DEPOT 

MAINTENANCE

Additional 

Information Needed to 

Meet DOD’s Core 

Capability Reporting 

Requirements

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2013

GAO-13-194

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-194, a report to 

congressional committees

February 2013

DEPOT MAINTENANCE

Additional Information Needed to Meet DOD’s Core 

Capability Reporting Requirements

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD uses both military depots and 

contractors to maintain many complex 

weapon systems and equipment. 

Recognizing the key role of the depots 

and the risk of overreliance on 

contractors, Section 2464 of Title 10 of 

the U.S. Code requires DOD to 

maintain a core maintenance 

capability—a combination of 

personnel, facilities, equipment, 

processes, and technology (expressed 

in direct labor hours) that is 

government-owned and governmentoperated—needed to meet 

contingency and emergency 

requirements. Section 2464 directs 

DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report 

to Congress and include three 

elements: (1) core capability 

requirements, (2) planned workloads, 

and (3) explanations and mitigation 

plans for any shortfalls between core 

capability requirements and planned 

workloads. In response to a 

requirement in Section 2464, GAO 

assessed the extent to which the report 

complied with the statute and included 

supporting information from the 

services as required by DOD. GAO 

reviewed relevant legislation, DOD’s 

2012 Biennial Core Report, the 

services’ submissions to support the 

report, and related DOD guidance.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD improve 

its Biennial Core Report by including 

detailed explanations of why the 

services do not have the workload to 

meet core maintenance requirements 

for each identified shortfall. In written 

comments on a draft of the report, 

DOD concurred with the 

recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with 

two of the three biennial reporting elements of Section 2464 by including 

information on core capability requirements and planned workloads available for 

maintaining these requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

reported core capability requirements totaling about 70 million direct labor hours 

for the military services. Also, OSD reported a total of about 92 million direct 

labor hours for planned workloads with an estimated cost of about $12 billion.

OSD reported complete information on core requirements and planned workload

at the top-level categories, such as Sea Ships, of the work breakdown structure. 

The statute directs that this information be organized by work breakdown 

structure, which is a group of categories of equipment and technologies. The toplevel category—an entire type of system or equipment—can be broken down into 

lower levels of detail or subcategories, such as Aircraft Carriers or Submarines, 

that make up the system or equipment. DOD’s overall planned workloads exceed

its core capability requirements, but the report shows shortfalls in certain 

categories for the Army and the Air Force.

The report partially complies with the third biennial reporting element. DOD’s 

report includes information on shortfalls at the top-level categories and plans to 

mitigate all shortfalls—where requirements exceed planned workload—identified 

in the report. However, the report does not include required information on the 

rationale for some of these shortfalls—reasons why the services do not have the 

workload to meet core requirements. The Navy and Marine Corps did not identify 

any shortfalls and were not required to provide explanations or mitigation plans. 

The report includes mitigation plans for shortfalls identified by the Army and the 

Air Force but does not always provide detailed explanations for why the Army 

and Air Force do not have sufficient planned workload to meet core 

requirements. The report does not always include detailed explanations for 

identified workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always 

provide explanations for them. Without reporting clear explanations for why the 

services have shortfalls, Congress does not have visibility on whether the 

services’ plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the 

shortfalls. 

Extent to Which the Report Complies with the Required Biennial Reporting Elements in 

Section 2464

Required elements GAO assessment

The core depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements 

and sustaining workloads, organized by work breakdown structure 

expressed in direct labor hours.

Complied 

The corresponding workloads necessary to sustain core depot-level 

maintenance and repair capability requirements, expressed in direct 

labor hours and cost.

Complied

In any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair capability 

requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining 

workloads, a detailed rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to 

correct, or mitigate, the effects of the shortfall.

Partially complied 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Data are from DOD’s Biennial Core Report. 

View GAO-13-194 For more information, 

contact Zina D. Merritt at (202) 512-5257 or 

merrittz@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Letter 1 

Background 4

DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report Partially Complies with Section 

2464 and Includes Information for Each of the Military Services 8

Conclusions 15

Recommendation for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments 16

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 19

Appendix II Prior GAO Work on Core Logistics Capability 21

Appendix III Category Levels from DOD’s 2012 Depot Maintenance Core 

Capability Worksheet 23

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 25

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Related GAO Products 28

Tables

Table 1: First-Level Categories of the Work Breakdown Structure 6

Table 2: Example of Category Levels for Aircraft 7

Table 3: Summary of the Core Report’s Core Capability 

Requirements by Military Service 8

Table 4: Summary of the Core Report’s Planned Workload by 

Military Service 9

Table 5: Summary of the Core Report’s Shortfalls by Military 

Service and Work Breakdown Structure 11

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Table 6: GAO’s 2009 Recommendations, Matter for Consideration, 

and DOD’s Actions to Improve DOD’s Report on Core 

Capability Requirements 22

List of Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

February 11, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains many complex weapon 

systems—such as aircraft and ships—and equipment—such as 

generators and radars—that require regular and emergency maintenance 

to continue being available for DOD to meet national security goals. To 

sustain these systems and equipment, at the depot level,1

Recognizing the important role of the depots in supporting U.S. forces 

and the risk of overreliance on private contractors for vital military needs, 

Congress enacted legislation in 1984 that exempts certain core 

maintenance activities identified by the Secretary of Defense from being 

contracted out.

the department 

uses a combination of military depots—public-sector facilities that are 

government-owned and government-operated—and private-sector 

contractors. Depots play a key role in sustaining the complex weapon 

systems and equipment both in peacetime and during surge conditions 

like those created by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Through these 

depots, DOD has what is referred to as the “capability” to perform needed 

repair work by maintaining a combination of skilled personnel, facilities, 

equipment, processes, and technology for each category of maintenance 

work being done.

2

• maintain a “core depot-level maintenance and repair capability”—a 

maintenance and repair capability that is government-owned and 

operated to provide a ready and controlled source of technical 

 The statute was later codified at Section 2464 of Title 10 

of the United States Code and has been amended several times. Among 

other things, Section 2464 requires DOD to

 

1

Depot maintenance is an action performed on materiel or software in the conduct of 

inspection, repair, overhaul, or the modification or rebuild of end-items, assemblies, 

subassemblies, and parts, that, among other things, requires extensive industrial facilities, 

specialized tools and equipment, or uniquely experienced and trained personnel that are 

not available in lower-echelon-level maintenance activities. Depot maintenance is a 

function and, as such, is independent of any location or funding source and may be 

performed in the public or private sectors.

2

Pub. L. No. 98-525 § 307 (1984). This section was originally codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2304 

(note).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

competence and resources to ensure effective and timely response to 

mobilizations, contingencies, or other emergencies and

• assign these government-owned and operated facilities (the depots) 

sufficient workload3

DOD has a process to implement this statutory requirement in which the 

services are required to use a computational methodology to identify their 

essential core capability requirements and the planned workloads

to ensure that the department can maintain cost 

efficiency and technical competence during peacetime while 

preserving the ability to respond to a mobilization, contingency, or 

emergency.

4

In 2009, we reported that DOD, through this internal biennial reporting

process, had not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it 

had the required core maintenance capability to support systems 

currently in use in the military depots.

to help 

support this core maintenance capability. The services are then required 

to submit biennially to the Secretary of Defense an internal report that 

summarizes the results of this process and identified shortfalls between 

requirements and planned workload. 

5

 

3

While the statute does not define workload, in this context, DOD defines workload as an 

amount of depot maintenance work related to specific weapon systems, equipment, 

components, or programs and to specific services, facilities, and commodities. DOD 

Instruction 4151.20, Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process (Jan. 5, 

2007). 

We found, among other things, 

that DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core capability 

requirements and planned workloads did not reveal shortfalls between the 

requirements and the planned workloads for specific categories of 

weapon systems or equipment that we had identified. Further, we found 

that Congress lacked visibility into DOD’s process, because there was no 

requirement for DOD to provide its Biennial Core Report to Congress. We 

recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics take several actions related to improving the 

Biennial Core Report, including requiring DOD to compile and report the 

services’ core capability requirements, planned workloads, and any 

4

In this report, we refer to what DOD calls “sustaining workload” as “planned workload to 

support core capabilities.”

5

GAO, Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core Capability at 

Military Depots, GAO-09-83 (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2009).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

shortfalls in workloads by work breakdown structure category.

6

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012

We also 

included a matter for congressional consideration to require DOD to 

provide this report to Congress. Appendix II provides more information on

our recommendations and actions DOD has taken to implement them.

7

1. The core depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements 

and sustaining workloads, organized by work breakdown structure 

expressed in direct labor hours.

amended 

Section 2464 to require DOD to, among other things, submit to Congress 

a biennial report, no later than April 1 of each even-numbered year. The 

statute states that DOD is required to identify the following three items for 

each military service, for the subsequent fiscal year:

8

2. The corresponding workloads necessary to sustain core depot-level 

maintenance and repair capability requirements, expressed in direct 

labor hours and cost. 

 

3. In any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair capability 

requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining workloads, 

a detailed rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to correct or 

mitigate the effects of the shortfall. 

In this report, we summarized these three elements as: (1) the required 

workload to sustain core maintenance capability; (2) the planned 

workload available; and (3) in any case where the required workload 

exceeds the planned workload—where there is a shortfall—a detailed 

explanation of why planned workload is insufficient and a plan to fix the 

effects of the shortfall. 

The statute mandates us to analyze DOD’s Biennial Core Report for 

compliance with the three elements above. In addition, the statute 

requires us to assess the completeness of the report. The statute further 

 

6

While the statute does not define “work breakdown structure,” these structures are 

groups of categories of equipment and technologies. The categories can be broken down 

into lower-level elements (levels of indenture) of this equipment and technologies.

7

Pub. L. No.112-81, § 327 (2011).

8

While the statute does not define direct labor hours, in this context, DOD defines a direct 

labor hour as one hour of effort directly attributed to a category of work. DODI 4151.20, 

Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process (Jan. 5, 2007).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

requires us to provide findings and recommendations after DOD submits 

its report to Congress. DOD submitted its first Biennial Core Report to 

Congress on September 4, 2012, and we also received the report on that

date. 

In response to the mandate, we reviewed the extent to which the report 

complies with the statutory requirements and is complete. To assess the 

extent to which DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with Section 

2464, we analyzed the text of the report and obtained information on the 

process by which DOD identified its essential core capability 

requirements and the workloads needed to support this core maintenance 

capability for fiscal year 2013. In those cases where we had determined 

that the report did not include a required element, we discussed our 

preliminary analyses with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

and military service officials to seek additional information. To assess the 

report’s level of completeness, we obtained and analyzed the data and 

other information that OSD required the military service headquarters to 

submit in support of the report. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to February 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our scope and 

methodology in more detail in appendix I.

DOD Instruction 4151.209

 

9

DODI 4151.20, Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process (Jan. 5, 

2007).

prescribes a “depot maintenance core 

capabilities determination process” to identify, in part, the (1) required 

core capabilities for depot maintenance and (2) planned workloads 

needed to support those capabilities. The instruction describes a series of 

mathematical computations and adjustments, which the military services 

Background 

Determining Core 

Maintenance Capability
 

Page 5 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

use to compute their core capability requirements and to identify planned 

workloads needed to support these requirements. First, the services 

identify the weapon systems required to execute the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

contingency10 scenarios, which represent plans for responding to conflicts 

that may occur in the future. After the systems are identified, the services 

compute annual depot maintenance capability requirements for 

peacetime in direct labor hours to represent the amount of time they 

regularly take to perform required maintenance. Then contingency 

requirements and resource11

During this process of identifying the systems for which they will be 

required to maintain repair capabilities, the services organize and 

aggregate their capability data by categories of equipment and 

technologies known as work breakdown structure categories. The work 

breakdown structure provides a way for DOD to break down a category of 

weapon system or equipment into subcategories of its parts at 

increasingly lower levels of detail. The work breakdown structure can be 

expressed at any level of detail down to the lowest-level part, such as a 

bolt. These categories, the programs or systems they include, and the 

lower-level elements or subcategories of defense materiel or equipment 

into which they are broken down are referred to by DOD as “levels of 

indenture.” There are eleven categories at the top level—“first” level—of 

the work breakdown structure. A first-level category summarizes 

information for an entire type of system or equipment, such as aircraft or 

adjustments are made to account for 

applicable surge factors during the different phases of a contingency, 

such as preparation/readiness and sustainment. Further adjustments are 

made to account for redundancy in depot capability. For example, a 

service may determine that repair capabilities for specific systems 

maintained in military depots are so similar that the capabilities for one 

system can effectively satisfy the requirements of another. Core capability 

requirements are also adjusted when one service’s maintenance 

requirements will be supported by the maintenance capabilities of other 

services. 

 

10A contingency is a situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, 

terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect U.S. 

interests.

11A resource, in this context, refers to the personnel, materiel, and other assets or 

capabilities available to provide depot maintenance.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

ground vehicles. Table 1 shows the eleven first-level categories of the 

work breakdown structure. 

Table 1: First-Level Categories of the Work Breakdown Structure

Category number Work breakdown structure category at the first level

1 Aircraft 

2 Ground Vehicles 

3 Sea Ships 

4 Communication/Electronic Equipment 

5 Support Equipment 

6 Ordnance, Weapons, & Missiles 

7 Software 

8 Fabrication/Manufacturing 

9 Fleet/Field Support 

10 Special Interest Items 

11 Other

Source: DOD.

a 

a

The “Other” category encompasses a number of other items that do not clearly fall under the 

remaining 10 categories, such as fire trucks, tractors, or missile transport trailers.

A first-level category can be broken down into second-level 

subcategories, which are the major elements that make up the system or 

equipment in the first-level category. For example, the first-level category 

for Aircraft can be broken down into the second-level subcategories for

Airframes, Aircraft Components, and Aircraft Engines, which are major 

elements that make up an aircraft. The second-level subcategories can 

be further broken down into third-level subcategories, which are 

subordinate elements that make up the major elements in the secondlevel categories. For example, the second-level subcategory for Airframes 

is further divided into the third-level subcategories—different types of 

airframes, such as Rotary, Fighter/Attack, or Bomber. The subcategories 

can be further broken down to the lowest-level element of the system. 

Table 2 shows an example of the top three levels of the work breakdown 

structure for Aircraft.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Table 2: Example of Category Levels for Aircraft

Level Category number Work breakdown structure category 

First 1 Aircraft 

Second 1.1 Airframes 

Third 1.1.1 Rotary

Third 1.1.2 Vertical and/or Short Take-off Landing Aircraft

Third 1.1.3 Cargo/Tanker

Third 1.1.4 Fighter/Attack

Third 1.1.5 Bomber

Third 1.1.6 Aircraft–Other

Source: DOD.

After the services have identified their core capability requirements, they 

identify the amount of available planned workload within the work 

breakdown structure categories and subcategories. 

DOD Instruction 4151.20 requires the military services to report biennially 

to OSD their core capability requirements and planned workloads, in 

accordance with a tasking memorandum issued for each reporting cycle. 

The instruction includes a worksheet that the services must fill out and 

submit to OSD. The worksheet calls for information to be organized by 

the work breakdown structure to various subcategory levels, mostly at the 

second-level subcategories. Appendix III provides a table listing these 

categories and subcategories.

On April 9, 2012, OSD issued the tasking memorandum for the 2012 

Biennial Core Report, which directed the services to use DOD Instruction 

4151.20 as basic guidance and included further guidance on how to meet 

the requirement under Section 2464 to report this information to 

Congress. The memorandum augments the worksheet by adding another 

column for the estimated costs of performing the planned workloads at 

the first level of categories. The instruction and tasking memorandum also 

require the services to provide additional information when reporting

shortfalls in planned workloads. If a military depot does not have sufficient 

workload to sustain the required level of capability that has been 

identified, a shortfall exists—in other words, the military depots have not 

been assigned the depot maintenance workloads that would enable them 

to sustain their identified core capability requirements. For example, a 

depot may have identified 10,000 direct labor hours of core capability 

Reporting Core 

Maintenance Capability 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

requirements for ground vehicles but have only 4,000 hours of assigned 

depot maintenance work for ground vehicles. This depot will have a 

shortfall of 6,000 hours. The instruction requires that the services report 

on shortfalls by providing a description along with the worksheet, but the 

shortfalls are not calculated in the worksheet.

DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report to Congress complies with two of the 

required reporting elements of Section 2464—including core capability 

requirements and planned workload—and partially complies with the third

element by including mitigation plans, but not all detailed rationales for 

workload shortfalls. Further, the report provides complete information for 

each of the military services as aggregated to the top-level categories of 

the work breakdown structure. However, without providing clear 

explanations for the workload shortfalls that clarify why the services do 

not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements, DOD’s 

report does not fully comply with Section 2464 and Congress lacks full 

visibility over DOD’s management of its shortfalls.

OSD included in the report the requirements information expressed in 

direct labor hours for each of the military services. As reported, DOD’s 

total core capability requirements are about 70 million direct labor hours. 

Table 3 shows a summary of these core capability requirements by 

military service.

Table 3: Summary of the Core Report’s Core Capability Requirements by Military 

Service 

Military service Core capability requirements (Direct labor hours)

Army 16,663,845 

Navy 30,455,340 

Marine Corps 3,337,264 

Air Force 19,021,493 

Total DOD 69,477,942 

Source: DOD. 

Further, the information in DOD’s report on core capability requirements 

for each of the military services is complete as aggregated to the top-level 

categories of the work breakdown structure. Section 2464 requires the 

information in the Biennial Core Report to be organized by work 

breakdown structure; however, the statute does not specify at which 

category level of the work breakdown structure the information should be 

DOD’s 2012 Biennial 

Core Report Partially 

Complies with 

Section 2464 and 

Includes Information 

for Each of the 

Military Services 

The Report Includes 

Information on Core 

Capability Requirements
 

Page 9 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

reported. To obtain the information needed to support the 2012 report, 

OSD’s memorandum directed the services to provide to OSD, among 

other things, information on core requirements and planned workloads at 

various lower-level subcategories. The memorandum also directed the 

services to provide, in any instance where core requirements exceed 

planned workloads, additional information on a plan to address workload 

shortfalls. Each of the services provided information in response to OSD’s 

memorandum.

In response to the tasking memorandum, the services provided data on 

their planned workloads—the amount of available work used to maintain 

the required capability—by the top categories and various levels of 

subcategories in the work breakdown structure. In the report, OSD 

included complete information on the amount of planned workload that is 

available to maintain the required capability, expressed in direct labor 

hours at the top-level categories and the estimated cost of these 

workloads for each of the military services. As reported, DOD has a total 

planned workload of about 92 million direct labor hours at an estimated 

cost of about $12 billion. Table 4 shows a summary of these workloads.

Table 4: Summary of the Core Report’s Planned Workload by Military Service

Military 

service 

Planned workload (direct 

labor hours)

Estimated cost of planned workload

(dollars)

Army 18,464,871 $2,476,607,078 

Navy 43,807,318 3,912,871,191 

Marine Corps 5,526,905 501,962,333 

Air Force 24,588,694 4,758,071,501 

Total DOD 92,387,788 $11,649,512,103 

Source DOD. 

However, we identified an anomaly in the information reported for the 

Marine Corps. Its planned workload for the sea ships category was 

reported as 15,124 direct labor hours, without any reported cost. Because 

the estimated cost of this workload is reported as $0, it is unclear whether 

the cost for this work is accounted for in DOD’s report. OSD and Marine 

Corps officials stated that the workload hours to do these repairs are to 

be performed by the Marine Corps for the Navy. The Navy would 

reimburse the Marine Corps for the workload hours. However, the Navy’s 

submission for the report did not include these workload hours to be 

performed by the Marine Corps. Thus, these hours and cost were not 

The Report Includes 

Information on the 

Planned Workloads That 

Are Available for 

Supporting Core Capability
 

Page 10 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

clearly accounted for in the workload cost figures included in the report. 

OSD officials stated that they noticed the anomaly, but that their reporting 

time constraints precluded them from thoroughly investigating it. The 

report shows that the Navy had a workload of 8.9 million direct labor 

hours above the core maintenance requirement in the Sea Ships 

category. Because of this, OSD officials believed that the estimated 

workload was sufficiently covered and this error would not result in a 

shortfall.

While DOD’s overall planned workloads exceed its core capability 

requirements, DOD’s report shows shortfalls in certain categories for the 

Army and the Air Force. The report includes complete information on 

shortfalls at the top-level categories and plans to mitigate all of the 

shortfalls identified in the report. However, the report does not include 

required information on the rationale for some of these shortfalls—the 

reasons why the services do not have the workloads to meet core 

maintenance requirements. Section 2464 requires that DOD include in its 

report “in any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair 

capability requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining 

workloads,”—that is, in any case where there are shortfalls—“a detailed 

rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to correct, or mitigate, the 

effects of the shortfall.” 

Consistent with how it reported the core requirements and planned

workloads, OSD aggregated the workload shortfalls under the top-level 

categories of the work breakdown structure for each service. The report 

shows that the Navy and Marine Corps did not identify any shortfalls in 

the workloads available to support their core capability requirements. In 

assessing the completeness of DOD’s report, we determined that the 

Navy and Marine Corps did not have workload shortfalls at any of the 

lower-level categories at which they provided information to OSD. The 

report shows workload shortfalls for the Army and Air Force totaling about 

1.4 million direct labor hours. Table 5 shows the shortfalls identified in the 

report.

The Report Includes 

Information on Shortfalls 

and Mitigation Plans but 

Does Not Include Detailed 

Explanations for Some 

Shortfalls 

DOD Reported Workload 

Shortfalls at Top-Level 

Categories of the Work 

Breakdown Structure
 

Page 11 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Table 5: Summary of the Core Report’s Shortfalls by Military Service and Work Breakdown Structure 

Direct labor hours

Military service Work breakdown structure category 

Core capability 

requirement 

Planned

workload Workload shortfall

Army Ground Vehicles 5,704,613 4,835,066 (869,547) 

Support Equipment 1,141,411 1,028,949 (112,462) 

Air Force Communication/ Electronic Equipment 430,330 169,632 (260,698) 

Ordnance, Weapons, & Missiles 958,862 815,582 (143,280) 

Total (1,385,987) 

Source: DOD. 

In assessing the completeness of DOD’s report, we determined that the 

Army and Air Force identified shortfalls at lower-level subcategories and 

submitted supplemental information to OSD describing these anticipated 

shortfalls. For the report, OSD aggregated the information on core 

requirements and planned workloads provided by the services at the toplevel categories of the work breakdown structure. OSD officials told us 

that the shortfalls included in the report were calculated by taking the 

difference between the total requirements and planned workload at the 

top-level categories. 

Because of this calculation, some of the workload shortfalls identified by 

the services at the lower-level categories were balanced out by surplus 

workload in other lower-level categories under the same top-level 

category. Thus, these lower-level shortfalls were not included in the 

report. For the Army, the report showed that there are workload shortfalls 

of approximately 1 million direct labor hours in the top-level categories for 

Ground Vehicles and Support Equipment. The Army also submitted 

information to OSD on additional shortfalls in lower-level subcategories 

totaling approximately 1.5 million direct labor hours. These shortfalls are

anticipated in various third-level subcategories under the top categories of 

Aircraft; Ground Vehicles; Communication/Electronic Equipment; Support 

Equipment; and Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles. For example, the 

Army identified a shortfall of about 625,000 direct labor hours under the 

third-level subcategory of Communication Systems Equipment, which is 

under the top-level category for Communication/Electronics Equipment. 

For the Air Force, the report reflects total workload shortfalls of 

approximately 404,000 direct labors hours in the two top-level categories 

of Communication/Electronic Equipment, and Ordnance, Weapons, and 

Missiles. However, the Air Force also provided information to OSD on 

additional shortfalls of about 64,000 direct labor hours for the second-
 

Page 12 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

level subcategory of Aircraft Components, under the broader Aircraft 

category. 

OSD officials told us that they chose to report at the top level because 

they believe this best reflects the services’ ability to provide core 

maintenance, as surplus planned workload in lower-level categories could 

make up for shortfalls in other categories. They noted that skills, facilities, 

and equipment are transferrable from one system to another within the 

top-level category of a work breakdown structure, and that aggregation of 

workload to the top level presents a more-accurate picture of shortfalls.

The report provides mitigation plans for identified shortfalls in the Army 

workload but does not provide explanations for all shortfalls to clarify the 

reasons why the Army does not have sufficient workload to meet core 

maintenance requirements. The report identifies Army shortfalls of 

869,547 direct labor hours that are needed to support its required core 

maintenance capability to maintain equipment under its Ground Vehicles 

category of work and 112,462 direct labor hours under its Support 

Equipment category of work. 

Ground Vehicles

The report stated that the shortfall in the Ground Vehicles category 

includes workload shortfalls for two subcategories—combat vehicles and 

tactical wheeled vehicles. The report provides both an explanation and a 

mitigation plan for the shortfall in the combat vehicles subcategory, but 

does not provide an explanation for the workload shortfalls in the tactical 

vehicle subcategory. For the combat vehicles shortfall, the report states 

that the workload shortfall is a result of low usage of ground combat 

vehicles in current operations. In addition, the report states that in recent 

years, the Army has executed robust programs to recapitalize and 

upgrade depot maintenance. Army officials responsible for compiling the 

Army’s input stated that this resulted in positive health and condition of 

these systems. Because of this low usage and the recent improvements 

in the systems, the Army anticipates minimal depot repair for these 

vehicles at this time. The Army plans to mitigate this shortfall by allowing 

military depot workers to repair similar vehicles that are used to support 

other maintenance programs. 

For tactical wheeled vehicles, the report states that there is a workload 

shortfall for tactical wheeled vehicles at Red River Army Depot, but does 

not provide a reason for the shortfall. Army officials stated that the 

reasons for these shortfalls are the same as the reasons for shortfalls for 

The Report Does Not Include 

Explanations for All Army 

Shortfalls
 

Page 13 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

ground combat vehicles—low usage and recent improvements resulted in 

reduced workloads in this area. Army officials told us that the Army is 

anticipating force structure reductions that will significantly lower the 

amount of tactical wheeled vehicles and result in a lower core 

maintenance requirement. Army officials told us that the Army is also 

forming an Integrated Process Team to review the core maintenance 

requirements for all ground vehicle systems. However, this shortfall 

mitigation information was not included in the report.

Support Equipment 

The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why there is a 

workload shortfall in the Ground Support Equipment work—why the Army 

estimates it will not have the workload to meet its core maintenance 

requirements. The report only states that the shortfall is related to the 

repairs of the Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System12 and Floating 

Bridges,

13

The report provides mitigation plans for identified shortfalls in the Air 

Force core capabilities but does not provide explanations for all of the 

shortfalls. The report identifies an Air Force shortfall of 260,698 direct 

labor hours that are needed to support its required core capability for 

maintaining equipment under its Communication/Electronic Equipment 

category of work. The report also identifies an additional Air Force 

workload shortfall of 143,280 direct labor hours that are needed to 

as well as other repairs for equipment, such as equipment 

related to bulk petroleum oil and lubricant distribution. Army officials 

stated that the reasons for these shortfalls are the same as the reasons 

for the shortfalls for ground vehicles—low usage and recent 

improvements resulted in reduced workloads in this area. The Army 

assessed this category to be at minimal risk, and it plans to use similar 

workloads to mitigate this shortfall. Further, Army officials stated that they 

project a decrease in core maintenance requirements in this area 

because of anticipated force structure changes. However, this shortfall 

mitigation information was not included in DOD’s report.

 

12The Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System is a capability used to defeat a subset of 

improvised explosive devices and features a universal bracket that can be mounted on 

any vehicle platform.

13Floating Bridges are structures used for troops, combat materiel, and transport to cross 

obstacles (such as water barriers, ravines, and roads) while traveling along roads or 

routes on the field of battle.

The Report Does Not Include 

Explanations for All Air Force 

Shortfalls
 

Page 14 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

support the Air Force’s required core capability in maintaining equipment 

under its Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category of work.

Communication/Electronic Equipment

The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why the Air Force 

anticipates insufficient workload to meet its core maintenance 

requirements in the Communication/Electronic Equipment category. The 

report identifies only that the shortfall in communications workload is 

primarily for unmanned aerial systems ground stations. We asked Air 

Force officials to clarify the reason for the shortfall, and they told us that 

the shortfall is caused by the lack of organic (military) depot capability to 

repair unmanned aerial vehicle ground stations for the anticipated 

increase in manufacturing of the MQ-1 Predator14 and MQ-9 Reaper15

The report stated that the Air Force would mitigate the shortfall through 

incrementally assigning maintenance work to organic (military) depots for 

the MQ-1 and MQ-9 between the third quarters of fiscal year 2012 

through fiscal year 2016. Because the Air Force does not currently have 

the facilities and personnel at the military depots to execute the identified 

planned workload, the Air Force also identified a capability shortfall. Air 

Force officials told us that the Air Force had no scheduled capital 

investments

aircraft. According to Air Force officials, contractors currently repair the 

stations. However, this shortfall explanation information was not included 

in the report.

16 for the assigned work at the military depots at the time of 

the report. 

 

14The MQ-1 Predator is an unmanned aircraft system employed primarily in a killer/scout 

role as an intelligence collection asset. Each system consists of four sensor/weaponequipped aircraft, a ground control station, a Predator Primary Satellite Link, and spare 

equipment.

15The MQ-9 Reaper is an unmanned aircraft system designed to provide a ground-attack 

capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess small ground mobile or fixed 

targets. Each system consists of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 

communications suite.

16Capital investment refers to improvements made to facilities or equipment that would 

make production more efficient or meet expected future needs.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles 

The report does not clearly provide an explanation for why the Air Force 

anticipates insufficient workload to meet its core maintenance 

requirements in the Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category. The 

report states only that for the Ordnance, Weapons, and Missiles category, 

the workload shortfall is in missile components. When asked to provide a 

reason for the shortfall, Air Force officials told us that this shortfall is 

driven by the lack of organic (military) depot capability for Missile 

Components work. However, this information is not included in the report.

The Air Force plans to mitigate this shortfall by assigning work to Air 

Force depots to support existing and new weapon systems, such as 

missile launchers and defensive missile systems for the MQ-1 Predator 

and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems. According to the report, the 

Air Force plans to begin the work on the MQ-1 and MQ-9 to mitigate the 

shortfall in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012 and complete this work 

by fiscal year 2017. Additional work on other aircraft weapon systems, 

such as for the F-35, will also be used to mitigate this shortfall. This 

additional work will begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013, with full 

implementation over the following 12-24 months. 

In addition, because the Air Force does not currently have the facilities 

and personnel at the military depots to execute the identified planned 

workload, it also identified a capability shortfall. Air Force officials told us 

that the Air Force had no scheduled capital investments for the assigned 

work at the military depots at the time of the report. 

The report does not always include detailed explanations for identified 

workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always 

provide explanations for them. Without clear explanations for why the 

services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance 

requirements, Congress does not have visibility whether the services’ 

plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the 

shortfalls. 

Section 2464, among other things, requires DOD to maintain a core 

maintenance capability that is government-owned and governmentoperated, assign sufficient workload to support this capability, and report 

information on this capability to Congress. DOD’s first report to Congress 

includes most of the required elements. However, it did not provide 

explanations for all of the identified workload shortfalls. Clear reasons for 

Conclusions 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

why the services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance 

requirements would provide key information for Congress about how the 

services’ plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls would be addressing 

the cause of the shortfalls. Without complete and clear information on this 

element of the statute, Congress may lack full visibility into the status of 

DOD’s management of its core capabilities.

To ensure that Congress has visibility over the status of DOD’s core 

depot-level maintenance and repair capability, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Maintenance, Policy, and Programs) to include in the Biennial Core 

Report to Congress detailed explanations for why services do not have 

the workload to meet core maintenance requirements for each shortfall 

identified in the report.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with our 

recommendation and stated that the department will include an 

explanation and mitigation plan for each workload shortfall identified in all 

future reports.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Maintenance, Policy, and Programs); the Secretaries of the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; 

and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
 

Page 17 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V. 

Zina D. Merritt

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 18 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Chairman

The Honorable Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 19 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

2012 Biennial Core Report complies with Section 2464 of Title 10 of the 

United States Code and includes service data and information required by 

DOD to support the report, we analyzed the text of DOD’s Biennial Core 

Report and obtained supporting information on DOD’s core determination 

process for 2013. One of our analysts reviewed DOD’s report to 

determine the extent to which it included each element of the mandate, 

and a second analyst reviewed the first analyst’s conclusions. All initial 

disagreements between analysts were discussed and resolved through 

consensus. When the report explicitly included all parts of the mandated 

element, our assessment is that DOD “complied” with the element. When 

the report did not explicitly include any part of the element, our 

assessment is that DOD “did not comply” with the element. If the report 

included some aspects of an element, but not all, then our assessment is 

that DOD “partially complied” with the element. We checked to see that 

the services were each providing the same type of information. 

To assess the level of completeness of the information, we obtained and 

analyzed the data and other information that the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) required the military service headquarters to provide in 

support of the report. We compared the services’ submissions to the 

reporting template in DOD Instruction 4151.201

 

1

DOD Instruction 4151.20, Depot Maintenance Core Capabilities Determination Process

(Jan. 5, 2007).

in order to determine the 

extent to which the services submitted information required by DOD’s 

instruction and identify any inconsistencies or errors. We conducted datareliability assessments for all the data analyzed and reported upon by 

performing independent reliability assessments through which individual 

team members reviewed the services’ submissions to determine (1) 

whether the requirements were met, and (2) the extent to which the data 

that was provided supports the responses. The team also reviewed the 

data provided by the services to OSD to support their respective 

responses for the Biennial Core Report. Individual team members 

compared the data provided to OSD to the data published in the report to 

ensure consistency. The team also met with knowledgeable officials to 

obtain clarification and understanding of the content of the submissions. 

From these analyses, the team concluded that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

We conducted this performance audit from August 2012 to February 2013

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Prior GAO Work on Core Logistics 

Capability

Page 21 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

In 2009, we reported that the Department of Defense (DOD), through its 

biennial core process, had not comprehensively and accurately assessed 

whether it had the required core capability to support fielded systems in 

military depots.1

• DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core requirements 

and associated workloads did not reveal specific shortfalls; and

 We found that, among other things, 

• Congress lacked visibility of DOD’s core process, because there was 

no requirement for DOD to provide its Biennial Core Report to 

Congress.

We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics take several actions related to improving the 

Biennial Core Report, including requiring DOD to compile and report the 

services’ core capability requirements, planned workloads, and any 

shortfalls by work breakdown structure category, and requiring DOD to 

provide this report to Congress. Table 6 details the three 

recommendations and one matter for congressional consideration we

made in our 2009 report that are relevant to this review of the Biennial 

Core Report, and the respective actions taken by DOD.

 

1

GAO, Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core Capability at 

Military Depots, GAO-09-83 (Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2009).

Appendix II: Prior GAO Work on Core 

Logistics Capability 
Appendix II: Prior GAO Work on Core Logistics 

Capability

Page 22 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Table 6: GAO’s 2009 Recommendations, Matter for Consideration, and DOD’s Actions to Improve DOD’s Report on Core 

Capability Requirements 

Recommendations Actions taken a 

Require DOD to compile and report the services’ core capability 

requirements, planned organic workloads, and any shortfalls by 

equipment/technology category (work breakdown structure). 

Implemented: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness tasked the services in an April 2012 

memorandum to report core capability requirements by work 

breakdown structure. 

Require DOD to implement internal controls to prevent errors and 

inconsistencies in the services’ core calculations. At a minimum, 

internal controls should address errors and inconsistencies 

identified in our review relating to the need to include (1) all Joint 

Chiefs of Staff-scenario-tasked systems, (2) software maintenance 

requirements, and (3) only public depot maintenance workload 

when adjusting for redundancy. 

Implemented: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness tasked the services in a March 2010 

memorandum to include all Joint Staff–tasked systems and 

software maintenance requirements as part of the core logistics 

capabilities. Also, the memorandum tasked the services to only 

consider organic (public) depot maintenance workloads when 

adjusting for redundant capability. 

Explicitly state the mathematical calculations, based on their core 

determination worksheets, which the services should use to 

determine core capability requirements, associated workload, and 

shortfalls, if any. 

Implemented: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness tasked the services in a March 2010 

memorandum to use the tables from DOD Instruction 4151.20. 

The services were instructed to fully complete those tables in 

their entirety in their format and provide their responses in both 

Excel spreadsheet and hardcopy. 

Matter for congressional consideration Actions taken 

Congress should consider requiring DOD to report on the status of 

its effort to maintain a core logistics capability consistent with 

Section 2464 of Title 10, U.S. Code. In doing so, Congress may 

wish to require that DOD report biennially on the results of its core 

determination process, actions taken to correct any identified 

shortfalls in core capability, and efforts to identify and establish core 

capability for new and modified systems in a timely manner, 

consistent with DOD guidance 

Implemented: The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, amended Section 2464 of 

Title 10 of the United States Code to require that the Secretary 

of Defense submit to Congress a biennial report identifying core 

depot-level maintenance capabilities and the workloads 

required to sustain those capabilities. The congressional report 

is required no later than April 1 on each even-numbered year 

detailing core capability requirements. In September 2012, the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & 

Logistics) issued the first Biennial Core Report to Congress. 

Source: GAO. 

a

GAO reported a total of eight recommendations and one matter for congressional consideration. We 

only included three recommendations and the matter for congressional consideration because they 

were based on improving the Biennial Core Report. 
Appendix III: Category Levels from DOD’s 2012 

Depot Maintenance Core Capability Worksheet

Page 23 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Appendix III: Category Levels from DOD’s 

2012 Depot Maintenance Core Capability 

Worksheet 

Work Breakdown Structure Category

1. Aircraft 

 1.1 Airframes

 1.1.1 Rotary

 1.1.2 Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing

 1.1.3 Cargo/Tanker

 1.1.4 Fighter/Attack

 1.1.5 Bomber

 1.1.6 Aircraft - Other

 1.2 Aircraft Components

 1.2.1 Dynamic Components

 1.2.2 Hydraulic/Pneumatic

 1.2.3 Instruments

 1.2.4 Landing Gear

 1.2.5 Aviation Ordnance

 1.2.6 Avionics/Electronics

 1.2.7 Auxiliary Power Units

 1.2.8 Other

 1.3 Aircraft Engines

2. Ground Vehicles

 2.1 Combat Vehicles

 2.2 Amphibious Vehicles

 2.3 Tactical (wheeled) Vehicles

 2.4 Construction Equipment

3. Sea Ships

 3.1 Aircraft Carriers

 3.2 Submarines

 3.3 Surface Combatants/Others

4. Communication/Electronic Equipment

 4.1 Radar

 4.2 Radio

 4.3 Wire

 4.4 Electronic Warfare

 4.5 Navigational Aids

 4.6 Electro-Optics/Night Vision

 4.7 Crypto

 4.8 Computers
Appendix III: Category Levels from DOD’s 2012 

Depot Maintenance Core Capability Worksheet

Page 24 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Source: DOD. 

 4.9 Other

5. Support Equipment

 5.1 Ground Support Equipment

 5.2 Generators

 5.3 Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment

 5.4 Calibration

 5.5 Other

6. Ordnance, Weapons, & Missiles

 6.1 Nuclear Weapons

 6.2 Chemical Weapons

 6.3 Biological Weapons

 6.4 Conventional Weapons

 6.5 Explosives

 6.6 Small Arms/Personal Weapons

 6.7 Strategic Missiles

 6.8 Tactical Missiles

7. Software 

 7.1 Weapon System

 7.2 Support Equipment

8. Fabrication/Manufacturing

9. Fleet/Field Support

10. Special Interest Items

11. Other
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 26 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Zina D. Merritt, (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Carleen Bennett, Assistant 

Director; Gina Hoffman; Joanne Landesman; Jennifer Madison; Michael 

Silver; Jose Watkins; and Michael Willems made key contributions to this 

report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 28 GAO-13-194 Biennial Core Report

Defense Logistics: DOD Input Needed on Implementing Depot 

Maintenance Study Recommendations. GAO-11-568R. Washington, 

D.C.: June 30, 2011.

Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core 

Capability at Military Depots. GAO-09-83. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 

2009.

DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help 

Ensure Viability of DOD’s Civilian Industrial Workforce. GAO-03-472. 

Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.

Related GAO Products 

(351717)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.