U.S. ASSISTANCE TO 

YEMEN 

Actions Needed to 

Improve Oversight of 

Emergency Food Aid 

and Assess Security 

Assistance 

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2013 

GAO-13-310 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

This report was revised on March 22, 2013, to correct a date 

cited on pages 23 and 24. 
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-310, a report to 

congressional committees

March 2013

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO YEMEN

Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency 

Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance

Why GAO Did This Study

The terrorist group AQAP, one of the 

top threats to U.S. national security, is 

based in Yemen—a country facing

serious economic and social 

challenges and undergoing a difficult

political transition following civil unrest 

in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and 

USAID have allocated over $1 billion in 

assistance to help Yemen counter 

AQAP and address other challenges. 

The three largest U.S. assistance 

programs in Yemen are USAID’s Food 

for Peace program, which has provided 

emergency food aid, and DOD’s 

Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, 

which have provided training and 

equipment to Yemeni security forces. 

In response to a Senate report that 

directed GAO to review U.S. 

assistance to Yemen, and following up 

on GAO’s February 2012 report on the 

types and amounts of such assistance, 

GAO examined (1) the extent of 

progress made toward U.S. strategic 

goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of 

progress made by the Food for Peace 

and Section 1206 and 1207(n) 

programs, and (3) key challenges to 

U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed 

agency documents and met with U.S. 

and Yemeni officials and implementing 

partners in Washington, D.C., and 

Sana’a, Yemen.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USAID improve 

performance reporting on Food for 

Peace efforts in Yemen and that DOD

collect and analyze data on the 

effectiveness of the Section 1206 and 

1207(n) programs in Yemen until 

security conditions permit an 

evaluation of these programs. USAID 

and DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The 

Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and 

security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals (see figure 

below). Although some progress has been made since the civil unrest in 2011, 

obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For example, while there has been an 

orderly political transition to a new president, key milestones—such as convening 

a national dialogue to promote reconciliation—have been delayed. In addition, 

while Yemeni security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains unstable.

U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance in Support 

USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of its 

annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number of individuals 

in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, reports to Congress about 

the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With 

regard to the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an 

evaluation process to assess the programs’ effectiveness but has not conducted 

an evaluation in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited 

information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these 

assistance programs and making future funding decisions.

Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key challenges to U.S. 

assistance efforts. First, Yemen’s unstable security situation constrains U.S. 

training of Yemeni security forces, restricts oversight of civilian assistance 

projects, and endangers Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For 

example, a Yemeni employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 

2012, and other Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face

threats. Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the 

Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use 

of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic 

goal of improving Yemen’s security. However, according to DOD officials, recent 

actions by the Yemeni government to replace key leaders of security force units 

and reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges. 

View GAO-13-310. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Letter 1 

Background 2

Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed 8

Food for Peace Exceeded Targets, but Performance Reports Have 

Weaknesses; Section 1206 and 1207(n) Programs Lack 

Evaluation 13

Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge 

U.S. Assistance Efforts 19

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28

Appendix II U.S. Funding for Food for Peace (FFP) and Section 1206 

and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs to Yemen 31

Appendix III Training and Equipment Provided to Yemen through 

Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs 33

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 35

Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 39

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42

Tables

Table 1: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Government 

Transition 9

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Table 2: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Strengthening 

Governance 10

Table 3: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Humanitarian 

Relief 11

Table 4: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Economic 

Development 12

Table 5: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Improving 

Security and Combating AQAP 13

Table 6: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Efforts in Yemen, Fiscal Years 

2007–2012 33

Figures

Figure 1: Map of Yemen 3

Figure 2: Timeline of Key Past and Projected Events Related to 

Yemen (2011–2014) 5

Figure 3: U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance 

in Support 6

Figure 4: Total Allocations of U.S. Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal 

Years 2007–2012 7

Figure 5: Number of Beneficiaries in Yemen of FFP Food 

Donations Made Using Fiscal Years 2008–2011 Funds 15

Figure 6: Weapons Provided to MOI through DOD’s Section 1207(n) 

Assistance Program 18

Figure 7: United States–Provided MOI Vehicle in Need of Spare 

Parts and Maintenance 23

Figure 8: FFP Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007–2012 31

Figure 9: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal 

Years 2007–2012 32
Page iii GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Abbreviations

AQAP al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

DOD Department of Defense 

FFP Food for Peace

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOI Ministry of Interior

State Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

YSOF Yemeni Special Operations Force

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 20, 2013

Congressional Committees

Yemen is an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP), a terrorist group based in Yemen that continues to 

plot against U.S. citizens and interests. Between 2009 and 2012, AQAP 

members attempted to blow up several U.S.-bound airplanes using 

increasingly sophisticated techniques, from incorporating explosives into 

garments in 2009 and 2012 to shipping explosives disguised as printer 

cartridges on two U.S.-bound flights in 2010. Further, Yemen faces 

substantial economic and social challenges, such as a reported 

unemployment rate of nearly 40 percent and, according to the United 

Nations, a third of Yemenis suffering from acute hunger. Yemen is also 

undergoing a difficult political transition following mass protests in 2011 

that culminated in the end of the 33-year rule of former President Ali 

Abdullah Saleh. This situation has fostered an attractive recruiting and 

training environment for AQAP. To assist in countering the AQAP threat 

and to address the various other challenges Yemen faces, the 

Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID) have collectively allocated over $1 

billion in assistance to Yemen since 2007. Nearly half of this assistance 

has funded USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP) program, which has provided 

emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 12061 and Section 1207(n)2

Given the threats emanating from Yemen as well as the significant U.S. 

investment in assistance to Yemen, a Senate report directed the 

Comptroller General to, among other things, review U.S. assistance 

programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni 

security forces.

 

1

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 

106-193, established this program, also known as the Global Train and Equip Program, 

which is used to build the capacity of foreign military forces through the provision of 

training, equipment, and small-scale military construction activities. 

2

Section 1207(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 

112-81, authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 

State, to provide equipment, supplies, training, and assistance for minor military 

construction to Yemeni Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Forces.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

efforts in Yemen.3

To address these objectives, we reviewed agency documents related to 

U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen—including strategy and planning 

documents, fact sheets, progress reporting, and funding information—as 

well as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the United 

Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 

Yemeni government. We also discussed U.S. assistance efforts with 

State, DOD, USAID, National Security Staff, and intelligence community 

officials in the Washington, D.C., area. Additionally, we conducted 

fieldwork in Sana’a, Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with 

State, DOD, and USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and 

representatives of the Yemeni Ministries of Interior (MOI), Defense 

(MOD), and Planning and International Cooperation. See appendix I for a 

complete description of our scope and methodology.

Our report examines (1) the extent of progress made 

toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by 

the FFP and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges 

to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen. We did not evaluate any covert 

programs that the United States may fund in Yemen.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Yemen is an important U.S. partner that faces significant humanitarian, 

economic, and security challenges. As figure 1 shows, Yemen is 

strategically located, sharing a land border with Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. 

 

3

Senate Report 111-201, related to the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act of 

2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (Jan. 7, 2011), directed the Comptroller General to report on 

several issues pertaining to Yemen. We worked with the appropriate congressional 

committees to agree upon a two-phased reporting process. In the first phase, we 

assessed assistance strategies and plans, as well as amounts and types of assistance, 

and reported this information in GAO, Uncertain Political and Security Situation 

Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, 

GAO-12-432R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2012). This second report completes our 

efforts to address this mandate.

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

ally, and a maritime border with a critical shipping lane connecting the 

Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The most impoverished country in the 

Middle East and North Africa region, Yemen is experiencing a rapidly 

growing population, which is estimated at about 25 million; increasing 

scarcity of natural resources, including water, and its primary export—

oil—in steady decline; extremely high unemployment; and dwindling 

revenues that decrease the government’s ability to fund basic operations. 

Internal conflicts have displaced over 430,000 Yemenis from their 

communities, and a December 2012 United Nations report found that 

nearly half of Yemen’s population had limited or no access to sufficient 

food.

4

Figure 1: Map of Yemen

Moreover, Yemen is a safe haven for the terrorist group AQAP, 

which the June 2011 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism identifies 

as a sustained threat to the United States with both the intent and 

capability to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland and U.S. partners.

Adding to these challenges, Yemen’s history has been marked by serious 

political tensions, including civil war, secessionist movements, and 

conflict between the government and various tribes. As shown in figure 2, 

in early 2011, mass protests began against the 33-year regime of 

 

4

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian 

Response Plan for Yemen 2013 (New York, N.Y.: Dec. 13, 2012).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh’s government responded by cracking 

down on protestors and clashing with troops that had defected to side 

with the protest movement. As the Yemeni government focused on 

suppressing upheaval in the capital, AQAP was able to take advantage of 

the situation by seizing control of portions of southern Yemen. In late 

2011, after months of political unrest, Saleh signed a Gulf Cooperation 

Council–proposed agreement outlining a transfer of power to his vice 

president, Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi.5

 

5

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, or Gulf Cooperation Council, 

was established in 1981 between the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 

Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. According to the council’s charter, its objectives 

include effecting coordination, integration, and interconnection between member states in 

all fields in order to achieve unity between them. The council is a regional common market 

with a defense planning council as well.

Hadi was elected president in 

February 2012, beginning a 2-year transition process that is intended to 

lay the groundwork for national elections in February 2014.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Figure 2: Timeline of Key Past and Projected Events Related to Yemen (2011–2014)

According to State, the overarching objective of U.S. policy in Yemen is a 

successful democratic transition that promotes political, economic, and 

security sector reforms that will enable the Yemeni government to 

respond to the needs and aspirations of the Yemeni people. Following the 

November 2011 transition agreement, the U.S. government developed a 

comprehensive new strategy to support the U.S. policy objective for 

Yemen. U.S. agencies are using this strategy to guide assistance 

U.S. Goals for Yemen
 

Page 6 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

activities during the 2-year transition period (2012–2014) outlined in the 

Gulf Cooperation Council–sponsored transition agreement. The primary 

agencies providing assistance to Yemen in support of the U.S. strategy 

are State, DOD, and USAID. Figure 3 illustrates the five strategic goals of 

the U.S. strategy and identifies which goals each agency is providing 

assistance to support.

Figure 3: U.S. Goals for Yemen and Agencies Providing Assistance in Support

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, State, USAID, and DOD allocated 

more than $1 billion in assistance for Yemen. USAID and State have 

provided civilian assistance focused on addressing Yemen’s 

humanitarian, economic, and political needs, while DOD and State have 

provided security assistance focused primarily on building Yemeni 

counterterrorism capacity. Overall, civilian assistance has constituted 

approximately 51 percent ($518 million) of the total $1.01 billion in U.S. 

assistance, with security assistance constituting the remaining 49 percent 

($497 million). As figure 4 shows, overall U.S. assistance funding 

increased annually between fiscal years 2008 and 2010, declined 

significantly in fiscal year 2011 because of Yemen’s political turmoil and 

insecure environment, and then rose again in fiscal year 2012.

U.S. Civilian and Security 

Assistance to Yemen
 

Page 7 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Figure 4: Total Allocations of U.S. Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007–2012

Note: Figures are current as of September 30, 2012. Security assistance totals do not add up to $497 

million because of rounding.

The three U.S. assistance programs in Yemen receiving the largest 

amount of allocated funds over the last 6 fiscal years are USAID’s FFP 

program, which provides emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206 

and 1207(n) programs, which provide Yemeni security forces with training 

and equipment for counterterrorism operations. From fiscal year 2007 

through 2012, USAID allocated $110 million for Yemen through the FFP 

program, while DOD allocated $361 million for its Section 1206 and 

1207(n) programs. Together, these programs account for 46 percent 

($471 million of $1.01 billion) of total U.S. assistance to Yemen over this 

period. See appendix II for further information on U.S. funds allocated to 

these programs.

In addition to the United States, bilateral and multilateral donors have 

provided or pledged billions of dollars in assistance to Yemen. Data from 

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development show that 

between 2007 and 2011, more than 35 bilateral and multilateral donors 

Other Donor Assistance
 

Page 8 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

disbursed about $2.7 billion in official development assistance for Yemen. 

Further, in 2012, donors pledged over $7 billion more in support of 

Yemen’s transition and development. This included a pledge of about 

$3.3 billion from Saudi Arabia, which State officials identified as the single 

largest contributor of aid to Yemen.6

Yemeni officials with whom we met stated that coordination of donor 

contributions is challenging but has improved over time. A senior Yemeni 

official explained that, of the various bilateral and multilateral donors 

providing assistance to Yemen, some coordinate and pool their resources 

with other donors before making contributions, but others do not. To 

address this, the Yemeni government has developed a mechanism to 

align donations with Yemen’s priority needs and minimize overlap. 

Additionally, Yemeni officials stated that the government plans to 

reallocate its own resources to address needs unmet by donor 

contributions.

State officials also noted that Saudi 

Arabia provided Yemen with approximately $2 billion in petroleum 

products earlier in 2012 to help ease fuel shortages caused by attacks on 

key pipelines.

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed, 

according to agency officials, agency documents, and international 

organizations. Specifically, in regard to the strategic goals: (1) the 

government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process; (2) 

although there have been some positive developments to strengthen 

governance, the Yemeni government’s ability to provide basic services is 

limited; (3) the humanitarian situation remains unstable; (4) the economy 

has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces major challenges; and (5) 

the security situation has improved in some respects but remains volatile.

The government transition in Yemen remains an ongoing process. As part 

of the Gulf Cooperation Council–brokered transition agreement signed in 

November 2011, the Yemeni government committed to hold early 

presidential elections within 90 days, convene an inclusive national 

dialogue conference, reform the constitution and electoral system, 

 

6

According to State, Saudi Arabia’s interest in Yemen stems from various factors, 

including the serious threat Saudi Arabia faces from AQAP as well as the two nations’ 

shared border. 

Progress toward U.S. 

Strategic Goals for 

Yemen Has Been 

Mixed 

Political Transition 

Progressing, but More 

Slowly than Intended
 

Page 9 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

reorganize the military, and hold general elections within 2 years of 

inaugurating a new president—which took place in February 2012 with 

the inauguration of Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi has since 

passed several reforms to restructure Yemen’s military and security 

institutions and removed many former regime elements from power. 

However, the national dialogue conference—a key step in the transition 

process—has been delayed from November 2012 to March 2013. This 

delay has affected other important steps in the transition process that are 

contingent upon the conference being held, such as the formation of a 

constitutional committee and the development of a new or revised 

constitution. Table 1 provides examples of U.S. assistance supporting the 

government transition in Yemen.7

Table 1: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Government Transition

Agency Assistance activities 

USAID • Supports civic engagement activities to channel citizen input to the 

appropriate government bodies and into the public policy process.

• Assists citizens with engaging the Yemeni government to obtain greater 

transparency in decision making and quality of service delivery.

• Works with the Yemeni government to increase receptiveness and 

responsiveness to citizen concerns and recommendations. 

State • Works with Yemeni media and civil society organizations to increase the 

capacity to identify, address, and engage the public on social issues 

related to the rights of women and children.

DOD • Meets periodically with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense (MOD) 

reorganization planners to provide support as needed.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID, State, and DOD data.

Although there have been some positive developments, the Yemeni 

government’s ability to provide basic services remains limited. According 

to a 2012 Yemeni government report,8

 

7

According to agency officials, U.S. assistance activities may support more than one 

strategic goal. For example, an activity supporting government transition may also support 

efforts to strengthen governance.

there were acute weaknesses in 

the level of basic services available to Yemenis even prior to the political 

unrest in 2011, with only 42 percent of the population receiving electricity, 

35 percent receiving security and legal services, 26 percent receiving 

8

Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Transitional Program for Stabilization 

and Development, 2012-2014 (Sana’a, Yemen: July 2012). 

Yemeni Government 

Capacity Remains Severely 

Limited
 

Page 10 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

water supplies, and 16 percent receiving sanitation services. The political 

unrest contributed to further reductions in available government services. 

State noted that there continue to be severe strains on the Yemeni 

government’s ability to provide public funds and government services 

throughout the country. For example, a United Nations report stated that 

the health of 1 million people has been compromised due to the 

dysfunctional health system in Yemen—700,000 children under 5 years of 

age and 300,000 pregnant mothers.9

Table 2: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Strengthening Governance

USAID officials in Yemen noted that 

President Hadi has made commitments to respond to citizens’ 

grievances. For example, in January 2013, he established two 

committees to address land disputes and resolve cases of early dismissal 

or retirement of civil, security, and military personnel in the southern 

provinces, where grievances have persisted since the civil war in 1994. 

Table 2 provides examples of U.S. assistance to strengthen governance 

in Yemen.

Agency Assistance activities

USAID • Works with key Yemeni agencies to promote accountability and 

strengthen government financial management.

• Assists the Yemeni government in election management, to include 

advising officials on technical topics regarding security, media, and 

information sharing, and participating in a postelection review process to 

determine future needs.

• Engages Yemeni youth to build youth capacity to create positive change 

through teaching youth life skills and job skills and encouraging 

participation in community service.

State • Provides technical assistance, training, and equipment to Yemen’s civilian 

law enforcement and judicial institutions.

• Supports efforts to enhance policing and justice services that respond to 

citizens’ crime and public safety concerns, particularly in underserved 

regions that combat the influence of AQAP.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.

The humanitarian situation in Yemen remains unstable as a result of 

armed conflict, civil unrest, reduction of basic social services, and rising 

cost of living. State reported in September 2012 that there were over 

550,000 internally displaced persons in Yemen, an increase of nearly 

 

9

United Nations, Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2013. 

Humanitarian Situation 

Remains Unstable
 

Page 11 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

150,000 from the previous year—in part a result of the large number of 

people fleeing areas experiencing an increase in armed conflict, such as 

the towns that AQAP had seized in the south. The number of internally 

displaced persons has since declined to about 430,000 as a result of 

stabilizing conditions in parts of Yemen, but, according to United Nations 

officials we spoke with in Yemen, some of those returning home are 

finding that their property has been damaged and their homes 

demolished or booby-trapped. Additionally, a December 2012 United 

Nations report found that over half the Yemeni population was without 

access to safe water, nearly half the population had limited or no access 

to sufficient food, and child malnutrition had increased almost 80 percent 

in 2 years to nearly 1 million children.10

Table 3: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Humanitarian Relief

Table 3 provides examples of 

U.S. assistance providing humanitarian relief in Yemen.

Agency Assistance activities

USAID • Delivers health services and nutrition needs to vulnerable populations 

through mobile health teams, fixed health facilities, and the distribution of 

food or food vouchers.

• Renovates remote health clinics, provides basic medical equipment, trains 

midwives and doctors in maternal and child health, and supports 

community health education.

• Promotes hygiene and access to safe drinking water.

• Pays for vocational training for rural families and work opportunities, such 

as rehabilitating key infrastructure sites and small-scale food processing 

initiatives.

State • Provides protection services, basic assistance, and education to internally 

displaced persons, conflict victims, and refugees and migrants from the 

Horn of Africa who have fled to Yemen. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.

Yemen’s economy has improved somewhat since 2011 but faces 

continuing challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund, 

economic activity in Yemen fell by 10 percent and inflation rose to 23 

percent in 2011 as a result of the civil unrest, which limited the availability 

of basic commodities, bank financing, and imports. The International 

Monetary Fund subsequently reported in December 2012 that the Yemeni 

economy had improved since 2011 and that the exchange rate had 

 

10United Nations, Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen 2013. 

Yemeni Economy Has

Rebounded since 2011, but 

Major Challenges Remain
 

Page 12 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

returned to levels experienced prior to the 2011 unrest. Additionally, 

according to the World Food Program, the inflation rate had dropped to 

less than 5.5 percent in December 2012. Also, USAID reported that some 

gains have been made in improving educational opportunities, increasing 

school enrollment rates, and decreasing dropout rates, though there is 

still a reported 50 percent adult literacy rate—73 percent for men and 35 

percent for women. Other economic challenges include reduced 

government revenues and disrupted services due to continuing attacks on 

oil pipelines and electricity transmission lines, as well as the anticipated 

depletion of oil reserves—the source of 60 percent of the Yemeni 

government’s revenue—within a decade. Table 4 provides examples of 

U.S. assistance intended to support economic development in Yemen.

Table 4: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Economic Development

Agency Assistance activities

USAID • Funds programs focusing on improving agriculture and increasing 

employment opportunities in highly vulnerable communities and 

especially for youth.

• Provides teaching aid kits to schools, sets up school libraries and 

resource rooms, and improves infrastructure to enhance learning 

environments for Yemeni children.

State and 

USAID 

• Support adult literacy, teacher professional development, and 

education policy reform and improve basic education opportunities.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.

The security situation in Yemen has improved in some respects, but 

remains unstable. Specifically, State, DOD, and Yemeni officials stated 

that the new administration led by President Hadi has been more 

aggressive in countering AQAP than the previous administration. Of 

particular note, in June 2012, a Yemeni military offensive conducted in 

conjunction with tribal militias in southern Yemen removed AQAP from 

regions where it had seized control during the civil unrest in 2011. 

However, DOD officials stated that AQAP continues to conduct attacks 

against the Yemeni government and remains a threat to the United 

States, and according to a senior Yemeni MOD official, AQAP’s decision 

to change tactics from seizing and holding territory to conducting targeted 

assassinations of Yemeni government officials, including in Sana’a, 

constitutes a major security challenge. In addition to AQAP, other 

destabilizing elements are active in Yemen. For example, a senior 

Yemeni MOD official cited the Houthi tribe based in northern Yemen as 

another security challenge. Similarly, in January 2013, the U.S. 

ambassador to Yemen stated that Iran was destabilizing the region by 

Security Situation in 

Yemen Remains Volatile
 

Page 13 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

assisting secessionists in southern Yemen. As of November 2012, State 

described the threat level in Yemen as “extremely high” due to terrorist 

activities and civil unrest. As indicators of the continuing tenuous security 

environment in Yemen, State noted the mob attack on the U.S. embassy 

compound in September 2012, the murders of several U.S. citizens in 

2012, a growing trend in violent crime, and continuing piracy near 

Yemen’s shores. Table 5 provides examples of U.S. assistance 

supporting improvements to security and combating AQAP in Yemen.

Table 5: Agency Examples of Assistance Supporting Improving Security and 

Combating AQAP

Agency Assistance activities

State • Helps Yemen’s Air Force to sustain several aircraft.

• Has provided Yemen’s Coast Guard with fast-response boats.

• Supplements training for Yemen’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces.

State and DOD • Provide training and equipment to fund Yemen’s national military 

and maritime forces to conduct counterterrorism operations; 

support reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in 

Yemen.

• Have provided specialized vehicles, helicopters, computers, 

training, surveillance cameras, spare parts, radios, weapons, 

ammunition, and body armor to the Yemeni government.

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD data.

Although USAID data indicate that the FFP program in Yemen has 

generally exceeded annual performance targets, reporting to Congress 

regarding this program has various weaknesses, and DOD has not yet 

evaluated its Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance programs in Yemen. 

Nearly 50 percent—$471 million of $1.01 billion—of U.S. assistance to 

Yemen since 2007 has been allocated through FFP and Section 1206 

and 1207(n) programs. While USAID data indicate that, between fiscal 

years 2008 and 2011, FFP exceeded annual performance targets three 

times for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food 

donations, reports to Congress about the program have lacked 

timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency.11

 

11Fiscal years cited for FFP refer to the years in which USAID allocated funds. Activities 

conducted using these funding allocations may span more than 1 fiscal year. 

With regard to Section 

1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has cited security concerns in Yemen 

as preventing it from evaluating the programs’ progress in building 

Food for Peace 

Exceeded Targets, but 

Performance Reports 

Have Weaknesses; 

Section 1206 and 

1207(n) Programs 

Lack Evaluation
 

Page 14 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. Consequently, limited information 

exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these 

assistance programs and making future funding decisions.

Data from USAID indicate that FFP—the largest U.S. civilian assistance 

effort in Yemen—has generally exceeded its targets; however, reports to 

Congress regarding FFP’s efforts in Yemen have lacked timeliness, 

accuracy, clarity, and consistency. As noted earlier, USAID allocated 

$110 million through FFP between fiscal years 2007 and 2012—

approximately one-fifth of the $518 million in total civilian assistance to 

Yemen over this period.12 Of this $110 million, USAID allocated 

approximately $90 million (about 81 percent) to support donations of U.S. 

agricultural commodities.13 As shown in figure 5, data from FFP indicate 

that the program exceeded its annual target for the number of 

beneficiaries in Yemen of food donations funded in fiscal years 2008, 

2009, and 2011, while missing its target in fiscal year 2010.14 These data 

also show that the donations of food that FFP funded between fiscal 

years 2008 and 2011 reached a total of about 920,000 beneficiaries in 

Yemen, exceeding the aggregate target of about 887,000.15

 

12USAID did not allocate any funding to FFP for Yemen in fiscal year 2007. 

However, we 

have reported that obtaining accurate food delivery data in some high-risk 

13The remaining $20 million in funding for FFP assistance to Yemen has supported four 

projects that provide Yemenis with vouchers to purchase food and one project that 

focuses on local procurement of basic food items. Because some of these projects were 

funded in fiscal year 2012 and were still ongoing as of March 2013, we do not include 

them in our assessment of FFP’s progress in Yemen.

14To assess the progress FFP made in Yemen in these years, we compared the number 

of actual beneficiaries to the number of planned recipients. Recipients and beneficiaries 

are related but distinct, as we previously reported in GAO, International Food Assistance: 

Improved Targeting Would Help Enable USAID to Reach Vulnerable Groups, GAO-12-862 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2012). USAID officials cautioned that a comparison of actual 

beneficiaries and planned recipients is generally not advisable for FFP efforts. However, 

they noted that, in the case of Yemen, the nature of the FFP programs conducted to date 

is such that the terms can be used interchangeably. USAID officials added that such a 

comparison may not be possible for future FFP assistance to Yemen. See app. I for 

additional information on the methodology for this analysis.

15FFP has established a target of reaching approximately 720,000 beneficiaries in Yemen 

with its fiscal year 2012 funding. This target includes planned beneficiaries of food 

donations as well as voucher projects. As noted earlier, some of these projects are still 

under way; consequently, complete data on the number of actual beneficiaries in Yemen 

of fiscal year 2012 FFP aid are not yet available.

USAID Data Indicate FFP 

Generally Exceeded 

Performance Targets, but 

Reports to Congress on 

FFP’s Efforts Have Several 

Weaknesses
 

Page 15 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

areas can be challenging because of security restrictions and limited 

resources to conduct monitoring.16

Figure 5: Number of Beneficiaries in Yemen of FFP Food Donations Made Using 

Fiscal Years 2008–2011 Funds

The Food for Peace Act mandates an annual report to Congress no later 

than April 1 of each year regarding each food donation activity carried out 

under the globally focused FFP program.17 USAID addresses this 

mandate through the annual International Food Assistance Report, which 

is the primary reporting mechanism for informing Congress of FFP 

progress made in Yemen.18

 

16GAO, World Food Program: Stronger Controls Needed in High-Risk Areas, 

However, these reports lack timeliness, 

GAO-12-790 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2012).

177 U.S.C. 1736a(f). 

18USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture jointly prepare and submit this report.
 

Page 16 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

accuracy, clarity, and consistency. Such weaknesses provide Congress 

with limited information to assist in its oversight of FFP efforts.

• Timeliness. The 2011 International Food Assistance Report, which 

was due to Congress on April 1, 2012, has yet to be delivered to 

Congress, though according to USAID officials they have provided a 

draft to the Department of Agriculture for final review. Additionally, as 

of February 2013, the 2012 report, which is due to Congress on April 

1, 2013, had not yet been drafted.19

• Accuracy. Some International Food Assistance Reports have not 

reported targets accurately. Following our request for data on FFP’s 

performance in Yemen, FFP officials found that the International Food 

Assistance Reports for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 reported incorrect 

targets for Yemen. An FFP official attributed these misreported targets 

to a database error that resulted in the number of planned recipients 

being double-counted.20

• Clarity. The International Food Assistance Report includes various 

types of data that are not clearly defined and could be misinterpreted. 

For instance, the report includes data on recipients without stating that 

these data reflect the number of planned recipients in Yemen for the 

reported year—a target—as opposed to the number of actual 

recipients. Additionally, although they appear directly next to the 

number of planned recipients, figures on metric tons of food delivered 

to Yemen and the associated cost represent actual values, not 

planned values, but are not marked as such.

While FFP provided us with corrected targets 

for use in our analysis of FFP’s progress in Yemen, it has not yet 

reported the corrected figures to Congress. 

• Consistency. The International Food Assistance Report uses 

inconsistent measures for reporting planned and actual results. The 

report uses the number of planned recipients as targets but measures 

actual performance in metric tons and cost. This makes it impossible 

 

19USAID indicated in its comments on a draft of this report that, barring unanticipated 

delays, the 2012 International Food Assistance Report should be submitted to Congress 

by April 1, 2013.

20According to this official, the same database error resulted in misreporting of targets for 

other countries as well.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

to draw an accurate comparison and prevents an evaluation of the 

extent of progress made in achieving the planned results.21

Two DOD programs account for the vast majority of U.S. security 

assistance to Yemen; however, DOD has yet to evaluate their 

effectiveness in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. As noted 

earlier, of the $497 million in total security assistance allocated to Yemen 

between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, DOD allocated over 70 percent 

($361 million) to its Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs. DOD has used 

this funding to provide various types of equipment and training to Yemeni 

security forces. Specifically, through its Section 1206 program, DOD has 

assisted several components of the Yemeni MOD. For example, DOD 

has provided vehicles, communications equipment, and other support to 

the Yemeni Border Security Force to enhance Yemen’s capability to 

detect and detain terrorists along its borders; helicopters, maintenance, 

and surveillance cameras to Yemen’s Air Force to support 

counterterrorism operations; and weapons, ammunition, and boats to 

Yemen’s special operations forces to build their counterterrorism 

capacity. Similarly, DOD’s Section 1207(n) program aims to enhance the 

ability of the Yemeni MOI to conduct counterterrorism activities, providing 

radios, vehicles, training, and, as shown in figure 6, weapons. See 

appendix III for a complete list of Section 1206 and 1207(n) efforts in 

Yemen by fiscal year.

 

21Given that the International Food Assistance Report does not facilitate an assessment of 

FFP’s progress in Yemen, our assessment is based on USAID data that are not reported 

to Congress.

DOD Has Not Evaluated 

Progress of Its Section 

1206 and 1207(n) 

Counterterrorism 

Assistance Programs in 

Yemen
 

Page 18 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Figure 6: Weapons Provided to MOI through DOD’s Section 1207(n) Assistance 

Program

According to federal internal control standards, agencies should have 

control activities in place, such as performance reviews, to ensure that 

government resources are achieving effective results.22 In April 2010, we 

found that DOD had not evaluated the effectiveness of its global Section 

1206 program and recommended that DOD develop a plan to monitor 

and evaluate Section 1206 project outcomes.23

 

22GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

In 2012, in response to 

our recommendation, DOD developed and validated an assessment 

process to determine the effectiveness of its Section 1206 and 1207(n) 

assistance in building partner capacity. This process involves DOD 

sending officials and subject-matter experts from Washington, D.C., or 

the relevant geographic combatant command to the country under 

evaluation. According to DOD, a key element of the assessment process

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).

23GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and 

Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010). 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

is observing and interviewing members of the individual units receiving 

Section 1206 or 1207(n) assistance to determine the extent to which the 

assistance developed their capability. In fiscal year 2012, DOD piloted its 

assessment process in Georgia and the Philippines and conducted 

assessments in Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland.24

DOD recognizes that assessing Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance 

enables the U.S. government to make better decisions about the types of 

projects that bring the greatest return on investment in terms of 

accomplishing counterterrorism missions and achieving the capabilities 

and performance intended through the assistance. However, although 

Yemen has received more Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance than any 

other country, DOD has yet to evaluate these programs to determine their 

effectiveness in developing the counterterrorism capacity of the Yemeni 

security forces receiving assistance. DOD headquarters officials 

attributed this to safety and security concerns, explaining that, given the 

unstable security environment in Yemen, it is not feasible at this time to 

send officials to Yemen to observe or interview members of the individual 

units receiving Section 1206 or 1207(n) assistance. DOD officials stated 

that once the security situation in Yemen improves, they plan to evaluate 

Section 1206 and 1207(n) projects using their newly developed 

assessment process.

U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen face two significant types of 

challenges.25

 

24DOD officials plan to evaluate an additional 11 country programs using this validated 

assessment throughout fiscal year 2013, though not in Yemen, with the intent to 

eventually evaluate all programs in countries receiving Section 1206 assistance.

First, Yemen’s high-threat security environment has 

complicated U.S. efforts to train and assess the capability of Yemeni 

security forces, restricted oversight of civilian assistance projects, and 

endangered Yemeni staff who play a key role in providing assistance. 

Second, because of political divisions within the Yemeni government, key 

recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance 

until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of 

improving Yemen’s security.

25Though we focus on FFP and Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance earlier in this report, 

here we refer to all U.S. assistance efforts. For more detailed information on U.S. 

assistance efforts since 2007, see GAO-12-432R. 

Security Conditions 

and Political Divisions 

in Yemen Challenge 

U.S. Assistance 

Efforts
 

Page 20 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Yemen’s difficult security environment continues to challenge U.S. 

assistance efforts. Our February 2012 report noted that Yemen’s 

deteriorating security situation caused DOD to suspend the majority of its 

security assistance activities in 2011 and restricted the ability of USAID 

program implementers to access remote sections of the country, thereby 

leading USAID to shift its focus to providing civilian assistance in large 

urban areas with a more secure and accessible working environment.26

• Constrained ability to train and assess capability of Yemeni security 

forces. We reported in February 2012 that DOD stopped the training 

component of its assistance in 2011 because it was no longer safe for 

U.S. instructors to be in Yemen.

According to U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners we met 

with during our October 2012 fieldwork in Yemen, insecure conditions 

remain the primary impediment to U.S. assistance activities. U.S. officials 

cited several areas in which this challenge has affected U.S. efforts:

27

 

26

While security-related constraints 

on providing training remain, DOD has taken steps to mitigate the 

effect of the security environment on its training activities by 

conducting training outside of Yemen. For example, DOD arranged for 

Yemeni personnel to receive helicopter training in Texas and plans to 

provide training on a fixed-wing aircraft in Spain in early 2013. DOD 

officials stated, however, that because of the unstable security 

environment, the level of DOD staffing in Yemen remains lower than it 

was prior to the unrest of 2011. As a result, there are currently too few 

DOD personnel present in Yemen to embed with Yemeni security 

forces, thereby limiting DOD’s ability to assess the extent to which 

U.S. security assistance has improved the capability of these forces. 

DOD officials explained that before the unrest of 2011, DOD 

personnel were embedded with the Yemeni units receiving U.S. 

training and equipment, which facilitated their ability to collect realtime information on the units’ capabilities. However, these officials 

stated that no DOD personnel have been embedded with Yemeni 

security forces since 2011. Similarly, as noted earlier, officials based 

in Washington, D.C., who manage DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) 

programs stated that, because of security conditions in Yemen, they 

are currently unable to travel there to assess the extent to which this 

assistance has increased the units’ capacity.

GAO-12-432R. 

27GAO-12-432R. 

Unstable Security 

Situation in Yemen 

Complicates U.S. Efforts to 

Provide and Oversee 

Assistance 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

• Oversight of civilian assistance programs restricted. In March 2011, 

the USAID Inspector General reported that security-related travel 

restrictions in Yemen had severely limited the monitoring and 

oversight of project activities.28 During our October 2012 fieldwork in 

Yemen, USAID officials stated that the security situation continues to 

prevent USAID staff from accessing areas of the country outside of 

the capital to conduct monitoring and evaluation of civilian assistance 

activities. To address this challenge, USAID has employed a 

contractor that hires Yemeni staff to monitor assistance efforts in other 

urban areas that U.S. officials are unable to access. However, as 

noted below, Yemeni nationals are also subject to significant security 

risks, and as the USAID Inspector General reported in March 2011, 

the tribal affiliations of Yemeni staff may make it difficult for them to 

travel to parts of the country controlled by rival tribes.29

• Locally employed Yemeni staff endangered. According to senior 

officials at the U.S. embassy in Sana’a, locally employed Yemeni staff 

members play a critical role in embassy operations—including in U.S. 

assistance activities—and provide extremely valuable “institutional 

memory.” However, these individuals face considerable risks as a 

result of their association with the U.S. government, as demonstrated 

by the October 2012 murder of a Yemeni national who was a longtime 

embassy employee and other instances of intimidation. Locally 

employed staff with whom we met during our October 2012 trip to 

Yemen expressed concerns about their safety, with several 

individuals citing the threats to them and their families as a serious 

disincentive to continuing their employment at the embassy. 

According to USAID, the embassy has since provided training in 

countersurveillance and personal security to several hundred locally 

employed staff. However, the embassy has deemed other steps 

proposed by locally employed staff, including telework and the option 

of working from implementing partners’ offices, to be unsuitable.

 

28USAID Office of Inspector General, Risk Assessment of USAID/Yemen’s Major 

Activities, 6-279-11-001-S (Cairo, Egypt: Mar. 30, 2011).

29USAID Office of Inspector General, Risk Assessment of USAID/Yemen’s Major 

Activities.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

According to DOD, leadership and coordination challenges in Yemeni 

security ministries have led to limited use of some U.S. security 

assistance. DOD officials stated that, until recently, key recipients of U.S. 

equipment and training in Yemen had conducted few counterterrorism 

operations since the outbreak of political hostilities in Yemen in early 

2011. DOD officials attributed this in part to opposition to the Hadi 

administration among some leaders at key Yemeni security ministries. 

Specifically, according to DOD, two counterterrorism units—one each 

within the Yemeni MOD and MOI—have been among the largest 

recipients of U.S. security assistance. However, DOD officials noted that 

MOI’s counterterrorism unit played a limited role in attacking AQAP 

strongholds in southern Yemen, while MOD’s counterterrorism unit did 

not make any contribution to those operations. DOD officials stated that 

this limited involvement was due in part to the nature of the conflict 

against AQAP—an effort to regain control of territory that was more suited 

to a response by conventional military forces. However, they added that 

the MOI and MOD counterterrorism units were under the leadership of the 

former president’s supporters at the time of the operations against AQAP 

and were consequently unwilling to strongly support the new president’s 

counterterrorism initiatives.

Coordination challenges between MOD and MOI have further limited 

MOI’s ability to participate in counterterrorism operations. DOD noted that 

MOI has had difficulty receiving replacement parts, equipment, and 

vehicles from the MOD logistics system, hindering its ability to conduct 

counterterrorism operations outside of the Yemeni capital. For example, 

although the United States has provided MOD with spare parts for 

Humvee vehicles to share with MOI, a senior MOI official stated that MOD 

has not done so, resulting in MOI’s inability to maintain and use its U.S.-

provided Humvees as intended, as shown in figure 7.

Leadership and 

Coordination Challenges in 

Yemeni Security Ministries 

Have Limited Use of Some 

U.S. Security Assistance
 

Page 23 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Figure 7: United States–Provided MOI Vehicle in Need of Spare Parts and 

Maintenance

Similarly, U.S. and Yemeni officials stated that although the United States 

has provided helicopters for both MOD and MOI to use in 

counterterrorism operations, MOD does not give MOI access to the 

helicopters in a timely fashion. Specifically, a senior MOI official stated 

that MOD takes approximately 3 months to respond to MOI requests for 

access to the helicopters, which are based at an MOD facility. The official 

explained that the length of time it takes MOD to approve MOI’s requests 

is not conducive to conducting time-sensitive counterterrorism operations.

According to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government 

have addressed some of these challenges. In December 2012, President 

Hadi announced a number of decrees to, among other things, remove 

several key leaders of Yemeni security forces units—including the heads 

of the MOD and MOI counterterrorism units—from their current positions. 

DOD officials stated that, as of February 2013, a new official had taken 

command of the MOD counterterrorism unit, which had also increased its 

involvement in counterterrorism operations. In addition, the current head 

of the MOI counterterrorism unit had agreed to step down. President 

Hadi’s decrees also called for further reorganization of the Yemeni 

security ministries—specifically, consolidating the MOD and MOI 

counterterrorism units under a newly created Yemeni special operations 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

command under MOD. As of February 2013, this new special operations 

command had been formed, according to DOD, and was overseeing the 

MOD counterterrorism unit, while planning was under way for the MOI 

counterterrorism unit to be absorbed under the new command. DOD 

noted that, as of February 2013, the Yemeni government had yet to 

develop a timeline to complete the consolidation.

AQAP terrorists based in Yemen are a continuing national security threat 

to the United States—a threat exacerbated by Yemen’s fragile economic, 

social, and political situation. In response, U.S. agencies have invested 

more than $1 billion in security and civilian assistance since 2007 in 

support of U.S. strategic goals for Yemen. While some progress has been 

made toward these goals, significant uncertainties remain regarding 

Yemen’s future, underscoring the possibility that Yemen will need further 

U.S. assistance as it navigates a difficult transition process. However, 

USAID’s reporting to Congress regarding FFP—the largest U.S. civilian 

assistance program—has been inaccurate, unclear, and inconsistent. 

Moreover, despite the $361 million investment in Section 1206 and 

1207(n) assistance since 2007, DOD has not yet evaluated the progress 

these programs have made in building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity 

and, because of security conditions, has not established a time frame for 

completing such an evaluation. As a result, decision makers lack the 

information necessary to adequately assess the three largest U.S. 

assistance programs in Yemen. This limited information inhibits decision 

makers’ ability to oversee these programs, assess their contribution to 

U.S. goals, and consider program performance when making future 

funding decisions.

To enable congressional and agency oversight of U.S. assistance 

programs in Yemen, inform future funding decisions, and enhance U.S. 

assistance efforts, we are making the following three recommendations:

First, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID improve reporting 

to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, such as by improving the accuracy, 

clarity, and consistency of data reported.

Second, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 1206 

program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense collect 

and analyze available data regarding the extent to which Section 1206 

assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces, such as 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 25 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or Yemeni government 

officials.

Third, until DOD is able to conduct an assessment of the Section 1207(n) 

program in Yemen, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense collect 

and analyze available data regarding the extent to which Section 1207(n) 

assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces, such as 

information from U.S. personnel posted in Yemen or Yemeni government 

officials.

We provided a draft of this report to State, DOD, USAID, the Departments 

of Homeland Security and Justice, the National Security Staff, the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence 

Agency for their review and comment. DOD and USAID provided written 

comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes IV and V, respectively. 

DOD, USAID, State, and the National Security Staff also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency did not 

provide comments.

DOD concurred with our recommendations to collect and analyze 

available data on the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n) 

assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces. DOD also 

noted its intent to develop baseline assessments to accompany its 

Section 1206 project proposals for fiscal year 2014. 

USAID concurred with our recommendation to improve reporting to 

Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, noting that it has already taken 

several steps to address the timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency 

of the International Food Assistance Report. USAID added that it expects 

the International Food Assistance Report to remain limited in its 

usefulness for gauging progress in any specific country, stating that such 

country-specific issues will be addressed through periodic briefings and 

other updates to Congress. We maintain that any information USAID 

conveys to Congress on FFP efforts in Yemen, whether through the 

International Food Assistance Report or other means, should be timely, 

accurate, clear, and consistent.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 26 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, State, DOD, USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security 

and Justice, the National Security Staff, the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix VI.

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director, International Affairs & Trade
 

Page 27 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Robert Menendez

Chairman

The Honorable Bob Corker

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Ed Royce

Chairman

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

To determine the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for 

Yemen, we reviewed relevant documents from the Departments of State 

(State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID), including strategy and planning documents, fact 

sheets, and progress reporting. Additionally, we examined the Gulf 

Cooperation Council–negotiated transition agreement for Yemen, as well 

as relevant documents from U.S. implementing partners, the United 

Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 

Yemeni government. We did not consider any covert programs that the 

United States may fund in Yemen.

To assess the extent of progress made by USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP) 

program and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, we 

analyzed funding data on all U.S. assistance activities in Yemen to 

determine allocations for these civilian and security assistance programs 

in Yemen since fiscal year 2007.1 To assess FFP’s progress in Yemen, 

we compared USAID data on the number of actual beneficiaries to the 

number of planned recipients as identified in annual reports jointly 

submitted to Congress by USAID and the Department of Agriculture 

regarding U.S. food assistance. Recipients and beneficiaries are related 

but distinct; specifically, recipients are individuals who receive food 

assistance rations, while beneficiaries are individuals who benefit from 

food assistance rations. For example, in a food-for-work program, only 

one person—the recipient—actually receives targeted food assistance, 

but other members of the recipient’s family or community may benefit 

from that individual’s participation in the program, making them all 

beneficiaries. Given the distinct meanings of the two terms, USAID 

cautioned that a comparison of actual beneficiaries and planned 

recipients is generally not advisable for FFP efforts. However, USAID 

noted that the nature of the FFP programs conducted in Yemen to date is 

such that the terms can be used interchangeably.2

 

1

Although agencies allocated less funding for Yemen from the FFP account between fiscal 

years 2007 and 2012 than from the Economic Support Fund account, we selected FFP as 

the largest U.S. civilian assistance program in Yemen because its efforts in Yemen 

constitute a single program. By contrast, assistance from the Economic Support Fund has 

supported multiple programs—none of which has received as much funding as FFP.

To assess the extent 

of progress made by the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, 

2

USAID added, though, that this may not be true for future FFP assistance to Yemen if the 

nature of the programs conducted changes.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

we reviewed DOD documents relevant to its new process for assessing 

Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance and prior GAO reporting.

To identify the key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen, we 

reviewed relevant documents from State, DOD, and USAID, including 

strategy and planning documents, fact sheets, cables, and progress 

reporting. We also examined several reports by the USAID Inspector 

General, including audits and a risk assessment of USAID activities in 

Yemen, as well as prior GAO reporting.

Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, DOD, USAID, 

National Security Staff, and intelligence community officials in the 

Washington, D.C., area. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of U.S. 

assistance efforts in Yemen, we also conducted fieldwork in Sana’a, 

Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with State, DOD, and 

USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and representatives of the 

Yemeni Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning and International 

Cooperation.

To update data on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated 

obligations, and disbursements for the FFP and Section 1206 and 

1207(n) programs as reported in appendix II, we collected and analyzed 

relevant funding data from State and DOD. Differences between FFP 

funding totals shown in figure 8 of this report and the FFP funding 

information presented in our February 2012 report3

• Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for 

fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates.

are due to the 

following factors:

• Totals in this report include funds from the International Disaster 

Account that were programmed by FFP in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.

Differences between Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding totals shown in 

figure 9 of this report and the Section 1206 funding information in our 

February 2012 report are due to the following factors:

 

3

GAO, Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a 

Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen, GAO-12-432R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2012).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

• Totals in this report are more current and include actual values for 

fiscal year 2012 rather than estimates.

• Our February 2012 report included data current as of September 30, 

2011. Consequently, it did not include data on the Section 1207(n) 

program, which was not established until the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 was enacted on December 31, 

2011.

• DOD considers Section 1206 funding to be disbursed once it awards 

a contract. If the final cost of the contract at the time of completion is 

different than the expected cost of the contract at the time of award, 

the amount of funding that DOD considers disbursed changes 

accordingly. 

To determine the reliability of the data we collected on the amount of U.S. 

assistance to Yemen and the number of targeted recipients and actual 

beneficiaries of FFP assistance in Yemen, we compared and 

corroborated information from multiple sources; checked the data for 

reasonableness and completeness; and interviewed cognizant officials 

regarding the processes they use to collect and track the data. We did not 

audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on them. On the 

basis of checks we performed and our discussions with agency officials, 

we determined that the data we collected on the amount of U.S. 

assistance to Yemen and the actual number of beneficiaries in Yemen of 

FFP assistance were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

engagement. With regard to the number of targeted recipients of FFP 

assistance in Yemen, we note in this report that annual reporting to 

Congress regarding FFP for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 did not 

accurately communicate FFP’s targets for Yemen. Consequently, we 

collected corrected data on FFP’s targets for Yemen to use in our 

assessment of the program’s progress. We determined these corrected 

data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to March 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace 

(FFP) and Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 

Assistance Programs to Yemen

Page 31 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

From fiscal year 2007 through 2012, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) allocated $110 million for Yemen through its FFP 

program. Figure 8 shows the increase in annual FFP funding to Yemen 

over this period.

Figure 8: FFP Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007–2012

Note: Totals for fiscal years 2011 and 2012 include funds from the International Disaster Assistance 

account that were disbursed through the FFP program. Figures in table may not sum correctly 

because of rounding.

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

allocated $361 million for Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance to Yemen. 

As shown in figure 9, funding for these programs has fluctuated over the 

years.1

 

1

Allocation amounts in figure 9 do not add up to $361 million because of rounding.

For example, no Section 1206 allocation was made in fiscal year 

2011 because of the political unrest that began in Yemen early that year. 

In contrast, the Section 1206 allocation for fiscal year 2010 and the 

Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace 

(FFP) and Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 

Assistance Programs to Yemen
Appendix II: U.S. Funding for Food for Peace 

(FFP) and Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 

Assistance Programs to Yemen

Page 32 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

combined allocation of Section 1206 and 1207(n) assistance in fiscal year 

2012 each exceeded $100 million.

Figure 9: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Assistance to Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007–2012

Notes: 

The amount of funding DOD allocates for Yemen-specific projects represents the estimated cost of 

the projects as notified to Congress. The disbursement amount represents the value of the contracts 

that support these projects, and may differ from the amount allocated. Funds that are allocated but 

not disbursed remain available for other authorized uses until the end of the fiscal year. In the case of 

Yemen, the amount of funding that was allocated but not disbursed was $1 million for fiscal year 

2007; $1 million for fiscal year 2009; $13 million for fiscal year 2010; and $3 million for fiscal year 

2012.

As contracts conclude, disbursement amounts are revised to reflect the final contract costs. As a 

result, the disbursement figures for fiscal years 2007, 2009, and 2010 above differ from those that we 

reported in February 2012.
Appendix III: Training and Equipment Provided 

to Yemen through Section 1206 and Section 

1207(n) Assistance Programs

Page 33 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Between fiscal years 2007 and 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) 

allocated $361 million in counterterrorism training and equipment to 

Yemeni security forces through its Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 

security assistance programs. Table 6 below identifies the efforts that 

DOD undertook using Section 1206 and 1207(n) funding as well as the 

specific capabilities DOD planned to build through these efforts.

Table 6: Section 1206 and 1207(n) Efforts in Yemen, Fiscal Years 2007–2012

Dollars in millions

Description Value of defense articles and training 

Section 1206 Efforts

Fiscal year 2007

Counterterrorism Units and Mobile Training Teams: This effort was intended to 

enhance Yemen’s border security capability. It included equipment such as cargo 

transport vehicles, infantry light armored vehicles, light tactical wheeled vehicles, 

spare parts, crisis action center equipment, and transportation. 

$26.0

Fiscal year 2009

Aerial Surveillance Counterterrorism Initiative: This effort was designed to build 

the capacity of the Yemeni Air Force to conduct counterterrorism operations by 

providing aerial surveillance capability for internal stability and combating terrorism 

within and at its borders. It included helicopter spares and surveillance cameras.

5.9

Counterterrorism Initiative for Increased Border Security: This effort was 

designed to provide the Yemeni Border Security Force with the capability to deter, 

detect, and detain terrorists along Yemen’s land borders. It included trucks, radio 

systems, and operations/maintenance training.

25.4

Coast Guard Patrol Maritime Security Counterterrorism Initiative: This effort was 

intended to enhance Yemeni Coast Guard capability to provide internal stability and 

counterterrorism within Yemen’s territorial waters. It was intended to help build the 

capacity of Yemen’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations 

by providing equipment and training to the Yemeni Coast Guard to improve its ability 

to identify, detain, and apprehend terrorists, and to respond to terrorist incidents 

within its area of responsibility. 

30.1

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Counterterrorism Initiative: This effort is intended 

to assist Yemen’s Ministry of Defense in improving its improvised explosive device 

ordnance mitigation and response to counter resurgence in terrorist activity. Some 

training or deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort.

5.8

Fiscal year 2010

Special Operations Force Counterterrorism Enhancement Package: This effort is 

designed to improve tactical effectiveness of the Yemeni Special Operations Force 

(YSOF). It is intended to build the capacity of Yemen’s national military forces to 

conduct counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training to enhance 

the YSOF’s mobility, situational awareness, survivability, communications, and 

tactical proficiency in support of YSOF’s counterterrorism mission. It includes 

vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and night vision goggles. Some training or deliveries, 

or both, are still pending for this effort.

34.5

Appendix III: Training and Equipment 

Provided to Yemen through Section 1206 and 

Section 1207(n) Assistance Programs
Appendix III: Training and Equipment Provided 

to Yemen through Section 1206 and Section 

1207(n) Assistance Programs

Page 34 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Dollars in millions

Description Value of defense articles and training 

Rotary-Wing Medium Lift: This effort is intended to help build the capacity of 

Yemen’s national military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations by providing 

equipment and training to increase Yemen’s rotary-wing medium-lift capability. It is 

intended to allow the Yemeni Air Force to transport small units at high altitude to 

participate in day- or night-time operations. It includes Huey II helicopters (4), spare 

parts, maintenance, and training. 

82.8

Fixed-Wing Tactical Heavy Lift: This effort is intended to provide equipment and 

training to improve the operational reach and reaction time of counterterrorism forces. 

It includes a CASA CN-235 aircraft for 51 troops, parts, tools, and maintenance. 

Some training or deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort.

38.0

Fiscal year 2012

Special Operations Forces Counterterrorism Enhancement: This effort is 

intended to help build the capacity of YSOF to conduct counterterrorism operations 

by providing equipment and training. It includes small arms and accessories, 

ammunition, radios, night vision goggles, global positioning systems, rigid hull 

inflatable boats, combat rubber raiding craft, organizational clothing, and individual 

soldier equipment. Some training or deliveries, or both, are still pending for this effort.

14.0

Fixed-Wing Capability: This effort is intended to help build the capacity of Yemen’s 

national military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations by providing 

equipment and training to improve the operational reach and reaction time of 

Yemen’s counterterrorism forces. It includes two short takeoff and landing aircraft, 

support, and training for CASA CN-235 aircraft. Some training or deliveries, or both, 

are still pending for this effort.

23.4

Section 1207(n) Efforts

Fiscal year 2012

Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Enhancement: This effort is intended to help 

enhance the ability of Yemen’s Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to 

conduct counterterrorism operations by providing equipment, minor military 

construction, and training. Through the provision of this assistance, it is intended that 

the government of Yemen will be able to grow and enhance its primary 

counterterrorism force and base elements of that force outside of Sana’a and closer 

to critical areas of operation. It includes night vision goggles, radios, vehicles, 

weapons and ammunition, RAVEN tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, minor military 

construction, and operational training. Some training or deliveries, or both, are still 

pending for this effort.

75.0

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The Section 1207(n) program was not established until fiscal year 2012.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Note: GAO received 

comments from the 

Department of Defense 

on March 8, 2013. GAO 

comments supplementing 

those in the report text 

appear at the end of this 

appendix. Page numbers 

in draft report may differ 

from those in this report.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

See comment 1.
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen
Appendix IV: Comments from 

the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated March 8, 2013.

1. We modified our report to remove all references to the Global Security 

Contingency Fund.

2. We modified our report to clarify that the discussion of key challenges 

to U.S. assistance efforts is not specific to Section 1206 or Section 

1207(n) assistance but instead applies to all U.S. assistance efforts.

GAO Comments
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 39 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Note: GAO received 

comments from the U.S. 

Agency for International 

Development on March 

13, 2013.
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 40 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development

Page 41 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 42 GAO-13-310 U.S. Assistance to Yemen

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director), 

Aniruddha Dasgupta, Brandon Hunt, Kendal Robinson, Karen Deans, 

Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Justin Fisher, Bruce Kutnick, Marie Mak, 

Mary Moutsos, and Jeremy Sebest made key contributions to this report.

Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance.

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320921)
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