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“There is plenty of 

potential for miscalculations, 

with security forces once 

more being used to impose 

outcomes in the absence 

of a political resolution.”

March 22, 2011

Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq 

after the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

Summary

•	 Since the fall of the former regime, in 2003, there has been continuous concern that fighting might break out between the Arabs and the Kurds over Kirkuk and the boundary of the 

Kurdistan Regional Government. 

•	 In response to requests to help manage tensions between the different security forces, 

General Odierno, then Commanding General of United States Forces-Iraq, developed a Joint 

Security Architecture, bringing together Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish forces, and US forces to 

work against their common enemy, the al-Qaeda.

•	 US forces are due to start pulling out of their conflict prevention role along the ‘trigger line’ 

that divides the Kurds and the Arabs in the disputed territories, by the summer of 2011. Unless 

new conflict prevention mechanisms are put in place, there is a real risk that tensions could 

boil over as people tire of waiting for a political resolution. 

Iraqi and Kurdish Security Forces: Face Off and Stand Off

In August 2008, tensions between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the peshmerga—Kurdish regional guard—increased around the disputed city of Khanaqin in Diyala province, near the Iranian 

border. The 1st Division of the Iraqi army entered towns in the Khanaqin district and demanded 

the withdrawal of the peshmerga within 24 hours. The commander of the 34th Peshmerga Brigade 

refused to withdraw, saying he had orders from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to 

remain in place. The Iraqi government ordered the movement of tanks to the area. U.S. officers had 

to intervene to calm down tensions.

In Ninewa, the provincial elections of 2009 brought to power Athil Najafi as the governor, 

leading the al-Hadba Gathering whose agenda was to push back the control that the Kurds had 

gained since 2005. In protest at being denied posts, the primarily Kurdish Ninewa Brotherhood List 

withdrew from the Ninewa provincial council and mayors of Kurdish dominated towns declared 

their secession from Ninewa. In May 2009, Governor Najafi decided to attend a kite flying festival in 

Bashiqa, a Kurdish-majority town. The peshmerga received orders that Governor Najafi should be 

shot at sight! Again, U.S. officers and diplomats mediated a resolution.

While the ISF and the peshmerga were busy facing off against each other, the al-Qaeda was able 

to exploit the seams between them to attack the minority communities in the disputed territories. 

Al-Qaeda’s intent was to attack those it regarded as ‘infidels,’ such as the Yezidis, to show that the 

Emma Sky

E-mail: emmasky1@yahoo.com

peaceBrieF86
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawl 

of U.S. Forces page 2 • PB 86 • March 22, 2011

Iraqi government was weak and incapable of protecting its people, and to provoke the Kurds and 

the Arabs into a civil war. Further complicating matters, Sunni nationalist insurgents, such as those 

associated with Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi, focused on pushing back what they regarded 

as two occupations—the U.S. occupation and the Kurdish occupation.

During this period of heightened suspicion and distrust between Prime Minister Maliki and 

President Barzani, both separately turned to General Odierno and requested his help in deescalating tensions between the ISF and the peshmerga and increasing the security of the Iraqi 

people, in particular, the minorities living in the disputed territories. Both understood the critical 

importance of improving security and putting in place the necessary security measures in the 

run-up to the national elections.

Establishing the Joint Security Architecture

General Odierno set about developing practical steps to manage tensions in the disputed territories and prevent conflict between the different security forces. He set up a Ministerial Committee 

comprising of himself as chair, Minister of Defense Abdul-Qadir al-Obeidi, Minister of Interior 

Jawad al-Bolani, Chief of Staff of the Army Babakir Zebari, KRG Minister of Interior Karim Sinjari, and 

the Minister of Peshmerga Sheikh Jaafar. General Odierno’s approach was to develop a common 

vision around the future. He wanted to ensure that each province had its own police force working 

for the governor, with the army and the peshmerga withdrawn, and intelligence officials working 

for national intelligence. During the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on August 16, 2009, 

General Odierno proposed six principles to guide their work:

1. The security of the Iraqi people is paramount.

2. Security forces in the disputed territories should work jointly together to ensure that there 

are no seams for terrorists to exploit.

3. Force levels should be adequate to meet security needs.

4. Security forces should be representative of the communities they serve.

5. Effective intelligence is key to preventing terrorism. Intelligence agencies should be 

transparent and work together; they should not work for any political party. 

6. Effective rule of law is needed to put terrorists behind bars. 

With agreement on the overall principles, General Odierno, in a subsequent meeting, set out a 

two-phased approach to achieving the overall vision. Phase I involved getting the different forces 

in the disputed territories to work together within a Joint Security Architecture which needed to 

be in place prior to the elections. During Phase I, planning needed to begin on the recruitment of 

additional police and army for Ninewa as it did not have sufficient security forces. Phase II involved 

the integration of the newly recruited forces with the provincial forces and national intelligence, 

and the withdrawal of the Iraqi army and the peshmerga from internal security. 

The situation in Ninewa remained of particular concern. In a meeting in July 2009, the Iraqi 

National Security Council discussed the deteriorating security situation in Ninewa and designated 

then Deputy Prime Minister Rafi Issawi to head a Ninewa Committee to investigate the cause of 

the problem and work a solution. As soon as he was appointed to this role, DPM Issawi began 

consulting with a wide range of stakeholders from Ninewa to understand their concerns and show 

that the central government cared and was willing to help. Through his consultations, DPM Issawi 

identified nine outstanding issues between the al-Hadba Gathering and the Ninewa Brotherhood 

List and the necessary steps needed to resolve them. The United Nations Assistance Mission for 

Iraq (UNAMI) and the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team worked hard to assist with bridging the 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawl 

of U.S. Forces page 3 • PB 86 • March 22, 2011

differences between the groups. Their aim was to get the provincial council back together and 

secure freedom of movement for Governor Najafi within his province. 

The proposed Joint Security Architecture was contested in Ninewa. The al-Hadba Gathering 

feared that it would legitimize the presence of the peshmerga below the Green Line. Addressing 

the governor and members of the provincial council, General Odierno and DPM Issawi persuaded 

that it would not be possible to remove the Kurdish security forces immediately. Eight thousand 

police and six thousand army personnel needed to be recruited in Ninewa. This would lead to 

the development of the integrated security forces that would represent the entire population of 

the province. Only then would the withdrawal of the Kurdish forces—not yet integrated with the 

provincial or federal police, nor the national intelligence agencies—be possible. Governor Najafi 

was frustrated that he had no input in the management of security in his own province and yet 

was held responsible by the public whenever attacks could not be prevented. 

In Kirkuk, the Arab and Turkmen communities also protested the proposed Joint Security 

Architecture and there was an uptick in security within the Arab areas of the province. It became 

apparent that they were concerned the Joint Security Architecture would give the peshmerga

a stranglehold of the city. The area of joint patrol was therefore revised into a horseshoe shape, 

ensuring that Kirkuk was not encircled. Tensions eased off.

The U.S. was also able to offer assistance to train and develop Kurdish forces that came under 

the KRG and were part of the recognized defense architecture of Iraq. This proved to be a big 

incentive for the Kurds to merge their peshmerga into one force under the KRG rather than 

maintaining them separately under the political parties of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and 

the Kurdistan Democratic Party. PM Maliki signed a memorandum instructing the two Kurdish 

brigades to be integrated with the Joint Security Architecture in the disputed territories. This gave 

the U.S. the legal basis to train and equip them as federal forces.

As the elections approached, stakes were high within the disputed territories. However, through 

U.S. organized joint training, the Arabs and the Kurds got to know each other, had fun doing activities together, and built working relations. On the trilateral checkpoints, U.S. soldiers ensured that 

everyone worked well together and focused on the job at hand. Through the combined coordination centers, the different forces were aware of each other’s movements, hence reducing rumors 

and mistrust that had the potential of sparking conflict. Phase I of the security plan went into effect 

prior to the elections.

Despite these measures, a crisis occurred in Ninewa in February 2010 which threatened to put 

in jeopardy not only the elections in the province and Arab-Kurd relations, but also U.S.-Kurd 

relations and even threatened to draw in Turkey.

Ninewa Crisis of February 2010

Progress on resolving the political issues in Ninewa got held up as politicians were drawn into 

tense negotiations over the election law, where there were differences on how Kirkuk should be 

handled and the number of seats to be allocated to the three Kurdish provinces. Recruitment of 

the additional forces to Ninewa also got delayed in the political wrangling and coalition building in 

the run-up to the elections. 

A key component of the plan was to ensure freedom of movement for the governor, to be 

worked through the coordination centers. Determined to test the new Joint Security Architecture 

at the earliest, Governor Najafi decided to make a trip to Tel Kayf, within the disputed territories, on 

February, 2010. The visit was coordinated in accordance with the rules that had been agreed upon 

in the Joint Security Architecture. Ignoring Kurdish objections, the U.S. forces decided that the visit 
© USIP 2011 • All rights reserved.

Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawl 

of U.S. Forces page 4 • PB 86 • March 22, 2011

should go ahead and that they would support it. In response, the Kurds brought down reinforcements and tried to prevent Najafi’s trip from taking place. Crowds of Kurds gathered to block the 

governor’s convoy and in the resulting melee shots were fired. The U.S. commander on the ground, 

fearing his soldiers were under threat, moved in tanks to protect them and ordered F-16s overhead 

to buzz the crowd. The police detained eleven Kurds for incitement and on suspicion of attempting 

to assassinate Governor Najafi. In response, the Kurds ‘detained’ some Arabs and withdrew from 

the Joint Security Architecture. Rumor reached Ankara that the Kurds had invaded Mosul!

After days of extremely intense negotiations brokered by the U.S. military, the crisis was diffused 

but only after the release of the Kurds and the Arabs detained during the incident. All sides learned 

from the Ninewa crisis. The provocations and overreactions were not repeated again. The Joint 

Security Architecture proved to be extremely successful in building relations between security 

forces on the ground and getting them to work together to protect the Iraqi people and prevent 

al-Qaeda from attacking minorities. Despite all the posturing and campaigning, the elections in 

Ninewa passed smoothly.

In fact, the government formation process and coalition building that followed the national 

elections, have, on one level, helped to manage tensions, with Iraqiyya and the Kurds sharing a 

common agenda in keeping PM Maliki’s power in check. However, there is plenty of potential for 

miscalculations with security forces, once more, being used to impose outcomes in the absence of 

a political resolution. 

New Mechanisms to Manage and Prevent Conflict 

U.S. forces operating along the ‘trigger line’ will commence to draw down in the summer of 2011 

in accordance with the Security Agreement. In order to maintain stability, Iraqi and Kurdish leaders 

should consider:

•	 Integrating security forces operating in the disputed territories. This will require transitioning from Phase I to II, ensuring that adequate police are recruited and trained, and national 

intelligence capacity built. Additionally, it will mitigate the risk of the joint checkpoints 

becoming another unofficial and contentious internal boundary.

•	 Declaring a demilitarized zone across the disputed territories, with neither the Iraqi army 

nor the peshmerga permitted to operate there. This will not only remove the chances of 

unpredictable escalation of tensions between the different forces, but also have a great 

psychological impact on the local population by increasing trust in local authorities and the 

rule of law. 

In order to reduce the chances of conflict in the disputed territories and help create the necessary conditions to deal with the grievances, fears, and interests of the different communities, the 

international community should consider supporting: 

1. Conflict resolution mechanism. Reactivate the UNAMI-sponsored High Level Task Force (HLTF) 

as a mechanism to resolve conflict over the disputed territories. The security ministerial committee 

should no longer stand alone, but become a subset of the HLTF. The HLTF should be the body 

which takes the political decision to move towards police primacy and a demilitarized decision 

across the disputed territories. The HLTF should also look to promote greater economic development across the disputed territories. 

2. Conflict management mechanism. Appoint a UN Special Rapporteur for the disputed territories. In order to help manage conflict prior to a political resolution, an international Special 

Rapporteur should be appointed who should regularly visit the disputed territories to receive reports on what is going on, listen to the complaints of the different parties, and report back on the 
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About This Brief

This PeaceBrief is written by 

Emma Sky, a fellow at the Institute 

of Politics, Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University. 

She was the chief political advisor 

to then United States Forces-Iraq 

Commanding General, Raymond 

Odierno, from 2008 to 2010.

progress made to the UN and the government of Iraq. Monitoring of human rights issues related 

to detainees, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, access to education in the mother 

tongue, resolving property disputes is important for recognizing and addressing grievances. 

3. Conflict prevention mechanism. Develop a cadre of local leaders and networks. These leaders 

could be members of police, tribes, and civil society and could serve as first responders to tension 

brewing on the ground, in order to prevent conflict. They should be provided with training and 

nurtured as part of a network. Similar initiatives have proved successful in other troubled places 

such as Northern Ireland and South Africa.

The US Embassy, through adequately resourced and well-led branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul, 

could support the work of the UN as well as develop a cadre of local leaders and networks.

Iraq’s leaders will continue to grapple with the thorny issues that have bedeviled relations 

between the Arabs and the Kurds since the foundation of the state. For solutions to be sustainable, 

these issues will need to be resolved through politics and consensus—not through violence and 

imposition. As Kurdish and Arab leaders negotiate compromises, the international community can 

play a key role in supporting mechanisms to help prevent conflict as well as in exposing Iraqis to 

the experiences of other people in finding solutions to such complex problems.

Preventing Arab-Kurd Conflict in Iraq after the Withdrawl 

of U.S. Forces page 5 • PB 86 • March 22, 2011