reviewed all of the remaining arguments raised by Henderson on appeal and find 

them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the May 14, 2021, order and 

judgment of the District Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court