IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALEX PARRISH

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 90-05606, 90-12109, 90-12110, 90-12111 Paula L. Skahan, Judge

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No. W2016-00645-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Alex Parrish, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The 

State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment 

pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our 

review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN

and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

James Gulley, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Alex Parrish.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin Ball, Assistant Attorney 

General; Amy Weirich, District Attorney General; and Pamela Stark, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On August 23, 1990, the Appellant pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance

and received a sentence of 7.2 years. Later on December 4, 1990, the Appellant pled 

guilty to a three count indictment of one count of robbery and two counts of aggravated 

robbery. Under this December 4, 1990 plea, the Appellant was sentenced to six (6) years 

for the offense of robbery and eleven (11) years for each aggravated robbery offense with

all sentences to run concurrently with each other. Even though the Appellant was out on 

bond for the initial sale of a controlled substance charge when arrested for the robbery 

and aggravated robbery charges, all four sentences were ordered to be served 

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concurrently with one another giving the Appellant an effective sentence of eleven (11) 

years from December 4, 1990. 

On July 11, 2014, the Appellant filed a pro se motion to correct illegal sentence 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The basis for the motion of the 

Appellant was the alleged illegality of the concurrent sentences received for the 

aforementioned charges. The Appellant argues that the concurrent sentences he received 

were illegal since he was out on bond for the charge of the sale of a controlled substance 

when he was arrested for the robbery and aggravated robbery charges. As a result, the 

Appellant claims the sentences for the two separate sets of indictments were statutorily 

required to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. See Tenn. Code Ann. §40-

20-111(b). He maintains that because the sentences are concurrent rather than 

consecutive they are illegal and therefore his guilty plea should be set aside.

Upon receipt of the motion, the trial court appointed counsel to represent the 

Appellant. On March 9, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to 

correct illegal sentence finding that the sentences had expired prior to the filing of the 

motion. The Appellant timely appealed the dismissal of his motion to this Court.

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, in effect at the time of filing, provides 

the following mechanism for seeking the correction of an illegal sentence:

(a) Either the defendant or the state may, at any time, seek the correction of 

an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the 

trial court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. For purposes 

of this rule, an illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by the 

applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.

(b) Notice of any motion filed pursuant to this rule shall be promptly 

provided to the adverse party. If the motion states a colorable claim that 

the sentence is illegal, and if the defendant is indigent and is not already 

represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent the 

defendant. The adverse party shall have thirty days within which to file a 

written response to the motion, after which the court shall hold a hearing on 

the motion, unless all parties waive the hearing.

(c)(1) If the court determines that the sentence is not an illegal sentence, the 

court shall file an order denying the motion.

(2) If the court determines that the sentence is an illegal sentence, the court 

shall then determine whether the illegal sentence was entered pursuant to a 
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plea agreement. If not, the court shall enter an amended uniform judgment 

document, see Tenn. S. Ct. Rule 17 setting forth the correct sentence.

(3) If the illegal sentence was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, the 

court shall determine whether the illegal provision was a material 

component of the plea agreement. If so, the court shall give the defendant 

an opportunity to withdraw his or her plea. If the defendant chooses to 

withdraw his or her plea, the court shall file an order stating its finding that 

the illegal provision was a material component of the plea agreement, 

stating that the defendant withdraws his or her plea, and reinstating the 

original charge against the defendant. If the defendant does not withdraw 

his or her plea, the court shall enter an amended uniform judgment 

document setting forth the correct sentence.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. 1

In his brief, the Appellant acknowledges the case of State v. Brown, in which the 

Tennessee Supreme Court addressed “whether Rule 36.1 expands the scope of relief 

available . . . by permitting either the defendant or the State to correct expired illegal 

sentences.” State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tenn. 2015). In the Brown case, our

supreme court held that “Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief and does not 

authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. Therefore, a Rule 36.1 motion may 

be summarily dismissed for failure to state a colorable claim if the alleged illegal 

sentence has expired.” Id. at 211 (emphasis added). In his brief, the Appellant argues 

that the basis for the Brown decision was the failure of the trial Court to issue pre-trial 

credits and as a result the Brown decision would not apply in the present case. A review 

of our Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Brown reveals that the primary issue in the 

case presented to the Court dealt with illegal sentences unrelated to the application of pretrial credits. Id. In fact, the opinion states that the ruling issued in regards to the illegal 

sentences was dispositive of the entire case and the court addressed the other issues 

presented, including the argument relating to pre-trial credits, only to “provide guidance 

to litigants, lawyers, and judges...” Id. at 212.

 

1

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 has since been amended to reflect the ruling 

in State v. Brown, 479 Sw.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), finding that Rule 36.1 may not be utilized to 

challenge expired sentences except in those limited circumstances related to the omission of the 

requirement of community supervision for life. We reach the same conclusion under the 

amended Rule.
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The record reflects that the challenged sentences of the Appellant expired 

approximately 13 years before he filed his Rule 36.1 motion. Accordingly, we conclude 

the trial court properly denied the defendant’s Rule 36.1 motion.

For this reason, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed pursuant to Court of 

Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Because the defendant is indigent, costs are taxed to the 

State.

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ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE